UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER V. ALLAN WAYNE MORTON

   No. 83-916

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1983

   On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit

   Brief for the United States

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutory and regulatory
   provisions involved
   Statement
   Summary of argument
   Argument:
      The federal government may
      not be held liable for
      reimbursement when it has,
      pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
      (Supp. V) 659, honored a
      facially valid writ of
      garnishment
       A. The language of the
          garnishment statute precludes
          a finding of liability against
          the government where it has
          performed the usual duties
          of a garnishee and the writ
          was regular on its face
       B. The court of appeals'
          decision disregards
          regulations authorized by
          Congress to implement the
          statute
       C. The court of appeals'
          decision is contrary to
          congressional intent
   Conclusion
   Appendix

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-60a) is reported
at 708 F.2d 680.  The opinion of the Claims Court (Pet. App. 62a-95a)
is not reported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgement of the court of appeals was entered on May 17, 1983.
A timely petition for rehearing was denied on July 5, 1983 (Pet. App.
61a).  On September 26, 1983, the Chief Justice extended the time
within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and
including December 2, 1983.  The petition was filed on that date and
was granted on January 23, 1984.  The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

             STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

   The relevant provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 659 et seq., and the pertinent parts of the implementing
regulations, 5 C.F.R. Pt. 581, as amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 26279-26294
(1983), are set forth in the appendix to this brief.

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether the federal government may be held liable for reimbursement
when it has, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659, honored a facially
valid writ of garnishment issued by a state court to collect alimony
or child support owed by a federal employee, if a federal court later
holds that the state court that issued the underlying judgment lacked
personal jurisdiction over the employee.

                               STATEMENT

   1. Prior to 1974, the sovereign immunity of the United States
barred writs garnishing the salaries of federal employees.  See FHA v.
Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940);  Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 19, 20, (1846).  In 1974, as one of several measures taken to
facilitate the collection of alimony and child support, Congress
enacted 42 U.S.C. 659, /1/ which partially waived sovereign immunity
and allowed garnishment of federal salaries to collect alimony and
child support payments "in like manner and to the same extent as if
the United States * * * were a private person." 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
659(a).  However, under 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659(f), which was added in
1977, /2/ neither the government nor its disbursing officers may be
held liable for amounts paid pursuant to legal process regular on its
face, if such payment is made in accordance with this section and the
regulations issued to carry out this section." The term "legal
process" is defined by statute as "any writ * * * or other similar
process in the nature of garnishment" that, among other tings, "is
issued by * * * a court of competent jurisdiction" (42 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 662(e)(1)).

   Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 661, the Office of Personnel
Management has issued regulations implementing Section 659.  See 5
C.F.R. Pt. 581, as amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 26279-26294 (1983).  These
regulations provide that federal disbursing agents must comply with a
writ of garnishment except in certain enumerated circumstances, such
as where there are jurisdictional defects apparent "on its face" or
where the garnishment is not for alimony or child support.  5 C.F.R.
581.30(a)(1).

   2. Respondent, a career Air Force officer, was sued for divorce in
Alabama.  Served by mail while stationed in Alaska, he failed to make
an appearance in the Alabama suit on the advice of counsel that such
service was insufficient.  /3/ On August 14, 1975, the Alabama court
entered a default judgment granting the divorce and ordering him to
pay alimony and child support.  Subsequently, to enforce that
judgment, Mrs. Morton obtained a writ of garnishment against
respondent's federal pay.  The writ, issued by the Register of the
Tenth Judicial Circuit Court of Alabama, was on the "regular form"
used in that State (Pet. App. 90a).  Attached to the writ was a copy
of the final judgment of divorce, which recited, inter alia:  "'It
appearing of record in this cause that the defendant was duly served
and failed to appear * * *'" (id. at 38a (affidavit of James R.
Russell)).

   The Air Force Finance Officer at Elmendorf Air Base in Alaska
received the writ on December 27, 1976, and promptly notified
respondnet (see 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659(d)).  Respondent, after
seeking the advice of counsel, protested that his pay could not be
garnished because he had not been served properly in the underlying
state court proceeding and because he was neither a resident nor a
domiciliary of Alabama (Pet. App. 4a, 37a-39a).  /4/ However, because
the Alabama writ was "regular on its face," the Air Force filed an
answer in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, confessing indebtedness of
$4,100 to respondent, and later began making deductions from
respondent's salary for payment to the court.  /5/ Other subsequent
garnishment writs were likewise honored.  Pet. App. 4a, 67a, 91a.

   Several months later, respondent successfully sued in the former
Court of Claims for recovery of this money, arguing that the Alabama
court had lacked in personam jurisdiction (see Pet. App. 68a-95a).
The trial judge concluded that "the Air Force Finance Office acted
arbitrarily and illegally when it ignored (respondent's) protest that
the Alabama court did not have jurisdiction to enter a money judgment
against him for alimony and child support, made deductions from
(respondent's) pay, and paid the money over to" the state court (id.
at 81a).

   3. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed (Pet. App. 1a-60a).  /6/ The court of appeals
noted that the government is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 659(f) only if payment is made "pursuant to legal process regular
on its face" (Pet. App. 5a-7a).  The court observed that "legal
process" is defined by 42 U.S.C. 662(e)(1) as process "issued by * * *
a court of competent jurisdiction," and interpreted "competent
jurisdiction" to encompass personal as well as subject matter
jurisdiction (Pet. App. 3a-11a).  The court then determined that
respondent's contacts with Alabama were insufficient to permit the
courts of that State to exercise personal jurisdiction over him (see
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)),
and thus that the Alabama court was not "a court of competent
jurisdiction."

   The court of appeals therefore concluded that the State's
garnishment writ was not "legal process" within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659 and 662(e)(1) (Pet. App. 11a-18a).  /7/ It stated
that "(t)o hold otherwise and to require * * * (respondent), a
resident of Alaska, to proceed in the Alabama state court against (his
former wife) would, in effect, render those statutes violative of
constitutional due process" (id. at 17a).  The court also stated
(ibid. (footnotes omitted)):

      (W)e hold that the immunity provisions of the garnishment
      statute permit the Government, where the process document is
      regular on its face, to make payment without liability on a
      presumption that the underlying judgment is valid, but that such
      a presumption is rebuttable by a showing that the Government had
      notice of a substantial claim of jurisdictional irregularity.

The court found that the government had such notice here and was
consequently liable to respondent for the amount withheld from his
salary pursuant to the writ (id. at 17a-18a).

   Judge Nies dissented (Pet. App. 20a-55a).  She concluded that a
private employer would not be liable to respondent under the
circumstances of this case (id. at 21a-31a) and that the government
was, in any event, immune from respondent's suit under Section 659(f)
because the garnishment writ was "regular on its face" (Pet. App.
33a-36a).  Judge Nies added (id. at 47a):

         The majority decision will create chaos in how the Government
      must operate in the thousands of garnishments it faces daily.
      It must either pay twice, or where permitted by a state court,
      litigate for any employee who raises a "substantial claim of
      jurisdictional irregularity" regardless of the regularity of the
      process "on its face."

                          SUMMARY of ARGUMENT

   The federal garnishment statute, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659, subjects
the federal government to garnishment writs for the enforcement of
child support and alimony obligations "in like manner and to the same
extent" as if it were a private person.  The statute expressly
insulates the government from liability for a payment made "pursuant
to legal process regular on its face, if such payment is made in
accordance with this section and the regulations issued to carry out
this section." Despite these provisions, the court of appeals held the
United States liable to respondent for payments made to respondent's
former wife and children, pursuant to an Alabama state court
garnishment writ that was regular on its face, on the ground that the
state court that issued the underlying divorce decree and awarded
alimony and child support lacked personal jurisdiction over
respondent.  The court of appeals' holding is clearly wrong and leads
to unreasonable results.

   A. The decision below conflicts with the plain language of the
statute.

   1. Although Section 659(a) subjects the government to garnishment
writs "in like manner and to the same extent" as a private party, the
court of appeals' decision would impose on the government far greater
liability and responsibility for legal investigation, analysis, and
litigation than is borne by private garnishees.  Indeed, many state
statutes, including that of Alabama, expressly insulate garnishees
from liability under circumstances such as those here.  A garnishee is
obligated, at most, to notify the principal debtor of the action if he
is not otherwise notified, to answer the state court summons, to state
whether the garnishee owes money or property to the principal debtor
and, if so, the amount, and to comply with the writ of garnishment if
it issues.  As a mere stakeholder, the garnishee is not required to
litigate on behalf of the principal debtor on issues (even
jurisdictional issues) relating to the underlying obligation.  Nor is
the garnishee, as a private party, empowered to second-guess the
jurisdictional holdings of the state court or to "refuse() to honor"
its process, as the court of appeals would require (Pet. App. 19a
n.14).

   2. Section 656(f) unequivocally provides that the federal
government is not liable for payments made "pursuant to legal process
regular on its face," and Section 662(e)(1) defines legal process to
require issuance by "a court of competent jurisdiction." Although the
court of appeals did not dispute that the Alabama state court
garnishment writ was "regular on its face," it concluded that the
immunity provision of Section 659(f) did not apply because there was
no personal jurisdiction over respondent in the underlying divorce
suit.

   In context, however, the term "legal process regular on its face"
cannot sensibly be interpreted to require an inquiry into the personal
jurisdiction of the court that entered the judgment sought to be
enforced by garnishment.  Such an interpretation, in addition to
distorting the usual meaning of the term "competent jurisdiction,"
would effectively read the qualifying term "regular on its face" out
of the statute.  In any event, the court of appeals' approach
permitting the government to comply with writs in the absence of
notice of a "substantial claim of jurisdictional irregularity" (Pet.
App. 17a (footnote omitted)), is supported by no possible reading of
the statute.

   3. The court of appeals' decision cannot be defended as necessary
to protect respondent's due process rights.  Respondent received
actual notice of the divorce suit and of the garnishment proceeding
and had full opportunity to enter a special appearance to challenge
the state court's jurisdiction.  Having failed to do so, he can hardly
claim that due process now entitles him to shift his losses to his
employer.

   B. Regulations authorized by Congress to implement Section 659
remove all discretion from federal disbursing officers to refuse to
honor garnishment writs on the ground of asserted latent
jurisdictional defects.  The court of appeals disregarded these
regulations, despite their intended "legislative effect." Schweiker v.
Gary Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981).

   C. The decision below is manifestly contrary to congressional
intent.  The purpose of the federal garnishment statute is to provide
a means for expeditious enforcement of alimony and child support
judgments against federal employees and retirees.  Congress intended
prompt compliance with state court garnishment writs that are regular
on their face, without further legal obstacles.  Yet the court of
appeals would require extensive and time-consuming investigation for
latent defects in the writ in all cases of an asserted "substantial
claim of jurisdictional irregularity" (Pet. App. 17a (footnote
omitted)).

   The alternative courses of action potentially available to the
government after investigation -- to refuse to honor the writ, to
litigate against the dependent spouse or children, or to institute
interpleader litigation against the principal debtor and the spouse or
children -- would run directly counter to achievement of the statutory
objectives.  Moreover, requiring the federal government to "pay twice"
-- once to the spouse and a second time to the employee -- if a court
subsequently finds the prior garnishment writ defective would be
unfair to federal taxpayers and contrary to principles of sovereign
immunity in the absence of any indication that Congress was aware of,
or intended to assume, such liability.

                               ARGUMENT

 THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR REIMBURSEMENT WHEN
IT HAS, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. (SUPP. V) 659, HONORED A FACIALLY VALID
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT

   In the underlying dispute between respondent and his former wife
and children, the United States is but a stakeholder.  Congress has
directed the federal government to honor state court writs of
garnishment for alimony or child support and expressly immunized the
government and its disbursing agents from liability for amounts paid
"pursuant to legal process regular on its face, if such payment is
made in accordance with this section and the regulations issued to
carry out this section" (42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659(f)).  Inevitably,
some writs received by the federal government will be legally
defective or challengeable, especially given the confused and
conflicting assertions of jurisdiction typical in cross-state marital
disputes among transient spouses.  Yet the government and its agents
are not required to intervene in the underlying litigation on behalf
of either party, to investigate the legal merits of any defense the
employee may have, to make legal judgments about the validity of
facially valid state court orders, to file interpleader actions, or to
subject themselves to state contempt proceedings or default judgments
in order to challenge the validity of the writ.  Congress has
permitted the government to rely on the facial validity of the writ.
The burden of legal research, investigation and litigation must be
borne by the employee involved.  /8/

   The court of appeals adopted a different approach.  It would
require the federal government to shoulder the burden of challenging
the state court order, proveded that the employee has given the
disbursing officers notice of a possible defect in personal
jurisdiction.  This places an unmanageable burden on the government;
in many instances, it will draw the government into marital disputes
and cause the government to oppose the alimony and child support
claims of former spouses and children.  In addition, where the
government has not taken adequate steps to challenge the validity of
the garnishment writ, the decision below will require it to "pay
twice" -- once to ths spouse and children, and a second time to the
employee.  Absent any indication that Congress intended these
consequences, the statute should not be interpreted to lead to so
unreasonable a result.

 A. The Language Of The Garnishment Statute Precludes A Finding of
Liability Against The Government Where It Has Performed The Usual
Duties Of A Garnishee And The Writ Was Regular On Its Face

   The court of appeals, analysis is purportedly based upon the
language of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659, but no fair reading of the
statute supports its conclusion.  We submit that the decision below is
precluded both by Section 659(a), the provision as originally enacted
in 1974, and by Section 659(f), which was added by amendment in 1977
to clarify the original intent.

   1. Section 659(a) provides that wage and salary entitlements of
employees of the United States shall be subject to legal process
brought for the enforcement of alimony or child support "in like
manner and to the same extent as if the United States * * * were a
private person" (42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659(a)).  As Judge Nies pointed
out in dissent (Pet. App. 21a-28a), a private employer garnishee in
Alabama, as in most other states, would be discharged from liability
to an employee defendant under the circumstances of this case.  See
Ala. Code Section 6-6-461 (1977).

   The court of appeals' interpretation would subject the federal
government to far greater liability and responsibility for legal
investigation, analysis, and litigation than is borne by private
garnishees.  Many state statutes expressly insulate garnishees from
liability under circumstances such as those present here.  Alabama law
provides that "(t)he judgment condemning the debt, demands, money or
effects to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's demand is conclusive as
between the garnishee and the defendant to the extent of such
judgment, unless the defendant prosecutes to effect an appeal from
such judgment" (Ala. Code Section 6-6-461 (1977)).  California law
even more explicitly provides (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 706.154(b)
(West Cum. Supp. 1984)) that "an employer who complies with any
written order or written notice which purports to be given or served
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter (on garnishment) is
not subject to any civil or criminal liability for such compliance
unless the employer has actively participated in a fraud." Similarly,
New York law (N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law Section 5209 (McKinney 1978))
states:

         A person who, pursuant to an execution or order, pays or
      delivers, to the judgment creditor or a sheriff or receiver,
      money or other personal property in which a judgment debtor has
      or will have an interest, or so pays a debt he owes the judgment
      debtor, is discharged from his obligation to the judgment debtor
      to the extent of the payment or delivery.  /9/

   The obligations of a garnishee typically are, at most, to notify
the principal debtor, to answer the state court's summons, to state
whether he owes money or property to the principal debtor and, if so,
the amount, and to comply with the writ of garnishment.  This Court
noted in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 226-228 (1905), /10/ that a
garnishee cannot be compelled to reimburse the principal debtor for
payment under compulsion of a garnishment proceeding, /11/ unless the
garnishee negligently failed in his duty to give notice to the
principal debtor.  The purpose of the notice, the Court remarked, is
to give the principal debtor himself the "opportunity to defend the
claim made against him in the attachment suit" (id. at 227).  No
further obligation is placed on the garnishee:  he is not required to
take sides in the underlying litigation and need not file a separate
interpleader action to protect himself from inconsistent judgments.
As between the garnishee and the principal debtor, the debt is
discharged by the garnishee's payment to the court in compliance with
the writ.  See, e.g., Agnew v. Cronin, 141 Cal. App. 2d 117, 306 P.2d
527 (1957) (garnishee is liable for failure to notify principal debtor
of garnishment;  no duty imposed beyond providing notice.)

   The court of appeals, relying on 38 C.J.S. Garnishment Sections 244
and 311 (1943) and cases cited therein, stated that "a valid judgment
against the defendant is essential to the validity of a judgment
against the garnishee" (Pet. App. 11a n.5).  However, this principle
has application only in the context of a defense by the garnishee in
the garnishment action, or by the principal debtor in litigation
against the plaintiff.  See, e.g., Chiaro v. Lemberis, 28 Ill. App. 2d
164, 171 N.E.2d 81 (1960).  It does not apply to the prejudice of a
third party stakeholder.  Neither the court of appeals nor the
relevant sections of C.J.S. cite any case in which this principle has
been applied as a basis for imposing a second liability on the
garnishee in an action by the principal debtor, at least where the
garnishee had notified the principal debtor of the garnishment
proceeding.  /12/ Indeed, 38 C.J.S. Garnishment Section 293(e)(2)
(1943) (footnote omitted) states that "where a garnishee notified
defendant to attend and make defense if he had any, a judgment against
the garnishee will protect him, although he failed to defend on the
ground of irregularity in the garnishment proceedings."

   This follows from the status of the garnishee as a stakeholder in
the action.  The garnishee is summoned to court in the garnishment
action and compelled to answer whether he owes money to or holds
property of the principal debtor.  Upon answer, and if so ordered by
the court, the garnishee is required to deposit the money or other
property belonging to the principal debtor into the registry of the
court.  It would be manifestly unfair to require the garnishee to
shoulder the burden of litigation on behalf of the principal debtor,
where the latter has notice of the proceeding and chooses not to avail
himself of the opportunity to appear to defend his interests, and
likewise unfair to require the garnishee to pay twice in the event the
underlying judgment is found to have a jurisdictional defect not
apparent on the face of the process.

   The equities of the matter were cogently set forth a century ago in
City of New Bedford, 20 F. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1884), a case remarkably
similar to this one.  There, as here, an employee was sued by a
creditor (Blake) in state court, in a proceeding he deemed void for
want of personal jurisdiction.  The employee "had full actual notice
of the suit on the day when it was instituted" (id. at 60), but
"(i)nstead of assuming the defense of that suit, if he had any
defense, he left the (garnishees) to defens as (they) could" (id. at
61).  After the garnishees had been compelled to pay his debts, the
employee repaired to federal court where he sued the garnishees under
the admiralty jurisdiction /13/ and asked the court "to require the
defendants (the garnishees) to pay that part over again" (id. at
60-16).  The court, even though expressly holding that the underlying
judgment was void for want of jurisdiction (id. at 60), held in favor
of the defendant garnishees (id. at 61):

      (H)ere the payment by the defendants has been already made, and
      made compulsorily under a power which they could not resist.
      The (employee's) debt to Blake has been thereby extinguished.  *
      * * He has had the full benefit of the defendants' payment of
      it.  These are all accomplished facts;  and in the absence of
      any proved circumstances of hardship to the (employee), there is
      manifestly no equity in his claim to be paid, in substance, a
      second time;  and such a decree would inflict a manifest wrong
      upon the defendants.

   See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. at 226 ("It ought to be and it is the
object of courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over)." /14/
See also Oppenheimer v. Dresdner Bank A.G., 50 A.D.2d 434, 377
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 949, 363 N.E.2d 358 (1977);
Savepex Sales Co. v. M.S. Kaplan Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 481, 243 N.E.2d
608 (1968);  Agnew v. Cronin, supra;  Steltzer v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 159 Iowa 1, 134 N.W. 573 (1912);  cf. Vanasse v. Labrecque, 381
A.2d 269 (Me. 1977).

   We do not challenge the oft-cited proposition (Annot., 49 A.L.R.
1411 (1927) (emphasis added)) that "if the judgment in a garnishment
proceeding is void, as, for example, where there is no jurisdiction
acquired by the court, payment by the garnishee is no protection to
him against a subsequent action by his creditor, or the creditor's
assignee, to recover the debt." See, e.g., Alabama Great Southern R.R.
v. Chumley, 92 Ala. 317, 9 So. 286 (1890).  /15/ It imposes no
unreasonable burden on the garnishee to ensure that the garnishment
action to which he is a party is proper.  Here, for example, there is
no doubt that the Alabama court had both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction in the garnishment suit by Mrs. Morton against the Air
Force;  the Air Force is present in Alabama for purposes of suit and
has consented to suit by virtue of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659.  It is
quite another proposition to require the garnishee to second-guess the
jurisdiction of the underlying proceeding, to which he was not a
party, where the process served on the garnishee is fully regular on
its face.

   To be sure, some state courts have stated that garnishees may be
held liable for reimbursement to the principal debtor where the
underlying judgment was void.  See, e.g., Upper Blue Bench Irrigation
Dist. v. Continental Nat's Bank & Trust Co., 93 Utah 325, 72 P.2d 1048
(1937);  Czesna v. Lietuva Loan & Savings Ass'n, 252 Ill, App. 612
(1929);  Roberts v. Hickory Camp Coal & Coke Co., 58 W. Va. 276, 52
S.E. 2d (1905);  Louisville & N. R.R. v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 23 So.
825 (1897).  But these are cases where the principal defendant had
been given no actual notice of the action.  In this case, by contrast,
respondent, the principal debtor, had actual notice of the suit and an
opportunity to contest jurisdiction.  See page 3, supra.  /16/
Moreover, the state statutes cited above would appear to preclude such
liability in most instances.  /17/ Indeed, the continued vitality of
the doctrine that subsequent actions based on void judgments are
themselves void is also in doubt.  In some states under some
circumstances, it was thought that a judgment based on an earlier
judgment that was subsequently held void was itself automatically
nullified, despite effects upon innocent third parties who had relied
on it.  As the new Restatement (Second) of Judgments makes clear,
however, this is no longer the law (if it ever was).  "The current
doctrine," according to the Restatement, "is that the later judgment
remains valid, but a party, upon a showing that the earlier judgment
has been nullified and that relief from the later judgment is
warranted, may by appropriate proceedings secure such relief." 1
Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 16 comment c 146 (1982).
This enables a third party, such as a garnishee, to rely on a facially
valid court order, while protecting the right of the defendant in the
underlying suit to obtain prospective relief.

   This view of the effect of a void judgment on ancillary judgments
meshes precisely with the statutory and regulatory scheme of Section
659.  The United States, as garnishee, is entitled to treat the state
court garnishment writ -- assuming it is regular on its face -- as
valid, and may rely upon it without fear that subsequent courts will
conclude that the court issuing the writ erred as to the validity of
the underlying judgment.  The employee debtor is promptly notified of
the garnishment and given an opportunity to undertake "appropriate
proceedings (to) secure * * * relief" from the judgment.  Under the
implementing regulations, the government will not honor a garnishment
writ in the event that such steps have been successfully completed.
If a court of competent jurisdiction enjoins or suspends the operation
of the garnishment writ, the disbursing agent is instructed not to
comply with the garnishment (5 C.F.R. 581.305(a)(5)), and if notice is
received that the employee debtor has appealed the underlying
judgment, the agent is instructed (unless to do so would be
inconsistent with applicable state law) to suspend payment of monies
to the plaintiff in the garnishment action (5 C.F.R. 581.305(a)(6)).
The employee debtor cannot, however, simply rest on his rights and
expect the government, as garnishee, to make him whole after the fact.
 See Calhoun v. United States, 557 F.2d 401, 402 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).  /18/

   Finally, even if currently prevailing state law did place private
garnishees at their peril in complying with facially valid writs where
the principal debtor was notified but failed to take steps to protect
his rights, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended to
subject the United States to such contingencies.  Not only has the
federal government traditionally been immune altogether from
garnishment writs, but the administrative and financial burden on the
government, by far the nation's largest employer, would far exceed
that of any private garnishee.  It is not likely that Congress would
assume the substantial adverse consequences of such a holding without
debate, reflection or explanation.  And even if such an interpretation
were possible under Section 659 as originally enacted, it is no longer
credible under the 1977 amendment, as we show below.  /19/

   2. Section 659(f), added by amendment in 1977, /20/ unequivocally
provides that neither the government nor its disbursing officers may
be held liable for a payment made "pursuant to legal process regular
on its face, if such payment is made in accordance with this section
and the regulations issued to carry out this section." In the present
case, the court of appeals did not dispute that the garnishment writ
was "regular on its face," but held that the writ was not "legal
process" within the meaning of the garnishment statute.  Section
662(e)(1) defines "legal process" to require issuance by a "court of
competent jurisdiction," and the court of appeals held that a "court
of competent jurisdiction" is one that has personal, as well as
subject matter, jurisdiction.  Accordingly, a garishment writ issued
by a court lacking personal jurisdiction is not "legal process." The
court thus concluded that when the government honors such a writ
despite notice of "a claim of substantial jurisdictional
irregularity," the government is not protected from liability by
Section 659(f).

   As an initial matter, we are puzzled by the court of appeals'
conclusion (Pet. App. 8a) that the term "court of competent
jurisdiction" -- whatever its meaning -- refers to the court that
issued the underlying judgment, rather than to the court that issued
the writ of garnishment.  /21/ These need not be the same, and even if
they happen to be the same, as in this case, the question of personal
jurisdiction in the two actions is quite likely to be different.  /22/
For example, if a divorce decree had been procured by Mrs. Morton in
Virginia, prior to moving to Alabama, and respondent had subsequently
defaulted on his support obligations, Mrs. Morton could have filed a
garnishment action against the Air Force in Alabama, identical in all
material respects to the garnishment action here.  In such a
hypothetical, it would be clear that the term "legal process * * *
issued by * * * a court of competent jurisdiction" would refer to the
Alabama proceeding that resulted in issuance of the writ -- not to the
prior Virginia divorce proceeding.  It would furthermore be clear that
the "competence" of the Alabama court would not depend upon whether it
correctly held that the hypothetical prior Virginia judgment was
entitled to full faith and credit.  Here, as in the hypothetical,
there is no doubt concerning the jurisdiction -- both personal and
subject matter -- of the Alabama court in the garnishment action
brought by Mrs. Morton against the Air force.  The only question
concerns the jurisdiction of the Alabama court in the underlying
divorce action brought by Mrs. Morton against her husband.  But that
is a markedly different inquiry not relevant to the "competence" of
the garnishment court to issue the writ.

   Even overcoming this initial problem, and assuming arguendo that
the invalidity of the underlying judgment somehow affects the
competence of the garnishment court, the court of appeals'
interpretation remains difficult to square with the statute.  Section
659(f) provides that the government is immune from liability for
honoring "legal process regular on its face." The term "legal process"
is defined by statute (42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 662(e)) to include "any
writ, order, summons, or other similar process in the nature of
garnishment, which * * * is issued by * * * a court of competent
jurisdiction within any State, territory, or possession of the United
States." The terms "competence" or "competent jurisdiction" are not
defined but, contrary to the court of appeals' apparent assumption,
such terms are often used to refer to subject matter jurisdiction
alone.  See, e.g. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto.) 714, 733 (1877)
(emphasis added) ("To give such proceedings any validity, there must
be a tribunal competent by its constitution -- that is, by the law of
its creation -- to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit;  and, if
that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the
defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of
process within the State, or his voluntary appearance");  1
Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sections 27, 28 (1982) ("The term
'subject matter jurisdiction' * * * is also sometimes referred to as
'competence' or 'competency.'");  Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws Section 92 (1971);  Restatement of Judgments Section 7 (1942);
18 U.S.C. 2510(9) ("(j)udge of competent jurisdiction" means judge
with authority to enter a certain type of order).  In other contexts,
the terms have been used to refer to personal as well as subject
matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Arizona v. California, No. 8, Orig.
(Mar 30, 1983), slip op. 13;  Ex parte Davis, 66 Okla. Crim. 271, 285,
91 P.2d 799, 807 (1939).  /23/

   In this case, the context clearly indicates that "court of
competent jurisdiction" cannot refer to an issue -- such as personal
jursidiction -- that is not determinable from the face of the writ.
The statute expressly immunizes the government from liability for
honoring "legal process regular on its face" (42 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
659(f)).  The phrase must be interpreted as a whole.  It does not
embody two separate and independent concepts.  Whether a writ is
"legal process" must be determinable on the face of the writ;
otherwise, the qualification "on its face" would be rendered
meaningless.  Interpreting the phrase "court of competent
jurisdiction" to refer in this context only to subject matter
jurisdiction harmonizes Section 659(f)'s reference to "legal process
regular on its face" with Section 662(e)(1)'s definition of "legal
process." Unlike the lack of personal jurisdiction, the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction is almost always detectable from the face
of the process.

   The court of appeals' conclusion perfectly illustrates the
interpretative problem created by viewing the two parts of the phrase
in isolation.  If the term "legal process" is understood to be limited
to process issued by a court with personal, as well as subject matter,
jurisdiction -- a question not generally determinable on the face of
the writ -- /24/ the government is not immune from suit for complying
with process that is "regular on its face," as the plain language of
Section 659(f) provides.  Instead, the government would be required to
look beyond the facial validity of a garnishment writ and determine
whether the state court that issued the underlying judgment had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  The court of appeals'
construction thus effectively nullifies the language "regular on its
face" and renders Section 659(f) internally inconsistent.  See
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975);  Chemehuevi Tribe of
Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 403 (1975);  Clark v. Uebersee
Finanz-Korporation, A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 488-489 (1947).  /25/

   Apparently recognizing that its interpretation would deprive the
government of its statutory protection for honoring writs that are
regular on their face, the court of appeals declared (Pet. App. 17a
(footnotes omitted)) that "the immunity provisions of the garnishment
statute permit the Government, where the process document is regular
on its face, to make payment without liability on a presumption that
the underlying judgment is valid, but that such a presumption is
rebuttable by a showing that the Government had notice of a
substantial claim of jurisdictional irregularity".  Whatever the merit
of this rule -- and we will show that it is unworkable (see pages
40-42, infra) -- it is clearly the court's own invention.  The court
did not purport to extract it from any provision of the federal
garnishment statute, from the legislative history of the statute, or
indeed from any other authority.

   This interpretation cannot be reconciled either with the plain
meaning of Section 659(f) or with the court of appeals' own reading of
the term "legal process." Section 659(f) unambiguously shields the
government from liability whenever it honors a state garnishment writ
that is "regular on its face";  it carves out no exception for cases
where the government has notice of potential challenges to the state
court's personal jurisdiction.  Notice of such potential challenges
would be equally immaterial if the court of appeals' interpretation of
the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" were accepted.  If a
court without personal jurisdiction is not a "court of competent
jurisdiction," as the decision below held (Pet. App. 8a-11a), then a
garnishment writ issued by such a court would not be "legal process"
within the meaning of the immunity provision and that provision could
not apply.  Thus, under either construction, whether the government
had notice of the jurisdictional defect would not seem to matter.

   The court of appeals' nonliteral interpretation of Section 659(f)
is especially inappropraite to a statute waiving sovereign immunity.
Such a waiver must be "unequivocally expressed" (Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981);  United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4
(1969));  the "'limitations and conditions upon which the Government
consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto
are not to be implied'" (Lehman, 453 U.S. at 161, quoting Soriano v.
United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)).  The court's implication of
a burden on the government to undertake legal investigation and
litigation whenever the employee defendant gives notice of a latent
jurisdictional defect in the proceedings underlying the garnishment
writ vastly expands the liabilities and obligations of the government
beyond anything that Congress expressly imposed or could reasonably
have intended when it waived sovereign immunity.

   It is essentially for these reasons that our interpretation of the
phrase "legal process regular on its face" has been adopted by two
courts of appeals (Rush v. United States Agency for International
Development, 706 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (table), cert. denied. No.
83-382 (Jan. 9, 1984) (Pet. App. 104a-107a);  Jizmerjian v. Department
of Air Force, 457 F. Supp. 820 (D.S.C. 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 1001
(4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082 (1980)) and the
Comptroller General (In re Technical Sergeant Harry E. Mathews, USAF,
File No. B-203668 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 2, 1982) (Pet. App. 109a-111a).  In
Rush, a federal employee sued for recovery of garnished wages and
injunctive relief, claiming among other things that the state court
that ordered him to pay child support lacked personal jurisdiction.
Noting that the government is immune from suit for payments made
pursuant to a garnishment writ that is "regular on its face," the
District of Columbia Circuit stated (Pet. App. 107a):

      In the prsent case, Ruse has not claimed that the garnishment
      order was facially invalid or that AID violated statutory
      requirements or applicable regulations.  Thus, at least to the
      extent that Rush seeks reimbursement of funds previously
      garnished, he is barred by the statute from litigating those
      claims against AID or its administrator.

   The court did not inquire whether the government had notice of any
substantial jurisdictional irregularities, as the decision below would
require.  Accord, Jizmerjian v. Dpeartment of Air Force, supra.

   In Mathews, the Comptroller General considered whether there is
authority to reimburse an Air Force sergeant for pay garnished under a
facially valid order, where the order had subsequently been set aside
for want of personal jurisdiction (Pet. App. 110a).  Relying on
Section 659(f), the Comptroller General concluded that there is no
authority for reimbursement under those circumstances.  The opinion
stated (Pet. App. 110a-111a):

         The inquiry into whether an order is valid on its face is an
      examination of the procedural aspects of the legal process
      involved, not the substantive issues.  Whether a process
      conforms or is regular "on its face" means just that.  Facial
      validity of a writ need not be determined "upon the basis of
      scrutiny by a trained legal mind," nor is facial validity to be
      judged in light of facts outside the writ's provisions which the
      person executing the writ may know.  Aetna Insurance Co. v.
      Blumenthal, 29 A.2d 751, 754 (Conn. 1943).

   3. The court of appeals defended its interpretation of Section 659
by suggesting that a contrary holding would violate respondent's due
process rights.  /26/ There is no basis for this suggestion.  The
personal jursidiction requirement admittedly protects an individual
liberty interest recognized by the Constitution, but it does not
violate due process to require a civil defendant to take appropriate
steps to invoke this protection (Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-705 (1982)) or to
permit third parties to act in reliance on a facially valid judgment
until the defendant has done so.

   Here, respondent was given actual notice of his wife's suit against
him in Alabama (Pet. App. 89a) and also of the garnishment action
against his employer, the Air Force (id at 91a).  He could have
entered a limited appearance for the purpose of challenging the
Alabama court's personal jurisdiction or, having risked a default
judgment in the underlying litigation, could have challenged the
judgment on jurisdictional grounds in the garnishment action or other
collateral proceeding (Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 706).
The very purpose of the notice requirement recognized in state law and
by federal statute and regulation is to enable the employee debtor to
take such steps as he deems appropriate to protect his interests.
Having neglected to assert his rights, as he had the opportunity to
do, respondent can hardly claim now that due process would be
infringed if he were denied the opportunity to shift his losses to his
employer.

   Indeed, fundamental considerations of fairness largely cut the
other way.  To require the garnishee -- a mere stakeholder -- to
shoulder the cost and burden of litigating the issue of personal
jurisdiction, and to impose the penalty of double payment on the
garnishee if a court subsequently holds the original state court
judgment void, is not self-evidently just.  Nor does it seem entirely
fair for the courts below to have adjudicated the rights of Mrs.
Morton and the children without their participation in the litigation.
 The conflicting interests of creditor, debtor, and garnishee are
indeed difficult to balance in multi-state situations such as this,
but Congress's solution -- to require the government, as garnishee, to
give notice to the debtor but to comply with facially valid state
court decrees until they are set aside -- is a reasonable
accommodation that does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703,
quoting International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).

 B. The Court of Appeals' Decision Disregards Regulations Authorized
By Congress To Implement The Statute

   Congress specifically authorized the issuance of regulations that
would govern the scope of liability of the United States and its
disbursing agents for payments pursuant to Section 659.  42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 661.  Section 659(f) provides that the regulations will have
the following effect (emphasis added)):

         Neither the United States, any disbursing officer, nor
      governmental entity shall be liable with respect to any payment
      made from moneys due or payable from the United States to any
      individual pursuant to legal process regular on its face, if
      such payment is made in accordance with this section and the
      regulations issued to carry out this section.

   Under this "explicit delegation of substantive authority"
(Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981)), the regulations
issued by the Office of Personnel Management /27/ implementing Section
659 (5 C.F.R. Pt. 581) are "'entitled to more than mere deference or
weight.'" They are "entitled to 'legislative effect.'" 453 U.S. at 44
(quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425, 426 (1977)).  The
regulations set out in great detail the requirements and procedures
for honoring writs of garnishment.  If payments are made in accordance
with the regulations, neither the government nor the disbursing
officer may be held liable for reimbursement.

   The regulations remove all discretion from disbursing officers to
"refuse() to honor the writs of garnishment," as the court of appeals
would require (Pet. App. 19a n.14), except in certain circumstances
enumerated in 5 C.F.R. 581.305(a).  Moreover, the regulations make
clear that the government will not -- as the court of appeals would
seemingly require -- represent the interests of the employee defendant
in the underlying proceeding.  5 C.F.R. 581.302(b)(2).

   5 C.F.R. 581.301 provides that upon proper service of process, the
employing agency shall "withhold payment of (garnishable sums) for the
amount necessary to permit compliance with the legal process." 5
C.F.R. 581.302(a) requires, inter alia, that the government give the
employee defendant written notice of service, including a copy of the
legal process, as soon as possible, and not later than 15 days after
service.  5 C.F.R. 581.302(b) authorizes the government to inform the
employee that "the United States does not represent the interests of
the obligor (i.e., employee) in the pending legal proceedings," that
"the obligor may wish to consult legal counsel regarding defenses to
the legal process," and that members of the uniformed services may
wish to avail themselves of certain provisions of the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. App. Sections 520, 521,
and 523 (relating, e.g., to stays of proceedings where military
service affects their conduct).  5 C.F.R. 581.305(a) as amended by 48
Fed. Reg. 26280 (1983) explicitly states:

         The governmental entity shall comply with legal process,
      except where the process cannot be complied with because:

         (1) It does not, on its face, conform to the laws of the
      jurisdiction from which it was issued;

         (2) The legal process would require the withholding of funds
      not deemed moneys due from, or payable by, the United States as
      remuneration for employment;

         (3) The legal process is not brought to enforce legal
      obligation(s) for alimony and/or child support;

         (4) It does not comply with the mandatory provisions of this
      part;

         (5) An order of a court of competent jurisdiction enjoining
      or suspending the operation of the legal process has been served
      on the governmental entity;  or

         (6) Where notice is received that the obligor has appealed
      either the legal process or the underlying alimony and/or child
      support order, payment of moneys subject to the legal process
      shall be suspended until the governmental entity is ordered by a
      court, or other authority, to resume payments.  However, no
      suspension action shall be taken where the applicable law of the
      jurisdiction wherein the appeal is filed requires compliance
      with the legal process while an appeal is pending.

   The regulations thus do not permit disbursing officers to refuse to
honor a writ because of doubts about personal jurisdiction over the
employee defendant in the underlying divorce proceeding.  This has
recently been made even more explicit.  See 5 C.F.R. 581.305(a)(6)(f),
as added by 48 Fed. Reg. 26280 (1983):

         If a governmental entity receives legal process which, on its
      face, appears to conform to the laws of the jurisdiction from
      which it was issued, the entity shall not be required to
      ascertain whether the authority which issued the legal process
      had obtained personal jurisdiction over the obligor.

   There can be no dispute that these regulations reflect a reasonable
implementation of the statute.  As regulations explicitly authorized
by Congress, they are entitled to more than the usual deference
accorded interpretations by the agency entrusted with implementation
of a statute.  Here, the court of appeals virtually ignored them.
/28/ The federal disbursing agents in this case complied fully with
the regulations.  They and the government are therefore immune from
suit for reimbursement of the payments made to the Alabama court from
respondent's salary.

 C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Contrary To Congressional Intent

   The court of appeals' interpretation of the garnishment statute
will frustrate Congress's expressed intent.  The garnishment statute,
together with other related measures, was enacted "to assure an
effective program of child support." S. Rep. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1974).  The Senate Report stated (id. at 42-43) that "(t)he problem
of welfare in the United States is, to a considerable extent, a
problem of the non-support of children by their absent parents * * *.
The Committee believes that all children have the right to receive
support from their fathers.  * * * (E)nforcement of child support
obligations is not an area of jurisprudence about which this country
can be proud."

   Before the federal garnishment statute was enacted, there were two
chief ways to enforce a child support or alimony award against a
federal employee or member of the armed services living in another
state.  First, the non-employee spouse could seek to enforce the award
in the courts of the employee's state.  This procedure was
unsatisfactory for several reasons.  It was costly for the spouse --
who was often without means of support -- to litigate in a distant
state.  The employee frequently had no assets to attach other than his
federal salary, which could not be garnished.  An employee delinquent
on his support obligations, who might have moved in the first place to
escape payment, could simply move again.  And because states are
constitutionally required to extend full faith and credit to support
orders only if they are final under the law of the issuing state
(Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910)), it was often necessary for
the spouse to bring repeated enforcement actions as installments
became due.  /29

   The second available procedure, under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) (9 U.L.A. 643 (1979)), was drafted
in 1950 in order to solve these and other problems.  URESA or
compatible legislation has now been adopted by every state.  /30/
Under URESA, the dependent spouse and children may file a complaint in
their state of residence (Sections 13, 14).  If the court finds that
the complaint "sets forth facts from which it may be determined that
the employed spouse owes a duty of support," the court sends the
complaint to the appropriate court in his state (Section 17), where
the local prosecutor represents the dependent spouse and children
(Section 18) and seeks the issuance of a support order (Section 23).

   Despite hopes, this procedure also proved ineffective, as Congress
has recognized.  The Senate committee that recommended enactment of
Section 659 observed (S. Rep. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1974)):
"Thousands of unserved child support warrants pile up in many
jurisdictions and often traffic cases have a higher priority." The
committee noted (id. at 43-44) that the former wives and children of
many affluent or middle-class fathers were forced to live on public
assistance because of the lack of effective procedures for enforcing
support awards, and the committee listed as among the principal flaws
in procedures then available "the statutory barrier to collecting from
military personnel and Federal employees, and the low priority given
child support investigations by the understaffed district attorney's
offices" (id. at 44;  see also 120 Cong. Rec. 40323-40324 (1974)).
During the House debates on the garnishment statute, Representative
Ullman, the floor sponsor, made much the same point, stating (120
Cong. Rec. 41810 (1974):  "(O)ur biggest problem in this whole area is
that prosecutors fail to prosecute (under URESA) because they have
more important things to do.  We just simply have not even gotten a
start on prosecuting these cases."

   Congress also recognized the special problems posed by delinquent
husbands who are federal or military retirees.  A House report on a
predecessor garnishment bill noted (H.R. Rep. 481, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 17 (1971)) that suits to enforce retirees' support obligations
were "frequently thwarted by a retiree pulling up stakes in the state
in which he is being sued and moving to another state where legal
action must be commenced again." Recommending the waiver of sovereign
immunity for certain garnishment writs, the committee stated (id. at
18):

         We recognize this is a drastic departure from anything we
      have had in the past;  but we believe it is wrong for the United
      States to protect retired and retainer pay while the military
      retiree can, for practical purposes, ignore court orders.

                      * * * * *

         We recognize that the military retiree, because of the
      frequency of moves during the time spent on active duty, may
      have less roots in a particular community than his civilian
      counterpart.

   The federal garnishment statute was designed to remedy many of
these problems.  It permits the garnishment of federal pay to enforce
alimony and child support obligations "in like manner and to the same
extent as if the United States * * * were a private person (42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 659(a)).  This enables a dependent spouse or child to attach
an asset that cannot easily be concealed, and it prevents a federal
employee or retiree from evading payment by changing his residence.
The government is not drawn into marital disputes and is spared undue
administrative expense, because it is immune from liability for
honoring "legal process regular on its face, if such payment is made
in accordance with (the garnishment statute) and the regulations
issued to carry out (that statute)" (42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659(f)).  At
the same time, the rights of employees and retirees are protected
because they are promptly notified when the writ is served (42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 659(d)) and may then take whatever steps are available to
any other similarly situated debtor under the laws of the issuing
state.  See 120 Cong. Rec. 41810 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).

   The court of appeals' decision is in conflict with this scheme and
frustrates Congress's clear intent concerning enforcement of the
alimony and child support obligations of federal and military
employees and retirees.  /31/ It also creates an unmanageable burden
for federal disbursing officers by forcing them to make complex legal
determinations on limited information, with the risk of being
penalized by double payment if they err.  In many instances, it draws
the federal government into litigation in a posture adverse to that of
the dependent spouses and children whom Congress intended to assist.

   The magnitude of the administrative burden -- and potential
liability -- imposed by the court of appeals' construction of Section
659 is immense, in light of the large numbers of federal employees and
retirees, especially military personnel.  /32/ Under the court's
interpretation of the statute, the government would be liable for
reimbursement if it honored a facially valid garnishment writ after
having received "notice of a substantial claim of jurisdictional
irregularity" (Pet. App. 17a).  Indeed, the court reserved decision on
the question whether notice of a mere "non-frivolous claim" would not
also suffice (id. at 17a n.12).

   Under so loose a standard, a large number of the federal employees
whose salaries are garnished can be predicted to attempt to avoid
payment by asserting alleged jurisdictional defects.  Especially in
cases involving servicemen, who, as Congress recognized (H.R. Rep.
481, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1971)), are frequently transferred,
asserting a colorable claim of lack of personal jurisdiction would not
be difficult.  As Judge Nies noted in dissent (Pet. App. 42a-43a),
"(t)he majority's test of 'notice of substantial irregularity' means
no more, on the basis of the facts here, than that an employee must
tell his pay officer or supervisor that he was not domiciled in the
state asserting jurisdiction over him."

   Determining whether such claims are "substantial" or "nonfrivolous"
is a task beyond the capabilities of federal disbursing officers.  In
the first place, there is no satisfactory way for disbursing officers
to ascertain the relevant facts.  If they rely on employees'
allegations, employees will have little trouble establishing
"substantial" claims.  On the other hand, disbursing officers have no
readily apparent means of engaging in independent factfinding.  That
presumably is why Congress provided protection for compliance with
legal process "regular on its face";  it is not practical to expect
disbursing officers to uncover latent defects in court orders.

   Even if the facts in a particular instance are known and
undisputed, the disbursing officer would often face additional hurdles
of legal interpretation.  Evaluating jurisdictional claims would be
extremely time-consuming and would require considerable legal skill.
Questions of personal jurisdiction are often difficult, and cases
involving military personnel are likely to explore the outer reaches
of the states' power.  Moreover, the court of appeals' decision holds
the government to an extremely high standard.  The government may not
safely rely upon a state court's determination that personal
jurisdiction was present.  Instead, the government must decide whether
the state court erred, or at least whether a substantial or
nonfrivolous claim of error has been asserted -- and is subject to
liability if a federal court later holds the state court's
jurisdictional ruling incorrect.

   The court of appeals' opinion is vague on the appropriate course
for the government to take in cases where the disbursing officer
determines that the personal jurisdiction of the state court that
rendered the underlying judgment is in doubt.  In fact, each of the
potential alternatives is either unacceptable or inconsistent with
Congress's purposes in subjecting federal salaries to garnishment for
alimony or child support.

   The court of appeals suggested in a footnote (Pet. App. 19a n.14)
that the government should simply "refuse() to honor" the garnishment
writ if its validity is in doubt.  Such a course would, however,
deprive the employee's spouse and children of any expeditious means
for challenging the disbursing officer's (possibly erroneous)
conclusion that the state court judgment may be void.  The court of
appeals sanguinely observed that the spouse's interests would still be
"protected" because she could invoke the procedures of URESA (ibid).
But Congress enacted Section 659 precisely to cure the documented
inadequacies of the URESA remedy (see pages 38-40 supra).  To relegate
dependent spouses and children to "protections" found inadequate by
Congress, in all cases raising "substantial" claims of jurisdictional
defects, cannot be deemed consistent with congressional intent.  In
addition, such a course -- if it is available at all /33/ -- would
provoke needless friction between the federal government and the state
courts (see Pet. App. 25a, 47a-52a (Nies, J., dissenting)) and could
lead to contempt citations against disbursing officers or default
judgments against the United States.  See, e.g., Ala. Code Section
6-6-457 (1977) ("Proceedings on failure to appear and answer") (Pet.
App. 59a).

   The more likely alternative is for the government to take the steps
set out by regulation for instances in which it cannot honor the writ.
 5 C.F.R. 581.305(b).  In such instances (listed at 5 C.F.R.
581.305(a)), the federal agency is instructed to "respond directly to
the (state) court, or other authority, setting forth its objections to
compliance with the legal process," and to "inform the garnishor, or
the garnishor's representative, that the legal process will not be
honored." 5 C.F.R. 581.305(b).  /34/ As contemplated by the
regulation, the consequence of this procedure may well be litigation
between the United States and the spouse and children.  This would
place the United States in the position of litigating an issue in
which it has no direct interest, on behalf of an employee who failed
to assert his own rights, against the intended beneficiaries of the
garnishment statute, the needy spouse and children.  /35/ It is
difficult to believe that Congress intended such a perverse result.

   A final alternative that may be available is for the government to
file an interpleader action in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1335.
See Texaco, Inc. v. LeFevre, 610 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
Such a course would, we believe, obviate the possibility of double
liability on the government.  Little else commends the procedure.  The
spouse and children would be compelled to undergo litigation in
federal court, which they can ill afford, and would be required to
await receipt of their support and alimony payments until after the
court renders judgment.  See 28 U.S.C. 1335 (the plaintiff in
interpleader must "deposit () such money or property * * * into the
registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court").
The corresponding advantage of this procedure to the employee debtor
is likewise slim, since he may be called upon to litigate in the
spouse's state (see 28 U.S.C. 1397) -- the very result he is
(presumably) seeking to avoid.  And the forum for resolution of the
conflict would be shifted from the state to the federal courts, which
are less appropraite tribunals for resolving matters of domestic
relations.  See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975);  Barber v.
Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859).  It is surely inconsistent
with principles of comity and federalism to multiply the instances in
which the lower federal courts are charged with second-guessing the
decisions of state courts on matters of the state court's own
jurisdiction, especially since the state courts themselves are
adequate and available to provide a remedy.

   None of these alternatives is consistent with the purpose of
enacting Section 659, which was to create a prompt, straightforward,
and inexpensive means for spouses and children to obtain enforcement
of support obligations.  Congress did not contemplate the additional
hurdles erected by the court of appeals.  As stated in a colloquy
between Representatives Ullman and St. Germain during the floor debate
on enactment of Section 659 (120 Cong. Rec. 41810 (1974)):

      MR. ST GERMAIN:  Essentially, the mother or the wife goes into
      the State court and gets a judgment, and then proceeds on the
      judgment, on the execution of same, and proceeds with the
      garnishment:  is that not correct?

         MR. ULLMAN:  The gentleman is correct.

         MR. ST GERMAIN:  And there are no other conditions

         precedent?

         MR. ULLMAN:  The garnishment is on the basis of the court
      order or decision.  * * *

   Congress thus intended the federal government to proceed with
garnishment "on the basis of the (state) court order or decision"
alone -- not to undertake factual investigation and legal analysis,
not to refuse to honor a facially valid writ, not to litigate against
the spouse and children in state court, and not to involve the spouse
and children in interpleader actions in federal court while
withholding payments.

   In sum, considerations of statutory language, agency
interpretation, fiscal prudence, administrative efficiency, and
redress for the needy class of spouses and children of federal
employees all point in the same direction.  The court of appeals'
interpretation of Section 659 should be rejected.

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Acting Assistant Attorney General

   KENNETH S. GELLER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   LEONARD SCHAITMAN

   WENDY M. KEATS

   MARY S. MITCHELSON

      Attorneys

   MARCH 1984

   /1/ Section 659 was originally enacted as part of the Social
Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, Section 101(a), 88
Stat. 2357.  The section was amended in 1977 and is now codified as 42
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 659(a).

   /2/ Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-30, Tit. V, Section 501(a), 91 Stat. 157.

   /3/ Respondent was advised by an officer of the Air Force Judge
Advocate General's office (Pet. App. 3a-4a).

   /4/ Respondent also claimed that he had already paid the obligation
(Pet. App. 4a, 39a, 91a).

   /5/ Because the disbursing officer was under threat of personal
suit, he contacted the United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama
to ask whether service of process by registered mail was sufficient
under Alabama law.  The United States Attorney answered affirmatively.
 Pet. App. 40a.

   /6/ Because this case was pending in the Court of Claims on October
1, 1982, jurisdiction over it was transferred to the newly created
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit pursuant to
Pub. L. No. 97-164, Section 403, 96 Stat. 57.  Thus, the absence of a
final decision of the Claims Court or Court of Claims, within the
meaning of Pub. L. No. 97-164, Section 127(a), 96 Stat. 37, to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. 1295(3), did not affect the jurisdiction of the
court of appeals.

   /7/ The court of appeals also suggested (Pet. App. 8a) that alimony
or child support orders entered by a court without personal
jurisdiction over the defendant are not "legal obligations" under
Section 659(a), which waives sovereign immunity for garnishment writs
"for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal obligations
to provide child support or make alimony payments."

   /8/ We therefore have not challenged before this Court the court of
appeals' holding that the Alabama court that issued the writ of
garnishment here lacked personal jurisdiction, even though that
holding is of questionable validity.  See Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364
So.2d 1170 (Ala. 1978);  Taylor v. Taylor, 44 Ill.2d 139, 254 N.E.2d
445 (1969);  McGlothen v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 106, 175
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1981).  If our position on the interpretation of
Section 659 is correct, then disputes concerning personal jurisdiction
in alimony and child support cases will be resolved not by the Federal
Circuit in suits by one party against the United States, but in state
courts in suits involving both of the actual parties in interest.  See
Jizmerjian v. Department of Air Force, 457 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D.S.C.
1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1082 (1980);  Cunningham v. Department of Navy, 455 F. Supp. 1370,
1372 (D. Conn. 1978).

   /9/ To similar effect are:  Alaska Stat. Section 09.40.040 (1983);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 12-1592 (1982);  Ark. Stat. Ann. Section
31-146 (repl. 1962);  Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Section 52-344 (West
1960);  D.C. Code Ann. Section 16-573(c) (1981);  Idaho Code Section
8-510 (1979);  Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 62, Section 44 (Smith-Hurd 1972);
Ind. Code Ann. Section 34-1-11-29 (Burns 1973);  Iowa Code Ann.
Section 642.18 (West 1950);  Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. Section
11-601(a) (repl 1980);  Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 246, section 43 (Michie/L
aw. Coop. 1974);  Mich. Stat. Ann. Section 27A.4061 (Callaghan rev.
1980) (applicable to garnishments against state);  Minn. Stat. Ann.
Section 571.54 (West 1947);  Miss. Code Ann. Section 11-35-37 (1972);
Mo. Ann. Stat. Section 525.070 (Vernon 1953);  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Section 512.38 (repl. 1983);  N.J. Stat. Ann. Section 2A:17-53 (West
Cum. Supp. 1983) (applicable to garnishments against state and local
governmental entities);  N.D. Cent. Code Section 32-09.1-15 (repl.
Supp. 1983);  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Section 2716.21(D) (Page Supp.
1982);  Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, Section 1233 (West 1961);  Or. Rev.
Stat. Section 29.195 (1981);  S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Sections
21-18-32, 21-18-48 (rev. 1979);  Tenn. Code Ann. Section 29-7-117
(repl. 1980);  Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, Section 3081 (1973);  Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. Section 7.32.300 (1961);  W. Va. Code Section 38-7-25
(1966);  Wis. Stat. Ann. Section 812.16(2) (West 1977);  Wyo. Stat.
Ann. Section 1-15-302 (1977).

   /10/ This portion of the holding in Harris v. Balk, supra, was not
affected by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

   /11/ In order to constitute a defense to a claim for reimbursement,
this Court stated, the payment must have been made "under a valid
judgment against (the garnishee)" (198 U.S. at 226).  There is no
requirement that the underlying judgment be valid as to the principal
debtor.

   /12/ Betts v. Coltes, 467 F. Supp. 544 (D. Hawaii 1979), the only
case cited by the court of appeals (Pet. App. 11a n.5), actually
supports our view.  There, the court stated that the principal debtor
could recover monies erroneously paid by a garnishee to a judgment
creditor from the creditor.  Only in instances of misuse of process or
failure to correct an erroneous garnishment, not relevant here, could
the principal debtor recover damages from the garnishee.

   /13/ The employee, a seaman, brought suit by libelling the vessel
owned by his employers.

   /14/ As this Court commented in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm,
174 U.S. 710, 713 (1899):  "How proceedings in garnishment may be
availed of in defence (by the garnishee) * * * the practice of the
States of the Union is not uniform.  But it is obvious and necessary
justice that such proceedings should be allowed as a defence in some
way." See also Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312
U.S. 183, 189, 194 (1941).

   /15/ In Chumley, a Tennessee creditor obtained a valid judgment in
Tennessee state court against Chumley, then a resident of Tennessee.
After failure of execution, the creditor obtained a writ of
garnishment in Tennessee state court against Chumley's employer, the
railroad, an Alabama corporation.  Since Tennessee then had no
provision permitting service of process on out-of-state corporations
except with respect to claims or property arising or located in the
State, and since the wages owing to Chumley, who by then had moved to
Alabama, were deemed to be situated in Alabama, the Tennessee court
had no jurisdiction over the railroad in the garnishment action.
Decisions following this pattern are easily distinguishable from the
instant case, where there is no doubt that the Alabama court had
jurisdiction over the Air Force in the garnishment action.

   /16/ As the dissenting opinion correctly observed (Pet. App. 27a
n.4), the question of pre-judgment garnishments (where the garnishee's
debt provides the jurisdictional basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction
over the principal debtor) presents different issues from that of
post-judgment garnishments.  See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law Section 5209
(McKinney 1978) (Practice Commentary).  In the wake of Shaffer v.
Heitner, supra, and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969), the question of the effect on garnishees of jurisdictional
defects in pre-judgment garnishment actions is of little practical
significance.  Cases such as Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., 201 Md.
616, 95 A.2d 273 (1953);  Riley v. State Bank of De Pere, 269 N.W. 722
(Wis. 1936);  and Egnatik v. Riverview State Bank, 114 Kan. 105, 216
P. 1100 (1923), are, therefore, not in point.

   /17/ We have found only one decision, O'Toole v. Helio Products,
Inc., 17 Ill. App.2d 82, 149 N.E.2d 795 (1958), in which the court
expressly considered one of the statutes cited and construed it as not
applying where the underlying judgment was void for want of personal
jurisdiction over the principal debtor, even though the principal
debtor had been given notice.  The dearth of reported decisions
construing these statutes in situations similar to that in this case
-- which presents a common fact pattern -- suggests that the plain
language of the statutes has been followed without need for judicial
construction.

   /18/ In Calhoun, a Navy officer sued to recover pay garnished to
satisfy alimony and child support obligations, contending that the
garnishment writ was void because the court that issued the underlying
divorce judgment lacked personal jurisdiction over him.  Observing
that the divorce judgment was "facially valid," the court of appeals
held (557 F.2d at 402) that "(t)he United States was under no duty to
contest the judgment * * *.  It was Calhoun's obligation to attack the
judgment if he wished to avoid the deduction from his pay.  See also
Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1977);  Snapp v.
United States Postal Service, 664 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1982);
Cunningham v. Department of Navy, 455 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Conn. 1978);
Popple v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. N.Y. 1976) (holding
that federal employees cannot sue to enjoin compliance with facially
valid garnishment writs under Section 659).

   The court below distinguished Calhoun on the patently irrelevant
ground that its construction of Section 659(a) took place prior to the
addition of Section 659(f) in 1977 (Pet. App. 10a).  The 1977
amendments left the content of Section 659(a) unchanged (albeit
renumbered) as it affects the federal government.  As the Senate
report accompanying the amendment plainly stated (S. Rep. 1350, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976)):  "(i)t is not the purpose of the committee
bill to make any major changes in the new child support law.  The bill
would make modifications, consistent with the original congressional
intent, to clarify questions that have been raised (and) to provide
for administrative improvement." See also Br. in Opp. 11.  In any
event, Section 659(f), which was added by the 1977 amendments,
expressly immunizes the government from certain liability;  it creates
no new source of liability.  We fail to understand how the addition of
Section 659(f) could undermine the Calhoun court's conclusion that
Section 659(a) did not itself give rise to liability.

   /19/ There is no merit in the court of appeals' suggestion (Pet.
App. 8a) that alimony or child support orders entered by a court
without personal jurisdiction over the defendant do not fall within
Section 659(a), which waives sovereign immunity for garnishment writs
for the enforcement of "legal obligations" to furnish child support or
pay alimony.  As the implementing regulations provide (5 C.F.R.
581.102(g)), a "legal obligation" in this context is one that is
"enforceable under appropriate State or local law." Here, the Alabama
court enforced respondent's obligations by issuing the writ.
Furthermore, the court of appeals' interpretation of the phrase "legal
obligation" would seemingly exclude judgments suffering any legal
defect.  And even if limited to judgments held to be void, this
approach would be subject to all of the objections we have lodged to
the court's holding concerning "legal process." See subpart A.2,
infra.

   /20/ As pointed out in note 18, supra, the legislative history
shows that the 1977 amendments were intended to clarify, not
substantively to change, the prior Section 659.

   /21/ The federal cases cited by the court of appeals in support of
its view (Pet. App. 8a n.4) involved pre-judgment attachments where
the plaintiffs sought to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction on the basis
of the attachment.

   /22/ Garnishment actions are commenced under different forms of
action in different states, but it is long established that, for
jurisdictional purposes, a post-judgment garnishment action "is a new
suit to which the creditor is plaintiff and the garnishee, the
defendant." 2 R. Shinn, Attachment and Garnishment Sections 469, 470,
at 836-838 (1896);  see United States ex rel. Ordmann v. Cummings, 85
F.2d 273, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1936).  Although the principal debtor (the
defendant in the underlying proceeding) has the right to appear and
defend as a party, the jurisdiction of the garnishment court does not
depend upon personal jurisdiction over the principal debtor.  Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210-211 n.36 (1977).  The general rule is
that the plaintiff may bring the garnishment action anywhere that the
principal debtor could have brought suit to collect his debt from the
garnishee.  Orrox Corp. v. Orr, 364 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Ala. 1978);
Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Willett Associates, 153 Conn. 588, 219 A.2d 718
(1966).  Of course, both under the tranditional law of garnishment
(see Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. at 227) and under evolving principles of
due process (see, e.g., Community Thift Club, Inc. v. Dearborn
Acceptance Corp., 487 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ill. 1980)), the principal
debtor must have notice of the garnishment action, at least where the
underlying judgment was by default or confession, and in the absence
of adequate alternative procedural safeguards.  See Betts v. Coltes,
467 F. Supp. 544 (D. Hawaii 1979).

   /23/ The court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 9a) that respondent
relied for his interpretation of the term "court of competent
jurisdiction" on Robinson v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 55 Ga. App. 141, 189
S.E. 555 (1937), and State v. Long, 44 Del. 251, 59 A.2d 545 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (Sup.
Ct. 1949).  The statements relied on in both decisions are dicta;
Robinson did not involve interpretation of the term "competent
jurisdiction, and in Long the controverted question was whether the
court had jurisdiction over a res -- not over the parties.

   /24/ This is especially true where the alleged jurisdictional
defect is in the underlying proceeding rather than in the garnishment
itself.

   /25/ Respondent defends the court of appeals' interpretation by
suggesting that Congress "intended to insulate the government from
suit when they honored a 'voidable' judgment as opposed to a 'void'
judgment" (Br. in Opp. 12).  This position, however, finds no support
in the language or legislative history of the statute.  We do not
doubt that Congress could have drawn the line between "void" and
"voidable" judgments;  however, the line actually drawn is between
legal process "regular" or irregular "on its face." And since this
determination is one to be made by federal disbursing agents, who
ordinarily lack either the information or the legal training that
would be required to distinguish between void and voidable judgments,
it is easy to understand why Congress decided as it did.

   /26/ The court stated (Pet. App. 17a):  "To hold othereise and to
require (as would the dissent) Colonel Morton, a resident of Alaska,
to proceed in the Alabama state court against Mrs. Morton would, in
effect, render (42 U.S.C. 659) violative of constitutional due
process."

   /27/ The President delegated authority to issue regulations
implementing Section 659 to the Office of Personnel Management.  Exec.
Order No. 12105, 43 Fed. Reg. 59465 (1978).  Prior to issuance, the
regulations were published for public notice and comment.  See 44 Fed.
Reg. 60301-60306 (1979);  see also 48 Fed. Reg. 811-812 (1983).

   /28/ The court of appeals quoted the implementing regulations to
establish that "legal process" must be issued by a "court of competent
jurisdiction" (Pet. App. 7a, 9a;  see also id. at 8a), but did not
otherwise allude to them.  Cf. id. at 43a-45a (Nies, J., dissenting).

   /29/ See Note, Counterclaims and Defenses under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 143, 144 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as Note, Counterclaims and Defenses);  Note,
Interstate Enforcement of Support Obligations Through Long Arm
Statutes and URESA, 18 J. Family Law 537 (1979-1980).

   /30/ See Note, Counterclaims and Defenses, supra, at 145 n.11
(collecting statutes).  New York, which has not adopted URESA, has a
similar, compatible law (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law Sections 30-43 (McKinney
1977)).

   /31/ The decision, if not reversed, might also jeopardize the
enforceability of support orders now exempted from restrictions or
garnishment under 15 U.S.C. 1673, which uses the term "issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction" in much the same way as it is used in
Section 659.

   /32/ We have been informed that more than 14,000 garnishment writs
are received each year with respect to military personnel alone.

   /33/ A state court order is, after all, binding legal process.
Accordingly, Judge Nies may be correct (Pet. App. 25a) that "(t)he
United States could no more 'refuse to honor' the writ summoning the
Government to the Alabama court than it could 'refuse to honor' the
summons by the Court of Claims."

   /34/ This procedure would appear to be the equivalent of an
"answer" or "return" under state law, and would probably be treated as
such.

   /35/ The other instances in which the government might be compelled
to litigate are inevitable, in that they involve issues of relevance
to the government in the garnishment proceeding itself.  See 5 C.F.R.
581.305(a).  Here, federal involvement in the litigation is far more
troublesome, since the government would be forced to support one side
in a domestic conflict where the issues are directly pertinent only to
the parties involved.

                               APPENDIX