Guidelines for Use of Personal 
Protective Equipment by Law 
Enforcement Personnel During 
A Terrorist Chemical Agent 
Incident 

Prepared by: 

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical 

Command (SBCCOM) 

June, 2001 

SBCCOM 

Approved for Public Release; distribution is unlimited 


Disclaimer 

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position 
unless so designated by other authorizing documents. 

The use of trade names or manufacturers' names in this report does not constitute an official 
endorsement of any commercial product. This report may not be cited for purposes of 
advertisement. 


PREFACE

The fiscal year (FY) 1997 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 104-201, Sept 23, 1996), commonly 
called the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, funded the Domestic Preparedness initiative. 
Under this initiative, the Department of Defense (DoD) was charged with enhancing the 
capability of federal, state, and local emergency responders in incidents involving nuclear, 
biological, and chemical terrorism. The U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command 
(SBCCOM), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, was assigned the mission of developing an 
Improved Response Program (IRP) to identify problems and develop solutions to the tasks 
associated with responding to such incidents. The Chemical Weapons IRP (CWIRP) was 
established to deal specifically with terrorists use of chemical weapons. 

The CWIRP subsequently formed the Law Enforcement Functional Group (LEFG) to identify 
key issues facing the law enforcement community in a chemical terrorist scenario. The Group 
then developed procedures and recommendations to improve the law enforcement response. The 
LEFG consisted of experienced personnel from the law enforcement community supported by 
scientists and engineers assigned by SBCCOM. The law enforcement personnel hailed from 
agencies and departments from federal, state, and local organizations. 

The LEFG used a series of exercises, entitled Baltimore Exercise (BALTEX), workshops, 
demonstrations, and other sources of information to facilitate the identification of the unique 
challenges facing law enforcement in situations involving the deliberate use of chemical warfare 
agents (CWAs). Issues were prioritized and slated for follow-on investigation and analysis. The 
Group placed particular attention on the operational impact that these agents presented and then 
focused on formulating recommendations designed to mitigate these challenges. 

The LEFG noted that most operational shortcomings facing law enforcement are related to 
equipment and training required for proper use and application of that equipment. Consequently, 
this report focused primarily on the range of equipment that, from a practical standpoint, is 
reasonably available to most departments. This report attempts to discern the fundamental 
information that is required to help those responsible for acquisition make sound decisions. 

Additional information regarding law enforcement activities and recommendations for 
responding to acts of domestic chemical terrorism can be found in other related Program 
publications such as the CWIRP Playbook. These can be obtained from the SBCCOM website at 
www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld. 


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors gratefully acknowledge the following departments and agencies that have 
generously given their time and expertise to the development of this report. SBCCOM would 
like to thank Special Agent James T. Barry of the Federal Bureau of Investigation  Baltimore 
Division for his contribution and support as chairman of the Law Enforcement Functional Group. 
Special thanks are extended to Colonel David B. Mitchell, Superintendent, Maryland State 
Police for his exceptional support of the program and to the officers of the Special Tactical 
Assault Team Element for their support of the protective clothing testing and evaluations. 

Participating Agencies: 

Federal 

Federal Bureau of Investigation - Baltimore Division 

Aberdeen Proving Ground Criminal Investigation Division 

State 

Maryland State Police 

Maryland State Fire Marshall 

Maryland Transportation Authority Police Department 

Mass Transit Administration Police Force 

Local 

Anne Arundal County Police Department 

Baltimore City Police Department 

Baltimore City School Police 

Baltimore County Police Department 

Harford County Sheriffs Office 

Howard County Police Department 

Metropolitan Police Department, District of Columbia 

Montgomery County Police Department 

New York City Police Department Emergency Services Unit 

Prince Georges County Police Department 


TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE iii 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 

TABLE OF CONTENTS v 

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1 

2.0 OBJECTIVE 3 

3.0 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENTS 3 

3.1 General 3 

3.2 Respiratory Protection 5 

3.3 Protective Clothing 10 

4.0 GENERAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 15 

4.1 General 15 

4.2 Initial Response 15 

4.3 Scene Security 16 

4.4 Perimeter Security 17 

4.5 Security of Critical Infrastructure 19 

4.6 Operations in the Warm Zone 19 

5.0 SPECIAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 23 

5.1 General 23 

5.2 Patrol Officers Operations 24 

5.3 SWAT Team Operations 29 

5.4 Ensemble Considerations 33 

5.5 Conclusions 35 

APPENDIX A MAN-IN-SIMULANT TESTS (MIST) A-1 
APPENDIX B ENSEMBLE STAY-TIMES B-1 
APPENDIX C SAFETY REQUIREMENTS C-1 
APPENDIX D FIT TESTING D-1 
APPENDIX E OSHA PROTECTION REQUIRMENTS E-1 
APPENDIX F HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION F-1 
APPENDIX G OVERVIEW OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS G-1 
APPENDIX H DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS H-1 
APPENDIX I NDPO BULLETIN, March 2000 I-1 
APPENDIX J SUMMARY OF STAY TIMES FOR PERSONNEL USING 

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IN CHEMICAL 

WARFARE AGENT VAPORS J-1 
APPENDIX K LIST OF ACRONYMS K-1 


LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Impermeable/Permeable Suit Comparison 14 
Table 2. Considerations for Using Tactical Officers to Perform Operations Inside 
of the Warm Zone 20 
Table 3. Overall PPDFs for Patrol Suit Ensembles 27 
Table 4. Overall PPDFs for SWAT Protective Ensembles 32 
Table 5. Physiological Protective Dosage Factor for SWAT Chemical Protective 
Suits Tested B-3 
Table 6. Physiological Protective Dosage Factor for Patrol Chemical Protective 
Suits Tested B-4 
Table 7. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for SWAT Teams Inside Buildings 
Using a Respiratory Protection Factor of 50 B-5 

Table 8. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for Patrol Officers at ERG Protect Zones 

Using a Respiratory Protection Factor of 50 B-5 
Table 9. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for SWAT Protective Suits Tested 

Using a Respiratory Protection Factor of 6,666 Inside Buildings B-6 
Table 10. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for Protective Suits Tested Using a 

Respiratory Protection Factor of 6,666 at ERG Protection Zones for Patrol 

Officers B-6 
Table 11. Test Subjects Questionnaire Responses (Suit Operational Characteristics) F-2 
Table 12. Test Subjects Questionnaire Responses (Seasonal Wear Times) F-4 
Table 13. Test Subjects Questionnaire Responses (Training Requirements) F-5 
Table 14. Stay-Time Guidance for Various Personal Protective Ensembles in a 

Highly Lethal and a Saturated Concentration of Chemical Warfare Nerve 

Agent Vapors J-3 
Table 15. Stay-Time Guidance for Various Personal Protective Ensembles in a 

Perimeter Concentration of Chemical Warfare Nerve Agent Vapors J-4 


GUIDELINES FOR MASS USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL DURING A TERRORIST CHEMICAL AGENT
INCIDENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 

The challenges facing law enforcement officers vary greatly between those of a hazardous 
materials (HazMat) incident and a deliberate attack using chemical agents. The CWIRP 
undertook this study to characterize these challenges in terms that are understandable to the law 
enforcement departments and individuals that may find themselves in these situations. In doing 
so, the CWIRP has attempted to identify and evaluate various personal protective equipment 
(PPE) alternatives that law enforcement officials may choose to use based on the types of 
missions being performed at the incident scene. Primary consideration was given to the 
protection of patrol officers operating on the perimeters of the incident and performing necessary 
crowd control and security functions as well as tactical teams that may be called on to perform 
operations inside of the Warm Zone. Protective clothing options for bomb technicians are 
basically limited due to the inherent dangers associated with the mission. The CWIRP did not 
identify any alternative protective ensembles beyond the already available chemical/biological 
(C/B) bomb suit. It is the Programs intent to provide law enforcement officials with sufficient 
information to make informed decisions about how to equip their departments for responding to 
a chemical terrorist attack. 

The recommendations made in this report are based on the assumption that officers wearing PPE 
will have a good understanding of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
hazards (awareness and operations training) and be well trained in the use of the equipment. 
Early recognition and protective measures are essential when dealing with chemical agents 
otherwise responding officers will only add to the list of victims (the proverbial blue canary). 
Inappropriate, improperly worn, or poorly maintained equipment can be more devastating to an 
officers safety than no PPE at all by giving them a false sense of security. 

This report is provided to assist departments on PPE acquisition, application, and maintenance 
decisions. The Program recognizes that there are numerous other factors that will directly 
influence these decisions such as jurisdictional size, availability of funding, functional 
responsibilities, capabilities, etc. 

The Improved Response Program (IRP) is a component of the Department of Defense Domestic 
Preparedness Program (DPP) developed to support legislation passed under Title XIV Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act. One 
of the initiatives under this legislation was the establishment of a program to improve the civilian 
response capability to C/B terrorism. The IRP was developed to identify and improve systemic 
deficiencies in the ability of a community to effectively respond to a C/B terrorist incident. 
Because there are major differences between chemical and biological agents and the expected 
response, a separate program was developed to study each area. 


Utilizing the Baltimore  Washington D.C. metropolitan 
area as its test-bed location the CWIRP conducted a series 
of exercises and workshops, entitled Baltimore Exercise 
(BALTEX) to present information regarding the potential 
impact of a terrorist chemical agent incident and lead 
discussions into identifying operational, procedural, and 
equipment shortfalls. 

To address these identified shortfalls, the CWIRP 
established functional working groups comprised of local, 

consequence management of a chemical terrorist incident. These four groups, Emergency 
Response, Law Enforcement, Health and Safety, and Emergency Management formed 
committees to develop solutions and recommendations for improving the civilian response 
capability. 

The Law Enforcement Functional Group (LEFG) met regularly from October 1998 through 
September 2000 to discuss and evaluate law enforcement missions, responsibilities, and 
protective equipment requirements for responding to an incident of chemical terrorism. As the 
Group outlined response procedures and their associated agent hazards, they evaluated various 
types of PPE available that would afford adequate protection for officers and be consistent with 
the law enforcement mission. 

In determining what protective ensembles to test, the Program focused on equipment that is 
readily available, easy to maintain, and relatively affordable. In addition, newly designed 
equipment targeted for emergency responders was considered and evaluated. 

state, and federal officials from key response and management positions associated with the
SBCCOM tested several varieties of PPE using internationally accepted protocols to determine 
the levels of protection each afforded. An explanation of the test procedure (Man-In-Simulant 
Test) and the resulting protection afforded (Ensemble Stay-Times) are included in Appendix A 
and B respectively. Maryland State Police troopers participated in the tests and evaluated the 
compatibility of the equipment with existing law enforcement tactics and equipment. In 
addition, several departments provided respiratory equipment that is currently in use by their 
agencies for evaluation. SBCCOM evaluated the serviceability of these based on current 
military standards in order to ascertain the level of protection current, off-the-shelf equipment 
may provide. 

THE CWIRPS INTENT WAS TO 
IDENTIFY PPE ALTERNATIVES FOR 
PATROL OFFICERS THAT AFFORDED 
ADEQUATE CHEMICAL PROTECTION AT A 
COST OF APPROXIMATELY $200 PER 
OFFICER. 


In January and September 2000, the CWIRP conducted tabletop exercises to present the 
Functional Groups operational recommendations and 
PPE guidelines to members of the law enforcement 
community. These exercises, BALTEX X and CRIME 2000 respectively, were designed to validate into the following operational 
the procedures and recommendations of the Group
Exercise participants were organized by operational 

 Command

areas and represented a variety of local, state, and 

 Patrol

federal law enforcement organizations from large 
metropolitan cities to small rural communities. LEFG  Communications 
members facilitated discussion throughout the  Tactical 
scenario and presented the Programs  Bomb 
recommendations to the participants. Participants  Intelligence/Investigation 
comments and recommendations were incorporated  Public Information Officer 
into the final law enforcement reports and guidelines.  Aviation 

2.0 OBJECTIVE 

The objective of this report is to present law enforcement issues associated with operations in a 
terrorist chemical agent incident environment and provide information to assist law enforcement 
organizations formulate policy and procedures that will improve response to such incidents. 

3.0 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT 

3.1 General 

Respiratory protection 
represents the single most Respiratory protection represents the single 
important piece of most important piece of chemical agentchemical agent protection protection for law enforcement officers. 

for law enforcement 
officers. Most chemical agents, and more importantly those with application to a terrorist 
interests (immediate, widespread casualties), are designed to enter through the respiratory 
track and mucus membranes. While the recommended PPE for law enforcement officers 
consists of a complete ensemble (respirator, suit, gloves, and boots), the best protective 
suit is only as good as the respiratory protection afforded by the mask that is worn. 

Respiratory protection is not new to law enforcement departments. It has been used for 
years as protection from riot control agents, however, there is a clear difference between 
protection from such agents and chemical warfare agents. The major difference is that a 
single mask does not offer protection against all chemical agents. Masks that work 
extremely well against riot control agents may be totally useless against nerve agent. In 
order to determine if a mask affords proper respiratory protection, an extensive 
evaluation must be performed. Reference to the standards associated with respiratory 
protection can be found in Appendix C (Safety Requirements). 


The primary protection that officers and/or first responders should 
use in a chemical incident response is high quality respiratory 
protection to protect their lungs and respiratory system. 

Regardless of the type of respirator used, it is 
recommended that a chemical protective hood be used in 
conjunction with it. While skin exposure to riot control 
agents provides only a slight level of discomfort, CWAs 
can penetrate through the skin causing agent casualties. A 
hood attached to the protective mask increases the 
protection to the neck area that is often left exposed 
without one. Testing of protective ensembles, as discussed 

later in this report, reinforces this recommendation. 

Also important to the effectiveness of a respirator is the means by which it filters out the 
chemical agent. Unless a respiratory protective system relies on a bottled air supply 
(self-contained breathing apparatus) it generally uses a filter or canister to remove 
chemical agent particles from the air as it passes through the filter system. Therefore, the 
type of filter/canister used must be certified for protection against the agent in question. 
Additionally, these types of respiratory systems also require that there be a sufficient 
level of oxygen in the area to sustain life in order for the respirator to be used. 

There are certain requirements Filter/canisters are a shelf-life item that must be 
for use of respirators with periodically rotated. There are generally two shelf-life 
filters/canisters. durations associated with a given filter/canister. The 

 
They must be designed for first applies to the filter/canister in its factory package 
the agent in question and the second to the duration of its effectiveness once 
 
Be within their 

serviceability shelf-life 
removed from the package. It's imperative that 

 
There must be sufficient departments using respirators with filters/canisters 

oxygen in the atmosphere 
establish a program whereby they receive standard 
updates on the effectiveness of the filters in stock. 

This section provides departments with a basic knowledge 
of the types of respirators available, their applicability to NIOSH assigned 
the law enforcement mission, the regulatory requirements respiratory protection 
for use of respirators, and discussion of evaluations factors for different types 
conducted on respirators currently in most departments of respirators are: 
inventories. The mention of any manufacturer or trade Negative-Pressure: 50 

PAPR: 50

names is solely for clarity and brevity and does not 

SCBA: 10,000

represent any endorsement of such product. Masks are 
referenced in order of increasing protection afforded and 
not in any government recommended order. 


3.2 Respiratory Protection 

3.2.1 Escape Masks/Hoods 

Escape masks with integral hoods, herein referred to as escape masks, are 
designed to provide short duration respiratory protection in order to evacuate from 
an area of suspected or known chemical agent contamination. Various types of 
escape masks are available ranging from simple (charcoal based filters) to 
complex (short duration bottled air supply). 

Members of the LEFG identified that performing the fit test requirements, 
outlined for tight-fitting respirators, is difficult for departments to comply with. 
A discussion of the fit test requirements is included 
in Appendix D (Fit Testing). Since there are A tight-fitting respiratorcurrently no fit test requirements for escape masks, is defined as a respiratorythe LEFG examined their suitability for use by inlet covering (mask face 
officers on the perimeter of a chemical incident. piece) that forms a 
Many escape masks are disposable, one-time use complete seal with the 
only masks that are unique from tight-fitting face. 
respirators since they do not need to be fitted to the OSHA 1910.134 
wearers face. These masks are designed to fit 
snugly around the wearers neck via an expandable neck dam. Although escape 
masks do not form a seal around the face like most other respirators, the neck dam 
must provide a complete seal in order to keep agent from entering the mask 
around the neck. 

Problems identified with escape masks included: 

 
Inability to communicate. 
 
Talking caused fogging of the lens. 
 
Some systems had nose clips (designed to control breathing through the 
nose) that fell off causing hoods to collapse around the head. 
 
Officers were unable to stay in the hood, even though they were familiar 
with wearing negative-pressure respirators, due to claustrophobia. 
 
Lack of NIOSH certification standards. 

It is expected that some of the problems regarding wear of an escape mask may be 
overcome with additional training and familiarization of the wearer; however, 
communication problems limit the appropriateness of these masks for use by law 
enforcement officers. In addition, these masks are intended for escape purposes 
only and therefore are not intended for prolonged use such as performing 
perimeter security operations. 


3.2.2 Negative-Pressure Respirators 

A negative-pressure respirator is what most people recognize 
as and often refer to as a gasmask. While negative-pressure 
respirators come in both full-face and half-face 
configurations, due to the considerations regarding the 
possibility of chemical warfare agents penetrating through 
the eye membranes, this report focuses only on full-face 
negative-pressure respirators as an alternative for law 
enforcement operations. A negative-pressure respirator 
consists of an air-purifying filter or canister, herein referred 
to as filter, through which the wearer breathes in clean air. Airflow through the 
filter occurs when the wearer inhales, therefore the name negative-pressure 
respirator. A full-face respirator forms a seal completely around the wearers 
face, which classifies it as a tight-fitting respirator. These types of respirators are 
the ones that most people can relate to as the military style protective masks and 
law enforcement riot control masks. 

Negative-pressure respirators come in two general styles, singular and bi-ocular 

vision with either an internal filter or 
Hazard Zones as defined in the 2000 external canister. Singular vision 
Emergency Response Guidebook are: versions often provide greater peripheral 

vision. Sight alignment is better with this 
Hot Zone: Area immediately surrounding a style respirator but the face piece and lens 

dangerous goods incident that extends far 

often interfere with placement of the

enough to prevent adverse effects from released 
dangerous goods to personnel outside the zone. cheek to stock when sighting a shoulder-
This zone is also referred to as exclusion zone, fired weapon. Bi-ocular versions 
red zone, or restricted zone in other documents. generally fit closer to the face; as such 

they provide less interference with

Warm Zone: Area between Hot and Cold zones 

where personnel and equipment shoulder-fired weapons. Sight alignment 

decontamination and Hot Zone support takes is not as good as singular vision masks 
place. It includes control points for the access due to the split between the eye lenses. 
corridor and thus assists in reducing the spread Most masks with an external canister 

of contamination. Also referred to as the have the capability of placing the canister

contamination reduction corridor (CRC), 

on either side of the mask. This is critical 

contamination reduction zone (CRZ), yellow 
zone, or limited access zone in other documents. for officers firing shoulder fired weapons 

and should be a factor that is looked for 
Cold Zone: Area where the command post and in determining what mask to procure. 
support functions that are necessary to control 
the incident are located. This is also referred to 

Negative-pressure respirators provide the 

as the clean zone, green zone, or support zone in 
other documents. respiratory protection of Level C personal 
protection (see Appendix E, OSHA 
Reference  U.S. Department of Transportation, Protection Requirements). This form of 
2000. 2000 Emergency Response Guidebook. respiratory protection is considered 

adequate for officers operating on the 
perimeter of the Warm Zone and in the 
decontamination corridor (area leading 
from the Warm Zone to the Cold Zone 


where decontamination takes place) where live citizens without respiratory 
protection are found. Negative-pressure respirators are not recommended for use 
in the Hot Zone unless agent and ambient air quality monitoring has been 
performed and concentrations of both have been defined. Additionally, there 
must be a sufficient level of oxygen (19.8 percent) in the atmosphere to sustain 
life in order to use a negative-pressure respirator. 

Any type of respirator hinders both voice and radio communications. Most 
manufacturers of negative-pressure respirators have voice amplification adaptors 
that fit over the voicemitters of the masks. These relatively small, lightweight, 
battery powered adaptors are basically essential for law enforcement operations. 
As a minimum, departments should consider procuring them for their squad and 
team leaders who must communicate directions to their personnel. 

3.2.3 Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPR) 

PAPRs generally consist of a full-face, tight-fitting respirator accompanied with a 
battery-powered generator (blower) that forces air through the filter/canister 
element into the wearers face piece. The blower is worn on a belt or can be fitted 
onto tactical equipment such as a webbed vest and provides air to the filters 
through a hose. 

Advantages that the blower provides in the PAPR are a decrease in the breathing 
resistance (level of difficulty involved in breathing air in through the respirator 
filter) from a negative-pressure respirator and 
the ability to use larger (thicker) filter elements 
with a greater degree of protection and comfort. 
The blower supplies a stream of cool air that 
both assists in reducing heat buildup and 
provides a form of positive pressure. 
Disadvantages identified with the use of 
PAPRs included the following: 

 
The hose connecting the blower to the
filter provided an easy way for someone
to pull the mask off of the officers face.
 
The hose can easily become crimped either manually or by additional 
equipment (especially tactical) thereby reducing or cutting off the oxygen 
supply. 
 
The blower is noisy thereby reducing the ability to communicate and 
virtually rendering the mask unusable for stealth tactical operations. 
Manufacturers are constantly making improvements on the blower to 
include the level of noise that it makes. 
 
The extra bulk and weight of the battery pack and blower was undesirable. 


 
There was concern that proper maintenance and rotation of batteries would 
not be performed on a battery-powered device. It is noted here that a 
PAPR can be used without a functioning blower (turned off, dead 
batteries, or any other malfunction other than a cut hose line). In this case, 
the mask operates like a negative-pressure respirator; however, as 
mentioned in the advantages, if a larger filter element is used, the 
breathing resistance will be increased without the blower operating. 
 
Finally, the additional cost above that of a negative-pressure respirator 
made the mask less desirable from a budget standpoint for outfitting 
anyone other than specialized teams. 

3.2.4 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) 

SCBA provides the greatest level of respiratory 
protection in a chemical agent environment as it 
relies on a supply of clean air either through a 
tank worn by the wearer or through an airline 
from a stationary air supply source. SCBA is 
required for Level A and B PPE. These levels of 
protection are required when entering an area 
where the agent hazard and concentration are 
unknown or when there is a danger of an oxygen 
deficiency in the area. 

The FBI is training and equipping their regional HazMat response teams (WMD 
coordinators) to operate in Level B protection. This is consistent with their 
mission of investigating the crime scene. SCBA was not considered an option for 
local law enforcement operations based on the following: 

 
The types of missions recommended for local law enforcement officers 
and covered in this report are inconsistent with the use of SCBA. 
 
SCBA provides for a limited duration of operation based on the air supply. 
Most portable air tanks provide 30-40 minutes of operation to include time 
required to suit up and process through decontamination. 
 
Communication in SCBA is worse than with negative-pressure respirators 
and/or PAPRs. 
 
Extensive cost and maintenance requirements make SCBA unsuitable for 
most departments. 

3.2.5 M17 Respirator Evaluations 

Many law enforcement agencies have acquired stocks 
of military M17 series protective masks for use in riot 
control situations. These are often preferred by 
agencies because they can be obtained free of charge 


from military surplus stocks. The M17 mask served as the standard protective 
mask for the U.S. Army for almost 3 decades before DoD began phasing them out 
in 1985. Now, more than 15 years later, they are still in use by some law 
enforcement agencies as their predominant means of chemical and riot control 
agent protection. 

In order to afford proper agent protection to its wearer, 
a mask must be in good working order, be outfitted 
with serviceable parts, and have filter elements that are 
tested and determined to protect against the agent(s) in 
question. To put the serviceability issue into context, 
consider the fact that all materials deteriorate over time 
and with use. Compare the fact that ballistic vests are 
replaced on an average of every five years due to 
changes in the kelvar fibre of the vest and concerns 
over deterioration of the protection afforded. Now 
consider that any M17 protective mask in a 

departments inventory is at least 15 years old. 

It must be reiterated that a mask that is worn on a gas training range that doesnt 
leak doesnt directly correlate to providing sufficient protection against chemical 
warfare agents. Differences in the physical properties of the agent, agent 
concentration, types of filters, etc. all make for differences in the protection 
afforded. In particular, filters for the M17 mask are 
The Department of Defense a major issue regarding CWA and riot control 
began phasing out the M17 protection. There were three different filters 
series mask in 1985. M17 produced for the M17. These carried the model 
masks currently in use by numbers (military nomenclature) of M13, M13A1, 
law enforcement agencies and M13A2. Of these, only the M13A2 filter was 
that were procured through approved for use against CWAs. The M13 and 
military surplus are at least M13A1 filters were strictly considered for protection 
15 years old. against riot control agents. In addition, the M13A2 

filters generally carried a one-year shelf life once 
removed from its vacuum-packed storage bag unless the lot number was extended 
through testing. 

SBCCOM raised concerns regarding the age of these masks based on their 
prolonged use in the military, the duration that they had been out of military 
service, and knowledge of the long-term affects on the mask components and 
materials. As part of the protective equipment analysis conducted for the LEFG, 
SBCCOM assessed the serviceability of the M17 masks currently in use by the 
law enforcement community. 

Protective masks, like ballistic vests, deteriorate 
over time reducing the protective qualities of the 
materials or system. 


In order to ensure safety to the user, each mask should be thoroughly inspected 
and if necessary repaired prior to use. The masks faceblank and head harness are 
susceptible to dry rot and tearing. Components such as the inlet and outlet valve 
disks become brittle and useless over time; and the filter elements must be of the 
appropriate type and serviceable as referenced above. 

SBCCOM conducted an evaluation of a representative sample of M17 masks that 
were part of a departments operational stockpile of masks. These masks were 
tested according to current U.S. Army serviceability standards for protective 
masks and the technical manual for the M17. This testing was done to provide a 
baseline for departments to understand the fitness of these masks for protection 
against CWAs versus their current level of use for riot control agents. 

SBCCOM tested twenty masks that were provided by a department supporting the 
CWIRP effort. It should be noted here that the department providing these masks 
was not the same department that 
provided masks for the mask fit test 
evaluation. Upon initial inspection, it 
was found that more than half of the 
masks had riot control filters, not CWA 
filters installed. Five of the masks failed 
a manual inspection according to 
technical manual standards for dry rot. 
Areas with particular problems included 
the area below the voicemitter, the head 
harness attachment straps and around the 
eyelens. The remaining 15 were placed 
on a machine that is used to identify improper faceblank seals and leakage 
through the mask openings (eyelens, inlet valves, etc.). All 15 of the masks failed 
the initial test on the machine. These masks were then rebuilt with new 
components (head harness, filters, inlet/outlet disks, etc.) and were retested on the 
machine. Five of the 15 (33 percent) still failed after being rebuilt. 

Evaluations conducted by the CWIRP indicate a clear concern regarding the 
serviceability of protective masks in law enforcement stocks as well as training 
and respiratory protection program requirements. It cannot be overstated that 
high quality respiratory protection is the basis of protecting officers responding to 
a chemical agent incident. 

3.3 Protective Clothing 

3.3.1 General 

Respirators provide the fundamental protection from chemical agent vapors and 
aerosols; however, chemical agents also present dangers from absorption through 
the skin. While absorption of most agents through the skin does not produce agent 
effects nearly as rapid as respiratory exposure it can be just as deadly. To provide 


protection against direct skin contamination, the respiratory protection needs to be 
supplemented with chemical protective clothing. 

The basic components of a chemical protective ensemble include a respirator, 
chemical protective gloves, footwear, and an overgarment or suit. The remaining 
components of a chemical protective ensemble are discussed here briefly. 

3.3.2 Chemical Protective Gloves 

Along with providing chemical agent protection, gloves 
worn by law enforcement officers as part of an overall 
protective ensemble must allow for the manual dexterity 
necessary to perform duties. This includes activities 
involving firearms (firing, reloading, holstering), 
handcuffing, and the use of specialized equipment such 
as tactical equipment. The protective glove worn by 
officers represents an essential part of the protection 
against liquid contamination. The chances of officers, performing perimeter 
security duties, encountering liquid contamination are negligible; however, officers 
operating in the decontamination corridor and within the Warm Zone are at a much 
greater risk through the potential for cross-contamination. The potential for cross-
contamination exists through direct contact between an officer and a victim with 
contamination on their clothing. This may be the result of providing physical 
assistance to someone injured or in distress or in the detention of disorderly persons 
and/or suspects. 

It must be noted that not all gloves provide adequate chemical agent protection. 

Latex gloves, the type used for blood-borne pathogens, provide almost no form 
of protection against CWAs. Simply providing a barrier between the skin and 
agent doesnt equate to protection, as the glove must stop the agent from penetrating 
through the material, which is the problem with latex gloves. 

Chemical protective gloves come in a large variety of styles and fabrics from 
numerous manufacturers. Any glove chosen as part of an officers ensemble must 
provide adequate chemical agent protection. While some manufacturers of charcoal 
impregnated suits offer gloves of similar materials, departments purchasing gloves 
separately should consider butyl rubber gloves as their primary choice for chemical 
protection. 

The second factor of most importance to the officer 
is the thickness of the glove. An increase in the 
thickness of the material will generally increase the 
protection provided by the glove; however, this 
comes at an increased loss in dexterity. Concerns 
with substituting a thinner material in order to gain 
increased dexterity include a lower level of 
protection and the threat of the gloves ripping. The 


gloves worn by law enforcement officers during the ensemble evaluations 
conducted by SBCCOM consisted of a seven-mil butyl rubber glove. Officers, 
understanding that any glove will reduce their dexterity, were generally accepting of 
the glove; however, when officers wore their ensembles on the firing range they 
experienced instances of the fingers ripping when reloading pistol magazines. 
Additionally, officers should avoid contact with any sharp objects to avoid ripping 
or cutting the gloves. 

3.3.3 Chemical Protective Footwear 

Chemical protective footwear is essential to limit the chance of agent being 
absorbed into the normal footwear by walking through liquid contamination. In all 
instances liquid contamination should be avoided at all costs regardless of the type 
of protection worn. Just as with gloves, not every boot will provide adequate agent 
protection. 

Protective footwear for chemical agent exposure generally consists of two types. 
The first are boots that can be worn over shoes or directly over the feet similar to 
the way one would wear snow boots. The second is booties that are a part of the 
protective suit being worn. There are distinct considerations for each type of foot 
protection. Boots provide a higher level of protection and are more durable than the 
suit bootie but are more costly. In addition, boots must be sized for the wearer. A 
general rule of thumb for chemical protective boots is that they should be two sizes 
larger than normal footwear. Booties, as part of the suit, are one-size fits all; 
however, they generally must be protected from tearing by wearing some form of 
footwear over them. The secondary cover does not have to provide chemical agent 
protection since that is provided by the bootie. A typical type of shoe cover 
designed for wear in rain or snow would perform well. 

3.3.4 Chemical Protective Suits 

Chemical protective suits complete the overall For an explanation ofprotective ensemble. While there are a large levels of protection andvariety of suit types (one-piece coverall, two-associated PPEpiece, hooded, disposable, etc.), they are 
manufactured in two major types, these being requirements refer to 
fully- and non-fully encapsulating. A fully Appendix E. 
encapsulating suit is the type that is necessary 
for Level A protection and provides a complete, airtight protection (cocoon) for the 
wearer. As such, a supplied air respirator such as SCBA must be worn with a fully 
encapsulating suit. Non-fully encapsulating suits consist of the types worn with 
Levels B and C protection. More discussion of levels of protection, as they relate to 
the LEFG PPE recommendations and ensemble tests, is included in section 5.4. 

All Level A and B suits are made of impermeable material while Level C suits are 
made up of a variety of either permeable or impermeable materials. The primary 
difference between a Level B and C impermeable ensemble is the respiratory 
protection (Level B requires SCBA). Since the PPE studies conducted by 


SBCCOM for use by law enforcement consisted of Level C ensembles, this section 
will focus primarily on those types of suits. Variations in the Level C suits that are 
pertinent to a departments decision on what protective equipment to purchase for 
their officers are discussed below. 

Most Level C suits come with an attached 
hood that provides additional protection to the 
neck area. Suit hoods generally do not form a 
closed seal around the mask and face and 
therefore should not be considered a 
replacement for the hoods that are designed 
for the protective mask. Most often the area 
of the neck under the chin is left exposed. 
Since chemical agents are also effective 
through skin absorption it is imperative that complete body protection be provided 
in order for the protective ensemble to provide protection to the wearer. 

These suits generally come as either a one-piece coverall or a two-piece style 
consisting of a separate top and bottom. A one-piece suit generally provides 
slightly better protection (based on the quality of the suit) than a two-piece of the 
same material because an airtight seal is not made between the top and bottom 
sections of the two-piece suit. Normally, impermeable suits do not come in two-
piece configurations. 

The final major factor to consider with a Level C type suit is whether it is 
permeable or impermeable. The importance of permeability of the suit for law 
enforcement purposes can basically be characterized by the fact that permeable suits 
should not be worn in areas where there is a danger of it becoming wet such as 
decontamination corridors. Wetting of a permeable suit decreases the protection 
afforded and can lead to agent absorbing through the fabric. 

Test results of these two types of suits conducted by SBCCOM in support of this 
initiative demonstrated that the permeable suits provided an increased level of 
protection to the wearer over the impermeable. Factors associated with each suit 
that are relevant to law enforcement operations are listed in Table 1 by suit type. 

Many manufacturers of charcoal impregnated suits also offer gloves and boots 
made of similar materials. 


IMPERMEABLE SUITS PERMEABLE SUITS 
Predominantly used for HazMat 
situations where Level A PPE is not 
required. 
Consist of charcoal lined or impregnated 
suits  standard military style C/B suits. 
Generally less expensive than permeable. Generally more expensive than 
impermeable. 
Disposable, one time use. Most can be washed and reused according 
to manufacturers instructions. Generally 
accepted practice is not to wash and reuse a 
suit that was worn in a known 
contaminated environment. Reuse of a suit 
would normally be considered if it was 
worn on a response that proved to be a 
false alarm (hoax). Shelf life applies once 
removed from vacuum sealed package. 
Most suits available in hooded versions 
with attached booties. 
Most suits are available in hooded 
versions, attached boots not a normal 
characteristic of these types suits. 
Increased level of heat buildup inside the 
suit. 
Less heat buildup due to air transfer. 
Can be exposed to water making it the 
preferred type of suit for operations in 
support of decontamination operations. 
Should not be exposed to water. 
Smaller and more compact  storage. Most are available in one- and two-piece 
configurations. 
Most are bright colored fabric making 
them inappropriate for tactical law 
enforcement operations. Fabric tends to 
tear easily under stress and is noisy to 
operate in. 
Dark cloth fabric that is more durable 
under extreme physical conditions. 
Supports tactical law enforcement 
operations well through design, fabric, and 
durability. 

Table 1. Impermeable/Permeable Suit Comparison 

- 14 


4.0 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 

4.1 GENERAL 

Responding to a chemical WMD crime scene is relatively new to law enforcement 
officers. Trained HazMat technicians normally handle the dangers associated with 
contamination from a typical HazMat incident. In the case of a deliberate use of 
chemical agents against persons or property, law enforcement must be involved in both 
the response and ensuing investigation. 

The most immediate factor associated with officer safety is rapid identification of the 
incident for what it is. Dispatchers and first arriving officers are presented the first signs 
that an incident may be a chemical incident from their initial observations and 
information provided in calls for assistance. 

This section outlines the basic operational considerations facing law enforcement officers 
responding to a known or suspected chemical agent incident. It is intended to provide a 
broad overview of the types of missions confronting officers that may involve exposure 
to chemical agents. 

4.2 Initial Response 

When responding to a known or suspected chemical terrorist incident, law enforcement 
officers must be prepared to meet the challenges associated with the chemical agent 
hazards. The first step that the LEFG took was to define the roles facing law 
enforcement officers upon arrival at the incident scene. While firefighters are better 
equipped and prepared to operate in hazardous environments due to their protective 
clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), there are clearly defined 
situations that require a law enforcement presence on the perimeter of the Warm Zone. 
Firefighters cannot be expected to handle crowd control, detention of suspects, security of 
downed officers equipment, etc. just because they are equipped with PPE. These roles 
are clearly a law enforcement issue, and departments need to evaluate how they will 
handle operations on the outskirts of the contamination zone. Departments may identify 
other key roles that must be quickly performed based on their jurisdiction, location of the 
attack (dignitary protection, security of sensitive equipment, etc.), or departmental 
procedures. 

Firefighters, although equipped with chemical protective equipment, 
cannot be expected to perform the roles of law enforcement officers. 

The first and utmost task for the safety of responding law enforcement officers is early 
recognition of the event for what it is. First responding officers must be cognizant of the 
signs/symptoms of the victims and information included in the first reports of the 
incident. It is essential that dispatchers and communications center operators identify an 
unusually large volume of calls reporting sick or injured victims as a potential chemical 

- 15 


terrorist incident. An overview of chemical warfare agents is included in this report at 
Appendix G. Operators should have quick reference sheets (similar to bomb threat 
sheets) regarding key information that may suggest a chemical agent incident. 
Departments should also have in place dispatch and notification procedures for alerting 
responding units of the potential danger of chemical (or other hazardous) agents at the 
scene. This should include instructions for PPE and response actions to take upon arrival. 
In many jurisdictions, fire, emergency medical service (EMS), and police departments do 
not have an interconnecting communications system. As such, initial critical information 
regarding the hazards at the incident response site may be obtained and passed through 
only one departments communications. It is essential that jurisdictions develop a 
method of cross-leveling information between responding elements of each department 
until a unified command post is established. 

It can be expected that terrorist acts The Trend of Increasing Terrorist performed on U.S. soil will be targeted at Lethalitylarge populations and mass gatherings. As There were 273 international terrorist 
statistics provide there appears to be attacks during 1998, a drop from the 304 
evidence of a portentous shift in terrorism, attacks we recorded the previous year and 
away from its traditional emphasis on the lowest annual total since 1971. The 
discrete, selective attacks toward a mode of total number of persons killed or wounded 
violence that is now aimed at inflicting in terrorist attacks, however, was the 
indiscriminate and wanton slaughter.1 In highest on record: 741 persons died, and 
many of these instances (political gatherings, 5,952 persons suffered injuries. 
sporting events, etc.), there will likely be a Idem, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 
law enforcement contingent already on the (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 

State Publication 10610, 1999) 

scene at the time of occurrence. Therefore, 
the greatest communications challenge 
affecting officer safety will most likely come from a call reporting an officer down at the 
incident scene. Departments, specifically dispatchers and supervisors, must rapidly 
identify the incident and have procedures in place for controlling officers response in 
such a case. 

4.3 Scene Security 

Scene security will most likely be comprised of two, if 
not three, levels of control and must take into account 
not only the physical layout of the crime scene but also 
the extent of contamination and cross-contamination 
concerns. These include an outer perimeter, inner 

Secondary Devices 
The threat of secondary 
devices targeting emergency 
responders should never be 
overlooked. 

perimeter, and possibly an access control in/around a 
building where an agent has been released. Various 
factors that will determine the size of the control zones 
that need to be established include, but are not limited to, 
the agent release point (inside/outside), the size of the 

1 Advisory Panel et al., (1999). First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to 
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. RAND, Washington 

D.C. 


device (estimated amount of agent), type of release (spray, bursting, evaporating, etc.), 
and wind direction and speed, as well as other weather related factors (humidity, 
precipitation, temperature, etc.). The first law enforcement officer arriving on scene 
should check with the Incident Commander (IC) regarding recommendations on initial 
perimeter boundaries. It is expected that in most cases the initial IC will be the senior fire 
department official on the scene. Security boundaries are not circular as may normally be 
established but elongated due to the airborne contamination hazard. 

4.4 
Perimeter Security 

4.4.1 
Outer Perimeter 

Given agent dispersal considerations and standard recommendations for 
protective distances (Emergency Response Guidebook) it can not be expected that 
law enforcement will have the manpower to establish a complete 360 degree outer 
perimeter. Outer perimeter security will more than likely consist of controlling 
traffic (foot and vehicular) at key intersections/roadways leading into and out of 
the incident location. Barriers and use of non-law enforcement personnel may 
enhance the outer perimeter security. Since this Cross-Contamination perimeter is outside of the extent of expected It should be noted that not all 
contamination, it does not require complete chemical agents are rapid 
closure. Officers and other personnel manning acting and some have very 
points along the outer perimeter should be prolonged contact hazards. 
equipped with Level D PPE. Level D consists The thought that everyone 
of having the protective clothing and equipment who comes in contact with 
necessary for Level C immediately available but agent will die or be 
not worn. As such, officers can easily don incapacitated within minutes 
protective gear to assume Level C protection in is only true of certain agents. 
the case of wind shifts, additional agent releases 
from the initial site and/or secondary devices. In addition, Level C is available for 
protection if the need arises to confront a citizen who is suspected of being 
contaminated. 

For the most part, crowd control on the outer perimeter will consist of diverting 
traffic away from the incident scene and keeping bystanders out of the area. The 
majority of citizens who were at the incident scene who wanted to leave will have 
done so prior to the establishment of security perimeters. 

4.4.2 
Inner Perimeter (Security of the 
Warm Zone) 

The most critical level of security 
regarding personal protection, both of the 
officers and the citizens, is on the 
perimeter of the Warm Zone. This is the 
boundary between the extent of chemical 
agent hazard and the clean area, or Cold 
Zone. The IC should rapidly identify this 


area. Everyone inside the zone should be considered potentially contaminated 
and undergo decontamination prior to being released from the scene. 

The Warm Zone also includes the contamination reduction corridors, also known 
as the decontamination corridors or lines. As a minimum, it can be expected that 
two separate decontamination corridors will be established, one for the general 
population and another for emergency responders. A law enforcement presence 
may be warranted at each of these (see comments under Operations in the Warm 
Zone below). References throughout this document to operations on the inner 
perimeter include operating in the decontamination corridors. Officers operating 
on the inner perimeter are at greater danger to agent exposure due to wind shifts, 
secondary releases, and cross-contamination from citizens with agent on their 
clothing and possessions. As such, Level C PPE is required for officers 
performing this mission. 

References throughout this document to operations on the inner 
perimeter include operating in the decontamination corridors. 

Officers on the inner perimeter are faced with additional crowd control concerns 
from those on the outer perimeter. These involve entry of both authorized and 
unauthorized personnel/responders as well as control of citizens and responders 
exiting the zone. Entry into and exit from the Warm Zone should be through one 
controlled entry point to ensure accountability of all personnel in the hazard area, 
verification that they are wearing appropriate PPE for their mission and operating 
area (entry), and decontamination of everyone (exit). This calls for a tighter, 
more secure perimeter that increases the manpower requirements on the 
department. Also, the detention of citizens who do not desire to go through 
decontamination must be 
addressed. It can be considered Departments must consider the

that the majority of those issues associated with detention 

wanting to leave the area will 

of citizens who may potentially 

have done so by the time 
responders gain control of the be contaminated. 
scene. Those still remaining, 
for the most part, can be expected to be cooperative with responders, or be 
incapacitated. Processing through decontamination takes time and some 
individuals may either grow tired of waiting or simply refuse decontamination. It 
is these individuals that pose a compound issue for law enforcement. To what 
point and under what conditions can/should law enforcement forcibly detain 
citizens who refuse to go through decontamination? Officers are charged both 
with protecting the citizens whom they serve from danger, while also upholding 
the civil rights of each individual. Departments must consider the issues 
associated with the detention of citizens, local ordnances and policies, and seek 
advice from their attorney general in establishing their procedures. Other 
response organizations that may be involved in operations at the incident scene 
should be aware of departmental policies once they are identified or established. 


4.5 Security of Critical Infrastructure 

In addition to on-scene security duties, 
law enforcement can expect that other 
sites may request a security presence. 
Departments should evaluate each 
request based on on-scene manpower 
requirements, the potential danger to 
individuals and facilities, and the 
necessity of the security mission to be 
performed by sworn law enforcement 
officers. Hospitals and other medical 
facilities are expected to be the 
principle locations requesting security support. These facilities are subject to a large 
number of self-referring casualties from the scene who will arrive without benefit of 
decontamination. In order to protect both staff and the facility from contamination and to 
keep it from being overwhelmed by shear numbers, it is expected that the facility will be 
locked down in order to create a controlled access to the building. In response to a lock-
down and delays in processing due to having to wait for decontamination, citizens may 
perceive that they are being denied access to care, which could lead to disorderly 
behavior or civil unrest. 

Another security concern that must be considered by law enforcement is other potential 
targets that may relate to the initial attack. One concern is the potential that the original 
attack is a diversion for a larger, more deliberate attack, second is the identification of a 
theme associated with the initial attack. In either instance intelligence sources should 
conduct an evaluation of locations, current events (meetings, exhibits etc.), and daily 
activities that may present additional targets. Depending on the threat assessment, 
available resources, and inherent security measures/forces already at an identified 
potential target, law enforcement may choose to provide a level of assistance or conduct 
risk-based notifications. 

4.6 Operations in the Warm Zone 

4.6.1 General 

Ideally, law enforcement would like to perform all 
operations outside of the contamination zone; 
however, this may not be entirely possible. The 
LEFG identified several key response areas that 
require a law enforcement presence in the Warm Zone. These areas are specific 
to law enforcement duties and for the most part are not expected to be shifted to 
other agencies (fire, HazMat, EMS, etc.). As such, departments should consider 
the identified missions and develop response procedures and PPE requirements 
for performing them. 


Based on the studies conducted by SBCCOM and outlined in this report, Level C 
PPE is considered adequate protection for officers performing these duties on the 
perimeter of the Warm Zone and in the decontamination corridor. Operating in 
the Warm Zone requires police officers to perform decontamination prior to 
exiting the area. Decontamination support will most likely be provided by the fire 
department. Basic decontamination procedures associated with the recommended 
PPE outlined in this report is outlined in Appendix H (Decontamination 
Operations). 

Departments choosing to conduct operations in the Warm Zone must consider 
which officers/departments are better suited to perform the missions. Typical 
missions are outlined in the following paragraphs. For the most part, the missions 
outlined are consistent with roles that would be performed by patrol officers. 
When the LEFG considered the increased risk of contamination from operating 
inside of the zone instead of on its perimeter, they questioned if tactical officers 
should perform these duties instead. The use of tactical officers has clear 
advantages and disadvantages as listed in Table 2. Departments should consider 
the mission, the personnels level of training, and operating policies and 
procedures when determining if they would perform such mission and with what 
resources. 

ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Tactical officers are better trained for 
operating with specialized equipment and 
their equipment is generally better 
maintained that patrol officers special 
equipment. 
Roles are consistent with patrol officer 
duties. 
Tactical officers often have more time for 
specialized training. 
Use of tactical officers fragments the tactical 
team. 
Outfitting tactical teams with better quality 
PPE consistent with the increased danger of 
contamination is easier and more cost 
effective then outfitting all patrol officers. 
Use of tactical officers reduces the ability of 
rapid deployment to an area/mission 
requiring a tactical team response. 

Table 2. Considerations for Using Tactical Officers to Perform Operations Inside of the
Warm Zone

4.6.2 Reconnaissance for Secondary Devices 

Under normal operating circumstances (no chemical contamination), someone 
familiar with the incident location and surroundings would perform a 


reconnaissance for secondary devices accompanied by a police officer. This may 
be a security officer, maintenance officer, or any other employee of the area who 
can identify things that look out of place. However, in a chemical agent incident, 
the contamination in the immediate area does not permit normal procedures. 
Safety requirements prohibit departments from giving a mask to a building 
employee and escorting them into the area (see Appendix C, Safety 
Requirements). Therefore, reconnaissance will most likely fall into the hands of 
the local law enforcement department if they are properly equipped for operating 
in the Warm Zone. Reconnaissance of the Hot Zone requires personnel to be in 
Level A protection unless HazMat has fully identified the agent, determined its 
concentration, and specified that a lower level of protection is acceptable. While 
officers are not expected to identify out of place items with the detail of 
someone familiar with the area, they can identify certain questionable items and 
collaborate on them. 

Reconnaissance in Level C PPE should be restricted to outdoor areas. 
Reconnaissance inside of buildings or enclosures may not be possible without 
higher levels of protection (clothing and respiratory) and the use of chemical 
agent monitoring devices. 

4.6.3 Security of Personal Property 

Everyone at the incident site is considered a potential witness to the crime. 
Victims may have records of events that occurred prior to or during the incident 
such as videotapes or pictures. Additionally, there exists the possibility that the 
perpetrator(s) may be among the crowd and seek to escape from the scene along 
with the victims. Therefore, the personal belongings of the victims are of an 
interest to law enforcement officers. 

The first stage of victim decontamination is to have 
citizens remove as much clothing as they are willing to. 
It is estimated that this act performs approximately 80% 
of the contamination removal. Depending on the 
magnitude of the incident, firefighters operating 
decontamination corridors may or may not attempt to 
segregate (bag and tag) clothing/belongings. 
Firefighters will be focused on the rescue and 
decontamination operations and are not expected to be 
concerned with the security of such items. Therefore 
law enforcement should be prepared to provide security 
and control over these items to the extent of their 
interests as far as personal identification and potential for evidence is concerned. 

Security of contaminated 

4.6.4 Security of Police Equipment law enforcement 
equipment must be 
As noted earlier, given the nature of terrorists considered as part oftargeting large gatherings, it is likely that law incident response plans. 
enforcement officers may already be at the location 


performing routine crowd control/security functions when the incident occurs. It 
can be expected that some will become casualties or fatalities and that their 
belongings will be contaminated. Unlike bagging and tagging belongings from 
the general public, there are important considerations regarding officers 
equipment. Badges, radios, uniforms, and most importantly, firearms are 
sensitive items that are not normally relinquished by officers. However, these 
items should not be released beyond the decontamination corridor until they have 
been thoroughly decontaminated with a bleach-based solution and monitored to 
ensure that no agent hazard exists. Departments need to be prepared to supply 
replacement equipment for that which is contaminated and left at the incident 
scene or cannot be thoroughly decontaminated. 

Departments should consider security of police equipment when determining 
response plans and manpower requirements. The LEFG recommends some form 
of a locking storage container be maintained at the decontamination corridor 
under supervision of someone from the department to handle the security of such 
equipment. In addition, most officers will only surrender their equipment, 
particularly firearms, to individuals from their own department further 
complicating the issue. Not only may there be multiple law enforcement 
jurisdictions involved in the response, in many locations jurisdictions share 
responsibilities for routine operations at large events. 

4.6.5 Suspect Arrest and Detention 

The final issue involving law enforcement operations inside of the Warm Zone 
focus on the detention and/or arrest of suspects. The 
identification of suspects may come from witness 
reports, individuals presenting themselves in the 
decontamination corridor with suspicious items 
(remote detonators, PPE), or individuals claiming 
involvement that may or may not be intent on 
surrendering to police. 

Regardless of how the suspect(s) is identified, 
firefighters are not expected to handle the situation. 
In certain instances, it may be prudent to not take 
action until the individual passes through the decontamination corridor where law 
enforcement can approach the situation without regard to chemical agent 
protection. However, certain circumstances may clearly require that officers 
confront an individual immediately in order to protect the 
immediate public. 

4.6.6 Investigation/Processing the Crime Scene 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead 
investigating agency for any act involving the use of a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD). As such, the FBI 
assumes primary jurisdiction and will direct all follow-up 


investigations in association with local law enforcement authorities.2 The FBI is 
enhancing its capabilities to respond to an act of chemical terrorism by training 
and equipping regional HazMat response teams (WMD coordinators) in their 
largest cities so that they are capable of operating in Level B protective 
equipment. 

It is expected that local HazMat teams and 
investigators will be on scene prior to the 
arrival of the FBI. HazMat will conduct 
operations in support of the Incident 
Commander in order to rapidly identify the 
agent. During such operations they may 
choose to support the law enforcement 
investigation by obtaining additional agent 
samples and turning them over to 
investigators. Local investigators may play 
a role in establishing a chain of custody 
over such samples until they are relinquished to the FBI for processing at an 
approved laboratory. 

The LEFG acknowledged that in order for the investigation to be successful, it 
would require extensive coordination, cooperation, and communication among 
law enforcement agencies from all levels of government. Local law enforcement 
can expect to support any part of the investigation, however, the Group did not 
see a need for local investigators to possess a capability to provide levels of 
protection essential to performing rapid collection of evidence from the scene. 
The primary focus that the LEFG took regarding PPE was to provide departments 
with guidelines for protecting the initial responding officers, patrol officers 
responsible for security on the scene and officers (patrol or tactical) who must 
perform duties inside of the Warm Zone. These duties and missions were 
considered part of the overall control of the incident scene and protection of lives. 
Departments choosing to establish investigative capabilities for contaminated 
areas have to train and equip their investigators with Level A response capability 
and should coordinate with the FBI crime lab to obtain specific collection 
procedures and materials necessary for chemical agents. 

5.0 SPECIAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

5.1 General 

The IRP performed evaluations on several types of protective suits with applicability to 
law enforcement agencies choosing to undertake operations such as those previously 
described. The general procedure used to perform these evaluations is outlined in 
Appendix A (Man-In-Simulant Tests [MIST]). Separate evaluations were conducted for 
patrol officers and tactical officers. This was based on the differences in the protective 
clothing that was suitable to each mission. Performance results of these evaluations are 

2 Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan 


outlined in Appendix B (Ensemble Stay-Times). Specific information regarding each of 
these evaluations is provided below. 

5.2 Patrol Officers Operations 

5.2.1 General 

While identifying PPE for law enforcement operations, the LEFG considered the 
level of expected contamination that may be encountered and ensembles that were 
consistent with this level. Ensembles were also chosen based on their 
compatibility with the mission that must be performed. As discussed in section 4, 
patrol officers are expected to be on the scene almost immediately, if not already 
on scene when an incident occurs. Duties performed by patrol officers in support 
of overall on-scene operations include, but are not limited to: 

 
External perimeter security (traffic control, major access ways etc.). 
 
Inner perimeter security (boundaries of the Warm Zone). 
 
Security of the decontamination corridor An important factor in(crowd control, law enforcement sensitive determiningequipment, personal property, evidence). contamination threat 

It was determined that officers operating on the and operational 
perimeters of a chemical agent incident are considerations is 
expected to be far enough away from the agent whether there are live 
source that they will come into contact with little, victims in the 
if any agent. The basis for protective equipment contamination zone. 
guidelines focuses on identifying if victims are 
alive inside of the initial exclusion zone (Hot Zone). This is an indicator of a 
limited agent concentration and should be used in making risk-based operational 
decisions by responders on the scene. 

Officers operating on the inner perimeter and decontamination corridor should 
have adequate protection if they are equipped with a high-quality respirator, butyl 
rubber gloves, chemical protective footwear, and a commercial chemical 
overgarment. Departments may choose not to provide complete Level C 
ensembles to every officer; however, any officer responding to a chemical 
terrorist incident scene should have available at least a high quality respirator and 
chemical protective gloves. 

Officers operating on the external perimeter should not be exposed to agent at all, 
but it is recommended that PPE be immediately available in case of secondary 
agent releases located in/around the initial incident site. This is a modification of 
Level D protection in that a complete Level C ensemble is recommended to be 
immediately available (such as in the officers patrol car). 

Impermeable suits were recommended for patrol officers based on the following 
criteria: 


 
These suits provided levels of protection consistent to that of the respirator 
being worn. 
 
Chance of exposure to water in and around the decontamination corridor 
required impermeable suits. 
 
A major consideration of any department is the cost of outfitting every 
patrol officer. Impermeable suits are less costly than other types. 

Protective suits with built-in boots, hoods, and elastic wrist closures are the 
preferred type of suits as these factors increase the overall protective qualities of 
the suit. Most manufacturers have suits made of identical materials with and 
without these additional factors. The cost of upgrading to the deluxe style is 
minimal considering the added protection afforded. 

5.2.2 Man-in-Simulant-Testing (MIST) 

For the patrol officer ensemble testing, various impermeable, chemical-resistant, 
hooded, protective ensembles representing 
Level C protection were tested. The 
MCU2P mask with, seven-mil butyl rubber 
gloves, and butyl rubber boots were worn 
with all suits. The MCU2P is a military 
mask that was later adapted for civilian use 
in the form of the Millennium by Mine 
Safety Appliances (MSA). The Maryland 
State Police (MSP) provided Special 
Tactical Assault Team Element (STATE) 
team members as the test participants. 

Details of the patrol officer ensemble testing, results and recommendations are 
outlined in the report Chemical Protective Clothing for Law Enforcement Patrol 
Officers and Emergency Medical Services when Responding to Terrorism with 
Chemical Weapons. Key information from this study and report are referenced 
herein. 

Four chemical-resistant protective suits were evaluated, using the procedures 
outlined in Appendix A, with the standard MSP duty uniform worn underneath. 
In order to establish a baseline for the protection offered by the MSP duty 
uniform, it was tested as an ensemble with only the addition of the respiratory and 
glove protection outlined above. In addition to the above, a suit worn by MSP 
mechanics for asbestos abatement (Tyvek Protective WearTM suit) was tested. 
Prices for the commercial chemical-resistant suits (suit alone) ranged from $15$
60. Commercial chemical-resistant ensembles that were tested included: 

Kappler CPF 4 suit (model 4T34). 

Dupont TyChem 9400 suit (style 94160). 


Dupont TyChem SL suit (style 72150). 

Tyvek ProTech F suit. 

Volunteers rotated test ensembles through six test repetitions that consisted of 
performing routine patrol officer duties for 30 minutes in the MIST facility. 
Activities were performed for three-minute intervals at each station, actions that 
were performed included: 

Station Activity Performed 

1 Standing. 

2 Slow walk on treadmill, moderate rate (2.5 km/hr). 

3 Hand movements (directing traffic, radio operation). 

4 Evacuation procedures (knocking on doors, talking). 

5 Running on treadmill, fast rate (5 km/hr). 

6 Seated rest. 

7 Hand movements (directing traffic, radio operation). 

8 Handcuffing, use of firearm. 

9 Slow walk on treadmill, moderate rate (2.5 km/hr). 

10 Seated rest. 

Issues that were identified by the officers during the assessment were: 

 
Suits made a lot of noise during wear. 
 
Heat build-up was a problem. 
 
Very large sizes must be ordered to prevent tearing when crouching or 
bending over. 

The results of the evaluations are listed in the form 
of overall Physiological Protective Doseage Factors 
(PPDF). The overall PPDF indicates how well the 
protective ensemble protects the officers skin from 
chemical agent vapors as compared to the exposure 
that would be received with no protection. For 
example, the PPDF of 42 for the Tyvek ProTech F 
suit, with butyl rubber gloves/boots and the MCU2P 
mask indicates that the protection afforded by the suit is 42 times greater than no 
protection at all. Results indicate that the Tyvek ProTech F suit provided the 
best overall protection and appeared to have a better seal around the chin and neck 
area. The overall PPDFs for each ensemble tested are represented in Table 3. The 
PPDF was used to determine ensemble stay-times based on the likely 


concentration of agent to be encountered. These results are discussed in 
Appendix B. 

Suit Configuration # Suits Average Overall 
Tested PPDF 
Standard MSP Uniform 3 2 
Tyvek. Protective Wear Suit 4 4 
TyChem. 9400 Protective Suit 4 17 
Kappler. CPF4 Protective Suit 4 18 
TyChem. SL Protective Suit 5 24 
Tyvek. ProTech F Protective Suit 5 42

 Table 3. Overall PPDFs for Patrol Suit Ensembles 

5.2.3 Weapons Proficiency 

In addition to identifying the protective factors of 
certain ensembles, the LEFG was concerned with the 
potential for degradation of weapons accuracy when 
wearing PPE. Members of the Maryland State Police 
performed weapons qualification in the suit 
ensembles that were used in the MIST testing. The 
results of these qualifications were compared to the 
scores from previous qualifications conducted in 
standard duty uniform. The scores were essentially 
the same with only a difference of one or two points between firing situations. 

While qualification scores were basically unaffected by 
the PPE, officers experienced other negative impacts on Protective 
functions that were attributable to the ensembles. Loading ensembles caused 
ammunition into magazines took longer, and the fingertips no noticeable 
of the gloves were ripped during the course of reloading degradation inthe magazine. Additionally, officers noted a decrease in weapons firing 
mobility, as well as a noticeable heat build-up. The firing proficiency. 
was conducted in the morning under warm, but not hot 

conditions and moderate humidity. All officers felt that if they had to remain in 


the ensembles for a period of more than an hour in the summer, the heat build-up 
would seriously degrade their ability to function. 

5.2.4 Conclusions 

Based on the PPDFs for suits tested for patrol officers, these ensembles will 
provide adequate protection to officers operating on the perimeter of a chemical 
agent incident as defined in section 4. Officers could expect to remain in the suits 
in this environment in excess of 14 hours without experiencing chemical agent 
symptoms (disregarding heat buildup). This stay-time is limited by the protective 
factor assigned by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) to the negative-pressure respirator. NIOSH has established a base 
respiratory protective factor of 50 for any negative-pressure respirator. Although 
SBCCOM conducted a quantitative fit test on each test subject and obtained a 
respiratory protection factor greater than 1000 for each respirator, the NIOSH 
requirement was applied in computing stay-times for the ensembles. This stay-
time represents the point where minimum affects due to eye exposure would 
occur. The standard duty uniform and mechanics overalls did not provide 
sufficient protection to be considered for these situations. 

These ensembles have been evaluated and stay-times calculated for exposure to 
vapor concentrations, which is the most likely form of contamination that will be 
encountered in performance of these missions. Officers performing the 
operational missions referenced in this report experience their most predominant 
chance of encountering liquid agent through cross-contamination from victims. 
Every attempt should be made to avoid any type of liquid contamination. 

This assessment demonstrates that law enforcement officers can be equipped with 
an effective low-cost PPE ensemble for responding to a chemical terrorist 
incident. An ensemble consisting of a high quality respirator, butyl rubber gloves, 
a commercially available chemical-resistant overgarment, and either built-in 
booties or butyl rubber boots provides an adequate level of protection against 
chemical agent vapors for officers operating on the perimeter of the incident. It 
must be emphasized that this clothing ensemble is inadequate protection for 
use in areas where significant levels of CWA vapor concentration may be 
present (Hot Zone) or interior spaces where reduced airflow will impede the 
dissemination of agent. The Hot Zone should only be entered by personnel in 
higher levels of protection (Level A/B) who are certified to operate in this level of 
equipment such as HazMat technicians, regional FBI WMD coordinators. 


5.3 Tactical Team Operations 

5.3.1 General 

Tactical officers, by nature of the missions 
they perform, receive a higher degree of 
training in their operational procedures, 
and are accustomed to operating with 
specialized equipment and performing 
specialized tactics. With this background, 
they are also considered good candidates 
for conducting operations where a greater threat of chemical agent exposure 
requires enhanced equipment and training in operational procedures 
(contamination avoidance, decontamination). 

Prior to discussion of tactical operations, it should be reiterated that some 
departments might choose not to outfit all patrol officers with PPE. In these 
circumstances, tactical officers or civil disturbance teams may be called on to 
perform some or all of the missions described in the previous section on patrol 
officers. In these instances, tactical officers could use the PPE recommended in 
the patrol officer section; however, this level of protection does not lend itself to 
true tactical operations. The remainder of this section focuses on conduct of 
tactical operations in chemically contaminated areas or those with the potential 
for chemical agent exposure 

The tactical clothing assessment conducted by SBCCOM focused on the PPE 
requirements based on tactical operations and an increase in the potential for 
chemical agent exposure. Missions that may subject tactical teams to chemical 
agent exposure include, but are not limited to: 

 
Apprehension of a suspect at a chemical terrorist incident. 
 
Take down of a suspect who is in possession of a chemical agent. 
 
Raid on a suspected chemical terrorist facility/laboratory. 
 
Hostage rescue operations. 
 
Dignitary protection missions. 

Individual departments

The topic of tactical officers entering an area where need to makechemical agents have been released was the basis of operational assessmentsnumerous LEFG discussions. It clearly is the intent regarding performingof any department conducting a tactical mission to missions inside of a 
perform the mission in the safest manner for the known chemically 
officers involved while accomplishing the objective. contaminated area. 
Tactical officers may encounter chemical agents in Officers should then be 
both liquid and vapor form and are subject to direct equipped and trained 

accordingly. 


attack with agents by means of a perpetrator or booby-trap. The CWIRP did not 
attempt to outline if a department will or will not conduct operations in a chemical 
agent environment. Individual departments based on the current situation, level 
of training, and protective equipment available, will make these decisions. 

PPE worn by tactical officers needed to be more durable, allow 
for unencumbered movement, be compatible with tactical 
considerations and equipment (dark colored, quiet), and provide 
an increased level of chemical agent protection. 

Since tactical team operations are military-like in nature, the 
style of chemical protection already in use by military units was 
considered for evaluation. This type of protection consists of a 
permeable chemical protective suit (one or two piece), 
negative-pressure respirator, and chemical protective gloves 
and boots. 

The impermeable style clothing evaluated for patrol officers were incompatible 
with tactical operations because they are noisy, brightly colored (although 
manufacturers can make them in almost any color desired), and tears easily. 

5.3.2 MIST Testing 

For the tactical clothing assessment, permeable, charcoal-impregnated, military 
style, chemical protective suits were used. In addition, two chemical protective 
undergarments (CPU) and one impermeable suit were tested. As with the patrol 
officer testing, the MSP STATE team provided volunteers for the test. Officers 
wore the MSA Millennium mask with hood and seven-mil butyl rubber gloves. 

Eight protective suits were evaluated during the tests in accordance with 
procedures outlined in Appendix A. When the suit consisted of an integrated 
hood, the mask hood was worn under the integrated hood, tucked fully inside of 
the suit. Manufacturers chemical protective gloves and socks that are considered 
a part of the suit were worn, if supplied. The standard MSP STATE team 
uniform, consisting of camouflaged fatigues and leather boots was worn in 
conjunction with the protective suits. Costs for suits other than the Tyvek Pro-
Tech F ($42) ranged from $150 - $960 for the suit alone. 

Suits that were used in the test include: 

 
Tyvek Pro-Tech F suit. 
 
Hammer Coverall. 
 
Hammer 2-piece suit. 
 
Giat Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical (NBC) Special Weapons 
and Tactics (SWAT) suit. 


 
Tactical Operations Multi-Purpose Suit (TOMPS). 
 
Saratoga CPU. 
 
Lanx CPU. 

Tests were conducted in a warehouse that was modified for test purposes to 
support the vapor test requirements. To provide a tactical scenario for testing, the 
interior of the warehouse was configured with moveable partitions that were 
altered for each test to provide members with a variable floor layout consisting of 
rooms and stairways. Members of the MSP STATE team initiated each test by 
performing a dynamic entry for 3 minutes to sweep through and clear the 
warehouse. They then proceeded to conduct stealth operations for 27 minutes in 
order to complete the 30-minute test cycle. Activities performed during both 
phases of the test included: 

Dynamic Mode 

 
Forced entry through doorway. 
 
Clear all areas of building. 
 
Sighting and discharging weapons. 
 
Suspect take-down. 

Stealth Mode 

 
Entry and reconnaissance. 
 
Forced entry through doorway. 
 
Clear all areas of building. 
 
Climb ladder/stairs to evaluate overhead
conditions.
 
Crawling, climbing, crouching,
maneuvering through building.
 
Movement along walls. 
 
Hostage rescue. 
 
Sighting and discharging weapons. 

Issues that were identified by officers during the assessment are: 

 
Tightness around the head and neck area restricted head movement. This, 
coupled with the reduced peripheral vision caused by the mask, resulted in 
more hand/shoulder contact along walls that could lead to an increase in 
liquid agent exposure. 


 
Inability to wear the ballistic helmet with the suit hood/mask hood 
combination. This is under investigation by the helmet manufacturers 
who identified that there is an oversized helmet available. This, however, 
would result in the necessity of two helmets per officer, one specifically 
for chemical situations. 
 
The ability to use whisper mikes was hampered by the masks. 
 
Heat build-up in the suits. 

The overall PPDFs for each ensemble tested are represented in Table 4. The 
overall PPDF indicates how well the protective ensemble protects the officers 
skin from chemical agent vapors as compared to the exposure that would be 
received with no protection. For example, the PPDF of 173 for the Hammer 
Coverall, with butyl rubber gloves and the MCU2P mask indicates that the 
duration (time) where an unprotected individual reaches a hazardous exposure 
level is increased 173 times for someone wearing the ensemble. The PPDF was 
used to determine ensemble stay-times based on the likely concentration of agent 
to be encountered. These results are discussed in Appendix B. 

The Tyvek ProTech F was used in both the patrol officer tests as well as this 
one. It is pointed out that in the tactical clothing assessment the suit PPDF is 
more than double that from the patrol test. This is clearly the result of the 
addition of the butyl-rubber mask hood which provided better protection around 
the chin and neck area. See the discussion in section 3.3.4 under protective 
clothing. Although the Tyvek ProTech F suit achieved a PPDF near those of the 
permeable suits, participants determined that the fabric of the suit created too 
much noise for it to be used for SWAT operations. Therefore, testing of the suit 
was discontinued. 

Suit Ensemble # Suits Overall 
Tested PPDF 
Tyvek Pro-Tech F Suit 3 103 
Hammer Coverall 9 152 
Hammer 2-Piece 10 106 
SWAT NBC Suit 8 186 
TOMPS Suit 8 141 
Saratoga CPU 8 116 
Lanx CPU 8 113 

Table 4. Overall PPDFs for SWAT Protective Suit Ensembles 

- 32 


A human factors evaluation was conducted following each test iteration to 
evaluate the operating aspects of the suits. The overall results of this evaluation 
are included in Appendix F. 

5.3.3 Conclusions 

The ensembles recommended for tactical operations clearly provide a greater 
level of protection over those for patrol officers. However, the limiting factor 
associated with the ensembles tested continues to be the negative-pressure 
respirator. NIOSH has established a base respiratory protective factor of 50 for 
any negative-pressure respirator. Although SBCCOM conducted a quantitative fit 
test on each test subject and obtained a respiratory protection factor greater than 
1000 for each respirator, the NIOSH requirement was applied in computing stay-
times for the ensembles. Calculated stay-times are referenced in Appendix C. As 
such, the ensembles provide protection to an officer operating on the perimeter of 
a chemical agent incident (roles outlined in the patrol officer section) for over 14 
hours of operation. When applied to a highly lethal concentration such as may be 
the case if attacked with a chemical agent during a take down of a perpetrator, the 
ensemble only provides protection for a 3-minute duration before officers would 
experience mild agent symptoms associated with eye exposure. Once the eyes are 
affected, the ability of an officer to sight and use their firearm is in jeopardy. 
Again, the limiting factor in these circumstances is the respirator. Increased 
levels of protection can be obtained by increasing the level of respiratory 
protection (PAPR, SCBA) but at a reduction in tactical operating ability. 

Based on the information gained from the study the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 

 
The ensembles tested provide a high level of protection for officers 
operating on the perimeter of the incident. 
 
The chemical protective clothing systems are of secondary importance to 
respiratory and eye protection. 
 
With a respiratory protection factor of 50, operations in any chemical 
environment are limited by eye exposure. 
 
Within minutes of exposure to a highly lethal concentration personnel 
must exit the area. 
 
Possibly saturated chemical environments are not safe for personnel using 
the ensembles examined in this study. 

5.4 Ensemble Considerations 

This report is intended to provide law enforcement 
commanders with essential information to make critical 
decisions regarding response procedures and equipment 
considerations. Protective ensembles were identified and 
evaluated based on the mission, contamination levels, and 


likelihood of contamination that may be encountered. 

The CWIRP focused on affordable, high-quality PPE that was compatible with the law 
enforcement mission, minimized the contamination threat, and seemed within the 
departments capability to procure, use, and maintain. These ensembles were then 
evaluated in accordance with standard analytical procedures. 

Regardless of the type, style or level of PPE used there are additional considerations that 
must be addressed by departments. Every piece of protective clothing and equipment that 
makes up a protective ensemble is sized. Even with these suits there is no one-size that 
fits all. While suits, especially impermeable ones, are normally worn two sizes larger 
than normal clothing, someone needing a medium may have a difficult time performing 
mission requirements if they are forced to wear a 3XL. To provide protection to first 
responding patrol officers, PPE (at least respirators) must be readily available, i.e., in the 
patrol vehicles. Departments choosing to provide PPE to their officers must determine 
how to ensure that their proper equipment is available to them. While vehicles are 
already over crowded with equipment, the most logical solution is to package each 
officers PPE in a carry-on bag that can be stored and placed in the vehicle during their 
shifts. 

In addition to sizing, storage and maintenance presented concerns. Extreme temperatures 
and/or high humidity can damage most respirators as may be presented through storage in 
the trunk of a patrol vehicle. The mask face blank is also susceptible to damage, mainly 
through deformation that can occur when it is crushed or pushed out of shape for an 
extended period of time as can occur if stuffed between a lot of equipment that may be in 
the trunk of a car. This problem is particularly true of the eye lens on singular-vision 
masks. 

Another concern presented was the maintenance of any equipment that required batteries, 
such as a PAPR mask. As referenced in the LEFG meetings, anything with a battery isnt 
cop proof. To ensure proper functioning, batteries must be in proper working order with 
a good charge. Departments must establish a thorough maintenance program to insure 
that all of their PPE is adequately maintained and capable to providing the protection for 
which it was designed. Personnel who perform maintenance 
checks and services on protective equipment must be fully 
trained on the procedures. 

Finally, obtaining and issuing PPE to officers is useless unless 
they are trained and proficient in its use, care and maintenance, 
and understand the limits of the protection it affords. Without 
this final consideration, PPE can produce more harm than good by providing an officer 
with a false sense of protection beyond the limits of the ensemble. A mask and suit 
doesnt allow an officer to rush into any and every contaminated area. 


5.5 Conclusions 

It is the intent of this report to indicate the types of law enforcement operations that may 
be performed in response to an act of terrorism using chemical agents and the types of 
personal protection that may support such operations. Each department must consider 
what roles they will perform in support of the overall response, what actions they feel 
must be handled by local authorities before state and federal resources arrive, and what 
their equipment requirements are to perform such missions. 

As demonstrated through the testing performed in this study 
protection is achieved only by providing serviceable and well-
maintained equipment to officers who are trained in its proper 
use. In addition, officers must be knowledgeable of the limits 
of the protection they are issued; otherwise they may gain a 
sense of being indestructible and exceed the safe operational 
capacity of their equipment. 

The National Domestic Preparedness Office published an Information Bulletin in March 
2000 to assist public safety agencies in the process of determining the types of 
chemical/biological equipment to procure. This bulletin is included with this report 
(Appendix I). 

A summary of the stay-times for suits evaluated as part of the Improved Response 
Program is outlined in Appendix J. 


APPENDIX A 

Man-In-Simulant Tests (MIST) 

The LEFG identified styles and types of protective ensembles that support law enforcement 
efforts on a chemical terrorist incident based on the outlined missions and threat of vapor and 
liquid contamination. Variations of these ensembles were tested using internationally accepted 
protocols. The chemical protection offered by these ensembles was 
measured using the Man-In-Simulant Test (MIST) procedure, at the 
Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground. MIST fully assesses the 
protection offered by complete protective ensembles by measuring the 
absorption of chemical vapors at the surface of the skin. Protection is 
determined by comparing that absorption to the absorption that occurs 
without any protection. MIST is used by the US Army, in development of 
its personal chemical protective ensembles, and by the Domestic 
Preparedness Program, in assessing operational protective performance of 
personal protective systems. 

Test subjects wear full protective ensembles, 

in a vapor simulant, while performing 
activities that they would perform in an 
actual chemical response. MIST does not 
place people at risk of exposure to chemical 
agents because a chemical simulant vapor is 
used in place of actual agent vapors. The 
simulants used duplicate actual agents in the 
manner in which they penetrate protective 
ensembles. 

MIST uses passive samplers, which sample 
by absorption. They are placed on the skin 
so that they can accurately measure the 
absorption of vapor at the skin surface. 
Samplers are placed at 17 specific body 
locations to determine the amount of vapor 
absorbed at various locations on the body. 
The Maryland State Police (MSP) Special Tactical Assault 
Team Element (STATE) supported testing by providing 
members for both the patrol and tactical testing phases of the 
program. During testing, these volunteers performed actions 
like those they would conduct at the incident scene. Tests 
were performed over a 30-minute period. A description of 
actions performed during each phase of testing is included in 
the sections addressing that specific assessment. After the 
thirty-minute vapor exposure, protective clothing is removed 
and vapor samplers are collected in a clean room. Analysis 


of each sampler yields the dosage received at the skin. 

The overall protective performance of the chemical protective system is determined through the 
Body Region Hazard Analysis (BRHA)3 and is expressed in the form of a Physiological 
Protective Dosage Factor (PPDF). The higher the PPDF the greater is the level of protection. 
The PPDF is then used to compute the increase in time (stay-time) that the wearer can be 
exposed to a specific agent concentration, above that of an unprotected person, before 
experiencing mild agent affects. 

3 Fedele, PD, and Nelson, DC, A Method of Assessing Full Individual Protective System Performance Against 
Cutaneous Effects of Aerosol and Vapor Exposures, US Army Edgewood Research Development and Engineering 
Center, APG, MD, October, 1995; Section 1-3 Body Region Hazard Analysis Process included in report for the 
JSLIST Program: Cronin, TD, Final Report for the Development of the Man-In-Simulant Test (MIST) Method for 
Evaluation of Chemical/Biological (CB) Protective Garments, TECOM Project No. 8-EI-825-ABO-004, US Army 
Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, April 1996. 


APPENDIX B 

Ensemble Stay-Times 

General 

The MIST analysis studies, as described in Appendix A, were used for determining stay-times 
for PPE ensembles for law enforcement officers based on the operational procedures and 
protection considered in this report. The ensemble stay-times represent the duration that 
someone can remain in the exposure concentration before experiencing mild chemical agent 
effects. 

Chemical Agent Exposure 

Chemical agents are absorbed into the body through the respiratory system, eyes, and skin. 
Agent absorption differs based on the type of agent and the route of exposure. Stay-time is based 
on how long an unprotected person can remain in a certain vapor concentration before they 
experience threshold effects of the agent. The threshold effects represent the point where the 
mildest chemical agent effects occur in the most sensitive part of the body. Additional exposure 
increases the extent and severity of the agent effects and can result in death depending on the 
agent and total amount of exposure. 

Depending on the agent, threshold effects develop either in a localized region, or through total 
body absorption of agent. Vapors from vesicants, like mustard (HD), cause reddening of the 
skin, and eventually blisters, in very localized areas (local effects). These areas are generally in 
the warm, moist, areas of the body such as the groin and underarms. Alternately, nerve agent 
vapors, like sarin (GB), soman (GD), and VX produce effects as a result of total body absorption 
(systemic effects). Direct eye exposure to nerve agent vapors; however, produces a localized 
effect known as miosis which is a severe constriction of the pupil. 

The two areas found to be most vulnerable to localized 
effects during MIST were the scrotum and the chin and 
neck region. The scrotum is very sensitive to chemicals. 
Exposure to over-the-counter liniments, such as Ben 
Gay. exemplifies this. As such, this area is highly 
vulnerable to chemical agents. In instances where the 
chin and neck region presented the most vulnerable area 
it was mainly attributed to a poor seal between the suit 
and mask in this area. The use of a hood, specifically 
designed for the mask being worn, can increase the 
amount of protection provided in this area. 

The amount of agent absorbed depends on the concentration of agent C (mg m3) and duration of 
exposure T (minutes). When the combination of concentration and exposure (time) cause 
threshold agents effects an individual is said to have received a threshold-effective dosage. 
Threshold effective dosages are labeled TECT(mg min m3). All people do not experience the 
same sensitivity to agents thereby creating a variance in the threshold-effective dosages for each 


individual. For each agent, the average threshold-effective dosage for all people represents the 
dosage whereby 50 percent of the exposed people will experience effects. This is expressed in 
the form of TECT(50). The National Research Council4 has developed TECT(50) values for chemical 
agent exposures. Unprotected stay-times, Ts, are calculated using these averages and are 
expressed as 

T = 
TECT (50) 

S 

C 

SBCCOM calculated stay-times for the ensembles tested using five chemical agent vapor 
concentration levels. Patrol officer stay-times were based on the perimeter boundaries outlined 
in the 2000 Emergency Response Guidebook5 (ERG) and the maximum downwind agent 
concentration expected at these boundaries from a 55-gallon chemical agent spill. The three 
perimeter boundaries correspond to the Initial Isolation Zone, the Day Protect Zone, and the 
Night Protect Zone. Chemical agent concentrations for these distances were calculated using 
spill evaporation and atmospheric transport and dispersion models detailed by Stuempfle6. 

The nature of the missions identified for SWAT teams may require them to operate indoors 
where chemical agent contamination exists or may be released. Chemical agent concentrations 
are expected to be greater in enclosed spaces and therefore, different agent concentrations are 
used in computing the stay-times for SWAT ensembles. The first concentration used represents 
the level whereby 95 percent of unprotected persons would receive a lethal dosage after 15 
minutes of exposure. This concentration is referred to as a Highly Lethal Concentration. The 
second concentration calculates the worst-case vapor concentration, referred to as Saturation 
Concentration and reflects a saturation of agent at a temperature of 18 degrees Celsius (65 
degrees Fahrenheit). It is emphasized that the concentrations referred to as Highly Lethal is in 
reference to unprotected persons. 

Physiological Protective Dosage Factor 

Chemical protective ensembles reduce the bodys exposure to chemical agent vapors thereby 
allowing personnel to remain in a contaminated environment for longer durations than they could 
without protection before experiencing chemical agent effects. The MIST measures the amount 
of agent absorbed by the body while a protective ensemble is being worn. The increase in 
protection that the ensemble provides, above that of an unprotected person, is expressed in the 
form of a Physiological Protective Dosage Factor (PPDF). For example, if an unprotected 
person exposed to a certain concentration of chemical agent vapor experiences threshold effects 
in 1 minute, then someone wearing a protective ensemble with a PPDF of 10 could be exposed 
for 10 times as long, 10 minutes, before experiencing the same effects. The PPDF is applied to 

4 Review of Acute Human-Toxicity Estimates for Selected Chemical-Warfare Agents, Subcommittee on Toxicity
Values for Selected Nerve and Vesicant Agents, Committee on Toxicology, Board on Environmental Studies and
Toxicology, Commission on life Sciences, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, DC,
1997, available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309057493/html/index.html.
5 US Department of Transportation, 2000 Emergency Response Guidebook, January 2001, available at:
http//hazmat.dot.gov/erg2000/erg2000.pdf.
6 KL Stuempfle and AD Stuempfle, Visual Comparision of Perimeter Challenge Levels from Model Predictions of
Chemical Incidents, Poster Paper, 2001 Chemical and Biological Defense Conference, March 2001.


the unprotected stay-time to derive a protected stay-time (TSP) for the protective ensemble. This 
is computed using the formula TSP = Ts x PPDF. 

Calculating the PPDF takes into account the type of agent and the earliest indication of threshold 
effects through either systemic or localized exposure. Therefore, a single protective ensemble 
may have separate PPDFs for different agents. 

SBCCOM computed PPDFs for law enforcement PPE ensembles using localized skin effects of 
HD and systemic effects of GB, GD, and VX. The overall protective performance of each suit is 
summarized by a systemic PPDF (PPDFS) and a local PPDF (PPDFL). Tables 5 and 6 below 
give the local and systemic PPDFs for each of the suits tested in the SWAT and patrol tests, 
respectively. The third column of each table indicates the region of the body where the threshold 
effects of HD are first expected. 

Protective Suit Ensemble PPDFS (for PPDFL (for Body Region 
Tested systemic skin effects of of skin 
effects of HD) irritation for 
nerve HD 
agents) 
LANX. Chemical Protective 
Undergarment 
113 95 Scrotum 
Saratoga. Chemical Protective 
Undergarment 
116 125 Scrotum 
Hammer. Two-Piece Chemical 
Protective Overgarment 
106 148 Scrotum 
Giat. SWAT One-piece 186 179 Scrotum 
Chemical Protective 
Overgarment 
TOMPS. Two-Piece Chemical 
Protective Overgarment 
141 183 Scrotum 
Hammer. One-piece Chemical 
Protective Overgarment 
152 191 Scrotum 

Table 5. Physiological Protective Dosage Factors For SWAT Chemical Protective Suits
Tested


Protective Suit Ensemble PPDFS (for PPDFL (for Body Region 
Tested systemic skin effects of of skin 
effects of HD) irritation for 
nerve 
3 
HD 
agents) 
2 Scrotum MSP Standard Duty Uniform 
Tyvec . Protective Wear TM 
Coverall 
Kappler CPF.4 Suit 
4 
18 
4 
5 
Scrotum 
Chin and Neck 
Dupont Tychem. 9400 Suit 17 7 Chin and Neck 
Dupont Tychem. SL Suit 24 8 Chin and Neck 
Tyvek. Protech F Suit 42 44 Chin and Neck 

Table 6. Physiological Protective Dosage Factors For Patrol Chemical Protective Suits
Tested

Respiratory Protection Factor 

To fully evaluate a complete protective ensemble, stay-times must be determined for all principle 
chemical agent threshold effects. The respiratory protection factor (PF) must be used to 
determine stay-times for eye effects; the suit PPDFs must be used to determine stay-times for 
systemic nerve agent effects and the local mustard effects. The minimum stay-times of all of 
these is then used to indicate how long it would take to receive a hazardous exposure with using 
the protective ensemble. The respiratory PF indicates the limits where threshold effects based on 
eye exposure occur for the type of respirator being worn. SBCCOM did not measure respiratory 
PF as part of their ensemble studies. Stay-times for law enforcement PPE ensembles were 
calculated using two respiratory PFs. The first was the NIOSH applied PF for negative-pressure 
respirators7 which is 50. The second, a value of 6,666, represents the respiratory PF typically 
achieved by modern tight-fitting, full-face, negative-pressure respirators8. 

Ensemble Stay-Times 

Using the agent concentrations, ensemble PPDFs, and respiratory protection factors described 
above, SBCCOM computed stay-times for each protective ensemble tested. The calculation of 
stay-time takes into account the systemic effects, localized skin exposure, and localized eye 
exposure threshold effects levels. The lowest of these three threshold effect levels is used in 
calculating the stay-time for that particular ensemble and agent. 

The ensemble stay-time represents the point where the average person can expect to experience 
chemical agent effects no more severe than the threshold effect. Threshold effect refers to the 
initial, first noticeable, symptoms indicating that a person has been exposed to a chemical agent 
(such as miosis for nerve agent eye exposure). Since people have different sensitivities to 
chemical agent exposures, the stay-time represents the point where 50 percent of the exposed 

7 NIOSH RDL, 78-108, 5-2000.
8 SBCCOM, Program Manager for NBC Defense, private communications, February 2001.


people can expect to experience threshold effects. Some individuals will experience threshold 
effects earlier, while others will experience no effects at the calculated stay-time. It is 
emphasized that regardless of time spent in a contaminated area, if an individual feels they are 
experiencing chemical agent effects they should immediately exit the area, undergo 
decontamination, and seek medical aid. 

Tables 7 and 8 below show the stay-times for all protective suits tested using a respiratory 
protection factor of 50. Using the respiratory PF of 50, localized eye effects becomes the 
limiting factor for exposure. Therefore, regardless of the protective suit worn, stay-times for all 
ensembles are the same. 

Protective Suit Ensemble 
Tested 
Highly Lethal 
Concentration 
Saturation Concentration 
(at 65oF) 
All Suits Tested* 3 0.007 (0.4 sec) 
Table 7. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for SWAT Teams Inside Buildings Using 
a
Respiratory Mask PF of 50

Protective Suit Perimeter Perimeter (Day Perimeter (Night 
Ensemble (Isolation Protect Protect Zone) Protect Zone) 
Tested Zone) Concentration Concentration 
Concentration 
All Suits Tested* 22 850 (14 hours) 3220 (53 hours) 

Table 8. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for Patrol Officers at ERG Protect Zones Using 
a Respiratory Mask PF of 50 

* Minimum stay-times are due to threshold effects associated with eye exposure, so stay-times 
do not vary by protective suit. 

Modern, well-fitted, respiratory protective masks can typically deliver protective factors of 
6,666. Tables 9 and 10 below indicate stay-times using a respiratory PF of 6,666 when applied 
to the PPDFs of the ensembles tested. 

Stay-times for SWAT ensembles vary based on the agent. The HD limits represent the point 
where localized reddening and irritation of the scrotum first appears. Stay-times for nerve agents 
indicate where threshold effects from local eye exposure (miosis) occur. Since the respiratory 
PF is still the limiting factor for nerve agent exposure, the stay-times for different suits do not 
change. Stay-times listed for Highly Lethal Concentrations for Nerve Agents should only be 
considered if nerve agents are known to be present, mustard (HD) is NOT present, and there are 
surviving unprotected people in the area. In the absence of surviving unprotected people, stay-
times for a Saturation Concentration should be applied. Stay-times under saturated conditions 
are too short for most operational missions. 


Protective Suit Ensemble Stay-Time Stay-Time Stay-Time 
Tested (Minutes) at (Minutes) at (Minutes) at 
Highly Lethal Highly Lethal Saturation 
Concentration Concentrations Concentration 
(HD) for Nerve (at 65oF)* 
Agents Only* 
LANX. Chemical Protective 
Undergarment 
19 395 1 
Saratoga. Chemical Protective 
Undergarment 
25 395 1 
Hammer. Two-Piece Chemical 
Protective Overgarment 
30 395 1 
Giat. SWAT One-piece Chemical 
Protective Overgarment 
36 395 1 
TOMPS. Two-Piece Chemical 
Protective Overgarment 
37 395 1 
Hammer. One-piece Chemical 
Protective Overgarment 
38 395 1 

Table 9. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for SWAT Protective Suits Tested Using
Respiratory Mask PF of 6666 Inside Buildings

* For Columns 2 and 3, Minimum stay-times are due to threshold effects associated with eye 
exposure, so stay-times do not vary by protective suit. 

Patrol officer ensembles tested provide adequate protection for prolonged operations on the 
perimeter of the Day Protect Zone and beyond. In fact, the limiting factor at these distances and 
stay-times will more likely come from fatigue and heat related injury rather than agent threshold 
effects. For operations inside of the Day Protect Zone functions are more limited due to agent 
exposure. Stay-times for all of the patrol officer ensembles represents the limits for localized 
threshold effects of mustard (HD) on either the scrotum or the chin and neck areas. 

Protective Suit Ensemble Perimeter Perimeter (Day Perimeter (Night 
Tested (Isolation Protect Protect Zone) Protect Zone) 
Zone) Concentration Concentration 
Concentration 
MSP Standard Duty Uniform 61 1520 (25 hours) 5750 (95 hours) 
Tyvec . Protective Wear TM 
Coverall 
93 2310 (38 hours) 8740 (145 hours) 
Kappler CPF.4 Suit 109 2710 (45 hours) 10200 (170 hrs) 
Dupont Tychem. 9400 Suit 152 3770 (62 hours) 14300 (238 hrs) 
Dupont Tychem. SL Suit 171 4250 (70 hours) 16100 (268 hrs) 
Tyvek. Protech F Suit 944 (15 hours) 23500 (391 hrs) 88800 (1480 hrs) 
Table 10. Minimum Stay-Times in Minutes for Protective Suits Tested Using Respiratory
Mask PF of 6666 at ERG Protect Zones for Patrol Officers

B-6 


APPENDIX C 

Safety Requirements 

General 

The LEFG examined the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and National 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) safety and certification requirements for 
protective clothing and respiratory equipment. NIOSH has historically focused on the 
environment encountered by workers in the chemical industry 
while OSHA has outlined standards for hazardous waste There is no direct 
operations and emergency response. Problems encountered by correlation 
the LEFG in determining PPE guidelines included the fact that between military 
there are no approved standards for civilian protective equipment 

protective

for the military chemical warfare agents (CWAs). While it is 
indisputable that many industrial chemicals pose grave danger equipment and 
and many of these chemicals are similar to CWAs, no respiratory civilian standards. 
equipment or protective clothing has been certified by NIOSH for 
CWAs. Consequently, no PPE that is currently available has been certified for use in a CWA 
contaminated environment. OSHA PPE requirements for chemical environments other than 
CWA are outlined in Appendix F. 

It must be noted that equipment in use by the U.S. Armed Forces is tested and complies with 
Department of Defense (DoD) standards and that OSHA and NIOSH do not govern DoD 
requirements for operations in a combat environment. Therefore, a direct correlation between 
military protective equipment and civilian application cannot be assumed. This holds true for 
protective equipment as well as certification standards for determining completeness of 
decontamination (how clean is clean). 

The Department of Justice, DoD, and NIOSH have entered into 
agreement to develop standards for protective equipment for 
CWAs. In the interim, many emergency response agencies faced 
with responding to an act of chemical terrorism today have 
indicated that they will use the military guidelines and standards 
until further research is conducted and civilian standards 
published. While it is understood that failure to comply with 
NIOSH and OSHA guidelines carries risk, another alternative is 

not available at this time. 

Currently, several respirators are being presented as NIOSH compliant for chemical agents and 
that they will protect against CWA if worn with a military mask canister. It should be noted that 
the NIOSH certification is for industrial chemicals and that there is no NIOSH certification for 
filters/canisters for CWA. While this may be the closest solution to date, departments should not 
consider these as being NIOSH compliant for use with CWAs. A National Domestic 
Preparedness Office list of questions to ask when considering purchasing equipment for chemical 


and biological operations is included as Appendix I. This list offers a very thorough outline of 
the important facts that should be obtained from manufacturers when considering what 
equipment to purchase. 

Respiratory Protection Requirements 

OSHA Regulations (Standards  29 CFR), Respiratory Protection 1910.134 outline requirements 
for agencies and individuals using respiratory protection. For the most part law enforcement 
agencies using masks for riot control purposes have not followed these requirements. As 
departments establish operating procedures and procure equipment for responding to acts of 
chemical/biological terrorism they can probably expect a more stringent application of the 
requirements of 1910.134. 

OSHAs respiratory protection standards requires employers to develop and implement a written 
respiratory protection program. Further requirements of 1910.134 that must be outlined in the 
respiratory protection program include: 

 
Procedures for selecting respirators. 
 
Medical evaluations. 
o 
Establishes requirements to determine an
employees ability to use a respirator.
o 
Must be administered by a physician or other
licensed health care professional.
o 
Begins with a medical questionnaire. 
o 
Can develop into a complete medical examination
based on answers to the medical questionnaire.
o 
Must be provided at no cost to the employee. 

 
Fit testing procedures. 
o 
Required prior to initial use, whenever a different size, style, model or make of 
respirator is to be used and at least annually. 
o 
Required whenever there is a change in the employees physical condition that 
could affect respirator fit. Such conditions include, but are not limited to, facial 
scarring, dental changes, cosmetic surgery, or an obvious change in body weight. 
o 
Requires masks to pass an approved OSHA
quantitative fit testing (QNFT) protocol. This
QNFT requires testing of the fit of the respirator
using calibrated test equipment.
o 
For a more detailed discussion of testing and
evaluations conducted on the fit of masks currently
issued to law enforcement officers refer to Appendix
D. 

o 
It is noted that use of a PAPR or SCBA or other form of respirator that provides 
an air source does not eliminate the requirement for passing a QNFT. These 
masks, which form a tight fitting seal on the wearers face, must still be tested to 
standards in the negative-pressure mode. 


 
Procedures for proper use of respirators in routine and reasonably foreseeable emergency 
situations. 
 
Procedures for maintaining respirators. 
o 
Cleaning and disinfecting. 
o 
Storage. 
o 
Inspection. 
o 
Repair. 

 
Training requirements. 
o 
Proper use of respirators, including putting on and removing them, any limitations 
on their use, and their maintenance. 
o 
Required annually. 


THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


APPENDIX 
D
Fit Testing

The respirator fit test represents a quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of the mask. 
Officers can compare this type of evaluation to that of calibrating a radar gun. Both identify the 
ability of the piece of equipment to accurately perform its designated function. 

Performing and maintaining respirator fit test requirements is one of the more difficult aspects of 
the respiratory protection program for departments because it is 

very time consuming and requires costly equipment. Even in 
departments that try to meet the requirements of respiratory 
protection the fit test is often neglected. However, it is the most 
A well-trained officer with a 
highly maintained 
(serviceable) respirator isnt 
protected if the respirator 
essential in determining if the wearer has the proper style, type isnt properly fitted. 
and size respirator for him/her. A well-trained officer with a 
highly maintained respirator isnt protected if the respirator isnt 
fitted properly. On the other hand, a properly fitted respirator 
isnt much good if the wearer isnt properly trained in its use, or 
the respirator isnt maintained to serviceability standards. 
A quantitative fit test (QNFT) requires a respirator fit test 
machine, someone (preferably more than one individual) trained 

in its use, and a computer for recording test data. Respirator fit test machines generally cost 
between $7000-$10,000 to purchase. Once the equipment is procured and operator(s) trained, fit 
testing of individuals takes approximately 15-20 minutes per person. It is required that 
individuals be tested using the same style, model, make, and size of respirator as that which they 
are issued for wear. Ideally, the individuals should be tested using their issued respirator. 

The CWIRP conducted a sampling of respirators in use by 
Results of testing of one of the law enforcement agencies supporting the IRP 
respirators currently in efforts. The intent of this sampling was to evaluate the 
use by law enforcement departments procedures for issuing (sizing and fitting) 
officers indicated that respirators, how well officers were trained on donning and 

sealing the respirators, and to perform a QNFT on each almost 50% were not officer with their mask as they would be wearing it in 
properly sized and/or response to a chemical agent incident. 
could not establish a seal 
in accordance with Officers were not assigned individual masks; rather, they 
OSHA fit test were issued masks from stocks as needed (primarily when 
requirements. faced with a riot control situation). Masks were issued to 

officers according to current procedures. A total of 44 
officers were tested on the standard QNFT equipment used 
by SBCCOM for their employees within the respiratory protection program. 

Results of testing showed that almost half of the officers tested could not obtain a fit that 
satisfied OSHA requirement. Of the 44 officers tested, 20 were not able to attain a validated fit. 
Seven of the 20 who originally failed were able to pass after receiving assistance from a member 


of the SBCCOM fit test team in refitting the mask. The results indicated that 13 of the 44 
officers were issued the wrong size mask and others lacked the familiarity and training with the 
equipment to don it properly. 


APPENDIX 
E
OSHA Protection Requirements

LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PROTECTION PROVIDED SHOULD BE USED WHEN: LIMITING CRITERIA 

A RECOMMENDED: 

 
Pressure-demand, fullfacepiece SCBA or pressure-
demand supplied-air respirator 
with escape SCBA. 
 
Fully-encapsulating, chemical-
resistant suit. 
 
Inner chemical-resistant 
gloves. 
 
Chemical-resistant safety 
boots/shoes. 
 
Two-way radio 
communications. 
OPTIONAL: 

 
Cooling unit. 
 
Coveralls. 
 
Long cotton underwear. 
 
Hard hat. 
 
Disposable gloves and boot 
covers. 

The highest available level of  The chemical substance has 
 
Fully-encapsulating 

respiratory, skin, and eye protection. been identified and requires the suit material must 
highest level of protection for be compatible with 
skin, eyes, and the respiratory the substances 
system based on either: involved. 
- Measured (or potential for) 
high concentration of 
atmospheric vapors, gases, 
or particulates 
or 
- Site operations and work 
functions involving a high 
potential for splash, 
immersion, or exposure to 
unexpected vapors, gases, 
or particulates of materials 
that are harmful to skin or 
capable of being absorbed 
through the intact skin. 

 
Substances with a high degree 
of hazard to the skin are known 
or suspected to be present, and 
skin contact is possible. 
 
Operations must be conducted 
in confined, poorly ventilated 
areas until the absence of 
conditions requiring Level A 
protection is determined. 

E-
1


LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PROTECTION PROVIDED SHOULD BE USED WHEN: LIMITING CRITERIA 
B RECOMMENDED: 
 
Pressure-demand, full-
The same level of respiratory 
protection but less skin protection 
 The type and atmospheric 
concentration of substances 
 
Use only when the 
vapor or gases 
facepiece SCBA or pressure-
demand supplied-air respirator 
with escape SCBA. 
 
Chemical-resistant clothing 
(overalls and long-sleeved 
jacket; hooded, one or two-
than Level A. 
It is the minimum level 
recommended for initial site entries 
until the hazards have been further 
identified. 
have been identified and require 
a high level of respiratory 
protection, but less skin 
protection. This involves 
atmospheres: 
- With IDLH concentrations 
present are not 
suspected of 
containing high 
concentrations of 
chemicals that are 
harmful to skin or 
piece chemical splash suit; 
disposable chemical-resistant 
one-piece suit). 
 
Inner and outer chemical-
of specific substances that 
do not represent a severe 
skin hazard; 
or 
capable of being 
absorbed through 
the intact skin. 
 
Use only when it is 
resistant gloves. - That do not meet the criteria highly unlikely that 
 
Chemical-resistant safety 
boots/shoes. 
 
Hard hat. 
 
Two-way radio 
communications. 
OPTIONAL: 
 
Coveralls. 
 
Disposable boot covers. 
 
Face shield. 
 
Long cotton underwear. 
  
for use of air-purifying 
respirators. 
Atmosphere contains less than 
19.5 percent oxygen. 
Presence of incompletely 
identified vapors or gases is 
indicated by direct-reading 
organic vapor detection 
instrument, but vapors and 
gases are not suspected of 
containing high levels of 
the work being 
done will generate 
either high 
concentrations of 
vapors, gases, or 
particulates or 
splashes of material 
that will affect 
exposed skin. 
chemicals harmful to skin or 
capable of being absorbed 
through the intact skin. 

E-
2


LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PROTECTION PROVIDED SHOULD BE USED WHEN: LIMITING CRITERIA 

RECOMMENDED: 
The same level of skin protection as  The atmospheric contaminants, 
 
Atmospheric 

 
Full-facepiece, air-purifying, 
canister-equipped respirator. 
 
Chemical-resistant clothing 
(overalls and long-sleeved 
jacket; hooded, one- or two-
piece chemical splash suit; 
disposable chemical- resistant 
one-piece suite). 
 
Inner and outer chemical-
resistant gloves. 
 
Chemical-resistant safety 
boots/shoes. 
 
Hard hat. 
 
Two-way radio 
communications. 
OPTIONAL: 

 
Coveralls. 
 
Disposable boot covers. 
 
Face shield. 
 
Escape mask. 
 
Long cotton underwear. 

Level B, but a lower level of liquid splashes, or other direct concentration of 
respiratory protection. contact will not adversely affect chemicals must not 
any exposed skin. exceed IDLH 

 
The types of air contaminants levels. 
have been identified, 
 
The atmosphere 
concentrations measured, and a must contain at 
canister is available that can least 19.5 percent 
remove the contaminant. oxygen. 
 
All criteria for the use of air-
purifying respirators are met. 

D RECOMMENDED: 

 
Coveralls. 
 
Safety boots/shoes. 
 
Safety glasses or chemical 
splash goggles. 
 
Hard hat. 
OPTIONAL: 

 
Gloves. 
 
Escape mask. 
 
Face shield. 

No respiratory protection. Minimal  The atmosphere contains no 
 
This level should 
skin protection. known hazard. not be worn in the 

 
Work functions preclude Exclusion Zone. 
splashes, immersion, or the 
 
The atmosphere 
potential for unexpected must contain at 
inhalation of or contact with least 19.5 percent 
hazardous levels of any oxygen. 
chemicals. 

E-
3


APPENDIX F 

Human Factors Evaluation 

Human Factors Evaluation and Operational Characteristics for SWAT Suits 

Evaluations of the operating aspects of the suits were performed during SWAT Team MIST 
testing by having the test participants fill out a Human Factors Questionnaire immediately after 
the mission ended. They rated different operational procedures of the suits, how long they could 
expect to operate in the suits during different seasons, and how much initial and yearly training 
was required. The test participants rating of the suits are summarized in (Table 1). The biggest 
problems noted for all of the suit ensembles were: 

 
The inability to use the whisper mikes (for communication to the other officers). 
 
The inability to wear the ballistic helmets. 
 
The restrictions on head movement caused by the mask hood/suit hood combination. 
 
Heat loading during the warmer test periods. 

Most of the problems had to do with the Millennium mask system. The manufacturer of the mask 
(Mine Safety Appliances - MSA) was contacted regarding the microphone problem and stated 
that a system is available for the Millennium Mask that will allow communications between the 
SWAT Team members. This system is called the ESP. RI (Electronic Speech Projection with 
Radio Interface) Communications System; it consists of an in-mask microphone and a corded 
control module with output-adapters to a wide variety of walkie-talkie radios. The system costs 
around $400 and is easily adapted for use with the Millennium mask. The external wiring that 
connects from the mask system to the officers radio is designed to be routed over the back and 
must be concealed (may be routed under the suit jacket). 

The problem with tightness around the neck and restriction of movement were caused because 
the hood of the mask was tucked under the hood of the suits, and some of the suit hoods sealed 
very tightly. This provides increased protection against vapors (as noted previously); however, it 
also limits the free movement of the head and may restrict SWAT Team officers from quickly 
rotating the head to clearly see hidden suspects. Some subjects noted that the tightness of the 
hood temporarily broke the mask seal when they turned their heads, or looked over their 
shoulders. The problem with free movement of the head was more evident with the French-
manufactured GIAT suits (NBC SWAT and TOMPS), but was also reported for the Hammer 
Coverall and 2-Piece suits. Test participants stated that the NBC SWAT was better than the 
TOMPS for this problem. 

It should be noted that most of the SWAT Team members who participated in this testing are 
very large (Football-Player Physiques), and several required sizes for the suits that were bigger 
than Large and Extra-Large. This may have contributed to the head movement problem and 
could be eliminated if suit manufacturers could provide suit-sizes that are bigger than Extra-
Large (or suits that have more room in the neck area). It should also be noted that the GIAT 
suits were designed for a different type of mask, and much of the problems with hood restriction 


are eliminated when the French-manufactured mask is used with this suit. The manufacturer has 
stated that a different hood configuration can be made available for different masks. 

Compatibility of suit with: 
Other SWAT 
Gloves? Boots? Mask? Mask Hood? Equipment? 
Average Score all suits: 4.63 4.68 4.45 4.45 4.44 
Average Hammer Coverall: 4.38 4.75 3.75 3.63 3.88 
Average Hammer 2-piece suit: 4.50 4.20 4.70 4.80 4.00 
Average SWAT NBC suit: 5.25 4.88 3.88 3.88 4.75 
Average TOMPS 2-piece suit: 5.00 4.67 4.50 4.50 4.67 
Average Score Saratoga. CPU gear: 4.57 5.00 4.71 5.00 5.33 
Average Score Lanx CPU gear: 3.71 4.29 4.71 4.43 4.43 
Average Tyvek. F suit: 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.67 4.75 
While operating in the suit: Ease of Ease of 
level of level of Heat putting the taking the 
Noise Comfort Burden? suit on? suit off? 
Average Score all Suits: 4.45 4.27 3.62 4.08 4.23 
Average Hammer Coverall suit: 4.00 3.88 3.88 3.75 3.75 
Average Hammer 2-piece suit: 4.90 4.30 3.40 4.40 4.40 
Average SWAT NBC suit: 4.63 4.50 3.75 3.25 3.38 
Average TOMPS 2-piece suit: 4.50 4.17 3.67 4.17 4.50 
Average Score Saratoga. CPU gear: 5.00 4.29 4.00 4.86 4.86 
Average Score Lanx CPU gear: 4.57 3.71 3.00 3.57 4.14 
Average Tyvek. F suit: 2.50 5.00 4.00 4.50 4.75 
Ease of Ease of Ease of Overall 
Operating SWAT Team Communications adequacy of 
Weapons? Operations? With others? suit? 
Average Score all Suits: 4.58 4.50 2.97 4.43 
Average Hammer Coverall suit: 4.25 4.00 2.75 3.88 
Average Hammer 2-piece suit: 4.70 4.40 2.90 4.50 
Average SWAT NBC suit: 4.63 4.50 2.75 4.50 
Average TOMPS 2-piece suit: 4.50 4.33 3.00 4.67 
Average Score Saratoga. CPU gear: 4.86 4.86 2.71 4.86 
Average Score Lanx CPU gear: 4.14 4.29 3.29 4.14 
Average Tyvek. F suit: 5.25 5.25 3.25 4.50 
Table Score Rating: 6 = Extremely good, 5 = Above average, 4 = Adequate, 3 = Not very good, 2 = Poor, 1 = Extremely poor 
Table 11. Test Subjects Questionnaire Responses (Suit Operational Characteristics) 


How would you rate the: Restriction Adequacy of 
suit's suit's of movement suit/mask 
fit? weight? by suit? interface? 
Average Score all Suits: 4.58 4.87 4.53 4.15 
Average Hammer Coverall suit: 4.00 4.25 4.00 3.50 
Average Hammer 2-piece suit: 4.80 4.80 4.70 4.50 
Average SWAT NBC suit: 4.63 4.75 4.50 3.88 
Average TOMPS 2-piece suit: 5.00 5.33 4.67 4.17 
Average Score Saratoga. CPU gear: 4.57 5.14 4.57 4.50 
Average Score Lanx CPU gear: 4.43 4.86 4.43 4.14 
Average Tyvek. F suit: 4.50 5.75 4.75 5.00 
Table Score Rating: 6 = Extremely good, 5 = Above average, 4 = Adequate, 3 = Not very good, 2 = Poor, 1 = Extremely poor 
Table 11. Test Subjects Questionnaire Responses (Suit Operational Characteristics) (con't) 

All test participants were concerned about the inability to wear ballistic helmets over the 
charcoal suit hood and mask/hood combination. This issue is being investigated with helmet 
manufacturers, and preliminary inquiries show that commercially available over-sized ballistic 
helmets are available. However, during later testing one of the test subjects found a way to wear 
the ballistic helmet with the mask/suit hood (during test 5), but the chinstraps had to be extended 
to the last hook. Extending the chinstrap appeared to solve the helmet issue for overgarments, but 
not for CPUs. Later on in the testing the same problem reappeared with the CPUs. The CPUs do 
not use a suit hood, and the problem with the helmet was trying to fit it over the mask/hood 
combination and secure the strap under the chin without bunching the hood up. 

The evaluation of how hard the suits were to put on or to take off showed that most of the suit 
ensembles were ranked easy to get into, or to get out of. Coverall suits were ranked harder to get 
out of than the two-piece suit ensembles. The average ranking9 for all suits was 4.08 for putting 
the suits on and 4.23 for taking them off. The one suit that was ranked hardest to put on and get 
out of was the SWAT NBC suit. This suit had a double zipper that extended from the chin to the 
ankles and ran down both legs. Many SWAT Team members verbally expressed the difficulties 
of putting it on and taking it off. Other suits that had lower ratings than the average were the 
Hammer Coverall and the Lanx CPU. These results were not verbalized but showed up on the 
questionnaire summary. Even though the SWAT NBC suit was hard to get into and out of, 
overall the test participants liked this suit ensemble the best and rated it as The most 
comfortable to wear (ranking of 4.5) and as more compatible with the SWAT Team equipment. 

Weapons firing was ranked lowest for the Lanx CPU ensemble (score of 4.14). Ease of SWAT 
Team Operations was rated lowest for the Hammer Coverall (score of 4.00). Subjects who wore 
the Lanx CPU had problems with the length of the fingers in the gloves. The gloves used for this 
suit were manufactured specifically for all of the test subjects based upon anthropometric data 
provided to the manufacturer; however, most fingers of the gloves were longer than necessary. 
Heat burden was ranked worst for the Lanx CPU and the Hammer 2-piece ensembles. It should 
be noted that most of the Lanx CPUs were tested in the summertime. The level of noise was 
worse for the Tyvek F suit (score of 2.5). It was suggested that if the plastic fabric of the Tyvek F 

9 All rankings from the questionnaire ranged from 1 to 6, with one being the worst and six being the best. 


suit could be softened this might help. None of the suits were rated as being Restrictive in 
Movement and all of the suits fit and weight were considered good. 

A summary of the questionnaire responses on how long the subjects could stay in the suits is 
presented in Table 2. The average time the subjects stated they could stay in the suits during 
winter-time operations was around 12 hours (all suits) with the shortest times being 6  hours 
for the SWAT NBC suit, and around 8  hours for the Hammer Coverall and the Lanx CPU. The 
average stay-times dropped to around 8 hours for spring/fall conditions (all suits) with the 
shortest times being 3  hours for the Hammer Coverall. The stay-times for summer-time 
conditions dropped to just under 2 hours for all suits. The best suits for summertime wear were 
the Hammer 2-piece suit and the Saratoga and Lanx CPUs. These values conflicted somewhat 
with the ratings stated earlier for "Heat Burden" of the Hammer 2-piece suit and the Lanx CPU 
(where they were rated poorly). Generally a two-piece suit ensemble will be better for heat stress 
management. 

Most test subjects felt that they could remain operational in the protective suit ensembles for 
only a very short time in the heat of summer. This became apparent during the late spring tests 
(May) when the temperature was between 75 and 80F. The SWAT Team leader stated in the 
questionnaire after one of these tests "The stay-times in spring/fall and summer are dependant 
upon getting water". Subjects felt that if they could get water to rehydrate their bodies, they 
could operate longer; otherwise, the time they could wear the suits in the heat was very limited. 
Since the Millennium mask contains the standard military drink tube system, canteens with the 
M1 cap were used during the summer tests that were capable of connecting the valve of the 
canteen cap to the drink tube of the mask. This worked very well to solve the problem and 
improved the comfort level greatly during the summer test periods. One subject stated "I was 
able to operate the drink tube/canteen without problems"; other subjects stated that it improved 
the operational capability of the suit systems and allowed them to withstand the heat better. The 
canteen used is available commercially; ordering information for the standard military canteen 
and M1 cap with the valve that connects to the drinking tube is as follows: 

Canteen, plastic, OD green, 1-quart capacity, cost around $2.00 
Canteen, plastic, black, 1-quart capacity, cost around $2.00 
M1 canteen cap with valve for mask drink-tube system, plastic, OD green, cost around $2.50 

How long could you stay in this suit (hours) during the: 
Winter? Spring/Fall? Summer? 
Average Score all Suits: 11.77 7.73 1.89 
Average Hammer Coverall suit: 8.19 3.29 1.09 
Average Hammer 2-piece suit: 10.94 9.70 3.80 
Average SWAT NBC suit: 6.75 5.56 1.63 
Average TOMPS 2-piece suit: 14.50 9.67 1.16 
Average Score Saratoga. CPU gear: 13.36 9.36 2.21 
Average Score Lanx CPU gear: 8.14 6.71 2.14 
Average Tyvek. F suit: 24.00 12.67 1.88 
Table 12. Test Subjects Questionnaire Responses (Seasonal Wear Times) 

F-4 


The response on how much initial training was required (see Table 13) for officers to become 
familiar with the use of the suit and the mask was around two to three days training for each. 
Yearly training requirements indicated a need for approximately a one-day quarterly refresher 
training for the mask and for the suit ensemble. 

Initial training (days) required Yearly training (days) required 
to become familiar with: 
the suit? the mask? for suit? for mask? 
Average Score all Suits: 2.71 2.59 3.17 3.41 
Average Hammer Coverall suit: 2.63 2.44 2.63 3.31 
Average Hammer 2-piece suit: 3.44 3.30 3.21 4.40 
Average SWAT NBC suit: 4.19 2.63 4.00 2.50 
Average TOMPS 2-piece suit: 2.90 3.50 2.83 3.67 
Average Score Saratoga. CPU gear: 2.21 2.36 1.93 2.50 
Average Score Lanx CPU gear: 2.14 1.93 1.29 2.43 
Average Tyvek. F suit: 1.03 3.53 3.06 4.00 
Table 13. Test Subjects Questionnaire Responses (Training Requirements) 


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APPENDIX G 

Overview of Chemical Warfare Agents 

A chemical agent is any chemical substance that is intended for use in military operations to kill, 
seriously injure, or incapacitate humans because of its physiological effects. A chemical agent 
symbol usually consists of two letters that are used as a designation to identify the chemical agent 
(e.g., GA = Tabun) and has nothing to do with the chemical formula of the agent. The onset of 
medical symptoms from chemical agent exposure is measured in minutes to hours, whereas the 
onset from biological agent exposure is measured in days. Additionally, easily observed 
signatures, such as colored residue, dead foliage, and dead insect and animal life, may be present. 

Persistency: An expression of the duration of effectiveness of a chemical agent. The level of 
persistency is used to describe the tactical use of chemical agents and should not be used as 
terms to technically classify the agent. 

 
Non-persistent agents remain in the target area for a relatively short period of time. The 
hazard, predominantly vapor, will exist for minutes. 
 
Semi-persistent agents remain in the target area for a period of hours. 
 
Persistent agents remain in the target area for long periods of time. Hazards from both 
vapor and liquid may exist for days or, in exceptional cases, weeks after dissemination of 
the agent. 
 
There are many factors that will affect the persistency of chemical agents including the 
following: 

- 
Type of AgentDifferent agents have various consistencies/viscosities ranging from 
rubbing alcohol to motor oil. Agents with similar consistencies/viscosities will 
evaporate/dissipate at approximately the same rate. 

- 
Amount of AgentDifferent amounts and dispersal of agents will impact the 
persistency of an agent. 

- 
TerrainThe area of dissemination (e.g., open area, vegetative, urban, soil composition) 
will affect the persistency of an agent. For example, terrorist use of a chemical 
agent would be most effective in enclosed spaces such as building entrances or 
underground subway platforms where evaporation is limited and the vapor can be 
recycled through the facility by the air handling systems. 

- 
WeatherWind, temperature, humidity, and precipitation all impact the persistency 
of an agent. 


Following is a general overview of chemical agents. 

Nerve Agents 
Chemical agents that affect the transmission of nerve impulses by reacting with the enzyme 
cholinesterase, permitting an accumulation of acetylcholine and continuous muscle stimulation. 
The muscles tire due to overstimulation and begin to contract. Nerve agents are colorless to light 
brown liquids, some of which are volatile. Toxic liquids are tasteless. Nerve agents may be 
absorbed through the skin, respiratory tract, gastrointestinal tract, and the eyes. Significant 
absorption through the skin takes minutes and prompt medical treatment and decontamination is 
imperative. 

A. 
Types of Nerve Agents 

(1) 
G seriesGA (tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman) 

(a) 
PersistencyG agents are normally considered to be non-persistent. They 
evaporate at about the same rate as water. These agents will remain in the 
target area for a relatively short period of time. The hazard, predominantly 
vapor, will exist for minutes or, in exceptional cases, hours after dissemination 
of the agent. 
(b) 
Physical states (at 20 C/68 F) 
GA  Colorless to brown liquid
GB  Colorless liquid
GD  Colorless liquid

(c) 
Odors 

GA  Faintly fruity; none when pure
GB  Faintly fruity; none when pure
GD  Fruity; camphor when impure

NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazardRespiratory tract. 
(e) 
Rate of actionImmediate for all G series agents. 

(2) 
VX series 


(a) 
PersistencyNormally considered to be persistent (days to months) and will 
remain in the target area for longer periods. The consistency is similar to motor 
oil. 
(b) 
Physical state (at 20 C/68 F)colorless to amber liquid. 
(c) 
OdorNone. 
(d) 
Primary hazardsSkin (direct contact), respiratory (vapors). 
(e) 
Rate of action  Immediate. 

B. 
Symptoms of Nerve Agents 

(1) 
Initial 
(a) 
Dimness of vision. Constricted pupils (miosis), marked, usually maximal 
(pinpointing of pupils). On exposure to vapor or aerosol the pupils become 
pinpointed immediately. If the nerve agent is absorbed through the skin only or 
by ingestion of contaminated food or water, the pinpointing will be delayed or 
even absent. 
(b) 
Runny nose (rhinorrhea). 
(c) 
Localized sweating. 

(2) 
Advanced 
(a) 
Tightness in chest 
(b) 
Difficulty in breathing 
(c) 
Nausea and vomiting 
(d) 
Involuntary twitching and jerking 
(e) 
Frontal headaches 
(f) 
Convulsions and coma 

(3) 
Nerve agent symptoms can easily be identified through use of the acronym SLUDGE. 

S  Salivation
L  Lacrimation (tearing)
U  Urination
D  Defacation
G  Gastrointestinal effects
E  Emesis (vomiting)


C. Treatment for Nerve Agents 

If conditions permit, the treatment center should be established upwind from the contaminated 
area. The casualties should be undressed and washed thoroughly, downwind of the treatment 
area, before being brought into the treatment area. 

 
Immediately remove any liquid contamination. 
 
If drop or a splash of liquid nerve agent gets in the eyes, immediately irrigate the eyes 
with copious amounts of water or saline solution/mydrin eye drops. Treat ocular 
symptoms (minimal pain relief with atropine sulfate ophthalmic ointment  1%). Notify 
opthamologist immediately. 
 
If available, administer 2 mg. of atropine as soon as any local or systemic nerve agent 
symptoms are noted. DO NOT GIVE ATROPINE FOR PREVENTIVE PURPOSES 
BEFORE EXPOSURE TO NERVE AGENT!!! If the patient has mild symptoms due 
to nerve agents, the IM injection of 2 mg. atropine should be repeated at 20-minute 
intervals, and 10-minute intervals if moderate to severe symptoms are present, or until 
signs of atropinization (dry mouth, blurry near vision) are achieved. A mild degree of 
atropinization should be maintained for at least 24 hours by INI or oral administration of 
1-2 mg. of atropine every  to 4 hours. 
1. 
Atropine can be given IM, Intravenously (IV), or orally. Atropine given IM requires 
approximately 8 minutes before effects are noticed. 
2. 
Atropine given by IV will show effects within 1 minute and will reach maximum 
effect within 6 minutes. 
3. 
Atropine tablets require 20 minutes before effects are felt and 50 minutes before 
maximum effect takes place. 

Atropine effects include dryness of the mouth and throat, with slight difficulty in swallowing. 
Patient may have a feeling of warmth, slight flushing, rapid pulse, some hesitancy of urination, 
and an occasional desire to belch. The patients pupils may be dilated slightly but react to light 
and near vision is blurred. Some individuals may experience mild drowsiness, slowness of 
memory, and the feeling that body movements are slow. Further doses of 2 mg. of atropine 
intensify the symptoms and prolong the effects. Effects of one to two 2 mg. injections last 3 to 
5 hours, and the effects of four injections given at close intervals last 6 to 12 hours. 

 
Patients with moderately severe nerve agent symptoms have increased tolerance to 
atropine, so fairly large doses may be administered before signs of atropinization appear. 
 
Severe nerve agent exposure may rapidly cause unconsciousness, muscular paralysis, and 
cessation of breathing. If this occurs, artificial respiration is required along with the 
atropine injections. If the patient is in severe respiratory distress or is convulsing, 4 to 6 
mg. of atropine should be injected by IV. If relief does not occur and bronchial 
secretions and salivation does not decrease, give 2 mg. of atropine every 3 to 8 minutes 


until relief occurs and secretions diminish. In severe nerve agent poisoning, the effect of 
each injection of atropine may be transient, lasting only 3 to 10 minutes. This requires 
the patient to be monitored closely and atropine repeated as needed. A mild 
atropinization should be maintained for at least 48 hours. 

 
Pralidoximine chloride (2-Pam Cl or Protopam Cl) can be used to increase the 
effectiveness of therapy in nerve agent poisoning. 2-Pam Cl reduces the time during 
which artificial respiration is required. Dosage for 2-Pam Cl is 1 gm. in 100 ml. of sterile 
water, normal saline, or 50/10 dextrose and water; administer by IV slowly over 15 to 
30 minutes. 

Choking Agents 
Chemical agents that irritate the alveoli in the lungs. This irritation causes the alveoli to 
constantly secrete fluid into the lungs. The lungs slowly fill with this fluid (a process known as 
pulmonary edema), and the victim dies from lack of oxygen (also known as dry land drowning). 

A. 
Types of Choking Agents 

(1) 
CG (Phosgene), CL (Chlorine) 

(a) 
PersistencyConsidered non-persistent, (vapors may persist for a longer period 
of time in low-lying areas or enclosed areas) is broken down rapidly by water 
(i.e., fog, rain, heavy vegetation). 
(b) 
Physical State (at 20 C/68 F)
CG  Colorless gas
CL  Greenish-yellow liquefied gas
(c) 
Odor 

CG  New mown hay, freshly cut grass, or green corn 
CL  Bleach 

NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazardRespiratory 
(e) 
Rate of action(Initially) rapid; (latent) delayed 2 to 24 hours 

B. 
Symptoms of Choking Agents 

(1) 
Initial 

(a) 
Dry throat (CG) 


(b) 
Feeling of suffocation (CL) 
(c) 
Tightness of chest 
(d) 
Coughing 
(e) 
Nausea and vomiting 
(f) 
Choking (CL) 
(g) 
Headache (CG) 
(h) 
There may be an initial slowing of the pulse followed by an increase 

Irritation quickly disappears when exposure is ended, and a symptomless period of 
2 to 6 hours elapses before pulmonary edema sets in. The onset of pulmonary edema 
is indicated by uneasiness, fear, and productive cough, with white or yellow phlegm 
that is often bloody. Nausea, vomiting, and gastric pain are common. Breathing is 
rapid, pulse is fast and faint. Shock develops, and the victim may die from heart 
failure or lack of oxygen. 

(2) 
Advanced 

(a) 
Rapid shallow breathing, painful cough, and cyanosis. 
(b) 
Severe coughing-up of frothy sputum (blood  CL). 
(c) 
Convulsions. 
(d) 
Victim may develop a shock like state, with clammy skin, low blood pressure, 
and feeble rapid heart action. 
(e) 
Pulmonary edema. 

C. 
Treatment of Choking Agents 

 
When latent symptoms appear, allow victim to rest in semi-seated position and keep 
warm. 
 
Treatment is rest, oxygen therapy, codeine for cough control, and antibiotic therapy to 
prevent secondary infections. Do not use expectorants or atropine. Patients who survive 
the first 48 hours usually recover. 

Blood Agents 
Chemical agents that act upon the enzyme cytochrome oxidase. This allows the red blood cells 
to acquire oxygen but does not allow them to transfer oxygen to other cells. Body tissue decays 
rapidly due to lack of oxygen and retention of carbon dioxide (first the heart and then the brain 
are effected). 

A. 
Types of Blood Agents 

(1) 
AC (Hydrogen Cyanide), CK (Cyanogen Chloride) 


(a) 
PersistencyConsidered non-persistent, highly volatile, dissipates rapidly 
(within minutes). Evaporates faster than gasoline. 
(b) 
Physical state (at 20 C/68 F): 

AC 
 
Colorless gas or highly volatile liquid that is highly soluble and stable 
in water. 

CK 
 Colorless gas or highly volatile liquid that is slightly soluble in water 
but dissolves readily in organic solvents.

 (c) 
Odor 

AC  Has a faint odor of peach kernels or bitter almonds. 
CK  Has a faint odor of peach kernels or bitter almonds. 

NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazardRespiratory only. Note: Blood agents degrade military style 
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protective filters (like the MCU2P 
mask) by breaking down the charcoal. 
(e) 
Rate of action
AC and CK  Very Rapid

B. 
Symptoms of Blood Agents 

(1) 
Initial 
(a) 
Strongly stimulates breathing rates (AC) 
(b) 
Immediate intense irritation of the nose, throat, and eyes, slows breathing rate 
with coughing, tightness of the chest, and tearing (CK) 
(c) 
Headache. 
(d) 
Nausea. 

(2) 
Advanced 
(a) 
Pinkish color to lips and skin. 
(b) 
Violent convulsions (AC) 


(c) 
Severe exposure causes an increase in the depth of respiration within a few 
seconds, vomiting is possible, unconsciousness, violent convulsions, cessation 
of regular breathing, occasional gasps, and dilation of the pupils (AC). 
(d) 
Choking, slowing of breathing rate, strong irritating tearing effect on the eyes 
(CK). 
(f) 
Death occurs rapidly (within 15 minutes) or recovery takes place after removal 
from the toxic area. 

C. 
Treatment for Blood Agents 

 
Give artificial respiration if patient is not breathing. 
 
Emergency treatment is IV administration of 10 ml. of 3% sodium nitrite over a 1-minute 
period plus 50 ml. of a 25% solution of sodium thiosulfate given slowly by IV. 
 
Further treatment is symptomatic. Recovery from AC or CK may disclose residual CNS 
damage to the CNS. The CNS damage may be manifested by irrationality, altered 
reflexes, and unsteady gait all of which may last for weeks, months, or be permanent. 
 
For lung irritant effects of CK, treatment is the same as that for choking agent poisoning: 

- Rest and warmth
- Sedation (used sparingly)
- Oxygen
- Antibiotics (acquired bacterial bronchitis/pneumonia)
- Steroids

Blister Agents 
Chemical agents that affect the eyes, respiratory tract, and skin, first as a cell irritant, and then as 
a cell poison. Blister agents initially cause irritation of the eyes (and respiratory tract if inhaled), 
erythema (reddening of the skin), then blistering or ulcerations followed by systemic poisoning. 
There are three types of blister agents. 

A. 
Types of Blister Agents 

(1) 
Mustards (H, HD [sulfur mustard]): 

(a) 
PersistencyFrom 1 day to several months depending upon the type used and 
the weather conditions in the incident area. 
(b) 
Physical state (at 20 C/68 F)
HD  Colorless to pale yellow liquid
(c) 
Odors 


HD 
 
Strong garlic or horseradish smell 

NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazard - (Eyes and respiratory tract vapor), skin (direct contact), 
digestive system (ingestion). 
(e) 
Rate of action - Most symptoms are delayed (from 12 hours to days), HN-3 may 
cause immediate lacrimation and eye irritation after exposure. 

(2) 
Arsenicals. L (Lewisite), 

(a) 
Persistency - somewhat shorter than HD when in dry climate; all relatively short 
when in wet or humid conditions. 
(b) 
Physical state (at 20 C/68 F)
Colorless to brownish liquid
(c) 
Odor 

Geraniums 

NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazardEyes and respiratory tract (vapor), skin (direct contact), 
digestive system (ingestion). 
(e) 
Eye effects and stinging sensation are immediate, prompt burning redness 
within 30 minutes, blister on 1st or 2nd day. Pain more severe. 

(3) 
Urtricants. Phosgene oxime (CX) is a powerful irritant that is especially effective as 
a liquid: 

(a) 
PersistencyDays to weeks in soil, otherwise relatively nonpersistent. Heavily 
splashed liquid persists for 1 to 2 days in concentrations and persists for a week 
to months in cold weather. 
(b) 
Physical state(at 20 C/68 F)colorless solid or liquid. 
(c) 
OdorA disagreeable penetrating odor. 


NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazardEyes and nose and respiratory tract (vapor), skin (direct 
contact) and digestive tract (ingestion). 
(e) 
Rate of actionImmediate. 

B. 
Symptoms of Blister Agents 

(1) 
Mustard AgentsMost symptoms are delayed (4 to 6 hours for H, HD): 
(a) 
Eye effectsIn a single exposure the eye is the most vulnerable. In mild 
exposure there is a latent period of 4 to 12 hours, followed by tearing and a 
gritty feeling in the eyes. Heavy exposure has a latent period of 1 to 3 hours, 
followed by severe irritation and lesions. 
(b) 
Effects on skinThe latent period depends on weather conditions. In hot, 
humid weather, latency may be as short as 1 hour, in cool weather after mild 
vapor exposure, latency may be days. Normal latency is 6 to 12 hours. The 
initial symptom is erythema resembling sunburn, followed by multiple pinpoint 
lesions that enlarge and form the typical blisters. The blisters are usually large, 
thin walled, superficial, translucent, yellowish domes surrounded by erythema. 
The blister fluid is clear, thin, and straw colored at first; later is yellowish and 
tends to coagulate. Liquid contamination of the skin usually results in a ring of 
vesicles around a gray-white area that does not blister. 
(c) 
Respiratory effectsDevelop slowly, taking several days to reach maximal 
severity. Symptoms begin with hoarseness which may progress to loss of voice. 
A cough, which is worse at night, appears early, and later becomes productive. 
There is pronounced dyspnea. Consequently, the lower airways become easily 
infected, causing broncho-pneumonia. 
(d) 
Systemic and gastrointestinal effectsIngestion of contaminated food or water 
produces nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, and prostration. Skin 
exposure may cause malaise, vomiting, and fever that appear about the same 
time as erythema. 

(2) 
ArsenicalsVapors are unlikely to cause significant injuries. Liquid will cause 
severe burns of the skin and eyes and can gradually penetrate rubber and most 
impermeable fabrics: 
(a) 
Eye effectsThere is immediate pain on contact. Edema follows rapidly, 
causing the eye to close within an hour. Severe exposure can cause permanent 
injury or blindness. 


(b) 
Effects on SkinEffects are more severe than those from liquid mustard. 
Stinging pain is usually felt 10 to 20 seconds after contact. The pain increases 
in severity with penetration and in a few minutes becomes deep and aching. 
About 5 minutes after contact, a gray area of dead skin appears that resembles 
what is seen in corrosive burns. Erythema resembles that caused by mustard 
agents but is accompanied by more pain. Itching and irritation persist for about 
24 hours, whether or not a blister develops. Blisters are often well developed in 
12 hours and are painful at first (mustard blisters are relatively painless). The 
pain lessens in 48 to 72 hours. 
(c) 
Respiratory effectsEffects are similar to those produced by mustard agents. 
Systemic absorption of arsenicals causes a change in the capillary permeability. 
This can permit sufficient fluid loss from the blood stream to cause 
hemoconcentration, shock, and death. 
(d) 
Systemic effectsAcute systemic poisoning from large skin burns causes 
pulmonary edema, diarrhea, restlessness, weakness, subnormal temperature, and 
low blood pressure. 

(3) 
Urtricants 
(a) 
Eye and nose effectsThere is a strong and violent irritation of mucous 
membranes from vapors. Even low concentrations can cause tearing. 
(b) 
Effects on skinAny exposure to liquid or vapor that produces pain (strong 
stinging sensation similar to bee stings) will also produce skin necrosis at the 
site of contact. The area becomes blanched and is surrounded by an 
erythematous ring within 30 seconds. Within 24 hours the original blanched 
area acquires a brown pigmentation. Itching may be present throughout the 
entire course of healing, which may take 2 months or more. 

C. 
Treatment of Blister Agents 

(1) 
Mustard Agent 
(a) 
Immediately remove any liquid contamination. Speed in decontamination of 
the eye is absolutely essential. Rinse the eye with copious amounts of water. 
(b) 
After rinsing the eyes, apply a steroid antibiotic eye ointment. The eyes must 
not be bandaged or the lids allowed to stick together. 
(c) 
All blisters should be opened and the fluid drained with care, as the fluid itself 
may be irritating and cause secondary erythema and blisters. Cleanse the area 
with tap water or apply saline and burn cream (10% Sulfamylon burn cream). 


(2) 
Arsenicals. Treatment can be handled one of two ways 
(a) 
Local neutralization can be achieved by liberal application of dimercaprol 
(BAL) ointment that must remain on the affected area. Remove any other 
protective ointment before applying BAL ointment. 
(b) 
Perform INI injection of dimercaprol (13AL) 10% solution in oil. 
 
For mild to moderate poisoning give 2.5 mg./kg. (1.5 ml./60 kg.) every 4 
hours for 2 days, then one injection every 12 hours on the third day. From the 
fourth to tenth day give one injection once or twice a day. 
 
For severe poisoning give 3 mg./kg. (1.8 ml./60 kg.) every 4 hour for 2 days, 
third day give one injection every 6 hours. The fourth through fourteenth day, 
give one injection twice a day. Up to 5 mg./kg. can be given in severe cases. 

Symptoms caused by BAL include dryness of the mouth and throat, mild 
tearing, slight reddening of the eyes, feeling of constriction in the throat, 
burning sensation of the lips, generalized muscular aching, abdominal pain, 
mild restlessness, sweating of the hands, apprehension, mild nausea and 
vomiting on eating, and a transient rise in blood pressure. Symptoms start 15 to 
30 minutes after injection and last about 30 minutes. Unless they are severe or 
prolonged, they are not a contraindication for continuing therapy. 

(3) 
Urtricants 

Decontamination is not effective after pain starts, but the contaminated area should be 
flushed with copious amounts of water to remove any agent that has not yet reacted 
with the tissue. Treat as any other ulcerated necrotic skin lesion, plus supportive care, 
as needed. 

Chemical Agents Not Usually Life Threatening 
The following chemical agents are usually not life-threatening in nature. While all require 
treatment, the urgency associated with agents previously discussed is not as apparent. 

Incapacitating Agents 
Agents that cause physiological or mental effects which lead to temporary disability lasting from 
hours to days after exposure to the agent has ceased. 

A. 
Types of Incapacitating Agents 

(1) 
There are two types of incapacitating agents. Central nervous system (CNS) 
depressants and CNS stimulants. CNS depressants block the transmission of 


information across the synapse (the point at which a nervous impulse passes from one 
neuron to another). CNS stimulators tend to boost the transmission of information 
across the synapse. 

(a) 
CNS depressants (BZ, marijuana) have a delayed action rate of 2 to 4 hours if 
inhaled, and up to 36 hours from skin absorption. 
 
PersistencyBZ is very persistent in soil, water, and on surfaces. 
 
OdorBZ has no odor. Marijuana has a distinct smell. 
 
Primary hazardRespiratory, skin absorption possible. 

(b) 
CNS stimulants (LSD, psilocybin, mescaline) have an action rate of minutes if 
inhaled and 30 to 60 minutes if ingested. 
 
PersistencyUnknown 
 
OdorNone 
 
Primary hazardRespiratory 

B. 
Symptoms of Incapacitating Agents 

(1) 
Depressants (BZ) 
(a) 
From 1 to 4 hours symptoms are the following: 
 
Dizziness 
 
Vomiting 
 
Dry Mouth 
 
Confusion 
 
Sedation, progressing to stupor 
 
Ataxia (an inability to coordinate voluntary muscular movements) 
 
Rapid heart beat 

(b) 
From 4 to 12 hours there may be an inability to respond effectively to the 
environment. 
(c) 
From 12 to 96 hours symptoms are the following: 
 
Increasing activity 
 
Random, unpredictable behavior 
 
Gradual return to normal in 48 to 96 hours 

(2) 
Stimulants (LSD) produce the following symptoms: 
 
Rapid heart beat 
 
Sweating palms 
 
Pupillary enlargement 
 
Cold extremities 
 
Mental excitation 


 
Possible paranoia 

C. Treatment of Incapacitating Agents 

General treatment consists of close observation, restraint and confinement as required, 
supportive care with fluids, and appropriate clothing. Underlying medical problems should 
be treated as needed. If the specific agent can be identified, treat appropriately. 

(1) 
CNS Depressants 
 
Prevent heat stroke 
 
Keep temperature down 
 
Segregate and provide reassurance 
 
Constant supervision until withdrawal is complete 

(2) 
CNS Stimulants 
 
Provide reassurance 
 
If possible, sedate the patient 

Irritant or Tear Agents 
Compounds that cause a large flow of tears and intense (although temporary) eye pain and 
irritation of the skin. The effects are immediate but transient. 

A. Types of Irritant or Tear Agents 

(1) CA, CN, CNB, CNC, CNS, CS, CR and PS: 

(a) 
PersistencyShort for the CN series; varies with CA, CS, and CR. 
(b) 
Physical state 
CA  Yellow solid or liquid 
CN  Solid Powder 
CNB, CNC and CNS  Liquid 
CS  Colorless solid, powder or liquid 
CR  Yellow powder in solution 
PS  Colorless, oily liquid 

(c) 
Odor 

CA  Soured fruit
CN  Apple blossoms
CNB  Benzene (gasoline)


CNC  Chloroform
CNS  Flypaper
CS  Pepper like
CR  Burning sensation
PS  Stinging, pungent

NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazardRespiratory only. 
(e) 
Rate of actionImmediate. 

B. 
Symptoms of Irritant or Tear Agents. Effects last 5 to 10 minutes after removal from 
contaminated area. 

(1) 
Immediate burning sensation of the eyes. 
(2) 
Coughing. Following heavy exposure there may be nausea and vomiting. 
(3) 
Difficulty in breathing. 
(4) 
Involuntary closing of the eyes. 
(5) 
Stinging sensation on moist skin, especially on the face, neck, ears, and body fluids. 

C. 
Treatment of Irritating or Tear Agents 

 
Do Not Rub Eyes 
 
Flush the eyes with copious amounts of water. 
 
To prevent skin reaction, rinse the body with water or 5 or 10% sodium bicarbonate in 
water. 
 
Delayed erythema (irritant dermatitis) may be treated with a bland shake lotion. 
 
Most persons affected by irritant agents require no medical treatment. Severe reactions 
of the eyes or skin may take days or weeks to heal depending on their severity. 
 
Decontamination  Aeration; cool shower may help. 

Vomiting Agents 
Compounds that cause irritation of the upper respiratory tract and involuntary vomiting. 


A. 
Types of Vomiting Agents 

(1) 
DA, DC, DMProduce a strong pepper-like irritation in the upper respiratory tract. 
They are usually dispersed by heat as fine particulate smoke. 

(a) 
PersistencyShort (disseminated as an aerosol). 
(b) 
Physical stateAll are colorless when diluted with air. 
DA  White to brown solid
DC  White to pink solid
DM  Yellow to green solid

(c) 
Odor: 

DA  None
DC  Bitter almond-garlic mixture
DM  None

NOTE: Agent odors should only be used as a reference if victims relate 
noticing a strange smell at the time of agent release. Responders should not 
attempt to determine an odor themselves. If you can smell the odor, you are 
exposing yourself to the agent. 

(d) 
Primary hazardRespiratory only. 
(e) 
Rate of actionVery rapid, with a rate of action from 30 seconds to 2 minutes. 

B. 
Symptoms of Vomiting AgentsEffects last 30 minutes to several hours after leaving 
from contaminated area. Mild exposure symptoms resemble those of a severe cold. 
Symptoms include the following: 

(1) 
Irritation of eyes (tearing) and mucous membranes. A feeling of pain and fullness in 
the nose and sinuses. 
(2) 
Viscous discharge. 
(3) 
Intense burning in the throat. 
(4) 
Uncontrollable coughing, violent and persistent sneezing, runny nose. And ropy 
saliva flow from mouth. 
(5) 
Severe headache. 
(6) 
Acute pain and tightness in chest. 
(7) 
Nausea. 
(8) 
Vomiting. 


C. Treatment for Vomiting Agents 

 
Most individuals recover promptly after removal from the contaminated area. 
 
Symptomatic relief is provided by inhaling chloroform vapors either directly from a 
bottle or by pouring a few drops into the cupped palms and breathing. 
 
Chloroform is inhaled until the symptoms or irritation subsides and is repeated when the 
symptoms become severe again. Do not use to the point of anesthesia. 
 
Aspirin may be given to relieve the headache and general discomfort. 

Indicators of Possible Use of Chemical Agents 
Some clues may be present that could be indicators that a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) 
incident involving chemical agents has taken place: 

 
Unusual numbers of dying animals are present. Some indicators are: birds that are 
usually present at outside trash bins are dead; no insect sounds; numerous dead animals 
on the road. 
 
There is a lack of insect life. If normal insect activity (ground, air, and/or water) is 
missing, check the ground, water, and the shoreline for dead insects. 
 
Numerous individuals are experiencing unexplained water-like blisters, wheals (like bee 
stings), and/or rashes. 
 
Numerous individuals are exhibiting serious health problems ranging from nausea, 
disorientation, and difficulty breathing to convulsions and death. It is apparent that a 
mass casualty incident exists. 
 
There is a definite pattern of casualties (i.e. the casualties are aligned with the wind 
direction outdoors). Casualties are distributed in a pattern that may be associated with 
possible agent dissemination methods (i.e. there is a lower number of ill people working 
indoors versus outdoors, or outdoors versus indoors). 
 
Unusual liquid droplets are present. Numerous surfaces exhibit oily droplets or film. 
Numerous water surfaces have an oily film; no recent rain. 
 
Unscheduled and unusual spray being disseminated. 
 
Abandoned spray devices, such as chemical sprayers used by landscaping crews, are 
found. 


 
The area looks different in appearance. Not just a patch of dead weeds, but trees, shrubs, 
bushes, and/or lawns are dead, discolored, or withered and there is no current drought. 
 
Unexplained odors completely out of character with the surroundings are present. 
 
Unexplained low-lying clouds or fog-like conditions exist. 
 
Unusual metal debris are present, such as unexplained bomb/munition material, 
especially if it contains a liquid and there has been no recent rain. 


APPENDIX H 

Decontamination Operations 

General 

Decontamination after exposure to a chemical agent environment is 
necessary to protect individuals from becoming contaminated through 
contact with agent that may be on the protective clothing that they wore. 
The fire service is generally well versed in decontamination procedures; 
however, decontamination, as well as operating in a contaminated 
environment, is relatively new to law enforcement. 

HazMat technicians perform decontamination on a routine basis as part 
of any HazMat response. Many firefighters also possess a good 
knowledge of decontamination operations and may have supported 
HazMat decontamination operations. As a result of enhanced training on 
chemical terrorism and the mass casualties that it may cause, firefighters are also becoming more 
aware of decontamination techniques for mass numbers of casualties. 

Law enforcement agencies may not choose to develop their own decontamination capabilities. 
Experienced manpower and resources should already be on scene in the form of the fire 
department and HazMat teams. Law enforcement must coordinate for decontamination with 
the fire department Incident Commander, it cannot be assumed. Numerous exercises conducted 
as part of the DPP training program have resulted in fire departments tearing down their 
decontamination stations once all victims had been processed even though law enforcement was 
still operating inside of the hazard zone. The predominant disconnect being the fact that 
decontamination support was never coordinated at the command post. 

Specific areas where law enforcement can be expected to 
require decontamination support include: 

 
Crowd control and perimeter security along the 
perimeter of the Warm Zone. 
 
Processing evidence out of the Warm Zone. 
 
Investigators processing the crime scene. 
 
Bomb technicians conducting operations in a 
contaminated area or on a suspected chemical device. 

 Tactical operations taking place in a known or 
suspected chemical agent environment. 

 
Take down of a suspect or perpetrator who may possess chemical agents or of a chemical 
production facility. 


Decontamination of Permeable Clothing 

The recommendations for PPE for law enforcement include both permeable and impermeable 
clothing ensembles. Just as these are recommended 

for different operations based on the types of The protection provided byenvironment that may be encountered, different 

permeable suits is degraded 

decontamination procedures must be used depending 
on the suit. Impermeable suits are generally used for if the suit becomes wet. 
HazMat operations and can be decontaminated Therefore standard water 
simply by washing the exterior of the suit with a decontamination should not 
spray from a fire hose. This is the type of be performed on such suits.
decontamination that fire departments are used to 
performing. Wet decontamination, however, is inappropriate for permeable suits. 

Permeable suits protect the wearer through a process whereby chemical agent vapors are 
absorbed into layer of charcoal material (usually beads) within the lining of the suit. Performing 
a wet decontamination of these suits can serve to transfer both agent on the outer layer of the 
suit, as well as agent trapped in the charcoal, through the suit along with the water and into 
contact with the wearers skin. Therefore a slightly more elaborate process for decontamination 
is required for permeable clothing. 

The basic steps to decontamination for permeable clothing consist of: 

 
Overgarment removal. 
 
Glove removal. 
 
Inner clothing removal. 
 
Respirator removal. 
 
Shower. 

Throughout the process, the operator should continue to move through the decontamination 
corridor, starting in complete ensemble and finishing at the shower point. Steps are performed as 
stations along the corridor so that as more clothing is removed, the individual is further through 
the corridor. 

The first step to decontamination for permeable clothing is to have someone assist with removal 
of the protective overgarment; we refer to this individual as the assistant. Ideally the assistant is 
someone performing decontamination, as they are less likely to be contaminated themselves, but 
it can be another team member who was operating on the mission. It must be noted however that 
a decontamination operator must assist the last person through the process. This individual 
should be dressed in the same level of PPE as those individuals going through the 
decontamination process. 

The person going through decontamination opens all overgarment closures (zippers, buttons, 
strings, etc.). The assistant can help, if necessary, but this serves as an avenue to increase their 
direct exposure to agent. The assistant then removes the overgarment by grasping the outside of 
the suit and pulling it off of the operator. At no time should the outside of the suit touch the 


inner clothing or skin of the operator. If chemical protective over-boots are worn, they must be 
removed before the overgarment. 

Throughout the process of overgarment removal the wearer must keep his/her gloves and 
respirator on. Respirators with a powered air supply (PAPR) or external air supply (SCBA) 
require the operator to carry the blower/bottled air supply and harness through the 
decontamination process. 

Gloves are removed by pulling on them until they are loose enough to be shaken off. At no time 
should one glove be removed and the bare hand used to remove the other. Proper removal of 
gloves is fairly simple with prior practice. 

At this time, the operator removes any inner clothing (duty uniform, chemical protective 
undergarments) and proceeds to the final stage of 
decontamination. The respirator is the 

last item removed in 

The final stage in the process consists of mask removal and the decontaminationshowering. Operators should hold their breath, remove their 

process prior to

mask by placing their hands inside of the hood, if worn, and
stepping into the shower or water stream. At this time, they stepping into the
can resume breathing and exit the shower when directed by the shower.
station operator.

It cannot be over emphasized that while more labor intensive and time consuming, this is the best
decontamination process for permeable clothing. It must also be stressed that fire departments
do not normally perform such decontamination operations and training through joint training and
exercises is necessary in order to ensure that proper techniques are performed.


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APPENDIX 
I
NDPO Bulletin

IB-2 National Domestic Preparedness Office March 9, 2000 

INFORMATION BULLETIN

OFFICIAL USE ONLY NOT FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AGENCIES 

Chemical/Biological Equipment Questionsfor Procurement Officials in Public Agencies 

Buying detection, protection and decontamination equipment to respond to the threatened terrorist use of 
chemical or biological warfare agents may be new for Public Safety Agencies. To help procurement 
officials obtain the best value for their domestic preparedness dollar, a group of experienced federal 
chemical and biological project managers have compiled a series of questions to ask equipment vendors. 
These questions should assist officials in selecting products from the large number in the present day 
marketplace. Requesting vendors to provide written responses to your specific questions may also be 
helpful in the decision process. 


Recommended Questions on Personal Protection Equipment 

1. 
What chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals and biological agents has the 
equipment been tested against? 
2. 
What were the testing procedures and standards NFPA, ASTM, NIOSH, U.S. Military Standards, 
NATO, European Standards, MILSPEC? 
3. 
Who conducted the tests and when? Have the test results been verified by an independent 
laboratory or only by the manufacturer? 
4. 
What types of tests were conducted - spray, vapor, man-in-simulant (MIST)? 
5. 
Were respirators, suits, gloves and boots tested against the agents individually or as part of an 
integrated ensemble? 
6. 
Is the test data available? Where? How can I get a copy? Curves showing concentration as a 
function of time are better than just a single breakthrough time. 
7. 
Was the equipment ever used in live agent testing? Who did the testing and is the data available? 
8. 
What is the fabric used to make the suits? How are the seams put together? Simple sewn seams 
are weakest, covered or bound seams are better. 
9. 
What are the breaking strength and tear strengths of the fabrics? How was the equipment wear 
and tear tested? 
10. 
If the manufacturer recommends sealing seams with tape, ask why and whether that was the 
configuration the suit was tested in? 
11. 
How flammable is the fabric and how quickly will a hot ember melt through the fabric 
compromising protection? Is there an aluminized version or overcover for use where there is a 
fire threat in addition to the toxic agent? 
12. 
How long does it take to don the equipment and can one person do it or is a buddy system 
required? Does the equipment allow sufficient operational flexibility to do the job to include use of 
firearms? 
13. 
What sizes are sold for boots and gloves? Does suit sizing consider people with special builds? 
For suits, ask for nominal heights and weights - one size does not fit all! 
14. 
What training is required to fit face masks? Does the company provide those services and how 
frequently? How do the masks accommodate prescription glasses, long hair or facial hair? 
15. 
How long can responder safely work in the suit at 50oF, at 70oF and at 90oF? Are cooling suits 
available to help manage heat stress? How much do they cost and what are the maintenance 
requirements? Do the cooling suits require any penetrations of the suit? 
16. 
Can the protective equipment be decontaminated after use or must it be disposed of? What are 
the decon and sampling procedures? What tests are required to verify that protection capability 
has not been compromised in the process? What are the procedures and costs for disposing of 
used equipment, for example spent mask filters? 
17. 
How long has the company/manufacturer been involved with the Chem-Bio-Nuc and first 
responder industries? You may also ask for references. 


18. 
Ask for names and phone numbers of departments currently using the company's equipment. Ask 
to follow-up on the phone any written testimonials. 
19. 
What additional items are required to operate/maintain the equipment? At what cost? 
20. 
What training materials are provided - manuals, videotapes, CD ROMs? Are less expensive 
training suits available? Is there a chart available identifying PPE requirements as a function of 
agents and concentrations? 
21. 
What type of warranty/maintenance support is offered? Cost? 
22. 
What is the return rate on the equipment under warranty? What are the top five reasons for 
failure? 
23. 
What similar companies' products has this product been tested against? What were the results of 
the tests? 
24. 
What is the shelf life for the equipment? (open exposed, closed exposed, open unexposed, 
closed unexposed). What is the recommended storage procedure after opening (hanging, 
folded)? What factors, if any, decrease shelf life (UV, critical temperature)? 
25. 
What are the environmental limitations - high temp, low temp, humidity, sand/dust, broken glass? 

Recommended Questions on Detectors 

1. 
What agents has the equipment been tested against? 
2. 
Who conducted the tests? Have the test results been verified by an independent laboratory or 
only by the manufacturer? What were the results of those tests? 
3. 
What common substances cause a "false positive" reading or interference? 
4. 
Is the test data available? Where? 
5. 
What types of tests were conducted? Have any engineering changes or manufacturing process 
changes been implemented since the testing? If so, what were the changes? 
6. 
Can the equipment detect both large and small agent concentrations? 
7. 
Are there audible and visual alarms? What are their set points and how hard is it to change them? 
Are the alarm set points easily set to regulatory or physiologically significant values? 
8. 
How quickly does the detector respond to a spike in the agent concentration? How quickly does 
the detector clear when taken to a clean area? What is the response time of the detector to a 
spike in the agent? How much time does the detector take to clear when taken to a clean area? 
9. 
How long does it take to put the equipment in to operation? Can it be efficiently operated by 
someone in a Level A suit? 
10. 
How long do the batteries last? How long does it take to replace batteries or recharge? What is 
the cost of new batteries? Are the expended batteries HAZMAT and what is the cost of disposal 
of batteries? 
11. 
How long has the company/manufacturer been involved with the Chem-Bio-Nuc and first 
responder industries? You may also ask for references. 


12. 
Is the company currently supplying its product(s) to similar agencies? If so, who? Ask for names 
and phone numbers of departments currently using the company's equipment. Ask to follow-up 
on the phone any written testimonials. 
13. 
What additional items are required to operate/maintain the equipment? At what cost? What 
training materials are provided - manuals, videotapes, CD ROMs? What is the cost of training 
materials? 
14. 
What type of warranty/maintenance support is offered? Cost? 
15. 
What is the return rate on the equipment under warranty? What are the top five reasons for 
failure? 
16. 
What is the required on-hand logistical support and costs? How often does the equipment need to 
be sent back to the manufacturer for maintenance? 
17. 
How often does the equipment require calibration? Does calibration require returning the 
equipment to the manufacturer? Does the calibration involve hazardous materials? 
18. 
What special licenses/permits/registrations are required to own/operate the equipment? 
19. 
What similar companies' products has this product been tested against? What were the results of 
the tests? Compare it in cost and performance to M-8/M-9 paper. 
20. 
What is the shelf life of the equipment? (open exposed, open unexposed, closed exposed, closed 
unexposed) 
21. 
What is required to decontaminate the equipment if taken into the Hot Zone? 
22. 
What capability does this equipment give me that I do not currently possess? What equipment 
can I do away with if I purchase this? Is it only used for military chemicals? 
23. 
Does this equipment require any hazardous materials for cleaning? If yes, what are they? 
24. 
Taking weight and size into consideration, what procedures/process is needed to employ down 
range? How hard is it to decontaminate to get it out of the Hot Zone? What procedures/process is 
employed to decontaminate to remove from Hot Zone? 
25. 
What is the theory of operation? Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) Photo ionization, Flame 
ionization, etc. 
26. 
What are the environmental limitations - high temperature, low temperature, humidity, sand/dust? 
27. 
What are the storage requirements? (i.e., refrigerators, cool room or no special requirements) 
28. 
What training is required to use the equipment and interpret the results? Does the company 
provide this training, and what is the cost? How often is refresher training required? 

Questions on Decontamination Equipment 

1. 
What decontamination operations does the system support - personnel, vehicles, buildings? 
2. 
What chemical warfare agents and biological agents has the decon equipment been designed 
against? 
3. 
What chemical warfare and biological simulants has the decon equipment been tested against? 
Has the equipment been tested against live agents? Which ones? 


4. 
Who conducted the tests and when? Have the test results been verified by an independent 
laboratory or only by the manufacturer? 
5. 
Is the test data available? Where? How can I get a copy? 
6. 
What decontamination agents does the system use? What precautions are required in storing, 
transporting and mixing the concentrated decontamination reagent? 
7. 
How much does the decon agent cost (per person treated or per vehicle treated) and what is the 
recommended quantity that a department should keep on hand? What are the shelf life and 
storage requirements? Is expedited logistics support for decon reagent available in an 
emergency? What are the costs, response times and time delays? 
8. 
What water sources does the system support - hydrant, open water source (pond, river)? How 
much water is consumed per hour? 
9. 
Does the system heat the water? If so what is the energy source? Does the heater capacity 
become the limiting factor on throughput during cold weather operations? 
10. 
Does the system include equipment for managing run-off? What are the hazards and 
precautions? 
11. 
What is the design throughput of the system - people per hour, vehicles per hour, square meters 
per hour? 
12. 
Has the system been tested in extended operations? Is the system capable of continuous 
operations or must the processing be stopped periodically to replenish consumables? How long 
between required maintenance? Equipment? 
13. 
What is the minimum suite of equipment for decon operations? How long does it take to set up 
the equipment? How many personnel are required for set up, continuous operations and 
breakdown? 
14. 
How large is the equipment - weight and cube? What is the recommended method of transport? 
Are there any transportation limitations? 
15. 
For personnel decon, does the design provide for gender separation, if disrobing is required? 
16. 
What training is required to set up, operate and maintain the system? Does the company provide 
those services? Are training materials (videos, books, CD-ROMs available for use by new 
personnel? What are the costs of training materials? 
17. 
Has the system been tested in extreme weather conditions -cold, rain, heat and wind? At what 
wind speed does the tent become a kite? 
18. 
How is the equipment decontaminated after use? What are the sampling procedures to verify 
safe? 
19. 
What are the procedures and costs for disposing of expended decontamination solution? 
20. 
How long has the company/manufacturer been involved with the Chem-Bio-Nuc and first 
responder industries? 
21. 
Ask for names and phone numbers of departments currently using the company's equipment. Ask 
to follow-up on the phone any written testimonials. 
22. 
What additional items are required to operate/maintain the equipment? At what cost? 


23. 
What type of warranty/maintenance support is offered? Cost? 
24. 
What is the return rate on the equipment under warranty? What are the top five reasons for 
failure? 
25. 
What similar companies' products has this product been tested against? What were the results of 
those tests? 
26. 
What is the expected life span of the equipment? 

Questions or comments can be sent to the NDPO at ndpo@leo.gov, or call (202) 324-9025. 

OFFICIAL USE ONLY -- NOT FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
AGENCIES 
This information is provided by the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), in coordination with 
the National Institutes of Justice, the Technical Support Working Group, and the students and staff of the 
Center for Domestic Preparedness, military Chem/Bio units, and members of the Inter Agency Board. This 
document was reviewed by all of the agencies represented at the NDPO. The NDPO was established to 
coordinate the Federal Government's efforts to prepare the nation's response community for threats 
involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Contact your local FBI office if confronted by a WMD 
Threat. 

APPENDIX 
J

Summary of Stay-Times for Personnel Using Personal Protective Equipment in Chemical 
Warfare Agent Vapors 

The following summarizes the Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program stay-
time guidance for various configurations of personal protective equipment (PPE) ensembles. 
This guidance applies to chemical warfare agent vapors. It does not address liquid-contact 
hazards, or any toxic industrial compounds. This guidance is intended to support actions 
appropriate only in immediately life-threatening situations. It does not replace Level A/B/C 
protective system applications other emergency situations. 

Stay-times depend on agent type, agent concentration, clothing protection, respiratory 
protection and the type of toxic effect which limits exposure. However, when full PPE ensemble 
performance has been assessed, chemical agent toxicities can be applied to determine the 
chemical agent effect which limits PPE ensemble exposure. The stay-time is the time spent in a 
vapor concentration, at which the first observable chemical agent effect becomes likely. Stay-
times do not zero-risk exposure times; they are exposure times at which chemical effects are 
anticipated, but those effects are expected to be of minimal medical consequence and not life-
threatening. Specific health risks associated with the presented stay-times are described in 
reports of the Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program10. 

Stay-times depend on vapor concentration. Three levels of vapor concentration have 
been used to help illustrate how various PPE ensembles can be used in different hazard 
situations. The smallest vapor concentration is called the perimeter concentration. This is the 
maximum concentration expected at the down-wind, Day-Protect Perimeter of a small chemical 
spill. The Day-Protect Perimeter is defined and specified in the North American Emergency 
Response Guidebook, prepared by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special 
Programs Administration. This perimeter is located down-wind of a hazardous chemical spill, at 
a distance within which personal chemical protective equipment should be used. This distance is 
established at each incident by HAZMAT procedures. 

The next largest vapor concentration is called the highly lethal concentration. It 
corresponds to the amount of vapor in which an unprotected victim has a small possibility of 
surviving (5%), after 15 minutes of unprotected exposure. This is the maximum concentration in 
which we anticipate the possibility of rescuing surviving victims of chemical exposure. At 
concentrations greater than the highly lethal concentration, we do not anticipate victim survival. 

The highest concentration considered is saturation. This is the highest vapor 
concentration that can be produced by evaporation from a liquid. It is not practical to reach a 
saturated vapor concentration in real-world scenarios. However, the saturated concentration 
represents the theoretical worst-case vapor hazard. 

10 Guidelines for Incident Commanders Use of Firefighter Protective Ensemble (FFPE) with Self-Contained 
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Rescue Operations During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident, US Army Soldier 
and Biological Chemical Command, Domestic Preparedness Chemical Team, August 1999. 


Stay-times have been determined for these concentrations of chemical warfare agent 
vapors, when individuals are using various combinations of personal chemical protective 
equipment. These stay-times illustrate how long it takes before people can expect to experience 
initial threshold chemical effects, when they wear certain, broadly defined types of personal 
chemical protective equipment, in the indicated concentrations of chemical agent vapors. 

For this stay-time summary, we consider broadly defined categories of PPE. For 
respiratory protection, we consider the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), the negative 
pressure respiratory protective mask, which is well maintained and offers a measurement-
verified respiratory protection factor (PF) of 6666, and a negative pressure respiratory protective 
mask, which offers the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) applied PF 
of 5011. These disparate values are used because respiratory protection factors are highly 
dependent on maintenance and good fit of the negative pressure mask. Military testing shows 
that well-fitted, high quality, negative pressure respirators typically offer PFs of 6666 and 
greater. However, the performance of such masks can significantly degrade without proper fit, 
mask maintenance, and user-training. Verification testing is the only way to ensure high levels 
of protection from negative pressure masks. Thus, NIOSH assigns an applied PF of 50 to 
negative pressure respirators. 

We consider personal protective clothing in three broad categories. We consider modern 
structural fire fighting protective clothing. This clothing is considered with SCBA, because this 
typically constitutes what firefighters wear. Such equipment is called firefighter turnout gear. 

We also consider permeable chemical protective clothing ensembles. These clothing 
ensembles are similar to many military-style chemical protective clothing systems. They are not 
designed to protect against toxic industrial compounds and toxic industrial materials, but they are 
effective against the battlefield use of chemical warfare agents that have been developed for 
military use. We refer to these clothing ensembles as Tactical (SWAT) PPE Ensembles. The 
following Tactical (SWAT) Ensembles were considered: 

Hammer. Two-Piece Chemical Protective Overgarment 

Saratoga. Chemical Protective Undergarment 

Hammer. One-piece Chemical Protective Overgarment 

Giat. SWAT One-piece Chemical Protective Overgarment 

TOMPS. Two-Piece Chemical Protective Overgarment 

LANX. Chemical Protective Undergarment 

For these Tactical (SWAT) PPE Ensembles, the minimum Man-In-Simulant-Test (MIST) 
Physiological Protective Dosage Factor (PPDF) was 95. For stay-time analysis, these clothing 
ensembles were paired with negative pressure respiratory protective masks, with PFs of 50 and 
6666. 

11 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Research Development Letter (RDL) # 78-108; Applied 
Protection Factor Table, May 2000. 


We also consider impermeable, Level C, PPE clothing ensembles. The following Level 
C PPE ensembles were considered: 

Maryland State Police Standard Duty Uniform 

Tyvec. Protective Wear TM coverall 

Dupont Tychem.9400 suit 

Kappler CPF.4 suit 

Dupont Tychem.SL suit 

Tyvek. Protech F suit 

These clothing ensembles also were paired with negative pressure respiratory protective masks, 
with PFs of 50 and 6666. 

PPE ensembles offering significant protection with respect to highly lethal concentrations 
offer more than adequate protection at perimeter concentrations. Thus, stay-times for perimeter 
concentrations are not given for PPE ensembles that offer significant levels of protection against 
highly lethal vapor concentrations. 

Stay-times for firefighter PPE clothing ensembles with SCBA and Tactical (SWAT) 
clothing ensembles with negative pressure respiratory protective masks are given below, in Table 

14. 

Nerve Agent Concentration 
Highly Lethal Saturation 
PPE Ensemble Characteristics Stay-Time 
(minutes) 
Firefighter Turnout Gear with SCBA 30 3 
Any PPE Ensemble12 and SCBA 30 3 
Tactical (SWAT) PPE Ensembles and 
Negative Pressure Respirators with a PF of 50 
3 0.007 
Tactical (SWAT) PPE Ensembles and 
Negative Pressure Respirators with a PF of 
6666 
20 1 
Table 14. Stay-Time Guidance for Various Personal Protective Ensembles in a Highly
Lethal and a Saturated Concentration of Chemical Warfare Nerve Agent Vapors

12 Any personal chemical protective clothing system, with a Man-In-Simulant Test (MIST) Physiological Protective 
Dosage Factor (PPDF) of at least 10. 


Stay-times for Level C PPE clothing ensembles, with negative pressure respiratory 
protective masks, are given below, in Table 15. 

Nerve Agent Concentration 
Perimeter - Day Protect Zone 
PPE Ensemble Characteristics Stay-Time 
(minutes) 
Level C PPE Ensemble and Negative 
Pressure Respirator with a PF of 50 
850 
Level C PPE Ensemble and Negative 
Pressure Respirator with a PF of 6666 
1500 
Table 15. Stay-Time Guidance for Various Personal Protective Ensembles in a Perimeter 
Concentration of Chemical Warfare Nerve Agent Vapors 

STAY-TIME EXPLANATIONS 

The protection offered by an overall PPE ensemble can be limited by either the 
respiratory protective mask, or the chemical protective clothing. In general, the respiratory 
system is more vulnerable to chemical exposure than the skin surface of the body. Thus, with a 
minimal respiratory protection factor of 50 and ordinary clothing, such as the Maryland State 
Police Standard Duty Uniform, an individual has a low risk of chemical effects in concentrations 
expected at the perimeter of a chemical release. Even if they remain for long periods in the 
maximum vapor concentrations expected at the down-wind Day-Protect Perimeter of a chemical 
release, chemical effects are not anticipated. 

In higher agent concentrations, with minimal respiratory protection, stay-times are 
severely limited, regardless of protective clothing for the skin. With a respiratory PF of 6666, 
stay-times are limited by clothing protection. The increased skin protection offered by Tactical 
(SWAT) PPE ensembles leads to longer stay-times. However, as the stay-times indicate, 
negative pressure respirators offering a respiratory protection factor of 6666 should still be 
considered primarily for escape purposes, or short-duration, dynamic operations. Such personal 
chemical protective ensembles do not equip law enforcement officers for operations that may 
involve long periods of exposure to highly lethal vapor concentrations. Limitations of such 
Tactical (SWAT) PPE ensembles must be weighed when considering stealth operations in 
potentially contaminated environments. 

In general, when self-contained breathing apparatus is used, protection against chemical 
warfare nerve agent vapors is limited by clothing protection. Firefighter turnout gear does not 
offer as much chemical protection as the Tactical (SWAT) PPE ensembles tested. However, 
with the use of SCBA, firefighter turnout gear offers sufficient chemical vapor protection to 


successfully manage chemical effect risks in quick rescue operations, even in highly lethal 
concentrations of chemical warfare agents vapors. 

Further details regarding the tests performed on these ensembles and the stay-times, 
please consult the referenced reports of the US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical 
Command, Domestic Preparedness Chemical Team, available at the web site: 
http://www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld. 


APPENDIX K 

List of Acronyms 

BALTEX Baltimore Exercise 
BRHA Body Region Hazard Analysis 

C/B Chemical and Biological 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
CPU Chemical Protective Undergarment 
CWA Chemical Warfare Agent 
CW IRP Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program 

DoD Department of Defense 
DPP Domestic Preparedness Program 

EMS Emergency Medical Services 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FY Fiscal Year 

HazMat Hazardous Materials 

IC Incident Commander 
IRP Improved Response Program 

LEFG Law Enforcement Functional Group 

MIST Man-In-Simulant Tests 
MSA Mine Safety Applicances 
MSP Maryland State Police 

NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

PAPR Powered Air Purifying Respirator 
PF Protection Factor 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 

QNFT Quantitative Fit Test 

SBCCOM Soldier and Biological Chemical Command 
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 
STATE Special Tactical Assault Team Element 


SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics 

TOMPS Tactical Operations Multi-Purpose Suit 
TOP Test Operation Procedure 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction