Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders
Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific Guides Series number 23
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Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 
Problem-Specific Guides Series 
Guide No. 23 

Gun Violence Among 
Serious Young Offenders 

Anthony A. Braga 

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 
#2002CKWX0003 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein 
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the 
official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

www.cops.usdoj.gov 

ISBN: 1-932582-31-2 


About the Problem-Specific Guides Series 

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about 
how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime 
and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention and 
to improving the overall response to incidents, not to 
investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. The 
guides are written for policeof whatever rank or 
assignmentwho must address the specific problem the 
guides cover. The guides will be most useful to officers 
who 

 
Understand basic problem-oriented policing 
principles and methods. The guides are not primers in 
problem-oriented policing. They deal only briefly with 
the initial decision to focus on a particular problem, 
methods to analyze the problem, and means to assess 
the results of a problem-oriented policing project. They 
are designed to help police decide how best to analyze 
and address a problem they have already identified. (An 
assessment guide has been produced as a companion to 
this series and the COPS Office has also published an 
introductory guide to problem analysis. For those who 
want to learn more about the principles and methods of 
problem-oriented policing, the assessment and analysis 
guides, along with other recommended readings, are 
listed at the back of this guide.) 
 
Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the 
complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to 
spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and 
responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before 
responding helps you design the right strategy, one that 
is most likely to work in your community. You should 
not blindly adopt the responses others have used; you 
must decide whether they are appropriate to your local 
situation. What is true in one place may not be true 


elsewhere; what works in one place may not work 
everywhere. 

 
Are willing to consider new ways of doing police 
business. The guides describe responses that other 
police departments have used or that researchers have 
tested. While not all of these responses will be 
appropriate to your particular problem, they should help 
give a broader view of the kinds of things you could do. 
You may think you cannot implement some of these 
responses in your jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In 
many places, when police have discovered a more 
effective response, they have succeeded in having laws 
and policies changed, improving the response to the 
problem. 
 
Understand the value and the limits of research 
knowledge. For some types of problems, a lot of useful 
research is available to the police; for other problems, little 
is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series 
summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate 
the need for more research on that particular problem. 
Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to 
all the questions you might have about the problem. The 
research may help get you started in designing your own 
responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This 
will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local 
problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, not 
every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has 
every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so 
would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The 
references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn 
on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of 
research on the subject. 


 Are willing to work with other community agencies 
to find effective solutions to the problem. The police 
alone cannot implement many of the responses 
discussed in the guides. They must frequently implement 
them in partnership with other responsible private and 
public entities. An effective problem-solver must know 
how to forge genuine partnerships with others and be 
prepared to invest considerable effort in making these 
partnerships work. 

These guides have drawn on research findings and police 
practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and 
Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and police 
practices vary from country to country, it is apparent that 
the police everywhere experience common problems. In a 
world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it is 
important that police be aware of research and successful 
practices beyond the borders of their own countries. 

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to 
provide feedback on this guide and to report on your own 
agency's experiences dealing with a similar problem. Your 
agency may have effectively addressed a problem using 
responses not considered in these guides and your 
experiences and knowledge could benefit others. This 
information will be used to update the guides. If you wish 
to provide feedback and share your experiences it should 
be sent via e-mail to cops_pubs@usdoj.gov. 


For more information about problem-oriented policing, 
visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at 
www.popcenter.org or via the COPS website at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website offers free online access to: 

 
the Problem-Specific Guides series, 
 
the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools 
series, 
 
instructional information about problem-oriented policing 
and related topics, 
 
an interactive training exercise, and 
 online access to important police research and practices. 


Acknowledgments 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are very much a 
collaborative effort. While each guide has a primary 
author, other project team members, COPS Office staff 
and anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guide 
by proposing text, recommending research and offering 
suggestions on matters of format and style. 

The principal project team developing the guide series 
comprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus, 
University of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke, 
professor of criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E. 
Eck, associate professor of criminal justice, University of 
Cincinnati; Michael S. Scott, assistant clinical professor, 
University of Wisconsin Law School; Rana Sampson, 
police consultant, San Diego; and Deborah Lamm Weisel, 
director of police research, North Carolina State 
University. 

Karin Schmerler, Rita Varano and Nancy Leach oversaw 
the project for the COPS Office. Suzanne Fregly edited 
the guides. Research for the guides was conducted at the 
Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the 
direction of Phyllis Schultze. 

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the members 
of the San Diego, National City and Savannah police 
departments who provided feedback on the guides' format 
and style in the early stages of the project, as well as the 
line police officers, police executives and researchers who 
peer reviewed each guide. 


Contents 

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series i
Acknowledgments v
The Problem of Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders 1
Related Problems 2
Factors Contributing to Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders 3
Previous Offenses 4
Gangs and Criminally Active Groups 5
Geographic and Temporal Distribution 7
Understanding Your Local Problem 9
Asking the Right Questions 10
Victims 10
Offenders 11
Gangs and Criminally Active Groups 11
Locations/Times 12
Measuring Your Effectiveness 12
Responses to the Problem of Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders 15
Offender-Oriented Responses 16
General Requirements for a "Pulling Levers" Focused Deterrence Strategy 19
Key Elements of a "Pulling Levers" Focused Deterrence Strategy 25
Disarming Young Gun Offenders 26
Place-Oriented Responses 28
General Requirements for a Place-Oriented Enforcement Strategy 29
Key Elements of a Place-Oriented Enforcement Strategy 30Responses With Limited Effectiveness 31
Appendix: Summary of Responses to Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders 35


Endnotes 41
References 43
About the Author 51
Recommended Readings 53
Other Guides in This Series 57


The Problem of Gun Violence Among 
Serious Young Offenders 

This guide addresses serious youth gun violence, 
describing the problem and reviewing factors that increase 
the risks of it. It then identifies a series of questions that 
might help you analyze your local problem. Finally, it 
reviews responses to the problem, and what is known 
about them from evaluative research and police practice. 

Criminal misuse of guns kills or injures tens of thousands 
of Americans every year. This violence imposes a heavy 
burden on our standard of living, not only on groups that 
have the highest victimization rates, but also on the 
community at large. By one estimate, this burden amounts 
to $80 billion per year.1 Although overall U.S. homicide 
rates declined between the 1980s and 1990s, youth 
homicide, particularly gun homicide, increased 
dramatically. Between 1984 and 1994, juvenile (younger 
than 18) homicides committed with handguns increased by 
418 percent, and juvenile homicides committed with other 
guns increased by 125 percent.2 During this time, 
adolescents (ages 14 to 17) had the largest proportional 
increase in homicide commission and victimization, young 
adults (ages 18 to 24) had the largest absolute increase, 
and there was much crossfire between the two age groups.3 
Gun homicide accounted for all of the increase in youth 
homicide. The youth violence epidemic peaked in 1993 
and was followed by a rapid, sustained drop over the rest 
of the 1990s.4 However, in 2000, more than 10,000 
Americans were killed with guns, and guns are much more 
likely to be used in homicides of teens and young adults 
than in homicides of people of other ages.5 


In urban areas, gun violence takes a particularly heavy toll, 
as vastly disproportionate numbers of young minority 
males are killed and injured, and increasing fear drives out 
businesses and disrupts community social life. Research 
has linked urban youth gun violence to gang conflicts, 
street drug markets, and gun availability.6 Youth gun 
violence is usually concentrated among groups of serious 
offenders and in very specific places.7 

The police can prevent youth gun violence by focusing on 
identifiable risks. While gun violence seems to pervade our 
society, it is remarkably clustered among high-risk people, 
in high-risk places, at high-risk times. This concentration 
of violence provides an important opportunity for police 
to strategically address a seemingly intractable problem. 

Related Problems 

For police agencies, the most pressing concerns regarding 
youth gun violence are why offenders target particular 
people, at particular places, at particular times. However, it 
is also important to recognize that youth gun violence is 
often linked to a variety of risk factors beyond the scope 
of problem-oriented policing. For example, it has been 
linked to changing demographics, adverse economic 
conditions, family disruption, media violence, and poor 
parenting skills.8 These are sometimes considered the "root 
causes" of the problem. However, by the time gun 
violence problems come to police attention, the broader 
questions of why youth offend are no longer relevant. 
While police often help people access social services, they 
are best positioned to prevent youth gun crimes by 
focusing on the situational opportunities for offending 
rather than trying to change those socioeconomic 
conditions on which other government agencies primarily 
focus. Thinking about how likely offenders, potential 


victims, and others are to make decisions based on 
perceived opportunities is more useful in designing 
effective problem-oriented policing interventions.9 

Youth gun violence is only one of many youth-related 
problems police must handle. The following require 
separate analysis and response: 

 
gang formation, 
 
gang intimidation, 
 
gang crime, 
 
youth drug dealing, 
 
youth drug use, 
 
underage drinking, 
 
gun availability to youth, 
 
gun possession by youth, 
 
illegal gun markets, 
 
street drug markets, 
 
disorderly youth in public places, 
 
assaults in and around bars, 
 
street cruising, and 

truancy. 

Factors Contributing to Gun Violence Among Serious 
Young Offenders 

Understanding the factors that contribute to your youth 
gun violence problem will help you frame your own local 
analysis questions, determine good effectiveness measures, 
recognize key intervention points, and select appropriate 
responses. Research has shown that crime problems tend 
to cluster among a few offenders, victims, and places. 
Youth gun violence is similarly concentrated among a few 
offenders in a few places. This section reviews what is 
known from criminal profiles of youth gun offenders and 


victims, addresses the importance of gangs and criminally 
active groups in youth gun violence, and discusses the 
clustering in location and time of youth gun violence. It is 
important to note that the problem frames vary across the 
studies described below. In many jurisdictions, an initial 
interest in "juvenile violence" or "gun violence" shifted, as 
the problem assessments proceeded, to a focus on 
understanding and controlling violence, regardless of age 
or weapon type. However, in all cities, youth gun violence 
was the most important component of the problem. For 
example, in Minneapolis, problem-oriented research 
conducted on an emergent total homicide problem found 
that homicide was largely committed by youth ages 24 and 
under, who used guns and were known to the criminal 
justice system.10 

Previous Offenses 

Youth gun violence is concentrated among serious 
offenders well known to police and other criminal justice 
agencies. In Boston, an interagency group of law 
enforcement personnel, youth workers, and researchers 
examined the criminal histories of youth ages 21 and 
under killed by gun or knife in the city between 1990 and 
1994, and of the youth offenders responsible.11 Of the 
victims, 75 percent had been arraigned for at least one 
offense in Massachusetts courts, and 20 percent had 
served time in a youth or adult detention center. Nearly 50 
percent had been on probation in the past, and many were 
on probation when they were killed. Of the offenders, a 
little over 75 percent had been arraigned for at least one 
offense in Massachusetts courts, 25 percent had served 
time, over 50 percent had been on probation in the past, 
and 25 percent were on probation when they committed 
the crime. Victims and offenders known to the criminal 


justice system had an average of nearly 10 prior 
arraignments, and nearly 50 percent had 10 or more 
arraignments. They had been arraigned for a wide variety 
of crimes, including armed violent offenses, disorder 
offenses, and drug offenses. In gang literature, this wide 
range of offending is described as "cafeteria-style" 
offending.12 

A number of other jurisdictions have reported similar 
findings. In Minneapolis, Baltimore, Los Angeles, 
Indianapolis, and Stockton, Calif., gun violence was largely 
committed by and against youth with extensive criminal 
backgrounds.13 

Gangs and Criminally Active Groups 

Youth gun violence is concentrated among feuding gangs 
and criminally active groups. The Boston interagency 
group examined the circumstances of the youth gun and 
knife murders and found that nearly two-thirds were gang-
related.14 Most of the murders were not linked to drug 
dealing or other "business" interests; instead, most 
resulted from relatively long-standing gang feuds. In 
Minneapolis, nearly two-thirds of youth murders between 
1994 and 1997 were gang-related.15 In the Boyle Heights 
section of Los Angeles, slightly less than two-thirds of 
youth gun homicides were gang-related. Another 25 
percent involved gang members as victims or offenders, 
but were motivated for reasons other than gang rivalries.16 

Even in neighborhoods suffering from high rates of youth 
gun violence, most youth are not in gangs and criminally 
active groups. In addition, some gangs are more dangerous 
than others. To better understand the city's gang problem, 
the Boston interagency group mapped gang turf and 


estimated gang size.17 They identified 61 different crews 
with around 1,300 members. Gang members represented 
less than 1 percent of all Boston youth, and less than 3 
percent of youth in high-risk neighborhoods. The 
mapping also documented rivalries and alliances among 
gangs. Gangs had identifiable "beefs" with particular rival 
gangs, not all rivalries were active (i.e., shots were not 
currently being fired), and certain gangs were much more 
involved in conflicts than others. In Minneapolis, 
researchers identified some 2,650 people in 32 active street 
gangs as being central to youth gun violence; they 
represented less than 3.5 percent of Minneapolis residents 
between the ages of 14 and 24. The gangs tended not to 
be territorial; they operated fluidly across Minneapolis and 
nearby jurisdictions. In Boyle Heights, researchers 
identified 37 criminally active street gangs as being 
involved in youth gun violence. 

However, gangs are not always behind youth gun violence. 
In some cities, criminally active groups who are not 
considered "gangs" are major gun offenders. In Baltimore, 
violent groups active in street drug markets were involved 
in numerous homicides in 1997.18 Most of the murders 
occurred in or near a street drug market, and many victims 
and suspects were part of a drug organization or a 
recognized neighborhood criminal network. Researchers 
identified 325 drug groups that ranged in nature from 
rather sophisticated organizations, to structured 
neighborhood groups, to loose neighborhood groups. 
While drug disputes and street drug robberies contributed 
to Baltimore's gun violence problem, homicides often 
resulted from ongoing, non-drug-related disputes among 
people in drug-selling groups. 


In thinking about the nature of your youth gun violence 
problem, it is important to recognize that the direct links 
between youth gangs, drugs, and violence are usually 
overstated.19 Even in Baltimore, where most youth gun 
violence occurs in a drug market setting, most youth gun 
homicide is not drug-related. Gang and group violence is 
usually retaliatory or expressive (defending gang honor, 
status, and members). Today's offenders are often 
tomorrow's victims, and vice versa. Youth gun violence 
victims treated in Boston emergency rooms often had scars 
from past gun and knife wounds.20 Youth gun violence in 
many cities appears to be a self-sustaining cycle among a 
relatively small number of criminally active youth. They are 
at high risk of being confronted by gun violence, so they 
tend to try to protect themselves by getting, carrying, and 
using guns; forming and joining gangs; acting tough; and so 
forth.21 This behavior adds to the cycle of street violence. 

The research confirms a high degree of overlap between 
victim and offender populations. It is important that you 
determine whether this overlap exists in your jurisdiction. 

Geographic and Temporal Distribution 

Like most crime problems, youth gun violence is clustered 
in specific places. Between 1987 and 1990, half of 
Chicago's gang-related homicides occurred in only 10 of its 
77 communities.22 In Minneapolis, nearly two-thirds of 
homicides were clustered in only eight of its 95 
neighborhoods. In Boston, gang turf covered only 3 
percent of the city's total area, but over 25 percent of the 
city's youth homicides, gun assaults, weapons offenses, and 
shots-fired calls for service occurred there. In Boyle 
Heights, spatial analyses revealed that youth gun homicide 


was concentrated in specific hot spots, in and around gang 
hangouts. Most of the Boyle Heights youth gun homicides 
were considered to be predatory, as perpetrators invaded 
rival gang territory to commit them.23 

Youth gun violence often clusters in time. For example, in 
Boston, most youth gun violence occurred in the 
afternoon hours immediately following school release, as 
well as during weekend evenings. In Kansas City, Mo., 
computer analysis of gun crime hot spots within a beat 
revealed that most gun violence occurred between 7 p.m. 
and 1 a.m.24 


Understanding Your Local Problem 

The information provided above is only a generalized 
description of youth gun violence. Research has shown 

that criminal and disorderly youth gangs and groups vary 
widely both within and across cities.25 (For example,
Boston gangs were small, loosely organized, mostly 
neighborhood-based groups, unlike Chicago and Los 
Angeles gangs.) You must combine the basic facts with a 
more specific understanding of your local problem. 
Analyzing the local problem carefully will help you design 
a more effective response strategy. 

Analyses of youth gun violence should combine official 
data with street-level knowledge to provide a dynamic, 
real-life picture of the problem. The experiences, 
observations, and historical perspectives of police officers, 
street workers, and others in routine contact with 
offenders, communities, and criminal networks are 
underused resources for describing, understanding, and 
crafting interventions aimed at crime problems. Collecting 
data through interviews and focus groups can help you 
refine existing practitioner knowledge.26 For example, you 
can greatly enhance official data on youth gun violence by 
systematically reviewing and recording the circumstances 
of each incident in a working-group setting. Crime 
mapping is also an important tool in assessing youth gun 
violence. It can provide important insights on the 
locations of gun crimes, gang turf, and drug markets. 

 Interested readers should consult 
the National Institute of Justice Mapping and Analysis for Public 
Safety website, at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/.


Asking the Right Questions 

The following are some critical questions you should ask 
in analyzing your particular problem of youth gun 
violence, even if the answers are not always readily 
available. Your answers to these and other questions will 
help you choose the most appropriate set of responses 
later on. 

Victims 

 
Before the shooting, was the victim ever arrested, 
arraigned, or incarcerated? If so, how many times, and 
for what offense(s)? 
 
Was the victim ever on probation or parole? Was he or 
she on probation or parole when the shooting 
occurred? 
 
Was the victim a member or associate of a gang or 
criminally active group? 
 
What were the circumstances surrounding the victim's 
death or injury? Was it gang- or drug-related? The 
result of a spontaneous argument or other 
interpersonal conflict? 
 
Did the victim know the offender? 
 
Did the victim or his/her associates have a conflict 
with the offender or his/her associates? If so, what was 
the conflict about? Was there prior violence associated 
with the victim's death or injury? 
 
Was the victim an innocent bystander killed or injured 
during a dispute between two gangs or groups? 
 
Did the victim own or carry a gun? If so, where did he 
or she get it, and why? Was the victim concerned about 
personal safety? Seeking status on the street? 


Offenders 

 
Before the shooting, was the offender ever arrested, 
arraigned, or incarcerated? If so, how many times, and 
for what offense(s)? 
 
Was the offender ever on probation or parole? Was he 
or she on probation or parole when the shooting 
occurred? 
 
Was the offender a member or associate of a gang or 
criminally active group? 
 
What type of gun did the offender use, and where did 
he or she get it? 
 
Did the offender routinely carry a gun? If so, why? Was 
he or she concerned about personal safety? Seeking 
status on the street? 

Gangs and Criminally Active Groups 

 
How many members does the gang or group have? 
 
Does the gang or group have any conflicts with other 
gangs or groups? If so, what are the conflicts about 
(retribution, race, turf)? 
 
Does the gang or group have any alliances with other 
gangs or groups? 
 
What types of crimes do gang or group members 
commit? 
 
Does the gang or group claim turf in particular areas of 
the city? 


Locations/Times 

 
Where do gun assaults, gun homicides, and shots-fired 
calls for service cluster? Do they occur on public or 
private property? 
 
Do the incidents occur where youth commonly 
congregate? If so, why do youth congregate there? 
What do they do there? 
 
What accounts for the location's attractiveness? 
Closeness to home? Access to restaurants, telephones, 
or video games? Lack of visibility to the police and 
others? Absence of management or authority? 
 
Are other crimes occurring at the location? Is it a street 
drug market? 
 
At what times do gun assaults, gun homicides, and 
shots-fired calls for service cluster? 
 
Why are violent youth converging at specific locations 
at particular times? Does the timing involve school 
release, sporting events, parties, or some other common 
social opportunity? 

Measuring Your Effectiveness 

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree your 
efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might 
modify your responses if they are not producing the 
intended results. You should take measures of your 
problem before you implement responses, to determine how 
serious the problem is, and after you implement them, to 
determine whether they have been effective. All measures 
should be taken in both the target area and the 
surrounding area. (For more detailed guidance on 
measuring effectiveness, see the companion guide to this 
series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide 
for Police Problem-Solvers.) 


Understanding Your Local Problem 

The following are potentially useful measures of the 
effectiveness of responses to youth gun violence: 

 
reduced youth gun homicides,  It is important to recognize that 
gun recoveries may initially 
 
reduced youth gun assaults, 
increase when police start a gun 
 
reduced shots-fired calls for service, violence-reduction program. If the 
 
reduced gun recoveries from youth, responses are effective, this initial 
increase will be followed by a 
 
reduced youth gun injuries (emergency room data are decrease in gun recoveries. 
available from hospitals and state public health 
departments), 
 
reduced severity of youth gun injuries, and 
 
greater perceptions of safety among neighborhood 
youth, other community members, and local 
merchants. 


Responses to the Problem of Gun 
Violence Among Serious Young 
Offenders 

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a 
better understanding of the factors contributing to it. 
Once you have analyzed your local problem and 
established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, you 
should consider possible responses to address the 
problem. 

The following response strategies provide a foundation of 
ideas for addressing your particular problem. These 
strategies are drawn from a variety of research studies and 
police reports. Several of these strategies may apply to 
your community's problem. It is critical that you tailor 
responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify 
each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an 
effective strategy will involve implementing several 
different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are 
seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem. Do 
not limit yourself to considering what police can do: give 
careful consideration to who else in your community 
shares responsibility for the problem and can help police 
better respond to it. 

Recent evaluation research has revealed that police can 
prevent gun violence. While this guide categorizes police 
responses by whether they are primarily focused on 
offenders or on hot spots, in practice, they overlap. For 
example, when police focus on offenders in gangs, they 
sometimes also focus on gang turf and drug market areas. 


When police are deployed to prevent gun violence in 
particular places, they often focus on controlling the 
behavior of particularly dangerous offenders there. The 
distinction between the focuses matters less than the fact 
that police can prevent youth gun crime by strategically 
addressing identifiable risks. 

The Richmond (Calif.) Comprehensive Homicide Initiative 
demonstrates the benefits of an approach combining 
offender- and place-oriented responses.27 This problem-
oriented policing project entailed a wide range of 
community-based and enforcement actions involving local, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Offender-
oriented strategies included intensive investigations, the 
apprehension of violent fugitives, immediate responses to 
gang violence to prevent retaliation, and the strategic use 
of prevention and intervention programs. Place-oriented 
strategies included towing potential getaway cars in areas 
with high numbers of drive-by shootings, enforcing 
building codes at drug nuisance locations, and assigning 
officers to particular schools. An evaluation of this 
multifaceted program revealed that it significantly reduced 
homicides in Richmond, particularly those involving 
guns.28 

Offender-Oriented Responses 

A number of jurisdictions have been experimenting with 
new problem-oriented policing frameworks to prevent 
gang and group gun violence among serious young 
offenders. Pioneered in Boston, this approach is known as 
the "pulling levers" focused deterrence strategy. It was 
designed to influence the behavior, and the environment, 
of the groups of chronic offenders identified as being at 


the core of the city's gun violence problem. The pulling-
levers approach attempted to prevent gang and group gun 
violence by making would-be offenders believe that severe 
consequences would follow such violence and change their 
behavior. A key element of the strategy was the delivery of 
a direct and explicit "retail deterrence" message to a 
relatively small target audience regarding what behavior 
would provoke a special response, and what that response 
would be. 

Evaluation research has revealed the pulling-levers 
deterrence strategy to be effective in reducing gun 
violence among serious young offenders. The well-known 
Boston Gun Project/Operation Ceasefire intervention has 
been credited with a two-thirds reduction in youth 
homicides, and significant reductions in nonfatal gun 
violence.29 Subsequent replications of the Boston strategy 
have shown very promising results in reducing gun 
violence. An evaluation of the Indianapolis Violence 
Reduction Partnership revealed that homicides dropped by 
42 percent, and that they were less likely to involve a 
firearm.30 Less scientifically rigorous assessments in 
Baltimore, Los Angeles, High Point, N.C., Winston-Salem, 
N.C., and Stockton reveal similar reductions in homicide 
and firearms violence.31 

Some key elements of the "pulling levers" approach to 
prevent gun violence are also part of Richmond, Va.'s 
well-known Project Exile to deter convicted felons from 
illegally carrying guns. This program is essentially a 
firearms sentence-enhancement initiative, as offenders are 
diverted from state to federal courts. At the heart of the 
project, all Richmond felon-in-possession cases are 


prosecuted in federal courts, with the defendants' facing 
an average five-year prison sentence if convicted. The 
project also includes training for local police on federal 

. statutes and search-and-seizure procedures, a public 
relations campaign to increase community involvement in 
fighting gun crime, and a massive publicity campaign to 
warn potential offenders about zero tolerance for gun 
crime and about the swift and certain federal sentence. 
Project advocates claim success based on a 40 percent 
decrease in Richmond gun homicides between 1997 and 
1998. This claim has been disputed, however, as a recent 
evaluation found that the decrease would have likely 
occurred regardless of the project;32 the study suggests 
that nearly all of the decrease was probably attributable to 
an unusually high increase in and level of gun homicide 
before the project began. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note here that, as demonstrated in Boston, federal 
prosecution of gang-involved chronic offenders central to 
gun violence problems is an important component of an 
integrated violence reduction strategy. 


General Requirements for a "Pulling Levers" Focused 
Deterrence Strategy 

1. Enlisting community support. It is important for 
community members to think that police efforts to for further information. 
address youth gun violence are legitimate. Communities 
will not support any indiscriminate, highly aggressive 
crackdowns that put nonviolent youth at risk of being 
swept into the criminal justice system. Before 
implementing a pulling-levers strategy, police need to 
engage community members in an ongoing conversation 
about legitimate and illegitimate means to control crime. 
The community needs to be aware that most of the gun 
violence problem is concentrated among groups of serious 
young offenders, and that police will be tightly focusing 
their activities on those youth (see text box below). 

Although they were not involved in Boston's Operation Ceasefire 
until after the strategy had been designed and implemented, 
the 10-Point Coalition of activist black clergy made it much easier 
for police to speak directly about the nature of youth violence in the city. 
Police could talk with relative safety about the painful realities of 
minority male offending and victimization, gangs, and chronic offenders. 
The clergy supported Operation Ceasefire's tight focus on violent youth, 
but condemned any indiscriminate, highly aggressive sweeps. 
Before the development of this partnership, Boston's black community 
viewed police activities to monitor violent youth with knee-jerk suspicion. 
With the coalition's approval of and involvement in Operation Ceasefire, 
the community supported it as a legitimate youth violence prevention campaign 
(Winship and Berrien 1999).

 See the POP Guide on The Benefits 
and Consequences of Police Crackdowns 


2. Convening an interagency working group. Criminal 
justice agencies often work largely independent of each 
other, at cross-purposes, without coordination, and in an 
atmosphere of distrust and dislike.33 This is often also true 
of different units within agencies. To effectively address 
youth gun violence, an interagency working group of line-
level personnel with decision-making power must be 
convened. The group should include members from all 
relevant local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies. 
Serious young gun offenders are often involved in a wide 
range of crime, and often vulnerable to some form of 
criminal justice intervention. For example, by enforcing 
and manipulating the conditions of community release, 
probation and parole officers can be powerful partners in 
influencing the behavior of serious young gun offenders 
under their supervision (see text box below). 

Boston's Operation Night Light was an innovative police-probation 
partnership that involved intensive home and street contact with 
high-risk offenders during the evening. It was a key component of 
the Operation Ceasefire intervention. As Corbett (2002) describes, 
probation officers are matched with officers from the Boston Police 
Department's Youth Violence Strike Force. The probation officers 
identify some 10 to 15 probationers they want to see each evening, 
concentrating on those thought to be "active" on the street. The teams 
use unmarked cars and wear plain clothes, visit probationers at home, 
and drive through crime-ridden areas to determine whether probationers 
are there who should not be. Probation officers gain a new credibility 
that did not exist when they conducted probation activities in the office. 
Police have a new tool that significantly increases their power. Many 
officers speak of their frustration at knowing that certain offenders 
are active, but being unable to control them because of the difficulties 
involved in detecting crime and apprehending criminals. While most 
probationers will not be detected committing crime, their failure to 
obey court orders can put them at risk of being jailed as certainly 
as being arrested for a new offense. Unlike people not on probation, 
they can be removed from the street for a variety of noncriminal behaviors. 
Feedback from offenders, police, parents, and community members indicates 
that the youth have become more cautious and more compliant in their behavior. 


Prosecutors can give priority to crimes committed by 
particularly dangerous offenders and work with police to 
develop solid cases. Federal law enforcement agencies can 
contribute the extra resources of the federal government 
and apply a wider range of stiff penalties for certain gun 
offenses. Social service providers should also have a role 
in the group, as the best way to change some offenders' 
behavior may be to offer them substance abuse 
counseling, job skills training, recreational opportunities, 
and the like (see text box below). 

Boston Community Centers' street workers were key members of 
the Operation Ceasefire working group and, along with juvenile 
corrections caseworkers, probation officers, and parole officers, 
added a much needed social-intervention and opportunity-provision 
dimension to the Ceasefire strategy (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001). 
The city-employed street workers were charged with seeking out 
at-risk youth in Boston's neighborhoods and providing them with 
services such as job skills training, substance abuse counseling, 
and special education. When the risk to drug-dealing gang members 
increases, legitimate work becomes more attractive, and when 
legitimate work is more available, raising risks will be more effective 
in reducing violence.3. Placing responsibility on the working group. In 
most cities, no one agency is responsible for developing 
and implementing an overall strategy for reducing youth 
gun violence. Most police agencies have units or groups 
responsible for responding to incidents, but not for 
preventing incidents. The working group needs to be 
charged with preventing incidents to keep its focus on the 
bottom line of reducing youth gun violence. 


4. 
Involving researchers. Researchers can be important 
assets to the working group by providing thorough and 
reliable data to refine the group's understanding of the 
problem, testing prospective intervention ideas, and 
maintaining a focus on clear outcomes and performance 
evaluation. Researchers can also be helpful in producing 
basic accounts of the implementation processes and 
problem analysis findings that will be helpful to other 
jurisdictions. 

5. 
Developing an effective communication strategy. 
While enforcement actions are being conducted, it is 
important for working-group members to communicate 
directly with serious young gun offenders. It is crucial to 
demonstrate cause and effect to those subjected to a 
pulling-levers intervention. In essence, group members 
need to deliver a direct and explicit message to violent 
gangs and groups that violent behavior will no longer be 
tolerated, and that the group will use any legal means 
possible to stop the violence. The group also needs to 
convey this message to other gangs and groups not 
engaged in violence so they can understand what is 
happening to the violent gangs and groups, and why. The 
group can deliver the message in a variety of ways: by 
talking to gang members on the street, handing out fliers 
explaining the enforcement actions (see Figures 1 and 2), 
and conducting forums with gang members in a public 
building such as a courthouse or community recreation 
center. Probation and parole officers can require gang 
members under their supervision to attend such forums. 
Social service providers and community members should 
also be involved, as they may be able to convince gang 
members that it is in their best interest to attend the 
forums. 


Problem:
Violent Gang Member

Solution:
Armed Career-Criminal Conviction

If you have a criminal record and are arrested with 
a gun or even a single bullet, you could face a 
mandatory-minimum sentence of 15 years to life, 
with no parole. 

Future Address:
Federal Correctional Institute, 
Maximum Security Facility

Fig. 1. Anti-gang violence flier 


GOAL: STOP THE VIOLENCE 

INTERVALE POSSE 

 
THEY WERE WARNED; THEY DIDN'T LISTEN. 
 
INTERAGENCY DRUG OPERATION: 
 
BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
 
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 
 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND 
EXPLOSIVES 
 
MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE 
 
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
 
SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
 
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION 
 
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PAROLE 
 
SAFE NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVE 

 
AUG. 29, 1996: 
 
15 FEDERAL ARRESTS: DRUGS AND CONSPIRACY 
 
EIGHT STATE ARRESTS 

 
EACH FEDERAL CHARGE CARRIES AT LEAST A 10YEAR 
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE. SEVERAL 
POSSE MEMBERS MAY FACE LIFE IN FEDERAL 
PRISON: 
 
CONFINED UNTIL TRIAL 
 
NO POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE 

 
THE INVESTIGATION PROCEEDS: THESE CHARGES 
MAY BE JUST THE BEGINNING. 

Fig. 2. Anti-gun violence flier 


Key Elements of a "Pulling Levers" Focused Deterrence 
Strategy 

6. 
Targeting intervention. Gangs and groups of serious 
young offenders select themselves for intervention by 
engaging in gun violence. The working group should focus 
on gangs and groups of chronic offenders currently 
engaged in gun violence rather than indiscriminately 
selecting or developing a "hit list" of gangs, groups, or 
particular individuals. 

7. 
Sending the initial message. Working-group members 
must send a message to violent gang or group members 
that they are "under the microscope" because of their 
violent gun behavior. Police, probation, and parole officers 
should immediately increase their presence and activities in 
areas frequented by the targeted gang or group, and 
explain that their increased presence and activities are a 
response to gun violence. Social service agencies and 
community-based groups should also increase their 
presence and activities in the area, and explain to the 
target group or gang that they support police efforts to 
quell violence and will provide help to those who want it. 

8. 
Pulling all available enforcement levers. The working 
group should identify a variety of possible enforcement 
actions. The group should tailor its approach to the 
targeted gang or group and assess different options, 
including conducting probation and parole checks, 
changing the community-release conditions for supervised 
offenders, serving warrants, giving special prosecutorial 
attention to any past or present crimes committed by gang 
or group members, enforcing disorder laws, and shutting 
down drug markets run by the gang or group. The key is 
to use the gang's or group's chronic offending against 


them, as it provides many opportunities for police to 
intervene. The goal is to save violent offenders from 
themselves rather than remove them from their 
environments. Police intervention should be harsh only to 
the extent necessary to stop gun offending. For some 
groups or particular individuals, changing probation 
conditions or shutting down a profitable drug market may 
be enough. For certain hardened offenders, heavy federal 
penalties may be necessary. 

9. 
Continuing communication. It is critically important 
to demonstrate cause and effect to the targeted gang or 
group by directly and explicitly conveying the message. It 
should be very clear to the gang or group that the police 
are focusing on them because of their involvement in gun 
violence. 

 Police agencies should be creative 
in communicating with offenders. In 
Boston, face-to-face forums with 
violent gang members and working-
group members were key in 
delivering the antiviolence message 
(Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996a). 
In Minneapolis, working-group 
members visited gang-involved 
victims of gun violencewho were 
often in the company of their 
friends, in the hospitaland warned 
them against retaliation (Kennedy 
and Braga 1998). In Winston-Salem, 
N.C., older offenders were involving 
juvenile gun offenders in their 
criminal activities. In response, the 
Winston-Salem working group, while 
maintaining their focus on juvenile 
offenders, met with older offenders 
and explicitly warned them that 
involving juveniles in their illegal 
activity would result in focused police 
attention (Coleman et al. 1999). 

10. 
Providing social services and opportunities. While 
law enforcement members of the working group are 
focusing on pulling the appropriate enforcement levers, 
social service providers and community-based groups 
should focus on diverting young offenders from their 
violent lifestyle. In the face of an impressive array of law 
enforcement actions, some gang or group members may 
want to take advantage of social services and other 
opportunities. This element of the approach allows the 
working group to provide some benefit to those who put 
down their guns. 

Disarming Young Gun Offenders 

11. Searching for and seizing juveniles' guns. The St. 
Louis Firearm Suppression Program (FSP) sought parental 
consent to search for and seize juveniles' guns.35 While this 
program did not explicitly focus on "dangerous" 


offenders, it aimed to prevent gun violence by disarming a 
very risky population of potential offendersjuveniles 
suspected of gang or gun involvement. The FSP was 
operated by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police 
Department's Mobile Reserve Unit, a squad dedicated to 
responding to pockets of crime throughout St. Louis. 
Officers conducted home searches based on citizen 
requests for police service, reports from other police units, 
and information gained from other investigations. An 
innovative feature of the program was its use of a 
"Consent to Search and Seize" form to secure legal access 
to residences. Officers informed adult residents that the 
purpose of the program was to confiscate illegal firearms, 
particularly those owned by juveniles, without seeking 
prosecution. They told residents that they would not 
charge them with illegally possessing a firearm if they 
signed the consent form.36 While it was operating, the FSP 
generated few complaints from those subjected to 
searches, but received criticism from local representatives 
of the American Civil Liberties Union, who questioned 
whether residents could give real consent to search when 
standing face to face with police officers. 

A key program component was to respond to problems 
identified by citizens, and the program's success depended 
on effective police-community relationships. By requesting 
community input regarding the gun confiscation process, 
the police department developed a model for policing gun 
violence that put a premium on effective communication 
and community trust not found in most policing projects. 
The FSP also was designed to send a clear message that 
the police and the community would not tolerate juvenile 
firearm possession because it threatened public safety. 
Unfortunately, while the program gained national attention 
for its innovative approach and seemed to be a very 


promising route to disarming juveniles, the Mobile 
Reserve Unit underwent a series of changes that caused 
the program to be stopped and restarted several times; 
 Rosenfeld and Decker (1996) subsequent variations of the FSP did not use the same 
reported that, while the program was approach as the original one. Thus, a rigorous impact 

operating as originally designed,
police seized 402 firearms in 1994, evaluation of the original FSP was not completed.
and another 104 firearms during the
first quarter of 1995.

Place-Oriented Responses 

In addition to focusing on high-risk individuals, police can 
prevent gun violence among serious young offenders by 
focusing on high-risk places at high-risk times. The Kansas 
City Gun Project,37 and its subsequent replications in 
Indianapolis38 and Pittsburgh,39 successfully used place-
oriented policing responses to prevent gun crime in gun 
violence hot spots. In general, these studies examined the 
gun violence prevention effects of proactive patrol and 
intensive enforcement of firearms laws via safety frisks 
during traffic stops, plain-view searches and seizures, and 
searches incident to arrests on other charges. The Kansas 
City and Indianapolis studies also examined whether 
focusing police enforcement efforts at problem places 
simply displaced gun crime to different places or times. 
Neither study found any evidence of significant 
displacement. 

It is important to note here that the research evidence is 
currently limited to place-oriented strategies involving 
mostly traditional police activities, such as increased patrol 
and street searches of suspicious individuals, at gun crime 
hot spots. While these interventions have produced crime 
control gains and have added to law enforcement's array 
of crime prevention tools, problem-oriented police should 
focus their efforts on those characteristics that cause a 


place to be a gun crime hot spot.40 Officers can reduce gun 
crime by changing the features, facilities, and management 
of problem places. For example, if problem analysis 
reveals that easy access to common areas in front of a 
high school causes youth gun crimes to be clustered there 
immediately upon school release, police should experiment 
with ways to limit access to these areas during problem 
times. The practice of problem-oriented policing is still 
developing, and additional research is needed on different 
approaches to controlling gun violence hot spots. 

General Requirements for a Place-Oriented Enforcement 
Strategy 

12. Enlisting community support. Some observers 
question the fairness and intrusiveness of aggressive law 
enforcement approaches and caution that street searches, 
especially of young minority males, look like police 
harassment.41 However, the results of the Kansas City and 
Indianapolis projects suggest that residents of 
communities suffering from high rates of gun violence 
welcome intensive police efforts against it. They strongly 
supported the intensive patrols and perceived an 
improvement in the quality of life in the targeted 
neighborhoods. Thus, the patrols apparently did not 
increase community tensions. The studies did not, 
however, assess the views of people stopped by police 
patrolling the hot spots. The police managers involved in 
these projects secured community support before and 
during the interventions through a series of meetings with 
community members. Effective police management 
(leadership, supervision, and maintenance of positive 
relationships with the community) seems to be the crucial 
factor in securing community support for aggressive, but 
respectful, policing. 



13. Training officers in appropriate search-and-seizure 
techniques. In general, the gun hot-spot patrol teams 
initiated citizen contacts through traffic stops and "stop 
and talk" with people on foot. They used these contacts as 
an opportunity to solicit information and investigate 
suspicious activities associated with illegally carrying and 
using guns. When warranted for officer safety reasons 
(usually after people acted suspiciously), police conducted 
"Terry" pat-downs for weapons; these searches sometimes 
escalated to more thorough checks when police had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and arrests were 
made. Officers participating in these programs must be 
trained in appropriate search-and-seizure techniques so 
that they conduct only legally warranted searches and 
seizures. In addition, police supervisors should stress to 
their officers that they need to treat citizens with respect 
and explain the reasons for stops. 

 In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 US 1, 
the Supreme Court upheld police 
officers' right to conduct brief 
threshold inquiries of suspicious 
persons when they have reason to 
believe that such persons may be 
armed and dangerous to the police 
and others. In practice, this threshold 
inquiry typically involves a safety 
frisk of the suspicious person. 

 Beyond the landmark Terry 
decision, there are many court 
decisions that govern search-and-
seizure techniques. For example, in 
Houghton v. Wyoming (1999) 526 US 
295, the Supreme Court upheld 
police officers' right to search the 
belongings of the passengers of the 
car, incident to the arrest of any of 
the vehicle occupants. You should 
consult legal counsel regarding the 
application of search and seizure law 
in your jurisdiction. 

Key Elements of a Place-Oriented Enforcement Strategy 

14. Increasing gun seizures. The Kansas City Gun 
Project focused on testing the hypothesis that gun seizures 
and gun crimes would be inversely related. In other words, 
an increase in the number of guns seized in a targeted 
location would be associated with a decrease in gun crimes 
there. The evaluation revealed that proactive patrols 
focused on firearm recoveries resulted in a 65 percent 
increase in gun seizures and a 49 percent decrease in gun 
crimes in the target beat area.42 The authors concluded that 
removing guns from high-risk places at high-risk times 
caused the crime prevention gains. 


15. Increasing contacts with potential gun offenders. 
The Indianapolis program tested the effects of two 
different types of directed patrol strategies on gun crime. 
In the north district, police focused on suspicious 
activities by particular people at high-risk locations. In the 
east district, police increased vehicle stops in the targeted 
area. During the intervention period, the number of 
firearms seized in the east district increased by 50 percent, 
while the north district experienced a modest 8 percent 
increase. The evaluation revealed that there were 
significant decreases in gun homicide, aggravated assault 
with a gun, armed robbery, and other gun crime in the 
north district. The east district had no significant changes 
in gun crime. In this study, the authors suggested that 
simply increasing gun seizures in a specific area does not 
seem to be enough to cause crime prevention gains. 
Rather, in Indianapolis, the effectiveness of this approach 
seems to depend on the ability of police to increase their 
visibility and contact with likely gun offenders within very 
small areas.43 

Responses With Limited Effectiveness 

16. Suppressing gangs without providing programs 
and services to address the social conditions that 
contribute to gang affiliation. The typical law 
enforcement suppression approach assumes that most 
street gangs are criminal associations that must be attacked 
through an efficient gang identification, tracking, and 
targeted enforcement strategy. The basic premise of this 
approach is that improved data collection systems and 
information coordination across different criminal justice 
agencies lead to more efficiency and to more gang 


members' being removed from the streets, quickly 
prosecuted, and given longer prison sentences.45 Typical 
suppression approaches have included street sweeps in 
which police officers round up hundreds of suspected 
gang members; special gang probation and parole 
measures that subject gang members to heightened 
surveillance levels and more stringent revocation rules; 
prosecution programs that target gang leaders and serious 
gang offenders; civil procedures that use gang membership 
to define arrest for conspiracy or unlawful associations; 
and school-based law enforcement programs that use 
surveillance and buy-bust operations.46 Unfortunately, 
gangs and gang problems usually remain in the wake of 
these intensive operations. Police agencies generally cannot 
"eliminate" all gangs in a gang-troubled jurisdiction, nor 
can they powerfully respond to all gang offending in such 
jurisdictions.47 Pledges to do so, though common, are 
simply not credible to gang members. Gang suppression 
programs' emphasis on selective enforcement may increase 
the cohesiveness of gang memberswho often perceive 
such enforcement as unwarranted harassmentrather than 
cause them to withdraw from gang activity. Thus, 
suppression programs may have the perverse effect of 
strengthening gang solidarity.48 

Focused law enforcement is an important part of a 
comprehensive gang violence prevention strategy. Clearly, 
violent gang members need to be arrested and prosecuted 
for their crimes. However, these suppression approaches 
work best when based on a thorough understanding of the 
nature of gangs and gang violence problems in local 
jurisdictions and blended with social intervention, 
opportunity provision, and community mobilization 


activities.49 Boston's Operation Ceasefire and the 
integrated approaches suggested by the U.S. Department 
of Justice's Strategic Approaches to Community Safety 
Initiative50 provide practical examples of gang suppression 
programs integrated within this broader framework. 

17. Implementing gun buyback programs. Gun 
buyback programs seek to reduce gun violence by reducing 
gun ownership. They typically offer money, goods, or 
services in exchange for firearms, and they usually offer 
amnesty and anonymity to those who exchange them. 
While police may check whether a returned gun was used 
in a crime, they do not use their findings to pursue the 
person who returned it. Unfortunately, evaluations have 
shown that gun buyback programs have no observable 
effect on either gun crime or gun-related injury rates.51 
They do not directly target guns that are highly likely to be 
used in violence,52 and the characteristics of the guns 
collected reveal little overlap between crime guns and 
buyback guns.53 While gun buyback programs are not 
effective in reducing serious gun crime, police departments 
should not be discouraged from launching problem-
oriented attacks on the illegal sources of guns for 
criminals.54 A thorough discussion of the prospects of 
disrupting illegal gun markets is beyond the scope of this 
guide. However, police departments interested in 
addressing the illegal supply of guns to criminals should 
consult the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives website, at www.atf.gov, and the Justice 
Department's Project Safe Neighborhoods website, at 
www.psn.gov. 


Appendix 

Appendix: Summary of Responses to 
Gun Violence Among Serious Young 
Offenders 

The table below summarizes the responses to gun violence 
among serious young offenders, the mechanism by which 
they are intended to work, the conditions under which 
they ought to work best, and some factors you should 
consider before implementing a particular response. It is 
critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, 
and that you can justify each response based on reliable 
analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve 
implementing several different responses. Law 
enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in 
reducing or solving the problem. 

Response No. 
Page No. 
Response How It Works Works Best If 
Considerations 
Offender-Oriented Responses 
General Requirements for a "Pulling Levers" Focused Deterrence Strategy 

1. 19 Enlistingcommunity 
support 
Helpscommunitymembers to view 
policeenforcement 
actions as 
legitimate 
police inform 
the communitythat gun violenceis concentrated 
among groups of 
serious 
offenders, and 
that they willfocus their efforts 
on them 
Indiscriminate, 
highly aggressive 
law enforcement 
can undermine 
community 
support 

2. 20 Convening aninteragency 
working group 
Combines the 
resources of 
multiple agencies 
to address the 
problem 
groupmembers' 
agencies 
coordinate their 
efforts 
The group shouldinclude members 
from all relevant 
local, state, and 
federal criminal 
justice agencies; 
social services 
personnel shouldbe included to 
offer offenders 
positive 
alternatives to 
their behavior 


Response No. 
Page No. 
Response How It Works Works Best If 
Considerations 

3. 21 Placingresponsibility onthe working 
group 
Holds the groupaccountable for 
strategy 
development andimplementation 
the group isexplicitly charged 
with preventing 
incidents 
This requires thatthe groupmembers have a 
proactive, rather 
than reactive, 
mindset 

4. 22 Involving 
researchers 
Provides the 
working groupwith thoroughand reliable data 
researchers 
provide both 
background and 
strategicallypracticalinformation, and 
evaluate 
performance 
Researchers' 
findings may behelpful to otherjurisdictions 

5. 22 Developing aneffective 
communication 
strategy 
Warns potentialoffenders about 
the 
consequences ofcommitting guncrimes 
the message is 
direct and 
explicit,
conveying clearcause and effect 
Nonviolent gangs 
and groups shouldbe informed of 
what is happeningto violent ones, 
and why;
probation andparole officers canrequire thoseunder their 
supervision to 
attend forums, 
and social service 
providers and 
communitymembers may beable to persuadegang members todo so 
Key Elements ofa "Pulling Levers" Focused Deterrence Strategy 

6. 25 Targetingintervention 
Ensures that 
enforcement is 
focused on 
chronic 
offenders 
police candifferentiate 
between 
formerly and 
currently active 
offenders 
Police must avoid 
indiscriminatelyselecting gangs, 
groups, or 
individuals for 
intervention 


37 

Response No. 
Page No. 
Response How It Works Works Best If 
Considerations 

7. 25 Sending theinitial message 
Lets violent 
gangs and 
groups know 
that they areunder close 
policeimmediatelyincrease their 
presence andactivities in areas 
Social service 
providers and 
communitymembers should 
let would-be 
scrutiny frequented by 
the gangs and 
groups 
offenders know 
they support the 
police, and offer 
help to those who 
want it 

8. 25 Pulling allavailable 
enforcement 
levers 
Provides a 
variety of 
opportunities for 
criminal justiceintervention 
interventions 
are tailored to 
the targeted 
offenders' 
behaviors 
Intervention 
should be harsh 
only to the extent 
necessary to stop 
gun crime 
9. 26 Continuing 
communication 
Reinforces the 
anti-gun violence 
message 
police make it 
clear to violent 
gangs and 
groups that theyare focusing onthem because of 
their 
involvement in 
Police agencies 
should be creative 
in communicatingwith offenders 
(e.g., byconducting forums 
with them) 
gun crime 
10. 26 Providing social 
services and 
opportunities 
Diverts 
offenders from a 
violent lifestyle 
consequencesfor continued 
involvement in 
gun violence aresevere enough tocompel offendersto seek positive 
alternatives 
A variety ofoptions should beavailable, such as 
substance abuse 
counseling, jobskills training, etc. 


Response No. 
Page No. 
Response How It Works Works Best If 
Considerations 
Disarming Young Gun Offenders 

11. 26 Searching forand seizingjuveniles' guns 
Reduces the 
opportunities for 
gun violence byeliminating the 
means 
the affected 
community 
supports the 
initiative; 
parents/
guardians trust 
police and 
prosecutors tokeep their word 
about criminal 
This is promising,
but it has not yetproved effective in 
reducing gunviolence 
prosecution, andgive signed 
consent to 
searches; and 
police basetargeting onreliable 
intelligence 
about juveniles' 
gun involvement 
Place-Oriented ResponsesGeneral Requirements for a 
Place-Oriented Enforcement Strategy 

12. 29 Enlistingcommunity 
support 
Helpscommunitymembers to view 
policeenforcement 
actions as 
legitimate 
police 
managers meet 
with communitymembers both 
before and 
duringinterventions, 
and demonstrate 
effective 
leadership andsupervision 
Communities with 
high rates of gunviolence tend to 
support police 
intervention 

13. 30 Training officersin appropriatesearch-and-
seizure 
techniques 
Ensures that 
officers conduct 
only legally 
warranted 
searches and 
seizures 
officers treat 
those they stopwith respect, andexplain thereasons for stops 
Street searches of 
young maleminorities may be 
viewed as policeharassment 


39 

Response No. 
Page No. 
Response How It Works Works Best If 
Considerations 
Key Elements ofa Place-Oriented Enforcement Strategy 

14. 30 Increasing gunseizures 
Reduces the 
opportunities for 
gun violence byeliminating the 
means 
police focuson high-riskplaces at high-
risk times 
Research has 
shown that, in 
some cases, 
increases in gunseizures in targeted 
areas have resulted 
in decreases in guncrime there 

15. 31 Increasingcontacts with 
potential gunoffenders 
Subjects would-
be offenders to 
increased policescrutiny 
police increasetheir visibilityand contact with 
likely offenderswithin very small 
Both traffic stopsand "stop and talk"
contacts may be 
effective 
areas 
Responses With Limited Effectiveness 

16. 31 Suppressinggangs without 
providing 
programs and 
services to 
address the 
social conditions 
that contribute 
to gangaffiliation 
Reduces gunviolence byidentifying,
tracking, and 
aggressivelyenforcing laws 
against known 
violent gangmembers 
when based on 
a thoroughunderstanding ofthe nature of 
gangs and gang 
violence 
problems in localjurisdictions andblended with 
social 
intervention, 
opportunity 
provision, and 
communitymobilization 
activities 
Gangs and gangproblems usuallyremain in the wake 
of these intensive 
operations;
suppression 
programs may 
have the perverse 
effect of 
strengthening gang 
solidarity; gangs donot consider policethreats to eliminate 
them credible; 
social intervention 
and prevention 
efforts are 
necessarycomplements tosuppression efforts 

17. 33 Implementinggun buyback 
programs 
Reduces the 
availability ofguns that may beused in violent 
This has not 
proved effective in 
reducing gunviolence-it fails to 
crimes byreducing theoverall number 
focus on the gunsmost likely to beused in violent 
of guns in the 
community 
crimes 


41 

Endnotes 

1 Cook and Ludwig (2000). 

2 Fox (1996). 

3 Cook and Laub (1998). 

4 Cook and Laub (2002). 

5 Fox and Zawitz (2002). 

6 Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996a); Cohen and Tita (1999); Rosenfeld, Bray, 
and Egley (1999); Blumstein and Cork (1996). 

7 Braga (2003); Sherman (2001). 

8 Moore and Tonry (1998). 

9 Eck (2000); Felson and Clarke (1998). 

10 Kennedy and Braga (1998). 

11 Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996a). 

12 Klein (1995). 

13 Braga, Kennedy, and Tita (2002). 

14 Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996a). 

15 Kennedy and Braga (1998). 

16 Tita, Riley, and Greenwood (2003). 

17 Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl (1997). 

18 Braga, Kennedy, and Tita (2002). 

19 Howell and Decker (1999); Block and Block (1993). 

20 Rich and Stone (1996). 

21 Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996a). 

22 Block and Block (1993). 

23 Tita, Riley, and Greenwood (2003). 

24 Sherman and Rogan (1995). 

25 Curry, Ball, and Fox (1994). 

26 Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl (1997). 

27 White et al. (2003). 

28 White et al. (2003). 

29 Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl (2001); Braga, Kennedy, Piehl, and Waring 
(2001). 

30 McGarrell and Chermak (2003). 

31 Braga, Kennedy, and Tita (2002). 

32 Raphael and Ludwig (2003). 


33 Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl (2001). 

34 Kennedy (1997); Kennedy (1998). 

35 Rosenfeld and Decker (1996). 

36 Rosenfeld and Decker (1996). 

37 Sherman and Rogan (1995). 

38 McGarrell et al. (2001). 

39 Cohen and Ludwig (2003). 

40 See, for example, Braga et al. (1999). 

41 Moore (1980); Kleck (1991). 

42 Sherman and Rogan (1995). 

43 McGarrell et al. (2001). 

44 Raphael and Ludwig (2003). 

45 Spergel (1995). 

46 Klein (1993). 

47 Klein (1993). 

48 Klein (1993). 

49 Spergel and Curry (1993). 

50 Coleman, et al. (1999). 

51 Callahan, Rivara, and Koepsell (1994); Reuter and Mouzos (2003). 

52 Sherman (2001). 

53 Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga (1996b). 

54 Braga, Cook, Kennedy, and Moore (2002); U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (2000). 


References 

Block, R., and C. Block (1993). Street Gang Crime in Chicago. 
Research in Brief. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Justice, National Institute of Justice. 

Blumstein, A., and D. Cork (1996). "Linking Gun 
Availability to Youth Gun Violence." Law and 
Contemporary Problems 59(1):524. 

Braga, A. (2003). "Serious Youth Gun Offenders and the 
Epidemic of Youth Violence in Boston." Journal of 
Quantitative Criminology 19(1):3354. 

Braga, A., P. Cook, D. Kennedy, and M. Moore (2002). 
"The Illegal Supply of Firearms." In M. Tonry (ed.), 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 29. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 

Braga, A., D. Kennedy, A. Piehl, and E. Waring (2001). 
"Measuring the Impact of Operation 
Ceasefire." In Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun 
Project's Operation Ceasefire. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. 

Braga, A., D. Kennedy, and G. Tita (2002). "New 
Approaches to the Strategic Prevention of 
Gang and Group-Involved Violence." In C. Huff (ed.), 
Gangs in America. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications. 

Braga, A., D. Kennedy, E. Waring, and A. Piehl (2001). 
"Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth 
Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation 
Ceasefire." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 
38(3):195225. 


Braga, A., D. Weisburd, E. Waring, L. Green Mazerolle, 
and F. Gajewski (1999). "Problem-Oriented Policing in 
Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled 
Experiment." Criminology 37(3):541580. 

Callahan, C., F. Rivara, and T. Koepsell (1994). "Money for 
Guns: Evaluation of the Seattle Gun Buyback 
Program." Public Health Reports 109:472477. 

Cohen, J., and J. Ludwig (2003). "Policing Crime Guns." In 

J. Ludwig and P. Cook (eds.), Evaluating Gun Policy. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 

Cohen, J., and G. Tita (1999). "Diffusion in Homicide: 
Exploring a General Method for Detecting Spatial 
Diffusion Processes." Journal of Quantitative Criminology 
15(4):451-494. 

Coleman, V., W. Holton, K. Olson, S. Robinson, and J. 
Stewart (1999). "Using Knowledge and Teamwork to 
Reduce Crime." National Institute of Justice Journal 
October: 1623. 

Cook, P., and J. Laub (2002). "After the Epidemic: Recent 
Trends in Youth Violence in the United States." In M. 
Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 

29. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

(1998). "The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth 
Violence." In M. Tonry and M. Moore (eds.), Crime 
and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 24. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 

Cook, P., and J. Ludwig (2000). Gun Violence: The Real Costs. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 


Appendix 

Corbett, R. (2002). "Reinventing Probation and Reducing 
Youth Violence." In G. Katzmann (ed.), Securing Our 
Children's Future. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 

Curry, G., R. Ball, and R. Fox (1994). Gang Crime and Law 
Enforcement Record-Keeping. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. 

Eck, J. (2000). Problem-Oriented Policing and Its Problems: The 
Means-Over-Ends Syndrome Strikes Back and the Return of 
the Problem-Solver. Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati. 

Felson, M., and R. Clarke (1998). Opportunity Makes the 
Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention. Crime 
Prevention and Detection Series, Paper 98. London: 
Home Office. 

Fox, J. (1996). Trends in Juvenile Violence: A Report to the 
United States Attorney General on Current and Future Rates 
of Juvenile Offending. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. 

Fox, J., and M. Zawitz (2002). Homicide Trends in the United 
States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 

Howell, J., and S. Decker (1999). The Gangs, Drugs, and 
Violence Connection. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention. 

Kennedy, D. (1998). "Pulling Levers: Getting Deterrence 
Right." National Institute of Justice Journal (July):28. 


(1997). "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-
Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention." 
Valparaiso University Law Review 31:449484. 

Kennedy, D., and A. Braga (1998). "Homicide in 
Minneapolis: Research for Problem-Solving." 
Homicide Studies 2(3):263290. 

Kennedy, D., A. Braga, and A. Piehl (2001). "Developing 
and Implementing Operation Ceasefire." In Reducing 
Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 
National Institute of Justice. 

(1997). "The (Un)Known Universe: Mapping 
Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston." In D. Weisburd 
and J. McEwen (eds.), Crime Mapping and Crime 
Prevention. New York: Criminal Justice Press. 

Kennedy, D., A. Piehl, and A. Braga (1996a). "Youth 
Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth 
Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy." Law and 
Contemporary Problems 59(1):147196. 

(1996b). "Gun Buybacks: Where Do We Stand and 
Where Do We Go?" In M. Plotkin (ed.), Under Fire: 
Gun Buybacks, Exchanges, and Amnesty Programs. 
Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. 

Kleck, G. (1991). Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America. 
New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 

Klein, M. (1995). The American Street Gang: Its Nature, 
Prevalence, and Control. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 


Appendix 

(1993). "Attempting Gang Control by Suppression:
The Misuse of Deterrence Principles." Studies on Crime
and Crime Prevention 2:88111.

McGarrell, E., and S. Chermak (2003). "Strategic 
Approaches to Reducing Firearms Violence: Final 
Report on the Indianapolis Violence Reduction 
Partnership." Submitted to the U.S. Department of 
Justice, National Institute of Justice. East Lansing, 
Mich.: Michigan State University, School of Criminal 
Justice. 

McGarrell, E., S. Chermak, A. Weiss, and J. Wilson (2001). 
"Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police 
Patrol." Criminology & Public Policy 1:119148. 

Moore, M. (1980). "The Police and Weapons Offenses." 

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 

Science 455:92109. 

Moore, M., and M. Tonry (1998). "Youth Violence in 
America." In M. Tonry and M. Moore (eds.), Crime and 
Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 24. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 

Raphael, S., and J. Ludwig (2003). "Do Prison Sentence 
Enhancements Reduce Gun Crime? The Case of 
Project Exile." In J. Ludwig and P. Cook (eds.), 
Evaluating Gun Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 

Reuter, P., and J. Mouzos (2003). "Australia: A Massive 
Buyback of Low-Risk Guns." In J. Ludwig and P. 
Cook (eds.), Evaluating Gun Policy. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press. 


Rich, J., and D. Stone (1996). "The Experience of Violent 
Injury for Young African-American Men: The 
Meaning of Being a 'Sucker'." Journal of General Internal 
Medicine 11:7782. 

Rosenfeld, R., T. Bray, and A. Egley (1999). "Facilitating 
Violence: A Comparison of Gang-Motivated, Gang-
Affiliated, and Nongang Youth Homicides." Journal of 
Quantitative Criminology 15(4):495516. 

Rosenfeld, R., and S. Decker (1996). "Consent to Search 
and Seize: Evaluating an Innovative Youth Firearms 
Suppression Program." Law and Contemporary Problems 
59(1):197220. 

Sherman, L. (2001). "Reducing Gun Violence: What 
Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising." Criminal 
Justice 1:1125. 

Sherman, L., and D. Rogan (1995). "Effects of Gun 
Seizures on Gun Violence: 'Hot Spots' Patrol in 
Kansas City." Justice Quarterly 12(4):673694. 

Spergel, I. (1995). The Youth Gang Problem: A Community 
Approach. New York: Oxford University Press. 

Spergel, I., and G.D. Curry (1993). "The National Youth 
Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process." 
In A. Goldstein & C.R. Huff (eds.), Gang Intervention 
Handbook. Champaign-Urbana, Ill.: Research Press. 


Appendix 

Tita, G., K. Riley, and P. Greenwood (2003). "From 
Boston to Boyle Heights: The Process and Prospects 
of a 'Pulling Levers' Strategy in a Los Angeles Barrio." 
In S. Decker (ed.), Policing Gangs and Youth Violence. 
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 

U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (2000). Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal 
Laws Against Firearms Traffickers. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives. 

White, M., J. Fyfe, S. Campbell, and J. Goldkamp (2003). 
"The Police Role in Preventing Homicide: Considering 
the Impact of Problem-Oriented Policing on the 
Prevalence of Murder." Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 40(2): 194225. 

Winship, C. and J. Berrien (1999). "Boston Cops and Black 
Churches." The Public Interest, Summer: 5268. 


About the Author 

Anthony A. Braga is Senior Research Associate in the 
Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of the 
Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy at Harvard 
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. His 
research focuses on working with criminal justice agencies to 
develop crime prevention strategies to deal with urban 
problems such as firearms violence, street-level drug markets, 
and violent crime hot spots. He has served as a consultant on 
these issues to the Rand Corporation; National Academy of 
Sciences; U.S. Department of Justice; U.S. Department of the 
Treasury; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Boston 
Police Department; New York Police Department; and other 
state and local law enforcement agencies. Dr. Braga was a key 
member of the Boston Gun Project / Operation Ceasefire 
working group that was responsible for reducing youth 
homicide in Boston by almost two-thirds during the late 
1990s. The Operation Ceasefire program has received 
numerous prestigious awards including the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police Webber-Seavey Award for 
quality in law enforcement, the Police Executive Research 
Forum Herman Goldstein Award recognizing excellence in 
problem-oriented policing, and the Ford Foundation 
Innovations in American Government Award. Dr. Braga has 
also been involved in a number of other strategic crime 
prevention programs such as the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms Youth Crime Gun Interdiction 
Initiative and the U.S. Department of Justice-sponsored 
Strategic Alternatives to Community Safety Initiative and 
Project Safe Neighborhoods. He received his M.P.A. from 
Harvard University and his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from 
Rutgers University. 


Recommended Readings 

 
A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 
Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 
guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 
to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 
public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 
provides guidance on whether and how to conduct cost-
effective surveys. 
 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An 
Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, by 
John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide is 
a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. It 
provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 
problem-oriented policing efforts. 
 
Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 
accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 
pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 
document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs. 
 
Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 
volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 
opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 
initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems. 


 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 1999 
Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This document 
produced by the National Institute of Justice in 
collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 
provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 
annual award program that recognizes exemplary problem-
oriented responses to various community problems. A 
similar publication is available for the award winners from 
subsequent years. The documents are also available at 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.
 
Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 
Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 
Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 
describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or 
ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 
England and Wales. 
 
Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for 
Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 
Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 
1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 
theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have 
practical implications for the police in their efforts to 
prevent crime. 
 
Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 
Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 
analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 
can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 
policing practices. 


Recommended Readings 

 
Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 
(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 
Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 
policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 
how a police agency can implement the concept. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime 
Prevention, by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice 
Press, 2003). Provides a through review of significant 
policing research about problem places, high-activity 
offenders, and repeat victims, with a focus on the 
applicability of those findings to problem-oriented 
policing. Explains how police departments can facilitate 
problem-oriented policing by improving crime analysis, 
measuring performance, and securing productive 
partnerships. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 
First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 
Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 
developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 
future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 
is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
 
Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 
Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 
(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 
rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 
problem-solving process, and provides examples of 
effective problem-solving in one agency. 


 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime 
and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 1998) (also available at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief introduction to 
problem-solving, basic information on the SARA model 
and detailed suggestions about the problem-solving process. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 
Studies, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 
methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 
20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives. 
 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson 
and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 
at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 
police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 
problems. 
 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 
police to analyzing problems within the context of 
problem-oriented policing. 
 
Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 
Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 
LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 
many of the basics of research as it applies to police 
management and problem-solving. 


Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides series: 

1. 
Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-00-2 
2. 
Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-01-0 
3. 
Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-02-9 
4. 
Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 
Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7 
5. 
False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5 
6. 
Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-05-3 
7. 
Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1 
8. 
Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-07-X 
9. 
Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8 
10. 
Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 
Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6 
11. 
Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X 
12. 
Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8 
13. 
Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6 
14. 
Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4 
15. 
Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-14-2 
16. 
Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-15-0 
17. 
Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-16-9 
18. 
Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 
2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7 
19. 
Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-18-5 


20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly. 

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3 

21. 
Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 
ISBN: 1-932582-27-4 
22. 
Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-30-4 
23. 
Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 
Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2 

Response Guides series: 

 The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns. 

Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X 

Problem-Solving Tools series: 

 Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for 
Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-19-3 

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police (2004) 

Problem-Specific Guides 
Crimes Against Tourists 
Disorder at Budget Motels 
Domestic Violence 
Mentally Ill Persons 
Prescription Fraud 
Robbery of Taxi Drivers 
Student Party Disturbances on College Campuses 

Response Guides 
Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime 

Problem-Solving Tools 
Repeat Victimization 
Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem-Solving 


Future Guide Topics (2004) 

Identity Theft 
School Break-Ins 
Street Racing 
Bomb Threats in Schools 
Underage Drinking 
Open-Air Drug Markets 
Sexual Activity in Public Places 
Drunk Driving 
Cruising 
Bank Robbery 

Other Related COPS Office Publications 

 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement. Timothy S. Bynum. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 
20 Years. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and 
Michael S. Scott. 2000. 
 
Community Policing, Community Justice, and 
Restorative Justice: Exploring the Links for the 
Delivery of a Balanced Approach to Public Safety. 

Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999. 

 
Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and 
Advancing Community Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl. 
2000. 
 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 
Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships. Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. 1998. 
 
Bringing Victims into Community Policing. The 
National Center for Victims of Crime and the Police 
Foundation. 2002. 


 
Call Management and Community Policing. Tom 
McEwen, Deborah Spence, Russell Wolff, Julie Wartell 
and Barbara Webster. 2003. 
 
Crime Analysis in America. Timothy C. OShea and 
Keith Nicholls. 2003. 
 
Problem Analysis in Policing. Rachel Boba. 2003. 
 
Reducing Theft at Construction Sites: Lessons 
From a Problem-Oriented Project. Ronald V. Clarke 
and Herman Goldstein. 2003. 
 
The COPS Collaboration Toolkit: How to Build, 
Fix, and Sustain Productive Partnerships. Gwen O. 
Briscoe, Anna T. Laszlo and Tammy A. Rinehart. 
2001. 
 
The Law Enforcement Tech Guide: How to plan, 
purchase and manage technology (successfully!). 

Kelly J. Harris and William H. Romesburg. 2002. 

 Theft From Cars in Center City Parking 
Facilities - A Case Study. Ronald V. Clarke and 
Herman Goldstein. 2003. 

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 
Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call 
the Department of Justice Response Center at 800.421.6770 
or visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 


FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Community Oriented Policing Services 

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20530 

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the 

U.S. Department of Justice Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below. 
e01042199 Updated Date: March 29, 2004 
ISBN: 1-932582-31-2 

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