EDWIN MEESE, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND JOSEPH
E. CLARKSON, APPELLANTS V. BARRY KEENE

   No. 85-1180

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1986

   On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California

   Brief for the Appellants

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Constitutional and statutory provisions
   involved
   Questions Presented
   Statement:
      A. Statutory framework
      B. Factual background
      C. Proceedings below
   Summary of argument
   Argument:
      I. Appellee lacks standing to challenge Congress's
         use of the term "political propaganda" in the
         Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938
         A. Appellee's allegation of a chilling
            effect does not suffice to confer
            standing
         B. Appellee's allegation of injury to
            his reputation does not confer standing
            because it is too indirect and is not
            fairly traceable to the wrong alleged
     II. Congress's use of the term "political
         propaganda" in the Foreign Agents
         Registration Act of 1938 creates no
         burden on free expression cognizable under
         the First Amendment
         A. The term "political propaganda" is
            defined in the FARA in a content-neutral
            manner that does not constitute official
            disapproval of political expression
         B. Because the statute as written and
            applied carries no official disapproval
            of political expression, the Act may
            not be invalidated on the basis of the
            connotations that its words may be given
         C. Even if the statute's use of the term
            "political propaganda" did embody official
            disapproval of the speech to which it
            applies, it would not offend the First
            Amendment
   Conclusion
   Appendix

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinions of the district court (J.S. App. 1a-31a, 36a-42a) are
reported at 619 F. Supp. 1111.  An earlier opinion of the district
court issuing a preliminary injunction (J.S. App. 44a-65a) is reported
at 569 F. Supp. 1513.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the district court (J.S. App. 32a-34a) was entered
on September 13, 1985.  A notice of appeal to this Court (J.S. App.
35a) was filed on October 11, 1985.  On October 29, 1985, the district
court granted appellants' timely motion to alter or amend the judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and the district court modified the
judgment (J.S. App. 40a).  A notice of appeal to this Court from the
amended judgment of October 29, 1985 (J.S. App. 43a) was filed on
November 12, 1985.  On November 27, 1985, Justice Rehnquist extended
the time within which to docket the appeal to and including January 9,
1986, and the appeal was docketed on that date.  The Court noted
probable jurisdiction on April 21, 1986.  The jurisdiction of this
Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1252.  /1/

           CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

   1. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, in pertinent part:

         Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of
      speech * * * .

   2. The relevant provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938, 22 U.S.C. 611-621, are set forth in an appendix to this
brief.  App., infra, 1a-5a.

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   1. Whether appellee, who is not a foreign agent under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. 611-621, and who is not
subject to the requirements or sanctions of the Act, has standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the statutory term "political
propaganda" on the ground that use of that term is alleged to ahve
chilled his exercise of First Amendment rights.

   2. Whether the use of the term "political propaganda" in the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. 611-621, which is
expressly defined in the Act in a neutral and valid way, violates the
First Amendment because in common usage the word "propaganda" might be
understood to have a pejorative meaning.

                               STATEMENT

                        A. Statutory Framework

   This case arises under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938
(FARA), ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631-633, 22 U.S.C. 611-621.  The purpose of
the FARA is to protect the national defense, internal security, and
foreign relations of the nation by requiring the agents of foreign
principals to identify themselves and their principals and to reveal
for public scrutiny their efforts to influence this country's foreign
policies.  22 U.S.C. 611 note (congressional statement of purposes);
Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241 (1943);  id. at 250-251
(Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting);  see pages 22-28 & notes 19-22,
infra.  To accomplish these goals, the FARA establishes a
comprehensive registration, reporting, and disclosure scheme for
agents of foreign principals.  The scheme is enforced by the Attorney
General.  He is authorized to bring suit to compel compliance with the
Act (22 U.S.C. 618(f);  28 C.F.R. 5.1(a)), and to bring criminal
actions for wilful violation of any provision of the Act (22 U.S.C.
618(a)).

   An agent of a foreign principal /2/ must file a registration
statement /3/ with the Attorney General and must thereafter
periodically provide certain information regarding his relationship
with a foreign principal, his sources of income, and the nature of his
activities.  22 U.S.C. 612.  He must further submit to the Attorney
General a copy of any "political propaganda for or in the interest of
such foreign principal" that the agent sends through the United States
mails or by any means of interest or foreign commerce.  22 U.S.C.
614(a).  /4/ The FARA defines the term "political propaganda" to
include (22 U.S.C. 611(j)):

      * * * any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other
      communication or expression by any person * * * which is
      reasonably adapted to * * * in any * * * way influence a
      recipient or any section of the public within the United States
      with reference to the political or public interests, policies,
      or relations of a government of a foreign country * * * or with
      reference to the foreign policies of the United States * * * .

   The agent must mark any such materials with an identification
statement containing information specified in the statute.  22 U.S.C.
614(b);  see also 22 U.S.C. 614(c).  The words "political propaganda"
do not appear in the standard identification statement form used for
films (Report Form CRM-159;  J.A. 16, 57, 59):

      This material is prepared, edited, issued or circulated by (name
      and address of registrant) which is registered with the
      Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. under the Foreign Agents
      Registration Act as an agent of (name and address of foreign
      principal).  Dissemination reports on this film are filed with
      the Department of Justice where the required registration
      statement is available for public inspection.  Registration does
      not indicate approval of the contents of this material by the
      United States Government.

   The labeling requirement is applicable only to agents of foreign
principals under the Act and does not apply to subsequent
disseminators or recipients of the materials, such as appellee.  In
fact, such people are free to remove the identification statement that
a foreign agent must affix to the materials (J.S. App. 49a. 54a-55a &
n.2).

                         B. Factual Background

   The National Film Board of Canada (Ottawa) produces films in
Canada, and as an agency of the government of Canada, is a "foreign
principal" under the Act.  The National Film Board of Canada (New York
office) (NFBC-NY) is the agent of the National Film Board of Canada
(Ottawa) in the United States and has registered with the Attorney
General pursuant to the FARA since 1947 (J.S. App. 5a).  /5/ The
NFBC-NY does not routinely include the FARA identification statement
in its materials, but rather submits a list of its films to the
Department of Justice for determination which ones are covered by the
Act (id. at 48a).

   In 1982, the NFBC-NY submitted to the Department of Justice a list
of 62 films and videotapes that it had distributed during that year.
The Department reviewed five of the films and concluded that three of
them included "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Act.
Two of the films, Acid from Heaven and Acid Rain:  Requiem or
Recovery, address the subject of acid rain;  the third film, If You
Love This Planet, concerns nuclear war.  J.S. App. 45a, 48a.

                         C. Proceedings Below

   In March 1983, appellee, an attorney and California state
legislator, brought this action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California, challenging the
constitutionality of the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign
Agents Registration Act.  Appellee alleged that he desired to exhibit
the three Canadian films but was "deterred from exhibiting the films
by a statutory characterization of the films as 'political
propaganda'" and that "if he were to exhibit the films while they bore
such characterization, his personal, political, and professional
reputation would suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to
practice his profession would be impaired" (J.S. App. 45a).  Appellee
sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against application of
the FARA to the three films.

   1. On September 7, 1983, the district court denied the government's
motion to dismiss and granted appellee's motion for a preliminary
injunction (J.S. App. 44a-65a).  The court held that appellee had
standing to challenge the use of the term "political propaganda" in
the FARA, and particularly its application to the three films which he
desired to exhibit (id. at 49a-54a).  It further held that the
complaint stated a claim for relief (id. at 55a-56a), indeed, that it
raised a "substantial question warranting litigation" (id. at 57a).
Finding the Act's use of the words "political propaganda" and its
labeling requirement to place a very heavy burden of hardship on
appellee (id. at 63a-64a), the district court entered a preliminary
injunction preventing appellants from applying any of the requirements
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to the three films in question
pending the disposition of this case (id. at 65a).  Although the court
recognized that appellee lacked standing to challenge the labeling
requirement applicable to the NFBC-NY, the court nonetheless concluded
that it was impossible to give appellee any effective interim relief
without exempting these films from the labeling and reporting
requirements of the Act (id. at 64a).  Accordingly, the court entered
an injunction to that effect (ibid.).

   2. On September 12, 1985, the district court granted summary
judgment for appellee on his request for a permanent injunction (J.S.
App. 1a-31a).  The court adhered to its prior ruling that appellee had
standing to challenge the validity of the statutory term "political
propaganda" (id. at 7a-16a).  The court explained that appellee
claimed that the statute's use of the derogatory term "propaganda"
"puts (him) to the Hobsen's choice of foregoing the use of the three
Canadian films for the exposition of his own views or suffering an
injury to his reputation" (id. at 15a).  Appellee's claim therefore
was that the statutory term amounted to an indirect form of
censorship, which was sufficient to provide him with standing (id. at
10a).

   On the merits, the district court held that Congress's use of the
term "political propaganda" violated the First Amendment (J.S. App.
19a-29a).  While recognizing that the statute defines "political
propaganda" in a "neutral" way carrying "no negative connotation" (id.
at 20a), the court noted that "the term 'propaganda' as used in
ordinary speech is a word of reproach" (id. at 19a (citation
omitted)), and predicted that "whoever disseminates materials
officially found to be 'political propaganda' runs the risk of being
held in a negative light by members of the general public" (id. at
26a).  The court found no "historical or semantic support" for the
argument that "the First Amendment was not intended to apply where
Congress enacts a statute whose purpose is entirely proper, but which
inadvertently burdens speech by the terms in which it is couched" (id.
at 24a).  In any event, the court stated that there was no
inadvertence here -- that, indeed, "congress enacted the portion of
FARA at issue in order to suppress or restrict that which it found
abhorrent," and that it deliberately used "a term of opprobrium" in
order "to discourage or suppress speech" (id. at 25a).

   Finding "no justification" for the use of the phrase "political
propaganda" (J.S. App. 28a), the court permanently enjoined
enforcement of "any portion of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
which incorporates the term 'political propaganda' as a term of art.
22 U.S.C. Sections 611(j) and 614(a)(b) and (c)" (id. at 31a).  The
court also held that these provisions were severable from the
remainder of FARA and that its ruling did not adjudicate the validity
of any other part of the Act (id. at 30a).  /6/

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   I. Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the use of the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents
Registration Act.  Plaintiff's allegation that the use of that term to
describe certain foreign political expression interferes with his
freedom to exhibit these films simply amounts to a claim that the
statute impermissibly "chills" his right to speak.  Allegations of a
subjective "chill," without more, however, are insufficient to confer
standing on appellee.  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).  Appellee's
second alleged injury -- injury to his reputation -- is also
insufficient, because no such injury can fairly be traced to the
language of the statute itself.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984);
 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
Because the statute defines the term "political propaganda" in a
nonpejorative, content-neutral manner, any stigma to appellee results
not from Congress's use of this term, but from the uninformed or
misinformed beliefs of members of the public.  Public misunderstanding
of the meaning of a clearly defined statutory term cannot be
attributed to Congress.

   II. The district court erred in ruling that the First Amendment is
violated by the use of the term "political propaganda" to refer to the
materials to be submitted and labeled under the Act.  The Act defines
that term in a content-neutral manner that does not express official
disapproval of the foreign political expression so defined.  The
legislative history of the FARA shows that Congress did not adopt the
Act or that term for the purpose of suppressing speech.  The actual
administration of the Act shows that this term has been applied in an
even-handed manner, demonstrating that the term "political propaganda"
is not limited to disfavored speech.  If negative inferences accompany
the use of the term "propaganda," they stem primarily from the
public's reaction to foreign attempts to influence this nation's
policies, rather than from the use of that term to describe such
efforts.  Finally, even if Congress had used this term to express
official disapproval of such expression, that expression would not be
unconstitutional, because it is ancillary to a legitimate
congressional purpose:  disclosure of the identity of foreign agents
in order to allow the public to appraise their expression in light of
their identities and allegiances to foreign principals.

                               ARGUMENT

 I. APPELLEE LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE CONGRESS'S USE OF THE TERM
"POLITICAL PROPAGANDA" IN THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938

   It is well settled that Article III requires the party who invoked
the authority of a federal court to "'show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury'" (Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472, (1982) (citation omitted)).  This injury must be
"'"distinct and palpable"'" rather than "'abstract' or 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical'" (Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)
(citations omitted)).  Moreover, the requisite injury-in-fact must be
caused by "the challenged action of the defendant," rather than "the
independent action of some third party not before the court" (Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976);
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 757-761).  And, of course, the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing his standing (Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501-502, 517-518 (1975)).  The power to seek judicial review "is
not to be placed in the hands of 'concerned bystanders,' who will use
it simply as a 'vehicle for the vindication of value interests'"
(Diamond v. Charles, No. 84-1379 (Apr. 30, 1986), slip op. 7).

   Appellee had precisely that status under the FARA.  Appellee is not
an "agent of a foreign principal" under the Act and is not subject to
any of the requirements or sanctions the Act prescribes.  The
identification statement that a registered, foreign agent must use to
label a film does not use the phrase "political propaganda," and, in
any event, appellee is free to remove any such label when he exhibits
these films (J.S. App. 54a-55a).

   Nonetheless, appellee claims that the statutory term "political
propaganda" has injured him in two ways.  First, he claims that it
prevents him from exhibiting these films "without interference" so
long as they are classified as "political propaganda" under the Act
(J.A. 49 (Amended Complaint para. 13)).  Second, he alleges that his
"personal and professional reputations" will be damaged by exhibiting
a film classified as "political propaganda," because he "would be
falsely, maliciously, and unlawfully identified as the disseminator of
distorted or untrue information on behalf of a foreign power" (J.A.
49, 50 (Amended Complaint paras. 11, 14)).  Neither allegation is
sufficient to establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the statutory use of this term.

 A. Appellee's Allegation Of A Chilling Effect Does Not Suffice To
Confer Standing

   Appellee's first allegation of injury is that he is being prevented
from showing the films by the chilling effect of the term "political
propaganda." Such an allegation is plainly insufficient to confer
standing under this Court's decision in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1
(1972).  There, the plaintiffs challenged an Army intelligence
gathering program on the ground that it chilled their First Amendment
right of speech and assembly, but the Court held that they lacked
standing to sue (408 U.S. at 10-16).  As the Court explained, a
plaintiff "who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights
is being chilled" by the existence of governmental program does not
"without more" have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
that program (id. at 10).  The Court noted that "in each of the ( )
cases (in which it had considered a "chilling effect" argument), the
challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either
presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions,
or compulsions that he was challenging" (id. at 11).  Thus, while the
Court recognized that "governmental action may be subject to
constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on
the exercise of First Amendment rights" (id. at 12-13), the Court held
that "(a)llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat
of specific future harm" (id. at 13).  See also United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-91 (1947);  United Presbyterian Church v.
Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378-1380 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  /7/

   The applicability of Laird is in no way altered by the district
court's conclusion that appellee "is not * * * complaining of a
'chilling effect' on the exercise of his First Amendment rights;  he
is complaining of a species of censorship" (J.S. App. 10a).  No actual
or threatened censorship is remotely involved in this case.  The
government has not restrained appellee from exhibiting these films;
he has not been subjected to or threatened with any type of sanction
or penalty for doing so;  and he did not need the prior approval of a
governmental licensing board to exhibit them.

   Moreover, the fact that appellee may voluntarily elect to forego
use of the films rather than have his name linked to "political
propaganda" does not by itself satisfy standing.  Without concrete
proof of independent and objective consequences flowing from the
government's action, a party's personal choice to relinquish the right
to speech is not cognizable injury under Laird v. Tatum, supra.
Standing is not conferred upon those who merely "'feel inhibited'"
(Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971).  Absent a direct threat of
a sanction, such as a criminal penalty, standing can only be
predicated on a showing of imminent, actual harm.  United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 89-90.

 B. Appellee's Allegation Of Injury To His Reputation Does Not Confer
Standing Because It Is Too Indirect And Is Not Fairly Traceable To The
Wrong Alleged

   Appellee's second alleged harm -- injury to his reputation /8/ --
is of a type which, in some instances, may serve as a basis for
standing.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 754-755.  In this case,
however, appellee's asserted injury to his reputation can result only
by a series of occurrences, some of which are unlikely and most of
which are not of the government's doing.  Accordingly, the claim of
causation alleged by appellee is so indirect and uncertain that it
cannot be said that the asserted injury will in fact result, or, if it
does, that it is the consequence of the statutory label, rather than
of the independent actions of third parties.  Id. at 751, 757-761;
Eastern Kentucky, 426 U.S. at 38, 41.

   The FARA (1) defines "political propaganda" in a way recognized by
the district court to carry "no negative ocnnotation" (J.S. App. 20a),
(2) requires that a label not using this term, and not at issue in
this case, be affixed to material fitting that neutral definition, and
(3) leaves persons such as appellee completely free to remove or
conceal the label.  In order for appellee to be injured by the
statute's use of that term, then, the members of the public must first
become aware that the material has been found appropriate for labeling
under the Act, either by appellee's decision to display the label or
by some other means.  They must also become aware that the statutory
term used to refer to such material is "political propaganda," which
is not apparent from the label affixed to the film.  Finally, they
must remain ignorant of the neutral manner in which the statute
defines that term, and must independently attach a significant
negative value judgment, first, to the film itself and, second, to the
person exhibiting it.  Given the indirect, and convoluted character of
this necessary chain of events, both the fact of injury /9/ and its
causation by the government's choice of words are highly speculative.
Such "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power" (Diamond v. Charles, slip op. 11 (quoting Eastern
Kentucky, 426 U.S. at 44)).  /10/

   In Eastern Kentucky, the Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge the decision to grant a federal tax exemption to a
hospital not providing more than emergency room care to indigents,
ruling that it was purely speculative whether the hospitals' treatment
policies would be altered if their tax exemptions were revoked (426
U.S. at 42-43).  The causal connection between the injury suffered by
the plaintiffs -- the hospitals' denial of nonemergency medical
treatment -- and the relief they requested -- revocation of the
hospitals' tax exempt status -- was sufficiently uncertain to break
the chain of causation necessary to establish standing (id. at 40-46).

   Similarly, in Allen v. Wright, supra, the Court held that the chain
of causation between the IRS's decision to grant federal tax
exemptions to allegedly discriminatory private schools and the effect
that the IRS's decision would have on the ability of children to
obtain an education in a racially integrated school was also too
attenuated to provide standing.  468 U.S. at 757-761.  The Court found
that that claim of injury was too dependent on the collective action
of third parties, the parents of the children attending the private
schools, whose decisions where to send their chidren might have a
significant impact on the ability of public school students to receive
an integrated education, to conclude that there was a sufficient
causal connection between the IRS's decision and the plaintiff's
alleged injury.  Id. at 758-759.

   In this case, if appellee has suffered any injury from the
statute's use of the term "political propaganda," that injury plainly
flows from the subjective impressions of third parties, and not the
government's classification of the films.  Here Congress defined its
terminology precisely.  The uninformed or misinformed reaction of the
public cannot be attributable to Congress.  Congress on occasion may
use terms whose ambiguity or shading gives rise to a somewhat
different meaning than the one intended.  All that can be expected,
however, is a reasonably lucid articulation of the legislative policy.
 Otherwise, a statute would be hostage to the public's perception of
the legislative scheme, and a determination of constitutionality would
hinge on the particular nuances in vogue at any given time.  /11/

 II. CONGRESS'S USE OF THE TERM "POLITICAL PROPAGANDA" IN THE FOREIGN
AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938 CREATES NO BURDEN ON FREE EXPRESSION
COGNIZABLE UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

   In holding that Congress's use of the term "political propaganda"
in the FARA unconstitutionally abridged appellee's First Amendment
rights, the district court endorsed what it rightly termed a "novel"
conclusion (J.S. App. 16a).  The district court did not find that the
FARA, or its use of the term "political propaganda," directly
restricts appellee's freedom of speech in any way.  Notably absent
from this case are any restrictions on the acquisition or exhibition
by appellee of the films in dispute, /12/ any conditioning of his
receipt or exhibition of the films on an official act of some type,
/13/ such as advance registration, /14/ or any suppression of his
exhibition of the films by threat or intimidation.  /15/

   Rather, the district court held that, by requiring exhibitors of
films defined by teh FARA as "political propaganda" to have, in the
court's words, "the courage to use materials officially censured by
the government," the statutory definition of "political propaganda,"
without more, "constitutes a burden on speech by making such materials
unavailable to all but the most courageous" (J.S. App. 26a-27a).  The
district court also found that Congress "understood and intended" this
phrase "as a term of opprobrium" in order "to discourage or suppress
speech" (id. at 25a).  Contrary to the district court's belief,
however, neither the meaning of the term "political propaganda," nor
the effect of the statute as applied, suggests that it amounts to
official disapproval or denigration of the material so classified.  It
simply reflects the congressional judgment that, in view of the wide
range of motives that may inspire such material, it is best viewed and
evaluated with an awareness as to its source.  Moreover, even if this
judgment by Congress, or negative connotations of the terminology it
chose, is viewed as constituting an official disapproval of each item
of material so classified, it is a judgment which Congress could
properly make without offense to the First Amendment, in the execution
of its constitutional powers.

 A. The Term "Political Propaganda" Is Defined In The FARA In A
Content-Neutral Manner That Does Not Constitute Official Disapproval
of Political Expression

   1. The district court's premise -- that the term "political
propaganda" serves as a badge of official disapproval (J.S. App. 25a)
-- finds no support in the text of the statute.  The statutory
definition includes "any * * * communication * * * reasonably adapted
to * * * influence a recipient * * * with reference to the political
or public interests, policies, or relations" of a foreign government
or foreign political party, or the foreign policies of this nation.
22 U.S.C. 611(j).  It describes in nonjudgmental terms a certain
category of communications.  That the Act proceeds to impose certain
labeling and disclosure requirements on these communications, while
not restricting their dissemination in any way, does not indicate a
judgment of any kind on the merit of each particular item so
classified.  It merely reflects Congress's conclusion that public
consideration of the material will be enhanced by awareness of its
source.

   This neutral use of the term "propaganda" is consistent with
general usage and understanding.  Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1817 (1981) defines "propaganda" in one definition as
"doctrines, ideas, argument, facts, or allegations spread by
deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to
further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause." /16/ Further,
Congress has used "propaganda" in a nonpejorative manner in other
statutes, /17/ and this Court has used this term in that manner as
well.  /18/

   In determining whether the statutory definition of "political
propaganda" constitutes official disapproval of expression, the text
of the statute is controlling.  It is well settled that "(s)tatutory
definitions control the meaning of statutory words" (Lawson v.
Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949)), and that it is
"both within the right and the wisdom of Congress not to trust to the
colloquial or the dictionary meaning of * * * (a word), but to write
its own" (62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951)).
 Where, as here, Congress has defined a particular statutory term,
that definition excludes "colloquial meanings" (Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945)).

   More generally, the text of the FARA emphatically identifies the
objectives of the Act in a way that does not prejudge any particular
item of "political propaganda." The text of the FARA makes clear that
it simply seeks "public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda
activities and other activities for or on behalf of * * * foreign
principals," so that both the public and the government can "appraise
(foreign agents') statements and actions in light of their
associations and activities" (22 U.S.C. 611 note).  The text of a
statute provides the surest guide to Congress's intent (see Board of
Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., No. 84-1274 (Jan. 22, 1986),
slip op. 12), and various sections of a statute should be read as a
whole (see Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975)).  This
statement of purpose, coupled with the broad and non-pejorative
statutory definition of "political propaganda," clearly shows that
Congress made no a priori value judgment -- beyond that of the
appropriateness of disclosure -- regarding communications so defined.

   2. The legislative history of the FARA also supports that
conclusion.  While stimulated by concerns about Nazi propaganda, after
substantial consideration Congress made the decision to cover the
propaganda activities of all foreign agents.  /19/ When the term
"political propaganda" and the labeling and submission requirements
were added in 1942, Congress made plain that it did not intend to
restrict the speech of foreign agents, /20/ or to single out only
information from hostile nations.  In fact, the neutral scope of the
1942 amendments was nearly their undoing.  President Roosevelt
initially vetoed the amendments, on the ground that they could
interfere with the joint activities of the United States and its
wartime allies.  /21/ Congress responded to his concerns by
authorizing him to create an exemption for agents of those nations
whose interests be deemed vital to the national defense.  /22/

   3. The administration of the Act by the Department of Justice
reveals that the term "political propagenda" has not been applied to
suggest official disapproval of any particular foreign political
expression.  Even in time of war, the FARA was consistently applied to
friend and foe alike.  See Report of the Attorney General to the
Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, at 100-101 (1945).  The record in
this case also shows that the term "political propaganda" is not used
to smear a film as "un-American, twisted, and pernicious" (J.S. App.
25a).  That term has been found applicable to films disseminated by
close friends and allies, such as Canada, which is responsible for
transmitting the three films at issue here, and to materials that
reflect policy positions taken by this nation (see Block v. Meese,
slip op. 14), such as Plight of the Soviet Jewry:  Let My People Go, a
film distributed on behalf of the Consulate General of Israel, The
Wall of Terror, a film distributed on behalf of the German Consulate
General, and Trade -- Who Needs It?, a film distributed on behalf of
the Government of Japan.  J.A. 60, 61, 63.  The day-to-day operation
of the Act therefore reinforce its literal meaning.  See Block v.
Meese, slip op. 14;  cf. FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., No. 84-1972
(May 27, 1986), slip op. 12-13.

   4. Notwithstanding the clarity of the neutral definition of
"political propaganda" in the FARA, as well as its even-handed
application, the district court invalidated the use of this term in
part because Congress "understood and intended (this phrase) as a term
of opprobrium, * * * by which it intended to discourage or suppress
speech" (J.S. App. 25a).  For two reasons, this conclusion of a
devious motive on the part of Congress does not support the court's
ruling.

   First, it is well settled that a statute may not be invalidated
under the First Amendment on the ground that the legislation, while
proper on its face, was motivated by hostility towards freedom of
speech when the legislature adopted the act.  As the Court explained
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-384 (1968), and
reiterated last Term in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., No.
84-1360 (Feb. 25, 1986), slip op. 5-6, "(i)t is a familiar principle
of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative purpose" (O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383;  City of Renton, slip
op. 5-6).  /23/ The district court's inquiry into legislative motive
is therefore irrelevant, because a statute may not be invalidated "on
the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the
undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact
form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it"
(391 U.S. at 383).

   Second, Congress did not, in fact, adopt this language in order to
"suppress or restrict that which it found abhorrent" (J.S. App. 25a).
The district court's ascription of such a purpose is belied not only
by the statutory definition and the legislative history, but also by
the fact that any negative connotations of the phrase derive primarily
from the public's reaction to the source and purpose of the material
it describes.  To whatever extent the term "propaganda" induces a
reaction of suspicion and caution, it is mainly due to the word but to
the phenomenon it describes:  public expression designed to further
one's cause.  Where, as here, the cause is related to the interests of
foreign nation, it is hardly surprising that it may be viewed
skeptically.  As Judge Scalia recently stated in a similar case (Block
v. Meese, slip op. 13 (citations and footnote omitted;  emphasis in
original)):

         It seems to us not quite true that, as asserted in a district
      court opinion involving the same provision at issue here (with
      whose holding we disagree) "'(p)olitical propaganda' is
      ordinarily and commonly understood to mean material that
      contains half-truths, distortions, and omissions." * * * It is
      understood to mean precisely the type of political speech the
      dictionary definitions quoted above describe (and which no other
      English word accurately describes) -- which type of speech is,
      in turn, generally regarded as more likely than other speech to
      contain "half-truths, distortions, and omissions."

   For precisely this reason, it is illogical to suppose, as appellee
does (see Mot. to Aff. 10), that the objection is really to the use of
the word "propaganda." Once the character of the material as defined
in the statute is understood, whatever term is used will engender the
same public reaction.

 B. Because The Statute As Written And Applied Carries No Official
Disapproval Of Political Expression, The Act May Not Be Invalidated On
The Basis Of The Connotations That Its Words May Be Given

   The Constitution simply does not, as the district court believed,
require Congress to devise "the best solution to a knotty problem to
draftsmanship" or "demand that those whose business is communication
communicate with their audience in terms of their audience's
linguistic conventions" (J.S. App. 29a).  Inherent difficulties in
draftsmanship can often preclude Congress from enacting a provision
completely free from unintended or extraneous potential connotations.
This is particularly true where the connotations that a term may have
depend on the context in which it is used.  See Block v. Meese, slip
op. 13-14 n.3 ("(u)ndoubtedly, one would not describe the ideological
efforts of one's own church or nation as 'propagandizing,' though they
are such -- just as one would prefer to describe one's brother-in-law
as a merchant rather than a used-car-salesman").  It is enough that
the terms be reasonably clear so that an ordinary person exercising
common sense can sufficiently understand the statutory scheme.  /24/
Cf. Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 240 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("almost any word or phrase may be rendered vague and
ambiguous by dissection with a semantic scalpel," but "(t)his kind of
semantic inquiry" "amounts to little more than verbal calisthenics").

   Even where constitutionally protected activities are involved, it
is not the role of the judiciary to secondguess Congress's decision on
issues that are inherently matters of judgment and discretion.  /25/
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82-84 (1976), for instance, this
Court sustained the $10 and $100 thresholds for the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2
U.S.C. 431 et seq.  The Court recognized that the threshold levels
"are indeed low" and "may well discourage participation by some
citizens in the political process" (424 U.S. at 83).  It nonetheless
rejected a constitutional challenge to the levels Congress set even
though Congress may not have been able to assert a compelling
justification for those particular levels, explaining (ibid.) "we
cannot require Congress to establish that it has chosen the highest
reasonable threshold.  The line is necessarily a judgmental decision,
best left in the context of this complex legislation to congressional
discretion."

   So, too, Congress cannot be expected to use the most precise
language or language that will not have a negative meaning for some
members of the public, /26/ and it certainly need not articulate a
compelling interest for the use of every word in a statute.
Otherwise, the judiciary would become a "panel of grammarians" (Flora
v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960)), and a determination of
constitutionality could well turn on the changing nuances or shadings
of the language used in a statute.

 C. Even If The Statute's Use Of The Term "Political Propaganda" Did
Embody Official Disapproval Of The Speech To Which It Applies, It
Would Not Offend The First Amendment

   Even if the Act's use of the term "political propaganda" does in
fact express official disapproval and denigration of the expression to
which it applies, it is nonetheless constitutionally valid as a
reasonable exercise of Congress's legislative power, which places only
the most attenuated burden on free expression.  The district court in
this case acknowledged (J.S. App. 25a) the validity of the statute's
basic purpose -- "to protect the national defense, internal security,
and foreign relations of the United States by requiring (certain)
public disclosure(s by foreign agents) * * * so that the Government
and the people of the United States * * * may appraise their
statements and actions in the light of their associations and
activities" (22 U.S.C. 611 note).  Every court that has addressed the
question has upheld the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions
of the FARA.  /27/ Although this Court has never expressly addressed
the issue, it has assumed that the FARA is a valid exercise of
Congress's plenary authority to regulate and protect the nation's
foreign policy and internal security.  See Communist Party of the
United States v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 99-100 (1967);  id. at 138-140
(Black, J., dissenting);  see also Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S.
at 251 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).  /28/ Moreover, this Court
has upheld a variety of other types of federal disclosure laws that
are similar to the FARA.  /29/

   Even if "propaganda" is a term carrying some negative connotations
and these connotations were intended, it would be surprising, indeed,
if Congress had the constitutional power to establish registration and
disclosure requirements relating to agents of foreign principals, but
lacked the incidental authority to state an official view that such
material, given its source and nature, should be viewed with
skepticism.  Cf. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., No.
84-1903 (July 1, 1986), slip op. 14-15 (whether the legislature should
engage in "'counterspeech'" or regulation is a matter of legislative
discretion).

   It is no answer to point to cases where the government expresses a
view with regard to a certain category of expression and takes
concrete action to impair or discourage its dissemination, which
concrete action is the basis for objection.  See Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963);  Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965).  /30/ Here, the government has not prevented appellee from
exhibiting these films in any way.  See T. Emerson, The System of
Freedom of Expression 708 (1970) (Bantam Books is best characterized
as an instance of government "action," rather than "expression").

   Put more broadly, the business of legislating is the business of
making value judgments, and it is unavoidable that those judgments
will at times find statutory expression in words which may be taken to
reflect negatively on a particular idea or point of view.  This
precise point was made by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Block v. Meese, slip op. 16-17:

      A rule excluding official praise or criticism of ideas would
      lead to the strange conclusion that it is permissible for the
      government to prohibit racial discrimination, but not to
      criticize racial bias;  to criminalize polygamy, but not to
      praise the monogamous family;  to make war on Hitler's Germany,
      but not to denounce Nazism.  It is difficult to imagine how many
      governmental pronouncements, dating from the beginning of the
      Republic, would have been unconstitutional on that view of
      things.  Consider, for example, the disparagement of pacificism
      contained in the Joint Resolution of March 29, 1800, commending
      the action of Captain Thomas Truxton and the crew of the United
      States frigate Constellation in their engagement with the French
      ship of war La Venegeance, and specifically praising the conduct
      of midshipman James Jarvis, "who gloriously preferred certain
      death to an abandonment of his post." 2 Stat. 87 (1800).  A
      state's selection of history and government textbooks for use in
      its public schools represents a most forceful and influential
      expression of official approval and disapproval of ideas.  It
      cannot be a response to these points that the only subjects
      off-limits to the government are those as to which there is less
      than substantial unanimity among the people -- thus permitting
      official positions on war heroism and motherhood, but excluding
      nuclear disarmament and acid rain.  That distinction would raise
      the intolerable prospect of the courts' deciding what ideas are
      sufficiently popular to be granted government support -- the
      object being, presumably, to assure that only the ideas of
      insular minorities will suffer official disparagement.

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the district court should be reversed and the case
remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the complaint for
lack of standing.  In the alternative, the judgment of the district
court should be reversed and the case remanded to that court with
directions to enter judgment for appellants.

   Respectfully submitted,

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Assistant Attorney General

   DONALD B. AYER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   PAUL J. LARKIN, JR.

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   LEONARD SCHAITMAN

   HAROLD J. KRENT

      Attorneys

   JULY 1986

   /1/ For the reasons given in the Jurisdictional Statement (at 2
n.1), the appeal was timely as measured from the date of either
judgment entered by the district court.

   /2/ An "agent of a foreign principal" includes "any person who acts
as an agent, representative, employee, or servant * * * of a foreign
principal" and "who directly or through any other person * * * engages
within the United States in political activities for or in the
interests of such foreign principal" (22 U.S.C. 611(c)(1)(i)).  A
"'foreign principal'" includes "a government of a foreign country" (22
U.S.C. 611(b)(1)).

   /3/ The registration statement must include, among other things,
the agent's name and nationality;  a comprehensive statement of the
nature of the agent's business;  the name of every foreign principal
for whom the agent is acting;  the terms of the agreement between the
agent and the foreign principal;  the activities engaged in by the
agent, including a detailed statement of any political activities;
and the compensation or reimbursement received by the agent and the
expenditures made by the agent.  22 U.S.C. 612;  see also 28 C.F.R.
5.200, 5.201;  Report Form OBD-63.

   /4/ The FARA also requires the agent to submit to the Attorney
General a report setting forth the places, times, and extent of such
dissemination.  22 U.S.C. 614(a);  see also 22 U.S.C. 616(a).

   /5/ In its 1983 registration, the Film Board described its
activities in part as (J.A. 27):

      Promotion and distribution through commercial and noncommercial
      channels of Canadian Government information, documentary and
      cultural films, filmstrips, and other visual aid materials to
      public film libraries, educational institutions, government
      agencies, etc. * * *

   /6/ Appellants thereafter moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
to alter the district court's judgment to limit it to only the three
films in question.  The district court granted the motion and modified
its judgment accordingly (J.S. App. 40a).  The district court also
denied appellants' motion for a stay pending appeal (id. at 40a-42a).

   /7/ As the court explained in United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan,
738 F.2d at 1378-1379 (emphasis in original):

      "(C)hilling effect" * * * is foreclosed as a basis for standing
      by the Supreme Court's holding in Laird v. Tatum * * * .  All of
      the Supreme Court cases employing the concept of "chilling
      effect" involve situations in which the plaintiff has
      unquestionably suffered some concrete harm (past or immediately
      threatened) apart from the "chill" itself.  * * * "Chilling
      effect" is cited as the reason why the governmental imposition
      is invalid rather than as the harm which entitles the plaintiff
      to challenge it.  * * * * * (T)he standing question * * * (is)
      whether the fear (of a "chilling effect") constitutes cognizable
      harm.  On th(is) latter point, Tatum is clear and categorical:
      "(a)llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not . . . adequate."

   See also 738 F.2d at 1379 n.1 (quoting G. Gunther, Cases and
Materials on Constitutional Law 1186-1187 (10th ed. 1980)).

   /8/ Insofar as appellee alleges harm to his chances for reelection
(see Mot. to Aff. 4-5), he raises a type of injury that is
significantly more attenuated than an impaired reputation.  The
district court did not rely on this argument, and we submit that the
injury appellee asserts is even more indirect and speculative than his
general allegation that his reputation has been impaired.  For that
reason, it does not suffice to confer standing.  See Winpisinger v.
Watson, 628 F.2d 133, 139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929
(1980).

   /9/ See J.A. 110 (Declaration of Barry Keene as Regards Having
Exhibited the Three Films) ("After obtaining a preliminary injunction,
* * * I arranged to exhibit the films.  The films were exhibited in an
auditorium in the basement of the West Wing of the State Capitol
Building, Sacramento, California, beginning at noon on July 6, 1983,
to a standing room only audience of the general public and legislative
staff.");  see also Canadian Films and the Foreign Agents Registration
Act:  Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 40-41 (1983) (Rep. Conyers) ("(t)here is a sort of comic
element about the whole thing in that by labeling something the
Government doesn't necessarily approve of you attract attention to it
* * * and citizens' appetites are whetted enormously to see what it is
that got the label * * * .  Certainly in this instance there has been
a totally warming effect on the films that have been involved.").

   /10/ This case differs materially from Block v. Meese, No. 84-5318
(D.C. Cir. June 18, 1986), cert. denied, No. 85-1837 (July 7, 1986),
where a plaintiff engaged in the commercial distribution of foreign
films on a substantial scale was found to have standing to challenge
the FARA.  The court there noted plaintiff's allegation that his sales
would be significantly reduced as a result of the classification of
the films and of the publication of the names of organizations and
theatres exhibiting them, and cited to affidavits of organizations
declining to purchase the films for precisely these reasons.  Slip op.
6-7.  In this case neither appellee nor the persons to whom plaintiff
proposed to exhibit the films would have their names disclosed or
reported in any way.  Insofar as Block contains dicta suggesting that
mere public misunderstanding of the term "propaganda" would suffice to
give standing (slip op. 8), we respectfully disagree.

   /11/ Assuming an injury to appellee's reputation caused in some
sense by the statute's classification and labeling scheme, alleviation
of that injury is not "'likely' to follow from a favorable decision"
invalidating use of the term "propaganda" (Allen, 468 U.S. at 751;
Eastern Kentucky, 426 U.S. at 38, 41).  Appellee's requested relief --
that the term "advocacy" be substituted in its stead (Mot. to Aff.
9-10), leaving the functioning of the statute otherwise unchanged --
would accomplish little or nothing.  Anyone aware of the reason for
the substitution is likely to treat the term "advocacy" simply as a
euphemism for the existing term "propaganda." And anyone aware of the
statutory objective -- to allow public appraisal of foreign source
material in light of the identity of its source -- is likely
nonetheless to approach the material with a sense of skepticism.  One
can imagine the government being required to substitute one term after
another, chasing an unattainable goal, despite the fact that each
successive statutory term carries only the message that the material's
source and purpose recommends it for careful and perhaps skeptical
consideration.

   /12/ See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., No. 84-1360
(Feb. 25, 1986);  Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976);  Erznozick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

   /13/ See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).

   /14/ See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).

   /15/ See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).

   /16/ The fact that the term is also sometimes used to carry a
disparaging meaning, see, e.g., Webster's New World Dictionary 1138
(2d ed. 1972) (definition No. 3:  "now often used disparagingly to
connote deception or distortion"), does not suggest that it must be or
is always so used.

   /17/ Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.)
(emphasis added) exempts organizations which carry on substantial
political activity from the charitable deduction:

      Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation,
      organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
      scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
      purposes * * * no part of the net earnings of which inures to
      the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
      substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
      propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation *
      * * .

   In addition, Congress has delimited the powers of United Service
Organizations so that "(n)o substantial part of the activities of the
corporation shall involve carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation" (36 U.S.C. 1304(a)).  See also 5
U.S.C. 4107.

   /18/ For instance, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 304 (1974), this Court explained that if political advertisements
were not banned on public rapid transit vehicles, "(u)sers would be
subjected to the blare of political propaganda." In National
Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 280 n.14
(1974), the Court, in discussing a union's organizational activities,
stated that "(i)t seems likely that the Executive Order was similarly
not intended to limit union propaganda or prohibit any other method of
peaceful persuasion." The Court characterized union informational
activities in a similar manner in NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S.
274, 279 (1960), recognizing the "right in unions to 'use all lawful
propaganda to enlarge their membership.'"

   /19/ The Act traces its lineage to a resolution passed by the House
of Representatives on March 20, 1934, authorizing a special committee
to investigate the extent of Nazi propaganda and similar forms of
subversive foreign influence in the United States.  H.R. Res. 198, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong. Rec. 11069.  The McCormick Committee, as it
was known, recommended that Congress adopt legislation requiring
foreign agents to register with the federal government.  H.R. Rep.
153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1935).  While the McCormack Committee
was particularly concerned with the spread of Nazi, Fascist, and
Communist propaganda (see id. at 3-23), the Committee advised Congress
to require "all publicity, propaganda, or public-relations agents or
other agents or agencies, who represent in this country any foreign
government or a foreign political party or foreign industrial or
commercial organization" to register with the federal government
(ibid.).  As the committee's report stated (id. at 23 (emphasis
added)):

      Congress should enact a statute requiring all publicity,
      propaganda, or public-relations agents or other agents or
      agencies, who represent in this country any foreign government
      or a foreign political party or foreign industrial or commercial
      organization, to register with the Secretary of State of the
      United States, and to state the name and location of such
      foreign employer, the character of the service to be rendered,
      and the amount of compensation paid or to be paid therefor.

   Congress endorsed the McCormack Committee's recommendations that
foreign agents should be required to register with the government and
that the registration requirement should be broadly defined to include
such agents of every stripe.  While Congress was concerned that "there
are many persons in the United States representing foreign governments
or foreign political groups, who are supplied by such foreign agencies
with funds to foster unAmerican activities, and to influence the
external and internal policies of this country" (H.R. Rep. 1381, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937);  S. Rep. 1783, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2
(1938)), the Act was not limited to only those persons espousing
allegedly subversive ideas and programs.  The statutory definition of
"agent of a foreign principal," which was taken virtually verbatim
from the McCormack Committee's report, covered "any person who acts *
* * as a public-relations counsel, publicity agent, or as agent,
servant, representative, or attorney for a foreign principal" as well
as "any person who receives compensation from or is under the
direction of a foreign principal" (22 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 611(d)).

   "The purpose" of the Act, Congress explained, was "to make
available to the American public the sources that promote and pay for
the spreading of such foreign propaganda," which is "usually conducted
in secrecy" (H.R. Rep. 1381, supra, at 2;  S. Rep. 1783, supra, at 2).
 By applying the principles underlying the labeling requirements of
the federal food and drug laws to "a different field, that of
political propaganda," the Act would force foreign agents "to come out
'in the open,'" without prohibiting "(s)uch propaganda" in any way
(H.R. Rep. 1381, supra, at 2;  S. Rep. 1783, supra, at 2).  As the
committee reports explained, Congress decided to "require all persons
who are in the United States for political propaganda purposes" -- not
only for the purpose of "establishing in the United States a foreign
system of government," but also for any other "purpose of a political
propaganda nature" -- to register with the government.  H.R. Rep.
1381, supra, at 2;  S. Rep. 1783, supra, at 2.  In that way, by
shining "the spotlight of pitiless publicity" on foreign agents and
their principals (H.R. Rep. 1381, supra, at 2;  S. Rep. 1783, supra,
at 2), Congress sought to ensure that "our people * * * (would) know
the sources" of the information and attempts at persuasion that they
were receiving (H.R. Rep. 1381, supra, at 2;  S. Rep. 1783, supra, at
2).

   /20/ Act of Apr. 29, 1942, ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248 et seq.  During
Congress's consideration of the 1942 amendments, the Department of
Justice successfully opposed the addition of a requirement that
foreign agents submit political propaganda to the Department before it
was transmitted by a foreign agent, on the ground that the requirement
might constitute a forbidden prior restraint.  See Amending Act
Requiring Registration of Foreign Agents:  Hearings on H.R. 6045
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 42 (1941) (L.M.C. Smith, Chief Special Defense Unit, Dep't
of Justice) (hereinafter cited as House Hearings).

   The House report stressed that "(i)t cannot be emphasized too
strongly that these amendments do not change the fundamental approach
of the statute, which is one not of suppression or of censorship, but
of publicity and disclosure" (H.R. Rep. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1941)), and that purpose was repeatedly emphasized during the debate
on the amendments.  See S. Rep. 913, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941);
87 Cong. Rec. 10022 (1941) (Sen. Kilgore);  id. at 10050 (Rep. Fish)
(bill "applies to all nations, the British, the French, Norwegian
(sic), and all the rest who have propaganda agents in this country");
id. at 10050, 10052 (Rep. McLaughlin);  ibid. (Rep. Michener);  id. at
10063 (Rep. McLaughlin);  see also House Hearings 14, 16, 17, 18,
19-20, 25, 26 (L.M.C. Smith);  id. at 34 (Vincent M. Miles, Solicitor,
Post Office Dep't);  id. at 42, 49-51 (L.M.C. Smith);  id. at 52-53
(Rep. Voorhis).

   The statutory definition of "political propaganda" was also
entirely neutral, covering "all communications issued by foreign
agents, 'whether friendly or unfriendly, whether violent or mild'"
(Block v. Meese, slip op. 10, quoting United States v. Kelly, 51 F.
Supp. 362, 363 (D.D.C. 1943)).  Discussing that definition, the Senate
report explained that it was "comprehensively defined" to ensure that
"all political propaganda disseminated by agents of foreign
principals" would be subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act
(S. Rep. 913, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1941)).  The definition of
"political propaganda" was intended to be "a broad one" (ibid.; see
H.R. Rep. 1547, supra, at 3), since Congress considered it "desirable
that any material which (a foreign agent) disseminate(d) that may be
classed as political propaganda be properly labeled and copies filed"
(S. Rep. 913, supra, at 9).  The labeling and filing requirements were
added so that "(w)ith all this information at their disposal,
recipients of such propaganda can properly appraise its worth" (H.R.
Rep. 1547, supra, at 4;  see S. Rep. 913, supra, at 9).

   /21/ Veto Message from the President of the United States (H.R.
Doc. 611, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1942)).

   /22/ See 22 U.S.C. 613(f);  H.R. Rep. 2038, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1942);  S. Rep. 1227, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1942);  88 Cong Rec.
3178 (1942) (Sen. Danaher);  Block v. Meese, slip op. 10.

   In fact, during World War II, agents of the British Government,
agents of the London Fire Brigade, and agents of the Spanish
Ambassador, to list but a few, registered under the Act.  Report of
the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the
Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (1945).
The Attorney General also noted in his report that "the great bulk of
propaganda in this period is that which, distributed by agents of
foreign governments, has centered on building up reservoirs of good
will and friendship.  The contributions our Allies have made to the
common war effort, their resistance to the Axis, conditions under Axis
occupation, and similar war topics have formed a principal part of
such propaganda, although the history and culture of a foreign
country, its political, economic, and social problems, are frequently,
and in some instances mainly, stressed" (id. at 32).

   The 1966 amendments to the Act also demonstrate that Congress still
regarded the purpose of the Act as requiring foreign agents to
disclose their identities and allegiances to inform the public of
their motives for engaging in advocacy, regardless of the particular
message they conveyed.  See S. Rep. 875, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964)
("(t)he 'pitiless spotlight of publicity,' which Congressman Emanuel
Celler so aptly referred to as the purpose of this legislation 25
years ago remains its purpose today");  id. at 9, 11-12;  110 Cong.
Rec. 16033, 16035 (1964) (Sen. Fulbright);  S. Rep. 875, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1964);  S. Rep. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 9, 11-12
(1965);  111 Cong. Rec. 6985 (1965) (Sen. Fulbright);  H.R. Rep. 1470,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) ("(t)he act is intended to protect the
interests of the United States by requiring complete disclosure by
persons acting for or in the interests of foreign principals where
their activities are political in nature or border on the political.
Such political disclosures as required by the act will permit the
Government and the people of the United States to be informed as to
the identities and activities of such persons and so be better able to
appraise them and the purposes for which they act");  112 Cong. Rec.
10536 (1966) (Rep. Tuck);  ibid. (Rep. Poff);  id. at 10537 (Rep.
McCulloch);  ibid. (Rep. Celler);  id. at 10538 (Rep. Dorn);  id. at
13827-13828 (Sen. Fulbright).

   /23/ In O'Brien, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of
a federal statute making it a crime to destroy a Selective Service
System registration card, on the ground that the statute was motivated
by congressional hostility towards the destruction of draft cards as a
means of voicing disapproval of the nation's participation in the
Vietnam war.  In upholding the statute, the Court made clear that the
presence of substantial and legitimate purposes for the act, not the
absence of illegitimate ones, was sufficient to sustain the
constitutionality of the statute.  O'Brien also expressly refused to
undertake the inquiry into legislative motive that the district court
followed in this case.  391 U.S. at 383-384.

   In City of Renton, the court of appeals had struck down a municipal
ordinance restricting the location of adult movie theatres, ruling
that the ordinance was invalid if "a motivating factor," however
slight, in the municipality's decision to adopt the ordinance was the
intent to restrict the theatre owners' exercise of their First
Amendment rights.  Slip op. 5-6 (citation omitted).  Relying on
O'Brien, this Court reversed the court of appeals, stating that
"(t)his view of the law was rejected in * * * O'Brien" (City of
Renton, slip op. 6), and that "(t)he district court's finding as to
'predominant' intent" was "more than adequate" to sustain the
ordinance (ibid.).

   /24/ Although the district court is correct (J.S. App. 24a) that
the First Amendment may be violated even if the legislature did not
have an invidious intent in drafting a statute (see, e.g., Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983)), here the alleged injury arises not from the statute as
written, but from the subjective perception of third parties who may
misunderstand the statutory scheme.

   /5/ If Congress had supplied no definition of the term "political
propaganda," a federal court confronting a First Amendment challenge
to the statute would "have a duty" (United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels
of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)) to follow the "cardinal
principle" (Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) of construing
the statute, if fairly possible, to avoid the constitutional defect.
See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982).  "The
judicial function is 'not to destroy the Act if we can, but to
construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport
with constitutional limitations'" (Selective Service System v.
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 850 (1984)
(citation omitted)).  Accordingly, a court with the undefined term
"political propaganda" would seek to interpret the statute in a
neutral way that both accorded with Congress's intent and would be
constitutionally permissible.  Surely, the FARA is open to no greater
challenge because Congress itself has supplied such a neutral
definition in the statute.

   /26/ The statute here is quite similar to the one reviewed by the
Court in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), which involved
a challenge to the reporting and disclosure requirements of the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. 261-270.  There, the
Court construed several provisions of the Act in a manner clarifying
its registration and reporting requirements.  It then rejected a First
Amendment challenge to these requirements (347 U.S. at 625-626):

         Under these circumstances, we believe that Congress, at least
      within the bounds of the Act as we have construed it, is not
      constitutionally forbidden to require the disclosure of lobbying
      activities.  To do so would be to deny Congress in large measure
      the power of self-protection.

   "Lobbying," like "propaganda," carries negative connotations at
least in the minds of some.  See United States v. Finance Committee to
Re-elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
("(l)obbying is of course a pejorative term, but another name for it
is petitioning for the redress of grievances").  If those connotations
posed no problem in upholding the statute in Harriss against a First
Amendment challenge, a similar conclusion would seem to follow here.

   /27/ See Attorney General v. The Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928,
935 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172
(1983), id. at 956 (Wald & Bazelon, JJ.);  Attorney General v. Irish
Northern Aid Committee, 530 F. Supp. 241, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982);  Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid
Committee, 346 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 465 F.2d 1405 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1080 (1972);  United States v. Peace
Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D.D.C. 1951).

   /28/ While Justice Black disagreed with the majority with respect
to the scope of the statutory registration requirements, he fully
agreed with the majority's articulation of the congressional purpose
underlying the Act, and he found that purpose constitutionally valid
(318 U.S. at 250-251 (emphasis added)):

         The general intent of the Act was to prevent secrecy as to
      any kind of political propaganda activity by foreign agents. * *
      *

                      * * * *

      Resting on the fundamental constitutional principle that our
      people, adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish
      between the true and the false, the bill is intended to label
      information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers may
      not be deceived by the belief that the information comes from a
      disinterested source.  Such legislation implements rather than
      detracts from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First
      Amendment.

   /29/ See Buckley v. Valeo, supra (upholding contribution disclosure
requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971);  United
States v. Harriss, supra (upholding disclosure requirements imposed on
lobbyists by the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act enacted as Title
III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat.
839);  Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913) (upholding
39 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) 234, postal law requiring all mailed,
second-class materials such as newspapers or magazines clearly to
identify all paid advertisements);  cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 365, 395 (1984) (suggesting that the government could require
public broadcasting stations to broadcast a disclaimer when they
editorialize stating that the editorial does not represent the views
of the government).

   /30/ In Bantam Books, a state commission sent notices to book
distributors that certain books were obscene, and the trial court
found that these notices compelled the distributors to cease selling
the books and to withdraw all outstanding books from retailers.  This
Court found that the commission's directives constituted a series of
unlawful "prior administrative restraints" (372 U.S. at 66-72) that
took the form of "thinly veiled threats to institute criminal
proceedings against them" (id. at 68).

   Similarly, in Lamont, the statute required the Postmaster General
to detain and deliver only on the addressee's request foreign mail
deemed by the Postmaster to constitute "communist political
propaganda." The Court invalidated the statute on the ground that "it
requires an official act (viz., returning the reply card) as a
limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's First
Amendment rights" (381 U.S. at 305;  see id. at 307).  The
government's detention of the material and the requirement that a
person affirmatively ask to receive it, not the label used to describe
it, was found an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment.

   Appendix