(Bench Opinion)
 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.  The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.  See United
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States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    Syllabus

 BLESSING, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY v. FREESTONE ET AL.
                                                            ____

     CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

         No. 95-1441.   Argued January 6, 1997 - Decided April 21, 1997

Respondents, five Arizona mothers whose children are eligible for state child
 support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed this 42
 U. S. C. S1983 suit against petitioner, the director of the state child
 support agency, claiming, among other things, that they properly applied for
 child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate,
 the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for
 them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and
 other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic
 failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all
 mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its
 implementing regulations.  They requested broad relief, including a
 declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D
 provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable through a S1983
 action, and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial
 compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations.  The
 District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner, but the Ninth Circuit
 reversed.  Without distinguishing among the numerous provisions of the complex
 Title IV-D program or the many rights those provisions might have created, the
 latter court held that respondents had an enforceable individual right to have
 the State achieve "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D.  It also disagreed
 with the District Court's conclusion that Congress had foreclosed private
 Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and
 Human Services (Secretary) to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs
 do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements.  

                                                                    I           

II                            BLESSING v. FREESTONE
                                      ____

                                    Syllabus

Held:  Title IV-D does not give individuals a federal right to force a state
_____
 agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D.  Pp. 9-18.
   (a) A plaintiff seeking S1983 redress must assert the violation of a federal
 right, not merely of federal law.  Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles,
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 493 U. S. 103, 106.  Three principal factors determine whether a statutory
 provision creates a privately enforceable right: (1) whether the plaintiff is
 an intended beneficiary of the statute; (2) whether the plaintiff's asserted
 interests are not so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the
 judiciary to enforce; and (3) whether the statute imposes a binding obligation
 on the State.  See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498,
                     ____________    ________________________
 509.  Even if a plaintiff demonstrates such a right, however, there is only a
 rebuttable presumption that it is enforceable under S1983.  Dismissal is
 proper if Congress specifically foreclosed a S1983 remedy, Smith v. Robinson,
                                                            _____    _________
 468 U. S. 992, 1005, n. 9, 1003, either expressly, by forbidding recourse to
 S1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive
 enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual S1983 enforcement,
 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S. 107, 133.  Pp. 9-10.
 _______    _________
   (b) Respondents have not established that Title IV-D gives them individually
 enforceable federal rights.  In prior cases, the Court has been able to
 determine whether or not a statute created such rights because the plaintiffs
 articulated, and lower courts evaluated, well-defined claims.  See, e.g.,
                                                                     _____
 Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 430. 
 ______    ____________________________________________
 Here, respondents have not identified with particularity the rights they
 claim, and the Ninth Circuit has not engaged in the requisite methodical
 inquiry.  That court erred in apparently holding that individuals have an
 enforceable right to "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D in all respects. 
 The statutory "substantial compliance" requirement, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. A.
                                                          _____
 S609(a)(8) (Nov. 1996 Supp.), does not give rise to individual rights; it was
 not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, but is
 simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of
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 a State's Title IV-D program, allowing her to increase the frequency of audits
 and reduce the State's federal grant upon a finding of substantial
 noncompliance.  The Court of Appeals also erred in taking a blanket approach
 to determining whether Title IV-D creates rights: It is readily apparent that
 many of the provisions of that multifaceted statutory scheme, including its
 "substantial compliance" standard and data processing, staffing, and
 organizational requirements, do not fit any of the traditional criteria for
 identifying statutory rights.  Although this Court does not foreclose the
 possibility that some Title IV-D provisions give rise to individual rights,
 the Ninth Circuit did not separate out the particular rights it

                              BLESSING v. FREESTONE                          III
                                      ____

                                    Syllabus

 believed arise from the statutory scheme, the complaint is less than clear in
 this regard, and it is not certain whether respondents sought any relief more
 specific than a declaration that their "rights" were being violated and an
 injunction forcing petitioner to "substantially comply" with all of Title
 IV-D's provisions.  This defect is best addressed by sending the case back for
 the District Court to construe the complaint in the first instance, in order
 to determine exactly what rights, considered in their most concrete, specific
 form, respondents are asserting.  Only by manageably breaking down the
 complaint into specific allegations can the District Court proceed to
 determine whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right. 
 Pp. 10-15.
   (c) Petitioner's argument that Title IV-D's remedial scheme is sufficiently
 comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude S1983 suits is
 rejected.  Petitioner does not claim that any Title IV-D provision expressly
 curtails S1983 actions, and she has failed to make the difficult showing that
 allowing such actions to go forward in these circumstances would be inconsis-
 tent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme.   That scheme is far more
 limited than those at issue in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
                                ___________________________________    ________
 Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, the
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 only cases in which the Court has found preclusion; in particular, Title IV-D
 contains no private remedy - either judicial or administrative - through which
 aggrieved persons can seek redress.  The only way that Title IV-D assures that
 States live up to their child support plans is through the Secretary's
 oversight, but the Secretary's limited powers to audit and cut federal funding
 are not comprehensive enough to foreclose S1983 liability.  Pp. 15-18.

68 F. 3d 1141, vacated and remanded.

 O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  SCALIA, J., filed
a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined.