Before the
                Federal Communications Commission
                      Washington, D.C. 20554
AT&T CORPORATION,               )
MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS          )
CORPORATION, et al.,            )
                                )
     Complainants,              )  )
                                )
               v.               )  File Nos. E-95-006, E-95-007,
                                )  E-95-009, E-95-010, E-95-015, E-95-016,
BELL ATLANTIC - PENNSYLVANIA,   )  E-95-017, E-95-018, E-95-021, E-95-022,
et al.,                         )  E-95-030, E-95-035
                                )
          Defendants.           )
                                )
                                )
                  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
   Adopted: December 2, 1998            Released: December 9, 1998
By the Commission:
                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section                                      Paragraph Numbers
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1
II.   BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     2
III.  PRELIMINARY MATTERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   A. Authority Over Damage Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   B. Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
IV.   SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   19
   A. Commission Rule 69.105(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   19
      1.   Application and Measurement of CCL Charges. . . . . .      19
      2.   Specific Optional Services. . . . . . . . . . . . .   38
        a. Call Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   38
        b. Voice Mail and Fax Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . .   50
        c. Paging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   57
        d. Call Waiting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   62
        e. Three-way Calling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   66
        f. Foreign Exchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   71
   B.  Section 203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   83
   C.  Section 201(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   86
V. DEFENSIVE CLAIMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   89
   A. Necessity for Rulemaking Proceeding. . . . . . . . . . .   89
   B. Impossibility of Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   91
   C. Unclean Hands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   94
   D. Damages Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   96
VI.   PROCEDURAL ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   101
   A. Motion to Strike Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   101
   B. Prior Rulings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   103
VII.  DAMAGES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   107
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERING CLAUSES. . . . . . . . . . . .   108
                         I.  INTRODUCTION
   1.  The complainant interexchange carriers, AT&T Corporation (AT&T), MCI
Telecommunications Corporation, Western Union International, Inc., and Telecom*USA (together
MCI), (collectively IXCs or complainants) filed formal complaints against the defendant local
exchange carriers (collectively LECs or defendants), alleging that the LECs improperly assess carrier
common line (CCL) charges for interstate calls involving certain optional calling services.  The
particular LEC optional services at issue are call forwarding, call waiting, three-way calling, foreign
exchange (FX), voice mail storage, facsimile (fax) processing, and paging.  According to the IXCs,
the LECs impose CCL charges for portions of calls that do not actually use a common line.  Thus,
the IXCs argue, in some instances the LECs impose a CCL charge where no charge is appropriate,
in other cases assess twice the correct number of charges, and in still other cases improperly measure
access minutes of use for the CCL charge.  The IXCs allege that
the LECs' practices violate Section 69.105(a) of the Commission's rules, as well as Sections 201(b)
and 203(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (hereinafter the "Communications Act"
or the "Act").  The LECs generally deny these allegations, and they maintain that they assess CCL
charges in full compliance with Commission rules and the terms of their tariffs.  Bell Atlantic,
NYNEX, and Pacific filed motions to dismiss AT&T's complaints.  For the reasons discussed herein,
we grant in part and deny in part the IXCs' complaints.  In addition, because we are addressing the
merits of the allegations, the defendants' motions to dismiss are denied as moot.
                         II.  BACKGROUND
   2.  The Commission's Access Charge Order established a comprehensive mechanism for LECs
to recover the costs associated with their provision of access services required to complete interstate
and foreign telecommunications.  The Commission's "access plan" sought to foster interexchange
competition while balancing four key policy goals: (1) eliminating unreasonable discrimination and
undue preferences among interstate service rates; (2) promoting efficient use of the local network;
(3) preventing uneconomic bypass; and (4) preserving universal service.
   3.  The access plan required LECs to tariff their rates for access services and to establish
separate charges for different elements of access, such as common line, transport, and local switching.
Most of these charges were assessed against IXCs as "carrier's carrier charges." In addition, the
system distinguished between traffic sensitive costs, which vary with use, and non-traffic sensitive
(NTS) costs, which do not vary with use.  NTS costs include the equipment that an end user needs
to access the local network, including common lines.
   4.  A common line, sometimes called a "local loop," connects an end user's home or business
to a LEC central office.  A characteristic feature of a common line is that it enables the end user to
complete local as well as interstate and foreign calls.  Twenty-five percent of the costs of the local
loop are assigned to the interstate jurisdiction.  Common line facilities represent NTS costs because
an end user's connection to the local network imposes the same cost whether the end user employs
that connection to make local, interstate, or no calls.
   5.  In the Access Charge Order, the Commission emphasized that its long range goal was to
have the LECs recover a larger share of NTS common line expenses from end users instead of
carriers, and to recover these costs on a flat rate basis rather than a usage sensitive basis.  The
Commission recognized, however, that a sudden change increasing the flat rates imposed by LECs
on end users could have a detrimental effect on universal service.  For this reason, the rules
apportioned charges for common line costs between end users and IXCs.  End users pay a flat, per
line "end user common line charge" (EUCL);  IXCs contribute to the remaining costs through a
usage-based CCL charge.  In particular, Section 69.105(a) of our rules provides, in relevant part, that
"[a] charge that is expressed in dollars and cents per access minute of use shall be assessed upon all
interexchange carriers that use local exchange common line facilities for the provision of interstate
or foreign telecommunications services."
                     III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
   A.  Authority Over Damage Claims
   6.  US West challenges the Commission's authority to adjudicate complaints seeking  damages,
arguing that, under Northern Pipeline, it is constitutionally entitled "to have private damage suits
tried by an Article III Court, not by an administrative agency."  We find US West's argument to be
without merit.  As an initial matter, US West is incorrect in its assertion that this proceeding involves
the adjudication of a "private" right.  While the Supreme Court recognized in Northern Pipeline that
it has never definitively explained the distinction between "private" and "public" rights, it also stated
that rights created by Congress in its exercise of its Constitutional authority over, inter alia, interstate
commerce, are properly considered "public" rights that are subject to adjudication by administrative
agencies, such as the Commission.  Moreover, the Supreme Court clearly stated that Congress may
indeed create courts or administrative agencies with jurisdiction to adjudicate some cases and
controversies that may also be within the purview of Article III courts, particularly where, as here,
the rights to be adjudicated are created by Congress.  Further, the Court of Appeals has found that
the Commission has an affirmative duty to adjudicate issues raised in complaint proceedings.
   7.  Northern Pipeline is also distinguishable on the facts.  There, the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a statute which vested in a non-Article III court complete jurisdiction over "all civil
proceedings arising under Title 11 [bankruptcy] [of the United States Code] or arising in or related
to cases under Title 11," to the exclusion of jurisdiction by Article III courts.  Our jurisdiction under
the Communications Act, however, is much more narrowly tailored than the one considered there.
The Communications Act deals with a "particularized area of law," and vests in the Commission
only concurrent jurisdiction, along with the federal district courts, over complaints for damages for
violations of the Communications Act by carriers, and explicitly makes any decision by the
Commission reviewable by Article III courts.
   8.  Congress may place certain matters within the purview of an administrative agency without
violating protections guaranteed by the Constitution.  "Congress is not required . . . to choke the
already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from committing some new
types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the relevant field."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld agencies' jurisdiction over damage claims much like
those presented in the instant cases, noting that "Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute
right to the plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court."  Therefore, we
find US West's argument that the IXCs' claim must be adjudicated exclusively by an Article III court
to be without merit.
   B.  Statute of Limitations
   9.  The IXCs seek to recover damages for CCL charges relating to the optional calling services
at issue here that the LECs allegedly assessed unlawfully on the IXCs.  While AT&T states that it
believes that the allegedly unlawful billing occurred with respect to at least some of the services for
the two years preceding its filing of the instant complaints, it does not limit itself to seeking damages
for this two-year period.  Instead, it appears that AT&T seeks damages for the entire period of time
(which may vary depending on how long each optional service has been available) that such allegedly
unlawful charges have been assessed.  MCI also appears to believe that the practices have occurred
for at least two years preceding its complaints, but its complaints only request damages arising for
charges beginning August 1, 1992.
      1. Contentions
   10.  The LECs contend that the IXCs' complaints are time-barred either by the general two-year
statute of limitations contained in Section 415(b) of the Act, or by various considerations of equity
and reasonableness.  They assert that the IXCs knew, or should have known, for more than ten
years how the LECs apply CCL charges to most optional service calls.  For example, the LECs point
out that the IXCs actively participated in the access charge rulemaking proceedings, and that AT&T
prepared initial models for LEC access tariffs.  They also state that some of the optional services
have been available at least since divestiture and the development of access charges. The LECs
submit that they have always imposed CCL charges on calls involving the optional services in the
same manner they do today, and that the IXCs had an economic incentive to audit the LECs' CCL
calculations.  In addition, they claim that because AT&T developed the equipment that measures
access minutes of use, it knew, or should have known, that such equipment did not exclude optional
service calls from application of CCL charges.  Moreover, according to the LECs, their CCL billing
methods are the longstanding, industry norm, and the fact that no IXC challenged this "unanimous
industry practice" for over ten years confirms both that their CCL billing methods are reasonable
and that the IXCs acquiesced in those practices.
   11.  The IXCs assert that equitable laches, estoppel, and waiver are not applicable to a Section
208 complaint and that their complaints are subject only to the statute of limitations contained in
Section 415 of the Act.  AT&T states that it did not know how the various LECs imposed CCL
charges on optional service calls until so advised by a consultant "in or about August 1993," and that
after unsuccessful efforts to resolve the issue informally, it filed all of the captioned cases within two
years of that date.  Although AT&T concedes that it "has long been aware of the LECs' general
approach to access charge tariff filings," it maintains that none of the LECs has ever disclosed that
it assesses CCL charges for optional service calls when no common line is used.  MCI states that
it did not acquiesce in the LECs' charging practices because it did not realize what the billing practices
were with respect to CCL charges for optional service calls until shortly before it sent certain letters
to the defendant LECs questioning these charges in August 1994.  MCI also briefly notes that,
under the statute of limitations for overcharge cases, Section 415(c) of the Act, the August 1994
letters extend the two-year limitations period for filing a Section 208 complaint.
        2.  Discussion
   12.  The central issue in the LECs' timeliness arguments, whether on grounds of equity,
reasonableness, or the statute of limitations, is whether the IXCs knew or, through the exercise of due
diligence, should have known, of the issues they now raise with respect to the LECs' assessment of
CCL charges long before filing their complaints.  Under Section 415(b), "all complaints against
carriers for recovery of damages not based on overcharges shall be filed with the Commission within
two years from the time the cause of action accrues . . . ."  A cause of action accrues for purposes
of Section 415 when the carrier does the unlawful act or fails to do what the law requires.
Moreover, the applicable rule where the injury may not readily be discovered when it occurs is that
the limitations period begins to run only when "the plaintiff  discovers, or with due diligence should
have discovered, the injury that is the basis of the action;" that is, when the defendant is on "inquiry
notice."
   13.  The LECs in this case do not directly contest the claims of AT&T and MCI that each first
learned of the allegedly improper CCL charges for optional services in approximately August 1993,
and August 1994, respectively, and that these IXCs promptly sought to resolve these issues
informally with the LECs before filing the instant complaints.  Rather, the LECs appear to argue that
the IXCs should have known about any potential problems with the CCL charges as early as the
inception of the Commission's access charge system in 1983, because the IXCs participated in the
initial development of the access charge system and had continuing transactional experience with its
application to various optional services thereafter.  In particular, the LECs note that AT&T had
owned the Bell Operating Company (BOC) defendants until forced to divest itself of them by the
1982 modification of final judgment, and that AT&T manufactured some of the equipment and
software that records these types of charges.  Accordingly, they argue that the IXCs should have
known about, or at least were on notice that they should have inquired into, problems with the CCL
charges long before the 1993-1994 period.
   14.   We conclude that these considerations strongly indicate that the IXCs were on inquiry
notice as early as 1983, when the access charge regime was inaugurated.  At the latest, we believe
that the IXCs were on such notice by March 31, 1986, when the key language of Section 69.105(a)
was further clarified with respect to actual use of the common line for CCL charge applicability in
connection with CCL charges for WATS closed-end arrangements. Moreover, by this time, the
IXCs had gained considerable experience with the access charge system and had participated in
several tariff review proceedings for annual access charge filings.
   15.   Both AT&T and MCI are sophisticated carriers that can be expected to know what access
charges they are paying.  Although there are additional factors bearing on AT&T's knowledge that
do not apply to MCI, namely the former's role in prior ownership of the BOCs and in manufacture
of the switches, we believe that MCI's active involvement as a major participant in the development
and application of CCL charges is sufficient to establish inquiry notice for itself.  We believe that due
diligence would have required both IXCs to inquire into the issues they raise in these proceedings
long before they did.  Therefore, if a LEC's imposition of CCL charges in these optional calling
situations were construed as a single unlawful act, the statute of limitations contained in Section
415(b) would have barred any complaint brought after March 31, 1988 for pre-existing optional
services, or two years from the time the LEC first assessed these CCL charges for new optional
services.
   16.  To the extent that the LECs unlawfully assessed CCL charges on the IXCs, however, we
conclude that the LECs have engaged in continuing violations of the Act.  While the LECs may have
begun assessing the CCL charges at issue as early as 1983, each successive billing of such charges
constitutes a separate unlawful act for which relief may be sought in a Section 208 proceeding, to the
extent that it is within the limitations bar of Section 415.  On the other hand, we have already
concluded that, even if we accept AT&T's and MCI's claims that they did not specifically discover
the factual basis for their complaints about the LECs' CCL charges until 1993 or 1994, respectfully,
with due diligence they should have discovered them as early as 1983 and certainly no later than
1986.  Thus, each continuing violation is subject to the two-year limitations period applicable to
damages claims under Section 415.  Accordingly, we shall limit our consideration of the IXCs'
damages claims based on alleged unlawful CCL charges to the two-year period immediately preceding
the date they filed each of the instant complaints.
   17.  MCI offers no support for its bare allegation that the letters it sent to the LECs in August
1994 served to extend the limitations period under Section 415(c).  MCI's theory apparently is that:
(1) the LECs' unlawful CCL charges were "overcharges," as that term is used in Section 415(c); (2)
the letters therefore constituted claims for overcharges presented  in writing to the carriers within the
two-year limitations period; (3) the LECs' written responses in turn constituted notice in writing of
disallowance of those claims; and (4) this would extend the limitations period to two years from the
date of those written disallowances.  Section 415(g), which MCI does not cite, defines "overcharges"
as "charges for services in excess of those applicable thereto under the schedules of charges lawfully
on file with the Commission."  The arguments of both IXCs throughout this proceeding, however,
generally have been that the LECs applied the CCL charges in cases where the charges were not
applicable, rather than that those charges were in excess of lawfully filed levels.  The present record
is insufficient in both fact and law to support MCI's theory on limitations and overcharges.  In the
damages phase of this proceeding, the IXCs may seek to show that some or all of the LECs'
violations were "overcharges" in the strict sense of Section 415(g), and that various items of
correspondence operated to extend the limitations period under Section 415(c).
   18.  Finally, we reject the LECs' various arguments that the IXCs' complaints were untimely on
grounds of equity or general reasonableness.  None of the LECs has cited specific authority for
equitable defenses to a Section 208 complaint.
                     IV.  SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS
   A.  Commission Rule 69.105(a)
      1.  Application and Measurement of CCL Charges
        a.  Contentions
   19.  The IXCs argue that the LECs may assess a CCL charge only when a call transported by
an IXC actually, physically uses a common line connecting the end-user subscriber to the LEC end
office serving the subscriber.  In particular, the IXCs contend that use of LEC central office
switching capabilities alone is not enough to trigger application of a CCL charge; a call must transit
the common line between the end user and the end office.  In addition, the IXCs claim that
measurement of access minutes of use should mirror the exact number of minutes a call actually uses
a common line.  In support of their position, the IXCs cite Section 69.105(a) of the Commission's
rules, which states that CCL charges are assessed on IXCs that "use common line facilities."  The
IXCs maintain that the rule expressly requires tangible use of a common line -- not merely central
office equipment -- before LECs may impose a CCL charge.
   20.  The IXCs also point to the 86-1 Docket Order, in which the Commission modified
Section 69.105 to exempt from CCL charges closed-end WATS arrangements, which do not use a
common line to connect end users to the end office.  The IXCs note that the original version of
Section 69.105(a) stated that CCL charges shall be assessed on all IXCs "that use local exchange
switching facilities." According to the IXCs, the Commission modified Section 69.105(a) to provide
that CCL charges apply to all IXCs "that use local exchange common line facilities," to clarify that
a CCL charge does not apply based solely on use of local exchange switching facilities.  Moreover,
the IXCs argue that Bell Atlantic Cellular, the NYNEX Waiver Order, and Bill Correctors have
established that LECs may not recover a CCL charge unless a common line is used, and may assess
the charge only once for each use.
   21.   The IXCs present an additional "double recovery" argument.  They contend that the LECs'
assessment of an interstate CCL charge for the use of common line is inappropriate in certain types
of call situations, especially call forwarding, where the LECs recover the cost of the common line
from intrastate sources through intrastate toll charges, subscriber fees for the optional service, or
general contribution.  In support of this position, the IXCs cite Bell Atlantic Cellular, in which the
Commission found unlawful a CCL charge to the IXC for the link from the LEC serving office to the
radio common carrier (RCC), not only because this link is not a common line, but also because the
LEC already recovers those costs from the RCC pursuant to inter-carrier agreements.  Similarly,
the IXCs assert that they should not be liable for unanticipated common line charges attributable to
an optional service that the subscriber, on its own initiative, takes from the LEC.
   22.  The LECs raise several arguments to counter the IXCs' allegations.  First, the LECs assert
that for purposes of applying a CCL charge, it does not matter whether a call uses a common line for
all or part of the call.  Most of the LECs stress that CCL charges are designed to recover a fixed
sum of non-traffic sensitive common line costs.  They submit that even though the Commission
required IXCs to contribute to recovery of common line costs, the Commission recognized that end
users, rather than IXCs, "cause" common line costs.  Accordingly, the LECs argue, since the CCL
charge is an imperfect match between cost causation and recovery, the Commission did not intend
that this charge recoup the costs of IXCs' "use" of common lines, or of a particular service.  Instead,
according to the LECs, CCL charges are a cost spreading mechanism or subsidy from long distance
to local exchange services to limit economic burdens to end users.  Thus, the LECs assert that the
Section 69.105(a) reference to common line "use" identifies which carriers must pay the CCL charge,
but does not describe how the charge is assessed.
   23.  Second, the LECs advance a related argument that a CCL charge applies to all access
minutes that in some manner use their access switching capabilities.  The LECs contend that the
common line encompasses not only the line connecting the end user to the serving central office, but
also the central office equipment at that central office.  Moreover, like the IXCs, the LECs draw
support from the Commission's modification of Section 69.105 in the 86-1 Docket Order. The LECs,
however, highlight the Commission's statement that differences in the adopted version of the rule did
"not reflect any difference in substantive result" from the proposed version.  The LECs suggest
that this revision, as well as other matters on which the IXCs rely, merely carved out narrow
exceptions for WATS or other special access services, and that CCL charges apply to all other access
minutes of use.
   24.  Third, the LECs dispute the IXCs' claim that measurement of common line minutes of use
must track, minute by minute, physical use of the common line.  They note, for example, that pursuant
to Sections 69.2(a) and  69.105(a) of the Commission's rules, the CCL charge is determined based
on "access minutes of use," and Section 69.2(a) specifies when measurement begins and ends.
   25.   Fourth, each LEC asserts that, except for paging, calls involving the optional services do
use a common line.  Initially, the LECs argue that the options make "general" use of common line
facilities because the common line is always available for use and is a bundled element of switched
access and local exchange service.  In addition, they cite physical uses of the common line in
connection with each optional service.  For example, in call forwarding, they note that a short signal
ring is sent to the subscriber's common line to indicate that the forwarding feature has been
activated; similarly, in three-way calling, they cite the fact that the subscriber's common line is
occupied simultaneously by signals from two distinct sources.
   26.   Finally, the LECs reject the IXCs' additional argument of cross-jurisdictional double
recovery for common line allegedly resulting from the overlap between interstate CCL charges and
various forms of intrastate charges for certain services.  They argue that jurisdictionally-mixed
common facilities are apportioned to each jurisdiction by the Part 36 separations process, and that
distinct regimes of rates and cost recovery are applicable thereto.  Accordingly, they claim, the
question of duplicated cost recovery across jurisdictional lines is foreclosed.
        b. Discussion
   27.   It is well established that in a formal complaint proceeding pursuant to Section 208 of the
Act, the complainant has the burden of proof.  Applying that standard, and after review of our rules,
prior decisions, and the record before us, we conclude that the complainant IXCs have carried their
burden of showing that the defendant LECs improperly assessed CCL charges in some instances.
   28.  With respect to the optional services in question, a LEC may impose CCL charges only at
points where an interstate or foreign call originates from, or terminates to, an end user via
transmission over a common line.  Pursuant to Section 69.105(a), CCL charges are assessed on "all
interexchange carriers that use local exchange common line facilities."  This express language
establishes not only which entities are subject to the charge, but also the prerequisite for application
of the charge.  Although common line costs are not traffic sensitive, this does not mean that CCL
charges are not tied to common line use.  On the contrary, the Commission implemented a usage-
based system of cost recovery in spite of the NTS nature of the costs themselves as a means to ease
the transition to its long range plan.  The Commission had long recognized that CCL charges
"reduce the relationship between rates and cost causation."  Yet, after weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of the approach, the Commission concluded that CCL charges were an appropriate
transitional means of recouping a portion of common line costs.
   29.  The Commission has explicitly stated that, "[c]ommon [l]ine usage charges obviously
should reflect common line usage."  For example, the Commission has explained that CCL charges
under the new plan would "be calculated on a straightforward minutes of use basis for services using
common line facilities."  The Commission applied this principle in Bell Atlantic Cellular, where it
held that CCL charges do not apply to calls that terminate to end users over an RCC's facilities.  The
Commission explained that RCCs are carriers, not end users, so that the facilities interconnecting
LECs to RCCs are not common line.  The Commission further noted that RCCs' facilities are not
"dedicated to a particular end user" such that those facilities could be considered common line.
Accordingly, the Commission concluded that CCL charges do not apply, and rejected a tariff
transmittal that would have applied CCL charges to calls that terminated over RCC facilities.
   30.  We also reject the LECs' view that CCL charges apply based on use of switching facilities
or central office equipment.  The fact that certain switching facilities are involved in common line
connecting functions and allocated to common line costs does not mean that the CCL charge can be
completely dissociated from common line use, or that switching equipment alone is sufficient to
justify imposition of a CCL charge.  In fact, the Commission rejected this very argument when it
exempted the closed ends of WATS services from CCL charges.
   31.  Thus, in the Second Reconsideration Order, the Commission decided that the closed ends
of WATS services should be subject to CCL charges so that they would be handled consistently under
both the access charge rules and the separations rules governing apportionment of costs between the
intrastate and interstate jurisdictions.  Although the Commission recognized that WATS closed ends
were private lines dedicated to interstate service, the Federal-State Joint Board had not completed
its examination of direct assignment of costs for separations purposes.  Hence, the Commission
temporarily placed closed-end WATS arrangements in the common line category "to prevent any
anomalous results and undue complexity produced by inconsistent cost apportionment and cost
recovery procedure."   When the Commission subsequently adopted the Joint Board's
recommendation that closed-end WATS access lines be directly assigned to the appropriate
jurisdiction, it made corresponding changes to its access charge rules to exempt closed-end WATS
from CCL charges because they do not use a common line.
   32.  In the 86-1 Docket Order, the Commission rejected arguments of certain parties that CCL
charges should apply to WATS closed ends because WATS calls use local switches.  The
Commission determined that, because closed-end WATS arrangements do not use common lines,
the costs of these connecting lines themselves should be recovered through special access charges
instead of CCL charges, once the temporary discrepancy between cost allocation and rates had been
resolved.  The Commission noted, however, that the costs of switching and transport functions
actually performed in association with the closed end of WATS lines would continue to be recovered
through appropriate traffic sensitive access charge elements.  This reflects the Commission's
recognition that access service consists of several elements, such as common line, local switching and
local transport, and that costs of each component are recovered through separate charges, triggered
by different conditions.  In the case of common line, the CCL charge pursuant to Section 69.105(a)
is expressly conditioned on actual common line use, and the presence of associated switching is
immaterial to that determination.
   33.  The LECs appear to misconstrue certain remarks by the Commission concerning the effect
of the access charge rules adopted in its 86-1 Docket Order.  The Commission originally proposed
to modify Section 69.105(a) of the rules to state that a CCL charge would apply to all IXCs "that use
local exchange switching facilities, and that [e]ach minute of use of any local exchange switch by
[interstate or foreign] services, except WATS access line minutes of use, shall be counted for
purposes of computing and assessing" the CCL charge.  As adopted, however, the rule applied a
CCL charge to IXCs "that use local exchange common line facilities," based on access minutes of use
that "use local exchange common line facilities."  The Commission acknowledged that the proposed
and adopted versions were different, but indicated that the variations did "not reflect any difference
in substantive result."  Because the  Commission specifically rejected arguments by certain parties
that CCL charges should be tied to use of local switches, the Commission's comment cited by the
LECs simply clarified that, notwithstanding the language of the rule proposed in the 86-1 NPRM, the
Commission never intended to impose CCL charges for use of the local switch.
   34.  Similarly, a CCL charge is generally appropriate only at points where an interexchange call
originates or terminates over a common line, and intermediate "uses" do not constitute chargeable
common line usage.  For instance, Section 69.2(a) of our rules explains how access minutes of use
must be measured on the originating and terminating ends of an interexchange call; it does not
provide for intermediate switching or common line "use."  Furthermore, as we said in Teleconnect
Co. v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, "[c]ourts and this Commission have consistently emphasized
that they consider the end-to-end nature of communications rather than the various facilities used .
. . .  Interstate wire communication is regulated from its inception to its completion by the
Communications Act and, within the meaning of the Act, does not end at an intermediate switch."
   35.  Just as a LEC may only impose an interstate CCL charge at points where a continuous
interstate call originates from, or terminates to, an end user via a common line, the LEC may only
impose that charge to the extent that it is not also recovering for the same use of the same common
line facilities through various intrastate sources.  For us to hold otherwise would condone
unwarranted double recovery.  On the other hand, this cross-jurisdictional double recovery can occur
only if the questionable portion of the interstate CCL revenue is clearly attributable to the portion of
common line facilities assigned to the intrastate jurisdiction by the Part 36 separations process.
   36.  We do not agree with the IXCs' contention that measurement of access minutes should
mirror the exact number of minutes a call actually uses a common line.  Once the conditions for
imposing a CCL charge are met -- a common line is used to originate or terminate an interexchange
call -- measurement of chargeable usage is strictly governed by Section 69.2(a).  Accordingly,
     [o]n the originating end . . . usage is to be measured from the time the originating end user's
     call is delivered by the telephone company and acknowledged as received by the [IXC's]
     facilities connected with the originating exchange.  On the terminating end . . . usage is to be
     measured from the time the call is received by the end user in the terminating exchange.
     Timing of usage at both the originating and terminating end . . . shall terminate when the
     calling or called party disconnects, whichever event is recognized first in the originating and
     terminating end exchanges as applicable.
Therefore, under our rules, calculation of access minutes of use is measured continuously between
well-defined points and is not affected by intervening events such as the hold time in call waiting or
other incidents in the optional service call configurations raised by the IXCs in this proceeding.
     37.  In sum, a common line generally must be used to originate or terminate an interstate call
before a LEC may assess originating or terminating CCL charges, respectively.  With respect to the
LEC optional services in question, there may be one, and only one, CCL charge for a single use of
a common line in an end-to-end call.  Moreover, the LEC must calculate access minutes of use
continuously based on the criteria of Section 69.2(a), regardless of certain intervening events.  In
addition, the LEC may not impose an interstate CCL charge if it would result in double recovery by
the LEC through various intrastate sources for the same use of the same common line facility.  We
address application of these general conclusions to each optional service individually in Section
IV.A.2., immediately below, in light of the differing call configurations for each option.
          2.  Specific Optional Services
               a. Call Forwarding
                    i. Description and Contentions
     38.  Call forwarding directs calls placed to the call forwarding subscriber's telephone to a
specified telephone number at another location, which may be either in the same or a different
LATA.  When the first part of such a call reaches the LEC end office serving the subscriber, the
LEC determines that the subscriber has activated call forwarding and re-routes the call to the alternate
location, through its own network and, in some cases, to an IXC's point of presence (POP).  The
LEC also sends a "signal ring" to the subscriber's premises as a reminder that the subscriber has
activated call forwarding.
     39.   The IXCs note that interexchange calls may be forwarded to locations in the same LATA
as the call-forwarding subscriber's location or to locations in other LATAs.  With respect to calls
forwarded interLATA, the IXCs note that an incoming call to a call forwarding subscriber is
intercepted at the subscriber's serving end office switch before establishment of the common line
connection to the subscriber, and is then routed to the forwarded-to location, i.e., the alternative
location that the call forwarding subscriber has selected.  In spite of the fact that no common line is
used, the IXCs argue, the LECs unjustifiedly assess both a terminating and an originating CCL charge
at the intermediate end office turn-around point, as if the call had terminated at the initially called
location and then a second call had originated from there to the forwarded-to location in another
LATA.  The IXCs admit that originating and terminating CCL charges are appropriately assessed at
the caller's location and at the forwarded-to point where the call actually terminates to an end-user.
     40.   With respect to interexchange calls that are forwarded intraLATA, the IXCs also
contend that, in addition to the fact that the first common line to the subscriber's residence is not
actually used, the LECs double recover by assessing a CCL charge at the forwarded-to location,
where a common line is actually used.  The IXCs do not claim that this double recovery is the result
of two terminating CCL charges being assessed.  Instead, the IXCs claim that the costs associated
with this common line are recovered through various forms of intrastate cost recovery. The IXCs
claim that such revenues may come from intraLATA toll charges, the call forwarding service fee
itself, or general contribution.  In a related argument, MCI asserts that this second terminating CCL
charge is inappropriate because the IXC's order for access service, and the corresponding access tariff
under which it is ordered, specify termination only at the end user's premises.  MCI believes that the
IXC should not be liable for an unanticipated common line charge attributable to an optional service
that the subscriber takes from the LEC and which prevents the IXC from delivering the call to its
intended destination.
     41.   Finally, AT&T claims that the LECs' architecture for call forwarding, i.e., treating the
originating, interLATA portion and the forwarding, intraLATA portion as two calls, does not justify
multiple CCL charges.  AT&T states this "two-call theory . . . would mean that the Commission
would not even have jurisdiction over" the intraLATA, forwarded portion of the call.  AT&T
concludes that such a result would conflict with the established principle that the Commission has
jurisdiction over the entire interLATA/intraLATA forwarded call as a continuous, two-way
transmission path.
     42.  The LECs contend that the intermediate CCL charges are warranted because call
forwarding uses the local switching equipment at the subscriber's end office, and that the common
line connection to the initially called location is used to send the reminder ring.   The LECs also
support the two-call approach, claiming that it is the universal practice, mirrored even by the IXCs
in their own interLATA forwarded calls, to consider the two parts of an intraLATA forwarded call
as separate for routing and billing purposes.  According to the LECs, this justifies counting the
common line to the subscriber's residence as contributing to a completed call for CCL charge
purposes.  Some LECs also argue that the Commission's previous assertion of jurisdiction over
intraLATA call forwarding does not constitute rejection of the two-call analysis in the present
context.  Moreover, the LECs state that, rather than frustrating the parties' intentions, call
forwarding makes it possible (1) for the caller to reach its intended party, (2) for the subscriber to
receive a call at its intended location, and (3) for the originating IXC to earn revenue on a completed
call.  Finally, with respect to the IXCs' additional argument regarding interjurisdictional double
recovery, the LECs respond that revenues from charges in each jurisdiction are exclusively
attributable to costs in each, so that double recovery of separated costs cannot occur.
     43.   Finally, US West briefly notes that calls may also be forwarded by PBX systems, in
which case US West imposes the same number of CCL charges to call forwarding calls.  US West
suggests that any "discrimination" in CCL rates applied to calls forwarded by customer premises
equipment (CPE) and calls forwarded by the LECs' optional service requires justification.
                    ii. Discussion
     44.  First, we find that the LECs' application of intermediate CCL charges, both originating
and terminating, on forwarded calls with at least one interLATA, interstate portion violates Section
69.105(a) of our rules.  As explained and qualified above, CCL charges generally may be applied only
where a call originates or terminates over a common line, regardless of intermediate central office
switching or transmission facilities.  Since a call redirected by call forwarding does not terminate at
the location dialed by the caller and does not use the common line, it does not meet this test.
Moreover, the "reminder ring" sent to the subscriber does not complete the call at that point and is
not "use" within the meaning of Section 69.105(a).  Therefore, the LECs may not assess either
originating or terminating CCL charges at the call forwarding subscriber's location for calls forwarded
interLATA.  Similarly, the LECs may not assess terminating CCL charges at the call subscriber's
location for calls forwarded intraLATA.
     45.   US West's conclusory and unsupported allegation that the prohibition of a CCL charge
in call forwarding CCL configurations might unreasonably "discriminate" between call forwarding and
PBX systems is unpersuasive.  US West makes no effort to demonstrate that the services are
sufficiently alike or that treating them differently would be unreasonable within the meaning of
Section 202(a) of the Act.  Moreover, the hypothetical customer in this scenario generally had the
option to obtain this feature through a LEC central office rather than a PBX and freely chose not to
do so for its own reasons.
     46.  Second, with respect to calls forwarded intraLATA, we do not agree with the LECs that
there are in fact two calls -- one interstate and one intraLATA, whether the latter is local exchange
or intraLATA toll.  In the BellSouth Preemption Order, the Commission specifically rejected this
argument and clearly articulated that interexchange calls forwarded to another location within the
terminating LATA constitute "a continuous path of communications across state lines."  The
Commission also stated that it "has not ceded jurisdiction over call forwarding when used in interstate
communications even if that service is locally tariffed" and that it regulates the charges for use of the
local network when used as part of an interstate call, which includes call forwarding.  The
Commission has reached similar conclusions regarding the end-to-end nature of such calls in
Teleconnect and Bill Correctors.
     47.  Despite our rejection of the LECs' two-call theory, we find that the IXCs have failed to
show that the LECs' assessment of both interstate and intrastate charges (i.e., interstate terminating
CCL charges at the forwarded-to location on interexchange calls forwarded intraLATA and intrastate
intraLATA toll or other associated charges) constitutes impermissible double recovery of common
line costs.  Although the LECs and even the IXCs treat the forwarded part of the call as a local or
intraLATA toll call for bookkeeping and billing purposes, call forwarding is jurisdictionally mixed,
so that both interstate and local charges may apply on the forwarded part of an interstate,
interexchange call.  Thus, with respect to both establishing liability and proving damages, the mere
fact that the LECs assess both interstate and intrastate charges on the forwarded part of the call does
not conclusively demonstrate that the LECs are double recovering.  As the LECs have repeatedly
pointed out, the CCL charge is intended to recover the fixed sum of common line costs assigned to
the interstate jurisdiction during the separations process.
     48.  Therefore, to demonstrate that an interstate CCL charge on the forwarded portion of the
call constitutes double recovery of common line costs insofar as there is also an intrastate charge, the
IXCs would have to show that the LEC recovers not only its full interstate costs through the
interstate CCL charges, but also recovers through that same interstate charge a portion of the fixed
sum of its intrastate costs attributable to the identical facilities and operations.  Given this finding here
in the liability phase of the instant proceeding, the IXCs may, in the ensuing damages phase,
undertake to trace the flow of costs and rates identified with these calling configurations with
sufficient precision to show that interstate rates did in fact improperly cross the jurisdictional
threshold to recover intrastate costs.  Short of such a showing, however, we conclude that the IXCs
have not met their burden of proof with respect to their double recovery claim.
     49.  Finally, we reject MCI's claim that it should not have to pay a terminating CCL charge
on calls forwarded intraLATA on the basis that these are unanticipated charges attributable to the call
forwarding service.  Even if, as MCI claims, the LECs' access tariffs specify termination at the "end
user's premises," MCI is well aware that call forwarding is offered by the LECs and that a portion of
its calls may be forwarded.  Moreover, call forwarding makes it more likely that the IXC's own
customer, the originating caller, reaches his or her own intended party; similarly, call forwarding
enables the IXC to obtain revenue for what might otherwise be an uncompleted call.  Finally, MCI
has not attempted to show that the LECs' access tariffs define "end user" in such a way as to exclude
the end user at the forwarded-to location.
               b. Voice Mail and Fax Processing Services
                    i. Description and Contentions
     50.  Voice mail service and fax processing service both forward calls made to a subscriber's
telephone number either to a voice mail or fax processing system (which are in some cases provided
on a nonregulated basis by the LEC itself) by means of LEC central office equipment.  The LECs
forward these calls to the voice mail or fax system if the central office detects a busy or no-answer
condition at the subscriber's premises.   In at least some instances, if a caller leaves a message or
fax for the service subscriber, the voice mail or fax system notifies the LEC central office, which in
turn notifies the subscriber with a stutter dial tone or a visual indicator.  Messages or faxes are
stored by the system, and the subscriber may call later to retrieve them.
     51.  The IXCs argue that, because voice mail and fax processing service calls are configured
in a manner similar to call forwarding, in that the LECs re-route calls made to the subscriber's
premises to an alternate location, any originating and terminating CCL charges at the intermediate
point are prohibited because no common line connection to the subscriber is established at that
intermediate point.  Therefore, the IXCs claim, terminating CCL charges on terminating calls
forwarded to such services are unlawful.
     52.   In addition, the IXCs challenge the assessment of terminating CCL charges on the
second, forwarding part of the call, which is actually used, when calls are forwarded to voice mail or
fax processing systems within the same LATA.  In this situation, they argue, various intrastate
charges may result in double recovery.  Similarly, the IXCs contend that the service is provided to
the customer solely by the LEC, and the subscriber's use of that service prevents the IXC from
delivering the interstate call to the subscriber's common line.  Consequently, the IXCs claim, the IXC
should not be responsible for the resulting CCL charges.  Finally, they contend that, in some cases,
the LECs connect with voice mail or fax systems using dedicated, "private line" facilities such as DS1
(T1) lines.  Accordingly, the IXCs conclude, calls forwarded to voice mail or fax processing systems,
as well as calls made directly to such systems, do not use a terminating common line and should not
be subject to CCL charges.
     53.  The LECs raise the same arguments they presented in connection with call forwarding.
Some of the LECs defend their practices based on use of central office equipment or subscriber's use
of a common line to retrieve messages or faxes.  Additionally, some LECs submit that these
processing systems subscribe to local exchange services that include common lines used to forward
calls to the voice mail or fax systems and that such arrangements therefore "use" the common line for
CCL charge purposes.  Moreover, BellSouth states that high capacity private line connections to
service providers are channelized into individual dial tone lines, and it notes that the Commission has
previously determined that EUCL charges may be applied to such lines.  On this basis, BellSouth
submits that CCL charges are properly applied whenever EUCL charges are applied.
                    ii. Discussion
     54.  Voice mail and fax services both rely on call forwarding features to re-route a call to an
alternate location.  To that extent, the LECs' assessment of  CCL charges on these calls attributable
to the unused common line between the subscriber's premises and the LEC end office, as well as any
other intermediate "common lines," violates Section 69.105(a) for the reasons discussed above in
connection with call forwarding.
     55.  We next consider the second portion of these calls, from the LEC's central office to the
voice mail or fax processing system.  This part of the call may be terminated over a common line,
with or without prior intermediate end offices and interoffice mileage, within the LATA.  A CCL
charge would be appropriate here to the extent that the call terminates over a common line,  even if
there are intermediate central office switching or transmission facilities.  Similarly, as with call
forwarding, the existence of intrastate charges associated with the second part of the call would not
necessarily constitute impermissible double recovery.
     56.  This second portion of the call may also be terminated by non-common line facilities,
however, and we agree with the IXCs' general proposition that in this instance, such calls should not
incur a terminating CCL charge.  We will only address, however, the two types of facilities of this
nature that the IXCs specifically identify: FX service and DS1 (T1) lines.  As discussed in Section
IV.A.2.f. below, we believe that the LECs' intraLATA FX does make use of a common line, and,
therefore, such voice mail or fax calls should not be exempt from CCL charges on this basis alone.
Moreover, we do not agree with the IXCs that all DS1 (T1) lines are private lines for purposes of
CCL charge applicability.  When T1 lines are multiplexed into individual channels, each subject to
EUCL charges and available for both local and interexchange calls, each constitutes a common line
for purposes of individual CCL charges.  Therefore, these multiplexed lines would not be exempt
from CCL charges on the grounds that they were not common line facilities.
               c. Paging
                    i.  Descriptions and Contentions
     57.  Paging services send a radio signal to a portable receiver, indicating that someone is
trying to reach the end user carrying the receiver.  Relying on Bell Atlantic Cellular, the IXCs
assert that terminating CCL charges may not be applied to calls delivered to paging carriers, both
because they use radio equipment, rather than a common line, to transmit the signal to the called
party, and because paging service providers are not "end users."
     58.  The IXCs did not make any allegations concerning paging service calls in their complaints
against Bell Atlantic, Ameritech or SWBT because these carriers represent that they do not impose
CCL charges on such calls.  NYNEX has conceded that CCL charges should not apply to calls sent
to paging systems and states that it will provide refunds for paging service calls on which NYNEX
has incorrectly assessed CCL charges.  BellSouth also admits that CCL charges should not be
assessed on calls delivered to paging systems.  Pacific initially contended that CCL charges are
lawfully applied to paging service calls, but subsequently, consistent with the other LECs' views
regarding the practice, agreed to re-examine its position.  US West concedes that paging companies
are co-carriers rather than end users and states that it will conform its tariffs properly.
     59.  GTE is the sole defendant that has not openly expressed a willingness either to concede
the inapplicability of CCL charges to paging service calls or, like Pacific and US West, review its
practices and work with the IXCs to resolve the dispute.  GTE states that it does assess CCL charges
on calls to be delivered to paging systems that are connected with GTE end offices via DID or Dial
Line Connections, and argues that the charges are lawful because both connections are common
lines.  GTE does not address AT&T's claims regarding the use of radio signals to terminate the call
or the paging providers' status as either co-carriers or end users.
                         ii.  Discussion
     60.  We commend the parties who have worked, or are working amicably to settle this issue.
Because not all of the parties agree that CCL charges do not apply to paging service calls, however,
we must decide the issue.
     61.  Bell Atlantic Cellular firmly established that CCL charges should not be assessed on calls
that terminate to end users via radio common carrier (RCC) facilities because those facilities are not
common lines and RCCs are not end users such that the facilities connecting the wireline carrier to
the wireless carrier are common line.  The same reasoning applies to RCCs such as paging carriers
-- they are not themselves end users and the lines to their facilities are not common line.  Accordingly,
it is unlawful for a LEC to assess terminating CCL charges on paging service calls.
               d. Call Waiting
                    i. Description and Contentions
     62.   Call waiting notifies a subscriber who is already on the telephone that an incoming call
is trying to get through, and enables the subscriber to answer the second call without terminating the
first call.  When the second call reaches the LEC end office serving the call waiting subscriber, that
end office "holds" the call at the switch and sends a signal tone to the subscriber.  If the subscriber
ignores the tone, the second call is not completed and the LEC does not impose a CCL charge for
that call.  If the subscriber instead flashes the telephone switchhook, he answers the second call,
and the first call is held at the LEC end office.  By repeatedly flashing the switchhook, the
subscriber may alternate back and forth between the two calls.  Measurement of minutes of use
does not begin until the second call is answered, and continues for each call until each is
disconnected.
     63.  The IXCs challenge the LECs' application of CCL charges to the duration of the time a
call waiting call is on hold because, at any given time, only one call is physically transmitted to the
subscriber using the common line while the other call is held at the LEC end office.  The IXCs claim
that the availability of the call on hold is insufficient to constitute "use" for CCL charge purposes.
Further, MCI argues that there is double recovery of either two CCL charges, if both calls are
interstate, or a CCL charge and intrastate charges, if one call is intraLATA.
     64.  The LECs assert that they lawfully assess CCL charges for both calls because two
separate calls are delivered to the subscriber over the common line and the common line is always
available to each call. Additionally, they aver that the incoming-call notification tone and the
subscriber's signals to the end office, triggered by flashing the switchhook, use the common line.
The LECs also contend that Section 69.2(a) requires that access minutes of use be measured until
one party to the conversation disconnects and that calls placed on hold are not disconnected.  Thus,
the LECs argue, if the first call is an interstate, interLATA call placed by the subscriber, access
minutes of use are measured from the time the IXC acknowledges receipt of the call until one party
to the conversation disconnects.  Similarly, the LECs claim, if the second call is an interstate,
interLATA call, access minutes of use are measured from the time the subscriber answers the call
until one party to the conversation disconnects.
                    ii. Discussion
     65.  The IXCs have not demonstrated that the LECs are overbilling CCL charges in
connection with call waiting.  Unlike call forwarding, the call waiting option effectively furnishes two
entirely distinct calls to the subscriber over a common line.  The line is used for each call in the sense
that the subscriber has the benefit of being able to activate that call at any time.  Moreover, the IXCs'
argument ignores the explicit measuring requirements of Section 69.2(a), which requires that access
minutes of use be counted until one party to a call disconnects.  The call placed on hold is not
disconnected, however, and thus Section 69.2(a) requires access minutes of use to be counted until
one party to a call disconnects.  Hence, the rule by its terms precludes the intermittent measurement
the IXCs advance.  Moreover, imposition of two CCL charges at the subscriber's end for the duration
of each call does not constitute double recovery for the same use of the same facility, whether both
calls are interstate or one is intrastate, because two calls are effectively present.
               e. Three-Way Calling
                    i. Description and Contentions
     66.  A subscriber to three-way calling may join two additional parties in a single conversation.
After establishing a connection with the first party, the subscriber flashes the switchhook to obtain
a dialtone to call the second party.  While the subscriber is calling the second party, the first call
is held by central office equipment at the LEC end office serving the three-way calling subscriber.
Once the second party answers, the subscriber again flashes the switchhook to join both parties in a
three-way conversation, prompting central office equipment to bridge the calls.
     67.  The IXCs note that the LECs impose two distinct CCL charges for the entire duration,
even though both calls in a three-way calling conversation share one common line.  They assert that
if both are interstate, interLATA calls handled by the same IXC, it pays two CCL charges for a single
use of the common line.  Similarly, the IXCs claim that if one of the interstate calls is handled by
another IXC, the LECs still recover twice, albeit from two different IXCs.  The IXCs further allege
that the LECs double recover CCL charges for the entire duration of the calls, i.e., where one call is
intraLATA toll or local exchange and the other is interstate, because the LECs assess both CCL
charges and state charges, such as intraLATA toll, the subscriber's optional service charge, or general
contribution.
     68.  As with call waiting, the LECs maintain that two separate calls are transmitted to the
subscriber over the common line, and central office equipment is used to join the calls.  US West
points out that some CPE is also capable of establishing three-way calls, and argues that applying
CCL charges to three-way calls facilitated by CPE, but not to those established by the LECs' service,
would discriminate against subscribers who choose to use CPE capabilities.
                    ii. Discussion
     69.   Once again, the IXCs' position overextends the Section 69.105(a) requirement for
common line use.  Three-way calling enables the subscriber to participate in two wholly separate calls
at any given time and subsequently to join or link them for conferencing purposes.  Both calls may
originate or terminate over the subscriber's common line, but the fact that they are transmitted over
that line simultaneously does not negate the independent, beneficial uses of the line by each.  Because
two calls originate or terminate over the subscriber's common line, both properly incur a CCL charge.
     70.   Nor can we agree with MCI's contention that the LECs' imposition of two CCL charges
on the subscriber's end of a three-way calling configuration results in double recovery where one call
is an interstate call and the other is subject to an intraLATA toll charge or other intrastate charge paid
to the LEC for the option.  As mentioned above, three-way calling involves two distinct calls using
the same line, even though each call originates or terminates over the same common line.  Therefore
it is proper for a LEC to assess a CCL charge on an IXC for the interstate call, even if the LEC
collects other intrastate charges for the intrastate call.
          f. Foreign Exchange (FX) Service
                    i. Description and Contentions
     71.   Foreign Exchange (FX) service connects a subscriber ordinarily served by a local (or
"home") end office to a distant (or "foreign") end office through a dedicated line from the subscriber's
premises to the home end office, and then to the distant end office.  The "home" end is known as the
closed end, while the "foreign" end is known as the open end.  In effect, this gives the subscriber a
dial tone presence in the distant exchange without additional toll charges. In interLATA FX service,
which is offered by AT&T but not MCI, the home and foreign end offices are in different LATAs,
connected by the IXC's interstate private lines.  In intraLATA FX service, which is offered by the
LECs, the home and foreign end offices are in the same LATA, connected by the LEC's intraLATA,
interoffice lines.
     72.   The IXCs contend that the LECs impose improper CCL charges on originating or
terminating calls that transit an interLATA FX service subscriber's closed end.  The IXCs, noting that
the link between the subscriber and the home end office is special access and that the link from there
to the foreign end office is a private line (i.e., together comprising the FX closed end), argue that the
links cannot be considered as a common line and so should not be subject to CCL charges.  The IXCs
support this characterization of the closed-end as private or dedicated by reference to court
decisions and statements or omissions by the LECs themselves.  The IXCs also contend that
there is no other common line forming part of this service that links a premises in the foreign LATA
to the foreign end office.  Accordingly, they conclude, no CCL charge for any part of the closed end
is appropriate.
     73.   BellSouth and GTE object to any consideration of AT&T's claims regarding interLATA
FX service, arguing that AT&T did not allege any violations involving interLATA FX service in its
complaint and raised them for the first time in its briefs.  Bell Atlantic, on the other hand, states that
only issues pertaining to interLATA FX service are raised in AT&T's complaint.
     74.  Regarding the merits of AT&T's claim, BellSouth argues that CCL charges for
interLATA FX service are properly imposed at the distant end office because the Commission has
not exempted calls between interstate switched access services from CCL charges.  Other LECs
argue that the three-LATA scenario described in Attachments 1 and 2 to AT&T's brief is not the most
efficient or cost effective means for making interLATA calls, and is so rare that it is virtually
nonexistent.  In addition, the LECs state that CCL charges are properly assessed at the open end
of an interLATA FX call, and that they do not assess CCL charges at the closed end.
     75.  IntraLATA FX service, in contrast to interLATA FX service, is provided by the LECs,
and the subscriber and distant end office are within the same LATA.  The IXCs assert that the
LECs unlawfully apply CCL charges at the distant end office point because private lines connect the
subscriber to the home end office, and private lines also run between the two end offices.  The
IXCs claim that, because the lines connecting the subscriber to the home end office cannot be used
to make calls without also using the intraLATA FX function, such lines are not common facilities.
     76.  The LECs contest the IXCs' characterization of the connection between the intraLATA
FX service subscriber and the home end office -- and in some cases the link from there to the foreign
end office -- as a "private line."  They maintain that an FX service subscriber purchases basic local
exchange service, including common line, and that FX service merely extends the subscriber's local
loop to a different local calling area within the same LATA.  Thus, the LECs argue that intraLATA
FX service is a type of local exchange service.  They assert that, although dial tone and other
functions are performed at the distant end office, the subscriber's connection to the home end office
is, ultimately, used for local as well as interexchange access.  Moreover, some LECs state that they
assess CCL charges for the line between the subscriber and the home end office, not the private line
connecting the two end offices.
     77.  The LECs emphasize that intraLATA FX service is a local exchange service, and they
argue that the authorities on which AT&T relies for its claim that all FX services use private lines are
distinguishable because these sources involve interstate, interLATA FX service.  BellSouth, for
instance, contends that an end user's selection of the FX option does not alter the fact that the
subscriber's premises are connected to a Class 5 office in the home LATA, or the fact that the option
is basically local exchange service.  Finally, SWBT argues that CCL charges are warranted because
FX calls use the home end office switching equipment.
               ii. Discussion
     78.   First, we disagree with BellSouth and GTE that AT&T failed to raise allegations
concerning interLATA FX service in its complaints.  Although AT&T's complaints could have been
clearer on this point, we find that it raised both interLATA and intraLATA FX service sufficiently to
put the LECs on notice that both services were at issue.  We note that AT&T included diagrams in
its complaint depicting both services, and, reading the text of the complaint in conjunction with these
diagrams, we believe it is clear that AT&T complained of both services.  Moreover, the remaining
LECs did not object on this ground in their briefs, and several responded to AT&T's allegations on
the merits as to both services.
     79.   There is no question that the closed end of interLATA FX service is a dedicated facility
-- consisting of LEC special access and other dedicated LEC or IXC components -- that is directly
linked to the foreign central office, because the line cannot be used to call anyone within the home
LATA without incurring interLATA toll charges.  Accordingly, the LEC should not impose a CCL
charge specifically attributable to this facility as if it were a common line to the foreign office, and,
it appears, none of the LECs do.
     80.   On the other hand, a CCL charge is appropriate at the open end of an interLATA FX
line.  A call with one terminus at the closed end transits the foreign central office on the open end and
ultimately may link over a common line to any station in the foreign exchange or, potentially, to any
station on the entire public switched network.  Thus any completed interLATA FX call, whether
originating or terminating on the FX subscriber's closed end, will have an actually-used common line
at the terminus of the open end.  Our conclusions here are consistent with Section 69.105(b)(iii) of
the Commission's rules, which provides that "[a]ll open end minutes on calls with one open end (e.g.,
an 800 or FX call) shall be treated as terminating minutes."  This rule recognizes that the sole CCL
charge for an FX call is the one attributable to the common line of the non-subscriber who originates
a call to, or receives a call from, the FX subscriber, and it provides that, even if a call originates at
the open end, the single CCL charge should be deemed as terminating in order to be charged at the
higher terminating rate.  We note, however, that calls placed according to AT&T's three-LATA
scenario are not subject to CCL charges for the link between the foreign end office and the IXC's
POP in LATA 1 on the side enroute to LATA 3, because it is not a common line; the only common
line on the open end is the termination in LATA 3.
     81.  As to intraLATA FX service, we find that the IXCs have not demonstrated that the LECs
are violating Section 69.105(a) of our rules.  We disagree with the IXCs' characterization of the line
between the subscriber and the LEC as a "private" line.  Unlike the case of an interLATA FX line,
the intraLATA FX line connects an end user to a LEC end office in the same LATA and can be used
in common for local exchange, intraLATA toll, and interLATA toll calls.  The various authorities that
the IXCs cite to support their characterization of FX service as a private line service address only
interLATA FX.  Those decisions do not discuss or define the nature of intraLATA FX service.  In
addition, the subscriber's inability to make local calls without also triggering the intraLATA FX
service function, a point on which AT&T heavily relies, is not dispositive.  It appears that in many
cases, the subscriber may indeed make toll-free calls within the entire LATA.  In any event, we
think that this factor may aid in understanding the call configuration, the role of the LECs, and the
difference between interLATA and intraLATA FX service, but it does not mean that the connection
necessarily functions as a private line for the purpose of CCL charge analysis.
          82.   Therefore, we agree with the LECs' view that the connection between the
subscriber and the home end office in intraLATA FX service, however it may be denominated, is the
functional equivalent of a common line for purposes of determining CCL charge liability.  It is a
dedicated line used merely to extend the subscriber's connection to a more distant end office in the
same LATA, in order to obtain dialtone and various other features available in that distant office.  Our
findings are also consistent with the Common Carrier Bureau's approach to intraLATA FX service
in Bill Correctors.  In that case, the defendant LEC was assessing two EUCL charges on
intraLATA FX calls: one based on the line between the end user and the home end office, and a
second based on the line connecting the home and distant end offices.  In ruling that only one EUCL
charge was appropriate, the Bureau stated that in the case of intraLATA FX service, "it is clear that
only one access point exists; the access point has simply been linked to the customer's serving office
by a regular loop joined to an FX line."
     B. Section 203
          1.  Contentions
     83.  The IXCs also allege that the LECs' assessment of CCL charges in the manner alleged
in their complaints is not authorized within their tariffs and therefore violates Section 203 of the
Communications Act, which prohibits carriers from assessing charges that are greater, less, or
different than specified in their tariffs.  According to the IXCs, all of the LECs' tariffs state that they
assess CCL charges for use of common lines.  The IXCs then conclude that the LECs' actual practices
are contrary to the terms of these tariffs because the LECs apply CCL charges to calls or portions of
calls that do not in fact use a common line.
     84.  The LECs respond that their tariff references to common line use merely reflect the
language contained in the Commission's access charge rules, which they argue do not require
common line use as a predicate to imposing CCL charges.  Moreover, the LECs point to tariff
provisions not cited by the IXCs that they argue make clear that they assess CCL charges for the
broader category of switched access service minutes of use.  For example, BellSouth notes that
Section 3.5 of its tariff, captioned "Determination of Usage Subject to Carrier Common Line Access
Service Charges," states that except as otherwise provided, "all Switched Access Service provided
to the customer will be subject to Carrier Common Line Access Service charges."  Similarly,
NYNEX notes that Section 3.8.5 of its tariff applies CCL charges to "all originating and terminating
access minutes of use." Furthermore, its tariff Section 2.6 defines "access minutes" as "use of
exchange facilities" recorded at the switch.  Moreover, the LECs emphasize that their tariffs specify
any exemptions from application of the CCL charge, and none identify as excepted calls involving the
optional services at issue in these proceedings.
          2. Discussion
     85.  We do not agree with the IXCs' claims that the LECs' application of CCL charges to
optional service calls is so contrary to the clear language of their tariffs as to constitute a violation
of Section 203 of the Act.  The tariff provisions on which the IXCs rely set forth general descriptions
of the LECs' common line access service that are generally modeled on, and therefore consistent with,
the various Part 69 requirements that we have discussed in Section IV.A.1, supra.  Due to the
generality of these tariff provisions taken by themselves, however, we do not conclude that the LECs'
practices that we have rejected under Section 69.105(a) and related Commission rules and orders also
violate the tariffs themselves.  On the other hand, some of the tariff provisions raised by the LECs as
counterexamples do appear to be inconsistent with our main conclusions in this order insofar as they
imply that all switched access minutes that are not explicitly excepted from the CCL charge must be
subject to that charge notwithstanding the absence of common line use.  Therefore, we direct all
the defendant LECs' to modify their tariffs as needed to properly reflect our present findings.
     C.  Section 201(b)
          1.  Contentions
     86.  The IXCs' final claim is that the LECs' CCL rates and related practices are unjust and
unreasonable under Section 201(b) of the Act.  AT&T contends that the LECs' CCL rates: (1) violate
Commission rules; (2) result in double recovery; and (3) charge for common line facilities the IXCs
do not use, all in violation of Section 201(b).  MCI argues that, because CCL charges must track
actual common line usage and must not be imposed in a duplicative manner under the Commission's
rules and orders, the LECs' CCL charges and practices should be found unjust and unreasonable, in
violation of Section 201(b).  The LECs do not specifically address the IXCs' Section 201(b) claims
beyond their argument that they have properly interpreted and applied Part 69.
          2.  Discussion
     87.  The Commission is empowered to promulgate rules and prescribe rate and practice
standards for common carriers to ensure that all "charges, practices, classifications and regulations
for and in connection" with their common carrier offerings are just and reasonable.  Conduct that
violates the rules and policies established by the Commission for this purpose is, therefore, unjust and
unreasonable.  We have determined that certain LEC practices violate Section 69.105(a) of our rules
in connection with calls involving call forwarding, interLATA FX, voice mail and fax processing
services, with respect to CCL charges that do not reflect origination or termination of interstate calls.
Thus, we also find that these unlawful practices violate Section 201(b) of the Act.
     88.  The IXCs have failed, however, to establish that the LECs improperly assessed CCL
charges in connection with call waiting, three-way calling, or intraLATA FX service.  As we have
explained, these practices comport with the Part 69 rules, and the IXCs have not demonstrated that
they are otherwise unjust or unreasonable within the meaning of Section 201(b). The IXCs contend
that the LECs obtain "windfall" double recovery and bill in the absence of common line use in
connection with these services.  As discussed above, however, we have determined that the LECs
lawfully impose CCL charges for calls involving these services based on common line use, and
properly measure the associated access minutes of use.  Thus, we find no Section 201(b) violations
with respect to call-waiting, three-way calling and intraLATA FX service.
                       V.  DEFENSIVE CLAIMS
     A.  Necessity for Rulemaking Proceeding
          1.  Contentions
     89.  As discussed above, the LECs maintain that current Commission rules do not require
them to assess CCL charges in the manner the IXCs contend.  Furthermore, they argue that their
application of CCL charges to the optional services at issue is consistent with longstanding, industry-
wide practice.  Accordingly, the LECs claim that the IXCs' approach is a drastic departure from
present standards and would impose substantial costs on the LECs to develop new billing capabilities.
They assert, therefore, that such a change may only be considered in a rulemaking proceeding and
imposed prospectively.
          2.  Discussion
     90.  We reject the LECs' assertion that we should decline to adjudicate a formal complaint
because similar issues might arise in a prospective rulemaking.  Our duty to address a properly filed
complaint is a matter of statutory obligation.  The IXCs have raised questions regarding the LECs'
past assessment of CCL charges and are entitled to a determination of whether the LECs violated the
Act or our rules and orders in any way.   As the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia has observed:
     Agencies do have a fundamental choice whether to interpret and apply federal statutes
     through adjudication or through rulemaking.  But they cannot avoid their
     responsibilities in an adjudication properly before them by looking to a rulemaking,
     which operates only prospectively.  The choice an agency has between different
     methods of 'making law' is simply irrelevant when the agency is called upon as an
     adjudicator to apply existing law to a complaint.
As noted above, the entire access charge system was recently the subject of a rulemaking in which
all the parties in this proceeding were participants.  Both sides had the opportunity to address the
issues concerning the need for prospective changes in our access charge scheme in that proceeding.
     B.  Impossibility of Measurement
          1.  Contentions
     91.  Some of the LECs submit that it would be inappropriate to hold them liable to the IXCs
for the alleged non-compliance with Section 69.105(a) because it would be impossible or
unreasonably difficult to measure CCL access minutes of use in the manner the IXCs promote.
They contend that current systems cannot screen calls, or segments of calls, as needed to suppress
the CCL charges that the IXCs contest and that developing new methods for such purposes may
be unreasonably expensive.
     92.  The IXCs respond that the LECs voluntarily chose to measure and record calls using a
particular method and "their deliberate choices to disable themselves from properly measuring
common line usage" is no defense.  Moreover, the IXCs argue that the LECs concede that current
switches already record the necessary information and that the costs of developing any new or
additional measuring capabilities is not unreasonable when compared to the damages to IXCs
resulting from the overbilling that occurs as a result of the IXCs' practices.  Finally, the IXCs argue
that the Commission has permitted use of "reasonable estimation techniques" to measure traffic and
ensure compliance with requirements of the Act and Commission rules and orders.
          2.  Discussion
     93.  The LECs offer no authority for a finding that obstacles to compliance with our rules
relieve them of liability for non-compliance.  In any event, they have not demonstrated that, in a
subsequent damages phase of this proceeding, it would be impossible to obtain reasonable estimates
of damages through sampling and other techniques, especially in light of our finding of liability for
less than all of the disputed optional services.  In addition, the LECs have failed to support their
claims that corrective measures would be unduly expensive to develop and implement relative to
projected overbillings.  Whatever uncertainties there are in the present record regarding both
retrospective and prospective measurement of the alleged overbillings, as well as adjustment
mechanisms to remedy them, are insufficient to negate liability, but rather go to questions better
addressed in the damages phase of this proceeding.
     C.  Unclean Hands
          1.  Contentions
     94.  Bell Atlantic and Pacific argue that the complaint should be dismissed because AT&T has
"unclean hands."  They assert that AT&T provides most of the equipment and software the LECs use
to measure CCL access minutes of use, but failed to provide capabilities for identifying and
suppressing CCL minutes of use in the manner it now claims is required by Commission rules.
Pacific also alleges that AT&T is contractually obligated to indemnify Pacific against any liability for
the billing practices AT&T challenges.  Bell Atlantic seeks damages from AT&T in the event Bell
Atlantic is found liable for any CCL overcharges.  In response, AT&T states that the LECs never
requested that AT&T develop or provide different means for measuring CCL minutes of use.
          2.  Discussion
     95.  We lack jurisdiction over the merits of Pacific's indemnification claim and Bell Atlantic's
counterclaim for damages.  These are claims made to the Commission by carriers either against
their customer or against their equipment supplier, neither of which is cognizable under Title II.
Nonetheless, even assuming, arguendo, that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands should ever bar
a Section 208 complaint, the record does not support its application in these cases.  As we have
said, the LECs are responsible for calculating CCL charges, and should, therefore, have taken steps
to correct any inability to properly do so.  Because they did not request that AT&T enhance or
modify the equipment it supplied, we find no basis for finding that AT&T unreasonably failed to
provide more capable technology.
     D. Damages Issues
          1.  Contentions
     96.  The LECs submit that the IXCs have not been damaged by their CCL billing practices.
They state that CCL rates are set by dividing a fixed sum of common line costs, less the amount to
be recovered from EUCL charges, by estimated demand for access minutes of use ("demand
minutes").  The per-minute CCL rate, they note, is set at whatever level is necessary to recover the
fixed common line costs.  According to the LECs, if the IXCs were correct and no CCL charge
should have applied to calls involving the optional services, the LECs would have excluded estimated
demand minutes associated with such calls in calculating the per-minute CCL rate.  Moreover, they
claim, a reduction in demand minutes would have resulted in a corresponding increase in the per-
minute CCL rate. Therefore, the LECs conclude, the IXCs would have contributed the same totals
to CCL cost recovery, albeit based on fewer demand minutes.
     97.  The LECs seek to offset any damages that the Commission might otherwise award to the
IXCs based on this alleged lack of financial injury.  In addition, Ameritech suggests that the absence
of economic harm to the IXCs is a public policy consideration that the Commission should weigh in
ruling on the LECs' liability.  Finally, Pacific contends that the IXCs have failed to establish damage
as an element of its claim and we must, therefore, dismiss the complaint.
     98.  The IXCs respond, first, that the LECs have supplied no factual basis for the conclusion
that the LECs' demand estimates used in setting annual access rates precisely took into account the
allegedly improper non-common line usage.  In this connection, the IXCs note that the Commission
has frequently observed that the LECs' annual demand projections have been inadequately supported
guesses, with a conservative bias, to justify higher rates.  In addition, the IXCs argue that awarding
damages for rates that were allegedly low would violate the "filed rate doctrine," the rule against
"retroactive ratemaking," and related principles.  Moreover, the IXCs claim that allowing offsets
to some, but not all, IXCs for unlawfully high access rates would result in unreasonable
discrimination.  Finally, the IXCs contend that the determination of a carrier's rights against a
customer is beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.
          2.  Discussion
     99.  First, we disagree with Pacific's contention that dismissal is justified if no damage has
been proven.  We may not dismiss a complaint based on a lack of direct damage to the complainant.
Lack of direct damage to the complainant does not bar a Section 208 complaint.  Furthermore,
when a complainant in a bifurcated case can establish that it has been assessed a charge prohibited
by Commission rules, that is a sufficient showing of damage to enable the complainant to proceed to
the damages phase and endeavor to quantify its injury.  As discussed above, the IXCs have
demonstrated that the LECs have imposed CCL charges in violation of section 69.105(a), and we
have in fact bifurcated these cases.
     100.  Second, the LECs' remaining arguments relate to the proper amount of any damage
awards, not whether the LECs have imposed CCL charges in violation of the Communications Act
or the Commission's rules.  Therefore, we will not entertain these contentions here.  Instead, the
LECs may raise them again in the damages phases.  Further, in light of the fact that the LECs
suggest that damages offsets may be appropriate because of an alleged lack of financial injury to the
IXCs, we remind the parties, when presenting damages arguments in the later stages,  to be mindful
of the court's opinion in MCI v. FCC to the extent their claims resemble offsets of the kind addressed
there.
                      VI.  PROCEDURAL ISSUES
     A.  AT&T Motion to Strike Declaration
     101.  AT&T has moved to strike the declaration, submitted by Bell Atlantic, of Albert
Halprin, a former Chief of the Commission's Common Carrier Bureau. The declaration purports to
explain the Commission's intent in promulgating the access charge rules.
     102.  AT&T's request is granted and the declaration will be stricken from the record.  The
Commission's orders speak for themselves.  Furthermore, we find that the declaration would not
alter our conclusions for all the reasons explained at length in this order, particularly Section
IV.A.1.b., supra.
     B.  Prior Staff Procedural Rulings
          1.  Contentions
     103.  US West and Bell Atlantic object to the Enforcement Division's rulings on certain
procedural matters.  First, the staff directed AT&T and the LECs to file their initial briefs at the same
time.  US West asserts that this unfairly required it to present its principal response to AT&T's
allegations without adequate knowledge of AT&T's claims.  Second, US West contends that the
staff erred in denying its motion to compel an answer to its "Interrogatory No. 3."  Third, Bell
Atlantic has moved to strike AT&T's reply brief as untimely because Bell Atlantic did not receive
notice of the staff's extension of the filing deadline.
          2.  Discussion
     104.  We reject these LEC claims.  Each of these staff rulings was consistent with Commission
rules, and well within this agency's discretion to manage a complaint proceeding, including discovery
and briefing schedules, in a manner that may aid in the disposition of the case.  Beyond this, none
of the rulings have prejudiced these LECs.  For example, our rules contemplate simultaneous briefs,
and US West already had notice of both the factual and legal arguments in AT&T's complaint, as well
as copies of materials AT&T might rely on in its brief.  Of course, US West was also permitted to
file a reply brief.
     105.  We likewise discern no prejudice to Bell Atlantic from the filing extension  because,
inter alia, AT&T's counsel did not review the LECs' replies until after he filed AT&T's reply brief.
Thus, AT&T did not, as Bell Atlantic states, have the "benefit" of reading the latter's reply in
preparing its own reply.  Accordingly, we deny the request to strike AT&T's reply.
     106.  As an alternative remedy, Bell Atlantic seeks leave to file a Supplemental Reply.
Although the allegedly deficient extension was not detrimental to Bell Atlantic, in the interest of
fairness and to further our goal of developing a complete record, we grant Bell Atlantic's request and
have included the Supplemental Reply in the record.
                          VII.  DAMAGES
     107.   As noted above, we have bifurcated these proceedings.  Thus, the IXCs may, pursuant
to 47 C.F.R.  1.722(b), file supplemental complaints for damages within 60 days of the release date
of this order.  With respect to damages, we note that in their original complaints, the IXCs stated that
the measure of their damages ought to be the difference between the amounts they actually paid to
the LECs for CCL charges and the amount they would have paid had the LECs properly assessed
CCL charges for the optional services at issue, plus interest.  We agree that this is an appropriate
measure of damages.  Further, we direct AT&T to explain in detail in its supplemental complaint
the methodology that it used in its study of the LECs' CCL billings described in its original
complaints, and to state the results of that study by LEC with respect to those optional services for
which we have found a violation and which were included in the study.  We likewise direct MCI to
state the methodology and results of any study it has conducted, or intends to conduct, concerning
damages.
              VIII. CONCLUSION AND ORDERING CLAUSES
     108.   For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the IXCs have made persuasive
showings that the defendant LECs' imposition of CCL charges for unused common lines in
connection with call forwarding, interLATA FX, voice mail, fax processing, and paging services
violates Section 69.105(a) of our rules and Section 201(b) of the Act.  We further conclude,
however, that the IXCs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that the LECs' imposition
of such charges in connection with call waiting, three-way calling, and intraLATA FX services at
issue are unlawful under Section 69.105(a) of the rules and Section 201(b) of the Act.  The IXCs
will have the opportunity to pursue their damages claims in supplemental complaint proceedings
pursuant to Section 1.722 of our rules, 47 C.F.R.  1.722.
     109.  Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201(b), 203(c), 208,
and 415, of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 201(b),
203(c), 208, 415, and Section 69.105(a) of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R.  69.105(a), that the
above-captioned complaints filed by AT&T Corp. and jointly by MCI Telecommunications
Corporation, Western Union International, Inc., and Telecom*USA ARE GRANTED to the extent
discussed above and otherwise ARE DENIED.
     110.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions to dismiss of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX,
and Pacific ARE DISMISSED as moot.
     111.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AT&T Corp.'s motion to strike the declaration,
submitted by Bell Atlantic, of Albert Halprin, a former Chief of the Commission's Common Carrier
Bureau, IS GRANTED.
     112.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the objections of US West regarding the
simultaneous briefing schedule and its motion to compel an answer to its Interrogatory No. 3 ARE
DENIED.
     113.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bell Atlantic's motion to strike AT&T Corp.'s reply
brief as untimely IS DENIED and its motion for leave to file a Supplemental Reply IS GRANTED.
     114.  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AT&T Corp., consistent with our directions in
paragraph 107, MAY FILE a supplemental complaint for damages within 60 days of the release date
of this order.
     115.   IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MCI Telecommunications Corporation, Western
Union International, Inc., and Telecom*USA, consistent with our directions in paragraph 107, jointly
MAY FILE a supplemental complaint for damages within 60 days of the release date of this order.
                         FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
                         Magalie Roman Salas
                         Secretary