PUBLIC HEARING                )
EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARD  )
EMERGENCY MINE EVACUATIONS    )


































Pages:   1 through 136

Place:   Lakewood, Colorado

Date:    April 24, 2006

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
	MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION



PUBLIC HEARING                )
EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARD  )
EMERGENCY MINE EVACUATIONS    )






                                9:00 a.m.

                                Monday,
                                April 24, 2006

                                Morrison Room
                                Sheraton Denver West Hotel
                                Lakewood, Colorado

I N D E X

SPEAKER / AFFILIATION                           PAGE
 
Melissa Young	17

Linc Derick	22

Rebecca Boam	53

Ralph Sanich 	66

Dale Byram		83

Tain Curtis 	104

Marion Loomis	115

Robert Butero	118

David Arnolds 	127

Al Quist 		129







	P R O C E E D I N G S
                                       (9:00 a.m.)
	MS. SILVEY:  Good morning.  My name is Patricia W. Silvey.  I am the acting Director of the Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances for the Mine Safety and Health Administration.  I will be the moderator of this public hearing today, on EMS, Emergency Temporary Standard, or ETS for emergency mine evacuations.
	And at this time, I would like to ask you if you would please, to join me in a moment of silence in honor of the miners who lost their lives at the Sago Mine accident, and the Alma No. 1 Mine, and the miners who were injured in those two accidents, and all the miners who have either lost their lives this year, or have been injured thus far this year.  And in honor of all the miners who have lost their lives and/or been injured working in the mines from the beginning.  So if you would join me in a moment of silence.
	(Pause.)
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you.  On behalf of the Secretary of Labor, Elaine Chao, David G. Dye, acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for MSHA, I want to welcome all of you here today.  Also attending this public hearing with me are several individuals from MSHA who are on the committee drafting this ETS.
	And they are, to my left, Eric Sherer.  And Eric is from Coal Mine Safety and Health, and he is the chair of this rulemaking committee.  Tom Macleod from Education Policy Development, and working on all the training aspects of the rule.  And Ken Sproul from our Office of Technical Support, who is working on technical aspects of the rule.
	To my right, Jeffery Kravitz.  And he is from the Office of Technical Support.  And many of you know, Jeff is well renowned in the mining industry for his expertise in self-rescues and other emergency issues.  Bob Snashall, who is our lawyer on the Committee.  And Pham, who is the economist from my office, and Debra James, who is the regulatory specialist from my office.
	So they have been working diligently to draft the ETS and will be working along with other people from MSHA in Arlington, drafting the final rule.  This is the first of four hearings on the emergency standard.
	The second hearing will be held on Wednesday in Lexington, Kentucky, April 26.  And the third hearing will be held in Arlington, on Friday 28, April.  The fourth will be held in Charleston, West Virginia on 9 May.
	In the back of the room, we have copies of the Emergency Temporary Standard, the Federal Register notice which rescheduled the Charleston hearing for May 9.  And Volumes I and II of the Compliance Guide that we have issued, addressing questions that have been raised thus far in the rulemaking.
	The purpose of these hearings is to receive information from the public that will help us evaluate the requirements contained in the emergency standard and produce a final rule that promotes safe and effective evacuation of miners during mine emergencies.  We also will use data and information gained from these hearings to help us craft a rule that responds to the needs and concerns of the mining public, so that the provisions of the emergency standard can be implemented in the most effective and appropriate manner.  	We published the ETS in response to the grave danger to which miners are exposed during underground coal mine accidents.  The ETS includes requirements in four areas, as you know.  The first area is immediate accident notification.  That provision is applicable to all underground and surface mines, both coal and metal and non-metal.
	The three other areas covered by the rule, self-contained self-rescuer storage and use, evacuation training, and installation and maintenance of lifelines apply to underground coal mines only.  During these four hearings, we will solicit public input on all of these issues.  The hearings will give manufacturers, mine operators, miners and their representatives, and other interested parties an opportunity to present their views on these issues.
	MSHA issued this emergency standard on March 9, 2006 in response to the tragic accidents at the Sago Mine on January 2, and the Aracoma Alma No. 1 Mine accident on January 19, 2006.  MSHA determined that better notification, safety and training standards are necessary to further protect miners when a mine accident takes place.
	The ETS was issued in accordance with Section 101(b) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, which we call the Mine Act.  Under Section 101(b), the emergency standard is effective until superseded by a mandatory standard, which is to be published in the Federal Register no later than nine months after publication of the emergency standard.
	The emergency standard.  Under the Mine Act requirements, the emergency standard serves as the proposed rule.  As stated earlier, we will use the information provided by you to help us decide how best to craft the final rule.  In addition to the provisions of the emergency standard, we are also considering the following issues, and seek further information from you on these issues.
	As you address these issues, either in your comments to us today, or in comments sent to us in Arlington?  Please be as specific as possible with respect to impact on miner safety and heath, mining conditions, and feasibility of implementation.  Here are the additional issues.
	1.  Should miners have the ability to tether themselves together during escape through smoke-filled environments?  If so, what length of tether between miners should be required?
	Should a miner's tether be capable of clipping easily to another's, so that any number of miners could be attached together to work their way out of a mine?  How should the tether be attached to the miners' belts, or should there be a place other than the miners' belt to attach the tether to the miners.
	Should the tether be constructed of durable and/or reflective material?  Where should the tether be stored on the section, or could it be a part of the miner's belt?  Should it be stored with additional SCSRs in a readily accessible and identifiable location, or in a separate location?
	2.  Should a training record under new paragraph 75.1502(c)(3) not only include a requirement that mine operators certify all miners who participated in each emergency evacuation drill, but also additional information such as a checklist.  The checklist could be used to itemize the successful completion of each step of the training, as outlined in the approved program of instruction.
	3.  When should a miner don an SCSR during an evacuation?  Currently, miners are told to don an SCSR when they believe they are in danger, or when smoke is encountered.  This may leave miners vulnerable to irrespirable air, such as air that contains lethal carbon monoxide levels or low oxygen.  MSHA is considering requiring that at least one miner in a group of miners, and an individual miner when working along have at least one multi-gas or air quality detector with them.
	4.  In the preamble to the ETS, we discuss a method to locate additional SCSRs, based on a joint MSHA-NIOSH heart rate study.  MSHA solicits comments on the heart rate method; whether this is the most appropriate method to determine location, whether it is realistic, and any other comments you may have on the heart rate method.  What other reliable alternatives exist for determining where to position additional SCSRs in the mine.
	5.  MSHA is considering a requirement that additional SCSRs under new paragraph 75.1714-4(c) be stored in all escapeways at intervals of 5,000 feet for mines where the escapeway height is above 48 inches, and 2,500 feet for all other mines.  Would such a specification standard be more appropriate than the performance oriented heart rate method provided in this ETS?
	Regarding such a specification oriented standard, what would be more appropriate?  5,000 and 2,500 foot intervals for heights greater than 48 inches, and heights 48 inches or less, respectively, or some other specific interval?
	6.  Should all underground coal miners be required to us SCSRs exclusively?  If so, is it appropriate to prohibit the use of filter self-rescuers in all underground coal mines.
	In addition, MSHA is considering adding a new provision to 75.1714-4 that would allow the use of new SCSR technology to comply with the standard, such as SCSRs that have the ability to provide up to two more hours of oxygen per unit.  Is such a provision appropriate?
	7.  Manufacturers sometimes lose track of which mines purchases their SCSRs.  When a mine shuts down, SCSRs are often sold to another mine.  In the past, problems have been discovered with all brands of SCSRs.
	MSHA is considering requiring that the following information be reported for each SCSR at each mine.  The total number of SCSRs, the manufacturer, the model, the date of manufacture, and the serial number.  Is it appropriate to require mine operators to report to the relevant MSHA district manager the total number of SCSRs in use at each underground mine?  If so, should any additional information be reported?
	8.  Because in the past, MSHA did not always learn of problems associated with SCSRs, MSHA is considering a requirement that mine operators promptly report to the MSHA district manager in writing all incidents where an SCSR required by 75.1714 is used for an accident or emergency, and all instances where such SCSR devices do not function properly.
	In addition, when any SCSR device does not function properly, the mine operator would be required to retain the device for at least 90 days for an MSHA investigation.  These requirements would help assure that MSHA is notified of problems in a timely manner, so that MSHA can provide timely notice to both manufacturers and users to assure that the affected SCSRs are available for testing and evaluation.  Should MSHA include such requirements in the final rule?
	9.  SCSR storage locations in escapeways may not be readily accessible to all persons underground, such as pumpers, out by crews and examiners.  Are there other ways to provide readily accessible SCSR coverage for these miners?  Are there other storage locations that would be readily accessible to such persons?
	10.  MSHA sought comments on the appropriateness of requiring that signs to help locate SCSR storage areas be made of reflective material.  MSHA also asks whether there are alternative methods available for making SCSR storage locations easy to locate when conditions in the mine might obscure storage location.  What methods exist that would made SCSR storage locations readily visible.
	11.  Under new paragraph 75.1714-4(c), operators are required to have separate SCSR storage in search escapeway.  Where a mine has parallel and adjacent escapeways, under what circumstances would it be appropriate to allow a hardened room, or a "safe haven" to serve both escapeways with one set of SCSRs?
	A hardened room is a room constructed with permanent seal techniques, submarine type doors opening to both escapeways, and positive ventilation from the surface through a borehole.  Is a safe have an acceptable alternative?  If so, what should be the minimum criterial for MSHA to accept a hardened room or safe haven?
	12.  Currently, cone systems on lifelines vary, some with the cones pointing toward the face, and others pointing away from the face.  Miners may become confused in an emergency as to the direction of escape.
	Should cones, or other directional indicators on lifelines be standardized?  Following a NIOSH recommendation, and for ease of movement, should the point end of the cone be toward the face?
	13)  Miners should be able to safely evacuate a mine without the use of mechanized transportation.  There may be unique escapeway conditions, including ladders, man doors, airlocks, and overcasts, where hands-on experience of these conditions is required in order to quickly and safely escape the mine.  It is reasonable to require that miners walk the escapeways at least under these unique escapeway conditions.
	Should all miners be required to walk the escapeway in its entirety rather than use mechanized transportation during the drills required by new paragraph 75.1502 (c)?  We are considering including a requirement in the part 48 training program for new miners that new miners travel, at least in part, both escapeways.  Would this training be appropriate, and should the training include walking part or all of the escapeways?
	14.  A more instructive emergency evacuation practice may be provided by using realistic drills.  For example, conducting a drill in smoke, or using a realistic mouthpiece that provides the user with the sensation of actually breathing through the SCSR, commonly referred to as expectations training, are more realistic than simulation training.  What other realistic emergency evacuation practices and scenarios would ensure that miners are better prepared to act quickly and safely in an emergency?
	We intend that scenarios required by the Approved Program of Instruction under paragraph 75.1502(a) be used to initiate the drill, and to conduct the mine emergency evacuation drills required under that paragraph.  For example, to initiate the drill, a section foreman may choose one of the mines approved explosion scenarios.
	The foreman would gather the miners on the section and state where the explosion occurred, any special circumstances of the event, and conditions requiring immediate donning of SCSRs.  The foreman and miners would then physically follow the best options for evacuation as they evacuate the mine.  When the miners travel to the place or into conditions that require immediate SCSR donning, the need to don the SCSR must be made clear, so that it is understood by all.
	15.  We expect that scenarios developed as part of the mine emergency and firefighting program of instruction under 75.1502(a) would be included as part of the emergency evacuation drills, under 75.1502(c), making the drills more realistic.  Should we further clarify this issue in the final rule?  Are there additional requirements that should be included in this training to make it more realistic, such as conducting SCSR donning in a smoke-filled environment?
	16.  We are considering putting all emergency evacuation drill requirements in 75.1502.  As you know, for example, the escapeway drill requirement under 75.383 pertaining to the frequency of drills, how far miners travel in the drills, and the number of miners involved in each drill.  I am sure you are familiar with those.  They would be incorporated in two requirements under 75.1502.
	Under 75.383(b)(1), each miner must participate in a practice escapeway drill at least once every 90 day, but is only required to travel to the area where the split of air ventilating the working section intersects a main air course, or 2,000 feet out by the section loading point, whichever distance is greater.  Under new 75.1502, during the emergency evacuation drills, the miners must travel to the surface, or to the exits at the bottom of the shaft or slope.
	Section 75.383(b)(2) and (b)(3) require that practice escapeway drills occur at least once every six weeks, but this only involves two miners and a supervisor.  Miners systematically rotate taking these drills, so that eventually all miners would have participated under that provision.  Under new 75.1502, emergency evacuation drills are required for all miners and at periods of time not to exceed 90 days.  We will have to reconcile these time differences.
	MSHA is requesting comments on incorporating all evacuation drill requirements in 75.1502.  We are also considering requiring section bosses to travel both escapeways in their entirety, prior to acting as a boss on any working section or at any location where mechanized mining equipment is being installed or removed.
	17.  And I believe this is the last issue, anyway, that I am going to read at this time.  We are also considering requiring that all mine fires be reported to MSHA, including fires shorter than 30 minutes duration.
	This would address all mine fire hazards, including situations where a number of short duration fires occur. Should the definition for accident in 50.2(h)(6) be revised to include all unplanned underground mine fires, or fires of a particular type or duration, or occurrences at particular locations in the mine?
	To date, well, at the time, I should say, when I left Arlington, we had received two comments on the emergency standard.  You can review the comments by going on our website at the following address, www.msha.gov, under the section entitled rules and regulations.
	We have also asked several questions on compliance with the ETS covering a range of issues.  These questions and answers and I spoke earlier of the compliance guide are included in the compliance guide, and are posted on our web page also.
	Finally, we have received questions as to whether the emergency evacuation training provision for metal and non-metal mines are affected by the ETS.  While the ETS amends part 48 by adding references to the requirements for emergency evacuation plans in existing 57.11053 for underground metal and non-metal mines, these references do not affect or change in any way existing training requirements for metal and non-metal miners and operators.
	And it is our intent not to change the existing part 48 emergency evacuation training provisions for metal and non-metal mines.  We will clarify this in the final rule.
	As many of you know, the format of this public hearing will be as follows: formal rules of evidence will not apply, and this hearing will be conducted in an informal manner.  Those of you notified MSHA in advance of your intent to speak, or have signed up today to speak will make your presentations first.  After all scheduled speakers have finished, others will be allowed to speak.
	We also have an attendance list, and I ask that if any of you have not signed it in the back of the room, would you please do so before you leave?  If you wish to present written statements or information to me today, you can do so.
	Please clearly identify your material.  I will identify the material, and it will be so identified in the record by the title that is submitted to me.  And you may also submit comments following the public hearing today.  The comments must be submitted to MSHA by close of the comment period which is May 30, 2006.  Comments may be submitted by any of the methods identified in the ETS.
	And this is important for you to know; that MSHA will post the transcripts of all of the public hearings on our website.  Each transcript will be posted there approximately one week after the completion of the hearing.  The transcript will include the full text of my opening statement, and the specific issues for which the Agency seeks additional comment.
	We will now begin.  And we will begin with persons who have requested to speak.  Please begin by clearly stating your name and organization for the reporter, to make certain we obtain an accurate record.  And how our first speaker is Melissa Young with Colorado Rock Products.
	MS. YOUNG:  Good morning.
	MS. SILVEY:  Good morning.
	MS. YOUNG:  Is this on?
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.
	MS. YOUNG:  Okay.  My name is Melissa Young, and I am the regulatory specialist for the Colorado Rock Products Association.
	On behalf of the Association, I would like to thank the Mine Safety and Health Administration, and the public for the opportunity to speak today about the Emergency Temporary Standard.  CRPA represents 34 producer members and 28 associate members throughout the state, who produce over 38 million tons of aggregates, crushed stone, sanding gravel and clay, which are used in various forms of construction for highways, sidewalks, residential and commercial buildings and water and sewage treatment plants.
	As stated before, on May 9, MSHA issued an emergency temporary standard, which included a requirement for immediate accident notification applicable to all underground and surface mines.  MSHA defined immediate notification as contacting MSHA at once, and without delay and within 15 minutes of an accident.
	This brings me to the concerns of our industry.  Requiring that MSHA be notified within 15 minutes of an emergency event is impractical, and may be dangerous.
	First, in the event of an emergency, mining personnel immediately are engaged in the rescue effort, excuse me, are engaged in the steps needed to save lives, and limit harmful effects, such as being focused on the rescue effort, securing the equipment and area, and letting the emergency responders in mine.  In questioning our members about the time it currently takes them to notify MSHA of an accident, the response was anywhere from 30 minutes to one hour after the accident has occurred.
	Second, what if there is only one cellular phone in the area, and that phone is used to contact 9-11?  The 9-11 operator keeps the caller on the phone until the emergency responders arrive.  The time that takes for the emergency responders to arrive could be longer than 15 minutes after the accident.
	Third, in some locations, the mine operator is the emergency responder, since it takes emergency personnel too long to get to the site.  In this case, the operator again would be focused on the rescue effort, and not in contacting MSHA within 15 minutes.
	Fourth, the Emergency Temporary Standard will adversely affect small mines, and mines that operate on the weekends.  Some operations are not fully staffed on the weekends, and just like small mines, if one or two people are injured in an accident, again, the other miners should be focused on the rescue effort, and not on contacting MSHA within the 15 minutes.
	Fifth, most mine operations have an emergency management action plan that denotes whose responsibility it is to contact MSHA in case of an accident.  In implementing the action plan, it may take longer than 15 minutes to follow the chain of command and get a hold of the person with the responsibility to contact MSHA.
	In conclusion, we believe that a reasonable notification period is necessary, but not one that has the potential to distract miners from life-saving activities.  To the heretofore mentioned concerns, the Colorado Rock Products Association respectfully requests that the 15-minute notification requirement of the Emergency Temporary Standard not be finalized.  Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you.  I would bring to your attention, as I am sure if you are the regulatory specialist you know, that the standard I was looking at it the standard does say within 15 minutes of having that you mentioned the issue of the cell phone, of having access to a telephone, or other means of communication.
	And I would also say that I would think that, and I mean, we have some of our MSHA people here today, that we would be reasonable under circumstances, depending on what circumstances are.  But one of the things that led us to do this was that not only in terms of and I understand clearly what you are saying.
	But not only in terms of the mine, and the mine in terms of guarding any necessary emergency resources needed to respond in this situation of an accident, but also in terms of MSHA, in terms of getting any necessary resources that it needs to help assist the mine.  So for those many reason that led us to come with this provision.  But you know, and as I stated to you, I think we probably would intend to be reasonable under the circumstances in terms of the requirement.
	MR. SNASHELL:  As an additional clarifying point Pat, the standard triggers when the operator has determined that an accident has occurred.  It is not 15 minutes from the occurrence of an accident, so much as it is 15 minutes from the time that the operator has determined that an accident has occurred, so the operator has a reasonable amount of time to investigate to determine whether there has been an accident.  Consonant with the intention of a standard that the action be done promptly and vigorously to make that determination.
	MS. YOUNG:  I just, two things I just would go in to about in the standard, where it does say it takes, you know, you are supposed to call MSHA as soon as like a phone is available.  And the consensus from my members was it just wasn't clear.  I mean, obviously a phone is available, if they are on the line with 911.
	But so, there was some confusion there.  Okay, a phone is available, but they are using it to call 911.  So that is just a concern that I wanted to bring.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Well, we appreciate that.  That is a valid concern.
	MS. YOUNG:  The other concern, right, about the you know, it wasn't clear to us that it basically is from when an operator determines the accident occurs.  It looks like in the preamble and everything, that it is from the moment that accident happens.  And so that is what the other big issue.  So that is what I wanted to talk about.  So, thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you very much.  And so if we can need to make any clarifying do any clarifying in the final rule, we would do that.
	MS. YOUNG:  Thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you.  Our next speaker is Linc Derick.  And Linc is with Twentymile Coal Company.
	MR. DERICK:  My name is R. Lincoln Derick, Technical Safety Manager for Twentymile Coal Company.  I appreciate the opportunity to present comments here today on behalf of Twentymile Coal Company.  I have been very active in the subject of mine emergency for over 30 years.
	The format of my comments starts with the specific MSHA request for comments, followed by comments specific to the emergency standard as published in the Federal Register.  Several additional comments that are outside the scope of these specific regulations but relate to the overall topic are also included, and designated as such.
	With the opening statement, I request that the record be extended for two more months, because there are way more requests for comments from MSHA than were ever in the Federal Register, in fact, probably twice as many as that I commented on.  So I think the record should be extended to be able to address those.
	MS. SILVEY:  Duly noted.
	MR. DERICK:  Okay.  The comments you have before you are in a format, going to the Federal Register, and then I used the every where MSHA requested comments.  And it is like I said, quite a few more requests came from the opening statement.
	But MSHA requested comments on whether miners should be required to walk the escapeway, rather than use mechanized equipment or transportation during the drill.  This could result in serious medical concerns.  Without actually donning an SCSR, the airflow or temperature could be a serious concern.
	At Twentymile, both escapeways are in fresh intake air with over 300,000 cubic feet per minute.  At this quantity, the velocity exceeds 30 miles per hour and can have a wind chill effect of more than minus 100 degrees in the winter months.  No miner should be exposed to this temperature for the length of time required to walk out of the escapeway when mechanical transportation is available and normally always utilized.
	In a real emergency situation the fact that SCSR is being used would protect the miner's lungs from temperature or high velocity air flow.  And the very fact that an SCSR if donned, would most likely address the temperature variation.  The time it takes to walk an escapeway when mechanical means are available only would measure endurance of miners, versus increasing their knowledge.
	The walking is going to be continually disrupted if walking the primary intake escapeway and mobile equipment is also utilizing that airway.  The chances of a vehicle-pedestrian accident increases.
	A confusing requirement has existed in the current regulations, and continues in the emergency temporary standards.  Drills should be required quarterly versus every 90 day.  The drills should take place in the first two week of each quarter, which would allow for two weeks of flexibility.
	The 90 day only accounts for 360 of 365 or 366 days.  Therefore the drills would be at different calendar times every year versus January, April, July, and October.  The annual retraining requirements allow for training until the end of the month in which the certificate is dated.
	Also, if someone returns to the mine and missed a drill, a two week period should be granted to conduct the drill with all employees who missed that drill.  Then all the employees who missed that drill could be given a mine emergency drill as a group, but never work greater than two weeks upon return until the drill is performed.  And I noticed that in your standard, you are actually saying until the next drill is scheduled.
	So that is immediate notification, MSHA invites comments on whether 50.10 should be further amended to require that the notification specify the type of accident for existing 50.2(h).  The 15-minute requirement or a more reasonable 30-minute requirement should only be required for emergencies that are still ongoing, and personnel safety is still at risk.
	The current requirement within one hour is sufficient for other emergencies or reportable events.  A roof fall in an out by location usually isn't even investigated by MSHA until a convenient time allows.  In a recent attempt to do an immediate notification that resulted solely from a power outage took over 15 minutes of constant calling and multiple contacts with spouses and MSHA officials.
	A call to the office with a voice mail should be sufficient notice.  The responsibility of the response should then should be MSHA.  Should the call be placed to the national number, call backs to clarify the incident would be very time consuming.  Again, under immediate notification, MSHA asks whether it should call, or should report all underground mine fires.
	MSHA has utilized a 30-minute fire for reporting under Part 50 for years.  We would hope that MSHA would verify a press article before using in the Emergency Temporary Standard.  I would like to MSHA related to a press article.  It was reported in the press that there had been a fire previously at the same spot along the beltline in the Aracoma Alma No. 1 Mine, and that the belt had been running hot for days before the fire.
	That, this standard was published on March 9.  Six weeks have passed.  I would have thought the MSHA investigation would have confirmed a fact like that, instead of using the press for part of its information for publishing standards.  Has there been a determination of whether those are true facts?
	MS. SILVEY:  Are you asking me that?
	MR. DERICK:  If I can.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  You can ask anything.  The investigation is ongoing at this time.
	MR. DERICK:  But has that fact been verified through the investigation?
	MS. SILVEY:  Well, the investigation is ongoing.  So the investigations are not final now.
	MR. DERICK:  Okay.
	MS. SILVEY:  When they are, we are going to make them public.
	MR. DERICK:  Okay.  I just believe referring to a press article is not really proper in a public standard.  Paragraph would lead one to believe that any type of fire should be reported under Part 50.
	Therefore, an immediate reportable event would be considered to have occurred, even though it has been totally abated before any notification could be made.  This could be as simple as cutting sparks smoldering that are quickly extinguished.  The clear and concise definition of what constitutes a reportable fire must be made available.
	How does spontaneous combustion get clarified with the oxidation of coal process?  Approved ventilation plans have had defined terms such as oxidation, increased oxidation, elevated oxidation and spontaneous combustion for that specific mine.  In these cases, smoke or flame may never have been encountered.
	The mine operator usually discusses these issues with the appropriate MSHA personnel, versus a must report situation.  Again, under immediate notification, MSHA wants to know how the definition of accident, if it should be revised to take fire hazards that miners face into consideration.
	If all situations of fire are smouldering would constitute a Part 50 reporting event, then Part 50 should be revised to allow for the operator to keep a log of such events versus triggering an immediate reportable event.  This could be similar to the OSHA log for reporting injuries versus the MSHA need to submit a 7000-1 report within ten days.
	MSHA also requested comments on whether miners should have the ability to tether themselves together during escapes through smoke filled environments.  This is a reasonable requirement for section crews, or fixed location crews performing work.
	Examples of method to quickly implement, makeshift tether lines should be provided to the mine operators and miners.  Electricians' tape, baling wire, firehose, tagline from an out by, a used SCSR case are some examples.  As a last resort, miners can be taught to simply grasp the miner's belt of the miner in front of them.
	However, consideration must be made than it may be safer to only have each miner holding the crew life line, versus being fastened to it, with the miner being continually stepping on the heels of the miner in front of them all the way out of the mine.  MSHA is asking for comments and suggestions on alternative realistic emergency practices, to ensure the miners are prepared to act in an emergency.
	Current regulations result in the miner operator and responsible person being in a difficult situation, because of questionable alternative options of evacuation or escape, versus solely instructing on designated escapeways as specified by the regulations.  Hand-on fire fighting training, realistic smoke training, and other training should be considered as compliance with these regulations, as long as MSHA is properly notified in advance to participate and to determine the effectiveness of the training.  MSHA must recognize the possibilities of other escape or evacuation options that do not include solely the primary and alternate escapeways.
	MSHA is soliciting comments on whether the record of training should include additional information, such as a checklist.  These regulations are already in place with the current fire drill requirements.  The checklist should be optional for the operator and used to consider whether a miner as being trained, as a trained mine emergency person who could respond to an emergency.
	MSHA also solicited comments on whether specific specification standard would be more appropriate than the performance oriented approach provided in the ETS.  A design type standard is reasonable to be the minimum requirement with the performance testing being used to allow an increase in storage distances.
	MSHA solicits comments on the appropriateness of eliminating filter self-rescuers from all underground mines.  A reasonable change, as long as time period for removal of the SCSRs is flexible.  MSHA had discourage in the past for many mines than desired utilizing short duration oxygen units which resulted in the use of the FSRs.  It appeared to us that once the United States Navy ordered a very large number of these units, their acceptance by MSHA started to change.
	MSHA also solicited comments on the appropriateness of requiring mine operators to report the total number of SCSRs with appropriate information semi-annually.  This should be a prudent business practice for operators to perform, especially with the large investment resulting from these new regulations.  It may be a reasonable expectation by MSHA to have these records available.
	MSHA is therefore soliciting comments on storage locations that are readily accessible to such persons, and this was referring to out by personnel.  Out by personnel would have sufficient SCSR units available for escape with the two units required to be available.  And I have a further comment later on that.
	If the mine escapeway distances exceeds that capability, then they would be covered under the amount of SCSRs needed in each out by storage area.  The regulation mandates a sufficient number of SCSRs be made available in both the primary and alternate escapeway for all employees who might use either of those escapeways.
	Storage locations within stoppings should be considered readily accessible.  Escapeways oftentimes go through stoppings, or miners have to go through stoppings to get to an escapeway.  And this location could offer better protection to the units that storing the devices in the intakes at below freezing temperatures.
	If the travelway utilized by out by personnel or section crews is the same as the escapeway, we do not believe that an additional SCSR gives additional protection, since the miners will always be within one hour of a storage location.  Carrying additional units will only result in more damage from frequent handling and being misplaced and forgotten at shift change, and other times.
	MSHA solicits comments on the appropriateness of requiring signs to be made of reflective material and alternative methods.  This is a reasonable requirement.  The alternative method should only have to provide an equivalent level of identification.  Future intake storages may allow for the possibility of strobe lights activated from the surface, or other similar method.
	This was under maps and locations, but the comment was on MSHA solicits comments on the reporting of failures or usages of SCSRs.  This would discourage testing of SCSRs, since what might be perceived to be a failure might be improper donning or premature removal of the unit.  Many removal of the units by employees during testing is because of uncomfortable feeling and not a unit failure.
	MSHA would need to demonstrate to industry that reporting would be beneficial to learning, versus enforcement.  The safety of the miners is what is important, not the manner of enforcement.
	We have had numerous reports of SCSR failures during tests to MSHA and in one, we were promised the results and never received them.  And eventually, it caused a recall.  But they would never release the information, even though it was our testing.
	Now back on to just that aren't specific requests for comments, but are in the scope of the ETS.  Under general discussion, because MSHA keeps referring to hands-on training, in the transferring of self-rescuer devices.  Information on the correct procedures is not provided by the manufacturer, especially from one manufacturer's unit to another.  Also, no instructions are available to transfer from a chemical generating oxygen unit to a compressed oxygen type unit or vice-versa.
	In the research and studies, we had participated in notice of trial with the Bureau of Mines, NIOSH now, on training since the 1980s.  We were the first mine at Orchard Valley to install self-contained self-rescuers in the United States.  Part of that training was SCSRs donning was deemed to be a motor skill.
	So NIOSH, or the Bureau then, they provided each miner with their own mouthpiece and corrugated hose, developed their own training unit.  They would simulate the resistance.  And each miner wouldn't be considered proficient until they could do five perfect three plus three donnings.
	The training models available today make that type of training almost impossible and it needs to be relooked at.  It is a motor skill, and to really become proficient simulating in a mouth piece and nose clip is not really providing that type of training.
	The recently published NIOSH Informational Circular 9481, Fire Response Preparedness for Underground Mines was preceded by Informational Circular 9452, An Underground Coal Mine Fire Preparedness and Response Checklist; the Instrument.  That publication was a cooperative research effort between NIOSH and Twentymile Coal Company, which was conducted over a period of years.
	In both of those instruments, there is a lot of recommendations that we are still having trouble getting approved to be used in the mines today.  And I will specifically talk about the green lasers.  On page 12,258, there was the need for additional self-contained self-rescuers.  Too much emphasis is being placed on all miners evacuating the mine that are not needed to respond to an emergency.  Once an employee is out by an emergency, they may be needed to obtain additional supplies from out by locations.
	Now that emergency drills are required on different types of emergencies, are the employees now deemed to be considered a trained person to respond to such emergencies?  If not, will additional mine emergency training, such as hands-on fire extinguisher, fire hose usage, et cetera be sufficient to classify them as a trained mine emergency employee.  Does MSHA have any plans on developing training guidelines that would qualify a miner for emergency?
	These next two are out of the first compliance guide.  The second compliance guide came out when I was on vacation, and I haven't responded to those either.  But there is one question in there.  It says, can I store the SCSRs in a room or entry that is adjacent to the escapeway that may be reached by going through a man door?  And the answer is no.
	This is understandable, if you need to enter the other air course, but using the answer to that is no, to the next question is wrong.  And that is, can I  I have a mine where a primary and alternate escapeways are adjacent to each other.
	Can I build a room between these two escapeways with block stoppings and two manors that is accessible from either escapeway to store one set of extra SCSRs required by the standards.  The answer is no.
	This prohibits the mine operators from storing the SCSRs in the most preferred locations.  Temperature would be one reason, and it may be the most logical location to test to see if another airway is now smoke free, or has less smoke.
	In our situation, we plan to store the additional units between machine doors that isolate two intake escapeways that are also isolated from the belt.  We want escaping employees to be led into this area, so they can test the escapeway on the other side of the belt, or secure additional unites if needed.  If the issue is the quantity, versus going through door, then if the quantity is needed for both escapeways, MSHA should actually encourage this situation.
	A note that is not there, a little extra note is, we are in the process of putting in another intake shaft.  And we have escapeways going out all directions out of the mine.  We had put our effort in additional escapeway directions, versus thinking somebody is going to come all the way out on of the mine from one SCSR to another.
	But when this shaft is completed, the four miles of our mine that have dual intake escapeways on both sides of the belt will be reduced to one designated escapeway.  We will naturally use those other SCSRs for the developing area of the mine that is going on at that time.  So what this would result in, is both escapeways are going to be left intact, but only one of them will be designated.
	And that is again, why we would rather have the SCSRs stored between the equipment doors that isolate those two escapeways.  Otherwise, if you were in the non-designated escapeway, you would have to enter the contaminated escapeway to get to an SCSR.  I don't believe that has really been thought of too much.
	And there is a lot of comments against storing them in through manors.  I think that everybody has always been taught that periodically, you should be evaluating the air courses next to you.  And in the mines where this is, there is actually three intake escapeways, plus an intaking belt.  And to not store these units out of 100 degree below zero windchill, and be where miners should access them, I think really needs strong consideration.
	These other comments are related to the Emergency Temporary Standard, but they are outside the scope of the actual standard themselves.  But similar to your introduction, you went into many requests for comments that are outside the scope.  Getting into the refuse chamber area, to drill holes from the surface, and the submarine type doors.
	So I feel that these comments are very appropriate, too.  Fire researcher items needed.  High expansion phone generator tests.  We have been conducting high expansion phone generator tests in conjunction with NIOSH for over ten years.  And in the near future, a NIOSH report will be issued.
	MSHA has not demonstrated a confidence in this type of fire fighting, and therefore, industry hasn't accepted it widespread.  Additional firefighting equipment, methods and training must be pursued.
	With barricade chambers being considered as new approaches, firefighting is more important than ever.  We will not want to seal a mine with miner still barricaded inside, but sealing seems to be the standard method chosen at this time.
	The gas chromatography data from the 1986 Orchard Valley fire in Colorado indicated that high expansion foam controlled a very large fire to a fuelstar fire with high oxygen and lower levels of carbon monoxide for hours.  When the foam supply was exhausted.  The fire immediately went to a fuel rich fire, and dropped the oxygen by 5 to 7 percent.  Carbon monoxide when from a level of within filter self-rescuer protection range to many times that range in only five minutes after foam depletion.
	The test several years ago at the Twentymile Mine demonstrated foam could be pushed up dip for a 280 foot elevation rise over a 1,000 foot distance, in two entries and connecting crosscuts.  This was the equivalent of pushing foam up to the top of a 28 story building from the ground floor.
	We have been asking NIOSH and MSHA for years for research on foam generator to answer some of the questions from the Deserato Mine in 1996, due to a lot of the hesitations of using high expansion foam.  Other fire fighting improvements of issues; we have been requesting for years, research is needed in determining the products of different types of fires along with products as different types of fire fighting measures are being applied.
	This research could easily be done at the Lake Lynn facility.  And that has been requested numerous times.
	Probably most important in our mind, we would rather think of evacuation or escape.  And part of these regulations depending on the mine, and that is why it is hard to pass a regulation for each mine.
	But our mine is set up that once you could get out of the CM gateroad, there are no more return escapeways, but there are other ways out of the mine.  And the self-rescuer concept is leading people maybe towards an emergency.
	And a lot of other options exist that aren't the designated way.  One that we are interested in and we are trying to pursue a little further with NIOSH is see through smoke.  Research needs accelerated, that our mine has twelve miles of mains.  And it would be a shame to have a fire that is eleven or twelve miles from the miners, and all they need to do is get maybe 5,000 to then have safe access to other escapeways that we would rather pursue see through smoke, infrared capabilities to drive through the smoke to get to better ways out of the mine.
	That research capability is available, but it is one we would like to see accelerated to feasibility.  One we have been talking with District Nine, that has been very cooperative and receptive to hearing things, is air changes that may be made during emergencies.  Our mine is set up.
	We are investigating air changes that could be made quickly in the mine by remote computer controls that would contain the products of fire.  In our mine, we have isolated intake escapeways that are separated by the beltlines, except a connecting overcast areas with hydraulic equipment doors.  We also have steep slopes, so a fire spreads similar to a high rise building.
	Additional computer controlled doors are being investigated to control air from intake to returns, with additional carbon monoxide sensors in the intakes, a fire may be detected, shorted to an up-dip return, and adjacent intake air fed to the fire, thus allowing the intakes in by to be cleared of smoke.  Additional doors that are installed in entries to separate several sections from other sections contain hydraulic doors that could be opened and closed, thus allowing the intake air from a clean air escapeway to ventilate that section, versus a contaminated intake airway. MSHA needs to be receptive to this different approach to aid, evacuation or escape from a mine emergency.
	With multiple this is an extra comment that is not on there with multiple potentials to escape, travel may be diverted away from the area of the mine involved, where the fire may spread, as miners travel towards the problem.  That is one thing with the idea of long escape and multiple SCSRs.
	We need to consider that the conditions can change by the time a miner gets there.  And we would rather if we had a belt fire that was smoking, or an intake fire, we would rather people go a different direction, versus going from one SCSR to another, only to find out that the fire compromises the stopping line.
	Past advances that were not supported by the agencies.  We developed a fire suppression system for power centers.  Orchard Valley Coal and Ansul designed and tested an inexpensive Halon Fire Suppression System that could detect a small fire, extinguish the fire with no damage, de-energize the power, and notify the atmospheric monitoring system.
	That system was developed for less than $500, and they have all the I was going to rediscuss this with District Nine.  We ran into just nothing but roadblocks from the national office to on down to try to develop that system.  The power center fires.
	Robotic fire fighting vehicle.  At Cypress Shoshone, a fire fighting vehicle, very similar to the new robot was tested.  It could drive 500 feet, a 2 ? inch fire hose with camera and nozzle control.  No interest was expressed, so the project was dropped.
	This was a major project of Bill Pommerly [phonetic] of the Minneapolis Bureau of Mines at that time, but no funding or no interest was in that research.  And yet, almost the identical vehicle was then hailed to be this robotic sensor or sampling device.  There is actually a video made of that driving into the mine, going through crosscuts negotiating, and then simulating extinguishing a fire.
	Use of green lasers, the Twentymile Coal Company and numerous other mines, in cooperation with NIOSH, while performing in-mine simulated smoke escape exercises, green lasers were found to be very effective in walking in smoke.  Several requests have been made to utilize these during emergency conditions, but we are having permissibility issues.
	MSHA should review the NIOSH data, and help by getting the units approved.  MSHA quotes NIOSH Informational Circular 2481 which recommends these lasers, but has not assisted in making these units available.
	Where is MSHA's documentation of fire experiences?  We need emergency situations and experiences documented in a teaching tool fashion.  The findings of the investigations are distributed by MSHA.  However, the use of the gas sampling data is not distributed.
	Fire fighting steps are also not distributed in a useful fashion.  MSHA is present at all mine emergencies, and many lessons are being learned.  But there is no useful release of that data.  There are no guidelines on inert gas injection and quick response drilling.
	It appears that only NIOSH publishes useful information on mine emergency, yet they are not the ones gaining the first hand experiences at the mine emergencies.  This should be a high priority.  The change in policy on how regulations are promulgated.
	There have been problems with almost every regulation promulgated in the last ten years, especially when they are technology forcing, or compliance needs are not immediately achievable.  The process needs to allow for the record to be reopened after one year, or other time period, so unforeseen difficulties can be addressed.  An example of this is the need for an operator to file a petition for modification to use a tested engine certified by a laboratory but paid by the operator.
	Since the regulation states that only the original manufacturer can have an engine tested, and use that data for obtaining a certification under part 7, the need to not use front brakes on road graders is another example that could be alleviated by a logical rewrite of the regulations.  MSHA, without input from industry or other interested parties can change their interpretation of a regulation, utilizing the program policy bulletin or letters.  However, the avenue is not open to the other parties.
	One comment on the last Emergency Temporary Standard is, as comments were being made, the responses were being, that is the law, that is how it is written.  But the idea of these comments are for the law is already in effect.  What we still have the opportunity to do is to change the final promulgated standards.
	And I would hope that a lot of these, that everybody makes all the comments received.  But we usually don't see too much change from the original standards, as they are proposed.
	One last comment that is on this.  I don't know if it is in the scope of MSHA.  But we have heard, and are preparing material for the Colorado Mining Association on the use of belt air.
	If there is anybody that disagrees with belt air, I would sure like to have time to review my comments and my years of experience with belt air, and the safety that has brought to the mines, versus the hazard that some people think it could bring to the mine.  So if that issue goes back up on the table, you will definitely hear more comments from me.
	MS. SILVEY:  That is clearly without that is outside the scope of this ETS.
	MR. DERICK:  But it is not outside of the scope of a lot of the legislation and stuff we are seeing.  I appreciate the chance to talk.  And again, I would like to thank the District Nine people that we work with.  They are very open to new ideas and are at least informing us of the right path to take when we have them.  And part of that is, is commenting here today.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you, Mr. Derick.  I have a few comments, and maybe some of my colleagues also.  First of all, you ask, and you may, I take it as your official request that the requirement for the record to be extended for another two months.  And I didn't comment at the time.  And I did say duly noted.  That is all I said.
	But I will also add, for the benefit of the entire mining public who was here, that Mr. Derick made that request.  But as I said in my opening statement, the legal requirements for the ETS are in the Mine Act.  And as I said, the ETS serves as the proposed rule.  It serves as the final rule.  And then the proposed rule on which we take comments.
	But the whole process must be accomplished under the mine act within nine months.  So we are under a somewhat tight time frame.  That is all I would say at this time.  We are under somewhat tight time frames for completing the rulemaking.
	MS. SILVEY:  With these being listed under grave concern for the miners, I would think all effort should be taken
	MS. SILVEY:  No.  I understand.  I see your point.  I understand your point.  The other thing I would like to say, and I would like to say this clearly, is that I don't think, and I am reading sort of what I square between, and I don't really need to read it.  I do not think that I included anything in my opening statement that went outside of the scope of the ETS.
	I did ask for comments on a number of issues that were in, you might say, in addition to issues that were in the preamble to the ETS.  But being in addition to and in an attempt to clarify or further improve the ETS, but not outside the scope.
	Secondly, on page 2, and I do appreciate your providing your comments in this fashion, on page 2 of your comments, Mr. Derick, when the issue of the 15 minutes, and you said the current requirement of within one hour is sufficient.  It is my understanding that the current requirement for certain twelve categories accidents require that these accidents be immediately reportable to MSHA.  And for this ETS to do is to further clarify and give some precision to immediately.
	But there was not one our requirement that they be reported within an hour.  And I just want to clarify that for everybody who was here.  Okay.
	The other comment I have is, on your page 3, under section I mean, you cite to page 12264 of the preamble, the bottom of the page.  A design, and we are talking at that time about storage distances.  I just wanted to get a little understanding from you in terms of your comment here.  A designed type standard is reasonable to be the minimum requirement, with performance testing being used to allowing an increase in storage distances.  And I want to understand exactly what you mean here.
	MR. DERICK:  Yes.  Probably the word maximum might have been a better term.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  So what the word maximum, where?
	MR. DERICK:  It probably would have read better to say a design type standard is reasonable to be the maximum requirement distance.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Yes.  Now I understand.  Thank you.  Yes.  Okay.  All right.  Now on page, and unfortunately, I should have, so everybody would know, he didn't just go out on us, Jeff Kravitz.
	I should have said that as soonactually maybe I should have said it at the beginning, had to leave to be on a conference call with some people from Arlington; his boss, my boss, and others at I think the conference call is at 10:30.  So it is sort of unfortunate, but sort of unavoidable.
	So he will be back as soon as he can, for everybody's information, because the next issue kind of deals with something he is involved in, and that is on your page 5, 12265.  And you spoke of us, the reporting requirement for all, for SCSRs where that had either been involved in an incident of possible failure, and reporting all these.  And keeping them for 90 days, so they could be investigated by MSHA.
	And you talked about you all had numerous reports of perceived failures and equipment that had been tested.  You all's equipment, but you never received the results.  Could you be a little you don't have to do it right now but could you be a little specific on the incidents in terms of when you sent stuff to MSHA, so I can check into that, and didn't get any response back from us?
	MR. DERICK:  Yes.  MSHA Technical Support actually participated in the
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  I gathered that.  Yes.
	MR. DERICK:  Took our units.  So I would rather do that separate, since it is	     	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  You can do it separate.  I just want to make sure.  You can do it separate later.  That will be fine.  On page 7, these get to some of the questions that were included in the compliance guide for everybody's information.
	The particular question talked about the storage of SCSRs where the primary and alternate escapeway are adjacent to it, and parallel to each other.  And you talked about our answer of just no, in the compliance guide.  But I believe that I addressed that in my opening statement, sort of signaling a situation where there might be some consideration to doing that.  And I asked for further comment on that.
	MR. DERICK:  Right.  And that one is the one I am thinking went beyond the scope, as that was really different wording to describe a barricade chamber.
	MR. SHERER:  Well Lincoln, it may be beyond the scope.  But what we are looking for is reasonable, practical ways to ensure that everybody has enough air to escape the mine.  If you have alternatives to what we have proposed, or better ways to do it, we are certainly open to that.
	MR. DERICK:  Yes.  One of the comments, I don't even remember saying so, as I was reading that, it was on the 15-minute notification.  When you are saying the other alternative is if we are receptive to that, but the other alternative is, we have got to realize the burden that the last Emergency Temporary Standard put on the responsible person.
	And that is where we were saying that these other alternatives, though you might not be able to make alist all inclusive, well we have got to be careful that we haven't done is made a person that has all the capabilities of being a responsible person, but we have taken his decision making away.
	And it pretty much has responsible people nervous right now, that their only reaction is issue a total mine evacuation order, and that is the only way anybody is going to accept his decision.  But there is so many decisions in some of these larger, complicated mines that could take quick thinking from the data and EMS systems given.  And some of it can be preplanned.
	And that is what we tried to discuss with District Nine is just show some types of preplanning that you could actually test prove its worth, that it would do what you are asking it to do, and then maybe putting it in the Mine Emergency Plan.  But that is going to be, like I say, not an all-inclusive list.
	And the worst thing we can't do is have people that can think all of a sudden just get more worried of the regulation that I better just get everybody out of the mine.  I mean, I have a lot of problems in a mine fire of people leaving the mine, once they are out by the emergency area, because they should be assembled at that point, and then decided whether they are not needed or there is always things people can be used for.
	But right now, the mentality is, you are not a defined emergency person.  There is an emergency in progress.  Get out of the mine.  And with people maybe trapped in by, I think we are going into a reverse progression of mine emergency preparedness.
	You know, just some other comments that I had kind of read in this whole subject of mine safety is kind of getting like a balloon that is in a bag.  And the balloon is getting bigger and bigger, and it is getting filled up.  And all of a sudden, if it ever bursts, we are right back to an empty bag.
	And we have got to be careful that we are really meeting the goal.  And that is, either prevent a fire.  Not many of these regulations are back to the basics of prevention, detection and control.  This is all control.  And it is not even fire control, it is all just escape control.
	So on the 15-minute notice, and if this is repeating, our mine emergency plan is completely written on time, not who does what.  And in the first 15 minutes have been involved in several being the first person, because that time goes by very fast.
	And if there is an emergency involving people, that first 15 minutes is the priority of notifying people in by the emergency, notifying people out by the emergency.  Notifying the responsible person.  And all that may have to be done by one person.  And I know I have missed something.  And I am glad there are comments in writing.
	But we always use the approach of Saturday night swing shift.  You have to look at your mine on Saturday night swing shift, and that is your least level of protection.  And what is at that mine at that time is what you are going to have to decide may be there.
	If somebody is making notifications, the most critical thing is documenting these communications.  Crews are calling out, and saying I am in this section.  I am leaving this way.
	All that is going to start possibly getting confused with I had better call MSHA or I am going to get this large fine, and I had better get all that done.  Notifying critical company personnel doesn't even fall within the first 15 minutes, unless there is time to do it.  So I think we really need to evaluate what might be lost when all the requirement is, is right now, people are saying, if I do one thing, it better be, I notify MSHA.
	We have got to get that burden off of the sole person that may get that emergency call.  I have been in that situation.
	MS. SILVEY:  I understand.
	MR. DERICK:  I supervise people that are in that situation.  And when you are back asking them, where is so and so saying they are going to come out
	MS. SILVEY:  I think we understand.  Thank you.
	MR. DERICK:  Because that time is very critical.
	MS. SILVEY:  I think we do.  Does anybody have any questions, further questions of Mr. Derick?
	(No response.)
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Derick.
	MR. DERICK:  Thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you very much.  Our next speaker will be Rebecca Boam, the State Mine Inspector, New Mexico, Office of the State Mine Inspector.
	MS. BOAM:  Good morning.
	MS. SILVEY:  Good morning.
	MS. BOAM:  my name is Rebecca Boam.  And I am the New Mexico State Mine Inspector at the New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Safety.  I also appreciate the opportunity to comment here today, and I will try not to belabor the panel or the audience with things that have already been discussed.
	Several comments on the ETS, and I have kind of put them in the order that the ETS was, so they may not be as compartmentalized.  And I have also made some changes here, just sitting here, to again, not go over the same material.
	In 1969, we had the Coal Mine Safety and Health Act that came into being after we had a significant incident in an underground coal mine in Farmington, West Virginia.  It wasn't until 1977 that we amended that to include the metal and nonmetal miners.  And I guess my first question is, you know, are we going to repeat history by doing that again.
	You know, the focus of this ETS is on underground coal mines.  And I guess my contention is that you know, in particular, if you look at a mine fire, the gasses and the CO are what kill people most commonly in a mine fire.  And I would venture to say that CO is no different in a coal mine, than it would be in a metal non-metal mine.  The risk to the individual miners is still there, because the atmosphere is irrespirable.
	At the behest of our Governor Bill Richardson, we changed the state law in New Mexico, and we do require now, the law was signed into effect on the 7th of March.  We do require that all underground miners have SCSRs.  They also have to have plans for caching additional units and all personnel that work underground have to be trained in the use of such devices.
	In addition to that, we have requirements for communication and tracking.  The tracking is only mandatory for the underground coal mines, but there is tracking in there.  It was a concerted effort to draft that legislation, between the State, the New Mexico Mining Association, and the operators, both coal, and metal non-metal.
	I think that the operators, particularly, the metal non-metal should be commended for their willingness to adopt those standards.  There was not a lot of pushback from that.  They recognized the need for that, and the protection that it gave the miners.
	On the new training requirements, in the ETS, it stresses the importance of training and education.  In fact, the quote is that it is critical for instilling the discipline, confidence and kills necessary to successfully escape and survive in emergency.
	My next question is, why would we remove the hands-on from the annual refresher training, realizing that we are going to do it in drills four times a year.  I don't get why we would remove a training component.  On the immediate reporting under Part 50, when we talk about immediate reporting and extenuating circumstances, as it relates back to the ETS.
	I guess further clarification on that, I think, would be a benefit to everyone, because there are lots of ways that that is looked at, even right now, today, with the immediate reporting being the requirement.
	MS. SILVEY:  Excuse me.  I am sorry.  Would you start at that point again?  I am sorry.  I missed that.  I was writing your other point.
	MS. BOAM:  In regard to the 15-minute reporting requirement, I guess I would like to ask for clarification, you know, through this standard, on what the extenuating circumstances are.  The ETS refers to that as immediate and within 15 minutes unless there are extenuating circumstances.
	I think we all need to be very clear on what that is, so that at the different districts, in the state, at the mine operations, that everybody is playing by the same set of rules.  And even now, that is sometimes difficult for us, just under the immediate.  So that was my only point there.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Yes.  Thank you.
	MS. BOAM:  We do require the 30-minute reporting in the State of New Mexico.  Again, that was part of our new law that we passed.  However, in that reporting and this kind of goes to the ETS, too what information is reported?
	Basically, we want the information of what type of accident you know, has occurred, or they believe has occurred.  And as many details as they can give.  But a contact of someone to contact back.
	Because again, I think there is a lot of people out there that are very leery about what is going to happen.  Oh my gosh, I am going to miss this 15-minute window, and I am going to go to jail, and the mine is going to get shut down.  So I think that there is some panic there that we could alleviate if we addressed those things in a little more concise manner.
	We also certainly wouldn't want to call MSHA and give wrong information and leave MSHA to believe that there is an accident going on or a disaster going on which causes you all to deploy resources to something that is truly not of that nature, because there might be another accident somewhere else in that immediate area that does need those resources.  So that was also a consideration.
	In regard to fires, there is a question that has been coming up repeatedly, particularly about coal stockpile fires.  Are they reportable under Part 50 or are they not?
	And that has been ongoing for many years, and I have had people ask me the question, and I have asked a variety of people within MSHA.  And there seems to be no clear cut answer to that question.  So if we are going to further define fire, it would be nice to be able to define what we are going to do about coal stockpile fires.
	The lifelines and tethering folks together, I am not sure that the ETS is the place to really define that.  I think that each operator at each mine has some very different sets of circumstances, such as grade of the escapeway.
	How many people work in a particular area?  What kind of belts do they wear?  What kind of SCSRs do they wear?  You know, I would think that the mine operator and the local MSHA officials and the district officials and the miners themselves that work there would be the ones to decide just what it is they need, and how it should work, and how it would best be utilized.
	The realistic emergency evacuation procedures.  I think that is a great idea.  A lot of mines have done that, where we do drills and things that are more realistic.  I am wondering if MSHA will play a role in that.
	Will the agency provide information to mine operators, particularly small operators that may not have large training and safety departments that are able to do that.  Will there be additional funding to state grants recipients, so that those folks can help the small operator to achieve those training requirements.
	Will MSHA participate in a drill?  Will MSHA have internal drills?  It refers to the emergency response plan at each district.  Is that available to us, so that we can all take a look at that and figure out who is doing what, or who would do what, in case of an emergency, so that again, we are all working off the same page.
	The check list for emergency evacuation, I believe that that is a great tool to use.  When you use that checklist, if there is something people struggle with, it gives you that information.  You know where to focus your efforts, particularly in between drills.  If four out of five people missed a certain step, then you can reemphasize that and then test it again in the next 90-minute drill.
	The total number of reporting, the total number of SCSRs in use at each underground mine semi-annually.  I may be off base here, but I thought that when you cached SCSRs, that you would have an SCSRs storage plan, and so that would be part of that plan, is that you would give the list.  The inspector is there four times a year.
	He could verify on his quarterly inspection, you know, that that plan is current.  If the plan changed significantly you had more or less SCSRs, then I would think the plan would need to be updated and approved.
	In the history of mining, it seems that the most successful or safety years were those in which education and training were at the forefront of everyone's mission.  From the institution of Part 48 to the slam process that we went through, there was educational activities focused on teaching individuals and giving them information and tools to assess hazards and risks.  If we don't have the event, then we don't have to worry about what do we do with a disaster.
	And I believe that risk assessment and being able to identify potential and correct it, before it becomes the disaster is really the key.  We have an enormous influx of young, inexperienced people coming into the mining industry.  Proper training and development of risk assessment techniques I believe is critical to the safety and success of the miner as well as the mining industry.
	I believe that we owe it to the miners to give them the best training and tools that we possibly can so that they can protect themselves and their work environments, and that that is how we will change behavior.  Some operators obviously need more assistance than others.
	But there are a large number of operators that do go above and beyond what the law requires.  And sometimes, I don't think that is brought to the forefront.  The media in particular likes to pick on those that do not instead those that do.
	I believe that MSHA should actively participate in being part of the solution by committing to the education process of the miners and the mine operators in adopting best practices.  This should include working with miners and mine operators, adding inspectors, writing more citations and levying fines, I don't believe by itself will effect the desired change that we need for mine safety.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you, Ms. Boam.  I have a few comments.  And that is, with respect to your New Mexico law, and is your law in effect right now?
	MS. BOAM:  Yes.
	MS. SILVEY:  Your law is in effect right now, right?
	MS. BOAM:  Yes, it is.
	MS. SILVEY:  And in terms of specifically, and I don't know if you are able to give me this information now, but in terms your specific response to the SCSR provision, you said it is applicable to all underground mines.
	How do I want to ask this.  Are your mine operators in New Mexico experienced in any issues, or with any provisions of it, or everything is going smoothly?
	MS. BOAM:  The only issue that they are having is the same issue of everyone.  It is how quickly they can get these units so they have until the 5th of June to develop an implementation plan that they will submit to
	MS. SILVEY:  They have until when.
	MS. BOAM:  June 5.
	MS. SILVEY:  June 5.
	MS. BOAM:  To give an implementation plan that says these are the types of rescuers that we will use.  This is what the manufacturer says is the approximate date that we will receive these.  And then they will begin to start putting that plan into effect.
	That plan may not just happen in 30 days.  It may be that it is a six month plan.  That in this month, we will do this, and the next month we will do that.  And it will be ongoing until it is fully
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay, because the next thing I was going to ask you had to do.  You said caching and training.  The next question I was going to ask you had to do with training.
	So I assume that they have you have training plan requirements for the training.  And so rather than me making these assumptions, I would let you say to me about how the training, how is the training requirement implemented?
	MS. BOAM:  The training requirement will be the same, similar as to what we have done with coal, with MSHA.  The three plus three donning technique, okay.  And each miner will be trained in that.  They will get it annually in their training.
	They will wear the SCSRs on their belt.  They will be trained in the changeover from one unit to another.  And it is up to the operator whether they are going to change from the same unit to you now, or whether they are going to have one manufacturer's unit and then change to a different manufacturer.
	MS. SILVEY:  So the training plans then, the laws have been approved now by the various training plans?
	MS. BOAM:  The training plan will be part of the implementation.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Part of this same implementation package.
	MS. BOAM:  Yes.  I am sorry.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  All right.  I understand.
	MR. SHERER:  Could we possibly get a copy of that state law?
	MS. BOAM:  Yes, sir.
	MR. MACLEOD:  You had a concern about possibly us removing the SCSR training from refresher training, which we technically did not do, but could you expand on that a little bit, what your concern was?
	MS. BOAM:  Well, I guess my concerns is that for almost 20 years, I have been doing training in the mining industry.  And we train and train on specific things.  And it seems to be a common thread that some people just don't know how to put that rescuer on.
	I have done actual training exercises where I have had people kneel on the ground, blindfolded them and asked them to put the rescuer on, and about two or three minutes later, they still can't get it on.  It concerns me that people are not capable of doing that.  I mean, that truly is their lifeline.
	And I just don't think we can overdo it.  I don't think that adding one more time in an annual refresher, when you are talking about safety as a whole, and hazards would cause any burden to anyone.
	MR. MACLEOD:  So you would think that people should have it five times a year?
	MS. BOAM:  Yes, sir.
	MR. MACLEOD:  Okay.  Thanks.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  I am glad you brought that up because I was going to.  I just wanted to clarify something.  	You said removing it from the annual refresher requirement.  But in point of fact, we were not removing it. We were really letting the training, the additional training in the drill requirements substitute for the annual.
	MS. BOAM:  Substitute.  Right.
	MS. SILVEY:  Right.  Yes.  So it really I just wanted to clarify that.  It is technically not removing it.
	MS. SILVEY:  Exactly.
	MS. SILVEY:  I am glad you I had written a note to myself and forgot.  Okay.  All right.  Thank you.  Anybody else to ask
	MR. SNASHELL:  You talked about extenuating circumstances where operators may not be able to notify.  Is that that they haven't had time to determine there is an accident in the first place, or they have determined there is an accident, and for some reason, beyond not having access to communications, some extenuating circumstance prevents them from notifying MSHA.
	MS. BOAM:  Well, I guess I would say it is a combination of all of those things.  We have metal non-metal, particularly sand and gravel operations that may only be a two man operation.  That person, as Ms. Young stated, you know, may be the only person doing treatment for the injured party.
	So the phone call may not be able to be made within a 15-minute window, because as soon as he gets the victim stabilized, he would call 911 first, you know and get things going.  So he might miss that 15 minute.
	The other thing is that maybe they haven't ascertained that it truly is a reportable accident.  And again, we have talked about the 30-minute supposed toand you know.  There are a number of those twelve things that have time associated with them.
	So extenuating, and we have the same issue in New Mexico under our law with the 30-minute reporting.  What is extenuating, you know.  And reasonable, I think, was the term that Ms. Silva used.  So if we could further define what reasonable is going to you know, kind of the parameters around that, or the components that should be weighed in determining reasonableness, I think that would be very helpful to everyone.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you.  Okay, at this point, and you all are probably looking at me funny.  Why don't we take a ten-minute break, and if we can really come back in ten minutes, so that everybody will have an opportunity to speak.
	(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
	MS. SILVEY:  Is everybody ready?  At this time, we will reconvene the Mine Safety and Health Administration's public hearing on the Emergency Temporary Standard for emergency mine evacuations.  Next on our list, we have Ralph Sanich with Interwest Mining Company.  Mr. Sanich.
	MR. SANICH:  Good morning.  Thanks for the opportunity to speak here today.
	MS. SILVEY:  Good morning.
	MR. SANICH:  My name is Ralph Sanich.  I am the manager of Health and Safety for Interwest Mining Company.  I would like to make the following comments.  These comments are submitted by Interwest Mining Company in response to the Emergency Temporary Standard issued by the Mine Safety and Health Administration on March 9, 2006.  We appreciate having the opportunity to comment on this most important regulatory initiative.
	In reviewing the ETS, we attempted to identify its shortcomings so that its application will meet MSHA's objective to protect miners from the grave dangers that they face when they must evacuate a mine after an emergency occurs.  Our limited recommendations therefore, are intended to strengthen the requirements to meet this objective, while at the same time, safeguard against unintended consequences, unrealistic performance outcomes, or unrealized expectations that may result from the ETS as published.
	Part 50, notification.  The accident reporting revisions incorporated in the ETS are intended to facilitate rapid response by MSHA to serious mining accidents.  Interwest Mining Company strongly supports this objective.
	We agree with the need to notify MSHA promptly to assist mine operators in dealing with mine emergencies.  When accidents occur that threaten the safety of coal miners, a rapid emergency response is appropriate and essential.  In life threatening situations, or situations requiring a potential rescue and recovery response, it is essential to immediately dispatch emergency resources to the accident scene.
	While we agree with the intent of the ETS, Interwest Mining Company maintains that many of the immediate reportable accidents requiring 15-minute notification do not justify a rapid response.  As a result, we recommend the development of a rapid response notification system that requires notification and response proportional to the nature of the accidents.  Clearly, many of the events listed in 30 CFR 50.2(h) should require a mine operator to notify MSHA within the prescribed 15 minutes.
	We contend, however, that each event must be evaluated on its own merits.  An appropriate evaluation of the facts on a case-by-case basis is necessary to determine whether a true emergency exists.
	It makes no sense to contact MSHA within 15 minutes for events that occur on a routine basis, especially when the health and safety of the miners are not at risk.  It would be counterproductive, and serve no useful purpose to contact MSHA within the required 15-minute time frame for these non-emergency events.  It is not necessary to activate mine rescue personnel and local emergency response resources for all immediate reportable accidents.
	Early notification and rapid response should be in proportion to the seriousness of the accident.  In our opinion, 15-minute notification period required by this ETS should be revised for fatalities, serious injuries and accidents with the potential to require mine rescue and or recovery responses.
	MSHA's notification procedures, the ETS is solely focused on the 15-minute notification requirements following immediately reportable accident.  The ETS fails to address how MSHA will receive and respond to these notification calls.  We are concerned that this omission will result in a system that unnecessarily delays an effective emergency response.
	The current protocol requires a mine operator to call the district manager, district office when an immediate reportable accident occurs.  If that call is placed outside of business hours, the caller is forwarded to an answering service.  The answering service provides the mine operator with other numbers to call to personally reach MSHA district officials.
	It is if the caller cannot reach one of these individuals, he is expected to contact MSHA headquarters.  The toll free answering service maintained by MSHA headquarters relies on individuals with no knowledge of the mining industry.  These individuals are not capable of making decisions on how to respond to an event that has been reported.
	Fifteen-minute notification should not be based on each MSHA district.  MSHA should establish a 1-800 number nationwide that would allow operators anywhere in the country to make one call that satisfies the law.  That call center would then make the additional notifications as necessary to the districts, to tech support, or whomever they deem necessary to call.
	MSHA personnel would be required to provide this call center with all relevant numbers and persons in charge. Thus, the operator makes one call, and then goes about their business to address the emergency.
	Our recommendation that notification system that fails to differentiate between serious and non-serious events will generate numerous false alarms and eventually lead to complacency.  It may also contribute to the unavailability of emergency response resources when a legitimate emergency occurs.
	We recommend that MSHA revise Part 50 requirements in the ETS.  The revised notification requirements should distinguish between serious and minor immediately reportable accidents.  As far as revising Part 50 definition of a fire, MSHA has requested comment on whether to revise the definition of an immediately reportable fire.
	Interwest Mining Company maintains that there is no compelling evidence justifying the revision of the definition of immediately reportable fire.  Current regulations require a mine operator an unplanned mine fire that has not been extinguished within 30 minutes of its discovery.
	Historically, this 30-minute period has provided mine operators with an adequate period to extinguish and control an unplanned heating event.  To shorten this 30-minute period would result in numerous false alarms.  It would lead to the ineffective use of the emergency response resources.
	The existing requirements of this area are clear.  Mine operators understand what types of unplanned fires to report, and the circumstances that require MSHA notification.  While there will always be unique events that require a mine operator to exercise good judgment, changing the current requirements will only result in confusion.
	It will also result in numerous unnecessary phone calls.  The current requirement for notifying MSHA of unplanned fires after 30 minutes is effective.  It should not be changed.
	Part 75 Mandatory Safety Standards.  The proposed revisions to Part 75, like those revisions to Part 50, are intended to address what the Agency deems to be grave danger when a mine accident occurs.  While well-intended, the proposal may introduce unintentional hazards and should be revised to address the concerns identified below.  We would note that many of these issues identified in this section have equal application to the new requirements under Part 48.
	75.1502(a)(1), this section involves the training scenarios.  Industry wants to reinforce the process under (a)(1)(iv).  We train our employees to fight fires as a first line of defense, so that we don't have full-blown mine emergencies.  Interwest Mining Company recommends that scenarios not be required within the plan, but require scenarios to be developed and used for fire fighting drills.  	75.1502(c)(1), Interwest Mining Company recognizes that the standard interval for training fire drill training and subsequently, mine emergency training has always been not more than 90 days.  With the addition of more extensive training requirements of the ETS, the industry recommends that the time frame be modified to once each quarter.
	This change would enable the operator to train more effectively without any negative effects on the actual training standard.  Large mines could be training over 300 people on SCSR transfers, escapeway systems, fire fighting and evacuation drills.
	This can be accomplished quarterly by providing timing flexibility, crews can be pulled systematically for training.  If there is a concern that someone might train at the end of the quarter, or at the beginning of the next, the rules could be written to provide that training must be accomplished in a window of time.  The schedule can be listed in the plan.
	75.1502(c)(2), Interwest Mining Company disagrees with the idea that all people must travel the entire escapeway every 90 days as part of the training requirements.  This is not training as the term is defined.  Physically traveling an entry does not train a person on escape.
	It would be more logical to train miners on escapeways as to the entrance from their working stations, lifeline systems, SCSR locations, physical issues in the escapeways for example, areas that are low or are more difficult to travel through, and locations where decisions need to be made, such as overcasts, et cetera.
	The second issue with travel of escapeways by all employees is the physical condition of the people.  The coal industry has an aging workforce, whose average age is in the early 50s.  Requiring miners to walk escapeways, rather than traveling by personnel carriers, or walking short distances could cause undue stress upon cardiovascular systems or personal injuries such as strains and sprains, which is the nation's largest injury type.
	The ETS states in the same section that miners may have to travel through long and difficult underground travelways.  This confirms that walking escapeways is laborious and could cause illness such as cardiovascular failures or injuries upon the aging minor.
	During the drill, miners could travel by personnel carriers, or walk short distances, as described under 75.383(b)(1), 2,000 feet or to a ventilation split.  This would have the same effect upon training and education, demonstrating the condition of the escapeways, lifelines, and stored SCSRs if applicable.  We recommend that this section be changed to require the operator to provide quarterly training to all employees on escape routes, emergency escape scenarios, SCSR locations, and areas in the escape system where decisions for escape need to be made.
	75.1502(c)(2)(ii), Interwest Mining Company wants to reinforce the position that donning and transfer training on SCSRs can be accomplished more effectively on the surface.  We support the Agency's recognition of this as reflected in the Emergency Temporary Compliance Guide that has been posted on the MSHA website.
	75.1714-2, Self-rescuer Devices, Interwest Mining Company supports the Agency's effort to enhance the resources available to our employees and others to evacuate safely from underground coal mines in the event of an emergency.  In an emergency situation however, it is critical that additional SCSR storage contemplated by the ETS be used for prompt evacuation of the mine; barricading remains the last resort.
	As far as signage is concerned, while a good faith desire to improve the exiting standards is apparent throughout the ETS, it may in may instances, it regulates language that is restrictive to the point of being counterproductive.  For example, the term SCSR is an industry-wide term that is used throughout the ETS.
	Yet Section 75.1714-2(f) requires the words self-rescuer or self-rescuers be used on storage location signs.  Under the circumstances requiring miners with existing SCSR storage location signs to invest the time and capital installing signs stating self-rescuers is counterproductive.
	SCSRs in primary and alternate escapeways.  Section 75.1714-4(c) has requirements for additional SCSR storage in the primary and alternative escapeways to augment other SCSR requirements where needed to provide enough oxygen for all persons to safely evacuate.  Where the operator determines additional SCSRs are required, the operator must submit a plan setting forth the location, quantity and type of additional SCSRs and may be required by the district manager to demonstrate the plan's adequacy.
	Based on the plain language of this provision and the preamble, a number of operators have proposed as an alternative the use of airlocks associated between adjacent escapeways for storage of SCSRs along with important emergency supplies.  The use of airlocks has the additional benefit of providing employees with an area isolated from the main air courses for the transfer of SCSR units.
	Another alternative proposal is to build an SCSR storage unit into the stopping to permit storage units to be accessible from either escapeway.  Both of these proposals are simple and functional.
	Moreover, Section 75.1714-4(c) does not require the identical quantities of additional units to be stored both in the primary and alternative escapeway.  Rather, this section only requires additional units in the primary and alternative escapeways.
	In addition, the operator's alternatives described above place the SCSRs in locations to satisfy both as primary and alternate escape storages.  And we have a couple of comments, specific questions raised in the preamble.
	MSHA is soliciting comments on whether filter self-rescuers should be phased out.  Our response is that these units have historically proven serviceable and provided mineworthy protection against hazardous levels of carbon monoxide.  Thus, while many operators are voluntarily eliminating filtered self-rescuers, some may still elect to continue with filter self-rescuers use to supplement the oxygen units required by the ETS.  We recommend that for the immediate future, that the Agency refrain from any action on these units.
	Question, MSHA is soliciting comments on whether operators should report details such as serial numbers for SCSRs deployed at the mine to the district manager on a semi-annual basis.  Our response is while this information would facilitate research oriented data gathering and enhance the thoroughness of any recall effort, the Agency first needs to arrive at a mechanism, such as a bar code to facilitate this data gathering.
	Even with such a mechanism, such data gathering will be time consuming.  In our view, there is no adequate justification to shoulder this additional responsibility on the industry.
	And our final comment is, MSHA is soliciting comments on storage location for out by persons such as pumpers.  Our response is first, all underground personnel must be provided with the appropriate protective devices.
	Further, the question of how to cover out by personnel, such as pumpers is not a new one for operators with existing SCSRs storage plans.  In general, existing storage plans provided for smaller SCSR caches to cover these individuals at designated locations such as belt drives, designated locations long belts, and along bleeder travelways.  And I thank you for your time in allowing us to comment.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you, Mr. Sanich.  I have one comment to make, and then I have to have a couple of questions of you.  And first of all, I think probably everybody heard you.  And I don't know if anybody here was there.
	I attended the workshop last week, as some of you know about.  The one, the NIOSH-MSHA workshop on mine rescue technology.  And it was a good workshop.
	And one of the things I would like to say, and you made that statement in your comment, is that we continue to iterate that in the case of a mine emergency that barricading is the last resort, and that miners ought to be trained to escape as the I guess, if you want to say, the first line of defense then, that is escape, emergency escape.  And the last line is barricade.  So that is an important point, and that is the Agency's position.
	On your comments that you made on Part 50, immediate notification, have you had any and recognizing that the ETS has been in effect only a short period of time, have you had any experience under the ETS with respect to the reporting requirement?
	MR. SANICH:  For our mine specifically?
	MS. SILVEY:  For your mine, yes.
	MR. SANICH:  Not yet.
	MS. SILVEY:  Not yet.  Okay.  I probably should have asked somebody else that, but it only came to me now.  The next thing, you mentioned, and these aren't necessarily in the order.  They aren't in the order in which you commented.
	But you mentioned in terms of traveling, you said traveling the escapeway was not training.  But at the same time, you did suggest that there are locations such as overcast, manors where people do need to know particular parameters if there are unique things about traveling there.  So your position is then that they get out and travel at those areas, but not but in the other parts of the escapeway, they do not need to travel.
	MR. SANICH:  Yes.  Primarily, any area that has non-routine, so in other words, you just get in an entry and walk.  So where there are obstructions, where there are areas where conditions change, where there are SCSR caches, those locations we believe would benefit the miner more than just the exercise of walking from A to B.  So to see those key areas of their escape route, I believe would serve better than to just walk for the sake of walking.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Well then, following on to that, you also mentioned that requiring travel could cause undue stress, and you spoke about the aging mining population et cetera.  Do you have any specific, and you don't have to, if you have it, you don't have to give it to me now, but before the comment period closes, do you have any specific information or evidence of requiring miners to travel the escapeway either cause an undue stress or causing further accidents or whatever danger.  If you have any specific information or data on that.
	MR. SANICH:  I will check on that.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  If you could provide it.  Anybody else?
	MR. SNASHELL:  Have you had any particular problems under the current notification standard which requires immediate notification?
	MR. SANICH:  No, we haven't.
	MR. SNASHELL:  So in the past, you haven't had any problems with, well, I should say the current, but before the ETS where it just said, immediate notification?
	MR. SANICH:  I would suggest that we probably have had the opportunity to investigate to a point that we have or we do not have an emergency prior to making a phone call.  So we do the best we can essentially to follow the criteria under Part 50.
	But again, we sense that, I mean you can determine, I believe, if you do have a true emergency, quite honestly, right away, in some respects.  But others are going to take some time to investigate the issue.
	MR. SNASHELL:  On the point that you made about not requiring people to necessarily travel the entire escapeway in a drill, there is some feeling that it seems logical that if in a natural emergency you are going to be required to be on foot, that even to put the miners through a foot drill makes more sense.  That perhaps there could be tethering in conjunction with that.
	It is a different experience, so that when they do do an emergency evacuation, the whole sensation of it is not new to them.  So in other words, you try and duplicate as much as you can the actual circumstances of an emergency evacuation.
	Now there is some elaboration on that, but perhaps there should be smoke training as well.  And what would your response be to that concern?
	MR. SANICH:  Well again, I don't necessarily agree with the fact that it is it shouldn't be almost like a sports drill if you will, to see what your endurance is.  What it should do is, it should train employees based on what it is they are going to confront in the time of the emergency.  And again, if the entryway for the most part is less or lacking obstacles and stuff, that was my point, or our point as far as why go through that entire exercise when from a training standpoint, you could show and demonstrate where specific areas of concern would be.
	MR. SNASHELL:  You also said that in donning and transferring an SCSR, that is more effectively done on the surface, that training?
	MR. SANICH:  Yes.
	MR. SNASHELL:  Could you say why?
	MR. SANICH:  I could say that most of the training SCSRs that we have, they require assembly to put them back together.  If they are in an area where you don't have the mud and debris and stuff to where as you actually don these, if you were utilizing the three plus three method, these things are going to get trashed in a very quick period of time, versus allowing to be on the surface, you can simulate lights out, miners lights, put your cap down, go through that whole process and actually even utilize smoke-filled rooms if necessary.
	MR. SNASHELL:  Thank you.
	MR. MACLEOD:  Just as a clarification, or maybe I just misunderstood it, you were talking about the scenarios, and that they would be useful training exercises for people who were involved in fire fighting.  Was that exclusive in that the rest of the people would not need this scenario training?
	Because in developing the scenario is a concept that we were thinking of was these are conditions that would actually require a miner to don the apparatus and evacuate the mine.  And that was the notion of that training.  So I just wanted you maybe I misunderstood what you said.
	MR. SANICH:  Well, and I believe our comments were directed towards the fire fighting portion of it.
	MR. MACLEOD:  Okay.  And you don't think it should be for miners, or you think in addition to?
	MR. SANICH:  Well, I think our comment primarily is to give us some flexibility to determine what scenarios we want to use rather than be tied to a plan.
	MR. MACLEOD:  Great.  Thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  That is funny.  I had written that down, because you said you wanted the scenario that they would be developed and used.  But then you said, but not as a part of what the training plan.
	MR. SANICH:  Correct.
	MS. SILVEY:  So I had asked I was going to ask how exactly that would work.  But I think here, I guess you just didn't you wanted the flexibility.
	MR. SANICH:  Right.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Sanich.  Our next speaker is Dale Byram with Jim Walters Resources, Inc.
	(Pause.)
	MR. BYRAM:  Hello.  My name is Dale Byram.  I am General Manager of Safety and Training for Jim Walters Resources in Brookwood, Alabama.
	The employees of Jim Walters Resources in Alabama understand the effect that a mine disaster has on a workforce and everyone included.  And our heartfelt thoughts and prayers are with the families and everyone affected by the disaster so far this year.
	In 2001, we experienced a disaster at our Number Five coal mine, where we lost 13 of our co-workers and friends.  Having the opportunity to speak to you about your Emergency Temporary Standard is important to us because there are certain aspects that we believe that we have input that we would like to share.
	There will be times when I am sure I will repeat some of the things that has already been said today.  I would like to look at that more as in support of our industry, versus being repetitious.  So if you will bear with me on that, I would appreciate that.
	And I will try and take it in sections.  And my comments are specific to the Emergency Temporary Standard and not necessarily to the comments that we heard at the opening remarks this morning, okay.
	Part 50, when dealing with a mine emergency, early notification is essential to both state and federal agencies.  But does MSHA really want a mine site's responsible person to be distracted from the importance of managing an emergency scene, and make calls that could cost precious minutes.  The ETS requires operators to notify MSHA immediately at once, within 15 minutes maximum of a 30 CFR 50.2(h) accident.
	It is MSHA's belief that early notification will enhance appropriate emergency response.  However, when faced with a serious event, operators cannot rely on MSHA to remotely manage the first minutes of a mine emergency.  Operators should be allowed to manage their event until it is controllable or until the need for additional support is identified.
	During these early stages, the 15-minute requirement can literally become intrusive and actually impair critical emergency management.  MSHA's strength lies in second and third tiered response.
	We recommend that the 15 minute notification period required by the ETS be revised to allow flexibility for the operator to manage the situation involving serious injuries or entrapment or other related injuries that require undivided attention in the early stages of the emergency response.  In contrast however, we do support immediate notification for a fatality or for an event that would potentially need mine rescue or mine rescue recovery and response.
	As stated earlier, the time required to comply with immediate notification has the potential to become more intrusive.  Per the ETS, an operator is obligated to contact their district office when reporting a 30 CFR Part 50.2(h) accident.  If the district office is unavailable, the ETS directs the operator to continue trying to make contact by following all prompts from their answering services.
	If unsuccessful in contacting the local MSHA district office, this ETS continues to require operators to use an alternate number for contacting MSHA headquarters 800 toll-free line.  This line has 24 hour seven day per week answering protocols.
	Recently, we got all of our safety department together on a speaker phone as a learning exercise.  And we called the MSHA 800 toll free line to test the procedures and to discuss information needed to train our responsible persons.  After several rings our call was answered, and we were promptly put on hold.
	After two minutes, the operator again answered and placed us on hold for a second time.  Later, when she returned, she asked for our complaint.  We explained that we had no complaint; that we just wanted to learn more about the emergency call line protocols.  We were informed that the person we needed to talk with was at lunch, but that she would be glad to send an e-mail with our request.
	And when we did, we asked that she would include to please return the call as soon as possible.  This took place about 11:40 in the morning, Central Standard Time.  We received a call back from our local district manager at 3:05 that afternoon.
	And the district manager and I discussed the issues at hand, and explained clearly why we had attempted to make this call.  It wasn't to try the Agency.  It was to learn how to train our people.  At Jim Walters Resources, emergency response is important to us.
	We recommend that MSHA develop a universal call system to be used by all MSHA district offices.  To prevent unnecessary delay in after-business hour calls, the system could be equipped with automatic rollover to the MSHA headquarters 800 line.  We further recommend that district offices and MSHA headquarters 800 toll free line receiving the emergency be adequately staffed with persons trained to be able to cover the intent.
	Were delays in emergency response prior to this ETS a failure of the existing regulation?  We believe that requirements listed in 30 CFR Part 49 are clear.  Rescue stations and teams are required be within two minutes of the miners that they are responsible for covering.  The Agency's attempt to enhance response by requiring more prompt notification will not change response times to an emergency, if a mine rescue team fails to respond in a timely manner.
	This requirement is the same for in-house and contracted mine rescue teams.  And it is the responsibility of the Agency, the operator and team members to ensure compliance with this regulation.  MSHA can best serve our miners by evaluating each operator's emergency capability and facilitating through enforcement when necessary the development of appropriate procedures to meet today's existing standards.
	If a mine rescue team response time issues were partly responsible for generating the ETS, then that particular aspect of the regulation should also be explored.  If delayed mine rescue response is specific to contracted mine rescue teams or their availability, then MSHA should consider additional requirements for operators dependent upon contacted mine rescue teams.
	In reference to mine fires, MSHA has asked for comments on whether a revision should be made to cover all unplanned underground mine fires, or unplanned underground mine fires of a particular type.  We do not support this position and believe that the definition of accident as related to 50.2.(h)(6) is adequate to ensure the safety of miners.
	A mine may deal with potential fire situations, such as smoldering material, or hot rollers that are extinguished within a matter of moments after being discovered, and these present no serious hazard to the mine or the miners.  Yet if a fire of significant size were to be located or recognized in the mine, through other notification requirements, this would already be in the system.
	On lifelines, we support the use of lifelines installed in both the primary and secondary escapeway.  When developing future recommendations, we request the Agency consider potential hazards associated with installation of lifelines in entries where track mounted or mobile equipment is operated.  We have lifelines in both our primary and secondary escapeways.  And these are some of the challenges that we have had to face.
	In addition, consideration should be given to maintaining the lifelines to within 500 feet of the loading point on active working sections, long walls or where equipment is being installed or removed.  With the amount of movement on the sections, lifelines could generate additional hazards.  Some other alternate means of identifying direction to get to your lifelines should be thought about.
	Tethers.  We believe that tethers should be provided, and miners trained to make informed decision as to how and if they should be used.  Since evacuation can be affected by conditions of the emergency, the use of tethers should not be mandated.
	It should be the ability of the miners or the team that is determining that they must escape whether or not it would be an asset to use them.  Earlier, I understood that you questioned about tethers, about length and how they should be connected and everything.
	Our particular tethers are about 50 to 60 feet long, they contain twelve loops, not connecting devices.  You never know if the team escaping or the group of miners escaping may run into a situation where another miner may impair travel of the entire team, and then other questions and challenges then are facing the guys trying to get out of the mine.
	Under 75.1502, mine emergency evacuation and fire fighting program of instruction.  Under this ETS, we recommend that 75.1502-1 be changed from a 90 day training requirement to a quarterly requirement.  Quarterly requirements provide the operator the flexibility to maximize the training of the miners in emergency evacuation and it allows us a more timely manner in which to make the drills for miners that have missed.
	The paragraph 75.1502(c)(2) is added to enhance miner evacuation.  We disagree with the Agency's position that all miners must travel the entire escapeway every 90 days as part of the training requirement.  Physically traveling an entry does not train the person on escape.  And I think we have heard that before my presentation.
	Under the new ETS, operators must establish continuous lifelines through both the primary and secondary escapeway.  It would be more logical to train the miners as to how to reach these lifelines from their workstations or workplaces, how to physically locate them.  Again, the locations of SCSRs or other issues that you may run into as you escape.
	Another reason for not needing to physically walk the entire escapeway, if you have continuous lifeline, then even a visitor who is properly trained to know which direction the cones are established as you mentioned earlier, would not what once they were able to make physical contact to the lifeline, they could escape, even if they were by their selves.
	Additional concerns with traveling escapeways by all employees are the physical conditions of the miners.  At Jim Walters Resources, our mean age is about 51 to 52 years old.  As we hire new miners, this age comes down.
	We risk knees and backs to walk a miner for five miles out of our coal mine.  In an emergency situation, knees or backs don't even count.  We get them out of the mine.
	And in our particular situation, we are unable to ride our alternate or secondary escapeway, and so in our application, they would literally physically have to walk.  In the Agency's Q & A, guidelines number two, it prohibits an operator from using a miner to don an SCSR to establish the distance for the SCSR storage due to the unnecessary strain on the miner's physical condition.
	Having a miner travel the entire escapeway for training purposes four times a year will subject them pretty much to the same undue physical stress.  The ETS states that in the same section, the miner may have to travel through long and difficult underground travelways, confirming the dangers associated with this task.
	75.1502 fire drills.  This ETS is concerned with the quality of fire drills, and the efficiency of miners' ability to fight fires.  This ETS eliminates the opportunity for underground miners to participate in fire fighting skills on actual fires.
	We believe that underground mine fire fighting can be enhanced if this ETS would give credit for at least one fire fighting drill per year to be conducted on the surface of a coal mine, where miners could actually fight fire with fire fighting equipment.  The requirement for conducting underground fire drills in this ETS eliminates the ability for actual hands-on fire fighting in the underground setting.
	75.1502(c)(3), the checklist.  The addition of the four scenarios incorporated into the fire fighting and evacuation drill ensures miners' exposures to all aspects of an emergency drill.  Required record keeping associated with these drills suffice for the need of a checklist.  However, if it was needed as an adjunct for training, and the operator chose to do so, we think that would be helpful, but it should not be mandated.
	75.1502(a)(1)(ii), the scenarios.  We disagree with the Agency's position that for training purposes, best options can be predetermined for a mine emergency evacuation.  Options for escape must be determined by the results and the issues facing the miners at that time.
	30 CFR 75.1714-4(c), MSHA has rejected a request to design SCSR storage sites that can be accessed from either the primary or secondary escapeways when located in parallel entries.  We believe allowing access to cached SCSRs from either the primary or secondary escapeway where possible is safe and reasonable.
	Miners and operators benefit from permitting such a design from having one known location rather than two separate caches in different areas.  Manufacturers may not agree, yet storing large numbers of SCSRs increases potential fire hazards.  Manufacturers of SCSRs are overwhelmed with orders, and are projecting one year wait times on their backorders.
	Allowing a cache to be accessed from either the primary or secondary escapeway we can more accurately represent the number of additional self-rescuers needed in storage without reducing the number of SCSRs needed for miners to escape.  The reduction in SCSRs required in duplicate caches would increase an operator's availability and his ability to comply with the regulation in a more timely manner.
	We recommend that MSHA reconsider allowing operators to cache SCSRs that can be accessed where possible from either the primary or secondary escapeways.  90 day tests for a particular type of a stored SCSR should be revised to eliminate the shake test.  This is the CSE unit.  If it is not being transported, where you don't risk breaking the crystals down within the unit, transported or belt worn.
	And finally, the section on storage sites.  MSHA has stated in the preamble that an operator may use any reliable method of choosing SCSR storage locations where miners can swap to another SCSR.  And yet as we talk with the Agency, and we see new printed information, there seems to be the Agency taking a position on the 5,000 feet and the 2,500 feet.
	So as operators, we really need direction on how the Agency intends for us to determine that distance.  There is inherent danger in swapping from SCSR to another in an irrespirable atmosphere.  We know that.  It is going to require this additional training, and we support the additional training required to teach miners to swap from one SCSRs to another.
	We also appreciate the agency considering the use of barricade chambers.  And we also support the use of the term barricade chambers.  As all of us within the industry hire new miners, these new miners don't need to be comfortable with the term safe house or rescue chamber.
	We need to continue with the message that was mentioned earlier.  That the primary purpose of evacuation is to exit the mine.  That is the barricade chamber is the last tool in the tool box for a miner to survive.
	We appreciate the opportunity to talk today.  It is a benefit to be here, and to hear the other people present and you too.  Thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you, sir.
	MR. SHERER:  Mr. Byram, you were talking about problems with lifelines.
	MR. BYRAM:  Yes, sir.
	MR. SHERER:  With the tracks and mobile equipment.  Could you expand upon that a bit for us?
	MR. BYRAM:  As much as a mine site tries to hang the lifeline out of the way of moving equipment, as you transport materials in the mine, every operator will experience a situation where a load may become loose and shift.  It is not supposed to, but that is reality.
	If a lifeline is hooked by moving equipment, then everyone in proximity of that lifeline could be injured by the lifeline being pulled into their area, their walkway, or their space.  If a lifeline is connected to a timber, and a piece of equipment jerked the timber down, you could even go beyond by creating more roof or rib dangers to the mine.  So there is several things.
	MR. SHERER:  You mentioned that you are currently using lifelines.
	MR. BYRAM:  Yes, sir.
	MR. SHERER:  What is your experience with those lifelines in those areas?
	MR. BYRAM:  You have to ensure that you have it out of the way as much as possible, yet accessible to the miners.  And there is challenges with the height of the coal, if you are twin seaming, or if you are in a lower area.  If you cross over tracks at intersections, all of these are challenges.
	MS. SILVEY:  I have a few questions, and maybe some comments.  In your comments on Part 50 notification, you state sort of a two tier approach.  And quite honestly we heard that earlier today.
	Maybe I am phrasing it as two tiered, but somebody else made a comment along this line.  And do I take your comment to mean that at least with respect to notification or fatalities and accidents with a potential for required mine rescue and/or recovery response that you are in agreement with the ETS requirement of at least of immediate and at least within 15 minutes?
	MR. BYRAM:  Of the fatalities, for the situation requiring mine rescue?
	MS. SILVEY:  For the fatalities?
	MR. BYRAM:  Yes, ma'am.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  All right.  And we will look into this situation that you gave, as you gave it a training experience, with respect to when your safety department called MSHA headquarters.  Okay, on the scenarios.
	MR. BYRAM:  Yes, ma'am.
	MS. SILVEY:  You spoke, because quite honestly we included templates for those four scenarios.  And you said that this option, you disagreed with our position on that for training purposes; that best options can be predetermined.  You disagree that they can be predetermined for a mine emergency, and that options for escape must be determined by the results of issues facing the miners.
	And I wanted you to go into a little bit on that.  I didn't quite understand that exactly.  So when you are developing the training program and the training plan, what would you then include in that?
	MR. BYRAM:  Okay.  To clarify.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.
	MR. BYRAM:  Where we do not agree that you can predetermine the actions of the miners.  If we say okay on Section four, you have just had a water inundation, you should go and give them a route to go at that point in time.  That may not be the best thing if that were to take place.
	So what you do is you train the miners in, you have a primary and a secondary escapeway.  If you have this event take place, what would be the safest most efficient way to get out of this working section?
	And as an operator, I need to facilitate that crew in that discussion.  Not me predetermining and tell them where to go, other than the primary and secondary escapeways.
	MR. MACLEOD:  I am a little concerned with the term predetermined only from the standpoint that I am hopeful we didn't write something that gave that impression.  But the intent was that the scenarios would be situational, and that they would be additional tools that the miners would be able to use to do just what you were saying.
	Something that occurs in your mind that reach the level of where they needed to don an apparatus, notwithstanding inundation, but they would know to make the right decisions in these scenarios would give them some additional knowledge tools if you will to be able to make those decisions that you are talking about.  So I was hoping to sort of may re-articulate it in the preamble we did.  Okay.
	MR. BYRAM:  Yes.  And, but in trying to make the best of all worlds, when we developed our scenarios, every scenario, including water inundation ended up requiring the use of a self-rescuer by blocking ventilation and reducing the oxygen content and increasing methane.  So you can be flexible with every option that you use.  We just didn't agree from the wording of the ETS that you predetermined.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  We will look into that.
	MR. SPROUL:  I have another question on the lifeline issue.  Did I understand you to say that you were concerned about extending the lifeline all the way up to the section loading point, because it might be problematic, and you were suggesting that the life line actually start something like as much as 500 feet out by and that you have some way of pointing the miners to it.
	MR. BYRAM:  Yes.  It doesn't have to be all the way out to 500 feet.  That is just kind of a planting a seed for evaluation.
	MR. SPROUL:  Okay.
	MR. BYRAM:  On a working section, you literally have more mobile equipment in process than anywhere else in the mine.  And so you have the greatest potential of having problems with lifelines.  In addition though, all due respect, you also have the greatest number of people you want to facilitate to the lifeline in that area.
	So I don't think we are there yet.  I think we all need to work together on what is the best way to solve that.
	MR. SPROUL:  But did you have any specific ideas, or do you have any experience with what methods you would use to point the miners to locating the lifeline?
	MR. BYRAM:  Yes, sir.  We are researching that right now.  We are looking into directional arrows.  We already do that.  And we are looking into like, directional, not cones, but some type of directional methods that we can place on timbers, identify water lines.  I don't think anybody is too big on using the high line, the high voltage line to get out.
	But there again, we are in a learning stage ourselves.  We are trying to determine what is best for our miners in that scenario.  And I don't think you know, we are open if anyone else has suggestions, we would love to hear it.
	MR. SPROUL:  Thank you.
	MR. BYRAM:  Thank you.
	MR. KRAVITZ:  I wanted to address the 75.1502, or actually this one he falls under self-rescuer storage.  But in the Q&As guidelines too, I don't believe we say prohibit the operators having a miner don an SCSR.  I think are discouraging it.  But I don't think we used prohibit.
	MR. SHERER:  No.  We don't recommend it.  But we have actually had numerous operators that have done that.  And some very interesting results that we have heard anecdotal reports of.
	MR. KRAVITZ:  One of the things we are trying to discourage is people using old SCSRs that have been beat around and they are about ready for the garbage heap and then they say we are going to do a walkout trial with this.  And they end up getting into some pretty bad stuff, where you might loosen up some KO2 dust and get somebody sick just using the thing.
	And that is the purpose of the shake test, to determine how much chemical bad degradation you actually do have.  And one of the comments you made, you recommend doing away with the 90 day shake test.  I think that one of the problems it would seem in the past is, the center designated for storage.
	Sometimes we will go to a storage and we will find there are dirty units.  You know that they haven't been in the storage room 100 percent of the time.  So that was one thing we were trying to avoid.  If we can do the shake test, regardless of whether or not the designated storage, it still proves that those self-rescuers are worthy of taking a person out of the mine alive.  So that is what we are trying to promote.
	MR. BYRAM:  I appreciate those comments, Jeff.  I am trying to find, it was in the number two.  And I may have misread it.  But where it refers to not supporting using an SCSR
	MR. KRAVITZ:  Yes.  Well, we are not supporting, but we are not prohibiting it, either.
	MR. BYRAM:  And one other comment too, that concerned me, because of the rescuer is reaching its end life, you may not accurately get the distance that you would normally get.  Well guys, and this, if they are still acceptable, what are they doing in the mine?  I have to be my primary objective is to help the safety of the miner.
	MR. KRAVITZ:  Sure.  Well hopefully, you don't have the situation where we have been to other mines where they haven't been keeping up with their visual examinations, and we found SCSRs with dents in them, and other types of problems.  So you know, those are the types of SCSRs we really don't want to see used.
	But SCSRs that pass the shake test, you know, I don't have any problem with you using those things.  In fact, MSHA can require the use of a demonstration if someone submits a plan for a SCSR storage location, and MSHA questions whether or not that is realistic.  And so in fact, MSHA could do that, request using a walkout trial using an SCSR.
	And the last thing I wanted to talk about was, you know, the switchover between one SCSR from the other in irrespirable atmospheres.  And what NIOSH and MSHA are doing right now, we are developing a procedure, which we are going to field test.  And then we are going to disseminate that just as we had with the three plus three donning procedure.
	MR. BYRAM:  Okay.
	MR. KRAVITZ:  And I think that will help a long way to coming up with a tried and true.  We have got the same researchers that addressed the three plus three addressing the transfer now too.
	And we are going to redo all the training modules we have.  The ones you see up on the interactive, for MSHA.gov.  We are going to do redo those and include that transfer into our videos and into our computer based training.
	MR. BYRAM:  Okay.
	MR. KRAVITZ:  And thanks for your comments.
	MR. BYRAM:  Okay.  Thank you.  We will respond in writing to the comments from your opening statement.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you very much.  Can we go off the record for just one moment, please?
	(Off the record.)
	MS. SILVEY:  Next on our list, we have Tain Curtis, Local 1769 UMWA, Deer Creek Mine.  Mr. Curtis.
	MR. CURTIS:  Thank you for the opportunity to voice our concerns.  We have heard a lot of talk today about the miner.  And I am a miner.  I have 25 years of experience as a coal miner.  I am not a safety professional, just a miner.  And I represent 276 miners at the Deer Creek Mine in Huntington, Utah.
	The ETS in my opinion, stresses many places that there is improvements.  But it also falls short in many other places, and I will try to address those places.  Number one, notification of MSHA.  I am not aware of any problem with our mine, our facility, with the way that notification has been going.  I feel comfortable with it.
	I know as a member of the mine rescue team, when Willow Creek had the explosion that we were on the site before MSHA was.  Many of us was there before the survivors were brought out of the mine from our team, to back up their team.  So notification, I am not sure if that is an area that needs to be reevaluated.
	Training and storage of SCSRs.  The only concern I have is SCSRs are rated for one hour.  Depending on the size and the exertion of the person, sometimes that person will use up an SCSRs in as little as 45 minutes.  I believe the storage should be comparable to that.  I am not sure if the 15 percent rule that you have got justifies that 15 minutes.
	I know we run a deep operation.  We are a long ways from the surface.  We do have outer portals that we are accessing now, that are close, within seven miles of working sections.  So I would think that that 45 minutes might be something to look at.
	Training.  I noticed that barricading is still one of the things that needs to be trained on.  And the accidents that happened this year, I worry about the mine rescue capabilities.  In our area, we have mine rescue teams that are required by law.  But the evaluation of those mine rescue teams, who does that evaluation?
	The mine operators.  There are several teams that do not complete in mine rescue teams where teams can be evaluated under stressful circumstances.  We have the only team in our area that competes in any kind of contest where any kind of evaluation is done on their training.
	So if we are going to continue to teach people and have to have people maybe use that as a last resort, a barricading or even the recovery of people, we need to better evaluate our mine rescue scenarios.  And the only way to do that is through people participating in contests, and also have their own teams available for that.
	I know that is not part of this standards, but it really needs to be looked at because if a team comes in to help another team, and there is no team there, then you don't have people to go with you that knows the mine.  So I feel that is very important about mine rescue teams.
	Number four, the installation and maintenance of lifelines.  This could prove important to us, in a disaster.  If you didn't have a in a disaster, if they don't get destroyed, is one of my big concerns.  And also a point was raised earlier about mobile equipment.
	In the west, we use a lot of diesel equipment.  And our main intakes is our primary escapeways.  Our haulage equipment going in and out of the mine, hauling materials to the sections travel these entries.  So there is big large considerations that need to be given for these areas on the placement of the lifelines.
	Also, the use of link lines.  We have already implemented in our mine that all the mantrips, all the kitchen areas, all the storage areas for the SCSRs have a link line there.  I am not exactly sure about the lengths.  But I know our mantrips are capable of hauling twelve people and the ones that are in the mantrips are capable of twelve people with a loop for them to either clip onto or hang onto.
	I think you need to be flexible whether you link to it, or just hang on to it.  You need to have that flexibility.  Our primary escapeway now is five miles, and our secondary escapeway is close to six and half.  So that is a total of eleven and a half miles that these link lines will be used.  I agree with the installation of the link lines.  I am just concerned about the maintenance of them.
	If you for, example, if you use a metal lifeline, you are going to be dragging it for a long ways when it hooks onto a piece of equipment.  And that could create an additional hazard along the roadways.  So things like that need to be considered.  Breakaway points and that.
	I forgot to mention on the third point, excuse me for my notes here.  I don't spend a lot of time in an office preparing statements.
	Okay, emergency evacuation and training of the miners.  We have miners at our mine that are approaching, well, I am not sure about the average, the mean age.  We have hired some younger miners.  We have probably brought it down to maybe 50 or 48.
	My concern is, these miners, there is miners that has come to me and said, if I have to walk out, somebody is going to have to carry me.  Their condition is such that walking out every quarter would be beneficial for them personally, but maybe unbeneficial for us who may have to pack them out on those training exercises.  So I would consider that
	(Loud talking in background.)
	MR. CURTIS:  It is not bothering me, if it is bothering you.  Having to take into consideration that the escapeways that we use in the mine, that special emphasis may have to be put on those areas of concern, overcast, those kind of things that you can drive to from the primary escapeway and show the people those hazards that are associated with them.
	I know that as Mr. Byram mentioned that we really don't worry about backs and knees and heart attacks if you are having to escape.  But during a training exercise, it is important to take care of the miner.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.
	MR. CURTIS:  In closing, I appreciate the opportunity, and I would hope that efforts are given to the evaluation of mine rescue teams.  Again, I can't express the importance of that.
	Knowing the capabilities of a team that you are going to go back up or that they are going to come and help you is very important, and the only way to do that is through a contest or having MSHA monitor the training of mine rescue teams.  Also make a consideration is that the four hours that is done monthly be increased, because we have talked about more training and more training.  But this is more training for these individuals that do this should be considered also.
	Talking about the storage of SCSRs I apologize for jumping all over, but I don't see a problem personally with having an airlock system where you store SCSRs.  I personally would feel more comfortable going into an airlock and changing an SCSR for another one, even though I know that I would understand that you would do it, going from one to the other with trying to retain yourself.  So anyway, I appreciate the opportunity and thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you.  And particularly thank you for the specific comments you made.  I just had a couple of things.  When you were talking about training and barricading needs to be trained on.  And several of us now have spoken about that.  And I think later you said that you mean that in terms of barricading being the last resort?
	MR. CURTIS:  Correct.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  Okay.
	MR. CURTIS:  I have had an opportunity to see a rescue chamber, a commercially built one.  While I wasn't personally impressed with them, I know that they are not really cost effective.  But I would hate to be the one to say how much you put on a life.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  I was interested in your comments about you said that you all have linklines with loops.  And you talked about the length of your escapeways.  How long have you all been using the linklines?
	MR. CURTIS:  Since the first of the year, because of the disasters that have happened.
	MS. SILVEY:  Since the first of this year.
	MR. CURTIS:  Particularly, I think it was the Alma that prompted us to put them in our mantrips.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.
	MR. CURTIS:  And it was because of that.  I don't want to say too many good things about our safety people, but they are proactive instead of reactive.
	MS. SILVEY:  You can say something good about them.  That was humor.
	MR. SHERER:  Are these linklines what we have been referring to as tethers?
	MR. CURTIS:  Yes.  They are approximately 25 or 30 feet long with a loop in them every three or four feet.  And personally, I don't see a problem with having the loop, because most miners, with the stuff they carry on their belt, there is a way that they could link to it, if they wanted to, if they needed to.
	MS. SILVEY:  So have you I take it.  You haven't used them in training or anything, or have you?    
	MR. CURTIS:  The training that we have had so far with them is that everybody has been made aware that they are there.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.
	MR. CURTIS:  We have had training in a smoke chamber where they have linked them.  I am not sure if they linked themselves together or if they just grabbed it and walked through.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you very much, Mr. Curtis.  Okay.  Next we have Kenneth Gunter with UMWA Local 1769.
	MR. GUNTER:  Thank you for the opportunity to sit here, but obviously, I am not a professional safety person either.  I was notified pretty late on coming to this meeting, so I am a little underprepared.  But hopefully I can correct that at a later date with some written statements.  I will go ahead and read what I have got, and answer any questions.
	My name is Kenneth Gunter.  I represent United Mine Workers of America, Local 1769.  I am a member of the local Executive Board and a member of the Mine Safety Committee.  I have 31 years underground experience at the Deer Creek Mine.
	Through our mine, we travel roughly twelve miles from the surface facilities to the working sections.  The nearest point to which we can escape to the surface is nearly six miles from our working sections.  With my current job of pump examiner, I am frequently required to work in long wall bleeder systems that is nearly five miles around.
	With these distances to travel, my fellow workers and I are very concerned with the Emergency Temporary Standards.  I don't feel there can be there can never be enough emphasis put on the need to maintain and mark our escapeways.
	At our mine, we have very large diesel powered equipment operating in our intake escapeways throughout the mine, making the installation and maintenance of a continuous lifeline as described very difficult at best.  But I feel with some provisions for areas where equipment must cross over the lifelines on a regular basis, it would be possible to install them and maintain them, as well as train the men in the location and use of them.
	As stated in the Emergency Temporary Standards, it should be required that everyone travel these routes both primary and secondary escapeways from their work areas to the surface, regularly in order to become completely familiar with them.  As for the storage and additional SCSRs should be standardized to the location beginning at the mouth of each section.  The same crosscut number throughout the mine.
	For example, for the storage area at the mouth of that first left section, and the next one at the crosscut 40, the next one at a crosscut 80.  This should also be followed for the next section, the second left section, beginning at the mouth in the same intervals throughout the mine.  With the standardizing of the locations, workers really need to remember a few crosscut numbers to know where the units are stored, and where they can be found.
	As for the storage of these SCSRs, the storage areas should be well marked, well maintained and afforded accessibility.  Isolating the storage areas with stoppings on both sides of them will, with self closing manors on each end, to make them accessible from either direction, I believe isolating them in this manner will give the SCSRs better protection, as well as giving the men trying to escape a chance to have an area with considerably less smoke within which to change to a fresh SCSR.
	Although there is never any mention of them, in the Emergency Temporary Standard there should be a mine phone installation in these storage areas also.  As for training in the donning and use of the SCSR units, this should be practiced as at near an emergency situations as possible, even if it has to be done on the surface to create that.  That is okay.  And as often as possible, so the men can become completely comfortable with the donning and use of them.  Thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you very much.
	MR. SHERER:  Mr. Gunter, as a pumper, you are probably subject to covering large areas of the mine.  Do you have any suggestions as far as providing additional SCSRs for people like you who are in remote locations?
	That has been a question that we have had.  We don't want to subject people to carrying additional units, because of the weight and the ergonomic considerations of such.  But we certainly would welcome any comments that you might have.
	MR. GUNTER:  At our mine, I feel we fairly well cover that.  We store the units in the bleeder entries at 2,000 foot intervals, which is adequate.  We are on a cache blend.  We don't have to carry them with us.
	And for say for me to talk around to the bleeder entry, that is a five mile entry.  I can walk that in an hour and a half.  So it puts me within 20 minutes of an SCSR at the furthest from one to the next probably.
	MR. SHERER:  And you are normally carrying a WD-65 helper unit?
	MR. GUNTER:  Yes.  The mention of mine phones, I would like to see that completely throughout the bleeder system.  We do have we carry lights that they can send us a message through our lights.
	But in order for us to respond there is no mention of mine phones anywhere.  No regulations putting mine phones anywhere, in bleeder or in, as I mentioned, in the cache areas.
	MS. SILVEY:  Uh-huh.
	MR. GUNTER:  I would like to see that implemented.
	MR. SHERER:  Thank you.
	MR. KRAVITZ:  How many SCSRs are stored in the bleeders at each location?
	MR. GUNTER:  I believe there is just two.  I could be wrong on that.
	MR. KRAVITZ:  Should be sufficient.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you very much, Mr. Gunter.  We appreciate you.  Okay.  We now have Marion Loomis with the Wyoming Mining Association.  Okay.  That is all right.  Yes, thank you.
	MR. LOOMIS:  Madam Chairman, my name is Marion Loomis.  I am the Executive Director of the Wyoming Mining Association.  We, like everybody else, want to thank you for the opportunity to comment today.
	Wyoming Mining Association represents 25 mining companies in Wyoming producing bentonite, coal, trona and uranium.  We have 17 surface coal mines and 1 underground mine.  Those mines produce 35 percent of the nation's coal.  So we obviously lead the nation and are its primary producer.
	We have four underground trona mines.  Trona is processed into soda ash.  And those four mines produce 90 percent of the nation's soda ash.  We have a number of bentonite operations, and also lead the nation in production of bentonite as well as uranium.  Last year, Wyoming mines produced 405 million tons of coal, 17 million tons of trona, 5 million tons of bentonite and 1.3 million pounds of uranium.
	The emergency rule adopted by the Mine Safety and Health Administration is very important to all of us, all the miners in Wyoming.  And it is important to note that while mining has inherent risk as we all know, and is shown by the tragic accidents in West Virginia and others, the accident rate and fatality rates have been coming down in the nation, and we haven't talked too much about that today.  But I think that the industry has made a major commitment to try to reduce those.
	The safety record at Wyoming mines is remarkable over the past 20 years.  For instance, Wyoming coal mine has won the sentinels of safety award for surface coal mines, twelve out of the last 24 years.  And from a period from 1998 to 2003, Wyoming coal mines won the award every year.
	So safety is very important to us, in all aspects of the mining industry.  In 2004, the last year of which I have complete data, 85 separate mining operations worked for a combined total of 6.7 million manhours without a lost time accident.  Working in a Wyoming mine is actually safer than working in state government, manufacturing or agriculture.
	I have included a graph that shows the statistics for the Wyoming operations.  Finance, by the way, is the only one that was safer than coal operations in Wyoming.
	Stated in the emergency rules, the Emergency Temporary Standards includes requirements for immediate notification applicable to all underground and surface mines.  And I won't dwell on this.  Our major point is the notification.
	And in the Federal Register, it confused an awful lot of the mining industry, because it wasn't referenced as 15 minutes from the time the accident was determined to be an accident.  It says, if an accident occurs, it is 15 minutes.  And that has been interpreted as it reads there.  Not from the time that it is determined to be an accident.
	And so I appreciate your comments, Madam Chairman, that you would further clarify that to make sure what you are actually talking about when to determine when an accident occurs.  But we would encourage you to consider the 30-minute time notice for that.  We think that is a more realistic time frame to try to address it.
	As you can understand, when you are faced with a $5,000 fine, the first reaction of some might be just to get out, and get the accident reported, rather than trying to do everything in the mine to make sure that they are addressing the accident, or the issues that need to be addressed.  There was one other comment that was brought to my attention here, and that was who to contact.
	In the Federal Register, it is you contact the district office having jurisdiction over the mine.  For those of us in Wyoming, that is probably the Denver office.  If you can't get the Denver office, then you go to Arlington.  It completely bypasses the local office that would be available.
	And maybe you should give some consideration to that being the first contact, if available.  Madam Chairman, that concludes our comments, and I thank you for the opportunity to comment.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you.  Does anybody have anything?
	MR. SNASHELL:  Why is working in Wyoming state government so lethal?
	MR. LOOMIS:  It is not.  It is just working in the coal mines is so safe.
	(Applause.)
	MS. SILVEY:  We don't have we can't touche.  Okay.  Next we have Robert Butero with United Mine Workers of America.
	MR. BUTERO:  This doesn't mean I am going to be long.  It just means that I am thirsty.
	MS. SILVEY:  That is fine.  I have got you.
	MR. BUTERO:  On behalf of President Cecil Roberts, Secretary-Treasurer Dan Kane, and all the members of United Mine Workers of America, and in fact, all miners across the nation, I would like thank the Mine Safety and Health Administration for the opportunity to comment on the Emergency Temporary Standard on mine evacuation.
	My name is Robert Butero, and I am the organizing Director for the UMWA Region 4.  The tragic events that bring us together today are far too familiar in the mining industry.  I am sorry to say that despite decades of tragedy in this industry, and years of complaints by the union, this Agency and the industry are still stuck in a pre-1968 mindset.
	My testimony here today will not focus greatly on what could have been, however, I would remiss if I did not say that had you listened to the United Mine Workers over the past six years, had you paid attention to the recommendations contained in Jim Walters' Number Five report issued by the Union, and had you focused on enforcement rather than compliance assistant, we would not be here today.  What I am saying may cause some of you discomfort, but this does not compare to the struggles and heartache of the wives and sons and daughters or other family members of the 24 miners killed, actually 26 now, since January 2, 2006.
	Your discomfort is of little consequence unless it forces a new thinking within the Government.  I must submit to you today that on January 6, 2006, the Government failed the miners at Sago.  It also failed the miners at Alma Mine on January 19, 2006.  And in fact, on at least ten other occasions this year, the Government failed this nation's coal miners.
	It is obvious to everyone that these failures cause more than monetary pain and suffering.  They cause more than loss of income and temporary hardships.  These failures and lives tear apart families, and leave widows and children without the comfort and companionship of their loved ones.
	MSHA's failures can no longer be tolerated.  It is time for this Agency to return to the basis of its creation, to protect the health and safety of the nation's miners.
	Finally, in my opening, I must state for the record that the sad truth regarding the hearing today is that we would not be, if not for the horrific death of those twelve miners at Sago on January 2, 2006, we would not be here.  It would appear we have learned nothing since 1969.  Meaningful regulations promulgated by this Agency are non-existent until miners die in large enough numbers to capture public attention and cast a spotlight on the industry.
	Again, a new rule will be promulgated.  Again, it will be written in blood of miner sacrifice for corporate profits.  When is enough sacrifice simply that; enough.  When will this Agency act proactively to protect the life of every miner, every day, every shift.
	The Sago miners account for half of the total fatal mining accidents this year.  And I submit to you that if the number of total numbers had been the same, 24 day, but had they all died one at a time, we would not be here.  That too, is a real tragedy.
	Over the course of the next several weeks, United Mine Workers will be submitting comments at each of the scheduled hearings.  We will also place substantial written comments in the record.  However, it is my intention today to discuss some of the issues I see as problematic with the emergency rule, and offering some additional guidance to the Agency to remedy these problems.
	The Union does agree that hands-on training and drills are the best way to ensure miners are adequately trained in donning their SCSR and escaping.  However, we believe this rule as written is fatally flawed.  SCSR and escape training must be completely separate from any of the current Part 48 training.
	The Union has offered at almost every hearing in the past six years evidence that the training is already overburdened.  There is not sufficient time to cover the required topics, let along all the add ons the Agency continues to put on the program.
	Therefore, the rules should require all annual training that deals with any aspect of self-contained self-rescuer training and evacuation or escape be uncoupled from any other training.  Specific times should be set aside during the miner's regular shift, and no loss in compensation for this training.
	The Union also believes that walking the escapeway to familiarize miners with their escape route every 90 days may have some benefit, at least in theory.  We will broaden our comments on this matter over the course of the next few months.
	Outlining the pros and cons of this practice, but on the surface, if this is to be another paper compliance aspect of the regulation, MSHA should remove it from the current rule.  I think everyone here knows exactly what I mean by this comment.  But if there are those that I have confused, I will elaborate.  Without outside independent verification that this section of the rules complied, and with some operators who will simply fill out the paperwork that their drill is completed, send it to the Agency, and we will be no further ahead in training miners in SCSR usage and mine evacuation than we are right now.
	It becomes apparent that MSHA must accept a more meaningful role in assuring compliance.  The Union believes that the Agency intends to enforce a 90 day training interval as we believe they should.
	These drills should coincide with the day an authorized representative of the Secretary is present in the mine.  This representative should accompany any miners participating in the drill.  The Union sees no additional cost to the Agency for implementing such a practice.  The Federal Inspector is required to walk the mines, escapeways every quarter, and would be readily available to perform this task.  This would not only ensure compliance but reinforce the importance of the drill.
	The Union is in agreement with the spirit and the language of requiring immediate notification, but not longer than 15 minutes, in the event of an accident.  We believe this is adequate time for the mine operators to determine what is occurring at the operation.
	There are two aspects the Union believes need clarification and stricter enforcement.  First, the caveat that allows the mine operators to delay notice beyond 15 minutes in the event communications is interrupted should be stricken.  In the event an accident occurs, another system shuts as fan charts or AMS indicate the problem, the Union understands a need to communicate with the underground area of a mine that may be affected.
	However, in the event that communication does not occur within 15 minutes of the onset of the problem, a call should be made to MSHA, notifying the Agency of a potential problem.  It should be up to MSHA to determine what steps should be taken from the point forward to protect the health and safety of affected miners.
	Secondly, regarding the accident notification, the current practice of permitting mine fires that last less than 30 minutes go unreported should be eliminated.  The Union believes that any fire at any mining operation should be an immediately reportable incident.
	Far too often, such events occur again and again because once a fire is extinguished, the operator is not compelled to eliminate the source of the problem.  This notification requirement would eliminate many of these hazards in the industry.
	The Union does support the use of directional lifelines in mine escapeways.  Having stated that, this is important to note here that the Union has argued on numerous occasions that the installation of lifelines should be required in all mines.  Unfortunately, these requests that were made in both public forums and private meetings with MSHA were completely ignored until the recent disasters.  Again, it is a shame that it took the death of miners to motivate this Agency.
	Finally, in writing of this emergency standard, the Agency has ignored, perhaps by design the very individuals who are the most impacted by your actions.  MSHA requires mine operators submit plans for SCSR storage for evacuation, for training, and to meet other requirements of the rule.  However, there is no seat at the table for miners or their representatives to directly participate in the process.
	These individuals have earned the right to offer input and expect expert comment on such important plans.  They should be given that right in this regulation.  Thank you for your time.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you.
	(Discussion was held off the record.)
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you for your comment on the training issue.
	MR. BUTERO:  You are welcome.
	MR. SHERER:  Mr. Butero, you were talking about mine fires, all of them should be reported.  One of the concerns that we have is in many mines there is hot work going on; welding, cutting, things like that on a fairly regular basis.  Do you have any suggestions as far as how to handle that.
	We know that is a planned event.  But still, it seems like people get too complacent.  They smell smoke.  They smell coal burning.  It becomes no big deal until a disaster happens.  Do you have any comments on that?
	MR. BUTERO:  You know, as far as the reporting to MSHA of a mine fire, we believe that should occur.  And then it is up to MSHA to decide the investigation of that, as it is now.
	As far as incidents like that, where you have welding or cutting or that in a mine, if you are going to have an event like that occur, everybody that is affected in by that area should be notified, and should be made aware of that situation.  That you have a situation like that occur.  And then of course with people's requirements of rock dust and fire extinguishers at the site and that, hopefully that contains that.  But that person should also be able to communicate immediately with anybody in by if that situation gets out of control.
	MR. SHERER:  Okay.  Thank you.
	MR. MACLEOD:  I wanted to, excuse me, ask a question concerning you suggested that we add additional training requirements to I am assuming you are referring to an annual refresher training, but you didn't specifically say that.  I was just curious if you could go a little bit further in that.
	Because actually, we removed all the SCSR training from annual refresher training, and put it into the drill.  So I wanted to make sure I understood what your concern was on that fact, because in fact, we did remove stuff out of that.  So if you could explain that, maybe.
	MR. BUTERO:  Okay.  You know, I have seen one of the women that testified earlier from the State of New Mexico, you know, she offered the testimony to the fact that the more the better.  And we are not against that.
	But we want to emphasize that the training of the self-rescuers and evacuation because of the problems that we had, to put more emphasis on that, and not just be a part of the Part 48 training.  That it all be separated, and put that out there itself.  So that it is what it is deemed for, and that is what is going to occur at that time.
	MR. MACLEOD:  Okay.  Thanks.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  Okay, Mr. Butero.  Thank you, Mr. Butero.  We next have David Arnolds with P & M.  Is that Pittsburgh and Midway?  Yes, it has been awhile.
	MR. ARNOLDS:  Good afternoon, Madam Chairman.  My name is Dave Arnolds, and I am an attorney with the Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company.  We thank you for the opportunity to make comments on the Emergency Temporary Standards.  And we will submit written comments by May 30.
	However, I wanted to address just one point that several other or many other commenters have addressed.  But I do so because of the importance.  And that is the absolute requirement to notify MSHA of an accident within 15 minutes after determining that it has occurred.
	There is no exception in the ETS to doing this, other than a failure of the communications system, basically, physical impossibility.  Therefore, it puts an individual in a dilemma of either perhaps attempting an immediate rescue effort to save someone's life, to provide immediate medical attention to someone, or to leave the scene of the accident and go to a phone to inform MSHA of the accident.  And a person who makes a choice of trying to save someone's life or deal with an emergency is faced with a wilful and knowing violation of a mandatory standard in making that decision.
	I submit that there should be an exception that is similar to those in Part 50 for preserving the scene of an accident, where you are required to preserve the scene of an accident, except for three exceptions.  One of which of course is to rescue someone and another is to deal with eliminating an imminent danger.
	And I suggest while these may not be the exact sort of exceptions that should be included, that certainly exceptions along that same mentality should be included in the immediate notification standard.  And we will submit written comments on the other points.
	MS. SILVEY:  Okay.  Thank you.  We will look forward to your written comment.
	MR. SNASHELL:  I am going to ask him one.
	MR. ARNOLDS:  Yes, sir.
	MR. SNASHELL:  In situations where there is more than one individual who can respond, can't a company basically say that you are to call MSHA in case there is a problem, and other people administer the life support?
	MR. ARNOLDS:  Absolutely.  If there are enough people, then it is not essential that they all work on the emergency.  But I think in the situation where people are faced with either making the call or dealing with the emergency, there should be a legal exception for dealing with the emergency.
	MR. SNASHELL:  Thank you.
	MR. ARNOLDS:  Thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you.  And the final person who signed up is Al Quist.
	MR. QUIST:  Quist.
	MS. SILVEY:  Quist.  Thank you.  With Aggregate Industries.
	MR. QUIST:  I want to thank the Committee for allowing me to speak on behalf of Aggregate Industries.  We are a sand and gravel quarry producer in about eight states.  And I am the Safety Manager.  I work for Richard Holmes, who is the Safety Department Manager, who would have been sitting here in my place, had he not had other things happen today.
	So I have taken some notes on a recent event.  Unfortunately, we lost one of our employees three weeks ago in the Central region.
	MS. SILVEY:  Yes.  Michigan.
	MR. QUIST:  Michigan, yes.
	MS. SILVEY:  Sorry.
	MR. QUIST:  Richard was called out to investigate.  And I am going to kind of not make any editorial comments on this, but I am going to go through a time line.  And these are approximate.
	Only the actual number or the actual time that we have is when the 911 call was made.  We operate a small sand and gravel operation in a real rural area.  It is farmland.  I don't even know what the nearest town would be.
	But on April 4, 2006, at 3:53 p.m., one of the employees discovered a new employee had become entangled, his clothing had become entangled in a tail pulley of a jaw crusher.  And the first thing that was done is 911 was called.  In the preceding minutes afterwards, an employee was told to stay with the victim.
	Two employees went oh, I don't know.  I haven't even been there, so I don't know.  But a ways to a tool shop to get tools to extricate the person.  They came back.  They worked frantically to get him out.  Fifteen minutes had gone by before the EMTs, and these are approximate, because I am going off of what I was told.  And I don't know that we will ever know when they arrived on the scene.
	But approximately 15 minutes passed before the EMTs, the fire department and the sheriffs arrived.  At that point, we were in violation of the law for failure to notify.  It went on to about 4:35 when there was enough sanity to call the safety manager.
	The safety manager was notified about 4:35.  He was in the hospital with his wife.  They were having a child.  He returned the call.  He made some phone calls to get the number to call MSHA.  He didn't have it with him.  He made the phone call around 5:00.
	If you follow through the time line, there was about one hour and seven minutes expired from the first discovery of the employee to the time MSHA was called.  We have been notified that we have received a citation for failure to call within that 15-minute time limit.  It is my understanding that it is quite an onerous fine.  It is $100,000, if I am not mistaken.
	MS. SILVEY:  No.  That's not right.
	MR. QUIST:  Okay.  Well, be that it is an onerous fine.  It is more than a $60 fine.  My reason to bring this up is that everybody's effort at the mine site was put towards trying to save a life at the very beginning.  It was determined after 15 minutes there was no life to be saved.
	So at this point, we were in violation of this emergency temporary standard.  And I just want to say that when you direct all your efforts into saving or getting somebody into an area where there is less harm, 15 minutes can tick by awful fast.
	And you can be in violation of a standard that I feel is, if the price tag is priced high enough there might be some efforts being set towards making a phone call to MSHA versus choosing to save a victim's life or save a person's life.  And so I think that 15 minutes is an awful short time period.
	And it ought to be either turned back to where it was, and a little bit of discretion used as to the chain of events and that they did the best they could, or raise it to 30 minutes.  I think that in 30 minutes this thing could have possibly been taken care of.  But with all the things that happened in this event, it took an hour and seven minutes.
	And I am not here to say whether that was right or whether that was wrong.  That is just what happened.   And I don't have anything else.
	MS. SILVEY:  Thank you.  And although those of you who were here this morning, you know we had a moment of silence this morning.  But we do express our sympathies to your company.
	MR. QUIST:  Thank you.
	MS. SILVEY:  I happened to know about that particular event before he even said it, because things change so fast, but I was in metal non-metal at the time, at MSHA.  And metal non-metal has jurisdiction over aggregates industry.
	So I knew exactly what you were going to say.  So thank you.  We will take that into consideration.  Thank you.  Does anybody else wish to speak at this time?
	(No response.)
	MS. SILVEY:  If nobody wishes to speak, I think what I am going to do is I am going to tentatively close the hearing.  But we will be here, because the public hearing notice said that we would be here until, we would have this hearing until, I think the hours were 9:00 to 5:00.
	So I am going to tentatively conclude the hearing at this time.  But if anybody comes up, then we will be around to reconvene it.  But even with that in mind, I am going to say to all of you that we appreciate all of you who came today.
	All of you who participated, and all of you who provided us with the real specific comments from your real life situations.  Your comment and testimony at today's hearing, and this is the first of four hearings, will help us develop a final rule which provides the most appropriate and effective protection for miners, and reflects the needs and the concerns of the mining community.
	And would like to reiterate, and now I can say reiterate, that as we heard from everybody today and as we listened and as people spoke, I think we all emphasized that when we talk about a mine emergency, an underground mine emergency situation, we want to probably, and maybe we can't overemphasize the point that the first thing we want to stress is that escape, escape.
	But if we are not able to do that, then barricading as a last resort.  And I do think that we all sort of agree with that fundamental safety principal.  So if nobody wishes to speak at this point, I am going to tentatively close the hearing.  If nobody else comes, then it will just close by operation of law.  But we all appreciate you participating today.  Thank you again.
	(Off the record.)
	MS. SILVEY:  Even though the public hearing notice says 5:00, it does say until the last scheduled speaker has spoken.  So I think I will just officially close the hearing at this time.  Everybody knows they can submit comments.
	(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)
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	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
IN RE:	     Public Hearing on Emergency Temporary
	     Standard
DATE:	     April 24, 2006
LOCATION:	     Lakewood, Colorado

	I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately on the tapes and notes reported by me at the hearing in the above case before the U.S. Department of Labor Mine Safety & Health Administration.



		Date:  April 27, 2006



		                              
		Marcene Ness

		Official Reporter

		Heritage Reporting Corporation

		1220 L Street, N.W.
	
		Washington, D.C.  20005
		


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	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS






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	Heritage Reporting Corporation
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	Heritage Reporting Corporation
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