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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial 
Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:

July 2003:

Nuclear Security:

Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed 
Radioactive Sources:

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-804] GAO-03-804:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-804, a report to Ranking Minority Member, 
Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International 
Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in 
stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, 
industry, and research. These sealed sources could be a threat to 
national security because terrorists could use them to make dirty 
bombs. GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of sealed sources in 
the United States, (2) the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or 
abandoned, (3) the effectiveness of federal and state controls over 
sealed sources, and (4) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 
state efforts since September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of 
sealed sources.

What GAO Found:

The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because 
NRC and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed 
sources. Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not 
required to apply to NRC for a license. Accounting for these devices 
has been difficult. In addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents 
have taken place in the United States where sealed sources have been 
lost, stolen, or abandoned. The majority of these lost devices were 
recovered.

Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 
10 states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRCs 
licensing process to obtain sealed sources. Approved applicants may 
buy sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because 
the process assumes that the applicant is acting in good faith and it 
can take NRC as long as 12 months before conducting an inspection, it 
is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for malicious intent. 
In addition, NRC currently evaluates the effectiveness of state 
regulatory programs, but these evaluations do not assess the security 
of sealed sources.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC and states have 
notified licensees of the need for heightened awareness to security, 
but have not required any specific actions to improve security. NRC 
has been developing additional security measures since the attacks, 
and issued the first security order to large facilities that irradiate 
such items as medical supplies and food on June 5, 2003. Additional 
orders to licensees that possess high risk sealed sources are expected 
to follow. NRC and states disagree over the appropriate role of states 
in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and implement 
all additional security measures on licensees with sealed sources, 
including those licensed by states. However, over 80 percent of states 
responding to our survey feel they should be given responsibility to 
inspect and enforce security measures.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that NRC (1) collaborate with states to determine 
availability of highest risk sealed sources, (2) determine if owners 
of certain devices should apply for licenses, (3) modify NRCs 
licensing process so sealed sources cannot be purchased until NRC 
verifies their intended use, (4) ensure that NRCs evaluation of 
federal and state programs assess security of sealed sources, and (5) 
determine how states can participate in implementing additional 
security measures. NRC stated that some of our recommendations would 
require statutory changes. We clarified our report language to address 
this concern. Agreement states and an organization of radiation 
experts agreed with our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-804.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
6870 or aloisee@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

NRC and the Agreement States Lack Complete Information on Numbers of 
Sealed Sources: 

Over 1,300 Devices Containing Sealed Sources Have Been Reported Lost, 
Stolen, or Abandoned Since 1998: 

Weaknesses Exist in Federal and State Controls Over the Security of 
Sealed Sources: 

NRC Efforts to Improve Security over Sealed Sources Have Been Limited 
and Disagreement Exists over the Appropriate Role of the States: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:  

Appendix II: Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources:  

Irradiators: 

Teletherapy: 

Industrial Radiography: 

Brachytheraphy: 

Well Logging Device: 

Fixed Industrial Gauge: 

Portable Gauge: 

Appendix III: Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress Addressing 
Security of Sealed Sources:  

Appendix IV: Results of Survey of Agreement States:  

Appendix V: Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States:  

Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:  

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:  

GAO Contact: 

Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Number of Specific Licenses Issued By Use in the United States 
as of December 31, 2002: 

Table 2: Type and Size of Sealed Sources Used in Medical and Industrial 
Practices: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: NRC Regulated Specific Licenses in NRC Regulated States and on 
Federal Facilities in Agreement States as of December 31, 2002: 

Figure 2: Agreement State Regulated Specific Licenses as of December 31, 
2002: 

Figure 3: Results of Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation 
Program Reviews: 

Figure 4: Product Conveyor System in a Panoramic Irradiator: 

Figure 5: Stereotactic Radiosurgery Device (Gamma Knife): 

Figure 6: Industrial Radiography Camera and Storage Case: 

Figure 7: High Dose Rate Remote After Loader Used for Brachytherapy: 

Figure 8: Storage Container for Well Logging Sealed Source: 

Figure 9: Fixed Industrial Gauge: 

Figure 10: Portable Moisture/Density Gauge: 

Abbreviations: 

CFR: Code of Federal Regulations:  

CRCPD: Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors:  

DOE: Department of Energy: 

DOT: Department of Transportation:  

GAO: General Accounting Office:  

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:  

OAS: Organization of Agreement States:

Letter August 6, 2003:

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 
Ranking Minority Member 
Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International 
Security 
Committee on Governmental Affairs 
United States Senate:

Dear Senator Akaka:

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks there has been concern 
that certain radioactive material, such as cobalt-60, strontium-90, 
iodine-131, cesium-137, iridium-192, and americium-241, could be used 
in the construction of a radiological dispersion device--commonly 
referred to as a "dirty bomb." Such radioactive materials are used in 
devices that treat cancer, sterilize food and medical instruments, and 
detect flaws in pipelines and other types of metal welds. Much of the 
radioactive material used in these devices is encapsulated, or sealed, 
in metal such as stainless steel, titanium, or platinum to prevent its 
dispersal.[Footnote 1] A dirty bomb could be produced by using 
explosives in combination with radioactive material upon detonation. 
Most experts agree that the dispersed radioactive material would have 
few short-term health effects on exposed individuals and that the 
explosives, not the radioactive material, would likely cause the 
greatest amount of immediate injuries, fatalities, and property damage. 
However, a dirty bomb--depending on the type, form, amount, and 
concentration of radioactive material used--could cause radiation 
exposure in individuals in close proximity to the material for an 
extended time and potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer 
for those contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of 
contaminated areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and 
serious economic costs on the affected population.

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) regulates domestic medical, industrial, and research uses of 
sealed sources through a combination of regulatory requirements, 
licensing, inspection, and enforcement. Section 274 of the act 
authorizes NRC to give primary regulatory authority to states (called 
"agreement" states) under certain conditions.[Footnote 2] To date, NRC 
has relinquished its licensing, inspection, and enforcement authority 
to 32 agreement states that administer the use of sealed sources within 
their jurisdictions;[Footnote 3] while continuing to regulate the use 
of sealed sources in the remaining states. NRC periodically evaluates 
each agreement state's regulatory program for compatibility with NRC 
regulations and its effectiveness in protecting public health and 
safety. Two types of licenses are associated with the use of 
radioactive materials--general licenses and specific licenses. A 
generally licensed device usually contains a sealed source within a 
shielded device, such as gas chromatograph units, fixed gauges, 
luminous exit signs, or reference and check sources. Such devices are 
designed with inherent radiation safety features so that persons with 
little or no radiation training or experience can use it, and as such 
do not require NRC or agreement state approval to purchase and are 
widely commercially available. Specific licenses cover uses, such as 
cameras used for industrial radiography, medical devices used to treat 
cancer, and facilities that irradiate food or medical products for 
sterilization. These uses generally require larger amounts of 
radioactive material than can be obtained with a general license. 
Organizations or individuals wanting to obtain a specific license must 
submit an application and gain the approval of either NRC or an 
agreement state. In addition to NRC and agreement states, other federal 
agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, the Food and Drug 
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency, regulate the 
safe transportation, medical use, and cleanup of radioactive material. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) regulates the use of radioactive 
material at its facilities and at the national laboratories.

This report--the third that we have prepared at your request to examine 
efforts to control sealed radioactive sources--examines efforts in the 
United States to regulate the use of sealed sources domestically and to 
prevent the use of this material by terrorists.[Footnote 4] 
Specifically, you asked us to determine (1) the known number of sealed 
sources in the United States; (2) how many of these sealed sources have 
been lost, stolen, or abandoned; (3) the effectiveness of federal and 
state controls over sealed sources; and (4) NRC's and agreement states' 
efforts considered or implemented following September 11, 2001, to 
strengthen security of sealed sources. To address these objectives, we 
distributed a survey to radiation control agencies in the 32 agreement 
states, the 18 non-agreement states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico to determine numbers and types of radioactive materials 
licenses in their jurisdictions and to solicit their views on the 
regulation of sealed sources. At the time of this report, all of the 
agreement states except Arizona, 11 non-agreement states, and Puerto 
Rico had responded to our survey. We did not receive responses from the 
following non-agreement states--Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, and the 
District of Columbia.[Footnote 5] We also surveyed and interviewed 
officials in the four NRC regional offices; interviewed officials at 
NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland; and analyzed NRC license and 
incident databases. In addition, we observed NRC evaluations of the 
effectiveness of state regulatory programs in Rhode Island and Florida 
and a similar evaluation of NRC's Region III radioactive materials 
regulatory program in Lisle, Illinois. We visited 10 states to meet 
with officials of state radiation control agencies and selected 
licensees representing a variety of types and uses of sealed sources. 
Appendix I presents our scope and methodology in more detail.

Results in Brief:

The precise number of sealed sources in use today in the United States 
is unknown. NRC estimates that there are approximately 2 million sealed 
sources in the United States. This estimate is based on the number of 
specific and general licensees from NRC's databases and agreement 
states combined with data from an NRC survey conducted in the early 
1990s. NRC and agreement states do not track the actual numbers of 
sealed sources, but only track the number of specific licensees and 
have limited data on general licensees. NRC, in cooperation with DOE, 
has begun examining options for developing a national sealed source 
tracking system, but this effort is limited in scope; importantly, it 
has had only limited involvement of the agreement states. Our analysis 
of NRC's specific license database and responses to our survey of 
agreement states indicate that about 20,000 entities (companies, 
hospitals, organizations, and in some cases, individuals) have obtained 
specific licenses to possess and use radioactive material, including 
sealed sources. Agreement states regulate 80 percent of these entities, 
while NRC regulates the remaining 20 percent.

NRC has had difficulty accounting for generally licensed devices. 
Owners of these devices are not required to apply to NRC or agreement 
states for licenses. Mishandling and improper disposal of generally 
licensed devices has, in some cases, lead to expensive investigation 
and clean up. NRC began tracking generally licensed devices in April 
2001, but has experienced problems locating device owners. To assist in 
this effort, NRC has contracted with a private investigation firm to 
help locate owners. In order to improve accountability over generally 
licensed devices, we are recommending that NRC determine the need to 
require owners of these devices to apply for specific licenses and 
whether the additional costs presented by applying for and approving 
specific licenses are commensurate with the risks these devices 
present.

Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 reported incidents of lost, 
stolen, or abandoned devices containing sealed sources, an average of 
about 250 per year. The majority of these devices were subsequently 
recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize the importance of determining how 
many sealed sources are present in the United States, and which sealed 
sources pose the greatest risk if they were to be used in a dirty bomb. 
NRC and DOE are working together to categorize sealed sources by their 
level of risk. However, NRC's and DOE's efforts are limited in scope 
because they do not include an analysis of sealed sources in the 
agreement states, which regulate 80 percent of the nation's radioactive 
materials licensees. This is because there is no single source of data 
on agreement state licensees; instead each state has its own database 
of the licensees it regulates. These databases are not linked to one 
another and NRC does not have access to them. Therefore, we are 
recommending that NRC as part of its continuing efforts to categorize 
the sealed sources that pose the greatest risk, consult with the 
agreement states to determine the types, amount, and availability of 
the highest risk sealed sources.

Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of 
sealed sources. Our visits to radiation control programs and licensees 
in 10 states found that security for devices containing sealed sources 
varied among facilities we visited. For example, a medical device 
manufacturer that we visited had extensive security measures, including 
electronic access control to areas containing sealed sources, perimeter 
fencing, and background checks on employees. On the other hand, a 
medical use licensee that we visited kept its sealed sources in an 
unlocked, unguarded space with the door propped open. In addition, we 
found a potential security weakness in NRC's licensing process to 
obtain sealed sources. The process assumes an applicant is acting in 
good faith and allows applicants to acquire sealed sources as soon as a 
new license is issued by mail. It can then take NRC as long as 12 
months to conduct its first inspection, leaving the possibility that 
materials will be obtained and used maliciously in the meantime. 
Certain agreement states have implemented measures to address this 
weakness, such as delivering licenses in person or conducting 
inspections before the delivery of sealed sources. In addition, NRC 
currently evaluates the effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but 
these evaluations do not assess the security of sealed sources. To 
address security weaknesses, we are recommending that NRC modify its 
licensing process to ensure that radioactive sources cannot be 
purchased before NRC verifies that the material will be used as 
intended. We are also recommending that NRC modify its evaluations of 
agreement state and NRC programs to include criteria and performance 
measures of program effectiveness in ensuring the security of sealed 
sources.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC, along with the 
agreement states, has notified licensees of the need for heightened 
awareness to security and the need to take certain actions, but has not 
issued, until recently, legally binding orders to improve the security 
of sealed sources. NRC has been developing specific additional security 
measures since the attacks, and issued orders on June 5, 2003, to 
strengthen security at large irradiator facilities. Although irradiator 
facilities contain large amounts of radioactive material, they are 
specially designed to include thick concrete and steel walls, security 
interlocks, and other protective equipment to protect against radiation 
exposure and secure the sealed sources. In light of such built-in 
security, agreement state officials and others have questioned NRC's 
decision to select irradiators as the first recipient of additional 
security measures. Of agreement states responding to our survey, 93 
percent identified sealed sources used in industrial radiography as of 
greater concern. Reasons for this may include that these devices are 
widely available and portable.

NRC and some agreement states disagree on the appropriate role of the 
states in the regulation of sealed source security. The Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 gives NRC the authority to issue rules, regulations, or 
orders to promote the common defense and security and to protect the 
health and minimize danger to life or property. Based on this 
authority, NRC intends to order licensees with sealed sources, 
including those licensed by agreement states, to implement additional 
security measures. NRC has already done so for large irradiator 
facilities. However, 82 percent of agreement states responding to our 
survey indicate that they want to have responsibility for inspection 
and enforcement of security measures for sealed sources. In addition, 
74 percent of agreement states responding to our survey indicated that 
their state program could effectively respond to a radiological 
incident with its current resources. NRC officials argue that the 
agreement states lack the staff and funding to carry out the additional 
responsibility of securing sealed sources. However, according to NRC 
officials we contacted, NRC clearly faces similar staffing and funding 
problems. NRC has initiated a materials security working group, which 
includes the states, as a mechanism for discussing and identifying 
potential resolutions to these issues. We are recommending that NRC 
determine how agreement and non-agreement states can participate in the 
development and implementation of additional security measures over 
sealed sources.

We presented a draft of this report to NRC, the Conference of Radiation 
Control Program Directors (CRCPD), and the Organization of Agreement 
States (OAS) for comment. NRC stated that the draft report did not 
fully present either the current status of NRC's efforts to improve the 
security of high-risk radioactive sources or the large effort that NRC 
has devoted to this issue over the past 18 months. NRC believed that 
several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both 
federal and state levels. We clarified our recommendations regarding 
the participation of the states in the development and implementation 
of additional security measures. CRCPD and OAS officials generally 
agreed with our conclusions and recommendations.

Background:

Radioactive material in sealed sources is used in equipment designed to 
diagnose and treat illnesses (particularly cancer), irradiate food and 
medical products for sterilization purposes, detect flaws and other 
failures in pipeline and other types of metal welds, and determine the 
moisture content of soil and other materials.[Footnote 6] Until the 
1950s, only naturally occurring radioactive materials, such as radium-
226, were available to be used in sealed sources. Since then, sealed 
sources containing radioactive material produced artificially in 
nuclear reactors and particle accelerators have become widely 
available, including cobalt-60, strontium-90, technetium-99m, cesium-
137, and iridium-192. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the states 
retain sole regulatory authority over most naturally occurring 
radioactive material as well as radioactive material produced in 
particle accelerators. Federal jurisdiction extends only to those 
materials used as a source of material for nuclear fuel or created as a 
result of irradiation in nuclear reactors.

Radioactive material can be found in various forms. For example, 
cobalt-60 is a metal, while the cesium-137 in some sealed sources is in 
a powder form closely resembling talc. Radioactive materials never stop 
emitting radiation, but their intensity decays over time at various 
rates. The term "half-life" is used to indicate the period during which 
the radioactivity decreases by half as a result of decay. Radioactive 
materials are measured by their level of activity. The greater the 
activity level--measured in units called curies[Footnote 7]--the more 
radiation emitted, which increases the potential risk to the public if 
the radioactive materials are lost or stolen.

Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive 
materials--general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed 
device usually consists of a sealed source within a shielded device, 
such as gas chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or 
reference and check sources. These devices are designed with inherent 
radiation safety features so that persons with little or no radiation 
training or experience can use it. General licensees are automatically 
licensed without having to apply to NRC or an agreement state for a 
license and are subject to a variety of requirements under NRC's or 
agreement states' regulations.[Footnote 8] Furthermore, manufacturers 
are required to report quarterly to NRC the names of customers who 
purchase generally licensed devices. Examples of requirements general 
licensees are subject to under NRC's regulations include:

* general licensees shall not abandon the devices;

* complying with instructions and precautions listed on device labels;

* performing tests to ensure radioactivity is not leaking from the 
device at least every 6 months, and, if leakage is detected, suspend 
operation of the device and have it repaired or disposed of by the 
manufacturer or another entity authorized to perform such work; and:

* reporting to NRC or an agreement state the transfer of a device to 
another licensee or the disposal of the device.

A company seeking radioactive material for uses that do not qualify for 
a general license must apply to NRC or, if it conducts business in an 
agreement state, to the appropriate state for a specific license. Its 
application must demonstrate how the use of the materials will meet the 
safety requirements in NRC's or agreement states' regulations.[Footnote 
9] Applicants must provide information on the type, form, and intended 
quantity of material, the facilities in which the material will be 
used, the qualifications of users of the materials, and radiation 
protection programs the applicant has in place to protect their workers 
and the public from receiving excessive doses of radiation.

NRC and the Agreement States Lack Complete Information on Numbers of 
Sealed Sources:

The number of sealed sources in use today in the United States is 
unknown primarily because no state or federal agency tracks individual 
sealed sources. Instead, NRC and the agreement states track numbers of 
specific licensees. NRC and DOE have begun to examine options for 
developing a national tracking system, but to date, this effort has had 
limited involvement by the agreement states. NRC had difficulty 
locating owners of certain generally licensed devices it began tracking 
in April 2001 and has hired a private investigation firm to help locate 
them. Twenty-five of the 31 agreement states that responded to our 
survey indicated that they track some or all general licensees or 
generally licensed devices, and 17 were able to provide data on the 
number of generally licensed devices in their jurisdictions, totaling 
approximately 17,000 devices.

NRC and Agreement States Track Licensees Rather Than Individual Sealed 
Sources:

NRC estimates that there are approximately 2 million licensed sealed 
sources in the United States. However, there is no single source of 
information in the United States to verify authorized users, locations, 
quantities, and movements of sealed sources. Separate systems are in 
place at NRC and in each agreement state to track the identities of 
specific licensees and the maximum quantity of radioactive material 
that they are authorized to possess. These systems do not, however, 
record the number of sealed sources actually possessed by specific 
licensees nor do the systems track movements (such as purchase, 
transfer, or disposal) of sealed sources by specific licensees. 
Licensees are required to maintain records for the acquisition and 
disposition of each sealed source it receives and inspections by NRC 
and/or an agreement state includes confirming inventory records.

The Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of NRC established a working 
group in June 2002 to address, among other things, the options for 
establishing a national source tracking system and the potential for 
the use of technological methods for tagging and monitoring sealed 
sources in use, storage, and transit. This working group reported in 
May 2003 that a national source tracking system should provide a 
"cradle to grave" account of the origins of each high-risk source, and 
record how, by whom, and where a source has been transported, used, and 
eventually disposed of or exported. According to the report, such a 
system would help NRC and DOE to:

* monitor the location and use of sealed sources,

* detect and act on discrepancies,

* conduct inspections and investigations,

* communicate sealed source information to other government agencies,

* respond in the event of an emergency,

* verify legitimate ownership and use of sealed sources, and:

* further analyze hazards attributable to the possession and use of 
sealed sources.

The working group did not determine how data on sealed source licensees 
in the agreement states would be integrated into a national level 
system.

While there are no complete data on the number of sealed sources in the 
United States, data are available on the number of specific licensees 
authorized to use sealed sources. Analysis of NRC's specific license 
database and responses to our survey of the agreement states indicates 
that there are about 20,000 specific licensees in the United States 
(see figs. 1 and 2). The majority (nearly 80 percent) are regulated by 
the 32 agreement states, the remaining 20 percent of specific licensees 
are regulated by NRC.

Figure 1: NRC Regulated Specific Licenses in NRC Regulated States and 
on Federal Facilities in Agreement States as of December 31, 2002:

[See PDF for image]

Notes: NRC regulates specific licensees on federal facilities in 
agreement states.

[End of figure]

NRC also regulates 5 specific licensees in Guam, 120 specific licensees 
in Puerto Rico, and 7 specific licensees in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Figure 2: Agreement State Regulated Specific Licenses as of December 
31, 2002:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Our analysis of NRC's license tracking system and responses to our 
survey of agreement states indicates that sealed sources for medical 
uses comprise the largest portion of specific licenses issued (see 
table 1).

Table 1: Number of Specific Licenses Issued By Use in the United States 
as of December 31, 2002:

State: Alabama; Medical: 153; Measuring systems: 185; Industrial 
radiography: 26; Well logging: 3; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 2; Other: 63; Total: 432.

State: Alaska; Medical: 10; Measuring systems: 21; Industrial 
radiography: 7; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 1; Other: 5; Total: 44.

State: Arizona; Medical: NA; Measuring systems: NA; Industrial 
radiography: NA; Well logging: NA; Irradiators-large: NA; Irradiators-
small: NA; Other: NA; Total: 318.

State: Arkansas; Medical: 118; Measuring systems: 128; Industrial 
radiography: 10; Well logging: 6; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 4; Other: 29; Total: 296.

State: California; Medical: 655; Measuring systems: 799; Industrial 
radiography: 40; Well logging: 18; Irradiators-large: 9; Irradiators-
small: 26; Other: 640; Total: 2,187.

State: Colorado; Medical: 85; Measuring systems: 166; Industrial 
radiography: 12; Well logging: 10; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 4; Other: 79; Total: 356.

State: Connecticut; Medical: 69; Measuring systems: 38; Industrial 
radiography: 3; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 3; Other: 63; Total: 176.

State: Delaware; Medical: 19; Measuring systems: 16; Industrial 
radiography: 1; Well logging: 1; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 2; Other: 15; Total: 54.

State: District of Columbia; Medical: 18; Measuring systems: 6; 
Industrial radiography: 0; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 1; 
Irradiators-small: 3; Other: 12; Total: 40.

State: Florida; Medical: 866; Measuring systems: 367; Industrial 
radiography: 20; Well logging: 8; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 24; Other: 111; Total: 1,398.

State: Georgia; Medical: 267; Measuring systems: 175; Industrial 
radiography: 13; Well logging: 1; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 5; Other: 66; Total: 529.

State: Guam; Medical: 2; Measuring systems: 3; Industrial radiography: 
0; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-small: 0; Other: 
0; Total: 5.

State: Hawaii; Medical: 21; Measuring systems: 25; Industrial 
radiography: 3; Well logging: 1; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 1; Other: 5; Total: 56.

State: Idaho; Medical: 20; Measuring systems: 36; Industrial 
radiography: 0; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 0; Other: 12; Total: 68.

State: Illinois; Medical: 273; Measuring systems: 338; Industrial 
radiography: 18; Well logging: 7; Irradiators-large: 4; Irradiators-
small: 8; Other: 125; Total: 773.

State: Indiana; Medical: 144; Measuring systems: 86; Industrial 
radiography: 4; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 1; Other: 39; Total: 274.

State: Iowa; Medical: 67; Measuring systems: 136; Industrial 
radiography: 6; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 5; Other: 27; Total: 241.

State: Kansas; Medical: 130; Measuring systems: 142; Industrial 
radiography: 12; Well logging: 20; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 2; Other: 13; Total: 319.

State: Kentucky; Medical: 158; Measuring systems: 180; Industrial 
radiography: 6; Well logging: 8; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 3; Other: 11; Total: 366.

State: Louisiana; Medical: NA; Measuring systems: NA; Industrial 
radiography: NA; Well logging: NA; Irradiators-large: NA; Irradiators-
small: NA; Other: NA; Total: 548.

State: Maine; Medical: 47; Measuring systems: 57; Industrial 
radiography: 4; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 3; Other: 22; Total: 133.

State: Maryland; Medical: 226; Measuring systems: 140; Industrial 
radiography: 2; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 7; Irradiators-
small: 19; Other: 169; Total: 563.

State: Massachusetts; Medical: 120; Measuring systems: 180; Industrial 
radiography: 7; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 13; Other: 239; Total: 561.

State: Michigan; Medical: 250; Measuring systems: 168; Industrial 
radiography: 7; Well logging: 4; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 7; Other: 64; Total: 501.

State: Minnesota; Medical: 56; Measuring systems: 49; Industrial 
radiography: 5; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 5; Other: 38; Total: 154.

State: Mississippi; Medical: 118; Measuring systems: 157; Industrial 
radiography: 21; Well logging: 5; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 6; Other: 21; Total: 329.

State: Missouri; Medical: 136; Measuring systems: 84; Industrial 
radiography: 7; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 3; Other: 56; Total: 286.

State: Montana; Medical: 16; Measuring systems: 38; Industrial 
radiography: 1; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 2; Other: 11; Total: 68.

State: Nebraska; Medical: 50; Measuring systems: 66; Industrial 
radiography: 4; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 3; Irradiators-
small: 4; Other: 19; Total: 146.

State: Nevada; Medical: 86; Measuring systems: 130; Industrial 
radiography: 5; Well logging: 1; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 3; Other: 13; Total: 238.

State: New Hampshire; Medical: 27; Measuring systems: 39; Industrial 
radiography: 2; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 1; Other: 13; Total: 83.

State: New Jersey; Medical: 239; Measuring systems: 98; Industrial 
radiography: 5; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 7; Irradiators-
small: 13; Other: 128; Total: 490.

State: New Mexico; Medical: 44; Measuring systems: 99; Industrial 
radiography: 9; Well logging: 11; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 5; Other: 22; Total: 192.

State: New York; Medical: 512; Measuring systems: 268; Industrial 
radiography: 25; Well logging: 2; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 4; Other: 38; Total: 851.

State: North Carolina; Medical: 266; Measuring systems: 235; Industrial 
radiography: 17; Well logging: 1; Irradiators-large: 4; Irradiators-
small: 5; Other: 124; Total: 652.

State: North Dakota; Medical: 13; Measuring systems: 37; Industrial 
radiography: 4; Well logging: 4; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 3; Other: 5; Total: 66.

State: Ohio; Medical: 341; Measuring systems: 274; Industrial 
radiography: 22; Well logging: 4; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 5; Other: 128; Total: 776.

State: Oklahoma; Medical: 111; Measuring systems: 107; Industrial 
radiography: 27; Well logging: 20; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 8; Other: 51; Total: 324.

State: Oregon; Medical: 88; Measuring systems: 262; Industrial 
radiography: 8; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 4; Other: 97; Total: 459.

State: Pennsylvania; Medical: 296; Measuring systems: 215; Industrial 
radiography: 11; Well logging: 4; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 24; Other: 145; Total: 696.

State: Puerto Rico; Medical: 65; Measuring systems: 35; Industrial 
radiography: 3; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 3; Other: 12; Total: 120.

State: Rhode Island; Medical: 22; Measuring systems: 16; Industrial 
radiography: 6; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 1; Other: 9; Total: 54.

State: South Carolina; Medical: 149; Measuring systems: 145; Industrial 
radiography: 22; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 3; Irradiators-
small: 1; Other: 50; Total: 370.

State: South Dakota; Medical: 17; Measuring systems: 16; Industrial 
radiography: 0; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 0; Other: 7; Total: 40.

State: Tennessee; Medical: 261; Measuring systems: 167; Industrial 
radiography: 26; Well logging: 1; Irradiators-large: 2; Irradiators-
small: 10; Other: 99; Total: 566.

State: Texas; Medical: 672; Measuring systems: 468; Industrial 
radiography: 102; Well logging: 54; Irradiators-large: 7; Irradiators-
small: 19; Other: 241; Total: 1,563.

State: Utah; Medical: 38; Measuring systems: 108; Industrial 
radiography: 10; Well logging: 7; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 2; Other: 35; Total: 201.

State: Vermont; Medical: 13; Measuring systems: 10; Industrial 
radiography: 0; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 2; Other: 7; Total: 32.

State: U.S. Virgin Islands; Medical: 2; Measuring systems: 4; 
Industrial radiography: 0; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; 
Irradiators-small: 0; Other: 1; Total: 7.

State: Virginia; Medical: 126; Measuring systems: 155; Industrial 
radiography: 12; Well logging: 2; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 6; Other: 57; Total: 359.

State: Washington; Medical: 110; Measuring systems: 199; Industrial 
radiography: 10; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 2; Other: 98; Total: 419.

State: West Virginia; Medical: 66; Measuring systems: 89; Industrial 
radiography: 2; Well logging: 3; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 0; Other: 15; Total: 175.

State: Wisconsin; Medical: 106; Measuring systems: 88; Industrial 
radiography: 9; Well logging: 0; Irradiators-large: 1; Irradiators-
small: 7; Other: 52; Total: 263.

State: Wyoming; Medical: 17; Measuring systems: 40; Industrial 
radiography: 2; Well logging: 3; Irradiators-large: 0; Irradiators-
small: 0; Other: 10; Total: 72.

Total; Medical: 7,781; Measuring systems: 7,090; Industrial 
radiography: 578; Well logging: 209; Irradiators-large: 70; 
Irradiators-small: 284; Other: 3,411; Total: 20,289.

Sources: NRC license tracking system and GAO survey of agreement 
states.

Notes: NA=not available.

Does not include licenses issued for naturally occurring or 
accelerator-produced radioactive materials in NRC regulated states. 
Twenty-nine of the 31 agreement states responding to our survey do not 
distinguish between materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 and naturally occurring or accelerator-produced radioactive 
materials in their licensing actions.

Data for Arizona and Louisiana includes only the total number of 
licensees.

[End of table]

Fixed and portable gauges used in industry to measure density, moisture 
content, thickness, and so forth, are the next most prevalent use of 
sealed sources, with nearly 7,100 specific licenses issued nationwide. 
Over 570 specific licenses have been issued for industrial 
radiographers. In addition, there are 70 large irradiators (containing 
high levels, between 10,000 and 15 million curies, of cobalt-60) across 
the United States used for the sterilization of food and medical 
products, and 284 smaller irradiators (containing less than 10,000 
curies of, in most cases, cesium-137 and cobalt-60) used in hospitals 
and other facilities for sterilization of smaller products, such as 
units of blood. The remaining specific licenses in the United States 
are issued for a variety of purposes, including, among other things, 
manufacturing and distribution of smoke detectors (containing small 
amounts of americium-241), academic research, and disposal of 
radioactive waste.

NRC Has Had Difficulty Finding Owners of Generally Licensed Devices:

While data exist on the numbers and locations of specific licenses in 
the United States, complete data are not available on the numbers of 
general licenses. In most cases general licensees are not required to 
apply to NRC or an agreement state for a license to possess and use a 
device. Therefore, in the past, data on general licensees have come 
from manufacturers of generally licensed devices that are required to 
report quarterly to NRC or the agreement states the names of customers 
purchasing generally licensed devices. According to NRC, approximately 
40,000 general licensees possess an estimated 600,000 generally 
licensed devices in the United States. Although general licensees are 
required to follow NRC's regulations, they traditionally have little 
contact with NRC. Mishandling and improper disposition of generally 
licensed devices has, on occasion, resulted in limited radiation 
exposure to the public and, in some cases, entailed expensive 
investigation, cleanup, and disposal activities. For example, two 
incidents occurred in New Jersey in 1997 involving luminous exit signs 
containing tritium. In May 1997, a 14-year old removed three tritium 
exit signs from a demolition site near his home and opened one sign 
exposing himself to radioactive material and contaminating his home. In 
October 1997, a patient at a state-run psychiatric hospital broke a 
tritium exit sign. While no injuries resulted, the state spent more 
than $200,000 cleaning up the hospital and disposing of the more than 
sixty barrels of radioactive waste--primarily contaminated carpeting, 
furniture, bedding, and other debris--from the incident.

NRC amended its regulations effective February of 2001, to, among other 
things, better enable NRC to verify and track the location, use, and 
disposition of generally licensed devices. NRC focused its efforts to 
improve accountability over generally licensed devices on a small 
subset of devices that were determined to be of higher risk. The 
amended regulations include a requirement for general licensees to 
register with NRC devices that contain certain levels of radioactive 
material.[Footnote 10] General licensees would be charged $450 to cover 
the costs of the registration program.

Beginning in April 2001, NRC mailed registration forms to about 2,800 
of its general licensees.[Footnote 11] As of May 2003, approximately 61 
percent of them had responded. Twenty-eight percent of the registration 
forms were returned as undeliverable and the remaining 11 percent were 
not returned by the general licensee, a response rate significantly 
lower than NRC expected. According to NRC, a significant amount of the 
submitted information is incomplete or inaccurate, requiring additional 
follow up that was not anticipated. To help increase the response rate, 
phone calls are being made in advance to locate general licensees 
before registration forms are sent to ensure the responsible 
individuals at the correct addresses receive them. In addition, NRC has 
contracted with a private investigation firm to help find general 
licensees whose addresses in the database are incorrect.

Twenty-five of the 31 agreement states that responded to our survey 
said that they require registration of some or all generally licensed 
devices. Seventeen of these states were able to provide us with data on 
the number of generally licensed devices they regulate. These 17 states 
estimate that approximately 17,000 generally licensed devices are used 
in their jurisdictions.

Over 1,300 Devices Containing Sealed Sources Have Been Reported Lost, 
Stolen, or Abandoned Since 1998:

Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 incidents where devices 
containing sealed sources have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned 
in the United States, an average of about 250 per year. The majority of 
these lost devices were subsequently recovered. Both NRC and DOE 
recognize the importance of not only determining how many sealed 
sources are present in the United States, but also which sealed sources 
pose the greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. NRC and DOE are working 
together to categorize sealed sources by their level of risk. However, 
NRC's and DOE's efforts have not, to date, addressed sealed sources in 
the agreement states.

Majority of Lost and Stolen Sealed Sources Subsequently Recovered and 
Represented Little Risk to the Public:

Analysis of NRC's Nuclear Materials Events Database indicates that, 
between 1998 and 2002, there were over 1,300 incidents of lost, stolen, 
and abandoned sealed sources. These losses averaged about 250 per year. 
Many of these incidents involved stolen portable gauges that are used 
to measure the moisture content and density of soils, concrete, or 
asphalt on construction sites. By themselves, these gauges contain low 
amounts of radioactive material and pose relatively little risk to the 
public. Portable gauges are most often stolen from construction sites 
or from vehicles such as pickup trucks. According to NRC and agreement 
state officials, individuals stealing gauges are usually unaware that 
they contain radioactive material, and they often abandon or return 
them once discovering their contents. Nevertheless, responding to these 
incidents takes time and resources. Well logging sources also account 
for a relatively large number of lost and abandoned sources. One major 
oil services company accounts for over 30 of the 132 total well logging 
sources abandoned since 1998. These sources contain several curies of 
americium-241 and cesium-137. These losses usually consisted of a 
sealed source becoming lodged down a well and subsequently abandoned. 
The well is filled with concrete and a marker is attached warning of 
the presence of radioactive materials. In addition, sealed sources are 
occasionally abandoned when companies owning them go bankrupt.

According to NRC, most sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or 
abandoned are subsequently recovered. In the past 5 years, few 
incidents have occurred involving what NRC considers high-risk sealed 
sources. For example, in March 1999, an industrial radiography camera 
containing over 88 curies of iridium-192 (a quantity NRC considers to 
be of concern) was stolen from a trailer at the radiographer's home in 
Florida. The Florida radiation control program, local law enforcement, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation, but 
never recovered the sealed source. According to NRC, the iridium-192 in 
the sealed source has now decayed to the point where it is no longer a 
high risk to the public.

Another example of lost or stolen sealed sources took place in a North 
Carolina hospital in March 1998. During a quarterly inventory of a 
hospital's sealed sources, it was discovered that 19 sealed sources 
were missing, containing an aggregate of over 600 millicuries of 
cesium-137--a highly dispersible radioactive material. These sources 
included 18 cesium-137 sealed sources--which had been locked in a safe 
at the time of the disappearance--and a new cesium-137 sealed source 
still stored in its shipping container. The North Carolina radiation 
control program, NRC, DOE, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
conducted an extensive joint investigation. The investigation included 
air and ground searches using radiation detection equipment. However, 
the sealed sources were not recovered and a conclusion about the cause 
of the incident was not reached.

NRC's and DOE's Efforts to Categorize Sealed Sources of Greatest 
Concern Does Not Include Sealed Sources in Agreement States:

The working group established by the Secretary of Energy and the 
Chairman of NRC in June 2002 was also tasked with determining which 
radioactive materials pose the greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. 
Their analysis was to provide a relative ranking of the degree of risk 
posed by specific materials as a basis on which initial judgments can 
be made regarding specific protective measures to be developed for 
these materials.

Using experts from DOE's Sandia National Laboratory, the task force 
developed a methodology to systematically evaluate radioactive 
materials for a dirty bomb. Researchers at Sandia considered the 
potential dispersability of radioactive materials, the number of 
locations possessing the material, the quantity of material possessed 
at each facility, and the protective measures already applied to the 
material. The combination of these factors yielded a "hazard index," 
which serves as an expression of relative concern. Specific radioactive 
materials were rated high, medium, low, or very low, depending upon the 
degree of health risk posed for their use in a dirty bomb.[Footnote 12] 
The analysis focused on the potential health effects of the use of 
radioactive materials in a dirty bomb and did not explicitly address 
the psychological and economic consequences. According to an NRC 
official, no specific data exists regarding how the public would react 
to a dirty bomb, which complicates efforts to analyze its psychological 
consequences.

The working group's analysis included materials under an NRC license 
and DOE's control in the United States, excluding nuclear weapons 
materials, radioactive materials in nuclear power plants, spent fuel, 
and other radioactive waste. DOE's and NRC's report, however, did not 
consider sealed sources held by the approximately 15,000 specific 
licensees in the agreement states. Although the agreement states and 
NRC have similar types of licensees, agreement states often have 
greater numbers of licensees with certain types of sealed sources than 
NRC-regulated states. For example, our survey of agreement states 
indicates that Texas has more well logging specific licensees than any 
other state.[Footnote 13] In addition, states exclusively regulate the 
use of naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive 
materials. Agreement state officials told us that any consideration of 
the risks presented by sealed sources needs to include all materials 
regulated by NRC and the agreement states because the psychological and 
economic consequences of a dirty bomb are likely to be similar whether 
the radioactive material is naturally or artificially produced. NRC 
plans to work with the states to implement follow-up actions based on 
the recommendations in the DOE/NRC report. Vulnerability studies have 
been initiated to identify security vulnerabilities and appropriate 
security enhancements. Scenarios involving the aggregation of sources 
in a single location will be considered. In addition, methods for 
improved tracking of the locations of sources will be developed.

Weaknesses Exist in Federal and State Controls Over the Security of 
Sealed Sources:

Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of 
sealed sources.[Footnote 14] Security for devices containing sealed 
sources varied among facilities we visited in 10 states. In addition, 
NRC's licensing process to obtain sealed sources presents a potential 
security weakness, namely that approved applicants may purchase sealed 
sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process 
assumes that the applicant is acting in good faith, it is possible that 
sealed sources can be obtained for malicious intent. It can take as 
long as 12 months before NRC conducts its first inspection of the 
sealed source holder, potentially allowing sealed sources to be 
obtained and used maliciously without NRC's knowledge.

Security at Facilities Using Sealed Sources Varies:

During visits to licensees, regulated by both NRC and agreement states, 
we found a varied level of security provided to sealed sources. A 
medical device manufacturer we visited in an agreement state had 
extensive security measures in place to protect sealed sources. For 
example, a heavy iron fence surrounds the building and guards are on 
duty to monitor the facility 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. For 
shielding and security, the concrete walls and ceiling containing the 
radioactive materials are more than 6 feet thick. All areas housing 
materials have electronic locks requiring a 4-digit code and card 
access. Visitors must be pre-arranged and escorted at all times. 
Background and drug checks are conducted on all personnel before 
hiring. Once hired, they are provided with varying degrees of building 
access, depending upon their duties. Eighteen staff members are fully 
trained in emergency response for hazardous materials and every 
employee is required to complete a 3-hour training course on 
radioactive materials and refresher training sessions are held 
frequently. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the company 
examined risks for the facility and established an in-house task force 
to develop scenarios of potential terrorist attacks. To test the 
company's security and employees' preparedness, the company's chief 
executive officer had a helicopter land, unannounced, on the roof of 
one of the company's buildings. Following this drill, emergency plans 
were developed that were integrated with the national Homeland Security 
Advisory System. For example, whenever the national threat level is 
raised to orange, the facility's front gates are closed and locked at 
all times. If the threat level were ever increased to red, no visitors 
would be allowed. Furthermore, the company has entered an agreement 
with the local police to hire armed off-duty police to provide 
additional security for the facility should the national threat level 
be raised to red.

Extensive security measures were also present at a facility we visited 
in an agreement state that manufactures portable moisture density 
gauges.[Footnote 15] Sealed sources, shipped to the manufacturer for 
installation in moisture density gauges, are immediately placed in a 
shielded basement storage room that is kept locked at all times. Only 
three staff members have keys to access the room. Entrances to the 
manufacturing facility are kept locked at all times, with an alarm 
system activated after closing time. Visitors must be escorted during 
visits. Finally, the company has initiated a computerized "cradle to 
grave" tracking system where all sealed sources installed in moisture 
density gauges are tracked from manufacture, use, and eventual 
disposal.

In the course of visits to a medical licensee, we observed poor 
security practices with sealed sources. For example, during a visit to 
a hospital in an agreement state, we were told that sealed sources, 
including strontium-90, cesium-137, and iridium-192, were securely 
stored in a room equipped with an electronic lock with limited access. 
Later, during a tour of the hospital, we found the room unlocked, 
unattended, and the door propped open. The hospital official explained 
that this practice was very unusual; he locked the room door after 
inspection and continued the tour. Shortly thereafter, we passed the 
room for a second time. Again, the room was unlocked, unattended, and 
the door propped open. The storage room was in close proximity to the 
hospital's laundry and maintenance facility, which is accessible to any 
hospital employee. In addition, an entry to the hospital from the 
outside was also nearby, and this entrance was not guarded nor equipped 
with radiation detection equipment to notify security if any sealed 
sources were being removed or stolen.

We also saw potential vulnerabilities at industrial radiography 
licensees we visited in agreement states. Industrial radiographers use 
high radioactivity iridium-192 sources to produce an image on 
photographic film to inspect metal parts and welds for defects. These 
devices are very portable because they are often used at remote 
locations. The devices are also subject to limited security at the 
locations we visited--primarily a series of padlocks on storage cases 
for the device. Personnel are not required to have background checks 
and training was historically only on-the-job. Most agreement states 
now require classroom training and testing to enhance radiographers' 
knowledge and skills. One industrial radiographer we visited added 
extra security measures consisting of a motion detector alarm system--
monitored by the local police--and an extra lock to the gate of the 
storage room at its facility. However, this additional security would 
not prevent the theft of the sealed source when the device is being 
used in the field or at a customer's facility. This industrial 
radiographer had taken additional steps to train his workers to be 
aware of security threats and required--even before it was required by 
NRC and agreement state regulations--for two people to be present 
whenever the sealed source was being used.

Current Licensing Process Leaves Sealed Sources Vulnerable:

To qualify for a specific license to use sealed sources, an applicant 
must demonstrate that their use of sealed sources will meet safety 
requirements set forth in NRC regulations or in comparable agreement 
state regulations (if the license applicant is located in an agreement 
state). NRC requires license applications to include information on, 
among other things, types of sealed sources that will be used, details 
of the applicant's radiation protection program for workers dealing 
with sealed sources, and qualifications of users of sealed sources. NRC 
reviews this information for adherence to procedures and criteria 
documented in NRC licensing guidance.[Footnote 16] If the application 
meets approval criteria, a license is issued.

NRC licensing procedures do not require inspection of licensee 
facilities before the issuance of a license. Instead, NRC performs 
initial inspections no later than 12 months after issuance of a 
license.[Footnote 17] However, as pointed out by an agreement state 
official, a licensee can purchase sealed sources as soon as a license 
has been acquired by mail. As a result, licensees may purchase sealed 
sources legally without first verifying that they will use the material 
as intended. Several agreement states have developed methods to verify 
the legitimacy of potential licensees. For example, one program we 
visited conducts prelicensing inspections. Another state program hand-
delivers licenses at the end of the application process. An agreement 
state official explained that pre-licensing inspections and hand 
delivery enabled regulators to establish authenticity of the 
prospective licensee and whether information provided in the 
application is indeed valid.

NRC and Agreement States Generally Ensure Safe Use and Handling of 
Sealed Sources:

NRC conducts periodic evaluations of NRC regional materials programs 
and agreement state radiation control programs to ensure that public 
health and safety is adequately protected. Accidents and injuries 
resulting from the use of sealed sources are relatively few. For 
example, analysis of NRC's Nuclear Materials Events Database and 
responses to our survey of the agreement states indicates that in 
fiscal year 2002, only 25 of the approximately 20,000 licensees in the 
United States reported radiation exposures in excess of regulatory 
limits. In addition, according to NRC, there were only 32 reported 
accidents in fiscal year 2002 involving medical use of sealed sources 
out of tens of thousands of medical procedures conducted.

To evaluate the performance of its and agreement states' programs, NRC 
developed the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program, 
which uses several performance indicators in assessment of program 
effectiveness, including timeliness and quality of licensee inspection, 
program staffing and training, licensing activity, and response to 
incidents and allegations. Officials from NRC and agreement states 
participate in these periodic evaluations. During these evaluations, 
NRC and agreement state officials review program documentation and 
interview officials with the state or regional program to assess the 
program's performance. When the results of each performance indicator 
have been determined, a final report is issued.[Footnote 18] Agreement 
state or NRC regional programs can be evaluated as:

* adequate to protect the public health and safety,

* adequate but needs improvement, and:

* inadequate to protect public health and safety.

Figure 3 outlines the results of the most recent reviews of agreement 
state and four NRC regional programs.

Figure 3: Results of Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation 
Program Reviews:

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

NRC's most recent reviews of the 32 agreement states and NRC regional 
programs, dating back to 1998, found that all programs are adequately 
protecting public health and safety. Of the last 35 program reviews, 31 
programs were found adequate to protect public health and safety--the 
highest evaluation. Four programs were found "adequate but needs 
improvement" and were placed on "heightened oversight."[Footnote 19] A 
program placed on heightened oversight must follow a plan to improve 
performance or it will be placed on probation for failing to correct 
programmatic deficiencies. Furthermore, NRC reserves the right to 
suspend a state's agreement if the state does not comply with one or 
more of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program is intended to 
ensure that the NRC and the agreement states adequately protect the 
health and safety of the public in accordance with NRC standards. For 
example, in February 2003, the Rhode Island program was found "adequate 
but needs improvement." As a result of its evaluation, the Rhode Island 
program was placed on heightened oversight and was instructed to follow 
a detailed plan to improve performance, which includes NRC monitoring 
of progress through bimonthly teleconferences. In addition, the Rhode 
Island program must periodically submit a progress report to NRC. The 
review team found that a deficiency in staffing and training had led to 
Rhode Island's performance problems. Therefore, as part of the plan to 
improve performance, Rhode Island was instructed to address staffing 
and training concerns. In November 2003, a follow-up review will be 
conducted to establish whether the program has improved enough to 
remove it from heightened oversight status.

The review program also encourages states and NRC regions to learn good 
practices from one another. For example, an NRC official recommended 
that Florida be cited for a good practice for its in-house training 
efforts for the program's staff, including the creation of a new 
"training coordinator" position. As a result of participation by an 
Ohio official during Florida's last evaluation, Ohio's program decided 
to hire a training coordinator. Furthermore, because review results are 
available to the public and a good practices report is periodically 
distributed to all agreement states and NRC regions, all programs have 
access to the good practices of other programs. The report not only 
shares the good practices, but also the reasons for poor performance. 
Agreement state and NRC regional programs can take action to improve 
performance by examining the strengths and weaknesses of other 
programs.

NRC Efforts to Improve Security over Sealed Sources Have Been Limited 
and Disagreement Exists over the Appropriate Role of the States:

Efforts undertaken by NRC and agreement states to strengthen the 
security of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use 
have only, to date, required large irradiator facilities to take 
specific actions. Additional orders to licensees that possess high-risk 
sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and agreement states 
disagree over the appropriate role of the states in efforts to improve 
security. NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security 
measures on licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by 
agreement states. However, 82 percent of agreement states responding to 
our survey feel they should be responsible for inspecting and enforcing 
security measures for sealed sources in their states under their 
authority to ensure public health and safety.

NRC's Security Efforts Have Not Focused on Sealed Sources:

Since the events of September 11, 2001, NRC efforts have focused on 
issuing advisories and orders for nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel 
licensees and implementing changes within NRC to streamline its 
security responsibilities. Specifically, NRC has issued over 30 
advisories and 20 security orders requiring action to nuclear power 
plants, decommissioning power reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and 
spent fuel facilities.[Footnote 20] Between November and December 2001, 
NRC's Office of Investigations visited 80 nuclear facilities, law 
enforcement agencies, and first responders nationwide to interview 
officials and review records to identify potential terrorist risks. NRC 
forwarded potential leads to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 
addition, NRC has revised the "design basis threat" for nuclear power 
plants--the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private 
guard force should be expected to defend under existing law--and issued 
a corresponding order in April 2003 requiring power plants to implement 
additional actions to protect against sabotage by terrorists and other 
adversaries. NRC also made a series of internal administrative changes, 
such as consolidating the agency's security responsibilities in 
establishing an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 
Response,[Footnote 21] which includes a Threat Assessment Team 
responsible for working directly with the Central Intelligence Agency 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on security issues. The Office 
of Nuclear Security and Incident Response also works with the 
Department of Homeland Security and other agencies concerned with 
terrorism to assess and respond to potential threats. In an effort to 
more effectively communicate and respond to threats, NRC developed a 
Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System[Footnote 22] based on 
the national Homeland Security Advisory System, and increased staffing 
at its 24-hour Emergency Operations Center. NRC also conducted a review 
of information available to the general public on the NRC Web site for 
potential security risks.

Efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources for medical, 
industrial, and research use--by both NRC and agreement states--have 
been limited. Since September 11, 2001, NRC has issued a total of six 
advisories urging licensees to ensure security of sources and advising 
them to be more aware of the possibility of theft and 
sabotage.[Footnote 23] Licensees were also advised to double-check 
shipping documents and inform local police authorities of their 
possession of sealed sources. On June 5, 2003, NRC issued its first 
security order for large irradiator facilities--70 facilities 
nationwide that expose products, such as medical supplies, to radiation 
for sterilization--that requires licensees to take action to strengthen 
security. The decision to select irradiators first has been questioned 
by agreement state officials and licensees, as they feel other uses of 
sealed sources pose a higher risk. For example, 93 percent of agreement 
states responding to our survey identified industrial radiographers as 
of greater concern. Reasons for this may include that the sealed 
sources in these devices are portable, have high radioactivity, and are 
widely available (over 570 licensees in the United States). Although 
irradiator facilities contain larger amounts of radioactive material 
than industrial radiographers, they are specially designed to include 
thick concrete and steel walls, security interlocks, and other 
protective equipment to protect against radiation exposure. In 
addition, the irradiator facilities we visited had taken the initiative 
to implement supplementary security measures, such as installing motion 
detectors, more extensive security alarms and monitoring, and employee 
identification badges. Other uses identified by agreement states 
officials in our survey as requiring stricter regulation include 
portable gauges and well-logging devices--over 4,600 and over 200 
licensees nationwide, respectively.

Transportation was also identified as needing additional security. 
Although most agreement states surveyed indicated that the Department 
of Transportation's (DOT) regulations are adequate to ensure safe 
transportation of sealed sources, 81 percent of them identified 
weaknesses in current regulations and 77 percent indicated that 
communications and coordination needs to be improved between their 
state program and DOT. Some DOT officials we spoke with disagreed that 
sealed sources were particularly vulnerable during transportation. 
However, one DOT official noted that large quantities of iridium-192 
are regularly shipped to the United States from Europe and South 
America using regular commercial freight services. Such sources are 
shipped in stainless steel transport kegs that require no special tools 
or equipment to open. Once loaded with up to 10,000 curies of iridium-
192, the transport keg weighs only 150 to 200 pounds. While this 
official believed that, overall, security is sufficient during 
transport, he told us that at certain phases such shipments could be 
vulnerable to terrorist diversion.

NRC and the agreement states have formed a materials security working 
group to develop and issue new security orders by the end of the year 
for approximately 2,100 licensees--located throughout the United 
States--that have been determined to be of the greatest risk based upon 
NRC's and DOE's work to categorize sealed sources. When these orders 
are issued, affected licensees will have a certain specified time 
period to comply with the order and implement required security 
measures. At the end of this period, licensees will be subject to 
inspections to ensure compliance and face enforcement actions if 
actions have not been taken.

Agreement states' efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources 
have focused primarily on facilitating NRC actions, such as forwarding 
NRC advisories, increasing attention on security when conducting 
inspections and license reviews, and coordinating with local law 
enforcement and first responders to develop emergency response 
procedures. Eighty-six percent of agreement state officials responding 
to our survey indicated that they are adequately addressing post-
September 11, 2001, heightened security concerns involving malicious 
use of radioactive material.

NRC and the Agreement States Disagree over Development and Enforcement 
of Additional Security Requirements:

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes NRC to issue rules, 
regulations, or orders to promote the common defense and security, 
while granting agreement states the authority to ensure public health 
and safety.[Footnote 24] Following the events of September 11, 2001, 
NRC determined that security-related efforts for all medical, 
industrial, and research licensees--including those licensed by 
agreement states--should be the responsibility of NRC under its common 
defense and security authority. However, 82 percent of agreement states 
responding to our survey noted that they want to have responsibility 
for inspection and enforcement of security measures for sealed sources 
under their authority to ensure public health and safety. Agreement 
states already enforce NRC's existing security regulations under this 
authority. In addition, 74 percent of agreement states responding to 
our survey indicated they could effectively respond to a radiological 
incident with their current resources.

Individual commissioners at NRC have expressed concern with budget 
shortfalls many states are currently experiencing. These commissioners 
said that states experiencing budgetary difficulties may not be able to 
assume additional responsibilities and that it may impact their 
program's performance. When asked whether their state had sufficient 
resources to support new efforts, 60 percent of agreement states 
responding to our survey indicated they would need additional 
resources.[Footnote 25] However, officials from organizations 
representing agreement states and non-agreement states have met with 
NRC and advised NRC that, although many states are facing budget cuts, 
funding of the radioactive materials programs in these states have 
largely been stable and the programs have been able and will likely be 
able to adequately fulfill their responsibilities.

According to our discussions with NRC officials, NRC is also facing 
budget and staffing constraints, largely as a result of its dependence 
upon fees from the licensees it regulates--only 20 percent of the total 
sealed sources licensees nationwide--for funding of its sealed source 
licensing and inspection activities. As more states become agreement 
states, NRC has fewer licensees to support its licensing and inspection 
programs.[Footnote 26] To address the potential effect this reduction 
in funding may have on its licensing and inspection programs, NRC and 
the agreement states have entered into a partnership--called the 
National Materials Program--to better share the responsibility for 
protecting public health and safety. Since the agreement states 
regulate about 80 percent of the nation's sealed source licensees, the 
National Materials Program allows them to participate more actively in 
the development of regulations and guidance, particularly in areas 
where they possess expertise. For example, Texas, an agreement state, 
regulates more well logging specific licensees than exist in all NRC-
regulated states. Thus, according to NRC officials, Texas could take 
the lead in developing any new public health and safety regulations for 
well loggers. Both NRC and the agreement states are currently 
conducting pilot projects to determine how the National Materials 
Program can and will work. In addition, states remain solely 
responsible for regulating certain radioactive materials, such as 
naturally occurring radioactive material like radium and material 
produced in particle accelerators, increasing the importance of federal 
and state cooperation in developing and implementing additional safety 
and/or security measures. NRC and the agreement states are continuing 
to work cooperatively to develop information on how responsibilities 
can be shared under the National Materials Program.

NRC officials said that NRC lacks sufficient staff to conduct 
inspections of all licensees expected to receive security orders--large 
irradiator facilities and approximately 2,100 licensees that NRC has 
identified as presenting the greatest risk. To mitigate this staffing 
shortage, NRC intends to enter into contracts with agreement states or 
independent contractors to assist in carrying out these inspections. 
According to agreement state officials we spoke with, however, 
agreement states may be reluctant to participate in these efforts if 
they have had no role in developing the additional security 
requirements or are not provided additional funding. NRC would remain 
responsible for taking appropriate enforcement action for any security 
violation found during these inspections. According to NRC, although 
final details regarding funding have yet to be determined, NRC 
anticipates increasing its licensees' fees and using funds NRC has 
received from emergency supplemental appropriations to cover costs 
associated with additional security.

Conclusions:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the focus of 
radioactive sealed sources regulation. Where NRC and the agreement 
states previously concentrated on ensuring the safe and effective use 
of sealed sources, they must now increasingly consider how to prevent 
terrorists from obtaining and using the material. Efforts to improve 
controls over sealed sources face significant challenges, especially 
how to balance the need to secure these materials while not 
discouraging their beneficial use in academic, medical, and industrial 
applications. The first step to improve security is to conduct a threat 
assessment that would identify sealed sources most likely to be used in 
a terrorist attack and the consequences of such an attack. Defining the 
types of sealed sources that are of the greatest concern will allow 
federal and state efforts to be appropriately prioritized. NRC's and 
DOE's current efforts to categorize sealed sources by the greatest 
amount of risk and their efforts to establish a national-level tracking 
system for the highest risk sealed sources are commendable. However, 
these efforts could be strengthened by involving the agreement states, 
which regulate 80 percent of the nation's radioactive materials 
licensees, in determining risk. In addition, these efforts could be 
further strengthened by determining the economic consequences of a 
dirty bomb and how to effectively mitigate any resulting psychological 
consequences. In addition, NRC's current regulations leave sealed 
sources at risk of malicious use. Modifying its regulations to 
eliminate general licensing of devices containing sealed sources could 
improve accountability, potentially reducing the number of sources that 
are lost, stolen, or abandoned. Furthermore, modifying NRC's licensing 
and/or inspection process to verify--before a licensee purchases 
radioactive material--that it will be used as intended may increase the 
security of sealed sources.

The President's National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the 
critical importance of integrating federal, state, local, and private 
sector efforts to prepare and respond to terrorist attacks, including 
those using sealed sources. The initial responsibility, however, falls 
upon state and local governments and their organizations--such as 
police, fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public 
health agencies--which will almost invariably be the first responders 
to any terrorist event involving sealed sources. Because of state and 
local governments' role in responding to incidents--in addition to the 
fact that the federal government lacks authority over naturally 
occurring and accelerator produced radioactive material--it is critical 
to involve state and local governments in the development and 
implementation of additional security over sealed sources. State 
radiological protection agencies can provide valuable expertise on the 
licensees that they have been regulating, in many cases, for decades. 
Developing criteria and performance measures to gauge NRC's and 
agreement states' effectiveness at implementing additional security as 
part of NRC's performance evaluation process would help ensure the 
consistent application of additional security measures across the 
United States. NRC and the agreement states have a proven record of 
cooperation in regulating the safe use of radioactive materials, 
including sealed sources. As increasing demands are placed on budgets 
at all levels of government, effectively leveraging the knowledge and 
resources of federal, state, and local agencies will be crucial to 
ensuring that sealed sources continue to be used safely and remain 
secure against terrorist use.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To determine the sealed sources of greatest concern, we recommend that 
the Chairman of NRC collaborate with the agreement states to identify 
the types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed sources 
and the associated health and economic consequences of their malicious 
use. In addition, we recommend that NRC and the agreement states 
determine how to effectively mitigate the psychological effects of 
their use in a terrorist attack.

In addition, accountability over generally licensed devices needs to be 
improved and gaps in the current licensing process need to be 
addressed. Because new efforts will involve additional licensing and 
inspection of potentially thousands of licensees and devices, we 
recommend that the Chairman of NRC:

* determine, in consultation with the agreement states, the costs and 
benefits of requiring owners of devices that are now generally licensed 
to apply for specific licenses and whether the costs are commensurate 
with the risks these devices present and:

* modify NRC's process of issuing specific licenses to ensure that 
sealed sources cannot be purchased before NRC's verification--through 
inspection or other means--that the materials will be used as intended.

Finally, to ensure that the federal and state governments' efforts to 
provide additional security to sealed sources are adequately integrated 
and evaluated for their effectiveness, we recommend that the Chairman 
of NRC:

* determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can 
participate in the development and implementation of additional 
security measures and:

* include criteria and performance measures of the NRC's and the 
agreement states' implementation of additional security measures in 
NRC's periodic evaluations of its and agreement states' effectiveness.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided NRC, CRCPD, and OAS with draft copies of this report for 
their review and comment. NRC's written comments are presented as 
appendix VI. NRC, CRCPD, and OAS also provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.

NRC stated that the draft report does not fully present either the 
current status of NRC's efforts to improve the security of high-risk 
radioactive sources or the large effort that it has devoted to this 
issue since September 11, 2001. According to NRC, the draft report does 
not fully reflect its existing statutory framework and does not 
recognize that several of our recommendations would require statutory 
changes at both federal and state levels. Furthermore, NRC commented 
that our draft report should have focused on high-risk radioactive 
sources that are of greatest concern for malevolent use by a terrorist 
rather than radioactive sources of all types.

Regarding NRC's comments that our draft report does not fully discuss 
its activities to increase the security of the highest-risk sealed 
sources, we note that our draft report detailed all advisories issued 
by NRC to sealed source licensees urging them to ensure security of 
sealed sources following September 11, 2001, as well as NRC's efforts 
with DOE to define the radioactive isotopes of concern. We have added 
information on the organization and goals of NRC's new materials 
security working group. Furthermore, our report discusses that NRC's 
security order to large irradiators was issued on June 5, 2003. This 
order was issued four days after our meeting with NRC officials to 
discuss our preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations. At 
the meeting, NRC officials told us that it could take until the end of 
2003 for the order to be issued. It is important to note that this is 
the first and only security order related to sealed sources issued 
since the September 11, 2001, attacks and that it applies only to 70 
large irradiator facilities in the United States. As discussed in our 
draft report, 93 percent of agreement states responding to our survey 
identified industrial radiographers, of which there are over 500 
nationwide, as of greater concern than large irradiator facilities.

Regarding NRC's comment that our draft report does not recognize that 
several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both 
federal and state levels, we have clarified our report to recommend 
that NRC determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states 
can participate in the development and implementation of additional 
security measures. We agree with NRC that its statutory framework 
reserves to NRC the authority to promote the common defense and 
security and our report discusses the distinction between federal and 
state authority. However, we continue to believe, as do state officials 
we spoke with, that involving the agreement and non-agreement states in 
the development and implementation of additional security measures 
would be beneficial. As our draft report stated, state and local 
governments will almost invariably be the first responders to any 
terrorist event involving sealed sources. States can also provide 
valuable expertise on licensees that they have been regulating for 
decades and which NRC has had no prior contact with. In its comments, 
NRC states that the possibility of state budget shortfalls played 
absolutely no role in its decision to develop and implement additional 
security measures under its common defense and security authority. 
However, numerous NRC officials told us during our review that budget 
difficulties could impact the performance of state radiation protection 
programs and NRC's former Chairman discussed the issue at a January 
2003 meeting. NRC acknowledges in its comments that cooperation with 
agreement states is vital to the success of its efforts. We are 
encouraged that NRC stated in its comments that it will examine changes 
to its statutory framework in its new materials security working group 
and intends to work with the states to the maximum extent possible 
under existing statutes.

Regarding NRC's comment that the draft report should have focused only 
on high-risk sources rather than radioactive sources of all types, we 
note that the objectives of our review included determining the known 
number of all sealed sources in the United States and the number of 
sources lost, stolen, or abandoned. Our draft report noted that 
defining the types of sealed sources that are of the greatest concern 
would allow federal and state efforts to be appropriately prioritized. 
As we did when responding to a similar comment NRC made in our May 2003 
report, we agree that the highest-risk sources present the greatest 
concern as desirable material for a dirty bomb.[Footnote 27] However, 
other sealed radioactive sources could also be used as a terrorist 
weapon. No one can say with certainty what the psychological, social, 
or economic costs of a dirty bomb--regardless of the radioactive 
material used to construct it--would be. We are concerned that NRC's 
and DOE's identification of the highest-risk sealed sources focuses 
solely on the health risks of their use and does not address the 
psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb. It is also 
important to note that NRC is still working with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to reconcile differences between their definitions 
of high-risk sealed sources. Furthermore, many of the radioactive 
isotopes identified by NRC and DOE as high-risk are used only at DOE 
facilities or by very few NRC licensees in the United States. NRC and 
DOE did not consider radioactive materials licensees in the agreement 
states, which constitute 80 percent of the nation's licensees. Without 
addressing the total consequences of a dirty bomb and considering the 
availability of sealed sources nationwide, we believe NRC's and DOE's 
determination of risk is incomplete.

In general, both CRCPD and OAS agreed with the recommendations in the 
report. However, both organizations noted that our use of the term 
"sealed source" to refer to all radioactive materials used in medical, 
industrial, and research purposes may exclude many radioactive isotopes 
that could be used in a dirty bomb that are loose and not in sealed 
form, especially those used in medical and research facilities. We used 
the term "sealed source" for simplicity to distinguish medical, 
industrial, and research radioactive isotopes from material used in 
nuclear weapons and as fuel in nuclear reactors. We did not intend to 
exclude unsealed radioactive material from our discussion of 
radioactive materials of concern and have clarified our use of the 
term.

CRCPD stated that the report does not address four critical areas of 
potential risk. First, CRCPD believes that a major area of risk is at 
bankrupt facilities where sealed sources can be left unattended and/or 
unsecured for long periods of time, leaving the sources easy targets 
for theft. We acknowledge this risk and have revised our discussion of 
lost, stolen, and abandoned sources appropriately. Second, CRCPD noted 
that radioactive materials licensed for "storage only" tend to be 
neglected by the licensee and the regulatory agency. While we agree 
that this is a potential weakness in sealed source security, individual 
state practices on "storage only" licenses differ. We did not 
specifically examine these practices during our review. Third, CRCPD 
stated that the report does not adequately address the radioactive 
material under the control of DOE and naturally occurring and 
accelerator produced radioactive material. While DOE does control a 
large amount of radioactive material, discussion of the security 
provided to it was outside of the scope of our review. We believe our 
report adequately discusses the challenges of regulating naturally 
occurring and accelerator produced materials. Finally, CRCPD states 
that the report does not consider transportation hubs through which 
very large quantities of radioactive material pass each day. While we 
do not specifically discuss transportation hubs, our draft report noted 
that weaknesses have been identified in the transportation of sealed 
sources and, at certain phases of transport, these shipments could be 
vulnerable to terrorist diversion.

OAS agreed with our recommendation that NRC should include criteria and 
performance measures of the agreement states' implementation of 
additional security measures in NRC's periodic evaluations of agreement 
states' effectiveness. OAS stated that such evaluation is not possible 
given the current intention of NRC to issue and implement security 
orders under its common defense and security authority. However, we 
believe that the recommendation in our draft report that NRC determine 
how states can participate in the development and implementation of 
additional security measures addresses this concern.

OAS also noted that our draft report stated that licensees are tracked 
instead of individual sealed sources and that the draft report lends 
support to the formation of a national tracking system for sealed 
sources. OAS commented that our discussion does not accurately describe 
the current system. Licensees are required to maintain records for the 
acquisition and disposition of each source it receives and maintain an 
accurate inventory of sources in their possession. While we agree with 
this comment and have revised our discussion of license tracking, our 
draft report was accurate in that there is no single source of 
information in the United States to verify authorized users, locations, 
quantities, and movements of sealed sources. OAS goes on to state that 
there are serious concerns with the practicality and accuracy of a 
national tracking system and that the development of such a system 
should be further evaluated with input from the states and private 
industry. We agree with OAS's comments, but believe that our 
recommendation to collaborate with the agreement states in order to 
determine the types, amount, and availability of the highest risk 
sealed sources and the health, psychological, and economic consequences 
of their use in a terrorist attack addresses OAS's concerns.

Finally, OAS commented that the states have long requested that the 
federal government seriously consider placing the use and regulation of 
all radioactive materials in a single federal agency. According to OAS, 
the current approach results in a disjointed regulatory structure and 
different standards for the same public health issue. While we agree 
that consistency and avoiding duplication is important, addressing the 
overall regulation of radioactive material in the United States was 
outside the scope of our review on security of sealed sources.

We conducted our work from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I 
presents our scope and methodology in detail.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 
days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the 
Chairman and Commissioners of NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; 
the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security 
Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the 
Chairman of the Organization of Agreement States; the Chairman and 
Executive Director of the Conference of Radiation Control Program 
Directors; the directors of the radiation control programs in the 32 
agreement states; interested congressional committees; and other 
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others who 
request them. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.] 
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, I can be 
reached at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed 
in appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Robinson: 
Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

Signed by Robert A. Robinson: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

At the request of the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on 
Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, we examined the following 
questions:

1. What is the known number of sealed sources in the United States?

2. How many of these sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or 
abandoned?

3. How effective are federal and state controls over sealed sources?

4. What efforts have been initiated or considered since September 11, 
2001, to better safeguard radiological sources?

To answer these questions, we distributed surveys to 32 agreement 
states, 18 non-agreement states, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, 
and to NRC's 4 regional offices. We focused the survey on information 
about each state's radiation control program, specific and general 
licensing activities, enforcement actions, effectiveness of controls 
over sealed sources, program evaluation processes, transportation of 
sealed sources, and the impact of September 11, 2001, on regulatory 
programs. We acquired a list of the appropriate agreement and non-
agreement state officials from NRC's Office of State and Tribal 
Programs Web site and from the Conference of Radiation Control Program 
Directors. Because this was not a sample survey, but rather a census of 
all states, there are no sampling errors. However, the practical 
difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly 
referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, measurement errors are 
introduced if difficulties exist in how a particular question is 
interpreted or in the sources of information available to respondents 
in answering a question. In addition, coding errors may occur if 
mistakes are entered into a database. We took extensive steps in the 
development of the questionnaires, the collection of data, and the 
editing and analysis of data to minimize total survey error. To reduce 
measurement error, we conducted two rounds of pretesting to make sure 
questions and response categories were interpreted in a consistent 
manner with both agreement and non-agreement states. We also provided 
draft copies of the questionnaires to NRC, the Organization of 
Agreement States (OAS), and the Conference of Radiation Control Program 
Directors (CRCPD) for their review and comment. Based on both 
pretesting and comments received from NRC, OAS, and CRCPD, we made 
relevant changes to the questions based upon these pretests. Copies of 
the agreement and non-agreement state questionnaires, along with the 
results to each question, are in appendixes IV and V, respectively.

In addition, we edited all completed surveys for consistency and, if 
necessary, contacted respondents to clarify responses. All 
questionnaire responses were double key-entered into our database (that 
is, the entries were 100 percent verified), and a random sample of the 
questionnaires was further verified for completeness and accuracy. In 
addition, all computer syntax was peer reviewed and verified by 
separate programmers to ensure that the syntax was written and executed 
correctly.

We made extensive efforts to encourage respondents to complete and 
return the questionnaires, including sending up to four reminder 
electronic mail messages to non-respondents, calling state radiation 
control program directors directly, and collaborating with OAS to 
promote completion of this survey. Our efforts yielded responses from 
31 of 32 (96.8 percent response rate) agreement states and 11 of 18 
(61.1 percent response rate) non-agreement states. We also received 
responses from Puerto Rico and the four NRC regional offices. In total, 
we achieved an overall response rate of 80.4 percent, receiving 45 of 
the 56 surveys disseminated. We did not receive a response from one 
agreement state: Arizona. The non-agreement states of Alaska, 
Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming did not respond to our survey, nor did we receive a response 
from the District of Columbia. Although we did not receive surveys from 
these states, we obtained data on incidents involving sealed sources 
and numbers and types of licensees from NRC. Three states (New York, 
South Carolina, and Texas) have multiple agencies with jurisdiction 
over sealed sources. We sent and received surveys from the appropriate 
agencies in each of these states.

To determine the number and types of sealed source licenses in the 
United States and the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or 
abandoned, we relied upon information provided by state radiation 
control programs in their responses to our survey. In addition, we 
obtained data from NRC's license tracking system database on licensees 
NRC regulates--both in the non-agreement states and on federal 
facilities in the agreement states. To determine the number of sealed 
sources lost, stolen, or abandoned over the past 5 years, we obtained 
data on incidents from NRC's Nuclear Materials Events Database. We 
chose to examine the past 5 years because information was readily 
available through this database. Because each state uses different 
systems to track its licensing activities, we did not attempt to 
independently assess the reliability of data provided by the states in 
their responses to our survey. However, we did ask states in what ways 
and how frequently information in their databases is validated. To 
assess the reliability of NRC's databases, we interviewed officials at 
NRC in charge of maintaining its license tracking system database and 
the Nuclear Materials Events Database to determine if data in these 
systems are reasonably complete and accurate. As a result of these 
interviews, we did not find any reasons to question the reliability of 
these data. In addition, we also performed limited testing on NRC's 
license tracking system database to find missing data or data outside 
expected ranges. We did not find significant errors or incompleteness 
as a result of these tests and concluded that the use of the data would 
not lead to incorrect or unintentional findings. These are the only 
data on NRC licensing activities in the United States and program 
managers at NRC regularly use the data.

In addition to data on state programs obtained through our survey, we 
obtained information through interviews with officials from state 
radiation control programs. We visited the following states during our 
review: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. We also 
interviewed officials from the Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and 
Ohio state radiation control programs.

We selected states to visit based upon the numbers of licensees 
regulated by the state and the different uses of sealed sources. We 
selected states with a low number of licensees (Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, and Utah), a medium number of licensees (Georgia, Maryland, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania), and a high number of 
licensees (Florida and Illinois). In addition, we considered the types 
of licensees in each state. For example, we visited South Carolina and 
Utah because they have two of the nation's three low-level radioactive 
waste disposal facilities--the Chem-Nuclear Systems, L.L.C. facility in 
Barnwell, South Carolina and the Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility in 
Clive, Utah. When visiting states, we met with officials from selected 
licensees that represented the major uses of sealed sources. We also 
visited manufacturers because they may possess larger quantities of 
radioactive material for installation in devices for sale. In summary, 
we visited three sites being decommissioned and decontaminated, two 
low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities, two moisture/density 
gauge manufacturers, two industrial radiographers, two medical 
licensees (hospitals), two large irradiator facilities, a well-logging 
licensee, a nuclear pharmacy, a research and development licensee, and 
an academic licensee to obtain their views on the effectiveness of NRC 
and state regulations, including the challenges associated with sealed 
source security. Additionally, we examined physical security measures 
during tours of these facilities.

We also visited Rhode Island, Florida, and the NRC Region III office in 
Lisle, Illinois, because they were undergoing NRC program performance 
evaluation reviews under the Integrated Materials Performance 
Evaluation Program. Visiting a program while it was being evaluated 
gave us the opportunity to witness review procedures for evaluating 
performance, consistency of application of NRC's review criteria, 
transparency of the review process, and the level of cooperation and 
involvement between NRC officials and representatives from agreement 
states. To follow up our review of the program evaluation process, we 
attended a 2-day NRC training class on the Integrated Materials 
Performance Evaluation Program and observed two program evaluation 
Management Review Board meetings at NRC headquarters in Rockville, 
Maryland.

We attended two conferences related to sealed source regulation--the 
May 2002 CRCPD annual meeting held in Madison, Wisconsin, and the 
annual OAS Conference held in October 2002, in Denver, Colorado. We 
also obtained a position paper from the Health Physics Society on the 
regulation of sealed sources. Furthermore, we met with the chairman of 
the Southeast Compact for low-level radioactive waste and the Advisory 
Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes to elicit views on the 
regulation and security of sealed sources.

At the federal level, we interviewed numerous NRC officials 
representing several different offices and programs. During these 
interviews, NRC provided us with information and documents about the 
regulation of sealed sources and the challenges it faces in the post 
September 11, 2001, security environment. We met with NRC's Office of 
Enforcement, Office of Investigation, Office of Nuclear Materials 
Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 
Response, and Office of State and Tribal Programs. Additionally, we 
attended an August 2002 meeting between representatives of OAS and 
CRCPD and the Commissioners of NRC. Finally, to gain the perspective of 
federal regulators at the regional level, we visited three of the four 
NRC regional offices, including NRC Region I located in King of 
Prussia, Pennsylvania; Region II located in Atlanta, Georgia; and 
Region III located in Lisle, Illinois.

In addition to officials at NRC, we interviewed several other federal 
government agency officials. To learn about sealed source 
transportation regulations and issues, we interviewed officials from 
the Department of Transportation, including the Office of Hazardous 
Materials Safety. To establish the role of the Environmental Protection 
Agency in regulating sealed sources, we met with officials from the 
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air. We also met with officials from the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and observed a FEMA 
evaluated exercise in March 2003 in Springfield and Morris, Illinois, 
that simulated a radiological release at a nuclear power plant. We also 
interviewed Department of Justice and Department of Energy officials.

We performed our review from August 2002 through June 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources:

Irradiators:

Irradiators are devices or facilities that expose products to radiation 
for sterilization, such as spices, milk containers, and hospital 
supplies. Irradiator facilities are relatively few in number and 
contain very high activity sources, which vary in physical size. Non-
self shielded irradiators do not provide shielding from the radiation 
beam; therefore, the facilities that contain the irradiation must be 
specially designed, often including thickly shielded walls, interlocks, 
and other protective equipment. Self-shielded irradiators do not emit 
external radiation beams and are usually small cabinet type devices. 
These irradiators are commonly used in research applications or for 
blood irradiation. According to our survey and NRC specific license 
data, there are a total of approximately 350 irradiator specific 
licensees in the United States, about 70 of which are large 
irradiators.

Figure 4: Product Conveyor System in a Panoramic Irradiator:

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Cobalt-60 sealed sources are placed in racks and stored while not 
in use in a deep water-filled pool beneath the product conveyor system.

[End of figure] 

Teletherapy:

Teletherapy is commonly referred to as external beam radiation. Fixed 
multibeam teletheraphy units focus gamma radiation from an array of 
over 200 cobalt-60 sources on cancer lesions. The facilities within 
which the units are located are specifically designed to include 
thickly shielded walls and have other protective equipment, due to the 
high activity sources. According to our survey and NRC specific license 
data, there are approximately 60 teletherapy licensees and about 60 
gamma knife licensees in the United States.

Figure 5: Stereotactic Radiosurgery Device (Gamma Knife):

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Industrial Radiography:

Industrial radiography is the use of radiation to produce an image of 
internal features on photographic film to inspect metal parts and welds 
for defects. Industrial radiography sources and devices are generally 
small in terms of physical size, although the devices are usually heavy 
due to the internal shielding. The sources are attached to specially 
designed cables for their operation. The use of radiography sources and 
devices is very common--a total of over 570 licensees nationwide--and 
their portability may make them susceptible to theft or loss. Further, 
the small size of the source allows for unauthorized removal by an 
individual, and such a source may be placed into a pocket of a garment. 
Industrial radiography cameras typically contain a high radioactivity 
iridium-192 source that is capable of inflicting extensive radiation 
burns if handled improperly.

Figure 6: Industrial Radiography Camera and Storage Case:

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Brachytheraphy:

Brachytherapy is an advanced cancer treatment in which radioactive 
seeds or sources are placed in or near the tumor itself, giving a high 
radiation dose to the tumor while reducing the radiation exposure in 
the surrounding healthy tissues. Brachytheraphy applications are of 
three slightly different varieties, generally referred to as low dose 
rate, medium dose rate, and high dose rate. These applications use 
sealed sources that are small physically (less than 1 centimeter in 
diameter and only a few centimeters long), and, thus, are susceptible 
to being lost or misplaced. High and medium dose rate sources, and some 
low dose rate sources, may be in the form of a long wire attached to a 
device (a remote after loading device). The after loading device may be 
heavy, due to the shielding for the sources when not in use, and the 
device may be on wheels for transport within a facility. The remote 
after loading device may also contain electrical and electronic 
components for its operation. Brachytherapy sources and devices are 
located in hospitals, clinics, and similar medical institutions, and 
such facilities may have a large number of sources.

Figure 7: High Dose Rate Remote After Loader Used for Brachytherapy:

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Well Logging Device:

Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources and/or unsealed 
radioactive materials to determine whether a well, drilled deep into 
the ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, and natural gas. The 
sources are usually contained in long (1 to 2 meters, typically) and 
thin (less than 10 centimeters in diameter) devices that also contain 
detectors and various electronic components. The actual size of the 
sources inside the devices is generally small, but the device is heavy, 
due to the ruggedness needed for the environments in which they are to 
be used. Our analysis of NRC's license tracking system and responses to 
our survey of agreement states indicates that there are about 210 well 
logging licensees in the United States.

Figure 8: Storage Container for Well Logging Sealed Source:

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Fixed Industrial Gauge:

Non-portable gauging devices are designed for measurement or control of 
material density, flow, level, thickness, weight, and so forth. The 
gauges--possessed by over 1,600 specific licensees and an unknown 
number of general licensees--contain sealed sources that radiate 
through the substance being measured to a readout or controlling 
device. Depending upon the specific application, industrial gauges may 
contain relatively small quantities of radioactive material, or may 
contain sources with activities approaching 30 curies. The devices 
generally are not large, but may be located some distance from the 
radiation detector, which may have electrical or electronic components 
located within the detector. A facility may have a large number of 
these gauges and the locations of such devices or sources within a 
facility may not be recognized, since the devices may be connected to 
process control equipment. This lack of recognition may result in a 
loss of control if the facility decides to modernize or terminate 
operations.

Figure 9: Fixed Industrial Gauge:

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Portable Gauge:

Portable gauging devices, such as moisture density gauges, are used at 
field locations and contain the sources, detectors, and electronic 
equipment necessary for the measurement. These gauges--over 4,600 
licensees in the United States--contain a gamma emitting sealed source, 
usually cesium-137, and a sealed neutron source, usually americium-241 
and beryllium. The source is physically small in size, typically a few 
centimeters long by a few centimeters in diameter, and may be located 
either completely within the device or at the end of a rod/handle 
assembly. The portability of the device makes it susceptible to loss of 
control or theft.

Figure 10: Portable Moisture/Density Gauge:

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Portable Moisture/Density Gauge:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Table 2: Type and Size of Sealed Sources Used in Medical and Industrial 
Practices:

[See PDF for image]

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, "Categorization of 
Radioactive Sources, Revision of IAEA-TECDOC-1191" Vienna, Austria, 
2003.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress Addressing 
Security of Sealed Sources:

Legislation: S.6 Comprehensive Homeland Security Act of 2003; Sec. 3006 
and Sec. 170; Major Efforts: Amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to 
include the following major efforts: (1) based on a new classification 
system, develop a national system for recovery of sealed sources that 
are stolen or lost; (2) develop a national tracking system that takes 
into account the new classification system; and (3) establish 
procedures to improve the security of sealed sources in use, transport, 
and storage; Study Requested: Establishes a task force to develop a 
classification system for sensitive sealed sources that is based on the 
potential for use by terrorists and the extent of the threat to public 
health and safety.

Legislation: S.350 A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to 
strengthen the security of sensitive radioactive material; Major 
Efforts: Directs a task force to (1) determine which sealed sources 
should be classified as sensitive sealed sources, (2) develop a 
national system to recover sensitive sealed sources that are lost or 
stolen, (3) develop a national tracking system for sealed sources, and 
(4) establish procedures to improve the security of sensitive sealed 
sources; Study Requested: Establishes a multiagency task force to 
evaluate the security of sealed sources and recommends administrative 
and legislative actions to provide the maximum degree of security 
against radiological threats.

Legislation: H.R.891 A bill to establish a task force to evaluate and 
make recommendations with respect to the security of sealed sources of 
radioactive materials, and for other purposes; Major Efforts: Directs 
a task force to (1) establish or modify a classification system for 
sealed sources based on sealed source attractiveness to terrorists, (2) 
establish or modify a national tracking system, (3) establish a system 
to impose refundable fees for proper disposal, and (4) improve the 
security of sealed sources; Study Requested: Establishes a multiagency 
task force to, in consultation with state agencies, make 
recommendations for appropriate regulatory and legislative changes to 
strengthen controls over sealed sources.

Legislation: S. 1043 A bill to provide for the security of commercial 
nuclear power plants and facilities designated by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission; Sec. 6; Major Efforts: Changes the definition of 
byproduct material to include naturally occurring and accelerator 
produced radioactive material and, within 4 years, transition 
regulatory authority over this material from non-agreement states to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Study Requested: None.

Legislation: S. 1005 The Energy Policy Policy Act of 2003; Title IX 
Subtitle D--Nuclear Energy Sec. 946; Major Efforts: Instructs the 
Secretary of Energy to establish a research and development program to 
develop alternatives to sealed sources that reduce safety, 
environmental, or proliferation risks to workers using the sources or 
the public; Study Requested: Directs the Secretary of Energy to 
conduct a survey of industrial applications of large radioactive 
sources. Requires the survey to include information on the management 
and disposal of sealed sources.

Legislation: S. 1045 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act of 2003; Major 
Efforts: Directs the Secretary of Energy to (1) identify options for 
disposal of low-level radioactive waste, (2) develop a report for 
Congress on a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class C 
waste, and (3) submit to Congress a plan to ensure continued recovery 
of greater-than-Class C waste until a permanent disposal facility is 
available; Study Requested: None.

Legislation: S. 1161 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, fiscal year 
2004; Title III Sec. 301--308; Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction 
Act of 2003; Major Efforts: Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to 
engage in activities with the International Atomic Energy Agency to (1) 
propose and conclude agreements with up to 8 countries under which the 
countries would provide temporary secure storage for orphaned, unused, 
and surplus sealed sources, (2) promote the discovery, inventory, and 
recovery of sealed sources in member nations, and (3) authorizes the 
Secretary of Energy to make voluntary contributions to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to achieve the aforementioned 
goals; Study Requested: None.

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Results of Survey of Agreement States:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001:

June 26, 2003:

Mr. Robert A. Robinson:

Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment United States 
General Accounting Office:

441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Robinson:

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and submit 
comments on the draft report, "NUCLEAR SECURITY: Federal and State 
Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources" (GAO-
03-804).

We believe the draft report does not fully present either the current 
status of our efforts to improve the security of high-risk radioactive 
sources or the large effort that we have devoted to this issue over the 
past eighteen months. It also reflects a limited outline of our 
existing statutory framework and does not recognize that several of its 
recommendations would require statutory changes at both Federal and 
State levels.

This report perpetuates one of the main problems of an earlier GAO 
report (GAO-03-638), namely its failure to focus on high-risk 
radioactive sources, which are of greatest concern for malevolent use 
by a terrorist. As I wrote you in commenting on that report, the vast 
majority of radioactive sources in use in the United States and abroad 
are not useful to terrorists. For example, iodine-131 and technetium-
99m should not be included in any list of radionuclides of concern, as 
your draft report does in two places.

The Commission has already done the following to improve the security 
of high-risk radioactive sources:

1) Together with the Department of Energy (DOE) we have defined the 
radionuclides of concern and action levels for those radionuclides. 
Working with appropriate Federal agencies, particularly the Department 
of State (DOS), we have sought to reconcile the DOE/NRC definition of 
high-risk radioactive sources with that being developed by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its draft TECDOC-1344. We 
believe that international consensus will soon be reached on TECDOC-
1344 so that we can reach international consistency on this critical 
definition.

2) We, together with DOE and DOS, have ensured that the United States 
has taken a leadership role in developing the draft IAEA Code of 
Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, a document which 
we hope will be finalized at the September IAEA General Conference 
Meeting.

3) The Commission has issued numerous advisories on security of sources, 
the most important of which was the advisory issued on March 17, 2003, 
at the initiation of Operation Liberty Shield. Working with our 
Agreement State colleagues, we assembled a list of approximately 2100 
NRC or Agreement State licensees whose licenses permit them to possess 
greater than NRC/DOE action level quantities of the radionuclides of 
concern, and promptly issued the advisory to them. That advisory 
specified the:

additional security measures which we felt appropriate with the Nation 
at the orange threat level.

4) The Commission issued an Order to large panoramic irradiators on June 
6, 2003, the detailed security measures of which are safeguards 
information under Section 147 of Atomic Energy Act.

5) The Commission has established a Materials Security Working Group 
involving both the Agreement States and the Conference of Radiation 
Control Program Directors (CRCPD) to ensure close coordination in the 
development of additional security orders to those licensees possessing 
category 1 or 2 quantities of radionuclides of concern as defined in 
TECDOC-1344 (a slight variation from the DOE/NRC action levels) and to 
deal with other materials security issues. The Commission discussed 
resolution of this issue with the leadership of the Organization of 
Agreement States (OAS) and CRCPD on June 6, 2003.

The Commission has plans in place to do the following:

1) In the very near term the Commission, in partnership with the 
Agreement States, will determine an initial inventory of high-risk 
radioactive sources (e.g., sources containing category 1 and 2 
quantities of radionuclides of concern as defined in the latest version 
of TECDOC-1344) in the possession of all NRC and Agreement State 
licensees.

2) The Commission will develop a requirement for tracking such sources, 
as envisioned in the draft IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security 
of Radioactive Sources.

3) The Commission will develop, in consultation with DOS and other 
agencies, an export and import control system for high-risk radioactive 
sources, again as envisioned in the IAEA Code of Conduct, and ensure 
the compatibility of our system with those of other countries.

The Commission fully recognizes that cooperation with our Agreement 
State colleagues is vital to the success of our efforts. The Commission 
must also work within the existing statutory framework. That framework 
reserves to the Commission the common defense and security authorities 
of the Atomic Energy Act. Moreover, section 147 of the Atomic Energy 
Act permits only the Commission, not the States, to prescribe that 
detailed security measures to protect byproduct material or special 
nuclear material be protected as safeguards information. These 
considerations have guided the Commission's approach to the security of 
high-risk sources in Agreement States. The possibility of State budget 
shortfalls played absolutely no role in the Commission's decision-
making.

We have issued the June 5, 2003 Order to panoramic irradiator licensees 
based on the existing statutory framework. These additional security 
measures go beyond what would be required in a safety framework; they 
are actually done under common defense and security.

The Commission is not opposed to potential changes in our statutory 
framework and will explore such changes in the Materials Security 
Working Group. However, we are also not prepared to advocate any such 
changes today. Any changes at the Federal level will almost certainly 
entail change in State laws. Any such effort to amend statutes at both 
the Federal and:

State levels will take time. In the meantime, the Commission intends to 
work with the States to the maximum extent possible under existing 
statutes and in particular to utilize agreements pursuant to section 
274i of the Atomic Energy Act to contract with the Agreement States for 
assistance in security inspections.

The enclosure provides specific comments on these matters . Should you 
have any questions about the NBC's comments, please contact either Mr. 
William Dean, at (301) 415-1703, or Ms. Melinda Malloy, at (301) 415-
1785, of my staff.

Sincerely,

William D. Travers 

Executive Director for Operations:

Signed by William D. Travers: 

Enclosure: Specific Comments on Draft Report GAO-03-804:

cc: Ryan Coles, GAO:

[End of section]

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Gene Aloise (202) 512-6870:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robert G. 
Crystal, Doreen S. Feldman, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, Peter 
E. Ruedel, Rebecca Shea, and Heather W. Von Behren also made key 
contributions to this report.

(360274):

FOOTNOTES

[1] Some loose material, such as iodine-131, used in thyroid cancer 
treatments, and technetium-99m, commonly used in medical imaging 
procedures is not in sealed source form. However, for simplicity this 
report uses the term "sealed source" to refer to all radioactive 
materials used for medical, industrial, and research purposes.

[2] The purpose of section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (42 U.S.C.  2021) is to recognize the interest of the states 
in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to establish programs for 
cooperation between the states and NRC to control the radiation hazards 
associated with the use of radioactive materials. While it details 
procedures for NRC to relinquish its regulatory authority to the states 
for medical, industrial, and research uses of radioactive materials, 
NRC retains sole regulatory authority over, among other things, nuclear 
power plants and the export and import of radioactive materials. In 
addition, NRC retains regulatory authority over federal facilities 
(such as Department of Defense bases or Veterans Administration 
hospitals)--see 10 C.F.R.  30.6(b)(2).

[3] At the time of our report, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington were agreement states. NRC 
expects Wisconsin will become an agreement state in the summer of 2003.

[4] Our report, U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery of 
Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO-03-483 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
15, 2003) examined DOE's efforts to recover and dispose of unwanted 
"greater-than-Class-C" sources--sources that typically contain greater 
concentrations of isotopes such as plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and 
americium-241, that cannot be disposed of at existing low-level 
radioactive waste facilities. Our report, U.S. General Accounting 
Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance 
Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening, 
GAO-03-638 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003) examined international 
efforts conducted by the United States, the Russian Federation, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and others to control sealed 
sources.

[5] Although we did not receive surveys from these states, we obtained 
data on incidents involving sealed sources and numbers and types of 
licensees from NRC.

[6] See appendix II for a discussion of medical and industrial devices 
that use radioactive sources.

[7] The curie is the unit of measurement most commonly used in the 
United States. The corresponding international standard unit, the 
Bequerel (Bq) is the activity equal to one radioactive disintegration 
per second. One bequerel=2.7 x 10-11 curies. 

[8] NRC's regulations are at 10 C.F.R.  31.5.

[9] NRC's regulations are at 10 C.F.R. Parts 19-21, 30-39, 40, 61, 70, 
and 71.

[10] 10 C.F.R.  31.5(c)(13). Registration is required for levels equal 
to or greater than 10 millicuries of cesium-137, 0.1 millicuries of 
strontium-90, 1 millicurie of cobalt-60, or 1 millicurie of any 
transuranic element (elements with atomic numbers higher than uranium). 


[11] This registration effort did not include the agreement states 
because the agreement states are not required to adopt compatible 
regulations requiring registration of generally licensed devices until 
February 2004. Once all agreement states have adopted rules compatible 
to NRC's regulations, NRC says that it is considering coordinating with 
them to implement a national level database that will incorporate data 
from agreement states and NRC regulated states.

[12] See U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Radiological Dispersion Devices: An Initial Study to 
Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to 
Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition, (Washington, D.C., May 2003). 
The specific radioactive materials identified as highest priority for 
increased protection in the near term have not been listed in the 
report. This information is "For Official Use Only."

[13] Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources and/or unsealed 
radioactive materials to determine whether a well, drilled deep into 
the ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, and natural gas.

[14] As used in this report, security refers to measures to prevent 
unauthorized access to, loss, and/or theft of sealed sources. Safety 
refers to measures intended to minimize the likelihood of an accident 
with sealed sources and, should such an accident occur, to mitigate its 
consequences.

[15] Moisture density gauges are commonly used to measure density of 
asphalt and concrete surfaces and soil moisture content during road 
construction. See appendix II for a complete descriptions of 
radioactive devices.

[16] NRC publishes guidance for specific license applicants that 
outlines procedures for licensing the use of sealed sources. See U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1556--Consolidated Guidance about 
Materials Licenses, (Rockville, Maryland: Nov. 2001).

[17] Chapter 2800 of NRC's Inspection Manual contains guidance for 
inspections of specific licensees with sealed sources.

[18] The final determination of program adequacy is made by a 
management review board at NRC, which consists of NRC executives and a 
nonvoting representative of the agreement states.

[19] States under "heightened oversight" as of May 31, 2003, are Rhode 
Island, Nevada, and New Hampshire. Tennessee was removed from 
"heightened oversight" based on an October 2001 follow-up review.

[20] Advisories are non-public, rapid communications from NRC to its 
licensees that provide information obtained from the intelligence 
community or law enforcement agencies on changes to the threat 
environment, and guidance for licensees to take specific actions 
promptly to strengthen their capability against the threat. Security 
orders contain requirements for licensees to implement interim 
compensatory security measures beyond that currently required by NRC 
regulations and as conditions of licenses.

[21] The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response was 
established in April 2002 and consists of two divisions - the Division 
of Nuclear Security and the Division of Incident Response Operations. 
It is responsible for the agency's security, safeguards, and incident 
response efforts and to serve as a point of contact and counterpart to 
the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. In this 
role, the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response participates 
in a number of interagency working groups and committees that address 
issues relating to terrorism, information sharing, and planning.

[22] NRC established this system in response to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 3.

[23] There were a total of seven advisories, one of which was a 
correction to a prior advisory.

[24] NRC's regulations require licensees to secure licensed materials 
that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas from unauthorized 
removal or access and to control and maintain constant surveillance of 
licensed material that is not in storage and is in a controlled or 
unrestricted area. 10 C.F.R.  20.1801, 20.1802.

[25] Approximately 20 percent of agreement state officials responding 
to our survey indicated that they are having difficulty retaining 
sufficient and/or qualified personnel to effectively regulate sealed 
sources. Nevertheless, NRC has determined that all agreement state 
programs are adequately protecting public health and safety.

[26] NRC is required by the Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-377) to recover 94 percent of its budget through 
fee recovery. As the number of NRC licensees decreases with an 
increasing number of agreement states, fees paid by NRC's licensees 
have increased in order to support NRC's regulatory program.

[27] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. 
and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive 
Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-03-638 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 
2003).

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