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                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    --------
                                   No. 94-1474
                                    -------- 
      IDAHO, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO, ETC., ET
                                ____
                                       AL.


       ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
                                  NINTH CIRCUIT

                                 [June 23, 1997]

  JUSTICE KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III, and an opinion with respect
to Parts II-B, II-C, and II-D, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins.

  In the northern region of Idaho, close by the Coeur d'Alene Mountains which
are part of Bitterroot Range, lies tranquil Lake Coeur d'Alene.  One of the
Nation's most beautiful lakes, it is some 24 miles long and 1 to 3 miles wide. 
The Spokane River originates here and thence flows west, while the Lake in turn
is fed by other rivers and streams, including Coeur d'Alene River which flows to
it from the east, as does the forested Saint Joe River which begins high in the
Bitterroots and gathers their waters along its 130-mile journey.  To the south
of the lake lies the more populated part of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. 
Whether the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's ownership extends to the banks and submerged
lands of the lake and various of these rivers and streams, or instead is vested
in the State of Idaho, is the underlying dispute.  We are limited here, however,
to the important, preliminary question whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a
federal court from hearing the Tribe's claim.

                                94-1474 - OPINION

2                     IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

                                        I
  Alleging ownership in the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and of
the various navigable rivers and streams that form part of its water system, the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, a federally recognized tribe, together with various
individual tribe members sued in federal court.  As there is no relevant
distinction between the Tribe and those of its members who have joined the suit,
for purposes of the issue we decide, we refer to them all as the Tribe.  The
Coeur d'Alene Reservation consists of some 13,032 acres of tribal land, 55,583
acres of allotted land, and 330 Government owned acres.  Statistical Record of
Native North Americans 53 (M. Raddy ed. 1995).  The Tribe claimed the beneficial
interest, subject to the trusteeship of the United States, in the beds and banks
of all navigable watercourses and waters (the "submerged lands") within the
original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation, as defined by Executive
Order on November 8, 1873.  Executive Order of November 8, 1873, reprinted in 1
C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 837 (1904).  The area in dispute
includes the banks and beds and submerged lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene and some
portions of the various rivers and streams we have described.  In the alterna-
tive, the Tribe claimed ownership of the submerged lands pursuant to unextin-
guished aboriginal title.  A state forum was available, see Idaho Code S5-328
(1990), but the Tribe brought this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho.
  The suit named the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state
officials in their individual capacities.  In addition to its title claims, the
Tribe further sought a declaratory judgment to establish its entitlement to the
exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged
lands as well as a

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                    3
                           ____

declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho statutes, ordinances, regulations,
customs or usages which purport to regulate, authorize, use or affect in any way
the submerged lands.  Finally, it sought a preliminary and permanent injunction
prohibiting defendants from regulating, permitting or taking any action in
violation of the Tribe's rights of exclusive use and occupancy, quiet enjoyment
and other ownership interest in the submerged lands along with an award for
costs and attorney's fees and such other relief as the court deemed appropriate.
  The defendants moved to dismiss the Tribe's complaint on Eleventh Amendment
immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.  The court held the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims against Idaho
and the agencies.  It concluded further that the action against the officials
for quiet title and declaratory relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment
because these claims were the functional equivalents of a damages award against
the State.  It dismissed the claim for injunctive relief against the officials,
on the merits, since Idaho was in rightful possession of the submerged lands as
a matter of law.  It explained that Idaho acquired ownership of the submerged
lands upon its statehood in 1890 under the equal footing doctrine.  The court
did not discuss the Tribe's claim to aboriginal title.  Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
                                                       _______________________
Idaho v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443 (Idaho 1992).
_____   _______
  The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  42 F. 3d
1244 (1994).  It agreed with the District Court that the Eleventh Amendment
barred all claims against the State and its agencies, as well as the quiet title
action against the officials.  The Court of Appeals found the Ex parte Young,
                                                              _______________
209 U. S. 123 (1908), doctrine applicable and allowed the claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief against the officials to proceed insofar as they sought to
preclude continuing violations of federal law.  The requested declaratory and
injunctive

                                94-1474 - OPINION

4                     IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

relief, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is based upon Idaho's ongoing inter-
ference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights premised on the 1873 Executive
Order as later ratified by federal statute.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543,
S19, 26 Stat. 1026-1029.  It further found it conceivable that the Tribe could
prove facts entitling it to relief.  It reversed the District Court's dismissal
of the declaratory and injunctive relief claims and ordered the case remanded. 
It also remanded for consideration of the Tribe's claim for declaratory relief
based on aboriginal title.  We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. ___ (1996), to
consider whether the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the
Tribe's purported beneficial interest in title may proceed, and we now reverse
in part.
  After issuance of the District Court's opinion the United States filed suit
against the State of Idaho on behalf of the Tribe seeking to quiet title to
approximately a third of the land covered by this suit.  United States v. Idaho,
                                                         ______________  _______
No. 94-0328 (D. Idaho filed July 21, 1994).  The Government's separate suit is
still pending and is not implicated here.
                                       II
                                        A
  The grant of federal judicial power is cast in terms of its reach or extent. 
Article III, S2 of the Constitution provides the "judicial Power shall extend"
to the cases it enumerates, including "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States."  The Eleventh
Amendment, too, employs the term "extend."  It provides:

     "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
   to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
   United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
   Foreign State."

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                    5
                           ____

This point of commonality could suggest that the Eleventh Amendment, like the
grant of Article III, S2, jurisdiction, is cast in terms of reach or competence,
so the federal courts are altogether disqualified from hearing certain suits
brought against a State.  This interpretation, however, has been neither our
tradition nor the accepted construction of the Amendment's text.  Rather, a
State can waive its Eleventh Amendment protection and allow a federal court to
hear and decide a case commenced or prosecuted against it.  The Amendment, in
other words, enacts a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable
limit on the federal judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction.  The immunity is
one the States enjoy save where there has been "`a surrender of this immunity
in the plan of the convention.'"  Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
                                  ______________________    ____________
U. S. 313, 322-323 (1934) (quoting The Federalist No. 81).
  The Court's recognition of sovereign immunity has not been limited to the
suits described in the text of the Eleventh Amendment.  To respect the broader
concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded the
Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exemplifying, we have extended a State's
protection from suit to suits brought by the State's own citizens.  Hans v.
                                                                    _____
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).  Furthermore, the dignity and respect afforded a
__________
State, which the immunity is designed to protect, are placed in jeopardy whether
or not the suit is based on diversity jurisdiction.  As a consequence, suits
invoking the federal-question jurisdiction of Article III courts may also be
barred by the Amendment.  Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. ___
                          ______________________    ________
(1996).
  In extended criticisms of the Court's recognition that the immunity can extend
to suits brought by a State's own citizens and to suits premised on federal
questions, some of them as recent as last Term, see id., at ___ (slip op., at
                                                    ____
___) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), id., at ___ (slip op.,
                                ____

                                94-1474 - OPINION

6                     IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

at ___) (SOUTER, J., dissenting), various dissenting and concurring opinions
have urged a change in direction.  See, e.g., Atascadero State Hospital v.
                                        _____ __________________________
Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Were we to
________
abandon our understanding of the Eleventh Amendment as reflecting a broader
principle of sovereign immunity, the Tribe's suit, which is based on its
purported federal property rights, might proceed.  These criticisms and proposed
doctrinal revisions, however, have not found acceptance with a majority of the
Court.  We adhere to our precedent.
  Under well established principles, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, and, a fortiori,
                                                                   ___________
its members, are subject to the Eleventh Amendment.  In Blatchford v. Native
                                                        ___________  _______
Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779-782 (1991), we rejected the contention
__________________
that sovereign immunity only restricts suits by individuals against sovereigns,
not by sovereigns against sovereigns.  Since the plan of the convention did not
surrender Indian tribes' immunity for the benefit of the States, we reasoned
that the States likewise did not surrender their immunity for the benefit of the
tribes.  Indian tribes, we therefore concluded, should be accorded the same
status as foreign sovereigns, against whom States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.  Id., at 782.
       ____
  The Tribe's suit, accordingly, is barred by Idaho's Eleventh Amendment
immunity unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for
certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers
in their individual capacities.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).  The
                                     _______________
Young exception to sovereign immunity was an important part of our jurisprudence
______
when the Court adhered to its precedents in the face of the criticisms we have
mentioned, and when the Court, overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
                                          _____________   ______________
U. S. 1 (1989), held that Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes,

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                    7
                           ____

may not abrogate state sovereign immunity.  Seminole Tribe, supra, at ___ (slip
                                            _______________ ______
op., at 26, n. 14)  We do not, then, question the continuing validity of the Ex
                                                                             __
parte Young doctrine.  Of course, questions will arise as to its proper scope
___________
and application.  In resolving these questions we must ensure that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity remains meaningful, while also giving recognition to the
need to prevent violations of federal law.
  When suit is commenced against state officials, even if they are named and
served as individuals, the State itself will have a continuing interest in the
litigation whenever state policies or procedures are at stake.  This commonsense
observation of the State's real interest when its officers are named as indi-
viduals has not escaped notice or comment from this Court, either before or
after Young.  See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 846-847
      _____       ______ _______  _______________________
(1824) (stating that the State's interest in the suit was so "direct" that
"perhaps no decree ought to have been pronounced in the cause, until the State
was before the court") (Marshall, C. J.); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
                                          ____________________________________
Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 114, n. 25 (1984) (noting that Young rests on a
__________                                              _____
fictional distinction between the official and the State); see also Florida
                                                                   ________
Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of
______________    _______________________
STEVENS, J.) (recognizing the irony that a state official's conduct may be
considered "`state action'" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes yet not for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment).  Indeed, the suit in Young, which sought to
                                                          ______
enjoin the state attorney general from enforcing state law, implicated
substantial state interests.  209 U. S., at 174 ("[T]he manifest, indeed the
avowed and admitted, object of seeking [the requested] relief [is] to tie the
                                                                  ___________
hands of the State") (Harlan, J., dissenting).  We agree with these
_____       ______
observations.
  To interpret Young to permit a federal court-action to proceed in every case
               _____
where prospective declaratory and

                                94-1474 - OPINION

8                     IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his individual
capacity, would be to adhere to an empty formalism and to undermine the
principle, reaffirmed just last Term in Seminole Tribe, that Eleventh Amendment
                                        _______________
immunity represents a real limitation on a federal court's federal-question
jurisdiction.  The real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be
sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and pleading.  Application of the
Young exception must reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal
_____
system and respect for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an
obvious fiction.  See, e.g., Pennhurst, supra, at 102-103, 114, n. 25
                       _____ __________ ______
(explaining that Edelman's limitation of Young to prospective relief represented
                 _______                 ______
a refusal to apply the fiction in every conceivable circumstance).
                                        B
  Putting aside the acts of state officials which are plainly ultra vires under
state law itself, see Pennhurst, supra, at 101-102, n. 11, there are, in
                      _________  ______
general, two instances where Young has been applied.  The first is where there
                             _____
is no state forum available to vindicate federal interests, thereby placing upon
Article III courts the special obligation to ensure the supremacy of federal
statutory and constitutional law.  This is a most important application of the
Ex parte Young doctrine and is exemplified by the facts in Young itself.  See
_______________                                            _____
209 U. S., at 146 ("The necessary effect and result of [the challenged]
legislation must be to preclude a resort to the courts (either state or Federal)
for the purpose of testing its validity").
  As is well known, the ultimate question in Young was whether the State's
                                             ______
attorney general could enforce a state rate-setting scheme said by the objecting
shareholders of railroad companies to be unconstitutional.  The shareholders
sought a federal injunction against Attorney General Young, prohibiting
enforcement of the

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                    9
                           ____

rate scheme.  Attempting to show the lack of necessity for federal intervention,
Young maintained the shareholders could wait until a state enforcement
proceeding was brought against the railroads and then test the law's validity by
raising constitutional defenses.  The Court rejected the argument, first because
a single violation might not bring a prompt prosecution; and second because the
penalties for violations were so severe a railroad official could not test the
law without grave risk of heavy fines and imprisonment.  The Court added that a
federal suit for injunctive relief would be "undoubtedly the most convenient,
the most comprehensive and the most orderly way in which the rights of all
parties can be properly, fairly and adequately passed upon."  Id., at 166.
                                                              ____
  Where there is no available state forum the Young rule has special signifi-
                                              _____
cance.  In that instance providing a federal forum for a justiciable controversy
is a specific application of the principle that the plan of the convention
contemplates a regime in which federal guarantees are enforceable so long as
there is a justiciable controversy.  The Federalist No. 80, p. 475 (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ("[T]here ought always to be a constitutional method of
giving efficacy to constitutional provisions").  We of course express no opinion
as to the circumstances in which the unavailability of injunctive relief in
state court would raise constitutional concerns under current doctrine.
  Young was not an isolated example of an instance where a state forum was
  ______
unavailable.  See, e.g., Osborn, supra, at 842-843 (explaining that if it was
                   _____ _______ ______
within the power of the plaintiff to make the State a party to the suit it would
"certainly [be] true" that a suit against state officials would be barred, but
if the "real principal" is "exempt from all judicial process" an officer suit
could proceed); United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (permitting suit for
                ______________  _____
injunctive relief to proceed where there

                                94-1474 - OPINION

10                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

did not otherwise exist a legal remedy for the alleged trespass); Poindexter v.
                                                                  ___________
Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 299 (1885) (explaining that the statelaw remedy for
_________
Virginia's unconstitutional refusal to accept its own bond coupons in
satisfaction of state taxes was, in fact, "no remedy").  In these early cases,
the Court, although expressing concern over the lack of a forum, did not rely on
the lack of a forum as its doctrinal basis.  After abandonment of Osborn's rule
                                                                  ______
that a suit was not against the State so long as the State was not a party of
record, see Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 124 (1828), the Young
            ____________________   ________                             _____
fiction was employed where "the act complained of, considered apart from the
official authority alleged as its justification, and as the personal act of the
individual defendant, constituted a violation of right for which the plaintiff
was entitled to a remedy at law or in equity against the wrongdoer in his
individual character."  In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 502 (1887).  In other words,
                        ____________
where the individual would have been liable at common law for his actions,
sovereign immunity was no bar regardless of the person's official position. 
See, e.g., Lee, supra, at 221 (common-law tort of trespass); Belknap v. Schild,
     _____ ____ ______                                       ________   _______
161 U. S. 10, 18 (1896) (common-law tort of patent infringement); Tindal v.
                                                                  _______
Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, 221-222 (1897) (common-law tort of trespass); Scully v.
_______                                                              _______
Bird, 209 U. S. 481, 483 (1908) (common-law tort of injuring plaintiff's
_____
reputation and sale of certain products).  Under this line of reasoning, a state
official who committed a common-law tort was said to have been "stripped" of his
official or representative character.  See Young, supra, at 159-160; 114 U. S.,
                                           ______ ______
at 288.
  With the growth of statutory and complex regulatory schemes, this mode of
analysis might have been somewhat obscured.  Part of the significance of Young,
                                                                         ______
in this respect, lies in its treatment of a threatened suit by an official to
enforce an unconstitutional state law as if it

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   11
                           ____

were a common-law tort.  See 209 U. S., at 158 (treating this possibility as a
"specific wrong or trespass"), id., at 167 ("The difference between an actual
                               ____
and direct interference with tangible property and the enjoining of state
officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act, is not of a radical nature"). 
Treatment of a threatened suit to enforce an unconstitutional statute as a tort
found support in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894), and
                 _______   __________________________
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).  See Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits
______   ____
Against Government Officers, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 149, 154, and n. 35.  By
employing the common-law injury framework, the Young Court underscored the
                                               _____
inadequacy of state procedures for vindicating the constitutional rights at
stake.  Id., at 163-166.  The enforcement scheme in Young, which raised
        ____                                        ______
obstacles to the vindication of constitutional claims, was not unusual.  See,
e.g., Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53-54 (1909) (discussing
_____ ________  ______________________
the "enormous and overwhelming" penalties for violating the challenged stat-
utes); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165 (1910) (penalties
       ____________________________  _________
for each violation of the challenged statute included $1,000 fine); Herndon v.
                                                                    ________
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 218 U. S. 135, 151 (1910) (penalties for violating
___________________________
the challenged statute could "in a short time . . . amount to many thousands of
dollars"); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 336 (1920) (penalties
           ______________________    _____
for violations are "such as might well deter even the boldest and most confi-
dent").  In many situations, as in the above-cited cases, the exercise of a
federal court's equitable jurisdiction was necessary to avoid "excessive and
oppressive penalties, [the] possibility of [a] multiplicity of suits causing
irreparable damage, or [the] lack of proper opportunities for [state] review." 
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 377-378
(1930).
  The reluctance to place much reliance on the availabil-

                                94-1474 - OPINION

12                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

ity of a state forum can be understood in part by the prevalence of the idea
that if a State consented to suit in a state forum it had consented, by that
same act, to suit in a federal forum.  See, e.g., Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203,
                                            ____________   _____
221 (1873); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra, at 391.  Today, by con-
            _______   __________________________ _____
trast, it is acknowledged that States have real and vital interests in
preferring their own forum in suits brought against them, interests that ought
not to be disregarded based upon a waiver presumed in law and contrary to fact. 
See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). In this case, there is
     ______________   _______
neither warrant nor necessity to adopt the Young device to provide an adequate
                                           _____
judicial forum for resolving the dispute between the Tribe and the State. 
Idaho's courts are open to hear the case, and the State neither has nor claims
immunity from their process or their binding judgment.
                                        C
  Even if there is a prompt and effective remedy in a state forum, a second
instance in which Young may serve an important interest is when the case calls
                  ______
for the interpretation of federal law.  This reasoning, which is described as
the interest in having federal rights vindicated in federal courts, can lead to
expansive application of the Young exception.  See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474
                             ______                _____________  _________
U. S. 64, 68 (1985) (explaining that Young furthers the federal interest in
                                     _____
vindicating federal law); Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 105 ("[T]he Young doctrine
                          ___________                          _____
has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights") (citation omitted).  It is difficult to say States consented to these
types of suits in the plan of the convention.  Neither in theory nor in practice
has it been shown problematic to have federal claims resolved in state courts
where Eleventh Amendment immunity would be applicable in federal court but for
an exception based on Young.  For purposes of the
                      _____

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   13
                           ____

Supremacy Clause, it is simply irrelevant whether the claim is brought in state
or federal court.  Federal courts, after all, did not have general federal-
question jurisdiction until 1875.  Assuming the availability of a state forum
with the authority and procedures adequate for the effective vindication of
federal law, due process concerns would not be implicated by having state tri-
bunals resolve federal-question cases.
  In some cases, it is true, the federal courts play an indispensable role in
maintaining the structural integrity of the constitutional design.  A federal
forum assures the peaceful resolution of disputes between the States, South
                                                                      _____
Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904), and suits initiated by the
______    _______________
United States against States, United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621 (1892). 
                              _____________    ______
While we can assume there is a special role for Article III courts in the
interpretation and application of federal law in other instances as well, we do
not for that reason conclude that state courts are a less than adequate forum
for resolving federal questions.  A doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of
state forums would run counter to basic principles of federalism.  In Stone v.
                                                                      ______
Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), we expressed our "emphatic reaffirmation . . . of
_______
the constitutional obligation of the state courts to uphold federal law, and
[our] expression of confidence in their ability to do so."  Allen v. McCurry,
                                                            ______   ________
449 U. S. 90, 105 (1980).
  Interpretation of federal law is the proprietary concern of state, as well as
federal, courts.  It is the right and duty of the States, within their own
judiciaries, to interpret and to follow the Constitution and all laws enacted
pursuant to it, subject to a litigant's right of review in this Court in a
proper case.  The Constitution and laws of the United States are not a body of
law external to the States, acknowledged and enforced simply as a matter of
comity.  The Constitution is the basic law of the Nation, a law to which a
State's ties are no less

                                94-1474 - OPINION

14                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

intimate than those of the National Government itself. The separate States and
the Government of the United States are bound in the common cause of preserving
the whole constitutional order.  Federal and state law "together form one system
of jurisprudence."  Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 137 (1876).  It would be
                    ________   _________
error coupled with irony were we to bypass the Eleventh Amendment, which enacts
a scheme solicitous of the States, on the sole rationale that state courts are
inadequate to enforce and interpret federal rights in every case.
  It is a principal concern of the court system in any State to define and
maintain a proper balance between the State's courts on one hand, and its
officials and administrative agencies on the other.  This is of vital concern to
States.  As the Idaho State Attorney General has explained, "[e]verywhere a
citizen turns - to apply for a life-sustaining public benefit, to obtain a
license, to respond to a complaint - it is [administrative law] that governs the
way in which their contact with state government will be carried out." 
EchoHawk, Introduction to Administrative Procedure Act Issue, 30 Idaho L. Rev.
261, 261 (1994).  In the States there is an ongoing process by which state
courts and state agencies work to elaborate an administrative law designed to
reflect the State's own rules and traditions concerning the respective scope of
judicial review and administrative discretion.  An important case such as the
instant one has features which instruct and enrich the elaboration of
administrative law that is one of the primary responsibilities of the state ju-
diciary.  Where, as here, the parties invoke federal principles to challenge
state administrative action, the courts of the State have a strong interest in
integrating those sources of law within their own system for the proper judicial
control of state officials.
  Our precedents do teach us, nevertheless, that where

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   15
                           ____

prospective relief is sought against individual state officers in a federal
forum based on a federal right, the Eleventh Amendment, in most cases, is not a
bar. See, e.g., Willcox, 212 U. S., at 40.  Indeed, since Edelman we have
         ______ ________                                  _______
consistently allowed suits seeking prospective injunctive relief based on
federal violations to proceed.  Last Term, however, we did not allow a suit
raising a federal question to proceed based on Congress' provision of an
alternative review mechanism.  Whether the presumption in favor of federal-court
jurisdiction in this type of case is controlling will depend upon the particular
context.  What is really at stake where a state forum is available is the desire
of the litigant to choose a particular forum versus the desire of the State to
have the dispute resolved in its own courts.  The Eleventh Amendment's back-
ground principles of federalism and comity need not be ignored in resolving
these conflicting preferences.  The Young exception may not be applicable if the
                                    _____
suit would "upset the balance of federal and state interests that it embodies." 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 
_______    ______
U. S. 265, 277 (1986).  The exception has been "tailored to conform as precisely
as possible to those specific situations in which it is necessary to permit the
federal courts to vindicate federal rights."  Ibid. (citation and internal
                                              _____
quotation marks omitted); see also Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 104, n. 13.
                                   __________
  The course of our case law indicates the wisdom and necessity of considering,
when determining the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment, the real affront
to a State of allowing a suit to proceed.  As we explained in Ford Motor Co. v.
                                                              _______________
Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945): "[T]he nature of a suit as
_______________________________
one against the state is to be determined by the essential nature and effect of
the proceeding."  Id., at 464.  We held that "when the action is in essence one
                  ____
for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial
party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign

                                94-1474 - OPINION

16                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." 
Ibid.  In re Ayers, cited with approval in Young, stated that it is not
_____  ____________                        ______
"conclusive of the principal question in this case, that the [State] is not
named as a party defendant.  Whether it is the actual party, in the sense of the
prohibition of the Constitution, must be determined by a consideration of the
nature of the case as presented on the whole record."  123 U. S., at 492.  See
also Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 500 (1921) (Young's applicability "is to
     ___________________                           _____
be determined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by the essential
nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the entire record").  Of
course, the State's interests are almost always implicated to a certain extent
in Young actions, but the statements we cite reflect the Court's recognition
   _____
"that the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to
the constitutional immunity of the States."  Pennhurst, supra, at 105.
                                             __________ ______
                                        D
  Our recent cases illustrate a careful balancing and accommodation of state
interests when determining whether the Young exception applies in a given case. 
                                       _____
In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the relief granted by the Federal
   _______    _______
District Court required state officials to release and remit federal benefits. 
While the district court's order might have served the goal of deterrence as
well as compensation, we concluded the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment
because it was not necessary for the vindication of federal rights.  In reaching
this conclusion, we explained that "we must judge the award actually made in
this case, and not one which might have been differently tailored in a different
case."  Id., at 665.  There was no need for the Edelman Court to consider the
        ____                                    _______
other relief granted by the district court, prospectively enjoining state
officials from failing

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   17
                           ____

to abide by federal requirements, since it was conceded that Young was
                                                             _____
sufficient for this purpose.  415 U. S., at 664.  The second time the Edelman
                                                __                    _______
litigation came before the Court, in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), we
                                     ______  ________
made a point of saying the relief sought pursuant to the Young action was a
                                                         ______
notice "simply inform[ing] class members that their federal suit is at an end,
that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and that there
are existing state administrative procedures. . . . Petitioner raises no
objection to the expense of preparing or sending it.  The class members are
given no more . . . than what they would have gathered by sitting in the
courtroom."  440 U. S., at 349 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
  Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977), is consistent with this approach. 
  _________   ________
Although authorizing relief having an undeniably substantial effect on the
State, Milliken does not obviate the need for careful consideration of a suit's
       _________
impact.  Milliken concerned a Young suit against various Michigan officials
         ________             ______
resulting in a District Court order requiring the State, along with the Detroit
School Board, to pay for a comprehensive education program for school children
who had been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation.  The gravamen of the
                                       _______
complaint and its ultimate purpose was to vindicate the plaintiffs' civil lib-
erties, not to establish ownership over state resources or funds.  The Milliken
                                                                       ________
lawsuit and the resulting order were a direct result of the State's "official
acts of racial discrimination committed by both the Detroit School Board and the
State of Michigan" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  433 U. S., at 269. 
If Congress pursuant to its S5 remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment
may abrogate sovereign immunity, even if the resulting legislation goes beyond
what is constitutionally necessary, see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S.
                                         _________________    _______
445 (1976) (concluding that Title VII's authorization of federal-court
jurisdiction to award money dam-

                                94-1474 - OPINION

18                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

ages against a state government to individuals subjected to employment
discrimination does not violate the Eleventh Amendment since Congress was
exercising its S5 remedial powers), it follows that the substantive provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment themselves offer a powerful reason to provide a
federal forum.  The Milliken Court, for similar reasons, rejected a Tenth Amend-
                    ________
ment challenge to the order.  433 U. S., at 291.  In short, "[t]he theme that
thus emerges from [our recent Young cases] . . . is one of balancing of state
                              _____
and federal interests."  Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S., at 27
                         _____________   ______________
(STEVENS, J., concurring).
  This case-by-case approach to the Young doctrine has been evident from the
                                    ______
start.  Before Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682
               _______   ____________________________________
(1949) (a federal sovereign immunity case), we allowed suits to proceed, as
explained above, if the official committed a tort as defined by the common law. 
While Larson rejected this reliance on the common law of torts, see id., at
      _______                                                       ____
692-695, the importance of case-by-case analysis was recognized again in
Seminole Tribe.  There, in holding the Young exception inapplicable to a suit
______________                         _____
based on federal law, we relied on Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412 (1988).
                                   __________   _________
Chilicky, in turn, addressed whether a Bivens type of action, a right of action
_________                              ______
stemming from the Constitution itself, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
                                           _______   __________________________
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), applied in a suit alleging due process violations
_______
in the denial of Social Security disability benefits.  A Bivens action was un-
                                                         ______
available, the Chilicky Court held, given the particular circumstances present
               ________
in the case.  Seminole Tribe's implicit analogy of Young to Bivens is
              ______________                       ______   ______
instructive.  Both the Young and Bivens lines of cases reflect a sensitivity to
                       _____     _______
varying contexts, and courts should consider whether there are "special factors
counselling hesitation," 403 U. S., at 396, before allowing a suit to proceed
under either theory.  The range of concerns to be considered in

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   19
                           ____

answering this inquiry is broad.  See id., at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
                                     _____
  As no one disputes, the Young fiction is an exercise in line-drawing.  There
                          _____
is no reason why the line cannot be drawn to reflect the real interests of
States consistent with the clarity and certainty appropriate to the Eleventh
Amendment's jurisdictional inquiry.
                                       III
  We now turn to consider whether the Tribe may avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar
and avail itself of the Young exception.  Although the "difference between the
                        _____
type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex
                                                                         __
parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and night," Edelman,
___________                                                            ________
415 U. S., at 667, this suit, we decide, falls on the Eleventh Amendment side of
the line, and Idaho's sovereign immunity controls.
  The Tribe has alleged an on-going violation of its property rights in
contravention of federal law and seeks prospective injunctive relief.  The Tribe
argues that it should therefore be able to avail itself of the Ex Parte Young
                                                               ______________
fiction.  Moreover, the Tribe points to the plurality decision in Florida Dept.
                                                                  _____________
of State v. Treasure Salvors Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS,
_________   _____________________
J.), where we allowed a Federal District Court to issue a warrant commanding
state officials to turn over various artifacts (mainly treasure from a sunken
Spanish galleon) to the United States Marshal despite the State's claim of
sovereign immunity.  
  An allegation of an on-going violation of federal law where the requested
relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young fiction. 
                                                             _____
However, this case is unusual in that the Tribe's suit is the functional
equivalent of a quiet title action which implicates special sovereignty
interests.  We do not think Treasure Salvors, supra, is helpful to the Tribe
                            ________________  _____
because the state officials

                                94-1474 - OPINION

20                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

there were acting beyond the authority conferred upon them by the State, id., at
                                                                         ____
696-697, a theory the Tribe does not even attempt to pursue in the case before
us.  We must examine the effect of the Tribe's suit and its impact on these
special sovereignty interests in order to decide whether the Ex parte Young
                                                             ______________
fiction is applicable.
  It is common ground between the parties, at this stage of the litigation, that
the Tribe could not maintain a quiet title suit against Idaho in federal court,
absent the State's consent.  The Eleventh Amendment would bar it.  Tindal, 167
                                                                   _______
U. S., at 223.  Despite this prohibition, the declaratory and injunctive relief
the Tribe seeks is close to the functional equivalent of quiet title in that
substantially all benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State
to the Tribe.  This is especially troubling when coupled with the far-reaching
and invasive relief the Tribe seeks, relief with consequences going well beyond
the typical stakes in a real property quiet title action.  The suit seeks, in
effect, a determination that the lands in question are not even within the
regulatory jurisdiction of the State.  The requested injunctive relief would bar
the State's principal officers from exercising their governmental powers and
authority over the disputed lands and waters.  The suit would diminish, even ex-
tinguish, the State's control over a vast reach of lands and waters long deemed
by the State to be an integral part of its territory.  To pass this off as a
judgment causing little or no offense to Idaho's sovereign authority and its
standing in the Union would be to ignore the realities of the relief the Tribe
demands.
  Any contention that the State is not implicated by the suit in a manner having
an immediate effect on jurisdictional control over important public lands is
belied by the complaint itself. The state officials who are the named defen-
dants, all members of the Board of Land Commissioners save Director Higginson,
include: Gover-

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   21
                           ____

nor Cecil Andrus, who is Chairman of the Board and trustee of a public water
right in Lake Coeur d'Alene pursuant to Idaho Code S67-4304 (1989); Pete Cenar-
rusa, Secretary of State; Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General; Jerry Evans,
Superintendent of Public Instruction; J. D. Williams, Auditor; and Keith
Higginson, Director of the Department of Water Resources.  The power to regulate
and control the use and disposition of public lands, including the beds of
navigable lakes, rivers and streams, is vested in the Board of Land Commis-
sioners.  Idaho Const., Art. IX, S7 (Supp. 1996); Idaho Code SS58-101, 58-104(9)
(1994 and Supp. 1996).
  Not only would the relief block all attempts by these officials to exercise
jurisdiction over a substantial portion of land but also would divest the State
of its sovereign control over submerged lands, lands with a unique status in the
law and infused with a public trust the State itself is bound to respect.  As we
stressed in Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U. S. 193, 195-198
            _________________________  _______________
(1987), lands underlying navigable waters have historically been considered
"sovereign lands."  State ownership of them has been "considered an essential
attribute of sovereignty."  Id., at 195.  The Court from an early date has
                            ____
acknowledged that the people of each of the Thirteen Colonies at the time of
independence "became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their
own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution
to the general government."  Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410
                             _______   __________________
(1842).  Then, in Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), the Court
                  _________________    ______
concluded that States entering the Union after 1789 did so on an "equal footing"
with the original States and so have similar ownership over these "sovereign
lands."  Id., at 228-229.  In consequence of this rule, a State's title to these
         ____
sovereign lands arises from the equal footing doctrine and

                                94-1474 - OPINION

22                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

is "conferred not by Congress but by the Constitution itself."  Oregon ex rel.
                                                                ______________
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363, 374 (1977).  The
_______________  _____________________________
importance of these lands to state sovereignty explains our longstanding commit-
ment to the principle that the United States is presumed to have held navigable
waters in acquired territory for the ultimate benefit of future States and "that
disposals by the United States during the territorial period are not lightly to
be inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain."  United States v. Holt State
                                                    ______________  ___________
Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 55 (1926).
_____
  The principle which underlies the equal footing doctrine and the strong
presumption of state ownership is that navigable waters uniquely implicate
sovereign interests.  The principle arises from ancient doctrines.  See, e.g.,
                                                                         _____
Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II, Tit. I, S2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841)
("Rivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in
rivers are in common").  The special treatment of navigable waters in English
law was recognized in Bracton's time.  He stated that "[a]ll rivers and ports
are public, so that the right to fish therein is common to all persons.  The use
of river banks, as of the river itself, is also public."  2 H. Bracton, De
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 40 (S. Thorne trans. 1968).  The Magna Carta
provided that the Crown would remove "all fish-weirs . . . from the Thames and
the Medway and throughout all England, except on the sea coast."  M. Evans &
R. Jack, Sources of English Legal and Constitutional History 53 (1984); see also
Waddell, supra, at 410-413 (tracing tidelands trusteeship back to Magna Carta).
________ ______
  The Court in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 13 (1894), summarizing English
               ________  ________
common law, stated:

   "In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as settled that
   the title in the soil of

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   23
                           ____

   the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark, is in the
   King; except so far as an individual or a corporation has acquired rights in
   it by express grant, or by prescription or usage . . . and that this title,
   jus privatum, whether in the King or in a subject, is held subject to the
   _____________
   public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing."
                 _____________

Not surprisingly, American law adopted as its own much of the English law
respecting navigable waters, including the principle that submerged lands are
held for a public purpose.  See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. L. 1 (1821).  A prom-
                                ______    ______
inent example is Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (1892),
                 ________________________  __________
where the Court held that the Illinois Legislature did not have the authority to
vest the State's right and title to a portion of the navigable waters of Lake
Michigan in a private party even though a proviso in the grant declared that it
did not authorize obstructions to the harbor, impairment of the public right of
navigation, or exemption of the private party from any act regulating rates of
wharfage and dockage to be charged in the harbor.  An attempted transfer was be-
yond the authority of the legislature since it amounted to abdication of its
obligation to regulate, improve, and secure submerged lands for the benefit of
every individual.  Id., at 455-460.  While Illinois Central was "necessarily a
                   ____                    ________________
statement of Illinois law," Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364, 395
                            _______    _________________
(1926), it invoked the principle in American law recognizing the weighty public
interests in submerged lands.
  American law, in some ways, enhanced and extended the public aspects of
submerged lands.  English law made a distinction between waterways subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide and large enough to accommodate boats (royal
rivers) and nontidal waterways (public highways).  With respect to the royal
rivers, the King was presumed to hold title to the river bed and soil while the
public retained the right of passage and the right to

                                94-1474 - OPINION

24                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

fish.  With public highways, as the name suggests, the public retained the right
of passage, but title was typically held by a private party.  See J. Angell, A
Treatise on The Common Law in relation to Water-Courses 14-18 (1824).  The
riparian proprietor was presumed to hold title to the stream to the center
thread of the waters (usque ad filum aquae) which accorded him the exclusive
                      ____________________
right of fishery in the stream and entitled him to compensation for any
impairment of his right to the enjoyment of his property caused by construction. 
The State's obligation to pay compensation could result in substantial lia-
bility.  Shrunk v. Schuylkill, 14 Serg. & Rawle 71, 80 (Pa. 1826).  State
         _______  ____________
courts, however, early on in Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Alabama, and North
Carolina rejected the distinction and concluded the State presumptively held
title regardless of whether the waterway was subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide.  See, e.g., Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810); Cates v. Wadlington,
           _____________    _______                         ______   ___________
1 McCord 580 (S. C. 1822); Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. 436 (Ala. 1835); Collins
                           ________  ________                          _______
v. Benbury, 3 Iredell 277 (N. C. 1842); but see Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90
   ________                                    _______   __________
(N. Y. 1822).  And this Court in describing the concept of sovereign lands
rejected the requirement that navigable waters need be affected by the tides. 
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 337-338 (1877); cf. Propeller Genesse Chief v.
_______   _______                                   _______________________
Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 (1852).
_________
  American law, moreover, did not recognize the sovereign's rights of private
property (jus privatum) that existed in England, apart from the public's rights
         ______________
to this land (jus publicum).  In England, for instance, the Crown had the
             ______________
exclusive right to hunt the "grand fishes," e.g., whales and sturgeons, of the
                                            _____
sea.  J. Angell, A Treatise on the Right of Property in Tide Waters and in the
Soils and Shores Thereof 18-19 (1847).  There was a particular aversion to
recognizing in States the Crown's jus privatum right to seize private structures
                                  _____________
on shores and marshes reclaimed from tidewaters.  See J.

                                94-1474 - OPINION

                      IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO                   25
                           ____

Gould, A Treatise on the Law of Waters including Riparian Rights, and Public And
Private Rights In Waters Tidal And Inland S32 (2d ed. 1891).  All these develop-
ments in American law are a natural outgrowth of the perceived public character
of submerged lands, a perception which underlies and informs the principle that
these lands are tied in a unique way to sovereignty.
  Idaho views its interest in the submerged lands in similar terms.  Idaho law
provides: "Water being essential to the industrial prosperity of the state, and
all agricultural development . . . its control shall be in the state, which, in
providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved. 
All the waters of the state, when flowing in their natural channels . . . are
declared to be the property of the state."  Idaho Code S42-101 (1990).  Title to
these public waters is held by the State of Idaho in its sovereign capacity for
the purpose of ensuring that it is used for the public benefit.  Poole v.
                                                                 _____
Olaveson, 82 Idaho 496, 503, 356 P. 2d 61, 65 (1960).  There are specific
_________
statutory provisions concerning Lake Coeur d'Alene.  The Lake is held in trust
by the Governor for the people of the State of Idaho.  The "preservation of
[Lake Coeur d'Alene] for scenic beauty, health, recreation, transportation and
commercial purposes [being] necessary and desirable for all the inhabitants of
the state is hereby declared to be a beneficial use of such water."  Idaho Code
S67-4304 (1989).  The "lands belonging to the state of Idaho between the ordi-
nary high and low water mark at [Lake Coeur d'Alene] . . . are hereby declared
to be devoted to a public use in connection with the preservation of said lak[e]
in [its] present condition as a health resort and recreation place for the
inhabitants of the state."  Idaho Code S67-4305 (Supp. 1996).
  Our recitation of the ties between the submerged lands and the State's own
sovereignty, and of the severance and diminishment of state sovereignty were the

                                94-1474 - OPINION

26                    IDAHO v. COEUR d'ALENE TRIBE OF IDAHO
                           ____

declaratory and injunctive relief to be granted, is not in derogation of the
Tribe's own claim.  As the Tribe views the case, the lands are just as
necessary, perhaps even more so, to its own dignity and ancient right.  The
question before us is not the merit of either party's claim, however, but the
relation between the sovereign lands at issue and the immunity the State
asserts.
  It is apparent, then, that if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho's sovereign
interest in its lands and waters would be affected in a degree fully as
intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury. 
Under these particular and special circumstances, we find the Young exception
                                                              _____
inapplicable.  The dignity and status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on
its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to these claims in
its own courts, which are open to hear and determine the case.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, and the case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                                               It is so ordered.
                                                               _________________