PUBLIC NOTICE
    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
    445 12th STREET, S.W.
    WASHINGTON, D.C.  20554




DA 00-504
            						 					        March 3, 2000
		
			
C AND F BLOCK BROADBAND PCS SPECTRUM AUCTION  
SCHEDULED FOR JULY 26, 2000

COMMENT SOUGHT 
ON RESERVE PRICES OR MINIMUM OPENING BIDS AND 
OTHER AUCTION PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Report No. AUC-00-35-A (Auction No. 35)

By this Public Notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau ("Bureau") seeks comment on 
reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other auction procedural issues for the auction of C 
and F block broadband Personal Communications Service ("PCS") licenses scheduled to 
commence on July 26, 2000 (Auction No. 35).   Auction No. 35 will include licenses for operation 
on frequencies as to which previous licenses have cancelled or otherwise have been returned to the 
Commission.   A list of licenses available for auction is included in Attachment A.  In addition, 
future public notices will include information about other Commission licenses, if any, available 
for auction in Auction No. 35.  

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to "ensure that, in the scheduling of 
any competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is allowed . . . before issuance 
of bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction procedures . . . ."   Consistent 
with the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate 
time to familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an 
auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated authority,  to seek 
comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction.   The 
Bureau recognizes that there are pending petitions and waiver requests, the resolution of which 
could affect participation in Auction No. 35.   We therefore seek comment on the following issues 
relating to Auction No. 35 from any interested party.
I. Auction Structure
A.  Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design
We propose to conduct the competitive bidding for these licenses by a single, simultaneous 
multiple-round auction.  As described further below, this methodology offers every license for bid 
at the same time, with successive bidding rounds in which bidders may place bids. We seek 
comment on this proposal. 

B.  Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility 
The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine an appropriate upfront payment 
for each license being auctioned, taking into account such factors as the population in each 
geographic license area, and the value of similar spectrum.    As described further below, the 
upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid on 
licenses.  The proposed upfront payment formulae take into account information gained in sales of 
these broadband PCS licenses from previous auctions.  Also, as required by the C Block Fourth 
Report and Order, the upfront payment amount for "former defaulters," i.e., applicants that have 
ever been in default on any Commission licenses or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt 
owed to any Federal agency, will be fifty percent more than the normal amount required to be 
paid. 

We propose the following formulae for upfront payments:

(1) 30 MHz licenses        5 % of most recent net high bid for C block licenses in same BTA

(2) 15 MHz licenses        2.5 % of most recent net high bid for C block licenses in same BTA

(3) 10 MHz licenses        1.6 % of most recent net high bid for C block licenses in same BTA

A complete list of all licenses, including the related population and upfront payments, are attached 
hereto as Attachment A.  We seek comment on this proposal.

For Auction No. 35, we further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a 
bidder will determine the initial maximum eligibility (as measured in bidding units) for each 
bidder.  Upfront payments will not be attributed to specific licenses, but instead will be translated 
into bidding units to define a bidder's initial maximum eligibility, which cannot be increased 
during the auction.  Thus, in calculating the upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine 
the maximum number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any single 
round, and submit an upfront payment covering that number of bidding units.  We seek comment 
on this proposal.

C.  Activity Rules
In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of time, an activity rule 
requires bidders to bid actively on a percentage of their maximum bidding eligibility during each 
round of the auction rather than waiting until the end to participate.  A bidder that does not satisfy 
the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the next round or use an activity rule waiver, 
if any remain.

We propose to divide the auction into three stages: Stage One, Stage Two and Stage Three, each 
characterized by an increased activity requirement.  The auction will start in Stage One.  We 
propose that the auction will generally advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage 
Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction activity level, as measured by the 
percentage of bidding units receiving new high bids, is approximately ten percent or below for 
three consecutive rounds of bidding in each stage.  However, we further propose that the Bureau 
retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement during the auction.  In 
exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder activity, 
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the percentage of licenses (as measured in 
bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in 
revenue.  We seek comment on these proposals.

For Auction No. 35, we propose the following activity requirements:

Stage One:  In each round of Stage One, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility be 
required to be active on licenses encompassing at least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility.  
Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding 
eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used).  During Stage One, 
reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity 
by five-fourths (5/4).  

Stage Two:  In each round of the second stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its 
current eligibility is required to be active on at least 90 percent of its current bidding eligibility.  
During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the 
current round activity by ten-ninths (10/9).  

Stage Three:  In each round of Stage Three, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is 
required to be active on 98 percent of its current bidding eligibility.  In this final stage, reduced 
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity by fifty-
fortyninths (50/49).

 We seek comment on these proposals.   

D.  Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's 
activity in the current round being below the required minimum level.  An activity rule waiver 
applies to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license.  Activity waivers are 
principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction eligibility in the event 
that exigent circumstances prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient activity would prefer to use an 
activity rule waiver (if available) rather than lose bidding eligibility.  Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver (known as an "automatic waiver") at the end of any bidding period 
where a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) there are no activity rule 
waivers available; or (2) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing 
eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum requirements. 

A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its bidding eligibility rather than use an 
activity rule waiver.  If so, the bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding period by using the reduce eligibility function in the software.  In this case, the 
bidder's eligibility is permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the activity 
rules as described above.  Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to 
regain its lost bidding eligibility.  

A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means to keep the auction open without 
placing a bid.  If a bidder submits a proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the 
bidding software) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are submitted, the 
auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be preserved.  An automatic waiver 
invoked in a round in which there are no new valid bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction 
open.  

We propose that each bidder in Auction No. 35 be provided with five activity rule waivers that 
may be used at the bidder's discretion during the course of the auction as set forth above.  We seek 
comment on this proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation
For Auction No. 35, we propose that, by public notice or by announcement during the auction, the 
Bureau may delay, suspend or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or 
weather necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct of 
competitive bidding.   In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round; resume the auction starting from some 
previous round; or cancel the auction in its entirety.  Network interruption may cause the Bureau 
to delay or suspend the auction.  We emphasize that exercise of this authority is solely within the 
discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for situations in which 
bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers.  We seek comment on this proposal.
II. Bidding Procedures
A.  Round Structure
The Commission will use its Automated Auction System to conduct the electronic simultaneous 
multiple round auction format for Auction No. 35.  The initial bidding schedule will be announced 
in a public notice to be released at least one week before the start of the auction, and will be 
included in the registration mailings.  The auction format will consist of sequential bidding 
rounds, each followed by the release of round results.  Details regarding the location and format of 
round results will be included in the same public notice.  

The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to foster an auction pace that 
reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies.  The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for the bidding rounds and 
review periods, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon the bidding activity level and 
other factors.  We seek comment on this proposal. 

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable 
reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses are 
subject to auction (i.e., because the Commission has accepted mutually exclusive applications for 
those licenses), unless the Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum bid is not in 
the public interest.   Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to seek 
comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each 
auction.   

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an item will not be sold in a 
given auction.  Reserve prices can be either published or unpublished.  A minimum opening bid, 
on the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which no 
bids are accepted.  It is generally used to accelerate the competitive bidding process.  Also, in a 
minimum opening bid scenario, the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the amount 
later in the auction.  It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the reserve price to be the 
same amount.  

In light of the Balanced Budget Act, the Bureau proposes to establish minimum opening bids for 
Auction No. 35.  The Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized in other 
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.   A minimum opening bid, rather than a reserve price, will 
help to regulate the pace of the auction and provides flexibility.  

Because both the C and F spectrum blocks are being auctioned at the same time, under the same 
general conditions, the Commission believes that it is appropriate to use a common baseline to 
establish the minimum opening bid formulae for all of the licenses in the auction.  The net high 
bids from prior C block auctions provide the most comprehensive broadband PCS baseline.  We, 
therefore, propose to base the minimum opening bids for each license available in Auction No. 35, 
including F block licenses, on the most recent net high bid for the C block license in the same 
BTA.

We propose the following formulae for calculating minimum opening bids:

(1) 30 MHz licenses        10 % of most recent net high bid for C block licenses in same BTA

(2) 15 MHz licenses        5 % of most recent net high bid for C block licenses in same BTA

(3) 10 MHz licenses        3.2 % of most recent net high bid for C block licenses in same BTA

The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in Auction No. 35 is set
forth in Attachment A herein.  We believe these minimum opening bids best meet
the objectives of our auction authority in establishing reasonable minimum opening bids. The 
Commission believes these minimum opening bids will speed the course of the auction and ensure 
that valuable assets are not sold for nominal prices without unduly interfering with the efficient 
assignment of licenses.  Minimum opening bids are reducible at the discretion of the Bureau.  This 
discretion will allow the Bureau flexibility to adjust the minimum opening bids if
circumstances warrant.  We emphasize, however, that such discretion will be exercised, if at all,
sparingly and early in the auction, i.e., before bidders lose all waivers and begin to lose substantial
eligibility.  During the course of the auction, the Bureau will not entertain any bidder requests to
reduce the minimum opening bid on specific licenses.  We seek comment on these proposals.

If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will result in substantial numbers of 
unsold licenses, or is not a reasonable amount, or should instead operate as a reserve price, they 
should explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.  
Commenters are advised to support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested reserve 
prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas.  In establishing the minimum opening bids, we 
particularly seek comment on such factors as, among other things, the amount of spectrum being 
auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the 
geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other relevant 
factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of C and F block licenses.  
Alternatively, comment is sought on whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public 
interest would be served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

C. Minimum Accepted Bids and Bid Increments  
Once there is a standing high bid on a license, a bid increment will be applied to that license to 
establish a minimum acceptable bid for the following round.  For Auction No. 35, we propose to 
use a smoothing methodology to calculate bid increments, as we have done in several other 
auctions.  The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum bid increment if it determines 
that circumstances so dictate.  The Bureau will do so by announcement in the Automated Auction 
System. We seek comment on these proposals.

The exponential smoothing formula calculates the bid increment for each license based on a 
weighted average of the activity received on each license in all previous rounds.  This 
methodology will tailor the bid increment for each license based on activity, rather than setting a 
global increment for all licenses.  For every license that receives a bid, the bid increment for the 
next round for that license will be established using the exponential smoothing formula.  

The calculation of the percentage bid increment for each license in a given round is made at the 
end of the previous round. The computation is based on an activity index, which is calculated as 
the weighted average of the activity in that round and the activity index from the prior round.  The 
activity index at the start of the auction (round 0) will be set at 0.  The current activity index is 
equal to a weighting factor times the number of new bids received on the license in the most recent 
bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor times the activity index from the prior round.  
The activity index is then used to calculate a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum 
percentage increment by one plus the activity index with that result being subject to a maximum 
percentage increment.  The Commission will initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum 
percentage increment at 0.1, and the maximum percentage increment at 0.2.  

Equations

Ai = (C * Bi) + (1-C) * Ai-1)
Ii+1 = smaller of ( (1 + Ai) * N) and M

where,
Ai  = activity index for the current round (round i)
C = activity weight factor
Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)
Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1), A0 is 0
Ii+1 = percentage bid increment for the next round (round i+1)
N = minimum percentage increment or bid increment floor
M = maximum percentage increment or bid increment ceiling

Under the exponential smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received on a license, the 
minimum acceptable bid for that license in the following round will be the new high bid plus the 
dollar amount associated with the percentage increment (variable Ii+1 from above times the high 
bid).  This result will be rounded to the nearest thousand if it is over ten thousand or to the nearest 
hundred if it is under ten thousand.  

Examples

License 1
C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = $1,000,000)

1. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using exponential smoothing:
	A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1
	I2 = The smaller of ((1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the maximum percentage increment)

2. Minimum bid increment for round 2 using the percentage increment (I2 from above) 
	0.2 * $1,000,000 =  $200,000

3. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000

Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = $2,000,000)

1. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using exponential smoothing:
	A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2
	I3 = The smaller of ((1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the maximum percentage increment)

2. Minimum bid increment for round 3 using the percentage increment (I3 from above) 
	0.2 * $2,000,000 =  $400,000

3. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = $2,400,000)
1. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using exponential smoothing:
	A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5
	I4 = The smaller of ((1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the maximum percentage 
             increment)
 
2. Minimum bid increment for round 4 using the percentage increment (I4 from above) 
	0.2 * $2,400,000 =  $480,000

3. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000

D. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal
For Auction No. 35, we propose the following bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.  
Before the close of a bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids placed in that 
round.  By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder may effectively "unsubmit" any 
bid placed within that round.  A bidder removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to 
withdrawal payments, but will affect a bidder's activity for the round in which it is removed.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.  However, in the next round, a bidder 
may withdraw standing high bids from previous rounds using the withdraw bid function.  A high 
bidder that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the bid withdrawal 
payment provisions.   We seek comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.  

In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals 
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as 
information becomes available during the course of an auction.  The Commission noted, however, 
that, in some instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons.  The Bureau, 
therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent 
any bidding abuses.  The Commission stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its 
discretion, consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and 
prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the 
Commission's bid withdrawal procedures. 

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in Auction No. 35 to withdraw standing 
high bids in no more than two rounds during the course of the auction.  To permit a bidder to 
withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of 
withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes.  The two rounds in which withdrawals are 
utilized will be at the bidder's discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the 
Commission's rules.  There is no limit on the number of standing high bids that may be withdrawn 
in either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized.  Withdrawals will remain subject to the 
bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the Commission's rules.  We seek comment on 
this proposal.

E. Stopping Rule
For Auction No. 35, the Bureau proposes to employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. The 
Bureau has discretion "to establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in 
order to terminate the auction within a reasonable time."   A simultaneous stopping rule means 
that all licenses remain open until the first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive 
waivers or withdrawals are received.  After the first such round, bidding closes simultaneously on 
all licenses.  Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would remain open on all 
licenses until bidding stops on every license. 

The Bureau seeks comment on a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified 
stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder 
submits a proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the 
standing high bidder.  Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a 
license for which it is the standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this 
modified stopping rule.

The Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to keep an auction open even if no new acceptable 
bids or proactive waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn.  In this event, 
the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver.  The activity rule, 
therefore, will apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding 
eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver.

Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to declare that the auction will end after a 
specified number of additional rounds ("special stopping rule").  If the Bureau invokes this special 
stopping rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid 
increased in at least one of the preceding specified number of rounds.  The Bureau proposes to 
exercise this option only in certain circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is 
proceeding very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the 
auction will not close within a reasonable period of time.  Before exercising this option, the 
Bureau is likely to attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, moving the auction 
into the next stage (where bidders would be required to maintain a higher level of bidding 
activity), increasing the number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the 
minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still a high level of 
bidding activity.  We seek comment on these proposals. 
III. Conclusion
Comments are due on or before March 24, 2000, and reply comments are due on or before April 4, 
2000.  An original and four copies of all pleadings must be filed with the Commission's Secretary, 
Magalie Roman Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 
Twelfth Street, S.W., TW-A325, Washington, DC 20054, in accordance with Section 1.51(c) of 
the Commission's rules.  See 47 C.F.R.  1.51(c).  In addition, one copy of each pleading must be 
delivered to each of the following locations: (1) the Commission's duplicating contractor, 
International Transcription Service, Inc. (ITS), 1231 20th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036; 
(2) Office of Media Relations, Public Reference Center, 445 Twelfth Street, S.W., Suite CY-
A257, Washington, DC 20554; (3)Rana Shuler, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 445 Twelfth Street, S.W., Suite 4-A628, Washington, DC 
20554.  Comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection during regular 
business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20554.

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact the Auctions and Industry Analysis 
Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Craig Bomberger, Auctions Analyst, at (202) 
418-0660; or Kathy Garland, Project Manager, at (717) 338-2888.

- FCC
 	"Auction of C and F Block Broadband PCS Licenses, Notice of Auction Scheduled for July 26, 2000," 
Public Notice," DA 00-49 (rel. January 12, 2000).  For C block broadband PCS license competitive bidding rules, see 
Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications 
Services (PCS) Licenses, Fourth Report and Order, FCC 98-176, 13 FCC Rcd 15743 (1998) ("C Block Fourth Report 
and Order"), aff'd, Order on Reconsideration of the Fourth Report and Order, FCC 00-54 (rel. February 29, 2000); see 
also Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licenses, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,791 
(September 23, 1998).  But see supra note 5.
 	Section 3002(a)(E)(i), Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) 
("Balanced Budget Act").
 	See Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules-Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT 
Docket No. 97-82, Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 12 FCC Rcd 
5686, 5697,  16 (1997) ("Part 1 Order") ("We also clarify that pursuant to Section 0.131 of our rules, the Chief, 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, has delegated authority to implement all of the Commission's rules pertaining 
to auctions procedures").
 	See Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules -- Competitive Bidding Procedures, Allocation 
of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, WT Docket No. 97-82, ET 
Docket No. 94-32, Third Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 
448,  124 (1998) ("Part 1 Third Report and Order").  The Commission directed the Bureau to seek comment on 
specific mechanisms related to day-to-day auction conduct including, for example, the structure of bidding rounds and 
stages, establishment of minimum opening bids or reserve prices, minimum accepted bids, initial maximum eligibility 
for each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of the auction, activity rule waivers, criteria for determining 
reductions in eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and bid removal, stopping rules, and information 
relating to auction delay, suspension or cancellation.  Id. at  125.
  	See "Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., 
BellSouth Corporation and Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. Petitions Regarding CMRS Spectrum Cap Limits," Public 
Notice, DA 00-318 (rel. February 18, 2000) and "Extension of Filing Deadline for Comments to the Petitions Filed by 
SBC Communications Inc. and Nextel Communications, Inc. Regarding PCS C and F Block Rules," Public Notice, 
DA 00-271 (rel. February 11, 2000); see also "Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Nextel 
Communications, Inc.'s Petition Regarding PCS C and F Block Spectrum, Extension of Filing Deadline For 
Comments to SBC Communications Inc.'s Request for Waiver," Public Notice, DA 00-191 (rel. February 3, 2000), 
"Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on SBC Communications Inc.'s Request For Waiver of the 
Eligibility Requirements For Participation in the Upcoming PCS C and F Block Auction," Public Notice, DA 00-145 
(rel. January 31, 2000).
 	See Part 1 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98,  16 (1997); see also Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 
FCC Rcd at 425,  86.
  	C Block Fourth Report and Order at 15761-62,  34, see 47 C.F.R. 1.2105(a)(2)(xi) and 
24.709(a)(5).
 	See 47 C.F.R.  1.2104(i).
 	See Balanced Budget Act, Section 3002(a).  The Commission's authority to establish a reserve price 
or minimum opening bid is set forth in 47 C.F.R.  1.2104(c) and (d).
 	See Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 454-455,  141 (1998).
 	See, e.g., Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve 
Prices, DA 97-2147, Order, 12 FCC Rcd 16354 (1997); Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses, Auction 
Notice and Filing Requirements for 908 Licenses Consisting of Economic Area (EA), Economic Area Grouping 
(EAG), and Nationwide Licenses, Scheduled for September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening Bids and Other Procedural 
Issues, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 16445 (1998).

 	See 47 C.F.R.  1.2104(g); 1.2109.
 	Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 460,  150.
 	47 C.F.R.  1.2104(e).


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