UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

**********************************************************
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF      *
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT 1420,      *	Docket Number
McDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-82, N215AA            *    SA-519
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, JUNE 1, 1999        *
**********************************************************

Arkansas Excelsior Hotel
Bill Clinton Ballroom
Three Statehouse Plaza
Little Rock, Arkansas  72201

Wednesday, January 26, 2000
9:00 a.m.

Board of Inquiry

		HONORABLE JIM HALL, Chairman
		Board of Inquiry

		THOMAS HAUETER, Deputy Director
		Office of Aviation Safety

		JOHN CLARK, Deputy Director
		Office of Research and Engineering

		BARRY SWEEDLER, Director
		Office of Safety Recommendations and
		Accomplishments

		BEN BERMAN, Hearing Officer
		Office of Aviation Safety


Technical Panel

		GREGORY SALOTTOLO
		GREGORY FEITH
		EVAN BYRNE
		MARK GEORGE
		CHARLES PEREIRA
		LAWRENCE ROMAN
		DAVID TEW
		DONALD EICK


Public Information Officer

		PAUL SCHLAMM
		Office of Public Affairs
		Washington, D.C.

Parties to the Hearing

		LYLE STREETER, Air Safety Investigator
		Accident Investigation Division, AAI-100
		Federal Aviation Administration

		RONALD J. HINDERBERGER, Director
		Airplane Safety
		Boeing Commercial Airplane Group

		ROBERT W. BAKER, Vice Chairman
		American Airlines, Inc.

		CAPTAIN CHRIS D. ZWINGLE
		Special Assistant to Chairman
		National Safety and Training Committee
		Allied Pilots Association

		KATHY LORD-JONES
		National Safety Coordinator
		Association of Professional Flight Attendants

		ROBERT KUESSNER
		National Weather Service

		DEBORAH H. SCHWARTZ, A.A.E.
		Airport Manager
		Little Rock National Airport

		J.T. CANTRELL, Training Chief
		Little Rock Fire Department

I N D E X

WITNESS:								

Operations

Michael H. Origel 						  	
First Officer on Flight 1420
	Interview by Dave Tew

Afternoon Session

William Trott								 
Flight Dispatcher for American Airlines
	Interview by Donald Eick

Captain Eric Lewis							 
MD-80 Fleet Manager for American Airlines
	Interview by Dave Tew

Dexter Taylor							 
AAL MD-80 Airplane Program Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
	Interview by Dave Tew

Corky Valentine							
FAA Principal Operations Inspector for
American Airlines
	Interview by Dave Tew



P R O C E E D I N G S
									9:30 a.m.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will convene this public hearing of 
the National Transportation Safety Board.  It's being held in 
connection with the Investigation of Aircraft Accident Involving 
American Airlines Flight 1420, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, 
Registration N215AA.  The accident occurred in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, on June 1st, 1999.
		Good morning and welcome.  I am Jim Hall, Chairman of 
the National Transportation Safety Board and Chairman of this Board 
of Inquiry.
		Today, we are opening a public hearing concerning the 
accident that occurred on June 1st, 1999, at Little Rock, Arkansas, 
involving American Airlines Flight 1420.
		This hearing is being held for the purpose of 
supplementing the facts, conditions and circumstances discovered 
during the on-scene investigation.  This process will assist the Safety 
Board in determining the probable cause of the accident and in 
making recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future.
		Public hearings, such as this one, are exercises in 
accountability, accountability on the part of the Safety Board, that it 
is conducting thorough and fair investigations, accountability on the 
part of the Federal Aviation Administration, that it is adequately 
regulating the industry, accountability on the part of the airline, that 
it is operating safely, accountability on the part of manufacturers as 
to the design and performance of their products, and accountability 
on the part of the workforce, pilots and machinists and flight 
attendants, that they are performing up to the standards of 
professionalism expected of them.
		These proceedings tend to become highly technical 
affairs, but they are essential in seeking to reassure the public that 
everything is being done to ensure the safety of the airline industry 
and the safety of flight.
		This inquiry is not being held to determine the rights or 
liability of private parties, and matters dealing with such rights or 
liability will be excluded from these proceedings.
		The Safety Board has collected a substantial amount of 
information over the past seven months, and during the course of 
this hearing, we will collect additional information that will assist the 
Board in its examination of safety issues arising from this accident.
		Specifically, we will concentrate on the following issues:  
flight crew decision-making, availability and dissemination of weather 
data, aircraft performance, passenger safety and emergency 
response, runway overrun protection, American Airlines' operational 
practices and procedures, and American Airlines' internal and FAA 
oversight.
		Let me emphasize that these issues are important and 
have serious implications for the safety of air travel.  Eleven lives 
were lost in this accident, and a 134 passengers and crew members 
survived, their lives forever impacted by this tragedy.
		The Safety Board has had the unfortunate task of 
investigating several of the world's fatal commercial aviation 
accidents where fatigue was an issue.  In two such accidents, an 
American International Airways DC-8, on August 18th, 1993, in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and, most recently, the Korean Air Boeing 
747-300 in Guam, fatigue was determined to have been a significant 
factor in the cause of the accident.
		Fatigue and its effects on flight crew performance has 
been and continue to be a growing concern for the aviation 
community worldwide.  
		Although the Safety Board has expressed -- has 
addressed the issue of flight crew duty time regulations in previous 
accident investigations, we must also look beyond the scheduling 
issues of our pilots and also consider the issue of fatigue as it relates 
to duty time of flight attendants as well, and, so, while we continue 
to investigate the specific causes of the American Airlines Flight 
1420 tragedy, it is my intention in this hearing to look at the larger 
picture and explore more precisely the dimensions of the fatigue 
problem, possible anomalies with the low-level wind shear alert 
system, various efforts underway to correct these issues, other 
important safety items, and what is being done to prevent future 
occurrences.
		The Safety Board has investigated several accidents 
involving American Airlines in recent years.  During this hearing, I 
intend to thoroughly explore the possibility of systematic problems 
within the airline, the efforts American has made to examine its own 
systems and procedures, and, perhaps most important, what the 
airline is doing about its problems.
		Further, the other issues that will be discussed in this 
hearing all have been identified at one time or another as significant 
factors in aviation incidents or accidents.
		Thus, because these issues continue to be identified, it 
is apparent that the actions that have been taken to eliminate or 
reduce or prevent the recurrence have not been as successful as we 
had hoped.
		Every accident also can teach us something new about 
these pre-existing safety concerns.  If we can learn more about safety 
issues, if we can draw attention to the serious problems that for 
whatever reason are lingering in the aviation industry, and if we can 
get someone to take action, then this hearing will have been 
worthwhile.
		Now, at this point, let me welcome the news media, but 
let me explain to the news media that this hearing is a professional 
hearing, and interviews with individuals need to take place outside 
this board room.  		So, I'd like to be sure that our press officers 
are sure that this is not used as a set, that the proceedings -- this 
room is for the hearings and proceedings.  Any interviews that need 
to be conducted need to be moved outside, but we very much 
appreciate your attendance.
		Thank you.
		At this point, I would like to introduce the other 
members of the Board of Inquiry.  To my -- joining us, to my left at 
this time, is Mr. Greg Feith, who is our Investigator-in-Charge.  
		Mr. Feith is occupying a seat on the Board of Inquiry 
and replacing Mr. Thomas Haueter, who is the Deputy Director of the 
Office of Aviation Safety.  We hope Mr. Haueter will be able to join us 
later today, and when he does, he will be seated to my left.
		To my right is Mr. John Clark, who is the Deputy 
Director of the Office of Research and Engineering.  To his right is 
Mr. Barry Sweedler, the Director of the Office of Safety 
Recommendations and Accomplishments. 
		The other member of the Board of Inquiry to my far left 
is Mr. Ben Berman, the Chief of the Major Investigation Division, the 
Office of Aviation Safety, who also serves as the hearing officer for 
these proceedings.
		The Board of Inquiry will be assisted by a technical 
panel, consisting of Mr. Greg Feith, who is the Investigator-in-Charge, 
Mr. David Tew, who is the Operational Factors Investigator, Mr. Don 
Eick, the Meteorology Investigator, Mr. Evan Byrne, the Human 
Performance Investigator, Mr. Charlie Pereira, the Aircraft 
Performance Investigator, Mr. Larry Roman, the Airport Crash-Fire-
Rescue Investigators, and Mr. Mark George, the Survival Factors 
Investigator.
		All of those individuals are still not here, but the 
individuals that are important to this morning's panel are in place, 
and I'm hoping the others will be joining us from Washington this 
afternoon.
		In addition, I'd like to acknowledge the presence of 
Board Members John Hammerschmidt, John Golia, and George 
Black, who are present for these proceedings, and the former 
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, who is from 
Arkansas, Jim Burnette.
		Mr. Pat Caraseo and Mr. Paul Schlamm from the Safety 
Board's Public Affairs Office are here to assist members of the news 
media.  I've only got about half of my news media operation here in 
place.  The media does a good job, but if you have any problems with 
the media, let me or let them know.  They're here to -- to report on 
these proceedings, and I expect them, as we expect all of our 
observers, to do so in a responsible fashion.
		In addition, we have the Mayor of Little Rock that is with 
us this morning, Mayor Daley, and Donna Madison representing 
Senator Lincoln, and Barrett Allman, representing Congressman 
Snyder.
		My principal assistant, Deb Smith, is on her way from 
Washington.  Behind me is Jamie Perecola, who is my traveling 
assistant, who will be assisting me in her absence until -- in Deb 
Smith's absence.  Excuse me.
		Lee Jones here is here from our Office of Government 
Affairs.  Sharon Bryson, Eric Grossauf and Brian Fifick, about half of 
them are here from our Office of Family Affairs, are here to assist the 
families.  I hope to have a full complement later today.
		Carolyn Dargan and Candy Bing who are over to my left 
are the individuals who have been responsible for setting up all these 
proceedings.  We had a hearing last week in New Orleans on a 
serious bus accident down there, and I appreciate their efforts in 
getting both of these hearings set up.
		You may certainly contact either of them for assistance 
regarding copies of exhibits or other matters.
		Also observing today's proceedings are representatives 
from independent safety boards representing Canada, Finland, 
Sweden and the Netherlands.
		Let me continue.  Neither I nor any Safety Board 
personnel will attempt during this hearing to analyze the testimony 
received nor will any attempt be made at this time to determine the 
probable cause of this accident.
		Such analyses and cause determinations will be made 
by the full Safety Board after consideration of all the evidence 
gathered during our investigation.
		The final report on the accident involving Flight 1420, 
which will reflect the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause 
determinations, will be considered for adoption by the full Board at a 
public meeting at the Safety Board's headquarters in Washington, 
D.C., to be held at a later date.
		The Safety Board's rules provide for the designation of 
parties to a public hearing.  In accordance with these rules, those 
persons, governmental agencies, companies and associations whose 
participation in the hearing is deemed necessary in the public 
interest and whose special knowledge will contribute to the 
development of pertinent evidence, are designated as parties.
		The parties assisting the Safety Board in this hearing 
have been designated in accordance with these rules.  The parties 
are seated at tables right in front of the dais, and as I call the name 
of the party, I would like to ask the designated spokesperson to 
please give his or her name, title and affiliation for the record, and I 
would appreciate it if you could briefly recognize the other 
individuals that are seated at your table.
		We will begin with the Federal Aviation Administration.
		MR. STREETER:  Mr. Chairman, my name is Lyle 
Streeter.  I am the Manager of the Accident Investigation Division at 
the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Accident Investigation.
		With me here is Mr. Tony James, the FAA's Investigator-
in-Charge for our purposes on this accident, Mr. Mark Baylen from 
our counsel's office, Mr. Corky Valentine, who will be a witness here 
later on and is the Principal Operations Inspector for American 
Airlines, and Mr. Wayne Williams, the Manager of the American 
Airlines Certificate Management Office.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you, and welcome.
		The Boeing Commercial Airplane Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  My 
name is Ron Hinderberger.  I'm the Director of Airplane Safety for 
Boeing, and with me today, I have William Steelhammer, who's our 
Lead Investigator and Party Coordinator for this investigation, 
Captain Tom Melody, our Chief Pilot of Flight Operations, Derrick 
Troy and C.J. Turner, Aerodynamics Engineers, and Mr. Scott 
Seabloom, our outside counsel.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Thank you.
		American Airlines, Incorporated?
		MR. BAKER:  Good morning, Mr. Chairman.  My name is 
Robert W. Baker.  I am Vice Chairman of AMR Corporation and 
American Airlines and the company spokesman.
		Seated to my right is Mr. Bob Kraft from the firm of 
Holland and Knight.  Next to Mr. Kraft, Ms. Krista Hinkley from our 
Risk Management Group.  Next in counter-clockwise fashion around 
the table, Mr. Kurt Lewis, a manager in our Flight Safety 
Organization.  Next, Captain Eric Lewis, the Fleet Manager of the MD-
80 Operations at American Airlines.  Bill Brown is next from the firm 
of Holland and Knight, and Mr. Tommy McFall, our Managing 
Director of Safety.
		Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you, and welcome.
		The Allied Pilots Association?
		CAPTAIN ZWINGLE:  Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and 
Members of the Board.  My name is Captain Chris Zwingle.  I am the 
party spokesman and party coordinator.
		At the table with me, to my right, Captain John 
Vanderventer, Check Airman on the MD-80, First Officer Gary 
Chestnut from the DFDR Group, Captain John Jeffries from the CVR 
Group, First Officer Don Pitts, Chairman of the National Safety 
Committee, and Mr. Ray Duke, counsel.
		Seated also at the APFA table, members of the 
Association, Captain Kevin Elmore from the National Safety 
Committee, First Officer Tim Minor of the Meteorology Committee.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you, and welcome.
		The Association of Professional Flight Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  Good morning, Mr. Chairman, 
Members of the Board.  My name is Kathy Lord-Jones.  I'm the 
National Safety Coordinator for the Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Kathy, if you could still just pull that 
over a little bit?  Thank you very much.
		MS. LORD-JONES:  Seated at the table with me is Mr. 
Lonnie Glover, Qualified Flight Attendant and Member of the Accident 
Investigation Team, Debbie Rowland and Emily Carter.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  Good morning, sir.  My name is Robert 
Kuessner.  I am the spokesman for the National Weather Service.  My 
title is Forensic Services Manager, Office of Meteorology, Weather 
Service Headquarters.
		Sitting with me at the table, starting across from me and 
running clockwise, Mr. Reinhard Dombrowsky, who is Chief, Surface 
Observations Branch.  Next to him is Mr. Judson Ladd, who is 
Program Manager of our Southern Region.  Next to him, Mr. George 
Wilka, who is the Science Operations Officer at the Weather Forecast 
Office at Little Rock, and next to him is Mr. Pat Slattery, who is our 
Public Affairs Officer, Central Region.
		Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you, and welcome.
		The Little Rock National or International Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  National, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Just like Chattanooga.
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  Mr. Chairman, my name is Deborah 
Schwartz.  I'm Airport Manager and spokesperson for Little Rock 
National Airport.
		To my right is Bill Flowers, Deputy Airport Manager at 
Little Rock National Airport, and behind me is Little Rock Municipal 
Airport Commission counsel Mark Stodala.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you, and welcome.
		And the Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  Good morning, Mr. Chairman.  My 
name is J.T. Cantrell.  I'm Training Division Chief for Little Rock Fire 
Department.
		Clockwise from my left, Mr. Bill Mann, one of our city 
attorneys, Mayor James Daley.  On the opposite side of the table, 
Chief W.A. Davis, who was Acting Fire Chief the night of the incident, 
District Chief Larry Tyner, who was the Operations Officer and Site 
Commander at the incident.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you very much.  That 
completes the introductions.
		I want to thank all of the parties, both that participated 
in the on-scene portion of this investigation and those who are 
participating in this hearing, for your assistance and cooperation.  
The parties are an integral part of our investigation, and we 
appreciate very much your participation.
		On January 11th, 2000, the Board of Inquiry held a pre-
hearing conference in Washington, D.C.  It was attended by the 
Safety Board's Technical Panel and representatives of the parties to 
this hearing.
		During the conference, the areas of inquiry and the 
scope of issues to be explored at this hearing were delineated, and 
the selection of the witnesses to testify on those issues was finalized.
		We plan to call 21 witnesses during the course of this 
hearing.  Let me note that some of the parties to the investigation 
recently asked the Board to call the air traffic controller who was on 
duty in the Little Rock Control Tower as a witness.  
		Serious consideration was given to this request.  
However, we were informed that the controller is under medical care, 
and it was his doctor's judgment that he should not testify.  
Therefore, through the end of this hearing, I will entertain written 
suggestions from the parties for questions to be asked of the 
controller.
		Based on these suggestions, the Safety Board's Air 
Traffic Control Group chairman or this Board of Inquiry may conduct 
an additional interview of the controller, if necessary.
		Copies of the witness list developed at the pre-hearing 
conference are available at the Media Table.  There are numerous 
exhibits that will be used in this proceeding.  Copies of the exhibits 
are available at the Media Table for review.
		The Safety Board has provided a complete set of 
exhibits to Kinko's at 1121 South Spring Street, Little Rock, 
Arkansas.  That telephone number is area code 501 372-0775.  
Copies of the exhibits can be obtained on request and at the 
individual's own expense.
		Please see Mrs. Dargan or Mrs. Bing or any member of 
the Board if you need additional information or that address.
		Also, the hearing exhibits may be found on the National 
Transportation Safety Board's Web Page.  That is found at 
www.ntsb.gov.  I repeat www.ntsb.gov.
		The first witness this morning will be the Investigator-in-
Charge of the accident investigation, who will summarize certain 
facts about the accident and the investigative activities that have 
taken place to date.
		The remaining witnesses will be questioned first by the 
Board's Technical Panel, then by the designated spokesperson for 
each party to the hearing, followed by questions from the Board of 
Inquiry.
		As Chairman of the Board of Inquiry, I will be 
responsible for the conduct of this hearing.  I will make all rulings on 
the admissibility of evidence, and all such rulings will be final.
		The record of the investigation, including the transcript 
of the hearing and all exhibits entered into the record, will become 
part of the Safety Board's public docket on this accident and will be 
available for inspection at the Board's Washington office.
		Anyone willing to purchase the transcript, including 
parties to the investigation, should contact the court reporter 
directly.
		In closing, let me say that as I observed in my opening 
statement, this is an important hearing.  I met this morning prior to 
this hearing with the individuals who are here representing -- the 
families representing the victims of this crash and the survivors and 
their families.  They are all observers of these proceedings, and we 
welcome them.
		I would like and respect to them and to this investigation 
that this room, the decorum in this room at all times be appropriate 
to this hearing.  If there are private conversations or other business 
that needs to be tended to, please take that outside this room.  This 
room will be for the purpose of this hearing.
		We have a large audience.  This will be a very long 
hearing.  We intend to be sure, and it may take us into Saturday, but 
we're going to be sure that we hear from all of these witnesses, that 
everyone that has a question has the opportunity from these parties, 
our Technical Panel, the Board of Inquiry, has the appropriate time 
to ask questions.  That may require these proceedings to run late 
some evenings.  
		I will try to get, you know, the feel of the various party 
tables and others in terms of our hours and breaks as we go along, 
but I just want to again stress if at any time on the break, any of you 
all have questions about how the National Transportation Safety 
Board conducts its business or any questions about these 
proceedings, myself and all the Board representatives are paid for by 
your tax dollars, and we will be glad to try to respond to you any 
questions about these proceedings and what is being done because 
the bottom line of this investigation, it's a function by your American 
Government to try to find out the facts of this tragedy, working 
together with the various parties, to take whatever steps are 
necessary to prevent a similar tragedy such as this from occurring 
again.
		Mr. Berman, have all the exhibits been entered in the 
public docket?
		MR. BERMAN:  Yes, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Then, Mr. Berman, please proceed to 
call the first witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Mr. Gregory Feith, Senior Air Safety 
Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board, and please 
proceed, Mr. Feith.
		MR. FEITH:  Good morning.  Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your introductory remarks.
		On June 1, 1999, at 2350 Central Daylight Time, a 
McDonnell Douglas MD-82, operated by American Airlines, 
Incorporated, as American Airlines Flight 1420, a regularly-
scheduled passenger flight from Dallas, Texas, overran the runway, 
Runway 4 Right, and collided with a localizer antenna and approach 
light stanchion at the Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, 
Arkansas.
		The Safety Board was notified of the accident on June 2, 
about 1:15 Eastern Daylight Time.  I was assigned as the 
investigator-in-charge of this accident.
		At 0430, the go team assembled at Ronald Reagan 
National Airport in Washington, D.C., and departed via the Federal 
Aviation Administration's Gulfstream 4 Jet for Little Rock.
		The team arrived on scene at approximately 7:00 that 
morning.  The Board member on duty at the time of the accident was 
George Black, and he accompanied the team to Little Rock.
		The investigative team consisted of various specialists 
from the Safety Board's headquarters.  The specialty areas were:  
Aircraft Operations, Human Performance, Aircraft Structures, Aircraft 
Systems, Power Plants, Survival Factors, Air Traffic Control, 
Meteorology, Airport Search-Fire-Rescue, Aircraft Performance.
		Specialists were also assigned to conduct the read-out 
of the digital flight data recorder and transcribe the cockpit voice 
recorder in the Safety Board's laboratories in Washington, D.C.
		The following organizations were given party status for 
the on-scene portion of the investigation and provided technical 
assistance to the Safety Board:  the FAA, American Airlines, Boeing 
Commercial Aircraft Group, Airplane Group, Pratt and Whitney 
Engines, the Allied Pilots Association, the Association of Professional 
Flight Attendants, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the 
National Weather Service, the Little Rock National Airport, and the 
Little Rock Fire Department.
		For a history of flight.  The accident occurred on the first 
day of a scheduled three-day sequence for this crew.  According to 
company records, the captain reported for the initial segment at 
10:38 Central Time, and the first officer reported at 10:18.
		The flight segments commenced at 11:43 from 
Chicago's O'Hare International Airport and proceeded to Salt Lake 
City International Airport and then on to Dallas-Fort Worth Airport.  
The final flight segment of the day was the flight to Little Rock.  
		Flight 1420 was scheduled to depart DFW at 8:28 p.m.  
However, the airplane that was planned for the flight to Little Rock 
was delayed in-bound to DFW because of adverse weather in the 
area.  
		According to the American Airlines dispatcher of Flight 
1420, using that original airplane, had it been -- that was originally 
scheduled for the flight, would have caused the flight crew to exceed 
the contractual crew duty day limit of 14 hours.
		As a result, the accident airplane, November 215 Alpha 
Alpha, was substituted so that Flight 1420 could be conducted.
		Prior to departure from DFW, the flight crew received 
paperwork for the flight that included weather information advising 
the crew of a line of thunderstorms along the planned route of flight.
		At 2240, and these are in 24-hour clock times which 
would be 10:40, Flight 1420 departed DFW after two hours and 12 
minutes of delay.  About 14 minutes after departure, the dispatcher 
sent an ACARS message to the flight crew advising them of both the 
in-route weather and the weather in the Little Rock area.
		The dispatcher's message indicated that the 
deteriorating weather conditions may be a factor during the arrival at 
Little Rock, and that "I suggest expediting your arrival in order to 
beat the thunderstorms to Little Rock, if possible".  The flight crew 
acknowledged receipt of the message.  
		At 2334:09, the CVR recorded the controller informing 
the crew of Flight 1420, "We have a thunderstorm just northwest of 
the airport moving through the area now ... wind is two eight zero at 
two eight gusts four four ..."  The first officer responded, "Yeah.  We 
can see the lightening ..."
		At 2334:41, the controller notified the crew to expect an 
instrument landing systems approach to Runway 2-2 Left, and four 
minutes later, the controller issued a clearance to descend to an 
altitude of 3,000 feet and asked the crew, "How is the final for 2-2 
left looking?"  
		The first officer responded, "Okay.  We can see the 
airport from here ... we can barely make it out, but we should be able 
to make 2-2 ... that storm is moving this way like your radar says it is 
-- but a little farther off than you thought."
		At 2339:44, the controller notified the flight crew of a 
wind shear alert at the airport and stated, "The center field wind is 
three four zero at one zero, the north boundary wind is three three 
zero at two five, the northwest boundary wind is zero one zero at one 
five."  	
		Shortly after receiving this information, the first officer 
asked to land on Runway 4, and the controller provided a vector for 
that runway.
		Between 2341:56 and 2342:25, the flight crew 
attempted to visually identify the airport.  At 2342:26, the controller 
transmitted to the crew, "... it appears we have a second part of this 
storm moving through, the winds now three four zero at one six, 
gusts three four."  The first officer acknowledged this transmission.
		At 2342:39, the CVR recorded the first officer asking the 
captain, "You wanna accept a short approach ... want to keep it 
tight?"  The captain responded, "Yeah.  If you see the runway ... 
'cause I don't quite see it."  
		Shortly thereafter, the CVR recorded the crew continuing 
to discuss the location of the airport, and at 2344:19, the captain 
said, "... see we're losing it, I don't think we can maintain visual."
		At 2344:33, the first officer told the controller, "... 
there's a cloud between us and the airport ... we just lost the field ..."  
The controller responded and provided vectors to the ILS approach 
course.
		At 2346:39, the controller notified the crew of Flight 
1420 that they were "... three miles from the outer marker ... cleared 
for the ILS Runway 4 approach right."  The first officer acknowledged 
that clearance.
		Approximately 13 seconds later, the controller reported 
that there was heavy rain falling on the airport, the visibility was less 
than one mile, and the runway visual range or RVR for Runway 4 
Right was 3,000 feet.  The first officer acknowledged that 
transmission.
		At 2347:08, the controller cleared Flight 1420 to land 
and reported the wind as "three five zero at three zero with gusts to 
four five."  This was followed less than a minute later with a second 
wind shear alert from the controller reporting the winds as "... center 
field wind three five zero at three two, gusts four five, the north 
boundary wind three one zero at two niner, and northeast boundary 
wind at three two zero at three two."
		At 2348:12, the controller reported the Runway 4 Right 
RVR was 1,600 feet.  The first officer acknowledged this 
transmission.  This was the last communication between the 
controller and Flight 1420.
		The captain continued the approach to Runway 4 Right, 
and at 2349:57, the CVR recorded an unidentified crew member 
saying, "we're off course".  Four seconds later, the first officer said, 
"we're way off."  This was followed one second later by the captain 
who said, "I can't see it", followed at 2350:06 by the captain saying, 
"Yeah.  I got it."
		At 2350:21, the CVR recorded the sound of the airplane 
touching down on the runway followed by the first officer saying, 
"we're down."  Two seconds later, the first officer said, "we're sliding".
		The first recorded sound of the airplane striking the 
localizer antenna occurred about 22 seconds after the aircraft 
landed.
		Mr. Chairman, I would like to show a video animation 
that depicts the motions of the flight of 1420 during the last minute 
of flight.  The airplane motion is based on the data from the DVDR 
and has select CVR comments annotated in the upper left-hand 
corner.
		So, I would defer to you, if you would like to announce 
this video, please.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We're going to show an animation 
that will simulate the final seconds of this flight.  If there are any 
family members or victims or survivors of this event that would 
prefer not to observe this, I would take a moment for them to exit the 
room.
		(Pause)
		MR. FEITH:  What you are going to see in this video is 
the last minute of flight as the airplane is approaching Runway 4 
Right.  There is a lot of text in the CVR transcript which is not in this 
video because of the clutter that it would cause, but there are select 
comments.
		I will talk through this video, just pointing out some of 
the highlights.  This video has been used by the investigators as a 
tool for the purpose of accident investigation but should give you 
some sense of what the airplane motion was during its last minute of 
flight.
		So, if you could please roll that tape.
		(Video shown)
		MR. FEITH:  And so that there is no mis-understanding, 
this video does not show any weather, given the fact that it was night 
conditions.  So, the animation does not represent any of the 
environmental conditions that occurred.  Its sole purpose is to show 
the motion of the airplane.
		We have various control positions.  You see the control 
wheel moving.  We also have the spoiler position.  We have thrust 
reverser position as well as engine pressure ratio or EPR, and we also 
have rudder position.
		What this is demonstrating is that the airplane as it 
approached, touched down, and when the aircraft touched down, it 
had 5,200 feet of a 7,200-foot runway remaining.  The aircraft 
touched down right of the center line with a significant right drift.  
There was an over-correct to the left, and as the correction took 
place, the airplane then exited the left side of the runway.
		From the flight data recorder, we understand that there 
was no braking action until 11 seconds after touch down when there 
was approximately 3,000 feet of runway remaining.
		We also note that the ground spoilers that typically 
deploy at touch down did not in this case deploy.
		Thank you.
		The following are a brief synoptic of some of the facts 
revealed thus far.  The captain was a graduate of the Air Force 
Academy and Michigan State University.  He served seven years as a 
member of the United States Air Force.  He was hired with American 
Airlines in July 1979, but after one year was furloughed for three and 
a half years.  After recall by American Airlines, he flew all three 
positions in a Boeing 727 and later became a captain on and a check 
airman on the MD-80 aircraft.
		According to American Airlines' employment records, he 
had accumulated over 10,000 hours as a pilot-in-command and over 
5,500 hours as pilot-in-command on the MD-80 aircraft.  The captain 
was promoted to the position of chief pilot in the Chicago base on 
January 1st, 1999.  		
		The first officer, who will be testifying in these hearings 
today, was a graduate of the University of Southern California and 
entered the United States Navy in 1988.  In 1991, he was released 
from the Navy due to a reduction-in-force and flew corporate aircraft.
		In addition to his flying duties, he had been the chief 
pilot for one company and the Director of Operations for a charter 
service.
		The first officer was hired by American Airlines January 
4th, 1999.  According to American Airlines' employment records, he 
had accumulated 4,292 hours of total flight time, of which, over 
2,800 hours of that time was as pilot-in-command.
		Since his employment with American, the first officer 
had accumulated a 182 hours in the MD-80 aircraft, of which, 65 
were in the last 30 days prior to the accident.
		The weather conditions at the airport shortly  before the 
accident were reported as the wind being from 180 degrees at nine 
knots with a visibility of seven miles, thunderstorms, few clouds at 
7,000 feet in cumulonimbus clouds.  The ceiling was broken at 
10,000 feet.  Temperature was 77 degrees Fahrenheit.  Dew point 
was 73.
		There was an AWOS, which is an Automatic Weather 
Observation System, report that there was a thunderstorm that 
began at 23 minutes after the hour.  There was frequent lightening in 
clouds and cloud-to-cloud located from the west through the 
northwest.  Thunderstorms west through northwest, moving 
northeast.
		Examination by our Meteorological Group chairman and 
his group members revealed that from the weather data, the Doppler 
radar images and surveillance video that we received from the 
airport, as well as witness statements, indicated that there was 
intense rainfall on the airport at the time Flight 1420 landed.
		The intensity of both the rainfall and the gusting wind 
conditions are factors and may have affected the performance of the 
airplane during the landing roll and will be discussed by several 
witnesses during this hearing.
		The Operations Group examined the flight crew 
procedures employed during the accident flight in relation to those 
set forth by American Airlines.  
		In addition to the flight crew's decision -- in addition, the 
flight crew's decision to land in the severe weather conditions, the 
non-deployment of the ground spoilers after touch down, the crew's 
non-use of auto brakes for the landing on a wet runway, and the use 
of a higher-than-recommended engine pressure ratio or EPR during 
reverse thrust operation, which may have affected the direction of 
control of the airplane on the ground, are all being examined and will 
be discussed by various witnesses in this hearing.
		The Safety Board also found in the investigation that the 
post-accident emergency response to the crash site was delayed 
several minutes because the air traffic controller was not 
immediately aware that Flight 1420 had crashed.
		The emergency response was further delayed because 
the fire equipment initially traveled to the approach end of Runway 4 
Right before realizing that the accident site was at the departure 
end.
		Additionally, the Safety Board is concerned about the 
non-frangibility of the approach light stanchions struck by the 
airplane and how this may have contributed to the survivability of the 
occupants.  Several witnesses will testify regarding these issues later 
in this public hearing.
		Some of the post-accident activities that took place.  
When we were finished on scene on June 10th, there was system and 
component testing that had taken place over the past six months.  
Some of these activities, including the component testing, involved 
the analysis of data that we gathered during the on-scene portion of 
the investigation.
		Further, the issues that were cited by the Chairman as 
well as those described briefly in this statement will be addressed by 
witnesses in this hearing that were selected based on their expertise, 
experience and extensive knowledge of the relevant subjects or 
issues.
		The team will use the additional information to either 
clarify factual data that we already have that was previously collected 
during this investigation or pursue additional issue areas, if so 
needed.
		This information will provide the Board a complete 
factual record from which to make its determination of probable 
cause and further recommendations.
		Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to 
take a moment to publicly thank the parties and their team 
representatives for their continued cooperation.  It's been seven 
months of investigative work, and we've, I think, worked well as a 
team.
		I'd also like to thank the City of Little Rock and the 
National Airport staff.  They've been very accommodating for the 
investigative team as well as the local hotel people and actually the 
citizens of Little Rock who accommodated us during our on-scene 
investigation back in June.
		Also, I want to thank the Red Cross and their volunteers 
who supported our activities under very difficult and stressful 
conditions.  We were out on scene for several days, and the weather, 
it was very hot.  So, they provided a lot of relief to the investigative 
staff.
		Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will get the table changed out for 
our first witness, and we'll call the first witness.  Mr. Feith, if you'll 
come back and join us.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Mr. Michael H. Origel, First Officer 
on Flight 1420.
Whereupon,
MICHAEL H. ORIGEL
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Welcome, Mr. Origel.  We appreciate 
your attendance this morning.  I'll turn it over to the Board of Inquiry 
-- I'm sorry -- the Technical Panel.
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:  
	Q	Mr. Origel, would you please state your full name and 
business address?
	A	Michael Origel, and I'm based currently in Dallas Flight 
Academy, Dallas, DFW Airport at the American Airlines.
	Q	By whom are you presently employed?
	A	American Airlines.
	Q	What's your present position?
	A	Actually in physical therapy, rehabilitation on my leg.
	Q	And do you -- are you assigned also as a first officer?
	A	Not at this time.
	Q	Not at this time.  Would you please briefly describe your 
duties and responsibilities as a first officer at American Airlines as 
you held it?
	A	I was a first officer at American Airlines, flying the DC-9.  
My responsibilities were to assist the captain and to be able to 
assume command in case the captain was not able to.
	Q	And would you please briefly describe your education 
and training and experience that you obtained to qualify you for the 
position as first officer at American Airlines?
	A	I graduated from the University of Southern California, 
entered the Naval Service, U.S. Navy Reserves, released in '91, 
reduction-in-forces. 
		I flew privately, flew for a private company, a KingAire E-
90, and then I started a charter operation and flew charter from 
1994 to I was hired at American in January 1999.
	Q	Thank you.  And, finally, what FAA certificates do you 
hold?
	A	I have an airline transport pilot certificate with a Learjet 
type rating and Boeing 737 type rating.
	Q	And your flight experience?
	A	4,000 hours of flight time.
	Q	Thank you very much.
	A	You're welcome.
		MR. BERMAN:  Please proceed, Mr. Tew.
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Good morning, Mr. Origel.
	A	Good morning.
	Q	I know we've talked several times before, and I, too, 
appreciate your taking the time to talk with us today.
		I'd like to ask you some questions to provide us with a 
brief overview of the accident.
		I understand that this was the first time that you had 
flown with Captain Bushman.  Were you aware of the fact that he was 
the chief pilot of the Chicago base when you first checked in with 
him?
	A	Yes, sir.  I had met with Captain Bushman on a prior 
occasion.  As a new hire, we have monthly checks they were 
supposed to provide on our progress with each of the chief pilots.  
So, I met with Captain Bushman approximately one month earlier.
	Q	Okay.  Did the fact that he was the chief pilot affect your 
relationship and interaction with him in any way?
	A	I don't believe so.
	Q	Would you have been more comfortable interacting with 
a regular line check -- airline captain?
	A	I saw Captain Bushman ran a smooth cockpit, very 
professional and very informal.
	Q	Could you tell us what briefing you received from Captain 
Bushman prior to the first flight?
	A	In Chicago, after I met with Captain Bushman in the 
office, I went to the aircraft.  When I was performing my pre-flight, he 
came into the cockpit and gave me a captain's brief on what he 
expected out of his first officers and what he would like to do in 
certain cases, in certain procedures.
		It was a standard American Airlines captain's brief.
	Q	Okay.  The day of the accident, could you tell us what 
legs you flew from Chicago to Dallas?
	A	I flew one leg that day from Salt Lake to Dallas.
	Q	And the captain?
	A	Flew from Chicago to Salt Lake and from Dallas to Little 
Rock.
	Q	At the time of the departure from Dallas, the flight had 
been delayed approximately two hours in Dallas.  How long had you 
been on duty at that time?
	A	I believe I checked in at 10:00 that morning in Chicago.
	Q	Were you fatigued or tired at the time of the departure 
from Dallas?
	A	I would say I was tired but alert.
	Q	Did Captain Bushman mention that he was tired or 
fatigued at any time?
	A	I didn't speak with Captain Bushman very much on the 
ground.  We checked the weather occasionally together, but I didn't 
really speak to him very much, and, so, no.
	Q	You have no knowledge of that?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Did you receive in-route and Little Rock weather 
prior to leaving Dallas-Fort Worth?
	A	Yes, sir.  As I mentioned, on the ground at Dallas, 
because the aircraft was delayed, we had time to check the weather 
and operations.  So, we checked it several times.
	Q	Okay.  When you got this weather, was there any 
concern, and was there any discussion between you and the captain 
concerning this weather?
	A	We did see the weather off to the west, moving to the 
east, but Little Rock was in VFR conditions, and it looked to be able 
to remain that way.
	Q	Was there any kind of a briefing concerning the weather 
at all?
	A	Well, yes, sir.  Captain Bushman -- that's basically what 
we were talking about, the weather.  We saw the adverse weather 
conditions to the west, moving to the east, but it looked like Little 
Rock was in visual conditions and was supposed to remain that way.
		The forecast that we saw from the terminal area forecast 
was that it would remain in VFR conditions.
	Q	Were you aware of the forecast for convective activity at 
Little Rock at the estimated time of arrival, and the current in-flight 
weather advisories which were included in the convective segment 
and severe weather forecasts?
	A	Yes, sir.  We -- I saw the terminal area forecast, and it 
remained -- the forecast did call for shower activities and 
thunderstorms, but the terminal forecast for Little Rock was VFR.
	Q	So, you weren't -- do -- do you recall the convective 
segment and the severe weather forecast?  There was a severe 
weather forecast at the time?
	A	Yes, I remember seeing that, yes.
	Q	Okay.  Was that discussed?
	A	Yes, sir.  On the ground in Dallas.
	Q	While en route to Little Rock, an ACARS message was 
sent concerning weather to the cockpit.  		Could you tell us 
who sent this message, and what did it mean to you?
	A	There was a couple --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Excuse me.  Mr. Tew, you might 
explain to -- for the benefit of the audience what an ACARS message 
is.
		MR. TEW:  Okay.  I was afraid you were going to ask 
that.  I think it's an Air Crew or an Aircraft, I'm not exactly sure 
which, Aviation Response.  It's a -- it's a radio signal that's sent from 
the company to the -- the aircraft.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Is that correct, Mr. Origel?
	A	It's -- basically, what it is is a printer, and the dispatcher 
is able to type or dispatch weather or free-text messages to us via a 
printer on board the aircraft.  It's an airborne communication 
system.
	Q	Okay.  This message you received, --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And this comes from the dispatcher?
		THE WITNESS:  It comes from the dispatcher.  It comes 
from -- we get ATIS from it.  We can get our departures from it.  We 
can get several forms of communication from it.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		MR. TEW:  Yeah.  It can provide a number of things.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	I'm particularly interested in the one message that was 
sent about the in-route weather.  I believe you know which one I'm 
talking about.
	A	The bowling alley message, sir?
	Q	And that was sent by the dispatcher, I believe?
	A	Yes.  There was two messages actually.  There was a 
segment before that which is a National Weather Service type of 
message that gives us data on -- it gives us the rough information 
sent from the MWS.
		But the dispatcher was able to very distinctly and 
descriptively give us an idea of what was going on with the bowling 
alley message, and it basically described weather to the left and to 
the right of course, but from our position to the airport was clear 
from the message.
	Q	Okay.  Did you and the captain discuss this message 
between you?
	A	Yes.  I received the -- the ACARS machine's off to my 
right.  So, I received the message, read it and gave it to the captain, 
and we discussed it, and we concurred.  We had the radar on the 
entire time, and what we saw visually and what we saw from our 
radar picture was that Little Rock was still clear of weather.
	Q	When the dispatcher sent in this message and 
suggested expediting your arrival into Little Rock, what did that 
mean to you and the captain?
	A	Do not expect any delay -- do not accept any delays, 
basically don't necessarily let ATC vector us any further than we had 
to to get to Little Rock. 		Because of the weather that day, a lot 
of activity, there were a lot of aircraft being vectored around that 
night.  So, I'm assuming that he wanted us to go directly to Little 
Rock, and that's what we took it as to mean.
	Q	Okay.  Was that discussed with the captain, that 
particular statement?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	What did you do to expedite your arrival into Little Rock?
	A	Well, it turns out we didn't have to.  We were on a direct 
course for Little Rock at that point, and we just continued straight 
ahead from -- to the airport.
		So, there was no other vectors given that night.  There 
was no delays given, and we were already at our planned mach 
speed at that point.
	Q	Could you tell us what training on the operation and 
interpretation of airborne weather radar you have received at 
American Airlines?
	A	There was classroom discussion on the operation of the 
radar unit, the basically knobs and switches associated with the 
radar unit, and then in the aircraft, on initial operating experience, 
the check airman gave us interpretation of the radar.  So, there was 
two actual -- one classroom and one operational side instruction.
	Q	Okay.  So, you get the -- the actual hands-on in the 
airplane then?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	When you received your hands-on, do you recall if you 
had weather during the flight?
	A	No, sir.  I believe both instances was VFR --
	Q	Okay.
	A	-- conditions.
	Q	What -- how did you discuss it with or how did the check 
captain discuss it with you then at that point?
	A	The check man, he can simulate the tilt by tilting the 
radar down and getting ground clutter and explaining what the cells 
will look like and how to interpret that information.  So, he 
substituted what he had available at the time.
	Q	Were you using the airborne weather radar while you 
were en route?
	A	In the flight to Little Rock?
	Q	Yes.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Could you tell us what -- what did you see on the radar 
screen while you were en route?
	A	We concurred with the dispatch messages about the 
weather to the left, and we could see the weather moving off to the 
east, and we didn't depict any colored areas, other than green, which 
indicated cells but light cells.
	Q	Was this airborne weather radar being used during the 
descent --
	A	We had -- we had the radar on the entire time.
	Q	Okay.  Who was operating it?
	A	Both the captain and I were operating the radar.
	Q	Could you tell us, what did you see on the radar during 
the descent into Little Rock?
	A	The descent, I remember seeing the activity on the 
radar, and on the descent, we actually were able to see the city lights 
of Little Rock.  So, it's fair to say the radar was working, but our 
route from where we were at that point to the airport still looked like 
we were able to continue the approach without maneuvering or hit -- 
or going -- we were able to avoid weather at that point.
	Q	Okay.  Was there weather depicted on the radar during 
the descent?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Did you discuss it among yourselves, the two of you?
	A	I don't believe -- I believe we -- we were looking at the 
radar.  We were both manipulating it.  I don't remember exactly what 
we said, but there were several conversations, and after reviewing 
the cockpit voice recorder, I know we were talking about avoiding 
weather and making reference to the weather out there in front of us.
	Q	Would you describe what you saw on this airborne 
weather radar while you were on the approach?
	A	The final approach segment?
	Q	Yes.
	A	I believe my focus from the time we turned final to touch 
down, I picked up the airport, and my focus was basically on the 
visual conditions, that I was able to see the airport on the final in-
bound, and I don't really recall what the radar was showing at that 
point.
	Q	Did you receive the ATIS for Little Rock?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	When the controller on the ATC transcript -- Page 1, if 
you need to look.  I don't think you need to, but it's there if you wish.
		When the controller mentioned a thunderstorm moving 
through the area and later said, "It appears we have the second part 
of the storm moving through", what did you visually observe of the 
weather at this time?
	A	We could see the activity, if you will, lightening, off in the 
distance, and we still had the city lights, but I didn't know what the 
relative position was, and the radar concurred with our visual picture 
that we were able to see the field, and the approach still looked -- we 
were able to make it without -- with being able to avoid the weather.
	Q	So, you were able to see the weather on the radar then?
	A	I believe so, yes.
	Q	Could you describe what that weather looked like?  Do 
you recall?
	A	I believe -- no, I -- I -- in all honesty, I -- all I remember 
seeing is the weather on the approach.  What segment are we talking 
about specifically?  Because there are several segments here.
	Q	This is -- this is when you were in the descent.
	A	Okay.  On the descent, the weather was to the left and 
moved off to the right, and the field from our position looked clear.
	Q	The controller gave two reports of wind shear during the 
descent and the approach.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	What concern was there by you or the captain of the 
possibility of wind shear during the final approach or during landing?
	A	It gave us a heightened awareness of the possibility of 
receiving a wind shear warning, but at that point, that was a wind 
shear alert, and the captain made the adjustment on his final landing 
speed by increasing the speed to 20 knots, which is procedure.
	Q	Okay.  So, then you increased to 20 knots.  That's kind 
of planning for it.
		Did you brief this at all, the increased awareness or 
anything like that?
	A	Well, the captain mentioned gear up plus 20, and I 
concurred.
	Q	What training did you receive at American concerning 
wind shear and operations into areas of suspected wind shear?
	A	We had classroom discussion and in the simulator on 
our landings and take-off sessions.  We saw the phenomenon of what 
it can do to our -- the landing and the approach and the fluctuation in 
air speed and vertical speed.  So, there was classroom instruction 
and simulator instruction.
	Q	Referencing the CVR transcript again, there were two 
statements in there.  One was, "We've got to get over there quick", 
and there was a second one where the captain said, "I don't like that.  
That's lightening."
		What message was trying to be conveyed in the cockpit 
at this time?
	A	When the captain made the comment about "that's 
lightening", no pilot likes lightening, and it was off to the distance, 
and we could see the weather, and it just went to our mindset that 
we're going to have to land as soon as practical, and if we had a 
delay or other vectors, we wouldn't be able to continue the approach.
	Q	There was no concern about flying into --
	A	Excuse me?
	Q	There was no concern about flying into the lightening 
and the weather there?
	A	We never flew into lightening.  We would never fly into a 
thunderstorm.
	Q	Reference the CVR transcript again, do you feel that the 
captain had the airport in sight well enough to perform a visual 
approach?
	A	After reviewing the CVR transcript, I -- there's two points 
I'd like to make here.  The first one is after the incident, what I recall 
is I had the field from the time we turned base to final and all the 
way down the runway, and I realize now that the captain may have 
lost the airport in sight, but I don't remember those comments.
	Q	You were initially planning for an approach to Runway 2-
2 Left?
	A	Correct.
	Q	What was the reason for the change to 4 Right?
	A	The wind shifted, and the winds were favoring 4 Right.
	Q	Okay.  When you were descending into Little Rock, they 
gave you the winds, and -- and the tower reported the high 
crosswinds relative to the runway which is why you changed 
runways, you said.
	A	Correct.
	Q	How did you or the captain ensure that you conformed 
to the crosswind limitations in the manuals?
	A	Well, we know what the crosswind limits are, and we 
used basically a crosswind reference tool that is very close in 
proximity to the actual numbers, and, so, from using that rule, we 
actually calculated the crosswinds.
	Q	How does American train you to determine what the 
crosswind component would be for a landing?
	A	Well, the crosswind training at American Airlines is via 
the performance manual.
	Q	Did you reference your manual or did the captain 
reference his manual or did he ask you to or --
	A	Not at this point, no, sir.
	Q	Did you brief or plan for the crosswinds, either one of 
you?
	A	Yes, we did.  Once we heard the runway conditions, that 
restricted our crosswind limit to 20 knots, and we reduced the 
crosswind limit at that point for us to 20 knots.
	Q	Was there any concern among you in the cockpit 
concerning these high crosswinds?
	A	I would say we were -- I was alert and concerned, but 
these are conditions I've encountered before, and I'm sure Captain 
Bushman has as well.
	Q	Did you voice your concern to the captain?
	A	I don't recall exactly what I said.
	Q	Do you recall what his response was?
	A	No, sir, I don't.
	Q	Regarding the wet runway crosswind limitations and the 
restricted visibility crosswind limitations, how were they discussed or 
briefed?
	A	The crosswind limitations for reduced visibility was not 
discussed, and we were in visual conditions, and I think this might be 
a prudent point for me to make, a point that I truly recall, and after 
reading the transcripts and after looking at the data, I realized that it 
may not seem plausible, but I really recall from the time I took off 
from Dallas, we took off from Dallas, to the time we were on final, I 
don't remember ever penetrating a thunderstorm or a cloud or 
weather.
		We were in visual -- VMC conditions, not that we had 
VFR cloud clearances, but we were in visual conditions, and, so, the 
reduced visibility limits weren't discussed.  We could see the runway, 
and the RVR reports that we received didn't concur with what we 
were seeing.
	Q	So, what you're saying is that you saw the airport?
	A	Yes, sir, and they didn't apply.
	Q	Because, as you know off the CVR, there were several 
statements where the captain apparently didn't.
		What training on these crosswind limits did you receive 
at American?
	A	There's classroom instruction and then the simulator on 
landings and take-offs again when we go over the crosswind limits.
	Q	During this approach to 4 Right, what was the crosswind 
limit for the landing on -- on the runway?
	A	I believe we were using the 20-knot crosswind limit.
	Q	I'm sorry.  I didn't hear you.
	A	The 20-knot crosswind limit.
	Q	Would the 1800 RVR have come into effect?
	A	No, sir.  We didn't -- we -- I had -- we had visual or I 
thought we had visual.
	Q	The controller gave you 1600 RVR.  Does that -- does 
that come into effect as far the decision as far as the landing limits 
with American?
	A	Which limits are you referring to?
	Q	The reduced visibility crosswind limits.
	A	As I mentioned, the data that we were seeing didn't 
concur with what the controller was giving us, and I don't remember 
discussing it with the captain, but I don't remember using that -- that 
limit.
	Q	Okay.  He didn't -- did he discuss it with you at all?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Was there any other discussion in the cockpit 
concerning the winds after that first initial time when you added 20 
knots?
	A	I don't recall.
	Q	Could you describe the weather conditions as they 
appeared when you were initially approaching the airport, during the 
decision to change from Runway 2-2 Left to 4 Right, and while on 
final approach for us?
	A	The weather conditions?
	Q	Yes.
	A	Rick had mentioned -- Captain Bushman had mentioned 
that he had the -- the field in sight, I believe, on his side, and we 
were given the winds, and we decided to request Runway 4 Right.  
The controller gave us a turn to the downwind for 4 Right, to the 
right.
		At that point, we were heading south, and I believe there 
was weather in front of us, and I mentioned that on -- to the captain, 
and I think the captain makes reference to it, and there was weather, 
and it was on the ATC transcript as well, the weather between the 
airport and us, and we lost visual conditions with the airport at that 
point.
	Q	Right around the airport, was there any weather that you 
could see or was it further off or could you describe what you saw 
there?
	A	We were heading south at this point on the downwind, 
and we could visually see and the radar concurred with weather in 
front of us and off to the west, approaching the airport.  We -- we 
weren't pointed in that direction.  We couldn't really see anything at 
that point to the -- to the west.	
	Q	How about when you turned back on final, back towards 
the airport?  What were you seeing there?
	A	The -- I had the cloud off to my right or the weather off 
to my right that I -- that I reported to ATC, and he vectored us right 
around it.  So, we remained in the -- we remained clear of clouds at 
that point, and then I focused in on the airport as I picked it up, 
completing the base to final turn.
	Q	Is an approach briefing required for all approaches?
	A	The captain's required to -- the pilot flying is required to 
give an approach briefing, yes.
	Q	If you wish to reference Exhibit 2K --
	A	Excuse me.
	Q	-- or 2 Kilo maybe.  
	A	Yes, thank you.
	Q	Could you tell us --
	A	What page, sir?
	Q	I'm sorry?
	A	Okay.  I've got it.  Yes, sir.
	Q	Could you tell us what the required items on the 
approach briefing for visual approach would be?
	A	For a visual approach or an ILS, I believe at that point, 
we briefed the same procedures.  We -- we still brought out our 
approach plate, and we still -- I briefed the applicable points that we 
would use and need on the approach.  So, the briefing is still valid for 
a visual.
	Q	Okay.  In this case, what would that be the required 
procedure off this list for the approach you were doing?
	A	Well, 4 Right, the facility, the frequency and the final 
approach course, the airport elevation, the decision missed approach 
chart -- missed approach procedure.
	Q	Who is responsible for the approach briefing, and when 
is it done?
	A	Prior to the approach, and the pilot flying is responsible.
	Q	Did Captain Bushman do a briefing for this runway?
	A	He -- no, sir.  He -- prior to starting the descent, Captain 
Bushman and I, we both thought we were landing on Runway 2-2.  
So, he briefed Runway 2-2.  
		On the descent, when we learned of the headwinds for 4 
Right and changed -- requested that runway, we -- I -- excuse me.  I 
briefed 4 Right after I got it out to assist the captain because he was 
flying the aircraft at that time.
	Q	I understand that Captain Bushman was the flying pilot, 
and you say he briefed you for Runway 2-2 which you were initially 
going to, is that correct?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Did he provide a full briefing for that runway or --
	A	I believe so.  I can't remember entirely at that point -- 
this point.  Excuse me.
	Q	Were any additional items covered in the approach 
briefing at Little Rock, other than the required items?
	A	When he made the brief at 2-2?  Is that your reference?
	Q	For 4 Right.  I'm sorry.
	A	For 4 -- I did the briefing for 4 Right, and I briefed the 
pertinent points, and Captain Bushman talked about the 20 knots, 
and he did increase the vero speed to 20 knots.  So, I would say he 
did include those two items.
	Q	Do you feel that your preparation for the approach to 
Runway 4 Right was adequate?
	A	Given the information that we had at the time, I believe 
so.
	Q	Was the preparation for the approach in accordance 
with American Airlines' procedures?
	A	I believe so.
	Q	Who's responsible for calling for checklists?
	A	The pilot not flying will perform the -- what checklist are 
you referring to, first?
	Q	The descent before landing.
	A	The descent before landing, the pilot not flying will 
ensure that both items -- both checklists will be called out.
	Q	Were the descent before landing checklists called for 
and accomplished?
	A	The descent checklist was accomplished, and the before 
landing checklist was accomplished, but I don't believe we heard it 
on the CVR tape, and I can't recall specifically when the completion 
of the before landing checklist  was complete, around the time before 
you do flaps, and that's what I recall of the last item being checked.
		Other than the enunciator light, which is a light on the 
panel, that checklist was being performed in a compressed time, and 
it was very compacted at that point, and I don't recall making -- I 
don't recall the statement.  I don't remember at that point, but I do 
remember making the 40 flap call, and that is one of the last items.
	Q	Okay.  The CVR recorded you stating "we're getting 
pretty close to this storm, we'll keep it tight, if we have to", and the 
captain stating, "we're going right into this".
		Could you tell us what you were seeing at that point, and 
what you were doing reference these statements?
	A	Was this on downwind?  I believe.
	Q	Yes.
	A	On down -- as I mentioned, there was weather on 
downwind to the south, and it was -- and if we continued at our -- this 
approach, on downwind, we would go into the weather at that point.
		So, we made the comment on Rick made the comment 
to keep it tight -- I believe he made the comment to call for a base or 
I made the comment, and we talked to the control tower at that point 
for a tight turn.
	Q	When the controller advised you that the RVR was not 
1600, where were you in relation to the localizer and the outer 
marker?
	A	When we made that turn, I believe we just passed the 
marker, and I made the comment "1600", and Rick makes the 
comment "we're inside the marker".  I said, "Good point", and we 
continued.
	Q	Were you established on the approach?
	A	I believe so.
	Q	What is American's definition of being established on the 
approach?
	A	I would list the stabilizer approach at a thousand feet, 
landing configuration, in an on position, to make a landing.
	Q	On the localizer on board with the glide slope?
	A	Yes, sir.  On an ILS, yes, sir.
	Q	Was there any discussion in the cockpit about possibly 
diverting to another airport?
	A	I -- at this point, I don't recall.  Prior to departing, we 
talked about the alternates.
	Q	Was there any discussion in the cockpit about possibly 
delaying the landing?
	A	At this point, I don't recall.  I just remember there was 
alternates discussed, and we talked about the weather at that point.
	Q	What training or guidance did you receive at American 
concerning a decision to abandon an approach?
	A	I believe it revolves around the stabilizer approach 
theory, that on an ILS or VFR visual approach, in the landing 
configuration, your stabilized sink rate is somewhere between 650 
and 800 feet per minute sink rate.  You're in the normal position to 
continue the approach, and if you -- and you're on speed.
		If your speed fluctuates, if your sink rate is excessive, if 
your deviation's left or right of course, move you out of a stabilizer 
approach parameters, then you don't meet the stabilizer approach 
definition.  Therefore, you should go around.
	Q	Who can call for abandoning the approach?
	A	Either pilot.
	Q	Did you call for a go-around at any time?
	A	Yes, sir, I did.
	Q	Did the captain respond to this?
	A	He responded -- I don't remember what he said verbally.  
Apparently from -- after reviewing the CVR, after I made that 
comment, it sounds like after reviewing the tape, you can definitely 
hear the go and the around.  It seems like he talked at the same time 
I did, and I looked over at him, and he was -- he brought the airplane 
back on course, back on center line.
	Q	So, he didn't respond to you verbally?
	A	Not verbally, but by him bringing the airplane back on 
course, I believed he -- he heard and responded that way.
	Q	During a previous interview, you stated that both you 
and the captain knew the runway was wet.  What discussion was 
there between you and the captain concerning the fact that the 
runway was wet?
	A	Well, that goes back to the time-out limitation on 
crosswinds, and when the controller made the comment, there's rain 
on the field, we reduced the -- we had a discussion between 
ourselves in the cockpit about reducing the crosswind limit from 30 
to 20 knots.
		I actually was confused at one point.  I -- I asked -- said 
25 because I know on a Cap-2 and Cap-3 approaches, there's 
different limitations, and Rick was confident it was 20, and that's 
what it --
	Q	Did you get the book out?
	A	I -- I did get the book out, but Rick signaled me to put it 
away.  He knew what it was, I believe.  That's what I took it to mean.
	Q	Did he get his book out?
	A	No, sir, he did not.
	Q	What special procedures for landing with the wet runway 
does American have and train on?
	A	Again, on landings, take-offs and landings, we practice 
wet runway procedures, and we use a maximum reverse EPR of 1.3, 
unless the number's in the situation.
	Q	Were the wet runway procedures covered in the landing 
briefing?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Does American's procedures require wet runway 
procedures to be included in to a wet -- to a briefing, approach 
briefing?
	A	I don't recall.  They -- I believe it's up to the captain -- 
the -- it does say on the approach briefing that we can brief 
additional items.  So.
	Q	Had you ever covered -- covered that or seen that 
covered in a briefing in the short time you were with American?
	A	No, sir.  I don't remember.  I don't recall.
	Q	Okay.  Reference Exhibit 2M and 2N, 2 Mike and 2 
November, --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- how is the before landing checklist accomplished, and 
by who?
	A	The before landing checklist is a pilot not flying 
challenge and response and moving the mechanical checklist toggle 
associated with that item.  The pilot not flying will assure that item 
has been accomplished, will challenge or respond on its 
accomplishment and move the toggle.
	Q	So, the pilot not flying does the checklist?
	A	The pilot not flying reads the checklist.  Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Which items on there would be -- does he 
respond to the items, too?
	A	The pilot not flying -- no, sir.  The pilot not flying will 
basically challenge and respond himself.
	Q	Are there any items responded to by both pilots?
	A	During the descent checklist, both pilots will concur and 
confirm the landing altimeters, but they are reset and cross-checked.
	Q	How about the before landing checklist?
	A	I don't believe so.  No, sir.  
	Q	There's no items on the before landing checklist that are 
accomplished by -- that are responded to by both pilots?  You've got -
- I think you have it there in the before landing checklist.
	A	No, sir.
	Q	But the gear?
	A	Excuse me?
	Q	What about the gear?
	A	Well, the captain --
	Q	Okay.  What are American's procedures for the selection 
of brakes, manual versus auto brakes?
	A	It's the captain's discretion.
	Q	Is there any guidance given by American to help you in 
your choice?
	A	There is quite a bit of talk on the techniques in the 
environmental section of the manual, but I believe it's -- it's really up 
to the captain's discretion on which he chooses.  I've interpreted it 
that way, after reading the manuals.
	Q	According to American's procedures, who is supposed to 
pull the spoiler lever upward arming the spoilers?
	A	Prior to touch down?
	Q	After the gear is down, you arm the spoilers.  Who is 
supposed to pull the spoiler lever upward arming the spoilers?
	A	What I recall, I believe either pilot can arm the spoilers.
	Q	Is this how you were trained when you went through 
American?
	A	In all fairness, sir, I've been out of training for one year, 
and I don't -- I mean it -- I'd been on the line for three months at that 
point, and I don't recall exactly all the training issues.
		But I have read, I have tried to recall a lot of this 
material and training that I received, and I believe in training, the 
pilot not flying would actually do it, but I'm not a hundred percent 
certain.
	Q	How's it normally done on the line?  Do you recall?
	A	Well, on the line, the captains almost always arm the 
spoilers because of the proximity of where they are to the captain's 
seat.
	Q	On the before landing checklist, is spoilers an item that 
requires a confirmation by two pilots or just --
	A	No confirmation was required.
	Q	Just -- just the non-flying pilot confirms it himself?
	A	Correct.
	Q	Who armed the spoilers on the accident flight?
	A	I believe after the gear was down, Captain Bushman 
armed the spoilers.
	Q	Did you call-out that the spoiler lever was armed?
	A	I don't believe so, sir.
	Q	What do you know about the effects of the spoilers not 
extending on landing?
	A	It does increase your landing roll-out.
	Q	Were these effects discussed or trained at American?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	On final approach, were the flaps set at the final flap 
setting prior to a thousand feet?
	A	I don't believe so.  I believe what I -- at that point in 
time, we were turning base to final.  Rick had armed the spoilers.  I 
looked down to confirm the checklist and make sure we were getting 
everything. I noticed the flaps were at 28, and my thousand-foot call-
out, it was -- it all happened at the same time, and I asked Rick if he 
wanted 40 flaps.
	Q	What's the American's normal procedures for when they 
should be set?
	A	Established on an IFR or an ILS by a thousand feet.
	Q	Describe any instruction or training at American 
concerning the definition of a stabilized approach.
	A	Well, I was discussing that earlier, about the concept of 
final approach segment, landing configuration, sink rate 650 to 800 
feet per minute, descent, on speed, and in a normal position to 
continue the approach to make a landing.
	Q	What were you trying to do when the approach was no 
longer stabilized?
	A	I can't remember -- can't recall any specific discussions, 
but on an unstabilized approach, you have to go around.
	Q	Did you feel like the approach was stabilized at all 
times?
	A	The only time that I felt uncomfortable was when I made 
the go-around statement, and Captain Bushman brought the aircraft 
back.
	Q	Was the aircraft continuously on the glide slope and on 
the localizer?
	A	I believe the glide slope, but not the localizer.  We were 
drifting, and that's where I had one indication that we were drifting 
off to -- I said we're off, and then I said we're way off, and I made the 
go-around.
	Q	What did the flight instruments indicate at that time?
	A	That we were drifting to the right.
	Q	About how far?  Do you recall?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Did you inform the captain when you noticed you were 
drifting to the right or did you say anything to him?
	A	I said, "We're off".
	Q	Reference the CVR transcript, at about 30 seconds 
before touch down, someone said, "We're off course", and then you 
said, "We are way off."
		Describe to us what these statements meant to you.
	A	We were on the final approach segment.  We were -- I 
made -- I believe I made my -- my call-outs.  I was monitoring the 
instruments.  I was looking inside and outside.  I saw the aircraft 
drifting right, and as it continued to drift right, I believe one third of 
the dot's a call-out.  If it's -- goes beyond that, I called out "We're off", 
and we continued, and then I said, "We're way off".
	Q	What were you seeing out the window at that time?
	A	I believe I saw the -- we're on final.  The right-hand side 
runway lights was drifting to my left.
	Q	Can you -- is this the point where you said you said "go 
around"?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Did you feel any reluctance to speak up during this flight 
due to the fact you were a new hire who was flying with a chief pilot?
	A	No.  I felt pretty comfortable with Captain Bushman at 
this point, and I was more concerned about the flight, and, so, I 
basically spoke my mind at that point.
	Q	After touch down, according to American's procedures, 
what call-outs are made concerning the spoilers and reversers?
	A	There is no call-out regarding the spoilers, and the 
reversers is -- we're confirming that the thrust reversers are actually 
working normally.  So, we're calling out the blue lights and the amber 
lights, confirming that the spoiler buckets are unlocked and 
operating.
	Q	Okay.  You said there's no call-out for spoilers.
	A	No, sir.
	Q	How about if they don't extend?
	A	No, sir.  No call-out.
	Q	What is -- what's American's procedures to do if the 
spoilers don't extend?
	A	The captain will manually deploy the spoilers.
	Q	Did you look at the spoiler lever to see if the spoilers had 
extended automatically?
	A	I -- I've had a lot of time to think about this issue, and, 
unfortunately, I can't remember exactly what position they were, but 
in all fairness, when we touched down, and I made that comment 
"We're sliding", it felt like we were hydroplaning, and I was not in a 
comfortable position in my seat as I'm sitting here, and I was being 
thrown around a little bit.
		So, when I was being tossed around, I did look out the 
thrust reverser handle and the quadrant.  I could see Rick going to 
reverse thrust, but I don't remember the position of the spoiler 
handle.
	Q	According to American's procedures, what is the engine 
pressure ratio or EPR power setting during reverse procedures on the 
dry runway?
	A	On a dry runway, it's 1.6 with an overshoot to 1.8 back 
to 1.6, and I -- I kind of misspoke.  There is a call-out on the landing 
roll-out.  When you decelerate under a hundred knots, then you call 
out 80 knots and stow the reversers by 60 knots.  So, that is a call-
out on landing roll-out.  But we never got to that point.
	Q	Thank you.  According to American's procedures, what is 
the engine pressure ratio or EPRs again power setting for a landing 
on a wet runway?
	A	1.3.
	Q	Describe your training on this procedure, the wet runway 
procedure, at American Airlines.
	A	It was again in the simulator, landings and take-offs.  We 
saw the effect of going in the reverse thrust and the possible -- I 
believe it was the rudder-braking issue came up a few times, and 
that's what we really discussed, and why the reason of the 1.3 is.  
But beyond that, I don't remember specifically.
	Q	Okay.  I'm going to get into the rudder braking in a 
second, too.
		After touch down, what were the EPR indications when 
the captain first went into reverse?
	A	I remember looking at the indications and call -- I don't 
know if I made a call-out, but I remember a 1.8 and a 1.6, 
respectively.
	Q	And you don't remember making a call-out then?
	A	I don't remember making a call-out.
	Q	Is that a required call-out?
	A	No, sir.  It's just a habit, what you're looking for.
	Q	How about if it -- it would be a call-out if it exceeds the 
normal setting?
	A	Excuse me.  I don't -- I don't know if it's a call-out.
	Q	Okay.  Reference Exhibit 2KK, 2 Kilo Kilo, --
	A	Excuse me.  Thank you.  I have it.
	Q	Okay.  Do you recall information in the manual that 
stated that as reverse thrust continues above 1.3 EPR, rudder 
effectiveness decreases until the rudder provides no control at about 
1.6 EPR and 90 knots?
	A	That was discussed in the classroom.
	Q	Did you receive any training on this?
	A	I -- I can't remember receiving any training.
	Q	After the touch down, on the CVR, you said, "We're 
sliding".
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Could you describe to us what you saw and did from the 
time you started sliding?
	A	We touched down firm and flat, and I remember the 
nose being cocked off to the left of center line when we touched 
down, and the sliding comment just refers to what I believed, we 
were hydroplaning.  We didn't have control of the aircraft, directional 
control of the aircraft, and Captain Bushman went into reverse at 
that point.
		Shortly after that, we -- I felt the sensation of being 
tossed around, if you will, from right to left, and I don't remember 
exactly the sensations of -- of the G forces and what was actually 
going on inside the cockpit.
		I just remember not being able to sit in my seat, and I 
was shifting.  Rick went into thrust reverse, and then, shortly after 
that, he came out, and for a little bit, I mentioned earlier that I 
thought he may be thinking about going around to get out of there, 
but after that, he went back in the thrust reverse, and he was, what I 
would describe as, manipulating the thrust reversers.
		Around that time, in earlier interviews, I described this 
sensation of being controlled from the tail or a tail slap sensation.  
We continued sliding, and it felt like we went off the left side of the 
runway or to the left side of the runway, and at about that time, 
Captain Bushman got control of the airplane or felt he was getting 
control of the airplane, and then we ran out of runway.
	Q	Did you feel yourself slowing down at all?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	You just mentioned that the captain came out of reverse.  
Could you describe the captain's actions, including that from the 
time the airplane began to slide until it went off?
	A	I can't remember it specifically.  I just remember 
distinctly him coming up, going into reverse, coming out of reverse, 
and I don't think it was simultaneous, and I don't remember exactly, 
but I just remember the manipulation of the thrust reversers, and 
then at one point, after this manipulation, he went back into reverse 
consistently, and then it happened very quickly.  It went off the end 
of the runway at that point.
	Q	Okay.  You just said manipulation of the reverse.  Are 
you meaning -- what are you meaning by that?
	A	Well, I -- I just saw his hands around the throttle 
quadrant, the reverse throttle quadrant, and I don't remember 
exactly what the motions were, but it wasn't one smooth continuous 
reverse thrust all the way down the runway.
	Q	What have you been taught at American concerning 
hydroplaning or skidding, and did you receive any training on this?
	A	I can't remember the training we really received, but I 
remember discussion about hydroplaning, stay on the antilock 
brakes, don't pump the brakes, stay on the brakes.
	Q	Now, one question just given to me.  Did you feel you 
were on a visual approach?
	A	At the point that we turned base to final, I thought we 
had -- I had the airport in sight, and I thought Captain Bushman had 
it in sight, but we never called for a visual, and we had our 
instruments tuned.  So, it's something that I -- I -- I had visual at the 
airport.
	Q	Did you use the windshield wipers?
	A	Yes.  Captain Bushman called for the wipers, and the 
rain stopped, and I turned them off.
	Q	What setting did you turn the wipers on?
	A	I -- I don't remember.  In fact, I think I turned mine on 
first, and then I realized he needed his.  So, I went to turn his on, 
and then the rain stopped, and I turned it off.
	Q	Okay.  Well, I appreciate your coming here and 
answering these questions.  I know it's a very traumatic event.
		Thank you, Mr. Origel.
		MR. TEW:  Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you.  Before we pursue with 
the parties, we will take a break of about 15 minutes, and, Mr. 
Origel, we will continue with the questions from the parties and then 
this panel as soon as we return, and be sure Mr. Origel can get off 
the side there where he can take a break as well.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We'll stand in adjournment for 15 
minutes.
		(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene this hearing of the 
National Transportation Safety Board.  We will continue with the 
questions from the Technical Panel.  
		Let me note that Mr. Haueter has now arrived from 
Washington, D.C., and taken his position on the Board of Inquiry, and 
welcome him, and some of our other staff have arrived as well, and 
Mr. Feith is now back where he appropriately belongs at the 
Technical table, and I would ask the Technical Panel if there are 
additional questions of this witness.
		MR. FEITH:  Yes, sir.  I have a few follow-up, and I know 
that Mr. Eick does, too.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Well, please proceed.
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Thank you, Mr. Origel, for -- for being here today.  We 
appreciate it.  I know that this is a difficult situation, and the 
questioning is sometimes a little bit intense, and recall is difficult.
		I just have a few follow-up questions to some of the 
answers that you gave Mr. Tew.
		In regards to the dispatch message that you received on 
ACARS referring to the bowling alley, is this a common term or a 
phrase that -- that is used between flight crews and -- and that of the 
dispatchers at American?
	A	No, but -- excuse me.  What the dispatcher was doing 
was describing free-text the weather conditions on the prior 
message, which was the SIGMEC, and the SIGMEC is rather long, 
and you have to look at way points and VORs to figure out the 
thunderstorm area, the box, if you will, and through a free-text 
message, he was able to articulate very clearly what the message 
prior meant.
		I wouldn't call it a normal or proper phraseology 
message, but it's a descriptive message that dispatchers sometimes 
use as a tool to get their message across to flight crews.
	Q	And just following up on that, that other part, where 
there was a bit of a sense of urgency to try and expedite your arrival, 
as far as that's concerned, is it typical of the dispatchers to provide 
such information to get you on the ground or is that still a decision 
that's left in the cockpit, I mean, as far as influencing your decision 
or the captain's decision to continue the -- the approach in this case, 
given the weather conditions?
	A	The captain has final authority of the aircraft, and any 
information that's given the captain is for his judgment to use how he 
wishes, and I believe that the dispatcher was just trying to convey a 
sense that there was weather off to the west, and as I mentioned, 
Rick and I believed the message tried to convey do not accept any 
vectors or unnecessary delays.
		But it was the captain's decision to continue and to 
disseminate the information as he -- as he chose.
	Q	But as far as influencing you as a crew, because it's two 
of you there making a decision to continue the approach, given your 
status as the first officer, and you said that you were comfortable 
with the captain, did you feel comfortable given the fact that you 
were looking out the window, you had acknowledged between the two 
of you that there was thunderstorms moving across the airport that 
was reiterated by the controller that the storm had moved over the 
top of the airport?
		All of these things, when you look at it with that type of 
message and the decision to continue, I mean what was it that may 
have influenced or put you over the edge to continue that approach 
versus abandoning the approach, given the level of information you 
had?
	A	Well, that's what's -- it's a good question that I've been 
thinking about, and it really revolves around the information that we 
had didn't concur with what we were seeing.
		In other words, the free-text message, the bowling alley 
message specifically, described what we were seeing, and the radar 
was showing the line to the west and to the east, and the airport 
from our position was clear of thunderstorm activity.
		The tower made a note in a transmission that weather 
moving from the airport north to northwest, I believe, and I -- after 
reviewing the transcripts, but the information we had and the level of 
activity we were seeing didn't necessarily concur, and as I mentioned 
in one of the transmissions, the weather seemed to be farther off 
than what the tower had thought.
		So, given our past experience, I've been in weather 
situations that are similar, and I thought it was a situation that was -- 
needed our attention, to be alert and to be cautious, but I believed it 
was at that point acceptable to continue the approach.
	Q	What kind of radar do you use in the airplane?  Is it color 
weather radar?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Do you recall what you saw on that radar as far as color 
bands in determining that the thunderstorm was in the proximity of 
the airport?
	A	We had -- well, to go back, and basically from right after 
the accident to this point, I never remember seeing red or high-
intensity weather, other than green cells, and none of them over the 
airport.
	Q	Does American have a policy regarding flight in and 
around areas of convective activity?
	A	I don't recall the exact policy, but no crew member 
would ever -- is supposed to go through thunderstorms or microburst 
activity.  You just avoid those.  You just avoid that kind of activity.
	Q	But American doesn't have a policy that says if you know 
that convective activity exists, that you want to stay three-five-10 
miles away from that activity?
	A	I don't recall, but convective activity is a rather broad -- 
we have convective activity quite a bit in the United States, and it's a 
warning to pilots to be alert, but I don't recall a specific policy 
describing a parameter to avoid.
	Q	How far would you say you were away from the cell that 
you saw the lightening in?
	A	I -- I don't want to guess and be inaccurate, but I just 
remember from our position at the time we saw the weather, I 
believe Captain Bushman made a PA to the passengers at that point.  
That's what made -- prompted me to give the tower a call about the 
lightening, and it was off in the distance, and I'd be very -- I'd just be 
taking a guess, but I knew it was moving in our direction.
	Q	And I know that you've had the opportunity to talk to Mr. 
Tew on several occasions with the group, and, so, pardon my -- my 
redundance if some of this may come up.  I'm just trying to establish.
		We're talking about convective activity.  We got a report 
from the air traffic controller now that there's a heavy rainshower 
moving across or thunderstorm moving across the airport.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Is that considered convective activity for you?
	A	I would say it's convective activity in the sense that it's -- 
it's weather.  It's -- it's raining, but there's no procedure to -- to leave 
the -- I mean I don't recall receiving a convective weather report at 
that point.  He said heavy rain on the field, but I don't really recall a 
procedure or parameters to use in those cases.
	Q	One of the things that I noticed in the transcript that you 
had already talked to Mr. Tew about this morning, and I think in 
previous conversations, was the fact that you never lost sight of the 
air field.
		However, there is a comment that you made with regard 
to sighting of the field and the fact that you "had lost sight of the 
field" when you were reporting to the air traffic controller -- when you 
were reporting to the air traffic control that, you know, you had lost 
sight of the airport.
		What -- what was the reference made as far as that was 
concerned since you've told us that you never lost sight of it?
	A	Well, there's a couple segments in here, and I believe I 
mentioned that from the final approach when we turned base to final 
to touch down, I did not lose sight of the field, of the airport -- of the 
runway.
		But prior to that, on the downwind, when we were 
actually performing a visual approach to Runway 4 Right, we were 
continuing, and we were about to make the base turn visually, and a 
cloud moved between the field and us.  So, I lost sight at that point, 
and at several points prior to that, Rick -- when we were approaching 
the air field, Rick had mentioned he had the city lights and had the 
field, and then we went over the top, and I -- we lost the field, and we 
had ground references, but in reference to weather reports, the only 
time I lost the field or -- excuse me -- the only time that weather was 
influenced or had me -- was -- I wasn't able to see the field at that 
point was because of that cloud between us and the field.  Excuse 
me.
	Q	Captain Bushman was flying the ILS on -- on the final 
approach?
	A	I -- yes, sir.
	Q	And your -- your view was inside the cockpit monitoring 
glide slope and localizer or outside the cockpit?
	A	I was using -- I was inside and -- and outside.  I was 
cognizant of the weather outside, but I was monitoring inside.
	Q	And I know that you may have answered this question, 
but you made the comment, "We're way off".  What -- what was the 
reference to?  Was that something you saw out the window or 
something you saw in the cockpit?
	A	I -- I believe it was the ILS HSI, horizontal situation 
indicator, that I was monitoring at that point, and I looked up, and I 
did see the runway lights at that point.  I don't remember at what 
point in the approach or what point in the deviation that I made 
those comments, but it was -- in my mind, as I sit here, it was 
actually two indications that we were moving off course, the HSI and 
the runway.
	Q	Did it ever cross your mind at all to intervene when the 
captain, right after you made that statement, "We're way off", the 
captain made the statement, "I can't see it"?  Were you concerned at 
any time, and had you thought about intervening?
	A	I -- I didn't hear that comment, "I can't see it", and -- and 
when Mr. Tew visited me in the hospital, and now that I read the -- 
these transcripts, there's a lot of comments from the captain that I 
don't recall.
	Q	With regard to the final segment of flight, where the 
controller had provided a fair amount of wind information, given the 
fact that there had been some earlier discussion by you and the 
captain regarding the crosswind component and how much was 
acceptable, --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Excuse me.  Now, I -- gentlemen back 
in the corner, we're not going to be doing television interviews during 
this proceeding in this room.  So, you take your equipment and move 
it out, please, while we wait.
		I made that announcement.  This room is for the 
purpose of this proceeding.  It's not a television studio.
		(Pause)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Proceed.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Let me just go back.  You had been provided quite a bit 
of wind information regarding the changing wind conditions and in 
fact a couple of wind shear alerts --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- almost all the way down to touchdown by the 
controller.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Given the fact that there had been some earlier 
discussion about the maximum crosswind limits for this particular 
operation, and the fact that in the procedures as we see them and 
the limitations that are in the manual that are basically driven by 
visibility, did -- did you ever think about pulling the manual out to 
just validate --
	A	Well, as I mentioned, --
	Q	-- the --
	A	-- on the downwind, when the heavy rain comment was 
made by the controller, I was concerned, and we actually -- the 
captain and I did discuss, and I had a conversation with him, and I 
actually did go to the manual in my kit bag to pull up the 
information, and when I pulled out the manual, Captain Bushman 
basically gave me the sign that he was confident.
		I assumed he was confident and knew the answer.  I 
don't know, but he had me put it away.
	Q	I don't want to belabor this, and it's hard because, 
unfortunately, Captain Bushman isn't -- isn't here to defend that -- 
that position, but you had enough of a concern to start to pull the 
manual out.
		Given the fact that then the RVR that was reported went 
below 3,000, did that not change your thinking to -- to the idea that 
we had a lower crosswind limit?
	A	As I sit here right now, I can remember that was an 
issue in my mind, but after concurring with the captain, he had me 
put the manual away, he seemed confident and comfortable in the 
position, and we continued the approach, and -- and as I sit here 
now, there's a lot of things I would do differently, if the opportunity 
ever arose again or that situation arose again.
	Q	Well, we hope it doesn't.
	A	Well, the weather conditions I'm talking about.  I would 
never --
	Q	And just a couple of clarifying points.  You had talked 
about that the captain had briefed for originally landing on Runway 
22.  Can you tell me typically when that briefing would occur, at least 
what segment of flight that would have occurred?
	A	It was in the descent -- after the -- we received the ATIS, 
and we had some idea of what the weather was, what kind of weather 
the airport was experiencing, we would normally do the brief and the 
descent.
	Q	Is that more or less than a hundred miles out?
	A	I don't -- it's -- in a comfortable position after you receive 
the weather.
	Q	And you had answered a question for -- for Mr. Tew 
about the spoilers and the fact that there isn't really a procedure to 
monitor whether the spoilers actually deploy or not after touchdown.  
You're checking thrust reverse unlocked and deployed but not the 
spoilers.
		Yet, if, for some reason, you or the captain had to 
manually deploy those spoilers for whatever reason, how would you 
come to knowing that that had to be done?
	A	American does train that if the spoilers do not deploy 
automatically, that the crew members and the captain specifically is 
supposed to deploy the spoilers, and what it comes down to is just 
being alert of what's happening in the cockpit.  But I don't remember 
a procedure.
	Q	Okay.  Well, who's -- how would you know that that didn't 
occur?
	A	As --
	Q	The spoilers deploying automatically.
	A	It's just being aware of what's happening in your aircraft, 
and I don't remember -- like I said, I don't remember a procedure, 
and that's one of the things that really does bother me about this 
flight, that if I missed that, but I -- I can't remember exactly what 
happened to them.
	Q	Did you at any time -- I know that the captain was 
actually on the controls.  Did you at any time look over?  You said 
that you saw the captain's hand on the reverse -- the levers 
themselves and across the pedestal.
		Did you happen to notice if the handle had moved to a 
deployed position?
	A	I looked over there, and I don't remember seeing them 
in a stowed position.  When he was reversing the engines, the spoiler 
would be back, and his arm would be in a way that would block my 
view.  So, I -- I couldn't see at that point.
	Q	Do you know if the captain had -- could you tell from the 
movement of the aircraft whether the captain was using 
asymmetrical thrusts?  You said that he had pulled the 1.6 and 1.8, 
respectively, on -- on the reverse thrust operation, if I heard you 
correctly.  		Was that -- do you know if that was intentional or 
was he just pulling to get both of them into reverse?
	A	I -- when we landed, I did say "We're sliding" and said it 
felt like we were hydroplaning, and I'd only be speculating on what he 
was doing, but I assumed that it was an adverse situation, that he 
thought it was going into an emergency situation, and he needed 
more reverse.
	Q	After the airplane was on the ground, you said "We're 
down, we're sliding".  There is an unidentified person, either you or 
the captain, we couldn't really discern when we were listening to the 
-- to the tape, but someone said, "On the brakes", followed by an 
expletive, and then someone unidentified said, "Other one, other one, 
other one".
		Can you tell us in that sequence what was transpiring, 
and who may have made those comments?
	A	I remember the captain making the brake comment, and 
I believe I mentioned that to Mr. Tew, but it was a surprise to me to 
see those comments so clearly and hear them on the -- on the CVR, 
"the other one, the other one, the other one", because they are clearly 
there, and I don't remember saying them or hearing them.
	Q	Did you get on the brakes?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  When you got on the brakes, could you tell -- I 
mean were you standing on the brakes?  Could you tell if the rudder 
pedals were deflected when you got on the brakes?
	A	Yes.  I -- I put all -- all the pressure I could on the 
brakes, and I don't remember displacement.  I don't remember -- I'm 
not saying they weren't.  I just don't remember the displacement.
	Q	Do you recall having -- feeling any type of fight where 
you may have been pushing, where your left foot was exerting more 
force than your right, but you felt that you were pushing against the 
captain?
	A	In all fairness, when he said brakes, and I saw the 
situation, I stood on those brakes as hard as I could.
	Q	Okay.  Going back real quick, what time did you get up 
that morning?  Do you recall?
	A	I -- I don't really recall.  I've been asked that question, 
and I believe it was around 7 or 8, which would have been normal for 
Chicago.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Origel.  Appreciate it.
	A	You're welcome.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Eick, I believe you have a couple 
of questions?
		MR. EICK:  Yes, I do.  Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Mr. Origel, I'd like to ask you some questions in regards 
to your pre-flight planning and briefing in Dallas-Fort Worth before 
the departure.
		Can you tell me what type of products and what briefing 
you and the captain participated in before departure?
	A	Yes, sir.  We had a two-hour delay in Dallas.  So, after 
checking our gate, we realized the delay.  We went to the Operations 
area, and American provides computer banks for the flight crews to 
check weather and other information pertinent to flight.
		There's also a WSI, it's a pictorial and gives us a graphic 
illustration of the weather, and we checked both systems.  We 
checked it right after we got down to Operations, and then as it 
became closer to flight time, we checked it again.
		As far as the pre-flight's concerned, when I went 
upstairs, the aircraft had arrived or they had switched an aircraft for 
us.  I did an exterior pre-flight, did the -- I was in the middle of doing 
the cockpit pre-flight.
		Captain Bushman walked in with the required paperwork 
and the pictorial for us to look at.
	Q	Did the WSI radar depict the severe thunderstorm watch 
or convective SIGMEC?
	A	I don't remember a severe watch, a box, if you will, 
depicted on the WSI, but it did indicate the cells, and I could see the 
weather to the west and to the east of Little Rock.
	Q	Do you remember the movement of the cells or the line 
of activity that was depicted?
	A	I believe it was an extensive line north to south, to the 
west, but I don't remember the exact dimensions.
	Q	In reference to the weather document or flight departure 
papers the captain brought into the cockpit, are those the same that 
are in Exhibit 2E?
	A	May I look?
	Q	Yes, and specifically on -- starting on Page 24, Exhibit 
2E, Page 24, where we have the weather document, beginning at the 
Little Rock Terminal Forecast.  Page 24?
	A	Yes, sir.  I'm looking at the documentation.  There's 
several pages, and -- I believe so.
	Q	Can you -- can you read me the terminal forecast for 
Little Rock, beginning at -- from 4Z?
	A	For Little Rock from 4Z?  "June 1st, 2330 Zulu, 02" --
	Q	You can start on the line from 4Z, if you'd like to, to get 
right to the time of the estimated time of arrival.
	A	The copy isn't very clear, but --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes, Inspector?  Let's get your 
microphone on, Mr. Baker.  
		Yes, Mr. Baker, American Airlines is recognized.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  I'd like to point 
out for the record that this particular exhibit was not specified for 
this witness, and he has not been prepared on it.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is that correct, Mr. Feith?  Mr. 
Berman?
		MR. BERMAN:  Our information is that he was advised to 
prepare for the entire two series of -- of exhibits which would include 
this one.
		MR. BAKER:  That's not so indicated on our latest 
witness list, dated 1/18.
		MR. EICK:  Well, the question basically revolves around 
the forecast that he recalls --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, wait a minute.  I want to find 
out whether it's on the list or not.  It's on the 1/25 list.  Did you not 
receive the 1/25 list?
		MR. BAKER:  Well, we have a 1/18 that says 2 Series.  Is 
that the entire --
		MR. BERMAN:  Yes.  I apologize if that wasn't clear to -- 
to American Airlines.  The 2 Series indicates all -- all of the ones 
beginning with 2 up through the whole alphabet and triple alphabet.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And I'll point out that this 
information for this hearing is in volumes.  So, there's a considerable 
amount of material in the 2 Series that might be referred to.
		Please proceed, Mr. Eick.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	So, on the 4Z, what was the forecast for Little Rock 
Airport?
	A	As I mentioned, the copy's very unclear.  You can take a 
look at this.  From -- I see Little Rock Airport, and 2-3-0-Z, 0-2-0-2-4, 
wind 1-8-0 gusts 15, up to 25 knots, six statute miles, scattered 
3,000, broken 8,000, temporary, and that's basically all I can read.  
It's not very clear.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Eick, if you have it, and you -- 
there are things you want read, you read them.
		MR. EICK:  All right.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	The forecast from 04Z, "winds 230 degrees at 12, 
gusting to 20 knots, visibility better than six miles, scattered clouds 
at 15, overcast at 3,500, temporarily between 04 and 08Z, winds 
variable at 25 knots, gusting to 40 knots, three statute miles and 
thunderstorm, light rain, mist, ceiling broken at 1,500 feet, in 
cumulonimbus clouds".
		Is that the forecast that you were basing your flight on?
	A	I don't recall, sir.  I don't.
	Q	Okay.	
	A	I remember looking at the weather, looking at the WSI.  
We received the airport information, the terminal information.  The 
airport was reporting VFR, I remember that, and we were dispatched.
	Q	In your pre-flight planning package here, we have the 
TAF, the convective SIGMECs, the weather watch, American Airlines 
SIGMEC. 
		Did you discuss this with the captain in the cockpit?
	A	The captain brought the information.  He said he was -- 
there was a concern about weather.  I mentioned it to Mr. Tew.  We 
did have two alternates, Nashville, I believe, and back to Dallas, and 
we did talk about the weather.  We did look at the WSI, the pictorial.  
It was off to the west, and the weather was discussed.  But we were 
still able to dispatch, and we did discuss it.
	Q	All right.  Were you -- did you receive any updated 
convective SIGMECs en route?
	A	Yes, sir.  Via the ACARS, there was a SIGMEC that was 
issued by the controller, and then shortly after that, we received the -
- the free-text message.
	Q	Do you remember what that convective SIGMEC referred 
to --
	A	It referred to --
	Q	-- or what it discussed?
	A	It referred to a box of weather activity off to the west of 
Arkansas, and -- and I don't remember more than that at this point.
	Q	Okay.  You mentioned earlier that you had received 
some training in meteorology with American Airlines.  Do you 
remember how many hours?  One?  Three?  10 hours?
	A	I don't recall.  Ground school was, I believe, a mixture of 
three weeks of ground school and simulator training.
	Q	Not three weeks of pure meteorology?
	A	No, sir.  But it was definitely a topic, and I don't 
remember exactly how many hours.
	Q	Did any of that training include any discussion on 
thunderstorms and thunderstorm dynamics, gust fronts, lines of 
severe thunderstorms, etc.?
	A	As I sit here today, I -- I can't remember specifically, but 
I'm sure it did.
	Q	Did the training discussed with your airborne radar 
about beam width, wave length -- do you know what the airborne 
weather radar wave length and beam width are --
	A	No, sir.
	Q	-- on the airplane?
	A	Do not.
	Q	And do you -- you don't recall if that was in any of the 
training?
	A	I don't recall.
	Q	En route, you mentioned that the lightening and 
referring to it off the side of the airplane.  Do you remember the 
frequency or type of lightening?  Was it in cloud?  Cloud-to-cloud?
	A	It was -- it was cloud-to-cloud, and we did see the 
lightening, and we -- Captain Bushman made the PA to the 
passengers, and we did discuss it.
	Q	He made the comment to the passengers why?  Because 
of the frequency or the amount of illumination?
	A	I think he just wanted to calm the passengers down, that 
he was aware of -- of the weather, and -- and what was going on 
outside on the left-hand side of the aircraft.
	Q	With regards to the -- what you saw on your radar, you 
said that you only saw green returns?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Did that match what you had seen in the WSI weather 
briefing or in reference to weather watches, the convective SIGMEC 
of a line of severe thunderstorms?
	A	The WSI and the radar picture matched to the extent 
that they both showed the line of weather off to the west and to the 
east.  The WSI is a black and white print-out, and it doesn't -- it's 
hard to see the intensity, if you will, without the color.  But there are 
ways that you can read the WSI and extract the -- the information.
		As far as the correlation between the information we 
received at that point, we were more concerned with the weather 
activity we were seeing and instead of the information that we 
already gathered.
	Q	One last question for you.  As you were in the terminal 
area, and you were being provided the low-level wind shear alerts, 
you -- you made a comment about you disregarded them because 
they were alerts and not warnings?
	A	It's not a disregard of the -- of the wind shear, but 
procedurally, a wind shear alert gives a crew that there's a possibility 
of encountering a wind shear on final, and the crew is -- Captain 
Bushman did, from what I understand -- that's why I interpreted it, 
when he used VERAP+20, he had that extra margin of safety on the 
final approach.
		But I don't remember or recall any procedure saying 
that a wind shear warning or alert is a discontinuation of an 
approach criteria.
	Q	Did you have any discussion with the captain about 
initially we were planning on this southerly wind, landing to the 
south, and now thunderstorms are being reported in the vicinity, and 
now we have a northwest wind?  Did you discuss what was causing 
that change in the wind?
	A	The actual discussion of cause, no.
	Q	Did it come to your attention or did you start to think of 
anything related to a gust front impacting the airport?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	All right.  That's all the questions I have.  Thank you very 
much.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  We'll move now to the 
tables for questioning.  Per the Board's procedures, American 
Airlines will be given the opportunity to question last.  We will begin 
with the Federal Aviation Administration and move across the tables 
from my right to the left, and then we will stagger after that who 
begins, so everyone has an opportunity to question first or in various 
sequence.
		If you'd please identify yourself, the Federal Aviation 
Administration table is recognized for questioning.
		MR. STREETER:  Yes, Mr. Chairman.  Lyle Streeter from 
the FAA.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	Mr. Origel, could you please go to the cockpit voice 
recorder exhibit, which I believe is 12, the transcript?  And if you 
would, sir, go to Page 40, and that's the page numbers marked down 
in the lower right corner.
		Now, it states elsewhere in here that you did get to 
listen to the CVR, is that correct?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  You talked earlier about the go-around statement.
	A	Yes.
	Q	Okay.  There is an entry at 1149:58 which is unclear.
	A	Correct.
	Q	Is -- is that where the go-around statement occurred?
	A	Yes, sir.  Upon my review with Captain Mark Sisel and -- 
and another captain that was in the review with us, we both 
concurred that we can hear the "go" very clearly, and the rest of the 
go-around statement, it seems like there was communication from 
both Rick and I at the same time.
	Q	Okay.  I want to -- I want to ask one further question on 
that, but it'll require a change of page.  While we're still on this page, 
if you'd look down to -- two lines down there, 1150:02, where it 
attributes to the captain the "I can't see it" statement, and I believe 
you stated you did not recall hearing that statement, is that correct?
	A	No, sir, I do not.
	Q	Okay.  After that, it attributes to you a statement of "got 
it".
	A	Correct.
	Q	Did you make that statement?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Do you recall what it was you saw or heard that -- and 
what did you intend by the "got it" statement?
	A	Does he have control of the aircraft?  Does he -- when -- 
when I'm looking over at him, after I make the go-around statement, 
and there's no go-around being executed, I looked over at him, and 
he's bringing the airplane back on course, and I just made the 
statement "you got it".
	Q	Okay, sir.  Now, in the same document, up to, I believe it 
is, Page 3, and this is the page, I think, that has the information that 
-- that you provided after your review of the tape.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Going again to the go-around statement, where it only 
attributes -- you stated very clearly you heard the word "go".  Do you 
have the page there now?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  There are two asterisks there.  Do you recall -- 
does that indicate that there were two words that you think were 
stated after "go"?
	A	It seems like, as I mentioned, I made -- I clearly 
remember, and I remember talking to Captain Dave Tew about this in 
the hospital, before anybody had heard the CVR, that I did make a 
go-around statement.  So, I remember that very clearly.
		Upon listening to the CVR, it seems as though there's a 
statement that's talked over by the captain at that point.  So, -- and 
it's unintelligible.  You can't understand what is being said.
	Q	Okay.  Understood.  Thank you, sir.
		Now, going back to the bowling alley message on 
ACARS, --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- did you perceive that message as anybody pressuring 
you to -- to rush the trip or do anything unusual?
	A	No, sir.  I just looked at it as being very informative, of 
being able to concisely give us a pictorial of what the previous 
message was indicating.
	Q	Okay.  Did the -- did the captain say or do anything to 
indicate to you in any way that he perceived that as applying 
pressure to --
	A	I don't recall that being discussed.  No, sir.
	Q	I believe you had mentioned that at -- somebody asked 
you earlier about your -- whether you were tired or not at DFW.  Let's 
go a little further.
		On the DFW-Little Rock leg, did you feel tired or fatigued 
in any way?
	A	I don't recall.  It was -- it was a short but busy flight, and 
the first officer's position in the DC-9 is busy.  So, I remember being 
busy with the work, if you will, but I don't remember actually talking 
about being tired or -- or being distracted.
	Q	Okay.  During -- during that leg of the flight, do you 
recall the captain making any statement or taking any action or doing 
anything that led you to believe he was fatigued or tired?
	A	During the flight, no, but during -- upon review of the 
CVR, I can hear a few things that indicate that.  A yawn at one point, 
I believe.
	Q	Okay.  A yawn.  Any actions or anything that caused you 
concern about whether he was fatigued?
	A	At the time, I didn't remember that yawn or any 
comments.
	Q	Okay.  How about upon review?  I think you mentioned 
you heard the yawn on review of the CVR.  Is there anything else on 
the CVR that might have caused you concern about the captain being 
fatigued?
	A	No, because after that point, things started happening 
pretty quickly, and we seemed to be both working pretty well and 
pretty alert.
	Q	That's all the questions I have, sir.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Boeing Commercial Airplane 
Group is recognized.
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, Ron Hinderberger 
from Boeing.  Boeing has no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you.  The Allied Pilots 
Association is recognized.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Mr. Chairman, First Officer Origel is 
represented by the APA, Allied Pilots Association.  With the 
concurrence of American Airlines, we request that we question the 
witness last.
		MR. BAKER:  We concur.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's fine.  The Association of 
Professional Flight Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  Kathy Lord-Jones, Association of 
Professional Flight Attendants, and we have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  Yes.  Bob Kuessner, National Weather 
Service.  I do have several questions.
		BY MR. KUESSNER:
	Q	I'd like you to -- to refer you back to Exhibit Number 2E, 
specifically Page 28, and I'm hoping, based on our experience with 
the TAF, that this will be more legible.
		Right across the top where it says, "Convective SIGMEC, 
11C", --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- I believe you -- you had indicated receiving that 
convective SIGMEC earlier in your testimony.
		Is this the one that you recall before you departed?
	A	As I mentioned, it was part of our dispatch release.  
There was quite a bit of information, and I don't remember 
specifically, as I sit here today, looking at this, if it was in the 
dispatch release.
	Q	Now, in -- in the -- in the line there, where it starts, 
"From", can you read that, "From 20 east northeast"?
	A	Yes.
	Q	So forth.
	A	Yes.
	Q	Just looking at that line, those are VORs, are they not, --
	A	Correct.
	Q	-- that bound the area of the convective SIGMEC?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	And based on that, would you say that it included Little 
Rock and a substantial portion of Arkansas to the north-northwest 
and west?
	A	Without the VORs in front of me right now and sitting 
here, I -- I remember that that was one of our concerns in looking at 
the WSI that showed that convective activity to the northwest.  So, I 
remember the pictorial more than I do the text.
	Q	Okay.  Now, on the second line, where it starts out with 
"area", what does S-E-V-T-S mean to you?
	A	Severe thunderstorms.
	Q	And it would be moving then from 300 at 20 knots?
	A	Correct.  Tops of 4-5-0.
	Q	So, assuming that Little Rock was already in this area 
with time, this is saying that with time, the area would be moving 
towards the southeast, and Little Rock would be further embedded in 
the area?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Is there any reference to hail and wind gusts in that 
forecast?
	A	Yes, sir.  Hail of two inch, wind gusts to 70 knots 
possible.
	Q	And you said that you received an update to this 
SIGMEC while you were in flight?
	A	Correct, sir.
	Q	Thank you very much.  That's all I have.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  Little Rock National Airport has no 
questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  Little Rock Fire Department has no 
questions.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  We'll return then to the Allied 
Pilots Association.  The agreement would be that you want to go last.  
We'll have American Airlines next then.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
		BY MR. BAKER:
	Q	Good morning, Mr. Origel.
	A	Good morning.
	Q	When one thinks of a bowling alley, one gets a picture of 
a long, narrow affair.  Either from the ACARS message or your radar 
displays, can you give us some sense of -- of the size of this bowling 
alley affair?
	A	From the --
	Q	From your point of view.
	A	From the flight deck, the weather that we were depicting 
and seeing visually at that point in the flight, as I mentioned, it was 
clear in front of us, and I -- I took it to mean that the bowling alley 
was a very large lane.  So, it was a wide area.
		I don't know exactly the mileage.  I think Mr. Trott would 
be better than I.
	Q	Thank you.  Did the tower controller ever give you a 
report on the runway conditions in terms of contamination or braking 
action?
	A	I don't recall, sir, no.
	Q	And, finally, did the tower controller ever withdraw the 
clearance to land?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Thank you.  We have no other questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  With our deepest appreciation to the 
witness, we have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  We'll move to the Board of 
Inquiry and Mr. Sweedler.
		MR. SWEEDLER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY	
		BY MR. SWEEDLER:
	Q	Good afternoon, Mr. Origel.  I just have a couple of 
questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is your microphone on, Mr.  
Sweedler?  If it is, I'm not hearing it.
		MR. SWEEDLER:  Yes.


INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. SWEEDLER:
	Q	I just have a couple of questions.  I was curious as to the 
decision when you decided to switch runways to 4 R, I believe.  The 
length of 4 R is 7,200 feet, and I was wondering if any consideration 
was given to using 4 Left which was an extra thousand plus feet.
	A	Yes, sir.  But it was NOTAM'd closed.
	Q	Oh, okay.  Thank you.  One area that hasn't been 
discussed that I'd like to cover with you a little bit is could you just 
give us an idea of what occurred after the aircraft came to a stop?
	A	As we hit -- let me back up.  As we went off the end of 
the runway, I could see the runway lights coming up, and I knew we 
were going off the end of the runway, and I thought that -- I couldn't 
see anything in front of us, and all I thought was the gear would 
collapse, and we would continue to slide, and it's got to be okay, and 
then all of a sudden, I felt the impact, a left -- to my left side.
		I put my hands up because I saw Captain Bushman put 
his hands up off my -- in my peripheral vision, and all I remember is 
the explosion, if you will, of glass and debris from the left side.
		The airplane came to rest.  Captain Bushman's seat was 
cocked to the left, and there was a hole in the left-hand side of the 
aircraft, and I couldn't see Captain Bushman.  I called for him a 
couple times and -- and got no response.
		As the -- as I'm sitting in my seat, still strapped in, I felt 
this odd sensation, this odd pain, and it started to become 
excruciating, and as I sat there, I knew I had to get out.  I couldn't 
see anything.  It was completely dark in the cockpit.
		So, I unbuckled my seat.  I stepped up on my right foot, 
and it was no problem, and I put my hand on the console.  As I put 
my weight on my left foot, I collapsed behind the console, and I 
couldn't move, and I heard the passengers, and, so, I knew tower had 
-- was monitoring us, and I felt confident that they would call for the 
crash crew.
		My briefcase was just behind me, and it contained my 
Flight Manual, Part 1, my cell phone and other things.  So, I -- the 
first thing I did, thinking of my family, I called my wife and just said 
you might get a call.  So, I'm okay.
		Then I called the company to make sure that they were 
well aware of we had a problem, and the company was aware at that 
point, and then I saw passengers outside the aircraft. 
		Quite a bit of time elapsed before fire crews arrived on 
the scene, and I don't have an exact time.  I just remember the Little 
Rock, Arkansas, Fire -- and I do thank the Fire Department.  I believe 
Robb was his name who helped me out and comforted me while -- 
they couldn't get me out because of the fire in the back of the 
aircraft, and I heard that.
		So, I -- I basically had to sit there until they were able to 
get the fire under control, and I was in pain, but I was okay, and I 
just wanted to make sure everybody was okay, and I could see the 
passengers, and I had the opportunity to thank the passengers who 
did help in the evacuation of the aircraft.  I'm very appreciative of 
that.
		And the fire crews arrived and got me out, and then I 
went to the hospital, and that's basically it.
	Q	Good.  Thank you very much.  I'm sorry I had to put you 
through that, but I appreciate that.
		Thank you, sir.
	A	You're welcome.
		MR. SWEEDLER:  That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?

		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Mr. Origel, thinking back to your -- your flying 
experience, both at American Airlines and the flying you did before 
that, have you ever had occasion on a previous flight to challenge a 
captain to go around?
	A	From my civilian flying to American Airlines, I -- I was 
always a captain.  When I was an instructor, I got my rating and 
became a flight instructor, I was hired on by a company to fly a 
KingAire and manage the department, and they sent me to school, 
and I was a captain there.
		The Learjet, I went right to the left seat in that, and I 
don't really have much experience as a second-in-command.
	Q	Okay.  Have you ever been challenged to -- to make the 
go-around?
	A	In a simulator but not in life.
	Q	Okay.  Please tell me -- thinking back to what your -- 
what your understanding was at the time of your approach, what -- 
what was your understanding about the position of the thunderstorm 
cell that was nearest you, and what was its movement?
	A	During the approach, we were descending.  I remember I 
had a good picture of the aircraft and the runway.  What I mean by 
that is I kind of had it in my mind, situational awareness, if you will, 
of where we were and where the aircraft was going and where the 
runway was, and I knew that the weather was off to the west, but 
because I could see the runway, I felt confident that we were in the 
clear.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  Do you recall thinking whether or not that 
that -- that cell or precipitation area that showed on your radar would 
have been approaching the Little Rock Airport or would you have 
thought it was leaving?
	A	I -- I don't remember at this point.  I think at that point, 
my visual cues was giving me more information than what I would 
see on my radar.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  What -- what direction do thunderstorms 
usually move from and to in the Central United States?
	A	Northeast, I would say.
	Q	They --
	A	In my experience.
	Q	-- move from southwest to northeast?
	A	Yes.  Well, yes, sir.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  
	A	In all fairness to that question, I -- I've seen 
thunderstorms move in all different types of directions.  Weather 
doesn't -- weather has a mind of its own.
	Q	Okay.  I know you said that you didn't give explicit 
thought to the idea of a gust front during this approach, but are you 
familiar with what a gust front is in relation to a thunderstorm?
	A	I've heard the term, but I've never experienced it, and I 
don't -- I've seen visual cue -- I mean classroom instruction on it, and 
-- but I don't remember ever experiencing it.
	Q	Did American Airlines train you on -- on the -- the outflow 
of -- of air out of a thunderstorm, out of a downdraft from a 
thunderstorm?
	A	In new hire class, we all monitored videos regarding 
some of these phenomenon.
	Q	Was there any reason to believe that a gusty wind that 
would come up from the northwest could be from another -- a 
different atmospheric phenomenon?
	A	I -- I can't answer that question.
	Q	I guess my -- my bottom line question is in this area.  If 
you're -- if you're concerned as you obviously were in this -- in this 
approach with -- with the proximity of a thunderstorm to the airport 
you're 
-- you're trying to land at, and if you're trying to make the -- the -- the 
most efficient arrival at the runway that you can possibly get, which I 
think is also clear from your testimony, if you're making an approach, 
and you haven't landed yet, and you find that the winds are gusting 
44 knots out of the northwest, have you reached the airport first or 
has the thunderstorm reached the airport first?
	A	If I may, let me ask that question like this.  I was the 
first officer on board that flight, and my responsibility at that point 
was to advise the captain and assist him in flying that aircraft.
		At that point in the approach, I don't remember the wind 
conditions.  I advised the captain of a go-around feeling that I had at 
one point.  He brought it back, and we landed the aircraft.
		So, I can't speak for what the captain was thinking, but 
my thoughts were I was concerned with the weather.  I expressed my 
views, and the captain may or may not have disregarded it, but he 
got the airplane back on course and landed.
	Q	So, would you describe what you were thinking about in 
terms of the presence of the thunderstorm on the field?
	A	I didn't see a thunderstorm on the field.
	Q	Yes, but you -- you said that you couldn't speak for the 
captain, but you -- you just expressed some concern about 
continuing the approach --
	A	Yes.
	Q	-- in response to my question about a thunderstorm 
getting to the field before the airplane.
	A	Well, my concern was of the captain's deviation more 
than it was the thunderstorm.
	Q	I see.  Would you consider a gust front or an outflow or -- 
or the winds from a microburst to be part of a thunderstorm or -- or 
different from it?
	A	I believe it's part of a thunderstorm.  It could be part of 
a -- I believe the terminology is -- a thunderstorm has three stages, a 
growth, mature and dissipating, and I understand that.
		During the growth and mature stages, it's possible to 
have this phenomenon happen.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  So, a -- a -- a downflow within the 
thunderstorm can occur during the growth and mature stages?
	A	I believe that mature and dissipating.
	Q	Okay.  I'll go with that.  Let me ask you a little bit about 
American Airlines' checklist requirements.
		You mentioned that there was a requirement to -- for the 
non-flying pilot, you in this case, for the before landing checklist, to 
complete the checklist and also to -- to call out when it was 
completed.
		Is there a procedural requirement for who's to call for 
the checklist to begin?
	A	To begin?
	Q	Yes.  Who calls for -- for doing the checklist?
	A	I don't believe there is a procedure for starting the 
checklist.
	Q	Okay.  If -- if -- if there isn't one, with you as the non-
flying pilot and a new first officer at that time coming out of training, 
how -- how do you know when to begin that checklist?
	A	Well, the captain will prompt you or when you see a 
certain stage of flight, and you know what needs to be done, you 
initiate it.  If the captain doesn't want you to -- to do the checklist at 
that point, I'm sure he'll voice his opinion.  He never did at that -- 
when I started the check -- the descent and before landing checklist.
	Q	When did you tend to start it on your flights at American 
Airlines?
	A	After we received the ATIS for the landing runway and 
the descent, prior to the descent checklist, and I believe the before 
landing at approximately the 10,000-foot call was around that point.
	Q	Hmm.  And the before landing checklist includes the 
landing gear and the spoilers being armed, and those aren't done at 
10,000 feet?
	A	No.  Those are down at a lower altitude, but to start, 
there are other items on the landing -- the before landing checklist 
that was clearly heard on the mechanical checklist -- on the CVR.
	Q	So, would you describe the -- the -- the American Airlines 
procedure or technique for performing this checklist to be that you 
initiated yourself as the non-flying pilot, and then you just kind of 
stepped through it, doing the items as they -- as they were 
accomplished?  Checking the items as they're accomplished?
	A	Even though I'm a first officer or we have first officers, 
the captains give us some discretion, and if they don't like what we're 
doing, and they're the captain, they'll tell us to stop.  That's my 
experience.
	Q	Did you get some advice on the line during your first few 
months about how to do this checklist from captains?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Can you describe that, please?
	A	It was pretty much in accordance with what we learned 
in the ground school, and my check airmen were the most helpful.
	Q	So, do you remember any specific advice?
	A	It was standard procedure pretty much, but just small 
technique items, and I guess there's -- it's safe to say in aviation, 
there's procedures and technique.
	Q	And, so, what was this?
	A	Procedure.
	Q	I've got one last question.  Would you expect an air 
traffic controller to -- to withdraw a landing clearance based on 
weather?
	A	As I sit here today, yes.
	Q	Has it ever happened to you in all of your flying hours?
	A	I've never experienced weather like this.
	Q	Who's in the best position in your opinion to make a 
decision about whether an airplane should be allowed to land or -- or 
told to go around regarding weather?  Is it the pilot or pilots or air 
traffic controllers?
	A	In my opinion, whoever has the best information at the 
time.  If we continue an approach, and the controller knows there's 
something possibly growing that we don't have the information for or 
something that we don't have in the cockpit, I would like the 
information, and I'm -- I have no problem going around or holding.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  What -- what information would you have 
liked to have had from the controller in this case that you didn't get?
	A	In all fairness to the controller, as I sit here today, I 
understand there was Doppler radar available at Little Rock or there 
was Doppler radar available in the vicinity, and that's the information 
I wanted.
	Q	Okay.  You -- you would want specific information about 
what Doppler radar was showing?
	A	Sure.  I -- I have visual on the field, and the controller 
was mentioning the winds and the rain, but not -- nothing beyond 
that, nothing about -- he never mentioned 70-knot winds or 50-knot -- 
wind velocity beyond that.
		Whatever the wind -- I heard -- I read somewhere, and I 
shouldn't probably be speaking on this issue, but the point I'm trying 
to make is whoever has information pertinent to flight should get it to 
the flight crews the best was possible, and if the controller doesn't 
think it's safe to land, we go around, and we discuss it later.
	Q	Okay.  Thanks very much.  No further questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  Thank you.  Just a few.  I'm sorry I was 
late getting here due to weather.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	In the event that you had to do a go-around, was there 
any special paperwork that you had to fill out for American Airlines?
	A	Not to my knowledge.
	Q	So, you would describe American as having a no-fault 
go-around policy?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  And there was a lot of discussion of the weather 
prior to touch down.  Could you describe what the weather you 
experienced after the touch down till you departed the runway?
	A	I believe I mentioned in one of my interviews that when I 
was in the -- when we just landed, and I made the comment "we're 
sliding", and I was trying to maintain orientation to what was 
happening, I looked out -- the nose was cocked to the left of the 
center line or to the left of the runway, and I remember looking out 
the side window, and I could see down the runway.
		I don't remember specific weather phenomenon 
occurring at that time.  Basically, I remember seeing the runway 
lights, the sliding and the going towards the left and coming back to 
the right and then going off the end of the runway.
	Q	Do -- do you remember any rain or hail at the time or --
	A	No, sir.
	Q	How about --
	A	In all -- I did mention the wipers on approach and 
experiencing some rain, but on landing, I don't remember what was 
actually occurring at that time.
	Q	Can you estimate the visibility down the runway?
	A	I just -- I spoke with Dave Tew about this, that when I 
looked down the runway, I thought I could see the red lights which 
would indicate towards the end, but I don't remember exactly the 
distance or how far.
	Q	Okay.  And I know you -- everybody would like to have 
more information in their cockpits.  Do you think that this controller 
provided you more weather information, wind information, than 
normal or this was a normal call-out by him?
	A	Well, one of the comments was made when we were 
talking -- we discussed internally was whether he became a 
distraction at one point, whether we had time to really disseminate 
the information, and I think that's an area that needs to be 
addressed.
		As I -- and I remember around the time of making that 
base-to-final turn, how fast and compressed everything seemed to 
happen at one time, and one of my concerns was making sure I 
didn't miss anything over the radio frequencies.
		So, it definitely needs to be addressed, and at this point, 
I would like to leave it at that.
	Q	Well, I guess you mentioned that you thought maybe he 
was giving you so much information, that it could have been a 
distraction.
	A	It could have been.
	Q	Did that give you any concern that maybe you should go 
around at that point or reconsider the approach?
	A	Well, it was always a consideration, and I was thinking 
about it, and as I mentioned, as we got lower, I did voice my 
concerns.
	Q	Finally, at any time during the flight, was there concern 
about the need to land at Little Rock in terms of your time on duty or 
having to go to an alternate, what that would do?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.
		MR. HAUETER:  That's all the questions I have.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		MR. CLARK:  I have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Origel, again I appreciate you -- 
we've kept you up here a long time, and I -- I do want to kind of touch 
on a few things, if I could, and hopefully will not be repetitive.
		Where do you reside?
		THE WITNESS:  Currently, I'm in Los Angeles.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Was that your home at the time that 
you were working for American on this particular flight?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And -- but you were based in 
Chicago?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, now I live in and my job's in 
Washington, D.C., but my family is in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and I 
commute back and forth.  So, I understand that's not that unusual 
now in our country, but tell me how that works in terms of you 
reaching your assignments, and I'm particularly concerned about 
your -- obviously your rest and fatigue.
		Do  you -- where do you stay in Chicago, and -- and how 
do you address the situation so that when you start out on a flight -- 
are you normally just coming from the West Coast or how do you 
plan all that?
		THE WITNESS:  I may not be the best witness for this 
question, the commuter question, that is, because in my situation, I 
have family in Chicago.  So, I was really living in Chicago, and I was 
going home to see my wife and my son, but because of our schedule 
at American Airlines, I was spending a lot of time on reserve, and, so, 
I spend more time in Chicago than at home, and I had relatives.  I 
had a car.  I had a house, and in fact, at one point, the relatives 
actually left, and I had the house to myself.
		So, -- and then there was other -- there was cousins in 
the neighborhood, and, so, I was invited over there, and it was -- as a 
pilot, I was living in Chicago.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  So, you started out that 
morning spending the night in Chicago?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And how many nights had you been 
in Chicago?
		THE WITNESS:  I believe it came -- it was Memorial 
weekend.  I believe I came in a day early.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And -- and I guess you stated 
that you flew a leg and the captain flew a leg.  The captain flew a leg, 
then you flew a leg, and then the captain was flying this leg to Little 
Rock.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And is that normal to -- to rotate like 
that?
		THE WITNESS:  Alternate legs is standard procedure, 
yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, now, in Dallas, when you had the 
two-hour layover, was the dispatcher aware of how much time you all 
had been on duty?  I think I noticed that some of the conversations, 
maybe that was -- was discussed as an impact that you might have 
to -- you know, that you might have to beg off the trip or unless -- if 
you waited for -- what was the equipment?  Maybe you can explain 
that for me.
		THE WITNESS:  As we were getting close to our limit, 
duty-time limit, Captain Bushman made the comment that he was 
going to get the weather, and I went upstairs and was checking on 
the status of our aircraft.
		So, I called the dispatcher.  He said he had just sat 
down at that point.  He -- I mentioned our situation.  I made the 
comment that we have a lot of passengers here, and that our duty 
time was getting close, and we would have to take the flight or not, 
and he'd have to get another crew or something to that effect.  But 
there was no pressure.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Were you talking to the dispatcher 
himself?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And he's there at the airport in the 
Operations Center?
		THE WITNESS:  I believe he's at the Dispatcher Center, 
which is in a different location than the airport.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But you were talking to him on the 
telephone?
		THE WITNESS:  Correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  On the telephone.  And then, he's an 
employee of American Airlines?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Now, explain to me, if you could, 
what in your mind is the responsibilities of the dispatcher and what 
he provides you before a flight?
		THE WITNESS:  According to the FARs, he and the 
captain have a joint responsibility in dispatching an aircraft.  The 
captain and the dispatcher will agree on the pertinent information on 
the flight regarding weather, fuel, and alternates.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And then you're briefed on that 
information or are you part of that process?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  That's between the captain and 
the dispatcher.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, the decision here was the 
captain's and the dispatcher's to go ahead and proceed with Flight 
1420?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  And in your training, you 
mentioned you'd had some training, extensive training, obviously 
with American, and you came to American obviously with a lot of 
experience.
		In the training that American on weather, was the 
expression "bowling alley" used during the training?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir, and as I mentioned, I believe the 
dispatcher was trying to give us a descriptive view from the text, and 
it demonstrated his ability to give us the information we were looking 
at on the -- on the text.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  
		THE WITNESS:  It's common to get free-text messages 
through the ACARS.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Right, and I just was -- I was just 
wondering about the training and whether that description or 
expression had been -- been used before --
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir, not to my knowledge.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- during the training, and 
-- very well.   
		Now, in regard to -- you've had a chance to listen to the 
cockpit voice recorder, --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- and in retrospect, were you all on 
time or behind in terms of, you know, the procedures and things that 
needed to be done to prepare the plane for landing?
		THE WITNESS:  I thought up to the descent, before 
landing checklist, the items that I mentioned were accomplished.  
They were done on time.  At the point of approximately a thousand 
feet or the flaps, I was behind the aircraft at that point but catching 
up.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And you expressed your 
concern, and at one point on the go-around, and the captain -- do 
you think he heard that information?
		THE WITNESS:  After reviewing the cockpit voice 
recorder, I don't know.  I don't -- at this point, it sounds like, as I 
mentioned, that we talked at the same time, and he may not have 
heard what I said.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  As part of your training, is there any 
procedure you're supposed to follow when you recommend a go-
around as the non-flying pilot?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  To continue to give advice 
when advice is not -- when you think it's needed, and since he made 
corrective action, I stopped giving the advice.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  But you -- in your mind, you 
feel you followed those procedures --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- as trained to?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  We've discussed briefly the 
fact that you had -- you were going to initially land on 22 L, is that 
correct?
		THE WITNESS:  I believe so.  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And that you had not used the longer 
runway because the ILS was out?
		THE WITNESS:  Correct, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And then they changed you to 4 
Right?
		THE WITNESS:  Correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Were you aware that there was a river 
at the end of that runway?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  It was on the approach plate.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  It was on the approach plate?  I was 
looking at the approach plate, and I saw trees.  What does the river 
indication look like?  Is it --
		THE WITNESS:  The airport diagram, I believe.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Oh, the airport diagram has 
--
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  But you were aware there was 
the river there.  Okay.
		Now, when -- let me take you just a minute, as Mr. 
Sweedler did, to after the accident had occurred, and -- and you were 
sitting in the seat.  Are there any procedures that the crew is 
supposed to follow in those situations in terms of -- taught at 
American?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  The evacuation procedures, 
and as I mentioned, as I sat there, I was in excruciating pain, and it 
was completely dark.  I was disoriented, and my first thought was to 
-- to get out of that situation.
		But as I mentioned, I have the -- on the yoke, the 
evacuation procedures, and I just couldn't see them.  I couldn't even 
see the throttle quadrants.  I couldn't see the fuel levers, and I don't 
know if I got them or not.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Was there any emergency lighting or 
was it just pitch black?
		THE WITNESS:  It was completely black.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And did you hear the rain at that time 
or do you remember/recall?
		THE WITNESS:  Excuse me.  I'm sorry.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Surely.  Go right ahead.  We're in no 
rush.
		THE WITNESS:  Oh.  I -- I do remember.  It took a few 
minutes to get oriented, and when I got out of the seat, and I fell 
back, the hole in the cockpit and the lights and, excuse me, the rain 
and the noise from the rain.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But you did not see any -- I'm kind of 
-- I want to find out if any of the instruments or do you know whether 
the -- your ability to communicate, the radios were still working?
		THE WITNESS:  I believe all the power was off.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  All the power was off?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Did you have a flashlight in the --
		THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  It's in my kit bag, and I couldn't 
get to my kit bag because of its position.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I understand you're in shock and a lot 
of pain, and I -- I -- I'm just trying to understand the circumstances 
that evening, so that we 
-- if there's anything that can be done in the future to address the 
subject of the evacuation and -- and recovery effort, we've done that.
		Well, Mr. Origel, you have been a very cooperative 
witness.  I'm very appreciative, and we have -- you have been very 
patient while you have been questioned by this Board of Inquiry, the 
Technical Panel, and the Parties.
		I'd like to present you an opportunity, if you have any 
comments or questions that you think, based on your experience, 
that we ought to be looking at and changes of the FARs, American 
Airline procedures.
		As you know, the purpose of this hearing and the 
purpose of this investigation is to try to learn from this event to 
prevent a similar event such as this from recurring, and it is certainly 
fortunate that you survived as well as so many others, and, of course, 
the whole event was tragic as well as the loss of life of the individuals 
who -- the 11 individuals who died in this event.
		But I would certainly welcome any comments that you 
would have on any subject that you think might help us in the future.
		THE WITNESS:  I -- I definitely do want to help.  I do -- 
I'd like to increase airline safety as much as possible, and I think it's 
an on-going part of airline operations as technology increases and 
advances, and I'd like to reserve the right to be able to address the 
Board at a later time about my suggestions.
		But right now, I'd just like to thank the passengers who 
have written and expressed their gratitude and prayers and thoughts 
to my family, and I want to thank my family for helping me get 
through this process.  
		So, thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, we -- we thank you, and -- and, 
Mr. Origel, normally we do not excuse our witnesses until the 
completion of the hearing, but I appreciate your willingness to come 
this -- this morning and spend the amount of time you have going 
through what I know is obviously a very difficult and painful event, 
and you are excused.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, sir.  Appreciate it.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will -- given the hour, and we have 
been going on, we will take a one-hour recess for lunch and 
reconvene at 2 p.m. Central Time.
		(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to 
reconvene this same day, Wednesday, January 26th, 2000, at 2:00 
p.m.)















A F T E R N O O N    S E S S I O N
									2:05 p.m.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene this hearing of the 
National Transportation Safety Board.  It's a public hearing on the 
accident of American Airlines Flight 1420.
		I'd ask our hearing officer, Mr. Berman, if he would 
please call the next witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Mr. William Trott, Flight 
Dispatcher.
Whereupon,
WILLIAM TROTT
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:  
	Q	Good afternoon, Mr. Trott.  For the record, would you 
please state your full name and business address?
	A	My full name is William G. Trott, and my business 
address is in Fort Worth, Texas, with American Airlines SOC.  I don't 
have the street address.
	Q	And by whom are you presently employed?
	A	American Airlines.
	Q	Thank you.  Please state your present position.
	A	I'm an aircraft dispatcher with American Airlines.
	Q	How long have you held the position of aircraft 
dispatcher?
	A	I've been employed with American since April of '96, but 
I've been under the AMR Corporation as a dispatcher since 1991.
	Q	Could you please briefly describe your duties and 
responsibilities as a dispatcher?
	A	As a dispatcher, I'm responsible under the Federal 
Aviation Regulations to monitor the progress of a flight, to provide 
safety-of-flight information to the pilot-in-command, and to cancel or 
redispatch any scheduled flights for American or non-scheduled.
	Q	And could you please briefly describe your education or 
training for that position?
	A	I graduated from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
in 1990 as -- with a Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Science.  I 
also received a commercial pilot license with multi-engine and 
instrument ratings.  I've also received a dispatcher license and 
advanced ground instructor license from Embry-Riddle, and on my 
own, I've received an air frame mechanic's license.
	Q	Have you any dispatch experience prior to joining AMR 
or its affiliates?
	A	I worked in the Federal Express Airlines Dispatch Office 
in Memphis, Tennessee, for one year but not as a dispatcher.
	Q	And how much total flying time do you have, and in what 
types of aircraft, generally?
	A	I haven't pursued flying much since college.  It's around 
300 hours only.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Who from the Technical Panel is 
doing this questioning?
		MR. EICK:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Eick, please proceed.
		MR. EICK:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Mr. Trott, good afternoon.
	A	Good afternoon.
	Q	Have you had a chance to review Exhibit 5A and 5B, 
specifically your statement, your interview with us?
	A	I've read over it briefly.
	Q	Okay.  Mr. Berman has already asked the 
responsibilities of a dispatcher and the shared responsibility.
		I would like to ask you, what was your workload on the 
evening of June 1st in relationship to 1420?
	A	The workload on the night of the accident, it was -- it 
was a busy night.  It was a challenging night, but it was manageable 
by my standards.
	Q	How many flights were you handling or releasing at -- 
during that -- your shift?
	A	When I come on duty at 10:00 p.m. for the midnight 
shift, the operation has winded down.  I'm pretty much in a flight-
following mode, and I was handling between 20 and 30 flights -- 20 
to 30 flights in various stages of departure and arrival.
	Q	Now, American Airlines is certified as an Enhanced 
Weather Information System or EWNS.  Can you explain to us what 
that means, and what advantages it provides you as a dispatcher 
with American?
	A	Sir, I'm not familiar with the EWNS Program.  I 
understand it's a meteorology function.  I -- I have a brief 
understanding of it but not a knowledgeable understanding.
	Q	All right.  So, you -- you were not EWN-certified then?  It 
was just the American Weather Services that will issue a forecast?
	A	I believe the Meteorology Department for American 
Airlines is EWNS-certified, but as a dispatcher, I don't believe that I 
am certified as an EWNS person.
	Q	On the evening of June 1st, can you tell us something 
about how you got -- went about getting weather familiarization, your 
knowledge of the weather conditions, and how it would be impacting 
the flights?
	A	Part of my work routine is to look at the weather while 
I'm at home.  I'm connected to the Internet, and I reference the 
Weather Channel on the Internet and also aviation sites for the en 
route scenario.  It's just a habit I've had since I started as a 
dispatcher.
		I wanted to see -- I knew that thunderstorms had moved 
through Dallas that night, and I just wanted to see how -- if the 
operation would pretty much look that day -- that night, and then as I 
came on duty, I took a briefing on the weather from the prior 
dispatcher that I relieved.
	Q	Your work station that you release your flights and do 
your flight following, can you describe to us how that is set up, what 
weather tools you have available at your work position?
	A	At my work position, it's a series of four desk pairings 
that pretty much encompass different parts of the country.  On the 
midnight shift, I assume responsibility for two desks.  
		Each desk has two monitors -- three monitors, and on 
the monitors, I have WSI vendor products.  That's a meteorology 
vendor service, and that is radar imagery, satellite imagery, and 
various meteorological charts that I require for my total 
understanding of the weather scenarios.
	Q	And how often are the radar -- radar summary or is this 
a single-site radar?  Can you explain a little bit further on the radar 
for me?
	A	It's not -- it's not a single-site radar.  It's -- it's -- it 
updates every 15 minutes for certain portions of the United States.  
On the desk that I was working, I had various areas of the country 
highlighted, and every 15 minutes, I would get a new snapshot, so to 
speak, of the radar imagery in that particular area.
	Q	Does that radar provide the weather watches, convective 
SIGMECs or American Weather Service's SIGMEC alerts?
	A	Weather watch boxes are -- are highlighted on the map, 
but SIGMEC areas were not highlighted.  We do have new technology 
that does do that now, I believe.
	Q	What about the access to lightening data?  Do you have 
access to that capability?
	A	Directly behind, we have these very large tv screen 
monitors that is inputted into the lightening detection network that 
they have available.
	Q	With the use of these systems that you have at your 
work station, have you received a lot of training on how to use and 
interpret the weather data?
	A	My training began in college.  I had one year of 
meteorology, basically two classes, and also at American Airlines and 
American Eagle, my prior employee, we are trained in weather, 16 
hours per year.
	Q	So, you had basically about 75 hours of formal 
classroom instruction at Embry-Riddle, 16 hours of meteorology 
training at American, and then recurrent training, also?
	A	Yes.  It is discussed yearly in recurrent, and also as a 
rated pilot, I was -- I was familiar with weather methodology and just 
pretty much being trained in it.
	Q	Did any of that training involve thunderstorm dynamics, 
mezo-scale interactions, things of that nature?
	A	Yes.  Thunderstorm activity is -- is also part of the 
training.
	Q	Another tool that's hitting the industry, if you will, is 
aircraft situation display, ASD, which provides aircraft track.  Did you 
have access to that at your work station?
	A	Yes.  That's a fairly new program with American Airlines, 
and it's a very useful program.  It portrays the United States, and I 
can depict various portions of the country that I'm responsible for, 
and I can superimpose radar pictures on top of actual aircraft that 
are flying.  It taps into the air traffic control system.  However, 
everything is in a delay mode.  It does not have real-time 
information.
	Q	Can you tell us anything about how that presentation 
was as you were getting ready to release Flight 1420 to Little Rock 
on the evening of June 1st?
	A	The night of the accident, the eastern half of the United 
States, from the Mississippi on towards the East Coast, was in 
various forms of convective activity.
		There was some very severe lines up in the Great Lakes 
region and also in the Lower Mississippi Valley, and there was large 
areas of scattered to broken thunderstorm activity throughout the 
eastern half of the United States.
	Q	And how was the impact across Arkansas?
	A	The impact across Arkansas at the time that I took the 
desk, there was a prominent thunderstorm line in the western 
portion of Arkansas.
	Q	With regards to your radar data, you said that it updates 
every 15 minutes, but when it updates, is that instantaneous -- 
instantaneous time or is there a lag on that presentation?
	A	The 15-minute updates, the radar picture can be 
delayed even further from there, from five to 15 minutes.  It's not a 
real-time picture.
	Q	All right.  Now, you also have text information at your 
work station.  So, you would have access to all the TARs, the 
terminal forecasts and weather alerts?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Do you have access to the weather alert updates, the 
WWAs?
	A	Yeah.  That information is relayed through the American 
Airlines Meteorology Department, and it is sent to me at my desk.
	Q	Now, also, as you mentioned, you have -- American has 
their own Weather Department, and it is well known in the industry.  
Did you consult with them on the evening of June 1st on how the 
impact with the thunderstorms would be affecting the flights?
	A	I felt totally briefed before I took the shift.  I didn't feel 
the need to further consult.  It would have been a moot point.
	Q	Is there any standard procedure of when you would 
contact the Weather Service?
	A	There's -- there's no standard procedure to get a 
weather briefing from the Meteorology Department.  They do 
broadcast a briefing, and it is up to the dispatcher to listen in on that 
briefing, if he feels so necessary.  I felt I was fully informed of the 
situation before I took the desk.
	Q	Okay.  I would like for you, if you could take a minute, to 
look at Exhibit 5A and look at Page 26, where we're -- you have the 
terminal forecast at 2330Z.
	A	I see it.
	Q	Is this the forecast that you released the flight on?
	A	Let me read it.
		(Pause)
		THE WITNESS:  It appears to be the -- the TAF that I 
released the flight on.
		MR. EICK:  Okay.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Can you describe the planning concerns you had based 
on that forecast, and what you knew about the weather situation?
	A	Looking at the TAF, that's not my sole reference to 
releasing a flight.  I also take into consideration the radar mosaic and 
the satellite imagery and the lightening data, and the main body of 
the TAF at the estimated time of arrival for the flight showed VFR 
conditions, and then there was a temporary condition for the 
thunderstorm, and based on the information that I was looking at 
and the radar, satellite, and the lightening data and the TAF, I felt 
that it could be a normal operation.
	Q	The -- the forecast is referring to a temporary condition 
with the thunderstorms.  Would that require an alternate based on 
the thunderstorm or because of the lowering ceiling of visibility?
	A	The Federal Regulations require that if the ceilings are 
below 2,000 feet, it does need an alternate, and that was -- that was 
one consideration I had, and, of course, the radar imagery that I saw 
in Western Arkansas, I felt they needed two alternates to give them 
more options.
	Q	Is there another term that we can use besides VFR in 
categories of weather?  We usually refer to IFR, marginal VFR, and 
VFR weather.  In that forecast, what category would that be based 
on?
	A	Well, my understanding of VFR conditions is ceilings 
better than a thousand feet and visibility greater than three miles.  
Technically, that is a VFR forecast.
	Q	But I -- do you agree that that meets the criteria of 
marginal VFR?
	A	I would say that --
	Q	Ceilings between 1 to 3,000 and/or three to five miles 
visibility?
	A	I agree with you.
	Q	All right.  On that forecast, did you plan a wet dispatch 
for Little Rock, and can you describe what a dispatch is for us?
	A	I believe you're referring to a release, and, yes, I did 
base it on a wet runway.  A release is sort of like a legal contract 
between me and the captain, stating that we have looked at all 
conditions en route, departure and destination, and both of our 
signatures signify that this flight can operate normally to its 
destination.
	Q	All right.  And that calculation of the wet dispatch also 
increases the amount of runway available for landing?
	A	The wet runway conditions, the way I plan the landing 
data is that I look at the available landing length, in this case 7,200 
feet.  That is a fixed reference.  The variables are the pressure 
altitude, the weight of the aircraft, and the temperature, and based 
on those variables and the fixed variable, I adjust the payload on the 
aircraft and make it so that the aircraft will be able to land per the 
regulations in that prescribed distance of 7,200 feet.
	Q	Is the Little Rock flight normally restricted to weight for 
landing?
	A	The runway and climb limit restrictions for Little Rock, 
there are none.  It's -- 7,200 feet is considered not to be a problem 
for the MD-80.
	Q	Okay.  Do you issue the pre-flight weather package or is 
that a load control or someone else's responsibility?
	A	The weather briefing package that's appended to the 
release is automated.  The weather briefing package, our system is 
set up so that the computer will look at the route of the particular 
flight, and based on the route of flight, the computer will pull up all 
weather data that is pertinent to that flight, and it'll append it to the 
weather briefing package.
	Q	Now, do you know what specifically is on that weather 
package sitting at your desk or -- or do you just rely on the MARS and 
square to select the required data, the observations, the forecasts, 
the NOTAMs, in-flight advisories and weather watches?
	A	Well, I do know what is on the weather briefing package, 
if that's what you're asking, yes.
	Q	Can you review the weather package at your desk?
	A	I have the capability of -- of looking at the weather 
package, correct.
	Q	Do you know if American Flight 1420 was provided the 
latest convective SIGMEC and severe thunderstorm warning?
	A	I do know that that is automatically appended on the 
weather briefing package.  There comes certain text information.  
You have a map feature of the United States in textual form.  It also 
appends all surface and terminal area forecasts that are pertinent to 
the flight, to that weather briefing package.
		We also include any notices to airmen.  Pilot reports are 
also appended, and we also have our company messages, I believe 
they're called J8s, and also F4s are appended to the -- to the release, 
and the other weather information is the de-icing situation at a 
station, and the runway conditions at a station.
	Q	Looking in the weather factual, Exhibit 5A, on Page 24 
through 26, is that the weather document -- weather docket that was 
provided to Flight 1420?
	A	The -- well, looking at it very briefly, it 
-- this is --
	Q	I should say it's a summary of what was included.
	A	It appears to be a summary.  It's not the actual 
information.  It -- it appears to be a summary of the information.
	Q	All right.  Well, we do have that as a -- well, under the 
exhibits in 5 -- in the original 5A, which is apparently not there.
	A	Yeah.
	Q	Did the flight crew call you prior to departure regarding 
the weather at Little Rock?
	A	The first officer called me, and we discussed his duty 
time limits and the availability of aircraft for 1420.
	Q	Now, this -- this route was being impacted with a line of 
thunderstorms and weather watch.  Is it normal to have a call from a 
flight crew when severe weather's forecasted along the route?
	A	The route was not affected by the thunderstorm activity 
at the time of release.  The routing that I had planned them on 
remained clear of the activity.  But usually the crew will call if there's 
a concern about the weather.
		But normally the captain and the dispatcher 
independently look at the weather.
	Q	Well, let me rephrase this.  Was the convective SIGMEC 
and weather watch current for Little Rock Airport?
	A	Based on what I saw, looking at our SIGMEC, the 
significant meteorological conditions report, and what I observed, it 
did reflect conditions that will eventually happen at Little Rock.
	Q	Does -- does that weather watch normally alter your 
flight planning or your flight-following role and escalate a caution or 
concern?
	A	Yes.  The weather watch boxes do take -- they do get my 
attention, and I do look at them, but I also take the whole picture, 
and I look in the movement of the area, the intensity, the estimated 
time of arrival, and per our regulations, we're required to remain 
clear of any broken or solid lines of thunderstorms, and that will 
affect my route decision.
	Q	Do you remember how intense that line was, that 
scattered to broken line of thunderstorms, approaching Little Rock?
	A	At the time that I observed the radar imagery at release 
of the flight, it was an intense thunderstorm line in the northwest 
corner of Arkansas.
	Q	And under the National Weather Service VIP levels, 
that'd be equated from what, from a Level 1 through 6 
thunderstorm?
	A	Say again your question.  I --
	Q	In the National Weather Service VIP Scale, Level Scales 
1 through 6, --
	A	Yes, it -- it shows the VIP Scale 1 through 6.
	Q	And the WSI radar is calibrated to give you six levels of 
return or -- or more?
	A	I believe our scale goes to 16, but that is a scale that 
you -- as a dispatcher, I toggle down because it will pick up virgo, 
which is very light precip, and, so, --
	Q	But --
	A	-- the lower scales are reduced so that they're not picked 
up.
	Q	But in this case, you -- you just mentioned that it was 
painting an intense cell or part of a line?
	A	It -- it painted a severe thunderstorm line in the 
northwest corner of Arkansas, correct.
	Q	Okay.  The flight has blocked out now, and now you're 
switching hats from a release to a flight-following role.  In Exhibit 5A, 
on Page 27, we have your flight update.
	A	Yes.
	Q	Can you read that to us and explain what you meant by 
it?
	A	Well, before I do that, I need to explain that our 
company SIGMEC was issued prior to my free-text message.  The 
SIGMEC is the formal notification to the pilot-in-command of intense 
weather or the severity of an area of weather.
		I felt that the cockpit crew needed to have further 
explanation, and that was the reason for this free-text message.
	Q	All right.
	A	Did you want me to read it now?
	Q	Yes, and just go on and explain.
	A	I wrote, "Right now on radar, there is a large slot to Little 
Rock.  Thunderstorms are on the left and right, and Little Rock is in 
the clear.  Sort of like a bowling alley approach.  Thunderstorms are 
moving east-northeastward towards Little Rock, and they may be a 
factor for our arrival.  I suggest expediting our arrival in order to beat 
the thunderstorms to Little Rock, if possible.  Regards, Bill Trott.  
Please acknowledge the message."
	Q	And did you receive an acknowledgement from the crew?
	A	A few minutes later, I did receive an acknowledgement.
	Q	Okay.  Can you describe what you meant by the "bowling 
alley approach"?
	A	In order to explain that, I must describe the ACARS unit 
on the cockpit -- in the cockpit.  The printer is very small.  The text 
that prints out, you're not allowed a large -- you cannot write a 
paragraph of information.  So, that is the reason for the -- the 
description the way I wrote it, to be as brief and concise and clear to 
the pilot-in-command as to what I saw.
		The large slot, as I explained it before, and also the term 
"bowling alley", the radar image that I saw, the bottom half was about 
half the state of Arkansas in width, narrowing down to about, I'd say, 
60 nautical miles towards the top end.
		The left side was solid.  The right side was broken.  Any 
escape or any diversion required would have been easily 
accomplished to the east, the southeast, the south or even the 
southwest.
		The term does sound rather non-aviation-related, but my 
only goal in giving him that term was to give him a mental image of 
what to expect out there due to the fact that his on-board radar will 
not paint a full area of coverage.
	Q	With regards to the remark about expediting to beat the 
thunderstorms into Little Rock, did you have information that the line 
or area of movement or speed was increasing at that time?
	A	The radar imagery that I showed was showing it tracking to the 
east-northeast at approximately 20 knots, and that's no indication of 
any increasing movement.
	Q	What further information would you provide under your 
flight-following role to the crew?
	A	Basically any safety-of-flight information is required by 
me to be sent to the pilot-in-command.
	Q	And that would be included as what?  Can you define 
that?  What you -- if you received an updated special observation 
from Little Rock, contamination confirmation again?
	A	There wasn't an indication of a special for a severe 
thunderstorm on the field till two minutes after the crash, but, yes, 
you are correct.  If -- if any information regarding the field conditions 
at estimated time of arrival, if it was in reference to safety-of-flight, it 
would be sent to the cockpit.
	Q	After you released the flight, at 0358Z, the terminal 
forecast for Little Rock was amended, and that is in Exhibit 5A on 
Pages 21 through 22.  That forecast lowered visibility to one mile, 
and thunderstorm and heavy rain, mist, ceiling overcast at 1,500 
feet with cumulonimbus clouds.
		Did you receive that forecast at your work position?
	A	I don't ever recall seeing that new TAF come to my desk.
	Q	What -- can you tell me what category that amended 
forecast put Little Rock into?  IFR?  Marginal VFR?  VFR?
	A	Well, that would put it into an IFR category, and the 
flight was planned as such.
	Q	Would that amended forecast be defined as safety-of-
flight information, a change in the basic forecast and require update 
to the flight crew?
	A	That's correct.  If -- if I had of received it, it would have 
been transmitted to the cockpit.
	Q	Is there any formal American Airlines procedure on what 
is uplinked, such as an amended TAF, granted it was not the one you 
released the flight, but a change in the basic forecast?  Is there a 
policy at American to uplink changed/amended terminal forecasts to 
the flights?
	A	There is no written policy.  The way the regulations read, 
and it is kind of generic or general in term, terminology, is any 
safety-of-flight information must be sent by the dispatcher to the 
pilot-in-command.
	Q	Okay.
	A	And this TAF could be interpreted different ways, but in 
my opinion, I would have sent it to the cockpit crew had I received it.
	Q	While you were flight-following, did you receive any other 
weather bulletins specifically mentioning terms such as "super cell", 
"line echo wave pattern", "bow echo"?
	A	No, I did not receive any information to that effect.
	Q	Are you familiar with their significance and meaning?
	A	Yes, I am.
	Q	Could you recognize any of them on your WSI radar if 
they had occurred?
	A	The terms that you just stated?
	Q	Yes.
	A	With -- yes, if -- if I had radar imagery, I could possibly 
identify those areas.
	Q	And I believe -- did you see any on that evening of June 
1st while the flight was airborne?
Any severe signatures, such as hail, loop, a bow echo, any of those?
	A	What the radar imagery indicated was a severe line, and 
I took it as that.
	Q	Okay.  What is American Airlines' policy on flight-
following and contacting the flight en route regarding the weather in 
the terminal area?
	A	Well, the dispatcher is required to relay any information 
to the crew, to the pilot-in-command, that affects the safety of flight.
		Now, there comes a point, though, where my role would 
almost not be effective to the pilot-in-command.  I'm basically a 
strategic planner, and I do the pre-flight planning or -- yes, the pre-
flight planning for the pilot-in-command to -- to reference.
		There comes a point as the plane gets closer to the 
terminal area, where the strategic planning is no longer effective, and 
the captain has to make tactical decisions based on the information 
he receives.
	Q	Do you as a dispatcher put any reliance on the FAA Air 
Route Traffic Control Center, Center Weather Service Unit or -- on 
providing weather support to your flights?
	A	The air traffic controller, it's -- his primary mission is 
separation of aircraft, but I also understand that as an additional -- I 
can't think of the terminology, but based on workload, he can provide 
weather information to the pilot-in-command.
	Q	To the best of your knowledge, do you know if the center 
controller has the same radar display that you have?  Same type of 
capability?
	A	The radar that the controller has, I don't believe it is 
specifically designed for weather radar imagery, but it can pick up 
radar returns.
	Q	Okay.  What about in reference to the Little Rock 
TRACON or Terminal Approach Control in the tower?  Do they have 
capability, to the best of your knowledge, of providing weather 
support?
	A	The TRACON and the Tower, I don't believe they do have 
the same capability as -- as I would.
	Q	Okay.  Does American Airlines Dispatch and Weather 
Service have access to the FAA Terminal Doppler Weather Radars, 
the TDWRs, nationwide?
	A	Does American Airlines? 
	Q	Have access to the TDWR Doppler Radars?
	A	No, we don't.  No, we do not have access to Doppler, 
which is unfortunate.
	Q	Okay.  Were you aware that the National Weather 
Service Regional Office in Little Rock had issued a severe 
thunderstorm warning versus a watch?  This was a confirmation of 
severe weather.  They had issued that at 0256Z for a line of severe 
thunderstorms approaching the airport.  Did you have access to that 
information?
	A	No, I did not have access to that information.
	Q	Would you normally have access to that?
	A	The -- no, I don't believe so.  Could you restate who the 
issuer of that information was?
	Q	Well, we initially put out a weather watch for potential 
conditions.
	A	Weather watch box?  I --
	Q	Right.
	A	That would be received by me.
	Q	Warnings are issued by the local areas to confirm severe 
weather and put a higher level of alert status up to the communities 
affected.
		Do you have those weather warning messages available 
to you at your work station?
	A	That information -- I'm trying to decipher as to what 
you're talking about.  I know we do get the weather watch boxes, and 
that -- that information is used by me, yes.  But --
	Q	Okay.
	A	-- the weather warnings, I -- I can't recall.
	Q	Now, you mentioned before about the lag in some of 
your weather products.  Would an accurate 30-minute movement in 
intensity forecast product of convection be valuable to you as a 
dispatcher?  30-minute forecast for thunderstorms?
	A	Any information that would help me to make a decision 
is very valuable to my decision-making, yes.
	Q	Okay.  How did you first become aware of the accident, 
and what action did you take?
	A	The first indication I received of the accident was 
approximately 10 minutes after midnight.  I received a call from an 
American Airlines ramp agent telling me that we have a problem with 
1420, and he said something to the effect "there's smoke, and it may 
be off the end of the runway", and that was my first indication of a 
problem.
	Q	And you notified who?
	A	The -- well, after that phone call, I called Little Rock 
Tower to confirm what was going on, and then I notified my sector 
and center manager as to we have a problem with 1420.
	Q	Were you relieved of duty shortly thereafter?
	A	I was eventually relieved of duty, yes.  It was a very 
disturbing event for me.
	Q	Well, I imagine it was, and I know from your background 
and your support that you provided, you made a good effort, and we 
do appreciate you coming in and answering some of these questions.
		That's all the questions I have for you, Mr. Trott.  Thank 
you very much.
	A	Thank you.
		MR. EICK:  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Are there other questions over there 
at the Technical Table?
		MR. FEITH:  Yes, sir.  I just have a couple follow-ups.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I wanted to ask a question, if I 
could, before you get to that, Mr. Feith.
		The -- how many -- at the time you were handling Flight 
1420, how many flights were you following?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't have an exact number for you, 
sir, but when I come in on midnight shift, the -- you know, as I stated 
before, the operation is winding down, and I'm handling between 20 
to 30 flights in various stages of departure, en route and arrival, and 
that's composed of two desks that are combined on midnight shift.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And then how do you pick and 
choose with the bad weather night what you're following?  You just 
kind of -- what you're following on the screen or how do you make 
those decisions?
		THE WITNESS:  The -- the Flight Monitor Program that I 
talked about a little bit earlier, I think, is the ASD.  It superimposes 
all aircraft that I'm responsible for on a -- on a map image, and it 
also imposes the radar snapshot at the 15-minute intervals, and 
based on that, I -- I take a look to see which aircraft need attention in 
reference to weather.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But you don't have the access to the 
terminal -- I mean to the Doppler weather radar at the locations or 
over the areas that you have responsibility for?
		THE WITNESS:  No.  I believe that's been addressed.  
We would like to have Doppler radar technology available as it is real 
time, but we do not have Doppler in our office.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is that on the Internet available or --
		THE WITNESS:  I've looked on the Internet, and I have 
seen, yes, Doppler sites available, but it's not available at our 
stations.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Now, the -- the -- and this information 
from Little Rock that didn't get -- you didn't get picked up and passed 
on, where did that come from?
		THE WITNESS:  You're saying I didn't get picked up what 
information?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What was the information you were 
referring to?
		MR. EICK:  Mr. Chairman, --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The amended terminal forecast.
		THE WITNESS:  Oh, the amended TAF.  No, I do not 
recall that coming to my -- my desk.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How would that have come to your 
desk?  On your screen or --
		THE WITNESS:  It is automatically sent to my screen, 
and usually, yeah, it will be automatically sent, and I can identify it, 
but I -- I -- I don't recall seeing that come across my screen.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, you just don't remember seeing -- 
recall seeing that that evening?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't even recall if it was sent to me, to 
be honest with you, and --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Who would have the responsibility for 
sending it?
		THE WITNESS:  I believe that's -- I really don't know.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do you know, Mr. Eick?
		MR. EICK:  The FAA's responsible for the dissemination 
of the weather.  So, it could be either the -- it slipped up from the 
FAA's dissemination or American Airlines dropped it in their 
computer system for some reason, or it might have been presented, 
Mr. Trott just does not recall.
		We do know for a fact that a terminal forecast was 
amended.  It was sent through the circuits, and it was provided to us 
in our -- our analysis and fact-finding trips on the Little Rock Airport.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Assuming you had that information, 
sir, what would you have done with it?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, it's sort of a moot point because I 
already knew that the area was eventually going to impact Little 
Rock.  An amended TAF would bring my concerns, but I already knew 
that eventually, that it would be a factor for Little Rock.
		I was more concerned with looking at the actual 
conditions at the field, and that's what I believe I was doing, was 
referencing the current reports, and they did not indicate any kind of 
gust fronts or any thunderstorm on the field.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  I have one last inquiry, Mr. 
Feith, and that is, on the -- when you calculate whether you're going 
to dispatch or not, do you -- and you're dealing with some people 
that are up against duty time, do you factor in how long it would take 
them to get to an alternative airport?
		THE WITNESS:  That's -- that's not a factor.  The 
crewman, the pilot-in-command normally will state that if he's 
fatigued or not, but --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  No.  I'm just talking about the 
practical amount of time that it would take --
		THE WITNESS:  For diversion?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- for a diversion, yes.  Just whether 
that's a factor or not.
		THE WITNESS:  Normally, that is not a factor.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Mr. Feith?
		MR. FEITH:  Thank you, sir.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Mr. Trott, just a couple of questions.  You had talked 
about your concern regarding the weather and providing a lot of 
information to the crew.
		Did that concern extend beyond the en route portion to 
and through the approach phase?  I mean you had talked about the 
fact that you were concerned about all of this weather, and then we 
had some updated weather information, the convective activity.
		Did you take that concern to try and keep 
communicating with the crew to provide them that information?
	A	Well, that was -- I did have a concern, and that was the 
reason for sending the updated SIGMEC, excuse me, and also the 
free-text message.  My -- I wanted to heighten the pilot-in-command's 
attention to the possibility that the thunderstorms could be a factor 
at our estimated time of arrival.
	Q	Okay.  But keep going.  After that -- that last free-text 
message, did you decide --
	A	I didn't receive --
	Q	Was there concern enough to -- to keep on trying to 
update them or --
	A	Well, looking at the radar imagery that I had, it still 
appeared the route was clear.  The current report at Little Rock did 
not indicate that there was a thunderstorm on the field, and as I 
stated before, there comes a point when the pilot gets into the 
terminal area, and my information is no longer tactical.
	Q	Okay.  You had talked about convective activity, and I 
think you gave a definition of that convective activity, am I correct?  
Did you talk about what your opinion is of convective activity or your 
understanding of convective activity is?
	A	In the conversation with Mr. Eick?
	Q	Yes.
	A	I believe we did talk, yes.
	Q	Are you aware of any American Airlines policy regarding 
the operation of the aircraft in an area of convective activity, any 
restrictions about flying three miles, five miles, 10 miles, in that type 
of area?
	A	Our policy is that we will remain clear of any broken or 
solid lines of thunderstorms.  That's the American Airlines' policy.
	Q	Any minimum distance or is that just a judgmental call?
	A	There -- there's no distance requirement.  It says you will 
remain clear of thunderstorm activity.
	Q	Okay.  Given the crew that -- given that this crew, had 
they waited for their original airplane, would have likely timed out on 
their duty day, what kind of impact would that have had for you as 
the dispatcher and the crew and then getting this flight underway?
	A	If we had stuck to the original aircraft, the crew would 
have timed out, and I would have consulted with the Dallas Tower as 
to whether they wanted to -- excuse me -- the Dallas American 
Airlines Tower, the ramp manager on duty, and asked him if we 
would want to put the passengers into, you know, the hotels or would 
you want me to try to find a replacement crew.
		I would take input from other people to see if we needed 
to find another plane and crew to take the passengers to Little Rock.
	Q	Using the conditions that existed that night, would that 
have been a significant burden on -- for you, given the fact of the 
impact that the weather was having on other flights?
	A	If -- yeah.  If we had been delayed any further, of course, 
I wouldn't have ceased operation because of the thunderstorm line, 
but we were able to get an aircraft swapped and depart.
	Q	Do you know what time that crew was supposed to 
depart from Little Rock the next morning, had the flight landed 
successfully, and the crew got to the hotel?
	A	Their required rest period -- I know that they would be 
legal after a required minimum rest period.
	Q	Which is?
	A	I believe it's eight hours.
	Q	But do you know what time they were scheduled out?
	A	The scheduled departure time?
	Q	What time that crew was scheduled out the next day.
	A	No, I -- I don't know what their sequence was for the next 
day.
	Q	Okay.  Tell me -- I know that you probably answered this 
question, but as far as the field conditions, do you recall how much 
time elapsed from the last notice of field condition report that you 
had in relation to the accident time?
	A	The sequence report that I was looking at, based upon 
an estimated time of arrival at Little Rock, indicated VFR conditions 
to me.  I believe two minutes after the crash, this is hindsight now, 
two minutes after the crash, there was issued a new sequence report 
stating severe thunderstorm on the field, but up to that point, it was 
VFR.
	Q	So, you didn't have any idea that the runway was wet?
	A	Well, I assume that the runway would have been wet 
because of the forecast.
	Q	Was that before the aircraft landed or during its 
approach?
	A	It was planned that it would be a wet runway eventually -
- let me try to think.  I believe the field condition report that was by 
the American Airlines agent indicated wet runway.
	Q	So, the crew would have been planning for a wet runway 
landing?
	A	I don't know what the crew would have been planning 
for.
	Q	All right.  As far as alternates and having a crew divert to 
an alternate, is there a policy regarding when the crew will divert, 
and do you have any influence on -- on calling that?
	A	The pilot-in-command makes the decision to divert the 
aircraft.  I can have a say in that.  I can't command the pilot to 
divert.  The regulations don't allow for that.  They state the pilot-in-
command is the final authority to the operation of that aircraft, but I 
can suggest to the captain, I see a condition that requires a 
diversion, and I can send a message to him, if required.
	Q	So, given the nature of your understanding of the 
weather en route and, of course, as it was moving into the Little Rock 
area, and your concern about that weather, is there -- was there any 
concern or any thought to suggest to the crew that they go 
somewhere else because of the weather?
	A	Based on the imagery that I was looking at, the route 
remained clear of the activity, and Little Rock field conditions also 
were reporting clear of the activity.  I assumed that the captain 
would make a decision if the field had reported a thunderstorm, that 
he would make a decision whether to land or divert.
	Q	But given the SIGMEC and all of the updated information 
that was -- that was coming forward towards the tail end of that 
flight, --
	A	Hm-hmm.
	Q	-- that still didn't suggest that they should go 
somewhere else or at least make an attempt to call them and discuss 
it?
	A	Once again, based on the radar imagery that I saw, I 
didn't feel that the flight was going to encounter the thunderstorm 
activity.  I felt it would remain clear, and I was relying on the captain 
to make the decision whether the field was clean or not for arrival.
	Q	Would you just look at Exhibit 5B, 5 Bravo, Page 18?  
And looking at the Figure 24A, would you have had access to that 
particular depiction of the weather?
	A	The radar imagery that I have is not that -- would not -- I 
-- I don't believe it would look similar to that particular image that 
you're referencing to.
	Q	Can you give me a -- your characterization of -- of that 
particular weather system?
	A	The imagery that I'm looking at right now?
	Q	Yes.
	A	It does indicate a severe thunderstorm line.
	Q	How about in the proximity of Little Rock?
	A	I don't know what the scale is, but Little Rock is in front 
of the activity.
	Q	With this kind of information, and given the time of 
1635Z, this kind of information, would you have passed that on to 
the crew and discussed going to an alternate based on this picture?
	A	Once again, I didn't have this picture to give that 
information to the cockpit crew.
	Q	Hypothetical.  If you had had this picture?
	A	Of course, it's required of me to provide any safety-of-
flight information to the pilot-in-command.
	Q	So, you are part of that process then as far as the 
decision-making process that takes place because it is your 
responsibility as well as --
	A	Well, --
	Q	-- the captain's?
	A	-- I don't make the decision to divert or land the aircraft.  
That's the pilot's decision.
	Q	Understand.  But you are part of that process of 
ensuring safe operation of the aircraft?
	A	That's correct.  If -- yes.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will move to the tables.  I assume 
American would like to defer to the end.  Has anybody else got any 
preferences?  If not, we'll begin with the Boeing Commercial Airplane 
Group.
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
Boeing has no questions of the witness.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  The Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  We have no questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  We have no questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  We have no questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  We have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Federal Aviation Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  One question, sir.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	Mr. Trott, the statement was made that the FAA 
disseminates those TAFs to you.  Is that your understanding, that 
American Airlines receives the TAFs from the FAA?
	A	We do receive the TAFs from, I believe, the National 
Weather Service, and --
	Q	Okay.
	A	-- I don't know what the link is.  Also, our Meteorology 
Department can issue a TAF, if required.
	Q	Thank you, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  We'll move to the Board of 
Inquiry.  Mr. Sweedler?
		Oh, I'm sorry.  American Airlines.  Thank you.  Mr. 
Baker, I apologize.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  We have no 
questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We moved through the table so 
quickly, I forgot.  Fine.
		Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no further questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Who's next here?  Ben?  Mr. Berman?
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Mr. Trott, you mentioned that you didn't believe the 
flight would have to divert.  You thought they'd get in based on the 
radar you were looking at.
		Did you give any -- any -- any -- any anticipation to what 
if they had to divert?  Did you -- did you do any work about where you 
thought they'd go if they -- if they did?
	A	Well, that was in the flight plan text.  There was always a 
plan for diversion, if necessary.  I elected to give the pilot-in-
command two alternates.  I did not have to give him two alternates, 
but I felt that he should have one on the east side and the west side, 
and I did take into consideration that if he had to go somewhere, I 
wanted to give him the options.
	Q	Did you do any ground work with the crew scheduling 
people or maintenance control about the event of getting that 
airplane into another airport in case that airplane had ended up in a 
different airport?
	A	If he had diverted to another airport, it would have been 
-- the information would have been disseminated to everybody in the 
company, and the alternate site plan, Nashville or Dallas, are -- are 
scheduled airports.  So, it would not have been a problem.
	Q	And if the airplane had diverted into either of those 
fields, would the crew have been able to take any more flights out of 
that airport that evening or would they have been done?
	A	The duty time-wise, I believe once they diverted there, 
they were -- they're required to stay there.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  No more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  Just a brief one.  I want to make sure I 
heard right.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	You recommended or suggested to the crew that they 
divert, based on weather?
	A	No, no, no.  I -- the flight plan text, the release, there 
was a plan.  I had two alternates, Nashville and Dallas.  In the flight 
plan, there was information for diversion, if required.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.
	A	Yeah.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		BY MR. CLARK:
	Q	Earlier and just now, you referred to the release and 
your evaluation of the weather, and you released the aircraft.
		What type of a scenario on a short flight like this would 
you be looking at that would cause you to hold that airplane or not 
release it?
	A	Well, there's numerous considerations to take.  In effect, 
whether the flight can go or not, weather being one of them.
	Q	I was referring specifically to weather.  What would you 
be looking at that would cause you to hold that airplane because of 
the weather?
	A	Basically, judging the time that the weather would be a 
factor for the arrival, and also, you know, any current conditions.  
That would be a factor for my decision whether the flight can go or 
not.
	Q	If -- if it were -- from your estimate, you were going to 
project that the weather were going to be at the airport upon arrival, 
that would be one cause to not release the airplane?
	A	If the main body of the terminal area forecast indicated 
that the thunderstorms would be on the field, that would be a serious 
consideration, but it was not in the main body.
	Q	Do the forecasts normally indicate that thunderstorms 
are predicted an hour away to be on a field, though?
	A	Well, -- say again your question.  I --
	Q	I stated it poorly.  Do -- do the forecasts normally 
predict that a thunderstorm is going to be on a field at a particular 
time, with an hour away?
	A	The main body of the forecast after the 4 Zulu would be 
a good indicator that, yes, there -- the -- the forecaster is definitely 
saying that at this time, there will be something on the field.  
However, if the forecaster is hedging his bets, so to speak, he'll say -- 
in the remarks of the forecasts, he'll say temporary condition or a 
chance of, and that's what the TAF indicated for Little Rock, that it 
was a temporary condition.
		So, I assumed that the forecaster wasn't sure whether it 
was going to be there or not.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I just -- Terminal Doppler Weather 
Radar, is that -- are you familiar with that, Mr. Trott?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, I am, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And you're aware, I guess, that some 
airports in the United States have that equipment and some do not?
		THE WITNESS:  I'm aware that Terminal Doppler Radar 
is available throughout the United States, but certain areas have it 
and certain areas do not have it.  It is a very useful tool.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes.  Does that impact your dispatch 
information, whether you have that type of information available or 
not?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't have that information available to 
me to render any kind of decision.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Period?  Do you know, were there 
plans that you would eventually have that type of weather 
information or the American Airlines Weather --
		THE WITNESS:  I know there --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- folks would have that?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I know there is a push to get 
Terminal Doppler Radar information available to the aviation 
community, and I think it would be an enhanced tool to use for flight 
planning.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And how would that -- how would -- 
but you don't know of any immediate plans at American for that?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't think American can instigate it, 
but I would like to see that available to the aviation community.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  All right.  Well, I would, too, because 
when people are sitting in their living rooms, and they got better 
information than someone, you know, getting ready to make an 
approach into an airport, we need to try to do a better job --
		THE WITNESS:  I agree with you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- in that area, and that's why I was 
trying to inquire.
		What is your hours of duty?  How long do you work, and 
how long had you been on duty?
		THE WITNESS:  I work eight-hour shifts, and the shifts -- 
my rotation during a month is six days on, three days off, six days 
on, three days off, and then six days on, four days off.  That's one 
rotation a month.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And I was trying to 
understand.  You were covering two positions.  I got a picture.  
You're not actually running from one position back to another, are 
you?  Is that two different set of screens or how do you do that?
		THE WITNESS:  No.  The desks are co-located within 
each other, and the dispatcher has the ability to merge the desks, to 
put all information on one or, if he so desires, he can go back and 
forth.  I choose to merge the information.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And that works adequately for 
you?
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.  The requirements on the 
midnight shift aren't as -- as they are during the day shifts.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And what is the difference in the shift 
where you don't have bad weather and one that you do?  How does 
that impact your -- your job?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, you have to expect bad weather 
days every now and then, and in a scheduled airline operation, and 
when we have bad weather days at American Airlines, there is an 
effort to bring in other dispatchers to maintain operational control.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Were any additional dispatchers 
brought in that evening?
		THE WITNESS:  During that -- during the second shift, 
the shift prior to mine, I believe there was other dispatchers on duty, 
and as the midnight shift came on, and the operation was winding 
down, there was no additional dispatchers available.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Well, Mr. Trott, you've 
been very responsive, and I'd like to provide you an opportunity for 
any comments you would want to  this Board and the individuals that 
are assembled that would have an interest in this flight. 
		If there any suggestions or recommendations that you 
have of areas that we ought to look at or changes that ought to be 
made in the aviation system, we would be glad to entertain them at 
this time.
		THE WITNESS:  The only thing that I can think of 
offhand is, as you stated before, that there is better weather 
information available on the Internet than there is available through 
the aviation community.  I would like to see that information trickle 
over, and it would be more useful to me.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  All right.  Well, thank you, Mr. Trott, 
and you're excused, and we'll call the next witness.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes.  I apologize.  Have you still got a 
question, Mr. Baker?
		MR. BAKER:  I have two items to cover, if I might, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Surely.
		MR. BAKER:  First, let me --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do you want Mr. Trott to remain?
		MR. BAKER:  No.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  You're excused, Mr. Trott.  
Please go ahead, Mr. Baker.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.  Let me try to clarify 
American's view on Doppler as we understand that subject.  That 
technology, as Mr. Trott testified, is 
-- is really quite -- quite marvelous in its abilities.
		The airlines of this country have a standing request to 
the FAA to gain access to that for our operation centers.  It's my 
understanding that there are various technical and vendor difficulties 
in achieving that, but the industry, through the Air Transport 
Association, continues to work that issue, and from our perspective, 
the faster we can achieve it, the better off we're all going to be.  So, it 
-- it's 
-- it's not a new subject to us, and it's -- it's one of continuous work.
		Let me move on to another subject that the Chairman 
raised earlier, and we think that in the normal course of things, this 
would be the point in time in the hearing in which we would hear 
from the air traffic controller at the airport, and we feel obligated 
because of how strongly we feel about this subject to -- to get into the 
record at this appropriate time the following points.
		American Airlines clearly supports the NTSB's public 
hearing process, but this hearing process is totally dependent on 
having all of the appropriate witnesses testify, and although our 
personnel would no doubt prefer not to experience the rigors of 
testifying in a high-pressure public hearing, they have recognized 
their obligation to show up and answer questions about this 
accident.
		The FAA air traffic controller who was in the airport 
tower and who cleared Flight 1420 to land should also be a witness 
here today.  He is conspicuous by his absence.
		The controller's perhaps the only eyewitness, other than 
the first officer, who we have heard from this morning.  Certainly he 
is the only one who can fully describe his own role in this accident.  
He is also the only one who can provide needed information on a 
number of important issues.
		Like the first officer, the controller was interviewed by 
the NTSB after the accident, but he is the one who is not here today 
to answer further questions from all the parties.
		We recognize that he may be distraught about his own 
role in this accident, but the accident was seven months ago, and he 
was previously able to give an interview and return to work, and we 
do not think this investigation should conclude without at a minimum 
the parties having an opportunity to further question the controller 
directly.
		Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, thank you, Mr. Baker, and let 
me mention, and then I'm going to call on Mr. Feith for a comment 
on this, that I appreciate very much the attendance of the officials 
that have been here previously, the first officer and the dispatcher.
		I think it's important to this investigation that these 
witnesses appear, and we have this opportunity for the questioning 
and dialogue that just took place.
		I myself was concerned and disappointed, but I will 
defer to Mr. Feith because I had relied on Mr. Feith in terms of advice 
on the testimony of the tower controller.
		Mr. Feith?
		MR. FEITH:  In response to your statement, Mr. Baker, 
the FAA provided me with a letter from the air traffic controller's 
physician, who is attending to the controller, and that letter states 
that his testimony under this type of environment may be 
detrimental to his mental health.
		As the investigator-in-charge, in consultation with the 
Chairman and the hearing officer, we found that with regard to his 
testimony under these conditions, it was better served that if in fact 
the parties have additional questions for the controller, that we will 
reconvene the Air Traffic Control Group as a group with the parties 
participating and come back down here, and under a less-hostile 
environment from the standpoint of his mental faculties re-interview 
the flight -- the air traffic controller as many times as necessary to 
glean the information that we believe is necessary to complete the 
factual record.
		We have to take that into consideration.  That was a 
responsibility I had and -- and the Board had as far as determining 
who these witnesses would be.  		So, again the offer is out 
through the Chairman and through myself as the investigator-in-
charge that our Air Traffic Control Group chairman will in fact 
reconvene that group and come down and re-interview the air traffic 
controller when he is cleared by his physician.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.  We find that an acceptable 
solution to this difficulty.
		Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you, Mr. Baker, and again I 
appreciate American's cooperation in providing the witnesses for this 
morning's hearing.
		Mr. Berman, the next witness, please.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Captain Eric Lewis.
Whereupon,
CAPTAIN ERIC LEWIS
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:  
	Q	Sir, would you please state your full name and your 
business address?
	A	My name is Eric Lewis.  My business address is GSWFA, 
that is Greater Southwest Flight Academy, Dallas-Fort Worth 
International Airport, Texas.
	Q	And by whom are you presently employed?
	A	American Airlines.
	Q	What's your present position, sir?
	A	Presently, I'm serving as the Managing Director of Flight 
Crew Relations at American Airlines.  At the time of this event, I was 
serving as the Douglas Fleet Manager.
	Q	And when did you begin your current position, and then, 
also, how long had you been in the previous one?
	A	I took my duties in my current position the first week of 
December of 1999.  I started work as the Douglas Fleet Manager in 
February of 1998.  Prior to that date, the 727 and Super-80 fleets 
were combined, and I was the manager of that fleet.  So, I've been 
working in the Super-80 fleet for about a period of three years.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  And considering the Douglas Fleet Manager 
position, would you please briefly describe the duties and 
responsibilities of that position?
	A	My duties as the Fleet Manager are to oversee the 
training programs, to ensure they comply with all applicable Federal 
Aviation Regulations.  I monitor our trainees' progress through the 
various courses that they are enrolled in.  
		I assist our Flight Operations Technical Organization 
with developing some of the manuals material and, in a limited way, 
some of the policy guidance contained in our Flight Manual, Part 1.
	Q	And could you please briefly describe your education, 
training and experience for the preparation for the position you're 
describing?
	A	Yes, sir.  I'm a graduate of Loyola College in Baltimore, 
Maryland.  I was hired by American Airlines in November of 1978.  
Since I got hired, I've served as a 727 flight engineer, MD-80 co-pilot, 
DC-10 co-pilot, upgraded to captain on the 727, served as a 727 
pilot check airman and Air Crew Program designee, and I've served 
as a Super-80 check airman, and an MD-11 check airman.
	Q	Thank you.  Finally, could you please give me your -- a 
summary of your FAA certificates and your experience in the MD-80 
and DC-9 fleets?
	A	Yes, sir.  I hold an airline transport pilot certificate with 
DC-9, 727 and MD-11 type ratings.  I hold a certified flight instructor 
certificate, a flight engineer certificate, and an advanced ground 
school certificate.
	Q	And your experience in the Super-80 or DC-9?
	A	I flew as a first officer on the DC-9 for a period of about 
three years, flying about 2,500 hours during that time.  I transitioned 
to captain on the airplane and flew it essentially as a check airman 
for a number of years.
	Q	Thank you very much.
		MR. BERMAN:  And now to Captain Tew.

INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Good afternoon, Captain Lewis.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We keep hearing that term, check 
airman, Captain.  Would you tell the audience, for those who are not 
familiar with aviation terminology, know what a check captain -- 
airman is, quickly?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  A check airman is a person 
designated by the FAA to perform proficiency checking functions, 
both in the simulator and in the aircraft.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you very much.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Good afternoon, Captain Lewis.
	A	Good afternoon.
	Q	The Operations Group has previously interviewed you, as 
we know.  Does American Airlines have any fatigue recognition 
training?
	A	Our fatigue training is given in the context of an 
alertness strategies course.  This particular alertness strategies 
course is taught during the basic indoctrination training for all of our 
new hire pilots and was also carried for a period of about a year and 
a half to two years in our recurrent training.
		It focuses, as I said, on alertness strategies; that is, 
more on fatigue countermeasures than on recognition of any 
individual symptoms.
	Q	Okay.  What training or guidance does American provide 
its pilots concerning weather and weather interpretation?
	A	Regarding weather and weather interpretation, during 
the captain and first officer upgrade courses, and during the basic 
indoctrination course, our trainees are familiarized with the types of 
weather products available to them typically on their dispatch 
release.
		Also during the basic indoctrination course, trainees are 
given a tour of the SOC and Meteorology Sections of the Operations 
Center, hopefully to encourage them to participate in the process 
and call on these resources, if they're needed.
		Additionally, in terms of weather training, the controls 
and indicators specific to the particular type of aircraft that they are 
being trained on is introduced in the ground school, and then the 
bulk of the weather radar training is accomplished during the IOE 
phase; that is, in the aircraft while flying with the pilot check airman.
	Q	Okay.  Maybe I didn't hear this.  Do you get into the 
weather interpretation, like, you know, the cells, how to distinguish 
what would be a serious -- Level 5 or Level 6?  In other words, 
weather interpretation?  Is there a course or training on that?
	A	We don't really train to the National Weather Service 
levels of thunderstorms.  We train to the precipitation reflectivity 
that's presented on our airborne weather radar.  That's the primary 
thrust of our training, and again we do that during the IOE phase.
	Q	Thank you.  What training or guidance for American 
provide its pilots concerning the avoidance of weather, such as wind 
shear or thunderstorms, including what criteria would they be given 
for avoiding thunderstorms, for instance?
	A	As Mr. Trott said, in our Flight Manual, Part 1, we have 
the policy guidance that American Airlines provides for operating in a 
terminal area, the en route phase, and so forth.
		Our pilots are forbidden to enter or depart a terminal 
area blanketed by thunderstorms.  The dispatcher and the captain 
will not agree to dispatch a flight along a route unless it is free of 
broken or -- or -- or greater levels of thunderstorms, and in the event 
that we can't avoid the thunderstorms entirely in the flight-planning 
process, the airborne weather radar is required to be operative to 
dispatch along that route.
	Q	You touched on the training that's given on the weather 
radar, the airborne weather radar.  Where does the pilot get its 
hands-on training in the operation of it?  I know how you can read it 
in the book, how to read --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Tew, before we proceed, I -- I'm 
kind of interested.  What does the word "blanketed" mean?  I think I 
know, but I don't --
		THE WITNESS:  It's a significant amount of coverage of 
the area.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is that just kind of your own opinion 
or is there some way you know that term?
		THE WITNESS:  There's not a quantitative percentage 
coverage or anything like that.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  All right.  Thank you.
		MR. TEW:  I guess it didn't stand out because I was used 
to the term.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I've heard these terms bowling alley 
and blanketed but not in this context.  So, I was trying to --
		MR. TEW:  It's an excellent question.  It's just I was just 
used to it, I guess, so it slipped right by me.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	The question I believe we were at was, you touched on 
the -- the airborne weather radar training that they do receive, and 
where would your pilots get their hands-on operation of actually 
using it?
	A	Again, we would do that during the initial operating 
experience phase of their training; that is, they've completed the 
ground school and simulator phases, and then they're assigned to fly 
a minimum of 25 hours in the aircraft, and during that time, we 
reference a worksheet which goes through the areas that we're 
required to cover with the individual trainee, and the operation of the 
weather radar is part of that training.
	Q	And what if the weather is clear when -- you know, you 
can't paint a picture to show a pilot what it looks like.  How do you -- 
how do you go about describing them how to use it?
	A	In the event we don't have a chance to observe actual 
weather conditions in flight, we have the ability to adjust the antenna 
tilt and get the trainee used to the weather radar display by using the 
ground return, and also we have reference material in both our 
Volume 1 and Volume 2 of our Operating Manual that has pictures, 
talks about reflectivity, the various types of precipitation and so 
forth.
	Q	What are American Airlines pilots trained to do when 
they receive a report of a wind shear?
	A	Could you be more specific about -- are we talking about 
a wind shear alert or a microburst alert or --
	Q	A wind shear alert.
	A	A wind shear alert should provoke an increased state of 
awareness on the part of the pilot that it's possible to encounter wind 
shear conditions.  We would expect him to evaluate the quality of 
that report in terms of the amount of direction change, the 
anticipated gain or increase of air speed, and then make a decision 
to either continue or to hold or to divert.
		If the decision's made to continue, we would expect him 
to take appropriate measures, such as increasing the planned 
approach speed for that particular approach, consider that there's -- 
or review and consider the possibility of a go-around or some other 
kind of maneuver to avoid the area.
		After that, the next phase that we want the pilot to be 
aware of is a recognition phase.  If he continues and experiences 
uncommanded changes in pitch, roll, rate of descent, then we would 
expect the pilot to execute an escape maneuver.
	Q	What is the definition of severe wind shear?
	A	Severe wind shear, as defined in our Operating Manual, 
Environmentals 13, is a reported -- a pilot report of an air speed -- 
abrupt air speed change of more than 20 knots.
	Q	Could you tell us what training is provided to American 
pilots concerning crosswinds?
	A	Yes, sir.  Specifically, on the sixth day of our simulator 
training course, and this is typical for most of our fleets, we have a 
day that is dedicated primarily to handling the airplane close to the 
ground.  So, that's our take-off and landing day.
		The take-off and landing day in the sim is preceded by a 
two-hour briefing that covers all the key points of the aircraft's 
handling characteristics, the wind shear escape and recovery, and 
occasionally there are other items added, such as TCAS and so forth.
		When we get them into the simulator, what we attempt 
to do is start off with little or no crosswind, dry runway, and then 
gradually increase the crosswind component until we reach the 
aircraft's demonstrated maximum.
		After that, we'll reduce the runway surface friction using 
the simulation; that is, decrease the amount of braking that's 
available to each trainee or available to the aircraft, and then we'll 
repeat the process, start out with a little bit of crosswind and then 
gradually increase it until we experience the control difficulties that 
we want the pilot to learn to correct.
	Q	Thank you.  How are your pilots trained to determine 
what the crosswind is, and if it exceeds the company limitations?
	A	The crosswind training is introduced in the ground 
school.  We have a day primarily dedicated to performance training; 
that is, familiarity with our performance manual.  
		The performance manual has a chart, it looks like a grid, 
where you can determine the number of degrees off the runway and 
the amount of the crosswind -- the amount of the wind velocity, and 
then resolve that into a headwind and crosswind component.
	Q	Okay.  If a pilot's flying like these pilots were doing, and 
they get a crosswind, would you expect them to take this chart out 
and look at it or --
	A	If they want to be very, very precise about it, yes, I 
would.  There are some general rules of thumb that you can use to 
approximate the crosswind component.
	Q	Okay.  What are American's procedures for landing on a 
wet runway?
	A	Landing on a wet runway, we'll encourage the use of 
aggressive manual braking or maximum auto braking.  We'd like to 
limit their reverse thrusters to approximately 1.3 EPR.  That's for 
directional control considerations.
	Q	And with a crosswind?
	A	Wet runway and crosswind is similar.  The procedures 
are similar.  The -- the intent or the -- the careful consideration on 
the crosswind part is the directional control issues that can result.
	Q	How does American train its pilots in wet runway 
procedures?
	A	In the simulator, again we -- we have the ability to set a 
friction loss, variable from zero to nine.  It's a -- it's an engineering 
scale.  It does not correlate to pilot reports of braking and so forth, 
but any type of surface contaminant is going to reduce that, whether 
it's wet or snow or whatever.  So, all we do is we adjust that friction 
loss component during the simulation.
	Q	Have the wet runway procedures been changed since the 
accident, and, if so, in what ways?
	A	As far as procedures, no.  They have received additional 
emphasis because of some of the conditions in this particular event.  
		We have added this directional control information into 
our recurrent training program, so that our pilots will have this in 
front of them as they come back through for their annual training 
cycle.
		We've also taken the opportunity after this event to bring 
in all of our check airmen during our third-quarter standardization 
meetings in 1999.  All of our MD-80 check airmen were exposed to a 
review of all the adverse runway condition landing considerations.
		To do this particular bit of retraining, what we did was 
we obtained a video that Captain Melody -- of a show that Captain 
Melody did at another carrier.  Tom has visited our academy before 
on this same subject, and again we used this video tape to give a 
credible source to go back through and review the information for 
our check airmen.
	Q	Okay.  I'd like to reference Exhibits 2QQ and 2RR, 
Quebec Quebec, Romeo Romeo.  
	A	Yes, sir, I have those.
	Q	Okay.  During observation of two separate simulator 
training sessions that were specifically dedicated to take-off and 
landing training, it was observed that during one session, wet runway 
procedures were not being followed by the students or the instructor, 
and during the other session, wet runway procedures were not 
discussed or trained.
		How do you monitor this training and ensure that proper 
procedures are being taught?
	A	As I said, when you and Captain Wyatt observed these 
two sessions, I was very concerned about it.  What we did then was, 
as I said, we brought everybody in for a third-quarter meeting and 
reviewed all the material in depth.
		What we do is twice per year, we have a standardization 
coordinator, that is typically an Air Crew Program designee that's one 
of our more senior check airmen, observe our newer check airmen 
conducting each of these types of events.
		We also have FAA oversight periodically to make sure 
that this is being conducted the way we expect it to be conducted.
		That said, for this year, we have also added additional 
staffing in terms of a full man-month of -- of a standardization 
coordinator.  So, now we have additional days and hours available for 
a senior check airman to observe perhaps some of our less-
experienced check airmen doing their work.
	Q	Did you monitor any of the training sessions after we 
did?
	A	Yes, sir, I have.
	Q	Did you discover anything of interest?
	A	No, not really.  I think that we gained a fair amount of 
benefit from reviewing all these adverse landing considerations.  That 
-- that presentation was very, very helpful, I think, for all of our 
instructors, especially our newer people.
	Q	Do you feel that American's wet runway training is 
sufficient?
	A	Within -- yes, I do.  Within the ability of the simulator to 
reproduce the kinds of conditions you can encounter, I do.  Again, 
there are some -- some limitations on the ability of the simulator to 
replicate what you experience on any given runway in any part of the 
country.
	Q	How do you --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Can the simulator simulate this 
rudder blanking?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  The Douglas Aircraft Company 
provided a ground-handling package, I believe in 1988.  That ground-
handling package was incorporated into all of our simulators within 
six to eight months after it was available.
		Again, depending on which test pilot you talk to, which 
pilot, line pilot you talk to, you may find some disagreement as to 
how faithful any simulator is at simulating those types of conditions, 
but it does allow us to train the desired learning objective, which is 
reduce the amount of reverse thrust until you regain directional 
control.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Once again referring to the wet runway procedures, how 
do you ensure that these procedures are being properly performed 
during line operations?
	A	In line operations, we give our captains periodic line 
checks.  To be honest, as you observe a captain on one or two legs 
per year, you may or may not experience these kinds of conditions.  
That recency is one of the things that I think helps the pilots stay 
proficient at adverse field conditions.
		Fortunately for us, most of the time, many of us aren't 
exposed to these kind of conditions on a very, very regular basis.  It's 
a relatively unusual circumstance.
	Q	Is an approach briefing required for all approaches?
	A	It's required for all instrument approaches.  If we are 
planning on conducting a visual approach, the captain is required to 
ensure that a briefing is conducted, and basically that particular 
briefing is going to be identified, who's going to do the landing and 
the runway of intended landing.
		If an instrument approach is planned, then the approach 
briefing, a full approach briefing is required.
	Q	Okay.  So, maybe I missed it.  For a visual approach, 
there's not an approach briefing really required, other than who's 
going to land?
	A	We're going to identify the landing runway to make sure 
that we land on the correct runway, --
	Q	Okay.
	A	-- and then we're going to brief who is going to do the 
landing, if it's other than the pilot flying, and -- and that will be 
probably the limit of what will be required on the visual approach.
		Again, most of us, as a matter of course, just about 
every place we go has an ILS available to us.  Most of us are going to 
review that, even if we intend on a beautiful day to -- to do a visual 
approach, we will review the information provided on the ILS chart.
	Q	What-- what training does American provide on approach 
briefings?
	A	The approach briefing concept is introduced in a ground 
school as we practice our normal procedures.  As we get into the 
simulator phase of training, approach briefings for each pilot are a 
very, very regular occurrence.
		Typically on every simulator session, we're going to do 
anywhere from two to five or more instrument approaches per pilot, 
and each of those approaches will have an approach briefing 
associated with it.
		The instructor is going to monitor that briefing and 
provide hopefully some constructive feedback about additional items 
that should be added or additional considerations that ought to be 
briefed, and then hopefully that continues into the IOE phase.
		Again, as you're flying with a new captain or a new first 
officer, you attempt to provide that pilot with the opportunity to 
continually practice those briefing techniques out in the real world 
where it really counts.
	Q	Who -- who conducts the approach briefing?
	A	Either pilot may conduct the approach briefing.  Our 
policy statement is that the captain will ensure that an approach 
briefing is completed.  That allows the captain to effectively manage 
the crew's workload.
	Q	Okay.  I'd like to refer Exhibit 2G, 2 Golf.
	A	I have that.
	Q	Okay.  First thing I would do is -- before that, what are 
the required items on an approach briefing for an instrument 
approach?
	A	I think we have that in one of the exhibits.  It might be --
	Q	Well, would you like to give us a normal American 
approach briefing using 2G?
	A	Yes, sir, I can do that.
	Q	Okay.
	A	Unfortunately, the -- the date and the chart number are 
cut off on my copy, and that's usually what I start with.
	Q	That's okay.  We'll allow that one.
	A	Okay.  I would begin by saying we're going to plan the 
ILS for Runway 4 Right at the Little Rock Airport.  It's the 11-2 Chart, 
and I would review the effective date.
		At that point, I would expect some acknowledgement 
from the first officer.  I would expect him to locate his chart, make 
sure that we have the same date, and then we'll go with whichever 
one is current.  Hopefully they're both the same.
		After that, we would review the reported weather, the 
report of visibility, and then compare that to the visibility required, in 
this case 2,400 RVR.  After that, I'd say the primary nav aid is the 
localizer.  The frequency's 1113.  The identifier is ICNL.  The in-
bound course is 42 degrees.  Initial altitude's 2,300 feet.  Glide slope 
cross is 90 at 2217.  Decision altitude's 460 feet based on 200-feet 
height above the ground.
		Missed approach procedure is climbing right turn to 
4,000 on a 1-10 heading outbound Little Rock, 89 radial to ATERS 
intersection and hold.  Airport elevation is 260 feet.  Minimum safe 
altitude, all quadrants, is 300 feet.  Highest obstacle is 2,272 feet, 
and that looks like that's on the 12-mile DME arc due south of the 
airport.
		After that, I would -- those are the required items.  After 
that, I would review anything that was special or unique to that 
particular approach, if we had an MEL issue that was going to affect 
how we operated the airplane, if we had any icing considerations, any 
other consideration that might require for us to do something slightly 
different than what we would normally do.
		The intent of the approach briefing is really to review the 
numbers that we intend to use to conduct a particular approach, and 
it also is to help us point out anything that's going to be different 
from what would be considered normal.
		Typically, we would not brief or rebrief what we would 
consider to be normal procedures as part of this approach briefing.
	Q	Okay.  You state that the additional items would be 
added to the required items as necessary.
	A	Yes, sir.  We encourage our pilots to do that.
	Q	Would -- would these additional items be such as wet 
runway procedures, wind shear or crosswind limits?  Would you 
expect those?
	A	If environmental conditions are going to be a factor, I 
would hope that those would be included, especially if they're at or 
near limits.  Typically, we would not go through and brief what we 
would consider to be a normal procedure; that is, reducing the 
amount of reverse thrust we intend to use on a wet runway.  That's 
something that we train to, hopefully with some regularity, and that 
should be a relatively familiar concept to the guys.  So, we -- some 
captains may choose to review it, others may not.
	Q	Hmm.  So, -- so, you wouldn't necessarily think that a 
wet runway procedure would be included on a -- as -- it could be, but 
it wouldn't -- it wouldn't be necessary?
	A	Yeah.  In my opinion, it would come under the category 
of other considerations, and again each captain has to look at all the 
considerations and then sort through what he perceives to be the 
threats.
	Q	Okay.  You said you would add these additional items.  
Are the American pilots trained to add these additional items --
	A	Yes, sir.  They are encouraged by their instructors in the 
simulator phase and during the IOE phase to look at all these factors 
or as many factors that they think might have a bearing and include 
those in their plan.
	Q	Okay.  You've read the CVR transcript?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	What -- what do you think of the approach briefing that 
was performed by this crew?
	A	I think that taken in the context of a runway change; that 
is, we had -- we -- we -- the first officer testified that we had a full 
approach briefing earlier in the flight.  I think taken in the context of 
it being an amendment to what was said before, I think it would have 
been adequate to help me fly that approach.
	Q	Do you think that there should have been any additional 
briefing on these crosswinds with the wind shear being mentioned 
and the high crosswinds?  What do you --
	A	I think that the captain, based on what I saw in the CVR, 
showed an awareness of the wet runway limitations, and I think by 
adjusting his reference for his approach speed, rather, I think he 
showed an awareness that there were conditions there that was 
understood by both pilots.
	Q	Who conducts the before landing checklist?
	A	The pilot not flying is charged with accomplishing the 
before landing checklist.
	Q	When would this checklist normally be accomplished?
	A	Normally, it's -- it's accomplished as you're, oh, most of 
the way through the descent.  In the vicinity of 10,000 feet above the 
ground is -- is a fairly good approximation for when we would start 
going through those items.
		The way the workload seems to fall out on the MD-80, 
the way our checklist is structured, the first portion of that checklist, 
the first five-six items or so, are going to be accomplished around 
10,000 feet, and that will take us down to the landing gear on the 
mechanical checklist.
		After that, the landing gear being extended pretty much 
drives the items that follow it as far as the configuration issues.  In 
other words, we have to have the gear first before we can continue.
		So, the workload kind of falls into two areas.  One, 
around 10,000 feet, and then one a little bit closer to the ground.
	Q	Okay.  Reference Exhibit 2M, 2 Mike, --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- how is the before landing checklist accomplished?
	A	The before landing checklist is accomplished by 
challenge and response.  That is to say, the pilot not flying verifies 
that the item has been completed, calls out the item, calls out the 
status of that item, and then moves the toggle switch corresponding 
to that item on the mechanical checklist.
		Two of the items, altimeters and flight instruments and 
bugs, are required to be acknowledged by both pilots; that is, the 
response should be recent and cross-checked for altimeters and set 
and cross-checked for flight instruments and bugs.
		One of the things that we've done or will do here toward 
the end of February is we're going to change the accomplishment of 
this checklist on all of our two-pilot aircraft to be -- to require a 
response from both pilots.  This is not really a revolutionary thing.  
It's an evolutionary type of change in that we want independent 
verification of all the primary tasks that we have, rather than as we 
have done in the past, leaving one individual basically alone with the 
configuration issues.
		This change again is going to affect all of our two-pilot 
aircraft and hopefully will be in place here before the end of 
February.
	Q	So, you're going to require dual confirmation, you say?
	A	Yes, sir.  Dual independent confirmation.  Both pilots 
will be required to respond aloud to all items on the before landing 
checklist.
	Q	All items?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Not just the spoilers?
	A	That's correct.  All the items.
	Q	Okay.
	A	Starting -- starting with hydraulic pumps and -- and on 
down through enunciator lights.  Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Who -- who arms the spoilers?
	A	The way our checklists are structured is we have duty 
columns.  The arming of the spoilers falls into the pilot not flying 
duty column.  So, that's what we train and check to, is having the 
pilot not flying on the spoilers.  
		That said, realize that as we pointed out earlier, most 
pilots, most captains will alternate the legs as we fly.  So, each pilot 
is the pilot not flying 50 percent of the time.  It is not unusual in line 
operations for the captain to occasionally arm the spoilers when he is 
the pilot flying.
		Our line pilots don't seem to have difficulty, and they are 
our experts, they don't seem to have difficulty with that particular 
task being allocated the way that it is.
	Q	Okay.  Since the checklist says it's under the pilot not 
flying, then American doesn't have a -- it's acceptable for the pilot to 
deviate from that procedure?  It's an acceptable deviation?  Is that 
what you're saying?
	A	Well, it's not really a deviation so much as in a two-pilot 
aircraft, the workloads and the areas of responsibility overlap.  When 
it's done well, each pilot is continually aware of the other pilot's 
activities, and it would not be unusual if the person was tasked with 
having a conversation with the air traffic controller, let's say, --
	Q	Right.
	A	-- for the other pilot to fill in and get the work done.  
Again, that's -- we would refer to that as an overlapping loop concept.  
Just we have a normal -- this is the way that we train, and then 
sometimes there are other operational considerations which will 
require some overlap of those duties to get the work done.
	Q	Okay.  You say you're changing the checklist.  We'll stay 
with the checklist, you know, that was in effect at the time --
	A	Okay.
	Q	-- for these questions.  Who was responsible for 
confirmation that the spoilers had been armed?
	A	The -- the pilot not flying, the person that conducts the 
landing checklist, is responsible for ensuring that all the items on 
that checklist are in the required position.
	Q	Okay.  When that item, spoiler levers, is read on that 
checklist, what would be the correct response, you know, to -- to that 
item and to assure that it's armed?
	A	I would expect the pilot not flying to visually or tactically 
determine that the spoiler handle has been armed.  After that, I 
would expect to hear him say "spoilers" followed by the word "armed", 
and then I would expect him to close the toggle switch the spoiler 
item on the checklist.
	Q	Are you aware of any instances where the spoilers were 
not armed prior to landing?
	A	I have flown an airplane as captain where the spoilers 
were not armed.  That was the result of an MEL, an item where the 
automatic operation of the spoilers is allowed to be on -- on a 
placard, as long as we manually deploy the spoilers and take a 
distance penalty.
		I've heard other anecdotes of the -- of the spoiler not 
getting armed, but I really don't have any concrete dates, numbers or 
-- or -- or names for you on that.
	Q	Okay.  When -- I'm trying to remember what you -- what 
date you said -- you're going -- you're going to change the checklist to 
where it's now going to be a dual confirmation of all items.  When 
does that go into effect again?
	A	Hopefully, it will be in all of our two-pilot aircraft 
manuals by the end of February.
	Q	Was this change the result of the accident or --
	A	No.  As I said, it's not really a direct result.  It's certainly 
an evolutionary type of thing.  We found that on two other areas, 
we've done something similar.  We -- in terms of setting our altitudes, 
we require dual confirmation on that.  We started that about, oh, four 
or five years ago; that is, one pilot sets it, the other pilot must verify 
it before we accept it.
		We've done the same thing with our FMS-equipped 
aircraft, with navigational changes, where if a change to the flight 
plan is going to affect the aircraft's flight path, we require both pilots 
confirm that.
		So, this is really the next logical step in that process.
	Q	What training and guidance is given to American pilots 
to guide them in their selection of automatic or manual brakes?
	A	In our Technique Section, we specify that on wet or on 
short or slippery runways, that we use the aggressive manual braking 
or maximum auto brakes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Could you help us explain for the 
audience what automatic and the manual braking is, --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- Captain?
		THE WITNESS:  For our manual braking, all of the 
aircraft are required to be equipped with anti-skid brakes, similar to 
what you might have in your automobile.
		Max or aggressive manual braking, what we would 
expect the pilot to do is apply a maximum force to the rudder pedals, 
to the brakes that is, so that the anti-skid will operate.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The rudder pedals are the brakes, 
right?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  The upper portion of the 
rudder pedals is where the brakes are.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Right.  And do you train on how you 
hit the brakes and operate the rudders at the same time?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  Hopefully our trainees have a 
chance to experience that in the simulator, and I guess from your 
tone, it is a challenging thing to do.  Directional control is a factor.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Please go ahead on the 
automatic.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.  On automatic brakes, the various 
manufacturers have different types of systems.  On the MD-80, on 
the landing range, we have three different levels of auto brakes, 
minimum, medium and maximum.
		Minimum and medium, the brakes are applied four 
seconds after landing approximately, and when the spoiler handle 
comes to its full-out travel, the braking timer begins, and then four 
seconds later, we get brake application.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And this is automatic, not --	
	THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  And I say we get brake application.  It 
uses a programmed rate of deceleration.  If the aircraft meets the 
rate of deceleration through other means, reverse thrust, for 
instance, then the brakes may not activate until later on.
		In the maximum setting, the auto brakes are applied 
with the full system pressure, reduced only by the anti-skid 
actuation, two seconds after landing or two seconds after the spoiler 
handle comes back.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And is there a switch you turn that on 
ahead of time?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  There's a rotary selector on the 
aft right portion of the pedestal.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Thank you.
		THE WITNESS:  And that is an item on our landing 
checklist.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Going with what you just said there, a question jumped 
in my mind.  The flight data recorder, the auto brakes start applying, 
I think, two and a half seconds after wheel spin-up?
	A	Two seconds in max.
	Q	Okay.
	A	Approximately two seconds.
	Q	The FDR recorded it took several more seconds than 
that for the pilot, 11, I believe, for the pilot to start applying the 
brakes.  That's -- that's a bit of time.
		With that in mind, does American feel that on a short 
wet runway with crosswinds, the decision to use manual brakes is 
acceptable?
	A	I think so, and I -- I'll tell you why.  Short is a relative 
term.  What do we weigh?  What are the field conditions?  What's the 
short at maximum landing weight?  It's not really all that short when 
the airplane's, you know, down at a 100,000 pound gross weight.
		So, I'm comfortable with leaving that decision in the 
hands of the person that has all the considerations at his fingertips.
	Q	What do you think of a pilot's ability using the manual 
brakes to quickly apply --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Now, this -- this -- the particular 
flight, was it just the manual brakes, right?  No automatic?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  The pilot made that decision.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	What do you think is a pilot's ability using manual 
brakes to quickly apply and maintain maximum braking when landing 
on a wet runway with high crosswinds, you know, being that you're 
having to, you know, use your rudders to control the aircraft and 
apply the brakes at the same time?
	A	In my opinion, it certainly raises a difficulty of 
accomplishing the maneuver, but many of our pilots -- most of our 
pilots can do that.  We -- we give them that experience in the 
simulator.
	Q	Do you think it would be as effective as using the 
automatic brakes?
	A	I think it can be as effective.  Again, it's a matter of the 
individual pilot's ability to maximum perform the airplane.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What is the adverse?  Why wouldn't 
you use automatic brakes?  That's what I --
		THE WITNESS:  If there is a lot of friction on the runway, 
a lot of braking available to you, the auto brakes in maximum are -- 
you can take it literally.  It's -- it's fairly aggressive, can be alarming 
to your passengers.
		In a situation where field conditions are poor, it will do 
something that the pilot may not be willing to; that is, you know, 
apply brakes promptly, and it relieves you of the difficulty that you 
were talking about before with operating the rudder.
		So, you have to balance all the conditions and make the 
decision.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Just got something here.  The Boeing FCOM, the Flight 
Crew Operating Manual, --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- recommends that on contaminated surfaces, full 
braking should be used, auto brakes, if available, should be used in 
the maximum setting. That's just a statement.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Can you think of any appropriate reason why the captain 
would have elected not to use auto brakes during the landing?
	A	I really couldn't speculate as to what considerations or 
all the considerations that Captain Bushman was working on as he 
made that approach.  So, I really -- I don't think I could accurately 
tell you what he's -- what he was thinking.  I'd be guessing.
	Q	I'd like to reference Exhibit 2Q, Quebec.  
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	What is American's definition of a stabilized approach?
	A	As you see on the exhibit, it's -- the aircraft is required 
to be in the final link configuration, whatever we've decided that will 
be, on the approach speed, on the proper flight path, the proper sink 
rate at a stabilized thrust setting, and then before we descend below 
the prescribed minimum altitude, we're supposed to have those 
conditions maintained throughout.
		We're supposed to achieve those conditions before 
descending through the appropriate minimum altitude, and we're 
supposed to be able to maintain those conditions throughout the rest 
of the approach.
	Q	Reference that exhibit, could you explain to us what 
parameters would define on approach speed on the proper flight 
path and at the proper sink rate?
	A	On approach speed, in my opinion, would be within five 
knots of what we have briefed as our planned approach speed.  
Stabilized thrust would be a power setting that we're not having to 
alter appreciably to maintain that speed and the aircraft's flight path.
		The key part of this is that the aircraft's flight path has 
to be such that it will land in a touch down zone.  This -- the intent of 
this wording here, and again this -- our wording very, very closely 
follows the wording in the 8410; that is, the Inspector's Handbook. 
		The intent is that the flight path take it into the touch 
down zone.  That allows for things like visual approaches where you 
may follow a turning path to the final versus a 10- or 20-mile 
straight-in type of approach.
	Q	Federal Aviation Administration's Inspector's Handbook, 
which gives guidance to the FAA for oversight of the airlines.
		These parameters we just -- you just talked about, are 
they written out for the pilots in the manuals?  The guidance for the -- 
in particular, like for the flight path?
	A	Well, I think the -- the flight path would allow to land on 
the touch down zone is -- I think most of the pilots are comfortable 
with that concept.  That said, later in 1999, in the third or fourth 
quarter, we added some additional policy guidance to our manuals 
regarding the stabilized approach concept.
		The handbook does not address actions regarding 
deviations below the minimum altitude or course of glide path 
deviations.
	Q	Right.
	A	Our added guidance directs the captain to order or 
execute a go-around if the stabilized conditions cannot be 
maintained throughout the approach.  That's a change to our policy 
guidance to expand upon this information that came out in August of 
1999.
	Q	So, what you're saying is that if a pilot exceeded one of 
those parameters, you would expect him to do a go-around?
	A	Well, in the parameters again, flight path is a -- is a 
relatively vague parameter.
	Q	Right.
	A	Again, it -- most of us tend to think of it in terms of an 
ILS approach where you have precise course guidance that is not 
always the case with visual approaches or some of the runways that 
we land on that aren't served by instrument approach facilities.
	Q	What would you expect a pilot to say if he noticed a 
deviation from these parameters?
	A	Depending on what type of guidance was available to 
him, I would expect to hear either a -- a call out of the amount of 
displacement, either, let's say, a third of a dot or half a dot.  If a 
VASE was available, I would expect to say here's something like 
you're too low or you're too high.
		You might even hear something like you're off course.  
So, I think that's what the CVR had us hear.  The idea is to -- of those 
deviation call-outs that we specify in our Operating Manual, is to alert 
the pilot that there's a condition that needs to be corrected, and the 
pilot who's flying that receives that call-out is required to 
acknowledge it.
	Q	You just mentioned he would call out, you know, 
localizer half a dot, dot or the same thing on glide slope.
	A	Yes, sir, if that's available.
	Q	What -- taking those conditions, what conditions or 
excedances in that case would require a missed approach?
	A	The only things that would require missed approach are 
if the approach was not stabilized, and again there is a variety of 
considerations in there, allowing for the case where you don't have 
precise course or glide slope guidance.
		So, there are not tight defined parameters on the 
stabilized approach.  We do that for other low-visibility approaches, 
but this concept really isn't aimed squarely at that.
	Q	Okay.  If you define it for the low-visibility approaches, I 
assume you're talking about a Category 2 and a Category 3, --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- which are the -- for the audience are the low minimum 
criteria.  That would be determined by the height of the ceiling of the 
weather or the limited visibility.
		Now, this crew was doing an ILS approach, but they 
were doing just an ILS-1 approach.
	A	Yes, sir, that's correct.
	Q	With -- doing an ILS-1 approach, on a final approach, 
what kind of excedances would -- would -- or guidelines does 
American train on to tell a pilot that if he's so far off of a glide slope 
or so far off a localizer, what kind of guidance would they give them 
in aiding them in making a decision whether to go around or not?
	A	Again, we have those deviation call-outs that the other 
pilot is required to acknowledge.  The guidance from the Inspector's 
Handbook, I believe, is going to be full scale at the point where you -- 
your flight path will no longer take you into the touch down zone.
		At that point, then we should be accomplishing a go-
around or missed approach, whatever's appropriate.
	Q	Okay.  So, you don't just define, say, one dot to the 
right, go around, or two dots to --
	A	No, we do not have a -- when you get to this point, you 
will do this.
	Q	Okay.  I would call out under the pilot decision-making 
criteria, I would say -- are you satisfied with the pilot decision-making 
training and guidance that's provided by American Airlines?
	A	Yes, sir, I am.  The pilot decision-making guidance, what 
we're talking about is judgment.  It can be very difficult to train.  
What we attempt to do in all phases of our training and during the 
IOE is put the pilot in a situation where he's required to make a 
decision, and then we're going to try to help them discover what the 
optimum decision is for a particular case.
		So, the decision-making training that we do is 
situational in nature.  The other thing that we have in the works on 
decision-making criteria is we're going to have a comprehensive 
approach and landing decision-making policy added to our Flight 
Manual, Part 1, here.  That's in draft form right now, and it is subject 
to review through our all-fleets process; that is, all the different 
aircraft in our fleet, 10 different models, will be required to review 
and -- and provide their input before we go to press with it, and this 
uses a gate concept.
		It expands on the two FAR gates, you know, leaving the 
glide slope intercept altitude and leaving a decision altitude, and it 
adds another gate up high, pretty much as you leave cruise altitude.  
So, we're attempting to do some additional policy guidance there for 
tactical decision-making.
	Q	So, there are plans to change this guidance or training 
or enhance it?
	A	It's to -- I would say it's to clarify and to expand the 
guidance available to the pilot.
	Q	Does American leave the decision to go around up to the 
captain or does the first officer play an equal role in these decisions?
	A	We expect the first officer to continually provide input, 
no matter how often that -- that advice might be ignored, and the 
captain is charged, both by the airline and by -- by the FARs, with 
making the final decision as to the operation of the aircraft.
	Q	Okay.  You expect him to do this.  Is he trained to do 
this?
	A	Yes, sir, I believe he is.  Again, we do this situationally.  
We expose trainees to a wide variety of situations and -- and critique 
and feedback on their actions and their decisions and the 
consequences thereof.
	Q	What are American Airlines' procedures, and how are 
pilots trained concerning spoiler extension after landing?
	A	They are trained in the context of normal procedures to -
- to arm the spoilers and observe them deploy.  In our landing 
checklist, the expanded portion of it, I think we've got it in one of the 
exhibits here, you'll notice that the -- after landing, there's -- the 
description of that duty goes across both columns.
		There's an implied requirement there for both pilots to 
monitor spoiler deployment, and then it goes on to say that the 
captain, regardless of which pilot who is making the landing, will 
manually deploy the spoilers, if they fail to deploy.
		In this area, we recognize that we could benefit from 
having additional information provided to the captain in this case.  
This week, we added to our Operating Manual on the airplanes where 
it's appropriate a no-spoilers call-out.  If the spoilers fail to deploy 
automatically, we'll have a no-spoilers call-out by the pilot not flying, 
and then we'll continue with having the captain manually deploy the 
spoilers.
	Q	So, that's going to be a new procedure?
	A	Yes, sir.  That should go to press this week.
	Q	Any thought to Delta Airlines --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That procedure was one 
recommended by Boeing, right?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I believe that is -- I believe the 
manufacturer recommends a no-spoilers call-out.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And do you know how or why you 
didn't incorporate that at the beginning, since it was recommended 
by Boeing?
		THE WITNESS:  No, I don't really remember what date it 
came into the manufacturer's manual, to be honest with you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	I guess one of the things that jumped out when we heard 
earlier testimony was that if it didn't extend, the only other 
procedure in the manual was for the captain to pull it.  There was 
nobody to call out for it.  So.
	A	Yeah.  There wasn't a call-out.  There was that 
responsibility for both pilots to monitor their operation, --
	Q	Yeah.
	A	-- but again the call-out is helpful to prompt action on 
the part of the captain, I think.
	Q	Well, if the first officer's monitoring it and doesn't call 
something out, then the captain might not know to pull it, you know, 
if he didn't see it.
	A	Exactly.
	Q	Have you given any consideration to a positive call-out?  
In other words, when it -- when it would extend, just call -- Delta, for 
instance, has a call-out of spoilers up.  That's a positive definite 
verification.  If they don't hear it, they -- you know, they look for 
something wrong.
	A	We have --
	Q	Did you consider that?
	A	We -- we kind of argued it both ways on all the fleets that 
have the automatic spoilers.  In general, our company policy is that 
we try to call out abnormal conditions rather than normal conditions.
		I think for the most part, that makes you more alert that 
if you hear something, if you hear a call-out, that there's something 
wrong which you need to address rather than conditioning yourself, 
you know, through a repeated number of landings.  You may not hear 
that information coming in, if it was different.
		So, we've -- again, our preference is to not call out 
normal parameters but call out abnormalities.
	Q	What guidance and training does American give its pilots 
on the performance detriment that would occur if the spoiler failed to 
extend?
	A	Performance decrements for failed spoilers are covered 
in the context of MEL, minimum equipment list, issues.  We typically 
go through a performance day in our ground school, I believe it's Day 
8, where we review all of the various performance aspects, and 
inoperative automatic spoilers are a part of that.  That would drive us 
to the MEL where the associated distance penalties are published.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Tew, we have gone about two and 
a half hours without a break, and I'm trying to figure out when you're 
going to take a break.  I don't want to cut you off.  If you've got more, 
if you've got like five minutes, --
		MR. TEW:  I would estimate --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- please continue.
		MR. TEW:  -- 15 minutes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, let's take a break now for 15 
minutes.  Stand in recess.
		(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene this public hearing 
of the National Transportation Safety Board.  It's being held in 
conjunction with the accident on June 1st of American Airlines Flight 
1420.
		Mr. Tew, if you would continue your questioning of the 
witness, and again, Captain Lewis, we appreciate your presence and 
your testimony.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Captain Lewis, reference Exhibits 2QQ and 2RR, you 
may still have them out there.  Quebec Quebec, Romeo Romeo.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  During my observation of one simulator session 
dedicated to landing training, several times, the automatic extension 
of spoilers was failed, and only once was it noticed by the flight crew.
		During a separate observation of a simulator session, 
there were no events of failed automatic spoiler extension.
		How do you ensure that all Americans -- or how did you 
ensure that all American pilots are receiving adequate training in 
recognition of no spoiler extension and performing the appropriate 
response?
	A	There's a couple of phases to what we're doing there.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And you might -- I don't believe we 
have had anybody, Captain Lewis, and you're probably the best 
person.  Explain what the spoiler system is, where it is on the 
aircraft, and what impact it has on aircraft performance.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  The spoilers on the MD-80 
consist of three panels on each wing, total of six.  They are 
hydraulically powered.  They are portions of upper wing skin surface 
located toward the aft side of the wing.
		In flight, we can use a portion of those panels to help us 
descend rapidly without building forward air speed.  On landing or 
during a rejected take-off, they spoil the lift over the wings, put the 
majority of the weight back on the aircraft's landing gear and provide 
us more effective braking.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you.  That's a good 
explanation.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Do you remember the question?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.
	A	Regarding failed spoiler events?
	Q	Yeah.  How do you ensure that all American pilots are 
receiving adequate training in recognition of no spoiler extension and 
performing the appropriate response?
	A	On the sessions that you observed, I'd like to point out 
that a failed spoiler event is not a specific training goal for our Day 6 
training or at least it was not at the time.
		It fits logically there, and it's been added there.  So, now 
we will train that event on three separate days.  Previously, we had 
accomplished that training on Day 3 and again on Day 7 of our 10-
day simulator course.  We have added it to our Day 6 training 
because it fits there as well.
		That said, that's how we intend to take everybody 
through our equipment course as they qualify initially on the 
airplane.  Our new recurrent training program -- well, our recurrent 
training program changes every year on February 1st.  That's when 
we implement the next year's training.
		We have added that as a briefing item for every 
recurrent training session that we conduct.  So, our check airmen 
will brief manual spoiler operation and the spoiler's effects on 
braking and stopping and so forth as part of the briefing, and then 
we will give each pilot a chance to manually operate the spoilers 
when they do their simulator training, and we'll do that on an annual 
basis.
		Typically, we will carry that event for about 13 months 
so that we can ensure that every crew member qualified on the 
airplane has a chance to receive that training.
	Q	Okay.  Have there been any -- could you tell us which -- 
what changes have been made to the manuals or procedures as a 
result of this accident?
	A	We have tried continually to evaluate what we do and 
improve and clarify some of the guidance we provided for our pilots.  
We've done a variety of things.  
		The checklist change to go to a challenged response 
response is probably our biggest and most important change.  We've 
operated all our two-pilot aircraft in a different manner for the past, 
oh, 18 to 20 years.  So, that's a very, very important change.
		We've changed one of our standard call-outs.  Our 
thousand-foot call-out.  We -- we would normally call out a thousand 
feet, and then our landing configuration.  We have added the words 
"before landing checklist complete" to that call-out.
		What we attempt to do there is we attempt to tie the 
accomplishment of the landing checklist to an altitude, and we've 
found in the past that that's helpful to keep the pilot on task, to tie 
things to the vertical events rather than a particular time.
		We added the no-fault go-around policy that we talked 
about before.  We've also strengthened the guidance for handling 
warnings from the LWAS or Terminal Doppler Weather Radar.  If we 
hear the words "microburst alert", our pilots are required to execute a 
go-around or the escape maneuver, and that was added, I believe, in 
November of 1999.
		Again, if the LWAS or the Terminal Doppler Weather 
Radar availability is such that we can hear the words "microburst 
alert", that should be a trigger phrase for our pilots.
		Let's see.  We talked about the no-spoiler call-out being 
added, and we talked about strengthening the guidance on the 
stabilized approach criteria to provide for a mandatory execution or 
ordering of a go-around.
		The other thing that we're doing in the way of manuals 
organization is on all our fleets whose manuals incorporate a 
Techniques Section, we are gradually editing out and thinning down 
that Technique Section until it will disappear.  The information 
contained in that section will go into the particular phase of flight in 
our normal procedures, so that we can hopefully get the information 
more towards one spot where it logically fits for the pilot's phase of 
flight-type of thinking.
	Q	Okay.  The no-fault landing change you said you made to 
the manual, that was made after the accident?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Why -- why was it made, and if you would?
	A	We had a rather lengthy discussion several years back 
about non-precision approaches, and what we wanted to emphasize 
to our pilots by this particular change, it -- it certainly would be 
beneficial for this accident, but in particular, it came from our 
discussion of conducting non-precision approaches.
		We wanted our pilots to realize that you can do -- you 
can fly the airplane to your very, very best of your ability, do 
everything right, and still wind up with a situation where you are 
required to accomplish a go-around, a diversion and so forth.
		So, we want -- it's an attempt to give them 
-- encourage the pilot to give equal consideration to landing and 
going around.  That -- that's what the no-fault go-around policy is 
about.  It specifically grew out of the discussion of non-precision 
approaches.
	Q	Have there been any changes made to the training as a 
result of this accident?
	A	Yes, sir.  As I said, we've incorporated what we've been 
able to learn so far from this body into our recurrent training 
program for this year.  We want all our pilots to be aware of all the 
factors or as much as we're aware of at this point surrounding this 
event.
		Again, we've -- in our recurrent training program, we 
have added a failed spoiler event, manual spoiler deployment for all 
pilots.  We're going to review the stabilizer approach guidance 
concept with them, and we're also going to review the wet slippery 
runway reversing and braking techniques with them so that they have 
some measure of recent experience in this, at least in the simulator.
		As I said before, in long operation, fortunately it's 
relatively rare.  So, we need to use a simulator to the best of our 
ability to provide them with that recent experience.
	Q	Has the FAA made any requests or suggestions to 
require changes to procedures or training since the accident?
	A	I don't recall any requests in particular.  Our relationship 
with our FAA is that we continually consult with each other on events 
that occur on the line and how we can best address those issues or 
irregularities that arise.
		So, the nature of our discussions there has been a 
continuing basis rather than, you know, a specific request at any 
particular time.  It's -- again, it's a continuing process.  We have a 
very strong relationship there, I think.
	Q	Could you appraise this accident crew's performance 
into Little Rock, and tell us what differs from American Airlines' 
procedures?
	A	Well, there, not being in the cockpit as I would be in the 
-- in the jumpseat in the simulator to observe and critique, obviously 
we all know that the results were unacceptable to our company, but I 
really can't, without having observed all of the factors firsthand, as I 
would as a simulator instructor or an IOE instructor.  I really can't, 
you know, go through a list for you of anything like that.
	Q	Do you have any suggestions as to how we might 
prevent an accident like this from happening in the future?
	A	Well, I think certainly strengthening the training --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's the Chairman's question, Mr. 
Tew.
		MR. TEW:  I'm sorry.  Strike that question.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's the Chairman's question.
		MR. TEW:  We can hold that.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  No.  Go ahead, go ahead, ask  it.
		THE WITNESS:  Certainly strengthening training can 
help.  We can always devote additional effort there.  Beyond that, I 
think once -- if -- if, together, we can figure out a better way to do 
things, then we should be able to use that information to strengthen 
our training programs.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  On that subject, let me ask you, 
Captain.  How do you monitor performance in your DC -- your MD-80 
crew in the field?
		THE WITNESS:  In the field?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Through check airmen or --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  Our check airmen --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Are you familiar with the quick 
access recorder and how that's used to monitor flight performance in 
Europe?
		THE WITNESS:  I'm familiar with our aircraft that have 
it.  I fly the MD-11, which has that capability.  I'm generally familiar 
with the program, but --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is that effective with the MD-11 or 
how would you -- is that something that would be -- you would 
recommend for the fleet or are you that familiar with it?
		THE WITNESS:  I'm not really familiar enough with it to 
give you a good comment on that, I'm afraid.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	The accident, Captain, the application of brakes didn't -- 
didn't occur until 11 seconds after touch down.  Is American 
planning in any way to address the preventing late brake applications 
in the future, and, you know, the effects that that might have or 
maybe, you know, educating the pilots or providing guidance?
	A	I think so.  What we plan to do there is provide 
additional exposure in the simulator environment to -- in both the 
briefing and in the simulator session for using automatic braking.
		Typically, that will do some -- that will do things that the 
line pilot may not be willing to on occasion; that is, max perform the 
airplane.  The other advantage is with automatic braking, a logical 
thing to do is start out with the highest level of automation available 
to you and then intervene manually, if required.
		It's very difficult to do it the other way, where you start 
out manually and then get back into the automatic mode.  So, that's 
perhaps a viable alternative.
	Q	Does American have a FOQA Program?  And I forget 
what the --
	A	Flight Operations Quality Assurance.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  To track these kind of incidents and 
issues?
	A	That is not in place yet, and there are other officials in 
the company that really work with those issues rather than me.
	Q	Okay.  I'd like to thank you for your participation today, 
and you participated with me in the past and have been invaluable in 
your service and your work.  I certainly appreciate it.
		MR. TEW:  Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions of 
this witness.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, thank you.  We'll move to the 
Party Table.  If the Technical -- we've been at the Technical Table too 
long.  If you all have any more questions, you can have a chance after 
the Parties.
		The Allied Pilots Association.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  We have no questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Federal Aviation Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  Yes, sir.  
INTERVIEW BY THE PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	A few questions, Captain.  First of all, have -- has there 
been any recently-conducted additional training in the radar area, in-
flight radar?
	A	Yes, sir.  I failed to mention that earlier.  I thank you for 
that.
		In the fourth quarter of 1999, we retained a radar expert 
to conduct a one-day seminar for all of our check airmen.  We had 
three of these in October, November and December, basically an 
eight- or 10-hour affair.
		This expert reviewed each aircraft's individual radar and 
its particular characteristics and then went on to review the various 
types of echoes that might be observed and the conditions that 
would be associated with those echoes.
		It's our hope that our check airmen will then be able to 
use that information as they conduct the training in the IOE phase.
	Q	Okay, sir.  Another issue I'd like to discuss with you is 
your -- American's mechanical checklist.  First of all, are there any 
other carriers that use that system?
	A	Not a system of toggles.  There's various means other 
carriers use, scrolls and so forth, but I believe we're the only one that 
uses a system of tabs.
	Q	Could you give me the company's policy on why -- why 
you believe that that's a better system to work than a regular paper 
checklist?
	A	This would go back before my time, to be honest with 
you.  But what I have observed during my 20 years with American is 
that the single biggest strength of it is that if you're interrupted by a 
transmission on the radio or some other condition in the cockpit, you 
can go back to the checklist and see what you have to accomplish 
and what has been accomplished.
		Using a paper checklist, there's a tendency to come in at 
the item below the one that you left off on and skip an item 
depending on where the interruption occurred.  That's its biggest 
strength.
		Also, as a captain, I found that it's very useful to be able 
to look down at the pedestal or, in the case of the 72, back on to the 
engineer's panel and see how that crew member is coming with the 
checklist.
		So, if I've been doing something else, my attention's 
taken away, I can look back at the checklist and see the status and 
our progress.
	Q	Okay, sir.  I believe you mentioned earlier in response to 
another question there was an indication that you had read the CVR 
transcript, is that correct?
	A	Yes, sir.  I saw it this morning.
	Q	Okay.  Have you had any chance to review any of the 
FDR data?
	A	I saw it in Little Rock, the early version of it, back in 
Little Rock, back in the summer.
	Q	Well, without -- I don't need for you to refer to that, but 
just based upon your reading of the CVR and your prior information 
that you had on the AFDR, are you aware of anything in either of 
those documents that would fall outside the stabilized approach 
criteria that -- that American utilizes?
	A	I would say that the FDR data is probably a fairly limited 
view of whether the approach is stabilized or not because there's so 
many other considerations that go into it.
		I think it's reasonable, though, to expect that if you look 
at the ILS, that those indications, course indications ought to be 
fairly close throughout.  So, I really -- I can't give you a good clear 
opinion on that.
	Q	Okay, sir.  And if you would, look at one other item for 
me.  I believe we -- let me make sure this is on your list here, and I 
see it is not.
		MR. STREETER:  Well, Mr. Chairman, I have a question 
that's based on an exhibit that is not on the list.  I think it's in 
Captain Lewis's area.  I defer to -- to you on this.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, Captain, it's your preference.  If 
you want to respond to the question or if you would prefer not to take 
questions not on the exhibits, then that --
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I'll make my best effort for you, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		MR. STREETER:  Then I'll explain what the issue is here, 
first.  If you -- if you could provide the captain with Exhibit 2X.
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	And, Captain, this is an exhibit regarding wind landing 
limits.  I believe this is a page from Flight Manual, Part 1, is that 
correct?
	A	Yes, sir, that's right.
	Q	All right.  Now, if -- if I am reading this correct, it seems 
to indicate that with a visibility of less than 1,800 RVR or a half mile, 
American has a 10-knot crosswind limit, and it appears to be pretty 
much across the entire fleet.  Is -- is that -- my interpretation correct 
on that?
	A	Yes, sir, that's correct.
	Q	Okay.  Now, based on your knowledge of this, the 
information you do have, and the first officer's statement this 
morning that he had the runway in sight, my question would be, if 
your crew had an RVR reported to them of less than 1,800, but they 
also had good visual on the runway, and in their opinion, that 
exceeded that limit, does American expect them to comply with the 
10-knot limitation or does the 1,800 RVR apply over what they can 
actually see?
	A	Based on a reported RVR of 1,600 in this case, I believe 
that a 10-knot restriction would apply.
	Q	Okay.
	A	That said, our policy guidance in this area does not 
specifically address the issue of where we have two bits of 
information that do not correlate well; that is, a low RVR with a 
considerably greater flight visibility.  
		That particular section of Part 1, this particular section 
of Part 1, that is, is in rewrite at this moment.  It will be subjected to 
the all-fleets review process, and we hope to improve the guidance 
on there to direct the pilot to observe the RVR in all cases where it's 
reported.  That's -- that will be our intention there.
		To be honest with you, our -- our guidance needed 
clarification for these pilots.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much, sir.  I have no further 
questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Commercial Airplane Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, we have no further 
questions -- no other questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Boeing?  American Airlines?
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Chairman, we have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Now, does the Technical 
Panel still have questions?
		MR. FEITH:  Just a few, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay, Mr. Feith.
INTERVIEW BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Captain Lewis, thank you very much.  It's been a long 
afternoon.
		Just following up on Mr. Streeter's comments about the 
RVR limitation, basic bottom line is that once the crew received that 
RVR report, the approach should have been abandoned at that point?
	A	Well, we don't provide the pilot with that guidance, with 
that guidance in that particular area.
	Q	But --
	A	That's something --
	Q	But from the standpoint of being a prudent pilot, once 
they got that RVR report of 1,600?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I don't think -- that's -- let's -- I 
don't think he's going to be any more specific on that subject than he 
has been.
		MR. FEITH:  Okay.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	You had described earlier about blanketed by 
thunderstorms, and you said that there was no real defined criteria 
for that description.
		How then do you evaluate either crew members' or even 
the dispatcher's ability then to determine, you know, without specific 
guidance, you know, blanketed by thunderstorms?  What -- what -- 
what level of measure do you use in making the determination 
whether it's actually blanketed or partially blanketed, if there's no 
specific guidance?
	A	Yeah.  I understand the difficulty with the wording there.  
That's one of those decisions that we typically make with radar and 
all available weather reports in front of us.
		In the cockpit, in a tactical mode, as a line captain, what 
I would tell you is we need to have a thunderstorm-free route to the 
airport, and we need to have escape options should the situation 
deteriorate.
		So, it is a very subjective word.  I understand that.
	Q	Okay.  And given that we know that at least part of the 
route was cleared to the Little Rock Airport, and we know that there 
were thunderstorms in the area, would that be considered blanketed?  
Would Little Rock, under the conditions as we know them now, have 
been considered to be blanketed by thunderstorms?
	A	At the point where the aircraft was released and en 
route, I don't think it was blanketed.  I think clearly there was room 
to go on and evaluate.
		Later on in the approach, again without seeing the 
airborne radar and -- and going into that tactical mode of decision-
making, I really couldn't tell you what the exact situation was.
	Q	We know that the captain in this particular case was the 
chief pilot out of the Chicago base.  He was paired with a new first 
officer.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Is there any policy at American Airlines regarding the 
pairing?  We know that, based on, you know, the psychological part 
of crew resource management and especially given that this first 
officer was in his probationary year, and there could have been some 
reluctance to speak up.
		Has American Airlines evaluated this situation and come 
up with a policy of any kind regarding this type of pairing?
	A	No, we don't really have a policy on this pairing.  I think 
what we have tried to do is we have tried to select as chief pilots the 
types of individuals that are approachable and show good leadership 
and communication skills.
		I think the selection of the personnel is probably the 
best way to avoid any kind of a pairing restriction.  All of us need to 
fly for proficiency, and, you know, anyone could be put off by flying 
with a person in a position of authority.
		But again I think the types of individuals that we have 
selected to be our chiefs are the kinds of individuals that are 
approachable and communicate well.
	Q	Just taking the chief pilot status one step further, he is 
the management pilot.  As far as him being required to fly so many 
hours a month to maintain proficiency, is there a minimum for a 
management pilot?
	A	There is not a minimum.  Obviously we encourage all of 
our pilots to remain current.  Typically, they are budgeted, 
depending on the individual, to rotate to line flying duties at least 
one a month a year, sometimes two, depending on the individual.
		Beyond that, I know that the folks in the Chicago Flight 
Office are very good at being able to get out and fly regularly.
	Q	You had made an earlier reference regarding wind shear 
and -- and the guidance that is provided, and if you would please 
look at 2 Alpha Alpha?
		With regard to what we know about the weather in the 
Little Rock area, and the alerts that were given by the air traffic 
controller to this crew, would this be appropriate as far as the 
criteria that the crew should have followed?  
		Basically the guidance says that you should avoid areas 
of known severe wind shear.  Given the Little Rock conditions, and 
the alerts that this crew received, would this guidance have applied 
to this particular crew?
	A	No, I don't believe it would have, as it's written.  Known 
severe wind shear would require a pilot report or a report of a 
microburst alert or from either the enhanced LWAS or the Terminal 
Doppler Weather Radar.
	Q	Okay.  Let's move down to the third paragraph, where it 
starts off by saying, "Search for clues which may indicate the 
presence of severe wind shear. Severe wind shear has been 
encountered under the following conditions", and it lists five things 
there.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Given the weather at Little Rock, do any of these five 
criteria match the weather conditions at Little Rock?
	A	Yes, sir.  I believe that at least four of them probably 
applied.  It certainly would be reason to be concerned and have a 
heightened level of awareness as you approach that area that such 
conditions might exist.
	Q	But it wouldn't require the crew to abandon their 
attempt to go to that airport and deviate?
	A	No.  There's a difference between having conditions 
which are conducive to and then having areas of known severe wind 
shear, and again that's -- maybe that's a little bit vague, but that's -- 
that's kind of our situation, I'm afraid.
	Q	And you also said that -- you characterized all the 
changes that were being made.  I presume this is being made fleet-
wide as far as the checklist and the -- the call-outs and the 
verbalization of the call-outs and things like that?
	A	Yes, sir.  Fleet-wide, to the extent that we still operate 
the 727 and DC-10, which are three-pilot aircraft.  All of our two-pilot 
aircraft, the checklist changes apply. 
		On some of the other training issues, such as the 
weather radar training and so forth, that would apply to all 10 types.
	Q	Okay.  And we're going to be talking later on regarding 
search and rescue and some of the problems that were there.  Do 
any of your aircraft have ELTs on them?
	A	Not that I'm aware of -- well, let me --
	Q	ELTs being emergency locator transmitters --
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	-- that's automatically activated in a crash.
	A	None, I believe, that are automatically activated.  The 
aircraft that are over water-equipped have ELTs which are activated 
on contact with sea water, but I'm not aware of any ELT in the basic 
MD-80.
	Q	So, given the circumstances of this accident, in your 
opinion, would an ELT, the installation of an ELT, on these types of 
aircraft to be beneficial or do you see a need for them?
	A	That's a little bit outside my area, but I think certainly if 
I were trying to locate somebody on a dark night, if I had the ability 
to receive and detect that ELT in my vehicle or whatever, that would 
certainly be helpful.
	Q	That was my softball figuring.  You're the -- you're the 
company guy.  I figured I'd throw it out and see what I got.
	A	Oh.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Feith, you about finished?
		MR. FEITH:  I am.  I am done.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
INTERVIEW BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Captain Lewis, just from your experience and your 
opinion as a captain, if there is a thunderstorm in the vicinity of an 
airport that you're approaching, and you find that there are strong 
gusting winds that are coming from the direction that the 
thunderstorm is towards the airport, and they're reported at the 
field, has the thunderstorm arrived at the airport?
	A	Certainly the wind gusts being detected on the field are 
a consideration, a pretty good indication that at least the outflow 
from the storm is on the field.
	Q	So, you're not going to beat the thunderstorm to the 
airport at that point?
	A	Well, you're asking -- you're asking me for one of many 
considerations, and you really need to make the decision in the 
cockpit with the whole picture in view.  So, I really can't speculate for 
you without seeing the whole situation.
	Q	Okay.  I was a little surprised to hear an earlier witness 
mention that there's no policy, procedure or instruction from 
American Airlines about the proper distance to remain from a 
thunderstorm cell.
Do you concur with that or do you have information that's different?
	A	No, sir.  We -- we avoid thunderstorms, and that's -- 
that's kind of the limit of our policy statement on that.  We -- we 
attempt to clarify the routing issues and the arrival and departure 
issues, but we do not use a distance.
	Q	Okay.  What in your way of thinking now as a person who 
designs procedures and implements them at American, what would 
constitute an emergency situation that might require using more 
than 1.3 EPR on reverse thrust on a wet slippery runway?
	A	Well, I participate in the design process.  We do 
everything through not really committee but through a participative 
process, not just a solo or individual effort. 
		That said, if directional control issues are not a factor, 
and you're in danger of going off the end of a runway, that's certainly 
cause to exceed that, but directional control is going to be your first 
priority in -- in the situation, in that situation.
	Q	So, the 1.3 EPR limit only applies to a slippery or wet 
runway, right?
	A	At our airline, yes, sir, that's true.
	Q	Yes.
	A	If you have enough cornering force on your tires to 
maintain directional control, then there's no reason not to use 
whatever level of reverse is required to stop the airplane.
		If directional control is an issue, that's the first priority 
as far as landing the aircraft.
	Q	So, if one of your pilots was starting to have a slight loss 
of directional control while reversing on a slippery runway, would you 
want that pilot to interpret that as the type of emergency situation 
that would call for more reverse, more than 1.3?
	A	Not if directional control was an issue.  No, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Let me ask you to put your captain's hat on again 
as opposed to the procedures and management captain.
		Would you expect the tower controller to -- to tell you to 
go around if there is weather considerations?
	A	No, I would not.  The only thing that I would ask of a 
tower controller is to provide me with the best of the information that 
he had available to him, and I'm -- I'm comfortable with having my 
crew and I make that decision together.
	Q	Okay.  Thanks.  I want to talk to you about some of the 
deeper lessons that you in your position and American Airlines as a 
whole might glean from some of the bits of information that have 
come up as a result of this accident.
		For instance, we have Captain Tew's and another 
captain's observation of some of the training sessions at American, 
and as -- as Dave mentioned, in several instances, the spoilers didn't 
deploy, and -- and -- and the crews didn't pick that up on most of 
those occasions.
		I know that you've implemented additional training in 
this -- in this -- in this area, but is the problem here, do you think, 
one that the crews need to practice manually deploying the spoilers, 
to practice it once or twice or even once a year, or is it that the -- or 
is the message here that they weren't prepared -- a good cross-
section of them wasn't prepared to be surprised by a failure to 
deploy?
		In other words, is the problem one of surprise or is it 
knowing how to work the handle?
	A	Well, I guess I don't necessarily see it as a problem.  The 
sessions that were observed were training sessions, and the purpose 
of training is to build habits and alter individual behavior.  
		Perhaps a truer measure of how successful we are is 
how does that person do on a proficiency check?
At the end of that period, could the individual that we observed 
accomplish the tasks that we had in front of them or not?  
		Again, we expect people to err in training.  That's how 
we learn.  So, I -- I need to split away the training from the 
performance standard.  At the end of the period, if we've 
accomplished our objective and changed the person's habits, we've 
been successful.
	Q	Hm-hmm.
	A	That said, the recency that you discussed is also, I 
think, important for a not-very-often practiced event.
	Q	An additional concern that we had, possibly with this -- 
with these results of our observations, was that the -- the check 
airmen weren't picking up the problem and correcting it.  So, that's 
not a training issue, is that correct?
	A	Well, it's a check airman training issue.
	Q	Right.
	A	Certainly we -- we've brought on board a pretty good 
number of new check airmen during the past two years.  Every check 
airman will tell you that it is -- being certified as a check airman is -- 
is indeed a license to learn, and the person who is radically different 
in their ability to teach after six months and after a year than they 
are when they're relatively new in the job.  They're a lot more 
effective as they have more experience teaching.
		That said, we depend heavily on their previous 
experience as we select them to be check airmen, but still there is -- 
there is so much to learn.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  So, all these people were qualified line 
captains before becoming a check airman, right?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	So, they were out there flying the line, and if -- if a 
spoiler didn't deploy, do you have any concerns that fleet-wide, they 
may not have done a very good job of picking up the problem?
	A	I guess I think that the problem stems from the -- not 
necessarily a problem.  It's a good problem.  The system is extremely 
reliable, and it's unusual in line operations to have a spoiler that fails 
to deploy.
		Certainly with the number of operations that we do on a 
daily and an annual basis, we just -- we don't have that happening 
with any regularity.  So, the recency is probably more of a factor than 
any lack of knowledge or understanding on their part.
	Q	And could you just clarify, because I -- I just am not sure 
I'm remembering it right, but in the training that you've 
implemented, I know you're going to give them a chance to extend 
the -- the spoilers manually, but are you going to give them a 
surprise --
	A	Yes, sir.  That's the intent of it.
	Q	Okay.
	A	That's the intent of it.
	Q	That's good.  Let me explore just one more area with 
you, if you don't mind, and that is, your -- the -- the discrepancy 
that's apparent between your standard operating procedures for who 
arms the spoiler and how it's done on the line, you seemed to 
express satisfaction with -- with the difference between the training 
school and how it's really done on the line at times.
		I can understand why the line captains are grabbing the 
handle and extending it because it's more convenient for them at 
times, but does it concern you at all at a deeper level that you have a 
mismatch between your -- your procedures and your -- the norms out 
there in the field, and have you considered a response to that?
	A	Yes, it does, and we've looked at it from a couple of 
different angles.  In the past, we have changed procedures to 
conform with the line practice in that the line pilot is the person 
that's out there doing this day in and day out.  Frequently, they are 
the expert at the best way to do a particular task, and then we also 
look at it in terms of the manufacturer's recommendations.
		So, we try to explore every angle before we make a 
decision on how to implement or not implement a particular item.  
I'm concerned about the difference here, but again in a two-pilot 
aircraft, there's a lot of overlap in the duties.  A little bit different 
situation in a three-person aircraft.  
		So, I'm not at all uncomfortable with who operates 
particular control or indicator as long as it gets to the correct spot.  
What I do have to insist on is that the checklist be strictly adhered to 
because that -- that is the key safety issue, is the checklist, not who 
physically operates a control, but do we verify that it's where we need 
it to be?
	Q	Hm-hmm.  And has there been any consideration given 
to changing the procedure of who arms it or is that not --
	A	Yes, sir.  And we will take that back to our experts and 
the other people in the other fleets and see if we can't figure out the 
best way to put that into our manual or change that in our manual.
	Q	Okay.  Thanks very much.
	A	Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  Yes, just a couple.  With the Chairman's 
indulgence, I'd like to ask the witness a question on an exhibit that's 
not on his list.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, it's the captain's indulgence if 
he wants to accept a question.
		THE WITNESS:  I'll -- I'll certainly be happy to take a 
look, sir, and if I can help you, I will.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	Okay.  It's Exhibit Number 5B, 5 Bravo.
	A	Thank you.
	Q	And looking at Figure 24A, B and C, -- I'll let you get 
there first.  This is the Doppler Weather Radar.
	A	24A, B and C?
	Q	Yeah.  24A -- Figure 24A, B and C.  I don't have a page 
number here, unfortunately.
	A	I think I have it.
	Q	Okay.  It should say at the top, "North Little Rock WSR 
88D".  
		PARTICIPANT:  What page number is that?
		MR. HAUETER:  I don't have a page number on mine. 
		PARTICIPANT:  It's Page 18 on mine.
		MR. HAUETER:  Okay.  Page 18.  It's cut off on mine.  
Appreciate it.
		THE WITNESS:  All right.  Thank you.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	Okay.  And I realize this information is not presented in 
your cockpits currently, and hopefully one day, you will get this, but 
looking at these depictions, is this what you mean by blanketed by 
thunderstorms or --
	A	Looking at the top couple of frames and again not being 
an expert in interpreting this particular type of presentation, I would 
not characterize the first two frames there as being blanketed.  I see 
a clear route to the airport.
		The range rings there are 20 nautical miles, is that 
right?
	Q	I believe so, yeah.
	A	In my opinion, I see maneuvering room there, and I see 
an escape route, and again knowing that the fuel load, there's plenty 
of decision time there.  So, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't characterize that 
as being blanketed.
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to object 
to this line of questioning.  I don't think Captain Lewis is qualified to 
interpret Doppler Radar displays.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Fine, fine.  We will -- that will be 
discontinued, Mr. Haueter.
		MR. HAUETER:  Okay.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Other questions?
		MR. HAUETER:  One other.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	You mentioned that American now has a no-fault go-
around policy.  That would kind of imply that before, there was a 
fault policy.  Could you describe what the previous policy was, and 
why crews may have thought they had to report or --
	A	No.  The -- there was not an implied fault policy there.  
It's just that we -- we want to make sure that it was clear to our pilots 
that it is possible to do your very best and still do a go-around. That 
is a successful outcome to an instrument approach.
		We've just -- we just want to make sure that we were on 
the record in our policy guidance that go-around is always a viable 
option available to the pilot.
	Q	But there's no previous requirement to report a go-
around or otherwise make annotations --
	A	No.  No, there is not.
	Q	Thank you, sir.  That's all.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		MR. CLARK:  I have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Captain, I appreciate very much your 
-- your testimony, and -- and -- and I understand your reservations, 
you know, making decisions on information you may not have had, 
that others may have had at the time of this particular flight -- flight 
took place.
		I'd kind of like to look very quickly at, you know, -- first of 
all, let me compliment you and American Airlines on the changes in 
these procedures.  I know many times, there is a chilling effect that 
our liability system places on carriers to make changes after an 
event, and that's just a reality of our society, and when I see an 
airline looking at an event, maybe not determining conclusions but 
saying these are ways we can improve our procedures and taking 
pro-active action, I think that, as someone with the safety 
responsibility at the federal level, that that ought to be acknowledged 
and commended, and I commend American Airlines for that.
		The crosswinds.  I read in all this information here.  Is 
this aircraft design any more susceptible to crosswinds than other 
models in your fleet?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I really can't give you a good 
comment on that.  I'm not an aerodynamicist.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do you think you get adequate 
crosswind information as it is -- we -- we were able with wind shear to 
come up with this LWAS equipment, which we're going to get into 
some detail later about its performance and use.
		I don't know how -- is there anything scientific as that in 
terms of measuring crosswinds?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  Really, the crosswind is just 
taking the reported wind and the runway heading and then figuring 
out how much of a component is going to affect your landing.  
There's really no science involved.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We kind of reviewed that there were a 
number of things that appeared to vary with the standard procedures 
that took place based on the information available to us.  Yet at the 
time we heard the first officer testify that he felt that the 
-- the captain felt he had it, I think "got it" was the terminology and 
had an approach and -- and -- and landed.
		How long -- how many feet of runway would it take under 
normal circumstances to stop this aircraft as it was with its weight 
that it had that evening?
		THE WITNESS:  That would be difficult for me to answer, 
and the reason is the way we do our analysis is we determine a 
maximum landing weight for a given runway and then observe that as 
the limit.  We don't really calculate the distance required to stop.
		We -- we -- we calculate our predicted landing weight 
and then select a runway which provides us adequate distance.  We 
kind of -- from a pilot standpoint, you -- you know what you weigh.  
You don't always calculate how long you're going to roll.  You -- you -- 
that's how we calculate our limits.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And, so, you thought this 
runway had adequate -- adequate length?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, based on what -- the 
information in our performance manual, the limiting weight, we were 
well below the limiting weight.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And as you pointed out, we are all 
aware with what occurred to this aircraft.  What do you think was the 
contributing factors to the performance of that aircraft once it hit the 
pavement at Little Rock?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I'm sure that there are a variety of 
things that hopefully we can find out together.  I would hate to 
speculate on all those things.  I'd like to help you to discover it, but I 
really can't speculate.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Fair enough.  Now, Captain Tew took 
my question, but do you have any -- anything else that you think we 
ought to be looking at as a part of these hearings?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I just would like you to be aware 
that every employee at American Airlines observes safety as their 
first priority.  That's our tasking from the very top of the organization 
on down.
		I'm just hopeful that together we can use every bit of 
information that we learn together to improve what we do.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And many of your observations, and 
again how do you -- do you have anything built into your training that 
-- that deals with fatigue and how that might affect performance?
		THE WITNESS:  We talked about the alertness 
strategies, of course, that we expose our pilots to.  That's been 
helpful to me.  I do a little bit of long-haul flying.  The prevention-type 
of countermeasures, I think, is helpful.
		Captain Tew asked about recognition.  That's certainly 
an area that we could -- we should explore.  I think learning how to 
detect that in another individual.  I wouldn't want to have to go to 
medical school to do that or anything, but certainly that's something 
we should look at.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Good, good.  All right.  Well, I -- 
unless you have any other closing comments, Captain?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well, then.  We will excuse this 
witness.  Thank you very much for your testimony, Captain.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will now call the next witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Dexter Taylor from the Federal 
Aviation Administration.
Whereupon,
DEXTER TAYLOR
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:  
	Q	Thank you, Mr. Taylor.  Would you please state your full 
name and your business address?
	A	Dexter J. Taylor, and I'm in the AMR CMO at Dallas-Fort 
Worth Airport, Texas.
	Q	And by whom are you presently employed?  I think we've 
covered that, but if you'd just state for the record.
	A	Who am I presently employed?
	Q	Yes.
	A	I'm in the AMR CMO.
	Q	Federal Aviation Administration?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Thank you.
	A	I'm sorry.  
	Q	What's your present position at the CMO?
	A	I'm presently a partial program manager on the 
American certificate.
	Q	I'm sorry.  I didn't catch the -- which program manager?
	A	Partial program manager.
	Q	Could you explain what that is?
	A	I'm not sure what the -- my duties are going to be.  I take 
the liberty of explaining why.  I was a program manager, Air Crew 
Program Manager, on the Super-80 Fleet for the last 15 years, and 
as of the 12th of this month, I was transferred over to the partial 
program manager position.
	Q	Okay.  So, at the time of the accident, were you the MD-
80 --
	A	Yes, sir.		
	Q	-- Air Crew Program manager?  How long had you been 
in that position, did you say?
	A	I was in that position for 15 years.
	Q	Thank you.  Would you please briefly describe your 
duties and responsibilities in that position, the one you held at the 
time of the accident?
	A	Yes, sir.  The Air Crew Program manager is a specialist 
in the particular airplane he's assigned to.  He is responsible for the 
surveillance of that operation of that airplane, the training programs, 
the manuals, monitoring all of the flight training, check airman, 
designated examiners that we use for certification work, and any 
other tasks that may fall our way.
	Q	And could you summarize your education and training 
and experience that qualified you for that position?
	A	Yes, sir.  I was in the Air Force from 1943 until 1967.  I 
joined FAA in 1967 in Oklahoma City.  I was an instructor there for 
six years, five of those six years on the DC-9 that FAA had for training 
our inspectors.
		In 1973, I moved to Dallas-Fort Worth and worked on 
the American certificate, Braniff, Continental, everybody at DFW at 
the time, and in 1980, I was a principal inspector for Muse Air, a 
start-up carrier in 1980, with MD-80s incidentally, and then in 1983, 
when American started taking delivery in '84 of their MD-80s, I 
moved over and worked with them on that program, and then in '85, 
I became the Air Crew Program manager for the Super-80 at 
American.
	Q	And could you please tell us what your FAA airman 
certificates are, and also your experience in the MD-80?
	A	Yes, sir.  I hold an airline transport pilot certificate, 
Conveyor -- various Conveyor airplanes, and a DC-9, Boeing 727, DC-
10.  I have about 3,000 hours of instruction time in the Super-80, 
plus a few odd hours here and there over the years since then.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much.  
		MR. BERMAN:  Captain Tew?
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Inspector Taylor, welcome.  Could you tell us why you're 
no longer the Air Crew Program manager for the MD-80?
	A	Pardon?
	Q	Could you tell us why you are no longer the Air Crew 
Program manager for the MD-80?
	A	I was -- yes, sir.  About in January, I think, -- December.  
Pardon me.  In December, I took three weeks leave in November into 
the first week of December.  Upon my return, why, the principal 
inspector and I were talking about some issues, I forget what they 
were at this time, and he asked me how long I'd been on the 80 
program, and I told him 15 years, and he said, "Isn't that a long 
time?"  I said, "No, sir, I don't think it is."
		And then about -- on the 12th of -- of January, why, he 
called me in his office and told me he was relieving me of that 
particular position because I'd been on the airplane too long, and, so, 
I was assigned a partial program manager position at that time.
	Q	Okay.  When you were the Air Crew Program manager, 
were you responsible for the approval of the MD-80 manuals and 
their revisions?
	A	I was responsible for recommendation of approval.  The 
principal is responsible for the final approval.
	Q	Okay.  How often did you inspect the content of the 
ground training that was provided?  All my questions, I'm sorry, 
would be dealing when you were with --
	A	Yes, sir.  Yes, sir.  I understand.
	Q	How often did you inspect the content of the ground 
training that was provided?
	A	I try to review the training manuals at least once a year 
and the training manuals when changes come in from American, and 
they come to me.  I review them then, and most of the changes to 
the training manuals are discussed prior to even their issuance 
between the fleet manager and myself, whoever's responsible for the 
development of them.  So, it's -- it's quite frequently.
	Q	I believe you had an assistant when you were Air Crew 
Program manager, is that correct?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	How often did you or your assistant observe a simulator 
training session?  How many simulator training sessions did you and 
your assistant observe in 1999 and 1998?
	A	In -- in -- the expansion -- I have to go back a little bit, 
please, if I may.  American entered into an expansion of training in 
1988.  I'm not sure exactly what month, but they started acquiring 
additional airplanes, and since the Super-80 is the junior fleet, 
comprises most of the junior fleet, why, the bulk of the training fell 
on our program, the retraining and upgrade training, and for the 
latter half of 1988 and all of 1999, there was a tremendous increase 
in check airmen and designated examiners.  We tripled the check 
airmen cadre and doubled the designated examiner group in that -- 
during that time.
		It required a tremendous amount of time to qualify all 
those check airmen, and each time we qualified one, we observed a 
simulator training session and a flight check.  Often and as much 
other as we could do, we did.
	Q	You say the other, you're talking about the regular 
simulator training sessions, other than qualifying a check airman?
	A	A few, not too many.  We -- we did manage to get a few.
	Q	You don't recall how many a few would be?
	A	No, I -- no, I don't.  Not right offhand.
	Q	Okay.  Should more simulator sessions have been 
observed?
	A	Yes, sir, hm-hmm.
	Q	How often did you or your assistant observe the MD-80 
check rides?
	A	Type ratings?
	Q	Yes.
	A	On the type ratings, the certification side, all -- the 
majority of our certification work is accomplished by designated 
examiners.  I would say 98 percent of it.
		The only ones that would be of a mandatory observation 
is when a pilot fails twice, and we must watch the third check.  We 
had a few of those, not too many, but we had a few.
		All the new designated examiners must be observed 
administering oral exam and administering a type rating, and then 
periodic checks when we can afford the time to watch them.
	Q	I believe you heard a remark earlier of an observation 
that I did and Captain White of Boeing did of some simulator training 
sessions, and there was some discrepancies found.
		With that in mind, how do you ensure that there's -- or 
how did you ensure that there was standardization in the simulator 
training?
	A	We have to -- we depend an awful lot upon the -- get the 
right word now -- the coordinator program that American uses.  We 
have -- I think they took -- they take the senior designated examiners 
and call them coordinators, and they're really standardization 
people, and they watch every check airman and every ground -- not 
ground, but every -- every simulator instructor at least once a year, 
maybe more.  I don't know.
		But I know they watch them at least once a year, and 
through that effort and through periodic meetings with -- with the 
check airmen that the company conducts every quarter, and we 
attend, why, we're able to further our standardization program.
	Q	So, you rely heavily on the American coordinators to 
ensure the standardization?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  How often did you meet with the American 
Airlines check airmen?
	A	At least once a quarter, whenever American scheduled 
their check airman recurrent visits.
	Q	What was the purpose of those visits or meetings?
	A	Standardization meetings, where they bring in -- a lot of 
times, they'll bring in specialists to cover certain areas.  I think they 
had a special on wet runway operation here not long ago and 
crosswind operation, hit the hot items that are coming up for the 
next cycle of proficiency checks, just a general information and 
question and answer program, and I'm always allowed a few minutes 
to talk to the check airmen, and we always have a -- oh, maybe a 15-
minute to half-an-hour time period allocated to the designated 
examiners before the check airmen meeting to cover any problems 
they may have.
	Q	How did you ensure that American's procedures were 
being performed correctly during normal line operations?
	A	By conducting en route inspections.
	Q	Do you recall how many of these you and your assistant 
performed in 1999 and 1998, these --
	A	I don't recall how many Mr. Smith covered, but I had 
over 700 in 1998, and I think about 600 in 1999.
	Q	How was the FAA budget restricting your oversight of the 
MD-80 fleet?
	A	Well, it's probably not as restrictive on the 80 program 
as it is on some of the others because most of our work is domestic.  
It did limit us to a lot of short-haul observations and so forth, which 
we used to great advantage to -- to qualify our check airmen that we 
had to look at, and that helped a lot.
		But it handicapped us some when we were -- we were -- 
when we lost any nighttime.  We couldn't work at night, and we 
couldn't work on Sunday because of budget restraints.  That cost us 
about three months this year, right during the real busy time of the 
year.
	Q	Was your travel limited?
	A	Pardon?
	Q	Was the travel limited?
	A	Oh, yes.
	Q	Did the implementation of ATOS affect your oversight of 
the MD-80 fleet in any way?
	A	The effect that I felt personally on it was that it took time 
to insert the material, the data material gathered for ATOS, and the 
data material.  We still had input for PTRS.
	Q	How is ATOS better/worse than the old system?
	A	How is it what?  I'm sorry.
	Q	How is ATOS better or worse than the old system, which 
would be the PTRS system?
	A	I think -- I think it's too early to pass judgment on ATOS.  
It's been -- it's been a -- a trial period.  We have seen very little 
results because we don't have the proper people to analyze the 
program.
		The first year was not well organized, but it was the first 
time.  This year looks a little better.
		MR. TEW:  Okay.  For those in the audience, I'd like to 
explain.  The ATOS System is -- the letters stand for the Air 
Transportation Oversight System.  It's a new system by the FAA, and 
when we refer to the old system, it is the PTRS System, and it's -- 
Inspector Taylor can probably help me there.  It's Performance 
something Reporting System.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	What does the T stand for?  Task?
	A	Pardon?
	Q	I was just explaining to the audience.
	A	Oh.
	Q	What changes has the FAA made or suggested to the 
MD-80 program since the accident?
	A	From my -- from my perspective, Captain Lewis and I 
discussed a lot of the issues early on, but with his position on the 
Operations Group, and my lack of -- of -- of input on what happened, 
we couldn't do an awful lot.
		Through the press releases and things, we did get 
opportunity to discuss the spoiler problem.  We felt that was an 
important one, and we spent quite a bit of time discussing those 
issues.
		There were some study groups formed, but I was not a 
part of those study groups nor was I privy to any information that 
they -- that came out at the time.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Your lack of input.  Would you please 
explain a little more of that, Mr. Tew?  What --
		THE WITNESS:  Sir?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes, sir.  You said you had 
-- you did not provide much input.  Who was running this review?
		THE WITNESS:  American had some study groups.  I 
think they had a couple of them.  I did -- I did --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  American didn't permit you to 
participate?
		THE WITNESS:  No, they didn't -- American didn't -- 
American didn't interrogate me or question me on the training 
program, one of their -- one of their members of the study group.  We 
spent about, oh, two-three hours one day discussing training 
programs, but the -- the one that was conducted at the other study 
groups, I was not part of.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What other study groups are you 
referring to?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't know the names of them even.  I 
know there were two study groups on-going.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  By American?
		THE WITNESS:  Joint -- jointly with FAA.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Was the POI involved or who was 
involved --
		THE WITNESS:  I'm sure --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- from the FAA?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, he was.  Hm-hmm.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	So, you weren't privy to that.  Were you privy to the -- 
what came out of those meetings?
	A	Not really.  No, sir.
	Q	Okay.  You mentioned that you were involved with the --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But you were in this position, correct, 
at the time these study groups were taking place?
		THE WITNESS:  Sir?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You were in the -- in your -- the 
previous position at the time these study --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- groups were taking place?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Taylor, why didn't they include 
you?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't have an answer for you, sir.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	You mentioned that you made or suggested some 
changes with the -- concerning spoiler problems, I believe you said, is 
that correct?
	A	I didn't understand, sir.
	Q	You mentioned a minute ago that there were -- there had 
been spoiler problems, and that you suggested changes?
	A	No.  The spoiler problem that we heard through the 
press releases was the only ones we could really use because Eric 
was not -- since he was privy to the Operations Committee, he didn't 
feel that we could use what he knew, and I didn't know what he knew.
	Q	Okay.  
	A	So, we just used that as a starter, and because it was 
public -- public information.
	Q	Well, were there any other spoiler problems that you're 
basing this on?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Just this one?
	A	Just the one that I know of.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  How could this oversight of American be 
improved?
	A	Oversight on a program takes a lot -- a lot of man hours 
because if you're going to do a really thorough job of oversight on the 
training programs, it takes manpower, and we don't have the 
manpower.  We spend many hours a month on initial operating 
experience checks that are required by law.  We spent a lot of time 
last year on new check airmen.  We spent a lot of time on our 
designees that all are required by our manuals and so forth, and we 
don't have the luxury of spending a lot of time in the simulator 
observing the training programs as they should be.
	Q	Do you observe the training that American provides on 
approach briefings?
	A	Approach briefings?
	Q	Yes, sir.
	A	Yes, sir.  I'm familiar with them.
	Q	Did you read the CVR?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	What is your opinion of the briefing that was performed 
by the accident crew?
	A	As near as I could tell by just reading the -- I believe that 
they performed the initial briefing during the descent of the Runway 
2-2.  When they diverted to Runway 4, they did a minimum change 
briefing.  Let me put it that way.
	Q	Was that acceptable to you?
	A	I think -- I think they covered most of the points that 
they should have covered.  They may not have covered -- they may 
have missed a few.  I didn't get time this morning to review the whole 
issue.
	Q	Okay.  Were you or any of your check airmen aware of 
any failures to arm the spoilers on the MD-80 fleet or on any fleet?
	A	I've been on that airplane for a long time with American, 
since they -- since they bought the first one, and I can't recall 
anybody, any captain, not arming the spoilers as long as they were 
functional.
	Q	Was the failure to arm the spoilers ever --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How would you -- on what are you 
basing that information?
		THE WITNESS:  My personal observation.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Personal observation.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Was the failure to arm the spoilers ever a topic that was 
discussed among the instructors and check airmen or the FAA prior 
to the accident, since the accident?
	A	Not as a -- not as a general issue.  I think Captain Lewis 
pointed out that the system is -- is extremely reliable, and failure of 
the spoilers to extend is rare, indeed, very rare.
	Q	What training and guidance does American give its pilots 
to aid them in the decision-making, such as diversions, delaying a 
landing or go-arounds?
	A	They have a D&R Program, Duties and Responsibilities, 
for captain program.  I believe in that program, they do have -- refer 
to some decision-making processes.  They also present a program 
during recurrent training that provides an opportunity to discuss 
items of that nature, and it's always brought to the pilot's attention 
on their annual recurrent training.
	Q	Did you feel that this training or guidance was sufficient?
	A	Decision-making is -- is a difficult -- a difficult issue to 
really pin down.  There's so many things that can -- that can change 
to change a decision, that can influence a decision.  There's just -- 
I'm satisfied with what I've -- what I've seen, but I haven't seen it all.
	Q	In a statement you made a minute ago, you -- you sort of 
implied maybe you misunderstood it, that the auto spoilers failed to 
deploy after being armed.
Do you think they were armed?  Why do you think they were armed?
	A	Oh, no.  I'm sorry.  Maybe I misunderstood what you 
said.  Maybe you misunderstood what I said.
	Q	Oh, I'm sorry.
	A	I said in all the time I've been in the airplane, I don't 
recall ever seeing an auto spoiler that was armed fail to extend or a 
captain fail to arm them.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you, Inspector Taylor.
	A	Does that help?  Okay.
	Q	Yes.  Thank you, Inspector.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Taylor, during your time in this 
responsibility, has American reduced any of its pilot training?
		THE WITNESS:  Reduced?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes.
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  It expanded it.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  It stayed -- it's expanded in that 
particular area?  Have you ever had more than two people to perform 
those responsibilities?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  Most of -- no, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  For how long?  American's grown a 
little bit, hasn't it?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  They started -- they started out 
with 25 airplanes, first delivery, and now there's 200 -- I believe 280 
some now after the acquisition of Reno, and that was also added to 
our program this year.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, how many MD -- how many were 
you responsible for?  Airplanes?
		THE WITNESS:  260 initially, and now it's about 280 
something, I think.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Did any of the findings from the recent accidents that 
American has had filter down to any changes in the MD-80 program?
	A	Yes, sir.  I think they -- the first -- the first one that was 
implemented, of course, was the spoiler program.  It would be -- it 
already started in the recurrent training, and it certainly is in the 
initial training, and as Captain Lewis pointed out, it will run for 13 
months to be sure and get everybody involved in it for the next year, 
and that was the first thing they did, and I really don't know what 
else -- there's an issue -- there's a manual change that just came in 
last month that will incorporate that particular change on their 
Procedures Manual, and the checklist -- the checklist challenge 
response will be on -- in that one.
	Q	Thank you, Inspector Taylor.
		MR. TEW:  Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Does the Technical Panel got 
additional questions at this point?
		Mr. Taylor, had you requested any additional people?
		THE WITNESS:  We got -- we got a little help on IOEs, 
initial operating experience checks.  We do get a lot of help from the 
various offices around the country where we -- we give the American 
flight standard schedulers the schedule for initial operating checks 
for new captains.
		Incidentally, American's MD-80 fleet has about -- 
averages about 28 new captains a month.  So, that's a pretty good 
workload.  We get a little help -- we get help in Chicago.  We get 
some help out of New York.  We get some help out of Nashville, 
various inspectors around the country, and the flight standards 
schedulers, I give them names for those locations, and they get as 
much help as they can.
		But the bulk of it falls on our office here.  We get a little 
help from some of the other people in the office, but -- but my 
assistant and I do 90 percent of what comes in the office for the 80.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And again how has that additional 
workload impacted your ability to provide oversight?
		THE WITNESS:  Considerably.  I couldn't put a number 
on it, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Well, we'll move to the 
tables, and I believe I started -- I believe we would begin now with 
American Airlines.
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Chairman, we have no questions.  
Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  The Association would just like to wish 
Mr. Taylor Happy Birthday today.  We have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Your birthday, Mr. Taylor?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, Happy Birthday.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  Sir, we have no questions for Mr. 
Taylor.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Boeing Commercial Airplane 
Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And the Federal Aviation 
Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
		MR. BERMAN:  Just a couple.
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	You -- you mentioned that your office performs 700 en 
route checks, 600 in the various years recently, and you said that 
most of those, I think, are for qualifying the check airmen.
	A	The check airmen and initial operating -- new captains.
	Q	Does your -- does your department or did your 
department get to do any routine surveillance that wasn't related to a 
qualification or a certification?
	A	En route, you mean?
	Q	Yeah, yeah.
	A	Yes.  What usually -- well, let me put it this way.  Most of 
them are one-leg checks for the -- for the check airmen and -- and -- 
and IOEs.  So, we get opportunity to observe another crew on the 
other leg of the trip.
	Q	And do you recall anything that your office has picked up 
from watching the routine line operations of American that prompted 
you to request a change or information or clarification?
	A	No, sir.  We -- you know, being an inspector, when we're 
on an airplane, everybody does it the right way.  It -- if there -- if 
there are differences, we critique them immediately, and I've never 
seen any -- I've never seen a major problem, just maybe a minor one 
now and then, but they're on their good behavior when we're there.
	Q	Have you ever written a violation for something that you 
or one of your colleagues observed en route?
	A	Not -- not -- not something I observed, but something 
that was discovered, why, through other means.  Yes, sir, I have.
	Q	Through a route check?
	A	Not through my route check, no.
	Q	Okay.  You mentioned a few minutes ago that the first 
year of ATOS was not well organized.  What -- what did you mean by 
that?
	A	I don't think we really were prepared to target the 
individual inspectors into their -- their particular program.  So, what -
- a lot of the things we -- that we accomplished were outside the 
ATOS regime and really had no place to put them, except in PTRS.
		It might have been valuable for ATOS.  I don't know, but 
we had to put them in PTRS then.
	Q	So, you're saying you had a problem coding your 
activities into the ATOS framework?
	A	The system was very cumbersome the first year.  A lot of 
delays in inserting data and so forth.
	Q	Okay.  And has that improved?
	A	Well, we -- we hope so.  They say it was -- they say it 
would be improved for this next year, yes.
	Q	You haven't noticed the improvement yet?
	A	I haven't -- I haven't put anything in the last -- since -- I 
haven't put anything in this month.  So, I don't know, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Thanks.  No more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  I have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		BY MR. CLARK:
	Q	You made a statement a moment ago that when you're 
on board, everybody's on their best behavior.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	The -- what is the best behavior regarding the landing 
checklist and the challenge and response issues that have been 
discussed today?  What do you see?
	A	I see people conducting their checklist responsibilities 
responsibly.  It's a -- sometimes it's busy, sometimes it's a very quiet 
day, but the first officers or the pilot not flying initiates the checklist 
when it -- at a practical time, conducts briefings.
		I just don't see too many mistakes.  If they are, they're 
very, very minor ones, and we talk about them after the flight.
	Q	Okay.  On the landing checklist, there are 10 items.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Do you observe those?  Are they handled with the 
challenge and response on each one or only the two that American 
Airlines referred to earlier today?
	A	The two mandatory ones are always -- always covered in 
that manner.  It's a challenge and response.  The rest of them are up 
to the pilot not flying to conduct the -- each -- each item, and then to 
respond aloud when it's complete, and then when the whole checklist 
is complete, landing check completed.  Extremely standard.
	Q	So, there is -- what you routinely see is verbalization on 
all 10, and you see a challenge and response specifically on two?
	A	Sir?
	Q	On a -- as the checklists are read or are performed, you -
- what I hear you say is that you have a -- you hear a verbal response 
on each of the 10 items, and you also hear specifically the challenge 
and response on at least the two mandatory items?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	How routine is it for -- to have a challenge and response 
on each of the 10 items?
	A	I think it would be good.
	Q	It would be a good thing to do?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	In your experience, was -- how often was that 
accomplished when you were on your check rides?
	A	If that program is implemented, surprising how many -- 
how many pilots respond even though they're not required to.  The 
pilot flying responds, even though he's not required to.
	Q	Okay.
	A	Just a habit -- I think it's a habit pattern that -- that the 
individuals develop.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  It wasn't unusual to see that happening in 
the --
	A	No, I don't think so, no.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You indicated that, I guess in your 
responses from the Technical Panel, that you're rather dependent on 
the American coordinators for information, is that correct?
		THE WITNESS:  The coordinators are all designated 
examiners.  They are probably the most standardized people you'll 
ever find in an aviation group, all of them.  They are highly qualified.  
I know all of them personally.  I've watched their work over 
-- over the past years.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I work with a lot of highly-
qualified people at the NTSB, but I constantly have to supervise 
them.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And how -- how can you -- don't -- it 
sounds to me, just listening to this, that -- isn't it going to be difficult 
for you to validate the information they're providing without the 
individuals to actually get in the field and check adequately?  
		Do you think the Government is performing the function 
that you're supposed to be performing with the present manning that 
you have in your office?
		THE WITNESS:  This seems -- this seems to be a trend 
to reduce our manpower pool.  Our designees are a good example.  I 
have 21 designated examiners -- I had 21 designated examiners on 
the program.  
		10 years ago, 15 years ago, we had inspectors doing all 
the certification work for American.  It took about -- when we first 
started on the 80 program, it probably took about five or six 
inspectors to do the certification work.  We don't have that luxury 
anymore.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Has someone replaced you, Mr. 
Taylor?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And who is that individual?
		THE WITNESS:  A gentleman from our office was put in 
my position.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What was his previous experience?  
Do you know?
		THE WITNESS:  No DC-9 experience, sir, to my 
knowledge.  He had some 7 -- I think he had a DC -- he had a 727 
type rating and a 737 type rating.  He has not worked on the 
American certificate, and he'll have to go through the American 
training program before he'll be of any value.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  My understanding, basically, though, 
of your testimony, if I characterize this incorrectly, please correct 
me, is that at the present manning levels, that the Government 
responsibilities are really in large measure to some degree 
dependent on the proper reporting of the American Airlines pilots 
that report to you.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Without adequate staff really to -- to 
verify and check their performance, and I understand you have a long 
association with them and have a high regard for them.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I do.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But is -- is that an unfair 
characterization?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir, it's not.  I've worked with these 
people almost on a -- on a daily -- not daily basis but frequent basis, 
and I've seen their work.  I talked to them frequently.  We have a very 
open dialogue going on almost continuously with some of them, and I 
trust them to do what they're supposed to do.
		For example, their failure rate of type ratings is far 
above what we used to have when the inspectors were doing the 
certification work.  Their criteria -- their standards are much higher.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Let's discuss the responsibilities you 
have briefly in terms of manuals.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I -- I just -- one of the things that 
fascinated me in this job with coming into this with my not having an 
aviation background but having been in this position, is that the 
manufacturer puts out a manual in terms of the operations of the 
aircraft, --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- and then the process is that the 
operator then can create their own manual, --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- and there's certain variances 
sometimes between how the operator -- what the operator has in 
their manual and what the manufacturer recommends, --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- and in fact, we noted one of those 
today, and it's your responsibility, as I understand it, to approve 
American's manual?
		THE WITNESS:  I recommend approval to the principal, 
principal office inspector.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And --
		THE WITNESS:  But I go -- 
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And are you the one that tracks the 
changes as they come to the manual, as the manufacturer makes 
changes?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  I keep -- I keep a volume of the 
manufacturers' manuals in my office, and most of the -- all -- in fact, 
all of the changes that are made on this program have been 
discussed by American personnel who are implementing the 
changes, the changes that would come to my office, and I review 
them for their correctness and application and recommend approval 
or if there's any changes that I don't like, we go back and discuss 
them with American.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And the MD-80 aircraft and its family 
is widely used by other major carriers.  Do you consult and look at 
the decisions that are made why, for example, say, Delta might have 
one procedure or have approved one thing, and you have something 
different?  Do you all have any networking within the FAA?
		THE WITNESS:  We don't -- we don't have a networking, 
but I know most of the APMs around the country, and we -- we talk 
quite often, not real often, but maybe two-three times a year, we get 
on the telephone.  If we have a question, certainly we call them and 
talk to them about it.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  But there's no -- now, what 
is the -- is it the presumption when you have a change that comes 
from the manufacturer?  Who is supposed to act on that?
		THE WITNESS:  American does, is supposed to act on it.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And do you have a time frame that 
you would expect them to either act or give you a response or is that 
just something you kind of follow as it goes?
		THE WITNESS:  No, we don't have a time frame.  They're 
usually pretty prompt about it, though.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And how many changes would you 
say you've seen through your career?
		THE WITNESS:  From the -- from the company's manual?  
Not too many.  Not too many.  They don't vary too much.  I couldn't 
put a number on it.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, were you aware of the Boeing 
spoiler deployed call-out recommendation that came from Boeing?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  I don't know when it  came out.  
What's the date on it?  Anybody know?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Boeing know when that came out?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, we're checking on 
that, and we should have an answer for you tomorrow.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Any of the staff aware of that?  The 
date of it?
		MR. TEW:  I'm sorry.  I didn't hear the question.  I was 
being asked something else.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Boeing Aircraft put out a spoiler 
deployed call-out recommendation that I believe you referred to, 
Captain Tew, or Mr. Feith did, before in regard to -- it was in the 
Delta procedures.
		MR. TEW:  Oh, yeah.  I did have the date.  That was from 
-- I believe Captain Lewis mentioned that.
		THE WITNESS:  Delta had -- Delta put out their own -- I 
believe did their own change after their accident in Cleveland two 
years ago.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Right.
		THE WITNESS:  They did it as a result of that, but I 
didn't see that until the NTSB's report came out, and I forget when 
that was now.  In fact, I didn't see that report.
		MR. TEW:  I believe that's in their Flight Crew Operating 
Manual from Boeing.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Yes, sir.  I believe that's Exhibit 2II.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  From the MD-80 Flight Crew Operating 
Manual.  One -- date of '98.  Exhibit 2II.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do you have that, Mr. Taylor?
		THE WITNESS:  I'm looking right now, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Ms. Dargan, if not, we'd like to get a 
copy for Mr. Taylor.
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  That -- the date on that page that 
was referred to by the Allied Pilots Association is April 1st of '98.  
However, that information that's in question as we speak isn't the 
information that was changed on April of '98.  The information in 
question was changed prior to that.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Well, I guess, Mr. Taylor, 
my -- my question is, when -- when a manual change like this comes 
from the manufacturer, does it go -- is it American's responsibility or 
your responsibility to -- how's a request like this handled or acted 
upon?
		THE WITNESS:  It usually goes through American first, 
and they furnish us our copies of this -- of this -- this change -- this 
manual.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, you do not have your own 
independent copy, and you are dependent on the airline on any 
question?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't -- I don't recall seeing this one.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  
		THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.  Correction.  This is where the 
1.3 EPR on the contaminated runways came from.  So, I was aware 
of the 1.3 EPR, but I don't recall seeing this particular -- I know that 
American implemented it -- implemented this in their manuals, but I 
don't remember -- I don't recall seeing this one.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Very well.  Well, we'd 
appreciate it, if the -- you know, we may want to explore that more 
with the next witness as well, if the FAA has any additional 
information in that regard.
		But again the procedure would be that these changes, 
procedural changes, went from the manufacturer to American, and 
then American would bring them to your attention?
		THE WITNESS:  They furnish us a copy of the change.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And is that the procedure with all the 
major carriers?  Are you familiar with that, Mr. Taylor, from your 
networking and --
		THE WITNESS:  I'm sure that's -- that is a procedure.  
The company's responsible for furnishing us these manuals.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The reason I mention that is we have 
made some recommendations out of a ConAir report that this 
process on this should be changed at the federal level. 
		If you all have the responsibility for guaranteeing to the 
flying public that these deviations and changes in the manual are 
acceptable, I don't think that the Government should be in the 
position of being dependent on the carrier for the information, not 
meaning that there's anything that the carrier would not in good form 
do.  I just think the appearance of that procedure is unacceptable, 
and we have made recommendations in that area.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, Mr. Taylor, you have long 
served us.  You were with the -- with the -- with the Air Force, did you 
say, sir?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  For how many years?
		THE WITNESS:  24.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  24 years, and you've been with the 
FAA how long?
		THE WITNESS:  33.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  33?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Add that.  What's that?
		THE WITNESS:  It's a long time.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, that's a lot of -- that's a heap of 
federal service, and I thank you for that service, and, Mr. Taylor, you 
have heard -- you're familiar with this event, --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- and certainly it's a tragedy that no 
one obviously -- it's a difficult -- let's just say a difficult event, but do 
you have -- with all those years of experience and service and 
particularly your working in this area with American so closely for the 
past 15 years, we would be very interested in any thoughts that you 
had in terms of things that needed to be changed in the system to 
prevent an event like this from recurring.
		THE WITNESS:  I believe American took prompt action 
where they really needed it immediately.  That was on the spoiler 
problem, if it was a problem.
		The one issue that -- that I would like to see get some 
attention would be good runway condition reporting.  This is the 
second accident that American has had with runway conditions less 
than desirable.
		The first one, you're probably familiar with, was at 
Cleveland, where no runway conditions were related to the captain, 
other than they were treating the runway, and he was holding, and 
they finally cleared him to land.  When he landed, the runway was 
covered with a contaminant -- contaminated.  How much, nobody 
knows.
		What they treated the runway with, I don't know.  But I 
knew -- I knew the flight crew.  I knew the captain, and was part of 
the ASAP group that talked with them and -- and took them to the 
simulator, and we demonstrated what had happened and that sort of 
thing, checked them, and he told me that when he stepped on to the 
runway after the accident to get in the bus to go to the terminal, that 
the slush was over his shoe tops, and they were not aware of the 
runway conditions.
		I think that is an area that needs some attention.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you very much, Mr. Taylor.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We appreciate your testimony.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You are excused.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And we will call the next witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Mr. Corky Valentine.
Whereupon,
CORKY VALENTINE
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:  
	Q	Good afternoon or good evening.  Would you please 
state your full name and business address?
	A	Yes, sir.  It's S.C. Valentine, and I am at the FAA Office 
at DFW, the AMR CMO.
	Q	And by whom are you employed at -- at the CMO?
	A	The FAA.
	Q	Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What's a CMO, Mr. Berman?
		THE WITNESS:  The AMR Certificate Management Office.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you.
		BY MR. BERMAN:  
	Q	What's your present position at the Certificate 
Management Office?
	A	I'm assigned as the principal operations inspector for 
American.
	Q	How long have you held that position, sir?
	A	I served -- I was in that position acting for one year, and 
then I have been on that certificate now as the POI for one year.
	Q	Could you please summarize your duties and 
responsibilities as the POI?
	A	Yes, sir.  I give authorization to American Airlines to 
conduct its operations through the issuance of operation 
specifications.  I approve manuals.  I approve MELs.  We investigate 
passenger complaints, and we do enforcements.
	Q	And could you please briefly describe your education 
and training and experience that qualifies you to be the principal 
operations inspector?
	A	Yes, sir.  I went to the University of Texas, and while I 
was there, I learned how to fly.  I got all of my certificates through 
civilian training.  I spent 10 years as a military contract instructor.  I 
was an airline captain for 13 years for a large regional carrier.
		I have an ATP, airline transport pilot certificate.  I have 
five air transport category type ratings.  Following that, I joined the 
FAA.  I've been on the American Airlines certificate for 10 years, and 
during that tenure, I have had five different positions.
	Q	Thank you.  And what type ratings do you have on your 
ATP, and do you hold any other FAA airman certificates?
	A	Yes, sir.  I have a certified flight instructor certificate.  
The type ratings are the Shorts 330, Saab 340, the Conveyor 580, 
the DC-9 Super-80, and the F-100.
	Q	What experience do you have -- flying experience do you 
have in the DC-9 or MD-80?
	A	I was qualified at the FAA Flight Academy.  I later went 
through recurrent training through a contractor.  That was at 
Northwest Airlines.  I went again through a recurrent training 
program at the contractor then, Delta.  That's the experience I have.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much.
		MR. BERMAN:  Captain Tew?
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Yes.  Welcome, Inspector Valentine.
	A	Thank you.
	Q	The question came up with -- during the previous 
testimony about these Boeing changes in the FCOM and all that.  
Could you address that or did you need that clarified or --
	A	Yes, sir.  I would be glad to.  American Airlines 
purchased two new aircraft this year or actually last year.  It's the 
777 and the 737.  Those manufacturers gave support to the carrier.  
At the same time, we have inspectors that went through that initial 
training, initial cadre, instructors, and you have to start somewhere 
in this training program.
		So, these inspectors that were assigned these new 
aircraft, much like those check airmen at American Airlines, received 
the same manuals from the manufacturer.  The inspectors now still 
on those new aircraft have those same manuals which are updated 
from the manufacturer.
		So, any bulletins, revisions to those manuals are 
received by the FAA.  I route those to those individuals, whether 
they're on the 777 or the 737.  They -- this person who is here, Crew 
Program manager, takes that to the carrier, and they discuss if this 
is an issue that needs to be addressed, their current procedures or 
policies, if that needs to be changed or revised to conform with 
whatever the subject matter is of the manufacturer bulletin.
		It -- it then comes from that APM back through to me, 
and with the concurrence of that APM, I make the approvals.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is there a burden of proof involved 
there?  It would seem to me if the manufacturer, and this is just my 
personal opinion, the manufacturer's recommending the change, 
then you would want to know why the operator did not want to make 
that change and determine that that did not have any safety 
consequences.
		THE WITNESS:  You're exactly right, Chairman Hall.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is that in procedures or is it just --
		THE WITNESS:  It is in -- you must remember that while 
one carrier has an airplane that's configured one way, Delta may 
have their airplanes configured quite another. 
		It's much like the options that you get when you buy a 
new car.  Some of these things that come across do dictate change 
while some may not.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But usually the brakes are pretty 
standard, right?
		THE WITNESS:  I think you're right.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Along this line, what criteria would you like -- like I know 
that Boeing calls after landing spoilers, and then Delta -- I mean 
Delta calls spoilers that now.  American is going to no spoiler call-
out.
		How do you determine which is a better one?  Do you 
just evaluate what the carrier sends you as what they want to do as a 
procedure and make a judgment call or what criteria do you use to 
say this is acceptable or this is not acceptable?
	A	I rely very heavily on the Air Crew Program managers, 
since that person has the technical experience having gone through 
that airplane and is qualified and works with it on a daily basis.  They 
are very closely in contact with not only the Aircraft Evaluation 
Group, but the manufacturer and the carrier as well.
		So, those combined resources, I consider, when those 
changes are proposed by the carrier, and the APM concurs or 
disagrees, we may -- may approve a manual revision, and then we -- 
we may not.
	Q	American Airlines has had a number of accidents and 
incidents in its recent history.  What actions has the FAA done in 
response to these accidents and incidents?
	A	We convened a System Analysis Team.  This was an 
effort -- it was a joint effort.  There was a member from the FAA, a 
member from APA, and a member from the carrier.  This -- this team 
addressed those issues involving the take-off and landing phases of 
flight.
		That seemingly was the problem areas.  It was a very 
narrow brush and scope, looking at those things that could cause 
immediate problems.
		There were six events -- six accidents and two incidents, 
over a period of five years that was considered in this System 
Analysis Team evaluation.  What's unique is that you get the input 
from the three parties that are all involved with the -- the process.
		You've got the FAA.  You've got the APA.  You've got the 
carrier.  The goals are common.  So, what we jointly did was look at 
these things.  Were there any commonalities?  What -- what surfaced 
as a high risk?
		There were some 89 recommendations coming from 
these audits.  The System Analysis Team, plus the audit that 
American Airlines did independently, and the other audit that APA 
did independently, of these three audits, there were 89 
recommendations.  There were 17 recommendations that received a 
high priority and set an immediate goal for changes, and Captain 
Lewis addressed several of those.
		The mandatory call for the spoilers, the checklist 
revision, the crosswind limitations being modified and simplified, 
things that the pilots brought in, the APA brought in, and the carrier 
brought to the table.  
		There's going to be a divider that you put inside the 
Jepsen charts that on this little plastic tab that separates or -- it -- it 
marks the page, the approach that you're using.  It's going to have 
the crosswind limitations.  So, you -- you eventually won't have to go 
looking through other books.  It will be readily available.
		The spoilers, the call-out, if the spoilers do not deploy.  
This is going to be a call.  So, there were a significant amount of 
good things that came from these three audits.
		The balance of these things will take some time.  There 
have been some discussion on winds.  Do you include the gusts in 
this limitation or is this a steady wind?  So, it's been so refined, that 
of the 17, it was a very quick way to put them into play, rather than 
put it out as a recommendation some months later, get it done.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, Mr. Valentine, that's what 
interests me in terms of that Boeing spoiler deployment call-out --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- that I referred to.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Because we had an audit that 
detected that, but Boeing had already brought that to American's 
attention two years ago.
		THE WITNESS:  I can't address that.  I'm not the APM on 
that particular program.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The APM -- you heard the APM testify 
that he had -- was not aware of it.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, I mean that's something we ought 
to probably audit at the Government level --
		THE WITNESS:  I agree.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- to be sure that we are, you know, 
performing -- because as commendable as the audit is, it was after 
the tragedy.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And when the information from 
Boeing was before the tragedy and was in place at at least one other 
major carrier in the country.  So, I commend the audit, and I 
commend the things that have been made, but --
		THE WITNESS:  I would like to ask a question, if I may, 
Chairman Hall.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Sure.
		THE WITNESS:  This spoiler deployment, was this a -- 
something that the manufacturer recommended as an immediate 
change?  Was this a recommendation that it should be just studied?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I -- well, we'll get -- I'll get the 
manufacturer to respond to that.  Are you prepared to do that or do 
you need to do that tomorrow, sir?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure what 
the context was of the letter that accompanied the change.  However, 
the actual words in the manual read, "If a spoiler lever does not move 
aft or does not remain at extended position, pilot not flying call no 
spoilers.  Pilot flying move lever aft until full extend position and up 
to latch position."
		So, that was in the manual.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I take it, Mr. Valentine, that you need 
to have Boeing indicate the urgency, whether that's something that 
needs to be done right away, be studied or not be done?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  Having now understood the 
context of that directive, if you will, American did comply with that in 
that, as you've heard earlier testimony, American historically calls 
out problem areas rather than normal operations.
		So, if the spoilers did not deploy, then spoilers would be 
the non-pilot flying, and it's then incumbent on the captain, and it is 
in their manuals today, that the manual -- the captain physically 
deploys spoilers.  So, that is in the manuals.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Thank you.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Are you aware of the American Airlines -- I've heard the 
term "blue ribbon panel".  I don't know if that's the correct term.  Of a 
panel that was organized to look into the recent accidents and 
incidents that American has been having or panels?
	A	Captain Tew, yes, sir, I do.  That was one of the audits I 
mentioned beforehand.  It was commissioned through the past chief 
pilot, Captain Ewell.  Captain Ewell did give me a courtesy call that 
they were conducting this audit.
		In this particular audit, they wanted to observe cockpit 
procedures again within the scope of the take-off and landing 
approach phases flight.  We did approve some of these gentlemen to 
access the cockpit, but I was well aware of that.
	Q	Could you tell us what actions occurred as a result of 
this panel?
	A	No, sir.  The debrief -- I was not involved in that 
particular debrief nor the APA audit.  I do know that these 
recommendations almost parallel what the -- the safety -- the System 
Analysis Team determined in that all of the parties were there.  So, 
there were some carried-over recommendations.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But you were not a participant in the 
debriefing?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Were you --
		THE WITNESS:  I was not.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Were you invited?
		THE WITNESS:  If I had called American, I'm sure I could 
have.  We were in the -- in the same time frame doing an audit with 
the same people.  So, it would not have served any further purpose 
to become a party of the APA audit and American's since we were 
doing the joint effort under the safety analysis team.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I -- okay.
		THE WITNESS:  Chairman Hall, let me -- maybe I can 
make this clearer.  There were three audits.  The SAT, APA and 
American.  They were looking at all aspects involving the take-off and 
landings.
		So, having an FAA representative on the SAT and an APA 
member and a member from American Airlines, that communications 
was intact.  It was there.  So, it would be repetitious for me to -- to 
be a party to those other audits.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, but they were all for the same 
purpose, is that correct?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, they were.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Wouldn't the information from one -- 
wouldn't you be curious whether that audit information was 
comparable with what you all were finding?
		THE WITNESS:  That is a true statement, and I was 
provided feedback from our representative, the FAA representative 
on the SAT.  That's how I knew that there were 89 total 
recommendations.  So, I did know, you know, what -- what they were 
doing.  I just did not participate in the APA audit, and I did not 
participate --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I understand that, but I was 
referring -- specifically referring to the debriefing in which they went 
through what they had found in the audit.
		Did -- but you did not feel that it was appropriate for you 
to be there or necessary for you to be there?
		THE WITNESS:  We did have a debrief with AFS-1 in 
Washington.  It was at that point in time that, you know, I became 
fully aware of some of these issues, but to be called to American 
Airlines for that single purpose, no.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But you are the principal person of 
the Federal Government charged with oversight of American Airlines?
		THE WITNESS:  That is correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And they have a number of accidents, 
and there's a major audit that the airline conducts to look at their 
operations, --
		THE WITNESS:  That is correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- and you again were not invited or 
were aware of that -- there was a debriefing on the results of that 
audit?
		THE WITNESS:  Of those two audits, I was not.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You were not notified?
		THE WITNESS:  I was not formally invited to attend the 
debriefings at the American Airlines headquarters.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But then that information was shared 
by the Federal Government in Washington by American -- with 
American?
		THE WITNESS:  And I was in attendance at that meeting.  
Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's just curious.  Proceed.
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Chairman?  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes?
		MR. BAKER:  Let me see if I can add a little light to this 
dilemma.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Sure.
		MR. BAKER:  Tomorrow, I will appear as a witness and 
talk in some detail about these three evaluations, and I think we can 
clarify some of the intent, the participants and what came out of it.
		So, -- or I can talk about it now, but that's part of my 
presentation tomorrow, for your information.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, you've heard our concerns, and 
maybe you can address those in your -- your testimony tomorrow.  
		Obviously I'm reacting both to Mr. Valentine's testimony 
and the testimony of the previous witness in regard to the Federal 
Government's ability through its appropriate agency, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, to oversee which they are charged with the 
training and operations of American Airlines, and since we have been 
told there was a manpower problem by the previous witness, and I 
asked Mr. -- will get into that with Mr. Valentine in a minute, and 
since obviously you all do coordinate and cooperate very closely, 
which is appropriate, to have a major audit and to have a debriefing 
without the -- without Mr. Valentine being present, I was curious 
about, and I'll look forward to your comments on that tomorrow.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	How do you ensure that American's pilot training is 
satisfactory and is standardized?
	A	Through use of the Air Crew Program managers who are 
qualified.  They go through the same training as the American 
Airlines pilots.  They are in the field observing proficiency checks, 
training events, line operations.
		Any of these things that are not standardized or are 
being conducted in a state other than in compliance, I'm notified, 
and then we -- we take action.
	Q	Do you review the surveillance records of the training 
and line operations?
	A	Yes, sir, I do.
	Q	What areas of concern in training and/or line operations 
have been evident during recent surveillance record reviews?
	A	American Airlines is in a state of rapid expansion and 
growth with the purchase of two new aircraft this year or, rather, last 
year.  They had also purchased Reno Air.  There's a great deal of 
training that is being conducted, and those are concerns.
	Q	American is one of the carriers that's now under the new 
Air Transportation Oversight System or ATOS.  When did it start at 
American?
	A	In February of 1999.
	Q	What happened to the previous oversight system?  Is it 
still in effect or did ATOS completely replace it?
	A	The -- as you mentioned before, PTRS is still viable.  It's 
a way that inspectors can record activities or data.  Those activities 
that are not involving surveillance generally, certification, 
surveillance is recorded and documented under the ATOS System.
	Q	What additional training is required for an inspector to 
be assigned to an ATOS carrier?
	A	That individual must first go through specialized ATOS 
training, which is conducted at the Academy in Oklahoma City, and 
then he must -- he or she must go through the training air carrier-
specific, and that would be conducted at the local level.
	Q	How effectively were the inspectors trained to use the 
ATOS System?
	A	With any new program, and as complex as ATOS is, you 
would expect some stumbling blocks.  It was implemented early on.  
It was a rapidly-changing program.  It went under -- it underwent a 
lot of changes.
		It's -- it's not a well-oiled machine, so to speak, today, 
but it has been changed, the principles of it.  I think it's a better way 
to conduct surveillance.
	Q	Is completion of this specific training required before an 
inspector can be used under the ATOS System?
	A	Yes, sir, it is.
	Q	Were all the ATOS inspectors assigned to American 
trained at the time of the accident?
	A	I have two new inspectors who transferred from General 
Aviation Offices.  They are going through the American Airlines-
specific training as we speak, and I have one other inspector who will 
be assigned as the DC-9 APM, who was on another certificate.  So, 
those -- those people are not presently qualified.
		There were approximately four individuals at the time of 
the accident not qualified under ATOS.
	Q	How many ATOS inspectors are assigned to the 
American Airlines certificate?
	A	I have 16 inspectors.
	Q	Is this enough?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Why not?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, have you requested more 
people?  Let me get that question out of the way.
		THE WITNESS:  Chairman Hall, we have.  I have 16 
inspectors presently in the office.  We have six geographic ATOS 
inspectors.  We're under a hiring freeze, and this is something that 
has severely impacted the abilities to conduct surveillance.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How many do you think you need, Mr. 
Valentine, to adequately do the job responsibly, since you're -- you 
know, you're the individual there that's accountable?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  I would like to have 20 
inspectors in the office.  I would like to have a minimum of 10 
inspectors geographically assigned to the certificate.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, that would be an additional 14?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	These inspectors you've got, do you feel like they've got 
the training to adequately do proper surveillance or have they got the 
experience level?
	A	Captain Tew, the -- the way -- surveillance hasn't 
changed.  It's the method of the way we record it.  Under the old 
system, we would go to the carrier or go observe an event and look at 
it, and it was a rather broad brush review.  
		Under ATOS, we have -- it's -- it's very narrow in scope.  
We have job aids that we use.  We look at a system rather than the 
entire carrier.  It gives you a much better quality inspection.
	Q	Did you have any input into the hiring of the geographic 
inspectors?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Who -- who does?
	A	I assume the ATOS Program Office.  I don't know.
	Q	I guess we'll ask the next witness that.  Who determines 
where the geographic inspectors are located?
	A	Not me.
	Q	Okay.  Is there a difference pre- and post-ATOS in the 
amount of actual surveillance done on an ATOS carrier, such as 
American, and is that indicated in the existing data?
	A	The constraints are there.  As I mentioned to Chairman 
Hall, we -- the FAA is presently under a hiring freeze.  Congress has 
allocated a very restrictive budget.
		So, in answer to your question, Captain Tew, is it 
adequate, no, sir.
	Q	It wasn't quite is it adequate?  Is there a difference in the 
amount of actual surveillance done was the question?
	A	I apologize.
	Q	Oh, okay.
	A	There is a difference in the amount and for those 
reasons I just mentioned.
	Q	How detailed is the data that's reported by the 
inspectors under the ATOS System?
	A	It's very detailed.  You have a well-educated inspector 
having gone through this refined air transport oversight system 
training, an inspector who has then gone to the airline and learns 
how American Airlines operates, and then you send that inspector 
armed with the regulations, with the handbook guidance.  You get a 
much better quality inspection, and those results that you get back 
are things that you can adapt and identify trends in a much readily -- 
it's -- it's far more readily than it was under the old system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Does the new system require more 
personnel, would you say, sir, than the old system?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.  I don't think it would take 
additional personnel.  We -- we are just under-staffed.  We were 
under-staffed before ATOS.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	How do you ensure that the oversight is broad enough to 
cover all the geographical areas?
	A	We have -- let me make a short answer long for you.  We 
still have inspectors who took an oath when they were hired.  Even 
though they're not on the ATOS certificate, they don't work at the 
American Airlines CMT, if -- if they observe something that is unsafe, 
there is an avenue for that inspector to report his or her findings, and 
that is through the PTRS.
		On many occasions, I get telephone calls asking is this -- 
is this legal?  Is this acceptable?  Did you know?  
		Under the surveillance we have with those individuals 
assigned to the ATOS CMT, those are six individuals, and they are 
positioned at six different locations throughout the United States.  
There needs to be more coverage.
	Q	So, in other words, the oversight could be broader to 
cover all these areas?
	A	It could.  An example of that is that I don't have an ATOS 
inspector at San Francisco.  This is one of those areas that American 
has a base.  There is a vacancy at New York.
	Q	How effective are the job aids that are used by the 
inspectors to do their inspections under the ATOS?
	A	Captain Tew, the job aids initially were written in such a 
way, they -- they bred confusion rather than gave an inspector the 
tools needed.  Those have since been revised, and they are much 
better.
		We just completed last week our annual planning 
meeting, and there were some compliments.  We -- we had a critique 
sheet that we passed out, and it was one of the comments made on 
these critique sheets that finally you could read the job aids and have 
some understanding of what the questions were asking.
	Q	Could they be improved further?
	A	Of course.  This system is in its infancy.  It will take, in 
my mind, three to five years to fully develop it.
	Q	Is the ATOS data entry, it is used afinally?  I'm using a 
computer term there as far as easy to put in the system and easy to 
work with for the inspector, easy to work the job aids in data entry?
	A	Early on, it was extremely difficult.  It was extremely 
time-consuming, and when you could even access the system, you 
would be entering data or attempting to enter data and be kicked out 
of the system.
		It's come a long way.  There has been some changes, 
but there are changes that could be made to enhance the program, 
and I suspect as we speak, those automation changes are being 
done.
	Q	And do you have access to the data that's been entered 
into the ATOS System?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  How effective is the guidance for the inspectors in 
the field for planning and performing inspections?
	A	That, too, has improved.  Through the job aids and the 
work assignments from our annual planning meeting, it's becoming 
more effective.
	Q	Are there any constraints placed on the ATOS inspectors 
regarding when and where they can conduct inspections?
	A	Those constraints would be driven by the budget.  An 
example of that was we were doing surveillance last year.  I ordered 
increased surveillance in the South America arena.  We were severely 
restricted in the completion of that project because of the budget.
	Q	When the FAA determines that there's a need for a 
special emphasis inspection, such as they did for carry-on baggage, 
how would this be recorded under the ATOS System?
	A	I can order an SEI.  I can retarget.  If we have a 
heightened awareness, if there is a risk, I can order a -- these 
inspections or retarget to assign in a geographic location.
		The -- the process is -- is adequate to provide the 
inspector the tools to conduct this inspection, and that data that 
they accomplish or gather is readily available to me.
	Q	You've alluded to the budget cuts affecting your 
inspectors.  How else have the budget cuts affected the oversight?
	A	Again, the -- the -- the budget drives the hiring.  The 
budget drives the availability of positioning personnel.  It also drives 
what you can do with an inspector who needs to go to Osaka, Japan.
	Q	Well, do you have all the -- do you have enough money to 
do all the inspections and travel that are required under ATOS?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Okay.  Because there's nothing you can do about it?
	A	No, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, you can at least answer those 
questions honestly, and you did that.
		MR. TEW:  That was the reason for the question.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I appreciate that because, you know, 
there -- many times, we'll have people go up to Congress, I've seen it 
happen while I've been Chairman, and say, oh, everything's fine, and 
if everything's not fine, it's your responsibility to say it isn't.  I 
commend you for that.  Go ahead.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Has an analyst been hired for your ATOS team?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Why not?
	A	Again, the hiring freeze.
	Q	Do you know how many analysts have been hired in the 
entire ATOS System?
	A	Yes, sir.  The POIs have a very close network.  We talk 
frequently.  It just so happens that Southwest Airlines has an analyst 
or an analyst.  They -- that inspector was on staff at the time.  So, 
rather than going outside and hiring this analyst, they were already 
in position.  So, they just changed job descriptions, and now you've 
got the analyst on board.  This is the only carrier out of the top 10 
that has an analyst.
	Q	Wasn't the analyst supposed to be an integral part of the 
ATOS System?
	A	Most definitely.
	Q	How are you collecting and analyzing data to, you know, 
support your trend monitoring and your inspection planning and your 
retargeting of surveillance without an analyst?
	A	It's based on my experience with the carrier and those 
individuals that I have under my employment.
	Q	How many hours a day are you working to do this?  What 
would you -- what would a -- you've had quite a bit of experience.  
What about a carrier that might not have the experience and 
background that you've got?  Are they having to rely on what little 
experience they've got as to how to target their inspections?
	A	I would not like to be in that position.
	Q	Okay.  Well, the next question is obvious.  How is the 
data being analyzed without an analyst?
	A	Simply put, it's not.
	Q	That's a fair question.  So, if it's not being analyzed, 
then we haven't determined anything from the data, I would assume, 
is that correct?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	So, ATOS data is not being used at this time?  It's being 
collected, but it's not being used?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	What were your emphasis --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And that is a program that's been 
touted and promoted by everybody.  Is that the same program?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	What were your emphasis areas at the time of the 
accident?
	A	Surveillance of the two new fleets, the South America 
arena, the take-off and landing phase under the System Analysis 
Team inspection.  Those were of paramount concern.
	Q	Could you explain to us what a comprehensive 
surveillance plan is, and tell us how many you've developed since the 
implementation of ATOS?
	A	Yes, sir.  The comprehensive surveillance plan under 
ATOS is the way that we assign work for the year.  We develop things 
that inspectors are assigned to do for that year.  Each inspection 
includes things like carry-on bags, exit row seating, en route 
surveillance of manuals.  All of these things develop under the CSP.  
All these things comprise that inspector's work program for that 
year.
		Now, the second part of your question was how many of 
these have I accomplished.  As of last week, that was the second one.
	Q	How effective was the planning guidance in developing a 
comprehensive surveillance plan?
	A	Initially, it was a disaster.  The -- the second one, 
because the program had undergone a lot of changes, because there 
were things that were recommended from the field that were taken to 
the program office, inspectors who had tried or attempted to enter 
data, to use the data, retrieve data, all of these things sent to the 
ATOS Program Office, did make the system better, and once again, 
Captain Tew, this is an evolution of a brand-new program.
	Q	In developing this plan, wasn't an analyst an integral 
part of that?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Supposed to be?
	A	Yes, sir, it was.
	Q	So, like you said, you're relying basically on developing 
this thing and -- and targeting your resources based on your 
experience and not an analyst?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Are you using the ATOS data that's been collected so far 
to develop these plans?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	How effective is the ATOS data that's been collected?
	A	The data that we have now in the repository, I am saying 
that it is much better quality.  It's timely, and from that data 
collection, I can sit -- knowing the carrier, I can sit at my desk and 
draw my own conclusions where I should either retarget work 
programs or I should maybe commission an SEI, special emphasis 
inspection.
	Q	What do you like about ATOS?
	A	Just that.  It's -- we -- we have a very specialized group 
of inspectors now who know the carrier, and you get a better quality 
product in your reporting and data collection.
	Q	Could you tell us what changes you would like to see in 
the ATOS System?
	A	Yes, sir.  I would like to be able to speak to those 
persons assigned to the certificate management team, those who 
would be geographically positioned.  I would like to be given the 
opportunity to at least give them my expectations of what I would like 
to see from them as an inspector.
		I would also like to have an opportunity to have a say in 
where I would like them.  I have a geographic inspector at Las Vegas.
	Q	Yes, sir.  Thank you very much for your answers.
		MR. TEW:  Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Does the Technical Panel have other -
- other questions?
		(No response)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Let me just clarify so I understand.  
There were three audits?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  One was essentially generated by the 
Government?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  One by the airline?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And one by the union?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And are all three of those audits 
completed?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And you have the information from all 
three of those now?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And how do they match up?
		THE WITNESS:  The 39 -- I'm sorry -- the 89 
recommendations that come from these audits was submitted in a 
plan form to our office and was submitted for review, and there were 
certain issues taken.  17 of these recommendations had such a high 
priority, that they were immediately implemented.  
		The remaining recommendations were given a certain 
amount of time to develop and research, and the direction that the 
carrier, with their union, would like to pursue.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Now, Mr. Feith, do we have this 
information in the record?  Copies of these recommendations for the 
record of this hearing?
		MR. FEITH:  Not that I'm aware of.  
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, we might request that.
		Now, who did the targeting?  Who decided there were 
the 17 that were important?
		THE WITNESS:  That was the core work group from the 
System Analysis Team that the Government did with the APA and 
American Airlines.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And were you on that team?
		THE WITNESS:  I was the team leader.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, these 17 immediate 
recommendations reflect your input?
		THE WITNESS:  They do.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And was that an independent 
decision that you made and the Government made in an oversight 
area or was that something that was made in a team effort with the 
union and the airline deciding how things were targeted?
		THE WITNESS:  It was a -- a collaborative effort and 
decision --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And are you --
		THE WITNESS:  -- between APA and the carrier and the 
Government.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Are you comfortable with that?
		THE WITNESS:  I certainly am.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Did that fulfill your responsibilities for 
oversight?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Now, this -- before we go 
to the tables, I will tell you this will be our last witness for the day.  
We will start at 8:30 in the morning, and we will take whatever time 
is necessary to be sure we've completed all of the questioning with 
this witness.
		I know there's quite a few more questions from the 
Board of Inquiry.  I'm sure there may be some from the -- from the 
party tables, but we will begin with the Association of Professional 
Flight Attendants.
		MS. LORD-JONES:  Chairman Hall, we have no questions 
for this witness.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  The Weather Service has no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We then will move to the Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group.
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, we have no 
questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  America Airlines, Inc.?
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Chairman, we have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Federal Aviation Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  Yes, Mr. Chairman, a couple of points 
for clarification here.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	Mr. Valentine, you said there were 16 inspectors in the 
office on the certificate.  Is this just Operations?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Okay.  And can you give me a feel for the average 
experience level of the inspectors on the Certificate Management 
Team?
	A	Yes, sir.  We -- the average is 34 years.
		MR. STREETER:  No further questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  All right.  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  Yes, Mr. Chairman.
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. SWEEDLER:
	Q	Mr. Valentine, about three and a half years ago, this -- 
this Board investigated a rather tragic accident, and as part of that 
investigation, it became clear that the people in similar positions that 
you hold had become aware of rather serious safety deficiencies at 
the airline that they were overseeing and attempted to pass this 
information with recommendations to their supervisors and to the 
higher-ups at the FAA, and their advice and suggestions were not 
accepted, and there was a lot of consequences to that, and 
apparently there were a lot of changes at the FAA to try to avoid this 
occurring in the future, and my question to you is a very simple one.
		You're the person, you're the principal operations 
inspector.  If you detect a problem or you see some things that need 
-- really need to be corrected, do you feel comfortable and confident 
that you have the ability to approach your supervisors or anyone else 
in a higher level at the FAA to get the attention that you need to get 
these, whatever you think is needed, accomplished?
	A	Mr. Sweedler, I will assure you I have that ability.  I 
would -- my supervisor clearly understands that if I recognize a 
safety-related problem, I will elevate it.
	Q	And you feel that that -- that you will get -- your voice 
will be heard?
	A	It -- yes, sir, and historically it has.  Like I said, I've been 
the principal operations inspector now for two years, acting one and 
here in the job one year, and I am most comfortable with the support 
that I get.
	Q	Thank you, sir.  
		MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no further questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Mr. Valentine, I have -- I'd like to clarify just a couple of 
issues based on your earlier testimony and then maybe talk about 
ATOS a little bit more.
		Going back to the -- the MD-80 -- I'm sorry 
-- going back to the issue of updating manuals based on input from 
the manufacturer, you mentioned that on the 737 and 777 fleets, the 
initial cadre of FAA airmen in your office were responsible for 
maintaining a Boeing manual and then providing input to your office 
about changes in the Boeing manual.
		It appeared to me from the testimony of Mr. Taylor that 
he in his -- in his previous job, going back a long time, may have 
been the appropriate person to be in that -- to serve that function for 
the MD-80 fleet, is that correct?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	So, he didn't mention having a current manual for the 
MD-80.  Do you -- do you believe he did have one?
	A	Yes, sir, I think he does.
	Q	Okay.  And did you notice him distributing information 
from the manufacturer and discussing it with -- with American 
Airlines and with you?
	A	Yes, sir.  There are other ways this information is 
disseminated.  For example, MELs.  When there is an equipment, 
some system on an airplane that the Aircraft Evaluation Group 
determines that now it must be operational, that information comes 
to our office.  
		It also goes to the carrier, and that Air Crew Program 
manager takes that information and knows that the carrier will 
change their minimum equipment list, and if it complies with the 
master equipment list, and that APM concurs with it, he gives me his 
concurrence, and I approve it or disapprove it and return it to the 
carrier.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  Now, going back, way back in time now, it 
appears that your office did have a functional way of getting 
information about the MD-80 Operating Manuals.
		Do you have any understanding or explanation for how 
the -- the -- the no spoilers call-out didn't get into the American 
Airlines' manual before -- before this?
	A	I certainly do.  It was as a result of the System Analysis 
Team recommendation.  This is one of those 17 most immediate --
	Q	No.  I'm sorry.  I'm asking why it didn't get -- did not get 
into the manual --
	A	Prior to?
	Q	-- before this?  Yeah, yeah.
	A	I'm sorry.  I can't answer that question, except in that I 
do know that in the DC-9 Operating Manual, if the spoilers do not 
deploy, this is an abnormal call-out, and the pilot not flying makes 
that call, and it's incumbent on the captain to physically position 
those spoilers to the deployed position.
	Q	That's very interesting.  So, are you equating the -- the 
American Airlines' procedure that was in existence at the time of the 
accident, which I understand was effectively -- it didn't specify who 
was to monitor spoiler -- auto spoiler deployment, but it 
-- it did specify the captain was to manually deploy them, if it didn't 
work.
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Do you equate that with the Boeing-Douglas procedure 
that included an explicit call-out by the non-flying pilot to alert the 
captain or the flying pilot of the need to manually deploy the 
spoilers?
	A	I agree with that procedure simply because I know the 
corporate philosophy.  The communications in the cockpit, if you 
called out everything that was normal, you would have a great deal of 
chatter from the time that the approach was started until the touch 
down through the roll-out.
		So, American has opted to use the philosophy of if 
something is abnormal, those things are what you call out.
	Q	Yes, I understand that, and in that regard, a no spoilers 
call-out as Boeing recommended is more consistent with American's 
philosophy than a spoilers up call-out that appears maybe another 
carrier uses.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	But in one case, it's somebody's job to look at the 
spoilers and say no spoilers if they don't go.
	A	That's correct.
	Q	American's procedure does not specify that?
Is -- are those the same or different?
	A	I think it's almost synonymous, but as a result of this 
System Analysis Team, it now will become a call-out, and I feel 
comfortable with that since the system that they were using prior to 
may have failed.
	Q	Thank you.  Let's turn to -- to ATOS a little bit.  It 
appears from your testimony today that largely due to a budget 
problem, except for the occasional inspector who -- who's not 
assigned to American Airlines surveillance and who just happens to 
notice something, aside from that, it appears that at New York, La 
Guardia Airport and Kennedy Airport, where American Airlines has a 
large volume of operations, that nobody from the FAA is watching 
American Airlines there, is that correct?
	A	I wouldn't say that.  The -- there are inspectors in that 
area, and again those inspectors are out looking at their assigned 
carriers.  We have inspectors assigned to the American certificate 
that are doing en routes from New York, but do I have a geographic 
inspector assigned to that area?  No, sir, I do not.
	Q	Right.
	A	So, I am not getting that quality inspection.  I'm still 
relying on someone that recognizes a difficulty, they report it in the 
old PTRS System or I get a phone call.
	Q	So, you're getting that good inspection in Las Vegas but 
not at La Guardia or Kennedy?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  And, now, under ATOS, haven't they taken most 
of the inspectors who used to be geographic inspectors, who would 
have been available to watch American Airlines from time to time and 
even assigned to that duty, haven't they taken them and assigned 
them to become an ATOS inspector for another airline?
	A	Those selections have been made.  Yes, sir.
	Q	So, there aren't all that many FAA people sitting or 
working at -- at La Guardia or Kennedy available --
	A	Like --
	Q	-- to do these --
	A	Like --
	Q	-- inspections?
	A	Like I said, I have six inspectors.
	Q	Yeah.  Okay.  I understand.  Does it appear to you that 
the FAA stopped the old system before the new ATOS System was 
ready?
	A	I think the old system was not giving us what we 
needed.  I think we needed a change.  I think we are in an 
environment now with the technology advancements that it dictates 
that we have highly-qualified individuals, that we get refined data, 
something that we can put in a repository, go back and identify trend 
analysis, and let's get to that zero accident rate.
	Q	So, ATOS is a good idea, and it -- and -- and it sounds 
like you're deriving some benefits from it but not -- it's not working 
yet?
	A	To reiterate, it, in my opinion, is going to take three to 
five years before we reach perfection at this rate.
	Q	Thanks.  No further questions.
	A	Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  Yes, sir.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	You're familiar with the NASIP Program, National 
Aviation Safety Inspection Program?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Do you have any opinions on that program?
	A	I was a team leader on one of those, on another large 
carrier at one time, and believe it or not, under ATOS, when we do 
this safety or this System Analysis Team inspection, that is much like 
a NASIP because you are focusing on details and very specific things 
that you want to look at, and that data, once it's collected -- 
presently, there's no avenue to record it or put it into a database.  I 
think that's going to be developed some time in the future, but -- but 
nonetheless, this inspection is very close to that NASIP.
	Q	The NASIP inspections have been terminated now in 
favor of ATOS, I understand it.
	A	Hm-hmm.
	Q	But under NASIP, people were brought from outside -- 
from other carriers to take a look at a carrier, and also in effect also 
look at the people surveiling that carrier.
		Does that outside look now exist under ATOS for 
somebody to come in and look at the ability of the FAA to do the 
surveillance?
	A	I'm not real sure.  I -- I don't know how to answer your 
question.
	Q	Under -- under ATOS, does somebody from another 
airline -- another FAA inspector from another airline, personally 
yourself, come in and take a look at American, what they're doing as 
a fresh set of eyes?
	A	Again, I -- I'm not sure.  I don't know how this is going to 
work.
	Q	Is -- that doesn't exist in ATOS?
	A	I don't know.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		BY MR. CLARK:
	Q	Are there any parts of the PTRS that have been dropped 
or disappeared with the implementation of ATOS?
	A	No, sir.  That system is still in effect --
	Q	Is --
	A	-- as far as recording certification issues.  We do not 
record surveillance issues under PT -- under -- yeah -- PTRS.
	Q	Okay.  But the -- ATOS covers a lot of areas, but 
throughout the old systems that were in place, are any of those 
systems being dropped or eliminated?
	A	No, sir.
	Q	Okay.  The -- I lost track of your inspectors.  You -- you 
now have six inspectors, and are they ATOS qualified or ATOS rated, 
each one of them?
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Okay.  
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I want to get back to this question of 
the three audits.  The audit that the Allied Pilots Association 
conducted, did you -- did the Government participate in that?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The audit that American Airlines 
conducted, did the Government participate in that?
		THE WITNESS:  No, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But the Government's audit was 
participated in by American Airlines and Allied Pilots Association?
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And the conclusion was -- there were 
how many recommendations?
		THE WITNESS:  Approximately 89.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Of which, how many were urgent?
		THE WITNESS:  The higher priorities were 17 of those 
recommendations.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Does that tell us that maybe the 
Government has not been doing the job we need to be doing in 
oversight if we have audits, and there's 17 changes that everyone 
deems are urgent to be made?
		THE WITNESS:  Of the 17 --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Independent of, you know, the union.  
They've got their responsibilities.  The airline, they got their 
responsibilities.  But it's the Government's responsibility to provide 
the oversight for public safety, and we have an independent audit by 
the union that we don't participate in, one by the airline we don't 
participate in. 
		We do our own.  We -- we -- they participate in it, and we 
come up with that many items, action items.  Does that give you any 
cause for concern, Mr. Valentine?
		THE WITNESS:  I had much rather work with the carrier 
and work with the APA.  I think I get better results by doing that 
rather than going out and doing surveillance under the old system, 
and when I found something, I did an enforcement case.
		I have yet to see an enforcement case provide positive 
results in preventing future problems.  When there is a program --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What would you ascribe to that 
theory?
		THE WITNESS:  There was a program just recently 
adopted by Mr. Clinton.  It's the Aviation Safety Action Program, --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Hm-hmm, hm-hmm.
		THE WITNESS:  -- and American Airlines was the front-
runner.  In this cooperative effort, we like to think of it like a three-
legged stool.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Right.
		THE WITNESS:  There are -- each party has a liable 
position, if you will.  We have an opportunity to look into areas that 
we've never looked -- been able to look at.  We have those manner -- 
those means to correct those problems, and I'll give you an example 
of one that was corrected.
		There was a navigation fix that was incorrect on a 
database, and the airplane would go beyond that point and make its 
turn.  ATC never said anything because there was no harm, no foul.  
But it was -- it was almost hilarious to watch these American Airlines 
airplanes go beyond the point and make a turn while all the other 
carriers or a few of them were making the turn at the proper point.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Hm-hmm.
		THE WITNESS:  Well, it came about through an ASAP 
report that it was challenged, and through the ASAP Program, this 
was fixed.  There are 18,000 reports that have been generated, and 
had we not had that -- that program, we would have effectively 
observed less than one-half percent of those things.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Hm-hmm.  Well, and I -- you know, I -
- I understand what you're saying, and I think the Board's position, 
particularly in regard to ATOS and these programs, has been very 
supportive, and -- and cooperation is important.
		This investigation is a cooperative effort.  We don't -- we 
could not perform these investigations without the cooperations of 
the parties to the investigations.  So, I -- my -- my concern and 
question was, there's a difference between cooperation and 
dependence.
		Are we getting in a position where because of 
manpower, we then become dependent on the carrier?
		THE WITNESS:  May I make a point of clarification?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes.
		THE WITNESS:  This is only one of the avenues available 
for inspections under ATOS.  The safety attribute inspection, we have 
-- the Government has set in place for this year four of these 
programs.
		One of these safety attribute inspections that I have 
directed will address the flight time/duty time limitations issue.  So, 
that is -- that inspection is completely driven by the Government.  
There will be no team effort from APA or the carrier.  So, those 
inspections will be conducted, and that's how we do validate the 
system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What about the manufacturer?  What 
role do they play?  I'm specifically just concerned about the FAA 
having no formal process in place to identify and review the 
manufacturer versus the operational manual differences.
		It would appear to me that it might be a constructive 
suggestion that this should be done by the PIOs collectively on an 
annual basis with the manufacturer and the various operators 
involved, so that we're not missing out as these changes are made 
and these very highly, you know, complex and technical machines 
that are taking us through the air now.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Chairman Hall, you're well aware 
of the accident that occurred in Chicago involving the 727 on the 
auto coupled approach.  This is -- this is one of those things that the 
manufacturer, with our principal avionics inspector, they're working 
very closely together.
		So, in defense of sounding like the manufacturers do not 
communicate with the FAA and the FAA not with -- it does occur.  I 
would like to leave you with that assurance.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, that's -- well, that's the purpose, 
Mr. Valentine.  I'm not -- I don't want anyone to be defensive 
because, I mean, I -- what we want to do through this investigation, 
obviously, is to explore and probe and try to understand the 
circumstances that brought about this event, so that we can be 
constructive in that -- in regard to any changes.
		One last comment.  You indicated that your average age 
of experience for your 16 or 17 inspectors is 30 --
		THE WITNESS:  34 years.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  34 years.  I guess I have two feelings 
about that.  One, I'm very proud that we have that many people that 
have that great service, and Number 2 is I'm kind of concerned who's 
going to replace them.  How much longer are we going to have all 
those individuals around with all that experience?
		THE WITNESS:  You know, this is one of the reasons for 
change.  I have an inspector in training now on the 727 in 
anticipation of replacing the APM who is presently assigned to the 
727 who has also been on that fleet for a number of years.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Good enough.  But 30 -- that's the 
average is 36 --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- years?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's -- that's a lot.  Well, Mr. 
Valentine -- does the Board up here have any more questions?  The 
Technical Panel have any other inquiries?  Questions?
		BY MR. CLARK:  
		There are a number of changes in process with you and 
American Airlines and the MD-80 fleet, many of those as a result of 
this accident.
		How are you carrying on that message to the other FAA 
counterparts, the other operators that have MD-80 fleets?
	A	Do we carry this over to the other fleets, did you say?
	Q	Yes, sir.
	A	I'm sorry.
	Q	Do you carry it over or how do you?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How are we going to be sure this 
information gets to the other major airlines and carriers that are 
operating this equipment?
		THE WITNESS:  I suspect that this will be in report form 
and then made available, once these things have been finalized.  This 
is the purpose of the ATOS Program, to make this data available in a 
repository.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, and I don't want to be critical of 
the ATOS Program, but what I do think that the public needs to be 
aware of is if we're going to be presenting a new program and touting 
it and saying that we're going to do things better, and then we find 
that it's not even minimally staffed to do what -- what it should have 
been doing, particularly with the analysis.
		The one -- Southwest -- the one only -- the one out of 10 
carriers has the key position to evaluate the information, that's 
certainly cause for concern, and I -- I hope you're not defensive about 
that.
		THE WITNESS:  Absolutely not.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's a factual statement.
		THE WITNESS:  In fact, Chairman Hall, I -- you don't 
know me very well.  If it's of concern to me, I -- I assure you I will let 
you know, and I think American Airlines knows me well enough and 
so does APA and certainly the Government.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, Mr. Valentine, I take you at your 
word, and I -- I just have to tell you sometimes observing things from 
inside the Beltway, I live outside the Beltway, people will go up to 
Congress and talk about certain programs as if there are solutions, 
and -- but you still got to have the funding and the personnel to 
implement the program.
		THE WITNESS:  I agree with you totally.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, that's in --
		THE WITNESS:  Perhaps your next witness can enlighten 
you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- the category of just commentary, 
but -- well, now I have given all the other witnesses an opportunity.  
		Mr. Valentine, I guess really of all the individuals that we 
have had testify, you're the one individual identified by the 
Government to have the responsibility for the proper handling of this 
certificate and the oversight on behalf of the American people of the 
operations of American Airlines.
		You're familiar with the circumstances of this tragedy 
that brought us to this hearing today.  I would like to provide you an 
opportunity for any comments that you think that we ought to hear in 
terms of things we ought to be looking at, things -- changes that 
ought to be made or comment -- any other comments you might 
choose.
		THE WITNESS:  I'll leave you with parting comments.  I 
know my responsibilities to the carrier, to the public, and I take 
those very seriously.  My son is employed by a company, and they 
buy him airline tickets.  He frequently flies.  So, I have a vested 
interest, if you will.
		The budget concerns me greatly.  The hiring freeze is a 
great concern, and then the last concern is where are we going to get 
qualified people, once we can -- can hire?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I appreciate those observations, 
and obviously you've seen a lot of growth at American Airlines.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  They're serving countries in South 
America and all over the world now.  I can even remember when they 
once served Chattanooga, Tennessee.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene at 8:30 in the 
morning.
		(Whereupon, at 7:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, 
to reconvene Thursday, January 27th, 2000, at 8:30 a.m.)


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