LOCAL NO. 82, FURNITURE AND PIANO MOVING, FURNITURE STORE DRIVERS,
HELPERS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND PACKERS, ET AL., PETITIONERS V. JEROME
CROWLEY, ET AL.

   No. 82-432

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1982

   On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit

   Brief for the Federal Respondent

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statute involved
   Statement
   Introduction and summary of argument
   Argument:
      I. The legislative history of the LMRDA shows
          that Congress thought courts were ill-equipped
          to remedy Title I violations by ordering new
          elections
          A. The Senate consciously rejected judicial
              supervision of elections in favor of enforcement
              and oversight by the secretary
          B. The addition of Title I on the Senate floor
              did not authorize judicially supervised
              elections
          C. The action of the House reemphasizes the
              Senate's conclusion that courts should not
              supervise union elections
     II. The terms of the Act show that Congress, out of
          concern for union self-government, intended to
          preclude courts from ordering and supervising
          elections to remedy Title I violations
    III. This court's decisions have recognized that the
          purposes of the Act would be frustrated if courts
          were permitted to remedy Title I violations by
          ordering and supervising elections
   Conclusion

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 41a-93a) is reported
at 679 F.2d 978.  The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 1a-40a)
is reported at 521 F.Supp. 614.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 94a) was entered on
May 21, 1982.  A petition for rehearing was denied on June 15, 1982
(Pet. App. 95a).  The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
September 13, 1982, and was granted on January 24, 1983.  The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                           STATUTE INVOLVED

   Relevant provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 411-412, 481-483, are set
out at Pet. App. 96a-103a.

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether the enforcement scheme created by Title IV of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 for violations
of the Act occurring in the course of a union officer election
precludes a court from enjoining the counting of ballots and ordering
a new election under court supervision to remedy violations of Title I
of the Act that occurred at a nominations meeting.

                               STATEMENT

   1. On November 9, 1980, a meeting was held to nominate candidates
for the seven-member executive board of petitioner Local No. 82,
Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers,
Warehousemen, and Packers ("Local No. 82").  The election was a
controversial one, and several disputes arose in the course of the
nominations meeting.  One concerned the requirement that members of
Local No. 82 show a computerized dues receipt in order to be admitted
to the meeting (Pet. App. 43a).  The district court found that such a
requirement had not been imposed at earlier meetings (id. at 19a).
Several members, including respondent Jerome Crowley, were denied
admission for lack of a receipt (ibid.).

   The second controversy occurred when nominations were made.
Petitioner Bart Griffiths, the incumbent secretary-treasurer of Local
No. 82 who was conducting the meeting, was nominated for re-election
to that position.  The district court found that respondent John Lynch
also was nominated for secretary-treasurer, although Griffiths ignored
the nomination and announced that he was running unopposed (Pet. App.
21a).  Griffiths included Lynch among the candidates for president
(id. at 44a).

   Crowley, Lynch, and others filed a protest concerning the conduct
of the nominations meeting with Local No. 82, with Teamsters Joint
Council 10, and with the International Union.  On November 20, 1980,
Local No. 82 denied the protests.  /1/ Ballots were thereafter mailed
to the members (Pet. 4), who were instructed to mark and return the
ballots by mail to a designated post office box before 9:00 a.m. on
December 13, 1980, when they were to be counted.  Respondent Lynch's
name appeared on the ballot as a candidate for president, and not for
secretary-treasurer (Pet. App. 116a).

   2. On December 1, 1980, respondents filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on behalf of
themselves and two classes of members (not certified by the district
court) against petitioners Local No. 82, Griffiths, the president of
the Local, and members of its election committee.  Respondents alleged
that petitioners had violated several provisions of Title I of the
LMRDA and sought preliminary injunctive relief (Pet. App. 2a-3a,
44a-46a).  In particular, respondents claimed that restricting
admission to those with dues receipts and the failure to recognize
Lynch as a candidate for secretary-treasurer violated their equal
rights to nominate candidates and to attend membership meetings,
provided by Section 101(a)-(1) of the Act, and their right to meet and
assemble freely with other members and to express views upon
candidates, provided by Section 101(a) (2) of the Act.  29 U.S.C.
411(a) (1) and (2).  /2/

   At 4:20 p.m. on December 12, 1980, about 16 hours before the
ballots were to be counted, the district court issued a temporary
restraining order preventing Local No. 82 from counting the ballots
(J.A. 2).  Seven months later, on July 13, 1981, the court issued a
preliminary injunction declaring that the nominations received at the
November 9, 1980 meeting were "legally without effect" and ordering a
new nominations meeting and mail ballot election to be conducted and
supervised by Lawrence Katz and the Honest Ballot Association of New
England ("the arbitrators") (Pet. App. 86a).  The injunction set forth
in detail the eligibility requirements for attendance at the
nominations meeting, candidacy for office, and voting, and directed
that disputes about eligibility would be resolved by the arbitrators
(id. at 87a-91a).  It also provided that the arbitrators were to make
arrangements consistent with the union's bylaws and constitution for
distribution of campaign literature (id. at 91a).

   3. Petitioners appealed, and the Secretary of Labor intervened in
the appeal.  They argued that the district court lacked authority to
enjoin the tabulation of ballots and order new court-supervised
nominations and a new election to remedy Title I violations occurring
in the course of the election.  /3/ Petitioners and the Secretary
contended that under those circumstances the exclusive remedy was the
procedure afforded in Title IV of the LMRDA, which provides that a
member complaining of election violations must, after exhausting his
remedies within the union, file a complaint with the Secretary.  29
U.S.C. 482.  If, after investigation, the Secretary finds probable
cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he may initiate an
action to have the election set aside and a new one conducted "under
supervision of the Secretary" (ibid.).  Section 403 (29 U.S.C. 483)
also provides that "(t)he remedy provided by this subchapter for
challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive."
Petitioners and the Secretary argued that to permit court-ordered and
supervised elections as a remedy for violations of Title I would
frustrate the very purposes underlying Title IV:  avoidance of delay
in the conduct of elections, resolution of such problems, where
possible, by the union itself, screening of frivolous complaints and
consolidation of apparently meritorious ones by the Secretary, and
reliance on the Secretary's expertise in supervising remedial
elections.

   The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 41a-85a).  The court found
no indication in the decisions of this Court that Title IV remedies,
including ordering a new election, were intended to displace the
relief available to a court in actions under Title I (id. at 49a-52a).
 It also determined that the legislative history of the LMRDA revealed
"no evidence that limitations on Title I by Title IV were ever
contemplated" (id. at 58a-59a).  The court found inapplicable the
"exclusive remedy" provision in Section 403 since, it concluded, an
election is not "already conducted" within the meaning of that section
"until all the ballots are counted" (id. at 67a) -- a situation that,
due to the district court's temporary restraining order, was prevented
from occurring in this case.  /4/

   Judge Campbell dissented.  He would have held that "the proper
accommodation between Title I and Title IV requires consideration not
only of the stage which the election process has reached but the
nature of the relief" (Pet. App. 83a).  Judge Campbell concluded that,
if a new supervised election would be required to remedy the asserted
election violations, "many concerns argue against finding Title I
jurisdiction:  intrusiveness, delay, disruption, and the court's lack
of expertise in this area, especially as compared to the Secretary"
(ibid.).

                 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   Section 403 of the LMRDA (29 U.S.C. 483) allows courts to enforce
rights under a union's constitution and bylaws, and under Title I of
the Act (see 29 U.S.C. 412), "prior to the conduct" of an officer
election.  The same section also states that "(t)he remedy provided by
(Title IV) for challenging an election already conducted shall be
exclusive." While that division of authority between the courts and
the Secretary of Labor suffices to resolve many doubts about the
proper procedure for seeking redress of rights guaranteed by the Act,
it does not clearly address all the kinds of problems that can arise
in the course of a mail ballot election.  Depending on how one reads
the division of authority, there may be a period of weeks from the
time immediately "prior to the conduct" of the election to the time
when the election is "already conducted." Many violations that can
occur during that period will contravene both Titles I and IV of the
Act.

   The question in this case is what authority a court has, when asked
to act under Title I, to remedy such violations.  In particular, the
issue is whether a court may remedy Title I violations by enjoining
the counting of ballots and ordering a new election under court
supervision.  We submit that such relief is not "appropriate" (29
U.S.C. 412), because it trenches on the authority of the Secretary
under Title IV and on the interests of labor organizations that the
scheme for secretarial enforcement was designed to protect.

                                  I.

   The legislative history of the LMRDA shows that Congress had little
confidence in the ability of courts to remedy Title I violations by
ordering and conducting new elections.  The Kennedy-Ervin bill that
became the Act was introduced in the Senate.  It gave the Secretary of
Labor exclusive authority to enforce its proposed election guarantees
and to supervise any new election that a court might order at the
Secretary's behest.  As Professor Archibald Cox (a principal
consultant to the draftsmen) pointed out during the Senate hearings,
such a provision was necessary because "(a) court is * * * a clumsy
instrument for supervising an election." Senate Hearings, infra page
14, at 133.  For that reason state-law remedies that could not be
provided in advance of an election were preempted.

   The Kennedy-Ervin bill included no bill of rights like that now
found in Title I of the Act.  It was amended three days before passing
the Senate to include a bill of rights enforceable by the Secretary of
Labor, who was authorized to seek "appropriate" relief, including
injunctions.  Two days later the provision for enforcement by the
Secretary was itself amended because of a concern that allowing the
government to seek injunctions would establish a precedent for federal
enforcement of civil rights laws.  Instead of the Secretary,
individual members were authorized to seek "appropriate" relief.
There is no indication that the hurried passage of Title I was
intended to afford a procedure -- parallel to the carefully designed
structure in Title IV -- for ordering and conducting new union
elections under judicial supervision.  In fact, Senator Goldwater
observed after Title I was added that Title IV's remedial structure
would prevent a federal court from appointing its own monitors to
supervise a court-ordered election.

   The Landrum-Griffin bill introduced in the House simply
incorporated without reconsideration the bill of rights passed by the
Senate.  Title IV of the House bill (which dealt with elections)
provided, like Title I, for enforcement by individual members, but
specified that new elections were to be supervised by the Secretary.
The absence of a similar specification in Title I strongly suggests
that a new election was not considered to be "appropriate" relief
under that title.

                                 II.

   The remedial structure created by Title IV embodies a congressional
concern to protect -- to the maximum extent possible consistent with
individual members' rights -- the union's interest in self-government
via the election process.  When courts order and conduct new elections
under Title I they ignore the principle of union autonomy that
Congress built into the Act.  Title IV requires elections to be held
at specified regular intervals.  29 U.S.C. 481(a), (b) and (d).  It
also provides that any challenged election shall be presumed valid
pending a final decision about alleged improprieties.  29 U.S.C.
482(a).  A court order directing a new election is immediately
appealable, but to avoid prolonging uncertainty may not be stayed
pending appeal.  29 U.S.C. 482(d).  To "preserve( ) a maximum amount
of (union) independence and self-government" (Senate Hearings, infra
page 14, at 134), only the Secretary is authorized to sue for Title IV
violations, and members may not seek his assistance before exhausting
remedies within the union.  29 U.S.C. 482(a).  The Secretary may not
sue to upset a union election unless he finds probable cause to
believe a violation has occurred (29 U.S.C. 482(b)), and a court may
not overturn an election at the Secretary's request unless -- after a
trial on the merits -- it finds that the violation may have affected
the outcome of an election.  29 U.S.C. 482(c).  Title IV also directs
that any new election must be supervised by the Secretary.  Ibid.
Finally, it specifies that "(t)he remedy provided by this (title) for
challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." 29
U.S.C. 483.

   As this case demonstrates, some election violations may contravene
both Titles I and IV.  In those circumstances, while some kinds of
relief under Title I may be appropriate, a new election may be ordered
only under Title IV.  Any other rule would trench impermissibly on the
protection for union self-government built into that title.  In this
case, ordering a new election under Title I delayed the union's
triennial election an entire year beyond the period fixed by statute.
29 U.S.C. 481(b).  It also resulted in retaining the incumbents in
office a year beyond their term, contrary to the spirit if not the
letter of 29 U.S.C. 482(a), which expresses a preference for allowing
new officials to take office pending a final decision.  By
entertaining an action by members the district court also disregarded
Title IV's exhaustion requirement and the Secretary's control over
whether to seek a new election (29 U.S.C. 482(a)-(b)), both procedures
designed to protect union "independence and self-government." And
though the Secretary would himself have sought a new election for a
nominations violation like the one alleged here, many Title I
violations that a court might try to remedy with a new election may
not affect the outcome of an election.  29 U.S.C. 482(c).  Directing a
new election by preliminary injunction is still another departure from
the scheme envisioned by Title IV, which permits a court to order a
new election only after a trial on the merits.  Ibid.  Finally, and
most obviously, the relief in this case contravenes Congress's
direction that new elections should be supervised by the Secretary.
Ibid.

                                 III.

   This Court's decisions have recognized two principles expressed by
Congress in the legislative history and embodied in the Act.  The
first is that the Secretary's expertise must be used in deciding
whether to order a new election, and in supervising the conduct of
such an election.  The second is that in tinkering with the election
process courts should preserve the "'maximum amount of independence
and self-government'" for unions.  Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389
U.S. 463, 472 (1968);  Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964);
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528 (1972);
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).  The action of the district
court ignores both those principles.

                               ARGUMENT

 I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA SHOWS THAT CONGRESS THOUGHT
COURTS WERE ILL-EQUIPPED TO REMEDY TITLE I VIOLATIONS BY ORDERING NEW
ELECTIONS

   The legislative history of Title IV of the LMRDA, which was the
subject of hearings, careful committee review, and floor debate over
two sessions of Congress, demonstrates a considered congressional
judgment that courts are poorly suited to order and conduct new
elections without the expert assistance of the Secretary of Labor.
Though there was little explicit discussion of how Title I's bill of
rights (added on the floor three days before the bill passed the
Senate) would fit together with that remedial scheme, it is clear from
the discussion and the purposes of Title I that it was not intended to
displace the central enforcement provisions of the elections title.

 A. The Senate Consciously Rejected Judicial Supervision Of Elections
In Favor Of Enforcement And Oversight By The Secretary

   The original proposal for what eventually became the LMRDA was the
Kennedy-Ives bill passed by the Senate in the 85th Congress.  S. 3974,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).  Like the Act ultimately adopted, it
provided for enforcement of election guarantees by the filing of a
post-election complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who would
determine after investigation whether to seek a court order for a new
election.  If a new election was held, it was to be under the
supervision of the Secretary.  "State laws and State remedies (were
specifically excluded) in the election area." S. Rep. No. 1684, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1958).

   The Kennedy-Ives bill failed to pass the House, and in 1959 the
Kennedy-Ervin bill was introduced.  S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959).  Like its predecessor, the Kennedy-Ervin bill gave to the
Secretary the exclusive remedy for election violations.  Id. Section
303.  Its chief rival -- the administration bill introduced by Senator
Goldwater -- would have authorized election enforcement through civil
actions filed by union members as well as actions by the Secretary.
S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Section 302(d) (1959).  The Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare considered these and other
bills, and after hearings and executive sessions reported out the
Kennedy-Ervin measure as a clean bill renumbered S. 1555, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959).  S. 1555 carried forward the ideas that enforcement
should be left exclusively to the Secretary and that any new election
should be carried out under his supervision.  Id. Sections 302-303.
The Committee Report explained:

      (S)ince the bill provides an effective and expeditious remedy
      for overthrowing an improperly held election and holding a new
      election, the Federal remedy is made the sole remedy and private
      litigation would be precluded.

   S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959).  /5/

   The bills considered by the committee did not include the bill of
rights that later became Title I, so there was no discussion of a
possible conflict of remedies between the elections title and the bill
of rights.  There was, however, extended consideration of how the
elections title would mesh with the judicial remedies that existed
under state law.  Of particular significance are the views expressed
by Professor Archibald Cox, "a principal consultant to the draftsmen *
* * ." Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 535
(1972).  Professor Cox endorsed the creation of federal standards for
officer elections and federal remedies for election violations in
large part because of the inadequacy of state law.  Labor-Management
Reform Legislation:  Hearings on S. 505 et al. Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 132-136 (1959) ("Senate Hearings").  A major deficiency of
common law remedies was the inherent inability of courts to supervise
elections (id. at 133-134;  footnotes omitted):

         A court is also a clumsy instrument for supervising an
      election.  The judicial process may be suitable for determining
      the validity of an election which has already been held;  but if
      it is found invalid, or if no election has been held, judges
      have few facilities for providing an effective remedy.  Merely
      to order an election might turn the authority to conduct the
      balloting over to the very same officers whose misconduct gave
      rise to the litigation.  The court has no tellers, watchers, or
      similar officials.  It would become mired in the details of the
      electoral process.  To appoint a master to supervise the
      election would delegate the responsibility, but the master would
      face many of the same problems as the judge.  Probably it is the
      consciousness of these weaknesses that has made judges so
      reluctant to interfere with union elections, though apparently a
      few court-conducted elections have been held.

   For that reason, among others, Professor Cox supported the
exclusivity provision in the Kennedy-Ervin bill -- the predecessor of
Section 403.  /6/ Substantively, the exclusivity provision eliminated
rivals to the federal elections standards and thereby fulfilled the
"need for uniformity" (Senate Hearings, supra, at 135).  But it also
addressed the remedial shortcomings Professor Cox had identified.
Because a court was such a "clumsy instrument for supervising an
election," it was important to "centralize control of the proceedings
in the Secretary of Labor" (ibid.).  The exclusivity provision did
that by precluding private suits and channeling elections complaints
through the Secretary.  And if a court decided at the Secretary's
behest "to direct the conduct of an election," it would be "under the
supervision of the Secretary and in accordance with * * * such rules
and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe." S. 505, supra,
Section 302(b).

   Professor Cox did feel that the exclusivity provision was broader
than it had to be.  If a private suit were filed "in advance of the
election" it might be possible to "pre(v)ent the evil before it is
accomplished" (Senate Hearings, supra, at 135).  Professor Cox
suggested by way of example suits seeking relatively mechanical
relief:  "actions * * * to compel the officers to comply with
provisions of the constitution and by-laws such as putting a
candidate's name on the ballot, permitting a classification of members
to vote, or giving adequate notice of the elections" (ibid.).

   But allowing such actions would not undermine the Secretary's
exclusive control over challenges to "the validity of an election"
(Senate Hearings, supra, at 135).  In the first place, relief afforded
"in advance of the election" need not entail delay and its
consequences -- such as maintaining the incumbents in office.  /7/ In
the second place, the kind of pin-point relief hypothesized by
Professor Cox would not require a court to get "mired in the details
of the electoral process" (id. at 133-134) or to prescribe rules that
might be inappropriate for the customs and circumstances of a
particular union.  /8/ Third, the policing needed for the examples
offered would be relatively simple, not involving the "tellers,
watchers, or similar officials" (id. at 133) required for a supervised
election.  Finally, pre-election suits would not necessarily frustrate
the interest in finality that attached once an election was held (id.
at 135):

      An election is an integer.  Its validity should be adjudicated
      once and for all in one forum.  To permit State court actions
      would open the way to unnecessary harassment of the union on one
      side and to friendly suits aimed at foreclosing the Secretary's
      action on the other.

   The court of appeals (Pet. App. 63a), in concluding that the
exclusivity provision (now Section 403) did not bar judicially
supervised elections in Title I cases, stressed Senator Kennedy's
statement that "(p)rior to the day of an election an individual can
sue in a State.  The day after an election the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction." 105 Cong. Rec. 6485 (1959).  But the division
of authority drawn by the exclusivity provision, as Professor Cox's
testimony makes clear, is functional as well as temporal.  The
statement in that provision (S. 505, supra, at Section 303) that the
"remedies provided by this title shall be exclusive" rested on the
perception that "(a) court is * * * a clumsy instrument for
supervising an election." Senate Hearings, supra, at 133.  See also
Pet. App. 83a (Campbell, J., dissenting) ("the proper accommodation
between Title I and Title IV requires consideration not only of the
stage which the election process has reached but the nature of the
relief");  Note, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act:
The "Twilight Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and the
Guarantees of Titles I and V, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1105, 1124 (1974).

 B. The Addition Of Title I On The Senate Floor Did Not Authorize
Judicially Supervised Elections

   S. 1555 was reported out of committee on April 14, 1959, and debate
began on it the next day.  On April 22, 1959 Senator McClellan
proposed adding a bill of rights that became Title I.  105 Cong. Rec.
6475.  Senator McClellan's version, though in many ways broader than
the version ultimately included in the Act, did not specifically
mention the rights "to nominate candidates," "to attend membership
meetings" (29 U.S.C. 411(a) (1)), and "to express any views * * * upon
candidates" (29 U.S.C. 411(a) (2)), upon which respondents rely in
this case.  105 Cong. Rec. 6475 (1959);  see Pet. App. 6a-7a, 22a.
Senator McClellan's proposal also vested authority for enforcement of
Title I in the Secretary, rather than in individual members.  His
amendment stated (105 Cong. Rec. 6476 (1959)):

         "SEC. 103.  The Secretary, whenever it shall appear that any
      person has violated or is about to violate any of the provisions
      of this title, may bring an action in a district court or other
      court of the United States for such relief as may be appropriate
      including, but without limitation, injunctions to restrain any
      such violations and to compel compliance with this title."

   The amendment was adopted that same day.  105 Cong. Rec. 6492-6493
(1959).  Almost immediately, however, there was strong sentiment for
modification.  As a substantive matter, objections arose to the
absolute terms in which the bill of rights was couched.  See Aaron,
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 851, 858-859 (1960) ("Aaron");  Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor
Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819,
832-833 (1960) ("Cox, Internal Affairs").  But there were also
strenuous objections to the provision for enforcement by the Secretary
of the rights guaranteed.  There is no indication that the Senate had
changed its mind about the courts' competence to supervise elections,
nor even that it had the election process in mind when it reconsidered
the enforcement provisions.  Rather, the principal objection to
secretarial enforcement by way of injunction was that it would set
what some viewed as an undesirable legislative precedent for federal
enforcement of civil rights laws.  As Senator Johnston of South
Carolina stated (105 Cong. Rec. 6696 (1959)):

      This bill gives the Secretary of Labor power to force
      integration of thousands of union locals and certainly would set
      an example or a pattern for the Attorney General to follow in
      school cases throughout the Nation.

   See also 105 Cong. Rec. 6485 (remarks of Sen. Carroll), 6486
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy), 6492 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy), 6725 (1959)
(remarks of Sen. Goldwater);  Aaron, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 859;
Cox, Internal Affairs, supra, 58 Mich. L. Rev. at 833.  /9/

   As a result of the dissatisfaction with those aspects of the
McClellan amendment, two days after it had been introduced and passed
Senator Kuchel proposed modifications.  105 Cong. Rec. 6693 (1959).
/10/ One change was to make more specific and limited the rights
secured.  Instead of guaranteeing open-ended "equal rights and
privileges" (id. at 6475), for example, the Kuchel amendment secured
"equal rights and privileges * * * to nominate candidates, to vote * *
* , (and) to attend membership meetings * * * , subject to reasonable
rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws."
Id. at 6693.  With respect to enforcement it provided (id. at 6694):

         SEC. 102.  Any person whose rights secured by the provisions
      of this title have been infringed may bring an action in a
      district court of the United States for such relief as may be
      appropriate.

   The Kuchel amendment was passed the next day, on April 25, 1959
(id. at 6727), /11/ as was the Kennedy-Ervin bill (id. at 6745).

   A reading of the debates that took place during the expedited
consideration of the McClellan and Kuchel amendments substantiates
Professor Cox's later statement that "the work was done late at night
or in little knots upon the Senate floor.  The draftsmanship left much
to be desired, perhaps because of the haste and stress, the number of
participants, and the priority of tactical acceptability over nicety
of expression." Cox, Internal Affairs, supra, 58 Mich. L. Rev. at 833.
 Nor did the House compensate for the Senate's haste in its passage of
Title I (ibid.):

      The draftsman of the Landrum-Griffin bill incorporated the bill
      of rights passed by the Senate because its sponsors had
      instructed him not to write any original provisions.  The
      Landrum-Griffin bill was approved upon the House floor without
      prior consideration in committee.  Since there were no
      differences between the Senate and House bills in this respect,
      under parliamentary law the conferees were powerless to revise
      the bill of rights.  Thus, these sections never received the
      careful technical review and clarification which comes from
      scrutiny by a congressional committee and its legislative staff.

   See also H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959).

   It is most unlikely that in the flurry of activity surrounding
enactment of Title I Congress meant to undermine its far more
deliberate conclusion -- expressed in detail in Sections 402 and 403
of the elections title (29 U.S.C. 482 and 483) -- that when a court
orders an election, it should be at the behest of the Secretary, and
under his supervision.  It is true, as the court of appeals in this
case noted, that "(b)oth houses of Congress displayed extensive
support for individual rights protections that were written into Title
I" (Pet. App. 63a).  That fact, however true, does not show that
Congress authorized the courts to order and supervise elections as a
remedy for conduct at nominations meetings that violates both Titles I
and IV.

   The relation between Titles I and IV in such cases may be discerned
from an analysis of Section 402 of the House bill reprinted by Senator
Goldwater after Title I was added (105 Cong. Rec. 14273 (1959)):

                 Enforcement of election requirements

         Section 402(a):  Before a member can go to court to upset a
      fraudulent election, this section requires that such member must
      first pursue internal union remedies for at least 6 months.
      This section would have operated as a bar to the court action
      instituted by the 13 teamsters resulting in the appointment by a
      Federal court of monitors to supervise that union.  /12/

   The action to which Senator Goldwater referred was filed in 1957 by
13 members of Teamster locals alleging a conspiracy to rig the
selection of delegates to a forthcoming national Teamsters convention,
disfranchisement of members, interference with freedom of expression
at meetings, and similar activities that would apparently have
violated both Titles I and IV of the Act passed two years later.
English v. Cunningham, 269 F.2d 517, 519, 533 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 897, 905 (1959).  The district court ultimately
entered a consent decree that allowed those elected to hold office
provisionally, pending the conduct of new elections under the
supervision of the court, assisted by a board of monitors (id. at
520).  The court of appeals sustained the action of the district
court, though as its numerous opinions on the matter indicate,
implementation of the decree proved to be a complex matter.  /13/

   As the analysis offered by Senator Goldwater indicates, any future
action seeking the remedy of a supervised election would --
notwithstanding Title I -- have to proceed under Title IV, beginning
with the procedures for exhaustion and filing with the Secretary to
which he referred.  Of course, in the Teamsters' case the appointment
of monitors was strictly speaking a post-election remedy.  /14/ But it
is difficult to believe that a judicial solution would have been more
compatible with the Act if the court had forbidden the election to
take place at all, rather than provisionally accepting its results
pending a judicially supervised rerun.  Rather, the lesson that
Congress more likely drew from the case was that "(a) court is * * * a
clumsy instrument for supervising an election." Senate Hearings,
supra, at 133.  Senator Goldwater's statement plainly suggests,
therefore, that a court-ordered and supervised election was not
considered an appropriate remedy for a violation of Title I.

 C. The Action Of The House Reemphasizes The Senate's Conclusion That
Courts Should Not Supervise Union Elections

   As we mentioned above, page 21, the bill of rights provisions in
Title I of the Landrum-Griffin bill were simply borrowed from the bill
passed by the Senate.  See Title I, H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959).  They included a guarantee (id. at Section 102) that "(a) ny
person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been
infringed may bring an action in a district court of the United States
for such relief as may be appropriate." Similar provisions concerning
Title I remedies were included in the mild reform bill sponsored by
Representative Shelley of California, which was supported by the labor
movement (H.R. 8490, Section 102, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959);  Cox,
Internal Affairs, supra, 58 Mich. L. Rev. at 822), and in
Representative Elliott's bill, which had been reported out by the
House Committee on Education and Labor (H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. Section 102 (1959);  H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959)).

   With regard to Title IV's election provisions each of the House
bills differed in one important respect from the Kennedy-Ervin bill.
Section 402(a) of the Landrum-Griffin bill provided (H.R. 8400, supra,
Section 402(a)):

      A member of a labor organization --

         (1) who is aggrieved by any violation of section 401, and

         (2) who (has pursued internal union remedies for six months)
      may bring a civil action against such labor organization in any
      district court of the United States for the district having
      jurisdiction of such labor organization to prevent and restrain
      such violation and for such other relief as may be appropriate,
      including the holding of a new election under the supervision of
      the Secretary and in accordance with the provisions of this
      title.

   Identical provisions were included in the Shelley bill (H.R. 8490,
supra, Section 402(a)) and the Elliott bill (H.R. 8342, supra, Section
402(a)).  The idea behind permitting members, rather than the
Secretary, to initiate Title IV suits may have been that "the losing
faction in an election could conduct its contest more expeditiously by
hiring aggressive local counsel than by undertaking a trek to
Washington * * * ." H.R. Rep. No. 741, supra, at 79 (Supplementary
Views on H.R. 8342).

   What is significant, though, is that each of the three bills
seriously considered by the House provided for secretarial supervision
of court-ordered elections even in actions filed by union members.
That requirement undoubtedly derived from a feeling that whatever
advantages private enforcement might have, a court would still be
poorly equipped to conduct an election.  Moreover, the absence of a
similar provision for secretarial supervision in the enforcement
sections of Title I (H.R. 8342, supra, Section 102;  H.R. 8400, supra,
Section 102;  H.R. 8490, supra Section 102) is a strong indication
that the House did not consider court-ordered elections to be
"appropriate" relief for Title I violations.  /15/

 II. THE TERMS OF THE ACT SHOW THAT CONGRESS, OUT OF CONCERN FOR UNION
SELF-GOVERNMENT, INTENDED TO PRECLUDE COURTS FROM ORDERING AND
SUPERVISING ELECTIONS TO REMEDY TITLE I VIOLATIONS

   The legislative history of the LMRDA makes clear that Congress had
little confidence in the courts' ability to conduct union elections.
The language of the Act demonstrates Congress's correlative conviction
that the election process was crucial to union self-government.
Although Title I, and especially Title IV, were intended to make
unions more democratic, both titles also respect the link between
elections and self-government.  Title I guarantees a broad spectrum of
rights to ensure the individual member's participation in his union's
affairs, but limits available remedies to those that are
"appropriate." Title IV shows a concern that elections be regular and
periodic, and not easily overturned.  When it is necessary to
interfere in the election process, Title IV installs the Secretary as
a buffer, and also commits to him the supervision of any court-ordered
election.  Though a court may afford some relief on its own "prior to
the conduct" of an election, Title IV's remedies are otherwise
exclusive.  When a court orders a new judicially supervised election
as the district court did here, it not only undertakes a task for
which it is ill-equipped, but also ignores the Act's structural
protection of union self-government.

   Title I of the LMRDA is a bill of rights, only some of which are
directly relevant to officer elections.  It assures members equal
rights "to nominate candidates, to vote in elections (for choosing
officers and for other purposes) * * * , (and) to attend membership
meetings" -- including those at which elections occur -- "subject to
reasonable rules and regulations" set by the union.  29 U.S.C. 411(a)
(1).  It also guarantees each member the freedom "to express * * * his
views( ) upon candidates in an election" (29 U.S.C. 411(a) (2)).  But
the right to participate in union affairs and the freedoms of speech
and assembly have numerous other applications.  And Title I also deals
with the rights to sue and to appear as a witness or communicate with
the legislature, the right to specified procedures for increasing dues
or imposing other assessments, and the right to notice and a fair
hearing if the union seeks to impose any form of discipline.  29
U.S.C. 411(a) (3)-(5).  Title I states in addition that if the various
rights it secures are infringed, an individual member may sue in
federal district court "for such relief (including injunctions) as may
be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. 412.

   Title IV, by contrast, is entitled "Elections" and is exclusively
concerned with the election process.  Like Title I it guarantees a
number of individual rights, though here they are both more specific
and more unqualified.  An opportunity must be provided for the
nomination of candidates.  Every member in good standing is declared
eligible (subject to uniform and reasonable qualifications) to be a
candidate;  each is given the right to vote or otherwise support the
candidate of his choice, and to 15 days' notice of the election.
Votes are to be weighted equally, and members whose dues are withheld
by an employer cannot be disqualified for nonpayment of dues.  29
U.S.C. 481(e).  Candidates are entitled to the union's assistance in
distributing campaign literature and are given the rights to inspect
membership lists and to have observers at the polls and at the
counting of the ballots.  29 U.S.C. 481(c).  These rights encompass
the kinds of claims made by respondents in this case:  the opportunity
to nominate candidates, the right to be a candidate, and the right to
support the candidate of one's choice.  See, e.g., Wirtz v. National
Maritime Union of America, 399 F.2d 544, 548-549 (2d Cir. 1968).

   In addition to protecting those individual rights, however, Title
IV includes structural provisions designed to assure that unions --
through their elections -- remain self-governing organizations.
Elections must be held at regular intervals -- in the case of a local
like petitioner "not less often than once every three years by secret
ballot among the members in good standing." 29 U.S.C. 481(b).  See
also 29 U.S.C. 481(a) and (d).  The regularity of that process cannot
be automatically upset by election challenges.  Rather, a "challenged
election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon" (29
U.S.C. 482(a)).  The thought was that

      union business must not be brought to a standstill whenever an
      election is challenged * * * .  The choice lies between keeping
      the old officers in office and allowing the new officers to
      govern even though their right is challenged.  The latter course
      appears preferable for several reasons.  A union election should
      be presumed valid until the contrary appears.  The newly elected
      officers would be more likely to have the support of the
      members.  There would be less disruption of normal procedure
      within the union.

   Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 609, 634 (1959) ("Cox, The Role of Law").  Moreover, an order
directing the conduct of a new election is immediately appealable,
though to avoid prolonging any uncertainty such orders may not be
stayed pending appeal.  29 U.S.C. 482(d).

   There are still other hurdles, both procedural and substantive,
that prevent courts from upsetting the regular election process.
Members may not file their own suits to correct Title IV violations,
/16/ but can only ask the Secretary to do so -- and then only after
exhausting internal remedies, or at least pursuing them for three
months.  29 U.S.C. 482(a).  As Professor Cox testified concerning this
requirement, it "preserves a maximum amount of independence and
self-government by giving every international union the opportunity to
correct improper local elections." Senate Hearings, supra, at 134.
The Secretary, in turn, will bring an action only "if he finds
probable cause to believe that a violation * * * has occurred and has
not been remedied" (29 U.S.C. 482(b)).  See S. Rep. No. 187, supra, at
21 ("an election is not to be set aside for technical violations").
Even then, the court may not "declare the election * * * to be void
and direct the conduct of a new election" unless "after a trial upon
the merits" /17/ it finds that the violation "may have affected the
outcome of an election" (29 U.S.C. 482(c)).  See Wirtz v. Hotel
Employees, 391 U.S. 492, 505-509 (1968).

   Title IV also responds directly to Congress's concern that courts
are ill suited to conduct elections.  It states that any new election
must be "under supervision of the Secretary" (29 U.S.C. 482(c)).  Once
the election has been held the Secretary "certif(ies) to the court the
names of the persons elected, and the court shall thereupon enter a
decree declaring such persons to be the officers of the labor
organization" (ibid.).

   Congress not only prescribed detailed procedures to administer the
remedy it selected for Title IV violations, but also restricted the
availability of other remedies for election violations.  Section 403
(29 U.S.C. 483) provides:

      No labor organization shall be required by law to conduct
      elections of officers with greater frequency or in a different
      form or manner than is required by its own constitution or
      bylaws, except as otherwise provided by this (title).  Existing
      rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a
      labor organization with respect to elections prior to the
      conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this
      (title).  The remedy provided by this (title) for challenging an
      election already conducted shall be exclusive.

   The first sentence of Section 403 means that the union constitution
and bylaws govern officer elections so long as they conform to Title
IV;  any other law purporting to impose different requirements is
preempted.  In the second sentence Congress preserved some existing
rights and remedies -- those to enforce the constitution and by-laws
-- so long as they are invoked prior to the conduct of an election.
The third sentence declares that when an election is already
conducted, all "remed(ies) * * * for challenging an election" other
than Title IV proceedings are foreclosed, even those that merely seek
to correct violations that took place "prior to the conduct" of the
election.

   As this case demonstrates, some conduct that violates Title IV may
also violate Title I.  To recognize that is not to acknowledge,
however, that a court-ordered and supervised election is an
appropriate remedy for such a Title I violation.  As we have shown,
Title IV prescribes a remedy for election violations that is carefully
designed to interfere as little as possible with union
self-government.  Title I, by contrast, merely authorizes a court to
redress violations of the various rights provided in that portion of
the statute by affording "such relief (including injunctions) as may
be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. 412.  But as this Court has frequently
emphasized, a statute must be read as a whole, giving effect to all
its parts.  Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979);
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633-634
(1973);  Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1961).

   The very use of the term "appropriate" in Title I suggests that
certain remedies are inappropriate.  The scope of the "appropriate"
remedy under Title I must be defined with an awareness of the
important end served by the more specific procedures in Title IV.  The
district court's action in this case chips away at the protection for
union self-government given by Title IV in numerous ways.  For
example, although Section 401(b) (29 U.S.C. 481(b)) guarantees local
elections every three years, the temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction issued here delayed the Local's triennial
election an entire year beyond its appointed time.  And although
Section 402(a) (29 U.S.C. 482(a)) directs that newly elected officers
should assume office even though their right is challenged -- since
they "would be more likely to have the support of the members" than
the incumbents (Cox, The Role of Law, supra, 72 Harv. L. Rev. at 634)
-- the court's intervention made that impossible.  New elections under
Title I may also conflict with the direction of Section 402(c) (29
U.S.C. 482(c)) that the regular election process not be upset to
remedy violations that could not have affected the outcome.  Although
refusal to recognize a nomination would be cause for ordering a new
election under Title IV, see Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, supra, 391 U.S.
at 507, the same may not be true of all election-related misconduct
that a court might seek to redress by ordering a new election under
Title I.

   A fourth way in which self-government would be promoted under Title
IV concerns the exhaustion of intra-union remedies.  Section 402(a)
(29 U.S.C. 482(a)) makes exhaustion a prerequisite to filing a
complaint with the Secretary under Title IV.  By contrast, although
exhaustion of Title I claims may be demanded by the union, 29 U.S.C.
411(a) (4), this Court has held that the necessity of complying is a
matter left to the discretion of the district court.  NLRB v. Marine
Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426-428 (1968).  In this case, a hearing to
review the conduct of the nominations meeting, undertaken by Teamsters
Joint Council 10, was cancelled when this action was filed (Pet. App.
15a-16a).  Still another difference may be found in Title IV's
requirement that a court may not order a new election except "after a
trial upon the merits" (29 U.S.C. 482(c)).  Because no similar
limitation is found in Title I, courts may upset the regular election
process more freely -- as the district court did here -- on the basis
of the necessarily less certain evidence offered in support of a
motion for a preliminary injunction.

   Yet another divergence from Title IV's procedures, and one of more
intimate concern to Congress, is that judicial elections under Title I
take place without the Secretary's supervision.  29 U.S.C. 482(c).
But a "court has no tellers, watchers, or similar officials.  It would
become mired in the details of the electoral process.  To appoint a
master to supervise the election would delegate the responsibility,
but the master would face many of the same problems as the judge."
Senate Hearings, supra, at 133-134.  Ultimately, there is no
substitute for the expertise the Secretary has acquired, and the
resources he can bring to the task.  As this Court emphasized in
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964):

      Reliance on the discretion of the Secretary is in harmony with
      the general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude
      in resolving their own internal controversies, and, where that
      fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most familiar with
      union problems to aid in bringing about a settlement through
      discussion before the resort to the courts.

   Those many departures from the detailed scheme created by Title IV
emphasize the point made in the "exclusive remedy" provision, Section
403 (29 U.S.C. 483).  One might wish that Congress had spoken with
more precision in the second and third sentences, whose language
(about remedies "prior to the conduct" of an election, and remedies
"for challenging an election already conducted") does not apply neatly
to mail ballot elections.  But it is clear that this case has escaped
an unequivocal clash with Section 403 only because the district court
issued a temporary restraining order less than 17 hours before the
ballots were to have been counted.  The sensitive remedial process
created in Title IV should not be bypassed on the basis of such hasty
judicial action.

 III. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE PURPOSES OF THE
ACT WOULD BE FRUSTRATED IF COURTS WERE PERMITTED TO REMEDY TITLE I
VIOLATIONS BY ORDERING AND SUPERVISING ELECTIONS

   Although this Court has not until now been required to reconcile
the remedies provided under Titles I and IV of the Act, its prior
decisions have frequently acknowledged the two relevant principles
that emerge with such clarity from the legislative history and the
terms of the Act.  The first is that the Secretary has an expertise,
which the courts lack, in overseeing union elections.  The second is
that unions should be -- to the maximum extent possible consistent
with protecting individual members' rights -- self-governing
institutions.  From those two principles flow a number of subsidiary
objectives that this Court has also found in the Act:  centralizing
litigation about election violations in the Secretary's hands,
insulating unions from insubstantial complaints and from litigation on
multiple fronts, and avoiding the delay created by protracted
litigation over elections.  By taking control of the election process
the district court ignored those principles and objectives.

   1. In Calhoon v. Harvey, supra, this Court rejected an attempt by
union members to enjoin an upcoming election because of alleged
violations of Title I.  The plaintiffs there claimed that restrictions
on who was eligible to be a candidate, in combination with a rule
permitting only self-nominations, violated their Title I right "to
nominate candidates." Relying in part on the express language of
Section 101(a) (1) (29 U.S.C. 411(a) (1)), the Court held that Title I
protects only the "equal" right to nominate and thus was not violated
by the union's rule absent a claim of discriminatory application.

   Assuming the rule may have violated Title IV, the Court went on to
stress the undesirability of correcting such violations by
pre-election actions for injunctive relief.  The Court noted that
Congress had consciously chosen, with regard to union elections,

      to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary
      of Labor in order best to serve the public interest.  In so
      doing Congress * * * decided not to permit individuals to block
      or delay union elections by filing federal-court suits for
      violations of Title IV.  Reliance on the discretion of the
      Secretary is in harmony with the general congressional policy to
      allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal
      controversies, and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies of
      Government most familiar with union problems to aid in bringing
      about a settlement through discussion before resort to the
      courts.

   379 U.S. at 140 (citation and footnote omitted).

   Those views were reaffirmed in Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n,
389 U.S. 463 (1968), which held that an intervening regularly
scheduled election does not moot the Secretary's action for a remedial
election under Title IV.  That conclusion, the Court found,
necessarily followed from both of the principles discussed above.  In
the first place, Congress's desire "to preserve a 'maximum amount of
independence and self-government by giving every international union
the opportunity to correct improper local elections'" (389 U.S. at
472-473, quoting S. Rep. No. 187, supra, at 21) meant that a final
decision in court would often be overtaken by a subsequent election.
/18/ It would be ironic if Congress's very devotion to ghe goal of
union self-government should have the effect of excusing a union that
was unable to clean its own house before the next election.  Moreover,
once a violation had been shown, there was no substitute for "the
protective presence of a neutral Secretary of Labor (to) prevent the
unfairness in the first election from infecting, directly or
indirectly, the remedial election." 389 U.S. at 474.

   The same emphasis on union self-government and the importance of
the Secretary's role shaped the decision in Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers of America, supra.  The Court there held that a member
complaining under Title IV could be allowed to intervene in an action
brought by the Secretary, though he would not be permitted to raise
points rejected by the Secretary for setting aside an election.  The
Court found that the Act carried out Congress's "interest in
minimizing judicial interference with union elections." 404 U.S. at
533.  To that end (id. at 532):

      Congress made suit by the Secretary the exclusive post-election
      remedy for two principal reasons:  (1) to protect unions from
      frivolous litigation and unnecessary judicial interference with
      their elections, and (2) to centralize in a single proceeding
      such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a single
      election.

   Allowing member intervention would frustrate neither of those
objectives.  On the other hand, permitting the intervenor to raise new
issues would "circumvent the screening function assigned by statute to
the Secretary." 404 U.S. at 537.

   Finally, the Court once again emphasized the "special knowledge and
discretion of the Secretary" and the disruptive effect of delay on
union self-government in severely restricting judicial review of the
Secretary's decision not to bring suit under Title IV.  Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571, 573 (1975).  In the course of its
decision, the Court noted (id. at 566):

         Certain LMRDA provisions concerning pre-election conduct, 29
      U.S.C. Sections 411-413 and 481(c), are enforceable in suits
      brought by individual union members.  Provisions concerning the
      conduct of the election itself, however, may be enforced only
      according to the post-election procedures specified in 29 U.S.C.
      Section 482.

   2. A district court order that delays a scheduled election for an
entire year, and then directs the conduct of a new election under
court supervision, frustrates all of those principles and objectives.
As we have already noted at some length, it dispenses entirely with
the Secretary's expertise and resources for supervising new elections.
 See pages 17, 30, 34-35, supra.  That process requires a court to
make decisions about the date of the election;  the time and method of
giving notice;  eligibility requirements for attendance at the
nominations meeting, for making nominations, and for running for
office;  distribution of campaign literature;  the method of casting
ballots and the procedure for overseeing the tally;  and a number of
other details.  See Pet. App. 86a-93a.  It may also necessitate
numerous decisions on contested claims of eligibility, which will turn
not only on factual questions, but also on the interpretation of the
union's constitution and bylaws, customs and practices (id. at
89a-91a).

   By entertaining election challenges under Title I a court not only
sacrifices the Secretary's expertise in supervising elections, but
also foregoes the benefit of the Secretary's decision about whether to
seek the conduct of a new election.  As this Court emphasized in
Dunlop v. Bachowski, supra, 421 U.S. at 571, Congress in Title IV
expressed its view that the Secretary was better able to make that
decision than a court:

      (S)ince the statute relies upon the special knowledge and
      discretion of the Secretary for the determination of both the
      probable violation and the probable effect, clearly the
      reviewing court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for
      the decision of the Secretary not to bring suit * * * .

   Moreover, the Secretary's authority to seek correction of
violations is less confined than that of a court acting simply on a
member's Title I complaint.  Some election violations will be unlawful
only under Title IV, and therefore not remediable by a court acting
under Title I.  See Calhoon v. Harvey, supra.  In this case, for
example, the district court dismissed one of respondent's claims --
that the union's rule conditioning eligibility on timely payment of
dues was an unreasonable qualification (Pet. App. 7a-8a, 12a-13a) --
because the facts alleged stated a violation only of Title IV.

   The district court's direction of a new election under Title I not
only ignores the statutory role of the Secretary, but also interferes
to an impermissible degree with the principle of union self-government
embodied in the Act.  As we have already noted (page 30, supra), "the
exhaustion requirement (in Title IV) was regarded by Congress as
critical to the statute's objective of fostering union
self-government." Wirtz v. Laborers' Union, 389 U.S. 477, 484 (1968).
That objective is ill-served by applying the more relaxed exhaustion
requirements of Title I (see pages 33-34, supra) to requests for a new
election.  The same principles of union autonomy persuaded Congress
"not to permit individuals to block or delay union elections by filing
federal-court suits for violations of Title IV." Calhoon v. Harvey,
supra, 379 U.S. at 140.  But again, as we have already noted, court
intervention in this case resulted in delaying a union election for an
entire year beyond the three-year maximum fixed by Title IV (29 U.S.C.
481(b)), and retaining in office incumbents whose claim on the
members' allegiance may be weaker than that of the 1980 election
winners, whatever the defects of that election may have been.

   The principle of union autonomy is also seriously compromised when
a court ignores the Secretary's ability "to centralize in a single
proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a
single election." Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, supra,
404 U.S. at 532.  As Professor Cox noted during the Senate hearings,
"An election is an integer.  Its validity should be adjudicated once
and for all in one forum." Senate Hearings, supra, at 135.  That
purpose is served by Title IV because all the reins are collected in
the Secretary's hands.  But there is no limit to the number of Title I
actions that may be filed to challenge the election process.  And the
venue provision in Section 102 permits such suits to be filed "where
the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such
labor organization is located" (29 U.S.C. 412).  It is thus
conceivable that several suits requesting a remedial election could
proceed in different courts at the same time, and come to different
conclusions about whether or how to conduct a new election.  Cf.
Carter v. Civil Service Employees Association, No. CV-80-0832
(E.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 26, 1982) (Title I);  Donovan v. Civil Service
Employees Ass'n, No. 83-CV-108 (N.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 31, 1983) (Title
IV).  That possibility alone makes it unlikely that the "appropriate"
relief authorized by Section 102 for Title I violations was intended
to include court-ordered elections.

   3.  The reasons advanced by the court of appeals to justify
judicially ordered and supervised elections under Title I will not
withstand careful examination.  The court suggested that "(t)he rights
protected by Title I, particularly equal rights to participate in
union elections, free speech, and due process, * * * are in the nature
of rights traditionally protected by federal courts" (Pet. App. 59a).
However true that may be as an abstract matter, it is also true that
the rights asserted here -- to nominate, to run for office, to vote --
are precisely the kinds of rights guaranteed by Title IV.  29 U.S.C.
481(e).  And Congress in Title IV

      relie(d) upon the special knowledge and discretion of the
      Secretary for the determination of both the probable violation
      and the probable effect * * * .

   Dunlop v. Bachowski, supra, 421 U.S. at 571.  More important,
whatever the nature of the rights a member seeks to enforce, there is
an undeniable difference in the respective competencies of the courts
and the Secretary to conduct a supervised election as a remedy.  And
what is at issue in this case is simply the propriety under the Act of
a district court (acting as a court of equity) affording immediate
pre-election injunctive relief, rather than waiting 17 hours to follow
the remedial structure prescribed by Title IV.  Congress's clearly
expressed desire to utilize the special competence of the Secretary,
and to respect to the maximum extent possible the union's autonomy,
leaves no uncertainty about the answer to that question.

   The court of appeals also suggested that "suits involving Title I
rights will produce individual fact patterns, and, even if several
suits are brought, conflicting or redundant rulings are not likely to
emerge, and unions will not be burdened unfairly by litigation" (Pet.
App. 59a-60a).  There is little support for that claim apart from the
court's ipse dixit.  LMRDA election violations will always involve
"individual fact patterns," because rights are inherently individual
claims.  Title IV's guarantees concerning the opportunity to nominate
candidates, the right to run for office, the right to vote, the right
to pre-election notice, the right to have one's vote counted equally,
and the right of one whose dues are withheld by an employer not to be
declared ineligible (29 U.S.C. 481(e)) all protect individuals.  Yet
Congress directed that they should be enforced only by the Secretary,
because the Title IV remedy for individual violations -- a new
election -- affects the entire union.  The same is true when a court
orders a new election to remedy Title I violations.  If "several suits
are brought, conflicting or redundant rulings" (Pet. App. 59a) about
whether and how to conduct a new election may well emerge, and the
effect on the collective interest in union self-government could well
be chaotic.

   In finding that its action was not foreclosed by the exclusivity
provision in Section 403 (29 U.S.C. 483), the court of appeals
concluded that "flagrant violations (of Title I) may go unremedied" if
courts are precluded from acting on complaints during the election
process (Pet. App. 65a).  That conclusion both exaggerates the problem
and ignores the explicit language of the Act.  Section 403 does say
that "(t)he remedy provided by (Title IV) for challenging an election
already conducted shall be exclusive." And when that point is reached,
/19/ a Title I claim that amounts to an election challenge may not be
entertained by a court.  /20/ But relief is still available for the
same conduct under Title IV.  And up to the point when an election is
"already conducted" Section 403 explicitly preserves "(e)xisting
rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws," and
implicitly permits Title I actions for "appropriate" relief (see 29
U.S.C. 412).  Such relief would include actions for damages.  It would
also encompass equitable remedies that did not result in delay or
judicial supervision of the election process.  See Note, Union
Elections and the LMRDA:  Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 Yale
L.J. 407, 558-559 (1972);  Comment, Titles I & IV of the LMRDA:  A
Resolution of the Conflict of Remedies, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 166, 179
(1974);  James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA:  Autocracy and
Insurgency in National Union Elections, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
247, 316-317 (1978).  /21/ But the "appropriate" relief contemplated
by Title I does not include an injunction that delays for an entire
year a union's regularly scheduled election and that directs the
conduct of a new election under the supervision of a court, unassisted
by the Secretary.

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed and the
case remanded with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction
and return the ballots to the custody of petitioners.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   KENNETH S. GELLER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   JOHN H. GARVEY

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   T. TIMOTHY RYAN, JR.

      Solicitor of Labor

   KAREN I. WARD

      Associate Solicitor

   MARY-HELEN MAUTNER

      Counsel for Appellate Litigation

   JOHN A. BRYSON

      Attorney Department of Labor

   APRIL 1983

   /1/ A hearing before Joint Council 10 was cancelled when this
action was filed.  No action was taken by the International Union
(Pet. App. 15a-16a).

   /2/ Respondents also made several claims under Titles I and IV
concerning increases of local dues and concerning the union rule that
only members who have paid their dues on time for the 24 months
preceding the nominations meeting may be candidates (Pet. App. 7a-8a).
 The district court declined for a variety of reasons to grant
preliminary relief on these claims (id. at 12a, 22a-23a, 25a-37a).

   /3/ Respondents have suggested, in a Motion To Limit Issues In Writ
Of Certiorari And/Or To Dismiss Writ As Improvidently Granted (denied
Mar. 21, 1983), that this case does not properly present the issue
whether the district court had authority to enjoin the union's
December, 1980 election.  That is so, respondents argued, because on
January 9, 1981 the union informed the district court that it was
prepared to hold a new nominations meeting and mail ballot election
(see J.A. 53, 97, 100).  Respondents' point seems to be that since the
union, like the district court, was dissatisfied with the conduct of
the 1980 election, it suffered no harm when the district court entered
a temporary restraining order enjoining the counting of ballots.

   Respondents' argument ignores several obvious points.  The first is
that the Secretary's brief in the court of appeals specifically
challenged the propriety of the district court's TRO as an improper
interference with the Secretary's enforcement powers under Section 402
(29 U.S.C. 482), and the court of appeals explicitly sustained the
district court's power to enjoin the election (Pet. App. 61a, 67a).
The second is that the union itself suffered harm under the statute
from the TRO even if it was willing to conduct a new election.
Section 402(a) of the Act (29 U.S.C. 482(a)) states that a "challenged
election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon * *
* and in the interim the affairs of the organization shall be
conducted by the officers elected or in such other manner as its
constitution and bylaws may provide." This means that, but for the
district court's TRO, those elected in the 1980 election (rather than
the incumbents) would have conducted the union's affairs until a new
election could be held.  As we explain in more detail below, pages
29-30, the purpose of Section 402(a) is to preserve as much as
possible the union's autonomy in the election process.

   /4/ The court of appeals also rejected claims by petitioners that
the preliminary injunction was improper under traditional equitable
principles and that the district court had improperly refused to
require respondents to post a bond (Pet. App. 68a-82a).

   /5/ The Committee also emphasized that the bill's requirement that
members exhaust internal remedies before going to the Secretary
"preserves a maximum amount of independence and self-government by
giving every international union the opportunity to correct improper
local elections." S. Rep. No. 187, supra, at 21.

   /6/ At that time the exclusivity section (S. 505, supra, Section
303) provided:

      The duties imposed and the rights and remedies provided by this
      title shall be exclusive, and no labor organization subject to
      the provisions of this title shall be required to conduct
      elections of officers with greater frequency or in a different
      form or manner than is required by this title.

   /7/ In committing post-election enforcement to the Secretary,
Congress faced a "choice * * * between keeping the old officers in
office or allowing the new officers to enter upon their duties even
though their right may be challenged." S. Rep. No. 187, supra, at 22.
Congress favored the latter, in part because an "election should be
presumed valid until the contrary can be reasonably established"
(ibid.), in part because "(t)he newly elected officers would be more
likely to have the support of the members" and "(t)here would be less
disruption of normal procedure within the union." Cox, The Role of Law
in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 634 (1959).

   In this case, the district court's temporary restraining order and
injunction resulted in delaying the election, and maintaining the
incumbents in office, for an entire year.

   /8/ In this case, rather than directing that Lynch's name be put on
the ballot as a candidate for secretary-treasurer, the district
court's order directed the running of an entirely new election under
court supervision.  It set forth eligibility requirements for
attendance at the nominations meeting, candidacy for office, and
voting, and directed that disputes about eligibility would be resolved
by the arbitrators (Pet. App. 87a-91a).

   /9/ Concern was also expressed that permitting the Secretary to
intervene in every dispute between members and their unions could
prove harmful to union autonomy.  See 105 Cong. Rec. 6726 (1959)
(remarks of Sen. Kefauver):

      (S)ection 103 * * * would put the Secretary of Labor in the
      middle of the actions of every labor union in the United States
      and give him the right to institute suits at his will.  It would
      be very difficult to carry on management-labor relations in the
      public interest if an unthoughtful Secretary of Labor wished to
      interfere.

   /10/ Senator Kuchel made this observation on the rapidity with
which the McClellan amendment had been passed (105 Cong. Rec. 6717
(1959)):

         The next day, I, like many of my colleagues, read the text of
      the amendment offered by (Senator McClellan) for which I had
      voted.  It was several pages long.  Certainly, with more than
      100 printed amendments on our desks, it was physically
      impossible for any of us to read, let alone to study, the
      amendments as, one by one, they were offered with rapidity and
      we were required to vote each one either up or down.

         Others of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle did what I
      did -- read and studied the amendments.  It became apparent that
      there were some obvious questions as to parts of the language
      used.  * * * (T)here were provisions which were imperfectly
      drawn, which should be improved, and changed.

   /11/ Actually, although the Kuchel amendment was introduced on
April 24, 1959, copies of it were not available to members of the
Senate until the next day, when it was passed.  105 Cong. Rec. 6717.

   /12/ As we note below, pages 25-26, the House bill allowed member
suits to enforce Title IV rights, though like the Senate bill it
permitted new elections only under the supervision of the Secretary.

   /13/ See English v. Cunningham, supra, 269 F.2d at 538
(Supplemental Opinion);  Cunningham v. English, 269 F.2d 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1959);  Milone v. English, 282 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
English v. Cunningham, 282 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1960);  English v.
Cunningham, 282 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1960);  Milone v. English, 282
F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1960);  San Soucie v. Schmidt, 282 F.2d 833 (D.C.
Cir. 1960);  International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Schmidt, 282
F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1960);  English v. Cunningham, 282 F.2d 838 (D.C.
Cir. 1960);  English v. Cunningham, 282 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
English v. Board of Monitors, 282 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1960);  English
v. Cunningham, 282 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1960);  Dorsey v. Cunningham,
282 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1960);  Hoffa v. Letts, 282 F.2d 842 (D.C.
Cir. 1960);  English v. Cunningham, 282 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Hoffa v. Letts, 284 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

   Justice Frankfurter, in a memorandum denying an application for a
stay of the court of appeals' original judgment (269 F.2d 517 (D.C.
Cir. 1960)), noted:

         "'"One thing more does need to be said.

         "'"As is recognized by all concerned, judicial supervision of
      a union with a membership of 1,500,000 and some 800 locals
      through the agency of a mechanism like the Board of Monitors is
      an unusual manifestation of equity powers.  Defendants seek to
      enlarge the significance of the immediate items in controversy
      by their anticipation of an expansion of the powers of the Board
      of Monitors and their resulting fear of disruption of forces
      within the Teamsters as well as a heavy drain on the Teamsters'
      treasury in the course of such far-flung judicial
      administration.  These are matters not immediately involved in
      the decree of the Court of Appeals now before me."'"

   English v. Cunningham, 361 U.S. 905, 909 (1959) (memorandum of
Frankfurter, J.).

   /14/ However, Senator Goldwater's statement, if nothing else,
disproves the court of appeals' conclusion in this case (Pet. App.
58a-59a) that

      The exclusiveness of the Title IV remedy in certain cases was
      intended to exist only vis-a-vis state remedies;  there is no
      evidence that limitations on Title I by Title IV were ever
      contemplated.

   Title I had been added to the bill at the time Senator Goldwater
made his statement, and Senator Goldwater gave no indication that
court-appointed monitors, though unacceptable under state law, were
authorized by Title I.

   /15/ The provision for member suits to enforce Title IV election
rights in the Landrum-Griffin bill was deleted in conference, and the
Kennedy-Ervin provision for secretarial enforcement was substituted.
H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1959).  The conference
report does not explain the reason why the House receded.  It was no
doubt felt, however, as Senator Goldwater said in comparing the House
and Senate versions (105 Cong. Rec. 16489 (1959)), that

      the Senate bill is substantively preferable in its reliance on
      Government, rather than exclusively individual, enforcement
      action.  Since the election standards are designed to insure
      honest elections for the benefit of all union members as a
      matter of public policy, their violation is a matter of public
      rather than exclusively individual concern, and should be
      enforcible in the same way as the trusteeship standards of the
      bill.

   /16/ An exception to this general rule is provided for enforcing
the right to distribution of campaign literature.  29 U.S.C. 481(c).

   /17/ The requirement that the court make its findings only after a
trial on the merits, though it does not preclude the granting of
summary judgment, see Brennan v. Local No. 639, 494 F.2d 1092,
1094-1098 (D.C. Cir. 1974), obviously forbids preliminary injunctive
relief invalidating an election.

   /18/ Other decisions as well have recognized the policy behind the
exhaustion requirement.  Wirtz v. Laborers' Union, 389 U.S. 477, 484
(1968) ("the exhaustion requirement was regarded by Congress as
critical to the statute's objective of fostering union
self-government");  Hodgson v. Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333, 339 (1971)
("Congress intended to foster a situation in which the unions
themselves could remedy as many election violations as possible
without the Government's ever becoming involved").

   /19/ The Secretary believes, contrary to the court of appeals, that
that point is reached no later than when the tally of the ballots is
begun.  Cutting off all individual challenges at that point prevents
candidates who may be losing from using the courts to sandbag the
election.  More important, the Secretary's post-election action will
be free from interference by individual members' suits.

   There have been cases that have erroneously granted Title I relief
after the election was over.  See, e.g., Kupau v. Yamamoto, 622 F.2d
449 (9th Cir. 1980);  Kraska v. United Mine Workers of America, 686
F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1982).  Even in those cases, however, the relief
granted was the installation in office of the winning candidates, not
the conduct of a new election.

   /20/ That does not necessarily mean that all post-election Title I
claims are precluded.  For example, discriminatory denial of a vote to
one member that did not affect the outcome of an election would not be
remediable under Title IV.  In that case the claim is not that the
election is invalid, but that an individual's right has been violated,
and a Title I suit for damages may be appropriate.

   /21/ Respondents have suggested, without supporting argument, that
"this action will be wholly moot before this Court is likely to decide
the merits" of the case (Br. in Opp. 25).  That suggestion is without
merit.  The district court has impounded and still holds the ballots
for the 1980 election, which it enjoined, and the term of the offices
voted on in that election has not yet expired.  It is true that the
next regularly scheduled election will occur before the end of 1983,
and we are informed that the officers chosen at that election will be
installed by the beginning of 1984.  But as this Court held in Wirtz
v. Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, supra, 389 U.S. at 468-476, the intervention
of a regularly scheduled election does not cut off the Secretary's
right to exercise his statutory authority with regard to the preceding
election.

   More important, the underlying order being reviewed here is only a
preliminary injunction.  The district court has retained jurisdiction
over the case, and as the court of appeals noted, "the district court
did * * * not regard (the preliminary injunction) as the final order
in this case" (Pet. App. 76a).  In papers recently filed with the
district court respondents suggested that further action by the court
might be "necessary to guarantee fair and open elections in the union"
even after the 1983 election.  Unless "the Defendant Griffiths is
replaced in that election," respondents suggested that they might have
"reason to believe (that) further injunctive relief is necessary * * *
." Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Their Modified
Motion For An Award Of Attorneys Fees 4.  (We have lodged a copy of
the Memorandum, along with a Proposed Contempt Judgment And Order for
violation of the preliminary injunction, with the Clerk of this
Court.)