C.C. Borden Construction, Inc., No. 4342 (February 8, 1999)
Docket No. SIZ-99-01-15-05
                                                                 
                                                                 
                                                          
                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                  SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
                 OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
                        WASHINGTON, D.C.


__________________________________
                                  )
SIZE APPEAL OF:                   )
                                  )
C.C. Borden Construction, Inc.    )
                                  )   Docket No. SIZ-99-01-15-05
     Appellant                    )
                                  )   Decided:  February 8, 1999
Re:  Pat Mathis Construction Co., )
     Inc.                         )
                                  )
Solicitation No.                  )
FTC 98-20                         )
Department of the Treasury        )
Federal Law Enforcement           )
  Training Center                 )
Glynco, Georgia                   )
__________________________________)


                   ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL [1]

     On   October  5,  1998,  the  Contracting  Officer  for  the
Department  of  the  Treasury, Federal Law  Enforcement  Training
Center, in Glynco, Georgia, issued the instant small business set
aside  procurement  for  the  construction  of  a  new  dormitory
building.   He  assigned to it Standard Industrial Classification
code  1522 (General Contractors-Residential Buildings, Other Than
Single  Family), with a corresponding $17 million average  annual
receipts  size  standard.  Opening bids were due on  December  4,
1998.   The apparent low bidder was Pat Mathis Construction  Co.,
Inc. (PMC).
     

      On December 10 and 15, 1998, C.C. Borden Construction, Inc.
(Appellant),  filed  size protests with the  Contracting  Officer
challenging  PMC's  size  status.   On  December  16,  1998,  the
Contracting Officer forwarded the protests to the Small  Business
Administration's (SBA) Atlanta Office of Government  Contracting-
Area III (Area Office) for a size determination.

      In  its December 10th protest, Appellant merely alleged PMC
was  not  a  small  business, but provided no  support  for  this
allegation.  In its December 15th protest, Appellant alleged  PMC
is  affiliated  with  The  Polote Corporation  (Polote),  through
common management and common facilities.

       On  December 17, 1998, the Area Office dismissed the first
protest as insufficiently specific, relying on 13 C.F.R. Sections
121.1007(b)  and  (c).   It  dismissed  the  second  protest   as
untimely,  because  the Contracting Officer did  not  receive  it
within  five  business days after bid opening. 13 C.F.R.  Section
121.1004(a)(1).   The Area Office also noted the  second  protest
was  non-specific, because it did not present any information--or
even   allege--that  either  PMC  or  Polote,  or  both  concerns
together, exceeded the applicable size standard.

      Appellant  received the dismissal letter  on  December  18,
1998, and filed the instant appeal on January 15, 1999. [2]

      Appellant  reiterates its previous December 15th  assertion
that PMC and Polote are affiliated through common management  and
common   facilities.   It  also  asserts  that  PMC  and  Polote,
together, exceed the applicable size standard.

     Appellant  filed the instant appeal within 30  days  of  the
Area  Office's service of the size determination, and it is  thus
timely    for   future   applicability.    13   C.F.R.   Sections
134.304(a)(2) and (b).
     
      The Administrative Judge concludes the Area Office properly
dismissed both protests.  The applicable regulation provides:

     A  protest must include specific facts.  A protest must
     be  sufficiently specific to provide reasonable  notice
     as  to  the  grounds upon which the protested concern's
     size  is  questioned.  Some basis  for  the  belief  or
     allegation  stated in the protest  must  be  given.   A
     protest  merely alleging that the protested concern  is
     not  small...does not specify adequate grounds for  the
     protest.
     
13  C.F.R. Section 121.1007(b).  Subsection 121.1007(c)  requires
the SBA to dismiss non-specific protests.

     Here, Appellant's first protest merely asserted PMC is not a
small  business, but offered no factual basis for the  assertion.
Thus,  it  lacked the specificity required by the  regulation  to
initiate  a size investigation.  The second protest was untimely.
13  C.F.R.  Section  121.1004(a)(1).  It  also  was  nonspecific,
because  it  failed to present any evidentiary  support  for  the
allegation that either PMC or Polote, alone or together, exceeded
the  applicable  size standard.  Thus, the Area Office  correctly
dismissed both protests. [3]

      In  view of the above, the Administrative Judge AFFIRMS the
Area Office's dismissal of both protests, and DENIES the appeal.

      This is the Small Business Administration's final decision.
See 13 C.F.R. Section 134.316(b).



                              ________________________________
                              GLORIA E. BLAZSIK
                              Administrative Judge


_________________________

       [1]  The Small Business Administration has amended certain
of  its size regulations.  63 Fed. Reg. 35726, 35738-39 (June 30,
1998)  (to  be codified at 13 C.F.R. Sections 121.103,  121.1001,
121.1103).   Because the Contracting Officer issued  the  instant
procurement  after the June 30, 1998 effective date, the  amended
regulations apply here.
       [2] The Contracting Officer awarded the contract to Polote
on December 24, 1998.
       [3]  Because the second protest was untimely,  Appellant's
assertion on appeal that the combined receipts of PMC and  Polote
exceed  the  applicable  size standard  cannot  cure  the  second
protest's  nonspecificity.  Similarly, the protest's untimeliness
defeats  Appellant's  attempt to cure, under  13  C.F.R.  Section
134.308,  which  permits introduction of new evidence  on  appeal
under certain limited circumstances.

                                              Posted: March, 1999