EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, PETITIONER V. SHELL OIL
COMPANY

   No. 82-825

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1982

   On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit

   Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutes and regulations involved
   Statement
   Summary of argument
   Argument
      I. The charge in this case fully satisfies the
          requirement of Title VII
          A. Section 706(b) and its implementing regulations
             do not require the EEOC to articulate
             the factual basis underlying a Commissioner's
             charge
          B. The date provided by the amended charge
             fully satisfies the notice provisions of
             Section 706(b)
     II. The reasons given by the Court of Appeals for
          rejecting the Commission's interpretation of
          Section 706(b) are unpersuasive
          A. There is no need for the Commission to

@- specify the factual basis for a Section 706(b)

             charge in order to obtain enforcement of an
             investigative subpoena
          B. The Commission's practice of issuing generally
             worded charges provides adequate notice
             and does not result in abuse of Commission
             authority
          C. Any concern that generally worded charges
             lead to improper "fishing expeditions" is unsubstantial.
    III. The decision below results in an unwarranted
          intrusion upon an administrative proceeding at
          its very outset
   Conclusion

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-14a) is reported
at 676 F.2d 322, and the decision denying rehearing en banc (Pet. App.
34a-39a) is reported at 689 F.2d 757.  The opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. 15a-31a) is published at 523 F. Supp. 79.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 28, 1982
(Pet. App. 32a-33a).  The opinion of the court of appeals was modified
and a petition for rehearing was denied on July 20, 1982 (Pet. App.
10a-14a, 34a-39a).

   The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on November 16,
1982, and granted on February 22, 1983 (J.A. 183).  The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                   STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

   The relevant provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 2000e et seq., and the EEOC's Procedural
Regulations, 29 C.F.R. 1601.12, are set forth at Pet. 2-3.  The
Commission's Standards for Selecting Systemic Respondents, E.E.O.C.
Compl. Man. (CCH) Section 16.2 (1979), and the Procedure for Selecting
Systemic Respondents (id. at 16.3) are set forth at Pet. App. 40a-43a.

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether a charge of unlawful employment discrimination filed by a
Commissioner of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under
Section 706(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is invalid
because it sets forth the asserted discriminatory practices in general
terms rather than articulating the factual basis for the allegations.

                               STATEMENT

   1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp.
IV) 2000e et seq., prohibits employment discrimination based on an
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  Section
703, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2.  Under the Act, charges of discrimination may
be filed by or on behalf of a person aggrieved, or by a member of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  Section 706(b), 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(b).

   Section 706(b) provides that all charges "shall be in writing.
under oath or affirmation, and shall contain such information and be
in such form as the Commission requires" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)).  The
Commission's regulations require a charge of discrimination to contain
a "clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent
dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices" (29
C.F.R. 1601.12(a) (3)), but further provide that, notwithstanding the
above, a written charge is sufficient if it identifies the parties and
"describe(s) generally the action or practices complained of" (Section
1601.12(b)).

   Section 706(b) further provides that, within 10 days of the filing
of a charge, the Commission "shall serve a notice of the charge
(including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful
employment practice)" on the respondent.  42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).  /1/
The Commission must then undertake an investigation to determine
whether reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge is true.
Ibid.  During the course of this investigation, the Commission is
entitled to inspect and copy any evidence of the person or firm being
investigated (Section 709(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(a)), and may issue
subpoenas that can be enforced upon application to the district
courts.  Section 710, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-9 (incorporating Section 11 of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 161).  If the
Commission finds insufficient evidence to support a finding of
reasonable cause, the Commission notifies the charging party of its
conclusion and takes no further action.  Section 706(b), 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(b).  If, however, the Commission finds that reasonable cause
exists, it must endeavor to eliminate any alleged unlawful practices
through informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion
before resorting to a civil enforcement action brought in federal
court.  Section 706(b) and (f), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) and (f).  /2/

   2. Many charges are filed directly by aggrieved complainants.  A
commissioner's charge may be filed on behalf of an aggrieved person,
however, where that individual is unwilling to come forward publicly
for fear of economic or physical reprisal.  See S. Rep. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1971).  Moreover, Section 707 of Title VII
grants the Commission "authority to investigate and act on a charge of
a pattern or practice of discrimination" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(e)).  /3/
Commissioners' charges, therefore, are filed in two circumstances:  to
protect the identity of an aggrieved individual, see 29 C.F.R. 1601.7
and 1601.11, and to alleviate instances of systemic discrimination
that may not be readily identifiable on the basis of individual
complaints alone.  See, e.g., Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v.
EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 38 (4th Cir. 1971).

   In order to isolate "situations where the patterns of employment
discrimination are the most serious, and where maintenance of a
successful 'systemic case' will have a significant positive impact on
the employment opportunities available to minorities and women"
(E.E.O.C. Compl. Man. (CCH) Section 16.1 (1982)), the Commission has
developed guidelines for identifying employers that may be engaged in
systemic discrimination.  E.E.O.C. Compl. Man., Pet. App. 40a-43a.
These systemic guidelines contemplate that commissioners' charges may
be issued against respondents that meet one or more of the published
standards.  Id. at 40a-44a.  /4/ These standards are applied to "an
analysis of EEO reporting data and other available information,"
including individual charge files and data from other administrative
agencies.  Id. at 41a-42a.  A potential systemic charge passes through
successive stages of staff review before being presented to a
commissioner with a memorandum detailing the preliminary data
supporting issuance of a charge.  Id. at 41a-43a.  Although a
complaint by an aggrieved individual may provide the basis of a
systemic charge (see 29 C.F.R. 1601.6), commissioners' charges
generally are based upon an analysis of the statistical data contained
in annual reports filed by employers with the Commission and the
Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.

   3. On September 27, 1979, Eleanor Holmes Norton, then Chair of the
Commission, issued a sworn commissioner's charge against the
respondent, Shell Oil Company, alleging unlawful employment practices
at respondent's Wood River Refinery, Wood River, Illinois.  The charge
was the product of the Commission's systemic charge process, and
Commissioner Norton stated that she had cause to believe that
respondent "has violated and continues to violate Sections 703 and 707
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by discriminating against
Blacks and females on the basis of race and sex with respect to
recruitment, hiring, selection, job assignment, training, testing,
promotion, and terms and conditions of employment" (Pet. App. 44a).
The charge specified that such discrimination resulted from
respondent's unlawful exclusion of Blacks from "managerial,
professional, technical, office/clerical, craft, and service workers
positions" and the company's similar exclusion of women from
"managerial, professional, technical, craft, operative, laborer and
service worker positions" (ibid.).  The charge was subsequently
amended to state that Commissioner Norton had reason to believe that
respondent had engaged in the unlawful practices on a continuing basis
from at least July 2, 1965, to the present (id. at 47a).  See EEOC v.
Dean Witter Co., 643 F.2d 1334, 1337-1338 (9th Cir. 1980).

   The charge was filed with the EEOC's St. Louis District Office on
October 16, 1979 (J.A. 59).  The charge, along with a request for
information regarding respondent's employment practices, was served on
the company 10 days later (id. at 60).  42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).
Although respondent recognized that the charge was based, at least in
part, on its annual EEO-1 reports that had been filed with the
Commission (J.A. 92, 157), /5/ the company refused to comply with the
Commission's request for information on the ground that the Commission
possessed an insufficient factual basis for "the broad general
allegations stated in the charge" (id. at 90).  Respondent argued that
any investigation of its employment practices was improper because its
"bottom line statistics reflect that there is no violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended on a systemic basis" (id. at 93).
The company sought to bolster its objection to the merits of the
charge by describing its undifferentiated aggregate workforce
statistics (id. at 90-91) and asserting that its record was "clearly
not the profile anticipated for a Commissioner's Charge" (id. at 90).
The company also suggested that the appropriate labor market for
purposes of statistical comparison was not the St. Louis Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), but instead a smaller region of
selected counties (ibid.).

   In response to the company's asserted defenses, the Commission
pointed out that respondent's submission of facility totals, rather
than information by particular job categories, was insufficient to
permit meaningful analysis (J.A. 106).  In addition, the Commission
stated that the evidence submitted by respondent was insufficient to
permit an evaluation of its defense based on non-SMSA labor market
availability, a defense the Commission regarded as premature in any
event at the investigatory stage (id. at 95).

   When informal efforts to obtain the requested employment
information proved fruitless, the Commission issued a subpoena duces
tecum on May 15, 1980, requiring respondent to produce certain
employment information covering the years 1976 to the present (J.A.
60, 112-127).  In accordance with Commission regulations, respondent
petitioned the St. Louis District Director to revoke or modify the
subpoena (id. at 139-144).  After considering each of respondent's 16
objections, the District Director, with one exception, denied its
petition to revoke or modify the subpoena (id. at 145-152).  /6/
Respondent then appealled the District Director's determination to the
Commission's General Counsel (id. at 154-163), asserting that the data
available to the Commission did not "provide a basis for finding
reasonable cause" (id. at 157).  The General Counsel upheld the
District Director's determination (id. at 164-168) and ordered
respondent to comply with the subpoena by September 18, 1980 (id. at
168).

   Respondent did not comply with the subpoena, but instead filed this
suit in federal district court in Missouri to quash the subpoena and
enjoin the Commission's investigation.  Respondent alleged that the
charge was invalid under Section 706(b) because it failed to disclose
sufficient facts to form a basis for its allegations of
discrimination.  /7/ Respondent sought extensive discovery relating to
all Commission subpoenas issued since 1976 (J.A. 50-51), pending
commissioner's charges (id. at 52-53), internal Commission procedures
for recommending commissioner's charges (id. at 52), Commission
personnel practices regarding performance bonuses or merit awards
(ibid.), and interagency communications regarding the Federal Reports
Act (id. at 51-52).  In February 1981, the Commission filed an action
in the Southern District of Illinois to enforce the subpoena.  Civ.
No. 81-5020 (S.D. Ill.) (J.A. 4).  The enforcement action was
transferred to Missouri, where the district court rejected
respondent's arguments and enforced the Commission's subpoena (Pet.
App. 15a-31a).

   The district court concluded that respondent's "allegation that the
Commissioner's charge does not specify sufficient facts is * * *
meritless" (Pet. App. 24a).  The court recognized that the "purpose of
a charge under section 706, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5, is only to
initiate the EEOC investigation, not to state sufficient facts to make
out a prima facie case" (Pet. App. 24a).  The court further noted
that, under Commission regulations, a charge "is sufficient when the
Commission receives from the person making the charge a written
statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to
describe generally the action or practices complained of" (id. at
25a).  29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b).  The court concluded that the present
charge fully meets these requirements (Pet. App. 24a-25a).

   On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed (Pet. App. 1a-14a).  The
panel held that the charge failed to state "sufficient facts to comply
with the date, place and circumstances requirements of section 706(b)"
(Pet. App. 5a).  The court of appeals found that the specification of
July 2, 1965, as the beginning date for respondent's alleged
continuing misconduct was insufficient because "(w)e find no factual
basis" to support the date (id. at 7a).  The court further held that
the circumstances of the charge must be supported by an articulated
"factual basis" (id. at 8a).  The court reasoned that "the factual
basis for the charge enables the parties to determine whether
conciliation is an appropriate remedy and aids the court and the
employer in determining what evidence is relevant for discovery and
what records must be retained in accordance with EEOC regulations"
(ibid.).  Notwithstanding Section 706(b), which provides that charges
"shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission
requires" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)), the court concluded that "(a)
sufficient Commissioner's charge should contain the following
information:  the type of information upon which the charge is based;
the approximate dates of the alleged unlawful employment practices;
the nature of the charge (e.g., failure to hire, failure to promote,
dismissal);  and if an individual charge has been filed, the position
of the aggrieved individual (e.g., applicant, employee, former
employee)" (Pet. App. 12a).

   On July 20, 1982, the court denied the Commission's motion for
rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Lay dissenting.  Chief Judge Lay noted
that the decision placed the circuit "in direct conflict with the
decisions of all other courts of appeals addressing the issue of
factual allegations in a Title VII charge" (Pet. App. 35a).  Chief
Judge Lay also criticized the practical impact of the panel decision
on Commission enforcement procedures (id. at 38a):

      It would appear that the panel decision would require the
      Commission to show extrinsic evidence of reasonable cause in
      order to conduct an investigation to determine reasonable cause.
       Furthermore, the court's decision would impose the pleading
      standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed. R. Civ.
      P. 8, upon an administrative fact-finding investigation.  Such a
      position is supported by neither logic nor precedent, and would
      severely undermine the Commission's ability to bring
      commissioner's charges of discriminatory patterns and practices
      as authorized under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000-5(.)

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   1. Section 706(b) and its implementing regulations do not require
the Commission to articulate the factual basis underlying a
Commissioner's charge.  Section 706(b) expressly provides that
"charges * * * shall contain such information and be in such form as
the Commission requires." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).  Commission
regulations have consistently provided that a charge is sufficient if
it identifies the parties and generally describes the action or
practices complained of.  29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b).  Prior to the decision
below, the courts of appeals had uniformly upheld the Commission's
interpretation of Section 706.  "The purpose of the charge under
section 706 is only to initiate the EEOC investigation, not to state
sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case.  * * * (The Section)
only requires a sufficient allegation to give the EEOC notice of waht
it is to investigate and put the respondent on notice of the practice
or violation with which it is charged." Graniteville Co. (Sibley
Division) v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 38 (4th Cir. 1971).

   The decision below is also at odds with the legislative history of
Section 706.  As originally enacted, Section 706(a) required a
commissioner's charge to "set( ) forth the facts upon which it is
based" (Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259).  Nevertheless, the courts
of appeals uniformly concluded that Section 706 did not require the
Commission to "plead evidence" (Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 241 (9th Cir. 1971)).  In the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, Congress deleted the requirement that a commissioner's
charge set forth "facts," substituting instead the notice provisions
of Section 706(b) (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)).  Congress' determination
that Title VII respondents should receive notice of the "date, place
and circumstances" of all charged discrimination (ibid.), however,
does not justify the court of appeals' creation of factual pleading
requirements for commissioners' charges.  Section 706(b), as amended,
was designed to notify a respondent that a charge is pending before
the Commission;  it does not impose "strict technical pleading
requirement(s) upon complainants, whether they be private parties or
the Commissioners of the EEOC" (EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., 643 F.2d
1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1980)).

   The court of appeals erred in requiring specification of the
"factual basis" (Pet. App. 14a) for the date and circumstances of the
discrimination alleged by Commissioner Norton.  The charge in this
case disclosed the precise circumstances justifying Commission inquiry
into respondent's employment practices:  allegedly discriminatory
exclusion of blacks from six designated job categories and similar
exclusion of women from seven such categories.  The date utilized by
Commissioner Norton, moreover, is "a good faith estimate of the
probable time period( )" of respondent's misconduct.  EEOC v. Dean
Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338.  The charge alleged a broad
pattern of discrimination affecting all black and female employees in
several job categories.  Such a pattern or practice seldom, if ever,
has a discrete beginning date, and the Commission cannot be required
to provide any such date at the very threshold of its inquiry into an
employer's discriminatory practices.  Because respondent has been
hiring blacks and women into its allegedly discriminatory employment
system since the effective date of Title VII, Commissioner Norton's
use of that date -- July 2, 1965 -- as the starting date for
respondent's misconduct was entirely proper.  That date, moreover,
fully informs respondent of the temporal scope of its alleged
misconduct.

   2. The district court's inquiry in a subpoena enforcement action is
decidedly limited.  A subpoena enforcement proceeding is not a forum
for "'a general inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a charge'" (Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC,
supra, 438 F.2d at 36).  Title VII "restrict(s) the district court's
inquiry in subpoena enforcement actions to whether the information
sought is material and relevant" (EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055,
1065 (6th Cir. 1982)).  Questions regarding the existence of
reasonable cause and the appropriateness of particular remedies,
therefore, "must await the completion of the administrative process
before the district court may properly review them" (EEOC v. Chrysler
Corp., 567 F.2d 754, 755 (8th Cir. 1977)).

   Nor is more particularized pleading necessary to afford "fair
notice" or prevent "abuse of governmental power" (Resp. Br. In Opp.
15, 17).  The charge in this case clearly informed respondent of the
substance of the allegations against it.  It would be anomalous to
require the Commission to plead evidence in order to commence an
administrative investigation, when such particularity is not required
to bring a civil enforcement action in federal court.  Unless the
Commission must present its proof along with its charge, "it is
difficult to see what additional information the Commissioner should
set forth as facts supporting (her) charge" (Bowaters Southern Paper
Corp. v. EEOC, 428 F.2d 799, 800 (6th Cir. 1970)).  The requirement
that commissioners' charges be filed under oath, moreover, provides a
safeguard for Title VII respondents against the possibility of an
errant bureaucracy.

   The objection that generally worded charges constitute mere
"fishing expeditions" carries little force.  "When investigative and
accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body,
it * * * may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is
probable violation of the law." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 643 (1950).  Because the "investigatory powers of the EEOC
should be interpreted broadly" (EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d
at 1066), any "fishing expedition" argument premised upon the
parenthetical notice provisions of Section 706(b) is particularly
unpersuasive.  "(I)t would be incongruous for Congress to create an
administrative agency to function in a new sensitive and socially and
economically important field * * * and then, by a parenthetical
clause, disable it from normal and effective investigation." Local
104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra, 439 F.2d at 242.

   3. The decision below unduly intrudes the federal courts upon EEOC
administrative proceedings at their very outset.  Under that decision,
the federal courts -- not the Commission -- would be the final
arbiters of whether particular facts justify an administrative
inquiry.  But the courts should not be drawn into probing the "factual
basis" of Commission charges any more than they should second guess
whether other administrative agencies have properly issued an
administrative complaint.  "Judicial review of the averments in the
Commission's complaints should not be a means of turning prosecutor
into defendant before adjudication concludes." FTC v. Standard Oil
Co., 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980).  The decision below erroneously and all
too readily "enable(s) those subject to administrative authority
unduly to delay investigations into their affairs." B. Schwartz,
Administrative Law Section 45, at 115 (1976).

                               ARGUMENT

   The court of appeals erred in refusing to enforce the Commission's
investigatory subpoena on the ground that the allegations in
Commissioner Norton's charge lacked a "factual basis" (Pet. App. 14a).
 Contrary to the conclusion of the court below, the amended charge at
issue here meets all the requirements of Section 706(b) and applicable
Commission regulations and fully justifies Commission inquiry into
respondent's employment practices.  Commissioner Norton's charge was
rendered under oath and identified the place of discrimination as
respondent's Wood River facility (Pet. App. 44a, 47a).  The charge,
moreover, specified the circumstances justifying an inquiry into
respondent's employment practices:  allegedly discriminatory exclusion
of blacks from six designated job categories and similar exclusion of
women from seven designated job categories (id. at 44a-45a).  Finally,
the charge, as amended, stated that respondent had engaged in such
practices "on a continuing basis from at least July 2, 1965, until the
present" (id. at 47a).

   The court of appeals, contrary to uniform precedent, concluded that
the charge failed to meet the notice provisions of Section 706(b)
because it was not supported by an articulated "factual basis" (Pet.
App. 14a) and specified July 2, 1965, as the starting date for the
alleged discrimination (id. at 11a-12a).  /8/ The court ordered the
case remanded to the district court to permit the Commission to
provide a "factual basis" for the date and circumstances of the
alleged discrimination (id. at 12a-14a).  The detailed pleading
requirement created by the court of appeals, however, unduly expands
the scope of a summary subpoena enforcement proceeding, goes far
beyond the requirement of fair notice, and erroneously intrudes the
federal courts into an administrative proceeding at its very outset.

 I. THE CHARGE IN THIS CASE FULLY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE
VII

 A. Section 706(b) and its Implementing Regulations Do Not Require the
EEOC to Articulate the Factual Basis Underlying a Commissioner's
Charge

   Title VII establishes "an integrated, multistep enforcement
procedure culminating in the EEOC's authority to bring a civil action
in a federal court." Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 359 (1977).  The primary purpose of a Section 706(b) charge is to
initiate an administrative investigation to determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that an employer has violated Title VII.
The initial charge does not commence a formal civil enforcement action
against a respondent, but rather is merely the first step in an
integrated procedure that emphasizes informal conciliation.
Consistent with the discrete function of a Section 706(b) charge,
Commission regulations and the prior decisions of the courts of
appeals have uniformly established that a commissioner's charge need
not incorporate the detailed "factual basis" found necessary below
(Pet. App. 14a).  The legislative history of Section 706(b), moreover,
clearly supports this conclusion.

   1. Section 706(b) expressly states that "charges * * * shall
contain such information and be in such form as the Commission
requires." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).  Commission regulations have
consistently provided that a charge is sufficient if it generally
describes the practices forming the basis of the complaint.  See Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R.
1601.11(b).  Current Commission regulations state that a charge should
contain a "clear and concise statement of the facts, including
pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment
practices." 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(a)(3).  Notwithstanding those
requirements, however, "a charge is sufficient when the Commission
receives from the person making the charge a written statement
sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe
generally the action or practices complained of." Section 1601.12(b).
Commission regulations have never required Title VII charges to embody
an articulated "factual basis" (Pet. App. 14a).

   The district court applied the Commission's regulations to
Commissioner Norton's charge and properly rejected respondent's
assertion that the charge "does not specify sufficient facts" (Pet.
App. 24a).  The district court quoted 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b), set out
above, and concluded that "(a)ccording to this standard, the
Commissioner's charge is sufficient, because it is a typewritten
statement which identifies the parties involved as being Shell Oil
Company and the EEOC, and it describes generally the practices
complained of as failing or refusing to recruit, hire, promote, train,
assign, or select Blacks and/or females for managerial, professional,
technical, craft, and service worker positions, inter alia, because of
their race and/or sex" (id. at 25a).  Because the charge was "sworn to
by Commissioner Norton, and substantially complied with Commission
guidelines" (id. at 25a), the district court rejected respondent's
evidentiary attack as "meritless" (id. at 24a).

   By contrast, the court of appeals, without adverting to the
Commission's determination that generally worded charges are
sufficient under Section 706(b), concluded that a valid charge
requires "some factual or statistical basis" (Pet. App. 12a).  The
court of appeals erred in substituting its own sufficiency
requirements for those adopted by the Commission.

   The longstanding interpretation by a federal agency of its founding
statute is entitled to great respect.  EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600, n.17 (1981).  The deference accorded an
agency's interpretation is particularly great when that interpretation
has remained consistent over a long period of time.  Ibid.  See, e.g.,
31 Fed. Reg. 10269 (1966).  In this case, where the question before
the court of appeals centered upon the necessary procedures for
instituting an administrative investigation, the Commission's
consistent view that a Title VII charge need not specify the
evidentiary basis for its allegations should have been virtually
conclusive.  As this Court has noted, "the EEOC does not function
simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private
parties;  it is a federal administrative agency charged with the
responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination
and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive
fashion." Occidential Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, supra, 432 U.S. at
368.  To paraphrase the opinion in Occidental Life, "(i)n view of the
federal policy requiring employment discrimination claims to be
investigated by the (Commission) and, whenever possible,
administratively resolved before suit is brought in federal court, it
is hardly appropriate (to shift the determination of whether an
initial charging document is sufficient from the Commission to the
federal courts)." Ibid.  The court of appeals accordingly erred in
failing to defer to the Commission's construction of Section 706(b)' s
requirements.

   2. a. As originally enacted in 1964, Section 706(a) provided that a
Commissioner's charge could be filed where a Commissioner of the EEOC
had "reasonable cause to believe a violation of (Title VII) ha(d)
occurred," and the charge "set( ) forth the facts upon which it (was)
based" (Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259).  /9/ The wording of Section
706 essentially paralleled the provisions of Section 707(a), which
even today authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil "pattern or
practice" actions only where he has "reasonable cause to believe" that
a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in violation of Title VII is
occurring and the civil complaint "set(s) forth facts pertaining to
such pattern or practice" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a)).

   The requirement that Commissioners' charges under Section 706 and
civil complaints under Section 707 state the "facts" upon which they
were based produced -- quite predictably -- a spate of early
litigation.  These cases, however, uniformly held that Title VII did
not impose any specific factual pleading burden upon the Commission or
the Attorney General.  In United States v. Gustin-Bacon Division,
Certain-Teed Products Corp., 426 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1970), the court
rejected the assertion that Section 707 imposed more onerous pleading
burdens on the Attorney General than those required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The court searched the legislative history
of Title VII and was "unable to find any expressed intent, clear or
otherwise" to create "a requirement of detailed pleading" (426 F.2d at
543).  /10/ The Ninth Circuit relied on similar reasoning to reject
the assertion that Section 706 "requir(es) a detailed statement of the
underlying facts relative to the alleged acts of discrimination."
Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 241 (1971).  The
court noted that Section 707 did not require detailed factual pleading
and concluded "that to require the Commission to plead evidence in a
(Section 706 charge) which is a step in an administrative
investigation when the same language in the same statute does not
require such specificity in a court action which seeks a judgment,
would constitute topsy-turvy logic and we will not indulge in it" (439
F.2d at 243).

   The subsequent decisions of other courts of appeals were in
unanimous agreement with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section
706.  As the Fourth Circuit stated shortly after the decision in Local
104, "(t)he purpose of the charge under section 706 is only to
initiate the EEOC investigation, not to state sufficient facts to make
out a prima facie case.  * * * (S)ection 706(a) only requires a
sufficient allegation to give the EEOC notice of what it is to
investigate and put the respondent on notice of the practice or
violation with which it is charged." Graniteville Co. (Sibley
Division) v. EEOC, supra, 438 F.2d at 38.  /11/ Accord, Bowaters
Southern Paper Corp. v. EEOC, 428 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 942 (1970);  New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown, 507
F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1975);  General Employment Enterprises, Inc. v.
EEOC, 440 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1971) (en banc);  Adolph Coors, Co. v.
EEOC, 464 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929
(1973);  Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. EEOC, 466 F.2d
541 (10th Cir. 1972);  Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Powell, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1419 (1975) and 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1429 (10th Cir. 1978).  The courts of appeals, therefore, uniformly
upheld Title VII charges against attack on sufficiency grounds.
Specifically, prior to the decision below, no court of appeals ever
refused to enforce an EEOC investigatory subpoena on the ground that
the administrative charge failed to specify its "factual basis" (Pet.
App. 14a).  On the contrary, the courts consistently enforced
subpoenas based on charges that are no more specific factually than
the one found deficient below.  /12/

   b. Respondent argues that the above precedent is irrelevant to the
interpretation of the current version of Section 706 (Resp. Br. In
Opp. 19-20), and suggests that the 1972 amendments to Title VII
significantly increased the pleading burden imposed upon the
Commission by Section 706 (Resp. Br. In Opp. 21).  We disagree.

   The 1972 amendments to Title VII made two changes in Section 706
that are relevant to the present inquiry.  First, the amendments
eliminated the requirement that commissioners' charges be supported by
reasonable cause.  Instead, commissioners' charges, like the charges
of any aggrieved complainant, must be in writing, under oath, and
"contain such information and be in such form as the Commission
requires" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)).  Second, instead of explicating the
"facts" upon which a charge is based, the Commission is required to
"serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice)" upon the
respondent within 10 days (ibid.).  See EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., 643
F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1980).  Nothing in either of these
alterations to Section 706 suggests that Congress has sub silentio
imposed a factual pleading requirement upon the Commission.

   The legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not indicate
that Congress intended to intensify the sufficiency requirements for a
commissioner's charge under Section 706.  Indeed, the 1972 amendments
were designed, in large part, to increase the investigative and
enforcement powers of the Commission.  See generally Occidental Life
Insurance Co. v. EEOC, supra, 432 U.S. at 358-373.  /13/ At the time
of those amendments, four circuits had concluded that Section 706
charges need only describe the alleged discriminatory conduct in
general terms.  Local 104, sHeet Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra, 439
F.2d at 241-243;  Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. EEOC, supra, 428
F.2d at 800;  General Employment Enterprises, Inc. v. EEOC, supra, 440
F.2d at 784;  Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC, supra, 438
F.2d at 37-39.  However, rather than continuing or strengthening the
requirement that a commissioner's charge set forth "the facts upon
which it is based" (Pub. L. No. 88-352, Section 706(a), 78 Stat. 259),
Congress eliminated any factual pleading requirement entirely,
substituting instead the notice provisions of Section 706(b).
Congress, furthermore, expressly left the form and content of Section
706(b) charges to Commission discretion.  Ibid.  Congress, therefore,
has plainly rejected any requirement that a Commissioner's charge set
froth its underlying factual basis.  /14/

   The court of appeals did not discuss the legislative history
outlined above.  Instead, the court concluded that the notice
provisions of amended Section 706(b) require the Commission to
explicate the factual basis for an administrative charge (Pet. App.
6a-7a).  But those notice provisions, properly construed, do not
support the decision below.

   Although the original version of Section 706 required service of
the charge upon the respondent, prior to the 1972 amendments the
section did not require service within any particular time period.  To
protect the charging party from reprisal, moreover, the Commission
routinely delayed serving a copy of the charge until an EEOC officer
was available to begin investigating the charge's allegations.  See
Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972).  Both the
House and the Senate sought to alter this practice by requiring that a
respondent be notified of a charge within a limited time period.  See
"Comparison of Title VII, as proposed to be amended by S. 2515 and
H.R. 1746," 118 Cong. Rec. 300 (1972).  The House proposal would have
required service of the charge itself within five days of its filing.
The Senate bill, however, which was eventually adopted by both houses,
required service within 10 days of a "notice of the charge (including
the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment
practice)" (118 Cong. Rec. 300 (1972)).

   There is no indication that Section 706(b)'s notice provisions were
designed to impose a stringent pleading standard on the Commission.
As this Court has noted, Congress' concern in amending Section 706(b)
"was directed entirely to the initial filing of a charge with the EEOC
and prompt notification thereafter to the alleged violator."
Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, supra, 432 U.S. at 371.
Congress took the view that the Commission's previous notification
procedures, under which a respondent might not receive notice of a
pending charge for a significant period of time, unduly prejudiced the
rights of employers.  The notice provisions of Section 706(b),
therefore, were drafted "to accord respondents fair notice that
charges are pending against them" (118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972)).
Contrary to the conclusion of the court below, the legislative purpose
behind the notice provisions of Section 706(b) is precise and
well-defined:  Congress amended Section 706(b) to provide "prompt
notification" to alleged violators (Occidental Life Insurance Co. v.
EEOC, supra, 432 U.S. at 371).  There is no evidence in the 1972
legislative history that Congress, by enacting a summary notice
requirement and deleting a provision for service of the charge itself,
intended to alter the well-established view that generally worded
charges are sufficient under Title VII.

   Except for the court below, every court of appeals that has
considered the question has rejected the argument that the 1972
amendments to Section 706 create a detailed evidentiary pleading
requirement for commissioners' charges.  EEOC v. Dean Witter Co.,
supra;  EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1982).  These
decisions, like the earlier cases described above, recognize that
Section 706(b) "impose(s) no strict * * * pleading requirement upon
complainants, whether they be private parties or the Commissioners of
the EEOC." EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338.

   In Dean Witter, the district court had refused to enforce a
Commission subpoena on the ground that the charge "failed to set forth
the date, place, and circumstances of the charge as required by
statute" (643 F.2d at 1336).  Although the court of appeals concluded
that the charge in that case did not adequately apprise the respondent
of the date of its alleged misconduct, the court rejected any claim
that amended Section 706 imposes a special pleading burden on the
Commission.  "We do not read the inclusion of the date, place and
circumstances requirement as imposing onerous new pleading
requirements upon the Commission" (643 F.2d at 1337).  Specifically,
the court concluded that the Commission's duty to provide a respondent
with "'the circumstances' of the alleged unlawful practice" does not
create "a more burdensome requirement than the 'fact' pleading
requirement of the former Section 706(a)," with the result that "our
decision in Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers continues to provide the
controlling principles to guide the form of EEOC charges" (643 F.2d at
1337, 1338).  "The charge is merely the first step in the
administrative process, and it would defeat the Congressional scheme
to impose detailed fact pleading burdens on the EEOC before it has had
an opportunity to investigate the basis for the charge" (id. at 1338).
 The court therefore held that a charge alleging "company-wide"
discrimination is sufficient to meet the "place" requirement of
Section 706(b) and a "listing of the nature of the alleged employment
practices, even though essentially conclusory in nature, (is)
sufficient to comply with the 'circumstances' requirement" (id. at
1337.) /15/ Significantly, the charge in Dean Witter, like the charge
in this case, set forth the alleged unlawful practices in general
terms without any supporting "factual basis" (Pet. App. 9a, 14a).
/16/

   In EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, the Sixth Circuit issued a writ of
mandamus to vacate an order of the district court that allowed K-Mart
to depose a Commissioner of the EEOC and other Commission employees.
/17/ The appellate court examined the language and legislative history
of Section 706 and concluded that "(n)othing in Title VII * * *
authorizes a district court in a subpoena enforcement proceeding to
allow discovery concerning the facts underlying a charge of
discrimination" (694 F.2d at 1065).  The court specifically disagreed
with the holding in the present case that "section 706(b) requires
'some basis in fact'" (id. at 1063 n.7).  The court noted that such a
requirement "is contrary to well-established law" (ibid.).

   Thus, as Chief Judge Lay noted in dissenting to the denial of
rehearing en banc, the decision below is "in direct conflict with the
decisions of all other courts of appeals addressing the issue of
factual allegations in a Title VII charge" (Pet. App. 35a).  Section
706, as originally enacted, did not require the Commission to provide
the "factual basis" found necessary below (Pet. App. 14), and nothing
in the 1972 amendments to Title VII alters that result.

 B. The Date Provided by the Amended Charge Fully Satisfies the Notice
Provisions of Section 706(b)

   The charge in this case, as originally filed, alleged that
respondent had engaged in continuing misconduct, but did not include a
specific beginning date for the unlawful employment practices
delineated by Commissioner Norton (Pet. App. 44a-45a).  Following the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Dean Witter Co., supra, the charge was
amended by Commissioner Norton to allege that respondent had engaged
in the identified practices "on a continuing basis from at least July
2, 1965, until the present" (Pet. App. 47a).  The court of appeals,
however, concluded that specification of July 2, 1965, as the
beginning date of respondent's alleged misconduct was insufficient to
provide the notice required by Section 706 because it lacked a
"factual basis" and did not notify respondent "of the parameters of
the investigation" (Pet. App. 11a-12a).  Neither objection is sound.

   1. The Commission, at the very threshold of its inquiry into an
employer's allegedly discriminatory practices, cannot be required to
provide the precise date that a pattern or practice of discrimination
began.  As the Ninth Circuit has concluded, Section 706(b) does not
mandate more than a "good faith estimate of the probable time periods"
involved.  EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338.  /18/
Such an estimate, moreover, was plainly given in Commissioner Norton's
amended charge.

   The charge lodged by Commissioner Norton described a broad pattern
or practice of discrimination affecting all black and female employees
in several job categories.  Unlike an individual complaint arising
from a specific incident on a given date, a pattern or practice charge
is based on the aggregate of many individual employment decisions over
a period of time.  Such a pattern or practice seldom, if ever, has a
discrete beginning date.  Indeed, the theory behind such a charge is
that nondiscriminatory employment practices will, over the course of
time, result in a workforce whose composition approximates that of the
available labor force, while discriminatory practices will result in
substantial disparities between the two figures.  International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20
(1977);  Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
307-308 (1977).  Positing a precise beginning date for discriminatory
conduct when such statistical disparities arise is, at best,
conjectural.  The difficulties are compounded when the time frame must
be estimated at the charging stage of a Commission proceeding, before
the Commission has had the opportunity to investigate the possibly
underlying causes of any statistical disparity.  /19/

   The Commission has not, as respondent alleges, utilized the
effective date of Title VII as "boilerplate" in all outstanding
pattern or practice charges (Resp. Br. In Opp. 12 n.7).  /20/ Rather,
the Commission has carefully considered the evidence in each case in
arriving at an appropriate starting date for the charged misconduct.
The Commission has generally limited the use of July 2, 1965, to those
cases where special circumstances indicate a history of assignment or
promotion discrimination that has been continued or perpetuated by
collective bargaining agreements.  Specification of the effective date
of Title VII as the beginning date of the charged discrimination is
appropriate in such cases in order to facilitate seniority relief to
the full extent permitted by law.

   Commissioner Norton considered an amendment to the effective date
of Title VII appropriate in this case because respondent's statistical
record indicated a pattern or practice of confining women to office/
clerical positions and of confining Blacks to operative and laborer
positions.  Because respondent has been hiring women and Blacks into
this allegedly discriminatory system since the effective date of Title
VII, Commissioner Norton's use of July 2, 1965, in her amended charge
is an entirely reasonable and good-faith estimate of the probable time
period of respondent's misconduct.  /21/ EEOC v. Dean Witter Co.,
supra, 643 F.2d at 1338.  The court of appeals erred in requiring a
more specific "factual basis" for the date utilized by Commissioner
Norton.

   2. The court below held that Commissioner Norton's use of July 2,
1965, lacked not only a "factual basis," but also failed to give
"notice to the employer of the parameters of the investigation" (Pet.
App. 11a).  Cf. EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d at 1063 (the
effective date of Title VII "does not give the employer, the district
court, or the EEOC's investigators any objective basis to determine
the temporal scope of the investigation").  /22/

   This objection is unsound because neither the scope of the
Commission's investgiation nor the scope of an enforcement action is
limited by the form or content of a charge under Section 706(b).  "Any
violations that the EEOC ascertains in the course of a reasonable
investigation of the charging party's complaint are actionable."
General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980).  Although
Section 706(b) charges are a condition precedent to agency action
under Title VII, they, like their counterpart charges under the
National Labor Relations Act, do not limit the scope of any subsequent
findings of reasonable cause by the Commission, nor do they define the
limits of a resulting Commission enforcement action.  Their "purpose
is merely to set in motion the machinery of an inquiry." NLRB v. Fant
Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307 (1959).  /23/ As respondent concedes,
"(t)he charge does not * * * reduce the ability of the Commission to
expand the scope of its investigation" (Resp. Br. In Opp. 27).  In
short, because a Section 706(b) charge does not define the limits of a
Commission investigation, conciliation action, or subsequent
prosecution, the court below erred in refusing to enforce the
Commission's subpoena on the ground that Commissioner Norton's charge
failed to set such limits.

   "Since a Commissioner's charge does no more than initiate
administrative fact finding and * * * conciliation," there is no sound
basis for requiring the Commission to provide a specific, factually
supported beginning date for the misconduct alleged in a charge.
General Employment Enterprises, Inc. v. EEOC, supra, 440 F.2d at 784.
The charge in this case notified respondent that Commissioner Norton
had reason to believe that the company had engaged in specified
misconduct since at least July 2, 1965.  The company, therefore, was
given a clear indication of the temporal and substantive scope of its
alleged misconduct.  The fact that the temporal boundaries of that
misconduct are broad is not a valid ground for objection;  the
Commission is clearly entitled to investigate misconduct since the
effective date of Title VII.  /24/ Because respondent cannot
legitimately complain of a lack of notice regarding the temporal scope
of its alleged misconduct, the company's probable concern with the
date provided in Commissioner Norton's charge is that it indicates a
far-reaching Commission investigation of its employment practices.
Any such concern, however, did not justify the lower court's refusal
to enforce the Commission's subpoena, which sought information only
for the period 1976 to 1980.  /25/

   Respondent has received all the notice that Section 706(b) requires
-- a concise statement of what it has allegedly done in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See Occidental Life
Insurance Co. v. EEOC, supra, 432 U.S. at 372-373 & n.32.  The "date"
and "circumstances" requirements of Section 706(b) do not require the
technical precision respondent would impose on the Commission prior to
the agency's investigation.  The respondent is of course entitled to
argue to the Commission that it did not commit the described unlawful
acts in the time period charged in this case.  Respondent, however,
may not claim that it does not know what it is charged with doing.

 II. THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR REJECTING THE
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 706(b) ARE UNPERSUASIVE

   The court of appeals reasoned that commissioner's charges must be
supported by an articulated "factual basis" in order to "enable( ) the
parties to determine whether conciliation is an appropriate remedy and
aid( ) the court and the employer in determining what evidence is
relevant for discovery" (Pet. App. 12a).  The court further stated
that a charge "without some factual or statistical basis gives the
appearance of a 'fishing expedition' and fails to give the employer
sufficient notice" (ibid.).  These grounds for the decision below,
however, do not withstand scrutiny.  The scope of a subpoena
enforcement action is decidedly limited and does not extend to such
inquiries as "whether conciliation is an appropriate remedy" (Pet.
App. 12a).  The level of notice mandated by the court below, moreover,
is at odds with the limited function of a Section 706(b) charge and is
not required to prevent abuse of authority.  Finally, any concern that
a generally worded commissioner's charge would permit an unwarranted
"fishing expedition" is largely illusory.

 A. There Is No Need for the Commission to Specify the Factual Basis
for a Section 706(b) Charge in Order to Obtain Enforcement of an
Investigative Subpoena

   The court of appeals suggested that the factual basis for a
commissioner's charge must be provided to enable the parties to
determine the applicability of certain remedies (Pet. App. 12a) and to
"protect the employer from an open-ended investigation" (id. at 11a).
The factual pleading requirement fashioned by the court of appeals,
however, goes far beyond the narrow range of issues legitimately
raised in a subpoena enforcement proceeding.

   The district court's inquiry in a subpoena enforcement action is
"extremely limited." NLRB v. Fredrick Cowan & Co., 522 F.2d 26, 28 (2d
Cir. 1975);  NLRB v. International Medication Systems, Ltd., 640 F.2d
1110, 1114 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982);
EEOC v. Bay shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 308-309 (7th Cir. 1981).
 This Court has established that, in general, administrative subpoenas
should be enforced by the federal courts "if the inquiry is within the
authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the
information sought is reasonably relevant." United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).  See also United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964).  While a Section 706(b) charge is a
prerequisite to an EEOC investigation, "(r)easonable cause for finding
a Title VII violation need not be established before an administrative
subpoena may be validly issued." EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 754,
755 (8th Cir. 1977).  Accord, EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d at
1066;  EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296, 1303 (10th
Cir. 1974);  Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EOOC, supra, 438
F.2d at 36.  "Rather, it is the function of such investigative
subpoenas to establish whether reasonable cause to bring a
discrimination charge exists." EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 567 F.2d
at 755.  A district court requested to enforce a Commission subpoena,
therefore, is "limited to determining whether the subpoenaed
information is material and relevant to the investigation of a
potential violation" (ibid.).  /26/ A subpoena enforcement proceeding
is not a forum for "'a general inquiry into the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a charge.'" Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v.
EEOC, supra, 438 F.2d at 36.  Questions regarding the existence of
reasonable cause and the appropriateness of particular remedies "must
await the completion of the administrative process before the district
court may properly review them." EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 567
F.2d at 755.  /27/

   The court of appeals' decision disregards the limited nature of an
EEOC subpoena enforcement proceeding.  An investigatory subpoena is
issued as part of an administrative inquiry into whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that a charge lodged under Section 706(b)
is true.  42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).  The net effect of the lower court's
factual pleading requirement, however, is to "require the Commission
to show extrinsic evidence of reasonable cause in order to conduct an
investigation to determine reasonable cause" (Pet. App. 38a;  Lay,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit rejected the opinion below as "contrary to well-established
law" precisely because "(i)n subpoena enforcement proceedings, the
EEOC usually does not have to prove probable cause or reasonable cause
to believe that a charge of discrimination is true." EEOC v. K-Mart
Corp., supra, 694 F.2d at 1063 n.7.  Because such a pleading
requirement would necessarily entangle federal district courts in
second-guessing the factual sufficiency of charges filed by the
Commission, the decision below "place(s) the cart before the horse,"
and "substitute(s) a different driver for the one appointed by
Congress." Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC, supra, 438 F.2d
at 36.  Such broad-scale expansion of the issues to be determined in
summary subpoena enforcement actions should not be countenanced by
this Court.  /28/

 B. The Commission's Practice of Issuing Generally Worded Charges
Provides Adequate Notice and Does Not Result In Abuse of Commission
Authority

   1. Respondent argues that Section 706(b) requires the Commission to
provide it with a "statement of the specific incidents or employment
practices alleged to be discriminatory" (Resp. Br. In Opp. 12).  The
record in this case, however, shows that respondent has received just
such a statement.

   The charge in this case notified the respondent that a Commissioner
of the EEOC had reason to believe that the company had excluded blacks
from "managerial, professional, technical, office-clerical, craft, and
service workers positions," and had confined women to office and
clerical positions (Pet. App. 44a).  The charge, as amended, informed
the respondent that the Commission had reason to believe that the
company "had engaged in the identified unlawful employment practices
on a continuing basis from at least July 2, 1965, until the present"
(id. at 47a).  The statistics upon which the charge was based,
moreover, were provided by the respondent itself.  /29/ Thus, the
charge clearly informed respondent of the substance of the allegations
against it.  Unless the Commission must present its proof along with
its charge, it is difficult to see how additional "facts" would
provide more "notice" to respondent at the very outset of this
proceeding.  Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, "it is difficult
to see what additional information the Commissioner should set forth
as facts supporting (her) charge." Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v.
EEOC, supra, 428 F.2d at 800.  /30/

   Respondent's "notice" arguments are unpersuasive for another
important reason.  The commissioner's charge in this case clearly
indicated the parties involved, identified the location of the
putative discriminatory activities, and alleged that the respondent
had confined its women employees in office and clerical positions and
its black employees in operative and laborer positions from at least
the effective date of Title VII.  Since such allegations would
certainly be sufficient to provide notice in a complaint brought by
the Commission in federal court after a finding of reasonable cause,
it would be highly anomalous to require the Commission to plead the
evidence supporting its allegations at the threshold of its
administrative investigation.  Although the respondent argues that "a
charge under Title VII is not to be compared to a complaint under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" (Resp. Br. In Opp. 27), there is
certainly no reason to impose on Section 706(b) charges "a standard
even more strict that that required by our Rules of Civil Procedure,
notwithstanding that the pleadings are even less significant in the
administrative process than in the judicial." Sparton Southwest, Inc.
v. EEOC, supra, 461 F.2d at 1059.  Accord, EEOC v. Dean Witter Co.,
supra, 643 F.2d at 1337;  Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,
supra, 439 F.2d at 243;  Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC,
supra, 438 F.2d at 39 & n.7;  General Employment Enterprises, Inc. v.
EEOC, supra, 440 F.2d at 784.  The extensive "notice" requirements
imposed by the court below, therefore, are "inconsistent with the
enforcement scheme of Title VII." EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694
F.2d at 1067.

   2. The factual pleading requirements imposed below are necessary,
respondent asserts, to prevent "abuse of governmental power" (Resp.
Br. In Opp. 17).  Congress, however, has specifically provided the
means of safeguarding Title VII respondents from an errant bureaucracy
by requiring that commissioner's charges be under oath -- there is no
need for the federal courts to erect additional barricades.  EEOC v.
Dean Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338;  EEOC v. K-Mart Corp.,
supra, 694 F.2d at 1065 & n.12.

   The contention that Title VII demands factually specific
allegations to prevent the filing of irresponsible charges is hardly
novel;  indeed, it was raised in some of the earliest EEOC subpoena
enforcement cases.  In Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC,
supra, 438 F.2d at 39, the district court had refused to enforce a
Commission subpoena because "Congress intended to deny the Commission
the broad investigatory powers of other federal agencies and to
carefully circumscribe its authority of investigation." The Fourth
Circuit, however, flatly rejected this conclusion.  After an extensive
examination of the legislative history of Title VII (438 F.2d at
39-41), the court of appeals found that the Commission's investigatory
powers were not narrowly confined (id. at 41).  The court, moreover,
concluded that a factual pleading requirement was not necessary to
prevent "abuse of authority" (Resp. Br. In Opp. 15).  "Congress sought
to control mere 'fishing expeditions' by requiring investigations to
be preceded by the filing of a charge by a party claiming to be
aggrieved or by a Commissioner with sufficient prior information to
have reasonable cause to believe that a statutory violation had
occurred" (438 F.2d at 41).  The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion
published just a few weeks later, reached the same conclusion for
virtually identical reasons.  Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,
supra, 439 F.2d at 242.

   As explained earlier, Congress amended Section 706(a) subsequent to
the above decisions, eliminating the requirement that a commissioner's
charge be supported by "reasonable cause to believe a violation of
(Title VII) has occurred" (Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259).
Instead, Congress provided that Commissioner's charges shall be under
oath.  42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).  The substitution of an oath for a
reasonable cause requirement, however, can hardly be viewed as
diluting the Graniteville and Local 104 court's conclusions regarding
the necessity of facutal pleading to avert capricious governmental
action.

   In EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338, the respondent
to a Commission subpoena renewed the argument that the EEOC has
"limited investigatory powers" and must therefore file "detailed and
specific" charges to avoid abuse of its authority.  The Ninth Circuit,
as it had in Local 104, rejected the argument.  The court observed
that the 1972 amendments to Title VII were designed to "strengthen the
investigatory power of the EEOC" (643 F.2d at 1338).  In these
circumstances, the court noted, the respondent's argument "has even
less force * * * than it did in 1971" (ibid.).  The court concluded
that Section 706(b) does not require the Commission to draft detailed
factual pleadings for final approval by a federal court.  "(T)he good
faith of high level governmental officials (is) a sufficient check on
the filing of irresponsible charges" (643 F.2d at 1338).  Accord, EEOC
v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d at 1065.

 C. Any Concern that Generally Worded Charges Lead to Improper
"Fishing Expeditions" is Insubstantial

   The court of appeals concluded that, "without some factual or
statistical basis," a Section 706(b) charge "gives the appearance of a
fishing expedition" (Pet. App. 12a).  The Commission's incipient
investigation into respondent's allegedly unlawful employment
practices, however, should not fall before the "colorful and nostalgic
slogan 'no fishing expeditions'" (United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
supra, 338 U.S. at 642).

   This Court has noted that "fishing expedition" objections carry
little force in the context of administrative investigations.  In
United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra, 338 U.S. at 642, the Court
wrote that, although courts may not "go fishing," administrative
agencies are not so strictly limited.  In addition to judicial
functions, administrative agencies are "charged with seeing that the
laws are enforced," and they may therefore "exercise powers of
original inquiry" (ibid.).  "When investigative and accusatory duties
are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it * * * may take
steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of
the law" (id, at 643).  "Fishing expeditiion" objections to
administrative investigations, therefore, must be viewed with some
skepticism because "(t)he only power that is involved * * * is the
power to get information from those who best can give it and who are
most interested in not doing so" (id. at 642).  Respondent's
construction of a "fishing expedition" argument upon the parenthetical
notice provisions of Section 706(b) is particularly unpersuasive.
"(I)t would be incongruous for Congress to create an administrative
agency to function in a new sensitive and socially and economically
important field * * * and then, by a parenthetical clause, disable it
from normal and effective investigation." Local 104, Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, supra, 439 F.2d at 242.

   "It is well settled that the investigatory powers of the EEOC
should be interpreted broadly." EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d
at 1066.  Accord, EEOC v. University of Pittsburgh, 643 F.2d 983 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 880 (1981);  EEOC v. University of New
Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974);  Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484
F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974);  EEOC v.
Cambridge Tile Manufacturing Co., 590 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1979).
Sections 709(a) and 710 of Title VII authorize the Commission to issue
subpoenas following the filing of a charge under Section 706 (42
U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-8(a), 2000e-9, and, as explained above, the
Commission does not have to establish reasonable cause to believe that
the charge is true -- i.e., explicate its "factual basis" (Pet. App.
14a) -- in order to obtain enforcement of those subpoenas.
Respondent, by its vigorous assertion that the charge in this case had
"no purpose other than the initiation of a fishing expedition by (the
Commission)" (Resp. Br. In Opp. 23), persuaded the court below that
Section 706(b) required "a detailed statement of the underlying facts
relative to the alleged acts of discrimination." Local 104, Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra, 439 F.2d at 241.  But, as the Ninth
Circuit correctly noted, that interpretation of Section 706 would mean
"that the Commission, in its investigation, must not ask any questions
to which it does not already know the answers." Ibid.  Such a result,
like the phrase "fishing expedition" itself, "has about it the aura of
another, and bygone, legal era." Ibid.  See also Graniteville Co.
(Sibley Division) v. EEOC, supra, 438 F.2d at 36;  EEOC v. Dean Witter
Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338;  New Orleans Public Services, Inc. v.
Brown, supra, 507 F.2d at 162 n.2, 164.

 III. THE DECISION BELOW RESULTS IN AN UNWARRANTED INTRUSION UPON AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING AT ITS VERY OUTSET

   Although the court of appeals couched its decision in terms of
"notice" (Pet. App. 12a), the pleading requirement created by the
court goes far beyond any generally recognized concept of notice.  By
mandating that the Commission disclose the evidence underlying a
Section 706(b) charge, the court has imposed a significant limitation
on the Commission's administrative discretion.  Under the decision
below, the federal district courts -- not the EEOC -- would become the
final arbiters of whether the information in the Commission's
possession justifies the issuance of a charge and the commencement of
an administrative investigation.  Respondents to Section 706(b)
charges would reflexively challenge the Commission to demonstrate the
"facts" supporting a proposed investigation of their employment
practices and, like the respondent here, would request depositions of
commissioners and other EEOC staff members to inquire into the
"factual basis" and "validity" of pending discrimination charges.
See, e.g., Resp. Br. In Opp. 5, 9, 19.  The end result would be that
the investigator would become the investigated, and the orderly
processing of discrimination claims under Title VII would grind to a
halt.  /31/

   The court of appeals' interruption of the Commission's
investigation into respondent's employment practices should not be
countenanced.  The court below has stymied an administrative
investigation because of the purported insufficiency of an
administrative charge.  That result is clearly contrary to the Court's
emphatic holding in FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980)
("Socal"), that federal courts may not intrude upon an administrative
proceeding at its very outset.

   In Socal, the Court held that the issuance of an administrative
complaint by the Federal Trade Commission does not constitute final
agency action reviewable under 5 U.S.C. 704.  The statute at issue in
Socal permitted issuance of an administrative complaint if the FTC had
"reason to believe" that a violation of the law had occurred (449 U.S.
at 234).  The respondent in that case asserted, as did the respondent
here (J.A. 157), that the FTC's complaint was invalid because the
agency did not have enough information to have "reason to believe"
that the law had been violated (449 U.S. at 235, 237).  The Court,
however, concluded that, unlike the promulgation of administrative
regulations, the issuance of an administrative complaint is not a
final agency action subject to judicial review because a complaint
merely represents "a threshold determination that further inquiry is
warranted" (id. at 241).  Review at the charging stage of an
administrative proceeding, the Court stated, results in "interference
with the proper functioning of the agency," "denies the agency an
opportunity to correct its own mistakes" and "results in inefficient
and perhaps unnecessary piecemeal review" (id. at 242).

   Under the principles enunciated in Socal, Commissioner Norton's
decision to initiate the administrative process in this case was well
within her lawful discretion.  Congress has charged the Commission
with the responsibility to make the initial determination of whether
unlawful employment practices exist (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b);
Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC, supra, 438 F.2d at 35;
EEOC v. South Carolina National Bank, 562 F.2d 329, 331-332 (4th Cir.
1977)), and federal courts should not probe the "factual basis" of
Commission charges any more than they should second guess whether the
FTC has properly issued an administrative complaint.  See generally
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946);
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).

   Like the administrative complaint at issue in Socal, Commissioner
Norton's charge in this case "is not a definitive statement of
position" (449 U.S. at 241);  the charge has not dispositive effect on
the rights, privileges, duties or liabilities of respondent.  /32/ A
commissioner's charge has no "determinate consequences" (ITT v. Local
134, IBEW, 419 U.S. 428, 443 (1975)), and is therefore not subject to
routine judicial oversight, precisely because it is merely a
preliminary step that signals the commencement of an agency
investigation.  /33/ Review at the charging stage of an administrative
proceeding, moreover, is particularly disruptive.  As the facts of
this case vividly demonstrate, judicial inquiries into the factual
basis for an administrative charge interfere with the "proper
functioning of the agency" and create a substantial "burden for the
courts" (Socal, supra, 449 U.S. at 242).  Judicial review at this
point, furthermore, does not advance the ultimate aim of Title VII but
rather "delay(s) resolution of the ultimate question whether the Act
was violated" (ibid.).  Such delay -- occasionaed by judicially
imposed requirements regarding the content of commissioners' charges
-- is particularly unfortunate here, inasmuch as Section 706(b)
expressly commits the form and content of all charges to the informed
judgment of the Commission.  42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).

   While the above considerations are by themselves sufficient to
preclude judicial intervention at the pleading stage of administrative
proceedings, there is yet another fundamental concern behind the
Court's rejection in Socal of the position successfully advanced by
the respondent below.  Arguments going to the sufficiency of an
agency's pleadings are hardly unique.  "(E)very respondent to a
Commission complain could make the claim that (Shell) ha(s) made.
Judicial review of the averments in the Commission's complaint should
not be a means of turning prosecutor into defendant before
adjudication concludes" (Socal, supra, 449 U.S. at 242-243).  Were the
rule otherwise, numerous administrative, /34/ civil /35/ and criminal
/36/ proceedings would be delayed while the courts went behind
facially valid complaints to determine whether the charging authority
actually possessed a sufficient factual basis to initiate a
proceeding.  Such review could soon bring the regulatory and judicial
functions of the government to a complete standstill.  /37/

   The intensely practical considerations justifying the conclusion of
the Court in Socal are amply illustrated by the course of events in
this case, and mandate reversal of the court of appeals.  By relying
on its own "bottom line statistics" (J.A. 93) and claiming that the
"statistical data now in the Commission's possession (do not) provide
a basis for finding reasonable cause" (id. at 157), respondent has
nullified for more than three years the Commission's investigation
into the merits of Commissioner Norton's charge.  Based on its
assertion that the Commission has not yet established the necessary
facts to bring a civil enforcement action, respondent has prevented
the Commission from determining whether there are indeed reasonable
grounds for considering such a course of action.  These arguments go
far beyond Section 706(b)'s requirement that the Commission provide
respondents with notice of pending administrative charges;  these
arguments unavoidably trench on substantive concerns.  A subpoena
enforcement proceeding, however, should not become a full fledged
trial on the merits of an administrative charge.  /38/

   The decision below would supply every respondent to a
commissioner's charge with immediate access to judicial review on the
ground that the Commission has not provided a sufficient "factual
basis" for the charge.  Should the Commission be required to defend
such actions in federal court as a matter of course, as well as submit
to the depositions, interrogatories and other discovery sought by
respondent (Resp. Br. In Opp. 5, 9. 19), the "integrated, multistep
enforcement procedure" (Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, supra,
432 U.St. at 359) designed by Congress in Title VII would simply break
down.  /39/ The decision below erroneously and all too readily
"enable(s) those subject to administrative authority unduly to delay
investigations into their affairs." B. Schwartz, Administrative Law
Section 45, at 115 (1976).

   Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not impose strict,
technical pleading requirements upon complainants, whether they be
private parties or the commissioners of the EEOC.  A charge under
Section 706(b) "is merely the first step in the administrative
process, and it would defeat the Congressional scheme to impose
detailed fact pleading burdens on the EEOC before it has had an
opportunity to investigate the basis for the charge." EEOC v. Dean
Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338.

                              CONCLUSION

   The decision of the court of appeals should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

      Deputy Solicitor General

   RICHARD G. WILKINS

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   DAVID L. SLATE

      General Counsel

   PHILIP B. SKLOVER

      Associate General Counsel

   VELLA M. FINK

      Assistant General Counsel

   KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL

      Attorney Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

   MAY 1983

   /1/ Although Section 706(b) expressly leaves the form and content
of administrative charges to the informed discretion of the Commission
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)), some courts, including the court below, have
stated that it "is not entirely clear" (Pet. App. 6a n.3) whether the
"'date, place and circumstances' should be in the charge itself * * *
or in the notice of the charge." EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., 643 F.2d
1334, 1337 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980).  The current Commission practice is to
provide respondents with a copy of the administrative charge in
satisfaction of Section 706(b)'s notice requirements.  29 C.F.R.
1601.14.

   /2/ Should informal conciliation efforts fail, the Commission is
empowered to bring a civil action against any respondent "not a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision" (Section
706(f), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)).  Cases involving governmental agencies
or other political subdivisions are "refer(red) * * * to the Attorney
General who may bring a civil action against such respondent" (ibid.).

   /3/ "Pattern or practice" charges under Section 707(e), 42 U.S.C.
2000e-6(e), may be filed by a member of the Commission and are
processed in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section 706.

   /4/ Relevant factors under the systemic guidelines include:
whether an employer "continue(s) in effect policies and practices
which result in low utilization of available minorities and/or women;"
whether an employer hires "a substantially smaller proportion of
minorities and/or women" in its higher paid than its lower paid job
categories;  whether an employer maintains recruitment, hiring,
assignment, promotion, discharge or other policies not justified by
business necessity "that have an adverse impact on minorities and/or
women;" whether an employer utilizes restrictive employment practices
that "are likely to be used as models for other employers;" and
whether an employer provides available minorities and women with fair
access to employment if the employer has "substantial numbers of
employment opportunities" (Pet. App. 40a-41a).

   /5/ EEO-1 reports detail the statistical composition of an
employer's workforce by job category, race and sex (see Pet. Reply Br.
4-6).

   /6/ The District Director rejected arguments, inter alia, that the
charge was filed without reasonable cause (J.A. 146), did not provide
notice (id. at 146-147), was beyond the Commission's authority (id. at
147), sought irrelevant information (ibid.) and was overly burdensome
(id. at 147).  The Director, however, did modify the definition of
"test" contained in the subpoena to eliminate any ambiguity (id. at
150).

   /7/ Respondent renewed a number of other objections to enforcement
of the subpoena, contending, inter alia, that the subpoena contravened
the terms of the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.,
the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1905, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See Pet. App. 17a-25a.  The district
court (ibid.) and the court of appeals (id. at 9a, 13a) rejected these
claims.

   /8/ The court noted that the "place" requirement of Section 706(b)'
snotice provisions are not in dispute -- the charge clearly identified
the Wood River Refinery as the site of the alleged discrimination
(Pet. App. 7a n.4).

   /9/ The original version of Section 706 provided in pertinent part
(Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259):

         (a) Whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person
      claiming to be aggrieved, or a written charge has been filed by
      a member of the Commission where he has reasonable cause to
      believe a violation of this title has occurred (and such charge
      sets forth the facts upon which it is based) that an employer *
      * * has engaged in an unlawful employment practice * * * the
      Commission shall furnish such employer * * * with a copy of such
      charge and shall make an investigation of such charge, provided
      that such charge shall not be made public by the Commission.

   Although the original version of Section 706 provided that a
respondent would receive a copy of any charge filed by the Commission,
the statute did not require that the charge be served within any
particular time period.

   /10/ The Gustin-Bacon court noted that a "'requirement that facts
be pleaded is illusory and unsound;  and results in a battle over the
form of pleadings that does not advance the action to an adjudication
of the merits'" (426 F.2d 542, quoting 2A Moore's Federal Practice
Paragraph 8.12 at 1692.

   /11/ The Graniteville court recognized that if Section 706 required
specific factual pleading, "charges initiating EEOC investigations
would be held to a significantly higher standard than complaints filed
in federal court by the Attorney General in Title VII civil actions"
(438 F.2d at 39).  Such a result, the court concluded, was "too great
an anomaly to be attributed to Congress" (ibid.).

   /12/ See, e.g., Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055,
1058 (10th Cir. 1971) (charge alleges that "(r)espondent
discriminatorily fails and/or refuses to recruit and/or hire Negroes,
Indians and Spanish-Surnamed Americans in the same manner it recruits
and/or hires Anglos");  General Employment Enterprises, Inc. v. EEOC,
supra, 440 F.2d at 783 (commissioner's charge alleges that employer
violates Title VII by "discriminatorily failing or refusing to hire
Negroes and Jewish people");  Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. EEOC,
supra, 428 F.2d at 800 (commissioner's charge alleges that employer
"has engaged in the following unlawful employment practices:  1.
Maintenance of racially restricted job classifications.  2.
Discriminatory use of tests, restricting Negro employees to lower
paying jobs.  3. Denial to Negro employees of opportunity to
participate in apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs");  New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown, supra, 507 F.2d at 163-164
(charge quotes statistics to support allegation that "(r)espondent
employer discriminatorily refuses or fails to recruit and hire
Negroes, Spanish Surnamed Americans, Jews and females in the same
manner it recruits and hires Caucasians,' but court explicitly notes
that charge would be sufficient "even without the statistical
information which this charge contains");  Graniteville Co. (Sibley
Division) v. EEOC, supra, 438 F.2d at 34 n.1 (charge alleges that
"Negroes are hired to the traditional Negro jobs and regardless of
length of service, Negroes are not promoted or considered for better
jobs as are the white employees").  These decisions implicitly
recognize that a commissioner may, within his or her discretion,
include underlying factual details in a charge.  The charge, however,
is valid so long as notice is given of the alleged unlawful practices.
 See, e.g., New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown, supra, 507 F.2d
at 163-164.

   /13/ Respondent's contention (Resp. Br. In Opp. 16-19) that the
Commission lacks authority to investigate its employment practices
therefore proceeds on a particularly weak foundation.  See EEOC v.
Dean Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1338.  In any event, as we have
noted earlier, this issue is not properly before the Court.  Pet.
Reply Br. 9.

   /14/ Congress' undoubted awareness of the preamendment decisions
rejecting the interpretation of Section 706 adopted by the court below
underscores its failure to impose a factual pleading requirement upon
Section 706(b).  See e.g., Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,
supra, 439 F.2d at 241-243.  Congress' failure to act in the light of
these decisions, while making other changes to the Act, indicates
congressional approval.  EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S.
590, 600 (1981);  Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8
(1975);  Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-581 (1978).  See also
Section by Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166 (1972)
("In any area where the new law does not address itself, or in any
areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was
assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts would
continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII").

   /15/ The court sustained the district court's refusal to enforce
the Commission's investigatory subpoena on the ground that the charge
did not disclose whether the alleged illegal practices "occurred in
the past, or at least, when they began in the past" (643 F.2d at
1338).  Following the Dean Witter decision, and as demonstrated by the
present case, the Commission has amended many outstanding "pattern or
practice" charges to include "a good faith estimate of the probable
time periods (involved)" (643 F.2d at 1338).  See infra, pages 26-31.

   /16/ The charge in Dean Witter alleged that the employer had
discriminated against Blacks, women, Spanish-surnamed Americans and
other minorities on the basis of race, sex, and national origin by
policies that included but were not limited to (643 F.2d at 1336 n.1):

         1. Refusing to recruit and hire Blacks, women,
      Spanish-surnamed Americans and other minorities in the same
      manner and on the same basis in which white males have been
      recruited and hired;

         2. Discriminatorily assigning and limiting Blacks, women,
      Spanish-surnamed Americans and other minorities to positions
      with lower pay and less opportunity for advancement than those
      to which white males have been assigned and hired;

         3. Refusing to provide training and promotion opportunities
      for Blacks, women, Spanish-surnamed Americans and other
      minorities in the same manner in which such opportunities have
      been provided white males;

         4. Disciminatorily subjecting Blacks, women, Spanish-surnamed
      Americans and other minorities to different terms and conditions
      of employment, including leave, benefits, and standards for
      disciplinary actions and terminations, than those which are
      applied in the case of white males.

   /17/ K-Mart obtained the discovery order during the course of a
subpoena enforcement proceeding opposed by the company on grounds
virtually identical to those advanced by the respondent here.  694
F.2d at 1058-1059.

   /18/ In EEOC v. Dean Witter Co., supra, the Ninth Circuit refused
to enforce a Commission subpoena because the Commissioner's charge
upon which it was based did not disclose whether the alleged unlawful
employment practices "occurred in the past, or at least, when they
began in the past" (643 F.2d at 1338).  The court, however, did not
insist upon a "factual basis" for the beginning date of the conduct
described in a Section 706(b) charge.  The court emphasized that it
was not imposing "strict technical pleading requirement(s)" upon the
Commission or other complainants (643 F.2d at 1338).  Because the
"filing of a charge is the first step in the EEOC administrative
process, and understandably, the EEOC may be uncertain about the
temporal scope of the challenged practices," the court concluded that
"a good faith estimate of the probable time periods should be
sufficient" to meet the requirements of Section 706(b) (643 F.2d at
1338).  That result should especially obtain, the court noted, "where
a pattern or practice charge is involved" (ibid.).

   /19/ It was precisely because of these difficulties that the
Commission, prior to the decision in Dean Witter, considered that its
notice obligations under Section 706(b) were fulfilled by providing in
a pattern or practice charge that the alleged misconduct was of a
continuing nature.  Following Dean Witter, however, the Commission has
sought to amend outstanding pattern or practice charges to specify a
beginning date for the charged discrimination.  But see EEOC v. Bay
Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 1981) (questioning
whether Section 706(b) requires a charge to specify a beginning date,
apart from the date of the charge itself).

   /20/ Respondent appears to have assumed that the Commission has a
policy of amending all outstanding charges to include July 2, 1965, as
the beginning date for the charged discrimination because that date
was utilized in the charge at issue in EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra.
That assumption is completely unfounded.  Of 139 outstanding systemic
commissioners charges being handled through the Office of Systemic
Programs, only 19 have been amended to reflect the July 2, 1965, date
as the beginning of the charged discrimination.  This practice refutes
any suggestion that July 2, 1965, is inserted as "boilerplate" into
"every case" (Resp. Br. In Opp. 12 n.7) without reference to the
special circumstances of each charge.

   /21/ This case is unusual, in that respondent has actually supplied
the Commission with statistical data extending to the effective date
of Title VII;  its first EEO-1 report was filed with the Commission in
April 1966.  That first EEO-1 report contains a description of
respondent's total employment statistics for the Wood River Refinery
as of February 25, 1965.

   /22/ The Sixth Circuit's suggestion in EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra,
that the Commission's use of the effective date of Title VII does not
satisfy the date requirement of Section 706(b) may well have been
influenced by the district court's finding that the Commission "had a
policy of inserting pro-forma the effective date of Title VII" into
commissioners' charges (694 F.2d at 1063).  As shown above (note 20),
however, the Commission has no such policy.

   /23/ The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 151 et
seq., which served as the remedial model for Title VII, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 366 (1977),
has often guided courts in construing Title VII.  Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n.11 (1982);  McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-804 (1973);  Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 768-769 (1976).

   /24/ Indeed, the Commission may properly investigate employment
practices even before the effective date of Title VII.  Past
discrimination, even if not legally cognizable, may establish a
pattern or practice of discrimination or show the motive or intent
behind present practices.  United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553, 558 (1977).

   /25/ There is no substance to the assertion that July 2, 1965, is
insufficient as a matter of law to provide an employer with notice of
the beginning date of its discriminatory practices (Resp. Br. In Opp.
12-15).  If acccepted, the argument would mean that the worst offender
under Title VII -- the employer that had never acted to integrate its
segregated workforce after the passage of Title VII -- could not be
accurately charged under the Act simply because of the extent of its
discrimination.

   /26/ See also EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d at 1065 (Title
VII "restrict(s) the district court's inquiry in subpoena enforcement
actions to whether the information sought is material and relevant");
Graniteville Co. (Sibley Division) v. EEOC, supra, 438 F.2d at 36)
(the standard to be applied in subpoena enforcement proceedings "is
one of relevancy and materiality, not one of reasonable cause to
believe that charge is true").

   /27/ Neither the charge itself, nor the notice of the charge
provided by Section 706(b), were designed by Congress to "enable( )
the parties to determine whether conciliation is an appropriate
remedy" (Pet. App. 12a).  That determination must await the conclusion
of the Commission's investigation and even then is contingent upon a
finding of reasonable cause.  42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).  As this Court
stated in EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 601 (1981)
(footnote omitted), disclosure by the Commission to the charging party
of information developed in the course of the Commission's
investigationis authorized precisely because such "disclosure enhances
the Commission's ability to carry out its statutory responsibility to
resolve charges through information conciliation and negotiation:  A
party is far more likely to settle when he has enough information to
be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent's case
as well as his own."

   /28/ Traditional subpoena enforcement procedures are fully
sufficient to protect against overly expansive administrative
inquiries (Pet. App. 11a).  In examining whether "the information
sought (by a Commission subpoena) is material and relevant" (EEOC v.
K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d at 1065), a district court may properly
consider whether a subpoena is indefinite or unduly burdensome.  EEOC
v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., supra, 668 F.2d at 308-310.  Cf. United
States v. Powell, supra, 379 U.S. at 58.

   /29/ Published Commission guidelines put respondents on notice that
Commissioners' charges are based on an analysis of "EEO reporting
data" (Pet. App. 41a-42a).  Contrary to the conclusion of the court of
appeals, therefore, there is little practical need to provide
respondents with "notice" of the statistical data upon which
commissioners' charges are based (Pet. App. 11a n.5);  respondents
already have such reporting data in their possession.  The record in
this case demonstrates that the respondent was well aware that its
EEO-1 reports supplied the basis for Commissioner Norton's charge.
See J.A. 92, 157.

   /30/ The Commission has provided the Court with the statistical
breakdown by job classification of the Wood River Refinery for the
years 1970-1978 (Pet. Reply Br. 4-5).  The Commission supplied these
data in response to respondent's reliance on misleading aggregate
employment statistics (Resp. Br. In Opp. 14, 17 n.12) and to counter
respondent's suggestion that the systemic enforcement program is
somehow irregular in that it does not rely on "specific evidence of
discrimination" (id. at 2;  see also id. at 11).

   Analyzed by job category, the statistical data provided by
respondent's EEO-1 reports for the nine years preceding the charge
show the complete exclusion of women from its managerial staff of over
230, despite an availability in 1978 of 16.9% women in the St. Louis
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) (Pet. Reply Br. 4-5).
The data also show gross underrepresentation of women in every other
job category except office/clerical.  In 1978, for example, respondent
employed one woman in its force of 763 craft workers despite 7.8%
female SMSA availability in this job category;  one women in 22
service workers (56.7% female availability);  one woman in 84
technical workers (39.6% availability) and 23 women in 422 operative
and laborer workers (24.3% availability).

   Blacks fared little better.  In 1978, one black was employed in a
managerial staff of 238, contrasted with 4.3% black SMSA availability
in that year.  The EEO-1 reports disclose that in 1978 respondent
employed 19 blacks in its force of 763 craft workers compared with
8.2% black SMSA availability;  one black in 22 service workers (30.1%
black SMSA availability);  and 3 blacks in 84 technical workers (13.2%
SMSA availability).  Blacks were also underrepresented as
office/clerical workers, constituting 9 of 96 in 1978 at their highest
level in 9 years (12.1% SMSA black availability), and, except for 1976
and 1978, were similarly underrepresented in the professional worker
category (Pet. Reply Br. 4-5).

   The Commission did not introduce these data below because of its
position, to which it adheres, that it is not required to provide such
information in order to obtain enforcement of a subpoena issued
pursuant to a commissioner's charge.  A subpoena enforcement action
should not become, as this one has, a "mini-trial" on the merits of
the administrative charge, with the respondent attacking the merits of
the charge (Resp. Br. In Opp. 3-5) and requesting discovery to
ascertain the "validity" of the charge (id. at 19;  see also id. at 5,
9, 17 n.12).

   /31/ The decision in this case will affect well over 100 pending
commissioners' charges.  The great majority of these charges,
moreover, have been filed by commissioners who have served their terms
and left the government.  The legal and administrative difficulties
created by the court of appeals' decision are therefore compounded by
the fact that it is unclear whether a sitting commissioner can amend a
charge to state what factual basis a former commissioner might have
considered when issuing the charge.

   /32/ Indeed, respondent admits that Commissioner Norton's charge
does not require the company to do or refrain from doing anything:
"The charge does not frame the issues in litigation, nor does it
require an answer from the respondent" (Resp. Br. In Opp. 27).

   /33/ Even a finding of reasonable cause, made after an
administrative investigation, is not final agency action reviewable in
federal district court.  A determination of reasonable cause merely
requires the Commission to attempt to resolve the dispute by informal
methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion -- it does not fix
any obligation or impose any duty on a respondent.  Georator Corp. v.
EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 766 (4th Cir. 1979);  Francis-Sobel v. University
of Maine, 597 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
(1979).

   /34/ A great number of administrative agencies are authorized to
act upon an administrative determination of "reasonable cause" or
"reason to believe" a statutory violation exists.  See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 437g(a)(2) (Federal Election Commission);  7 U.S.C. 9
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission);  7 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 87f-2(b)
and (c) (Federal Grain Inspection Service);  7 U.S.C. 193, 213, 228a,
292, 1599(a), 2046 (Secretary of Agriculture);  12 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1730a(h)(5)(A) (Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.);  12 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1844(e)(1) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System);  15 U.S.C. 21(b) (Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal
Communications Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Reserve
Board and Federal Trade Commission);  15 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 45,
57b-1(c) (1), 68e(b), 68h, 69g(b), 69i, 70f, 70i (Federal Trade
Commission);  15 U.S.C. 77j(b), 80a-26(d) (Securities and Exchange
Commission);  15 U.S.C. 1195(a) (Consumer Product Safety Commission);
15 U.S.C. 522 (Secretary of Commerce);  15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1312(a)
(Attorney General);  20 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1234(a) (Commissioner of
Education);  29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 816(b) (Secretary of Labor);  30
U.S.C. 185(r)(5) (Secretary of the Interior);  33 U.S.C. 1908(e), 46
U.S.C. 86h(a) (Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is
operating);  38 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1673(d) (Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs);  42 U.S.C. 3142(b)(1) (Secretary of Commerce);  42 U.S.C. (&
Supp. IV) 2000a-5, 3613, 3766(c)(3), 3789(d)(c)(3) (Attorney General);
 49 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 10934(c)(1) (Interstate Commerce Commission);  7
U.S.C. 2305(b) (Secretary of Agriculture);  29 U.S.C. 160(1) (National
Labor Relations Board);  46 U.S.C. 88f (Collector of customs or Coast
Guard District Commander).  Cf. 2 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 501(e) (House
Committee on Congressional Mailing Standards) ("substantial reason to
believe");  2 U.S.C. 502(b) (Senate Select Committee on Standards and
Conduct of the Senate) (same);  8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (27) (consular
officer or Attorney General) ("knows or has reason to believe");  15
U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 77 (President) ("reasonable ground to believe");
15 U.S.C. 77t(b), 78u(d) (Securities and Exchange Commission)
("appears to the Commission").  See generally 12 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1464(d)(2)(A) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board) ("reasonable cause to
believe" future violation is about to take place);  12 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) 1730(e)(1) (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) (same);
 12 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1786(e)(1) (National Credit Union Administration
Board) (same);  12 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1818(b)(1) (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation) (same);  46 U.S.C. 834 (Secretary of the
Treasury) ("satisfactory reason to believe");  49 U.S.C. 41(3)
(Attorney General) ("reasonable grounds to believe").

   /35/ See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (signing of pleading by attorney
certifying that there is "good ground to support it").

   /36/ See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974)
(an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the
ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or
incompetent evidence);  Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363
(1956) (same).

   /37/ The Ninth Circuit refused to impose a factual pleading
requirement on the Commission precisely because of the litigation such
a rule would stimulate.  The court noted that requiring the Commission
to supply the basis for a charge "would inevitably encourage employers
to challenge subpoenas on the ground that the EEOC could have supplied
more information than was actually contained in the charge" (EEOC v.
Dean Witter Co., supra, 643 F.2d at 1339).

   /38/ The record in this case demonstrates the fragile nature of the
"notice" veil with which respondent has attempted to cloak its
arguments.  Although respondent argues that concepts of "fair notice"
(Resp. Br. In Opp. 15) require the Commission to disclose the factual
basis for a Section 706(b) charge, the record in this case discloses
that, from the outset of this litigation, respondent has been
repeatedly informed that Commissioner Norton's charge was formulated
in accordance with "the published standards for the selection of
systemic respondents" (J.A. 94).  These standards provide that a
systemic charge is based on "an analysis of EEO reporting data" (Pet.
App. 41a-42a), and respondent has acknowledged that "much" of the
statistical data upon which the present charge is based was "provided
by the respondent" (J.A. 157;  see also id. at 92).  Therefore,
respondent's assertion that it lacks "notice" of the factual basis for
the present charge, while artful, is hardly persuasive.

   /39/ Cf. EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., supra, 694 F.2d at 1067 (judicially
ordered discovery into the factual basis of a Section 706(b) charge is
"inconsistent with the enforcement scheme of Title VII").