Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Salsgiver Communications, Inc.,
Complainant,
v.
North Pittsburgh Telephone Company,
Defendant.
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File No. EB-06-MD-004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted:  November 26, 2007 Released:  November 26, 2007
By the Enforcement Bureau:
1. In this Order, we grant in part a pole attachment complaint1 filed by Salsgiver 
Communications, Inc. (Salsgiver) against North Pittsburgh Telephone Company (NPTC) pursuant to 
section 224 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act).2  We hold that section 224 and the 
Commissions pole attachment rules3 require NPTC to allow Salsgiver access to NPTCs poles in Buffalo 
Township, the Borough of Freeport, and Harrison Township, Pennsylvania. We also find that several
terms in the NPTC-Salsgiver pole attachment agreement violate section 224 and the Commissions rules.  
We therefore order NPTC to amend the parties pole attachment agreement to eliminate those terms that 
we have found unlawful, and to process promptly Salsgivers attachment applications.
I. BACKGROUND
2. Salsgiver describes itself as a cable television operator, and a provider of competitive 
communications services, including broadband services.4  NPTC is an incumbent local exchange carrier
in Pennsylvania,5 and is a utility within the meaning of section 224(a)(1) of the Act.6  As a utility, 
NPTC must give cable television systems nondiscriminatory access to attach their facilities to any poles 
  
1 Complaint, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed Mar. 20, 2006) (Complaint).  
2 47 U.S.C.  224.
3 See 47 C.F.R.  1.14011.1418.
4 Complaint at 2.  As discussed below, NPTC challenges that characterization of Salsgivers status.
5 Complaint at 2; NPTC Response, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed Apr. 24, 2006) (Response) at 4.
6 Complaint at 2; Response at 4.  Section 224(a)(1) of the Act defines utility as including a local exchange carrier 
 who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way use, in whole or in part, for any wire 
communications.  47 U.S.C.  224(a)(1).
Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
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that it controls.7  
3. Salsgiver has been seeking to attach its facilities to NPTCs poles since 2004.8  In its 
initial request, Salsgiver indicated that it sought attachment for wiring and equipment necessary to 
provide data communications services.9  NPTC denied the request on the grounds that, as a provider of 
only data communications services, Salsgiver did not qualify for mandatory access under section 224.10  
After much negotiation, during which Salsgiver asserted that it was eligible for access as a cable 
television system,11 NPTC eventually sent Salsgiver a proposed pole attachment agreement.12 Salsgiver 
signed the Agreement in September 2005, and then sent NPTC payment and an application requesting 
access to specific poles.13  
4. Salsgiver has never attached its facilities to NPTCs poles, however.14  In February 2006, 
NPTC again raised the issue whether Salsgiver was entitled to access as a cable television system, in light 
of the fact that Salsgiver had not yet installed a cable headend.15 NPTC asserted that the Pole 
Attachment Agreement required Salsgiver to identify the location of its headend, and that a headend is 
necessary for Salsgiver Communications to be considered a cable television system entitled to pole 
access under the Act.16 NPTC returned Salsgivers application and payment, indicating that Salsgiver 
could resubmit them if and when its headend was complete.17 Salsgiver then filed its Complaint.18
  
7 47 U.S.C.  224(f)(1) (A utility shall provide a cable television system  with nondiscriminatory access to any 
pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it.) For purposes of this Order, we consider cable 
television system under section 224(f)(1) of the Act to be synonymous with cable operator under section 602(5) 
of the Act, 47 U.S.C.  522(5), and we use these terms interchangeably.
8 See, e.g., Complaint at 2; Response at 5.  
9 Complaint, Exh. 2.
10 Complaint at 2, Exhs. 3 & 4; Response at 5.  
11 Complaint, Exhs. 5-7.
12 Complaint at 7, Exh. 8 (Pole Attachment Agreement or Agreement).
13 Complaint at 7, Exhs. 8 & 9.
14 Complaint at 9.
15 The Agreement defines a headend as [t]he control center of a cable TV system, whose primary function is to 
receive via antenna, filter, amplify and process local, TV broadcast signals and to receive, decrypt, and modulate 
satellite-delivered video programming for distribution from the headend over cable, fiber or wire to, and receipt by, 
cable television subscribers as discrete channels.  Complaint, Exh. 8, at  1.5.  
16 Complaint, Exh. 14.
17 Complaint, Exhs. 14-15.
18 The Complaint initially requested that the Commission grant extraordinary relief in the form of penalties and 
sanctions.  Complaint at 40-42,   166-169.  See Reply, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed May 23, 2006) (Reply) at 
26-28.  On May 24, 2007, however, Salsgiver filed a Notice that it was withdrawing its request for extraordinary 
relief, penalties, forfeitures, sanctions, and damages.  Notice, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed May 24, 2007).  
Accordingly, we are not ruling on the initial request.
Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Salsgiver Is Entitled to Access to NPTCs Poles in Areas Where It Has a Local 
Franchise Agreement.
5. Under section 224(f)(1) of the Act, operators of cable television systems are entitled to 
nondiscriminatory access to utility poles.19  In a complaint proceeding, if a cable operator establishes a 
prima facie case that it is entitled to such access, the utility has the burden of proving that its denial of 
access is lawful.20  As explained below, we find that, by presenting evidence of its local franchise 
agreements, Salsgiver has established a prima facie case that it is entitled to pole access as a cable 
operator.  We also find that NPTC has not rebutted Salsgivers prima facie case.  We therefore hold that 
Salsgiver is entitled to access to NPTCs poles in the areas covered by the franchise agreements.  
6. The dispute in this case centers on whether Salsgiver actually intends to provide cable 
television services -- which would make it eligible for mandatory access to NPTCs poles -- or only 
services ineligible for mandatory access, such as information services.  As evidence that it is a cable 
operator, Salsgiver provides copies of an FCC Cable Community Registration Form 322 for the Borough 
of Freeport,21 and cable franchise agreements with Buffalo Township, the Borough of Freeport, and 
Harrison Township, Pennsylvania.22 Salsgiver also provides the declaration of its Chief Executive 
Officer, Loren Salsgiver, stating that the company has entered into programming agreements with video 
content providers, and purchased some of the equipment it will need to construct a cable headend.23  
7. The FCC Registration Form is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Salsgiver 
is a cable operator.  It does not represent an authorization to operate a cable television system, or an FCC
determination that Salsgiver operates a cable television system.24  It is merely a necessary, but not 
sufficient, prerequisite to providing cable service.  We also find the declarations about equipment and 
programming agreements insufficient in themselves to make a prima facie case.  These declarations fail to 
identify any particular equipment or programming suppliers.  
8. We do, however, find Salsgivers showing that it has cable franchise agreements with a 
number of municipalities sufficient to create a prima facie case that it is entitled to pole access as a cable
television system within the meaning of section 224(f)(1) of the Act.  These franchise grants demonstrate
that the municipalities involved expect Salsgiver to operate a cable television system.  For instance, the 
Harrison Township franchise requires Salsgiver, within three years, to construct an all-digital video 
system capable of offering not less than one hundred seventy-eight (178) channels of programming and 
high speed internet service.25  Moreover, in three other recent cases involving NPTC, we found that 
  
19 47 U.S.C.  224(f)(1).  
20 47 C.F.R.  1.1409(b).
21 Complaint, Exh. 1.  FCC Form 322 is a registration statement filed pursuant to 47 C.F.R.  76.1801.
22 Reply in Support of Motion to Expedite and Bifurcate, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed April 12, 2006) (Reply in 
Support of Motion), Exhs. 1-3.  
23 Reply, Declaration of Loren Salsgiver (Salsgiver Declaration) at 3.  See Reply in Support of Motion at 5-7.
24 See Sur-Reply of North Pittsburgh Telephone Company, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed June 20, 2006) (NPTC 
Sur-Reply) at 2.  See also 47 C.F.R.  76.1801 (a system community unit shall be authorized to commence 
operation only after filing  FCC Form 322).  This was the only evidence that Salsgiver initially offered to NPTC 
to demonstrate that Salsgiver was operating a cable television system.  Complaint at 6.  We therefore find no fault 
with NPTCs rejection of that showing.
25 Reply, Exh. 1 at  3.2.
Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
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prospective pole attachers can rely on decisions by responsible regulatory agencies, such as franchise 
authorities in the case of cable system attachers, to establish a prima facie showing of their status as 
entities entitled to pole access under section 224(f) of the Act.26  Furthermore, the Pole Attachment 
Agreement itself recognizes franchise agreements as relevant to assessing Salsgivers status as a cable 
operator.27  
9. NPTC nevertheless argues that the Freeport and Buffalo franchise agreements are
inadequate to show that Salsgiver is a cable operator, because they do not obligate Salsgiver to initiate 
service at any particular time, or to serve specific areas as cable franchises customarily require.28 But 
NPTC provides no other agreements to demonstrate what is customarily required,29 and offers only 
speculation that Salsgiver will not provide service under these franchise agreements.  Thus, we find 
NPTCs argument inadequate to counter Salsgivers prima facie showing.30  
10. Aside from attacking the franchise agreements, NPTC questions Salsgivers eligibility for 
pole attachment on four other bases.  As explained below, we find none of those arguments sufficient to 
rebut Salsgivers prima facie case.
11. NPTC first asserts that because Salsgiver has not yet constructed a cable headend, it is 
not yet eligible to attach to NPTCs poles as a cable operator.  NPTCs primary support for this assertion
is that the Pole Attachment Agreement between the parties allegedly requires Salsgiver to have a headend 
already in place.31 We disagree, even assuming, arguendo, that such a contractual requirement would be 
reasonable under section 224 of the Act.  The only portion of the Agreement that NPTC cites is Sheet 1 of 
Exhibit 1, CATV System Application for Permit to Attach to NPTC Pole(s). 32 This application form 
includes a field for identifying CATV headend street address.  Nothing, however, indicates that the 
application is invalid if there is no such address yet.33  Moreover, a cable operator may have an address 
where it is building, or plans to build, a headend before the construction is complete.  Thus, this field on 
the application form is not sufficient to create the substantive requirement that NPTC claims.  
  
26 Fiber Technologies Networks, LLC v. North Pittsburgh Telephone Company, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
22 FCC Rcd 3392, 3397,  15 (Enf. Bur. 2007) (Fiber Technologies); DQE Communications Network Services, 
LLC v. North Pittsburgh Telephone Company, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 2112, 2116,  12 
(Enf. Bur. 2007) (DQE Communications); Salsgiver Telecom, Inc. v. North Pittsburgh Telephone Company, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 9285 (Enf. Bur. May 24, 2007) (Salsgiver).
27 Section 2.1 of the Agreement provides that pole attachments will be permitted only in areas for which Salsgiver 
has been granted a franchise by the applicable authority.  Complaint, Exh. 8,  2.1.
28 NPTC Sur-Reply at 4-5.
29 The single example of the Harrison Township Agreement, with its three-year buildout requirement, is insufficient 
evidence to establish an industry standard.
30 See Paragon Cable Television Inc. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 152, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding Commissions 
decision to enforce pole attachment agreements requirement that attacher have a local franchise, and to presume 
validity of franchising authoritys action).  See also Fiber Technologies, 22 FCC Rcd at 3395-98,  10-16; DQE 
Communications, 22 FCC Rcd at 2116-17,  10-13; Salsgiver, 22 FCC Rcd at 9281-9291,  9-12.  NPTC also 
objects that the Harrison Township agreement post-dates the filing of the Complaint, and thus does not support 
Salsgivers claim that it was a bona fide cable system operator in 2004 and 2005.  Sur-Reply at 5.  We agree, but 
note that the agreement does constitute a prima facie showing that Salsgiver is a cable operator in Harrison 
Township currently.  
31 Response at 17.
32 See Response at 2, 17 (citing Sheet 1, Exh. 1 of the Pole Attachment Agreement, Complaint Exh. 8).
33 See Reply at 9.
Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
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12. Second, although NPTC accuses Salsgiver of gloss[ing] over the issue of how it could 
be a cable television system within the meaning of Part 76 of the Commissions rules without a fully 
constructed headend,34 NPTC offers no legal argument to suggest that Salsgiver cannot be.  Rule 76.5 
defines a cable system as a facility consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal 
generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable service. 35 Thus, rule 76.5 
expressly contemplates that a network can qualify as a cable television system, even if it is still in the 
design phase and not yet fully operational, if it is intended to provide cable service.  The fact that 
Salsgivers headend has not yet been completed does not, in our view, disqualify Salsgiver from pole 
attachment rights as a cable television system.
13. Third, NPTC argues more generally that Salsgiver does not actually intend to provide 
cable services, but rather has embarked upon a staged campaign to dress itself up as an entity entitled to 
access NPTCs poles.36 NPTC suggests that Salsgiver actually intends to use NPTCs poles only to 
provide services not eligible for mandatory pole attachment, such as information services.37 We find, 
however, that Salsgivers obtaining franchise agreements constitutes a strong prima facie case that is not 
countered by mere speculation about Salsgivers motives and intentions.  As discussed above, the 
Harrison Township franchise requires Salsgiver to construct a cable system within three years.  Moreover, 
the Agreement already addresses NPTCs concerns about whether Salsgiver will actually provide cable 
services via its attachments to NPTCs poles.  Section 9.2 of the Agreement provides that Salsgivers 
attachment rights will be deemed terminated if Salsgiver fails to initiate cable television service to a 
franchise area within one year after completion of make-ready work, or if Salsgiver ceases providing 
cable service in a franchise area.38  
14. Finally, NPTC asserts that the franchise agreements may not properly be considered part 
of Salsgivers evidence of its claim that it is a bona fide cable television system, because the 
agreements were not filed with the Complaint.39  We disagree.  Rule 1.1409 permits the Commission to 
request additional filings or information from the parties in pole attachment cases, and the staff made such 
a request here for the franchise agreements.40  NPTC was given an opportunity to respond, and was in no 
way unfairly prejudiced by the filing of this additional information.41
15. In sum, we find that Salsgiver has established a prima facie case, unrebutted by NPTC, 
that it operates a cable television system in Buffalo Township, the Borough of Freeport, and Harrison 
Township, Pennsylvania.  Therefore, we hold that Salsgiver is entitled, under section 224 of the Act, to 
access NPTCs poles in these areas.  We order NPTC immediately to provide Salsgiver with 
nondiscriminatory access to NPTCs poles in these areas, and promptly to process Salsgivers attachment 
  
34 Response at 17-18.
35 47 C.F.R.  76.5 (emphasis added).
36 Response at 1.
37 E.g., Opposition to Motion for Expedited Action, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed Apr. 3, 2006) (Opposition to 
Motion), at 1-4; Response at 1-3.
38 Complaint, Exh. 8 at section 9.2.  Similarly, under section 224(f) of  the Act, if Salsgiver does not use its 
attachments to provide cable service (or telecommunications service), it will lose its statutory right to pole access.   
39 Sur-Reply at 2 (citing 47 C.F.R.  1.1404(e)).
40 47 C.F.R.  1.1409.
41 Note, however, that had Salsgiver attached the franchise agreements to its initial Complaint, the pleading cycle in 
this case could have been more streamlined.  Indeed, had Salsgiver provided the agreements to NPTC sooner, the 
parties negotiations may well have been more fruitful.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
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applications submitted pursuant to the Pole Attachment Agreement.42  
B. Salsgivers Claims Regarding Rates, Terms, and Conditions of Attachment are 
Granted in Part and Denied in Part.
16. Salsgiver attacks numerous terms of the Pole Attachment Agreement as unjust, 
unreasonable, or discriminatory, in violation of section 224(b)(1) of the Act.43  As discussed below, we 
conclude that Salsgiver has met its burden of proving that certain of the challenged provisions are 
unlawful.  Salsgiver has failed, however, to meet its burden of proving that many other challenged
provisions are unlawful.
1. The Pole Attachment Agreement Unreasonably Restricts Overlashing.
17. Section 3.2 of the Pole Attachment Agreement states that Salsgiver is limited to one 
attachment per Licensor Pole and one installation per conduit, that attachment or installation is to include 
no more than one (1) cable.44  Salsgiver contends that, by limiting attachments to one cable per pole, 
the Agreement unreasonably prohibits Salsgiver from overlashing its own attachments.45 We agree.46  
The Commission has a long-standing policy against unreasonable restrictions on overlashing, including 
restrictions on attachers ability to overlash their own facilities.47 The one-cable limitation does appear to 
ban Salsgiver from overlashing its own facilities, and NPTC does not argue otherwise.48  NPTC also fails 
to provide any justification for the limitation.  Thus, we find this blanket limitation to be unreasonable on 
its face, and direct NPTC to eliminate this restriction on overlashing within 60 days of the release of this 
order.
18. NPTCs only response is that Salsgiver did not raise this issue while the parties were 
negotiating the Pole Attachment Agreement.49 NPTC raises this defense in response to a number of 
  
42 We note that Salsgiver has not made a prima facie case as to other portions of NPTCs service area, nor has it  
challenged that portion of the Pole Attachment Agreement granting access only in those areas in which Salsgiver has 
been granted a cable franchise by the relevant authority.  We expect that Salsgiver will provide NPTC with evidence 
of such franchises if Salsgiver seeks to attach to poles outside the areas specified above.  
43 47 U.S.C.  224(b)(1) (providing that the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole 
attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable).
44 Complaint, Exh. 8 at 6.
45 See Complaint at 19-20.  Overlashing, whereby a service provider physically ties its wiring to other wiring already 
secured to the pole, is routinely used to accommodate additional strands of fiber or coaxial cable on existing pole 
attachments.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 6777, 6805,  59 (1998) (subsequent history omitted) (Telecom Order).    
46 Section 5.2.3. of the Agreement states that Salsgiver may over-lash to its own attachments permitted under this 
Agreement.  Complaint, Exh. 8 at 11.  We cannot determine whether this provision overrides or otherwise affects 
section 3.2, as neither party has explained it.  We thus must consider whether section 3.2 is reasonable standing 
alone.
47  See, e.g., Telecom Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 6805-10,  59-69 (citing Common Carrier Bureau Cautions Owners of 
Utility Poles, Public Notice, DA 95-35 (Jan. 11, 1995) (cautioning owners of utility poles against restricting cable 
operators from overlashing their own pole attachments)).
48 NPTC says that section 3.2 does not prohibit [Salsgiver] from overlashing onto third-party facilities, but does 
not respond to the contention that the provision prohibits Salsgiver from overlashing its own facilities.  See 
Response at 25.
49 Response at 24-25.
Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
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Salsgivers other claims as well.50  Failure to object to a pole attachment provision prior to its adoption, 
however, does not necessarily preclude a subsequent complaint, especially where, as here, the Agreement 
was challenged within several months of its adoption.51 Thus, we reject NPTCs argument in connection 
with this and all other issues as to which it has been raised.  
2. The Pole Attachment Agreement Unreasonably Restricts the Number of 
Salsgivers Attachments.
19. Salsgiver complains that, independent of its effect on overlashing, the blanket prohibition 
on multiple attachments in section 3.2 of the Agreement is facially unreasonable, and that NPTC can deny 
access only on a case-by-case basis, and only when there is insufficient capacity, or for reasons of safety, 
reliability, or engineering concerns.52 We agree, given that section 224 allows exceptions to attachment 
rights only for reasons of insufficient capacity, safety, reliability, and generally applicable engineering 
purposes.53 NPTC offers no such justification for this limitation, noting only that Salsgiver did not raise 
the issue earlier, does not assert that it has requested multiple attachments, and does not prove that it 
needs multiple attachments.54  Under the Act, none of these factors permits such a restriction.  Therefore, 
we direct NPTC, within 60 days, to revise the Pole Attachment Agreement to eliminate this limitation.
3. The Pole Attachment Agreement Unlawfully Restricts Salsgivers Use of 
Boxing.
20. As previously indicated, the Act requires utilities to allow cable operators to make 
attachments to utility poles, allowing exceptions only on a non-discriminatory basis where there is 
insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally accepted engineering purposes.55  
Salsgiver asserts that section 3.2 of the Agreement violates the Act by imposing a discriminatory
restriction on Salsgivers attachments.  Section 3.2 provides that Salsgiver shall make all attachments on 
the same side of the Licensor Pole as Licensor has done . . . . Two-sided attachments are prohibited.56  
Salsgiver complains that this provision discriminatorily prohibits Salsgiver from engaging in the 
commonly-accepted industry practice of boxing, the installation of facilities on both sides of a pole at 
approximately the same height.57 Salsgiver asserts that NPTC itself uses boxing, and allows other 
attachers to do so as well.58 NPTC does not actually deny this, but says that Salsgiver does not aver facts 
to show that NPTC itself uses boxing.59 In reply, however, Salsgiver offers photographic evidence of 
boxing on NPTC poles.60  
  
50 See Response at 29-38.
51 See, e.g., RCN Telecom Services of Philadelphia, Inc. v. PECO Energy Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 
FCC Rcd 25238, 25240-41, Phase I Order (Enf. Bur. 2002).
52 Complaint at 20-21,  78-80 (citing 47 U.S.C.  224(f)(2)).
53 47 U.S.C.  224(f).
54 Response at 25-26.
55 47 U.S.C.  224(f) (emphasis added).
56 Complaint, Exh. 7 at 6.
57 Complaint at 21-22,  81-85
58 Complaint at 22; Reply at 12-16.
59 Response at 26.
60 Reply at 19-21 and attached Salsgiver Declaration at 12-16.
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21. Given the evidence that NPTC does allow boxing on some occasions, we find that the 
Agreements blanket ban on Salsgivers doing so is discriminatory and thus in violation of section 224 of 
the Act. Moreover, although NPTC states that boxing creates an unnecessary safety hazard and/or 
encumbrance for NPTC lineman (sic) and technicians,61 that statement is unsupported by specific facts 
or analysis, and is undermined by the evidence of some boxing on NPTCs poles.  Accordingly, we direct
NPTC, within 60 days, to revise the Pole Attachment Agreement to eliminate this discriminatory 
provision.62  
4. The Pole Attachment Agreement Unreasonably Requires Salsgiver to Incur 
Make-Ready Costs With No Assurance That Those Costs Will Be 
Reasonable.
22. Section 4.1.3 of the Agreement provides that Salsgivers submission of a pole attachment 
application is deemed to constitute Salsgivers agreement to pay for the cost of the Make-Ready survey.  
Under the Agreement, NPTC is not required to provide, nor is Salsgiver apparently permitted to demand, 
an estimate of those costs before Salsgiver is deemed to have agreed to pay them.  We find this provision 
to be unreasonable on its face. NPTC argues that it is not unreasonable to charge Salsgiver for the cost of 
the survey.63 We agree  the problem with this provision lies only in the fact that Salsgiver is committed 
to costs in an unspecified amount, with no opportunity to review them in advance.64 We direct NPTC, 
within 60 days, to revise the Pole Attachment Agreement to provide Salsgiver an opportunity to review a 
cost estimate before incurring Make-Ready costs.  
5. The Pole Attachment Agreement Unreasonably Requires That Third Parties 
Overlashing Salsgivers Attachments Obtain A License From NPTC.
23. Section 5.2.3. of the Agreement prohibits Salsgiver from allowing any third party to 
overlash Salsgivers attachments without obtaining a license to overlash from NPTC.  Salsgiver argues 
that this provision is unreasonable on its face, and we agree.  The Commission has made clear that 
neither the host attaching entity nor the third party overlasher must obtain additional approval from or 
consent of the utility for overlashing other than the approval obtained for the host attachment.65 NPTC 
asserts that Salsgiver lacks standing to object on behalf of third parties.66 Inasmuch as it is a provision of 
NPTCs agreement with Salsgiver that is at issue here, that position is meritless.  We find this provision 
to be unreasonable on its face, and direct NPTC, within 60 days, to revise the Pole Attachment Agreement 
to eliminate the requirement that third party overlashers obtain their own licenses. 
6. The Pole Attachment Agreements 30-Day Application Requirement for 
Service Drops Is Unreasonable.
24. Salsgiver alleges that section 5.6 of the Agreement unreasonably requires an application, 
  
61 Response at 27.
62 Our decision here is limited to and by the record in this case.  In some future adjudication or rulemaking, the 
Commission could, on the basis of a different record, decide to allow restrictions on boxing.  
63 Response at 28-29.
64 See Cable Texas, Inc. v. Entergy Services, Inc., Order, 14 FCC Rcd 6647, 6652  14 (Cable Serv. Bur. 1999) 
(stating that pole owner must keep costs imposed on attacher reasonable).
65 Amendment of Commissions Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial Order on 
Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd 12103, 12141,  75 (2001).
66 Response at 28.
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30 days in advance, before attaching or removing a service drop from NPTCs poles.67  Salsgiver argues 
that it is entitled to make service drops on reasonable notice, and without prior approval.  We agree, and 
find that section 5.6 is unreasonable on its face.  
25. The former Cable Services Bureau, now Media Bureau, has previously stated that 
attachments to drop poles are adjuncts to attachments that are approved in the normal application process, 
and thus a utility may require notice, but not prior approval.68 Salsgiver points out that a 30-day notice 
period would force the company to impose a 30-day waiting period on new service requests, and that such 
delays may be inconsistent with its franchises or other legal obligations.69 NPTC fails to address the 
substance of Salsgivers allegations, stating in a conclusory fashion only that Salsgiver fail[s] to aver 
facts which would show that such notice in its 30 day requirement is discriminatory, unjust or 
unreasonable.70  For the reasons stated by Salsgiver, we find the 30-day application requirement to be 
unreasonable, and direct NPTC, within 60 days, to revise the Pole Attachment Agreement to state a 
reasonable notice provision.
7. The Pole Attachment Agreement Provides Insufficient Notice For Removal 
of Salsgivers Attachments.
26. Salsgiver challenges sections 5.9 and 9.371 of the Pole Attachment Agreement as 
providing inadequate notice for removal of Salsgivers attachments.72 Section 5.9 says that if NPTC 
decides to abandon, remove, or relocate a pole, Salsgivers right to attach to that pole will terminate at the 
earlier of 60 days following the date of NPTCs notice to Salsgiver or the scheduled date of 
abandonment, removal, or relocation.73 Section 9.3 states that if the Pole Attachment Agreement is 
terminated because of Salsgivers noncompliance or default, NPTC may remove Salsgivers attachments 
upon 30 days written notice.74 Salsgiver alleges that these provisions conflict with the Commissions 
rules, which require utilities to provide no less than 60 days written notice prior to removal of facilities 
or termination of any service to those facilities, such removal or termination arising out of a rate, term or 
condition of the  pole attachment agreement.75  
27. We agree that the challenged provisions, on their face, patently conflict with the plain 
  
67 Complaint at 28-30,  115-120; Complaint, Exh. 8 at 14 (section 5.6. provides that installing or removing 
service connections shall not require prior authorization or notices, except that when a service drop is attached to or 
removed from a Licensor Pole, Salsgiver shall submit an Application at least 30 days prior to the attachment or 
removal). A service drop is an adjunct line to the electric supply or communications main line.  In cases where a 
service drop must cross a roadway, it is attached to a drop pole on the opposite side of the roadway.  See Mile Hi 
Cable Partners, L.P. v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., Order, 15 FCC Rcd 11450, 11460,  19 (Cable Serv. Bur. 2000) 
(Mile Hi Bureau Order), affd on review, Order, 17 FCC Rcd 6268 (2002) (Mile Hi Commission Order), review 
denied sub nom. Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. FCC, 328 F.3d 675 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
68 Mile Hi Bureau Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 11460,  19.  NPTC asserts that this decision is irrelevant because it 
concerns drop poles, not service drops.  Response at 33.  NPTC is incorrect  the decision addresses the issue of 
attaching service drops to drop poles.  Id.  
69 Complaint at 29-30,  118, 120.
70 Response at 33.
71 The Complaint refers to section 9.2, but the language that Salsgiver quotes actually appears in section 9.3.
72 Complaint at 31.
73 Complaint, Exh. 8 at 16.
74 Complaint, Exh. 8 at 25.
75 47 C.F.R.  1.1403(c) (emphasis added).
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language of our rules.  NPTCs defense seems to be that the 60-day minimum notice provision of rule 
1.1403 applies only if NPTC removes the attachments, not if it directs Salsgiver to remove them.76 NPTC 
offers no rationale for making such a distinction, nor can we find one in the rule or its adopting order.77  
Moreover, such a distinction would make no sense.  Accordingly, we direct NPTC, within 60 days, to 
amend the Pole Attachment Agreement to provide at least 60 days notice prior to removal of attachments.
8. The Pole Attachment Agreement Imposes an Unreasonable Penalty For 
Unauthorized Attachments.
28. Section 5.7.1 of the Agreement imposes a penalty charge of $250 for each 
unauthorized attachment, in addition to back attachment fees.78 We agree with Salsgivers contention that 
this penalty charge directly conflicts with Commission precedent.79 The Commission has previously 
found unlawful a similar $250 unauthorized attachment fee.80 In Mile Hi Cable Partners, the 
Commission applied general contract principles prohibiting the enforcement of unreasonable penalties for 
breach of contract, and limited the utility to compensatory damages, where there was no specific record to 
support punitive damages.81 Similarly, here we find that it would be unreasonable for NPTC to charge a 
$250 per attachment penalty, above and beyond compensatory damages, without a specific basis to justify 
such charges.  NPTC asserts that the Mile Hi Cable Partners precedent is irrelevant, but offers no cogent 
basis for its assertion.82  NPTC also fails to explain how the charge is anything but punitive.  We therefore 
direct NPTC, within 60 days, to amend the Pole Attachment Agreement to limit the penalty for 
unauthorized attachments to compensatory damages, in accordance with Mile Hi Cable Partners.  
9. Salsgivers Other Facial Challenges to the Pole Attachment Agreement Are 
Denied.
29. Salsgivers remaining claims are denied.  Contrary to Salsgivers allegations,83 we find 
that sections 2.1, 5.2.1, 5.3, 6.1, 6.4, 6.7, 9.1, 9.2, and 9.5 of the Pole Attachment Agreement are not 
facially unlawful.84 As to its claims regarding sections 2.6, 3.2, 5.11, 5.5.4, 6.2, 6.6, and 6.16 of the Pole 
  
76 Response at 35.
77 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and 
Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 16094-98 (1996) (subsequent history omitted).
78 Complaint, Exh. 8 at 14-15.
79 See Complaint at 31-31,  121-25.
80 Mile Hi Cable Commission Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 6271-73.
81 Id.
82 Response at 34-35.
83 See Complaint at 23-39,  89-102, 129-31, 137-41, 149-59. 
84 Section 2.1 does not, as Salsgiver asserts, apply to Salsgivers attachments on other utilities poles. Sections 5.2.1 
and 6.1, dealing with space reservation, are not facially unreasonable because we presume that NPTC will comply 
with the guidelines for space reservation established by the Commission.  Section 5.3 charges Salsgiver for safety 
inspections only if Salsgiver is found to be out of compliance with the Pole Attachment Agreements Construction 
standards; this is not facially unlawful, and Salsgiver has not shown that NPTC will charge an unreasonable amount
for such inspections.  Section 6.4 does not, as Salsgiver claims, require Salsgiver to misrepresent the nature of its 
access rights.  Section 6.7 does not, as Salsgiver claims, require Salsgiver to accede to requests from other utilities 
for make-ready work.  Section 9.1, which permits either party to terminate the agreement without cause, but only 
with at least six months notice, does not vitiate Salsgivers attachment rights.  Sections 9.1, 9.2 and 9.5 are not 
facially unlawful, inasmuch as they merely terminate Salsgivers pole attachment rights if Salsgiver ceases to 
operate a cable television system.    
Federal Communications Commission DA 07-4721 
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Attachment Agreement,85 Salsgiver has failed to meet its burden of proving the facts necessary to show 
that those provisions would be unlawful, as applied.86 Salsgiver has also failed to meet its burden of 
proving that NPTC has imposed unlawful make-ready charges.87 Finally, we deny as moot Salsgivers 
claim that NPTC violated 47 C.F.R.  1.1403(b) by failing to grant or deny Salsgivers November 8, 2005 
attachment application within 45 days,88 inasmuch as we now grant the access that Salsgiver sought in 
that application.
III. ORDERING CLAUSES
30. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 224 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 224, and sections 1.1401-
1.1408 of the Commissions rules, 47 C.F.R.  1.1401-1.1408, that Salsgiver Communications, Inc.s 
complaint is GRANTED to the extent that it requests immediate access to North Pittsburgh Telephone 
Companys poles located in Buffalo Township, the Borough of Freeport, and Harrison Township, 
Pennsylvania.
31. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 224 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 224, and sections 1.1401-
1.1408 of the Commissions rules, 47 C.F.R.  1.1401-1.1408, that the Complaint is GRANTED to the 
extent that we find above that certain provisions of the Pole Attachment Agreement are unlawful, and that 
NPTC SHALL, within 60 days from the release of this order, amend the Pole Attachment Agreement to 
eliminate or modify those terms that we have found unlawful.  
32. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 224 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 224, and sections 1.1401-
1.1408 of the Commissions rules, 47 C.F.R.  1.1401-1.1408, that the Complaint is otherwise DENIED.
33. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 224 of the 
  
85 See Complaint at 19-36,  73-74, 86-88, 103-20, 132-36, and 142-48.
86 As to the confidentiality provision in section 2.6, Salsgiver has not explained why it must be permitted to divulge 
the terms of the Pole Attachment Agreement to others, simply so that Salsgiver may determine whether it is 
discriminatory.  With respect to Section 3.2,  Salsgiver has not shown how the requirement to obtain written 
agreement, which agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld, constitutes an unreasonable burden on its right to 
attach to non-wooden poles.  Salsgiver claims that section 5.11 discriminates between Salsgiver and other attachers, 
but provides no evidence of what other attachers are required to do.  Salsgivers complaint about sections 5.5.4 and 
6.2 is merely speculative, and those provisions do not on their face suggest that NPTC will disregard its section 224 
obligation to provide Salsgiver with nondiscriminatory access to rights of way.  With respect to section 6.6, which 
gives NPTC the authority to bump unauthorized Salsgiver attachments off its poles in favor of a subsequent attacher, 
Salsgiver fails to provide any rationale for why its unauthorized attachments should be entitled to priority over other 
parties authorized attachments.  Salsgiver claims that under section 6.16, NPTC plans to charge for overhead and 
administrative costs that are already recovered in the annual rental rate, but offers inadequate evidence to prove this 
charge.
87 See Complaint at 14-17,  51-66.  Salsgiver provides no factual basis for its claim that NPTC has attempted to 
charge Salsgiver for remedying other parties violations.  As to the claim that NPTCs make-ready charges exceed 
prevailing market rates, Salsgiver has not provided sufficient evidence of comparative rates.  And as to the claim 
that NPTC has charged for unnecessary make-ready work, Salsgiver does not respond to NPTCs justification for 
the charges, and thus we do not have sufficient basis to rule for Salsgiver at this time. We note, however, that costs 
not required to accommodate the attacher may not be imposed on the attacher.  See, e.g., Kansas City Cable 
Partners v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., Consolidated Order, 14 FCC Rcd 11599 (Cable Serv. Bur. 1999) 
(attacher responsible only for cost of work made necessary because of its attachments).   
88 See Complaint at 13-14,  47-50.
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Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 224, and sections 1.1401-
1.1408 of the Commissions rules, 47 C.F.R.  1.1401-1.1408, that Salsgivers Motion for Expedited 
Action and to Bifurcate Complaint89 is DENIED as moot.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Kris A. Monteith
Chief, Enforcement Bureau
  
89 Motion for Expedited Action and to Bifurcate Complaint, File No. EB-06-MD-004 (filed Mar. 20, 2006).