(Bench Opinion)
 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.  The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.  See United
                                                                     ______
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
______    ___________________

                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    Syllabus

 STRATE, ASSOCIATE TRIBAL JUDGE, TRIBAL COURT OF THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF
     THE FORT BERTHOLD INDIAN RESERVATION, ET AL. v. A-1 CONTRACTORS ET AL.
                                                 ____

     CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

         No. 95-1872.   Argued January 7, 1997 - Decided April 28, 1997

Vehicles driven by petitioner Fredericks and respondent Stockert collided on a
 portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold
 Indian Reservation.  The 6.59-mile stretch of highway within the reservation
 is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and
 is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right-of-way that lies
 on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and
 their members.  Neither driver is a member of the Tribes or an Indian, but
 Fredericks is the widow of a deceased tribal member and has five adult
 children who are also members.  The truck driven by Stockert belonged to his
 employer, respondent A-1 Contractors, a non-Indian-owned enterprise with its
 principal place of business outside the reservation.  At the time, A-1 was
 under a subcontract with LCM Corporation, a corporation wholly owned by the
 Tribes, to do landscaping within the reservation.  The record does not show
 whether Stockert was engaged in subcontract work at the time of the accident. 
 Fredericks filed a personal injury action in Tribal Court against Stockert and
 A-1, and Fredericks' adult children filed a loss-of-consortium claim in the
 same lawsuit.  The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over
 Fredericks' claim and therefore denied respondents' motion to dismiss, and the
 Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed.  Respondents then
 commenced this action in the Federal District Court against Fredericks, her
 adult children, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge Strate, seeking a
 declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked
 jurisdiction

















                                                                    I           

II                          STRATE v. A-1 CONTRACTORS
                                  ____

                                    Syllabus


 to adjudicate Fredericks' claims; respondents also sought an injunction
 against further Tribal Court proceedings.  Relying particularly on National
                                                                    ________
 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845, and Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.
 _______________________    ___________                    __________________
 v. LaPlante, 480 U. S. 9, the District Court dismissed the action, determining
    _________
 that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint
 against respondents.  The en banc Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
 controlling precedent was Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, and that,
                           _______    ______________
 under Montana, the Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
       ________
 dispute.

Held:  When an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State
_____
 pursuant to a federally granted right-of-way over Indian reservation land, a
 civil action against allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or
 federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; absent a statute or treaty
 authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the
 State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in such cases. 
 This Court expresses no view on the governing law or proper forum when an
 accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation.  Pp. 4-20.
   (a) Absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal
 jurisdiction over nonmembers' conduct exists only in limited circumstances. 
 In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held that tribes lack
    ________    ________________
 criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.  Later, in Montana v. United States,
                                                    _______    ______________
 the Court set forth the general rule that, absent a different congressional
 direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers
 on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to exceptions relating to (1)
 the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
 or its members and (2) nonmember conduct that threatens or directly affects
 the tribe's political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.  450
 U. S., at 564-567.  Pp. 4-7.
   (b) Montana controls this case.  Contrary to petitioners' contention,
       _______
 National Farmers and Iowa Mutual do not establish a rule converse to
 ________________     ___________
 Montana's.  Neither case establishes that tribes presumptively retain
 _______
 adjudicatory authority over claims against nonmembers arising from occurrences
 anywhere within a reservation.  Rather, these cases prescribe a prudential,
 nonjurisdictional exhaustion rule requiring a federal court in which tribal-
 court jurisdiction is challenged to stay its hand, as a matter of comity,
 until after the tribal court has had an initial and full opportunity to
 determine its own jurisdiction.  See 471 U. S., at 857; 480 U. S., at 20,
 n. 14; see also id., at 16, n. 8.  This exhaustion rule, as explained in
                 ____
 National Farmers, 471 U. S., at 855-856, reflects the more extensive
 _________________
 jurisdiction tribal courts have in civil cases than in criminal proceedings
 and the corresponding need to inspect relevant statutes, treaties, and other
 materials in order to

                            STRATE v. A-1 CONTRACTORS                        III
                                  ____

                                    Syllabus

 determine tribal adjudicatory authority.  National Farmers' exhaustion
                                           _________________
 requirement does not conflict with Montana, in which the Court made plain that
                                    ________
 the general rule and exceptions there announced govern only in the absence of
 a delegation of tribal authority by treaty or statute.  See 450 U. S., at
 557-563.  Read in context, the Court's statement in Iowa Mutual, 480 U. S., at
                                                     _____________
 18, that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the] activities [of non-Indians on
 reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts," addresses only
 situations in which tribes possess authority to regulate nonmembers'
 activities.  As to nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
 exceed its legislative jurisdiction, absent congressional direction enlarging
 tribal-court jurisdiction.  Pp. 7-13.
   (c) It is unavailing to argue, as petitioners do, that Montana does not
                                                          _______
 govern this case because the land underlying the accident scene is held in
 trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members.  Petitioners are
 correct that Montana and the cases following its instruction - Brendale v.
              _______                                           ________
 Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408, and South
 _______________________________________________                    _____
 Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679 - all involved alienated, non-Indian-owned
 ______    _________
 reservation land.  However, the right-of-way North Dakota acquired for its
 highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch here at issue equivalent, for nonmember
 governance purposes, to such alienated, non-Indian land.  The right-of-way was
 granted to facilitate public access to a federal water resource project, forms
 part of the State's highway, and is open to the public.  Traffic on the
 highway is subject to the State's control.  The granting instrument details
 only one specific reservation to Indian landowners, the right to construct
 necessary crossings, and the Tribes expressly reserved no other right to
 exercise dominion or control over the right-of-way.  Rather, they have con-
 sented to, and received payment for, the State's use of the stretch at issue,
 and so long as that stretch is maintained as part of the State's highway, they
 cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude.  Pp. 13-16.
   (d) Petitioners refer to no treaty or federal statute authorizing the Three
 Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway-accident tort suits of the kind
 Fredericks commenced against A-1 and Stockert.  Nor have they shown that
 Fredericks' tribal-court action qualifies under either of the exceptions to
 Montana's general rule.  The tortious conduct alleged by Fredericks does not
 _______
 fit within the first exception for "activities of nonmembers who enter
 consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
 dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements," 450 U. S., at 565,
 particularly when measured against the conduct at issue in the cases cited by
 Montana, id., at 565-566, as fitting within the exception, Williams v. Lee,
 _____________                                              ________    ____
 358 U. S. 217, 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384; Buster v. Wright, 135
                     ______    __________                ______    _______
 F. 947, 950;

IV                          STRATE v. A-1 CONTRACTORS
                                  ____

                                    Syllabus

 and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134,
     __________    ____________________________________________
 152-154.  This dispute is distinctly nontribal in nature, arising between two
 non-Indians involved in a run-of-the-mill highway accident.  Although A-1 was
 engaged in subcontract work on the reservation, and therefore had a
 "consensual relationship" with the Tribes, Fredericks was not a party to the
 subcontract, and the Tribes were strangers to the accident.  Montana's second
                                                              _______
 exception, concerning conduct that "threatens or has some direct effect on the
 political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
 tribe," 450 U. S., at 566, is also inapplicable.  The cases cited by Montana
                                                                      _______
 as stating this exception each raised the question whether a State's (or
 Territory's) exercise of authority would trench unduly on tribal self-
 government.  Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont.,
              ______    ____________________________________________________
 424 U. S. 382, 386; Williams, 358 U. S., at 220; Montana Catholic Missions v.
                     _________                    _________________________
 Missoula County, 200 U. S. 118, 128-129; and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264,
 ________________                             ______    ____
 273.  Opening the Tribal Court for Fredericks' optional use is not necessary
 to protect tribal self-government; and requiring A-1 and Stockert to defend
 against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court
 is not crucial to the Tribes' political integrity, economic security, or
 health or welfare.  Pp. 16-20.

76 F. 3d 930, affirmed.

 GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.