From ntia  Mon Nov 14 09:07:56 1994
Received: (from ntia@localhost) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) id JAA06933; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:07:56 -0800
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:07:56 -0800
From: NTIA Virtual Conference <ntia>
Message-Id: <199411141707.JAA06933@virtconf.digex.net>
To: avail, intellec, opnacces, privacy, redefus, standard
Subject: NTIA Virtual Conference KeyNote Address


                    WELCOMING STATEMENT FROM 
            DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE DAVID BARRAM

Welcome to the Virtual Conference on Universal Service and Open
Access to the Telecommunications Network.  In hosting this
conference we seek to broaden our reach beyond the physical
limits of any conference room or auditorium.  The NII will tear
down the barriers of time and distance.  This conference, like
the NII itself, is meant to be inclusive and your ideas are
welcome and encouraged.  Your participation will help make it a
success.

This effort is jointly sponsored by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the
Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), as part of the
Administration's National Information Infrastructure initiative. 
Through the NII, the Administration is focusing on the ability of
computer mediated communications to enhance the life and work of
every American.  The NII is a harbinger of change, both economic
and political, and holds great promise for the future of America. 
Some benefits of the NII include telecommuting, distance learning
and active life-long education, remote consultations with expert
medical professionals, as well as new forms of art, entertainment
and culture.

This conference continues the dialog started by NTIA's five field
hearings, held over the past nine months in cities throughout
America.  Unlike the field hearings, this conference allows for a
much wider participation, and more in-depth discussion on the
issues.  There are over 80 public access points in 25 states.

With this conference we are hoping to:

    Garner opinions and views on universal telecommunications
     service that may shape the legislative and regulatory
     debate.

    Demonstrate how networking technology can broaden
     participation in the development of government policies,
     specifically, universal service telecommunications policy.

    Illustrate the potential for using the NII to create an
     electronic commons.

    Create a network of individuals and institutions that will
     continue the dialog started by the conference, once the
     formal sponsorship is over.

This conference is an experiment in a new form of dialog among
citizens and with their government.  The conference is not a one-
way, top down approach, it is a conversation.  It holds the
promise of reworking the compact between citizens and their
government.

I thank you once again for your participation.
From jholman@ns.onramp.net  Mon Nov 14 09:50:34 1994
Received: from ns.onramp.net (ns.onramp.net [199.1.11.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id JAA09998 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:50:34 -0800
Received: from .onramp.net (dal08.onramp.net [199.1.11.108]) by ns.onramp.net (8.6.5/8.6.5) with SMTP id IAA05222 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 08:42:41 -0600
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 08:26:27 PST
From: "Jimmie L. Holman" <jholman@Onramp.NET>
Subject: suscribe virtconf jholman@onramp.net
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
X-Mailer: Chameleon - TCP/IP for Windows by NetManage, Inc.
Message-ID: <Chameleon.4.00.941114083339.jholman@.onramp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

>
>You may subscribe to the privacy discussion by sending email to:
>
>   privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov


From MILLJEFF@uofrlaw.urich.edu  Mon Nov 14 09:53:30 1994
Received: from urvax.urich.edu (urvax.urich.edu [141.166.36.6]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id JAA10168 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:53:29 -0800
Received: from UOFRLAW (uofrlaw.urich.edu)
 by urvax.urich.edu (PMDF V4.3-11 #7506)
 id <01HJGR7R93PS004K9O@urvax.urich.edu>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:45:31 -0500 (EST)
Received: from UOFRLAW/MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon,
 14 Nov 94 9:45:09 EST
Received: from MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon, 14 Nov 94 9:44:59 EST
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:44:53 -0500 (EST)
From: Jeffrey Millican <MILLJEFF@uofrlaw.urich.edu>
Subject: RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Message-id: <43C1A6E37B3@UOFRLAW>
Organization: University of Richmond
X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail v3.22
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Priority: normal

    As a law student, it is hard to believe that I will: 1.) attend a 
prestigious conference; 2.) discuss issues of privacy law with a wide 
diversity of scholars; 3.) attend all my scheduled classes; and 4.) 
go home for supper tonight.  It is like an AT&T commercial with Tom 
Selleck except instead of saying "You Will" were saying "You ARE!"  
It is a real pleasure for me to be part of this.  

PRVACY IN AN ELECTRONIC COMMONS

    It will be tough to answer questions posed here for many reasons. 
 Not the least of which is: 1.) Issues of National (US) sovereignty 
and security are juxtaposed against a SEAMLESS electronic network; 
2.) Issues of Federalism arise over a court's jurisdiction in this 
environment - is it for the states or for the federal government; 3.) 
Issues of personal privacy - what's to stop me from getting 
pornography I do not want or unsolicited advertisments.  

    First: Issues of US national sovereignty.  If anyone has claim to 
this net it is us (US).  Internet is the regulated and permitted 
outgrowth of the ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency NETwork). 
Literally, a spinoff of the Cold War, in which the Free World was 
victorious, the Internet moves to encompass a much larger Free World. 
Issues of security for all nations must be questionned, and the US 
must ask itself: "Shall we be the Eagle which provides its own 
feather?"  
    I, therefore, propose that the limits of the systems security 
remain in the hands of the US Defense establishment with 
Congressional oversight.  This will allow for privacy encoding to be 
established in the network without jeopardizing our nations security. 
In an era of defense cuts and "rightsizing" we cannot allow for us to 
play "catch-up" in times of crises.  

    Second: Whose courts, within the US, will resolve conflicts of 
litigatable proportions?  While the Internet is clearly a federal 
matter, what about connected Local Area Networks or Electronic 
Bulletin Boards.  Will the development of an "Electronic Common Law" 
become applicable to the "Electronic Commons?"  
    I propose that the Internet and all related activity to the 
Internet be under Federal Jurisdiction.  Similar to a state long arm 
statute any transaction on the Internet is, for that transaction, 
under federal jurisdiction.  Local networks will be subject to state 
law unless the transaction in question was on the Internet.  

    Third: How will my personal privacy, and sanity, be maintained in 
this increasingly penetrating multi-media world?  When Tom Selleck 
says I can send a fax from the beach - I get scared!!! Won't I be 
able to relax in privacy on the beach?  If I can send, will I not 
also recieve?  What will be sent me?  If I am relaxing on the beach 
with my family, the last thing I want is to recieve is a fax.  Worse, 
is getting a fax from an impersonal advertiser who wants to sell me 
something.  Or, God forbid, a high resolution pornographic fax 
advertising a phone sex line.  
    I propose that tight restrictions on the commercial use of 
Internet addresses be implemented, and that Internet users have an 
easy, low cost dispute resolution tool with which to enforce their 
privacy.  An online Internet Arbitrator who may award money or 
equitable damages to complaintants against commercial entities who 
violate privacy laws may be the answer. 

    I look forward to further participating.  I am off to class!
                            Take Care,
                            Jeffrey Millican
                            milljeff@uofrlaw.urich.edu
                            
The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance.
                             
    





























From jholman@ns.onramp.net  Mon Nov 14 09:55:55 1994
Received: from ns.onramp.net (ns.onramp.net [199.1.11.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id JAA10323 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:55:55 -0800
Received: from .onramp.net (dal08.onramp.net [199.1.11.108]) by ns.onramp.net (8.6.5/8.6.5) with SMTP id IAA05422 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 08:48:03 -0600
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 08:37:52 PST
From: "Jimmie L. Holman" <jholman@Onramp.NET>
Subject: suscribe privacy jholman@onramp.net
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
X-Mailer: Chameleon - TCP/IP for Windows by NetManage, Inc.
Message-ID: <Chameleon.4.00.941114083901.jholman@.onramp.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

suscribe privacy jholman@onramp.net

From <@QUCDN.QueensU.CA:andrukow@cspo.QueensU.CA>  Mon Nov 14 10:36:43 1994
Received: from QUCDN.QueensU.CA (QUCDN.QueensU.CA [130.15.126.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA14797 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:36:42 -0800
Received: from cspo.QueensU.CA by QUCDN.QueensU.CA (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with TCP;
   Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:27:57 EST
Received: by cspo.QueensU.CA (5.0/SMI-SVR4)
	id AA14535; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:29:32 +0600
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:29:32 -0600 (CST)
From: Alison Andrukow <andrukow@cspo.QueensU.CA>
X-Sender: andrukow@cspo
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Subject: Subscribe Alison Andrukow
Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.941114102900.14492E@cspo>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
content-length: 26

Subscribe Alison Andrukow
From <@QUCDN.QueensU.CA:andrukow@cspo.QueensU.CA>  Mon Nov 14 10:38:13 1994
Received: from QUCDN.QueensU.CA (QUCDN.QueensU.CA [130.15.126.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA15036 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:38:12 -0800
Received: from cspo.QueensU.CA by QUCDN.QueensU.CA (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with TCP;
   Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:29:17 EST
Received: by cspo.QueensU.CA (5.0/SMI-SVR4)
	id AA14348; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:54:39 +0600
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:54:39 -0600 (CST)
From: Alison Andrukow <andrukow@cspo.QueensU.CA>
X-Sender: andrukow@cspo
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Message-Id: <Pine.SOL.3.91.941114095413.14287F-100000@cspo>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
content-length: 0

sign me up.alison.
From freedman.richard@mail.ndhm.gtegsc.com  Mon Nov 14 10:39:08 1994
Received: from eagle.ndhm.gtegsc.com (eagle.ndhm.gtegsc.com [155.95.155.166]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA15129 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:39:08 -0800
Received: from mail.ndhm.gtegsc.com by eagle.ndhm.gtegsc.com with SMTP;
          Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:31:41 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <n1427313458.65714@mail.ndhm.gtegsc.com>
Date: 14 Nov 1994 10:28:37 -0500
From: "Freedman Richard" <freedman.richard@mail.ndhm.gtegsc.com>
Subject:  
To: "privacy conference" <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>
X-Mailer: Mail*Link SMTP/MS 3.0.0

subscribe property Richard Freedman
From geoffrey@vt.edu  Mon Nov 14 10:51:02 1994
Received: from vtucs.cc.vt.edu (vtucs.cc.vt.edu [128.173.4.72]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA15810 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:51:01 -0800
Message-Id: <199411141851.KAA15810@virtconf.digex.net>
Received: from geoffrey.beva.blacksburg.va.us by vtucs.cc.vt.edu with SMTP
	(1.37.109.8/16.2) id AA00417; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:43:01 -0500
X-Sender: geoffrey@mail.vt.edu
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:42:41 +0500
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
From: geoffrey@vt.edu (Geoffrey C. Chapman)
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:4] RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference
X-Mailer: <PC Eudora Version 1.4>

It seems to me, sir, that you may have one or two priorities out of order. 
Re your concern about receiving what you do not wish to receive, I would 
argue (as I do with regard to sex and violence on TV) that you STILL have an 
on-off switch; i.e., if you don't turn the darn thing on--or just don't take 
it to the beach--it isn't going to interrupt your privacy. This, by contrast 
to the telephone, which unless you take it off the hook, will invariably 
interrupt you at dinnertime by someone trying to sell you something, survey 
you for something--or try to sell you another phone service. One can always, 
later, delete incoming faxes or email without reading it if one chooses.
My concern with privacy is simply this: Who is reading over my shoulder 
without my knowledge and why? And if the net, as you suggest, is in the hand 
of the military or federal government in some other form, what's to prevent 
blatent abuse there? If someone sends me unwanted porn, I can always wipe it 
out without even looking at it. But if Big Brother is watching what I send 
and to whom, there's nothing I can do about it, and undoubtedly no way I 
could know in the first place. This is a frightening issue and one I hope 
will be seriously addressed here.
>    As a law student, it is hard to believe that I will: 1.) attend a 
>prestigious conference; 2.) discuss issues of privacy law with a wide 
>diversity of scholars; 3.) attend all my scheduled classes; and 4.) 
>go home for supper tonight.  It is like an AT&T commercial with Tom 
>Selleck except instead of saying "You Will" were saying "You ARE!"  
>It is a real pleasure for me to be part of this.  
>
>PRVACY IN AN ELECTRONIC COMMONS
>
>    It will be tough to answer questions posed here for many reasons. 
> Not the least of which is: 1.) Issues of National (US) sovereignty 
>and security are juxtaposed against a SEAMLESS electronic network; 
>2.) Issues of Federalism arise over a court's jurisdiction in this 
>environment - is it for the states or for the federal government; 3.) 
>Issues of personal privacy - what's to stop me from getting 
>pornography I do not want or unsolicited advertisments.  
>
>    First: Issues of US national sovereignty.  If anyone has claim to 
>this net it is us (US).  Internet is the regulated and permitted 
>outgrowth of the ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency NETwork). 
>Literally, a spinoff of the Cold War, in which the Free World was 
>victorious, the Internet moves to encompass a much larger Free World. 
>Issues of security for all nations must be questionned, and the US 
>must ask itself: "Shall we be the Eagle which provides its own 
>feather?"  
>    I, therefore, propose that the limits of the systems security 
>remain in the hands of the US Defense establishment with 
>Congressional oversight.  This will allow for privacy encoding to be 
>established in the network without jeopardizing our nations security. 
>In an era of defense cuts and "rightsizing" we cannot allow for us to 
>play "catch-up" in times of crises.  
>
>    Second: Whose courts, within the US, will resolve conflicts of 
>litigatable proportions?  While the Internet is clearly a federal 
>matter, what about connected Local Area Networks or Electronic 
>Bulletin Boards.  Will the development of an "Electronic Common Law" 
>become applicable to the "Electronic Commons?"  
>    I propose that the Internet and all related activity to the 
>Internet be under Federal Jurisdiction.  Similar to a state long arm 
>statute any transaction on the Internet is, for that transaction, 
>under federal jurisdiction.  Local networks will be subject to state 
>law unless the transaction in question was on the Internet.  
>
>    Third: How will my personal privacy, and sanity, be maintained in 
>this increasingly penetrating multi-media world?  When Tom Selleck 
>says I can send a fax from the beach - I get scared!!! Won't I be 
>able to relax in privacy on the beach?  If I can send, will I not 
>also recieve?  What will be sent me?  If I am relaxing on the beach 
>with my family, the last thing I want is to recieve is a fax.  Worse, 
>is getting a fax from an impersonal advertiser who wants to sell me 
>something.  Or, God forbid, a high resolution pornographic fax 
>advertising a phone sex line.  
>    I propose that tight restrictions on the commercial use of 
>Internet addresses be implemented, and that Internet users have an 
>easy, low cost dispute resolution tool with which to enforce their 
>privacy.  An online Internet Arbitrator who may award money or 
>equitable damages to complaintants against commercial entities who 
>violate privacy laws may be the answer. 
>
>    I look forward to further participating.  I am off to class!
>                            Take Care,
>                            Jeffrey Millican
>                            milljeff@uofrlaw.urich.edu
>                            
>The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance.
>                             
>    
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

From BEVR@ksgrsch.harvard.edu  Mon Nov 14 11:05:31 1994
Received: from shango.harvard.edu (shango.harvard.edu [128.103.190.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id LAA16867 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:05:30 -0800
Received: from ksgrsch.harvard.edu by shango.harvard.edu with smtp
	(Smail3.1.28.1 #2) id m0r73qr-000FBSC; Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:01 EST
Received: from RESEARCH/MAILQUEUE by ksgrsch.harvard.edu (Mercury 1.13);
    Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:57:30 -500
Received: from MAILQUEUE by RESEARCH (Mercury 1.13); Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:57:29 -500
From: <BEVR@ksgrsch.harvard.edu>
Organization:  Kennedy School of Government
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Date:          Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:57:26 EST
Subject:       privacy
Priority: normal
X-mailer:     Pegasus Mail v3.1 (R1a)
Message-ID: <2DFB297084A@ksgrsch.harvard.edu>

NTIA Virtual Conference Nov.14-18:  I would like to subscribe.  
Thanks.


From KLRAPER@ISCEMS.remnet.rockwell.com  Mon Nov 14 11:30:04 1994
Received: from ns1.mke.ab.com (ns1.mke.ab.com [130.151.82.121]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id LAA18768 for <privacy@VIRTCONF.NTIA.DOC.GOV>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:30:03 -0800
Received: from ABSSW.REMNET.AB.COM (mkeibm.mke.ab.com) by ns1.mke.ab.com (4.1/SMI-4.1)
	id AA24449; Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:22:48 CST
Received: from ISCEMS.REMNET.AB.COM by ABSSW.REMNET.AB.COM
        (Soft*Switch Central V4L380P5) id 105021100094318FISCEMS;
        14 Nov 1994 08:20:08 CST
Message-Id: <ISCEMS.KLRAPER.105021100094318FISCEMS@REMNET.AB.COM>
Date: 14 Nov 1994 08:20:08 CST
From: "Karen Raper" <KLRAPER@ISCEMS.remnet.rockwell.com>
Subject: Privacy in Internet Communications
To: privacy@VIRTCONF.NTIA.DOC.GOV
Comment: ISCEMS   KLRAPER  11/14/94 08:20:46 WORLD


In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be
assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and
agree to encoding/decoding methods.  The problem with this technique, however,
is that encryption/decryption requires additional hardware and/or software
which is not necessarily cheap and accessible to all.  Also, there's likely
some problems with securing the encryption/decryption mechanisms themselves.
It also limits the communications to directed only, not "broadcasted" messages.
Should the use of the "internet common" be limited to only those applications
which are not sensitive to privacy?  What would those applications be?

Kindest regards, -KLR

From JQIANG@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU  Mon Nov 14 11:36:28 1994
Received: from CENTER.COLGATE.EDU (colgate.edu [149.43.1.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id LAA19174 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:35:47 -0800
From: JQIANG@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU
Received: from CENTER.COLGATE.EDU by CENTER.COLGATE.EDU (PMDF #3157 ) id
 <01HJGTO9KHN48WYF0L@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:56:42 EDT
Date: 14 Nov 1994 10:56:42 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Passord
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Message-id: <01HJGTO9KRAA8WYF0L@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU>
X-VMS-To: IN%"privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov"
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT

Why do we need to change the password? 
From donbrown@rain.org  Mon Nov 14 13:55:52 1994
Received: from coyote.rain.org (root@coyote.rain.org [198.68.144.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id NAA24707 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:55:51 -0800
Received: by coyote.rain.org(4.1/SMI-RAIN) with id AA22651 
	  for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov on Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:17:18 PST
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:17:17 -0800 (PST)
From: Donald Brown <donbrown@rain.org>
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Cc: Multiple recipients of list <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:11] Privacy in Internet Communications
In-Reply-To: <ISCEMS.KLRAPER.105021100094318FISCEMS@REMNET.AB.COM>
Message-Id: <Pine.SUN.3.90.941114101520.19417H-100000@coyote.rain.org>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

I believe that Karen is correct.  

On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Karen Raper wrote:

> 
> In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be
> assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and
> agree to encoding/decoding methods.  The problem with this technique, however,
> is that encryption/decryption requires additional hardware and/or software
> which is not necessarily cheap and accessible to all.  Also, there's likely
> some problems with securing the encryption/decryption mechanisms themselves.
> It also limits the communications to directed only, not "broadcasted" messages.
> Should the use of the "internet common" be limited to only those applications
> which are not sensitive to privacy?  What would those applications be?
> 
> Kindest regards, -KLR
> 
> 
From mcintosh@cs.rice.edu  Mon Nov 14 13:57:12 1994
Received: from cs.rice.edu (cs.rice.edu [128.42.1.30]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id NAA24894 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:57:11 -0800
Received: from helena.cs.rice.edu by cs.rice.edu (AA15216); Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:26:13 CST
Received: by helena.cs.rice.edu (AA08324); Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:26:10 CST
From: mcintosh@cs.rice.edu (Nathaniel McIntosh)
Message-Id: <9411141726.AA08324@helena.cs.rice.edu>
Subject: Privacy on the Internet
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:26:09 -0600 (CST)
In-Reply-To: <ISCEMS.KLRAPER.105021100094318FISCEMS@REMNET.AB.COM> from "Karen Raper" at Nov 14, 94 11:30:21 am
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23]
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Length: 1241      

>From: "Karen Raper" <KLRAPER@iscems.remnet.rockwell.com>
>
>In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be
>assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and
>agree to encoding/decoding methods.  ...

<snip>

I agree -- encryption seems like it will be very important.

In addition to simply insuring that private communications can't be
read by third parties, though, there is the issue of whether vendors
can pass on "incidental" information that is obtained as a side effect
of communication.

For example, if I download a file on prescription drugs from an
archive server somewhere, the owner of that archive could sell my user
ID to a company which sells drugs by mail.

Or suppose I send email to a travel agent to buy some plane tickets,
and the travel agent saves my mail message and sells it to some third
party. The third party then analyzes the mail headers and determines
that the program used to send the message was running on a Mac, so in
two weeks I get "junk" email advertising Mac software.

Nat
---
Nathaniel McIntosh     |    Department of Computer Science
mcintosh@cs.rice.edu   |    Rice University, P.O. Box 1892
713-527-8101 x2740     |    Houston, Texas 77251   USA
From DMASSON@ucs.indiana.edu  Mon Nov 14 13:59:06 1994
Received: from geneva.ucs.indiana.edu (portal.ucs.indiana.edu [129.79.4.21]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id NAA25524 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:59:05 -0800
Message-Id: <199411142159.NAA25524@virtconf.digex.net>
Received: from PRISM.DECnet by geneva.ucs.indiana.edu
	(5.65c+/9.6jsm) id AA02364; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:13:51 -0500
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 13:14:42 EST
From: DOUG MASSON <DMASSON@ucs.indiana.edu>
X-To: PO%"privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov"
Subject: Subscribe
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov

subscribe dmasson@ucs.indiana.edu privacy virtual conference
From XCPTRS%TAO1@amdahl.oryx.com  Mon Nov 14 14:07:12 1994
Received: from amdahl.oryx.com (amdahl.oryx.COM [147.223.1.5]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id OAA26996 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:07:11 -0800
Message-Id: <199411142207.OAA26996@virtconf.digex.net>
Received: from TAO1 by amdahl.oryx.com (IBM MVS SMTP V2R2.1) with BSMTP id 0135;
   Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:30:42 EST
Date: Mon 14 Nov 1994 11:29 CT
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
From: Tom.Sullivan@oryx.com
Subject: Electonic Privacy and Regulation

In the words of a great man, (my father), locks and laws were designed to keep
honest people honest, neither will stop a criminal. To suggest that our
national security will be compromised on the net underestimates the ingenuity
of the perpeTRAITORS. Any legislation to provide the government the ability to
monitor communications amounts to a sacrifice of privacy for all to provide
marginal benefits and a huge opportunity for abuse. Not a good tradeoff!
The authorities have as much right to peek into my windows as it does to
intercept my communications, electronic or otherwise. That doesn't mean I
have to leave my curtains open.

I would like the capability to unsubscribe or block communications from
specific addresses to keep the unsolicited mail to a manageable level. If
there is some questionable content in a communication, a disclaimer on the
first page would be adequate. I would think most advertisers would be happy
to voluntarily comply with this request as a courtesy.

Tom Sullivan
From levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu  Mon Nov 14 14:12:58 1994
Received: from blatz.cs.uwm.edu (blatz.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.2.6]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA27863 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:12:55 -0800
Received: (from levine@localhost) by blatz.cs.uwm.edu (8.6.9/8.6.9) id NAA01934 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:05:00 -0600
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Message-Id: <199411141905.NAA01934@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Subject: Some topics for discussion
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:05:00 -0600 (CST)
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Phones: 1-414-229-5170 office; -229-6958 fax
Return-Receipt-To: llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Length: 8594      

Mark Rotenberg and I have been asked to produce a running review 
of what appears here on a daily basis.  We will try to use this 
review to center each days discussion based on the previous day's 
work.  As a beginning let us consider the following:

One approach to personal privacy is to consider it is a concept 
that permits each individual to deny to others certain facts 
about his or her life.  Its definition may depend upon the social 
attitude of a particular group.  Salary, for example, might be 
considered private for one group and public for another.

Sometimes individuals barter part of their privacy in order to 
obtain other advantages that are important to them.  As long as 
the bartering is on an even footing, as long as what each person 
gets for the privacy lost is viewed by that person as a fair 
trade, and as long as the bartering is done with free will the 
loss of privacy that occurs is generally not considered a 
problem.

For example, anyone might have purchased some office supplies at 
a shop and paid with a personal check.  Before the clerk would 
accept such a check she might well ask to see the purchaser's 
driver's license, checked the picture against his face, and 
copied the license number onto the check.  The purchaser 
effectively gave the shop a copy of his license number in 
exchange for them trusting the check, a deal that many would 
consider fair.  Furthermore, had the customer been concerned, he 
could have gone to a cash machine, taken some cash out of his 
checking account and then paid the shop with anonymous cash.  At 
some small cost of personal time he could have maintained his 
anonymity at the shop.

A second example:  Anyone might well have purchased a can opener 
manufactured by a major corporation.  She might find enclosed a 
registration card asking for her name, address, phone number, 
shopping and reading habits, life style, birth date, marital 
status, annual income, number and age of children, home ownership 
status, occupation, credit card type, and a selection of her 
hobbies chosen from a list of fifty items.  A final check box 
even might allowed her to refuse mailings from a "multi company 
marketing program".  She would also be expected to pay the 
postage costs for returning the registration card.  In return for 
this the manufacturer would offer to contact her about any safety 
notifications dealing with the can opener. Many people would 
judge that the barter of that level of intrusion for that 
advantage was not in their best interest.

In many social interactions there is an exchange of personal 
information for other advantages.  In the two examples above the 
benefit to the individual can be shown to vary.  Both of them, 
however, were voluntary in that subject had the choice of paying 
by cash or check and of accepting or rejecting a potential safety 
notice.

Other transactions are not voluntary.  These transactions involve 
information extracted from an individual by a government via an 
act of law and by large conglomerates or corporations pooling 
otherwise voluntarily submitted data.  

An example of the first might be driver's license data.  A 
driver's license and car registration are appropriate tradeoffs 
of private information to the state affirming our individual 
acceptance of responsibility for our actions in return for the 
improved mobility afforded by being able to drive anywhere in the 
nation.  But the public disclosure of these records has raised 
problems, ranging from excessive junk mail to the murder of a 
licensee.  Recent federal legislation, aimed at increasing the 
privacy of driver's license information is still to be tested to 
see if it establishes appropriate boundaries.

An example of the second might be data collected and sold by 
credit reporting agencies combining publicly available bankruptcy 
data with credit card purchases and medical data.  There is a 
good deal of controversy in the United States about exactly who 
owns such data collected by grocery stores, hospitals, credit 
agencies and the like.  

Another example might be if the local telephone company decided 
to start selling the records of the telephone calls of its 
customers.  As a practical matter, a telephone customer might  
have difficulty finding another local carrier who didn't sell the 
records. In this sense the disclosure would be involuntary.

A different approach to privacy is to think about principles that 
generally make good sense for social well-being. For example, the 
legal principle that protects the confidentiality of what a 
patient tells a doctor is based on the belief that if the patient 
is assured confidentiality he or she is more likely to be 
forthcoming with the doctor.  This leads to more accurate 
diagnosis and better medical care. Similar legal privileges exist 
for communications between spouses, between attorneys and 
clients, and between priests and parishioners.

Other privacy principles are based on concerns about specific 
types of abuse.  The Privacy Act of 1974 limits the sharing of 
private records by government agencies.  This law was passed in 
response to concerns about the creation of a centralized Big 
Brother database that many believe would threaten the freedom of 
American citizens.  There is, at present, no such limitation on 
the equivalent action on the part of corporations.

Other laws exist to protect the privacy of telephone 
communications and even the privacy of video rental records.

In the example of cashing the check above, we might decide as a 
matter of policy that stores should not ask individuals for their 
licenses when they cash checks because of concern that the stores 
might misuse the license information. This policy may have the 
effect of requiring stores to rely on check verification services 
(which many do) or simply accepting the risk of bad debts. 
Whether the policy makes sense depends on how we balance the 
privacy concern against the potential costs.

We might also have a policy that says that companies should not 
sell a person's name unless the company receives the person's 
affirmative consent. This "opt-in" approach is generally not 
followed in the United States, although it is followed in Europe.  
Some people believe it would be a good way to protect privacy 
here.

Other privacy issues are less related to laws and principles and 
more tied specifically to recent developments in technology.  
Encryption provides a method for very private communications.  
Policies for encryption may have a great impact on the level of 
privacy for future users of the information highway.

Encryption also creates a capability for "pseudononymous" 
transactions.  These are transactions where the actual identity 
of the buyer is kept hidden but sufficient information is 
available to the seller to verify the transaction.  Such systems 
may well be suited for network environments such as the Internet.

Anonymity can also be maintained by simple debit cards, such as 
the metro cards in some of the large metropolitan areas like San 
Francisco or Washington, or by telephone cards.  With these 
electronic cash cards, it is possible to pay for services and to 
keep absolute anonymity.

Returning to our example of buying the office supplies, if our 
subject carried an electronic cash card and the store was 
equipped to read the card, he would have been able to purchase 
the supplies without disclosing his identity.

The privacy issues facing users of the information infrastructure 
are likely to combine aspects of several of the approaches 
described above.  Of course, not all of these ideas work equally 
well.  And that's where the decisions have to be made.

Here are a few questions to consider:

- Is privacy really that important?  Couldn't we get by with less 
focus on privacy issues?

- What are the most serious privacy concerns that will face the 
users of the information highway?  What specifically is the 
problem?

- Who are likely to pose the greatest threats to privacy?  Is it 
the government?  Is it the private sector?

- Can you think of an example where your privacy or the privacy 
of someone you know was violated?  What did you (or the other 
person) do?

- What policies do you think are best for privacy protection?  Do 
you favor barter systems, new laws, technology, or some 
combination?

Prof. Leonard Levine            Marc Rotenberg, Director
University of Wisconsin-        Electronic Privacy Information 
Milwaukee                       Center
Milwaukee, WI                   Washington, DC



From Richmeyer_Joseph/GHQ_RAPA@rapa1.sbc.com  Mon Nov 14 14:19:06 1994
Received: from rutgers.edu (RUTGERS.EDU [128.6.21.9]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id OAA29119; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:19:05 -0800
From: Richmeyer_Joseph/GHQ_RAPA@rapa1.sbc.com
Received: from texbell.sbc.com by rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) 
	id AA19885; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:11:10 EST
Received: from rapa1 (rapa1.sbc.com) by texbell.sbc.com (4.1/SMI-4.1)
	id AA25288; Mon, 14 Nov 94 12:58:47 CST
Received: from  by rapa1 with SMTP
	(1.37.109.4/16.2) id AA03566; Mon, 14 Nov 94 13:09:00 -0600
X-Openmail-Hops: 1
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 13:08:07 -0600
Message-Id: <H000023500936469@MHS>
Subject: Untitled
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov, standard@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov

unsubscribe jr9283@rapa1.sbc.com privacy virtual conference
From wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us  Mon Nov 14 14:20:48 1994
Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA29388 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:20:47 -0800
Received: from server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us [198.108.4.7]) by merit.edu (8.6.8.1/merit-1.0) with SMTP id OAA05556 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:12:56 -0500
Received: from [198.111.160.21] by server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (4.1/1123-1.2)
	id AA07332; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:14:26 EST
Message-Id: <9411141914.AA07332@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:13:09 -0500
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
From: wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (Wayne County RESA)
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:16] Electonic Privacy and Regulation

>In the words of a great man, (my father), locks and laws were designed to keep
>honest people honest, neither will stop a criminal. To suggest that our
>national security will be compromised on the net underestimates the ingenuity
>of the perpeTRAITORS. Any legislation to provide the government the ability to
>monitor communications amounts to a sacrifice of privacy for all to provide
>marginal benefits and a huge opportunity for abuse. Not a good tradeoff!
>The authorities have as much right to peek into my windows as it does to
>intercept my communications, electronic or otherwise. That doesn't mean I
>have to leave my curtains open.
>
>I would like the capability to unsubscribe or block communications from
>specific addresses to keep the unsolicited mail to a manageable level. If
>there is some questionable content in a communication, a disclaimer on the
>first page would be adequate. I would think most advertisers would be happy
>to voluntarily comply with this request as a courtesy.
>
>Tom Sullivan

The latest incident of spying didn't involve high tech. It was one
intelligence guy stealing info and letting his Russian connection know by
marking an "X" on a mailbox. Not very high tech but effective. Privacy is
paramount in a democratic society. The ability to communicate freely and
share information helps everyone.


From MILLJEFF@uofrlaw.urich.edu  Mon Nov 14 14:36:06 1994
Received: from urvax.urich.edu (urvax.urich.edu [141.166.36.6]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA01460 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:36:05 -0800
Received: from UOFRLAW (uofrlaw.urich.edu)
 by urvax.urich.edu (PMDF V4.3-11 #7506)
 id <01HJGXR5IZJK003AFF@urvax.urich.edu>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 12:52:57 -0500 (EST)
Received: from UOFRLAW/MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon,
 14 Nov 94 12:52:35 EST
Received: from MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon, 14 Nov 94 12:52:10 EST
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 12:52:10 -0500 (EST)
From: Jeffrey Millican <MILLJEFF@uofrlaw.urich.edu>
Subject: RE: Of Big Brother, Phone Cops, and the On/Off Switch
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Cc: geoffrey@vt.edu
Message-id: <43F392405AC@UOFRLAW>
Organization: University of Richmond
X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail v3.22
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Priority: normal

    OF BIG BROTHER: {Response to Mr. Chapman} 
    I agree that abuse of this system to monitor citizens is of 
concern, but one must remember that this "electronic common" is 
one created by the government, and therefore under its control.  
Further, unlike landowners we are users with lisence from the owner.  
In this case we must submit to the owners rules and regulations.  Our 
rights in the lisence are circumscribed by the owner through his 
grant of that lisence.  [see concepts of lisence, and sovereign 
immunity].  
    This then comes to the heart of my proposal: Regulation by the 
Department of Defense (DOD) with Congressional oversight.  There are 
two basic limitations which will benefit the citizen-user of the 
Internet.  First, DOD may not conduct inteligence activities against 
US citizens (EO 12333), therefore the DOD may never become the 
thought police which maintain the system and oppress its users. It 
also makes it tougher for law enforcement (state, FBI, IRS, etc) to 
get onto the net to conduct such operations, since they MUST, under 
my idea, get DOD approval.  Second, Congress, the elected 
representatives of the people, would have oversight.  Like 
Intelligence Oversight, Congressional oversight would be a strong one 
especially when Congress would use the Internet to communicate with 
other government agencies, commercial entities, and, most 
importantly, their CONSTITUTIENTS!

    OF THE ON/OFF SWITCH: {Response to Mr. Chapman}
    When I saw your message in my queue I knew this: 1.) it was about 
this conference, and 2.) your name.  I HAD to open my mail to conduct 
the housekeeping on my account and partake in this Conference.  
Therein lies the rub, unless you open and process your e-mail, or 
read your faxes, you can't manage your information.  Turning the 
switch to off, tuning out, doesn't work; and we find our selves more 
akin to a phone then the TV.  I, then, propose strict disclosure laws 
for pornographers on the Internet.  Similar to the ones for the 
current Postal System.  Would that work?

    OF USING CODING UNITS {Response to Ms. Raper}
    As noted above we are here under lisence, and will the owner let 
us talk without him knowing?  Not for a Big Brother purpose but for 
security.  For example, you and I talk over this net in code which 
the owner can't read.  If we only talk about the weather, business, 
etc. there is no problem, but if you start passing government secrets 
to me so that my government, or radical group may use them then the 
owner wants to know.  This is why I think that under DOD control, as 
above, users be allowed to participate using approved ecoding units.  
It reaches your goal of keeping out your neighbor, but accomodates 
the owners desire not to see a terrorist attack facilitated by the 
Internet occur.  

    OF RESPONSE
    I look forward to hearing from you.  Enjoy the Conference. 
                        Take Care,
                        Jeffrey Millican
                        milljeff@uofrlaw.urich.edu
                        
The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance.                        
From cnewmark@crl.com  Mon Nov 14 14:47:46 1994
Received: from mail.crl.com (mail.crl.com [165.113.1.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id OAA02241 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:47:45 -0800
Received: from crl3.crl.com by mail.crl.com with SMTP id AA20623
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:39:18 -0800
Received: by crl3.crl.com id AA07572
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:39:42 -0800
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:39:42 -0800 (PST)
From: Craig Newmark <cnewmark@crl.com>
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:14] Privacy on the Internet
In-Reply-To: <9411141726.AA08324@helena.cs.rice.edu>
Message-Id: <Pine.SUN.3.91.941114113702.7344B-100000@crl3.crl.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Nathaniel McIntosh wrote:

> >From: "Karen Raper" <KLRAPER@iscems.remnet.rockwell.com>
> >
> >In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be
> >assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and
> >agree to encoding/decoding methods.  ...
> 
> <snip>
I'm the security architect at a major financial services firm.  I'm 
already proposing the use of public key methods to insure privacy when 
people use our home-oriented investment programs.  I can't speak for other
companies, but the whole Clipper controversy has sensitized a lot people to
the need for consumer privacy.  (More on that later.)
___________________________________________
Craig Newmark
cnewmark@well.sf.ca.us
cnewmark@crl.com

From wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us  Mon Nov 14 14:51:28 1994
Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA02736 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:51:27 -0800
Received: from server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us [198.108.4.7]) by merit.edu (8.6.8.1/merit-1.0) with SMTP id OAA09896 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:43:23 -0500
Received: from [198.111.160.21] by server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (4.1/1123-1.2)
	id AA07520; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:44:52 EST
Message-Id: <9411141944.AA07520@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:43:36 -0500
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
From: wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (Wayne County RESA)
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:20] RE: Of Big Brother, Phone Cops, and the On/Off Switch

>    OF BIG BROTHER: {Response to Mr. Chapman}

>The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance.

I rather see the commercialization of the internet than see the internet
under DOD and Congressional Oversight neither of which are very reliable or
harbingers of freedom. The price of freedom is incurred risk.I'm not
worried about radicals of the left or the right utilizing the internet for
nefarious means but I am concerned about government using that fear to
exercise more control. The State does not own the internet. We do or
should. I think the ability to exchange ideas without fear of big brother
is a better safeguard for our political freedoms than giving the authority
to the State that says it will take care of this for us. Granted there are
risks involved but I think they are minimal. Technology in the hands of the
people be it a selected few because of economics or demographics is better
than in the arms of a monolith. I think the real issue is educating people
about the importance of privacy. The importance of access to information
and that information is power.
Federico Acerri


From wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us  Mon Nov 14 14:55:50 1994
Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA03035 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:55:49 -0800
Received: from server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us [198.108.4.7]) by merit.edu (8.6.8.1/merit-1.0) with SMTP id OAA10103 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:47:57 -0500
Received: from [198.111.160.21] by server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (4.1/1123-1.2)
	id AA07547; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:49:29 EST
Message-Id: <9411141949.AA07547@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:48:12 -0500
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
From: wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (Wayne County RESA)
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:21] Re: Privacy on the Internet

The clipper controversy demonstrated the weak arguement that the government
presented. We have less to fear from spies and flaming eyed radicals
utilizing the internet than a government that uses it as a subterfuge for
implementing all kinds of restrictions on access, what is to be accessed,
and who are the people that are providing the information.
Federico Acerri


From sryan@sils.umich.edu  Mon Nov 14 14:57:41 1994
Received: from sils.umich.edu (sils.umich.edu [141.211.203.30]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA03249 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:57:41 -0800
Received: by sils.umich.edu (8.6.8/2.0)
	id OAA03557; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:51:39 -0500
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:51:38 -0500 (EST)
From: Sara Louise Ryan <sryan@umich.edu>
Sender: Sara Louise Ryan <sryan@umich.edu>
Reply-To: Sara Louise Ryan <sryan@umich.edu>
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:17] Some topics for discussion
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
cc: Multiple recipients of list <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>
In-Reply-To: <199411141905.NAA01934@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Message-ID: <Pine.3.89.9411141426.A28740-0100000@sils.umich.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII

My greatest concern about developing policies relating to privacy for the 
NII is that the policy makers understand *exactly*, not only in 
legislative terms but also in technological terms, what their policies 
are stating.  Many "citizens of the Net" frequently express distrust of 
policy makers' ability to comprehend the systems and processes about 
which they are attempting to make policy decisions.
  
Certainly privacy is important, and worthy of consideration.  And there 
are models which can be considered when discussing "electronic privacy," as 
well.

The Postal Service is one example.  We have a certain amount of faith that 
any mail we send shall be delivered without being tampered with; to tamper 
with it is a federal offense.  Tampering with electronic mail could similarly 
be considered a federal offense.  The government is not authorized to intercept 
surface mail for its own purposes; neither should it be authorized to 
intercept electronic mail.  So new laws, based on older laws, are part of 
what I think should be incorporated into a vision of electronic privacy.

I am not sure that we can define who or what the *greatest* threats to 
electronic privacy will be; one could argue credibly for any number of 
sources of threats, from the government to hackers to overly aggressive 
marketers.  What we must develop is a system which ensures privacy 
*regardless* of the source of the threat.  That means not allowing government 
the capacity for an "electronic wiretap," that means forbidding companies 
from tracking electronic mail in the way another participant has 
outlined, and that means that we need penalties for hacking based on an 
understanding of what hacking *means* and the amount of harm it can and 
cannot do. 

I would also favor technological means of ensuring privacy, specifically 
public key encryption.

Bartering, as defined by Professor Levine and Marc Rotenberg, also would 
have its place, because some people will want to have their names on 
electronic marketing mailing lists, as an example, just as some people 
want to receive many printed catalogs today.

In sum, I favor a combination of methods to ensure privacy, based upon a
real understanding of both the legislative and technological issues 
involved.    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sara Ryan			          	  	
Library Associate			   	
University of Michigan Engineering Library
phone: (313)763-4835                              email: sryan@sils.umich.edu






From cnewmark@crl.com  Mon Nov 14 15:01:35 1994
Received: from mail.crl.com (mail.crl.com [165.113.1.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id PAA03499 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:01:34 -0800
Received: from crl.crl.com (crl.com) by mail.crl.com with SMTP id AA22581
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:53:02 -0800
Received: from crl3.crl.com by crl.crl.com with SMTP id AA23797
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:53:01 -0800
Received: by crl3.crl.com id AA07770
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:52:11 -0800
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:52:10 -0800 (PST)
From: Craig Newmark <cnewmark@crl.com>
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:4] RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference
In-Reply-To: <43C1A6E37B3@UOFRLAW>
Message-Id: <Pine.SUN.3.91.941114114249.7344C-100000@crl3.crl.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Jeffrey Millican wrote:

>     First: Issues of US national sovereignty.  If anyone has claim to 
> this net it is us (US).  Internet is the regulated and permitted 

You might do a little investigation on net culture and history and find 
that no one has any "claim" on the net.  Everyone seems grateful for the 
ARPA work, but the concept of "claim" or ownership was abandoned years ago.

>     I, therefore, propose that the limits of the systems security 
> remain in the hands of the US Defense establishment with 
> Congressional oversight.  This will allow for privacy encoding to be 
> established in the network without jeopardizing our nations security. 

This puts the foxes in charge of the henhouse, which has been 
overwhelmingly rejected.  As for privacy encoding, this suggestion is 
almost unanimously considered a threat, not a solution.  Take a look at 
the EFF or Wired archives for more info, and references to existing 
solutions.

>     I propose that the Internet and all related activity to the 
> Internet be under Federal Jurisdiction.  Similar to a state long arm 

Not a great idea, but an improvement possibly.  Witness the recent 
Memphis "pornography" decision.

> 
>     Third: How will my personal privacy, and sanity, be maintained in 

Like a previous respondent said, turn it off when you want to do so.  I 
already have the time management problem you expect to have, but like 
lots of other people, you learn to deal with it.

> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

___________________________________________
Craig Newmark
cnewmark@well.sf.ca.us
cnewmark@crl.com

From miriam@watson.ibm.com  Mon Nov 14 15:05:31 1994
Received: from watson.ibm.com (watson.ibm.com [129.34.139.4]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id PAA03669 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:05:30 -0800
From: miriam@watson.ibm.com
Message-Id: <199411142305.PAA03669@virtconf.digex.net>
Received: from YKTVMV by watson.ibm.com (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with BSMTP id 7409;
   Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:57:47 EST
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:57:18 EST
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Subject: [PRIVACY:25] RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference

Ref:  Your note of Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:02:08 -0800

please cancel subscription
From cnewmark@crl.com  Mon Nov 14 15:07:10 1994
Received: from mail.crl.com (mail.crl.com [165.113.1.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id PAA03778 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:07:09 -0800
Received: from crl3.crl.com by mail.crl.com with SMTP id AA23367
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for <privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov>); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:58:46 -0800
Received: by crl3.crl.com id AA07955
  (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:59:10 -0800
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:59:10 -0800 (PST)
From: Craig Newmark <cnewmark@crl.com>
To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov
Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:20] RE: Of Big Brother, Phone Cops, and the On/Off Switch
In-Reply-To: <43F392405AC@UOFRLAW>
Message-Id: <Pine.SUN.3.91.941114115247.7344D-100000@crl3.crl.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Jeffrey Millican wrote:

>     OF BIG BROTHER: {Response to Mr. Chapman} 
>     I agree that abuse of this system to monitor citizens is of 
> concern, but one must remember that this "electronic common" is 
> one created by the government, and therefore under its control.  

"Created" true, but only of historical value at this point.  No one 
"controls" the net.

> Second, Congress, the elected 
> representatives of the people, would have oversight.  Like 
> Intelligence Oversight, Congressional oversight would be a strong one 
> especially when Congress would use the Internet to communicate with 
> other government agencies, commercial entities, and, most 
> importantly, their CONSTITUTIENTS!

Congressional oversight has been a consistent failure.  The EFF and EPIC 
have been much better.  Witness the passage of the recent telephony bill, 
export laws regarding encryption, and the entire banking crisis.
___________________________________________
Craig Newmark
cnewmark@well.sf.ca.us
cnewmark@crl.com