From chriswilson2000@earthlink.net Fri Jul 13 08:49:39 2001
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 16:04:57 -0700
To: hpstapp@lbl.gov
Subject: Re: Essential Agreement with Searle? (fwd)

      May I just say that I think these most recent exchanges with
      Searle et al., together with the Ann Arbor paper are
      admirably clear and convincing.

Regards, Chris

From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Fri Jul 13 08:51:04 2001
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 19:15:41 -0700 (PDT)
To: John R. Searle

Subject: Re: your mail

On Tue, 10 Jul 2001, John R. Searle wrote:

> Dear Henry,
> 
> I was travelling a lot in Europe when all the various email
> correspondence took place.  I'm afraid I am rather out of the
> discussion, but there is one point that is important that I want
> to be clear about.
> 
> As far as I understand your position, you have no explanation
> at all for the very existence of consciousness.  It is taken
> to be an absolute primitive in your system, not to be
> explained by neuronal or other sorts of physical processes.
> If I am right in interpreting you in this way, then it seems
> to me you part company not only with neurobiology but with
> pretty much all of contemporary science.  On my view
> consciousness is a system or higher level feature of the
> brain entirely caused by neuronal processes and realized
> in the neuronal system.  Am I right in thinking that you reject
> this view altogether?  That is, am I right in thinking
> 
> 1. You do not think that consciousness is caused by brain
> processes, and
> 
> 2. You do not think there is any causal explanation for the
> very existence of consciousness at all.
> 
> Anyway, once again many thanks for participating in my
> seminar.  I look forward to our continued exchange of
> ideas.
> Yours ever,
> John Searle
> 

Dear John,

Your questions are hard-edged and directly to the (or `a')
point, as usual. I shall also be blunt:

1. I think consciousness is caused brain processes, at least
   in part. 

2. I think there is some causal explanation for the existence
   of consciousness.

Let me elaborate, on the basis of my Ann Arbor talk. 

I believe that most neurobiologists and most of contemporary
science agree the quantum theory is basic and should be the
foundation of neuroscience, in principle. Indeed, a lot of
brain process is chemical, for which quantum theory is needed
in principle. But there are big differences in opinion as to
how necessary it is in practice to use QT. Still,  most scientists
recognize that QT ought to be used IN PRINCIPLE.

Indeed, all of the validated predictions of classical physical 
theory can be derived from QT, so there is no rational scientific
reason not to accept QT as the best contemporary foundation
for neuroscience and the quest for a scientific understanding
of consciousness. 

The next the question is: What is the structure of a QT
of the brain?

The Copenhagen interpretation (QT is merely a set of rules
that allow scientists to compute predictions about connections
between their observations) is not applicable because
biological systems are explicitly excluded.

All other interpretation begin with von Neumann's approach
of bringing all particles and EM and Grav fields, and hence
everything constructed out of these spacio-temporal structures,
into the system described by the quantum mathematics. There
is a well defined way to do this, and it is awkward and inconsistent
to leave some of these particles out.

But there are two processes that are not specified by the
the quantum laws and principles as they are currently
understood: What chooses the particular "answer/outcome"
to the questions that are posed by systems that stand outside
the system described by the quantum mathematics?
What chooses the particular question that is posed by that
outside system? The point is that the mathematics is structured
around these posed questions, and the answers to them.

Some physicists prefer to evade these question by going to the
many-worlds/minds scenario, where every possible thing happens.
I believe that it can be ruled out for technical reasons, but
won't go into that here. I believe most physicist reject
the Bohm and Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber ontologies. Von Neumann's
QT is I believe the prime contender for a quantum theory of the 
brain, and I accept it as the best and most orthodox basis
for a QT of brain dynamics.  

Now in vN QT the brain certainly "causes" consciousness:

The quantum state of the brain evolves in accordance with
the laws and prinples of QT, and evolves necessarily into
a superposition of distinguishable states that are initiating
different possible classically describable courses of action:
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle entails micro
uncertainties that get magnified by releases or nonreleases
of vesicles of neurotramsmitter, so that different classical
describable states will exist in parallel, like the 
simultaneous parallel existence of the alive and dead
branches of Schoedinger's cat

Consciousness is associated with the `snapping of reality'
into one or another of the empirically/experientially
distinct versions. Thus consciousness is `caused', 
at least in part, by the brain that specifies the possibilities, 
into one of which the brain will snap.

You said:

> On my view
> consciousness is a system or higher level feature of the
> brain entirely caused by neuronal processes and realized
> in the neuronal system.  Am I right in thinking that you reject
> this view altogether? 

So you said "ENTIRELY caused" and "reject this view ALTOGETHER"

Quantum theory has a built-in stochastic element. Thus
one does not expect to be able to say "entirely caused":
the stochastic element must also play a role.

In my Ann Arbor talk I described one possibility consistent with
the von Neumann QT in which, apart from this stochastic element,
the collapse can be said to be "entirely caused" by the brain: 
the evolving brain state has all the information that is needed to
completely specify the evolution, apart from the basic quantum
stochasticity. Since the quantum state is essentially
a carrier of the information that INHERES in the conscious
thoughts, and that is INJECTED into to the state by the collapse 
process, it becomes hard to distinguish the experience from the collapse
that exactly represents it in the mathematical theory. If one
identifies the experience with the collapse itself, then
in this particular model one could say that the conscious experience is
entirely caused by the brain, plus the quantum stochastic  element.

But another possibility is open: maybe the physical aspects of
nature are imbedded in a larger space, which includes experiential
realities, such as "pains", and "feelings of effort". The available
scientific evidence does not rule out that possibility, and whereas
application of occum's razor is often a good idea in science, one 
ought not claim that science rules out this second possibility.

I said, above,

2. I think there is some causal explanation for the existence
   of consciousness.

I believe the scientific tradition of seeking rational
causal explanations has worked well and should be pushed
to the limit. I am committed to the pursuit of
rational causal explanation. I believe
that there is a causal explanation for the existence
of consciousness.

The basic truth about contempory science is that it is
incomplete. There is some important process going on that 
we do not yet understand, and whose existence is symptomized
by the need in quantum theory for the participant/observer.
Of course, science is a human endeavour, and it is unremarkable
that we can formulate it as an interaction between ourselves and
a world in which we are imbedded. But there is more to it than
just that: the mathematics, which gives results that are accurate
to one part in a hundred million, is naturally built as a question
and answer machine, with an outside poser/receiver.

Something important is going on, and our conscious experiences
are just some tiny part of it. As William James stressed,
one's stream counsciousness seems to play a role in choosing
between options that are too complex to allow simple low-level 
automatic response to be adequate. Human experiences seem clearly
to be playing a key role in an "evaluative" process. 

The causal explanation for the existence of consciousness
will surely be that conscious experiences play an essential role in 
bringing the "other process of nature" into play in the high-level
evaluation and actualization process that we associated with
our streams of consciousness. Thus I believe that experiences  are doing
what they seem to be doing: grasping, evaluating, and actualizing
macroscopic features of brain activity in a way highly constrained by,
but not completely determined by, the laws and principles of QT.

Overall, I think we are in essential agreement.

Best regards,

Henry

      ---------- Forwarded message ----------
      Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2001 15:16:30 -0700 (PDT)
      From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov

      Subject: Essential Agreement with Searle?

      I have received several messages questioning not
      the details of my reply to Searle, but my final
      assertion:

      "Overall, I think we are in essential agreement."

      That statement contrasts with the body of my reply, in which
      I spell out some differences. Thus one respondent
      (Sid Mirsky) pointed out that:

      "Some time ago we corresponded about this and you were
      similarly in agreement with some of my views, which
      are diametrically opposite to those of John."

      Some explanation of that last statement of mine
      is clearly needed.

      First I would say that my quantum-based view is diametrically
      opposed to Dennett's claim that:

      "a brain was always going to do what it was caused to do
      by local mechanical disturbances." 

      If Searle's essential position is the same as Dennett's
      on this key point then Searle and I are NOT in essential
      agreement. But Searle's views are not known for their close
      affinity to Dennett's, and Searle's seeming tentative embrace
      of quantum indeterminism at the last Tucson conference
      leads me to believe that he is not irretrievably wed
      to classical determinism. So when I said that we seemed
      to be in essential agrrement, it was with the understanding
      that local mechanical determinism was  NOT entailed by his
      oft-made assertion that "brain causes  consciousness".

      In the quantum universe a human brain is an informational
      structure
      that is entangled with the rest of the universe, and that
      undergoes
      periodic nonlocally implemented "resettings" that constitute
      the injection of the informational content of a conscious
      thought
      into the state of the brain, which is in a state of readiness
      to
      receive it. There is therefore a close dynamical two-way
      linkage
      between brain and consciousness: consciousness is not some
      freefloating entity that simple works its will coersively on
      brain.
      There is a dialog, and the conscious experience is caused, in
      part,
      by the presence of the appropriate receiving brain.

      The laws of quantum theory while not COMPLETE, are very
      potent.
      For example, they allow all the validated predictions of
      classical
      physical theory to be reproduced, and hence they do determine
      the
      behaviour of the brain to the extent that the classical
      approximation
      is adequate for describing brain behaviour. So in that
      classical
      approximation one could say that brain causes
      `consciousness',
      provided, however, that no distinction is drawn between the
      experiential felt realities that constitute one's stream of
      consciousness,
      and the high-level brain processes (spacio-temporal
      structures built
      out of agregates of particles and  EM and Grav fields) whose
      actualizations are, in the full quantum treatment, the
      manifestations
      within the quantum mathematics of the associated conscious
      thoughts.

      I hope that this elaboration will prevent any misconstruals
      of
      my earlier statement.

From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Fri Jul 13 09:02:11 2001
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2001 18:01:37 -0700 (PDT)
To: Stanley Klein <klein@spectacle.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Free will, Stapp & QM

On Wed, 11 Jul 2001, Stanley Klein wrote:

> [Ethan Tarasov]
> >          In the 1999 JCS issue devoted to volition and
> >      free will, Henry Stapp made a point which I think
> >      many discussants are ignoring, ... that we have
> >      known for  nearly a century that classical physics is
> >      neither a correct nor comprehensive explanatory
> >     system for the universe we encounter.
> >
> >          Stapp makes the claim that "it is completely
> >      in line with contemporary science to hold our thoughts
> >      to be causally efficacious....".  I am not stating that
> >      Stapp is right, but it seems to me we need to hear
> >      more from the physics community as to the validity
> >      of his arguments.  Regardless of his particular theory,
> >      it seems unassailable that the debate needs to be
>       framed within the framework of contemporary quantum physics,
> 
> [Stan]
> Let's focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics (abbreviated NQM) 
> since it is simpler than the full relativistic version and it 
> suffices to account for Stapp's conclusions. There are several points 
> to be made.
> 
> 1) There are at least two ontologies compatible with NQM: Bohm and 
> von Neumann (abbreviated vN). Stapp uses the vN collapse ontology 
> where there appears to be some room for free will.  However in the 
> Bohm ontology everything is determined and there doesn't seem to be 
> room for free will. Most physicists believe that Bohm's NQM and vN's 
> NQM give identical predictions. Stapp disagrees because he takes free 
> will literally rather than metaphorically (see point 4).

I disagree because Bohm's theory, which has no collapses, is dynamically
complete, whereas von Neumann's theory has a dynamical gap: the
von Neumann theory has "collapses" which depend on choices of projection
operators, and these choices are not defined by the quantum laws and
principles themselves. This dynamical looseness allows the von Neumann
theory to produce  prediction that are nonidentical to those of Bohm's
model.

> 
> 2) Ethan brings up the issue of our thoughts being efficacious. I 
> presume even a rigid classical materialist would say that our 
> thoughts are efficacious, operating through the neural circuitry of 
> the thoughts.

The neural curcuitry is efficacious. No one questions that. But unless
the conscious thought is identically the very same thing as the
neural activity it does not follow from the fact that the neural
curcuitry is efficacious that the conscious thought is. If the conscious
thought is not the very same thing as the associated brain activity then,
at least within the framework provided by the principles of classical
physical theory, one could remove or take away the conscious thought
without affecting the causal efficacy of the neural curcuitry.
But if removing the conscious thought has no effect then it seems
improper to say that the conscious thought is causally efficacious.

> 
> 3)...
> It is 
> my understanding that Stapp believes that there were collapses in the 
> universe before complex matter was around. 

I think a physical system must satisfy special conditions before
it can mediate a collapse. But human brains are not the only systems that
satifies these conditions. Nor are biological systems the only
systems that satisfy these conditions.

Henry