<< GX102101 >>

~VERNMENT
~1O21I

1~5Cr.394

ifl 2000 during the presidential campaign, ~ne person said
re lice ?re~i~ert raised the iss:e Thterrally that t~e
connection between WT~4D arid terrorism was the primary
security threat to the country.

(Question: If so, when and where did that notion come from
that early? To whom was it expressed?)

During the 2000 campaign Cheney generally supported the
U.N. weapons inspection process for Iraq but developed the
theme of Clintons weak and erratic policies.

(At that point was there a sense of unfinished business
with Iraq--that the Saddam Hussein matter would have to be
confronted in some form if Bush arid Cheney were elected?)

~~After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there was a
spike in the intelligence about Iraq trying to get WMD.

(Do you recall any and what was your reaction?)

.~. Several people have said that the Vice President believed
7/
the pre~iderr~de~ided before the end of 2001 that the Iraq
problem was going to be solved one way or the other.

(Does this seem right and what other than 9/11 caused
that?)

Others have said that the core discussion with the
president about Iraq in late 2001 was as follows: If Saddam
uses ~JND on Israel and Israel retaliates, especially with
nuclear, then youve lost the entire Middle East. If
Saddam uses WMD in the U.S. and thousands or hundreds of
thousands die, there will be no excuse if the
/	administration says the evidence was not conclusive. So
the weight of evidence required before 9/11 does not apply
after 9/11. The standard of pzoof has to be lowered.

(Can you locate when and where such discussion occurred?)

009692
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<< GX102102 >>

.~.-
	 		Zr.
	 - .  .	.  -. . ~-.		.

sc as ~ to create tne ~mrress~on or :mr~.anen: ~ctior..
			t		..ct		sax	  -~ z~.e :ca~
	-.	- ~ ~		~ d		~1rectl\		thc..
wouid be democracy in the Isiar~ic world.

(Recall the evolution of this speech and your reaction? How
important is this speech?

Others have said the presidents intellectual framework for
Iraq had four major parts: 1. 9/11, 2. the WMD
~	intelligence fro?rl late 2001, 3. the Axis of Evil speech, 4.
the June 1, 2002 West Point speech about preemption.

(Is that about how you see it? What would you add or
emphasize?

April 2002, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah met with Bush and
pushed for a $1 billion intelligence operation to overthrow
Saddam rather than using the military.

(Reaction? Why would this not work?)

__	May 29, 2002. George ShuJ.tz gave a speech calling for hot
preemption. Cheney privately says that is George at his
wisest and best.

(Did this play a role in the preemption doctrine? Did you
talk with shultz about his remarks? Was the PTesident
aware of them?)

The Presidents June 1. 2002 West Point speech was possibly
the most important and the clearest formulation that
5.~!	American values would be spread. Our Nations cause has
always been larger than our Nations defense. And, it is
really good vs. evil, a conflict between right and wrong.
The U.S. seeks not only an absence of war, but a just
oeace moral purpose, .democracy, free markets and
rights for women. If we wait fdr threatsto fully
materialize, we will have waited too long.

009699

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<< GX102103 >>

-.. rrr.+r.,.C. ....P.. rC.... e.r,c ..C

Jtiv 2002, the. presider~t zrde~s abou: ,~u manor constr~ztizs
pr.~jects in Gen. ranksAOR--r~anway extensions, fue1in~
facilities, port improvements etc., socalled preparatory
tasks that cost hundreds of millions.

(Was this a significant step? What was the role of
Congress in this?)

...~	July 31 cabinet meeting. On Iraq, the President said, The
stated m4~~ ~ ~ ~h~nge. But all this talk from
level four people . . tthey) are talking about things
they know nothing about. Our intent is serious. There are
no war plans on my desk. I believe there is causus belli
and that the doctrine of preemption applies. Will not do
anything militarily unless confident we can succeed.
Success is removal of Saddam. Rumsfeld said, If it looks
untidy in the press, it is. Preemption is an important
discussion to have. Problem is that it gets particularized
to Iraq.

(Does this fully convey the state of play at this point?
What was your sense of where decisions were heading? And
on what timetable?)

Aug. 26, 2002. One person said the vice president
mentioned to the president that he was going to give a~
peech on Iraq and the president simply said, Dont get me
)
in trouble. The speech said that the weapons inspections
ran the danger of providing false comfort. The question
of interpretation arose and eight paragraphs were dropped
in a speech three days later, Aug. 29 to the Vets of the
Korean War.

(What exactly happened here? What was Rices role?

Sept. 3, 2002. Andy Card starts the WHIG meetings--White

Hou-se Iraq Group. Gameplan is to ask Congress to vote

009694
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<< GX102104 >>

	A
	/ A.
		.. ...   -. t~. ~
	a
	.Lr:-S- ~	- ~	
		I:.
	a	.1

~specIaI1y in light of your ir~itia. i6easabout Conoress
~e~ore the 1991 !~u1f war?)

Sept. 12, 2002. The Presidents U.N. speech calling for a
new Iraq resolution. Others have said this was the moment
the president decided he would have to use force because he
had promised that if the U.N. did not disarm Saddam, the
tLS. would. This was the point of no return; needed
credible threat of force for diplomacy to work.

(Recall any specific reaction? The president apparently
had a different view of inspections than anyone else?
Recall what it was?)

Sept. 18. The president and vice president have a
breakfast meeting with Congressional leaders. In a meeting
before or after, the President and Vice President are told
aboXit Vitiating cloture, and both wondex what it means.
Caijo brings in a definition sheet-meaning to make it go
-away.

(Do you recall this? What was the key to getting the
resolutions and avoiding cloture in the Senate?)

Oct. 2. At 1:15 p.m. the President appears with dozens of
lawmakers including Gephardt in the Rose Garden to announce
agreement on Congressional resolution language. -

(What did you think of Daschles absence and role?)

Around this time, the CIA made contact with the former head
of the Iraqi UAV program who was living in Australia. He
~.	may have ordered topographical maps of the U.S. on-line.
But he wanted some 20 members of his extended family in
Iraq to ~e taken out of Iraq.

(Was this important? Your reaction?)

009695
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<< GX102105 >>

	:~	1 ~	I	1	~	

- ~ tne ~flC:~t ser2.cj.:5 c1~r~:ers yr cur ~e

October 2002. CIA NIE on Iraqs WMD programs etc. It was
	later briefed to senators.

(What did you think of the NIE at the time?)

	Oct. 10 and 11. House and Senate pass the resolution by a
~ margin of about 3 to 1.

(What was the key to this? Recall what the Presidents
reaction was? The decision, now more than ever, was on his
shoulders. Did he talk about that?)

Oct/Nov 2002. One of the first detailed Iraq war plans
called for: 5 days to establish the air bridge; 11 days
for flow of forces; 16 day air campaign; 32ftd day the ground
forces in.

(Your reaction to this more or less traditional sequential
war plan?)

In the period of the fall, when people wanted early
		I
	military action, Powell at one point said to the president,
	Ask the vice president. He was myboss when pour fath~r
	was the president, and even if we wanted to (attack Iraq)	3
	in August, September, October, November (1990) we were not
	ready. The argument was that we also were not ready in
the fall of 2002.

~Is that correct? Were you asked?)

..~. Nov. 8. The United Nations Security Council approves
Resolution 1441 by a 15 to 0 vote. -. -

(Your reaction? What did it mean? What did it not mean?)

009696

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<< GX102106 >>

.~.fter 1441 passed it meant that the ?.resilent had t~ start
dep.oying forces credibly. But without a crest. Rumsfeld
	_ -~ ~~ -~	ziri~e this c.ut
~
slowly, so that its enough to keep the pressure on for the
diplomacy, but not so much as to disciedit the diplomacy so
(critics) could say, Well, you have already made up your
mind.

~Do you recall this? Your reaction?)

Several people have said that the. President knew he was
underestimated and he was able to use that conventional
wisdom as he responded to 9/11 but there was a point when
he could no longer count on that.

(Was there a realization of this in the Fall of 2002?
Discussion of this?)

Did the diplomatic track run the risk of giving the
President a diplomatic victory but a strategic loss?
Or was diplomacy the equivalent of economic sanctions in
the first Gulf crisis of 199091: The. U.S. had to show that
it had tried diplomacy and that it didnt and wouldnt
work.

Dec. 21. Received the intercept of two Iraqi Republican
Guard commanders discussing.the removal of nerve agents
in wireless communications. (Powell later used it in his
U.N. presentation).

(Any particular reaction to that and its meaning?)

Another discussion involved the use of the poison ricin by
.	terrorists connected to Iraq. They tested it on a donkey
who dies and they laughed. It was quite chilling. But
British intelligence asked that it not be used.

(Recall? Reaction? Someone else said release would scare
the public. Correct?)

009697

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<< GX102107 >>

	.9  	k....  I..	

o~erati~ns are knowr~ and coordinated with. eacri 3ther.
Small scale sabotage. Later a train was attacked witn an
~PG. ~-~::e;:~e ~andbil2s in a histzriz theatre (ff~ th~
Baath party). An operation to make Saddam believe there
was a senior defector inside the SSO who was feeding
information to the CIA. This was all before the war.

(Did you get involved? How? What did you think? Several
people have suggested that the U.S. essentially laid the
groundwork with these secret efforts and made victory
almost certain. Es that possible?)

President Bush apparently said at one point that if the war
plan is good the only thing that can go wrong is if the
country or the president loses his nerve.

(Reaction?)

Jan. 11, 2003. Rumsfeld and Myers brief Prince Bandar in
Cheneys office on the war plan. Essentially said that
everything that sounds natural and logical will NOT happen.
Franks had ideas to make tactical surprise irrelevant.
Plan then called for four days of massive bombing before
the ground war--many more bombs and precision bombs than
in the 38 days of the Gulf War.

(Your reaction?)

___	Jan. 25, 2003. Scooter Libbys presentation of the case
document or intelligence on WND and terrorist connections.

(Did you review this and have any reaction?)

Feb. 5. Powells presentation to the U.N.

(What was he saying and not saying? Your reaction?)

In~elligence. showed the Hans Blix was lying about lots.

I
LLOO5-09716

<< GX102108 >>

I ~

weeks, not more, but that conclusion w~s apparently never
put on a piece of paper or conveyed to the president and
Cheney~

(If true, why was that?)
(How was the CIA plan devised so it facilitated the
military war plan? It was a corollary to the war plan?
Why and how and when?)

In February 2003, the president told others it looked like
war, though he would proceed with diplomacy. Asked people,
are you with me?

(Any recollection of that?)

February--end of month, Franks proposed starting the war
with 48 hours of Special Operations within Iraq (socalled
SDay), and the president was somewhat uncomfortable that
it would leave the American public in the dark.

(What persuaded him to approve this?)

Feb. 22. At one point this was N-day or Notification Day
or flow all the forces.

(What was this?)

___	The president has said privately (publicly??) that during
the diplomatic phase the French stopped the momentum by
breaking the solidarity and if they had not, peaceful
disarmament hada chance?

(What was your assessment at the time?)
(What about the question of the sincerity of the diplomatic
strategy?)

009699

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<< GX102109 >>

	even talk of drafting a presidential speech addressing the
r~ew post-Sa~arn .reality.

	(What did you think the chances of a coup were?)

Mar. 3 At one point this might have been the start day
of the war. Delay because of: 1. Second U.N. resolution,
2. Franks was.ready but not f~l1y ready. 3. Still the
question of Turkey (only to some.) The start day was
apparently then moved to Mar. 10, then to Mar. 19.

(Do you recall this period, the state of readiness and the
reasoning?)

Mar. 7, 2003. Ken Adelman, Cheneys friend, did a piece in
USA Today arguing that the administration had made a~
whopping mistake waiting too long already. Waiting to
attack Iraq allowed the opposition to build, empowering
France and domestic critics.

(Your reaction?)

March 10. Two presidential speeches are being prepared on
the second U.N. resolution. One assumes a veto, the second
on getting a reaffirmation of Resolution 1441. The
president said that Blair was deeply worried, But I dont
think hes going to lose office. He obviously didnt want
Blairs government to go down; it was one time the
president was pulling on the reins to slow down. Cheney
was to make some calls to Conservatives in Britain. -

(What happened here?)

Mar. 12. Working on ultimatum speech. The President
declared about the U.N. process, This needs to end.
Thought they might need the speech for as early as the next
two days.

(Again, what was this?)

LLOO5-0971 8
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<< GX102110 >>

~andar S. rr~essage from t~.e CrQwn ~r:rice is that the ~eiay is
too long; the President might le helping 2lair but ~
				~	46O~	4~S 1	~ V

is sweating and says he wont shave until the war starts,
and he might in the end have a beard as long as bin
adens. Bush said that they had to trust him, that he was
going. he asks Bandar to estimate how long after the
ultimatum before the war would start. Bandar estimates 72
hours. Wrong, Bush says.

(Question: Do you recall this? What was going on?)

Mar. 16. Cheney on Meet the Press. He said, I think we
are still in the final stages of diplomacy, obviously,
that there was not much Saddam could do to alter the
outcome.

(Was it not just a matter of time now? Did you fear some
lastminute stunt? With so many U.S. forces deployed, was
the administration over the tipping point suchthat there
had to be a war to conclusively end the regime?)

Azores summit. Blair and his staff suggest making Bush s
ultimatum speech more conditional. If we must begin a
military campaign for example was added.

(Your reaction?)

Mar. 17, about 9:45 a.m. Flejecher announces that there
will not be a U.N. vote and the second resolution was being
withdrawn; and the president would address the nation that
night at 8 p.m. Half the press corps ian out to file.
The president was to give his ultimatum speech. At a pre
brief in the Oval Office he said, The hardest part was
making the decision that force may need to be used. The
decision today to use it was not the hardest.

(Do you recall this? Reaction?)

At 6:20 p.m. meeting with Congressional committee chairs in
the Cabinet Room. The president leaves at 6:26 and the

~Q97Qi
LLOO5-O9719
	I	I

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<< GX102111 >>

	~, , ra ~rcc- , ~,on,-	Al..,~ -4	= ~~= A fl..	-4

tne OOQS were ~o~ar~r ~1. ~	~ ~ w~~
~reete~ as Iiberat~rs but there are scores to be settled.
Its a tough neiohborhood. Well prcwide s~u~i~y.

rWhat were you trying to convey?i

Mar. 1~. rebate in Parliament. Blair wins 412 to 149! The
Vice President watched it on TV.

(Was there real worry about the vote? In the end, it was
quite a majority, more than the Bush Administrations.
Reaction?)

MarA 19, 2003, Wednesday.

This was going to be tricky because the war would begin at
1 p.m. with Special Operations. Card said of the plan to
fill in the next 48 hours: A lot of briefings from the
Pentagon, a lot of silence from the White House.

(Did you expect that Special Operations would have 48 hours
without tipping off the Iraqis or the media?)

When Tenet and Rumsfeld arrived with the new intelligence,
the president had two issues. 1. It could be a set up and
you would wake up the next morning to dead children. 2.
Would an early strike on the Dora Farm have an impact on
General Franks plan? Would it blow strategic or even
tactical surprise?

(Your worry or concerns?)

__	Tenet said on the intelligence, This is as good as it
gets. I cant give you 100 percent assurance, but this is
as good as it gets.

(Your reaction?)

Later it turned out there may have been no bunker;
translation should not have necessarily been bunker but

009102
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<< GX102112 >>

Peacticn?

At one point the guestion of announcing the strike came up.
Rurnsfeld said if someone had to do its. jt could be him or
the presidents
Cheney. said, This is an ongoing operation. We didnt
announce that Special Operations Forces were going in, or
the Poles or the Australians. It was not necessary to
announce it until you are ready.

(Do you recall this? Any other reasons?)

Issue was raised about what it would mean for Israel, Saudi
Arabia and other Arab friends-and their defense.

(Could they have been more vulnerable?)

The president said that. if lives were in danger he should
announce it; and he said he had promised publicly that he
would let people know when the war had started.

(Do you recall this?)

Someone said the vice president talked privately with the
president during this period and the president wanted to
make sure everyone agreed.

(Correct?)

After the strike the report came back that a bloodied Uday
shouted, Weve been betrayed. Weve been betrayed, and he
then shot an IIS man.

(Do you recall this?)

Franks asked what were the chances of a stealth bomber - -
gertingthrough with no air defense suppression; answer was
50 percent. So he ordered two planes.

~~~g7O3

LLOO5~~~21

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<< GX102113 >>

	-~ ~irr~ ~ -fl.~ i~~iP~fl ~ ,,~ ~m~ ~ ~ I

ater luring the war, GeneraP Franks one day became deeply
a ~io zr zhe~i:a2. weapr. attack, that a sr~P~
amount could become what he called a strategic
dislocator, upsetting the course of the war. Franks
ordered that every known iraci. plane or helicopter which
would be a possible means of delivery be destroyed at once.

(Do you recall this?)

Do you recaLl. the 22 high collateral damage targets and
some medium collateral damage targets; they were presented
to the president who asked, Do you want me to pick
targets?

General Franks saw five fronts in the war plan: Western
Iraq, Southern Iraq, Northern Iraq, Baghdad and Information
operations.

(What did you see as the major fronts?)

General Franks talked in terms of lines of action. This
included socaLLed operational fires or majo~r actions but
also things like information operations, timesensitive
targets, support for opposition groups etc.

(I confess to being very confused about this and the
relationship to specific targets Can you explain? HELP!)

Mar. 20 at 8 a.m. Gen. Franks recommends moving the ground
attack up 24 hours from Friday night to Thursday night. Or
was this already decided?

(Someone said it was better to begin with a strategic
success than with what could be seen as a massive, ugly air
campaign. Was that part of the reasoning?)
(Was it risky to put the ground forces in first without a
lot of air preparation?)

OO97~~

LLOOS-09722

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<< GX102114 >>

vCe #

Mar. 21, Friday at 1 p.rr~. ADay, air attack be;ins.

(Did you see this as shock and awe or something else?)

Mar. 22, Saturday. Gen. Franks publicly lays out the 8 war
aims: regime change, eliminate WMDI drive out terrorists,
collect intelligence, humanitarian aid, secure the oil
fields, help create conditions for selfgovernment.

(What was the origin of these? Was there ever concern that
it was too ambitious, too long a list? Or is this just the
practical and sweeping specifics that naturally result from
the Presidents speeches? When I interviewed the President
on Aug. 20, 2002, he said, I will seize the opportunity to
	achieve big goals. Are the specific war aims an outgrowth
of that?)

Mar. 24, Monday. Post front page story, U.S. Losses
Expose Risks, Raise Doubts About Strategy.
The President was appalled.

(Your reaction??7)

Mar. 25. Defense reports to the president, The regime is
perceived as being in control still. By April 5, the CIA
says, Iraqi command and control is disintegrating. -

(By way of summary, in your view what happened in those 11
critical days, if a summary is possible?)

Mar. 25 (continuing) Franks report, Were almost startled
by the progress.
The president has a series of questions: Whats the
~.ondition of water treatment? What s the condition of the
oil fields? Commando Solo? How is it operating? What is
the status of the fedayeen? Whats the morale of these
young soldiers and their commanders?

009705,

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<< GX102115 >>

terrzris:s. 3ts irnportar.t fcr ycu tc charactez::e tue
~ these bastards. Theyre tP.~gs.
0

put?
Franks, Not a high degree.
The President said that was not satisfactory and they
needed to m~ke sure the Turks stay put..

(Recall? Reaction?)

Mar. 27, Thursday. Post front page story, War Could Last
Months, Officers say.

(Your reaction? What was going on here? Mow important was
it?)

Mar. 27. Bush and Blair meet at Camp David.

(What was this about?)

Mar. 28. Defense reports that they have three Commando
Solo aircraft in the area. The President asks, How real
does this look to the average Iraqi? Answer the military
is doing still pictures and voiceovers, covering Baghdad
between 6 and 11 at night. The President, You have to
calibrate it, you have to market programs. People dont
turn on television if theres nothing to watch.

(Do you recall? Were the NSC principals or deputies working
this issue?)

Mar. 28 at 2 p.m. the President met with a group of
veterans. The President said Im not paying attention to
the press. . . I get my information from Tommy Franks.
The vets then applauded. We dont second guess out of the
White House, we dont adjust the plan based on editorials,
we dont have timetables.

(Ever hear the president talk like this? Expand if you can
on his view?

OO97c~o
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<< GX102116 >>

Vie:r.arn. was that po1itica~. leaders should not force
t~rnetables on generals to take oressure of~ themselves.

(Recall any discussions about Vietnam and that or other
lessons?)

Nar. 29, Saturday SVTS. Rumsfeld gives some of the bad
news: Shinseki story that should not have started until the
4tk ID was ready; Wallace comments that it was not what they

war gained against. Overall Tom Franks is very
encouraged, Rumsfeld adds. Good news: nothing out of the
Scud baskets, got the oil wells in the south, Patriots are
highly successful, no massive refugees; they didnt mine
the harbors, didnt blow the bridges etc.
The President says, Only one thing matters, winning.
Theres a lot of second guessing regarding the post-Saddam
-world. Our job is to speak to the American people, tell
them how proud we are of the soldiers; to the world to tell
them that we will accomplish this mission; to our European
allies, thanks for your help; to the Iraqi people, we will
be coming to. liberate the entire country. Dont worry
about the carping and second guessing, rise above it, be
confident, remember your constituencies . . . . Its not a
matter of timetable, it s a matter of victory.

(Do you recall this? Your reaction and the reaction of
others?)

March 3).. Franks reports that 54 timesensitive targets
were hit in the last two days.

(Was this the chat room used by Centoom and the
intelligence agencies that could accommodate some 2,000
people to coordinate real-time intelligence and ship it to
the military units in the air or on the ground?
What did you think of all this? Is it correct that nothing
like this was available during the 1992. Gulf War?)

After the experiences in the southern Iraq cities, the
commanders learned that the so-called Thunder Run of
tanks into the cities led to the concentration of Baath
Party officials in a panic so they could be attacked more~~
easily. This informed what happened later in Baghdad.

OO97Q~~
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<< GX102117 >>

Ap:i. .. At the 1~3C, the ?resi~ier.t aske.~ Lx ar~ks, A:e
pleased with our information ops? Franks said, Im not
pleased that Iraqi TV remains on the air. Apparently it
was possible to take it out but that would have taken out
all Arab satellite TV.

(Do you recall this discussion? What was going on here?
Was it a difficult decision?)

April 2, 2:05 p.m. The President met with Wall Street
economists. Were not going to let the stock market drive
the war, the Hill or focus groups or polls. Tommy Franks
drives the war.

(Ever hear similar thoughts? Where and when?)

April 4. Andy Card reports on the four errors by the media
and how this information ought to be put out arid the
corrections noted. He asked that these be put out to let
the public see how bad the errors are. One was a New York
Times correction; a news analysis had suggested or said
that Cheney had called Saddam s government a house of
cards.

(Your reaction?)

April 8. The President and Blair meet in Northern Ireland.
(What were the origins of this? What happened?)

April 9. Cheney speech to editors. The key to the war
plan, Cheney said, was fixed objectives and flexibility in
meeting them.

(Did you have a sense that the war had been won militarily
at that point? Your state of mind about the war was?)

009708

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<< GX102118 >>

	.9 	 I I    	, -    	,,.	1	-
		~A~Ih		3 ~		tr~ ~ ~r.

~Y~ur reactizn, an~ ~ he discuss this?)

ranks reports ~O,OOO estin~ated casualties.

The president was insistent ibat the U.S. define the
baseline against which things are going to be measured---
the conditions in Iraqi cities versus their prewar status,
not against American cities. This guys spent 20 to 30
years ruining this country, the President said. It ~s
going to take a while to rebuild it . . We still have a
lot of work to do. Dont let the celebrations fool you.

(Your reaction?)

GENERAL QUESTIONS:

On the question of Turkey, the president asked Franks if he
could win without Turkey. Franks said it would be an ugly
baby. Can you win? Yes, sir.

(Do you recall this? When was it?)

One person suggested that anyones position on Iraq has to
do with their willingness to tolerate uncertainty. And when
all the assessments and reasoning were laid out, the
President just felt there was too much uncertainty, too
many dots about threats from Saddam. That in the end the
only prudent course was to take him out.

(Is that correct?)

009709

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LLOO5-09727