Title: The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization, and
Research Agenda
Series: Research Report
Author: David H. Bayley and Clifford D. Shearing
Published: July 2001
Subject: Law Enforcement: police planning and management; other issues
in criminal justice: international statistics and issues
60 pages
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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice

The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization, and
Research Agenda

David H. Bayley and Clifford D. Shearing

research report

---------------------------

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531

John Ashcroft
Attorney General

Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov

National Institute of Justice
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

---------------------------

The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization, and
Research Agenda

David H. Bayley and Clifford D. Shearing

July 2001
NCJ 187083

---------------------------

National Institute of Justice

Eric Jefferis
Program Monitor

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice,
under award number 98-IJ-CX-0017 to David Bayley, State University of
New York at Albany, and Clifford Shearing, University of Toronto. Points
of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

---------------------------

Acknowledgments

The research for this report was made possible by the National Institute of
Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, under grant number 98-IJ-CX-0017.
We are grateful for NIJ's support and encouragement throughout this
project. 

We were assisted by three diligent and hardworking research assistants at
the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto: Michael Kempa, Ryan
Carrier, and Janesse Leung. We are also grateful to Rita Donelan, Centre
of Criminology, and Arlene deGonzague, Hindelang Criminal Justice
Research Center, State University of New York at Albany, for their
painstaking efforts in administering this research program.

---------------------------

Contents

Acknowledgments
Executive Summary
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Auspices
Chapter 3: Providers
Chapter 4: Mentalities
Chapter 5: Explanations
Chapter 6: The Role of Government
Chapter 7: Research Agenda
Chapter 8: Conclusion
Bibliography

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Executive Summary

Accepting evidence from many sources that policing is undergoing a
historic restructuring, this report describes the forms this restructuring is
taking, the reasons for it, and the issues that it raises for governance,
especially with respect to the issues of justice, equality of protection, and
quality of service. We believe that the current restructuring is worldwide,
although information for the report is drawn more extensively from
democratic countries, both developed and developing. The report does not
undertake original research but, rather, explores how the topic should be
studied. The report concludes with a discussion of the topics that most
urgently need to be studied if contemporary developments in policing are
to be understood and made responsive to public policy. 

The major findings of the study are:

1. Policing is being reconstructed worldwide. Its distinguishing features
are (a) the separation of those who authorize policing from those who do it
and (b) the transference of both functions away from government.

2. The change in policing cannot be understood in customary terms. It is
often mischaracterized, for example, as "privatization." Because the
distinction between public and private domains becomes problematic in
the new policing, the more appropriate description for what is occurring is
"multilateralization."

3. To understand what is happening to policing, it is essential to
distinguish the way in which policing is authorized from the way in which
it is provided. In other words, those who authorize policing may differ
from those who provide it. 

4. Policing is authorized currently under five auspices: economic interests,
both legal and illegal; residential communities; cultural communities;
individuals; and governments. 

5. Policing is provided by commercial companies, nongovernmental
authorizers of policing, individuals, and governments. 

6. Many nongovernmental providers now perform the same tasks as the
public police. 

7. Although public and private providers perform the same tasks, they
employ distinctive practices. Specifically, governmental providers tend to
prevent crime through punishing; nongovernmental providers do so
through exclusion and the regulation of access. 

8. In response to the restructuring of policing, the role of the public police
may be changing significantly. In particular, its agenda is becoming
increasingly that of government rather than individuals; it is specializing
in criminal investigation and undercover surveillance; its operations are
undertaken in groups; and it is increasingly militarized in equipment and
outlook.

9. The explanations for the current restructuring of policing involve
shortcomings of the public police; increases in crime; the nature of
economic systems; the character of government; and the social structure,
ideas, and culture. The most popular explanations fall under the first three
categories.

10. These explanations are largely hypotheses. Very little empirical
research has been done to test or confirm them.

11. It is important for governments to continue to safeguard justice, equity,
and quality of service in the current restructuring of policing. 

12. To safeguard the public interest in policing, governments must develop
the capacity to regulate, audit, and facilitate the restructuring of policing.

13. Research on the structure of policing has been fragmentary and
uneven. The extent and character of the changes in the structure of
policing, their impact on society, the role and responsibilities of
government, and the causes of the changes must be studied. 

14. Policing is being restructured through the development of new
auspices and providers within nations and by the transference of police
functions to transnational and international agencies. In other words,
policing is being challenged by forces inside and outside contemporary
nation-states.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Policing is being transformed and restructured in the modern world. This
involves much more than reforming the institution regarded as the police,
although that is occurring as well. The key to the transformation is that
policing, meaning the activity of making societies safe, is no longer
carried out exclusively by governments. Indeed, it is an open question as
to whether governments are even the primary providers. Gradually, almost
imperceptibly, policing has been "multilateralized": a host of
nongovernmental groups have assumed responsibility for their own
protection, and a host of nongovernmental agencies have undertaken to
provide security services. Policing has entered a new era, an era
characterized by a transformation in the governance of security.

Although a number of studies have attempted to document in particular
countries the rise of what is loosely referred to as "private security," the
extent of the transformation of policing has yet to be determined (Johnston
1999, 1994, 1992; Shearing and Stenning 1981, 1980; Nalla and Newman
1991; Cunningham and Taylor 1985). We believe, however, that the
following statements about the current restructuring are true and amply
justify our effort to understand what is happening: 

1. In most countries, certainly in the democratic world, private police
outnumber public police. 

2. In these same countries, people spend more time in their daily lives in
places where visible crime prevention and control are provided by
nongovernmental groups rather than by governmental police agencies. 

3. The reconstruction of policing is occurring worldwide despite
differences in wealth and economic systems. 

Viewed historically, what is happening to policing is not unprecedented. It
could be argued that the monopolization of policing by government is an
aberration. It is only in the last 100 to 200 years that policing has been
effectively monopolized by government, and even that was not uniform
across countries (Spitzer and Scull 1977b; Shearing and Stenning 1981;
Blair 1998). In Europe, for example, France led the way in the systematic
nationalization of policing in the 17th century (Bayley 1975).
Nationalization followed fitfully throughout the rest of continental Europe,
concentrated largely in towns and often deferring to the private authority
of the landowning aristocracy. Prussia permitted the landowning Junker
aristocracy to police their large estates up to the unification of Germany in
1871. Russia, too, allowed policing to be shared between government and
the landed gentry until the early 20th century. In England, policing
remained largely in private hands until well into the 19th century. In the
United States, where policing was gradually governmentalized by cities in
the middle of the 19th century, private policing never really died (Walker
1977; Monkkonen 1981). The constituent States did not begin to develop
organized police forces until the early 20th century, and the national
government did not do so until a decade or so later (Smith 1925).

Is the current restructuring of policing, then, simply a return to the past,
another cycle in the historical ebb and flow of policing power between
governmental and nongovernmental agencies? Yes and no. Clearly
governments have shared, even conceded, the power of policing to
nongovernmental groups before (Bayley 1985a). Sometimes security has
been so precarious that government could scarcely be said to exist at all in
many parts of the world. At the same time, the restructuring that is taking
place today is taking a different form than in the past because
contemporary societies are organized differently than previous ones.
Indeed, the concepts and terminology inherited from the past are
inadequate for understanding what is happening today. For policymakers
to comprehend, and possibly deal effectively with, the current
transformation in policing, it will be necessary to examine contemporary
developments with a fresh intellectual eye. 

Our knowledge of what is occurring is based largely on studies from
democratic countries. These, after all, are where information about
policing can be most freely obtained. The character of government, then,
affects what is known about policing and, as we shall discuss, probably the
extent of restructuring as well. Although we believe the restructuring is
worldwide, it remains for new research to document its extent across the
globe. We do know that the change in policing is occurring across the
divide of economic development, with developing democracies
participating along with developed ones.

When the term "policing" is used in this report, it does not refer to all the
means by which human beings provide safety for themselves--policing is
not synonymous with social control. Societies create order, and hopefully
thereby safety, through processes of socialization and informal discipline.
Everyone plays a role in these processes--parents, siblings, peers, friends,
acquaintances, colleagues, and a host of authority figures. This report will
not reinvent social control theory. Its focus is on intentional attempts to
regulate the distribution of physical security produced by actual or
potential use of force.[1] The report deals with the governance of security
in the modern world. Emphasis is placed on physical security because that
is what people want foremost from police, despite the fact that technology
has produced new forms of insecurity in relation to information, nonreal
property, and cyberprocesses.

The purpose of this report is threefold:

1. To review systematically what is known about the contemporary
restructuring of policing. 

2. To reflect about the meaning and significance of what is occurring and
to develop concepts and terminology that do justice to the phenomenon. 

3. To specify a prioritized research agenda for understanding the
restructuring of policing and for supporting the development of policy to
deal with it. 

This report is derivative--that is, based on what others have found and
documented. Our contribution is in outlining what is known, suggesting
what needs to be found, and showing how these matters should be thought
about. This is not the last word on the restructuring of policing. It is an
invitation to others to join in studying one of the most momentous but, so
far, understudied topics of our time. 

The report covers four topics. The first and longest part describes the new
forms that policing has taken in the late 20th century (chapters 2, 3, and 4).
In so doing, a crucial distinction is made between the auspices and the
providers of policing. Auspices are groups (and sometimes individuals)
that explicitly and self-consciously take upon themselves the responsibility
for organizing their own protection (chapter 2). Providers are the groups
that actually do the policing asked for (chapter 3). Sometimes auspices and
providers coincide. A defining characteristic of the new paradigm of
policing, however, is that auspices and providers may not be the same. In
the old paradigm, governments had responsibility for articulating security
needs and for developing institutions to meet them. 

Distinguishing between auspices and providers allows an escape from the
oversimplification of describing policing as being either public or private.
Auspices may be either public (governmental) or private
(nongovernmental); so, too, may providers. Furthermore, they may be
combined in four ways--public/public, public/private, private/public, and 
private/private. The current restructuring of policing involves more, then,
than privatization. It involves the multilateralization of the sources of both
demand and supply of policing. As will be shown, distinguishing public
from private auspices conceptually is not easy. 

To describe what is happening today, it is important to determine whether
there are characteristic differences in the practices of the new policing. Do
these new combinations of auspices and providers carry out policing in
new and different ways compared with the governmental, or public,
police? We refer to these as "the mentalities of policing" because they
reflect different practices in the way in which security is provided (chapter
4). 

The second major topic of this report is a discussion of the reasons that
have produced the current restructuring of policing (chapter 5). Here, all
the explanations for the current restructuring that have been suggested by
observers, scholars, and practitioners are reviewed. 

In order to review what is happening to policing and why, a team of
librarians and research assistants searched for all the written material that
might conceivably touch on contemporary policing and domestic security.
The review was limited to materials written in English. From this
voluminous and diverse writing, the team compiled lists of all auspices,
providers, mentalities, and explanations that were mentioned. 

Chapter 6 raises a third topic; namely, the role that government is playing
and should be playing in the formation of the new policing paradigm.
Relatively little has been written about this because the extent of the
transformation has not been recognized by either intellectuals or
policymakers. Reality has outrun efforts to understand what is happening
or to shape it to appropriate civic ends. 

Finally, building upon what was found to be known about the restructuring
of policing and the problems of governance that are thereby generated, a
research agenda reflecting we believe to be the most important topics
requiring study is presented (chapter 7). Ways to go about this research
also are suggested. 

In a short conclusion (chapter 8), we reflect upon the meaning of what is
occurring and the prospects for policing in the future. 

Note

1. People familiar with writing about the police will recognize that this is
not a complete definition of the police. It is an approximation, indicating
what people commonly expect of the police. For a discussion of the
concept of "police" and one attempt at a definition that can be applied
comparatively both historically and geographically, see Bayley's Patterns
of Policing (1985a).

---------------------------

Chapter 2

Auspices

Until recently, governments assumed primary responsibility for providing
security. "Providing" has a double meaning: Governments determined
what sort of security was needed and provided the means to achieve it.
Governments were the organizational auspices for formulating demand for
policing, and they were the providers who supplied it. In the current
restructuring of policing, these two functions have become separate.
Furthermore, it has become acceptable for groups other than governments
both to take control of their own policing and to select the providers of it.
In short, the responsibility for authorizing policing and for providing it
instrumentally has been multilateralized and denationalized. 

This restructuring of policing is often referred to as "privatization." This is
an oversimplification, at the heart of which is a significant conceptual
problem. The function of policing--providing security through physical
constraint--is a quintessential function of government. Many theorists have
followed Max Weber's lead in defining states, which have been the most
inclusive and powerful level of government in history, in terms of the
possession of a "monopoly of force" (Weber 1968). In this formulation,
government is recognized in part by the control of policing. This implies
that the capacity to authorize policing indicates the existence of
government. It would follow, then, that policing can never be privatized.
But this defies our common understanding. 

The contemporary restructuring of policing separates both the
authorization of security and the activity of policing from what is
recognized as formal government. In so doing, the distinction between
"public" and "private" itself becomes problematic. This confusion also
afflicts judgments about the public/private character of policing before the
rise of states (Bayley 1985a). The problem becomes even more acute
today when the auspices and providers of policing become mixed in terms
of being public or private, as shall be seen. For these reasons, it is more
accurate to characterize what is happening as multilateralization in the
governance of security rather than the privatization of policing.

In this chapter, we will examine the sorts of people, for the most part
groups, that undertake to authorize policing. They are called the auspices
of security, as opposed to the providers of security, who actually do the
work of policing. This review shows that control of policing today is
exercised under five auspices: (1) economic interests, (2) residential
communities, (3) cultural communities, (4) individuals, and (5)
governments. Each category contains a variety of auspices (see table 1).

Economic Interests

The most familiar subset of economic interests consists of businesses,
which may act individually or cooperatively to organize security.
Businesses create their own in-house security forces or hire others to
police for them (Shearing and Stenning 1981; Johnston 1992). They also
band together to protect themselves on the basis of both geography and
function. In the United States, the best example of the former are business
improvement districts (BIDs), which tax members to support police
patrols, trash collection, or physical improvements to the environment
(New York Times 1994; Greene, Seamon, and Levy 1995; Murphy 1997).
In New York City, BIDs have been established for Times Square, Grand
Central Terminal, Bryant Park, 34th Street midtown, and other areas.
Businesses that provide a common service, such as banks, bars, and taxi
companies, also collaborate to enhance mutual security. These functional
economic interests are less likely than geographically based ones to hire
and share police. Instead, they work cooperatively to minimize threats to
their common enterprise by warning one another about potential threats,
sharing ideas about improving security, and supporting one another in time
of need. 

Unfortunately, the economic interests active in constructing security are
not always legal. In many parts of the world, criminal enterprises, such as
crime syndicates and juvenile gangs, play a significant role in organizing
security. They do so in their own interests, of course, and usually in direct
opposition to government. But in so doing they govern security for the
people among whom they live, becoming in some places the only effective
police that exist. Such illegal but parallel security regimes that create order
benefiting others exist and have existed in Mafia-dominated
neighborhoods in New York City, the favellas of Latin America, the
barrios of Los Angeles, and the major cities of Russia (Leeds 1996;
Shlapentokh 1995). Violent revolutionary groups, as well, often try to
establish parallel governments in the geographical areas they dominate,
serving both as the local police and the military. 

Governments may be complicit in these parallel but illegal security
activities. The public police sometimes turn a blind eye to the illegal
activities of crime groups in exchange for information that helps them
solve crimes, especially if those crimes threaten the government. The
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), for example, depended upon warnings
by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) about impending bombings to protect
the general population. The RUC, in turn, allowed the IRA to become the
effective police for several Catholic "no-go" areas of Belfast (Hillyard
1993). In some areas, the IRA established "Provo Police Stations" to
address community problems as well as to document abuses by the RUC.
Similarly, Japan's organized crime--the Yakuza--performs the useful
function of enlisting and disciplining unemployed and potentially
delinquent young men ("chimpera") who would otherwise gravitate toward
predatory crime. Although the Japanese police periodically crack down
against the Yakuza, there seems to be an informal understanding that the
rigor of enforcement will be influenced by the Yakuza's adherence to
certain rules, specifically whether they victimize the public directly
(Bayley 1991; Szymkowak and Steinhoff 1995). Violence among the
Yakuza themselves is tolerable, provided it is kept out of public view;
violence against the public is not. As a final example, the conduct of the
so-called "good Donos" (drug lords) of Brazil is often tacitly tolerated by
the public police because they help to maintain order (Leeds 1996).
Tolerance runs out, however, when drug-trade violence is turned on the
public. 

Furthermore, corrupt governments may actively foster parallel but illegal
security activities. In Russia, for instance, members of the government
have been observed to provide and solicit illegitimate krysha (roofs) of
security for themselves and favored members of the private sector
(Shlapentokh 1995). 

The general point is that criminal enterprises may be "cut some slack" by
governments provided they contribute to public safety in ways the public
police cannot. They may even be actively courted by corrupt state agencies
in service to their own interests.

Residential Communities

Residential communities exist in many forms. First, gated communities
may be created where policing is constructed either by realty companies or
by the homeowners themselves operating as a cooperative. Our impression
is that the former is more common in private housing estates (horizontal
gated communities), and the latter is more common in condominium
apartments (vertical gated communities). In gated communities, policing
involves regulating access, surveillance, and patrolling. Gated
communities are especially popular in the United States, where they have
been the fastest growing segment of the housing market (Egan 1995;
Kennedy 1995; Blakely and Snyder 1997; Garreau 1991; Jones and
Newburn 1999; Owens 1997). 

It is worth noting that creating gates for communities does not happen
exclusively under private auspices. When the public police barricade
streets to create cul-de-sacs that impede driveby criminal activity, as in
Houston and Los Angeles in the 1980s, they are creating gated
communities, and often for the poor (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy
1990).

Second, residents of neighborhoods may agree to pay a small per capita
fee to support private security services. This happened recently in parts of
Glasgow, Scotland, London, England, and Melbourne, Australia. Such a
practice demonstrates again the problem with describing security auspices
as being either public or private. The financial levies agreed to could be
regarded as a form of local government or as nongovernmental self-help.
In cases like these, cooperative activity looks very much like self-
government.

Third, residential neighborhoods may form ad hoc advisory councils to
mobilize in-kind community resources that address security needs
(Blakely and Snyder 1997; Baron 1998). Residents may undertake to
watch one another's houses, alert police to suspicious strangers, patrol the
streets at certain times of the day, improve dangerous physical conditions,
mediate neighborhood disputes, and organize restorative justice
conferences (Braithwaite 1989; Bayley 1994; Shearing 1995). Rachel
Neild, writing about Latin America, calls this the "informalization" of
security (1997). In the United States, the Federal Government has given
some communities grants to support the security plans they have
developed (Sheppard 1998). Similar initiatives have been undertaken in
South Africa and Ireland (Shearing 1997; Independent Commission on
Policing for Northern Ireland 1999).

In traditional societies, whole villages may organize to take responsibility
for security, supplementing what is regarded as inadequate protection by
the public police. As in developed settings, it is difficult to know whether
such activity should be regarded as public or private. In India, for
example, the government passed legislation authorizing villages to create
"village defense forces" and paying some of their costs. In Tanzania the
government sponsored vigilante groups ("sungusungu") to protect cattle
from rustlers. In addition, various nongovernmental groups have
sponsored local security initiatives facilitated by microlending and
technology transfer (Cassani 1995; Conger 1997). Should these be
regarded as devolution to private auspices or decentralization to local
government auspices? On the other hand, if villages take advantage of
opportunities within the law to organize their own self-defense, even
though not explicitly authorized to do so, is this local government or
private policing? We submit that this sort of argument can be avoided
altogether by not using the "public/private" terminology when describing
the current restructuring of policing, except where such application is
unambiguous.

The concept of centralization/decentralization also becomes difficult to
apply in this context. The new paradigm of policing represents more than
decentralization within existing governmental institutions. Governments
are not just devolving power on subordinate levels of government--they
are accepting new bases of legitimate government. And they are doing
more than acquiescing; sometimes they are actively promoting the sharing
of responsibility for policing with new institutions, as shall be seen. 

Cultural Communities

Cultural communities may be ascriptive groups where membership is a
matter of inheritance or voluntary associations that people join by choice.
In either case, groups with which people identify because of shared
cultural beliefs and practices occasionally serve as auspices for the
construction of policing (Stenson 1999; Stenson and Factor 1994). In the
United States, for example, the Nation of Islam, often called the Black
Muslims, has organized a group of young men known as the Fruit of Islam
to protect members and their businesses. The Rashtriya Swayamsezak
Sangh (RSS) in India is a militant band primarily consisting of young men
whose avowed purpose is the physical defense of Hindus.

Individuals

Individuals have always been auspices of policing in the sense that they
worry about security, think about ways to minimize risk, and act to
enhance their personal safety. Self-defense is accepted everywhere as a
human right, although it may be regulated by the state. Today people in
many countries go to elaborate lengths to protect themselves--residing in
protected communities, living in houses designed for security, avoiding
dangerous areas, attending self-defense classes, buying security
equipment, and joining crime-prevention organizations. Most important
for this analysis, they also hire their own human protectors. It stands to
reason that private guards are most often hired by people of wealth,
although relatively poor people engaged in unpopular or criminal
enterprises hire bodyguards as well. Our impression is that individual self-
defense, especially the hiring of private guards, is much more common in
less developed countries, where the homes of well-to-do individuals are
frequently surrounded by high walls topped with broken glass or barbed
wire. In Latin America, for example, wealthy individuals have hired
private police to protect themselves and their families from an epidemic of
kidnaping (Heine 1994). Owing to the turbulence of political life,
politicians in less developed countries frequently employ private guards
who are sometimes used offensively against their opponents as well as
defensively. This is also true in Russia (Shlapentokh 1995). 

The State

During the past century, governments have been both the primary auspices
and the primary providers of policing. Paradoxically, they have also, in
their role as authorizers of policing, contributed substantially to the current
multilateralization of policing, the very phenomenon that is undermining
their monopoly. In recent years, governments have facilitated, encouraged,
and required nongovernmental groups to become both auspices for
authorizing policing and providers of it. They have done so in two ways--
by creating permissive environments and by actively encouraging nonstate
police activity. 

Passive encouragement has come primarily through the creation of legal
space into which nonstate auspices could expand (Hauber et al. 1996). In
the United States, for example, businesses have defensively protected
themselves against damaging civil suits by improving the physical security
of their employees or customers (Benson 1998). The law also allows
owners of businesses to regulate the access of people who violate rules of
dress and behavior. This legal environment, coupled with the expansion of
so-called mass private property--premises privately owned but open to the
public--has made possible, even necessary, a new territorial division of
labor between public and private police (Shearing and Stenning 1981).
Finally, by requiring providers of certain public services to be insured,
government has created a set of security monitors who can create financial
incentives for businesses to improve their security performance. 

Governments may even enable people to share the coercive power of the
police. They do this when they permit private persons to be armed in their
own defense, as in the United States. Ironically, this not only undermines
their monopoly on the use of force but also encourages the notion that
public policing is inadequate. 

But governments have not simply acquiesced in allowing
nongovernmental groups and individuals to authorize. They have actively
encouraged them in several ways. 

First, governments have sponsored the growth of private policing. The
best example is the community policing movement of the 1980s and 1990s
(Skogan and Hartnett 1997; Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 1988; Greene and
Mastrofski 1988; Goldstein 1990; Trojanowicz n.d.; Trojanowicz and
Bucqueroux 1990; Stenson 1999; Stenson and Factor 1994; Crawford
1995; Crawford and Jones 1995; Sheppard 1998). Acting on the insight
that crime cannot be prevented or solved without the active assistance of
the public, police departments have mobilized neighborhoods in their own
defense (Bayley 1994). Members of the public collectively consider
security needs, advise the police about problems requiring attention, give
information to the police about suspicious persons, patrol neighborhoods
on foot and in cars, fix up the physical environment, mediate disputes and
quarrels, install security devices, force businesses that cause disorder to
move, and pressure fellow residents to adhere to community norms of
propriety. In the language of the day, community policing seeks to
"empower" neighborhoods to share responsibility for policing with the
state (Crawford 1995; Crawford and Jones 1995; Sheppard 1998).

Some local governments have directly sponsored commercial private
policing. For example, several municipalities in Montreal hired private
police to augment the patrols of the metropolitan police. By 1998, within
the jurisdictions of 18 of Britain's 43 police forces, local governments had
hired private security patrols (Blair 1998). 

Private security companies working for the state should be distinguished
from low-cost quasi-police agents who work side by side with the public
police. In the Netherlands, for example, most towns now have "City
Guards" (Stadswacht) to patrol high-use public areas. Similar agents
known as Sicherheitswachen have emerged in Germany, where they
perform surveillance functions, including stopping people on the street and
requesting identity cards (Nogalla and Sack 1998; Lacey and Zedner 1998)
In Britain, several towns have hired long-term unemployed people as
"City Stewards" or "social caretakers" to patrol public housing estates
(Blair 1998). All of these "policing" agents receive minimal training and
pay. Their chief function is to be visible and to alert the public police to
real or potential dangers. 

Second, governments have enacted regulations requiring private persons to
act in ways that enhance public safety. For example, they require banks to
transport cash in approved ways, hospitals to report suspected child abuse,
airlines to inspect hand baggage, gun owners to register, people in
sensitive occupations to submit to background checks, sporting events to
be covered by private guards, construction companies to manage traffic
around building sites, and ethnic groups to follow stipulated rules for
parades and fairs (Grabosky 1995). 

Third, governments have delegated activities previously carried out by the
public police to private contractors. Police in many countries have
outsourced their housing and transport of prisoners, street patrolling,
guarding of public buildings, investigation of traffic accidents, electronic
monitoring of parolees, provision of security advice to businesses, and
conduct of crime-prevention workshops for at-risk populations (Johnston
1994). James Q. Wilson suggested 30 years ago that because most calls to
the police for assistance involved noncriminal matters, governments could
save a great deal of money by turning this responsibility over to private
firms (1968). Farfetched at the time, a great deal of public policing has
since become "commodified" in just the way Wilson suggested (Wood
1999; Spitzer and Scull 1977a). According to Peter Manning, the largest
employer of private security in the United States is the Federal
Government (Forst and Manning forthcoming).

Fourth, governments invite firms to collaborate with them in improving
public policing. In Durban, South Africa, the public police share a
communication channel and computer with a private security company.
The private firm often responds first to criminal emergencies, preserving
the scene until the public police arrive. In the United States, Australia, and
Canada, private businesses have been solicited to purchase equipment such
as automobiles for the police and to provide offices, telephones, and
furniture for neighborhood police posts.

In this discussion of the role governments have played in facilitating
multilateralization, we are not suggesting that governments have been the
prime movers. For the most part, they have been playing "catchup." The
government's monopoly on policing has been eroded because it has not
provided the sort of effective consumer-responsive security that private
auspices and suppliers have proved to be capable of giving.

Conclusion

The United States is often criticized by those in other countries for having
an ungovernable police system composed of more than 17,000 separate
police forces. Indeed, Bruce Smith, a famous authority on the American
police, said that the United States did not have a police system at all
(1949). This radically decentralized system produces for Americans many
of the benefits achieved elsewhere through community policing because it
represents restructuring on the basis of neighborhoods. Americans
properly describe their system as decentralized because it occurs within a
constitutional, established system of government. But when the same
functions are authorized by unincorporated neighborhoods or residential
communities that are no larger than the jurisdictions of many local
governments, they are seen as being private. The point is that when it
comes to policing, what is governmental or not governmental, public or
private, depends more on legal status than on the nature of the activity
undertaken or the size of the entity undertaking it.

---------------------------

Chapter 3

Providers

Security companies such as Burns, Wackenhut, and Pinkerton represent
what most people think of when they hear the phrase "private policing."
But large commercial security companies are only the tip of the iceberg of
restructuring. They provide policing, but they do not authorize it. And they
are only one sort of nonstate provider among several. In our survey, we
found four major groups of policing providers in the late 20th century
world: (1) commercial security companies, (2) nongovernmental auspices
acting as their own providers, (3) individuals, and (4) governments (see
table 2). Governments are included, paradoxically, because they contribute
police services through the market to nonstate policing auspices.

Commercial Security Companies

The archetypical private security company is one that provides uniformed
security personnel to guard and patrol. They are particularly visible in
malls, banks, large stores, and sports stadiums--places that are privately
owned but to which the public has access. They also protect private
housing and businesses that are not open to the general public, such as
gated communities and factories. But commercial companies provide
many other sorts of security personnel as well, such as inquiry agents,
personal bodyguards, security consultants, control room operators for
closed-circuit TV and police communications, manufacturers and sellers
of security equipment, installers and repairers of security equipment, and
trainers in personal protection (Prenzler and Sarre 1998). All these
functionally varied companies offer themselves through the market, filling
gaps in policing that governments cannot or will not fill. 

Nongovernmental Auspices

Private groups as well as individuals may take security into their own
hands, as we have seen, supplementing or supplanting the protection
provided by governments. They may decide to provide protection
themselves, becoming providers, or to hire commercial firms. Many large
businesses, for example, create their own in-house police forces. So, too,
do developers of some large housing estates. Guards for apartment
buildings and condominiums may be employees of outside firms or of the
housing complex itself. Neighborhoods provide policing to themselves
when residents join the Neighborhood Watch or serve in foot patrols or
mobile patrols (Johnston 1992). 

The Guardian Angels in the United States are an interesting hybrid of the
inside/outside provision of policing. Composed primarily of young men
from minority communities, they provide visible patrol to selected
neighborhoods and businesses that request their services. They are
outsiders in service to local auspices, sometimes working as volunteers,
sometimes working for a fee. 

By protecting themselves, criminal organizations sometimes protect others
as well, as in the favellas of Rio, the barrios of Colombia, the bustees of
India, and the immigrant neighborhoods of American cities. In these cases,
private auspices operating in their own illegal interest create a public good.

Individuals

Individuals become providers of policing when they undertake protective
actions on others' behalf, for example, as volunteers in neighborhood street
patrols, Special Constables in Britain, police cadets and reserves in the
United States, and Police Explorer Scouts. Individuals also take self-
protecting defensive actions, such as purchasing firearms or taking martial
arts classes. Because we have defined policing as a collective action for
collective benefit, self-defense activities do not qualify individuals as
providers of policing. Individuals may be both the auspices and the
providers of policing, not necessarily at the same time. 

Governments

One of the most curious developments of modern policing is the public
police acting as private suppliers of protection. The assumption behind
government policing is that it is available to everyone equally on the basis
of citizenship. Increasingly, however, the public police are offering their
services through the marketplace for profit. This takes two forms. 

First, some governments allow individual officers to work off duty for
private interests in their official uniforms as visible police. In the United
States this represents the expansion of an older practice of allowing police
officers to "moonlight" as completely private persons for private security
companies (Reiss 1988; Bayley 1994). For American police officers, the
opportunity to work two jobs is a prized benefit of police employment. 

Moonlighting may be highly organized. Some American police
departments sign contracts with private interests to provide uniformed off-
duty police. In Honduras, too, in the late 1980s, the Public Security Force
(FUSEP) contracted with businesses to provide security guards (Kincaid
and Gamarra 1995). 

Second, many police forces, especially in North America, now charge for
services they previously provided free of charge, such as responding to
burglar alarms and regulating traffic around construction sites. They do so
on the argument that because these efforts disproportionately benefit a
commercial interest, the general public should not bear the cost. The same
is true for policing rock concerts, sporting events, and special interest
parades. 

In this way the profit motive has begun to affect the allocation of public
policing. Private interests have tried to do this in less obvious ways for
many years. For example, fast-food restaurants and convenience stores,
especially if they operate around the clock, sometimes provide food to
police free of charge or at concessional rates to encourage their patronage
and, hence, protection. More overtly, businesses may offer in-kind
support, such as equipment or buildings, to the police in exchange for
increased coverage. The Alliance for Downtown New York, for example,
recently offered the police department $5 million to set up a new police
substation on Washington Street if it would assign 40 police officers to
patrol the area south of Chambers Street (New York Times 1998). Such
practices have been an integral part of some community policing
programs, as police departments have required local communities to
provide office space, furniture, and equipment in order to obtain a
neighborhood (storefront) police station.

In all these examples, public policing is no longer being treated as a public
good, available equally to all and paid for by general tax revenues. It has
become a publicly created service that can be sold as a commodity through
markets. 

None of this should be confused with the civilianization of police, where
tasks formerly carried out by sworn officers are performed by civilian
employees. Civilians, who make up 30 percent of police employees in
Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States, now direct traffic,
investigate accidents, collect physical evidence, and organize crime
prevention activities. Nonsworn people sometimes work in policelike
roles, often in uniforms that are very similar to those of sworn officers. 

Without close scrutiny, it has become difficult to tell whether policing is
being done by a government using sworn personnel, by a government
using a private security company, by a private security company using
civilian employees, by a private company using public police, or by a
government employing civilians. Even carrying firearms does not always
distinguish public from nonpublic providers (Forst and Manning
forthcoming). Interestingly, a politician in Australia recommended
recently that the private security guards already deployed by government
on trains should be armed so that they would not be regarded as "Keystone
Cops" (Walker 1999). Guns, he thought, were "an absolute . . . necessity to
cope with the job." 

Today, a distinction between public and private policing is increasingly
meaningless. The world has come a long way since the Hallcrest Report
(Cunningham and Taylor 1985) documented the size of the private
security industry. Both public and private entities have assumed
responsibility for authorizing policing; both public and private entities
provide policing to these auspices. Even government's role is no longer
exclusively public. It authorizes policing, encourages nongovernmental
groups to authorize policing, and provides policing to specialized
consumers on a fee-for-service basis. Similarly, private providers are not
exclusively private, since they sometimes work under public auspices and
are sometimes staffed by public police personnel. 

Policing today is not just being "privatized." It is being restructured
though the development of new groups as both instigators and providers of
policing. The public and the private are being combined in new ways,
ways that sometimes make it difficult to separate public from private.
Multilateralization, although an awkward term, is a more accurate way of
describing what is happening to policing in the late 20th century than
privatization.

---------------------------

Chapter 4

Mentalities

The restructuring of policing under way in the world today involves more
than changes in the types of people who are involved in it. The character
of policing--meaning its practices and activities--is also changing. We call
these elements the "mentalities" of policing because how policing is
conducted reflects distinctive ways of thinking about it. 

It is important to distinguish the tasks that police undertake from the
mentalities they adopt. While different auspices may require different sorts
of services from their providers, the functions may be performed
differently by different providers. The extent to which this is so is an
important topic for future research. This research will be complicated
because auspices and providers may independently influence the way in
which similar tasks are performed. Furthermore, because state and
nonstate auspices and providers may be combined in different ways, the
relations between auspices/providers, on the one hand, and the mentalities
of policing, on the other hand, may be very complex. 

With respect to the functions of policing, we agree with Les Johnston that
nonstate providers of security now perform all the tasks once reserved to
the public police (Johnston 1992). They patrol, guard, investigate, respond
to emergencies, monitor, collect intelligence, work undercover, constrain,
ameliorate crime-producing conditions, advise about crime prevention,
and control disorder. The tasks of policing are increasingly being shared
between public and private providers. 

Historically the two core tasks of public policing have been patrolling and
criminal investigation (Bayley 1994). Although investigation has long
been a specialty of commercial security companies as well as in-house
security agencies, patrolling has not been until recently. Today the
employed and consuming public are as likely to see private security
personnel guarding and patrolling in the course of a day as they are to see
public police. In addition to providing a visible presence, private police
necessarily respond to emergencies and, when crimes occur, preserve
evidence and hold suspects until the public police arrive.

In Britain, street patrolling is being performed today by the public police,
private security privately employed, private security employed by
municipalities, unsworn but uniformed personnel hired by municipalities,
constabularies with jurisdiction in particular places such as parks or
housing estates, and community volunteers (Bayley 1994; Johnston 1994).
In many places, these varied forces work side by side, sharing offices,
radio frequencies, information, and plans. 

Private providers have one major advantage over the public police with
respect to the tasks they perform--they can pick and choose. The public
police, on the other hand, must provide the full range of police services, an
obligation they find increasingly burdensome and have begun to take steps
to reduce. 

The insight that private policing exhibits a different mentality from that of
public policing was formulated originally by Clifford Shearing and Philip
Stenning and has since been elaborated on by others (Shearing and
Stenning 1980; Farnell and Shearing 1977; Shearing, Farnell, and
Stenning 1980; Prenzler and Sarre 1998; Forst and Manning forthcoming).
The consensus is that private policing is more concerned with preventing
than punishing crime. Rather than deterring crime through the threat of
detection, arrest, and punishment, private policing tries to regulate
behavior and circumstances to diminish the possibility that crime will
occur. In so doing, it focuses less on people who are behaving
unreasonably and more on reasonable people who will comply with crime-
and disorder-reducing directives. By emphasizing the responsibilities of
all, private security tries to create an environment of discipline and order
that limits opportunities for crime, reassures law-abiding people, and
constrains the deviant few. 

The mentality of private policing is similar to that of self-help by
individuals: conciliatory rather than penal, emphasizing desistance rather
than punishment, concerned with outcomes more than rules, and speedy
rather than measured (Black and Baumgartner 1980).

The metaphor for private policing's distinctive mentality is gates. Private
security regulates entry, limits participation, and excludes on the basis of
presumptive signs of bad behavior--membership (residence, employment);
dress (T-shirts, bare feet); and behavior (obscene language, skateboards,
boom boxes). It can do what the public police have recently come under
strong attack for doing--it can profile. It can take premonitory action on
the basis of social criteria that do not have to be justified in terms of law.
Unlike the public police, private police are not hampered in their
regulatory actions by probable cause. 

The restructuring of policing results in the substitution of banishment for
incarceration. Governments can banish only by incarcerating, and that can
be done only on the basis of behavior adjudicated to be illegal. Private
agents can banish by regulation based on presumptive signs of deviancy
and disorder.

Private security is primarily concerned with governing the future: its
objective is to prevent crime. Public policing is concerned with governing
both the future and the past: preventing crime and rendering justice with
respect to past crimes. Its favored strategy is deterrence based on
punishment because punishment promises both to prevent crime and to
exact a cost for misdeeds already done. This explains why the mentality of
punishment is so popular with the public as well. It is an all-purpose
solution to two important concerns. Restructuring has occurred today in
part because groups within the state, notably businesses, realized that they
would be better protected if they uncoupled security from justice, which
the public police cannot do. The new auspices and providers of security
are more interested in reducing losses than in validating legal norms.
Consequently, they also rely less on deterrence and more on premonitory
prevention. It may also be true that when private police are called upon to
do justice, they act in a less punishment-oriented way. Shearing, Stenning,
and Braithwaite have all argued that private policing is more likely than
public policing to act according to principles of restorative justice
(Shearing and Stenning 1980; Braithwaite 1989). 

We are arguing that changing the governance of security can affect the
way in which justice is done. The converse may also be true: the way in
which justice is done can affect the achievement of security (Bayley
1999). Restorative justice conferences seek to produce undertakings
among all parties that reduce the chances of reoffending. In the search for
justice locally understood and accepted, the conferences also engage in
policing. The lesson is that security and justice are intimately, linked but
not exclusively through punishment. 

Dichotomizing the mentalities of public and private providers of policing
is, of course, too simplistic. We are not saying that all nongovernmental
providers of policing exhibit one mentality and all governmental providers
another. Our analysis is heuristic, describing the poles of a continuum
along which the mentalities of policing can be arrayed. Private providers
of policing are not always "warm and fuzzy" but can behave punitively,
illegally, and brutally. Conversely, governments are learning to
incorporate some of the mentalities of private policing. In the past 20
years, public police agencies throughout the world have consulted with
communities about security needs, adapted their tactics to local
circumstances, encouraged neighborhoods to work cooperatively with
them, and proactively changed conditions that breed danger, violence, and
disorder (Bayley 1994; Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Similarly, they have
used the civil law to pressure landlords and other guardians of private
space to control access, evict disruptive persons, improve physical
conditions, and monitor behavior. Called third-party policing, these
practices conform to a compliance model of policing similar to what
private police do (Buerger and Mazerolle 1998; Reiss 1987).

The public police have also begun to adopt a familiar technological tactic
of private police: they are using closed-circuit television to monitor
behavior in public places. Electronic patrolling has moved from banks,
stores, and hotel lobbies to streets, parks, and transportation hubs.
Television cameras now monitor traffic flow and can detect individual
violators of traffic regulations. By the mid-1990s in Britain, 550 closed-
circuit television surveillance programs, involving more than 5,000
cameras, had been approved by the Home Office (Blair 1998). 

It is worth remarking that the mentalities associated with private policing
may have been operating in one sector of government policing for many
years; namely, the policing of military personnel. Military police operate
in a controlled environment with a population subject to a host of
disciplinary sanctions not available to the public police. The study of
military policing, long neglected, may provide valuable insights into the
conditions required to institutionalize the mentalities of private policing in
public policing. 

Finally, public and private policing may be moving toward a division of
labor where the public police increasingly specialize in investigations and
counterforce operations while private police become decentralized, full-
service providers of visible crime prevention. There are signs in Europe
and America that this is occurring. For all the heartening signs that public
police are adopting community-oriented crime prevention strategies, there
are counterindications that they are focusing more on threats to society at
large, such as drugs and terrorism, than on crimes directed toward
individuals; that law enforcement is the tool of choice; that proactive
undercover operations are gaining in importance; and that military
equipment and tactics are being used more often (Kraska 1996; Kraska
and Cubellis 1997). Private policing, by contrast, specializes in risk
reduction, focuses on ordinary crime and disorder, stresses visibility and
availability, seeks compliance rather than punishment, and eschews
confrontational tactics. If this division of labor were to become structured
by class, as is likely, with public policing for the poor and private policing
for the rich, the consequences for social justice, equality before the law,
and political stability would be serious (Bayley and Shearing 1996). 

Whether we are right or wrong about this trend, the point to underscore is
that the connections between who authorizes policing, who provides it,
and how it is done need to be studied. Not only may they not be
independent of one another, but their distribution socially has enormous
political implications for the future.

---------------------------

Chapter 5

Explanations

After a prolonged period in which nation-states gradually monopolized
policing, why have groups outside the state undertaken to develop it on
their own now? The research literature on policing and the evolution of
government offers many suggestions and some agreement on a few major
factors. We will describe these hypotheses and then offer some comments
of our own. 

Hypotheses 

The explanations suggested can be grouped into seven major categories:
government performance, crime, economics, political character, social
relations, ideas, and culture. These are discussed in declining order of
importance as reflected in the literature reviewed.

Government Performance

The failure of government to provide adequate police protection is the
reason most commonly cited for today's restructuring of policing
(Sklansky 1999; Johnston 1992, 1999). This explanation seems intuitively
correct but not very informative, because it would be irrational for people
to concertedly construct new forms of policing unless the existing system
was perceived to be inadequate. More helpfully, five hypotheses have been
suggested about the particular ways in which the actions of government
have led to policing's reconstruction. 

1. Faith in the public criminal justice system has declined because it is
perceived to be unable to punish criminals successfully because of a
growing number of procedural rules (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990; Lunney
1989). Consequently, people doubt that it can be an effective deterrent to
crime (Packer 1968). This has increased the attractiveness of more locally
focused prevention systems based on regulation, where informal constraint
is more important than formal law (Reiss 1984). The ability of the police
to intervene in community life through premonitory regulation has also
been diminished in many countries by the decriminalization of public-
order offenses, such as loitering, panhandling, drinking in public, and
lewdness. 

2. Governments have become much more cost conscious due to declining
revenue and are therefore more willing than in the past to share
responsibility for crime control and other functions with private auspices
(Shearing and Stenning 1980). For example, local governments in Britain
and the Netherlands have tried to reduce the cost of policing by creating
city watches and guards (Blair 1998). The Chief Constable of West
Yorkshire even proposed in 1994 to create his own security force of
Special Constables that would compete with private security companies.
In Australia, a committee on workforce reform in New South Wales
suggested that the police hire "Career Constables" on short-term contracts
at low rates of pay and minimal training to perform general patrolling and
emergency response (Anonymous 1998).

Governments around the world have reduced the functions their police are
expected to perform (load shedding). In Britain, for example, there have
been several major reviews of police responsibilities during the last
decade, all recommending a reduction (Home Office 1995; Sheehy
Committee 1993; Cassels Committee 1996). The Home Office Review of
Police Core and Ancillary Tasks (1995) recommended giving up 26
functions.

Cost-consciousness also accounts for the rapid pace of civilianization over
the past few years and for the hiring of private contractors (out-sourcing)
to perform tasks that were previously police functions, such as prisoner
transport and radio dispatch. 

3. The development of the professional police model in the 20th century
narrowed the focus of public policing, disconnected it from communities,
and weakened its ability to reduce risk and prevent crime (Kelling and
Moore 1988; Kelling and Coles 1996; Goldstein 1990). Order
maintenance gave way to crimefighting, meaning preoccupation with the
investigation and punishment of criminals; deterrence replaced informal
regulation (Kelling and Moore 1988; Monkkonen 1981). The separation
between police and their communities was further intensified by the
professionalization of social services, notably social work, psychological
counseling, and family mediation. Police officers no longer are engaged in
community-based crime prevention; they became specialists in law
enforcement. The movement to remake public policing through
community policing in the past 20 years explicitly recognizes these defects
in public policing. 

4. The public police are increasingly perceived to be corrupt, brutal, and
unreliable, especially in less developed countries. People would rather take
security into their own hands than trust discredited government police.
This perception has grown in part as a result of the "democratization" of
previously repressive governments that followed the collapse of the
Communist bloc. Stories about official misconduct that were once
suppressed are now more freely publicized. 

5. Businesses, especially in North America, have felt a growing need to
decrease the financial risk of being sued for failing to adequately protect
their employees or customers. Concerned about legal liability, they created
police forces that would focus exclusively on reducing risk to themselves
(Sklansky 1999).

Crime

Crime has risen sharply in the past 40 years and with it the public's fear of
crime (Prenzler and Sarre 1998). This fear has been magnified by what are
perceived to be new criminal threats in some countries, such as kidnaping
of businessmen and their families in Latin America and international
terrorism in the United States. The world is in a "moral panic" about crime
(Johnston 1992; Caldeira 1996). This moral panic may be part of the
constellation of forces that are leading to the very police restructuring that
it is helping to bring about.

First, with the growth of market capitalism around the world, the media
have become increasingly commercialized and free of governmental
control. Knowing that crime sells, worldwide media conglomerates
exaggerate the threat of crime by highlighting the most sensational crimes
wherever they occur (Chermak 1995). 

Second, increasing competition in the policing market leads all providers,
public and private, to exaggerate the danger from criminal activity. In this
way the restructuring of policing becomes self-reinforcing after a certain
threshold has been reached. 

Third, the more people are mobilized to protect themselves, the greater
their fear. Protective activity, such as installing burglar and car alarms,
heightens rather than allays fear. In effect, supplying protection increases
the demand for it (Loader 1997a). 

For all these reasons, the public's expectations about what constitutes
reasonable security have risen. But people are also convinced that risk can
be reduced. They believe what providers tell them--crime can be
controlled, if only policing is done right, which means by
nongovernmental agencies. 

Economics

Three hypotheses have been put forward under this heading.

Commercialized policing. Policing has become increasingly
"commodified," a service to be bought and sold, due to the expansion of
free-enterprise economic systems internationally (Sklansky 1999; Kaplan
1998; Johnston 1999). It should be noted that this hypothesis applies to
only one sector of the restructuring phenomenon; namely, commercial,
for-profit policing. Moreover, it is not clear why the existence of markets
creates the commercialization of policing specifically. To be sure, without
markets there would be no commodification. But policing has not always
been as commodified as it currently is, even in market economies. 

Mass private property. A particular form of property, namely, "mass
private property," that has expanded in the past half-century requires a
different sort of policing (Shearing and Stenning 1981). When private
entrepreneurs expand facilities to which the public has access, such as
shopping malls, large retail stores, cinemas, and sports complexes, the
responsibility of owners to provide security grows, especially in an
environment of legal liability. In this setting it is more important for
policing to manage risk than to assign blame. 

Drawing on the work of Spitzer and Scull, Shearing and Stenning have
generated a larger principle: Nongovernmental policing expands
regardless of the nature of the economic system as the size of landholdings
in private hands increases, whether it be feudal manors, industrial towns,
or mass-public accommodations (Spitzer and Scull 1977b; Shearing and
Stenning 1981). Private policing grows as the proportion of private
landholdings accessible to the public grows. It has been suggested that the
mass private property hypothesis is especially relevant to the North
American context, where its growth has been most extensive. Some think
that this account is less applicable to Britain and Western Europe where
there is a greater tradition of public ownership of space (Jones and
Newburn 1999). At the same time, mass private property continues to
expand in tandem with new forms of policing in many developed
countries, notably those of Latin America and South Asia, suggesting that
the explanatory power of the mass private property hypothesis extends
beyond the North American context (Caldeira 1996; Nalla 1998). 

We will not pass judgment on the validity of this explanatory account
pending further empirical research into the expansion of mass private
property globally. It may be that Britain and Western Europe--where it has
been suggested that the mass private property principle may not hold--are
the aberrations in the broader global context. 

Economic development. Economic development increases criminal
opportunities with respect to property crime, such as theft, robbery, and
burglary, because personal property becomes more valuable as well as
portable (Clarke 1997; Cohen and Felson 1979; Prenzler and Sarre 1998).
Furthermore, because economic development distributes these goods more
widely in the population, the consciousness of risk and the need for
protection becomes more generalized. 

Although we have not seen this argued as an explanation for restructuring,
economic development is also known to raise expectations, which may in
turn have the effect of intensifying dissatisfaction arising out of
inequalities of wealth and opportunity. As people become less content
with less, they may become less willing to accept the rules of what they
perceive to be an unjust society. Thus economic development increases
both the quantity of goods to be readily stolen and the number of potential
property criminals. 

Political Character

The expansion of democracy globally facilitates restructuring (Cerny
1995; Drainville 1995; McMichael 1996; Slaughter 1997). Democratic
governments can accommodate diverse centers of power, whereas
authoritarian regimes cannot. Democratization facilitates restructuring by
providing political space into which it can grow. As political pluralism
increases, so too do the auspices that want to share responsibility for
policing.

Social Relations

We found three hypotheses that explained the restructuring of policing in
terms of changes in large-scale features of social organization.

Social complexity. As societies become more complex, so too do the
security needs of their people. Complexity refers to increased
specialization in the roles people play as well as the spatial dispersion of
these roles (Durkheim 1973; Elias and Boulding 1996; Jervis 1997).
Social complexity also multiplies the number of interest-based
communities, which then become potential auspices for constructing
security on behalf of their members. Furthermore, if social complexity,
especially the separation of work from residence, decreases the willingness
of people to exert informal social control, what Cohen and Felson refer to
as "guardianship," then crime and disorder increase as well, outpacing the
capacities of the public police (Cohen and Felson 1979; Jacobs 1962). It
would be natural in these circumstances for people to use the interest
communities they inhabit to provide security. 

Modernization. Modernization of societies leads to a decline in the
authority of primary social groups such as families, residential
communities, and occupations (Nisbet 1969, 1975; Tonnies 1957; Wirth
1938). This leads to rising crime and disorder (Caldeira 1996; Rodriguez
and Winchester 1996). If governments are unable to meet public
expectations about protection, people will look for other auspices to take
responsibility. In capitalist societies, markets provide one solution by
commodifying security. People buy what they need when they can afford
to do so. Commodified security replaces what Louis Wirth called the
"little platoons" of traditional social control (Wirth 1938).

Social heterogeneity. Social heterogeneity within nation-states leads to the
restructuring of policing when constituent groups, both economic and
ascriptive, lose faith in the willingness or ability of government to protect
them. This development is almost inevitable if people believe that they
have been denied rights, among them adequate physical protection,
because of their communal affiliation. The restructuring of policing on the
basis of identity can be benign, enhancing safety where it was problematic,
but it is inherently dangerous. Visible acts of communal self-protection
often polarize social relations. Political compromise becomes increasingly
difficult, the ability of government to perform declines, and people take
policing into their own hands for what they feel are righteous reasons. 

In a less dramatic way, restructuring may also increase when democratic
countries valorize minority norms and practices out of respect for
"diversity." To protect cultural heritages, groups may claim from nation-
states the ability to determine what is enforceable as right and wrong. On
one hand, they may disagree with the majoritarian moral consensus about,
for example, matters of dress or preventive medicine. In this case, they
want government policing to be looser. On the other hand, they may
define security more narrowly than government, wanting it to embody
communal morality, for example, about contact between the sexes. They
may feel that the criminal law is too permissive; they want policing to be
tighter but under their control. 

Whether based upon interest or identity, communities are simultaneously
sources of social cohesion and fragmentation, of discipline and disruption.
The way in which security is organized is both a reflection of the structure
of societies and a determinant of it.

Ideas

Ideas about government and crime have been cited as contributors to
restructuring because circumstances alone do not determine the nature of
policing. How people think about things constrains what can be done.

Markets as a cost-effective alternative. During the 1980s, the idea became
popular, especially in developed democracies, that governments were
inherently less efficient than private auspices in providing services. In
particular, markets were accepted by many people as a cost-effective
alternative to government. As a result, public policing's loss of market
share was viewed not as a threat to public safety but as a sensible response
to proven inadequacy. Intellectual support for the marketizing of policing
came from several sources. The influential economist Frederick Hayek
argued that government bureaucracies, especially national ones, were less
efficient than markets because they could not take advantage of local
knowledge (Hayek 1989). Macrosocial policies of earlier periods, such as
the New Deal, were criticized as being too generic and therefore unable to
adapt to variations in circumstances across countries. Social problems
were best solved by individuals working together in small arenas (Murray
1988; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). Local knowledge was essential because
governing should be done, in Burchell's fine phrase, "in accordance with
the grain of things" (Burchell 199l).

The communitarian movement also provided an idea that encouraged the
restructuring of policing. Communitarians argued, as conservatives did,
that government was too remote and impersonal to meet the needs of
diverse communities (Etzioni 1983, 1993, 1996). Their solution, however,
did not involve economic markets. Instead, they urged government to
formally devolve responsibilities upon neighborhoods and communities so
that its activities could be more closely supervised and directed by clients
and stakeholders. Government would become more effective not by
transcending government, but by allowing local communities to assume
more responsibility for their own well-being. 

In sum, powerful intellectual voices, both conservative and liberal, have
called for the devolution of government services to new auspices--markets
in one case, local communities in the other. Policing is one of several
functions to which these analyses can be applied. 

Recognizing the changed political climate, the public police responded
with well-publicized schemes to demonstrate that they too were responsive
to local communities and giving "value for money." Community
partnerships became very popular, as did community policing.
"Accountability" and "effectiveness" were watchwords, exemplified by
performance audits in Australia, citizens' charters in Britain, and
COMPSTAT in the United States.

Local knowledge. Independently of both Hayekians and communitarians,
criminologists and police reformers discovered during the 1970s and
1980s that local knowledge was a neglected resource in policing. It was
needed to specify and prioritize security needs (Trojanowicz and
Bucqueroux 1990; Goldstein 1990), to diagnose problems (Goldstein
1990), to implement remedies (Bayley 1994; Goldstein 1990), and to
render justice in acceptable terms (Braithwaite 1989). Localizing policing
is the basis of community- and problem-oriented policing as well as of
restorative justice. They are arguably the most important, certainly the
most coherent, reform philosophies to be developed in policing during the
past half-century.

Culture

Whether societies are individualistic or communitarian in culture may
affect the way they provide policing (Bayley 1985b). Although both sorts
of cultures may restructure policing, the form that it takes will differ.
Individualistic societies are more likely to restructure through commercial
markets, communitarian societies through community-based mobilization
(Bayley 1999). 

Discussion

Reflecting on the range of explanations that have been put forward to
explain the current restructuring of policing, it is apparent that there has
been more conjecture than science in these offerings. Reasoning has
generally been a priori, although often grounded in sound descriptions of
trends. But the connections between these trends and policing have been
assumed rather than demonstrated. 

We offer three observations about the processes that have brought about
the current reconstruction of security. 

First, it appears to be unlikely that a single explanation for the
phenomenon will be found. At the same time, because restructuring seems
to be global, there may be a small number of generic factors contributing
to it throughout the world. Three that may be playing a role almost
everywhere are (1) fear of crime, (2) marketization of economies, and (3)
the passing of a critical threshold in the creation of commercial
multinational security companies. The first two points have already been
discussed. With respect to the third, we are suggesting that after the
commercial security industry reaches a certain size, it creates continuing
demand for policing through enhancement of fear, emulation among
consumers, and presumptive protection against liability. 

Second, the reconstruction of policing may occur as the result of small
changes in many different social arenas. Borrowing from Kuhn and Gould,
the restructuring of policing may represent a paradigmatic shift in social
organization that is not connected to any single factor (Kuhn 1962; Gould
1996). Small and essentially fortuitous changes in many places may have
produced a qualitative "phase" change in policing that could not have been
predicted from changes in any one of them. In complicated processes of
social change, the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts. 

Third, multilateralization evolves along different paths using different
institutions and displays different mentalities depending on the relative
power of governments, groups, and individuals. Countries will vary in the
trajectories they follow to restructuring. In the Western democracies,
national governments monopolized policing during the 18th, 19th, and
20th centuries at the expense of subordinate groups. Policing was
nationalized, increasingly constructed from the top down. In the 20th
century, these same democratic governments made policing available to
individuals through the creation of emergency-response systems. Indeed,
legitimate self-help was limited to calling 911 or its equivalent. In this
way, democratic governments made the public police serve the interests of
disaggregate individuals. Later in the century, however, democratic
governments became concerned that the police were not as effective in
controlling crime as the public wanted. Acting on the insight that local
knowledge and resources were essential to effective crime control, the
police encouraged residential and interest groups to share policing
responsibility with them. This was community policing, and it devolved
policing authority from the government to nongovernmental groups. At
the same time, nongovernmental groups themselves in many countries
took advantage of market opportunities to hire their own police. This
evolutionary trajectory produced policing that responded to collective
needs represented by nongovernmental groups and mediated through
either markets or voluntary organizations. In communitarian countries
such as Japan, however, policing has always relied more upon
nongovernmental structures, such as families, neighborhoods, and
workplaces, to assist the government in maintaining social order (Bayley
1991). At the end of the 20th century, therefore, they had less need to
commercialize policing than Western countries, although nonstate groups
were free to use markets if they chose to do so.

In authoritarian countries, policing is controlled by government and its
primary objective is always the protection of the regime. Authoritarian
states try hard to maintain their monopoly on policing and discourage
groups from acting as either auspices or providers of policing. They too,
however, recognize that effective crime control requires assistance from
the public. They obtain it through mobilizing groups, just as democratic
governments do, but not by allowing them to participate in markets. They
mobilize local knowledge and resources through coopting direction. This
trajectory produces the pretense of multilateralization and a style of
policing that is preoccupied with threats to governments rather than to
individuals. 

Although we believe that policing is being restructured around the world,
the extent and form of the restructuring depend on local history and
circumstances, in particular on the trajectory by which policing is already
developing. Locality matters, even to generic trends such as restructuring.

---------------------------

Chapter 6

The Role of Government

The contemporary transformation of policing is like Topsy in Uncle Tom's
Cabin--without anyone paying attention, "it just growed" (Stowe 1852).
But Topsy is no longer a beguiling adolescent; she has become a giant that
many find menacing (Forst and Manning forthcoming; Loader 1997b;
Grabosky 1996; Johnston 1992). Peter Manning, for example, says:

[T]he essence of the economic/free market paradigm, or extracting fees
and profit from human misery and commodified needs, is inconsistent
with the police mandate, the nature of collective goods and their
distribution, and in some sense the moral bases of collective solidarity and
trust that as yet bind us. (Forst and Manning forthcoming)

Echoing our concern with a growing dualistic division of labor between
the public and private sectors, Rod Morgan observes:

At present there seems to be a danger that we may end up with the worst
of all possible worlds: increasingly large and centralized police services
with ever-growing powers, alongside the anarchic emergence of
unregulated self-help and private "police" or "security" services in the
hands of sectional local interests. (Morgan 1994)

Among people who have noticed that policing is being changed
dramatically, questions are being asked about whether the change is good
or bad. And if it is bad, what should be done about it? For example, should
government supervise what is occurring? Should nongovernmental police
agencies be made publicly accountable in the way that public police
agencies are? Can government regulate nongovernmental policing without
stifling its creativity and efficiency? Can government regulate
nongovernmental policing in the public interest when its own
bureaucracies have a vested interest in preserving their monopoly? Should
government encourage the restructuring of policing, especially for
populations underserved by existing security arrangements? Can it do so
constructively without losing the very benefits that restructuring promises?
In short, what is the role of government in a restructuring of policing that
is changing the governance of security?

Not surprisingly, this report does not try to answer these questions. Too
little is known at this time about restructuring itself, and still less is known
about the effect of alternative regulatory regimes upon it. There are many
opinions about the role of government, but they tend, with a few
exceptions, to be general and philosophical rather than pointed and
programmatic. 

What the report can do, however, is explore the kinds of public interests
that governments should be concerned about as the transformation
continues. Although we are unsure about the balance that should
ultimately be struck between governmental and nongovernmental policing,
especially because of the hybrid nature of contemporary policing, we will
suggest functions that government should retain with respect to policing.

The Public Interests of Policing

Three public interests must continue to be served as the governance of
security is transformed: justice, equality of protection, and quality of
service.

Justice

As with the public police, nongovernmental providers may violate the law
and behave in illegal ways. For example, private security personnel have
denied access on the basis of race, engaged in industrial espionage, and
forcibly broken the picket lines of striking workers. They have harassed
homeless people in an effort to "clean up" neighborhoods and used
excessive force in maintaining order in bars and sports venues. They have
violated the privacy of individuals by obtaining and acting on privileged
information obtained from the police. Moreover, it is not just commercial
security agents that engage in such practices. Community-based providers
of policing have discriminated against residents or overreached legally
(Owens 1997; Ross, Smith, and Pritt 1996; Smith et al. 1997). One must
never forget that the substitution of policing by states for policing by
communities was an important factor in the liberation of workers, women,
and minority groups from local, often customary, tyrannies. 

The leverage that governments have over such behavior varies from
country to country. Some countries protect human rights with laws; others
do not. Some countries value human rights so highly they write them into
constitutions and other fundamental laws, creating judicially enforceable
standards to which all actions of government must conform. This is true,
for example, in the United States where nongovernmental police are
viewed as private persons under contract to perform a particular service.
As such, they may be held accountable for wrongful acts under criminal,
civil, and contract law. They enjoy none of the immunities allowed the
public police (Sklansky 1999).

Equality of Protection 

No service of government is more fundamental than protecting people's
bodies and possessions. Indeed, the relationship between personal security
and government is tautological: if people are not provided with protection
at some minimal level, government is not considered to exist. Anarchy is
the absence of enforced public safety. Public safety in democracies is
considered a public good--an obligation of government to all. 

Restructuring policing through markets distorts the distribution of security
in favor of those who can afford it; restructuring policing through
voluntary mobilization distorts it in favor of those who are creative and
committed enough to organize it in kind. The former runs the risk of
creating a dualistic system of policing where the poor are protected by the
public police operating with a deterrent, law-enforcement mentality and
the rich are protected by private police using a more consumer-responsive,
regulatory mentality (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Braithwaite
forthcoming). 

According to Sam Walker, this is not a new problem for the United States-
-the rich have always been protected better and less punitively than the
poor (Walker 1975). In the past several decades, various levels of
American government have sponsored voluntary neighborhood policing
precisely to make policing more effective and more acceptable to insecure
inner-city populations. As Patrick V. Murphy, former Commissioner of
Police of New York City, has observed, "Community policing is private
policing for the poor" (private communication).

If the distribution of policing coincides with structural divisions of race
and class, the legitimacy of government itself may be jeopardized. People
may be encouraged not only to take the law into their own hands for their
private protection but also to defy law associated with unresponsive
government. Societies that fail to pay attention to the distribution of
security are playing with dynamite blindfolded. 

With the growth of market-based policing, there is always the danger that
affluent people will become less willing to support public policing on the
argument that they are paying twice for the same service. Robert Reich
refers to this as the "secession of the successful," which is already
occurring in the field of public education (Herrnstein and Murray 1994). 

Assuming that multilateralization skews the distribution of security, what
can be done about it and by whom? Even in countries where safety is
regarded as a fundamental right, it may not be enforceable in law. In the
United States, for example, the courts have determined that minimal levels
of security are not guaranteed under the Constitution (Sklansky 1999). Nor
is government liable for civil damages if it neglects to provide adequate
protection, except in a few limited circumstances (Sklansky 1999).[1]

The danger arising out of an unequal distribution of public security has
been considered so serious and so imminent that one British chief
constable has proposed that all police providers should be made "police
compliant," meaning that their services should be supervised and
coordinated by the public police (Blair 1998). Policing should remain a
public good whose distribution cannot be distorted by commodification.
The public police, he argues, "should put itself forward, first, as the central
point for interagency cooperation designed to strengthen communities and,
secondly, as the center point of a coordinated system of patrol services,
carried out by a mixture of police, volunteer, local authority and private
sources" (Blair 1998). In other words, government may share policing, but
it should not share the responsibility for it. 

The rationale of devolving the practice of policing to multiple auspices
and providers while maintaining ultimate responsibility for the equitable
distribution of its benefits--safety and security--underlies the recent
proposals for the renewal of policing in Northern Ireland (Independent
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 1999). Specifically, the
proposals call for the creation of a Policing Board that is responsible for
regulating the activity of all the agencies involved in the multilateral
process of governing security and not simply the activities of the public
police. 

A question of national sovereignty also arises in connection with the
restructuring of policing. Because commercial security is sometimes
provided by multinational corporations, the distribution of security within
countries is shaped partially by decisions made abroad (Shearing and
Stenning 1981). In some countries, it can fairly be argued that foreigners
working for large multinational corporations are better protected than
locals. It is one thing for government to cede policing control to domestic
nongovernmental auspices and quite another to cede it to offshore
interests.

Quality of Service

Nongovernmental police agencies may fail to provide the service
promised. With commercial providers, competition in the marketplace
should be the corrective. But this does not always happen. Caveat emptor
is an empty admonition if information is not available to consumers about
the relative quality of the service they are receiving. Voluntary
neighborhood-based security programs, too, may not work as expected,
serving instead the interests of a self-perpetuating few (Crawford 1995).

Nongovernment police, like public police, also engage in questionable,
even reckless, practices. For example, a private security firm in Australia
offered a sophisticated course in installing burglar alarms that was taken
by known armed robbers wanting to learn how to bypass electronic
systems (Anonymous 1998). Private police have endangered the public in
shootouts with would-be kidnapers and hijackers. They have been widely
criticized for inadequately training personnel; supervision may also be lax.
Some American companies have hired illegal aliens; others have failed to
discipline employees who drink on duty (New York Times 1995). Finally,
security companies may misrepresent their services, delivering much less
than promised.

The point to this enumeration of public interests that endure in the new
policing--justice, equality of protection, and quality of service--is that
multilateralization affects not only the governance of security; it also
affects the security of governance. Unless these interests are protected, the
legitimacy of government itself may be affected. Security is both a subject
of governance and a requisite for it. The public interest in policing endures
despite restructuring. The important question is: How can it be
safeguarded? 

Discussion

From our survey of writing about accountability, we conclude that the
public interest in policing can be protected if government retains three
functions--regulating, auditing, and facilitating. 

Regulation

Regulation comes in many forms. It involves more than enacting rules and
punishing people for failing to abide by them. John Braithwaite and his
colleagues have given a nuanced discussion of regulatory modalities
(Ayers and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite and Grabosky 1986).
Regulation may be done, for example, through command regulation with
nondiscretionary punishment, command regulation with discretionary
punishment, enforced self-regulation, and voluntary self-regulation (Ayres
and Braithwaite 1992). One size does not fit all regulatory problems, and
both regulatory efficacy and regulatory costs vary with the choices made.

Auditing

If the public interests of justice, equality of protection, and quality of
service are to be safeguarded, government must audit what security
agencies provide and monitor what is going on in a systematic way.
Government must use this information to evaluate the distribution of
security provided by various combinations of providers. This requires the
development of a capacity that governments currently do not have, namely
the capacity to evaluate the relative quality of police protection throughout
its territory and across social classes and divisions. The intellectual as well
as the administrative problems in doing this are daunting and require the
collaborative effort of social scientists, lawyers, and specialists in public
administration.

Facilitation

Providing equitable security imposes an additional and very difficult
obligation upon governments. They must learn to mix and match policing
services, which means they must learn how to facilitate the growth of
different kinds of policing. As Peter Grabosky has said:

Whether it is the public or private sector which carries law enforcement
has become a misplaced question. One must now inquire what institutional
form, or what blend of institutional forms, is best suited to a given task.
The design and guidance of hybrid law enforcement systems is an
essential task of government in the next century. (Grabosky 1996) 

Governments have many instruments for mixing and matching forms of
policing: subsidies, entitlements and incentives (such as tax rebates),
mandated coordination, cooperative support, contracting out, delegation,
and abdication of responsibility (Grabosky 1996; Bayley 1999; Prenzler
and Sarre 1998). We need to know more about the costs and benefits of
these mechanisms. Governments seem generous and responsive, for
instance, when they talk about forming "partnerships" with nonstate police
auspices and providers, but their assistance may be more stultifying than
encouraging. Partnerships can be a clever way of staying in charge
(Johnston 1999; Crawford 1995; Cruikshank 1999; Lacey and Zedner
1998; Fu 1993; Hou and Sheu 1994). For governments to become
effective at diversifying policing appropriately, police policymakers need
to study the record of government facilitation in other arenas, such as
education, irrigation, communications, and electrical power (Ostrom
1990).

Conclusion

Given the fragmentary nature of current knowledge about the restructuring
of policing, we cannot approve or disapprove of it in principle. Its
advantages and disadvantages depend on social conditions, combinations
of auspices and providers, the nature of criminal threats, and the feasibility
of alternatives. We discount, therefore, the apocalyptic visions of
restructuring, although we acknowledge the dangers to freedom in any
form of policing. Vigilance will be the price of liberty, as Thomas
Jefferson said, in the future as in the past. For this reason we also discount
the view that restructuring will generate new forms of accountability on its
own. It may, but governments as we know them are the only institutions
that have the authority and capacity to make this determination and take
corrective action as required.

Note

1. The courts have denied tort liability on three grounds: (1) they do not
have the ability to make judgments about the adequacy of protection; (2)
the law provides no justiciable standards; and (3) adequate redress exists
through the political system (Sklansky 1999).

---------------------------

Chapter 7

Research Agenda

The current transformation of policing has not yet attracted the sustained
scholarly attention it deserves. Although researchers have nibbled around
the edges of the topic, the extent, nature, and impact of police restructuring
have yet to be determined. Based upon our survey of published research
and thought and our understanding of what is happening, we have
constructed the following research agenda. These are the questions,
grouped into four categories, that most urgently require study: 

1. Foundational description: What is happening to policing? 

2. Social impact: What effect is restructuring having on justice, equality of
protection, and quality of service? 

3. Government policy: What is government doing and with what effect? 

4. Causation: What factors are shaping the reconstruction of policing and
government's relation to it? 

Foundational Description

1. Who is constructing and delivering policing in the modern world?
Answering this requires more than counting public and private cops. It
requires determining the people responsible for public safety (the auspices
of policing). Because security regimes vary across time and space, the
research needs to be conducted comparatively, which requires that
researchers employ a common format for describing what is happening. 

Two approaches might be taken in answering this question. First, people in
different places could be asked to identify the entity they expect to provide
protection. Who are the frontline providers of policing locally, and who is
responsible for them? Second, maps could be constructed showing the
amount of time a cross-section of people inhabit various locations in the
course of a normal day/week/month and what the security auspices and
providers are in each.

2. How many nongovernmental providers of policing, both voluntary and
commercial, are there, what do they do, how much do they cost, and
whom do they serve?

3. How have the public police adapted to restructuring? Are the nature and
scope of public policing changing? Are its functions increasing or
decreasing? Are public police defining their responsibilities differently
than in the past? Have they changed their geographical deployment as a
result of the growth of private security? 

4. How do governmental and nongovernmental policing agents interact in
the field? In other words, what is the interface between auspices of both
kinds and providers of both kinds? Do they ignore, hinder, or help one
another? Do they plan together, coordinate operations, or exchange
information?

5. To what extent is public policing being commodified; that is, being
made available to private interests for money? 

6. Do different providers of policing take different operational approaches
when performing the same task? In our terminology, do mentalities differ
among providers of security? An important source of information would
be public police officers who have worked for commercial security
companies. They would be asked what they find different in operations
and management between public and private police agencies.

7. With respect to the commercial security industry, several questions need
answering:

a. How many companies are there? How many people do they employ?
Whom do they work for? How much does this form of policing cost? 

b. What is the degree of industrial concentration in the private security
industry? 

c. Do the activities of multinational security companies vary from country
to country? How much central direction is exerted by multinational
companies over the operations of local providers?

Social Impact

1. How effective are the different auspices/providers of security?
Especially, has restructuring produced greater or less public safety and for
whom? This could be studied cross-sectionally, comparing places with
different mixes of policing, or longitudinally, examining changes in
criminality and disorder before and after a major shift in the nature of
policing in a particular place. In both cases, great care must be taken in
describing the nature of the policing mixes. 

In this connection, it is curious that no one, to our knowledge, has
suggested that the recent, much-publicized decline in crime in the United
States might be due to the growth of nonstate policing, especially in its
commercial form. Criminologists have attributed the decrease to changes
in demographics, crime patterns, gun crime, and police numbers and
tactics. There are four reasons the restructuring of policing may have
played a role. 

a. Multilateralization may have produced a more visible police presence.
Cumulatively, the visibility of police has grown dramatically over the past
decade. 

b. Crime may be reported less to the public police and more to the private
police, reducing its chances of becoming an official statistic. 

c. More people may be living, working, buying, and playing in
environments regulated by nongovernmental police; hence, the
opportunities for crime have decreased. 

d. Formerly disadvantaged social groups, among whom crime is likely to
be high, may be more intensively policed by either voluntary associations
or public police redeployed away from areas covered by commercial
security. 

2. Who gains and loses in terms of public safety as a result of the
reconstruction of policing? In other words, has the distribution of security
changed as the result of restructuring? For example, Ian Loader (1997b)
has suggested that multilateralization will displace crime from private to
public spaces. This critical question is difficult to answer because it
requires the construction of a test for the quantity of security. Public
opinion surveys as well as official measures of crime and disorder could
be used. 

3. Does restructuring cause a decline in support for public policing among
privileged groups, Reich's "secession of the successful" (Murray 1988)?
Are people who are covered by commercial police protection less likely to
support public expenditures for policing?

4. Are the rights of individuals more or less at risk when policing is
provided by nonstate rather than state auspices/providers? Do violations of
rights vary according to the nature of the policing? Generally, do the forms
of misbehavior vary with the type of policing? 

5. Are nonstate providers of policing more or less accountable than state
police? This question has two dimensions. First: How effective is the
oversight of the group that has instigated the nongovernmental policing?
For example, do they pay close or only episodic attention? Are there well-
understood ways of bringing problems to their attention? Second: Whose
interests are represented in the operations of the new police? For example,
are some people being policed without representation in the accountable
body? 

6. To what extent do community-based justice systems, such as mediation
and restorative-justice conferences, enhance security through the
undertakings they develop among participants?

Government Policy

1. What are the variations in legal conditions within which restructuring
occurs from country to country? What is legally allowed and not allowed?

2. What aspects of nonstate policing are regulated by governments and in
what ways? What aspects do governments think require more regulatory
attention?

3. In what ways are nongovernmental providers of security held
accountable for violations of laws, human rights, and contracts? 

4. What is the relative effectiveness of different mechanisms in achieving
accountability? In Australia, for example, Prenzler and Sarre (1998) say,
"To date, there have been no controlled studies of expanded legislation to
test the impact of new requirements." 

5. How have the public police responded comparatively across countries to
the growth of nonstate policing? It seems that some have been indifferent,
others hostile, a few cooperative, and some co-opting. 

6. What regulations do governments have for managing the relationship
between public and private police, for example, with respect to sharing
information, using facilities, reporting crime, making arrests, submitting
cases for prosecution, and employing personnel?

Causation

1. What factors account for the growth of nonstate policing? In addition to
the customary approach of correlating changes in policing with other
measurable social factors, it might be useful to ask people what motivated
them to create alternative auspices of policing or to seek other suppliers of
policing. 

Historical research would also be important in determining the
evolutionary paths followed by different countries with respect to the
auspices and providers of policing. Chronological comparison of the
changes in policing among countries will reveal likely determinants. 

2. What governmental regulations facilitate or retard the development of
nonstate policing?

3. What factors explain differences in the types of regulations and legal
environments countries have developed with respect to nonstate policing?

4. If operational mentalities differ among police, as we believe, what
accounts for them? There are several possibilities: the nature of the tasks
they are assigned, the conditions in which they work, the directions given
by sponsoring auspices, and their in-house professional experience. 

5. Can governments manipulate the conditions required for the successful
development of (a) security markets (commodified security) and (b)
cooperative security auspices (community-based security)? What should
government do and not do? To this end, it would be useful to study
government's experience with restructuring in other dimensions of social
policy as well, such as housing, irrigation, and education.

Conclusion

It may not be easy to marshal the kind of sustained intellectual attention
that current developments in policing deserve and that our agenda calls
for. There are three reasons for this. 

First, criminal justice education and scholarship focus almost exclusively
on institutions of government. Governments are its main supporters,
practitioners its primary clientele, and state agencies the main employers
of its students. Perhaps this was inevitable in a field that grew out of the
perception that research about the activity and effectiveness of the
institutions of crime control was being neglected by traditional
criminology. Criminal justice education and research thereby tied itself to
the chariot wheel of the state and it remains so today. 

Second, criminal justice scholarship is more concerned with institutional
effectiveness than with institutional evolution. This, too, reflects its
concern with public--meaning government--policy. For criminal justice
social scientists, institutional variation is studied to determine the relative
effectiveness of different policies, but not, except for a handful of
researchers, to account for the variety itself. American historians have
done better than social scientists in this regard, and for a simple reason.
Because they are concerned with changes over time, their research does
not take institutional forms as givens.

Third, American criminal justice scholarship is parochial and not
internationally comparative. In part, this reflects its preoccupation with
efficacy. Americans generally assume that policies that work in one
country will not work in another owing to differences in social setting,
culture, and history. They believe that social processes in the United States
are unique. This deeply rooted belief overlooks the fact that the only way
it can be tested is through comparative research. As a result, because
American criminal justice scholars focus so exclusively on the United
States, they fail to see that institutions are artifacts, created out of
combinations of contemporary exigencies and historical traditions.
Context for them is a given, much as water is to fish, and just as
uninteresting. 

For all these reasons, American criminal justice scholarship is not
prepared to perceive the significance of what is occurring in contemporary
policing. It is doubtful that it will able to provide the sort of intellectual
support needed to guide public policy.

---------------------------

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Policing is changing today as profoundly as when Sir Robert Peel put the
first bobby on the streets of London in 1829. The new model that is being
constructed consists of two elements. First, the people who authorize
policing have become separate from the people who do it. Second, the new
players in policing are not part of formal government. As a result,
governments, especially governments of nation-states, have lost their
monopoly on policing. The change that is occurring is paradigmatic
because it cannot be understood in customary terms (Kuhn 1962). The
current restructuring involves more than "privatization." It involves a
blurring of the boundary between the public and private. The new
paradigm also involves more than decentralization or devolution because
these terms apply to changes within a single institutional system. What is
taking place in policing today crosses institutional boundaries. Because of
the unprecedented nature of today's reconstruction, we have coined the
term "multilateralization" to describe the nature of the restructuring. 

What is happening to policing today is also paradigmatic because it is
more than an elaboration on what has gone before. It is a fundamental
transformation in the way security is governed. 

In the new paradigm, the very concept of government, technically the
state, becomes problematic. How can government be recognized if
policing is no longer done exclusively by the public police? How should
people who have been authorized expressly to police but are not employed
by government be referred to? When people deliberately and legitimately
construct policing, either through authorizing or providing it, are they not
engaged in governance?

Of course, what has been said about the importance of what is happening
depends on current trends being general and stable. Only time will tell
whether we have overestimated or underestimated their significance. For
this reason, it is critically important to study the structure of policing now
to establish benchmarks by which to judge the extent of change in the
future. Contemporary changes in policing should also be studied because
policing affects human well-being so fundamentally. Failure to provide
public safety fairly and equitably can affect the stability of government
itself. 

Finally, insights into the changing governance of security have
implications for foreign policy. A country like the United States that is
concerned about the expansion of democracy abroad must pay careful
attention to policing. The governance of security is both an indicator of the
quality of political life and a major determinant of it. 

The restructuring of policing that has been described refers to a process of
transferring the construction of security to nongovernmental groups within
existing states. But there is another process going on, one that constitutes
an equally profound challenge to nation-states. At the very moment that
policing is being distributed to new groups within states, it is also being
developed vigorously at international levels. Nation-states are ceding their
authority to police both upward and downward. This globalization of
policing has several dimensions that are not always distinguished.

First, private multinational corporations now provide policing on a
worldwide basis (Johnston 1999; Patterson 1995; Zarate 1998). They are
providers of transnational policing.

Second, transnational cooperation among law enforcement agencies of
nation-states is developing rapidly (Nadelman 1993; Fijnaut and Hermans
1987; Murphy 1998). National law enforcement agencies cultivate
relations with colleagues abroad, undertake joint operations, exchange
information, and share facilities. Pooling collective resources in an ad hoc
way to meet a common threat, they are similar to the posse in America's
Old West. INTERPOL was the earliest transnational institution created by
this sort of transnational collaboration. Such actions encourage the
presumption, undoubtedly correct, that effective policing at the turn of the
millennium requires governance at transnational levels. 

Third, policing is being undertaken by genuinely international institutions,
such as the United Nations, the World Court, and the European Union.
Functionally specific agencies, too, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, increasingly require countries to either
develop or reform policing in specific ways as conditions for receiving
assistance. The impulses to create supranational auspices for policing are
the same as those that created existing nation-states out of previously
sovereign principalities, estates, kingdoms, cities, and small countries. The
common precipitator in both cases is the need to construct security at more
encompassing levels (Bayley 1975, 1985b). Note that the organization of
policing at international levels of government, like restructuring within
nation-states, will cause conceptual confusion. Are armed forces acting
under international direction considered to be police or military? What
Americans call the Korean War was technically a "police action" carried
out by the United Nations. 

Policing today is being restructured away from nation-states by two
forces: multilateralization within countries and supranationalization
among countries. In both cases, policing is no longer being constructed
and provided exclusively by nation-states. It is quite unclear how these
forces will play out in the next few years. The possibilities are worthy of a
millennium.

---------------------------

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---------------------------

About the National Institute of Justice

NIJ is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of
Justice and is the only Federal agency solely dedicated to researching
crime control and justice issues. NIJ provides objective, independent,
nonpartisan, evidence-based knowledge and tools to meet the challenges
of crime and justice, particularly at the State and local levels. NIJ's
principal authorities are derived from the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. sections 3721-3722).

NIJ's Mission

In partnership with others, NIJ's mission is to prevent and reduce crime,
improve law enforcement and the administration of justice, and promote
public safety. By applying the disciplines of the social and physical
sciences, NIJ--

 o Researches the nature and impact of crime and delinquency.

 o Develops applied technologies, standards, and tools for criminal justice
practitioners.

 o Evaluates existing programs and responses to crime.

 o Tests innovative concepts and program models in the field.

 o Assists policymakers, program partners, and justice agencies.

 o Disseminates knowledge to many audiences.

NIJ's Strategic Direction and Program Areas

NIJ is committed to five challenges as part of its strategic plan: 1)
rethinking justice and the processes that create just communities; 2)
understanding the nexus between social conditions and crime; 3) breaking
the cycle of crime by testing research-based interventions; 4) creating the
tools and technologies that meet the needs of practitioners; and 5)
expanding horizons through interdisciplinary and international
perspectives. In addressing these strategic challenges, the Institute is
involved in the following program areas: crime control and prevention,
drugs and crime, justice systems and offender behavior, violence and
victimization, communications and information technologies, critical
incident response, investigative and forensic sciences (including DNA),
less-than-lethal technologies, officer protection, education and training
technologies, testing and standards, technology assistance to law
enforcement and corrections agencies, field testing of promising programs,
and international crime control. NIJ communicates its findings through
conferences and print and electronic media.

NIJ's Structure

The NIJ Director is appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. The NIJ Director establishes the Institute's objectives, guided by
the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the U.S. Department of
Justice, and the needs of the field. NIJ actively solicits the views of
criminal justice and other professionals and researchers to inform its
search for the knowledge and tools to guide policy and practice.

NIJ has three operating units. The Office of Research and Evaluation
manages social science research and evaluation and crime mapping
research. The Office of Science and Technology manages technology
research and development, standards development, and technology
assistance to State and local law enforcement and corrections agencies.
The Office of Development and Communications manages field tests of
model programs, international research, and knowledge dissemination
programs. NIJ is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which
also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and
the Office for Victims of Crime. 

To find out more about the National Institute of Justice, please contact:

National Criminal Justice Reference Service
P.O. Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000
800-851-3420
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