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Cover
================================================================ COVER

High-Risk Series

February 1997

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACT
MANAGEMENT

GAO/HR-97-13

DOE Contract Management

Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOE -
  GAO/HR

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER

February 1997

The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives

In 1990, the General Accounting Office began a special effort to
review and report on the federal program areas its work identified as
high risk because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement.  This effort, which was supported by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, brought a much-needed focus on
problems that were costing the government billions of dollars. 

In December 1992, GAO issued a series of reports on the fundamental
causes of problems in high-risk areas, and in a second series in
February 1995, it reported on the status of efforts to improve those
areas.  This, GAO's third series of reports, provides the current
status of designated high-risk areas. 

This report describes our concerns about the Department of Energy's
implementation of its contract reform initiative.  It focuses on the
Department's continued use of noncompetitively awarded contracts to
operate its major facilities.  The report also identifies some
implementation problems that can affect the accomplishment of the
Department's missions, compromise its authority, and result in cost
inefficiencies. 

Copies of this report series are being sent to the President, the
congressional leadership, all other Members of the Congress, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the heads of
major departments and agencies. 

James F.  Hinchman
Acting Comptroller General
of the United States

OVERVIEW
============================================================ Chapter 0

As the largest civilian contracting agency in the federal government,
the Department of Energy (DOE) generally fulfills its multiple
missions with contractors who manage and operate its federally owned
facilities.  In fact, some of DOE's current contracts date back to
the 1940s.  Since then, DOE has continued a policy of "least
interference," which left it unaware of many of its contractors'
activities.  Moreover, DOE paid nearly every cost that these
contractors incurred.  In fiscal year 1995, DOE contracted out about
91 percent of its $19.2 billion in obligations (or about $17.5
billion) to, among other things, maintain its weapons complex, fund
its national laboratories, and clean up its legacy of environmental
contamination. 

   THE PROBLEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

DOE's contracting practices and problems stem from the time of the
Manhattan Project's development of the atomic bomb during World War
II.  This undertaking involved special contracting arrangements, such
as least interference in the contractor's work and indemnification of
a contractor's liability.  Decades later, DOE continued to enter into
contracts in which competition was the exception, reimbursement of
virtually any cost to the contractor was the practice, and lax
oversight of contractors was the norm. 

In 1990, we designated DOE contracting as a high-risk area vulnerable
to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.  This designation was
precipitated by DOE's history of weak oversight of contractors
coupled with heavy reliance on contractors to fulfill DOE's missions. 
We subsequently issued a series of reports and testimonies,
identifying some of the costly effects of DOE's practices.  These
products have contributed to the Congress's budget deliberations and
provided an impetus for DOE to reform its contracting. 

Although past Secretaries of Energy have instituted various remedies
and have moved in the direction of improved contracting, changing the
way DOE does business has not come easily or quickly. 

   PROGRESS TO DATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

A major contract reform effort now under way and receiving high
priority and visibility at DOE raises expectations for improvement. 
Responding to continued criticism of DOE's contract management, in
1993 the Secretary of Energy established a Contract Reform Team.  The
Reform Team evaluated the Department's contracting practices and, in
its February 1994 report, recommended nearly 50 actions to
fundamentally change DOE's contracting practices. 

Often in direct opposition to DOE's historical contracting patterns,
the recommendations included, among other things,

  -- increasing competition for contracts;

  -- using alternatives, such as performance-based contracts, to
     typical management and operating contracts;

  -- improving DOE's management and control of certain costs; and

  -- putting performance criteria and incentives into DOE's
     contracts. 

The recommendations identified specific DOE actions to guide the
agency's contracting.  In response, DOE has made progress in
developing an array of policies and procedures.  For example, it has
published a new regulation adopting a standard of full and open
competition for the award of its management and operating contracts. 
In addition, DOE is including incentives to improve performance and
control costs in its contracts.  DOE also has initiated a new
approach for some environmental cleanup work in an attempt to shift
much of the risk and responsibility onto the contractor. 

Although DOE has made headway, most of the completed actions were
delayed, which will push back the implementation of the final reforms
accordingly.  The new policies and guidance provide a framework for
improved contracting. 

   FURTHER ACTION NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

The changes proposed in DOE's current reforms, which are
unprecedented in scope within DOE, provide a comprehensive plan to
address the problems resulting from the Department's past contracting
practices.  However, the real test of DOE's success will occur as DOE
implements, monitors, corrects where needed, and standardizes "best
practices" for a totally new way of doing business.  This effort will
require time as the current contracts are either competitively
awarded or noncompetitively renewed with the reform provisions
incorporated into the contracts. 

When we recently completed a review of the status of all of DOE's
contract reform actions,\1 we noted that competition now may be the
rule but that DOE has a long way to go before it realizes the
benefits of competition.  Most of DOE's contract decisions continue
to be noncompetitive.  In addition, we found that problems are
emerging in early implementation.  For example, the contracts' goals
are not always linked to those of the Department.  Given the
magnitude of these reforms, implementation problems are to be
expected.  However, they must be identified and corrected for
contract reform to succeed. 

Also, it is critical that DOE not lose its momentum and priority in
implementing contract reform.  Therefore, continued high-level
monitoring and oversight by DOE will be needed to identify problems,
standardize the best practices, and make needed corrections as DOE
makes its way through these changes. 

DOE also needs to make the specific changes we identified in our
recent review of its early implementation of contract reform.  For
example, DOE should competitively award its management and operating
contracts to the greatest extent possible and link the contractors'
goals to DOE's strategic goals. 

Finally, when the new contracts and regulations produce the desired
results, the high-risk designation can be lifted. 

--------------------
\1 Department of Energy:  Contract Reform Is Progressing, but Full
Implementation Will Take Years (GAO/RCED-97-18, Dec.  10, 1996). 

BACKGROUND
============================================================ Chapter 1

Over the last 50 years, DOE and its predecessor agencies have spent
billions of dollars for its management and operating contractors
using contracting policies that were developed during the crisis of
World War II.  In fact, some of DOE's current contracts date back to
the 1940s.  DOE continued a policy of "least interference," which
left it unaware of many of its contractors' activities.  Moreover,
DOE paid nearly every cost that these contractors incurred. 
Contracting in DOE accounted for $17.5 billion, or 91 percent of its
fiscal year 1995 obligations, employing about 120,000 contractor
staff, compared to 19,600 federal staff. 

Almost all of DOE's contract obligations (82 percent, or $14.35
billion worth) are with its management and operating contractors and
are generally extended every 5 years.  DOE's own unique procurement
regulations cover many of the activities performed under these
contracts, which are for operating, maintaining, or supporting
government-owned research, development, production, or testing
facilities, both nuclear and nonnuclear.  These regulations differ
from those applicable to typical government contracts and other DOE
contracts, which are primarily governed by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation.  For example, noncompetitive procurement has been the
normal practice for DOE's management and operating contracts, while
competitive contracting is the normal practice for other contracts. 

We have issued numerous reports relating the effects--unnecessary
costs and contractors' poor performance--of DOE's practices. 
Similarly, we reported how DOE's most significant projects, called
major system acquisitions, have had limited success under DOE's
management.\2 Of the 80 projects initiated in the last 16 years, only
15 have been completed--most of which were behind schedule and over
cost; after billions of dollars had been invested, 31 were terminated
before completion. 

For example, a project to solidify high-level radioactive waste for
long-term storage had grown from a cost of about $446 million to over
$1 billion and was more than 7 years behind schedule.  Another
project, the Superconducting Super Collider, had an original cost
estimate of $5.9 billion, but as we reported, the project's expected
costs had ballooned to more than $11 billion.  Concerned about the
cost increases and the federal budget deficit, the Congress finally
terminated this high-energy physics project. 

We believe that four key factors underlie the problems with these
projects.  Two are contract related--a flawed system of incentives
for contractors and insufficient DOE personnel with the appropriate
skills to effectively oversee the contractors' operations.  The other
two factors relate to DOE's unclear or changing missions and to the
incremental funding of projects. 

Although DOE began to take action to improve it contracting practices
in l990, reform has been an elusive goal.  In May 1993, the Secretary
of Energy told the Congress that DOE was not adequately in control of
its contractors and, as a result, was not "in a position to ensure
effective and efficient expenditures of taxpayer
dollars.  .  .  ." As a result, the Secretary initiated a complete
review of DOE's contracting practices by a Contract Reform Team. 

--------------------
\2 Department of Energy:  DOE Has Had Limited Success With Major
System Acquisitions (GAO/RCED-97-17, Nov.  26, 1996). 

DOE'S REFORM ACTIONS ARE UNDER WAY
============================================================ Chapter 2

After reviewing the agency's contracting practices, the Secretary's
Contract Reform Team issued, in February 1994, its report entitled
Making Contracting Work Better and Cost Less.  The Team focused its
efforts on management and operating contracts and identified numerous
problems that needed correcting.  The 48 recommendations (47 in the
report and 1 directed by the Secretary) for specific actions sought
to make sweeping changes in DOE's policies and practices, often
completely contrary to the way DOE has done business. 

   DOE IS DEVELOPING A CONTRACTING
   POLICY FRAMEWORK
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

DOE is making headway in developing policies, procedures, and
guidelines in response to the Reform Team's recommendations.  Along
with the recommendations, the Reform Team assigned to a specific DOE
office the responsibility for completing each action and established
deadlines for them.  As of August 1996, DOE reported completing 47 of
the 48 recommended actions; the last one is nearing completion. 
Specifically, DOE has

  -- published a policy adopting a standard of full and open
     competition,

  -- developed guidance for contract performance criteria and
     measures,

  -- created incentive mechanisms for contractors, and

  -- developed training in performance-based contracting for DOE
     personnel. 

These steps, as well as others, are crucial to improving DOE's
contracting and represent a framework upon which the actual
implementation of reforms will take place in contracts. 

   DELAYED ACTIONS POSTPONE
   IMPLEMENTATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Although DOE's efforts are significant, most of the actions were
completed later than expected and consequently delayed the
implementation of the final reforms.  DOE missed the deadlines for 45
of 47 completed reforms by an average of 11 months.  Moreover, nearly
one-half of the reform actions have just been completed in the last
fiscal year.  The recency of the contracting policies and guidance
will subsequently push implementation further into the future.  Thus,
DOE's contract reform may not realize all of its expected benefits
for some time. 

DOE CONTINUES TO MISS THE BENEFITS
OF COMPETING CONTRACTS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Possibly DOE's most important reform initiative--to open its
management and operating contracts to competition--has become policy. 
However, DOE continues to award the majority of its contracts
noncompetitively. 

DOE's new policy adopts a standard of full and open competition and
directs that DOE competitively award its contracts to the fullest
extent possible.  Also, the Contract Reform Team's report recommended
that the terms of the contract be negotiated before existing
contracts were extended.  The recommendation is intended to improve
DOE's bargaining position with respect to contract costs and
deliverables and encourage new contractors to submit bids. 

   DOE CONTINUES NONCOMPETITIVE
   AWARDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

DOE continues to award most of its contracts noncompetitively.  Of
the 24 decisions made from July 5, 1994, to the end of August 1996,
DOE decided to extend 16 contracts on a noncompetitive basis and to
competitively award the other eight.\3 DOE had had long-term
relationships with many of the contractors whose contracts it decided
not to compete.  The average age of the 16 contracts was about 35
years, and 12 of them had never been competitively awarded. 

Second, although contrary to a recommendation by the Contract Reform
Team, DOE may have weakened its bargaining position when it
conditionally decided to extend the contracts for three of its
laboratories before negotiating with the contractor.  As a result,
DOE placed itself in the same weak negotiating position it has
maintained for years. 

DOE officials maintain that they are improving existing contracts
without the benefit of competition.  However, DOE is still
negotiating in a noncompetitive environment and will not gain the
full benefits of competition. 

--------------------
\3 According to DOE's Procurement and Assistance Data System, DOE had
42 active management and operating contracts as of July 1, 1996. 

   DOE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW
   COMPETITION POLICY COULD BE
   BENEFICIAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

DOE adopted in 1996 the provisions of the Competition in Contracting
Act that provide for specific exceptions to full and open
competition.\4 One of the exceptions authorizes noncompetitive
procurements for federally funded research and development centers
that maintain an essential engineering, research, or development
capability.  DOE has 18 research centers; under this exception, it
could justify its noncompetitive procurements with the management and
operating contractors operating the centers. 

In the past, DOE has successfully competed contracts to operate
research centers at two national laboratories and within the last few
months has decided to competitively award another similar contract. 
We believe that DOE needs to continue to compete its research center
contracts to the greatest extent possible. 

In the event that DOE does need to use this exception to justify a
noncompetitive procurement, it should do so only for the research
work, which should be segregated from the other activities of its
management and operating contractors.  For example, in a recent
review of DOE's contracts with research centers, we reported that
only about half of the funds the contractors spent was for research
and development activities.\5 The remainder was spent on such
activities as the environmental restoration of facilities
contaminated with hazardous and nuclear waste and did not involve
research and development.  Therefore, DOE could get the most value
from its competitive awards by separating and competitively awarding
the portion of the work that is not research-related. 

--------------------
\4 Because DOE did not adopt these provisions until 1996, they did
not apply to DOE's earlier decisions to extend the 16 contracts. 

\5 Federal Research:  Information on Fees for Selected Federally
Funded Research and Development Centers (GAO/RCED-96-31FS, Dec.  8,
1995). 

SOME PROBLEMS EMERGE IN EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION
============================================================ Chapter 4

As DOE begins to implement the contract reforms, some implementation
problems are occurring.  The contracts' goals are not always clearly
linked to those of the Department; some contract language could
affect DOE's authority to determine the total amount of available
incentives; and DOE does not have guidance for its contracting
officers to reach reasonable prices on its incentive contracts. 
These problems, which relate to the use of the new performance-based
management contracts, can affect the accomplishment of DOE's
missions, compromise DOE's authority, and result in cost
inefficiencies.  In trying to put contract reforms in place quickly,
DOE officials said that some inconsistencies occurred and that they
see these early implementation stages as a learning process. 

   CONTRACTS' GOALS ARE NOT ALWAYS
   CONSISTENT WITH DOE'S
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

First, the goals in the management and operating contracts are not
always clearly linked to those of the Department.  A strong linkage
is important because most of DOE's missions are performed under such
contracts.  DOE's contract reform guidance stated that a top-down
approach should be used to link DOE's strategic plan to subordinate
plans and ultimately to specific goals in a contract. 

In a review of several contracts awarded after DOE's strategic plan
was published, we had difficulty linking the contracts' goals to the
Department's goals.  For example, DOE's strategic plan lists five
business lines and four key success factors.  One contract we
reviewed contained goals listed under seven different categories. 
However, the seven categories were not related to the nine DOE goals. 
As a result, it was difficult to match the contracts' goals to those
of the Department.  Clear linkage would help DOE in directing the
performance of its missions and the results of its contracts. 

   SOME CONTRACT LANGUAGE MAY
   COMPROMISE DOE'S AUTHORITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

In addition, some DOE contracts authorized the contractors to dispute
DOE's determination of the total amount of available contract
incentives or the available incentive amounts that can be applied to
specific goals in the contracts.  For example, in two contracts we
reviewed, the contractors could legally dispute the available amount
of an incentive.  By providing contractors with the authority to
question its decisions, the language in these contracts could hinder
DOE's ability to determine the priority of its work, motivate the
contractors, and fulfill its mission. 

   DOE'S REGULATIONS DO NOT
   ADDRESS COST-CONTROL INCENTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

Finally, as DOE attempts to use incentive contracts to control costs,
it is apparent that its management and operating procurement
regulations do not provide the necessary direction for its
contracting officers.  For these incentive to be effective, the
contracting officer must price the contract to motivate the
contractor to effectively manage costs.  The Federal Acquisition
Regulation provides guidance and procedures for pricing contracts,
but DOE's procurement regulations do not.  However, for management
and operating contracts, DOE's contracting offices are not required
to follow the governmentwide procurement regulation. 

In the absence of procedures, two DOE contracting officers obtained
different results from the cost incentives they developed for their
contracts.  One contracting officer used aspects of the
governmentwide regulation, while the other did not.  When the
governmentwide regulation was applied, DOE was able to favorably
affect the contractor's performance. 

DOE'S RECENT PRIVATIZATION
APPROACH RAISES SOME CONCERNS
============================================================ Chapter 5

In another move away from its traditional contracting, DOE has
recently initiated a "privatization" approach for some of its
environmental cleanup work.  However, it is important to note that
DOE's privatization is not a divestiture, which involves the sale of
government-owned assets or functions.  (For all practical purposes,
DOE's activities are already privatized--contractors conduct DOE's
programs at its major sites.) What sets this initiative apart from
DOE's traditional approach is its attempt to shift the responsibility
for financing and much of the risk onto the contractor.  It requires
DOE's management and operating contractors to competitively award
portions of the work that they would normally have done themselves
and make the subcontractors bear the risks. 

DOE has begun several projects this year under the new approach and
has more planned.  Although it is too early to assess the success of
this approach, we have questioned the accuracy of DOE's cost-savings
estimates and ability to provide the necessary oversight.\6 Instead
of DOE's historical approach--awarding cost-plus-award-fee contracts,
owning the facility that the contractors operate, and paying the
contractors' costs regardless of what was accomplished--DOE's
privatization approach uses a fixed-price, competitive contract;
requires the contractors to finance, design, build, and operate the
facilities; and pays the contractors only for successful results. 
DOE expects this approach to save billions of dollars because of the
potential for greater efficiencies and improved performance in the
marketplace. 

--------------------
\6 Environmental Protection:  Issues Facing the Energy and Defense
Environmental Management Programs (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-127, Mar.  21,
1996) and Hanford Waste Privatization (GAO/RCED-96-213R, Aug.  2,
1996). 

   UNCERTAINTIES EXIST IN
   COST-SAVINGS ESTIMATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1

Because DOE's cost-savings estimates have a wide margin of error and
limited technical data to support them, we believe that the estimates
should be viewed with caution.  DOE's cost-savings estimates for
privatization are based on a comparison of the estimated cost of the
privatization approach compared to DOE's historical noncompetitive
approach for projects.  DOE's recent cost-savings estimates are
listed in its 1997 budget submission, identifying six projects it
considered highly successful in reducing costs.  DOE reported that
savings from these projects would range from about 45 to 95 percent. 

However, in reviewing an earlier cost estimate, we identified several
weaknesses in DOE's calculation.  DOE estimated that it could save 30
percent to treat the highly radioactive tank wastes at DOE's Hanford
site.  However, the estimate is actually based on a range of values
with a margin of error of plus or minus 40 percent.  That is, the
privatized approach could range from $5.8 billion to $13.4 billion,
and the noncompetitive, from $8 billion to $18.6 billion.  Because of
the large margin of error in the cost estimates, the privatization
approach could be more costly.  Such broad estimates occur because
little is known about the technical process to be used, and little
data are available from feasibility or engineering studies. 

DOE acknowledges that the estimates are subject to a wide margin of
error and that actual savings will be affected by such factors as the
extent to which competition is achieved.  In fact, DOE may not be
obtaining the degree of competition that it expected.  For example,
although DOE expected three or more bids for the first phase of work
to be conducted at Hanford, it had received two bids as of August
1996. 

Other uncertainties exist, as our previous work has demonstrated. 
The contents of the tanks and the effectiveness of many of the
technologies needed to be successful are uncertain.  Therefore, the
compensation that a private contractor may require to cover such
uncertainties, called the "risk premium," could offset the
efficiencies that might be gained by privatization.  Furthermore, the
actual savings will not be known until the projects, which are either
in the planning phase or only recently under way, are completed. 

   APPROACH REQUIRES A DIFFERENT
   OVERSIGHT ROLE FOR DOE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2

Under privatization, oversight could become more complex and
demanding.  For example, in the past, DOE has not regulated the
nuclear waste-processing facilities that are owned and operated by
private companies.  Consequently, DOE does not have the procedures or
the staff in place to carry out this role.  DOE will also have to
oversee the competitive contracting process as well as the
contractors' activities. 

DOE acknowledges that even under its traditional contracting
approach, it has had difficulty overseeing contractors.  DOE
officials emphasized that they are taking steps to assume this new
role but recognize that DOE is not fully prepared.  It remains to be
seen whether DOE can effectively deal with this expanded role. 

Because privatization is in its very early stages, these and other
aspects of this approach will bear watching.  One such aspect is
liability.  Has DOE adequately defined what liability the private
firms should assume?  Given the substantial risk involved,
indemnification bears close scrutiny to ensure that the government
does not assume so much of the risk that the effort becomes
privatized in name only. 

FURTHER ACTION NEEDED
============================================================ Chapter 6

Because DOE's contract reform and related "privatization" initiative
are in such early stages, it is too soon to assess their overall
effectiveness.  DOE's contract reform thus far has established the
parameters in the form of policies, guidance, and plans.  The real
test--the implementation of these reforms in contracts--will occur in
future years.  With the magnitude of policy changes such as these,
implementation problems are to be expected.  However, they must be
identified and corrected during implementation for contract reform to
succeed. 

To ensure success, adequate oversight and prompt responses to
problems that occur during this important phase are needed.  In
addition, it is important that the Secretary of Energy keep contract
reform as a high-level priority within the Department.  Otherwise,
DOE's contract reform could lose its momentum during this critical
stage. 

DOE's privatization approach also consists of many uncertainties at
this point.  Furthermore, this approach will require a different
oversight role for DOE, for which DOE has neither the procedures nor
the staff in place. 

Because DOE's missions heavily depend on contractors, successful
contracting is critical to the success of DOE as a federal
department.  Once DOE has identified and corrected the problems that
occur in these early stages of contracting changes--and subsequently
shown that it can work within the contracting framework that it has
set up we can remove DOE's contracting from the high-risk area. 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 7

Department of Energy:  Contract Reform Is Progressing, but Full
Implementation Will Take Years (GAO/RCED-97-18, Dec.  10, 1996). 

Department of Energy:  DOE Has Had Limited Success With Major System
Acquisitions (GAO/RCED-97-17, Nov.  26, 1996). 

Hanford Waste Privatization (GAO/RCED-96-213R, Aug.  2, 1996). 

Environmental Protection:  Issues Facing the Energy and Defense
Environmental Management Programs (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-127, Mar.  21,
1996). 

Federal Research:  Information on Fees for Selected Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers (GAO/RCED-96-31FS, Dec.  8, 1995). 

Nuclear Facility Cleanup:  Centralized Contracting of Laboratory
Analysis Would Produce Budgetary Savings (GAO/RCED-95-118, May 8,
1995). 

DOE Management:  Contract Provisions Do Not Protect DOE From
Unnecessary Pension Costs (GAO/RCED-94-201 Aug.  26, 1994). 

Energy Management:  Modest Reforms Made in University of California
Contracts, but Fees Are Substantially Higher (GAO/RCED-94-202, Aug. 
25, 1994). 

High-Risk Series:  Department of Energy Contract Management
(GAO/HR-93-9, Dec.  1992). 

Energy Management:  Vulnerability of DOE's Contracting to Waste,
Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement (GAO/RCED-92-244, Apr.  14, 1992). 

1997 HIGH-RISK SERIES
============================================================ Chapter 8

An Overview (GAO/HR-97-1)

Quick Reference Guide (GAO/HR-97-2)

Defense Financial Management (GAO/HR-97-3)

Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-4)

Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-97-5)

Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR-97-6)

Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7)

IRS Management (GAO/HR-97-8)

Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9)

Medicare (GAO/HR-97-10)

Student Financial Aid (GAO/HR-97-11)

Department of Housing and Urban Development (GAO/HR-97-12)

Department of Energy Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-13)

Superfund Program Management (GAO/HR-97-14)

The entire series of 14 high-risk reports can be ordered by using the
order number GAO/HR-97-20SET. 

*** End of document. ***