Title: Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives.
  Series: Bulletin
  Author: Bureau of Justice Assistance
  Published: October 1998
  Subject: Alternatives to incarceration
  25 pages
  63,000 bytes
  
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  -------------------------------
  
  U.S. Department of Justice
  Office of Justice Programs
  Bureau of Justice Assistance
  
  Nancy E. Gist, Director
  
  Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives
  Onsite Visits, Case Histories, and State and Local Innovations From the
  Bureau of Justice Assistance
  October 1998
  
  -------------------------------
  
  [The program] built on the wise belief that not every criminal should go to
  prison continues to prove itself. It is money well spent. Since 1990, more
  than 40,000 offenders, most of them confronted with their first-ever prison
  term, have been diverted to this nationally recognized program. . . .
  Extensive counseling explores the root of the problem, community work
  teaches reliability while restoring dignity, and reading programs help
  develop valuable skills.
  
  The Hartford Courant
  October 20, 1997
  
  -------------------------------
  
  Connecticut's Alternative Sanctions Program 
  $619 Million Saved in Estimated Capital and Operating Costs
  
  By Patrick J. Coleman, Jeffrey Felten-Green, and Geroma Oliver, BJA
  
  Any visitor to the Alternative to Incarceration Center (AIC) in Bridgeport,
  Connecticut, will be impressed by the facility's structure and organization.
  The Bridgeport center is one of Connecticut's 17 AICs, which serve
  referrals from the 17 state courts. Just inside the front door is a control
  center that tracks the comings and goings of the several hundred offenders
  who are assigned to the center each year. During our visit on February 22
  and 23, 1998, a Connecticut Noreaster was pounding the outside walls of
  the AIC, so many clients were busy at various activities within the center.
  For example, down the hall from the control center, six clients were
  folding and stapling newsletters for local nonprofit organizations to fill
  part of the community service requirement of their sentence. Ordinarily, if
  it had not been raining so hard, "Most of these clients would be outside
  doing much more physical community service work," according to Jim
  Greene, Deputy Director of Field Services for the Office of Alternative
  Sanctions (OAS). More physical work includes activities like cleaning up
  state parks, removing trash from inner-city vacant lots, or building and
  maintaining giant playscapes (as OAS community service teams have a
  reputation of doing). OAS Field Services organizes and runs all of the
  community service opportunities available to OAS clients.
  
  The AIC also contains a classroom and a computer room where clients are
  taught how to read or prepare for their general equivalency diploma
  (GED). One part of this educational program--Project READ--is funded
  through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Edward Byrne Memorial
  Formula Grant funds. Other services available to AIC clients include
  substance abuse treatment and a batterer's education group.
  
  Michael Lawlor, Co-Chair of the Judiciary Committee in the Connecticut
  House of Representatives, said, "[Alternatives to incarceration are] an
  alternative to prison, not an alternative to punishment." Alternative
  sanctions programs allow the state courts to ensure that all criminal
  offenders receive swift, certain, and meaningful punishment, while
  repaying the community and preventing the citizens of Connecticut from
  having to fund the operations of new prisons years into the future. Bill
  Carbone, the Director of OAS said, "These programs don't remove the
  need for prison; they reinforce the severity of prison as a sanction."
  
  AICs are just one element in a complete continuum of alternative
  sanctions. Placements are made according to the amount of risk a client
  poses to the community. These alternatives include:
  
  o Alternative to Incarceration Centers. AICs provide supervision,
  substance abuse treatment, educational/vocational assistance, counseling,
  and community service opportunities. All AICs are operated by private
  nonprofit agencies.
  
  o Community Service Labor Program. This program requires that
  offenders provide needed services to the community in lieu of prosecution.
  
  o Electronic Monitoring. Electronic monitoring technology is used to
  verify that an offender remains in his or her home during specified hours.
  
  o Day Incarceration Centers (DICs). The most serious offenders are
  supervised in DICs 7 days a week during the day. At night, all DIC clients
  are monitored electronically.
  
  o Youth Confinement Centers (YCCs). Drug-involved offenders, between
  ages 16 and 21, are confined in these centers where they receive substance
  abuse treatment services.
  
  o Project Green. This project combines extensive community service in
  state parks with substance abuse treatment.
  
  o Women and Children Program. This program permits female offenders
  to live with their children during their participation in a treatment
  program. 
  
  o Traditional Inpatient Drug and Alcohol Treatment. With this treatment,
  clients are admitted to a residential setting where they receive
  detoxification, substance abuse treatment, and educational/vocational
  assistance.
  
  The Connecticut judiciary has established alternative sanction options for
  virtually every offender who does not absolutely have to be in prison.
  Alternative sanctions programs are available to juveniles (up to age 16),
  youthful offenders (ages 16 to 18), and adults (18 and older). Each
  offender's risk of reoffending and his or her living skills needs (staying
  sober, learning to read, maintaining employment) are assessed by judicial
  branch personnel and alternative sanctions program staff. The offender is
  then placed in the program(s) most likely to protect the community and
  assist the offender in developing skills that will keep him or her out of the
  criminal justice system in the future. Evaluations have shown that OAS
  programs are saving money and reducing offender recidivism.[1]
  
  How did Connecticut pull this off when most of the nation is getting tough
  on crime and building more and more prisons? How have the programs
  generated legitimacy and public support for keeping criminals out of
  prison? How have they avoided the traditional problems of overcrowding
  and underfunding, which have ruined the effectiveness of many criminal
  justice intervention programs in the past? How have they escaped the
  damaging, negative publicity that would have rained down if even one
  offender had committed a high-profile violent crime in the 8 years since
  the program started? Do alternative sanctions really make a difference in
  the safety of the community and the lives of offenders? Before our visit we
  had a lot of questions about the program. But after much background
  research and 2 days in Connecticut conducting interviews with seven key
  political and program players, three groups of alternative sanctions staff,
  and two groups of clients (one juvenile and one adult) and visiting four
  day reporting centers in two cities, our questions were answered.
  
  History
  
  Development of the Connecticut Alternative Sanctions Program
  
  Bill Carbone, the Director of OAS and a career advocate for progress in
  the Connecticut criminal justice system, told us, "In the late 1980s, the
  criminal justice system in Connecticut had lost its integrity in the eyes of
  the public. Most offenders [including violent offenders] sentenced to
  prison were doing 10 percent or less of their sentence." This crisis was, in
  part, due to 1981 legislation that dismantled the Connecticut Parole 
  System and established definite sentencing. Definite sentencing led to
  longer sentences for offenders and fewer releases from prison. The
  immediate result of definite sentencing was prison overcrowding, which
  led to a dramatic increase in the use of supervised home release for
  offenders. Bill Carbone told us, "The original response to this problem,
  much like the current response in many other areas of the country, was to
  build [facilities to hold] 11,000 prison beds. Between 1985 and 1990 the
  state of Connecticut spent over $1 billion in this effort." 
  
  By 1990, however, the citizens of Connecticut were tired of paying for the
  construction and upkeep of new prisons. The original expense of building
  the prisons was minor compared with the ongoing expense of operating
  them year after year. Prison building, once an economic development
  plumb sought by Connecticut communities, was no longer popular. Even
  enormous tax incentives offered by the state were not enough to persuade
  communities to allow the building of new prisons in their midst. Also, it
  became apparent to Connecticut residents that the prison-building
  marathon had not solved the criminal justice system's sentencing integrity
  problems.
  
  In addition, Connecticut, along with the rest of the country in 1990, was
  experiencing an economic recession. Mr. Carbone told us, "There was no
  Connecticut income tax in 1990, and the sales tax wasn't generating
  sufficient revenue to maintain state institutions, let alone expand them.
  State employees were being laid off, and the construction of any new state
  institutions became an unpopular option."
  
  Government leaders and criminal justice officials realized that the prison-
  building effort had resolved neither the crowding problems nor their
  credibility problems. We spoke with Ed Schmidt, Counsel to the
  Connecticut House of Representatives, who told us, "Despite political
  differences, there was no incentive to defend the status quo."
  
  Court as a Community Problem Solver
  
  Director Carbone told us that he and several others were responsible for
  the idea behind the creation of OAS. He chaired the Connecticut
  Commission on Prison Overcrowding, which had recommended
  alternatives to incarceration as an option for solving prison crowding and
  sentencing legitimacy issues. The Governor at the time, Democrat William
  A. O'Neill, and members of the state legislature had explored the ideas of
  alternatives to incarceration as well. Director Carbone, however, gives
  credit for the formulation of the idea and the sheparding of the legislation
  to Judge Aaron Ment.
  
  The Honorable Judge Ment, highly respected Chief Court Administrator in
  Connecticut, stepped forward during the prison crisis with ideas that called
  for more effective sanctions and less money. In 1990, Judge Ment
  proposed two pieces of legislation. The first created the Office of
  Alternative Sanctions and empowered judges to sentence offenders
  directly to intermediate sanction programs, including substance abuse
  treatment. OAS was to develop a series of alternatives to incarceration for
  low-risk pretrial and postadjudication offenders. OAS was to provide
  judges with a variety of sanctions that took into account the seriousness of
  the offense and the criminal history of the offender. A get-tough side to
  OAS was to be set up; if an offender failed the program, he or she would
  be sent to prison to complete the full sentence. OAS was to base its
  programs on two premises:
  
  1. Every individual convicted of a crime should be swiftly punished and
  that punishment should be strictly enforced. The sanctions, however,
  should be consistent with the severity of the offense, the offender's
  criminal and personal history, and public safety needs.
  
  2. A continuum of credible, enforceable community-based sentencing
  options, falling between probation and prison should be created in every
  court in Connecticut. Intermediate sanctions must punish justly and
  sensibly and ensure the availability of prison space for violent and chronic
  offenders.[2]
  
  Judge Ment's second piece of legislation demanded progressive increases
  in the percentage of time served by inmates and ultimately reinstated the
  Connecticut parole system. This legislation required that, within a year,
  with the diversion of 1,500 inmates to OAS, minimum prison sentences
  had to increase from 10 percent to at least 25 percent of the sentence. In
  the second year, with 3,000 offenders diverted to OAS, 40 percent of
  prison sentences had to be served. In the third year, with 4,500 offenders
  going to OAS, the parole system was to be reinstated. According to this
  legislation, inmates could not see the parole board until they had served 50
  percent of their sentence--with no time off for good behavior, no
  exceptions, and no frills. Judge Ment's legislation was intended to restore
  the severity of prison sentences and represented a critical element in the
  Connecticut judiciary's effort to control prison and jail overcrowding by
  providing court-based pretrial and sentencing options for judges to
  consider in lieu of long periods of incarceration. 
  
  Judge Ment told us, "I don't consider myself a 'Judicial Activist,' but I do
  believe that the court should play a role as a problemsolver for the
  community." Both pieces of legislation passed with one condition--a 5-
  year sunset clause. This clause was a message to Judge Ment and the
  supporters of OAS; they had 5 years to demonstrate that they could safely
  and effectively manage low-risk offenders outside prison. At the end of 5
  years, the Connecticut legislature would have to pass new legislation to
  fund OAS or the program would end. When the 5-year period was up, the
  legislature unanimously passed a bill that continued the operation of the
  OAS indefinitely with no additional sunset clauses.
  
  All branches of Connecticut's government worked together to respond to
  the prison and jail overcrowding crisis. The judicial branch conducted
  research that led to the development of OAS and accepted the
  responsibility for the administration of the project. The legislature passed
  the public acts described above. The executive branch has increased
  funding for these initiatives every year, despite the state's periodic
  financial problems.
  
  In addition to the progressive state financial commitment, the Bureau of
  Justice Assistance has also supported OAS efforts steadily over the years.
  Since 1994, OAS has received more than $11.5 million in BJA Byrne
  Formula Grant funds, which are administered in Connecticut by the Justice
  Planning Unit in the Governor's Office of Policy and Management. In
  addition to Project READ, Byrne funding has been used to support
  juvenile justice centers; Latino offender programs; AIC capacity
  enhancements; intensive supervision of sex offenders; the New Haven,
  Waterbury, and Hartford drug courts; and many other OAS programs.
  OAS has also received more than $2.5 million in BJA discretionary
  funding for corrections options programs for Latino, female, and youthful
  offenders. 
  
  In the last 2 years, OAS has also received funding from other offices
  within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice Programs
  (OJP). A Family Violence Court Docket has been funded in three
  Connecticut cities by the Violence Against Women Grants Office. OJP's
  Drug Courts Program Office has funded a drug court in Bridgeport.
  Additionally, the Corrections Program Office has funded a drug treatment
  program for mothers and their children to fill a large gap in available
  treatment services from OAS. This combination of extensive state
  resources and significant contributions from BJA and other OJP agencies
  has kept OAS well funded and well managed. 
  
  Selling Alternative Sanctions in a "Tough on Crime" World
  
  In 1987, the declaration of the War on Drugs started a trend of
  criminalizing what were previously considered to be minor offenses, such
  as low-level drug possession.[3] Most of the nation seemed to agree that
  government should incarcerate more people for longer periods of time to
  demonstrate its intolerance of crime.[4] Three years later, Judge Ment was
  successful in getting legislation passed that would prevent many of these
  same low-level offenders from going to prison. How did the supporters of
  alternative sanctions effectively sell this idea?
  
  Judge Ment said that several things had to be in place for him and his
  supporters to be successful. First of all, there had to be a prison crisis or
  they would not have needed alternative sanctions. Second, they had to
  have the support of the state judiciary. Judge Ment said, "We avoided
  telling judges they had to [use alternatives]--we have no sentencing
  guidelines in Connecticut." Instead, Judge Ment offered the judges the
  possibility of having a "full array of sanctions" and having "complete
  control" over their implementation. Another crucial element was the
  accompanying legislation, which demanded minimums for time served.
  Judge Ment said, "Credibility is crucial--[alternative sanctions] have to be
  an alternative to higher sanction, such as prison." 
  
  Once the legislation was passed, the fledgling OAS had 5 years to prove
  that its solution worked. Mr. Carbone said, "We had no time to waste, so
  we started evaluating our programs from the beginning." In fact, the
  survival of OAS depended upon several objectives that had to be
  accomplished for potential detractors to be sold on the idea.
  
  Developing Firm Public Support. To secure public support, OAS waged
  an effective marketing campaign emphasizing the accountability aspects of
  alternatives to incarceration. A highly visible community service
  component was developed that showed offenders doing hard work to pay
  back the community and improve neighborhoods. Jim Greene said that
  "we had to legitimize community service. We did this by putting offenders
  along side regular volunteers. It's more changing the image of offenders
  than changing the offenders." OAS clients assist community volunteer
  organizations in building playgrounds, maintaining state parks, cleaning
  inner-city vacant lots, and building "pocket parks" on vacant lots. Jim
  Greene said, "We try to avoid derision of clients and use them always as a
  resource. . . .We have our supervisors work right alongside offenders."  
  
  One of the problems with community service programs has always been
  getting the clients to fulfill their obligations. Jim Greene said, "We
  thought, 'What if offenders actually wanted to do community service?'."
  To accomplish this, OAS sought out unusual community service
  opportunities for its clients. One example is its work with the Nutmeg
  Games, an annual state athletic event. Ordinarily, community service
  workers would clean up the trash after the event. But after OAS had
  established the credibility of its community service program, it began
  using offenders to collect the gate money at the Nutmeg Games. Jim
  Greene said, "We've collected more than $70,000 over each of the last 4
  years and the books have always balanced." 
  
  To make sure that the community service work was visible to the public,
  OAS clients work alongside residents from the community. People who
  may have been unsure about having offenders work on projects in their
  community "virtually always change their mind after a day of working
  alongside one of our clients," said Jim Greene. Having offenders work
  with community members not only raises the visibility and community
  acceptance of OAS programs, but also legitimizes the work of the
  offenders while integrating them with the noncriminal population. 
  
  OAS has also attracted a good deal of positive attention from the press,
  which has raised the public profile of its community service work.
  Director Carbone has been open and willing to talk to the press when
  approached about OAS programs and evaluation outcomes. This openness,
  combined with the success of the program, has resulted in an ongoing
  positive relationship with the press.
  
  OAS creates its own newsletters and holds its own staff meetings,
  conferences, and program evaluations for its network of providers.
  Providers share the newsletters with OAS clients and the public. The staff
  meetings and conferences allow ordinarily isolated providers to create and
  reinforce a network that includes other community providers across the
  state. The program evaluations update local providers on the impact of the
  program so that they can respond to questions from community members
  about the nature and success of OAS programs.
  
  Another effort used to gain public support for alternative sanctions was
  emphasizing how much tax payer money the program would save--
  $25,000 is spent annually to incarcerate an offender compared with $7,000
  spent (with an average of four clients per slot per year) to supervise an
  offender through alternative sanctions. Further, Judge Ment told us, "The
  late Raymond Burr made two movies to promote and inform the public
  about alternative sanctions. One included an interview with a victim."
  These movies relayed the message that even victims saw alternative
  sanctions as more appropriate for low-risk offenders than prison.
  
  Maintaining Credibility. When asked how the program has managed to
  build and maintain its credibility, Tom Siconolfi, Director of the Justice
  Planning Unit in the Governor's Office of Policy and Management, said it
  was "with no horror stories plus lots of positive stories." Jim Greene
  explained, "We have managed the heck out of these programs--the entire
  project is dependent upon proper supervision." When performing
  community service OAS maintains a ratio of one staff member to six
  offenders. Jack Bailey, the Chief State's Attorney in Connecticut told us,
  "There is another side to credibility and that is accountability. If an OAS
  client doesn't show up to the AIC, they are reported and docketed to be in
  court the next day." This swift response to noncompliance sends a
  message to offenders, law enforcement personnel, and the community that
  OAS is serious about its commitment to public safety. 
  
  Perhaps the most significant factor in maintaining credibility is that OAS
  designed these programs exclusively for pretrial and low-risk offenders
  and has stayed true to its admission criteria. OAS has carefully followed
  the design of its programs and admits only offenders that match the
  admission criteria. Many correctional programs that get a reputation for
  doing a good job are suddenly flooded with referrals of all kinds. Some
  programs accept inappropriate referrals under this pressure and end up
  with horror stories that hit the press and damage the credibility of the
  programs. There may be nothing wrong with the programs, but admitting
  the wrong types of clients could be disastrous.
  
  Maximizing the Benefits of Privatization. Alternative sanctions programs
  are operated through OAS contracts with private, nonprofit organizations.
  Privatization helped to sell this program to Connecticut's Governor, voters,
  legislators, press, judges, and corrections system in several ways. First,
  privatization has a reputation for saving money because, when done
  correctly, services can be provided without the massive administrative
  overhead that comes with operating under the state government umbrella.
  Next, privatization allows "small government" advocates to say that they
  are providing more services to the state with fewer government
  employees. 
  
  Another benefit of privatization is that it allows OAS to use organizations
  that are already providing services and have already established credibility
  in the community. Further, shedding the bureaucracy, according to Mr.
  Carbone, "allowed OAS to start and expand programming almost
  immediately when it could have taken years had the programs been state
  operations." Finally, and what is most important--for OAS, its supporters,
  and the community--privatization makes program providers accountable to
  OAS. If a contracted service provider is not doing a good job, Jim Greene
  said that OAS "can drop them in 30 days." Privatization offered cost
  savings, accountability, smaller government, and community economic
  development--all were appealing to conservatives who might have
  opposed a program that they could have killed by labeling it "soft on
  crime."
  
  Creating the Opportunity To Get Tough on Prison Sentences. Shortly after
  the two pieces of legislation that created OAS and minimum prison time
  served were passed, offenders sent to prison were required to spend
  significantly longer portions of their sentence behind bars. It became
  possible for "tough on crime" lawmakers to consider more stringent prison
  sentences for appropriate crimes. This was largely due to the prison beds
  that were made available by the diversion of low-risk offenders to OAS.
  More prison beds and tougher sentences restored the credibility of a prison
  sentence. 
  
  Avoiding a Fight With the Unions. Another common difficulty with active
  offender community services programs involves replacing union workers
  with offenders. The OAS community services programs operate in state
  parks and inner-city sites but generally do not displace any workers,
  particularly union workers. Jim Greene told us that the state workforce had
  been so depleted by the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s that
  there were "basically no union staff left to maintain state parks." OAS
  clients were meeting a community need but not threatening the jobs of
  hard-working, honest citizens; this was key to selling the idea. 
  
  Avoiding Becoming a Political Football. All of the factors discussed
  above have, to date, prevented OAS from becoming a political football.
  Judge Ment and Director Carbone have carefully sheparded the program
  through the economic and political minefields. A "soft on crime" label, an
  OAS client committing a violent crime, an impression of government
  expansion draining tax dollars, or a suspicion that citizens must compete
  with offenders for jobs can be portrayed as highly volatile images that are
  easily adapted to the needs of political opportunists. It has taken patience,
  tenacity, and reinforced credibility to sell alternative sanctions to the
  people of Connecticut. Mr. Bailey said, "If you have one element of the
  criminal justice system against it, it won't go." Mr. Siconolfi added, "If an
  area doesn't have a critical mass of issues (i.e., prison relief needs) [and a]
  demonstrated level of cooperation among all leaders, you can have the
  money or not, [but] it probably won't work." 
  
  Unique Political Structure May Have Helped Establish OAS
  
  The state of Connecticut has a unique government structure. State court
  judges are nominated by the Governor and appointed by the general
  assembly for 8-year terms and can only be removed with just cause. The
  Chief Court Administrator is appointed by the Chief Justice of the
  Connecticut Supreme Court who is appointed by the Governor. The Chief
  State's Attorney is appointed by a commission, which is appointed by the
  Governor. Local state's attorneys are appointed by the Commission on
  Criminal Justice, which is appointed by the Governor. Jack Bailey said,
  "The Attorney General is elected, but has no jurisdiction over criminal
  matters--civil only." Further, Connecticut has no county governments, and
  therefore no county courts. There are few stakeholders and fewer turf
  boundaries to cross in trying to obtain the necessary consensus of support
  for alternative sanctions programs. 
  
  In short, none of the players that would have to defend alternative
  sanctions on the political stump have to run for election. Jack Bailey said,
  "It would have been a much harder sell if they had to run for election. If I
  were running on the opposing side, I would get up and say, 'We spend $35
  million a year on prosecuting and $42 million on keeping [offenders] out
  of prison. Don't you think its time we restored the credibility of the
  criminal justice system?'. " Because these players do not have to run for
  election, the issue is not tested on the front lines by today's contentious
  partisan politics. 
  
  These political dynamics have centralized control and allowed a small
  number of individuals to shape policy without having to pass the test of
  intense public scrutiny. In this day of campaign sound bites, misquotes
  and quotes taken out of context, and political grandstanding on criminal
  justice issues, it is likely that this consolidation of power has contributed
  immensely to the acceptance of alternative sanctions in Connecticut. 
  
  This should not take away from the fact that OAS is supported by a
  bipartisan, public/private/government coalition, which includes a
  partnership of all three branches of government and a partnership of the
  state court leadership. OAS staff and supporters worked extensively to
  make the program visible to the public and a credible offender
  management tool. Alternative sanctions programs are extremely popular in
  Connecticut and have demonstrated their effectiveness in saving money,
  improving conditions in the community, and reducing offender recidivism. 
  
  Connecticut Alternative Sanctions in 1998
  
  I think AIC is a very good program. AIC has helped me in many ways. . . .
  Since I have been coming here I have gotten my GED. Now I attend
  [technical college] where I am earning an associate's degree in business
  administration. I am also employed at [a supermarket]. The case managers
  are very helpful. If you have a problem they try to help you out and be
  there for you [in] any way they can. . . . AIC is a good program for those
  who want to take advantage of a good thing. If you have the attitude you
  are going to make your time here count, you can accomplish anything.
  
  AIC Client 
  February 24, 1998
  
  Structure
  
  The Connecticut judicial branch has administrative authority over all
  criminal courts, the Bail Commission, the Office of Adult Probation
  (OAP), and OAS. OAS has primary responsibility for coordinating and
  contracting public and private efforts to expand alternative incarceration
  programming. The Bail Commission and OAP are judicial branch
  divisions that provide direct supervision to more than 50,000 accused and
  sentenced offenders.[5] Rapid and efficient statewide replication of
  proven, alternative sanction model programs is facilitated by this unified
  criminal justice system.
  
  Program Components
  
  In addition to the programs for adult offenders that were described in the
  introduction, there are many other levels of sanctions that are available
  through this system. A statewide network of more than 50 public and
  private providers deliver the following services: 
  
  o Community service.
  
  o Day incarceration center.
  
  o Restitution center.
  
  o Family counseling.
  
  o Mediation.
  
  o Drug court.
  
  o Intensive supervision probation.
  
  o Substance abuse treatment.
  
  o Youth confinement centers.
  
  o Sex offender supervision and 
  treatment.
  
  o Electronic monitoring/house arrest.
  
  o Victim restitution.
  
  o Halfway house placement.
  
  These are cost-effective alternatives to incarceration that use community-
  based punishment, treatment, and supervision of criminal offenders.
  
  We spoke to several offenders at the Bridgeport AIC about their
  experiences with alternative sanctions. All reported very positive
  encounters. An offender involved in the more restrictive Day Incarceration
  Center programs said, "[Alternative sanctions] make sense. If you send a
  man to prison, that'll just make him mean. This way you can deal with
  your problems and stay out of trouble." Another offender said, "I would
  never have thought I could get out of the criminal justice system, but now
  I'm learning to read; I'm learning how to work a computer. You can't get
  me out of that computer room. And I think I really have a chance to
  change my life." 
  
  Some of the offenders had suggestions for improvement. One offender
  said, "I think AIC should have a job developer--someone who goes out to
  different companies in the area to try to get jobs for the clients when they
  get out of [the program]." We found that some AICs do offer job
  development services, but resources are limited. Most of the clients'
  criticisms of alternative sanctions were related to restrictions on their
  freedom, which are required by the program to ensure public safety. 
  
  Each center we visited had a different "feel" to it. The first AIC we visited
  was in New Haven. The physical setup of this center was very open with
  cubicles scattered throughout the building. Multicultural art adorned the
  walls along with many quotes from famous African-American leaders. We
  entered the education room where a group of AIC clients were having a
  values exploration discussion with their teacher. They were discussing
  whether the United States should bomb Iraq for noncompliance with U.N.
  weapons inspection resolutions. Values exercises such as these force
  offenders to think beyond impulsive responses to events and to consider
  the direct and indirect ramifications of such actions on the lives of others.
  Each client had to state an opinion and explain why he or she felt that way.
  One young man said, "I don't think we should bomb them because they
  might have all those chemical weapons near another country's border. And
  if we bomb them, the chemicals might hurt the people in the other
  country."
  
  The AIC we visited in Bridgeport (described in the introduction) had
  almost no art on the walls, and motivational quotes had been posted on the
  walls in the classroom. The atmosphere in Bridgeport seemed less
  culturally focused and more businesslike than that in New Haven.
  However, the clients at both facilities seemed equally engaged and
  enthusiastic about the opportunity to be in an alternative sanctions
  program instead of prison.
  
  Successes of OAS
  
  In its first year of operation, OAS had a budget of less than $1 million and
  worked with 750 offenders. Eight years and more than 150,000 offenders
  later, OAS has an annual budget of $48 million. At any given time, there
  are 4,500 adult and 700 juvenile offenders involved in the program.
  Director Carbone said that, next year, the budget is likely to be more than
  $52 million. Program development and fundraising must be considered a
  major success of OAS. But the program has also demonstrated dramatic
  success in achieving its primary operational goals. 
  
  The first goal of OAS was to manage offenders for less money.
  Alternative sanctions operate at an average cost of just over $7,000 per
  year (with an average of four clients per slot per year), while the average
  cost for incarcerating an offender is approximately $25,000 per year.
  Therefore it is estimated that, without these alternatives, more than 3,500
  additional prison and jail beds would have been needed at a capital cost of
  $525 million and an additional $94 million per year in operating costs. 
  
  Another goal that was imperative to achieve to survive the 5-year sunset
  clause in OAS's funding legislation was to prove that the program
  protected the public. More than 60 percent of OAS clients successfully
  complete the program. Of the 30 to 35 percent of offenders who are
  terminated from the program, less than 10 percent are terminated for a new
  offense. A 3-year longitudinal study of the effectiveness of OAS
  programs, conducted by the Justice Education Center, Inc., was completed
  in 1996. The study compared offenders who had been sentenced to OAS
  programs with offenders who had been incarcerated by the Department of
  Corrections (DOC), and the findings were favorable. After 3 years, there
  were about two arrests of an OAS client for every three in the DOC
  comparison sample, showing a significantly better track record for OAS
  clients than for those released from prison. 
  
  Ensuring that offenders give back to the community where they have
  offended has been another area of OAS success. OAS has participated in
  the building of seven 15,000-square-foot playscapes and a 25,000-square-
  foot, handicapped-accessible play structure in various communities in 
  Connecticut. OAS community service crews regularly maintain these
  playgrounds. OAS Project Green clients maintain 30 state parks each year.
  In 1996 alone, more than 7,000 offenders participated in statewide
  community service activities, providing more than 250,000 hours of work,
  valued at more than $1.3 million. More than 100 state, municipal, and
  nonprofit agencies received services at approximately 300 work sites. The
  list goes on and on.
  
  And, convincing the Connecticut legislature that the program works and
  subsequently obtaining unanimous passage of a public act to continue
  OAS funding were major successes as well. 
  
  The Justice Education Center, Inc., study also identified some areas of
  improvement for OAS. The study identified the lower rates of success for
  Latinos and suggested that increased efforts at culturally sensitive
  programming were warranted.[6] In response to this recommendation,
  OAS opened special programs to provide culturally sensitive services to
  Latinos such as the Apoyo (Caring) Center in New Haven. Apoyo is a
  combination of an AIC and a DIC that serves only Latino clients. Almost
  all of the staff are Latino, and the probation officer assigned to the center
  is Latino as well. The art on the walls at Apoyo is Latino, and the program
  is much more family focused than regular AIC and DIC programs. This
  program demonstrated that the success rate for Latino clients could be
  improved. Jim Greene said, "Apoyo gets more Latino referrals than other
  centers and has a better success rate with Latino clients." AICs in other
  locations have attempted to integrate Latino sensitivity into their
  programming by hiring Latino staff and reaching out to the Latino
  community. At this time, however, Apoyo is the only free-standing,
  specifically Latino program in the state. 
  
  Another special need that was identified in the study was services for
  adolescent girls and young female offenders who are pregnant or already
  have children. OAS has applied for a BJA grant to develop a program that
  would meet their needs.
  
  The Future of OAS
  
  At some point in the life of a program like those administered by OAS,
  which is designed to divert "certain offenders" from prison, all of the
  offenders that fit the admission criteria are diverted to the program leaving
  no room for expansion. This is the case with the adult alternative sanctions
  programs in Connecticut. The state has realized the maximum adult
  offender diversion and cost savings that OAS, as it is currently designed,
  can provide. The only way to accommodate more offenders would be to
  accept offenders that are more likely to be a danger to the community.
  OAS has been trying to ensure that this risk is not taken. 
  
  However, there has been great interest on the part of OAS and elected
  officials in creating a parallel network of similar programs for juveniles.
  Tom Siconolfi commented, "[OAS programs] haven't hit any walls yet,
  but now they're looking at special populations--pricey populations. This is
  where they'll start to hit walls. Any further growth will come on the
  juvenile side."
  
  And so, in the 1995 Juvenile Justice Reform Bill, with a Republican
  majority in the state Senate, a Republican Governor, and a Democratic
  majority in the House of Representatives, funding was legislated for OAS
  to establish a complete continuum of sanctions for juveniles in
  community-based settings. House Counsel Ed Schmidt said, "None of this
  would have been possible without the OAS longitudinal study."
  
  Alternatives for Juveniles
  
  OAS has established both residential and nonresidential alternative
  sanctions for juveniles. Nonresidential programs called Juvenile
  Supervision and Reporting Centers are highly structured programs that
  provide day and evening programs, 7 days a week, for nonviolent
  juveniles who otherwise would be in detention. Services offered by the
  programs include:
  
  o Alternative education.
  
  o Afterschool services.
  
  o Volunteer community service 
  activities.
  
  o Family participation programs.
  
  o Substance abuse education and intervention. 
  
  o Life skills training.
  
  o Recreational activities.
  
  o Meals. 
  
  o Case management.
  
  Residential centers are also highly structured and intensively supervised
  but are designed for higher risk juveniles. These staff-secure alternatives
  to detention provide 24-hour-a-day supervision for juveniles. These youth
  could be supervised in the community but need an alternative to residing
  at home. Youth housed in these centers have access to the services listed
  above.
  
  OAS is finishing its 2d year of implementing programs for juveniles.
  Programs are now available in five cities. OAS has also developed
  Juvenile Justice Centers in eight cities. These centers provide less-
  structured activities for youth. Juvenile programs started with a budget of
  $3 million. The 2d year the budget was raised to $8 million. The budget
  for 1999 will be $11 million. Jim Greene said, "We anticipate that the
  program will continue to grow like this for 3 more years and then growth
  will begin to slow down." Therefore, it is planned that by the end of the
  next 3-year period, alternative sanctions programs will be fully
  implemented in Connecticut.
  
  We met with a group of juvenile clients from nonresidential and
  residential programs in Bridgeport. At first the youth were not very
  talkative, but eventually a couple offered complaints about their
  conditions. "Why can't we watch rap videos?" asked one boy. A boy
  seated next to him added, "Yeah, we should be able to watch R-rated
  movies too instead of watching kid movies all the time." The youth also
  provided some valuable feedback about the programs. The rap video fan
  said, "If I wasn't here I'd be at Long Lane [detention center]. Here, I'm at
  least close to home and can work on school. At Long Lane it's just like
  prison. There's nothing to do." 
  
  It seemed to be unanimous among the youth that they would rather be in
  the alternative program than housed in Long Lane. When asked what they
  thought might improve the program, one girl said, "The community
  service is a waste. They need to come up with community service that
  makes sense for us. Like, I like to write stories. Why don't they let me go
  read stories to little kids in elementary school or go help out with babies at
  a daycare center or something like that?" We passed these suggestions on
  to Mr. Greene who thought they were great ideas and said that he would
  work on finding such opportunities. He repeated one of his first comments
  to us: "In order to have any success with these folks, you have to get them
  to come in. So we try to find community service ideas that will make them
  want to come in."
  
  Midway through their implementation in Connecticut, juvenile alternative
  sanctions seem to have the same level of support and momentum as adult
  programs. Despite major news coverage of the increased violent crime
  committed by juveniles, this program has bipartisan support. Mr. Siconolfi
  said, "These programs are providing leverage for more conservative
  lawmakers to get 'tough on crime'. The enacting legislation allowed the
  creation of alternatives to detention but also allowed the transfer of 14-
  year-old defendants charged with certain felonies to be automatically
  transferred to adult court." Director Siconolfi admitted (and Chief State's
  Attorney Bailey backed him up) that the vast majority of cases that get
  transferred to adult court are immediately transferred back to juvenile
  court. Jack Bailey said, "That's really the most appropriate place to handle
  these cases."
  
  Consideration of Challenges to OAS's Results
  
  Admittedly, it is hard to find much to criticize about alternative sanctions
  programs in Connecticut. However, a few issues are worth considering.
  The first is the question of how much money OAS really saves the state.
  Mr. Siconolfi said, "First of all, [OAS] used the average cost of
  incarceration, but low-risk offenders don't cost as much to incarcerate as
  high-risk offenders." Therefore, the broad averages used to formulate the
  figure of $94 million saved in annual prison operations costs could be well
  off the mark. Tom Siconolfi went on to say that, as a budget analyst, he
  has always struggled with such broad averaging and with programs
  nationwide that use such averages--not just OAS or the state of
  Connecticut. 
  
  Director Siconolfi raised a second issue that potential critics of the
  program might use to discredit the program, "[OAS is] suggesting that 100
  percent of their clients would have gone to prison. I think that's the case
  for two-thirds of them, but the other third is arguably marginal; they might
  not have been sent to prison." If one-third of OAS clients were managed in
  traditional community supervision (i.e., probation), then they would be in
  a less expensive program than the alternative sanctions program. He went
  on to say, "Even if that one-third wasn't prison bound, the program is still
  saving the state an enormous amount of money." However, Jim Greene
  finds that Connecticut could only have saved this money if new facilities
  with more prison beds had actually been built: "I don't think they would
  have been. I think we would have just gone on with really short prison
  sentences." Jim Greene said that, when he talked to other states about
  alternative sanctions, he told them not to expect to save money that they
  are currently spending on prisons because the prisons that they already
  have will probably stay full. Instead they should look at this kind of a
  program as a way to prevent building more prisons and paying for those
  new beds in the future.
  
  The study conducted by the Justice Education Center, Inc., also addresses
  the issue of recidivism. The study showed that prison inmates reoffended
  at a rate of 2 to 1 compared with OAS clients. But by Director Carbone's
  own admission, OAS strives to admit only lower risk offenders into
  programs and to send higher risk offenders to prison. Following this logic,
  one would expect the prison cohort to recidivate at a significantly higher
  rate. Therefore, the recidivism data could indicate that OAS is accurately
  following the low-risk guidelines of its admission criteria but that there is
  no conclusive evidence that alternative sanctions programs reduce
  recidivism. 
  
  Director Carbone pointed out that the 750 prison inmates in the
  comparison group were matched to the OAS clients according to their
  offense and criminal history. The criminal behavior of these two groups
  were very similar. While this would validate the results, it also begs the
  question, Why were those 750 inmates in prison instead of in OAS
  programs? There are many possible explanations for this. It could be that
  OAS was in its developmental stages during the study and did not have the
  capacity at that time to divert all the appropriate offenders in the system. It
  could also be that there is room for OAS to increase the efficiency of its
  referral and screening processes to prevent appropriate offenders from
  ending up in prison. Another possibility suggested by Director Carbone is
  that the screening process looks at offenders closer than the matching
  criteria of the study. Although the two groups may have exhibited similar
  criminal behavior, members of the prison group may have been screened
  out of the program for other reasons such as negative attitude, lack of
  family support, or lack of steady employment. 
  
  But are such factors as attitude, employment experience, and family
  support really risk factors? Are they solid reasons for rejecting offenders
  who otherwise fit the criteria for diversion from prison? Not just OAS but
  offender treatment programs and interventions all over the country are
  struggling with this question. If these are factors that make or break an
  offender's chance to be diverted, do they open the program up to
  accusations of creaming off candidates that are most likely to succeed and
  rejecting those likely to be distracting and noncompliant? Does the
  emphasis of such factors open the program up to allegations of bias in that
  some racial/cultural groups may be less likely to have family support and
  some socioeconomic groups are less likely to have a stable employment
  situation or history? These issues are still under examination by OAS. The
  challenge is to match appropriate offenders to effective programs without
  creaming or bias. Connecticut is striving to achieve the most effective
  mechanisms for identifying and screening clients.
  
  Such a high-profile program, with such a large piece of the judicial
  financial pie, could not be without opponents. Mr. Greene told us, "The
  only people who don't like this program are the 15,000 people in prison
  who aren't getting the benefit of supervised release any more."
  
  The Future Looks Bright for OAS
  
  We were curious about how susceptible OAS would be to one or two key
  changes in the political landscape of Connecticut. Could a sudden
  economic downturn, a serious spike in violent crime, or a change of key
  personnel (such as the Legislative Sub-Committee Chair or the Chief
  Court Administrator) dramatically change the level of support for OAS?
  Judge Ment was not overly concerned with such possibilities: "The
  program is built on everybody winning. It is not a political issue."
  
  Director Siconolfi commented, "The program has survived Governor
  William A. O'Neill, a Democrat; Governor Lowell P. Weicker, an
  Independent (actually a progressive Republican who ran as an
  Independent); and the current Governor, John G. Rowland, a Republican."
  He went on to say, "It depends on what the program is doing for [elected
  officials] at the time. This program allows [likely detractors] in the state to
  be tough on [prison sentencing]. Detractors rising up against the program
  is very unlikely at this point."
  
  We were also curious about how OAS had survived the traditional cause
  of death of many good criminal justice programs. The following is a
  common scenario. A program gets a good reputation and is flooded with
  too many referrals, many being inappropriate. Then there is an economic
  downturn and program funds and staff are cut. Finally, an evaluation is
  conducted of the overcrowded, underfunded program, operating outside
  the original design, and the evaluation concludes that the program does not
  work. OAS has a good reputation and has had pressure to open admission
  to other types of offenders. The state economy has had several economic
  slumps since the formation of OAS and yet evaluations continue to be
  positive. How has OAS survived? Representative Michael Lawlor said
  that "discipline on the part of elected officials" prevented any pressure
  brought to bear on OAS staff to overuse alternative sanctions. Jim Greene
  said, "We used research to prevent net widening. Contractors can prevent
  overloading because there are limits built right into their contract."
  Director Carbone and Judge Ment both said that a commitment to program
  design and research showing that the programs saved money have allowed
  OAS to resist the pressure to increase admissions.
  
  In the last 8-years more than 150,000 offenders have gone through the
  program. We were curious about how the program has avoided the
  scenario of a high-profile crime being committed by a former client. Mr.
  Carbone said, "We have been vigilant to ensure that only low-risk
  offenders are admitted to the program and that we supervise all of our
  clients very closely." Jack Bailey said, "I think they've been lucky. But
  they've also had real discipline on admissions criteria."
  
  Public and political support for OAS appears to be strong and is not likely
  to be susceptible to one or two isolated changes in the political landscape.
  However, Mr. Bailey added, "Crime is down! How long can we sustain
  funding when the public gets wind of that fact?" Another factor could
  undermine the stability of OAS in the future. All of Connecticut's prison
  beds are now full. If overcrowding recurs, could the percentage of time
  served once again drop below 50 percent of the sentence? Director
  Carbone said, "Inmates still serve an average of 75 percent of their
  sentence." So as it stands, Connecticut is a long way from returning to the
  prison crisis it faced in the late 1980s. 
  
  Conclusions
  
  Judge Aaron Ment and the judiciary branch of the Connecticut state
  government have done an admirable job of "engaging the courts as a
  problem solver" in response to the prison crisis of the late 1980s. OAS was
  born and has developed as a result of patient and meticulous planning,
  collaboration, evaluation, and marketing. Judge Ment and the other
  planners of OAS found a solution that promised meaningful benefits for
  everyone involved, including the communities, the judiciary, government
  officials, and offenders.
  
  OAS created programs that demonstrated to the community that offenders
  would be held accountable for their crimes. OAS closely managed its
  programs to defend against the possibility of new offenses being
  committed by clients. Further, OAS provided an alternative to the endless
  expense of building and operating state prisons, while restoring the
  public's faith in the efficacy of the criminal justice system.
  
  Many stakeholders who could have opposed the program were appeased
  by design aspects specifically included to obtain their support. The
  judiciary was not told it had to use alternative sanctions; instead, the
  judiciary was offered a complete array of sanctions and given total control
  over their implementation. Conservatives were not asked to support
  dramatic increases in government size; they were shown that OAS would
  be an economic development opportunity for existing nonprofit
  organizations in Connecticut communities. Further, OAS made it possible
  for prison sentences to return to credible lengths of stay. This last
  component allowed both the opportunity for the state to appear "tough on
  crime" and the opportunity for OAS to tell its clients that prison is a real
  and severe punishment and it's what you will face if you fail in this
  program. OAS has purposely avoided disputes with unions by ensuring
  that its programs never displace civilian employees.
  
  Finally, Director Carbone, Jim Greene, and OAS staff have researched and
  evaluated the cost savings, public safety, and reduced recidivism afforded
  by the program. OAS is applying what was learned from the research to
  improve its effectiveness with current populations and to reach out to new
  groups of clients. Having satisfied the scrutiny of these groups, OAS
  provides public safety daily through the close community supervision of
  more than 4,500 adults and 700 juveniles. The programs are cleaning up
  communities and parks, building playgrounds, and supporting community
  development. Clients are provided with substance abuse treatment and
  batterers education groups and are taught how to apply for and retain a job.
  
  In the political and public management environment of 1998, this program
  truly stands out as an innovative community problemsolving
  collaboration. Could a statewide program such as this succeed in other
  places? In a much larger state? Or in a state where the stakeholders have to
  run for election? In closing we asked Judge Ment and Bill Carbone to
  make some recommendations for other states interested in developing
  alternatives to incarceration. 
  
  Judge Ment's recommendations included:
  
  1. Make the judicial branch understand it and embrace it.
  
  2. Sell the judges on the idea of having complete control of a full array of
  sanctions.
  
  3. Start out with offenders who are being incarcerated but are not
  marginal--namely, low-risk offenders.
  
  Director Carbone's recommendations included the following:
  
  1. Conduct extensive planning and invite all of the people to the table who
  will have a stake in the program.
  
  2. Start small in one place and expand slowly. Do not expand so fast that
  you deviate from the design of your program and lose track of admitting
  low-risk offenders.
  
  3. Document and evaluate the progress of your program from the very
  beginning.
  
  -------------------------------
  
  Notes
  
  1. Lyon, Eleanor, "Longitudinal Study Alternatives to Incarceration
  Sentencing Evaluation, Year 3," Justice Education Center, Inc., September
  1996. 
  
  2. "Connecticut's Judicial System, New Initiatives," Briefing Folder,
  Judicial Branch of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, 1996.
  
  3. Weintraub, Bernard, "President Offers Strategy for United States on
  Drug Control," New York Times, p. A1, September 6, 1989.
  
  4. Ibid., p. B7.
  
  5. "Connecticut's Judicial System, New Initiatives," Briefing Folder,
  Judicial Branch of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, 1996.
  
  6. Lyon, Eleanor, "Longitudinal Study Alternatives to Incarceration
  Sentencing Evaluation, Year 3," Justice Education Center, Inc., September
  1996, p. 62.
  
  -------------------------------
  
  For More Information
  
  For more information regarding the Connecticut Alternative Sanctions
  Program, contact:
  
  Bill Carbone, Director
  Office of Alternative Sanctions
  1155 Silas Dean Highway
  Weathersfield, CT 06109
  860-257-1904
  
  For additional reading on the Connecticut Alternative Sanctions Program:
  
  Daniels, Jeffrey and Flora Parisky. 1991. Judicial Sanctions: A Three-Year
  Strategic Plan. Hartford, Connecticut: Judicial branch. 
  
  Grants Management and Justice Planning Unit. May 1997. Federal Drug
  Control and System Improvement Grant Program Abstracts. Hartford,
  Connecticut: Office of Policy and Management. 
  
  Papirno, Elissa, Marty Petty, Clifford Teutsch, and John Zakarian. October
  20, 1997. "A Wise Alternative to Prison." The Hartford Courant. A10.
  
  Pearsall, Susan. Feburary 25, 1996. "Hard Work, Earning That Second
  Chance." Connecticut Weekly.
  
  Sanctions Update. 1997. Hartford, Connecticut: Judicial branch. Volume
  6, Number 1.
  
  For more information regarding the Bureau of Justice Assistance
  Practitioner Perspectives Series, contact:
  
  Patrick J. Coleman
  Resident Practitioner
  Bureau of Justice Assistance
  810 Seventh Street NW.
  Washington, DC 20531
  202-616-0313
  
  To order publications or to find out more about BJA programs, contact:
  
  Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse
  P.O. Box 6000
  Rockville, MD 20849-6000
  1-800-688-4252
  E-mail: askncjrs@ncjrs.org
  World Wide Web: http://www.ncjrs.org
  
  Clearinghouse staff are available Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to
  7:30 p.m. eastern time. Ask to be placed on the BJA mailing list.
  
  -------------------------------
  
  Acknowledgments
  
  The Bureau of Justice Assistance would like to express its appreciation to
  the Government of the state of Connecticut (Governor John G. Rowland),
  the state of Connecticut's judicial branch, and Chief Court Administrator
  Aaron Ment. We would especially like to thank Bill Carbone, Jim Greene,
  and the staff of the Office of Alternative Sanctions for their assistance and
  for agreeing to be interviewed by our case study team. We would also like
  to acknowledge the contributions of Representative Michael Lawlor, Co-
  Chair of the Judiciary Committee in the Connecticut House of
  Representatives; Chief State's Attorney Jack Bailey; Tom Siconolfi,
  Director of the Justice Planning Unit in the Governor's Office of Policy
  and Management; and Ed Schmidt, Counsel for the Connecticut House of
  Representatives whose time and input were highly valued by the case
  study team. In addition, special thanks go to the management and staff of
  the many alternative sanctions programs who took time from their
  important work to meet with us. Finally, our thanks to the groups of
  alternative sanctions clients who allowed us to invade their personal
  worlds to see and hear their perspectives on the program.
  
  The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice
  Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
  National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and
  Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.
  
  -------------------------------
  
  This series is dedicated to the exploration of vital issues in criminal justice
  program development and management. Case studies highlight the work
  of progressive, innovative people and programs in state and local criminal
  justice systems. Although a case study may include a detailed description
  of the operational aspects of a program, it is not a scientific program
  evaluation. Rather, it is a document designed to explore the interaction of
  factors such as collaboration, politics, resources, culture, and others that
  play a part in successful public management.
  
  -------------------------------
  
  NCJ 172870