TITLE: Policing in Emerging Democracies: Workshop Papers and Highlights.
SUBJECT: International Statistics and Issues
Series: NIJ Research Report
Published: October 1995
213 pages
394,567 bytes
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice
Policing in Emerging Democracies: Workshop Papers
and Highlights
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs  U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C., December 14-15, 1995
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
Janet Reno
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
John C. Dwyer
Acting Associate Attorney General
Laurie Robinson
Assistant Attorney General
Jeremy Travis
Director, National Institute of Justice
Justice Information Center
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ncjrs.org
Opinions or points of view expressed in this
document are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official position of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
The National Institute of Justice is a component of
the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for
Victims of Crime.
NCJ 167024
Policing in Emerging Democracies: Workshop Papers
and Highlights
National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of
Justice
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C., December 14-15, 1995
October 1997
------------------------------
CONTENTS
Workshop Overview and Highlights Opening Remarks
--Jeremy Travis
--Robert Gelbard
Paper
--Principles of Democratic Policing
--Philip B. Heymann
Keynote Address
--American Law Enforcement Perspectives on Policing
in Emerging Democracies
--Raymond W. Kelly
Paper
--Toward Democratic Policing: Rethinking Strategies
of Transformation --Clifford Shearing
Reflections on Day One
--Strategic Implications
--Michael Smith
Paper
--Reflections on the Transfer of Knowledge to
Support Democratic Policing in Hungary and Romania
--Deborah G. Wilson and William F. Walsh
Paper
--Who Are We Kidding? or Developing Democracy
Through Public Reform
--David H. Bayley
Workshop Wrap-Up
--Where Do We Go From Here?
--Mark H. Moore Appendixes
-----------------------------------
PREFACE
For some time, the United States has offered
training and technical assistance to police
organizations in other countries. Over the past
several years, there has been an unprecedented
opportunity to do so within the context of state
reform in countries making the transition to
democracy. As a result, the agencies of the U.S.
Government that administer this assistance have
expanded their training activities and changed the
focus of the assistance provided.
The Department of State and the Department of
Justice have built a strong and evolving
partnership in this arena. These two U.S.
Government Departments seek to promote the
development of effective and accountable police
services in countries where the difficult
transition to democratic forms of government is
taking place. Both agencies also recognize that
fundamental questions remain about the most
effective strategies for fostering such reform.
To pose these questions and to challenge
traditional assumptions, we hosted a workshop on
policing in emerging democracies and
commissioned papers from leading academics who have
reflected on these issues. The workshop was
cosponsored by the State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
and the National Institute of Justice, the research
arm of the Department of Justice. Attending the
workshop was an impressive group of scholars and
practitioners, representing the experiences of more
than 20 nations in developing democratic police
functions. Also participating were representatives
of each of the Federal agencies now engaged in
providing training and technical assistance abroad.
The keynote speaker was Raymond W. Kelly, former
Police Commissioner of New York City, who had
recently returned from overseeing the international
policing operation in Haiti.
The exchange of ideas that took place at the
workshop, and the papers reproduced here, will
serve as a rich resource to be tapped in shaping
policy in the future. We wish to express our thanks
to the participants, particularly those who wrote
the foundation papers and who provided the
synthesis of the proceedings. It is our hope that
the discussions inspired by the workshop will
continue and expand in the years to come.
Timothy E. Wirth
Under Secretary for Global Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
---------------------------------------------
WORKSHOP OVERVIEW AND HIGHLIGHTS
Haiti, South Africa, and numerous countries in
Eastern Europe and Central America have been
working in the past several years to build
democratic institutions of government to take the
place of authoritarian forms. A major government
institution in any country, the police in these
emerging democracies are a current focus of
attention. In emerging democracies as elsewhere,
the police are the government's face--the
institution citizens come into contact with on a
daily basis more often than others. In countries
where the police have been an instrument of
repression rather than democracy, building citizen
confidence in this institution is a particular
challenge.
The United States currently offers technical
assistance to the police in emerging democracies
and other countries. The two agencies most active
in providing this assistance, the U.S. Department
of State and the U.S. Department of Justice, are
collaborating on ways to expand and disseminate
information that can promote modern, democratic
policing practices based on the rule of law,
support international justice assistance, and help
shape future policy. One outcome of that
collaboration has been an exchange of ideas and
experiences among professionals in criminal justice
research and law from the United States and abroad,
police officials, and Federal policymakers. That
exchange took place at a workshop on policing in
emerging democracies sponsored by the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, and the
National Institute of Justice, Department of
Justice. A key component of the workshop was a
series of papers presented by experts in law and
criminology. These papers form the basis of this
report.
U.S. Justice Assistance for Policing in Other
Countries
Several agencies of the U.S. Government offer
justice assistance to the police in other
countries. It takes the form of training and
technical assistance to help combat such crimes as
firearms and drug trafficking, money laundering,
and currency counterfeiting; and programs aimed at
improving law enforcement techniques (by building
forensics capabilities and providing firearms
training, for example). These efforts to aid
criminal justice agencies abroad have increased
dramatically in recent years. One reason is the
growth of transnational crime, which affects
domestic law enforcement because it victimizes U.S.
citizens, and the other is the transition to
democracy occurring in the newly independent states
of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, a process
the United States supports as a foreign policy
objective. That involves support for the police as
an institution affected by the reform process. The
expansion of U.S. assistance for policing and the
need for information that can shape public policy
related to this assistance provided the impetus for
the workshop on policing in emerging democracies.
(A detailed discussion of current U.S. justice
assistance for policing is in appendix A.)
The Workshop and Its Goals
The 2-day workshop on policing in emerging
democracies, held in Washington, D.C., in December
1995, brought together 64 participants to exchange
information and ideas as a means of contributing to
the body of knowledge on the topic. (A list of
attendees is in appendix B.) Complementing that
exchange were presentations of experiences in the
field and suggestions that could be incorporated
into the development of policy on assisting police
in emerging democracies. Future steps were also
contemplated, as both sponsoring agencies wish to
continue these exchanges, whether through research,
document exchange, or the creation of a "virtual"
organization. They are particularly interested in
dissemination of information across national
boundaries.
Ideas presented by several experts in criminology
and law and case studies related by professionals
experienced in assisting in police reform abroad
were a central component of the workshop. These
experts had been commissioned to prepare papers on
the principles of democratic policing and on issues
critical to the successful transfer of knowledge to
support democratic policing in emerging
democracies.
A Framework for Analyzing the Issues
The notion of promoting police reform has an almost
intuitive appeal, but the discussions and papers
made evident the complexity of that notion as it
applies to emerging democracies. Even the
definition of "democracy" was debated. The workshop
was a forum for identifying this and other issues
related to policing in emerging democracies,
exploring them, and bringing to light and comparing
varied and sometimes opposing perspectives. At the
workshop conclusion, Mark Moore articulated an
overall framework for analyzing the issues
explored.[1]
A key component of the framework is a series of
"tests" or standards for measuring the viability
and utility of a government strategy for assisting
the police in emerging democracies. These are the
same tests or standards that must be met by any
other strategy adopted for use in the public
sector:
o The strategy must have some important public
value.
o The strategy must have legitimacy and attract
support from those who are in a position to provide
resources and lend their authority to it.
o Operational capacities must be sufficient to
achieve the goal of the strategy.
It is assumed that democratic values should be
reflected in policing and overall governance (the
first test). However, the notion of the form of
policing as itself a shaper of democratic culture
should also be considered. In other words, a
distinction can be made between a style of policing
that pursues particular values and legitimates
itself in a particular way and, on the other hand,
a style of policing that reflects or is the product
of a local democratic culture.
Stepping outside the local environment and viewing
the strategy from the perspective of the U.S.
Government, assistance for policing could meet the
third test by contributing to operational capacity
(for example, through technical assistance,
funding, and equipment) and it could meet the
second test by contributing to the legitimacy of
policing, when such assistance supports--or does
not support--local authorizing processes.
The basic question and its variants. The basic
question--how can we reform the police in ways that
promote the development of democracy--has several
variants. One variant proposes a more modest
objective than promoting democracy: How do we
reform the police in ways that are not destructive
of the development of democracy? Alternatively, a
middle ground is to phrase the question as, "How do
we reform the police in ways that make them
reflective of democratic society?" The first form
of the question is the "strongest," proposing to
strengthen democracy beyond just the boundaries of
police operations.
Implied in the basic question are several others.
One is how to define the terms "we," "police," and
"democracy," for their definitions are not
necessarily self-evident. "We" is assumed to mean
the citizens or representatives of the U.S.
Government who are considering the use of public
resources. The term "police," however, can mean
either police institutions only, criminal justice
institutions, or the general security function of
society. "Democracy" too can be defined in several
ways--more traditionally, as a set of institutions;
in terms of culture as citizens' aspirations and
expectations; or as the rule of law. Quite
different from the rule-of-law definition is that
of democracy as an articulation of citizens'
collective aspirations or as a system providing
equal delivery of services (not just equal delivery
of political rights) or creating just conditions in
society.
Depending on the definition, the course of reform
might vary. Thus, the way democracy is defined
would determine the perception of the role of the
police. For example, if democracy is viewed as
providing equal services, then all citizens have
equal claims on public security.
The foreign policy context and objectives. There
are several situations in which promoting police
reform in support of democracy becomes especially
relevant to U.S. policy. The three most common are
where a state has collapsed, where civil war has
broken out, or where an invasion has occurred. U.S.
support for police operations is no longer tied to
Cold War objectives. Rather, our own domestic law
enforcement objectives are gaining in importance
and, where states have collapsed, opportunities may
arise to provide humanitarian aid and support
democracy.
In all these situations there is a related
question, "Whose purposes are we trying to
accomplish?" The answer, "Not ours," presupposes
that the United States should act only in response
to the wishes of the recipient country. The
alternative answer, "It is U.S. objectives that
matter," derives from the notion that the resources
expended are ours, although the institutions and
culture of the recipient country must be understood
and its needs accommodated.
The end or goal of U.S. assistance to policing may
be to advance U.S. law enforcement objectives or to
advance democracy. If it is the former, several
types of intervention are possible, among them
improving operational capacity--through training
and technical assistance--and there are means to
affect more than just operations. If the goal is to
advance democracy--assuming there are forces within
a country working toward that end--support for the
police becomes only one small part of what can be
done.
It should be kept in mind that the goal of
advancing U.S. law enforcement objectives and the
goal of advancing democracy are sometimes
incompatible. An example would be situations in
which our country supports authoritarian regimes to
achieve our own internal law enforcement objectives
such as suppression of drug trafficking.
What kind of policing will be "exported"? If the
foreign policy context and the goals of U.S.
assistance vary, so will the form of policing being
exported. If the goal is to advance democracy,
protection of individual rights may be a
consideration, and if so, other components of the
criminal justice system might be the objects of
reform in addition to policing. In fact, reform
might extend to the entire criminal justice system
and even beyond--to institutions in civil society
that have a security function. These are
particularly important to consider if the form of
democracy pursued calls for construction of a
political culture within the civil society.
The functions for which the police are to be
responsible also need to be identified. They might
extend not just to street crime but also to
antiterrorism, antisubversion, and police handling
of civil unrest. Antisubversion and antiterrorism
might be best left outside the purview of the local
police, as these functions may be closely linked to
politics.
Should community policing be the form adopted? It
may be necessary to first pass through a stage of
more traditional "professional" law enforcement. To
be sure, focusing on community policing and the
security function of civil society would be
valuable, as it would encourage the development of
support for a local capacity for action that would
in turn support responsive democracy.
Can police reform affect democracy? There are
several mechanisms through which reform of
policing, the criminal justice system, or society's
security function can affect the quality of
democracy:
o By bringing to the table the question of what
form of policing is to be adopted, it may be
possible to create a dialogue about democratic
principles. In other words, simply making policing
an issue for discussion might favorably affect the
quality of democracy.
o Assuming that the policing profession is a means
of upward mobility for people who join the force,
training could be a way to prepare recruits for
leadership in civil society as well as policing.
o Having police focus on effectively controlling
street crime and disorder might diminish any
tendency for them to support authoritarian regimes.
o By supporting the government, policing could
enhance government's credibility as effective,
powerful, fair, and equitable.
o The way policing is conducted might engage
citizens in experiences that teach democratic
values. Citizens' experiences as victims,
witnesses, offenders, or in oversight of the police
could help construct a political culture supporting
democracy.
The value of documentation. In providing assistance
to policing, the United States might have to move
quickly when the situation demanded it but would
also need to stay long enough in a particular place
to produce the desired effect. Whether the United
States is prepared to act quickly, provide
sufficient resources, stay long enough, and be
flexible are questions that need to be addressed.
In addressing them, it should be kept in mind that
in any situation, the U.S. will not have the luxury
of first being able to learn, and then acting on
the basis of what is learned. Rather, we will be
learning while doing. For this reason, it may be
useful to take such preparatory steps as
documenting what is being done in a specific
situation and with what effect. That would include
examining case studies of interventions in
partnership between academics and practitioners.
These case studies would form the basis of
understanding what seems to have worked and what
has not.
Highlights of the Workshop
The workshop on policing in emerging democracies
opened with remarks by the directors of the two
sponsoring Federal agencies. Jeremy Travis,
Director of the National Institute of Justice (U.S.
Department of Justice), noted that the intent of
the exchange of ideas and information was to
contribute to the further development of policy in
support of policing in emerging democracies. He
expressed his interest in continuing this type of
dialogue in partnership with the State Department.
Ambassador Robert Gelbard, then-Director of the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (U.S. Department of State), noted that
there is a lack of empirical knowledge related to
policing in emerging democracies and that his
department's recent experiences could help provide
the means to build that knowledge base.
The four commissioned papers and other addresses
explored a range of issues related to policing in
emerging democracies, including the relationship of
policing to democracy and of democracy to policing,
how the United States defines its interests in
offering assistance, and the shifts in the role of
government in democratic societies that is in turn
shaping policing and other institutions. Some of
the addresses drew from the presenters' own recent
experiences in assisting police in Eastern Europe
and Latin America.
First Paper: "Principles of Democratic Policing,"
by Philip B. Heymann
It is difficult to develop a truly competent
criminal justice system by beginning with a focus
on common crimes and then slowly building competent
institutions, especially if the system disregards
the crimes of the powerful. The United States
should invest in strong systems that can and will
press for equal application of the law to the
powerful as well as the weak and small. That means
taking a forceful stand on corruption, bias,
political violence, and intimidation.
Keynote Address: "American Law Enforcement
Perspectives on Policing in Emerging Democracies,"
by Raymond W. Kelly
Raymond Kelly presented as a case study the U.S.
role in setting up a new police force in Haiti
following the intervention led by the United
States. Because Haiti under the old regime
represented an almost textbook case of the police
as an unchecked instrument of state oppression,
indistinguishable from the military, and with no
tradition of public service, the intervention
included a police monitoring force. The work of the
monitors revealed that corrections and the
judiciary in Haiti shared the problems of the
Haitian police and suggested that where policing
reform is called for, reform may need to be
extended to other components of the criminal
justice system.
Second Paper: "Toward Democratic Policing:
Rethinking Strategies of Transformation," by
Clifford Shearing with the assistance of Jennifer
Wood
Established democracies are no longer viable models
to be emulated because in them the assumption of
governance as a state monopoly is now being
questioned. This rethinking (or reinvention) of
government has several expressions, among them the
call for more direct citizen involvement. Within
law enforcement it is most evident in community
policing, while the growth of private policing also
expresses this devolution of responsibility--to
"corporate governments." In South Africa, Professor
Shearing has been working to promote a vision of
police reform that recognizes this devolution, with
programs seeking to empower communities with the
autonomy of corporate governments.
Reflections on the First Day, by Michael E. Smith
Professor Michael Smith drew on his own experience
in assisting criminal justice officials in England,
France, and the former Federal Republic of Germany
in transferring techniques and lessons from the
United States. On the basis of this experience, he
concluded that direct exposure, which permits
individuals to judge the value of what they
observe, is the best practice. His comments on the
papers and discussions included the following:
o The discussion about the conflict between short-
term domestic law enforcement needs and a long-term
interest in stable democracies could have been more
frank.
o The United States needs to understand enough
about what policing does in this country if it is
to be able to transfer that understanding to other
countries.
o Even relatively simple interventions in another
jurisdiction's law enforcement take considerable
time.
Third Paper: "Reflections on the Transfer of
Knowledge to Support Democratic Policing in Hungary
and Romania," by Deborah G. Wilson and William F.
Walsh
Professors Wilson and Walsh assessed their
experience in providing training to the national
police of Hungary and Romania. The factors
promoting entry and acceptance are recognition of
the need for outside assistance (which may be
precipitated by a crisis), recognition by the
United States of professionalism in a country's
police force, evidence of a commitment for the long
term, and the perception of education and training
as a dialogue resulting in reciprocal development.
For the two recipient nations, three major needs
became evident: (1) to increase public confidence
and create a more favorable public perception of
law enforcement; (2) to recruit and retain
qualified personnel in the face of growing market
forces that devalue the attractiveness of the
policing profession; and (3) to adopt modern
management techniques, which have been limited
partly by the highly centralized nature of the
policing organization and partly through lack of
exposure.
Fourth Paper: "Who Are We Kidding? or Developing
Democracy Through Police Reform,"
by David H. Bayley
The police cannot be an instrument of reform
because unless a government is committed to
democracy, reform of the police can do little to
bring it about. Approaches generally assumed to be
associated with democracy, such as community
policing, in fact have been adopted in
nondemocratic regimes, while a centralized police,
often associated with repressive government, is the
organizational form the police have taken in many
democracies. Certain reforms are more likely to be
exported than others, and those that are least
exportable (those affecting police purpose,
functions, control, and accountability) are also
those that have the least effect on democratic
development.
Workshop Wrap-Up: Where Do We Go From Here? by Mark
H. Moore
Professor Moore drew on the ideas of the
participants to construct a framework for
understanding and analyzing strategies to promote
policing reform in emerging democracies. The basic
policy objective of reforming the police in ways
that promote democracy may have to be modified to
less ambitious variants, among them reforming the
police in ways that are not inimical to democratic
development. Although reform of the police is a
foreign policy issue, one that raises the question
of whether the United States wishes to advance its
own domestic law enforcement ends or to enhance
democracy, those ends are not always incompatible.
The mechanisms by which policing affects democracy
include
sustaining a dialogue about democratic principles
by raising the question of the form policing should
take, providing training for future leaders,
focusing on street crime as a way to deter the
police from supporting an authoritarian regime,
enhancing the credibility of government as fair and
equitable, and creating experiences in which
citizens who come into contact with the police are
exposed to democratic values.
Note
[1] The full text of Mark Moore's presentation is
in this report.
------------------------------------
OPENING REMARKS
Honorable Jeremy Travis
Director, National Institute of Justice,
U.S. Department of Justice
All of you are here for a 2-day workshop on
policing in emerging democracies. We have much to
discuss over a relatively short period. The purpose
of our introductory remarks this morning is to open
the discussions and to get things going. I would
like to take just a moment to share with you some
of the thoughts that we have in the National
Institute of Justice about the next 2 days and then
ask Ambassador Robert Gelbard to do the same for
the Department of State.
The National Institute of Justice, as most of you
know, is the research and development arm of the
Department of Justice. Since our creation by
Congress in 1968, we have had an international
dissemination mandate, and we are now working with
a number of our colleagues in the Federal
Government to try to develop new capabilities,
capacities, and dimensions to our congressional
mission. This, I must say, is the most exciting of
our new undertakings: to bring together
practitioners, researchers, and policymakers from
around the world to talk about the issue of
policing in emerging democracies.
A number of objectives have been established in our
discussions with our colleagues in the Department
of State for the next 2 days, and they are quite
straightforward. However, we should all have them
clear in mind as we begin. One is to engage in an
exchange of information, ideas, and experiences. In
furtherance of that objective, we asked for four
papers by five people who are here with us today.
We asked them to share their experiences, reflect
on those experiences, and assist us in finding
common elements that are worthy of our further
consideration. The second part of that first
objective is to ask each of you to help us think
about how to continue this exchange of information,
whether it is in a research capacity, an exchange
of documents, or as Clifford Shearing used the
phrase once, in the creation of a "virtual
institute." Think about ways to share knowledge
across international boundaries.
Our second objective is to ask you to provide
policy ideas and advice to our international
community gathered here today and, in particular,
to the representatives of the Federal Government
agencies who are gathered either around the table
or elsewhere in the room. We are all open to your
suggestions; your ideas are welcome.
The third specific objective is to think about the
future. When Ambassador Gelbard and I first
discussed this idea, we were very clear with each
other that we wanted more than a 1- or 2-day
gathering of people to talk about an important
topic. We are both interested in asking ourselves
and asking you how to continue these sorts of
exchanges in the future.
We are enthusiastic about today and tomorrow. The
timing of this workshop could not be more
appropriate considering many people in this room
are thinking about a very specific application of
the issue of policing in emerging democracies. We
hope, on behalf of the National Institute of
Justice, that we can make a contribution to the
development of an effective policy in this regard
in any of the emerging democracies, and I include
our own as an emerging democracy. I will turn now
to Ambassador Gelbard.
Ambassador Robert Gelbard
Director, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, U.S. Department of State
As NIJ Director Jeremy Travis just noted, the
genesis of this workshop was the discussions that
he and I had about the increasing importance of
policing in emerging democracies. As we have
continued to look at the issue of building
democracies, it has become clearer and clearer from
the point of view of foreign policy, particularly
over the past decade and a half, that the previous
thinking--that of relying on the first presidential
election in a country as the goal to achieve
democracy--was extraordinarily shortsighted. But,
of course, we had very little experience in
actually trying to do this.
In fact, the first presidential election is a
necessary but insufficient condition. The longer I
have been involved with these kinds of issues, the
more I am convinced that it is the second
presidential election that becomes much more
interesting. The more we have tried to look at the
kinds of issues involved in consolidating
democracy, not with creating democracy, it has
become more clear how important the justice
sector's role is in trying to build democratic
police, as well as judicial, prosecutorial, and
penal institutions and the kinds of legal
frameworks that are necessary for the public to be
able to have confidence in their systems.
Reading through the papers that have been provided
for this workshop, I found subjects and issues
raised that were of great interest to me. I was
reading them on the airplane as I returned from
Bosnia yesterday, where we have been asked to begin
to establish a program of police monitors both
there and in eastern Slovenia, as well as to try to
create other kinds of democratic law enforcement
and judicial institutions. We certainly hope that
we can call on some of you to help us and give us
advice as we try to take on this extraordinary
task.
But as we begin to grope our way with our friends
and allies toward better understanding of the type
of role required in order to build these kinds of
core institutions, it is very clear that the amount
of knowledge that exists based on empirical
evidence is somewhat lacking and that we will be
building a further knowledge base over time using
the experiences we are having, whether in Cambodia,
Haiti, Central America, South Africa, or Namibia.
We certainly see this workshop as a very important
start to try to reinforce our efforts to create a
greater interchange of views with theoreticians,
practitioners, and others. We look forward,
together, to working further with you as we try to
move along this path.
------------------------------------
PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC POLICING
by Philip B. Heymann
I have been asked to draw on my experience working
in Guatemala, South Africa, Colombia, and Russia
and visiting criminal justice institutions in many
other countries to comment on the principles of
democratic policing. I am happy to do so but should
admit at once to an unqualified commitment to one
particular concept of the U.S. interest in this
area. I think our national stakes rather plainly
lie in encouraging very strong democracies and very
strong criminal justice systems--ones that are
unbiased as well as effective--even when
compromising on these ends might offer us more
immediate advantages.
But let me begin. I worry that you may expect me to
talk about the comparative merits in policing of
professionalism, problem-solving attitudes, and
close relations to local communities at early
stages of democratic development in nations of
Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, or Asia.
These are important questions. But other questions
about the relationship between democracy and
policing or, more broadly, law enforcement, are
even more fundamental. They are the relationships I
shall discuss. I shall describe two types of
democracy--"weak" and "strong" in the strength of
support for popular rule--and two types of criminal
justice systems--"weak" and "strong" in their
ability to handle crimes by the powerful. Then, I
shall describe how the type of democracy you get is
influenced by the type of criminal justice system
you pursue. Finally, I shall describe what
outsiders like us can do to help develop an
effective and "strong" criminal justice system and
thus a strong democracy.
Weak Democracies and Strong Democracies
GUATEMALA CITY--The United Nations issued a damning
review of Guatemalan human rights yesterday,
painting a grim panorama of state killings, death
squads and abuses by leftist rebels . . .
The report accused police and army forces of cold-
blooded murder, running "social cleansing" death
squads to kill common thieves, drug trafficking,
car thefts, and illegal logging . . .
It said Guatemala's legal system was "virtually
paralyzed," and incapable of investigating crimes,
even threats and attacks against its own judges and
prosecutors. The main victims of abuse continue to
be human rights activists, politicians, and public
prosecutors.
- Reuters, October 31, 1995
Democracy in the contemporary world is sustained by
two primary forces. It can be the result of the
rather powerful demand of the population. For this
reason, few people thought that the military would
attempt a coup in South Africa even after President
F.W. de Klerk stunned his nation by announcing
there would be free and open elections that would
include [black] African voters. But democracy can
also be largely the result of international
pressures, especially with the end of the Cold War.
Guatemalan democracy is largely maintained by such
pressures. The generals know and are reminded by
powerful economic interests of the great cost of
any coup. Many countries are now trying to impose
such costs on Nigeria. In this discussion I will
call "strong" a democracy supported by the strong
demands of its people, and "weak" a democracy
maintained only by the fear its opponents share of
the international repercussions of either a coup or
the election of a nondemocratic party.
The distinction turns out to be important.
Guatemala is a weak democracy--a country where
there always seems to be an authoritarian
alternative waiting in the wings to challenge a new
democracy. The candidate winning the second largest
number of votes in the elections last month was
widely regarded as a stand-in for General Rios
Montt, who had been leading in the polls until the
courts declared him ineligible to run because of
the constitutional provision that bars the
candidacy of anyone involved in a prior coup. The
President leaving office had been put in place when
his predecessor, Jorge Serrano, attempted to
suspend the Constitution and close down the
Congress. The weakness of the democracy encourages
corruption and impunity for political violence.
Guatemala is not alone. The possibility that
democratic institutions will be replaced by far
more authoritarian ones, either as the result of an
election or of a coup, is real from Santiago,
Chile, to Moscow.
This talk of weak and strong democracies may sound
very abstract to you. To me, it is accompanied by a
storehouse of vivid images. I was working on a U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)
contract to build criminal justice institutions in
Guatemala when the first attempt at a military coup
against the first freely elected President in
decades took place. Gramajo, the general serving as
Defense Minister, ordered the colonels who had
organized the coup to return to their bases. Then
the President, Vinicio Cerezo, called for a mass
demonstration of public support for the new
democracy. President Cerezo's call was answered by
only a few grade school students who were brought
into the capital city by bus. The message was
unmistakable: Cerezo's survival depended upon his
retaining the good will of the general who was
chosen by the army as Defense Minister.
A weak democracy works in the shadow of the
independent power of its military and its other
undemocratic economic and political competitors. In
Guatemala and in other weak democracies, votes are
counted every 4 or 5 years and the count is usually
fair. But there are policies that cannot be
seriously entertained, even if they would be
supported by a substantial majority of the
population. And there are parties that cannot be
allowed to compete fairly in the political process.
A United Nations mission report of October 31,
1995, described Guatemalan police and army death
squads directed both at common criminals and at
politicians, human rights activists, and public
prosecutors. It said between 10 and 12 bodies of
people who were shot with their hands tied behind
their backs were brought daily to Guatemala City's
morgue.
A coup by a powerful and independent military is
not always the principal threat in a weak democracy.
A new democracy may be weak because of
corruption or incompetence (they often go
together). The problem can be so pervasive that the
electorate is likely to choose an altogether
different form of government, hoping to find
efficiency and honesty. This electoral threat to
democracy is the one that has characterized Russia
and would threaten important nations in the Middle
East. What is common to both cases is the absence
of strong citizen support for a system of popularly
chosen leaders and policies.
The existence of weak democracies poses serious
problems for U.S. foreign policy. For very good
reasons, we want stable democracies enjoying
powerful internal support. They are far more likely
to be long-term friends. They will be more secure
and reliable economic and social partners. They can
enjoy continuous domestic support and not involve
us in painful compromises of our own ideals such as
those that have recently been investigated in the
CIA's relationship with the Guatemalan killers of
an American and the husband of an American. But we
also want the immediate benefits of cooperation
even with a weak and limited democracy,
particularly against enemies such as communism or
drug cartels. Too often, I think our tendency has
been to treat a very limited form of democracy as
if it were as valuable to us as the stronger
democracies of a South Africa or Costa Rica. Let me
pause long enough to give an example of United
States ambivalence on this score.
In Guatemala, the attorney general has a small
office, poorly funded and closely connected to the
President. Still, the office has the advantage of
not being tied to the military, a primary suspect
in much political violence. Why not build an
investigative capacity into the attorney general's
office itself and then create a tradition of
independence from both the police and the President
in enforcing the law? The United States Attorney
General enjoys this capacity and independence, and
I think it serves us very well. Moreover, the idea
seemed desirable to the Guatemalan investigative
judges, who have investigative responsibilities (as
is customary in countries whose legal system is not
based on the British common law) once the police
have brought a suspect to court or have filed a
report of a crime in court. Their reaction was not
surprising. After all, many matters were dangerous
to investigate and cases were almost never
successful.
Indeed, cases were dangerous to investigate. In
spring 1988, as we were exploring this idea with
Guatemalan prosecutors sent to Cambridge by their
attorney general, the chief of Guatemala's National
Police, Julio Caballeros, seemed to have solved the
case of a "death van," a white van that had been
cruising the streets of Guatemala City and
"disappearing" both politically active students and
drug dealers. He had ordered the seizure of a van
meeting the description of the death van, and it
proved to be full of police from a separate
organization, the Treasury Police, headed by a
close associate of President Cerezo.
In due course, Caballeros delivered to the courts--
particularly to Judge Trejo, an investigative judge
of extremely questionable reputation--a number of
suspects and a file that implicated their superiors
up to the head of the Treasury Police. There were
reports that Judge Trejo initially declined a bribe
offered by a military judge. Whatever his
motivations, his reward was to be kidnaped and,
during the time he was held, to receive an
unmistakable message. His good friend was, on the
same occasion, seized, tortured, and killed.
For the first time, I wrote to President Cerezo
insisting that he understand the importance of a
vigorous investigation of the kidnaping, noting the
message that a failure to protect judges would send
throughout the criminal justice system. There was
no action or response. A number of Treasury Police,
including its chief, had been ordered detained by
the temporary judge who replaced Judge Trejo during
his kidnaping. On his release, Judge Trejo was
reassigned to the case, and he quickly dismissed
the charges against all of the Treasury Police.
There was no investigation of the kidnaping, which
Judge Trejo insisted was unrelated to the case. Few
believed him. Under routine procedures the file has
always been kept secret.
It soon became clear that neither Attorney General
Polencia nor his successor, Attorney General
Cardenas, was anxious to assume the responsibility
for such cases. I could see why not. What was more
surprising to me was the reaction of some of the
leaders in the Department of State and USAID to my
concern about all this. I was invited to Washington
to a lecture by a highly respected senior foreign
service officer about what had to be accepted in
Central America. My hints that Harvard Law School
would not work in an atmosphere in which the
official perpetrators of terrible violence were
given impunity were, I was told, naive or out of
place. Later that year I received a far less
friendly letter from one of USAID's senior regional
administrators in Central America suggesting that I
would do very well to change my advisers and staff
to include those more familiar with the violent
customs and cynical ways of Central Americans. The
tone of the letter was superior; its level of
indifference and cynicism was stunning.
In the meantime Jim Michel, a dedicated ambassador
and the founder of the Administration of Justice
program, used every ounce of his influence to
support my futile efforts to bring the Guatemalan
attorney general into the process of investigating
the most notorious of crimes, including those of
political violence and corruption. All of his
influence was needed because USAID's regional
director was successfully mounting a campaign in
Washington to prevent any such disruptive step. In
the final analysis, Attorney General Polencia and
President Cerezo--to whom Ambassador Michel made
his case in the clearest terms--decided not to
build such independence into the system. But the
divisions within the U.S. Government as to goals
and means had already become very apparent.
Weak Law Enforcement and Strong Law Enforcement
I have argued that a deep and widespread loyalty to
democratic institutions is crucial to a strong,
stable, and lasting democracy. That loyalty depends
upon two conditions. The population has to believe
that democracy works decently well in carrying out
the tasks for which people must depend on from
government. Beyond this, the support for democracy
depends upon very large portions of the population
having some measure of political influence and a
feeling of equality before governmental
institutions. Thus, for example, loyalty to
democratic institutions in Northern Ireland was
undermined among the large Catholic minority by
their inability to influence crucial political
institutions when they disagreed with the
Protestant majority.
In emphasizing that loyalty to democratic
governments depends on a moderate level of
effectiveness in providing the services people
require from their governments and an adequate
measure of fairness in making decisions, I have
left out respect for human rights as a condition of
loyalty to democratic institutions. Perhaps it too
should be included, but populations are not tempted
to turn from democratic to authoritarian regimes in
the hope of achieving greater respect for human
rights, in the hope of ending brutality or
political repression.
Policing or, more broadly, the law enforcement
system has a crucial role in building and
maintaining the sense of effectiveness and fairness
on which loyalty to democratic institutions
depends. As a start, nothing is more important to
the citizens of a country than physical security.
When a democracy is unable to provide protection
against the predatory activities of other citizens,
the call for authoritarian alternatives grows. That
is much of the basis for the popularity of General
Rios Montt in Guatemala. It is much of the argument
for a return to more authoritarian regimes of the
right or left in Russia. Even in South Africa,
where democracy is blessed by widespread respect
and an extraordinary leader in Nelson Mandela, an
inability to control street crime was the number-
one issue in the recent municipal elections in a
South Africa that has been suffering 48 murders a
day. The consequences are felt in terms of the
economy as well as in terms of the fear of
citizens. A healthy economy does generate support
for democratic institutions, yet frightening crime
statistics drive foreign investors away from
Johannesburg as well as from the downtown areas of
many American cities. So the effectiveness of
everyday law enforcement matters greatly to the
strength of popular support for democracy.
Law enforcement also matters to democracy in terms
of the sense of equality on which loyalty to
democratic institutions also depends. A willingness
to pursue corruption and to examine, without undue
deference, the activities of the powerful and the
well connected is an attribute of a strong criminal
justice system that creates faith in democracy. By
an extraordinary and courageous course of
investigations leading from the Mafia to the
political corruption of prime ministers, Italian
law enforcement will create new faith in a
democratic system that, in the time of the Red
Brigades, many citizens hardly preferred to the
alternative offered by the terrorists and which was
the target of a nearly successful coup d'tat from
the right.
I could provide examples from Russia, Colombia, or
Africa but, as usual, events in Guatemala are more
vivid, open, and revealing. This time, drug-based
corruption is at the center of my story:
On August 1, 1989, someone gave an assistant
luggage carrier for Guatemala's airline, Aviateca,
a green suitcase and ordered him to place it on
Aviateca's flight to Miami, bypassing all security
channels. The assistant luggage carrier, Vasquez
Castillo, was stopped by two warehouse employees
who reported the incident to the narcotics airport
unit of the national police and to the army
intelligence officers stationed at the airport. The
green suitcase was opened; it contained 25 kilos of
cocaine.
Vasquez Castillo told the police that the suitcase
had been given to him by two men who identified
themselves as representatives of the government
organization "DECAP," an agency created to help
President Cerezo control problems of corruption
within his government. With more than 100
investigators and a larger budget than the attorney
general's office, DECAP reported directly to the
President. Its chief at the time was Lieutenant
Colonel Hugo Moran Carranza, reported to be a close
friend of the President. The luggage carrier,
Vasquez Castillo, had identified two employees of
DECAP, Rolando Moises Fuentes and Minera Naves, as
those who had given him the green suitcase.
In Guatemala, the only statements by a defendant
that can be used in a court are those taken by
judges, not the police. But the judges have no
training in taking statements and the interviews of
the two suspects the next day were poorly conducted
by a justice of the peace. Both simply denied their
guilt. Minera Naves produced the names of alibi
witnesses; alibi witnesses are very easy to come by
in Guatemala.
The Guatemalan justice of the peace is required to
send the investigative file promptly to an
investigative judge, who has only 15 days to
complete the investigation. The investigative judge
is supposed to perform many of the functions
performed by both the police and prosecutors in the
United States and to do it in a far shorter period
of time than we allot. That can be a dangerous job,
and the investigating judge did not proceed very
promptly against such dangerous suspects.
The judge questioned Vasquez Castillo again. This
time Castillo implicated his boss as well as a
representative of DECAP. Castillo was obviously
frightened. He thought that he might have been the
real target when a witness had been assassinated a
few days earlier. He said that he had been followed
by four men in a red pickup truck, an ominous sign
in Guatemala.
The investigating judge, Julio Rene Garcia, was
getting the point. He asked to be excused from the
case on the grounds that his wife was remotely
related to the luggage carrier's boss. He was
excused. There had in any event been widespread
rumors that Judge Garcia had received money to
sabotage the investigation and, shortly after
recusing himself from the case, Judge Garcia was
fired from the court system.
What is clear from many accounts is that the chief
of DECAP, Lieutenant Colonel Moran Carranza, had
spoken quite often with the judge and with those
members of the judge's staff who were handling the
case and that Moran had access to the case file so
that he would know exactly who was saying what, a
matter that frightened witnesses. One might wonder
where the prosecutor was all this time. The
prosecution was simply absent for the first 15 days
of the investigation, not an unusual absence in
cases that can be very dangerous.
The case was reassigned to a new judge with only 1
of the 15 permitted investigative days left. That
was not enough. The judge found that he did not
have enough evidence to continue detaining the two
DECAP employees, Minera Naves and Rolando Moises
Fuentes.
Under pressure from the United States, the case was
reopened. At his trial, Minera Naves, who had by
now threatened the brave female prosecutor and
investigating judge with death, defended himself on
the grounds that corruption was widespread in the
Cerezo regime. He alleged that the brother of the
Christian Democratic Party's presidential candidate
was involved in drug trafficking and that a witness
to his transactions had been murdered. He charged
that President Cerezo's brother had been involved
in corruption, selling passports when he was
director of immigration. He said the army, the
national police, and DECAP all knew about the
crimes that were committed but refused to
investigate and that Lieutenant Colonel Moran
Carranza, his boss at DECAP, had told him he was
under orders not to investigate such cases. These
charges were made in the new form of a public
hearing, causing an immense sensation. Minera Naves
and Rolando Moises Fuentes were acquitted.
The patent inability to get to the bottom of
charges of very serious corruption against those
very close to the President and the leadership of
his party, despite an extraordinary intervention of
the U.S. Ambassador, who publicly characterized one
of the defendants as a drug suspect, stood as a
reminder at the end of President Cerezo's
administration that the democratically elected
government could and would protect its own people,
that personal wealth was a central motivation of
many elected officials, and that corruption of
courts and intimidation of witnesses was sometimes,
perhaps often, part of the system of justice. For
many people and groups to support democracy
strongly enough to stand up against a military
coup, the administrations that are products of the
democratic process must be willing to pursue
allegations of corruption of the sort I have just
described. If they were, without pressure from the
United States Government, there would be far more
reason to believe in democracy.
A system that cannot effectively prosecute ordinary
street crimes is hardly a criminal justice system
at all. But a system that can prosecute only
ordinary street crimes and that cannot prosecute
crimes involving prominent or powerful people is a
weak system of criminal justice. A weak system that
does not deal with corruption or extortion of the
sorts that are rampant in Moscow, that cannot deal
with the wealthy and powerful (as was true until
recently in Colombia and in Italy), and that cannot
prevent systematic violence or intimidation by its
own security forces (as has been true at one time
or another within the last decade of South Africa,
Israel, Spain, and Northern Ireland) is an open
announcement that there is inequality in
fundamental political rights and a public
invitation to disloyalty toward the democratic
institutions of each of these countries. Every
country will sometimes have corruption, favoritism,
and efforts at intimidation. But a willingness to
cover these up by controlling and limiting the
activities of the crucial factfinding agencies in a
democracy--law enforcement authorities and
oversight committees--is a signal to large portions
of a population to hold on to their wallets, keep
their heads low, and withhold trust.
The Complicated Relationships Between Confidence
and Fairness in Law Enforcement
I have argued so far that a weak law enforcement
system--one that can handle only ordinary street
crime--leads to a weak democracy, one that must
operate without the spirited support of most of its
population. Even if you accept my argument,
however, a major tactical question remains: Is the
shortest path to a strong justice system in a
fragile democracy the slow building of competence
in the police and other law enforcement
institutions, or does it require a forceful stand
on issues of corruption, bias, political violence,
and intimidation? That question is of fundamental
importance for those trying to build democratic
institutions and strong justice systems.
When I first went to Guatemala, I wrote to the
Minister of the Interior, Juan Jose Rodil, saying
that the USAID/Harvard project should begin only if
there was a commitment to proceed against political
crimes as well as ordinary crimes. He argued
strongly against this approach, saying that the
first step was to build the ordinary capacity of
the police, the prosecutors, and the courts. When
they were capable and respected, perhaps in 10 or
15 years, somehow a capacity to investigate and try
violence and corruption from the highest and most
powerful levels would emerge.
This much of Rodil's argument is surely true. It is
hard to detect a coverup when it is buried in
massive incompetence. Thus, the political pressures
to deal equally with the well connected, the
powerful, and the wealthy are hard to bring to bear
when the reason for exoneration may simply be
general incompetence of the criminal justice
system. A system that is quite competent, such as
ours, often leaves an attempt at coverup exposed
and obvious, with the devastating political results
that we saw in Watergate. But aside from this
aspect of the politics of coverup, there is little
reason to believe that the strengthening of law
enforcement institutions will, in itself, lead to
an expansion of their jurisdiction into areas
uncomfortable for governmental leaders. The
Israelis would not investigate the murders of two
terrorists who had seized a bus in the Negev
desert. The British would not investigate the
killings of IRA activists in Gibraltar and closed
down an investigation by a distinguished police
commissioner in Northern Ireland. For decades, the
Spanish hid from their courts governmental
involvement with "GAL" and its assassinations of
Basque terrorists.
Beyond that, it is difficult to develop a truly
competent system in the way that Juan Jose Rodil
was urging: by beginning with common crimes and
steering clear of the crimes of the powerful. Bias
corrodes respect for the police, and without
respect, the police are denied the public
assistance they need even to deal with ordinary
crime. We are paying that price in our central
cities from the Bronx in New York to the South
Central District in Los Angeles. It is a price
likely to be exacted far more severely in the
former Communist states and in Latin America.
The issue has always been a difficult one for the
United States as it offers assistance to other
governments. I can only tell you my own
conclusions. I think it is worth taking the
political risks of investing in a strong criminal
justice system that is willing to and capable of
investigating the powerful and influential. A
strong criminal justice system plays a major role
in developing a strong democracy, and our national
interests are much better served by a strong
democracy than by a weak one. I think the chance of
developing a strong criminal justice system by
slowly building competent institutions without
pressing for their equal application to the
powerful as well as the weak is small--based either
on extreme optimism or on deep cynicism.
With the encouragement of President Bush' s friend,
Ambassador to Guatemala Thomas Strook, I ended the
USAID/Harvard project when there was no apparent
effort to investigate the disappearance of 12
university students 6 years ago in Guatemala City.
I visited the Minister of Interior, the Minister of
Defense, and the President, accompanied by Embassy
officials, and explained that we would not take
part in the creation of a system of criminal
justice that was designed to be weak and not to
reach the powerful and influential. This created an
immense stir in Guatemala, magnified by the strong
statements of a strong ambassador. I think we did
what was necessary. Incremental institution-
building efforts over the last 6 years have left a
system that the United Nations describes as
incapable of protecting even its own prosecutors
and judges, let alone the ordinary Guatemalan.
What Can the United States Do to Help?
It is simplest to begin with a reminder of the
tasks that have to be performed by any criminal
justice system. We all know that there is a very
substantial variety of systems, but the central
tasks are common and, to accomplish them, each of
the systems uses some combination of police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and juries.
The common functions are as follows. The system
must become aware that a crime may have been
committed. Then a decision has to be made whether
the matter is worth investigating. Then there must
be an investigation. Then a decision has to be made
whether the matter warrants a trial. Then someone
must present evidence to the factfinder. There must
be a process for testing the validity of that
evidence, providing contradictory evidence, and
developing alternative explanations of what it all
means. Someone must decide on guilt or innocence
and the consequences if the finding is guilt. Very
generally there is an appeal.
To describe these functions as common from Thailand
to Guatemala to Tanzania is not to deny some
immensely important variations in how they are
carried out. In much of Latin America there has
been no or very little prosecutorial role until the
last few years; and the evidence has been read, not
heard, by the factfinder. There is hardly a defense
function for the great majority of cases in South
Africa and in much of Latin America. The prosecutor
is remarkably powerful in Japan and was in the
Soviet Union; the judicial function is
proportionately diminished. Still, with all this
variation, it is important to remember the set of
functions that are widely recognized as essential
parts of the process of convicting the guilty,
protecting the innocent, and doing this with
decency and credibility.
Why Criminal Justice Systems Fail
It is tempting, but a mistake, to look only at the
discrete functions that a criminal justice system
must perform and conclude that fixing each of them,
one at a time, will solve the problem (i.e.,
produce a system that convicts an adequate number
of the guilty, assures that the innocent are not
convicted, and does this without treating citizens
indecently or unfairly as part of the process).
Criminal justice systems fail for a number of
reasons; weaknesses of design are only one of them.
Let me review the major possibilities.
A comparison to four possible sources of
malfunctioning of a clock may provide a useful
mnemonic device. If the clock doesn't work, (1)
there may be something wrong with the system of
gears; (2) it may lack the resources--battery or
winding--to make it go; (3) someone may be
tampering with it; or (4) someone may have put it
under water or in some other environment where it
is not designed to work. Now consider the four with
regard to a criminal justice system.
First, something may be wrong with the system; the
procedures may be so badly flawed that they can
hardly work. Let me give two examples from
Guatemala. For some labor-intensive investigative
tasks, police are essential everywhere in the
world. Calling individuals before a prosecutor,
grand jury, or judge is simply not an adequate
substitute, in part because it is too cumbersome a
way to identify potential witnesses. Guatemala does
not use police in this important way, and the
possibility of finding the truth suffers because of
it.
Consider another example. The factfinder in
Guatemala must decide on the basis of reports
written by staff working for an investigative
judge. The staff do not generally probe witnesses
or seek additional evidence that would confirm or
rebut the statements of witnesses. As a result, the
factfinding judge is regularly left with a record
that involves several witnesses implicating the
defendant, several alibi witnesses stating that the
defendant was elsewhere at the time, and no way to
resolve the dispute. Worse, if some of the
witnesses worked for the victim or are related to
him, the trial judge is directed by statute to
wholly or substantially disregard their testimony.
Thus, either the normal burden of proof or the
results of special evidentiary rules make it very
unlikely that anyone will be convicted.
Second, like an unwound clock, even if the system
is sensibly designed, the processes necessary for
finding the facts and convicting the guilty may
regularly fail because of inadequate resources.
Some forms of this are obvious. Having too few
police or prosecutors or judges or, most often,
defense attorneys, is a common problem in countries
pressed by tight budgets. Similarly, the
facilities, equipment, and support staff are in
general shockingly inadequate. All this is
compounded where the civil law tradition purports
to require police investigation and then
prosecution and adjudication of every factually
provable criminal act without any discretionary
sorting in terms of the importance of the matter.
Another inadequate resource is intangible and
therefore less apparent although equally important.
Contempt for the police in many Latin American
countries prevents the cooperation of victims,
neighbors, and other witnesses--cooperation that is
essential in every country for the detection and
investigation of most crimes. The low status of
judges and prosecutors, reinforced by low salaries
and excessive workloads, discourages cooperation at
a later stage. It is a Herculean task to change
citizen attitudes toward police who, in a country
like Guatemala, must often buy their offices for a
sum that can only be recaptured by corruption. It
is just as difficult to change attitudes toward
judges and prosecutors in a country like Russia
when they are part of a structure whose
independence has long been suspect.
Often low status cannot be made to rise without
wholesale firings and new levels of salary. (A
distinguished member of the establishment in
Guatemala told me that the poorest and least well-
connected law students in the state university
divide their time between careers as taxi drivers
and as judges.) Just as a beginning, the task of
changing public attitudes toward police,
prosecutors, and judges requires overcoming the
sense of hopelessness, helplessness, and disrepute
that pervades lower bureaucratic levels in many
countries and makes indifference and corruption
seem sensible responses to the situation.
Before turning to the last two reasons why systems
fail, I should note that there are always two
plausible and competing explanations of the deeper
causes of the first two reasons for failure.
Foolish design and tragically inadequate resources,
including lack of credibility with the public, may
be the undesired results of societal poverty,
disorganization, and despair. Alternatively, they
may be what powerful individuals want.
That no more money and attention is dedicated to
building the resources of the criminal justice
system does reflect comfort with its irrelevance in
the minds of many, some of whom enjoy the
protection and the freedom from the constraints of
law that come with control of private security
forces in Latin America. That the system does not
seem to be designed to bring out the truth is often
a planned or accepted result of the fear of lawyers
and judges that it can be turned against the
innocent by a hostile government, a fear that is
expressed in a set of systems that weaken the least
dangerous branch at the same time as they preserve
its purity against misuse.
Like a clock that has been tampered with, a third
reason criminal justice systems fail is because
they are vulnerable to abuse by wealthy, powerful,
influential, or simply ruthless parties.
Intimidation of witnesses is a serious problem in
the United States but a far greater one in Latin
America, South Africa, and Russia. Intimidation of
prosecutors and judges is rare in the United
States. A former Minister of Justice was killed on
the streets of Bogota while I was working in
Colombia. A judge, who had announced that he had a
powerful case for murder committed by senior
leaders of a branch of the security forces in
Guatemala, was kidnaped while we were working in
Guatemala.
Corruption is more genteel than intimidation. It is
also harder to substantiate, but it is believed to
be widespread in the justice systems of many of the
countries I have been discussing. One of the judges
with whom we worked most closely in Guatemala was
relieved from his position for demanding bribes;
major drug dealers were believed to have paid to
shape the new rules of criminal procedure in
Colombia; corruption is endemic in the new Russia.
Above all, there is a continuous entanglement of
influential political supporters with the careers
of judges in places such as Guatemala. President
Cerezo's pleasure in the dismissal of a criminal
case against a relative was fervently, and perhaps
practically, conveyed to one of the judges working
with us in Guatemala. It took the form of later
help in obtaining credit for a business investment.
The result of all this is that the wealthy, the
powerful, and the influential are rarely tried in
Latin America. Fear and greed shape or eliminate
witness testimony throughout the developing world,
in Russia, and in South Africa, too. Beyond being
morally repulsive, the too obvious failure of the
rule of law undermines public acceptance of even
that part of the criminal process that could
operate by enforcing the law against those who lack
the power, wealth, or status for impunity.
Fourth, a clock can't run under water.
Correspondingly, last in my list of major reasons
that criminal justice systems fail are the special
and often overwhelming problems of severely divided
societies. A segment of the society may be in a
state of rebellion against the central government.
That was the situation in Guatemala when we were
there. It was also true in Colombia. War is a
solvent of both justice and truth. Warriors don't
care much about either. I met with murderous
colonels in the embattled highlands of Guatemala
who asked, in bewildered tones, what I thought they
should do with people they suspected of being
supportive of guerrillas other than kill them. My
answer, to try them in court, seemed incredibly
naive to them.
Even when there is not guerrilla warfare or other
open and armed rebellion, a criminal justice system
cannot easily deal with extreme and violent
hostility by a proud group against the government.
It doesn't work in Belfast or Kwa-Zulu. For a group
member to furnish information or evidence of even
common crimes becomes unpatriotic and very
dangerous, and without that citizen cooperation, the
system either collapses or becomes brutal and lawless.
These are, I believe, laws of nature.
How Can the United States Help Build a Stronger and
Fairer Criminal Justice System in a Foreign
Country?
Our experience suggests that representatives of
other countries can help build a criminal justice
system in four ways. Broadly they can:
o Provide financing for needed human and material
resources.
o Provide technical advice.
o Provide hope and energy to a system that is
despairing and immobile.
o Bring international and domestic pressure to bear
on local elected leaders and, where necessary,
leaders of the military.
The first hardly requires elaboration. Evidence in
Guatemala was recorded by interviewers who
simultaneously typed, in five copies with carbon
paper, on old mechanical typewriters. The third,
fourth, and fifth copies were rarely legible
although they played an important role in the
processes. The interviewers were so busy typing
that they never observed the defendant or witness
answering the question and rarely followed up with
probing questions. The typed reports were bound
with ribbons and stored in old file cabinets. All
this was done in an open bullpen that looked like a
movie version of a police detective squad room. No
witness enjoyed privacy as she told what had
happened. Tape recorders, word processors or at
least electric typewriters, photocopy machines, and
space dividers can and do make a substantial
difference.
But resources make a real difference only if their
provision is part of a broader plan carefully
monitored and encouraged along the way. I am afraid
that is rarely true. We furnished Polaroid cameras
so that justices of the peace could photograph
crime scenes but later found them stored, along
with video recorders, in a closet, thankfully not
yet stolen. Similarly, we worked on simple forms as
an investigative checklist to be used by officials
asking questions in particular cases, such as
homicides. When we asked later why the forms did
not seem to be used, the answer was that no one had
arranged for reprinting or photocopying them.
These stories are perhaps a good introduction to
the second gap that foreigners can fill. In
Guatemala, Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Russia
and South Africa, assistance provided the momentum
of hope, energy, and American impatience. The slow
pace of events in Guatemala was a constant
frustration to the Americans and a source of
friction with our judicial, prosecutorial, or
police associates in Guatemala. But our very
presence gave impetus to what had been immobile for
very long. Our expectations that something would
change proved infectious; nothing in the experience
of the Guatemalans gave them reason to believe that
anything would change. Sharing in our hopes and
excitement became an adrenaline-based reward for
people who had long since stopped caring about
their work.
There is a serious problem here, one that I should
not ignore. When we departed, we left behind all
the blueprints for a continuation of a process of
step-by-step building of new courts with new
procedures. But our departure, motivated by the
desire to repudiate the indifference of the
government to the killings of students, drained the
energy of the people working in institutions we had
been helping to create and let hopelessness creep
back in. Without our energy, the work hardly
survived except as a memory of a short period of
hope and innovation.
Third, the international assistance brings with it
a certain amount of political muscle. Every nation
that is at least partially democratic cares about
what its public thinks. Every nation relying on
international good will cares about its
international reputation. Those bringing assistance
from influential nations or international bodies
bring with them a certain amount of political
influence traceable to both of these forces.
When we objected to the militarization of patrols
in a rural area of Guatemala in which we were
working, the Minister of Defense arranged for the
withdrawal of the military component of those
patrols. When we objected to the appointment of a
military intelligence officer to a particularly
sensitive position in the police, the appointment
was withdrawn despite considerable embarrassment to
the chief of police. When we needed meetings at a
high, medium, or low level with the officials with
whom we were dealing, they would occur. Thus, we
could bring a degree of political support to a plan
worked out with the criminal justice officials of
Guatemala that they could not muster on their own.
It was that political support, domestic and
international, that I decided to expend, in one
burst, when 12 students were "disappeared" in late
1989. I demanded a serious investigation and
threatened and then delivered a quite substantial
outcry in Guatemala and in the United States when
no serious investigation took place.
I have left until last the most interesting matter.
From what source can outsiders also provide insight
toward the solution of problems that the local
officials have lived with much longer and
understand much better (assuming, as I trust we all
do, that it makes no sense to try to transfer
American, British, French, or German institutions
wholesale to a country whose politics, culture, and
economics are very different)? What do we have to
offer in the way of advice? I think there are two
different answers, one bearing particularly on
diagnosis, the other on prescription. I have
included these in the appendix to this presentation
for those who are interested.
Conclusion
It is time to draw to a close this description of
the perils and prospects of undertaking law reform
in another country, particularly in countries where
democracy is new, flawed, or embattled. I have not
spoken of the gratification in the process: the
thrill of exaggerated hopes, the friendships
formed, and the sense of a shared enterprise that
is not entirely safe. They are all there. My
colleagues and I have enjoyed the process almost
everywhere.
I have described why the effort is important, what
ways the "clock" of the criminal justice process
can be broken, the ways in which outsiders can
help, and how it all depends upon politics as well.
Still, at the end, I have a feeling that I have
described something too difficult for frequent
success, too subtle for most government work, too
frustrating for a long-term national commitment. I
hope that is not the message that I left you with.
There are wonderful successes. We brought oral
trials to Guatemala, and the enthusiasm of the
public at seeing justice done produced an
irreversible effect. We helped the Russians plan
jury trials. In that country, where tradition
precludes trust in judges, jury trial has a
powerful claim. We wrote the police practices for
managing demonstrations in South Africa and
brought to an end a source of unnecessary but regular
killings and resulting deep resentment.
Assisting criminal justice systems abroad is a task
requiring thoughtfulness, openmindedness, patience,
and commitment. Often the effort fails, and to a
large extent our effort in Guatemala did. But the
rewards when you succeed are immense. It is an
effort well worth our government undertaking, well
worth the participation of anyone who cares about
justice and democracy.
Appendix: Providing Advice Across Law Enforcement
Cultures
There are many ways to perform the functions of a
criminal justice system and a number of agencies a
state can use in differing ways. What are constant
are the functions that must be performed and the
obstacles that must be overcome. The role of the
U.S. adviser is to force a very American focus on
the functions and problems. Then it is up to the
officials seeking advice to design who should do
what to satisfy the need in a way consistent with
local history, fears, capacities, and beliefs about
institutions.
Diagnosis
At the level of diagnosis I believe that we do have
some knowledge that is robust enough to be of value
in very different settings. It simply has to work
at a higher level of generality than we, as
lawyers, are usually accustomed to. It does no good
to urge--as some in the U.S. Government did--that
Colombia would be better off with prosecutors,
especially if they were attached to the executive
branch rather than the judicial branch. Prosecutors
mean too many different things in too many
countries, and the nature of interbranch relations
is also too contingent for our notions of
separation of powers to be useful here. But at a
more functional level, we can talk about what
prosecutors do in different systems, see if those
functions are being adequately performed in the
criminal justice system seeking advice, and ask
whether a prosecution office in a particular
country can be made to operate like those in other
nations where they are effective.
To understand what I mean about the robustness of
such knowledge, consider some of the things we know
about one very important responsibility of criminal
justice systems: solving at least those crimes for
which there are witnesses. Start with a functional
description of what a working criminal justice
system requires to find the facts. The description
is, I believe, very generally true of criminal
justice systems whether in North America, South
America, Europe, Africa, or Asia.
No system can get far at solving crimes and then
providing the beneficial effects of conviction and
punishment unless it knows that the crime has taken
place. For some crimes, such as crimes of
corruption, there is no obvious complainant who
will know of the facts. These crimes are unlike
assaults, robberies, and burglaries in this regard.
But we set ourselves the task of helping with
violent crimes and these have victims or, in the
case of homicide, the families of victims who can
complain.
Even if the police, the prosecutors, or the courts
are aware of a crime having been committed, it is
relatively difficult for them to solve the crime
unless the victim or other witnesses are able to
identify one or a few suspects by observation at
the time of the crime, by providing information as
to possible motivations, or perhaps in some other
way. There is simply no efficient way for the
police to check what hundreds of people may have
been doing at the time of the crime or even to
compare the fingerprints of everyone in a
neighborhood with one fingerprint found at the
scene of the crime. The police cannot search 100
homes or interrogate 100 individuals hoping for a
confession. All this is too costly in any but the
rarest of cases--costly both in terms of police
resources and also in terms of the public outrage
it would engender.
Thus, there are crucial functions that have to be
performed by victims and other witnesses in solving
crimes. Maintaining their belief in the usefulness
of providing information, appearing in court, and
subjecting themselves to whatever that involves is
the most important single requirement of any
criminal justice system. It is a mistake to think
that physical evidence, of the sort Sherlock Holmes
used, can compensate. If the police have found
fingerprints, hair, and blood at the scene of a
murder, they may be able to compare them to those
of particular suspects with devastating effect, but
only if the victim or other witnesses have already
identified the particular suspects. So trust in the
police and in the efficacy of the criminal justice
system is essential for investigative success.
In every system, because of the centrality of live
witnesses, intimidation of victims and witnesses
becomes an important possible move for violent
defendants. Preventing intimidation is a
sophisticated business. It requires finding ways to
use the information from witnesses without letting
the source be known, obtaining the information
before the threat is made, or making a difficult-
to-accomplish effort at protection. It also
involves making the prosecution of efforts at
intimidation a serious objective of the police,
prosecutors, and courts.
I have so far been talking about what it takes to
"solve" a crime; i.e., to determine who did it to
the satisfaction of the police. Conviction takes
more in every modern system. What I have said so
far indicates that detective squads (often called
"judicial police" in civil law systems) are not
going to "solve" many violent crimes. They are
essential, however, for turning the knowledge of
who committed the crime into evidence and rebutting
the alibi of the defendant. This followup
investigation, at the request of a prosecutor or
investigative magistrate, is often essential to
conviction if the system truly imposes a strong
burden of proof on the government. In its absence,
one is likely to be left, as in Guatemala, with
inadequate evidence to counter even a weak alibi.
Even if there is an effective use of the police for
these purposes in preparation for trial, the system
must involve some effective means for choosing
among the competing stories of defense witnesses
and prosecution witnesses. In Latin America, there
has long been a reliance on rules that are intended
to separate the more credible from the less
credible witnesses by evidence of bias or
inconsistency that is apparent from the written
record alone. They cannot and do not work. In the
United States, we rely primarily upon cross-
examination and the factfinder's observation of
demeanor (the appearance of the witness as she
testifies) and, to a lesser extent, on the effect
of an oath and the threat of prosecution for lying.
The defendant himself is an important source of
evidence in most countries, even though a number of
criminal justice systems around the world deny or
limit the effect of a confession given by the
defendant while in police custody. In the United
States, where we have sharply limited the capacity
of the police to force a confession, many cases are
still solved by confessions that result from the
desire of the defendant to talk his way out of
custody or future trial. And we use deals made with
the defendant or his associates as a way of
exchanging less punishment than the crime would
otherwise warrant for either a guilty plea or
testimony against a colleague. European systems
provide a substitute by enabling judges on the
court to question the defendant and others, and
giving judges or lay factfinders the freedom to
draw conclusions from the defendant's relatively
infrequent failure to respond.
Every system must also have some way of sorting the
cases that deserve more attention from those that
deserve less. In the United States, one of our uses
of plea bargaining is to dispose of relatively
unimportant cases. France, Germany, Italy, and
Russia each have their own systems to accomplish
this, which differ sharply from ours and from each
other. The point is simply that the problem of
focusing attention on the more important crimes is
essential in almost every system.
If I now compare this list of very general
requirements with how the Guatemalan, or Colombian,
or South African, or Russian criminal justice
system works, I can identify crucial weaknesses. To
take a clear example, Guatemala's system failed to
sufficiently encourage the cooperation of victims
or other witnesses, exaggerated the potential for
using physical evidence, ignored a massive problem
of intimidation, regarded the police as almost
irrelevant to investigation, lacked a way for
factfinders to choose between competing prosecution
and defense stories, failed to make use of a
defendant's knowledge, and lacked a system for
disposing of the less important cases so as to
leave time for the more important. A set of quite
robust judgments about the processes of factfinding
allows a diagnosis of the nature of the problem.
Prescription
Prescription is another matter. A comparative
perspective provides a number of alternatives that
may not have been considered. But it does not deal
with the immense importance of the political,
social, ideological, and economic context of any
legal structure or procedure nor does it deal with
the relationship of the particular alternative
being proposed to other parts of the very same
criminal justice system. How then can outsiders be
of help at the level of prescription?
In the realm of prescription, what works best is a
fairly patient dialogue. The foreign consultant
brings to the dialogue two things: a sense of the
relatively robust requirements for getting
important parts of the job done and a list of
alternative ways these requirements are met in
different systems. Local practitioners bring to the
conversation crucial information about what
functions are not being performed adequately now
and some knowledge of what, in their society, is
the likelihood--and what would be the consequences-
-of adopting one or another of the alternatives
suggested. Out of the discussion can come a joint
understanding of what are the real gaps in the
present system and what alternatives are promising
and not dangerous.
The idea of a dialogue is so central that I should
illustrate. A Guatemalan judge might complain that
there is no way for her to resolve the conflicting
stories, reduced to writing, of the victim and the
defendant. One of our team might then ask, "Can you
not get additional witnesses?" The Guatemalan would
respond, "We already called those witnesses
suggested by the victim or the arresting officer
who responded to the event." We would say, "Why
don't you use the police to look for additional
witnesses, as more criminal justice systems do?"
The answer might be, "We don't trust the police--
for these reasons . . ."
Now the possible solutions are narrowed and
informed. Could we not create a special
investigative unit that could be trusted, or have
the investigation carried out under the supervision
of the otherwise idle prosecutors, or ask witnesses
specifically whether they have been told what to
say by the police or by one of the parties?
Alternatively, can we realistically hope to change
the police? The resulting prescription, whatever it
is, is attributable to both parties and is far
better imagined and better assessed because it is
the product of an informed dialogue.
We used much the same process, during 3 straight
weeks of meetings, to review with Russian draftsmen
their proposed new substantive code of criminal
procedure. The system works in much the same way;
dialogue is again central. I remember our
discussing the peculiar and very vague crime of
"hooliganism." I said, "Why not eliminate that
crime completely because it is so subject to
abuse?" The Russians responded with a set of
specific problems, deeply embedded in Russian
society, that the crime was believed essential for
addressing.
Again, as a result of the dialogue, the stage is
now set. Other countries, I said, address those
problems by A, B, or C. The Russians responded that
B would not work and that A would not be
acceptable. C, on the other hand, might be possible
and would only involve an amendment of the
hooliganism statute.
Let me give a final example that combines the role
of diagnosis and prescription in what I think is an
especially revealing way. Intimidation of judges is
obviously a particularly serious problem in
Colombia. Pablo Escobar alone was responsible for
several judges' deaths. Colombia's response, like
that of Peru in its trial of Abimael Guzman, has
been to maintain the anonymity of judges. The
danger is even greater, far greater, for witnesses.
Here, too, Colombia uses anonymity as a protection
by allowing witnesses who testify to be identified
only by a fingerprint.
Consider the more troublesome practice: the use of
anonymous witnesses. Two problems spring to mind.
Such witnesses cannot easily be questioned by or
before a skeptical factfinder, leaving the
possibility of police concoction of crucial
evidence in a situation where the police and major
drug dealers are in a state of near war. Colombia
addresses that by having questioning done by judges
through one-way mirrors and with voice distorters.
Still, that leaves the problem of biases that would
be known only to the defendant and only if he knew
who the witness was. For this there is no present
answer under the Colombian system.
Can our experience help? Intimidation of witnesses
is also a serious problem in the United States. The
most important device we have for handling
intimidation is the ability to use informants as
the basis for gathering other evidence from sources
not so easily harmed or intimidated. We can promise
an informant secrecy and obtain a search warrant or
a wiretap. We can try to place an undercover
operative in the organization. In each of these
cases, the ultimate witness is a police officer and
not the endangered and frightened citizen. Beyond
that, we induce the necessary cooperation from
frightened witnesses by plea bargaining as well as
by the use of a grand jury with the capacity to
offer immunity.
All these alternatives--as well as those used by
the British in Northern Ireland, the French, and
the Italians--come to mind as soon as the
underlying problem is carefully diagnosed. The
Colombians may object that some of the
alternatives, such as the use of undercover agents,
require too great a departure from their legal
tradition. Some, they may think, are more dangerous
than the use of anonymous witnesses at trial in the
different context of Colombian society. But the
discussion can explore the possibilities fully and
in an informed way.
A Final Word About Institutions
I have emphasized the importance of diagnosing at a
functional level rather than at a level of
institutions or even procedures. Still, in
considering alternatives (prescriptions), the
relatively enduring characteristics and reputations
of broader institutions are also relevant. South
Africa has a strong judiciary, a relatively
bureaucratic prosecution, a weak public defense,
and a police force deeply distrusted by much of the
black population and for good reason. Expanding the
control of the police by the judiciary may thus be
helpful. Russia has a weak judiciary, a strong
prosecution, a traditionally weak defense, and a
police that has only recently lost a reputation for
frightening ruthlessness. Building a strong and
independent judiciary as a crucial ingredient of
public trust will take time, but in the meantime
jury trials can create trust in factfinding where
there was none. Guatemala has a weak judiciary, an
almost negligible prosecution, an ineffective
defense, and a hardly competent but brutal police.
You have to start there on a very broad front.
This information about the capacity and credibility
of institutions tells you something about what
there is to build upon, what must be constrained,
what should not be granted greater powers, and what
is not operating at its full potential. Expanding
prosecutorial responsibility for the police might
be wise in South Africa. In Russia, where the
prosecution has been dominant for too long, nothing
is more important than building the strength of
judicial institutions. Colombia and Guatemala could
both benefit from a stronger defense, but only if
the prosecution is built up first. This type of
judgment is also important.
-----------------------------------
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: AMERICAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING
IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
by Raymond W. Kelly
Thanks to reformers such as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the police in this country are, by and
large, an apolitical group, beholden to no
politicians, selected through civil service
examinations, and independent of abusive State or
Federal authorities. Unlike many other places
around the world, here the police are not called
upon to prop up or defend the state. They make it
almost impossible to libel a public official in the
United States; and unlike Great Britain, they make
it very difficult for the state to keep an official
secret. Police in America don't arrest people who
speak against the state. That is an obvious and
important distinction to be made between law
enforcement here and in many areas of the world.
Growing out of our revolutionary experience, we are
still suspicious of a standing police authority at
the national level. Something also persists from
our experience in the American civil rights
movement. Police in America have come to
accommodate even the timing and manner of arrest
used on people engaged in civil disobedience. They
have shown that accommodation frequently here in
Washington during the protest campaign to end the
apartheid government in South Africa. Civil
disobedience has become a tool of dissent,
recognized both by citizens and law enforcement of
the United States.
There is yet another distinction about the police
in a democratic society. Nowhere is free speech as
vigorously protected as it is in the United States.
The police in America, as an institution, recognize
how important free speech is to the American
people, who will sacrifice a great deal to ensure
it. So when the police in America engage in
brutality, partisanship, or oppression, it is big
news indeed. In some foreign countries the police
are expected to engage in brutality, partisanship,
and oppression. That is their job. In Haiti, we
once asked, hypothetically, how the police might
handle a large crowd assembled in front of the
police headquarters. One of the interim Haitian
officers raised his hand and said, "Beat them?" He
thought he had the right answer, and under the old
regime it would have been. Several years ago, one
of Haiti's politicians had taken the risk of making
an antiregime speech in front of police
headquarters. A plainclothes officer came outside
and shot him in the head in front of civilian
witnesses.
Certainly, people in this room know that in America
we have our own problems with corruption and
excessive use of force among the police, but these
never reach the level of impunity practiced in
Haiti under the old regime or practiced among
dictatorships around the world. American police
problems pale by comparison with those of emerging
democracies. For one thing, we recognize corruption
and brutality as problems that need to be
corrected, not as qualities in the leadership to be
accepted.
I got a sense in Haiti that the police waited in
station houses, playing dominoes, until they
received orders from higher up to go out and do
harm. There was no tradition of public service that
one could associate with the police. Police
officers were assigned to traffic duty, but little
else was done to accommodate the public. There was
no attempt to combat corruption. The police were
not expected to conduct thorough investigations of
accidents. We learned this early on from a bus
accident in which five people were killed and no
regular police responded with an investigation.
Police did not respond, they did not remove the
injured to hospitals, they did not remove the dead,
nor were they of much assistance. Good samaritans
in the town where the accident happened took it
upon themselves to bury the unknown victims on the
spot. This was deemed a public service in light of
the hot weather.
Preparing for an invasion of Haiti, the planners
envisioned having a separate police monitoring
force. This was a good idea for two reasons. First,
Haiti's police were notoriously bad and
indistinguishable from the Haitian military. If the
U.S.-led invasion was to take out the Haitian army,
it made little sense to leave the police in place.
Secondly, the American planners recognized that it
was best to have police interacting with police
rather than with the soldiers. Instead of having
only soldiers act as police, we had police from 20
different countries interact as monitors with the
Haitian police. It was a simple idea that turned
out to be brilliant. We have the Department of
State's Bob Gelbard to thank for putting it
together. Bob brought professional and highly
motivated police from about 20 countries together
with about 300 translators. The total package of
about 1,300 international police and personnel
constituted a monitoring force. Bob also thought
about simple things like recognizing that French is
not the same as Creole. He supplied enough Creole-
speaking interpreters to accompany every patrol in
Haiti. They gave a lot of themselves. I have spent
a career in law enforcement, and I was very
impressed with the caliber of the police monitors
from countries as diverse as Belgium, Benin,
Australia, and the Philippines. Each country had
made it a point to try to send the very best. As a
result, we had a professional, disciplined,
experienced police force monitoring the Haitian
police. Our job in Haiti was frequently complex.
First, we had to stop human rights abuses by the
Haitian police. Second, we had to monitor the
retraining of the remaining force. Third, we had to
pave the way for the U.S. Department of Justice to
set up a program to train new people.
The first part was relatively easy. In our
monitoring of human rights, the Haitian police were
afraid of us, afraid for their future, and afraid
of the public. While Haitian police were agreeable
to stopping human rights violations, they were not
particularly enthusiastic about functioning in our
new matrix until a new force was in place. Given
Haiti's total lack of experience with police as
most democracies would know it, we should not be
surprised that the international police monitors'
experience and conditions were so harsh. The life-
threatening situations were many, especially in the
first few months of our operation. Very often this
involved stopping mobs from exacting street justice
on each other or common criminals. Sometimes a
political rationale would be used to settle a
personal score.
The monitors were also directly engaged in public
services commonly associated with the United States
and not with Haiti. Such services included, for
example, responding to the bus accident that I
described earlier and disaster relief in the case
of a hurricane that struck while we were there.
Very often, police monitors put injured persons and
corpses into their own vehicles to get them to
hospitals and to provide for the dignified removal
of the dead. This is the kind of service we would
normally expect of law enforcement, but one thing
the Haitian police did not have was a tradition of
public service. They also simply lacked the
vehicles. In my judgment, it was important for the
monitors to be fully engaged proactively. To do
otherwise would have undermined our credibility and
clashed with a professional police attitude that
encouraged them to act with a sense of duty in a
required fashion. To put this much in action, the
Haitians needed new vehicles, along with
instructions to control the restructuring of their
profession.
Initially, it was the tendency of the foreign
police monitor to sit in the front seat of the
vehicle while the Haitian officer and the
interpreter would sit in the back. In a two-door
vehicle, this meant that the police monitor would
be the first out of the vehicle. This arrangement
reinforced the Haitian officers' tendency to hang
back and let the monitor do most of work. Soon we
insisted that the Haitian officer sit in the front.
That meant that he would be the first out of the
car and the first to engage. It seemed a simple
idea and came initially from the Australian
monitors, but it was an important mentoring tool.
The U.S. Army, U.S. State Department, and
supporting contractors established our own
communications network that we maintained with the
commanding and operations officers of each foreign
contingent, who met twice a day to address
deployment issues and strategy. Unlike the United
Nations, which would integrate each of the teams of
police from various countries, we kept individual
contingents--in fact, separate factions--and
assigned them to different regions. For example,
the Bolivians patrolled a border town where there
was a high concentration of Spanish speakers among
the population. We assigned the Israeli contingent
to a particular area of Port-au-Prince. All the
Jordanians were assigned to the opposite side of
the town. Each contingent brought its own strategy.
In addition, the international makeup had the
advantage of conveying to the Haitians that this
was not simply an American operation. I think that
idea was better conveyed by the fact that the
national groups were deployed in force in a
particular area.
All of the contingents shared democratic values,
but it was necessary to articulate the importance
of democracy. There are only so many interpreters
who can translate Arabic to Creole. Deploying the
foreign contingents in discrete units was, I
believe, essential to the integrity of our command
structure and better for morale. The police
monitors were better organized and more confident
with issues. We deployed some contingents within 24
hours of their arrival in Port-au-Prince. Again,
the foreign contingents had a level of
professionalism that could be expected in a large
American police department. For example, the
Bolivians engaged the Haitian police in a complex
narcotics investigation and even organized a sting
in which Haitian police arrested a corrupt Haitian
police supervisor, definitely a first in Haiti. The
Israelis were experts in community relations and
quickly made the public feel welcome, encouraging
requests for police services. The Belgians could
organize a local population to meet immediate
needs. In one of the few shooting incidents, we had
a Haitian government police doctor treating a
Haitian suspect wounded by an American police
officer. Under the old regime the suspect would
have been allowed to die with no questions asked.
Treating him on the spot was a practical
application of democratic values.
The jails were another matter entirely. They were
medieval and presented us with a problem. After
insisting on the humane, professional treatment of
suspects, we would have to turn them over to
prisons that were overcrowded, unsanitary, and
dysfunctional. We had to deal with many issues like
making sure that the prisoners were fed. We also
investigated reports that people were held without
seeing judges or that those who were incarcerated
prior to our arrival had no record of why they were
being held and for how long. With these issues, the
problem of Haiti's corrupt judiciary surfaced. This
became the focus of a long investigation.
We quickly learned that police monitoring is
inevitably linked to prison and judicial reform.
A prison cannot be reformed without a drastic
change in the judiciary. If a corrupt judiciary is
left in place, it will quickly undermine all the
hard work that went into reforming the police in
the first place. It is an issue that the United
States should be prepared to deal with in other
emerging democracies. America is still a young
nation, but we are the oldest democracy and have a
great deal to offer to those that are newly
developed, especially when it comes to law
enforcement. Most emerging democracies are poor.
We, as a wealthy state, should be prepared to help
equip and monitor the training. Basic equipment
needs, and I will stress basic, not high
technology, should be an integral part of training
and should not be ignored. This should include, for
example, equipment for protecting the police and
citizens.
We painted the police station white, since the old
yellow color was associated with the old regime.
Together with the U.S. Army, we took machine guns
away from the Haitian police, and we helped them
get some restored, working sidearms. Again, this
was a practical application of democratic values.
Police forces armed with machine guns actively
intimidate the public. Police armed with pistols
are armed to protect themselves and others from
deadly harm. This is an important distinction for
police in an emerging democracy. Fortunately, not
every emerging democracy is as poor as Haiti, but
presumably equipment needs may still be severe.
Americans are bringing much more than equipment to
the table when it comes to police experience. These
are the intangibles of democracy that are far more
important than weapons. They quickly become real in
the hands of teachers of organization and
professionalism. Along with our traditions of
organization and professionalism for the police are
preservation of the rights of the accused,
protection of free speech, and nonpartisan conduct
of the police. These are not theoretical issues for
the people in emerging democracies.
They are very real and practical. The United Sates
can be an effective role model by showing emerging
democracies how to separate the police from the
military, as difficult as that may be. We can show
them how to professionally hire and train police,
how to safeguard suspects in custody, how to
maintain order without breaking up a peaceful
demonstration, how to restrict the use of deadly
force, or how to protect voters at ballot boxes on
election day regardless of who is being elected.
American police do all these things very, very
well--probably better than just about any other
police force. For the most part, they are also done
instinctively, which is why members of American law
enforcement are first class. They are great
teachers when it comes to police issues.
President Aristide and Ambassador Gelbard said that
the second election will be Haiti's most important.
In Haiti, or in any other emerging democracy, how
the police conduct themselves on that second
election day may be the greatest test of all. What
occurs on that day may determine whether there will
be a third election. The facilitation and
maintenance of order during the peaceful change of
the legitimately elected government will be the
ultimate test for police in an emerging democracy.
American law enforcement should proceed to teach
the lessons necessary to get to that point.
-----------------------------------
TOWARD DEMOCRATIC POLICING: RETHINKING
STRATEGIES OF TRANSFORMATION
by Clifford Shearing with the assistance of
Jennifer Wood
The question of what emerging democracies should be
doing to transform their policing is both topical
and urgent. This question has given rise to a
growing literature on the transformation of
policing within countries that are emerging from
authoritarian forms of rule. There is remarkable
agreement in this body of work as to the nature of
the problem and what should be done about it.
Whether the topic of analysis is Spain, South
Africa, Nigeria, or South Korea,[1] the analysis of
the problem and the prescription for reform are
much the same. The police in these countries are to
be transformed from authoritarian, partisan
instruments of government into modern police
institutions that are nonpartisan and
democratically accountable.
I will argue that this conventional wisdom is
fundamentally flawed not because it is wrong in
what it has to say about the police institutions
that exist in authoritarian countries, but because
its view of policing and the institutions through
which it is accomplished is much too limited. This
flaw arises because the conventional wisdom on
policing fails to comprehend, or even recognize,
the fundamental transformations that have been
taking place within policing over the past several
decades. As a consequence, it promotes ideas and
strategies of transformation that are out of sync
with the way in which Western policing is
practiced. Our practices have outstripped our
theoretical understandings of democracy generally
and policing in particular.
If we are to offer useful advice and assistance to
emerging democracies, we must first get our
conceptual house in order, for it is our conceptual
frameworks rather than our practices that are
driving our policy initiatives and interventions.
We must, like Hegel's Owl of Minerva, take a
theoretical flight even though our philosophical
wings beat above a terrain that has long been
fundamentally transformed through our practices and
the institutions in and through which they take
place.
I will begin my presentation with a review of the
reigning wisdom on policing that is being used as a
basis for providing advice to emerging democracies.
I will then turn my attention to an alternative
framework which recognizes and grasps the way in
which policing, and governance more generally, have
been changing within established democracies.
Finally I will turn, using work that I have been
involved with in South Africa, to the implications
of this alternative conception for the
transformation of policing.
The Conventional Wisdom
The conventional wisdom about policing is founded
on the assumption that democratic governance is
state governance and that what is required of
emerging democracies is that they develop state
institutions which operate in ways consistent with
liberal-democratic principles. Critical among these
state institutions is the police, as they are a
major repository of governmental coercion. Indeed,
as David Bayley has argued, "perhaps no other
institution is more central to the success of
democratic nation-building than the police."[2]
Policy initiatives to transform the police within
emerging democracies focus attention on two
principal arenas. The first is police operations.
Ronald Weitzer's comments on the problems with the
South African Police (SAP) that the new government
has inherited are illustrative of what is
identified as the problem:
It is urgently required that the SAP reduce or
eliminate its involvement in some security duties
and take steps to blunt the abrasive manner in
which police handle other problems. It is vital
that the authorities put an end to the trigger-
happy policing of protests and riots, surveillance
of government opponents, the misuse of police power
of arrest, undercover hit squads and torture and
murders of suspects in custody.[3]
Initiatives to transform police operations
typically draw attention to the institutional
structures within which police in authoritarian
countries operate, in particular their military
organization, and the occupational culture of the
police that guides and shapes police practice. The
second arena singled out for attention is the lack
of accountability outside the governing elite. Here
the advice offered is typically to promote
transparency in police operations so that newly
emerging democratic governments and courts will
have the information they require to exercise
control over the police within the framework of
liberal democracy. Etannibi Alemika's comment on
the transformation of Nigerian policing is
illustrative:
It is . . . imperative for every society to develop
frameworks for the constant monitoring and
regulation of the functions, powers, performance
and accountability of the police. This need is
particularly critical in societies that lack
appropriate or developed democratic institutions
and safeguards against political authoritarianism
and extreme economic inequalities.[4]
The intention of both these forms of intervention
is the same. Policing, it is argued, needs to
become an impartial source of order rather than an
instrument of a partisan government. Frederik de
Klerk, the last apartheid president, in a speech to
senior South African police officers during the
period leading up to democratic elections,
committed himself to this ideal when he promised
that his government would not use them "any longer
as instruments to attain political goals."[5] To
accomplish this depoliticization of the police, two
principal modes of intervention are advanced.
First, the police are to be made more directly
responsive to the safety requirements of ordinary
citizens by developing links to ordinary people
that ensure they will be directed by people rather
than by governments. This, it is argued, can be
accomplished in a variety of ways ranging from
enabling the police to react directly to individual
citizen requests for service through a 911 dial-a-
cop type strategy,[6] to requiring the police to
work directly with communities to identify safety
risks and then work with them to reduce them.[7]
The second strategy for depoliticizing the police
involves insulating them from direct political
control so as to ensure that they are, in Lord
Denning's oft cited words, "answerable to the law
and the law alone" rather than to political
authorities, so that they may be "not the servant
of anyone, save the law itself."[8]
Arguments to transform the police in these ways
invariably recognize that what is done at the
institutional level can be undermined by a police
culture that is itself biased, and that indeed the
insulation of the police from direct political
control can operate to create an autonomous police
who use their powers to indulge their institutional
interests and prejudices rather than the dictates
of the law. Virtually all policy initiatives to
transform policing in emerging democracies argue
that ways must be found to transform the thinking
of ordinary police officers in addition to the
structures and policies intended to guide their
practices. Underlying this conventional view is the
argument that the problems of developing a
nonpartisan state police are ones that established
Western democracies have wrestled with for decades.
While these nations may not have solved all the
problems associated with developing such a police,
they have made considerable progress. As a result,
they are well placed to advise those who are just
embarking on this difficult road full of potholes
and dead ends ahead and help them negotiate the
turns they should be taking. In order to share this
experience, Western nations are dispatching hordes
of analysts and police officers to emerging
democracies throughout the world to offer advice on
how democratic policing can be established. At one
level this analysis is perfectly fine. It does
indeed identify critical issues with respect to
state police that need to be addressed and it does
make available a shared experience to those who
would embark on this path. Furthermore, this is
clearly a path that must be negotiated by emerging
democracies. They all have state police who will
have to be transformed, and the experience of more
established democracies will be useful to them if
they tackle this task. The problem with this
analysis is not that it is wrong but that it is too
limited. It has been developed from a partial view
of policing and of governance more generally. As a
consequence, it is an analysis that serves to
identify some but not all of the challenges and
possibilities that confront both established and
emerging democracies.
A Less Conventional' Analysis
The conventional wisdom rests not only on a
restricted view of policing but more generally on a
restricted view of governance. The fundamental
premise of this account is that governance is and
should be a state monopoly. This premise guides and
shapes all else. Thus, within this view a
democratic polity is one in which state governance
is directed by the will of the people, and
democratic policing is policing in which the work
of the state police reflects this will. Within this
conception, policing is conceived as the aspect of
governance that is concerned with providing safety
and security. Within modern systems of government
this task has been assigned primarily to the
police.
The conventional analysis accepts these claims and
then asks how police can be organized so that they
operate in ways that promote safety and security
for ordinary people and not simply for a political
elite. In the case of developing democracies it
asks more specifically how they can move closer to
Western nations that are further along this road.
This analysis accepts that even established
democracies may have some way to go in fully
realizing the dream of a democratic police, but it
argues nonetheless that as they are farther along
this path they do provide a model that less
developed nations can and should emulate.
Critical to this argument is the assumption that
established democracies are confident that this
vision of democratic governance, and policing more
specifically, is one to which they are committed.
Herein lies the nub of the difficulty with the
conventional wisdom. The problem is that people
within established democracies are no longer
confident that the vision of democratic governance
on which the conventional wisdom rests is one to
which they wish to remain committed.
It is not that we no longer believe in liberal-
democratic ideals. Rather, we question the liberal-
democratic institutions that we have fashioned to
give expression to these ideals. We are no longer
confident that our liberal-democratic institutions
are achieving what we want of them.
We are in a period of neoliberal transition in
which we are seeking to renew our liberalism by
renewing its institutions. At the very core of this
rethinking is a renewal of our institutions of
governance involving a challenge to the assumption
that governance should be a state monopoly and more
particularly that it should be driven by the expert
knowledge of state professionals. Skepticism of
state institutions includes skepticism of the
police as the institution that should be providing
safety and security.
This challenge to our conventional wisdom and to
the institutions of liberalism that it takes for
granted and defends is taking place most obviously
via a widespread polity initiative that argues that
institutions of state governance should not be
exclusively state based and that they should not
depend exclusively on the work and knowledge of
experts. Some argue that governance should not
simply be the business of professionals but should
be everybody's business. People, it is said, should
be involved in their own regulation. Peter Drucker
says that governance should be taking place through
a "social sector" of civil institutions. In arguing
for the feasibility of this governmental shift he
notes that "almost every other adult" in the United
States works at least 3--and often 5--hours a week
as a volunteer.[9] This is time and energy that
can, and should, be devoted to self-governance.
This initiative for a "reinvention of government,"
[10] which William Eggers and John O'Leary have
recently dubbed a "revolution at the roots,"[11] is
one that has widespread currency. At the nub of
this "revolution" is a questioning of conventional
wisdom's premise that democratic governance is
governance by the state for the people. In its
place the argument being advanced is that for the
ideals of democracy to be realized, governance must
be reinstitutionalized in ways that will ensure
that governing is done more directly by people. Two
consequences of this argument are being realized,
one more radical than the other.
The less radical version is a new dream of
democracy that seeks to make government "smaller,
better, and closer to home."[12] This argument has
been articulated by Eggers and O'Leary in relation
to policing. They argue that we will not have
realized the ideals of liberal democracy if we
continue to think of government and policing as
being a state monopoly. "Waiting for governments to
make it all better," they argue, "is a losing
strategy. People have to become more involved in
ensuring their own security."[13]
In expanding on this argument, these authors are
careful to point out that they are not advocating
vigilantism. What they propose is what Jane Jacobs
has described as "an intricate, almost unconscious,
network of voluntary controls and standards
established and enforced by the people
themselves."[14]
The language of this rethinking of the institutions
of liberal-democratic governance is one of
interagency cooperation, local initiative, and
public-private "partnerships."[15] What is
maintained is that the work of governing should be
devolved to citizens through a process of
"responsibilization."[16] In this less radical
version, devolution is designed to shift control
over governance away from the state; government is
not seen as "taking a back seat."[17] In essence,
what is envisaged is a shift in the rowing of
government but not the steering.[18] This intention
is nicely captured by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller
when they speak of neoliberal governance as "rule
at a distance."[19]
Within the policing arena, the most obvious
evidence of this partial devolution is found in
community policing initiatives that redefine the
police as brokers of community resources that
mobilize and coordinate. In arguing for this form
of devolution, Eggers and O'Leary note:
There is a great deal that government can and
should do to improve public safety, but first it
must recognize that it needs help. Restoring public
safety demands a renewed partnership between the
police and the community. Police must reacquaint
themselves with the people in the communities they
serve, and communities must recognize that the
brunt of the task of policing a free society does
not lie with the police but with citizens
themselves.[20]
In addition to this form of devolution there is a
second form happening without any policy fanfare.
This "quieter revolution" is older and more radical
in that it involves a devolution not only of the
rowing but much of the steering of governance as
well. Within the policing arena the most obvious
evidence of this development is the "rebirth of
private policing."[21] Private policing is
associated with the growth of what I think of as
corporate governments that govern contractual
communities. Literally throughout the world,
corporate governments are doing many of the things
that we think of as the preserve of state
governments including, and indeed in particular,
the provision of safety and security. Everywhere
one looks one finds evidence of new governmental
territories that have been called "mass private
property" being governed by "private
governments."[22] Examples of these territories
include the gated communities found throughout
North America and in many other parts of the world,
recreational spaces such as "Club Meds," and what I
like to think of as the "industrial Club Meds."
These latter territories are often huge spaces that
one finds in countries like Zimbabwe, in which tens
of thousands of people live and work under the rule
of corporate entities that are reminiscent of the
great 17th- and 18th-century trading companies such
as the English and Dutch East India Companies and
the Hudson Bay Company. In addition to these "real"
territories of governance there are a variety of
virtual territories governed by corporate
governments, such as the corporate entities that
govern financial markets.
This corporate regulation not only predates the
neoliberal "revolution at the roots," but the shift
in the locus of rule is, as I have already
suggested, much more radical than the "rule at a
distance" forms of governance that are being argued
for by neoconservatives. In the case of corporate
governance, the role of the state is not one of
governing at a distance through the private sector.
Rather, the state provides a framework for the
regulation of multiple sites of governance. Here
the state's role is less one of a player and more
one of a referee to ensure that the various private
governments are not trampling on individual
liberties.
Within this arrangement, sovereignty shifts from
the state to private entities, and democratic
control shifts from the vote to the market. These
communities of governance are, in Drucker's words,
"communities of choice not fate,"[23] in which
democratic control is exercised through consumer
choice rather than through the ballot box, which
allows, as he notes, "citizens to vote once every
few years and to pay taxes all the time."[24] This
displacement of sovereignty is leading to the
development of new forms of governance that have
elsewhere been referred to as a "new
feudalism."[25]
Implications for Emerging Democracies
Emerging democracies have not been immune from
these developments. They too are seeing the
emergence of corporate governments within their
territories and are being exposed to the neoliberal
move to revolutionize liberal democracy through a
reinvention of its governing institutions. If we
are to speak to emerging democracies about the path
that lies ahead of them in a voice that they find
convincing, we will have to shift into a key that
is not founded on the premises of the conventional
wisdom. We are going to have to talk to them about
the emerging liberal polity with its network of
governing institutions and not simply of a state
that pretends that it can and should monopolize
governance. We are going to have to talk to them in
a voice which recognizes that the Enlightenment
dream that grounds the conventional wisdom has been
discredited and that a new dream and a new quest to
construct institutions realizing it is emerging.
Only if we can do this will we speak in a voice
that addresses their concerns and one that
addresses the foreign policy concerns of
established nations that are seeking to operate in
a global environment where the old certainty of a
stable nation-state system is being rapidly eroded.
Private government is a global phenomenon that
reflects the emergence of mass private property,
contractual communities, and the
"commodification" of governmental goods on a global
scale. To speak to the people of emerging
democracies in a voice that does not recognize this
can only lead to failure both from the point of
view of these new democracies and from the point of
view of the West. The conventional wisdom cannot
provide the basis for a sensible foreign policy for
any established democracy if it directs attention
away from the very loci of sovereignty and
governance that should be the focus of their
interventions. To focus attention exclusively on
the state and its institutions through a lens that
sees only what has been and obscures what is
emerging is foolish.
The South African Case
This brings me to the work I have been undertaking
with others in South Africa through the Community
Peace Foundation at the School of Government at the
University of the Western Cape. We have sought to
promote a vision of reform for policing and for
justice more generally that recognizes the
devolution of governance being promoted both
through the advocacy of a neoliberal philosophy and
the emergence of corporate governance. In this work
we do not accept uncritically the neoliberal claims
that devolution of governance and the
commodification of governmental services do indeed
promote liberal, democratic values for all.
Our stance in relationship to these developments
has two elements. First, we have argued that as
these developments are in fact taking place and
must be acknowledged and engaged, there is no point
in acting as if the old liberal-democratic dream of
a state monopoly of government continues to be the
guiding principle of established democracies or
that this monopoly has not been fundamentally
eroded. Secondly, we have argued that while there
is much that is worrisome about these neoliberal
developments, especially for poor people, there is
much in the devolution of governance being promoted
by neoliberalism that deserves more than a simple
condemnation. We have argued that what is required
is not a rejection of the devolutionary tendencies
of neoliberalism but rather its construction in
ways that will challenge the more undemocratic
features of the neoconservative mobilization of
this reassessment of classic liberal tenets.
Within the policing field this stance has
translated into programs that are seeking to
empower communities to operate with the same level
of autonomy as corporate governments and to develop
a similar level of control and direction over their
security as these entities. Our aim has been to
explore the possibility of creating a form of
"community policing" that shifts both the rowing
and much of the steering of policing to
communities. To do this we are developing a
conception of community policing for poor people
that takes its lead from private policing, not
state policing. In doing so, we are directly
challenging the forms of community policing that
seek to institutionalize "rule at a distance"
strategies that have been the hallmark of most
community policing initiatives in established
democracies that have had poor people as their
focus.
The conceptual framework guiding this work
recognizes two sets of devolutionary strategies in
established democracies, one that has provided the
corporate communities with control of both the
rowing and the steering of policing, and the other
that has sought to devolve to poor communities the
rowing of policing but not its steering. Our
framework identifies this as institutionalizing two
sets of governmental institutions under the
umbrella of a single set of neoliberal principles--
one for the rich and one for the poor. We regard
this strategy as a critical feature of the
neoconservative response to neoliberal thinking.
In challenging the established vision of community
policing that police in established democracies are
promoting and that they are exporting to emerging
democracies, we are seeking to provide an
alternative to the neoconservative agenda within
policing and to use this as the basis for building
a conceptual and normative platform for promoting
alternative forms of neoliberal governance.
The strategy we have adopted in South Africa in
light of these considerations has four related
components:
o Seeking to reshape the police in ways required by
the conventional wisdom through retraining and
enhanced accountability.
o Engaging the state in ways that will provide for
a relocation of control over tax revenues in a
manner that will provide blacks with purchasing
power.
o Establishing blacks as powerful customers with
ability to control their security.
o Striving to do this in a manner that will keep
currency in the present South African political
climate.
This strategy has been pursued on two principal
terrains. On the one hand, the Community Peace
Foundation has sought to reshape the legislative
framework that will govern policing in the new
South Africa. On the other, it has sought to
discover new institutional arrangements for
policing. I will briefly outline our work on both
these terrains.
At the legislative level our work has, to date,
focused primarily on the new interim Constitution
and the new Police Act. At this level our concern
has been both with establishing legislative
directions that will take the state's security
budget out of the direct control of the police and
with creating mechanisms for making police work
more transparent.
With respect to both the Constitution and the
Police Act, we have lobbied, with some success, for
transparency mechanisms that will permit what the
police do to become visible. A key component of
this has been the establishment of citizen boards
at the station, the regional, and the national
level. While these provisions go further than those
of most Western countries in the extent to which
they provide for citizen involvement at the station
level, they do not require any particular comment
here, as they follow closely the logic of the
conventional wisdom.
Where our initiatives at the legislative level have
tended to depart from the conventional approach is
in respect to the way in which responsibility for
security and policing have been assigned. We
successfully persuaded the multiparty forum that
drafted the interim Constitution to accept a legal
framework that distinguishes between the provision
of security and the provision of police. This
resulted in provisions in the Constitution that
enable the establishment of laws that will give at
least part of the budget for security to local
levels of government, Local governments can use
these funds to buy policing resources either from
the state police or elsewhere. This is a strategic
move designed to enable the placement of state
resources in a location where they can be mobilized
to empower blacks as consumers of security. Our
objective has been to place policing resources at
the lowest level possible within the state.
The model we have considered proposing is a
modified version of the Canadian arrangement
whereby the Federal police can be hired by other
levels of government contractually to meet their
legal responsibilities to establish police
departments. The modification we envisage, and it
is a crucial one, is that local governments in
South Africa will not be required to set up police
departments but will be required instead to fund
initiatives that will provide people within their
jurisdiction with safe and secure places in which
to live and work. These initiatives may or may not
involve the national police.
In our view the national police should have as its
principal function the application of physical
force within the rule of law. Our position is at
odds with developments within community policing
that have led to an enormous expansion of the
police role. This expands rather than reduces
police ownership of policing. While policing should
not be conceived in terms of the application of
nonnegotiable physical force, the police role
should be conceived in these terms. In taking this
stance, we are adopting the classic Weberian
position and the position of a number of
contemporary state theorists who believe the state
should monopolize physical coercion. This position
is particularly necessary in South Africa where the
widespread use of coercion by private entities has
been a major problem. It is, however, a principle
that we believe is relevant to any attempt to
support and extend networked policing in a manner
that will enhance security for all who share a
territory.
This legislative work is taking place in
conjunction with research designed to discover
institutional structures that permit poor people to
access tax revenues in a manner that will enable
them to become customers. Our thinking here has
been influenced by work within the housing arena in
which the emphasis is also on finding ways of
permitting poor people, and particularly groups who
constitute themselves as a community, to function
as customers rather than simply as recipients of
professional expertise over which they have no
control. With the rich it is the customer who
controls the housing budget and decides what will
and will not be built. With poor people this is not
the case. Poor people are clients of experts, not
customers assumed to have the expertise necessary
to make informed choices.
The empowerment that market relations can provide
can only be accomplished within the security arena
if the above analysis is correct and if solutions
can be found to the following problems:
o Identifying communities that share interests.
o Stressing the need for these groups to develop
the skills and knowledge required to operate as
demanding customers of security services.
o Devising some scheme to provide poor communities
with access to buying power. Within the legislative
framework we have devised, this means finding a way
to turn the tax revenues available to local
government into purchasing power that can be
deployed at the level of specific groups.
o Doing all in a manner that is consistent with the
municipal government's responsibility to facilitate
the provision of security--the backbone of our
legislative framework.
o Empowering black people to become powerful
customers within a context that recognizes the
police responsibility for the exercise of
nonnegotiable physical force and their
responsibility to preserve the state's monopoly of
force.
o Empowering black people to engage and reap the
benefits of problem-solving, risk-focused policing
if security is to be provided.
We are still a long way from having models that
meet these
requirements. We are, however, making progress. At
present we are working at developing two
institutional arrangements that we hope will
provide a core around which we can build. The first
concerns the development of institutions whose job
it will be to meet municipalities' responsibilities
for enabling local communities to lead safe and
secure lives. To accomplish this we are developing
what we are calling Safety Centers as institutional
sites of these responsibilities. We envision that
these centers will be situated at the neighborhood
level. Their task will be to locate groups that
require security--women's groups, businesses,
residential groups, sports groups, youth, and so
on--and to create dialogical forums within which
they can meet and discuss how their security is to
be accomplished.
These forums constitute the second set of
arrangements we are exploring. We have conceived of
them as "triangles of security" that will always
involve three principal parties--interest group
representatives, a police representative, and a
Safety Center representative. The intention is that
these persons will work together within these
forums to develop plans for policing that will
benefit the group.
We are experimenting with two ideas to avoid the
problem of the community component in this triangle
being overwhelmed by the other two parties. The one
involves ensuring that interest groups meet
together, before they participate in such forums,
in workshops to develop plans that they will
present at the forums. We are also looking for some
mechanism that will establish an onus on the other
two groups to accept these plans unless they
violate some set of guiding principles and minimum
standards of safety. One way of accomplishing this
and dealing with disagreements that might arise
would be to build in some sort of appeal process.
The next step is to find a way of bringing these
plans together as part of a larger municipal plan.
We have yet to tackle this issue.
We are unclear as to how to fund the plans
developed through these dialogical forums and how
to keep operational control at a local level. One
idea we are considering is establishing well-funded
corporate entities at the Safety Center level,
controlled by a local board, to manage the budgets,
locate and contract for resources, and so on. These
corporate entities would have the ability to
operate effectively as powerful customers within
the security market. They would act on behalf of
persons living in the small geographic areas for
which Safety Centers are responsible. One idea for
holding these corporate entities accountable to the
communities they are required to serve would be to
establish regular meetings with people in the area.
These meetings would operate in a way similar to
shareholder meetings in nonprofit companies.
In developing these plans and ideas we are working
in two ways. First, we are examining local
initiatives, of which there are many in black South
African towns. Second, we are constantly organizing
workshops with a whole variety of people and
organizations to discuss and respond to our ideas.
Once we have established plans that we think might
work, we intend to develop pilot projects that will
work in conjunction with local community groups.
Exactly what the final institutional arrangements
will look like will depend on what transpires in
these processes. While we are a long way from
finality, we are confident that we are on the right
track and will make considerable progress in
reinventing policing to give blacks substantial
control over their security arrangements. Our hope
is that the process of dialogue on which our work
is based will provide us with the ideas needed to
develop structures that will:
o Define policing in terms of the networking of a
range of resources not limited to the actual or
potential capacities of the state police.
o Establish a system for allocating tax revenues to
local communities that will enable them to
participate effectively in a market for security.
o Radically decentralize control over policing in
ways that will shift control over policing out of
the hands of the police and into the hands of the
people who require security.
Notes
[1] For Spain, see Macdonald, Ian R., "Spain's 1986
Police Law: Transition From Dictatorship to
Democracy," Police Studies, 10(1), 1987:16-22; and
Morn, Frank, and Maura Toro, "From Dictatorship to
Democracy: Crime and Policing in Contemporary
Spain," International Journal of Comparative and
Applied Criminal Justice, 13(1), Winter 1989; for
South Africa, see Weitzer, Ronald, "Transforming
the South African Police," Police Studies, 16
(1993):110; for Nigeria, Alemika, Etannibi E.O.,
"Colonialism, State and Policing in Nigeria,"
Crime, Law and Social Change, 20 (1993):187-219;
and for South Korea, see Young Lee, Soon, "Morning
Calm, Rising Sun: National Character and Policing
in South Korea and in Japan," Police Studies,
13(3), 1990:91-110.
[2] Bayley, David. "A Foreign Policy for Democratic
Policing," Policing and Society, 5 (1995):79
[3] Weitzer, 110.
[4] Alemika, 189.
[5] Sunday Times, January 28, 1990.
[6] Bayley.
[7] Sherman, Lawrence W., "The Police," in Crime,
ed. James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia, San
Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies,
1995.
[8] All England Reports 763, at 760, as quoted in
Johnston, Les, The Rebirth of Private Policing, New
York: Routledge, 1992.
[9] Drucker, Peter F., "The Age of Social
Transformation," Atlantic Monthly, November 1994:76.
[10] Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing
Government, New York: Plume, 1993.
[11] Eggers, William D., and John O'Leary,
Revolution at the Roots: Making Our Government
Smaller, Better, and Closer to Home, New York: Free
Press, 1995.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Eggers, William D., and John O'Leary, "The
Beat Generation: Community Policing at Its Best,"
Policy Review, 1995:4.
[14] Cited in Eggers and O'Leary, "The Beat
Generation," 4.
[15] Garland, David, "The Limits of the Sovereign
State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary
Society," British Journal of
Criminology, 36 (4), Autumn 1996:453.
[16] O'Malley, Pat, "Post-Keynesian Policing,"
unpublished paper, 1994.
[17] Garland, 454.
[18] This metaphor is cited by Osborne and Gaebler.
[19] Rose, Nikolas, and Peter Miller, "Political
Power Beyond the State: Problematics of
Government," British Journal of Sociology, 43(2),
1992:172-205.
[20] Eggers and O'Leary, "The Beat Generation," 4.
[21] Johnston.
[22] Macauley, Stuart, "Private Government," in Law
and Social Science, ed. L. Lipson and S. Wheeler,
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986.
[23] Drucker, 76.
[24] Ibid.
[25] See also Elkins, David J., Beyond Sovereignty:
Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty First
Century, Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995.
----------------------------------
REFLECTIONS ON DAY ONE: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
by Michael Smith
Today our task is to explore how knowledge about
policing might most usefully be transferred to
emerging democracies. I've been asked to review our
discussions up to this point, as they bear on the
strategic matters we are to take up today. As my
reflections have a primitive appearance, even to my
own eye, I am reassured to remember the charge
given us yesterday by Ambassador Robert Gelbard and
Jeremy Travis: This is the beginning, not the end,
of a collaborative exploration of these matters.
My reflections are shaped, of course, by my own
experience of "technology transfer." Limited though
it is, I think it proper to disclose it. Some years
ago, encouraged and financed by several private
foundations and the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Vera Institute of Justice worked with criminal
justice officials in central government and at the
local level in England, France, and the (then)
Federal Republic of Germany. The object of this
work, for which I had principal responsibility, was
to bring to bear in those countries the techniques
developed and the lessons harvested by the Vera
Institute from a couple of decades' engagement in
reform of U.S. police, court, and correctional
practices. There was a healthy appetite there for
the practical and technical knowledge we had drawn
from our work here, but our European clients were
too eager for us to help them replicate U.S.
reforms in contexts we understood imperfectly at
best. And we were too willing.
While some of these transfers worked reasonably
well from the start, and while all of us who were
posted abroad to assist in the replications learned
a lot about our own system by looking back at it
through the lens of these experiences, we were, in
effect, just guessing about what in our experience
was likely to be useful to our foreign hosts. In
time, that led us to amend our approach to the
task. We began identifying (mostly) young officials
who seemed to have the passion and capacity for
reform of their own criminal justice systems, and
we began bringing them to the States to work
alongside us here. We had confidence that if our
initial judgments were right, our handpicked guests
would learn a lot more about how to do this kind of
work in their setting by watching us struggle in
ours. I think we were right. They were far better
positioned than we to find what was relevant to
their problems, to draw productive analogies to
their own circumstances, and to take home
techniques and practical lessons that they could
apply more creatively than we could. Certainly,
those we recruited into this endeavor, who came to
the States for several months, did a better job of
it when they went back than those we tried to help
directly when we were abroad.
Now I recognize that I am reporting only my own
experience, and I hasten to acknowledge that the
countries with which Vera was concerned were not
emerging democracies. But after listening to
yesterday's discussion, it occurred to me that we
in the United States are too quick to think of
ourselves as the only (or best) agents for
transferring to others whatever knowledge we have
that might promote and sustain democratic
institutions abroad. We, and our friends in the
emerging democracies, might work a better transfer
of our knowledge if we were to facilitate their
direct exposure to our practices (good and bad) and
if we were to encourage them to judge the value of
what we may or may not have learned about these
matters here.
Let me now touch on a few of the points made
yesterday that could help frame today's discussion.
Philip Heymann started us off in a direction I at
first found puzzling, because he didn't seem to be
talking about emerging democracies in particular,
and he wasn't talking about policing in particular.
As the day wore on, I think I began to understand
why he took that broader view, and why he insisted
on our being "impatient" and using muscle (when we
have it) to push for democratic policing
everywhere. In his view, it is in our national
interest to promote and sustain strong democracies
abroad, and strong criminal justice systems are
essential to strong democracies. Strong criminal
justice systems are essential, he argued, because
government institutions lose popular support if
they cannot do a reasonable job of public safety,
and because a criminal justice system that is
corrupt or grants immunity to the powerful cannot
long enjoy the popular support that effective
delivery of public safety requires.
I came to understand that Phil was demanding what
Paul Chevigny identified as "rule-of-law policing"-
-a phrase I think we found more fitting than
"democratic policing." But as the morning wore on,
Phil's insistence that rule-of-law policing be at
the core of U.S. engagements with criminal justice
systems abroad became a potential source of
conflict within our group. (Actually, that conflict
rose pretty quickly--I just didn't see it the first
time around.) Someone pointed out that we don't
have enough Federal agents to protect our children
from Eastern European thugs--unless we form
partnerships with law enforcement there. From one
point of view, those partnerships can't wait for
the emergence of democratic or rule-of-law policing
in Eastern Europe.
I began to realize that the subject matter of our
meeting had something to do with what ought to be
the shape of U.S. law enforcement interventions in
foreign countries--whether they be emerging
democracies, declining democracies, fledgling
democracies, or whatever. What ought to be the
shape of our impatient, muscular interventions when
a short-term domestic law enforcement interest is
in conflict with our insisting on rule-of-law
policing (and, presumably, with our long-term
interest in stable democracies)?
I don't think we had a frank discussion of this
question, and I am left unsatisfied by yesterday's
suggestion that this conflict, if it arises, is
bureaucratic and not substantive. Among the things
we might usefully do today are:
o Better understand conditions that require a
choice to be made between our short-term law
enforcement and our long-term strategic interests.
o Specify who should make the choice.
o Identify the principles that ought to guide the
choice.
The likelihood of such conflict arising ought not
to stop us from trying to be helpful to other
nations by making available what we've learned
about effective policing in a democratic society. I
suspect we are in some way embarrassed by the fact
that from time to time we will trade long-term
interests in something as obviously "good" as
democratic policing or rule-of-law policing for
some short-term interests that can't be ignored but
don't have as nice a ring to them. I am pretty sure
it would help our conversation for us to be a
little more open about this.
Clifford Shearing's presentation took us on a trip
around some very different territory, though I
think what he actually said fit remarkably well
where Phil left off. That is, because the
institutions that generate public safety are not
exclusively and maybe not even principally
institutions of the state, then some of our dearly
held propositions about the importance of the
police and of the criminal justice system need to
be questioned. If I understood Clifford, that
questioning is itself central to what we ought to
be sharing with those in emerging democracies who
are struggling to generate public safety as a
foundation on which to build institutions of
democratic government. He also opened the door for
a conversation about community policing and
problem-solving policing--matters which Phil said
he was not going to talk about but which are very
much on the minds of U.S. police personnel today.
As I thought about how undiscovered is most of the
territory that lies through the door Clifford
opened, I recalled a helpful remark Carl Klockars
made at some point in yesterday's proceedings. In
this country, he said, we do not really understand
very well how we produce public safety or who plays
what role in producing it. As a consequence, he
pointed out, we are somewhat mystified by our
successes.
Of course, we seem to understand it well enough to
do it rather well sometimes, and to try to reform
it (as police officials are now trying to do across
the land). But perhaps we don't yet understand our
successes at the level that would be appropriate if
we were to try to teach others what we know--
another reason for at least the appearance of
humility when offering help in emerging
democracies.
Those are some of my reflections. Perhaps they
reveal no more than my unfamiliarity with a
conversation that seems to have been going on for a
long time within the Federal agencies represented
at this table.
But reflection, which was required of me, led me to
try to fix a meaning for the stated subject matter
of our meeting. Is there an assumption that, for
example, policing or the form of it can produce
democracy or frustrate the production of it? It may
be that the latter is true, but it is hard to see
how the former could be true. That is, policing, or
changes in it, can operate to undermine democracy
in all the ways Phil suggested at the head of our
conversation. But can it produce democracy? That
seems unlikely to me for the same reasons we now
question the extent to which policing can produce
safety. Policing is powerful, but maybe not that
powerful. A more modest goal for our own policing
might be to facilitate and defend the
nongovernmental, safety-producing process that
Clifford Shearing referred to. Abroad, we might
similarly try to facilitate the emergence and
defend the practice of policing that doesn't
interfere with the development of democracy. It
might be wiser to try for policing that is not
incompatible with democracy rather than try for
policing that will somehow produce it. If so, we
should be assisting the development of policing
that is perfectly neutral with respect to all
political questions, including questions of the
pace and type of democracy that might be emerging.
One final point: I was very grateful to David
Bayley yesterday for his timely story about the
transfer of Japan's Botan technology to Singapore,
because it reminds us of how long it takes to do
any of these things. Seven years--which, as I
remember, was the timeline for the Botan reform in
Singapore--sounds about right for a successful
technology transfer. It certainly conforms to my
own experience, about which I spoke a few minutes
ago. It should take that long for effective
intervention to reform another jurisdiction's law
enforcement methods, even for such a relatively
simple (though potentially powerful) intervention.
(If it were easier and quicker, we would wonder
whether it really represented a reform, or a reform
of anything important.) It occurs to me that
David's story is welcome as well because it reminds
us that we should not be surprised to hear that
successful transfer of the Botan seems not to have
much advanced the emergence of democratic
institutions in Singapore.
In sum, I didn't come away from yesterday's
discussion thinking the United States should stop
trying to help in this field--only that we need to
be modest in the way we go about it and modest in
our expectations of the likely effects of our
interventions over time. That leads me back to
where I began these remarks, but now with a sharper
question on my mind. If we are interested in the
long-term development and stability of democratic
institutions abroad, which surely we are, and if we
believe that the style and quality of policing have
some relationship to that ambition, which none of
us questioned yesterday, then why are we not
spending more time looking for individuals whose
own ambitions and capacities suggest they could use
our experience well in their efforts to accomplish
such things in their own countries? Why are we not
devoting more effort to bringing them here, in
capacities that permit them to learn, at their
pace, the things that, in their own view, they need
to learn? Why do we spend so much effort sending
folks from here over there, to offer a menu of
things we think might be relevant to folks whose
circumstances we barely understand?
Questions and Answers
Q: Norval Morris. Thank you, Michael. I have a
question I want to ask you and others too--not a
major one of your points, but quite an important
one to me. Is the proper question "Can policing
produce democracy?" or is it slightly different? Is
a criminal justice system with the values that Phil
offered essential to produce democracy?
A: Michael Smith. A stronger proposition, it seems
to me, is that a criminal justice system
(particularly, a style of policing) that doesn't
respect democratic values, that isn't prepared or
capable of either producing public safety or
bringing to justice those who with impunity violate
the law, makes it very difficult for democratic
institutions to develop and thrive. Not least
because of the corrosive effect such a criminal
justice system has on the trust and confidence that
individuals have in their governmental
institutions. The other way around, though, just
doesn't strike me as plausible. It seems to me
unimaginable that one could produce the political
habits and institutions of democracy by reforming
policing operations (or even a criminal justice
system) in a jurisdiction lacking those habits and
institutions. That just doesn't make sense to me.
Q: David Bayley. Michael, I wanted to reflect a bit
on your idea about where we do this training and
why here rather than abroad. I am attracted by that
notion. It seems to me, however, that your
recommendation is more than simply moving the site
of training. I think what you are saying is that
American training tends to be very didactic and it
also tends to be very pretentious. It doesn't
matter where we do it--whether we do it here or do
it abroad. We tend to say the United States does
democratic policing, we do it the following ways,
and here they are.
What is really important is that wherever we do
this we have got to stop and we have got to
understand. This is tough to do because to some
extent this business of creating democracies
through police reform is a holy cause. We have got
to realize that we must create a dialogue here
between the people in these countries and ourselves
in which we examine if what we are doing is truly
both as effective and as democratic as we think.
You suggest to me that the people who might help in
this business of foreign training are not
exclusively the appropriate people and that this
dialogue to some extent needs to be mediated by
area experts and people on our side who are
familiar with how the institutions of law
enforcement in our society evolved. I think it is
that kind of openness you are asking for, and we
have got to do it every place.
A: Michael Smith. I hear all that. I guess I was
speaking without much precision about several
things. One was that I believe it likely that
contributions from our experience to the
development of rule-of-law policing and democratic
institutions abroad through police reform are most
likely to occur when imaginative, inspired,
creative, smart people from such jurisdictions come
here and take what they can from our experience and
practice. Our job then becomes one of being open to
those inquiries and helping them become specific.
Also, when I asked why we don't spend more energy
bringing people here to learn, I was trying to
point back to the potential tension between long-
term U.S. interests in developing stable
democracies with strong criminal justice systems
and our short-term law enforcement interests. What
might be given up if we brought people here rather
than send people there? There are several possible
reasons for not bringing them here. One is just
simple pretentiousness, but I don't think it is
that simple. It occurs to me one of the reasons
might be that sending our law enforcement personnel
there serves our short-term local law enforcement
interests. Although the primary assignment might be
to train others in our ways, being there affords
opportunities to form partnerships with them.
Again, this suggests to me that we should separate
these two U.S. interests, think of them as
separate, and deal with the conflicts if and when
they arise.
-----------------------------------
REFLECTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE TO
SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC POLICING IN HUNGARY AND
ROMANIA
by Deborah G. Wilson and William F. Walsh
In less than a decade, the world has witnessed a
series of events that resulted in the rejection of
communism and the overthrow of totalitarian
repression in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Glasnost led to the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the
reunification of Germany, and the overthrow of one
Eastern European government after another. These
events represent the first steps in the reform and
democratization of nations that since World War II
have been enclosed behind the Iron Curtain and cut
off from the West. These transitions were peaceful
with the exception of Romania, whose revolution
ended with the executions of its former dictator
Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena. As might be
expected, when the social and political
transformation of these national states
accelerated, established state institutions, such
as the police, were called to account for their
activities. Under the old regimes the police were
an integral subsystem of the state apparatus
centrally controlled by the Ministry of the
Interior.[1]
They had little concern for individual liberty and
were expected to convey party authority to the
everyday life of citizens.[2] As a result, the
forces of order, especially the police in the
majority of these countries, are currently in the
process of organizational transformation. These
conditions have provided an opportunity for the
exchange of ideas and scholarship as these
countries turn to the West for assistance.
This paper presents an assessment of the
experiences and knowledge derived from working with
the national police forces in both Hungary and
Romania. During 1993, faculty from the Department
of Justice Administration and the Southern Police
Institute[3] at the University of Louisville
established contact with representatives from the
Hungarian and Romanian National Police Forces.
Hungarian National Police Force representatives
were the first to initiate contact with the
university, while faculty interested in promoting
police training based on democratic principles made
contact with the Romanian National Police Force.
During the past 2 years, these initial contacts
have resulted in establishing an ongoing
relationship with representatives from both
organizations and accomplishing a number of
activities in conjunction with these two
organizations.
To date, the following activities have been
accomplished in conjunction with representatives
from the Hungarian National Police Force:
o Conduct of a management training and educational
needs assessment within the Pest County Police
Department.[4]
o Development of a report and recommendations for
the Pest County Police Department on management and
educational needs as well as organizational
management issues faced by the department.
o Development and implementation of an
undergraduate degree program at Godollo University
specifically targeted for inservice police
officers. This program is the result of cooperative
activities between representatives from the
University of Louisville, Godollo University, and
the Pest County Police Department. The degree, the
first of its kind in Hungary, is a 4-year
undergraduate degree in public administration with
a concentration in police management. This program
is unique not only in the nature of the degree but
also in that it is an educational program not
subsidized by the government. Officers
participating in this degree program pay tuition
themselves.
Activities in conjunction with the Romanian
National Police Force have included:
o The development of three seminars, in association
with the Project on Ethnic Relations,[5] on
policing within a democratic model and police-
minority relations. The first of these was a series
of 2- to 3-day presentations conducted at three
different sites in Romania. The second was a 3-day
conference during which representatives from the
national police force and the Roma[6] participated
in a joint workshop. Issues of common concern were
identified and proposed solutions developed during
the seminar. The third of the seminars consisted of
a 3-week training program, "Issues in Democratic
Police Management and Minority Relations."
o The development of recommendations for
organizational and procedural changes to address
specifically police-minority relations within
Romania based on problems and difficulties
identified by the Romanians. The recommendations
have been forwarded by the Project on Ethnic
Relations to representatives in the Romanian
national government, the Romanian Council for
National Minorities, and leadership in the Roma
community.
o Discussion of an ongoing program of training that
would involve establishing an institute for
democratic police management within Romania.
While the activities engaged in with the two
national police forces have differed in nature, the
processes that have contributed to successfully
establishing the ongoing relationships are
virtually identical.
This analysis will now address:
o The philosophies, orientations, and modes of
entry that resulted in successfully establishing
these ongoing relationships and the accomplishment
of related activities.
o The needs and issues that have been identified as
evident within these two organizations as they
attempt to adjust to a new political model of
democracy.
Processes and Orientations
Promoting Entry and Acceptance As with most events,
the factors that contribute to successful programs
and projects are in part structured and planned and
in part serendipitous. However, whether the result
of fate or a structured approach to international
involvement, certain orientations and common
procedures and events can be identified as directly
contributing to the success of the current
international relationships and programs.
Perception of a "crisis" or need and a consequent
recognition that direction can be provided through
an outside agent or organization. Much of what we
understand about organizational change and,
specifically, successful organizational change
suggests that change occurs when those affected by
it perceive there is a need for, justification for,
and value to be gained by changing the status
quo.[7] This condition existed before both of the
initiatives currently under way within Romania and
Hungary.
The cooperative activities with representatives
from the Hungarian National Police Force were
initiated by the Hungarians. These representatives
had identified two specific needs, one primary and
specific, the other broader and with longer-range
consequences. First, they had a specific need to
obtain more technical information on means to track
and identify stolen automobiles. Cars were being
stolen within the United States, shipped to Russia,
and then brought into Hungary for sale. Many U.S.-
made cars with individual State license plates
(e.g., New York and California) still attached
could be observed daily on the streets of Budapest.
The Hungarians had limited technology and limited
relationships with U.S. police departments. They
believed rectifying these deficiencies was
essential to their ability to more adequately
address this crime problem.
Representatives from the Pest County and Budapest
police departments organized a visit to the United
States, funded by Hungarian insurance companies, to
develop professional ties and learn more about the
technical and operational means by which U.S.
police addressed auto theft. Secondly, members of
this delegation recognized an additional need to
provide Hungarian police officers with more
efficient and effective management education.
The current system of educating police officers in
Hungary is based on the classical continental model
that establishes two points of entry, one for
noncommissioned ranks and another for commissioned
officers.8 Police are trained in two tiers, the
police secondary school and the police college.
Those trained within the secondary school can rise
through the ranks from the basic officer position
to become low-level supervisors and noncommissioned
officers. Those educated through the police college
or universities enter the commissioned officer
corps at the rank of lieutenant. These individuals
are often placed in command of units; however, they
are not trained specifically in management
practices and techniques. Factors related to the
dissolution of the Communist government, the
emergence of a market economy, and newly proposed
requirements for police training and education
created a need for more efficient and differently
oriented police training and education. As a
result, the Hungarian representatives had as a
secondary purpose the assessment of police
education and training in terms of content, form,
and delivery.
Initially, contact with the Romanian National
Police force began at the request of a faculty
member within the department of sociology who had a
direct interest in Romanian culture and, more
specifically, in changes within this society that
had occurred as a result of the transition from a
Communist to a democratic form of government.
Through contacts within the Romanian National
Government, a proposal was presented to the
Romanian National Police Force recommending a
series of seminars on policing within a democratic
society. The response from the Romanians was, "We
have training on democratic policing." The proposal
received no response and no further contact was
promoted.
Several months later, representatives from the
Project on Ethnic Relations were informed of the
proposal for seminars on democratic policing that
had been submitted to the Romanian National Police
Force. During this same period, the Project on
Ethnic Relations had conducted a series of studies
to determine the nature of several violent events
involving the Roma that had occurred in Romania
during the early 1990s. These events, primarily
involving incidents of vigilante justice by
Romanians against the Roma, had sparked national
and international concern.
A central issue within these events had been the
adequacy of the police response as a contributing
or instigating factor in escalating the violence.
The Project on Ethnic Relations had determined that
cultural factors such as the police perception of
the Roma and the limited technical infrastructure
of the national police force had, in fact,
contributed to a situation in which violence
escalated more than necessary. As a result of these
conditions, representatives from the Project on
Ethnic Relations participated in the creation of a
Council for National Minorities, dedicated to
improving the status of minorities within Romania.
This Council consisted of prominent leaders within
the national government as well as the Roma and
Hungarian leadership.9 Leaders from the national
police force had become convinced that a "crisis"
existed based on the events that had occurred and
were working with the Project on Ethnic Relations
to develop solutions to this problem.
Representatives from the Project on Ethnic
Relations, with the support of the Romanian
National Police Force, approached
representatives from the Department of Justice
Administration of the University of Louisville as a
source of police education and training on
democratic policing methods with special emphasis
on police-minority relations.
In both instances, the opportunity for the
involvement of "change agents" was created by a
perceived need or crisis among those who would be
affected by the change. Entry into the
organizations was a means of addressing and
resolving the perceived crisis. And, while it was
apparent that not all members of these two police
organizations were equally committed to change
through external agents, there was substantial
interest in promoting change. It is also important
to note that research has found that the
effectiveness of any planned change is directly
dependent on the degree to which members of an
organizational hierarchy take part in factfinding
and in diagnosing the need for change.[10] These
specific conditions led to the reactivation of the
rejected faculty proposal for training in
democratic police methods in Romania.
Recognition of the significance of national and
cultural heritage as well as established
professionalism, accomplishments, and successes of
the police organizations. Acceptance of cultural
relativism, the degree to which the national and
cultural heritage of a people shape their
organizations, the processes of these
organizations, and the orientation of organization
members are essential to the successful
accomplishment of change as an external agent. All
cultures and members of these cultures are shaped
by their political and social heritage. Proposals
for change within organizations must be filternt
through an understanding of the significance of
this social and cultural heritage and must be made
within an appropriate context.[11] Additionally,
the strengths of an organization must be
recognized. Attempts to promote change based on the
premise that there is nothing worth salvaging
within an organization will be met with great
resistance. They are more likely to succeed if
change is seen simply as a means of enhancing
existing strengths.
Both the Romanians and Hungarians exhibit intense
national pride. This sense of nationalism,
suppressed though not eliminated during the
Communist regime, has had a rebirth of sorts with
the advent of democracy within each nation. The
people are proud of their history, accomplishments,
and traditions. Some sense of this history and
tradition is necessary to understand the factors
that contribute to their organizational structures,
processes, and procedures. Both police forces had
received training from external change agents--
French, British, German, and Irish police
representatives. Our conversations with managers in
both police forces revealed that they believed
their training was patronizing, ethnocentric, and
of little value since it assumed their
organizations should be more like those in other
nations and that a total, indiscriminate, and
direct adoption of these alternative organizational
forms was necessary.
The current projects within these countries are
based on alternative premises. That is, through
available published information and lengthy
discussions with representatives from these two
police agencies, a knowledge base that included an
understanding of the history and circumstances that
governed organizational structures and policies was
developed. The U.S. contingent attempted to gather
as much information and insight as possible into
the national culture and the organizational
orientation and processes within the law
enforcement organizations. The rationale governing
this process is the reality that police
organizations are not self-created units but
instead derive their structure, culture, and
process from the source of their authority.[12]
Differences in policing styles and the rationales
for these differences were identified and
discussed. Strengths of both organizations in
preservice training, technical expertise, and
organizational processes were identified and
recognized. It was apparent that this entry by
change agents with an orientation to cultural
relativism had not previously been experienced by
members of either police force. Acceptance of the
differences and recognition of the significance of
organizational strengths and accomplishments laid
the foundation for acceptance of the
recommendations for change and adjustment.
Though seemingly minor issues, certain conditions
of entry and participation with representatives
from these two organizations greatly contributed to
their perception of our engagement as "equals" and
greatly facilitated our acceptance and the
acceptance of the content of our programs. While
"in country" on all projects, U.S. representatives
were housed in accommodations and shared in meals
and other related activities that were comparable
to those provided for the Romanian and Hungarian
participants and representatives. Western hotels
were not used. Western meals were not requested.
Visits to historically significant sites and
participation in local cultural events and
activities were encouraged. Organizational protocol
was observed and respected.
Assessment of needs in conjunction with members of
the organization. As with any change, especially
that introduced from outsiders to the organization,
success will follow only when those affected have a
vested interest in promoting or adjusting to the
change. In all activities, an assessment and
identification of the needs to be met through
change were developed in conjunction with those to
be affected.
A management training and educational needs
assessment was conducted within the Pest County
Police Department. This consisted of both a structured
and unstructured identification of the strengths and
weaknesses of the organization with respect to
standing procedures for training and education; it
also included a more qualitative assessment of
current practices and procedures. Visits were made
to the police secondary school, police college, and
Godollo University. Discussions with administrators
and faculty were held as a means of developing an
understanding of current practices, strengths, and
weaknesses as well as options for change.
Discussions with police personnel concerning their
perception of the strengths and weaknesses of
current practices in meeting their organizational
needs were conducted as well as a structured
assessment of the responsibilities and activities
of police managers, their prior educational and
training experiences, and their perception of the
future needs of their organization. Reviews of
curriculums, instructional facilities, and
instructional techniques were made.
Though conducted in a very different manner, a
needs assessment of sorts was additionally
instituted in conjunction with representatives from
the Romanian National Police Force. Information on
the violent events involving the Roma and the
outcome of internal and external studies of the
causes and contributors to these events were
analyzed. Proposed topics and formats for the
seminars were negotiated and adjusted through
discussions with Romanian police commanders. During
the first two seminars Romanian police
representatives were participants and facilitators.
The format of the second conference resulted in the
development of extensive information and
understanding which laid the foundation for the
third and lengthier seminar. It also promoted
discussions on establishing longer-term educational
programs through the creation of an institute.
Participants invited to this conference included
leaders of both the Romanian National Police and
minority groups, primarily the Roma. The conference
functioned as a workshop. On the first day,
minority and police representatives met in a
general session, during which each group was
provided equal and alternating opportunities to
identify problems, issues, and needs related to
police-minority relations that required some
attention. The U.S. participants recorded the
issues identified.
The list of concerns was then categorized, and on
the second day of the conference participants were
assigned to working groups. These working groups
comprised equal numbers of minority and police
representatives. Each had a minority and U.S.
facilitator. The task of the working groups was to
develop strategies to resolve the issues related to
police-minority relations. The third day consisted
of a final joint session during which strategies
and solutions proposed by each working group were
presented and discussed. When applicable, U.S.
representatives discussed proposed strategies and
solutions, providing descriptions of the failures
and successes within U.S. law enforcement as they
related to the various issues. A joint document
identifying common concerns and cooperative
solutions was developed. This document served as
the foundation for a series of recommendations that
were forwarded to leadership within the Roma and
national police force from the Project on Ethnic
Relations and the U.S. representatives. The
Romanians have instituted several programs of
organizational change based on these and other
recommendations sent to the Romanian National
Police Force as a product of exchanges that
occurred during these seminars.
Establishment of education and training as a
dialogue resulting in reciprocal professional
development, learning, and understanding. While the
dissolution of the Communist government in both
countries resulted in extensive changes within the
police organizations, it did not create widespread
havoc or result in the development of police
organizations without professional standards and
significant strengths. It has created needs that
will be discussed later in this paper. Both police
organizations, however, have identifiable and
recognizable strengths, many of which would enhance
U.S. law enforcement if they were adopted here.
Specifically, educational requirements for both
commissioned and noncommissioned officers in both
of these police organizations are more stringent
than those of most U.S. police departments.
Officers in both organizations have a much greater
understanding of technical criminalistics and
forensics and procedural criminal law than U.S.
police officers. Romanian and Hungarian police
officers are more cognizant of international
affairs and, especially, the international
implications of crime, and specifically organized
crime. They are more likely than U.S. police
officers to be bilingual and well versed in
addressing investigative and prosecutorial issues
related to international crime or crime that
traverses jurisdictional boundaries.
All seminar activities took the form of dialogues
with police participants. The needs within the
Romanian and Hungarian police organizations were
compared to situations, needs, and problems within
U.S. policing and the U.S. policing experience.
U.S. organizational philosophies, procedures, and
policies were presented as items for consideration.
The strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures
of strategies and activities conducted by U.S. law
enforcement in response to similar problems were
openly discussed and addressed.
Police in both organizations were especially
interested in police events with high international
visibility--the Rodney King incident, the Los
Angeles riots, and the O.J. Simpson trial were of
specific and special interest. These incidents
along with other events related to the police role
within the U.S. democracy were discussed with
candor. Our recommendations for change were
received more readily when problems, failures, and
frustrations related to change within U.S. society and
U.S. policing were recognized and shared.
Establishment of trust and personal relationships.
Based in part on differing cultural traditions and
in part on sheer numbers, one of the primary
adjustments necessary for engagement in Romania and
Hungary was these societies' extensive reliance on
personal relationships rather than organizational
roles and positions, in both police organizations
and other government organizations. The Hungarians
follow a formalistic organizational structure and
protocol and are linear and focused in their
organizational activities. Conversely, while the
Romanians have a highly centralized organizational
structure, they are less focused and linear in
their approach to organizational matters and
organizational problem solving. Representatives
from both organizations (especially the Romanians)
base decisions for ongoing relationships with
external agents on personal ties and ensuing
individual trust. Most specifically, the success of
activities in both countries was promoted as the
project team members developed trust, friendship,
and personal commonalities with individuals from
both police organizations.
Introduction to the Romanian National Police Force
and the development of personal trust and loyalties was
accomplished through previously established
personal relationships between the director of the
Romanian office of the Project on Ethnic Relations,
the Secretary General of the Romanian National
Government, and representatives from the Romanian
National Police Force. During seminars and
conferences, U.S. representatives made themselves
available and engaged in informal discussions with
representatives from the Romanian police. The
candid nature and informality of these discussions
resulted in the development of personal trust and
relationships that contributed to the credibility
and acceptance of ideas and recommendations for
change.
In Hungary the experience was similar. The
hospitality shown to the Hungarians while they were
in the United States and the open and informal
discussions established personal bonds that led to
the development of a more formalized professional
relationship.
These personal bonds are important, given the
traditions and circumstances of the Romanians and
Hungarians. Both countries are small, have
relatively small populations, and are rural and
agriculture-based societies. They each have a
history of invasion and occupation from external
forces--occupation by the Soviet Union being only
the most recent in this series. Families, kin, and
personal relationships take precedence over more
structured and formal interpersonal ties. The
cultural ethos, though currently one that values
participation in activities and lifestyles more
comparable to Western, modern society, still
reflects reliance on personalized relationships as
important and sustaining factors in people's lives.
Flexibility in content and pedagogy. Engagement in
international educational and training activities
must have as a central theme flexibility and ease
of adaptation to changing expectations and
circumstances. While partly based in cultural
tradition and partly based in the circumstances
created by international exchanges of this type,
the content and delivery of police education and
training must be responsive to immediately changing
circumstances.
Determining the content and structure of police
education and training activities within both
Romania and Hungary was, of necessity, a fluid
process. In Romania, for example, while general
topics for presentation were agreed upon in
advance, the Romanian penchant for negotiation
resulted in constant adjustments and readjustments
to the form and content of presentations up to the
immediate start of the seminar and many times
during the course of the program. As it became
apparent that certain issues or concerns were of
greater interest to the Romanian audience,
instructors adjusted presentations accordingly.
Similarly, in both Hungary and Romania as
organizational circumstances and incumbents
changed, the course of the initiatives was
necessarily adjusted, and appropriate
accommodations were made.
Ability to show evidence of long-term interest and
commitment. The current social, political, and
economic situation in both countries is uncertain.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and change to a
democratic form of government have created massive
social change and instability. Representatives from
police organizations in both countries realize they
are a visible and central component of social and
political stability in their societies. They are
seeking a means of establishing stability both in
their societies and in their specific
organizations. They understand the slow and
deliberate process of achieving stability and are
seeking cooperative relationships with change
agents who are willing to engage in long-term
activities. Assistance based on a short-term
orientation and a short-term relationship with the
change agent may be tolerated but is not
acceptable. Within both the Romanian and Hungarian
police organizations there is a clear need for a
willingness and ability of the change agent to
engage in long-term organizational development. All
activities in both sites have been discussed and
planned as part of a broader and longer-term
program of professional change and education.
The 4-year college degree program in Hungary has
been established as a cooperative degree program. A
board to determine program
effectiveness and direction has been proposed. This
board would have representatives from the police as
well as Hungarian and U.S. faculty. The development
of this board and its proposed activities
establishes a long-term relationship that will last
after the actual implementation of the college
degree program. In Romania, the proposal of a
cooperative institute solidifies the commitment of
the external change agent to a long-term
relationship and sponsorship of organizational
development and involvement.
Promotion of change by those in leadership
positions. The support of leadership within an
organization is essential to the promotion of
change in that organization. The breadth of
commitment by the two national police forces
exemplifies the critical nature of the involvement
of leadership.
Contact in Romania was made through high-level
national leadership. The Secretary General,
Minister of the Interior, Commander of the National
Police Force, and Head of the Council for National
Minorities all supported this initiative.
Consequently, police education and training
activities have involved representatives of the
command staff from all districts of Romania.
Recommendations that followed from these seminars
and dialogues with representatives from the
Romanian police are distributed at the national
government level.
In contrast, while support for the Hungarian
activities has by necessity included the support of
leadership from the Pest County Department and
Godollo University, the scope of our activities has
not been on a national level in this instance. It
has instead been limited by the scope of the
authority of the supportive leadership and has
therefore primarily targeted Pest County and
surrounding jurisdictions.
The lessons learned through the course of these
international projects have not necessarily been
groundbreaking experiences or observations. They
have been based on well-known principles of the
management of change, persuasion, personal and
social interaction, respect for diversity, and
cultural relativism. These are, however, principles
not always appreciated and observed by change
agents and may especially have the potential to be
ignored when change agents are overly enthusiastic
or overly convinced that their way is the best way.
In the instance of providing direction to emerging
democracies within Central Europe, and specifically
to police in these emerging democracies, the best
and overriding principle to keep in mind and from
which the others logically follow is that policing
within a democratic model and the understanding of
precisely what this means have not been completely
accomplished in our own society. Democracy, and
therefore policing in a democracy, is always an
emerging process.
Policing Issues and Needs in Central Europe
While the experiences related above are limited to
only two countries of Eastern Europe, the
conditions in Romania and Hungary are not unique.
The issues and needs do not evolve from police
organizations that are in a state of chaos and
confusion. Rather, the needs have developed as
these organizations have grappled with the rapid
change promoted by transition to a democratic form
of government and the resulting social and economic
changes. These two police organizations have a firm
foundation of professionalism and accomplishment
from which to make the adjustments necessary to
respond to their changing social, political, and
organizational environment.
Issues related to public perception and public
confidence. Both the Romanian and Hungarian police
recognize the need to develop greater public
confidence and a more positive public perception of
law enforcement in their countries. Under the
Communist regimes, political and domestic police
both functioned as protectors of public security.
The domestic police performed responsibilities
similar to those of U.S. police while the political
or secret police functioned to enforce loyalty to
the Communist ideology and specific Communist
regime. Though much more evident within Romania--
given the strength of the Communist regime in this
country--there is a need to promote greater public
understanding of the domestic police function under
a democratic model. In both Romania and Hungary
this need has been met through public relations
campaigns comparable to those promoted by U.S.
police. The police organizations publish and
distribute materials to educate children about the
role and function of police. In Hungary, several
police districts have established civilian police
advisory boards that are used to define strategies
to address these issues in the districts--a version
of community-oriented policing. There is a need to
further expand these activities, especially in
Romania and among the minorities within this
country.
Recruitment and retention of qualified personnel.
The market economies developing in both Romania and
Hungary have functioned to decrease the relative
attractiveness of policing as a profession and
means of economic support. This has resulted in
increasingly high attrition rates and difficulties
in retaining highly trained and qualified
personnel. This is an especially significant
problem in Hungary, which has a stronger and better
developed market economy than Romania. In Pest
County, Hungary, the salary for a newly
commissioned officer is approximately $250 per
month and has not kept pace with the rising cost of
living.
The cost of an average small apartment in Budapest
is more per month than the $250 these officers
make. The private sector, with higher wages and a
growing need for human resources, is becoming an
increasingly attractive option to many younger and
better educated and trained officers within law
enforcement. The turnover rate in some Pest County
police districts is as high as 35 percent.
Given the 4 years required for these officers to
complete the required education and training and
the fact that this training is offered through only
one national police college, attrition creates
serious problems for police staffing and coverage.
All of this makes it essential to address these
conditions in educational programs directed toward
the management of recruitment and retention and in
the promotion of strategies to minimize attrition.
Police management techniques. The application of
modern management techniques is variable and in
some instances limited in the Romanian and
Hungarian National Police Forces. While some of the
limitations to the adoption of modern management
techniques are based in tradition and in the highly
centralized nature of these organizations, others
simply result from lack of exposure. For example,
promotion occurs as a matter of seniority or for
some particularly exemplary accomplishment. Annual
performance appraisals and promotional examinations
are virtually nonexistent. Training in personnel
supervision, management, and administration is
generally on-the-job training, and inservice
training is sporadic and generally conducted in
response to some immediate crisis rather than for
continued professional currency, development, and
advancement. Police managers in these organizations
need education in modern and efficient management
philosophies, techniques, and procedures, as
discussed below.
Strategic management and managed change. The mode
of response for police managers in both Romania and
Hungary is primarily reactive. Change has been so
swift and radical that managers have had little
time to develop strategic management and
organizational development plans. While the rapid
social change cannot be slowed, the police
anticipation of events and responses to change can
be managed with the development of appropriate
planning and management skills.
Centralization versus decentralization. The
transition from a Communist to a democratic form of
government has been accompanied by
decentralization of political power. Though still
highly centralized, the jurisdictions comparable to
U.S. States or counties in both countries currently
have greater autonomy within the democratic
political model. This decentralization of political
authority has been accompanied by a degree of
decentralization of authority in the national
police forces. Commanders of the police districts
now make independent decisions concerning the
hiring, promotion, discipline, and deployment of
personnel. In Hungary, district commanders have
been given the authority to engage in independent
entrepreneurial projects and cooperative activities
with groups and organizations from the private
sector.
However, decisions concerning budget, procurement
of equipment and supplies, development of formal
policies and procedures, publication of crime data
and information, release of information on major
cases and case resolution, and the appointment of
command staff to the districts are still highly
centralized and controlled. As immediate local
needs arise, special requests for assistance,
resources, and direction must be made through
national headquarters, often a laborious and
cumbersome process. Administrative positions in the
national police structures are topheavy, and
administrative overhead and expenditure are
extensive. In some instances, these expenditures
are so extensive that they come at a cost to the
local districts.
It is apparent that commanders in the various
districts want decentralization and more budgetary
control. However, those within the administration
of the national police forces, though willing to
decentralize to some extent, are not comfortable
with a more complete decentralization that would
result in greater local autonomy. This
decentralization will, nonetheless, be critical to
the ability of police managers and officers to meet
the immediate needs of their local jurisdictions.
These needs, the result of social and economic
changes, are in constant flux and cannot be met
through a centralized process. Police managers need
the requisite analytic skills and information
necessary to promote and justify decentralization
and to manage within a decentralized organizational
environment.
Introduction to police rights and labor relations.
The growing market economies of Eastern Europe will
eventually influence police organizations. Current
police organizational, economic, and salary issues
create a situation that is ripe for developing
police unions and collective bargaining. Police
managers should be made aware of the relationship
between a market economy, a democratic political
structure, and labor issues and relations within
the public sector.
Increased efficiency in police education and
training. As already noted, the educational and
training requirements for police in these two
countries are more stringent than in the United
States with respect to general educational and
technical requirements. In Hungary, for example,
noncommissioned officers must attend a 2-year
police secondary school following their completion
of what would be comparable to high school within
our educational system.
Commissioned officers must attend a 4-year police
college program following their graduation from
what would be comparable to our high school. Both
programs offer a combination of liberal studies
including training in a foreign language and
detailed technical training in forensics, law, and
criminalistics that far exceed the requirements for
U.S. police. The pedagogy, however, is traditional
and limited. While some courses are offered as
correspondence courses and are tuition subsidized
(with commitments for a period of employment
following graduation), the current educational
system cannot keep pace with the need to provide
educated and trained police officers within these
organizations that are currently plagued with high
attrition rates and accompanying personnel
shortages. There is a need for "training the
trainers" in more efficient and shorter-term
educational techniques, including the use of field
training with field supervisors which, though
present in some instances, is not widely used by
these organizations.
Development of policies and procedures. Both
Romania and Hungary have newly ratified national
constitutions and police legislation. The
principles and philosophies embodied in these
documents have not been translated into written
policies and procedures to directly guide the
activities of police managers and officers. In most
instances, there is overreliance on practical
training, previous practice, and verbal directives.
For example, in Romania, the commanders who
attended the seminars were especially receptive to
the Americans' mode of instruction because it was
practical rather than philosophical. They were
particularly interested in the integration of the
"use of force" continuum into police training and
the way this could be translated into specific
police policies for managing instances of use of
force.
Similarly, both Romanian and Hungarian police
commanders are very interested in the practical
ways in which U.S. police address large-scale civil
disturbances. They understand the principles
underlying democratic policing but in some
instances are unclear about the specific
translation of these principles into practice.
Development of strategies to foster ethical police
practice. Emerging market economies, newly
developing consumerism, and the failure of salaries
in public organizations to keep pace with the
private sector have the potential to create and, in
some instances, have created situations that foster
police corruption. For example, the Russian news
agency Interfax reported that 2,000 officers await
trial on corruption charges, while in Moscow an
entire precinct was suspended because officers were
accused of running a prostitution ring.[13]
Practical means of identifying and disciplining
unethical or illegal police misconduct related to
economic conditions are not well developed.
Internal affairs units are generally not highly
visible, and specific policies and procedures
related to these investigations are limited.
Additionally, the rights of police officers in
these circumstances and situations are not well
defined or protected but are important elements of
policing that need to be addressed within the new
political order in these national states.
Diversity training and education. While the
emergence of strong nationalism is important
following the suppression of cultural pride under
the Communist regime, the current wave of
nationalism cannot ignore the existence and rights
of minorities within these societies. The national
police forces are facing increasingly vocal and
active minority groups. The Romanian National
Police Force has come under especially critical
national and international scrutiny for its
response to crimes involving members of minority
groups as both offenders and victims. Skills to
improve police-minority relations are limited as is
the understanding of organizational benefits that
follow from a diverse police force. This issue
becomes especially complicated with respect to the
Roma, given the Roma subculture and practice of
self-segregation. However, U.S. policing has much
to offer through its history of trial and error and
current attempts to improve police-minority
relations.
Organizational communication issues. Observations
and conversations with members of both national
police forces indicate that downward communication
is the primary form of organizational
communication, with both lateral and upward
communication lacking. Communication is a critical
process in democratic organizational management.
Thus a primary role of the police executive is that
of a communicator to both the external and internal
organizational environment. This process must be
understood especially as it relates to leadership
and effective managerial practices.
Accurate collection, dissemination, and analysis of
crime statistics. Under the Communist regimes,
"common crimes" were seldom counted, tracked, or
analyzed as information necessary for sound
decisionmaking within police organizations. Though
crime statistics are kept by the police
organizations, currently the processes used create
inaccuracies, and, as is not uncommon in the United
States, police managers are generally concerned
over full public disclosure of these figures. This
hesitance to publicize crime statistics is not
without justification since the new and more open
reporting and counting of crimes has created the
appearance of a major crime wave following the
dissolution of communism. This information is an
important management tool that needs to be used by
these organizations as decisions concerning planned
change and resource allocation are made.
Use of alternative modes of response in lieu of
available technology. The technological
infrastructure of these police forces is very
limited. Many rural police districts have no patrol
vehicles. In Romania, police described situations
in which officers in the district share one or two
handguns. Computer technology and software are
limited as is highly technical investigative and
forensics equipment. Technological needs are great
while the budgets of both police forces are such
that they cannot accommodate daily operational
support needs. For example, in Pest County, the
utility company threatened to discontinue service
when the force could not make monthly payments.
Police managers need education in alternatives to
technology and alternative means of providing the
funding necessary for the purchase of technology.
For example, some police and private-sector
partnerships in Pest County have been able to
obtain new office furniture and the underwriting of
professional development costs for members of the
department. In Vac, Hungary, the district commander
contracted with a local business to run a private
restaurant in the police district building. Profits
from this cooperative venture are shared with the
police and used to supplement available funding for
technology in the district.
In Romania, the use of auxiliary police forces to
assist in times of civil disorder in remote rural
districts and the use of citizen councils to
monitor and provide information on civil disorder
to police have been proposed as means to compensate
for a virtual absence of technology and equipment
for a more immediate police response to crisis
situations. These options need to be shared with
police managers as new creative strategies are
regularly shared with U.S. police managers.
Education on the limitations of technology. Time
and time again, lack of technology within Eastern
European policing has been identified as a
contributor to police failure to provide adequate
responses to critical situations. Similarly, there
is a strong tendency for police in these countries
to believe that the quality of U.S. policing is
directly related to the availability of technology.
Eventually, technology will be integrated more
fully and completely into Eastern European
policing. Managers within these organizations need
to be apprised of the limitations and
organizational costs of technology so that they may
make informed decisions concerning the nature and
extent of its integration into their force.
Access to international networks for technical
assistance and information. Eastern European police
have addressed international crime and
international organized crime for decades. They
have had highly technical and extensive training on
techniques related to detecting and investigating
these types of crimes. It would not be unreasonable
to assume that in these skills they far exceed most
U.S. police and could, in fact, provide U.S. police
with valuable information and training on these
topics. However, training and education that would
encourage police managers to divert resources into
the technological equipment necessary to promote
the systematic retention, use, and sharing of
information between Eastern European police
organizations are needed. Additionally, expanding
access to automated databases and systems supported
within the United States and training police
personnel on the use of these systems would promote
more effective law enforcement.
Conclusion
The needs identified in these national police
forces that reflect needs in Eastern Europe in
general are not unlike those in U.S. policing
today. It is simply a matter of degree and
emphasis. The Romanian and Hungarian police
officers and organizations are not unlike their
U.S. counterparts. The organizations are highly
structured, traditional in their orientation, and
generally resistant to change. The Romanian police
officers who participated in the seminars were
hesitant to identify flaws in their organizations
and organizational practices. In some instances,
they were not openly receptive to new ideas and
strategies to promote change.
These two characteristics are common to police in
the United States as well. At the same time,
however, like their U.S. counterparts, Romanian and
Hungarian police are receptive to recommended
changes that they believe are reasonable and
practical and in which they have a vested interest.
This acceptance is further enhanced when they
perceive that recommendations are offered not as
criticisms of their organization and organizational
procedures but instead as improvements or
adjustments to a generally sound base. This is true
especially if the recommendations are presented in
a form that has been adjusted to accommodate the
countries' unique cultural traditions and
circumstances.
The process of engaging in professional education
and dialogue in these two countries has been based
on reciprocity--a reciprocity of respect and
reciprocity of learning. The Eastern European
police are cautious but enthusiastic about their
potential for professional development and change.
They have great pride in their countries, their
traditions, their organizations, and their
profession. They are eager to enhance their
strengths and to improve their image in the
international community. The environment is
receptive and challenging. It is an environment in
which the U.S. instructors learned as much about
their counterparts in Eastern Europe and themselves
as the Eastern Europeans learned about police
practices in our ever emerging democracy.
Notes
[1] Lundberg, Kristen, The Czech Republic: Police
Reform in a New Democracy, Boston: John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, 1992.
[2] Szkinger, Istavan, "Community Policing in
Hungary--Perspectives and Realities," In Community
Policing, Comparative Aspects of Community Oriented
Police Work, eds. Dieter Dolling and Thomas Feltes,
Felix, Germany: Holzkirchen/Obb., 1993:199-205;
Shelley, Louise, "The Sources of Soviet Policing,"
in Police Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1994:49-63.
[3] Since 1951, the Southern Police Institute has
provided advanced education and training courses
for police practitioners. It is a division of the
Department of Justice Administration, College of
Arts and Sciences, at the University of Louisville
in Kentucky.
[4] Pest County surrounds the Hungarian capital,
Budapest. It encompasses 6,394 square kilometers
with a population of 1 million inhabitants living
in 180 municipalities (medium-sized cities and
villages). Ten percent of all crimes committed in
Hungary take place in Pest County. In addition to
its central headquarters, the county police
maintain 13 regional police stations in major
population centers. Approximately 1,500 officers
serve in the Pest County Police Department.
[5] The Project on Ethnic Relations is a not-for-
profit organization supported by the Carnegie
Foundation, which seeks to promote the status of
minorities in Central Europe.
[6] The Roma, commonly referred to as "Gypsies,"
represent a distinct cultural and ethnic population
group in Eastern Europe. Their language, cultural
norms, and physical appearance set them apart from
other Eastern European ethnic groups, often
resulting in their oppression. There are
approximately 255,000 Roma in Romania.
[7] Senge, Peter M., The Fifth Discipline: the Art
& Practice of the Learning Organization, New York:
Doubleday, 1990; Bolman, Lee G., and Terrence E.
Deal, Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice,
and Leadership, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers, 1991.
[8] Fosdick, Raymond B., European Police Systems,
Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith reprint of
1915 original, 1969; Repetto, Thomas A., The Blue
Parade, New York: The Free Press, 1978.
[9] There are about 1.8 million Hungarians--about 8
percent of the population of Romania. The Romanian
government does not permit them to emigrate to
Hungary.
[10] Benne, Kenneth D., and Max Birnbaum,
"Principles of Change," in The Planning Change,
eds. Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert
Chinn, New York: Holt, 1969.
[11] Schein, Edgar H., Organizational Culture and
Leadership, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1985; Ott, J. Steven, The Organizational Culture
Perspective, Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole
Publishing Company, 1989.
[12] Bayley, David H., Patterns of Policing: A
Comparative
International Analysis, New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1990:8.
[13] "World Roundup," USA Today, November 17,
1995:11A.
-----------------------------------
WHO ARE WE KIDDING? OR DEVELOPING
DEMOCRACY THROUGH POLICE REFORM
by David H. Bayley
My thoughts on the topic are organized into three
parts:
o Principles, by which I mean unavoidable
impediments to achieving democracy through police
reform.
o Possibilities, referring to opportunities through
police reform that may be exploited.
o Policies, which will be specific recommendations
for getting the job done.
Principles
If the objective of American policy is to encourage
and facilitate the reform of police forces abroad
so as to smooth transitions to democracy,
policymakers must recognize three unavoidable
constraints on their efforts. First Principle
Unless a regime is dedicated to becoming
democratic, there is little that reform of the
police can accomplish on its own to bring about
democracy. Although the police can affect politics
in important ways, their autonomy is slight. The
most important effects police might have on
democracy depend on the policies of regimes. In
sum, the police can undermine democracy and they
can reinforce it, but they cannot create it.
Police affect political life in two ways.[1] They
have direct effects on:
o Persons who want to act politically--by arrest,
detention, and exile.
o The conduct of political processes, such as
elections, public meetings, freedom of speech,
protection of dissent, and provision of physical
and logistic support to political campaigns.
o The safety of regimes, by defending or not
defending them against violence.
o The content of policy, by participating in
councils of government, by having privileged access
to leaders, by threatening to give or withhold
support to government, and by political
mobilization (election blocs).
They can have indirect effects through:
o Socialization of the public, as teachers of civic
virtues.
o Legitimization of government in use of force,
openness, defense of rights, corruption, lack of
favoritism, etc.
o Demonstration effect, by which police can serve
as a model for other sectors of society with
respect to diversity versus exclusion, merit versus
ascription, honesty versus venality, equality
versus inequality before the law, and science
versus tradition.
o Participation in development through physical and
logistical support for economic development
(communications) and creation of demand for modern
technology and infrastructure (such as roads and
computers).
For the most part, these activities are matters of
government initiative or at least require approval
by government. Police are not freestanding
bureaucratic actors. Their autonomy is probably
greater with respect to their indirect effects,
which might be where foreign assistance should
concentrate.
Moreover, it is misguided to believe that a foreign
government can cultivate democracy abroad through
involvement in police reform if the regime is not
already committed to democracy and willing to
practice it.
Second Principle
The connection between democracy and the forms of
policing is weak, for democracy is compatible with
many forms of policing. Policing may be organized
and conducted similarly in both democratic and
nondemocratic countries. The character of
government and the character of the police do not
neatly coincide. This principle can be demonstrated
by examining the relation between democracy and the
following elements of policing:
o National organization of policing, particularly
its centralization or decentralization. Many
contemporary democratic countries have centralized
regimes (Sweden, France, and Israel). Decentralized
systems of policing are compatible with repression
(Germany prior to World War I, the United States in
the South before the 1960s).
o Accountability and civilian oversight. Close
political oversight is not necessarily democratic
(such as in the former Soviet Union and Cuba).
Oversight primarily by bureaucrats is compatible
with democracy (such as in France and Japan). The
balance between political control and political
insulation is rarely stable; it must be adjusted
constantly as it veers toward one extreme or the
other (such as in Colombia, India, and the United
States).
o Organization/management. Democracy is not
strongly correlated with whether recruitment is
stratified by rank or occurs only at the bottom
(for example, Japan versus Britain); whether
criminal investigation is part of the uniformed
police or separate from it (for example, the United
States versus France); and whether police are armed
or unarmed (for example, the United States versus
New Zealand).
o Strategies/programs. Community-oriented policing
can be used for grassroots ownership of policing or
for enhanced government control through
penetration, intimidation, and co-optation (for
example, the United States and Canada versus
Singapore, China, and Cuba).
o Technology. Enhancement of the technical capacity
of the police is ambiguous in its effects. It may
serve the interests of governments or of the public
depending on the nature of the government.
Police reform is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for creating democratic government.
Reforms focusing exclusively on the police are
insufficient to create democratic government.
Indeed, most reforms are neutral in their political
effects. Moreover, almost any police practice can
be exploited by a determined regime for its own
purposes.
As Michael Oakshott has said, it is "one of the
most insidious current misunderstandings" that
"institutions and procedures appear as pieces of
machinery designed to achieve a purpose settled in
advance, instead of as manners of behavior which
are meaningless when separated from their
context."[2]
American police practices do not necessarily
encourage democracy. We must be careful not to
overgeneralize from our own national experience.
Additionally, Americans engaged in police reform
abroad must listen as well as teach so that they
can better appreciate what is essentially
democratic in American practice.
Third Principle
During transitions to democracy, democratic reform
of the police is likely to be less important to
emerging democratic governments than security. The
emphasis on security in policing arises from two
sources. The first is the political interest of
emerging democratic regimes.
o Democracy requires stability and order, yet
transitions to it are often accompanied by violence
and disorder.
o Threats to regimes always take priority over
threats to the disaggregate public (subversion over
crime).[3]
o At the same time, the legitimacy of government
requires providing internal order for the
population.
The second source consists of the national
interests of foreign donors.
o Access to police abroad will be allowed only if
the security needs of the emerging democratic
regimes are acknowledged and provided for.
Enhancement of the security capacity of the police
in an emerging democracy is likely to be the sine
qua non of access for foreign government
involvement. One might call this the involvement
dilemma. We will want to remain involved so as to
have leverage, but remaining involved exposes us to
compromise with reformist principles. It is awkward
both to leave and to stay.
o Because donor countries often have their own law
enforcement interests in foreign countries (drugs,
terrorism, fugitives, and organized crime),
responsibility for which is concentrated in
national governments, foreign providers are likely
to be interested in police abroad not only to
facilitate political reform but to achieve their
own domestic law enforcement objectives.
In providing assistance to foreign police,
democratic reform is likely to take second place to
the development of enforcement capacity.
Possibilities
Granting that there are limits to the contribution
police reform can make to democratic development,
there are nonetheless possibilities for leverage.
(Recommendations with respect to the sort of
involvement the United States should have with
foreign police forces are given later in this
paper.)
First: It should be underscored that foreign
assistance to police forces is not a new or
unprecedented undertaking. It has a long history
and is being conducted currently on a considerable
scale. Foreign assistance is occurring now through:
o Institutional connections between countries based
on historical patterns of association and conquest
(Britain-Malaysia, United States-Philippines,
United States-Japan, Belgium-Zaire, Britain-
Australia, and France-North Africa).
o Commercial firms developing international markets
for police technology and expertise (Motorola;
Booz-Allen and Hamilton).
o Emulation facilitated through international
professional connections (International Association
of Chiefs of Police; International Association for
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement; United
Nations Institute for the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders, Tokyo).
o Regional integration leading to cooperative law
enforcement (European Union, ASEAN).
New bilateral efforts to assist the police of
emerging democracies must compete for the attention
of potential foreign clients. Such efforts may be
offset by the activities impinging on host
countries from these other sources. Foreign
assistance to the police will take place in a
competitive environment.
Second: Police reforms that may contribute to
democratic development vary enormously in the
likelihood of their being implemented successfully
in a foreign country. There are varying degrees of
difficulty in transferring police practices from
one country to another.
o Institutional changes involving the relations of
the police to the government or other social
structures are the most difficult to make. Reforms
that affect the purpose, functions, control, and
accountability of the police are least likely to be
exported successfully to other countries. No
government will easily relinquish control of these,
whatever its character. Examples include
centralization, civilian oversight, separation from
the military, political surveillance, intelligence
gathering.
o Matters of internal management, which are more
fully under police control, are moderately
difficult to reform. Examples include stratified
recruitment, supervisor responsibility for
mistakes, relations across ranks, and corruption.
At the same time, both culture and tradition may
limit the exportability of management practices.
o The transferability of operational strategies and
programs, too, must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. Their exportability depends, first, on the
institutional objectives of the government and,
second, on the culture and tradition of both the
police and the public.
o Technology, including some features of
management, is the least difficult to change from
abroad. Technologies are readily exportable because
they affect capacity but not substantive direction.
They are not "political." Examples are computer
information systems, techniques of forensic
analysis, communications equipment, management by
objective, performance contracts, and quality
control.
As a general rule, the police reforms that are
easiest to achieve abroad have the least effect on
democratic development, and the reforms that are
the hardest to achieve abroad have the greatest
effect on democratic development. Policymakers
should recognize as well that progress in reforming
the police is likely to come in "increments" that
contribute to "trajectories" of eventual democratic
development.[4]
Third: Taking into account both what foreign
countries are most likely to accept and what donor
governments are most likely to give, there are
several specific reforms that the United States
could advocate and support that would contribute to
democratic development. These are targets of
opportunity for American foreign police policy.
o Priority should be given to reorienting police
forces to respond to the needs of individual
citizens and private groups as opposed to serving
the interests of regimes. Foreign police forces
should be encouraged to concentrate on reactive law
enforcement, responding to the needs of the
disaggregate public.
o The role of the police should be restricted to
overt law enforcement and criminal investigation.
Police in emerging democracies should be encouraged
to give up political surveillance and
counterinsurgency.[5]
o Police should emphasize accountability to law
rather than political direction. They should be
encouraged to institutionalize the distinction
between the making of policy and the conduct of
operations, otherwise the rule of law becomes a
casualty of politics.
o Assistance should be given to help foreign police
reduce the level of force they commonly employ. n
Foreign assistance should emphasize the development
of appropriate strategic and managerial approaches
rather than enhancing technical capacity.
o Foreign assistance should be contingent on
effective efforts by police forces to eliminate all
forms of corruption.
o Foreign assistance should incorporate evaluations
of police efficacy and conduct carried out by
indigenous scholars and consultants.
o Foreign police should be encouraged to
participate in international organizations
dedicated to information sharing, standards
development, and civilian oversight and
accountability.[6]
Policies
In order to exploit the limited contribution that
police reform can make to the development of
democracy abroad, how should the United States and
other democratic countries conduct their police
foreign policy?
o The devil is not in the details but in the
objective. Police reform is not a powerful engine
of democratic development without the prior
commitment to democracy of host regimes.
o A mechanism needs to be created within the U.S.
Government whereby the sometimes conflicting
objectives in foreign political policy, foreign law
enforcement policy, and foreign police policy can
be discussed and harmonized.
o Technical assistance for the enhancement of
foreign law enforcement capacity should be given
only to convincingly democratic countries. Access
by the United States to foreign police will most
likely be contingent on developing their technical
enforcement capacity, which is highly ambiguous in
its political effects.
o Training of foreign police officers should be
done primarily by local law enforcement personnel.
The sort of policing that will make the greatest
contribution to democratic development abroad is
done at local levels in the United States. Federal
law enforcement agencies (Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Drug Enforcement Agency; Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Secret Service;
Customs Service; and Immigration and Naturalization
Service), do not do full-service, public-responding,
community-accountable policinc, which should not be
taken to imply that they do not have important functions
to carry out. Full-service, community-responsive
policing is done by State and local police agencies.
This qualitative difference in the character and
function of police agencies in the United States
creates a serious problem for implementing police
reform abroad. Relations with foreign governments
are conducted through the Federal Government, and
foreign
governments are uneasy and inexpert at contacting
local governments directly.
The solution is for the Federal Government to
develop the ability to marshal local government
talent and to project it abroad.
o Implementation of police policy abroad must
involve more than police personnel. It should be a
cooperative venture among police specialists, area
experts, management consultants, and private
industry. The role of the Federal Government will
be to enlist and coordinate these human resources.
Conclusion
In sum, the United States must be realistic about
the contribution that police reform can make to
democratic development. Enthusiasm for the
objective of spreading democracy abroad should not
impel us to undertake thoughtless programs. Realism
is essential both to successful implementation of
any reform program and to the maintenance of
essential support for such efforts within the
United States itself. We should also be careful
that international law enforcement operations by
the U.S. Government are not justified in the
beguiling language of democratic development.
Police reform is not the tail that wags the
democratic dog. And involvement in police reform
from abroad provides a feeble grasp even of that
tail.
Notes
[1] Bayley, David H., Patterns of Policing, New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1985.
[2] Oakshott, Michael, Rationalism in Politics and
Other Essays, New York: Basic Books, 1962.
[3] Bayley.
[4] Goldsmith, Andrew, "Democratization and
Criminal Justice: Human Rights and Police Reform in
Colombia," unpublished draft, March 1995.
[5] Ibid, 91ff.
[6] Ibid, 60.
-----------------------------------
CONFERENCE WRAP-UP: WHERE DO WE GO
FROM HERE?
by Mark Moore
My assignment for this session is to take the
pieces put on the table by conference participants,
and assemble them into a whole that captures the
points made. It is an exciting challenge to try to
present a complete, coherent picture of where we
stand now, and where we might go in the future on
the basis of the presentations and discussion of
the past few days. Each of you has contributed
something important, each something different, and
the framework must be able to contain all these
interesting contributions.
To help us, I have an outline of my talk. First, I
am going to introduce the concept of strategy in
the public sector, a topic that I can't resist
mentioning within 3 minutes of speaking before an
audience. Second, I want to identify and explore
what I think was the basic question we tried to
address: "How can we reform the police in ways that
can support the development of democracy?" Third, I
want to take up three issues related to that basic
question:
o Under what circumstances is the basic question
interesting and important?
o In what situations does it become an interesting
question to the United States Government?
o In thinking about reforming the police, whose
purposes are going to matter--a foreign
government's or ours?
I present a basic analytic framework for
identifying the relationship between the reform of
government, the reform of policing, and the form
that police reform takes. Finally, I conclude by
discussing the interesting question that arose
concerning the relationship between the goals of
support for U.S. law enforcement objectives, on the
one hand, and the goal of supporting democracy on
the other. That is one important question. Others
include: What are the forms of policing that are
available to us to consider as "export items"? What
do we think the mechanisms are by which any
particular form of policing might affect the
quality of democracy? What are the rules and
instruments of engagement that we would use in
trying to export a model of policing? That is the
basic outline. I will try to go through it rather
quickly.
Strategy in the Public Sector
Let me start by introducing a basic concept. My
colleague, Professor [Philip] Heymann, invented
this concept when we were working together on
public sector management. The basic idea is that in
order for a public sector initiative or enterprise
to be viable and useful in the world, it has to
meet three tests, symbolized by three different
points of the triangle I present as figure 1.
First, the enterprise must achieve some important
public value; otherwise, the expenditure of money
and authority required to accomplish the enterprise
is not worth it. Second, the initiative must have
legitimacy and attract support from those who are
in a position to contribute money and authority to
it; otherwise, there will not be enough resources
to accomplish the goal. Third, there has to be a
set of operational capacities sufficient to achieve
the goal; otherwise, the enterprise will fail. The
basic concept is that in order for the government
enterprise to be successful, it has to be valuable,
authorizable, and doable--very trivial ideas. What
is important about this diagram is that it reminds
us that all three of those bases must be brought
together in order for us to have successful
enterprises. You can see quickly what happens when
one of them is missing. If a purpose has legitimacy
and support but insufficient operational capacity,
people say, "Great idea. Couldn't get it done, too
bad. Let's take the money back." If operational
capacity is sufficient for a particular purpose but
there is no longer legitimacy and support, you hear
such comments as: "Great idea. Nice try. Too bad
nobody wants it." If the purpose is one for which
there is neither support nor capability, then you
are an academic. This is the framework that I tend
to use.
Now I want to begin applying this framework to our
particular discussion. One way to proceed is to
draw a box around figure 1 and indicate what the
strategy of policing in a foreign country should
be. In order for that concept to be viable, it must
meet the strategic requirements we have been
talking about, i.e., it must be consistent with:
o An attractive set of values.
o A set of operational capacities.
o Legitimacy and support.
We have been assuming that a particular set of
values, namely, democratic values, ought to be
reflected both in policing and in overall
governance. Part of our discussion has focused on
what particular kind of policing we think is
consistent with democratic values--would it
emphasize "rule of law" or "local responsiveness?"
But the most interesting idea we have been talking
about is the possibility that the way in which a
local police enterprise tries to define and
authorize itself might have an important causal
connection not only to the success of the police
function but also to the production of a locally
satisfactory democratic culture. That would be one
way to understand the key issue. We are trying to
imagine the nature of the relationship between, on
the one hand, the construction of a certain style
of policing (one that seeks to pursue particular
values and legitimate itself in a particular way)
and, on the other, either the reflection or
production of a locally attractive democratic
culture.
We could, of course, put ourselves outside the
local environment and look at the problem from the
vantage point of the U.S. Government. We could
imagine that the U.S. Government affected local law
enforcement strategies by simultaneously
contributing to the operational capacity of the
local police (we do so through technical
assistance, providing money and equipment, etc.)
and to their legitimacy and support (through
endorsing or criticizing local authorizing
processes). This idea is reflected in figure 2,
which shows us standing outside the local
environment but trying to influence the local
strategic situation--pressing our values,
influencing local authorizing environments, and
providing direct assistance to operations. And, of
course, in order for some U.S.-based agency (such
as the U. S. Department of Justice's International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP)) or a university-based training effort to
accomplish this result, the initiative must be
consistent with its own strategic situation.
The Basic Policy Question
The strong form of the basic question is, "How can
we reform the police in ways that can support the
development of democracy?" A weaker form of the
question is, "How can we reform police in ways that
are not destructive to the development of
democracy?" That would be a more modest objective.
We could say something slightly in the middle,
which would be, "How can we reform the police in
ways that make the police reflective of a
democratic society without undermining whatever
democratic impulses exist in the local
environment?" We could support the democratic
impulses by having a form of police that was
consistent with democracy and definitive of it. Or
we could have a form of police that is not only
reflective of and definitive of democracy but
actually did things that strengthened the quality
of democracy beyond the boundaries of its own
operation.
Note that the preceding sentence contains three
important nouns. One is "we." Who are the "we?" For
the purposes of our exercise, I am imagining that
we are taking the point of view of citizens or
representatives of the U.S. Government who are
contemplating the allocation of Government
resources to support policing in foreign countries.
(This is the outside position suggested by figure
2.)
A second noun is "police." This is a more
interesting question, and you will see that in the
framework presented as figure 3, the concept of
police becomes more complicated. Actually, we were
never quite sure if the focus of our interest in
policing was one of the following three
possibilities:
o Police institutions.
o Criminal justice institutions (including
prosecutors, jails, prisons, and perhaps defense
counsel).
o The security function that might be distributed
across a large number of institutions in the
society.
At varying times, each of these possibilities was
considered a potential target of our intervention.
I will use the word "police" conveniently to
bracket the uncertainty about each of the meanings
we had in mind. Thus, our question becomes, "How
can we reform the police, criminal justice system,
or security function in ways that can support the
development of democracy?"
The third noun is "democracy." That, too, requires
a definition. I will not attempt to resolve all the
interesting questions about how to define
democracy, but I do want to draw your attention to
some of the various ways in which that concept
entered into our conversations. Figure 4 helps us
understand some different concepts of democracy. In
this diagram, the first things to note are the two
columns labeled "culture" and "institutions." I
want to start there because Professor Heymann
started us off in an interesting and useful way. He
said he wanted to define democracy not in terms of
a set of institutions and not even in terms of the
functions of governmental institutions, but,
instead, as a force in the lives of citizens that
shapes their aspirations and expectations with
regard to how their government should be organized.
Thus, Professor Heymann began by focusing our
attention on culture, not on institutions.
We made an interesting distinction, as shown in the
rows of figure 4. One definition of democracy we
offered and used could be called the "rule of law."
I think, as do some others here, that the rule of
law is at least necessary, and sometimes
sufficient, both for the definition and the
accomplishment of democracy. The "rule of law"
concept encompasses having effective street crime
control, having a legal system capable of reaching
police corruption, and having a law enforcement
system capable of reaching political corruption
(understanding that when we move from police to
political corruption we are moving toward
increasingly powerful figures in the political and
economic system). I'd like to add to that list the
protection of individual rights in situations in
which a person is accused of a crime. Professor
Heymann could have said that having all four of
these is the definition of a "strong enforcement
operation" and therefore supported by the
definition of a strong democracy. But it could also
be true that such a strong enforcement operation
could come into existence only if a strong
democracy already existed.
I also introduced a different definition of
democracy. I claimed that it was concerned not with
"rule of law" but with some notion of
responsiveness to collective aspirations. A notion
of democracy, then, was built around the existence
of a politics that included elections and voluntary
associations that would be capable of both
articulating collective aspirations and holding
government agencies accountable for their
performance against that set of collective
aspirations. There was some notion of democracy as
requiring a capacity for citizens to get together
in various ways, ideally in large numbers, to
express their collective views. Those are the two
concepts we associated with democracy.
A third idea of democracy never came into so sharp
a focus. That idea went beyond the equal delivery
of political rights and included the equal delivery
of substantive services to people, or the creation
of just conditions in society. That concept might,
at a minimum, include some expectation that people
would enjoy equal security. It might also mean that
citizens would enjoy equal claims on the public
security being provided. Those ideas were sometimes
articulated as principles of democracy that must be
honored in the particular way in which we operate
in society.
Again, I will not attempt to resolve the question
of which of these is the correct definition of
democracy. At this stage I want simply to observe
that the concept of democracy as we have used it in
this conversation is quite complicated and probably
needs to be sorted out.
Let me move quickly through the next couple of
questions. Under what situations does this question
become an interesting policy question for the U.S.
Government? The three most common cases are where
the state has collapsed, civil war has broken out,
or an invasion has occurred. There is an older
tradition of intervention to support policing. This
occurred when the United States had a nationally
important law enforcement objective that it could
not achieve except through the existence of a
powerful local police capacity. In those
situations, we would intervene to advance our own
law enforcement objective. Indeed, the principal
reason we began supporting police operations
overseas was to advance U.S. law enforcement or to
achieve Cold War political objectives. With Cold
War political objectives achieved, U.S. law
enforcement interests are advancing and becoming
more important. But we suddenly find ourselves in a
situation in which many states seem to have
collapsed, and that gives us an opportunity to
intervene to provide humanitarian aid, to support
democracy, to effect future advancement of U.S. law
enforcement purposes, or any of the above. That is
the foreign policy context of the local situation
that has arisen.
In these situations we face an important question,
"Whose purposes are we trying to accomplish?" One
answer to that question is, "Not ours." We should
do for other countries only what they ask and want.
Our relationship then is to offer support to
countries in whatever they are trying to get done.
I think that is the extreme view of the cultural
relevance argument. The alternative answer is, "No,
it is our purposes that matter. We're spending the
money, we're spending the effort, we're trying to
accomplish something here." Of course, we would
understand that the accomplishment of our purposes
requires us to understand a country's institutions
and cultures and what it is trying to achieve and,
to the extent that we can, accommodate such goals.
If we don't accommodate them, there will be
relationship problems, and we won't have any
leverage.
I prefer the second answer to this question so that
we would not have to deal with it again. It is, of
course, true that when we sit here thinking about
how to use U.S. resources to support policing in
emerging democracies, it is our purposes that
matter. I think we all agree that it is terribly
important for us to attend to the capabilities and
interests of emerging democracies and to
accommodate them and not feel
vulnerable to accusations of having "gone native."
We must always be a little nervous that we have
given up too much in terms of our objectives in
order to maintain the relationship and satisfy a
country's desire for independence. I assume that is
the general problem with diplomacy that we don't
have to resolve today.
Question from Carl Klockars. So a collaborative
approach is discarded. It is our objectives that
count? Is that what I understand?
Answer by Mark Moore. No. Collaboration is not
discarded. I am simply making the point that we
evaluate any particular collaboration in our terms.
We calculate whether we like what is going on. When
we come to the rules of engagement, Professor
[David] Bayley says, "Be prepared to pull out."
Professor Heymann says, "Be tough, be demanding,
insist on something." A collaborative relationship
is necessary in negotiation, but you calculate what
you get out of the result of a negotiation in terms
that matter to you. Those terms may include the
protection of an ongoing relationship, certain
humanitarian assistance, and so on. However
attentive you are to their concerns and their
desire to maintain a relationship, in the end you
calculate whether you like or don't like the
results of the deal you have been offered in terms
that satisfy you (which can, of course, also
include concerns for them and their welfare).
Question from Philip Heymann. In the litany of
interests that might motivate us, Ukrainians and
Russians in their country have suspicions about
Americans buying up the market, so it may be
appropriate to list our financial interests in the
area.
At worst we ask, whose purpose? The answer is that
it is a common purpose. The reason that we offered
four courses on money laundering in Ukraine is that
curtailment of money laundering is one of our
objectives. We did it because it matched that
country's objectives. We had a match, so we did a
program. If we didn't get a match, we didn't do a
program.
Answer by Mark Moore. Sometimes you can offer a
program because you have different interests, but
the program you are planning to offer serves the
interests of both countries. It may turn out that
is a rather common situation. You don't necessarily
need common objectives to be able to make a deal.
Sometimes people will agree to a deal because they
see something in the deal for them and are happy to
go along, and what each party to the deal values is
different.
The Basic Analytic Framework
Now we are at the stage in which we are talking
about the basic analytic framework. When thinking
about a policy, I always think in terms of three
questions: (1) What are our objectives? (2) What
are our instruments? (3) What do we know about the
relationship between our ends and our means? So
far, we have talked about the possible ends of U.S.
support to policing overseas--the advancement of
law enforcement objectives or the enhancement of
democracy. At this stage you can incorporate that
matrix I presented in which the goals were the
development of political culture and civil society
(figure 4). One of the issues I'll address deals
with the relationship between these two different
objectives.
I have already alluded to the fact that at various
times we have targeted the intrastate police,
criminal justice system, or security function to
examine how those would be effective. The means we
talked about include ICITAP, which provides
training and technical assistance and supports
morale. We also heard about several Government-
supported university programs that tended to use
the same set of instruments for accomplishing the
result. Professor Heymann was particularly strong
on the potential value of using outside
institutions to intervene (by building morale and
political pressure) in the authorizing environment
of the locality, rather than to intervene directly
in developing operational capabilities. I think it
was David Bayley who also reminded us that a lot of
other things were happening that affected either
the police, criminal justice, or security.
We could even extend that list of interventions
significantly if we ask the question, "Who is doing
something that affects the quality of democracy in
that country?" If we asked that question, we would
find that our interests in supporting policing were
just a tiny part of overall efforts to support
democracy. One of the big questions in the
background of our discussion has been, "How much
leverage can we get out of any change in this
system for the enhancement of democracy?" Compare
that with a variety of other efforts that we might
have if our goal was to enhance the quality of
democracy. I assume all our political aid and a
number of other things are working to enhance the
quality of democracy. We have this one tiny piece
that we are trying to define. This is the basic
analytic framework that I wanted to present.
Basic Issues and Themes
Now let's move to the basic issues and themes. The
first question is, "What is the goal of advancing
U.S. law enforcement objectives versus the goal of
enhancing democracy?" Ambassador [Robert] Gelbard
said he thought these ends were not always
incompatible. I think he is right. I could imagine
some circumstances in which the two would be quite
closely aligned. They would include a situation in
which a target of U.S. law enforcement objectives
was an impediment to the development of democracy
in a country, and apprehending the targeted person
required the development of local institutions and
political cultures that would move toward enhancing
democracy.
Where we would not be in alignment, however, is in
a situation where we would support authoritarian
regimes in order to achieve our law enforcement
objectives. In that case we would be tempted to use
nondemocratic means to achieve our law enforcement
objectives and, in so doing, would shape the
development of local policing and become a sponsor-
-in the name of developing democracy--for precisely
the kind of things we want to discourage. No matter
what we need to do, sponsorship of the wrong course
of action comes from outside rather than inside the
country and is always a price we end up paying when
U.S. diplomatic instruments and financial
assistance are used to support only U.S.
objectives. There is some uncertainty about whether
these things are always in opposition or always
aligned. I think the answer is that they are
sometimes together and sometimes in opposition.
The next question is, "What is the form of policing
that we will try to export?" I again want to
emphasize this distinction--which came up rather
forcefully in our conversation--and that is the
distinction among policing, the criminal justice
system, and the security function. I want to
emphasize this because its importance occurred to
me when we were talking about the need for decent
jail and prison conditions as well as effective
policing. You could easily imagine that if none of
the values we are trying to advance took hold (for
example, democratic policing as respect for the
rights of defendants), it would be a hollow
position to maintain that we are in favor of
protecting the rights of defendants if we then read
them their Miranda rights and leave them
languishing in jail without benefit of trial for
long periods. It may be that insofar as our goal is
to advance democracy, it includes not only the rule
of law but also the protection of individual
rights. We would, of course, have to take
responsibility for working on trials and conditions
in prisons and jails as well as good policing.
Clifford [Shearing] asked us to think more broadly
outside the boundaries of criminal justice and
imagine the ways in which institutions and private
and civil society could be engaged in the process
of producing security. It is quite interesting that
if the form of democracy we seek to encourage
includes constructing a political culture in a
civil society, then determining how to police in a
way that would help build that political culture
would be an important contribution to at least that
form of democracy, if not to the rule-of-law form
of democracy.
The next question we addressed--and dropped rather
quickly--deals with how to structure the security
function. What I mean by that is determining which
functions to include in the agency that we call the
police. Should we include antiterrorism,
antisubversion, civil disorder responses to riots,
street crime, and governmental presence as
functions of the police? David Bayley said he
always recommends leaving the antisubversion,
antiterrorism function out of the agency that you
are trying to call the local police on the grounds
that it is politically the most vulnerable. That is
an interesting idea. There was also a question
about whether we wanted to have a centralized or
decentralized police force.
Perhaps the most important question concerns where
we stand on the question of "professional law
enforcement" versus community policing? We shared a
couple of interesting observations. One is that we
may have to practice professional law enforcement,
to pass through that stage in police development,
because it is most consistent with rule-of-law
democracy. Focusing on community policing and the
security function might be valuable as well because
it would encourage the development of a local
capacity for action that would support the kind of
democracy associated with responsiveness, including
cultural responsiveness. Those affected are going
to see that tension. This was question one and
issue one. Issue two involved the kind of policing.
Issue three is this interesting question of the
mechanism by which policing affects democracy. We
heard a great deal of skepticism about the extent
to which one could expect reform of policing or of
the criminal justice system or security function,
in terms of capacity to affect the quality of
democracy. I wrote down about five possible
mechanisms by which we can imagine that happening.
Let me just run through these because I think they
are important.
The first mechanism would be to ask what form of
policing we are going to have in this country and
make it an issue. By doing so we may be able to
sustain a dialogue at high levels and throughout
society about democratic principles and what it
means to live in a democracy. What part of
democracy do we really want? What part of it has to
do with being responsive to citizens? What part of
it has to do with building a local as well as
national political infrastructure? By making this
an issue for discussion, we might be able to have
an effect on the quality of democracy.
Second, if policing is a means of upward mobility
for the society, it may be that police training is
really training of future leaders--not just of the
police department, but also of the civil society.
That may be an important side effect of training--
to train leaders for future civil society if not
for the police.
A third possible mechanism could be this: To the
extent that the police were effective in
controlling street crime or disorder, one issue
that would be favorable to the creation of
authoritarian politics would be removed. In effect,
an important way in which the police might be able
to promote democracy is by doing a good enough job
on reducing crime and stilling fear that people
wouldn't be tempted to grant official power to the
national regime. Effectiveness in controlling crime
might be particularly important in judging whether
a particular policing venture is likely to support
democracy.
A fourth mechanism could be that policing could
support democracy by enhancing the credibility of
government as an effective agency, as a powerful
agency, and most important, as a fair and equitable
agency. That would mean that policing would be
successful largely by building credibility in
government.
The last mechanism I could think of--the fifth--is
that the way we do policing might affect our
success in engaging citizens in an experience that
taught them democratic values. That experience
could be in operation as an offender, victim, or
witness, or it could be in some oversight of the
police. If citizens have those kinds of
experiences, that might be conducive to
constructing a political culture supporting
democracy.
It seemed to me that Dave's [Bayley] point when he
was urging caution about introducing centralized
systems was that we may want to try to introduce
systems that have a kind of recurrent resistance to
potential abuse. That is a downward-looking system,
as I understand his argument, drawing its strength
locally, and it has a peculiar kind of resistance
to manipulating undemocratic ways. Not that it has
to be foolproof, but the general objective would be
to introduce or suggest systems with mechanisms
that we believe are particularly resistant to
totalitarian regimes.
Comment from Jeremy Travis. I would also add that
we can support democracy by showing that no one is
allowed to steal from the state. Nobody should be
allowed to use the state for his or her own private
purposes.
Response from Mark Moore. I think that is an
important point. I meant to include that idea when
we discussed being fair. We would be successful by
eliminating corruption both within the police and
other agencies of government as well as among
politicians.
I have two last things to discuss. One is the rules
and instruments of engagement. Our basic notion
here is that we ought to apply [David] Bayley's
principles for the next generation as long as he
has a chance to think about it. It did seem fair to
state that we faced a very tough strategic problem,
in terms of our operational capacity, which has to
do with tension we face (described quite well by
the ICITAP people) between moving quickly in a
situation, interacting effectively with U.S. and
other military operations when they are still on
site, and providing enough resources and staying
long enough to have an effect. Again the question
is about whether the U.S. Government is really
prepared to act quickly, interact effectively with
its own military, supply enough resources, stay
long enough, and be flexible enough to actually
produce a result. By all accounts it takes us 5 or
7 years to get a strong police organization formed
in some democracies. Maybe we should be doing this
for many reasons other than building democracies.
My last point concerns how to make further
intellectual progress on the basis of this start. I
think it is important to recognize that in any
situation we enter, learning accompanies doing. We
are not going to have the luxury of standing back,
learning, and then doing. We are going to have to
learn while we do. We ought to organize ourselves
to learn while we are doing, which I think means
documenting as effectively as we can our activities
and their effects and giving ourselves many chances
to get together and talk about our thoughts on the
meaning of a particular experience. A partnership
between academics and practitioners would be a
crucial element. The particular new piece of grist
that we need for this would be case studies that
accurately describe all such interventions we have
made so far. These studies can be used as the basis
for understanding what seems to have worked and
what hasn't. In any event, the cases will help us
understand and describe the situations we are
talking about in more concrete detail.
APPENDIX A: U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR
ACTIVITIES
by Daniel McGillis*
International criminal justice assistance efforts
have increased dramatically in recent years. U.S.
Government agencies have begun to provide technical
assistance and training to justice system personnel
in nations around the world. This paper presents a
brief overview of major Federal international
justice assistance activities. The paper's focus is
on formal training and technical assistance
programs. Many additional ad hoc assistance
activities (e.g., hosting meetings with justice
system delegations visiting from overseas and
responding to requests for information regarding
draft legislation and procedures) are conducted by
units of government that do not otherwise have
systematic programs. These ad hoc activities are
not reviewed here. The justice assistance field is
growing rapidly, and the summaries presented below
inevitably provide only a snapshot of the many
evolving Federal technical assistance and training
efforts.
Federal agencies are increasingly providing justice
assistance to foreign governments for two major
reasons:
o To respond to the growth and seriousness of
transnational crimes that victimize U.S. citizens
(including organized crime, drug trafficking,
sophisticated financial crimes, and terrorism).
Such crime has grown in the wake of rapid economic,
political, and technological changes around the
globe.
o To assist fragile emerging democracies in
establishing the rule of law. Justice reform is
often an essential precondition to the
consolidation of democratic governance and the
creation of effective market economies in such
nations.
The first reason addresses critical U.S. domestic
law enforcement needs while the second deals with a
high-priority foreign policy objective. The
importance of both purposes for international
justice assistance efforts was highlighted by then
Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick in recent
testimony before the House Committee on
International Relations.[1] In many cases these two
purposes have converged in specific nations;
emerging democracies have often become significant
staging areas for transnational crime due to the
weakness of their domestic justice systems.
The U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and
Treasury, along with the Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA) have taken the lead in
providing Federal international justice assistance.
The various Federal investigative agencies--Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA); Secret Service; Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); and others--
have different areas of expertise depending upon
their statutory jurisdictions within the United
States and provide assistance in keeping with their
relative expertise. Agreements have been developed
between the agencies to help clarify relative areas
of responsibility for technical assistance and
training.
The U.S. Department of State has worked to enhance
coordination across the broad array of Federal
international justice assistance activities in
collaboration with the other agencies. It has
provided funding for training programs in Eastern
and Central Europe and in the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union through the
Support for Eastern European Democracies Act (SEED)
and the Freedom Support Act (FSA), and has provided
funding for assistance in other parts of the world
from other State Department funding sources.
Federal law enforcement agencies (including the
FBI, Secret Service, ATF and others) submit their
SEED and FSA training plans to the State Department
at the beginning of the fiscal year and receive
support for their training programs following
assessment of the plans.
It should be noted at the outset that the problem
of international crime and the issue of how to
design effective strategies for responding to it
have recently moved to center stage on the world
agenda. This increased attention to the topic by
the G-7/P8 and the United Nations may lead to even
greater demands upon Federal agencies for
international justice assistance. At the June 1996
G-7/P8 Summit in Lyons, participating nations
approved an ambitious 40-point plan to combat
transnational crime. The P8 (the G-7 plus Russia)
recommendations deal with such key issues as
extradition, improved information sharing, the
seizure of criminal assets, cooperation to deter
money laundering, and enhanced monitoring of the
movement of criminals across borders.
A related broad-ranging international initiative
was approved shortly before the Lyons meeting.
President Clinton's October 1995 call for a major
International Crime Initiative led to passage of
the Declaration on Crime and Public Security by
nations participating in the May 1996 meeting in
Vienna of the United Nations Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice. The Commission
recommended that the General Assembly adopt the
Declaration, which urges signatories to take
vigorous action to combat terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, illegal arms sales, and related
crimes. Reforms recommended in the
Declaration include improved police force
partnerships, the implementation of asset
forfeiture mechanisms, expanded use of mutual legal
assistance treaties, and related measures. Article
4 of the Declaration urges "the provision of
bilateral and multilateral technical assistance to
member States by utilizing training, exchange
programs and law enforcement training academies and
criminal justice institutes at the international
level."[2]
In his October 1995 address to the U.N. General
Assembly, President Clinton also called for the
drafting of a U.S. international crime bill to
improve capacity in the United States to combat
transnational crime. According to a recent
publication by the Office of International Criminal
Justice (a component of the State Department's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs [INL]), "The bill will contain
proposals to augment the ability of U.S. agencies
to investigate and prosecute international
criminals. It will seek authorization for increased
U.S. training and assistance to countries similarly
committed to fighting international crime but
lacking the resources to do so."
The training and technical assistance efforts of
U.S. government agencies that are described below
are playing a critical role in the international
fight against crime. These efforts are likely to be
essential to the successful implementation of the
ambitious P8 and U.N. international crime
initiatives, and the U.S. international crime bill
that is being drafted may expand current levels of
such assistance to help meet the growing needs in
this field.
U.S. Department of Justice
Congressman Benjamin Gilman has characterized the
Justice Department as "the newest and potentially most
powerful administration player in the democracy
rule-of-law field."[3] Seven components of the
Justice Department are currently involved in the
systematic delivery of international justice reform
training and technical assistance. These components
include the FBI, the DEA, two programs of the
Criminal Division (the International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
and the Office of Professional Development and
Training (OPDAT)), the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and the Antitrust
Division.
Two additional Justice Department components are
involved in closely related international justice
reform. The Criminal Division's Office of
International Affairs (OIA) handles mutual legal
assistance treaties, extraditions, and liaisons to
multilateral organizations. The National Institute
of Justice (NIJ), DOJ's research and development
arm, conducts research in this area, disseminates
information worldwide, and sponsors conferences on
important topics in justice reform. NIJ is an
affiliate institute of the U.N. Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice (UNCPCJ) Branch and is
developing the U.N. Online Crime and Justice
Clearinghouse (UNOJUST) to link UNCPCJ institutes
on the World Wide Web.
As might be expected, many other components of DOJ
(e.g., some of the litigation divisions, the
Marshals Service, and the Bureau of Prisons) have
also provided assistance to foreign governments.
This has included advising governments about draft
statutes, meeting with visiting foreign delegations
to discuss their areas of expertise, and like
areas. Such assistance has been provided on an ad
hoc basis, and these intermittent activities are
not discussed here.
The diverse DOJ international justice assistance
activities are coordinated within the Department by
the Executive Office for National Security (EONS).
EONS is a component of the Deputy Attorney
General's office and, among other activities,
convenes a working group of relevant Justice
Department organizations to share information on
international technical assistance and training.
The aims of the working group are to avoid
duplication of effort, to ensure that activities
reflect DOJ's enforcement priorities, and to
maximize the use of departmental resources and
other funding from outside DOJ. In addition to
representatives from the various DOJ assistance
programs, senior officials of the Criminal Division
also attend the working group meetings to assist in
coordination.
This section presents a brief overview of the
efforts of the nine Justice Department
organizations, noted above, that are systematically
involved in international justice reform.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI is involved in a wide range of
international criminal justice training and
technical assistance activities and is the Federal
investigative agency with the broadest law
enforcement responsibility. In addition to
transferring skills to its foreign counterparts,
the FBI reports that such activities are extremely
valuable in developing close relationships between
U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials. Such
relationships can lead to the cooperation and
communication across borders that is essential to
solving crimes.
FBI training programs take place in three major
settings: (1) at the International Law Enforcement
Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, (2) in foreign
countries in collaboration with local law
enforcement agencies, and (3) at the FBI Academy in
Quantico, Virginia.
The International Law Enforcement Academy in
Budapest is a joint effort of the Government of
Hungary and the Government of the United States.
The U.S. Government agencies involved in the
development and operation of ILEA include the
Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and
their efforts are coordinated by the interagency
ILEA Steering Group. The FBI, DEA, Secret Service,
ATF, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Customs
all participate in ILEA training programs. Opening
in 1995, with its formal dedication ceremony taking
place in April 1996, the Academy offers an 8-week
training program for law enforcement personnel from
the nations of Eastern and Central Europe and the
former Soviet Union as well as periodic seminars on
various topics. The 8-week program places
particular emphasis on strategies for combating
international crime, especially financial and
organized crime, and also teaches leadership and
management skills. The FBI academy is funded by the
SEED and FSA.
Academy instructors are drawn from a number of
Federal agencies, including the FBI, DEA, Secret
Service, ATF, and the IRS. In addition, instructors
from law enforcement agencies in Canada and a
number of Western European nations have taught at
the academy.
The academy plans to hold five 8-week training
sessions each year, with 50 students per session.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 1996, academy students will be
drawn from Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia,
Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The
specific courses presented by Federal agencies at
ILEA are noted below in the discussions of the
individual agencies' training and technical
assistance activities.
In addition to the 8-week training course, ILEA
serves as a venue for conducting a wide variety of
briefer executive training seminars and related
advanced training programs. For example, the Secret
Service recently sponsored an advanced course at
ILEA on the topic of counterfeiting.
The FBI also provides in-country training to
foreign law enforcement officials. During FY 1995,
approximately 4,400 law enforcement personnel
received such training. Before developing training
programs, the FBI conducts in-country training
needs assessments to determine the specific
priority training needs of individual nations.
Experienced FBI personnel serve as the teachers for
the typically 1- to 2-week training sessions.
Topics addressed have included organized crime,
bank robbery, terrorism, white-collar crime,
forensics, investigative skills (including
undercover techniques), international automobile
theft, and other issues. Recent in-country training
sessions have been held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;
Vladimir, Russia; Prague, Czech Republic; and
Warsaw, Poland.
Some additional training programs for foreign law
enforcement personnel are conducted at the FBI
Academy in Quantico, Virginia. For example, between
January and March 1996, 150 officers of the Russian
Ministry of Interior (MVD) received training there.
In addition, foreign officers participate in the
FBI National Academy Program at Quantico, which
primarily serves State and local law enforcement
personnel from this country. In FY 1995, 110
foreign law enforcement personnel were trained in
this program along with State and local personnel.
International technical assistance provided by the
FBI takes many forms. FBI legal attachs, stationed
in 23 countries around the world, work closely with
local law enforcement personnel to share
information and collaborate in working on important
cases. In the course of this work, they often
provide advice and assistance to their
counterparts. In FY 1995, FBI attachs worked on
more than 11,000 matters.
In some particularly challenging case
investigations, the FBI brought foreign case
investigators to the United States to work closely
with FBI personnel. FBI agents provide their
foreign counterparts with information regarding the
investigative techniques used in the United States
to solve similar complex cases. Such assistance is
particularly helpful with difficult investigations
involving organized crime.
In addition, the FBI has sent personnel to other
countries to offer advice on practical matters in
developing law enforcement agencies. For example,
an agent has worked with the government of
Kazakhstan in that nation's effort to develop an
investigative agency similar to the FBI.
Drug Enforcement Administration
The Drug Enforcement Administration has provided
international training and technical assistance for
many years in support of its mission to combat
drugs. The State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters (INM) and its
successor agency, the current Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, have provided funding for DEA's overseas
training and technical assistance. More recently,
additional funding has been provided from the SEED
and FSA legislation, noted above, for training in
Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union. These funds are also managed by INL.
A variety of types of training courses are offered.
Basic drug enforcement classes taught in-country
are 2-week training programs shaped to local
conditions in a given nation. Instructors are
highly experienced DEA agents. The foreign law
enforcement officials who enroll in this course
typically have had limited drug enforcement
experience. Topics covered include basic
investigative techniques, surveillance skills, and
related areas. The courses are offered to officials
in nations around the world who are confronting
significant drug enforcement problems (e.g.,
Brazil, Costa Rica, Haiti, Pakistan, and Taiwan).
The DEA offers its International Narcotics
Enforcement Managers Seminar twice each year. The
seminar is attended by mid- to senior-level law
enforcement officials who are working on drug
enforcement operations in their countries. They
learn management and leadership skills in addition
to receiving information about drug enforcement
strategies.
The DEA's allocation from SEED and FSA funds is
supporting an ambitious program of training in
Eastern and Central Europe and the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union. This
funding supports training in specific countries and
DEA participation in the training program of the
International Law Enforcement Academy.
Course sessions offered by DEA at ILEA cover a
broad range of issues and include narcotics program
overview/demand reduction, worldwide drug
trafficking routes and trends, drug identification
and behavioral effects of narcotics use, drug field
testing, informant management, case management,
intelligence operations, undercover operations,
clandestine laboratory operations, drug conspiracy
investigations, raid planning, airport/seaport
operations, international controlled deliveries,
and risk management.
Some training programs are held in-country for
specific nations; others are held regionally. For
the current fiscal year, FSA funds will support
nine in-country and four regional schools, and SEED
funds will support seven in-country and three
regional schools. Moscow will be the site for one
of the regional programs, and law enforcement
personnel from six nations will be represented at
the session.
The DEA also conducts some training sessions in the
United States for foreign law enforcement
personnel. Topics vary, and typically three to four
DEA instructors serve as teachers. All DEA
instructors must have a minimum of 10 years'
experience with the agency. In addition, the DEA
provides technical assistance to foreign law
enforcement personnel through its field offices
overseas. DEA personnel posted abroad play a
valuable role in working on specific cases with
their foreign counterparts and providing them
information about advanced
investigative techniques to deal with such cases.
Criminal Division: International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program
The Criminal Division's International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program provides
a wide array of law enforcement training programs.
A component of the Justice Department's Criminal
Division, ICITAP's stated mission is "to develop
sound civilian police organizations that operate
under internationally recognized human rights
standards within sustainable justice systems."[4]
ICITAP offers courses in basic police procedures,
forensic testing, and specialized investigative
techniques for handling various types of cases,
including organized crime, financial crime, and
alien smuggling. Instructors are highly experienced
law enforcement personnel. In addition, ICITAP
personnel train law enforcement trainers in various
nations to institutionalize an ongoing capacity for
police training.
ICITAP has delivered technical assistance in a wide
variety of areas. It has been provided to develop
police academies, forensic testing capabilities,
law enforcement department policies and procedures,
and central offices of professional responsibility
to encourage accountability and integrity among law
enforcement personnel. ICITAP's efforts to develop
police academies include assistance in structuring
the curriculums and training instructors to make
the effort sustainable. The core curriculums
include such topics as Policing in a Democracy,
Human Dignity, Police Ethics, Community Oriented
Policing, Police Functions, Interviewing
Techniques, and Firearms and Personal Defense
Training.
ICITAP began operations in 1986 and since then has
worked in 26 countries, including nations
throughout Central and South America and the
Caribbean, the newly independent states of the
former Soviet Union and, recently, in the Balkans
and Central Africa. Countries or regions that now
receive or have recently received ICITAP assistance
include Albania, Belarus, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Eastern Slavonia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Panama, and Rwanda.
The training and technical assistance programs of
ICITAP have led to the development of a number of
regional law enforcement coordinating bodies,
including the Central American Chiefs of Police
Association (CACPA) and the Association of
Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP).
Criminal Division: Office of Professional
Development and Training
The Office of Professional Development and Training
is also a component of DOJ's Criminal Division. It
was established in 1991 to provide in-house
training for Criminal Division staff as well as to
provide training and technical assistance to
prosecutors in other nations. In nations in which
the judges who initially receive cases have an
investigative function akin to that of U.S.
prosecutors--a common practice in Latin America--
training is also provided to these investigating
magistrates.
OPDAT is currently providing assistance to
prosecutors and other judicial personnel overseas
in Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti, Peru, Russia, and
Poland. These far-reaching programs have included
training in prosecution and oral advocacy skills
and in the provision of new criminal procedural
legislation. The programs also provide assistance
with the development and management of prosecutors'
offices, the drafting of legislation to reform
justice system institutions and procedures, and
related matters. OPDAT field representatives, drawn
primarily from the Criminal Division and the
Executive Office for United States Attorneys, are
all experienced prosecutors.
OPDAT assistance in Bolivia began in 1993 with
placement of an OPDAT field representative in La
Paz. Within the first year of operations in
Bolivia, the program trained more than 800 judges,
prosecutors, police, and public defenders in
important revisions in the nation's laws on
prosecution. OPDAT has also helped the Bolivian
Attorney General develop model prosecutors' offices
and has worked in collaboration with the Attorney
General to develop a prosecutor's procedures manual
and a computer case tracking system.
As a result of its accomplishments in Bolivia,
OPDAT was asked to establish a similar program in
Colombia. An OPDAT representative is developing a
training program for the almost 3,000 Colombian
prosecutors, and OPDAT personnel, in collaboration
with USAID, are training the faculty of the new
Colombian prosecutor's school.
In Haiti, beginning in early 1995, OPDAT developed
a training program for the country's 500
prosecutors and judges, an effort undertaken in
conjunction with the National Center for State
Courts. OPDAT has also assisted the Ministry of
Justice of Haiti in developing a judicial school
and in preparing a benchbook for judges and
prosecutors dealing with criminal justice
procedures.
In Peru, OPDAT has assigned two Criminal Division
trial attorneys to assist in revising that nation's
criminal procedural code. As is the case with many
reformed Latin American criminal procedural codes,
the revised code in Peru will provide for oral
trials and increase the role of the prosecutor in
case processing. OPDAT has sent two Justice
Department attorneys to Moscow to provide ongoing
assistance to Russian justice system officials in
prosecuting economic crime and organized crime, and
in related matters. They have also provided
extensive advice in drafting legislation to reform
the Russian legal system. OPDAT is working in
collaboration with the American Bar Association's
Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) in
a number of its efforts.
OPDAT has also hosted many foreign justice system
delegations to the United States. For example, in
1994, OPDAT received requests for more than 350
meetings with foreign officials and made
presentations to more than 500 international
visitors. These presentations provided overviews of
the U.S. justice system and dealt with technical
topics such as money laundering, organized crime,
asset forfeiture, and the like, depending on the
visitors' interests.
Criminal Division: Office of International Affairs
The Criminal Division's Office of International
Affairs has several important roles in the
international criminal justice arena. A number of
them involve dealings between the U.S. justice
system and counterpart agencies in other individual
countries. For example, the OIA provides assistance
to U.S. Attorneys and State and local prosecutors
in obtaining evidence from foreign justice system
agencies. The Office also works on extradition
matters and is involved in the negotiation of
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with other
nations; these bilateral agreements seek to improve
cooperation between governments in handling
criminal matters.
OIA also works very actively with multilateral
organizations, including the U.N. Crime Commission,
the G-7/P8, the Council of Europe, the European
Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and the Organization of
American States. Personnel from OIA were recently
involved in drafting the P8 40-point set of
recommendations to combat transnational crime and
the U.N. drafting of the Declaration on Crime and
Public Security.
One staff member from OIA is on detail to the U.S.
Agency for International Development. This staff
member provides information to that agency on
Justice Department capacities, interests, and
recommendations related to rule-of-law efforts
being planned by USAID.
Executive Office for United States Attorneys
As noted above, the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys has served as a major source of
personnel for OPDAT. OPDAT sends requests for
attorneys with specific experience, legal skills,
and language skills to EOUSA, the Criminal
Division, and elsewhere, as appropriate. Some
overseas assignments are relatively brief (2 or 3
weeks) while others involve long-term placements
abroad (e.g., the Bolivian, Colombian, and Russian
examples cited above). One major challenge is to
fit such assignments into the caseloads of busy,
experienced attorneys. Assistant U.S. Attorneys who
are selected to provide training and technical
assistance overseas first receive orientation and
training at OPDAT. They are also tested by OPDAT to
ensure that their language skills are sufficient
for the assignment.
Immigration and Naturalization Service
The Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts
an Overseas Fraudulent Document Detection Training
Program. The training is provided by experienced
overseas INS personnel, with assistance from other
INS components, including the Inspections Division.
Trainees include representatives of air carriers,
immigration authorities, law enforcement agencies,
airport security, foreign consular officials,
border police, and others.
The training program is coordinated by INS district
offices in Mexico, Rome, and Bangkok, with training
sessions held in countries located in these three
districts. In June 1996 more than 1,100 people were
trained in Mexico, El Salvador, Panama, Belize,
Nicaragua, Great Britain, Austria, Germany, and
Thailand. In FY 1995, 11,702 people were trained by
the Overseas Fraudulent Document Training Program,
a number that included 5,455 foreign governmental
officials, 5,652 airline personnel, and 595 others
(including U.S. Embassy and consular officers).
In addition, INS personnel provide one-on-one
training to their counterparts in many nations to
teach them how to detect fraudulent documents.
Antitrust Division
The Antitrust Division, in collaboration with the
Federal Trade Commission, has provided assistance
to more than 20 countries in competition law and
policy issues. These countries are in many regions
of the world, including Eastern and Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Africa. USAID has funded most of
this training and technical assistance.
In some instances two-person teams comprising an
attorney and an economist have been assigned to
relevant foreign agencies to provide long-term
assistance (for 3- to 8-month periods). These
advisers work with their counterparts in economic
competition agencies on a daily basis to assist
with reforms in agency operations. The types of
assistance provided have included assistance in
legal and regulation drafting, staff training,
provision of information regarding methods of
competition analysis and relevant investigative
techniques, and discussions of specific cases or
problems in a particular sector of the nation's
economy.
In other nations, assistance is provided on a
short-term basis for 1 to 2 weeks. Such shorter-
term visits address specific competition issues.
The Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission have also sponsored internships in
Washington for foreign officials for periods up to
6 weeks.
National Institute of Justice
The National Institute of Justice is the research
and development arm of the U.S. Department of
Justice. NIJ is involved in international justice
reform issues in a variety of ways, including
sponsorship of conferences, conduct of
clearinghouse and dissemination activities,
sponsorship of research and visiting fellows, and
maintenance of cooperative relationships with
multilateral organizations. NIJ has sponsored
conferences in a wide variety of topic areas during
the past 25 years. Many have relevance to ongoing
foreign and domestic justice reforms. In December
1995 NIJ cosponsored a workshop on "Policing in
Emerging Democracies" with the State Department;
the meeting was attended by representatives of 19
Federal agencies, participants from Russia and
Ukraine, leading scholars, and others.
NIJ has been very active in conducting information
clearinghouse and dissemination activities. It
sponsors the world's largest criminal justice
system clearinghouse, the National Criminal Justice
Reference Service (NCJRS), which has a library of
more than 130,000 documents. NCJRS has placed
substantial resources on the Internet, including
many international materials and links to other
international sources of information. At a recent
U.N. Congress, an NIJ official characterized NCJRS
Online as "the beginning of a worldwide justice
library without walls from which the inter-national
criminal justice community can access information
in order to improve the operations of the criminal
justice system around the world."[5]
NIJ has conducted research on a very broad range of
criminal justice issues during the past quarter
century and, in the international area, has funded
studies of Colombian drug trafficking, money
laundering, Asian organized crime, and Soviet
emigre-organized crime networks. The field of
international justice reform is an extremely
important one and merits intensive research to
determine what works and what strategies should be
pursued in different settings. Further efforts are
needed to collect, consolidate, and analyze the
experience and results of the various training,
police support, and rule-of-law efforts so that the
findings can inform future initiatives.
The Institute recently hosted four Visiting Fellows
from the newly independent states who were
conducting research dealing with such topics as
organized crime and police integrity. In the past
NIJ has hosted Visiting Fellows from Italy, Israel,
Ukraine, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.
NIJ has growing ties with the United Nations and is
an affiliate research institute of the United
Nations CrichoPrevention and Criminal Justice
Branch. NIJ is developing the United Nations Online
Crime and Justice Clearinghouse. Currently in the
prototype stage, this system will link the 11
national and regional institutes affiliated with
the United Nations on the World Wide Web. It will
make NIJ information that is machine translated in
six languages widely available. It will also make
information from the foreign institutes available
to Federal, State, and local justice system
officials in the United States. Such linkages will
greatly increase the U.N. institutes' capacity for
information sharing and collaboration. UNOJUST
development is being funded by the State
Department's Office of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs. In addition, NIJ has
already developed the Rule of Law Online World Wide
Web site to provide relevant information to the
states that emerged from the former Soviet Union.
U.S. Agency for International Development
The U.S. Agency for International Development has
been involved in the international justice reform
arena since the mid-1980s. A recent policy paper
developed by USAID estimates that the agency
expended over $220 million for rule-of-law programs
between the mid-1980s and 1995.[6] This figure
includes both criminal justice and civil justice
reform efforts.
USAID rule-of-law efforts began in Central and
Latin America and have spread to many other regions
of the world, including Eastern and Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and the
Near East. Rule-of-law programs within these
regions have typically been developed by USAID
personnel assigned to in-country missions in
collaboration with local justice system officials
and personnel from USAID's regional offices in
Washington. The recent reorganization of USAID has
resulted in the development of a Center for
Democracy and Governance at USAID. Fostering the
rule of law is a primary concern of USAID's Center,
and this reorganization has increased the
centralization of analysis and rule-of-law planning
on a global basis.
Brian Atwood, the administrator of USAID, recently
commented on the role USAID plays in the justice
reform field, stating, "USAID rule-of-law programs
complement U.S. law enforcement interests by
focusing on the long-term development needs of the
justice system. USAID's focus on institutional
strengthening reinforces and amplifies the benefits
of law enforcement training by creating strong,
sustainable institutions in which individuals, once
trained, see their efforts pay off when the legal
system functions properly. Without the long-term
approach, short-term training efforts stand less
chance of taking root."[7]
USAID rule-of-law programs are typically
multifaceted. Many programs involve fundamental
reform of the legislation underlying the justice
system, including substantive and procedural
criminal codes and statutes underpinning the
courts, prosecution, and police. In addition,
programs typically include efforts to strengthen
justice system institutions, such as training and
technical assistance for judges, prosecutors,
public defenders, and members of the private bar.
USAID has provided funding for the Justice
Department's ICITAP and OPDAT efforts to improve
the skills of police and prosecutors. Some USAID
rule-of-law programs have also sought to strengthen
civil society support for justice reform as well as
to increase the nations' capacity to investigate
justice system problems and promote reforms and
adherence to generally recognized human rights
standards in the administration of justice.
Furthermore, innovative approaches, such as the use
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, have
been supported in many nations as part of USAID
rule-of-law programs. USAID programs seek to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary and
the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and
accessibility of justice systems. Major USAID rule-
of-law programs have been developed in many
nations, including Russia, Ukraine, Colombia,
Guatemala, Panama, Haiti, the Philippines, and Sri
Lanka.
U.S. Department of State
Two major components of the State Department are
involved in international justice reform: the
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and the Bureau for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). The work of each
Bureau is discussed in turn.
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs
The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs plays a major role in many
facets of the international justice assistance
arena. INL chairs a Law Enforcement Interagency
Working Group that seeks to coordinate
international law enforcement assistance and
administration of justice efforts. During the past
2 years the working group has had approximately $32
million in funds from the SEED and FSA acts
available for international training and technical
assistance in Eastern and Central Europe and the
former Soviet Union and an additional $10 million
for such assistance in other areas of the world.
For the most part, these activities are carried out
by law enforcement agencies of the Departments of
Justice and Treasury. These funds have also
supported the development and operation of the
International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest,
discussed earlier. The Academy received
approximately $3 million during the past year, and
a subgroup of the Law Enforcement Interagency
Working Group, the ILEA Steering Group, has
conducted the planning for ILEA.
The Interagency Working Group meetings bring
together representatives of many organizations
including the FBI, DEA, ICITAP, OPDAT, Secret
Service, ATF, IRS, Customs, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Department
of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, its
Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and
the U.S. Agency for International Development.
INL is also actively involved in a working group
that is drafting the international crime bill
(discussed in the introductory section of this
paper) as well as in efforts to dismantle money-
laundering havens, and efforts to target the
Colombian Cali cartel's assets. Other INL
activities include working on the Stolen Cars
Initiative in cooperation with the National
Insurance Crime Bureau, cochairing (with INS) an
Interagency Working Group on Alien Smuggling,
assisting in the development of the Bosnian and
Haitian police forces, and chairing an Interagency
Working Group on Nigerian Crime. The Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
has personnel detailed to it from the FBI, Customs,
INS, Coast Guard, and other law enforcement
agencies in order to enhance coordination across
agencies. INL is involved in a number of
cooperative activities with the United Nations. INL
played a major role in drafting the U.N.
Declaration on Crime and Public Security, and the
Bureau's Deputy Assistant Secretary of State led
the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Crime Commission
meeting in May 1996. In partnership with NIJ, INL
is funding the UNOJUST system, discussed above,
linking all U.N.-affiliated crime institutes on the
World Wide Web. INL is also funding HEUNI, a U.N.-
affiliated institute in Helsinki, to expand its
existing database on law enforcement training
programs relevant to nations in Eastern and Central
Europe and the newly independent states. The
database will include completed, ongoing, and
future training programs. INL is also working with
institutions of the European Union (EU) and
encouraging EU participation at the International
Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest.
INL has been active in the P8 Senior Experts Group
on Transnational Organized Crime and contributed to
the recently approved P8 40-point plan discussed
earlier.
Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
The Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
chairs the Interagency Working Group on Democracy
and Human Rights. This working group was
established at the direction of the National
Security Council in 1994 following a review of
democracy assistance programs throughout the
government. It is responsible for monitoring human
rights and democracy programs. Its members include
representatives of the Departments of Justice,
Treasury, Defense, and Commerce as well as USAID,
USIA, CIA, and other agencies. This working group
provides broad policy and priority coordination in
the democracy and human rights area, and
representatives from DRL sit on other related
working groups involved directly in resource
allocation, such as the INL and Law Enforcement
Interagency Working Group.
U.S. Department of the Treasury
This section presents brief summaries of the work
of the U.S. Secret Service, ATF, and the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network. The Internal Revenue
Service and the U.S. Customs Service also provide
some assistance in their specialized areas of
expertise, including presentation of courses at
ILEA.
U.S. Secret Service
The U.S. Secret Service provides international
training and technical assistance dealing with its
areas of specialization in financial crime
detection and investigation. Training sessions are
conducted by highly experienced Secret Service
personnel, with most sessions held overseas.
Countries in which training has recently been
conducted include, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Turkey. The bulk of the funding for
this international training has been received from
SEED and FSA funds administered by the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs.
The Secret Service provides training in the
investigation of currency counterfeiting, credit
card fraud (including counterfeit credit cards,
altered credit cards, and fraudulent use of credit
card account numbers), and telecommunications fraud
(e.g., the encoding of microchips for cloning
cellular telephones to mimic the identity of a
legitimate account holder, and related frauds).
Secret Service training programs include
discussions of actual cases to demonstrate the
complexity of investigating financial crimes. The
technology and tools available to law enforcement
to combat such crime are reviewed.
The Secret Service teaches a part of the ILEA
curriculum in Budapest. Sessions presented include
Technical Features of Genuine Currency, Production
of Counterfeit Currency, Principles of Counterfeit
Investigation, Managing Counterfeit Investigations,
Counterfeit Lab (providing practical experience),
International Trends in Counterfeiting, Access
Device (i.e. credit card) investigations, and
Protection Overview.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
ATF conducts international training in its areas of
specialization, including (1) international
firearms trafficking, (2) gang activities,
including discussion of the ATF Gang Resistance
Education and Training Program (GREAT), and (3)
postblast investigation. As is the case for the
other Federal agencies, ATF trainers are highly
experienced agents. ATF's international training is
supported by SEED and FSA funds. Nations in Eastern
and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have
experienced considerable problems with firearms
because many weapons were discarded or sold by
soldiers when they were demobilized.
ATF training is conducted overseas for the most
part, but postblast investigation training is
typically provided at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. ATF personnel
teach part of the ILEA curriculum and current
courses on gangs and gang resistance as well as on
firearms.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FinCEN accumulates, analyzes, and disseminates
information on financial crimes and places
particular emphasis on drug money laundering.
FinCEN was developed in 1990 by the Treasury
Department, and in addition to its own staff has
personnel from the FBI, DEA, ATF, Postal
Inspector's Office, Coast Guard, and nine other
agencies who serve 2- to 3-year assignments.
FinCEN literature indicates that its mission is "to
provide a governmentwide, multisource intelligence
and analytical network to support law enforcement
and regulatory agencies in the detection,
investigation, and prosecution of financial
crimes." FinCEN maintains a number of computer
databases to carry out its work. These include (1)
Treasury's Financial Database, with reports filed
in response to the requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act (basically, currency transactions over $10,000
and international transport of currency and
monetary instruments of more than $10,000); (2)
databases owned and administered by Federal law
enforcement and regulatory agencies; and (3) publicly
available commercial databases that include business
and marketing records and demographic data.
FinCEN analysts prepare reports for a variety of
law enforcement agencies throughout the government
and seek to identify patterns of money laundering
and related financial crimes. FinCEN personnel have
been very active in the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). FATF members include the 26 members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development plus Hong Kong and Singapore. FATF is
working to strengthen worldwide anti-money-
laundering regulations and enforcement. The members
of FATF have all agreed to develop organizations
similar to FinCEN. A Caribbean Financial Action
Task Force (CATF) has also been established, and
these nations are also interested in developing
financial intelligence units similar in purpose to
FinCEN.
FinCEN officials are encouraging the development of
financial intelligence units around the world and
working with various multilateral groups (including
FATF, CATF, and Interpol) to foster such efforts.
Such a global network would be useful in combating
money laundering by reducing the capacity of
criminals to hide illegally obtained assets.
U.S. Information Agency
The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) has sponsored a
wide variety of exchanges between U.S. and foreign
justice system agencies. These exchange programs
have exposed foreign justice system officials to
many aspects of the U.S. justice system and have
encouraged collaboration in reform. Similarly, U.S.
justice system personnel have visited foreign
justice system agencies, have presented discussions
of reforms in the U.S., and have learned about the
problems encountered by the foreign justice
systems.
USIA officials stress that exchange programs not
only result in transferring technical skills but
also in building relationships among professionals
and in critically increasing foreign officials'
understanding of how democratic values have become
embedded in U.S. institutions. USIA personnel
indicate that their programs seek to strengthen the
"culture of democracy" in nations with emerging
democratic systems as well as to help with the
"technology of democracy" through the transfer of
technical information on promising reforms.
USIA has had a number of partners in its efforts
and has funded exchange programs sponsored by the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC), the Central and East
European Law Initiative (CEELI) of the American Bar
Association, and the Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs (and its successor, the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the State
Department), and many others.
USAID exchange visits have dealt with a broad array
of issues. For example, a USAID delegation of
Russian officials visited the United States to
learn about the jury system and how it might be
structured in Russia and adapted to local needs and
conditions. Judges and prosecutors have visited the
United States from many Latin American nations to
observe our adversary system of justice and explore
the elements of this system that might be
beneficial to their judicial systems.
Conclusion
As the above brief review indicates, many Federal
agencies are conducting international justice
assistance efforts. This technical assistance and
training can be of great use in combating trans-
national crime and can also strengthen fragile
emerging democracies as they seek to consolidate
democratic governance. Recent initiatives by the G-
7/P8, the United Nations, and the Federal
Government suggest that the demand for
international justice assistance is growing
rapidly.
Much remains to be done in this important field.
Most observers agree on the need for broad
information sharing and effective coordination. In
addition, increased analysis and understanding of
what works in the fight against crime is essential.
Developments in this field have moved rapidly, and
little time has been available to reflect upon what
strategies, or combinations of strategies, are most
promising for combating transnational crime and
developing sustainable reforms in foreign justice
systems. Over time it will be helpful to develop a
more detailed understanding of the major problems
confronted by foreign justice systems and the
implications of these justice system weaknesses for
U.S. interests in combating transnational crime.
Such information can provide the basis for the
systematic prioritization of U.S. assistance in
this critical field.
-----
*Daniel McGillis, Ph.D., is with Abt Associates Inc.
-----
Notes
[1] Statement of Jamie S. Gorelick, then Deputy
Attorney General, before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on International
Relations at Hearings on Democracy, Rule of Law,
and Police Training Assistance (December 7, 1995),
pp. 11-12.
[2] United Nations Declaration on Crime and Public
Security approved by the U.N. Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice in Vienna, May
1996.
[3] Hearing before the Committee on International
Relations, House of Representatives, on Democracy,
Rule of Law, and Police Training Assistance
(December 7, 1995), p. 4.
[4] International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program Overview Document (undated).
[5] Statement by Martin Lively presented at the
Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Cairo, Egypt
(April 29-May 8, 1995), and excerpted in a summary
of "NCJRS International Activities" on the NCJRS
Justice Information Center Web site.
[6] Policy and Implementation Options for Rule of
Law in USAID. Democracy and Governance Policy Paper
No. 1 (February 27, 1995).
[7] Testimony of the Honorable J. Brian Atwood,
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development, before the House Committee on
International Relations (December 7, 1995), p. 50.
-----------------------------------
APPENDIX B: WORKSHOP ATTENDEES
(Current as of 1995)
Yury Antonyan
Principal Researcher
Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Federation
Kutuzovsky Prospect 19, Apt. 47
Moscow
Russia
011-240-4369
011-290-3613
Virginia Baldau
Director
Program Development Division
Office of Development and Dissemination
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-514-6204
202-307-6394
baldau@justice.usdoj.org
Frederick Baron
Director
Executive Office for National Security
U.S. Department of Justice
10th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., Room 4119
Washington, DC 20530
U.S.A.
202-514-6753
202-307-0097
David Bayley
Dean and Professor
School of Criminal Justice
State University of New York at Albany
135 Western Avenue
Albany, NY 12222
U.S.A.
518-442-5215
518-442-5603
dbayley@cnsvax.albany.edu
Marlene Beckman
Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-3562
202-514-7805
Michael Berkow
Chief of Police
Coachella Police Department
1515 Sixth Street
Coachella, CA 92236
U.S.A.
619-398-0101
619-398-3802
Fred Borakove
Senior Analyst
Criminal Investigation Division
Internal Revenue Service
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1111 Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20224
U.S.A.
202-622-4120
202-622-9250
Stephanie Bourque
Program Manager
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-2955
202-307-6394
Douglas Cassel
Professor and Executive Director
International Human Rights Law Institute
DePaul University College of Law
25 East Jackson
Chicago, IL 60604
U.S.A.
312-362-5920
312-362-5923
dcassel@condor.depaul.edu
Sergey Chapkey
International Visiting Fellow
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-2942
202-307-6394
Paul Chevigny
Professor New York University School of Law
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012
U.S.A.
212-998-6249
212-995-3156
chevigny@acfcluster.nyu.edu
Dan Corsentino
Sheriff
Pueblo County Sheriff's Department
909 Court Street
Pueblo, CO 81003
U.S.A.
719-583-6131
719-583-6143
Michael Dalich
Special Assistant
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-3203
202-514-9065
Steven Edwards
Program Manager
Office of Research and Evaluation
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-2942
202-307-6394
Robert Gelbard
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (Currently Special
Representative to the President and the Secretary
of State for the Implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accords)
U.S. Department of State
2201C Street N.W., Room 6219
Washington, DC 20520
U.S.A.
202-647-3774
202-647-0939
William Geller
Associate Director
Police Executive Research Forum
2116 Thornwood Avenue
Wilmette, IL 60091-1452
U.S.A.
708-256-0017
708-256-0111
wageller@aol.com
Susan Ginsburg
Senior Advisor
Office of the Under Secretary (Enforcement)
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, Room 4412
Washington, DC 20220
U.S.A.
202-622-1496
202-622-7301
susan.ginsburg@tres.sprint.com
Herman Goldstein
Professor Emeritus
School of Law
University of Wisconsin
975 Bascom Hall
Madison, WI 53706
U.S.A.
608-262-1227
608-262-5485
hgold@macc.wisc.edu
David Harrell
Director
International Training Division
U.S. Customs Service
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1301 Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20523
U.S.A.
202-927-0624
202-927-8295
Philip Heymann
Professor
School of Law
Harvard University
522 Hauser Hall
Cambridge, MA 02138
U.S.A.
617-495-3137
617-495-1110
heymann@hulaw1.harvard.edu
Sally T. Hillsman
Assistant Director
National Institute of Justice
Office of Research and Evaluation
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-2967
202-307-6394
David Holmes
Assistant Director of Training
U.S. Secret Service
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1800 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20523
U.S.A.
202-435-7180
202-435-7408
Langley James
Assistant for Foreign Internal Defense Policy
Planning
U.S. Department of Defense
2500 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2500
U.S.A.
703-693-5208
703-693-0615
David Kalish
Commander
Los Angeles Police Department
150 North Los Angeles Street, Room 611
Los Angeles, CA 90012
U.S.A.
213-485-4018
213-237-0676
Raymond Kelly
President and Director
The Investigative Group International
(Currently Under Secretary [Enforcement]
U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Room 4330
Washington, DC 20220)
U.S.A.
202-622-0240
Carl Klockars
Professor
Division of Criminal Justice
University of Delaware
120 Timberline Drive
Newark, DE 19711
U.S.A.
302-368-1109
302-368-1337
klockars@udel.edu
Ginger Kyle
DUF Program Analyst
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-2966
202-307-6394
kyle@justice.usdoj.gov
James Lassiter
Rome District Desk Officer
International Affairs
Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 I Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20536
U.S.A.
202-633-2411
202-633-3782
John Lee
Staff Coordinator
International Operating Programs
Drug Enforcement Agency
U.S. Department of Justice
700 Army-Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202
U.S.A.
202-307-4233
202-307-4154
G. Martin Lively
International Liaison
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-514-6211
202-307-6394
lively@justice.usdoj.gov
Gerald Lynch
President
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
City University of New York
899 10th Avenue
New York, NY 10019
U.S.A.
212-237-8600
212-237-8607
LYNCH Johnjay@interport.net
Phyllis McDonald
Social Science Analyst
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-3653
202-307-6394
pmcdonald@justice.usdoj.gov
William McDonald
Visiting Fellow
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-9796
202-307-6394
Debra McFarland
Rule of Law Advisor
Global Bureau
U.S. Agency for International Development
2201 C Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20520
U.S.A.
202-736-7877
202-736-7892
Sam McQuade
Social Science Program Manager
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-0200
202-307-6394
mcquades@justice.usdoj.gov
Fred Mecke
Director
Office of International Criminal Justice
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20520
U.S.A.
202-736-4551
202-736-4515
Lois Mock
Program Manager
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-0693
202-307-6394
Mark Moore
Professor
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Room 206
Cambridge, MA 02138
U.S.A.
617-495-1113
617-496-6372
mark_moore@harvard.edu
Norval Morris
Professor Emeritus
School of Law
University of Chicago
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
U.S.A.
312-702-9587
312-702-0730
norval_morris@law.uchicago.edu
Regina Nassen
Counsel on International Programs
U.S. Department of Justice
10th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20500
U.S.A.
202-514-8168
202-616-1080
Caroline Nicholl
Harkness Fellow
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-0153
202-307-6394
nichollc@justice.usdoj.gov
Robert Perito
Deputy Director
International Criminal Investigative Training and
Assistance Program  U.S. Department of Justice
1255 22nd Street N.W., Suite 700
Washington, DC 20037
U.S.A.
202-653-9122
202-653-2280
Carol Petrie
Director
Planning and Management
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-3674
202-307-6394
Jamie Phillips
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-7510
202-514-5958
Winifred Reed
Program Manager
Office of Research and Evaluation
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-2952
202-307-6394
wreed@justice.usdoj.gov
Alan Ringgold
Deputy Assistant Director
International Relations Criminal Investigative
Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Room 7443
Washington, DC 20535
U.S.A.
202-324-5904
202-324-1096
Laurie Robinson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-5933
202-514-7805
Jeffrey Ian Ross
Social Science Analyst
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-7036
202-307-6394
Luis Salas
Director
Center for the Administration of Justice
Florida International University
North Miami Campus Academy 1, Room 225
2000 N.E. 145th Street
Miami, FL 33181
U.S.A.
305-940-5952
305-956-5485
salasl@servms.fiu.edu
Clifford Shearing
Professor and Director
Center of Criminology
University of Toronto
130 Saint George Street
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
416-978-3720
416-978-4195
Michael Smith
Professor School of Law
University of Wisconsin
975 Bascom Hall
Madison, WI 56706
U.S.A.
608-263-7762
608-262-5485
mesmith4@facstaff.wisc.edu
Janice Stromsen
Director
International Criminal Investigative Training and
Assistance Program  U.S. Department of Justice
1255 22nd Street N.W., Suite 700
Washington, DC 20037
U.S.A.
202-653-9122
202-653-2280
Michael Sullivan
Deputy Commander
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
6010 Sixth Street
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5506
U.S.A.
703-806-0407
703-806-0417
sullivanm@cidc-belvoir.army.mil
Gary Thomas
Special Agent in Charge, International Enforcement
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
U.S. Department of the Treasury
650 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
U.S.A.
202-927-8500
202-927-8972
John Thomas
Program Manager
Office of Development and Dissemination
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-514-6206
202-307-6394
angelicom@aol.com
R.J. Bankole Thompson
Professor
Police Studies Department
College of Law Enforcement
Eastern Kentucky University
Stratton, Room 467
Richmond, KY 40475
U.S.A.
606-622-1464
606-622-6392
Michael Tonry
Professor
School of Law
University of Minnesota
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
U.S.A.
612-625-1314
612-625-2011
Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-307-2942
202-307-6394
travisje@justice.usdoj.gov
William Walsh
Director
Southern Police Institute
Department of Justice Administration
College of Arts and Sciences
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40202
U.S.A.
502-852-0330
502-852-0335
wfwals01@ulkyvm.louisville.edu
Richard Ward
Associate Chancellor for Special Programs
Executive Director of the Office of International
Criminal Justice University of Illinois at Chicago
1033 West Van Buren, Suite 500
Chicago, IL 60607
U.S.A.
312-996-9595
312-413-0458
Deborah Wilson
Assistant University Provost
Co-Chair
Department of Justice Administration
College of Arts and Sciences
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292-0001
U.S.A.
502-852-6153
502-852-0657
dgwils01@ulkyvm.louisville.edu
Jane Wiseman
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
U.S.A.
202-616-3233
202-307-6394
wiseman@justice.usdoj.gov
Anatoly Zakalyuk
Deputy Chief
Ukrainian Academy of Internal Affairs
Yinogradny Pereulok 1/11, Apt. 75
Kiev-24
Ukraine
011-293-0156
Ugljesa Zvekic
Research Coordinator
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice
Research Institute Via Giulia 52
Rome 00186
Italy
011-687-7437
011-689-2638
202-616-3233
-----------------------------------
APPENDIX C: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS'
BIOGRAPHIES
(Current as of December 1995)
Yury Antonyan is a Distinguished Scientist of
Russia, Doctor of Law, Professor Emeritus, and a
Principal Researcher of the All-Russian Research
and Development Institute of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. He is
also a leading researcher of the Serbsky State
Scientific Center for Social and Judicial
Psychiatry.
Mr. Antonyan is the author of about 250 scientific
publications, including more than 30 monographs and
textbooks. Major works include Social Environment
and Formation of a Criminal Personality (1975),
Psychological Alienation of a Person and Criminal
Behavior (1987), Crime and Psychological Anomalies
(1987), Criminal Psychopathology (1989), Causes of
Criminal Behavior (1992), Crime Among Women (1992),
Sexual Crimes (1993), Punishment and Rehabilitation
of Offenders (1994), and Cruelty in Our Life
(1995).
David Bayley is Dean and Professor in the School of
Criminal Justice, State University of New York at
Albany. He is a specialist in international
criminal justice, with a particular interest in
policing. He has done extensive research in India,
Japan, Australia, Canada, Britain, Singapore, and
the United States. His work has focused on
strategies of policing, the evolution of police
organizations, organizational reform,
accountability, and the tactics of patrol officers
in discretionary law enforcement situations.
Professor Bayley's most recent publication, Police
for the Future (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994), is based upon field research in Australia,
Canada, Great Britain, Japan, and the United
States.
Other major publications include Forces of Order:
Policing Modern Japan (University of California
Press, 1991); Patterns of Policing: A Comparative
International Analysis (Rutgers University Press,
1985); The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six
American Cities (The Free Press, 1986) and
Community Policing: The Singapore Story
(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice,
1988), both with Jerome H. Skolnick; A Model of
Community Policing: The Singapore Story
(Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice,
1989), and "The Organization of the Police in
English-Speaking Countries," in Modern Policing
(University of Chicago Press, 1992). He has also
written Police and Political Development in India
(Princeton University Press, 1969) and "The Police
and Political Development in Europe," in Charles
Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in
Western Europe (Princeton University Press, 1975).
Professor Bayley has a B.A. degree from Denison
University (1955), an M.A. from Oxford University
(1957), and a Ph.D. from Princeton University
(1960).
Michael Berkow is the Chief of Police in Coachella,
California. He is also currently a Police Project
Manager for the U.S. Department of Justice's
International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program. Two major aspects of this
latter position have been his roles in the Somalia
Police Project and the Haiti National Police
Project. In both of these efforts, he was the
project manager. The Somalia project was the first
police development project by the Department of
Justice outside the Western Hemisphere. In both
instances, his responsibilities have included
building police academies, providing technical and
infrastructure assistance, and helping to create
civilian police forces.
Previously, Mr. Berkow was a member of the
Rochester Police Department, where he served for 17
years, working his way up from a uniformed patrol
officer to the rank of Lieutenant. In this
position, he served as confidential assistant to
the Chief of Police and was responsible for
sensitive criminal investigations and special
projects.
Mr. Berkow also has considerable teaching
experience. In 1986, he was an Adjunct Professor at
the State University of New York, Brockport. He has
taught at various police academies and training
sites, including Northwestern University; the
Connecticut State Police Academy; and the Orlando,
Florida, Police Academy. Currently, he is a member
of the adjunct faculty at the International
Association of Chiefs of Police in Alexandria,
Virginia.
Mr. Berkow received his Bachelor's degree from
Kalamazoo College in Arts, Sociology, and Public
Policy. He went on to receive his J.D. from the
Syracuse University College of Law. He has also
attended the FBI National Law Institute, the FBI
National Academy, and the New York State Municipal
Police Training Council. Mr. Berkow is the author
of numerous publications and belongs to several
professional associations.
Lee P. Brown is Director of the White House Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).
Previously, Dr. Brown was a Distinguished Professor
at Texas Southern University and Director of the
University's Black Male Initiative Program. From
1990 to 1992 he served as New York City Police
Commissioner and as Atlanta's Public Safety
Commissioner from 1978 to 1982.
Dr. Brown began his career in law enforcement in
1960, as a patrolman in San Jose, California. After
8 years, he moved to Portland, Oregon, and
established the Department of Administration of
Justice at Portland State University. In 1972, he
joined Howard University in Washington, D.C., as
Associate Director of the Institute for Urban
Affairs and Research. He held the titles of
Professor of Public Administration and Director of
Criminal Justice Programs. Dr. Brown returned to
Portland in 1975 to serve as Sheriff of Multnomah
County. The following year, he was appointed
Director of Justice Services, a department composed
of all the county's criminal justice agencies.
Dr. Brown is a past president of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police and is involved in
a number of professional and community
organizations. He has written many articles and
papers on police management, community policing,
and the criminal justice system. He is coauthor of
Police and Society: An Environment for
Collaboration and Confrontation.
Dr. Brown received a Doctorate in Criminology from
the University of California at Berkeley in 1970, a
Master's degree in Criminology from the University
of California at Berkeley in 1968, a Master's
degree in Sociology from San Jose State University
in 1964, and a Bachelor's degree in Criminology
from Fresno State University in 1961.
Douglas Cassel is Executive Director of the
International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul
University College of Law in Chicago, and of its
Jeanne and Joseph Sullivan Program for Human Rights
in the Americas. He teaches international human
rights law in DePaul's College of Law and in the
Institute's training programs for lawyers and
judges from such countries as El Salvador,
Guatemala, Poland, and Egypt. He also directs the
Institute's research, training, advocacy, and
technical assistance programs.
In 1992-1993, he served as special counsel to the
United Nations Commission on Truth for El Salvador
and was a principal editor of its report. Currently, he
chairs the American Bar Association's Working Group
on the American Convention on Human Rights, as well
as the ABA's Human Rights Subcommittee for Latin
America.
Professor Cassel has published nationally and
internationally in such journals as the Human
Rights Law Journal and the Revista del Instituto
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, and he
broadcasts a weekly commentary on human rights on
National Public Radio in Chicago, WBEZ. He has
given Spanish-language lectures on international
human rights law at universities and other
institutions in El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and
the Dominican Republic.
Before helping to found the International Human
Rights Law Institute at DePaul in 1990, he served
for 16 years as Attorney and General Counsel of
Business and Professional People for the Public
Interest, a Chicago public interest law center.
Professor Cassel is an honors graduate of the
Harvard Law School, where he was managing editor of
the Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law
Review.
Paul G. Chevigny is a Professor at New York
University Law School, where he has been teaching
since 1977. In the last 6 years, he has begun to
work on a large project comparing the problems of
police violence in cities of the developing world.
Mr. Chevigny has also participated in missions for
the international human rights group Human Rights
Watch. Through his association with this group he
has completed extensive studies of human rights
abuses in Jamaica and police abuses and violence in
Brazil and Argentina. For Human Rights Watch he has
prepared a critique of the failure of the Federal
Government in the United States to control or
oversee police violence in its cities.
Among Mr. Chevigny's publications are Gigs: Jazz
and the Cabaret Laws in New York City (1991), Edge
of the Knife (1993), Police Violence in Argentina
(1991), More Speech: Dialogue Rights and Modern
Liberty (1988), Police Abuses in Brazil (1987),
Human Rights in Jamaica (1986), Cops and Rebels
(1972), and Police Power: Police Abuses in New York
City (1969).
Before he began his teaching career, Mr. Chevigny
was associated with the New York affiliate of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). At the ACLU,
he used the practice of law, particularly criminal
and civil rights litigation, as a way to
investigate social and political problems
underlying police abuses in the United States.
Dan Corsentino became Sheriff of Pueblo County in
Pueblo, Colorado, in 1991 and was reelected in
1994.
Sheriff Corsentino was appointed by Governor Roy
Romer in 1991 to serve on the Drug Control System
Improvement Advisory Board, which oversees Federal
funding for law enforcement agencies. In August
1993, Governor Romer appointed Sheriff Corsentino
to the Police Officer Standards and Training
(P.O.S.T.) Board. He is a member of the Criminal
Justice Advisory committee for Pueblo Community
College and cochairs the County Sheriffs of
Colorado's legislative committee; he is also the
Second Vice President on the Board of Directors for
that organization. He received his first national
appointment to the International Association of
Chiefs of Police Patrol and Tactical Operations
Committee. He also serves on the National Sheriffs'
Association's Ethics Committee and Native American
Indians Committee. He is a member of numerous
civic and service organizations. Recently, Sheriff
Corsentino was invited to conduct a needs assessment
of police organizational structure, community relations,
community policing, and executive protection, and
to make substantive recommendations for a law
enforcement academy in the city of Leon, Mexico,
State of Guanajuato.
Sheriff Corsentino is an adjunct faculty member at
the University of Southern Colorado and at Pueblo
Community College. His courses include History and
Sociology of Law Enforcement; Ethics, Values, and
Racism in Policing; and Policing in the 21st
Century. His most recent publication was "Employee
Involvement Implementing Quality Change" (FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, November 1993).
Sheriff Corsentino holds a Master's degree in
Public Administration and a Bachelor's degree in
Political Science from the University of Colorado.
He is also a graduate of the Police School of Staff
and Command at Northwestern University Traffic
Institute in Chicago, Illinois. In 1993, he
graduated from the National FBI Academy, Quantico,
Virginia, 172nd session.
Robert S. Gelbard is currently Special
Representative to the President and the Secretary
of State for the Dayton Peace Accords. At the time
of the Workshop he had been Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs since November 1993.
His career began with service in the Peace Corps in
Bolivia (1964-1966), and he joined the Foreign
Service in 1967. After a year in Washington, he was
detailed to the Peace Corps as Associate Director
in Manila, Republic of the Philippines, from 1968
to 1970. He was then assigned as Principal Officer
at the United States Consulate in Porto Alegre,
Brazil, from 1970 to 1972. Returning to the State
Department, Ambassador Gelbard was a financial
economist in the Office of Development Finance in
the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs from
1973 to 1975, focusing principally on Latin
American development and debt issues. From 1976 to
1978, he was the officer responsible for the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in
the Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs and
also worked on European macroeconomic and European
Community financial issues.
From 1978 to 1982, he was assigned as Deputy
Treasurer Representative and First Secretary at the
United States Embassy in Paris. Ambassador Gelbard
was then reassigned to Washington as Deputy Director
of the Office of Western European Affairs (1982-1984),
where his responsibilities included relations with
France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, covering
military base negotiations with Spain and Portugal
and diplomatic relations with the Vatican. From
1984 to 1985, he was Director of the Office of
Southern African Affairs, where he was responsible
for U.S. relations and negotiation with 10 nations,
including South Africa, Angola, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, and Namibia.
In 1985, Ambassador Gelbard was named Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for South America, a
position he held until 1988. He was responsible for
U.S. relations with the nations of that continent,
including involvement in the transition to and
consolidation of democracy in many nations, trade
and financial issues, political-military issues,
and management responsibilities for the Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs. In 1988, he was named
Ambassador to Bolivia, a post he held until 1991.
Ambassador Gelbard then became Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs (1991-1993). He was responsible for U.S.
policy in Cuba and Haiti and was significantly
involved in issues related to the El Salvador peace
process. He was also President Bush's
representative preparing for the 1992 San Antonio
Summit.
Ambassador Gelbard has been a member of numerous
U.S. Government delegations to the OECD,
particularly the Economic Policy Committee, and
served on the U.S. delegation to the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation (the North/South
dialogue). He was also detailed part-time to the
President's Council of Economic Advisers in 1978.
Ambassador Gelbard has received the Presidential
Meritorious Award, the State Department's Superior
Honor Award, and the State Department's Meritorious
Honor Award. He is also the recipient of the United
States Coast Guard's Distinguished Public Service Award.
The Bolivian Government awarded him the Condor of the
Andes, Order of the Grand Cross, its highest decoration to a foreign citizen.
Ambassador Gelbard graduated from Colby College in
1964 with a B.A. in History. He subsequently
received a Master's in Public Administration in Economics
from Harvard University in 1979. He also studied economics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
William Geller is Associate Director of the Police
Executive Research Forum (PERF) based in
Washington, D.C., and Director of PERF's Midwest
Office. Mr. Geller previously served as Project
Director of the American Bar Foundation, Executive
Director of the Chicago Law Enforcement Study
Group, and Special Counsel for Public Safety and
Internal Security to the Chicago Park District. He
has written, lectured, and consulted widely on the
causes and prevention of police and citizen
violence; police leadership; risk reduction; and
racial equity for units of Federal, State, and
local governments. His books include The Untapped
Potential of the Middle Manager (1995), And Justice
For All: Understanding & Controlling Police Use of
Force (1995), Deadly Force: What We Know (1992),
the golden anniversary edition of the
International City Management Association's Local
Government Police Management (1991), Police
Leadership in America: Crises and Opportunity
(1985), and Split-Second Decisions: Shootings Of
and By Chicago Police (1982).
Herman Goldstein is Professor of Law Emeritus at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He first
studied the police as a researcher with the
American Bar Foundation's Survey of the
Administration of Criminal Justice. From 1960 to
1964, he was Executive Assistant to O.W. Wilson,
the widely recognized architect of the professional
model of policing, when Wilson undertook, as
Superintendent, to reform the Chicago Police
Department. With a grant from the Ford Foundation
to support research and teaching relating to the
police, Professor Goldstein joined the Wisconsin
faculty in 1964. He has published on such topics as
the police function, police discretion, policy
development, the political accountability of the
police, and the control of police conduct. He was a
consultant to the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,
New York City's Knapp Commission, the Police
Foundation, and the Police Executive Research
Forum. He coauthored the American Bar Association's
The Urban Police Function in 1973 and published
Policing in a Free Society in 1977. In recent
years, he has focused primarily on developing the
institutional arrangements whereby police might
better address--through research and
experimentation with responses--the substantive
problems that the police are called on to handle.
As part of this work, he published Problem-Oriented
Policing in 1990. Professor Goldstein has in recent
years consulted with the police in several
countries, including Chile, the United Kingdom, The
Netherlands, and Israel.
David H. Harrell is Director of the International
Training Division of the U.S. Customs Service where
he manages approximately 75 international training
programs. In recent years, his office has seen a marked
increase in programs for emerging democracies,
particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union.
A career civil servant, Mr. Harrell began as a
management intern with the Department of Defense
and moved to the Customs Service in 1971. He served
as Head of the Management Studies Staff, Chief of
the Management Information Branch, and Director of
the Program Evaluation Division.
Mr. Harrell received a B.A. in Political Science
from Dickinson College and an M.A. in International
Law and International Relations from the American
University School of International Service. He also
held a 1-year fellowship at the University of
Washington Graduate School for Public Affairs.
Philip Heymann is James Barr Ames Professor at
Harvard Law School, the Director of the Center for
Criminal Justice, and Professor at Harvard's
Kennedy School of Government. He was Deputy
Attorney General in 1993-1994, Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Criminal Division from
1978 to 1981, and Associate Watergate Special
Prosecutor from 1973 to 1975. The previous decade,
he held several posts in the U.S. Department of
State (Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary
of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organizations, and head of the Bureau
of Security and Consular Affairs). Earlier in his
career, after clerking for Justice Harlan of the
U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Heymann represented the
U.S. Government in the Solicitor General's Office
from 1961 to 1965.
In his current position as Director of the Center
for Criminal Justice at Harvard, Professor Heymann
has in recent years managed a number of projects
designed to improve the criminal justice systems of
countries seeking to create or preserve democratic
institutions, including Guatemala, Colombia, South
Africa, and Russia. He chaired the panel of
international experts proposing to the Goldstone
Commission new procedures for conducting and
handling mass demonstrations in South Africa.
Sally T. Hillsman is Deputy Director of the
National Institute of Justice, with responsibility
for the Office of Research and Evaluation. Dr.
Hillsman develops and manages NIJ's external
research program, its congressionally mandated
evaluation program, and its intramural research
program. Dr. ontatman joined NIJ in February 1995
from the National Center for State Courts, where
she was Vice President with responsibility for the
Center's national-scope research and court
technology programs. Previously she was an
Associate Director of the Vera Institute of Justice
in New York City and its Director of Research. She
has conducted a wide range of research on justice
system policy issues, including intermediate
sanctions, pretrial diversion, case processing,
prosecution and court delay, as well as policing
and narcotics law enforcement. Dr. Hillsman holds a
Ph.D. in Sociology from Columbia University.
K. David Holmes is the Assistant Director of
Training for the Secret Service. In the Senior
Executive Service, Mr. Holmes has performed duties
as the Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the Vice-
President Protective Division, where he had direct
oversight for the transition of security for the
Vice President following the 1992 presidential
election. In 1993, he assumed the position of
Special Agent in Charge of the Vice-President
Protective Division.
Mr. Holmes began his career as a Special Agent in
the Secret Service in 1974 in San Juan, Puerto
Rico, and was subsequently transferred to the Miami
Office where he performed long-term undercover
operations targeted against the Mariel criminal
elements in Miami. In 1982, he became a Senior
Course Instructor in the Secret Service Office of
Training, where he wrote and developed numerous
training courses in Investigative Tactics,
Undercover Operations, and Investigative Spanish,
for which he received a Secretary of the Treasury
award. Mr. Holmes briefly served on the
Presidential Protective Unit and in 1988 was
appointed Special Agent in Charge of the San Juan
Field Office. He later returned to Washington,
where he became the Deputy Assistant Director for
the Office of Government Liaison and Public
Affairs, until his promotion to his current position.
Mr. Holmes has a Bachelor's degree in Hispanic
Studies from the University of Puerto Rico. Upon
graduation, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant
in the U.S. Army, where he served as an
Intelligence Officer. He subsequently received his
Master's degree in Human Relations from the
University of Oklahoma.
Langley B. James has served as Assistant for
Foreign Internal Defense, U.S. Department of State,
where he has been responsible for policy and
planning issues related to low-intensity conflicts
since 1988. He was Deputy Chief, Special Defense
Acquisition Fund, Defense Security Assistance
Agency, from 1982 to 1987. Mr. James also worked
with International Security Affairs from 1980 to
1981, as Assistant for Arms Transfer Policy. In
addition, he served as Assistant for COCOM
Technology Transfer, International Security Affairs
(Strategic Aid and Disclosure) from 1974 to 1979.
Mr. James began his defense career with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1971. During his
tenure with DIA he served as Strategic Intelligence
Officer (Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact), Ground Forces,
as an Indications and Warning Alert Team Officer.
Mr. James has extensive Army Military Intelligence
training and has received various awards throughout
his career, including the Office of the Secretary
of Defense Meritorious Civil Service Award in 1987.
He received a B.S. in Business Administration and
Political Economy, as well as an M.A. in Economics
of National Security from Ohio State University. He
also attended the National War College from 1979 to
1980.
David J. Kalish is the Commander of the Los Angeles
Police Department where he has served for over 20 years.
His duties have included patrol, detectives, gang
suppression, juvenile operations, and many other
specialized enforcement, investigative, and
administrative assignments. As the Commanding
Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Group, he
currently directs the activities of approximately
150 personnel assigned to the Anti-Terrorist
Division and the Administrative Vice Division.
Commander Kalish is an active member of many
professional and community organizations. He has
been a member of many international delegations
and regularly instructs and lectures on a variety of
criminal justice topics.
Raymond W. Kelly is currently Under Secretary
(Enforcement) in the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. At the time of the Workshop he was
President and Director of New York operations of
The Investigative Group International, with offices
in New York, Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Boston, Philadelphia, and London. Mr. Kelly served
as Director of the International Police Monitors of
the Multinational Force in Haiti from October 1994
through March 1995, during which time the monitors
ended the Haitian Police's human rights abuses and
established an interim public security force. Mr.
Kelly was awarded a commendation by President
Clinton for "exceptionally meritorious service" in
Haiti and the Commander's Medal for Public Service
by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
John Shalikashvili.
Mr. Kelly rose through the ranks of the New York
City Police Department to become Commissioner in
October 1992 and served through January 1994,
capping a 32-year career that included service in
every rank and 25 commands, including the Emergency
Service Division and the Office of Management,
Analysis and Budget. As Police Commissioner, Mr.
Kelly was widely praised for the emergency response
to the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and its
subsequent investigation. He also presided over the
largest increase of the uniformed ranks in the
department's history and was recognized as New York
State's Law Enforcement Official of the Year.
Mr. Kelly's service in the U.S. Marine Corps
included combat in Vietnam, and he retired with the
rank of colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. He is
an attorney with law degrees from St. John's
University and New York University, where he
lectures on the law, public policy, and crisis
management. A graduate of Manhattan College, he
also holds a Master's degree in Public Administration
from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. He was awarded an honorary doctorate
from Marist College in May 1995 in recognition of his
career in public service.
Carl B. Klockars, Professor of Sociology and
Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware, has
been a criminologist for 25 years. During this time
he has published five books, about 80 articles, and
numerous papers. His first book, The Professional
Fence, is a detailed life history of a dealer in
stolen property. Three of his more recent works,
The Idea of Police, and the first and second
editions of Thinking About Police, are widely used
not only in college and universities but also in
police academies in this country and abroad.
He is currently the nationally elected Vice
President of the Police Section of the Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences and was three times
elected by the American Society of Criminology to
serve as a member of its Executive Board. He has
served on the editorial boards of many academic
journals, worked as a professional lobbyist for the
Maryland Sheriff's Association, and testified as an
expert witness in cases involving allegations of
excessive use of force by the police. He is
currently conducting a large research project that
compares police and citizen attitudes toward
corruption and appropriate discipline. The project
employs systematic cross-cultural comparative
samples from the United States, Croatia, and
Australia.
Dr. Klockars holds a Bachelor's degree in Sociology
from the University of Rhode Island and a Master's
in Criminology and Doctorate in Sociology with a
concentration in criminology from the University of
Pennsylvania.
James E. Lassiter is the Rome District Desk Officer
in the Office of International Affairs at the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, a position
he has held since 1992. His areas of expertise
include international development, cultural change,
and the peoples of Africa.
From 1985 to 1988, Dr. Lassiter served as Peace
Corps Country Director in Tanzania, and from 1988
to 1991 he directed the Peace Corps program in
Ghana. From 1984 to 1985, he worked as a Country
Desk Officer and resident expert for Southern
African affairs at the U.S. Peace Corps
headquarters in Washington. Mr. Lassiter began his
association with the Peace Corps in 1980 as a Peace
Corps volunteer science teacher in Swaziland.
Dr. Lassiter also worked as a Research Analyst for
the State of California, Center for Health
Statistics in Sacramento. In 1974, he received his
B.A. in Anthropology, with honors and a minor in
Biological Sciences, from California State
University in Sacramento. He received an M.S. in
Anthropology from the University of Oregon in 1975,
and in 1983 he received a Ph.D. in Cultural
Anthropology from the University of Oregon.
G. Martin Lively is currently the International
Liaison for the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ), U.S. Department of Justice, and coordinator
of NIJ's National Criminal Justice Reference
Service. Mr. Lively has served in several posts at
NIJ, including Court Specialist, Conference
Manager, Law Enforcement Programs Manager, and
Assistant to the Director of Research and
Evaluation. Before joining NIJ in 1974, he worked
in various California jurisdictions, serving as a
police officer in Dale City, deputy district
attorney in Contra Costa County, and deputy public
defender in Sonoma County.
Mr. Lively has also held the positions of Director
of Productivity, Program Development, with the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management; Deputy Director of
Management and Administration, National
Emergency Management Agency; Manager of
Professional and Technical Training, Martin Marietta
Orlando Aerospace; and general practitioner of law in
California and West Virginia.
Mr. Lively received his J.D. from the University of
San Francisco Law School and his Bachelor's degree
in Literature and Philosophy from Wheeling College,
West Virginia.
Gerald W. Lynch has been President of John Jay
College of Criminal Justice since 1976. John Jay
College is the only institution of higher education
in the United States dedicated exclusively to the
study of criminal justice, law enforcement, police
science, and public service. An internationally
known expert and advocate of criminal justice
education, Dr. Lynch has lectured throughout the
United States, the Caribbean, Europe, the former
Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Australia. He
conducted a major conference in 1992 in St.
Petersburg, Russia, on "Crime, Justice and Public
Order" and has consulted with South Africa and
Namibia on establishing a College of Criminal
Justice. Dr. Lynch and several colleagues at John
Jay College have designed an innovative course to
improve police-community relations entitled "Human
Dignity and the Police." The course has now been
taught to police officers of many nations
throughout Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern
Europe, and the former Soviet Union. In cooperation
with the Puerto Rican Police Department, John Jay
College recently opened a campus in Puerto Rico,
with a curriculum integrating academic study for an
Associate Degree in Police Science with basic
police training for all recruits.
He received his B.S. from Fordham College and his
Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from New York
University.
Mark H. Moore is the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim
Professor of Criminal Justice and Public Management
at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and
Faculty Chair of the Kennedy School of
Government Program in Criminal Justice. For a
decade he served as the Founding Chair of the
Kennedy School's Committee on Executive Programs.
Professor Moore has led national "executive
sessions" on the future of juvenile justice,
police, and prosecution. He is the author of Buy
and Bust: The Effective Regulation of an Illicit
Market in Heroin, From Children to Citizens: The
Mandate for Juvenile Justice, Beyond 911: A New Era
in Policing, and Creating Public Value: Strategic
Management in Government.
Norval Morris is Julius Kreeger Professor of Law
and Criminology Emeritus at the University of
Chicago and is a Fellow of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences. For 8 years he was a member of
the Police Board of the City of Chicago.
Mr. Morris has taught law and criminology in
England, Australia, Japan, and the United States
and has written extensively on legal and
criminological issues. His books include The
Brothel Boy and Other Parables of the Law (Oxford
University Press, 1992); Modern Policing (editor
with Michael Tonry, University of Chicago Press,
1992); and The Oxford History of the Prison (editor
with David Rothman, Oxford University Press, 1995).
He serves on several Federal and State government
and scholarly commissions and councils.
Mark M. Richard is the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice, where he
oversees the Office of International Affairs,
Internal Security, Terrorism and Violent Crime
Sections, and the Office of Special Investigations.
Mr. Richard has overseen international law
enforcement efforts in the areas of white-collar
crime, international affairs, internal security,
antinarcotics, terrorism, money laundering, asset
forfeiture, special investigations, and violent
crime. For the 4-year period he served as Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security
and International Law Enforcement, he supervised
approximately 120 attorneys in the Internal
Security Section, the Office of International
Affairs, and the Office of Special Investigations.
In this capacity, he oversaw prosecutions involving
espionage, violations of export control and
neutrality laws, and unauthorized disclosure of
classified information.
Mr. Richard directly participated in negotiations
of mutual legal assistance treaties with senior
government officials of the United Kingdom, France,
West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Israel and
was responsible for all extradition litigation. In
an earlier position with the General Litigation and
International Law Enforcement Section, Mr. Richard
oversaw a variety of regulatory matters including
those administered by the Customs Service and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
As Chief of the Fraud Section in the U.S.
Department of Justice, he prosecuted cases
involving bank fraud, securities and consumer
fraud, and government contract and procurement
fraud. In that role, he also maintained liaison
with senior officials of the U.S. Department of
Defense and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Mr. Richard's previous experience includes
developing comprehensive programs for combating
white-collar crime and prosecutorial experience
against major drug dealers in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area.
Mr. Richard received a J.D. degree with honors from
the Brooklyn Law School and received a B.A. degree
in Psychology from the City University of New York.
His further executive training includes the
Executive Program in National and International
Security at Harvard University's Kennedy School of
Government (1982).
Alan G. Ringgold is the Deputy Assistant Director
for International Relations in the Criminal
Investigative Division at the FBI, where he
oversees the FBI's relationship with police and
security services throughout the world. He manages
the FBI's international assistance program.
Mr. Ringgold began his service with the FBI in
1970, as a specialist in Italian organized crime.
He was the Senior Resident Agent in Charge of FBI
activities for western Massachusetts and later
managed labor racketeering investigations in
Boston. In 1982, Mr. Ringgold was transferred to
Bern, Switzerland, as the Assistant Legal Attache,
and later was promoted to Legal Attache, with
responsibility for FBI liaison activities in
Switzerland, Austria, and Liechtenstein.
Additionally, he was an exchange manager with the
Drug Enforcement Administration, where he assisted
with the development of its money laundering and
asset forfeiture programs. In 1989, he became Legal
Attache in Paris, where he managed the FBI liaison
with France and half of the African continent. In
1994, he was promoted to his current position.
Mr. Ringgold graduated from Juniata College with a
Bachelor's degree in French and History.
Thereafter, he served in the United States Army,
Military Intelligence Branch. Upon discharge, he
served briefly as a police officer in Alexandria,
Virginia.
Laurie O. Robinson was appointed Assistant Attorney
General for the U.S. Department of Justice's Office
of Justice Programs (OJP) in 1994. She previously
served as Associate Deputy Attorney General and
Acting Assistant Attorney General at OJP.
Before joining the Justice Department in 1993, Ms.
Robinson served as Director of the American Bar
Association's (ABA) Criminal Justice Section
beginning in 1979. She also headed the ABA's
Professional Services Division-D.C., which
constituted about half the Association's
Washington, D.C., office. From 1972 to 1979, Ms.
Robinson served as Assistant Staff Director of the
ABA Criminal Justice Section.
Ms. Robinson graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta
Kappa from Brown University with a degree in
Political Science in 1968. She served as Chair of
the National Forum on Criminal Justice from 1991
until 1993 and was a member of the Boards of the
National College of District Attorneys, the
National Committee on Community Corrections, the
National Association of Women in Criminal Justice,
and the Victim Assistance Legal Organization
(VALOR). She currently serves on the Advisory Board
of the Federal Sentencing Reporter.
Luis P. Salas joined Florida International
University in 1975 and is now a full Professor in
the Criminal Justice Department. He is a recognized
expert on Latin American justice systems and has
written or coauthored six books and a number of
articles on the subject since 1992. Professor Salas
has served as Chair of the Criminal Justice
Department, which offers an undergraduate and
master's program.
In 1985, Professor Salas was named Director of the
Center for the Administration of Justice at Florida
International University. The Center employs a
multidisciplinary and international staff of
specialists and places special emphasis on support
to local efforts to strengthen and invigorate fair
and independent justice systems.
Professor Salas has been a consultant to a number
of State, Federal, and international organizations
as well as private consulting firms. He received a
degree in political science from North Carolina
State University and received his J.D. degree from
Wake Forest University.
Clifford Shearing is a Professor and Director of
the Centre of Criminology at the University of
Toronto and is Academic Director of the Community
Peace Foundation, a unit of the School of
Government at the University of the Western Cape in
South Africa. His research focuses on shifts in
governance and their implications for policing and
justice. Most recently he has been studying and
providing advice on the transformation of policing
and justice in South Africa. His latest book is
Policing for a New South Africa (Routledge). His
forthcoming book is tentatively titled Governing
Diversity.
Michael E. Smith is a Professor at the University
of Wisconsin School of Law, and a visiting lecturer
at Yale Law School. Previously, Mr. Smith was
President of the Vera Institute of Justice, a
nonprofit institute that deploys its research and
operational divisions to devise, test, and
disseminate more effective responses to pressing
social policy problems.
Mr. Smith has also held many trusteeships, among
them the Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem,
the New York Criminal Justice Agency, the Center for
Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services, and
the Vinland Property Trust. He is still a member of
the board of trustees of all the aforementioned
organizations.
Mr. Smith received his undergraduate degree from
Princeton University and his J.D. from Harvard Law
School. He also received a degree from Oxford as a
Rhodes Scholar.
Janice M. Stromsen, who has been with the U.S.
Department of Justice since 1971, is Director of
the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of
Justice. Before being appointed Director of ICITAP,
she held various posts in U.S. law enforcement
agencies, including ICITAP's Associate Director for
Field Operation, and served 10 years as the Deputy
Chief of INTERPOL-USNCB. She is credited with the
institutionalization of INTERPOL within the
Department of Justice, creation of INTERPOL's
Standing Committee on Information Technology,
implementation of the Canadian interface project
enabling direct database contact between law
enforcement agencies of the United States and their
Canadian counterparts, and the design and
implementation of ICITAP's Haiti Police Development
Project. Ms. Stromsen received her B.A. from the
College of Wooster and an M.A. from the Middlebury
College program at the University of Paris (Sorbonne).
Michael L. Sullivan is the Deputy Commander, U.S.
Army Criminal Investigation Command, at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia. He began military service by
serving 4 years in the U.S. Marine Corps and then
enlisting in the U.S. Army, where he rose to the
rank of sergeant. He attended Infantry Officer
Candidate School and was commissioned as second
lieutenant.
Colonel Sullivan has served in numerous infantry
and military police assignments, beginning as a
Special Forces Detachment Executive Officer, 8th
Special Forces Group, Panama; Rifle Platoon Leader,
D Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry
Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Provost Marshal
Operations Officer, Fort Harrison, Indiana; and
Chief, Training Support Division, U.S. Army
Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama.
Colonel Sullivan spent several years at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, where his assignments included
Assistant S-3, 16th Military Police Brigade (ABN);
Executive Officer, 503d Military Police Battalion
(ABN); Provost Marshal, 82d Airborne Division;
Commander, 503d Military Police Battalion (ABN);
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G3/DPT, XVIII
Airborne Corps; and Commander, 16th Military Police
Brigade (ABN).
His awards include the Legion of Merit with Oak
Leaf Cluster, Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf
Cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak
Leaf Clusters, Army Commendation Medal, Army
Achievement Medal, both Army and Marine Corps Good
Conduct Medals, National Defense Service Medal with
Bronze Star, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with Oak
Leaf Cluster, Vietnam Campaign Medal with two
Bronze Stars, Southwest Asia Service Medal with two
Bronze Stars, Humanitarian Service Medal with Oak
Leaf Cluster, Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Ribbon,
Vietnam Service Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal,
Vietnam Civic Action Medal, French Armed Forces
Expeditionary Medal, Combat Infantryman's Badge,
Ranger Tab, Special Forces Tab, and Master
Parachutist's Badge, U.S. Marine Corps Parachutist
Badge, and the Armed Forces Parachutist Badges from
Argentina, Ecuador, and Spain.
Colonel Sullivan holds a B.S. degree in Criminology
from the University of Tampa, an M.S. in Education
from Purdue University, an M.A. in International
Relations from Salve Regina College, and an M.S. in
Strategy and International Policy from the Naval
War College. His military education included
Officer Candidate School, Airborne School, Ranger
School, the Special Forces Officer Course,
Jumpmaster School, the MP Officer Advanced Course,
the FBI National Academy, the Naval College of
Command and Staff, and the Army War College.
Gary L. Thomas is a special agent with the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). He
currently serves as the Special Agent in Charge of
ATF's International Enforcement Branch in Bureau
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Thomas began his law enforcement career in 1977
as a U.S. Border Patrol agent in El Paso, Texas. In
1978, he joined ATF as a special agent assigned to
the Lubbock, Texas, Field Office. In 1980, he was
reassigned to the Miami Field Division, where he
worked in the Miami and Fort Lauderdale Field
Offices during the Vice President's Drug Task
Force. In 1984, he was promoted to Senior
Operations Officer in the Atlanta Field Division.
He was later promoted to Supervisor of the Atlanta
Firearms Enforcement Group. In 1991, he was
promoted to Bureau Headquarters where he served as
the Achilles Program Manager in the Foreign
Operations Program. Mr. Thomas is a graduate of
Florida State University with a degree in
criminology.
Bankole Thompson is currently a Professor in the
Department of Police Studies of the College of Law
Enforcement, Eastern Kentucky University. Formerly,
he was Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
Studies at Kent State University. He also served as
Judge of the High Court and District Attorney in
the West African State of Sierra Leone and Legal
Adviser to the Mano River Union (a subregional
economic integration group in West Africa).
Professor Thompson has published widely in the
areas of law and comparative criminal justice and
has forthcoming book chapters on comparative
aspects of criminal justice in developing African
countries, and a book on the constitutional history
and law of Sierra Leone (1961-1995). He holds an
M.A. in Philosophy from Durham University and an
M.A., LL.B., and Ph.D. in Law from the University
of Cambridge.
Michael Tonry is Sonosky Professor of Law and
Public Policy at the University of Minnesota. He
has written or edited more than 25 books, including
Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Punishment in
America (Oxford University Press, 1995);
Intermediate Sanctions in Overcrowded Times
(Northeastern University Press, 1995) with Kate
Hamilton; Building a Safer Society: Strategic
Approaches to Crime Prevention (University of
Chicago Press, 1995) with David P. Farrington;
Drugs and Crime (University of Chicago Press, 1990)
with James Q. Wilson; and Between Prison and
Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a Rational
Sentencing System (Oxford University Press, 1990)
with Norval Morris. Professor Tonry has worked as
an adviser on sentencing and corrections matters to
U.S. Federal and State agencies; Canadian Federal
and provincial agencies; and Australian, British,
and Swiss national government agencies. He is
editor of Crime and Justice--A Review of Research,
a series of refereed essays on criminal justice
research subjects, published since 1979 by the
University of Chicago Press; Overcrowded Times, a
bimonthly sentencing and corrections newsletter for
public officials and researchers; and the book
series Studies in Crime and Public Policy,
established in 1992 by Oxford University Press.
Jeremy Travis was appointed Director of the
National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of
Justice, in 1994. Before joining the National
Institute of Justice, Mr. Travis was the Deputy
Commissioner for Legal Matters at the New York City
Police Department. In this position, he served as
adviser to the Police Commissioner and as General
Counsel to the Department and oversaw the Legal
Bureau, the License Division, and the Criminal
Justice Bureau. While with the department, Mr.
Travis also developed the Civil Enforcement
Initiative, which provided lawyers as counsel to
police precincts; wrote New York City's ban on
assault weapons; introduced new technologies into
the arrest process; drafted the Police Department's
quality-of-life strategy, "Reclaiming New York's
Public Spaces"; and, as chair of the Chancellor's
Advisory Panel on School Safety, developed a
proposal for a new approach to school violence.
In a previous position, Mr. Travis served as Chief
Counsel to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice for
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary. Working with the subcommittee chairman,
Mr. Travis developed new agendas for oversight hearings
and legislative initiatives on criminal justice issues.
Before his service with the Subcommittee, Mr.
Travis was Special Adviser to New York Mayor Edward
Koch. Among other tasks, he conducted a management
and legal review of the City Human Rights
Commission, coordinated the city's implementation
of the Federal immigration legalization program,
formed the Commission to Establish the High School
Institute for Law and Justice, established the
Mayor's Advisory Council on Community Relations
following the Howard Beach incident, and served as
the coordinator of the Mayor's Office of
Educational Services.
Before becoming Special Adviser to the Mayor, Mr.
Travis was Special Counsel to the First Deputy
Mayor and Assistant Director for Law Enforcement
Services for the City of New York. Earlier, he was
Special Counsel to the Police Commissioner for the
New York City Police Department. In addition to his
many consulting and research positions, Mr. Travis'
extensive legal and criminal justice experience
includes serving as law clerk to Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Executive Director for the New York City
Criminal Justice Agency, and Executive Director of
the Victim/Witness Assistance Project for the Vera
Institute of Justice.
William F. Walsh is the Director of the Southern
Police Institute and Associate Professor in the
Department of Justice Administration in the College
of Arts and Sciences at the University of
Louisville. A former member of the New York City
Police Department with 21 years of service, he
holds undergraduate and Master's degrees from John
Jay College of Criminal Justice and a Doctorate in
Sociology from Fordham University. Professor Walsh
has conducted research and written articles on
issues relating to both public and private police,
which have been published in the American Journal
of Police, Justice Quarterly, Journal of Police
Science and Administration, Journal of Criminal
Justice, The Justice Professional, Security
Journal, and Police Chief. He is coauthor with
Edwin J. Donovan of Police Supervision: A
Performance Based Approach and of the forthcoming
fifth edition of Wilson and McLaren's Police
Administration with James Fyfe and Jack R. Greene.
Harold D. Wankel is Chief of Operations for the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), where
he oversees enforcement programs throughout a worldwide
network of over 200 DEA offices in the United States and
abroad.
Mr. Wankel began his career in Federal drug law
enforcement in 1970, as a Narcotics Agent in Kansas
City, Missouri, with the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), U.S. Department of Justice.
Since then, he has held positions with the BNDD and
its successor agency, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), as a Special Agent in Kansas
City, Missouri, and Detroit, Michigan; as DEA
Country Attache in Kabul, Afghanistan, and
Islamabad, Pakistan; as Staff Coordinator in the
Office of International Programs; as Senior
Inspector in the Office of Inspections; as
Assistant Special Agent in Charge at the Detroit
Field Division; as Executive Assistant in the
Office of the Administrator; as Deputy Assistant
Administrator for the Office of Investigative
Support; and as Deputy Assistant Administrator for
Operations in Washington, D.C.
As part of an Executive Exchange Program, Mr.
Wankel was appointed by the FBI Director as Deputy
Assistant Director of its Criminal Division, an
assignment that extended from 1994 to 1995, when he
assumed his present position as DEA's Chief of
Operations.
Mr. Wankel received a B.S. degree from the
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.
Richard H. Ward has been with the University of
Illinois at Chicago (UIC) since 1977, serving first
as Vice Chancellor for Administration (1977 to
1993) and currently as Associate Chancellor for
Special Programs. He is a tenured Professor of
Criminology and Executive Director of the Office of
International Criminal Justice at UIC.
Dr. Ward's academic achievements include numerous
articles and books, both written and edited, in the
field of criminal justice. His most recent work,
coauthored with James Osterburg, is Criminal
Investigations. He has been a visiting professor at
the National Police College and has also lectured
or spoken at the FBI Academy, the Army War College,
and before numerous law enforcement agencies. Dr.
Ward has been a consultant to more than 50 police
departments in the United States and to numerous
international organizations including the United
Nations.
An internationally recognized expert on counter-
terrorism, investigative methods, and comparative
systems, Dr. Ward has traveled extensively
conducting research and lecturing in more than 40
countries including the People's Republic of China,
Colombia, Egypt, England, France, Germany, Israel,
Italy, Panama, Russia, and Sri Lanka. In 1994, in
recognition of his outstanding contributions to the
People's Republic of China, he received the Friendship
Award, the highest honor awarded by the State Bureau
of Foreign Experts through the State Council.
Before coming to UIC, Dr. Ward served as Vice
President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
City University of New York, where he also held the
position of Dean of Graduate Studies, Dean of
Students, and Professor of Criminal Justice. He
served with the New York City Police Department as
detective for 8 years.
Dr. Ward earned his Doctorate in Criminology from
the University of California at Berkeley.
Robert Wasserman is Chief of Staff for the White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP). Prior to his appointment, Mr. Wasserman
served as a Research Fellow at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, where he was a member
of the Executive Sessions on Community Policing.
Mr. Wasserman has served in a number of
governmental executive positions throughout his
career: Assistant City Manager of Yellow Springs,
Ohio (1966 to 1967), and Administrative Assistant
to the Chief of Police in Dayton, Ohio (1966 to
1970), where he led a major reorganization of the
police. In 1970 he assumed the position of
Director, Community Assistant Group, in the
Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, where he
was responsible for management of riot prevention
and control activities of the Massachusetts State
Police. In 1973, Mr. Wasserman was appointed
Director of Training and Education of the Boston
Police Department. He was promoted again to
Operations Assistant to the Police Commissioner in
1976, assuming responsibility for management of
field operations for that department.
Mr. Wasserman left the department to form the
consulting firm Wasserman Associates, Inc., in
1978. As a consultant, he worked with a large
number of communities and issues, such as criminal
investigations (Rochester, New York), community
profiling and research experiments (San Diego
Police Department and the Police Foundation of
Washington), and resource allocation and police
improvement (Atlanta Police Department). He served
as a principal in the firm from 1978 to 1982, 1985
to 1988, and 1990 to 1994.
In 1982, Mr. Wasserman was selected to serve as
Director of Planning for the Houston Police
Department, moving to the position of Senior
Assistant to the Chief of Police in 1983. In this
position, which he held until 1985, he worked as
key staff coordinator for the development of the
neighborhood policing planning process. From 1988
to 1990, Mr. Wasserman served as Director of Public
Safety for the Massachusetts Port Authority, where
he managed police and fire services for Boston's
airports, waterfront, and bridge properties. He was
responsible for restructuring the provision of
police and fire services to meet the enhanced
safety needs of the area.
Mr. Wasserman did his undergraduate work in
sociology at Antioch College and his graduate work
in police administration at Michigan State
University. He is the author of numerous articles
and monographs on police training, community
relations, community policing, and criminal
investigations.
William H. Webster was sworn in as Director of
Central Intelligence in 1987. In this position, he
headed the Intelligence Community (comprising all
foreign intelligence agencies of the United States)
and directed the CIA until 1991, when he joined the
law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy in its
Washington, D.C., office.
A practicing attorney with a St. Louis law firm
from 1949 to 1959, Judge Webster served as U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri from
1960 to 1961, after which he returned to private
practice. From 1964 to 1969, he was a member of the
Missouri Board of Law Examiners.
In 1970, Judge Webster was appointed a Judge of the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri and in 1973 was elevated to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. He resigned that position to become
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
1973. During his service on the bench, Judge
Webster was Chairman of the Judiciary Conference
Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules and a
member of the Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus and
the Committee of Court Administration.
Judge Webster earned a B.A. degree from Amherst
College in 1947 where, in 1975, he received an
honorary Doctor of Laws degree. He received his
J.D. degree from Washington University Law School
in 1949.
Deborah G. Wilson is an Assistant Provost at the
University of Louisville. Dr. Wilson served as
Chair of the Department of Justice Administration
from 1990 to 1994 and has been a member of the
faculty since 1983. She has a Ph.D. from Purdue
University and served on the faculty of Auburn
University before her appointment at Louisville.
Dr. Wilson is the director of two international
projects in Central Europe, involving the Pest
County Police Department (Budapest) and the
Romanian National Police Force. Both projects are
directed toward the provision of police management
education within a democratic model, with a special
emphasis on police-minority relations in Romania.
Additionally, Dr. Wilson organized and served as
leader of the U.S. delegation for a joint seminar
on Police Administration in the 21st Century, which
was cohosted by the University of Louisville and
Beijing Public Security University.
Dr. Wilson has written or coauthored numerous
books, chapters of books, scholarly articles and
technical reports. In addition to serving on the
faculty and in administrative positions at the
University of Louisville, she served as an
Assistant to the Kentucky Attorney General and as
the Director of Planning and Research for the
Kentucky Department of Corrections.
Anatoly Zakalyuk is the Deputy Chief of the
Ukrainian Academy of Internal Affairs and a member
of the Presidium of the Academy of Juridical
Sciences of Ukraine. In addition to his formal
position as researcher for the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, he has written many policy documents
drafted in response to requests of the President
and Supreme Rada of Ukraine, including an analysis
of the crime situation in Ukraine for the past 20
years.
Ugljesa Zvekic is currently a Research Coordinator
at the United Nations Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute and a Senior Scientific
Consultant at the Institute for Criminological and
Sociological Research in Belgrade. He is also an
Honorary Professor at the School of Social and
Political Sciences, the University of Hull.
Dr. Zvekic wrote and edited a number of volumes,
articles, and U.N. reports on such subjects as
informal crime control, alternative policing
styles, development and crime, the judicial
profession, a world survey of noncustodial
sanctions, probation in an international
perspective, an international survey of victims of
crime, and criminal justice information. He has
organized several international conferences,
seminars, research workshops, and training courses
within the U.N. crime prevention and criminal
justice programs and for international associations
in criminology and criminal law.
For more information on the National Institute of
Justice, please contact: National Criminal Justice
Reference Service
P.O. Box 6000 Rockville, MD 20849-6000
800-851-3420
e-mail: askncjrs@ncjrs.org
You can view or obtain an electronic version of
this document from the NCJRS Justice Information
Center World Wide Web site at
http://www.ncjrs.org
If you have any questions, call or e-mail NCJRS.