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Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 
Response Guides Series

No. 2 

Closing Streets and 
Alleys to Reduce 
Crime: Should You Go 
Down This Road? 

by 
Ronald V. Clarke 

www.cops.usdoj.gov


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Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 
Response Guides Series 
Guide No. 2 

Closing Streets and 
Alleys to Reduce Crime: 
Should You Go Down 
This Road? 

Ronald V. Clarke 

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 
#2002CKWX0003 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein 
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the 
official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

www.cops.usdoj.gov 

1-932582-40-1 



About the Response Guides Series 

The response guides are one of three series of the 
Problem-Oriented Guides for Police. The other two are the 
problem-specific guides and problem-solving tools. 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledge 
about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific 
crime and disorder problems. They are guides to 
preventing problems and improving overall incident 
response, not to investigating offenses or handling specific 
incidents. The guides are written for police-of whatever 
rank or assignment-who must address the specific 
problems the guides cover. The guides will be most useful 
to officers who 

 understand basic problem-oriented policing principles 
and methods, 
 can look at problems in depth, 
 are willing to consider new ways of doing police 
business, 
 understand the value and the limits of research 
knowledge, and 
 are willing to work with other community agencies to 
find effective solutions to problems. 
The response guides summarize knowledge about whether 
police should use certain responses to address various 
crime and disorder problems, and about what effects they 
might expect. Each guide 

 describes the response, 
 discusses the various ways police might apply the 
response, 
 explains how the response is designed to reduce crime 
and disorder, 


 examines the research knowledge about the response, 
 addresses potential criticisms and negative 
consequences that might flow from use of the 
response, and 
 describes how police have applied the response to 
specific crime and disorder problems, and with what 
effect. 

The response guides are intended to be used differently 
from the problem-specific guides. Ideally, police should 
begin all strategic decision-making by first analyzing the 
specific crime and disorder problems they are confronting, 
and then using the analysis results to devise particular 
responses. But certain responses are so commonly 
considered and have such potential to help address a range 
of specific crime and disorder problems that it makes 
sense for police to learn more about what results they 
might expect from them. 

Readers are cautioned that the response guides are 
designed to supplement problem analysis, not to replace it. 
Police should analyze all crime and disorder problems in 
their local context before implementing responses. Even if 
research knowledge suggests that a particular response has 
proved effective elsewhere, that does not mean the 
response will be effective everywhere. Local factors matter 
a lot in choosing which responses to use. 

Research and practice have further demonstrated that, in 
most cases, the most effective overall approach to a 
problem is one that incorporates several different 
responses. So a single response guide is unlikely to provide 
you with sufficient information on which to base a 
coherent plan for addressing crime and disorder problems. 



Some combinations of responses work better than others. 
Thus, how effective a particular response is depends partly 
on what other responses police use to address the 
problem. 

These guides emphasize effectiveness and fairness as the 
main considerations police should take into account in 
choosing responses, but recognize that they are not the 
only considerations. Police use particular responses for 
reasons other than, or in addition to, whether or not they 
will work, and whether or not they are deemed fair. 
Community attitudes and values, and the personalities of 
key decision-makers, sometimes mandate different 
approaches to addressing crime and disorder problems. 
Some communities and individuals prefer enforcement-
oriented responses, whereas others prefer collaborative, 
community-oriented, or harm-reduction approaches. These 
guides will not necessarily alter those preferences, but are 
intended to better inform them. 



Acknowledgments 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are very much a 
collaborative effort. While each guide has a primary 
author, other project team members, COPS Office staff 
and anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guide 
by proposing text, recommending research and offering 
suggestions on matters of format and style. 

The principal project team developing the guide series 
comprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus, 
University of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke, 
professor of criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E. 
Eck, professor of criminal justice, University of 
Cincinnati; Michael S. Scott, clinical assistant professor, 
University of Wisconsin Law School; Rana Sampson, 
police consultant, San Diego; and Deborah Lamm Weisel, 
director of police research, North Carolina State 
University. 

Karin Schmerler, Rita Varano and Nancy Leach oversaw 
the project for the COPS Office. Suzanne Fregly edited 
the guide. Research for the guide was conducted at the 
Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the 
direction of Phyllis Schultze. 

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the members 
of the San Diego, National City and Savannah police 
departments who provided feedback on the guides' format 
and style in the early stages of the project, as well as the 
line police officers, police executives and researchers who 
peer reviewed each guide. 



Contents 

About the Response Guide Series i 
Acknowledgments v 
Introduction 1 
Focus of the Guide 3 
What Does Research Reveal About Street Access and Crime? 5 
What About Displacement? 7 
How Effective Are Street and Alley Closures?  9 
How Should You Meet the Concerns of Those Who Oppose Closures? 17 
Residents  18 
Nearby Neighborhoods 20 
City Officials and Essential Service Providers 20 
The Public at Large, the Media, and Politicians 21 
Your Checklist of Tasks 23 
Analyzing the Problem 23 
Getting Support 24 
Implementing the Closures 24 
Assessing Effectiveness 25 
Appendix: Narrative Description of Studies Summarized in Table 1 27 
Endnotes 41 
References 43 


About the Author 49 
Recommended Readings 51 
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 55 



Introduction 

Police sometimes advocate closing streets and alleys to 
keep offenders out of an area. This guide will help you 
decide whether this is an appropriate response to a 
problem you are confronting in a particular neighborhood 
or community. It assumes that you have already conducted 
a detailed problem analysis and are now exploring 
alternative responses, including closing streets or alleys. It 
explains why you might expect street closures to reduce 
crime or disorder, it summarizes the literature on their 
effectiveness, and it discusses the arguments for and 
against their use. It also lists the questions you should ask, 
and steps you should follow, in implementing closures. 
Finally, it suggests measures you might use to assess the 
effectiveness of your actions. 

Police have often successfully been involved in using street 
and alley closings to reduce local crime problems 
including street prostitution, gang activity, robbery, 
burglary, and drug dealing. But closings do not always 
work, and they often arouse strong opposition in the 
affected neighborhood, in nearby neighborhoods, and, 
more widely, in local newspapers and on TV. You must 
therefore expect to spend considerable time and effort 
working with the residents and businesses affected to gain 
support for proposed closures. You will need to agree on 
which streets and alleys to close, how to close them, how 
to monitor results, when or whether to remove the 
barriers, and many other specifics of the plan. 

You may be considering some other ways of responding to 
your problemfor example, establishing a block-watch 
scheme or undertaking a crackdown. In fact, police have 
usually combined street closings with other crime 


prevention measures; in problem-oriented projects, it is 
often better to combine responses than to rely on a single 
one. Remember also that no response works equally well in 
all situations, and in every case, you must carefully tailor 
your responses to the problem. This guide will help you do 
so by summarizing the lessons from the available research 
and from other problem-solving projects. However, as 
explained below, the information from these sources is 
incomplete in numerous respects, and the guide cannot 
answer every question you might have. You must combine 
the information it provides with your own assessment of 
situational needs. 


Focus of the Guide 

This guide deals only with closing public streets and alleys 
to control crime in residential areas. In most cases, the 
streets and alleys police close are in poor, troubled 
neighborhoods, though sometimes they close streets in 
wealthy neighborhoods that abut poorer ones. The 
closures are intended to be permanent, even if the streets 
are reopened later. 

 The implications of closing 
streets are generally much wider 
than those of closing alleys, which 
may affect only a small number of 
residents. In fact, there has been 
little research on closing alleys, and 
most of the information reviewed in 
this guide concerns street closures. 

The guide does not cover 

 temporary street closures during demonstrations, 
festivals, and sporting events; 

 street closures as part of a traffic-calming scheme, or to 
reduce cruising (which falls under traffic calming); 

 securing apartment complexes (whether public or 
private) with fences and gates; 

 securing facilities such as parking lots or shopping malls 
by entrance closures or fence installation; 

Bob Heimberger 
Image of orante gated entrance
Image of ornate gated entrance
Ornate gated entrances to private streets, 
such as these in St. Louis, can effectively 
control crime problems, but are not feasible for 
most crime prevention initiatives. 


 crime-inhibiting street layouts in new residential 
neighborhoods (this is best considered at the planning 
and design stage of new developments, not in response 
to current crime problems); and 

 so-called "gated communities," small residential 
developments for middle-class or wealthy residents; in 
this country, these enclaves are usually designed as such 
from the beginning, not subsequently created out of 
previously public streets. 

 This is less true of some other
countries, such as Brazil and South 
Africa, where residents in existing
affluent neighborhoods are making
increasing use of street closures in 
an effort to protect themselves from
crime (Landman, 2003). 



What Does Research Reveal About 
Street Access and Crime? 

Researchers have argued that closing neighborhood streets 
and alleys can prevent crime because there is a relationship 
between street access and crime rates. The details of the 
argument are as follows: 

1. 
Offenders find targets in familiar territory. They gain 
knowledge about vulnerable areas and potential 
opportunities through their contacts with other 
offenders and through their daily routines, such as 
hanging out with friends, traveling to work, and going 
to the movies. This means that frequently traveled 
streets are more vulnerable to crime. 

2. 
Offenders are quick to recognize a closely knit 
neighborhood and the presence of people who might 
notice them. From litter and other signs of neglect, 
they can judge whether they are likely to be challenged 
if they deal drugs or solicit for prostitution. 

3. 
Burglars avoid cul-de-sacs and prefer corner sites 
where neighbors are less likely to see them. Offenders 
look for heavily traveled streets and locations near 
major highways, where there are many potential 
victims and where they can easily escape. 

4. 
Reducing through-traffic by closing streets or alleys 
means that 

 
criminal outsiders are less likely to become
familiar with the area;

 
residents learn who does not belong in the
neighborhood, which helps them to more
effectively keep watch on the streets near their
homes;

 
residents committing crime in their own
neighborhood cannot so easily blame outsiders
and thus deflect suspicion from themselves;


 
burglars cannot so easily gain access to 
properties, especially from alleys behind 
houses; 
 
escape routes for robbers are blocked off; and 
 
drive-by shootings are prevented because cars 
cannot easily enter a street, or because they 
have to backtrack to escape, exposing them to 
retaliation from those shot at. 

Research findings are generally consistent with this theory: 

 
Areas with street layouts that permit easy access 
experience more crime than areas with restricted access 
and complicated street patterns.1 
 
A study in Vancouver, British Columbia, found that the 
more entrances to a street, the more crime on that 
street.2 Most research supports the idea that burglars 
avoid houses in cul-de-sacs, unless these abut wooded 
areas or wasteland affording access from the rear. 
 
A study of 86 Norfolk, Virginia, neighborhoods found 
that those with high burglary rates had a larger number 
of access points from arterial roads.3 
 
An early study comparing adjacent high- and low-crime 
neighborhoods found that the low-crime areas did not 
have major thoroughfares.4 
 
Reconstruction of a major highway led to the closing of 
all cross streets in Pompano Beach, Florida., at the 
highway's right-of-way. An unexpected side effect was a 
dramatic reduction in drug dealing, robbery, assault, 
and other crime in the adjacent neighborhoods during 
reconstruction. Side streets were reopened after the 
work was done, but Pompano Beach made traffic 
modifications and adjusted police patrols to control 
access to neighborhoods.5 



What About Displacement? 

The rationale for closing streets and alleys in a particular 
neighborhood is that outsiders commit much of the crime 
there, either going there specifically to do so or doing so 
when passing through. But research shows that criminals 
typically offend quite close to home, so before closing 
streets, you should check arrest records to make sure that 
most of the active criminals in the neighborhood are not 
residents. Otherwise, you cannot justify the closings. If 
you find that a high proportion of those arrested are 
indeed outsiders, you then have another worry to deal 
with: What if the closures do not stop these criminals, but 
simply displace them elsewhere in your jurisdiction? What 
have you gained? 

In fact, displacement can be advantageous if it stops the 
neighborhood from reaching a "tipping point,"6 when 
minor crimes build up to produce a much more serious 
problem (the familiar "broken windows" process). If you 
prevent the neighborhood from reaching this tipping 
point, then the savings to the city as a whole will be much 
greater than the costs of displacement to other 
neighborhoods. But try telling that to the residents of 
those other neighborhoods! Fortunately, you won't need 
to, because research generally shows that displacement is 
by no means inevitable. Most research shows that if it 
occurs at all, the crimes displaced are far fewer in number 
than those prevented.7 This is because some 
neighborhoods are so attractive to criminals and so full of 
criminal opportunities that they actually foster crime. It is 
wrong to think that criminals commit only a certain 
restricted number of crimes in a specific time period, and 
stop once they reach those limits. On the contrary, 


criminals will commit as many crimes as they have the 
time and energy for, if the crimes are easy to commit, low 
risk, and profitable. When these conditions change and the 
rewards of crime decline, or the risks and effort necessary 
increase, criminals will lower their expectationsas we all 
must do when opportunities for gain are reduced. This 
means that street closures do not inevitably result in 
displacement, and that they can reduce the overall volume 
of crime.8 



How Effective Are Street and Alley 
Closures? 

You may have read newspaper reports about successful 
street closures in particular neighborhoods, or heard about 
them from police officers involved. Crime may indeed 
have been reduced, but you should always be wary of 
anecdotal evidence of this kind. People like to think their 
projects were successful, and newspapers like to publish 
"feel-good" stories about communities pulling together to 
defeat crime. While you can learn much from these 
accountsfor example, how to overcome the difficulties 
associated with street closuresresearch studies generally 
provide more reliable evidence on effectiveness. 

Unfortunately, only a relatively small number of projects 
involving street closures have been evaluated (for example, 
no published evaluations exist of substantial street-closure 
schemes in Dallas; Houston; Chicago; Bridgeport, 
Connecticut; and Oakland, California and the studies that 
have been published tend to focus on successful projects, 
simply because studies of unsuccessful projects are less 
likely to be published. Furthermore, not all research 
studies on street closures are well designed. Properly 
designed studies compare the neighborhood's crime rates 
before streets were closed with crime rates after they were 
closed. They should also compare the neighborhood's 
crime rates with those of nearby "control" areas where 
streets were not closed. This helps to rule out alternative 
explanations for drops in crime, such as seasonal changes, 
intensified police enforcement, or reduced gang activity. 
The studies sometimes collect other data that help in 


evaluating street closings, including information regarding 
the number of service calls, the volume of traffic, the 
residents' perceptions of security, and the costs of 
installing gates or barriers. In some cases, evaluations also 
examine whether crimes prevented by the closures have 
been displaced to nearby locations. 

This section summarizes the information available from 11 
studies that evaluated street or alley closings. There is 
considerable variety among the projects reviewed. Several 
were undertaken in deprived inner-city neighborhoods, 
plagued by a variety of crimes. Three other projects were 
citywide efforts, one undertaken in an affluent Florida city. 
Three overseas projects focused on street prostitution. 
Only one (British) project specifically focused on closing 
alleys, though in other projects, both alleys and streets 
were closed. City governments and residents' associations 
implemented most of the projects, though often with 
considerable police involvement. 

Despite the variety of areas and crimes covered, for some 
crimes and for some settings, there are no directly relevant 
studies to draw upon. This means the studies may not tell 
you whether closing streets or alleys will work in your 
particular situation. This is not unusual, because there are 
important gaps in knowledge about effectiveness for 
nearly every aspect of policing, from patrol through 
criminal investigation. In fact, research almost never tells 
you exactly what to do in a given situationit can only help 
you select responses that have a better chance of working 
for you. It is down to you to judge the fit between the 
available research and your own situation. 



Table 1 summarizes the main features of the studies, 
including the type of area covered, the crimes targeted, 
and the results achieved (the Appendix provides fuller 
descriptions of the studies). Few of the studies are recent. 
Only one projectthat undertaken in Charlotte, North 
Carolinawas specifically designed as a police-led problem-
oriented project, though police were active partners in the 
other projects. In the past 10 years, projects submitted for 
the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-
Oriented Policing have frequently included closures, but 
deal only with problems in shopping plazas and other 
commercial facilities,10 and problems relating to festivals 
and other events.11 

Even though few of the studies in Table 1 are problem-
oriented projects, you can still learn from them-particularly 
about the effectiveness of the closures. To help you decide 
how much weight to place on each study, Table 1 includes 
ratings of the research designs' quality: weak, adequate, or 
strong. You will see that several of the studies are rated as 
weak, and you should be aware that even those rated as 
adequate or strong have their limitations. Few of them can 
separate the effects of street or alley closings from those 
of other measures taken at the same time, and few 
examine the effects on crime or disorder for more than a 
year. This means that little is known about street closure's 
long-term effects. 

 Judged by the strictest criteria, 
none of the studies would be 
considered strong because none of 
them included randomly selected 
streets to be closed. However, this 
would very rarely be possible, and 
the studies must be judged against 
more realistic criteria. In these 
assessments, an informal (probably 
generous) judgment was made, 
taking account of the number of 
streets closed, the crime measures 
used, the level of crime before 
intervention, the time period 
studied, whether control areas were 
studied, whether 
displacement/diffusion was 
measured, and whether costs were 
calculated. No criticism of the 
researchers is implied by these 
ratings, since they were generally 
doing the best they could, given the 
practical constraints and the time 
and funds available. 


Table 1 
Evaluated Projects Using Street and Alley Closures 

City Type of Area Year Targeted No. of Other Actions How Effective? Research Studies 
(s) Offenses Streets Design 
Closed 
1 Hartford, 
Conn. 
Declining 
inner-city 
neighborhood 
(Asylum Hill) 
1973 Burglary, 
mugging, 
purse-
snatching 
Four Residents' 
associations 
established; 
neighborhood 
policing scheme 
Closures reduced 
crime, but effect 
only temporary. 
Fear of crime 
reduced. 
Adequate Fowler, 
McCalla, and 
Mangione 
(1979); Fowler 
and Mangione 
(1982) 
2 Dayton, 
Ohio 
Transitional 
neighborhood 
(Five Oaks) 
1992 Drug houses, 
gunshots, 
prostitution, 
gangs, 
burglary, 
speeding 
35 streets, 
26 alleys 
Supportive 
residents' 
association; 
high level of 
media attention 
Crime reduced by 
25 percent within 
one year; violent 
crime reduced by 
40 percent. No 
evidence of 
displacement. 
Strong Dayton Office 
of 
Management 
and Budget 
(1994); 
Donnelly and 
Kimble (1997) 
Concern about 
crime decreased. 
Traffic declined by 
36 percent. 
3 Los 
Angeles 
Crime-ridden, 
inner-city 
neighborhood 
(Newtown) 
1990 Gangs, drug 
dealing, 
assault, 
homicide, 
14 Increased 
police patrols; 
community 
policing 
Serious crimes 
immediately 
reduced, including 
homicides and 
Strong Vernon and 
Lasley (1992); 
Lasley (1998) 
drive-by drive-by 
shootings shootings. Crimes 
increased when 
streets reopened. 
4 Hartford, 
Conn. 
Public-
housing 
project 
About 
1997 
Drug 
dealing, 
assault, 
One None Violent crime 
reduced, with no 
displacement. 
Weak Zavoski et al. 
(1999) 
drive-by Drug dealing 
shootings unaffected. 



Table 1 (contd) 

City Type of Area Year Targeted No. of Other Actions How Effective? Research Studies 
(s) Offenses Streets Design 
Closed 
5 Charlotte, 
N.C 
Inner-city, 
drug-dealing 
neighbor2000 Drug 
dealing, 
violence 
Two None Substantial 
reduction in 
violence in the 
Adequate Markoe 
(2000) 
hood 
(Belmont) 
area immediately 
affected by the 
closures. Violence 
was not displaced, 
but drug activity 
may have been. 
6 Finsbury 
Park, 
London 
Run-down, 
inner-city 
neighborhood with 
long-
established 
1985 Street 
prostitution 
and cruising 
johns 
Seven Police 
crackdown on 
prostitutes, 
pimps, and 
johns; hotels 
and landlords 
Large reduction in 
street prostitution 
and cruising. 
Lower rates of 
auto theft, assault, 
and burglary. 
Strong Matthews 
(1997) 
street 
prostitution 
prosecuted Resident 
satisfaction 
increased. 
Surprisingly little 
displacement. 
7 Streatham 
London 
Middle-class, 
residential 
area with a 
1989 Street 
prostitution 
and cruising 
Several 
streets 
closed and 
Police 
crackdown on 
prostitutes and 
Large reduction in 
street prostitution, 
cruising, burglary, 
Strong Matthews 
(1993) 
recent 
problem of 
johns "no entry" 
signs 
cruising johns; 
police 
and other crimes. 
Increased resident 
street 
prostitution 
antiburglary 
initiative 
satisfaction. 
Prostitutes 
displaced from 
residential area. 


Table 1 (contd) 

City Type of Area Year 
(s) 
Targeted 
Offenses 
No. of 
Streets 
Closed 
Other Actions How Effective? Research 
Design 
Studies 
8 Vancouver, 
British 
Columbia 
Downtown 
prostitution 
strolls 
1981 Street 
prostitution 
and cruising 
johns 
"Series"of 
diverters 
installed 
Series of other 
initiatives taken 
at different 
times in the 
same areas 
The "hardened," 
drug-addicted 
prostitutes 
adapted by 
displacing to 
nearby areas. The 
barriers also 
reportedly helped 
prostitutes to 
solicit cruising 
johns, who were 
forced to slow 
down. 
Adequate Wagner 
(1997) 
9 St. Louis Racially 
integrated, 
60-block city 
neighborhood 
1984 Street 
prostitution 
and cruising 
johns UCR 
offenses 
Multiple Target-
hardening; 
lighted porches; 
neighborhood-
watch; 
Lower rates of 
increases in 
burglary up to five 
years after 
closures. Limited 
Weak Lowman 
(1992) 
community crime impact on fear. 
newspaper 
10 Liverpool, 
England 
Residential 
neighborhoods with 
row houses 
and rear 
alleys 
2000 
to 
2003 
Burglary 3,168 alley 
gates 
installed 
Research design 
focused only on 
alley gates 
Burglary reduced 
by 37 percent 
within one year. 
Little 
displacement, but 
diffusion of 
benefits. Gates 
were highly cost-
effective. 
Strong Bowers, 
Johnson 
and 
Hirschfield 
(in press) 
11 Miami 
Shores, 
Fla. 
Affluent 
suburban city 
1988 
to 
1991 
Robbery, 
burglary, 
larceny, 
aggravated 
assault, auto 
theft 
67 in first 
phase; 
eight in 
second 
phase 
None Burglary, larceny, 
and auto theft 
reduced. Lower 
rates of increases 
in robbery and 
assault, compared 
with nearby 
jurisdictions. 
Weak Atlas and 
LeBlanc 
(1994) 



The incomplete coverage of the research, the limitations 
of the methodology, and some inconsistencies in the 
results have been discussed above. Even so, one can draw 
some broad conclusions about the street and alley 
closures, summarized as follows: 

 
Street closures have been used for many years in the 
United States and elsewhere as a method of preventing 
crime. Only a small number of projects have been 
evaluated. Those with positive results are more likely to 
be reported. 

 
Street closures are usually introduced along with other 
measures (such as crackdowns, neighborhood watch, 
and target-hardening), and it can be difficult to separate 
the effects of street closures from those of other 
measures. Nevertheless, most of the evaluations 
conclude that street closures have reduced crime and 
disorderin some instances, quickly and dramatically. 
The crimes reduced include robbery, burglary, 
prostitution, drug dealing, assault, and drive-by 
shootings. 

 
Street closures have been judged effective in a variety of 
different settingsinner-city residential neighborhoods, 
downtown areas, prostitution strolls, and affluent areas 
abutting poorer ones. 

 
Little is known about the long-term benefits of street 
closures, though one study reported that the benefits 
were only temporary. 

 
Even when closures have been found effective, streets 
have sometimes been reopened as a result of pressure 
from the local community. 

 
In some cases, barriers have been said to facilitate 
crime. They can slow cars down, enabling prostitutes or 
drug dealers to solicit customers. They can also trap 
unwary motorists who stray into dangerous 
neighborhoods. 

 Though residents and police 
believed the 1993 street-closure 
scheme in the Hispanic East Side of 
Bridgeport, Connecticut, had been 
effective in reducing drug dealing 
and other crimes, the city council 
ordered that the barriers be removed 
in 1998, in response to residents' 
complaints. Many had become tired 
of the inconvenience caused by the 
40 street closures, and they also 
believed that the ugly concrete 
barriers stigmatized the 
neighborhood and scared off 
businesses (Halbfinger 1998). 


 
Little research is available on the effect of gating alleys 
behind properties, but one exceptionally strong study 
found that gating brought about large reductions in 
burglary. 

 
Street and alley closures typically cause little 
displacement of crime. In some cases, the benefits of 
street closures can spread beyond the closure area (a 
phenomenon researchers call "diffusion of benefits"). 

 
Little is known about the cost-effectiveness of street 
closings. One study of alley closures found them to be 
highly cost-effective. Within one year, the savings from 
burglaries prevented were much greater than the costs 
of installing the gates. 

In conclusion, research has shown that street and alley 
closures can reduce crime in a variety of different settings. 
However, research is absent or sparse for some crimes and 
settings. In addition, the studies do not separate the 
benefits of closures from those of other measures taken at 
the same time. Follow-up is typically short, and little is 
known about the long-term benefits of street and alley 
closures. Finally, the studies provide little information 
about whether the savings in crime outweigh the costs of 
the closures. 



How Should You Meet the Concerns of 
Those Who Oppose Closures? 

As you have seen from the previous section, street and 
alley closures can reduce crime, but the available research 
cannot tell you whether closures will work in your 
situation. You must make that judgment yourself by 
interpreting the research findings in the light of your 
problem analysis. 

Even if you think they will work, effectiveness is not the 
only thing you must consider. Street closings are often 
very controversial and may be strongly opposed (this is 
generally less true of closing alleys). While some 
communities have petitioned the authorities to close 
streets, it is more likely that, in your case, you will be 
trying to convince a divided community and skeptical city 
authorities of the likely benefits. There are several groups 
you will need to persuade: residents, neighboring 
communities, essential service providers, local politicians 
and officials, and the media and public at large. Do not 
underestimate the importance of gaining the support of 
all these groups, or the time and effort this might take. 
Table 2 summarizes the arguments they might raise both 
for and against closures. 

Before meeting with any of the groups, you should brief 
yourself on any legal requirements that must be met to 
bring closures into effect. Will a new local ordinance be 
needed? What are the steps required to bring this into 
effect? You should also have a clear idea of which streets 
should be closed and what types of barriers should be 
used. There are many different types, such as concrete 
"Jersey barriers," steel highway guardrails, railroad ties, 
planters, posts and chains, removable bollards anchored in 
sleeves in the road, and other purpose-built barriers. 


Besides varying in aesthetic appearance (which may change 
over time), they have different installation and 
maintenance costs. They can be used in combination with 
other traffic management measures, such as diagonal 
diverters, one-way streets, "no entrance" or "no turning" 
signs, and parking restrictions. Your proposals should 
include any of these that seem appropriate, especially 
where they can reduce the number of streets closed and 
the inconvenience to residents. 

Residents 

Residents generally express three main concerns. First, 
they fear that the closures will be inconvenient and will 
hinder everyday tasks like shopping or getting to work. 
Second, they think the barriers will be ugly and will 
stigmatize the neighborhoodthey may even believe that 
the closures will turn the neighborhood into a ghetto. 
Third, they may think that closures are merely an excuse 
to scale back police patrols. 

Even if these worries seem exaggerated, you must take 
them seriously and address them directly. A residents' 
association can help you do this, but expect the process to 
be very time-consuming. You may need to meet many 
times with the association leaders, and you should hold 
open meetings for all residents to attend. Without a 
residents' association, obtaining general agreement can be 
even more difficult, since there is no obvious person with 
whom to discuss the plans. Beware of self-appointed 
community leaders who may simply be pursuing their own 
agendas. You may find that local elected politicians can be 
very helpful in the process of reaching consensus. 



It is essential to be well prepared for meetings. You should 
be able to present crime data showing the proportions of 
crime committed by nonresidents, and you will need to 
discuss the limitations of alternative wayssuch as 
increased patrolsof dealing with these outsiders. You will 
need large maps showing where the barriers will be placed 
and how residents will be able to access their homes. You 
will need to show that the closures will not adversely 
affect the provision of police and other emergency 
services. 

You should bring along illustrations of the types of 
barriers you are planning to install. If your plan includes 
provision for a trial period with temporary barriers, bring 
pictures of those barriers, as well as pictures of the 
permanent barriers to be installed if the trial is successful. 
If lockable gates are to be used, you must reach agreement 
with the community about who will be provided with 
keyswhether every householder, the police, or resident 
association nominees. 

Each meeting should have a written agenda and should 
conclude with a review of the agreed actions to be taken, 
and by whom. If possible, you should set the time and 
place for the next meeting while everyone is still present. 
It is important to communicate a sense of urgency to all 
the participants, and to keep up the momentum. 

In addition, you must be very open and clear in your 
approach. At all costs, avoid giving the impression that all 
the important decisions have already been made, and that 
consultation is merely a formality. Be open to alternative 
ideas such as closing streets during the evening hours only, 
redirecting traffic flows, changing parking regulations, 
using more one-way streets, and so forth. Make strenuous 
efforts to engage stakeholders who are reluctant to 


participate in the discussions, and try to consider the 
needs of resident groups such as children and teenagers, 
who might not be adequately represented at the meetings. 
Finally, it is very important that you persuade your 
superiors to let you remain in post until negotiations are 
concluded and agreement has been reached. The success 
of such a process depends on the trust developed between 
you and the other stakeholders, and nothing is more fatal 
to a problem-oriented project than a change of police 
leadership at a crucial point. 

 For information on how some of 
these measures were used in an 
attempt to reduce access to a drug 
market, see Zanin, Shane and Clarke 
(2004). 

Nearby Neighborhoods 

Adjacent neighborhoods may fear that the closures will 
bring them more crime and more traffic. They may also 
resent what they see as preferred treatment of the 
neighborhood where streets are to be closed. Again, you 
should seek meetings with the residents' associations of 
these neighborhoods and/or the local elected 
representative(s) to find ways to allay these concerns. 

City Officials and Essential Service Providers 

City planning officers will need to be satisfied that your 
proposals to close streets or alleys do not conflict with 
wider plans for the city. You will also need to clear your 
proposals with your superiors, with city traffic engineers, 
and with fire and ambulance services. They will all need to 
be sure that the closures will not pose a risk to life. Where 
lockable gates are used, as in alleys, police, fire, and 
ambulance services will need immediate access to keys. 

You will also need to discuss closures with local providers 
of garbage pickup, snow removal, and mail deliveryand 
be prepared, if necessary, to adjust your plans to meet 



their needs. You should also be prepared to accommodate 
any special needs of public transport or school bus 
providers serving the neighborhood. Finally, you should 
consider whether the closures will cause difficulty for 
drivers making deliveries to the area, whether parcels or 
furniture and appliances. 

The Public at Large, the Media, and Politicians 

Proposals to close streets can give rise to strong emotions, 
even among those not directly affected. Closures can be 
attacked as being antidemocratic and as infringing on civil 
liberties. Some of this opposition is a by-product of the 
hostility that many social commentators feel for "gated 
communities."12 Because these communities often cater to 
the rich, they are seen as having "exclusionary" and 
divisive consequences for society. Other social 
commentators cite street closings in their general 
condemnation of the trend toward a "fortress society," 
where people live in fear behind locked doors, venturing 
out only when they have to, with little concern for their 
neighbors' welfare. 

So you can expect the local media to take an interest in 
your proposals. You could even find yourself at the center 
of civil action to prevent the closures, though court cases 
are more likely to result from the large-scale introduction 
of street closures affecting many different neighborhoods 
in the city. The media concerns may have little substance, 
and they might prove more of an irritation than a real 
impediment. Dealing with them will be easier if you can 
demonstrate the problem analyses you have undertaken, 
and if you carefully explain the limitations of alternative 
solutions. 


You will be in much more trouble if you don't have the 
local elected representative's support, and you will need to 
carefully plan how to approach him or her and how best 
to argue your case. 

Table 2 
The Arguments For and Against Street and Alley Closures 

For Against 
Closures help to prevent crime and disorder by 
excluding offenders. 
By slowing traffic, barriers facilitate drug dealing 
and prostitution. 
Closures reduce crime in nearby communities 
because they discourage offenders from coming 
to the area as a whole. 
Barriers displace crime to more vulnerable 
neighborhoods that cannot take similar defensive 
measures. 
Barriers provide protection for bedroom 
communities with few residents at home during 
the day to keep an eye on things. 
Barriers are an inadequate substitute for proper 
policing of a neighborhood. 
Closures enable residents to regain control of 
their neighborhood and send a message to 
criminals to keep out. 
Closures prohibit the free use of public streets. 
They are exclusionary and antidemocratic. 
The process of closing streets brings neighbors 
together. Barriers can help to define and create a 
neighborhood. 
Barriers stigmatize neighborhoods and create 
ghettos. They sometimes promote discord within 
a neighborhood between those in favor and those 
against. 
Barriers reduce fear of crime, which can lead 
residents to become actively involved in their 
neighborhoods. 
Closures weaken civic ties and create tension 
with neighboring communities. 
Closure reduces speeding, pedestrian injuries, 
noise, and congestion. 
Closures create havoc on nearby streets by 
displacing traffic. They can create dangerous, 
life-threatening situations if emergency vehicles 
are restricted. 
Closures make it possible for neighborhood 
children to play on the streets. 
As a result of closures, parents become 
complacent and fail to monitor their children's 
whereabouts. 
Street closures improve property values. Barriers harm businesses. 



Your Checklist of Tasks 

Too little is known about street closures to provide you 
with a step-by-step guide on how to go about them, and in 
any case, every problem-oriented project is unique. You 
will therefore have to tailor general guidelines to your own 
situation to produce an action plan. Answering the 
following questions will help you determine how well you 
have done this. 

Analyzing the Problem 

 
Have you clearly defined the neighborhood's 
boundaries? 
 
Have you collected reliable data about the types of 
crime or disorder that are the focus of concern? 
 
Do you know the proportion of crimes committed by 
outsiders? 
 
Do you know how they reach the neighborhood (by car 
or on foot)? 
 
Do you know whether they go to the neighborhood 
specifically to commit crimes, or whether they do so 
when passing through? 
 
Have you estimated how much crime the barriers will 
prevent? 
 
Have you explored alternatives to closures (e.g., CCTV, 
neighborhood watch, crackdowns, target-hardening)? 
 
Can you explain why these alternatives could not 
adequately substitute for closures? 


Getting Support 

 
Do you have support from police district commanders, 
the chief, and other key city officials, such as the traffic 
engineer? 
 
Do you have a clear mandate from residents and elected 
representatives to proceed? 
 
Are residents content with the barriers' appearance? 
 
Have you allayed resident concerns about neighborhood 
stigmatization? 
 
Have you agreed on who will have keys (if keys are 
needed)? 
 
Have you dealt with the worries of nearby communities 
about displaced traffic and crime? 
 
Have you satisfied the concerns of emergency service 
providers (fire, ambulance, and police)? 
 
Is your plan acceptable to local providers of garbage 
pickup, snow removal, and mail delivery? 
 
Does your plan accommodate any special needs of 
public transport or school bus providers serving the 
neighborhood? 
 
Will your plan avoid untoward difficulty for delivery 
and cab drivers? 
 
Have you briefed the local media about the need for 
closures? 
 
Have you dealt satisfactorily with public opposition? 

Implementing the Closures 

 
How many streets and/or alleys will be closed? 
 
Can you produce a map showing where the closures will 
be made? 
 
Can you clearly explain the effect on neighborhood 
access and traffic patterns? 
 
What kind of barriers will be installed? 
 
How much will the barriers cost? 



 
How long will it take to install the barriers once 
agreement has been reached? 
 
Who will install the barriers? 
 
Does your plan include a trial period? If so, is it long 
 See Eck (2002) for help with 
enough to assess the closures' effect on crime? assessing effectiveness. 
 
How will it be decided whether to make the closures 
permanent? 
 
Have you made sure that any legal requirements for 
implementing closures can be met? 

Assessing Effectiveness 

 
Will you compare neighborhood crime or disorder 
before the closures with that after the closures? 
 
Will the before-and-after time periods be directly 
comparable? 
 
Will you be able to directly compare the proportions of 
crime committed by outsiders in the before-and-after 
periods? 
 
Will you be able to compare before-and-after crime 
trends in your neighborhood with those in nearby 
neighborhoods? 
 
Will you examine possible displacement/diffusion? 
 
Will you be able to estimate the barriers' cost-
effectiveness? 


Appendix 

Appendix: Narrative Description of 
Studies Summarized in Table 1 

1. A Declining Inner-City Neighborhood in Hartford, 
Connecticut 

One of the first reported projects to use street closures in 
the United States was undertaken in Asylum Hill, a 
declining inner-city neighborhood in Hartford, 
Connecticut.13 In an attempt to deal with burglary, 
mugging, and purse-snatching, four streets were closed 
using large planters, some streets were made one-way, and 
entrances to several streets were narrowed. At the same 
time, neighborhood policing was introduced, as well as a 
scheme to encourage the development of community 
groups and residents' organizations. Subsequent 
evaluations compared crime in the area with that in an 
adjacent control area. Victim surveys showed that crime 
dropped immediately following the street closures, but this 
result did not last for long. There was little evidence that 
the other changes had any effect on crime, though they 
did reduce fear of crime and improve community 
cohesion.14 

Research design: Adequate. This is a small but careful case 
study using sound crime measures. 

2. A Transitional Neighborhood in Dayton, Ohio 

Another widely reported project involved a 10-squareblock 
Dayton, Ohio, neighborhood known as Five Oaks. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, this once stable, 
middle-income neighborhood rapidly changed into a 
working-class area with increasing poverty and 
neighborhood decay. This was accompanied by an increase 


in crime problems, including drug houses, gunshots, 
prostitution, and speeding traffic. To regain control, a 
neighborhood stabilization project was implemented. A 
major component of the project was a traffic management 
scheme in which 11 streets from the surrounding areas 
were closed to traffic, as well as 24 streets within the grid. 
Twenty-six alleys were also closed so that the gates could 
not be circumvented, creating several sub-neighborhoods. 
Brick columns with metal gates served as barriers, and the 
remaining entrances to the area were identified with brick 
columns bearing a logo and the name Five Oaks. 

One year after these changes were implemented, overall 
crime had dropped by 25 percent, with an even larger 
decline of 40 percent in violent crime. Resident surveys 
showed a reduction in the perceived seriousness of crime, 
including drug-related offenses, prostitution, gang 
problems, burglary, and violence.15 

An active residents' association was extensively involved in 
planning the project, and took responsibility for it. A high 
level of media attention may have promoted images of a 
cohesive neighborhood and deterred potential offenders. 

Research design: Strong. This is a large study, using sound 
crime measures, with street closings as a major 
component. 

3. A Crime-Ridden, Inner-City Neighborhood in Los 
Angeles 

In 1990, the city of Los Angeles and the police 
department decided to implement "Operation Cul-de-Sac," 
a community-based policing program to restore order to 
crime-ridden, inner-city neighborhoods. Because of the 


problems resulting from the Rodney King beating, the 
program never progressed beyond its trial in Newton, an 
area in south central Los Angeles. Newton covers 
approximately one square mile, with 5,000 residents in 
some 500 dwellings. In 1990, over half the households 
were below the poverty line. In 1988, the community was 
95 percent African American, and by 1990, 60 percent of 
its residents were Hispanicsmost of them illegal 
immigrants. Newton had one of the highest recorded 
levels of serious crime in the city and was plagued by drug 
activity, gang activity, and drive-by shootings.16 

Fourteen iron gates were placed on streets to mark 
Newton's outer boundary. Barriers were installed to 
impede drive-by shootings and drive-up drug purchase. 
Patrols (foot, bicycle, and horseback) were stepped up to 
suppress these crimes and to improve police-community 
relations. Officers also joined in cleanup efforts with 
community groups and the high school. A survey of 350 
residents taken in both the first and the last month of the 
program found that their ratings of police officers' 
politeness and helpfulness improved by over 33 percent. 

The barriers brought about an immediate reduction in 
serious crimes, including drive-by shootings and 
homicides. For example, in 1989, the year before 
Operation Cul-de-Sac, seven homicides were committed in 
the area. In the two years after the barriers were installed, 
only one homicide was recorded. There was no evidence 
that homicides had been displaced to another 
neighborhood. When the barriers were removed (in the 
aftermath of the Rodney King beating), homicides 
returned to their previous level.17 

 The traffic barriers prevented cars 
from entering the street, or required 
those that did enter to leave the 
same way. The latter increased the 
risks for shooters, because those 
whom they shot at would have their 
weapons ready when the car 
returned. 


 

Research design: Strong. This is a large study, with street 
closings as a major component of the intervention. 
Displacement/diffusion was assessed. The study's major 
strength is its assessment of the effect of reopening the 
streets. 

4. A Public-Housing Project in Hartford, Connecticut 

In response to a drive-by shooting that wounded four 
adolescents in a large public-housing project in Hartford, 
the housing authority erected a barrier across the street at 
the site of the shooting. Violent crimes on the street 
decreased by 33 percent (from nine to six) during the 15 
months after it was barricaded, compared with the 15month period before. 
On adjoining streets and blocks, 
violent crime also decreased in similar proportion, 
indicating that no displacement occurred. The barrier had 
no effect on drug-related crimes on the street.18,  

 The authors' claim that increased 
drug activity on nearby streets was 
due to displacement therefore seems 
unlikely.

Research design: Weak. A carefully designed study, but 
only one barrier was installed, and the reduction in the 
number of violent crimes (from nine to six) could have 
been due to chance. 

5. An Inner-City, Drug-Dealing Neighborhood in 
Charlotte, North Carolina 

Belmont is a deprived inner-city neighborhood in 
Charlotte, well known locally for being an easy place to 
buy drugs on the street. The streets are laid out in a grid, 
and the neighborhood is easily reached from several 
nearby highways. Five drug-related homicides and more 
than 100 aggravated assaults in a nine-month period in 
1998 to 1999 led to the establishment of a problem


oriented policing project in the northeastern part of the 
neighborhood. Analysis revealed that 60 percent of those 
arrested for buying or selling drugs in the area were not 
Belmont residents. It also revealed that distinct travel 
routes for drug trafficking fed vehicles from nearby 
highways into the area. The police decided to block two of 
the busiest routes by installing concrete barriers at the end 
of two streets. 

A 12-month before-and-after comparison of reported 
crime data showed that after the barriers were installed, 
violent offenses decreased by 54 percent (from 59 to 27) 
in the northeastern part of Belmont, and arrests fell by 42 
percent. The largest drops were on the two barricaded 
streets. There was no evidence that violence had been 
displaced elsewhere in Belmont (in fact, violent offenses 
for Belmont as a whole dropped by 12 percent, from 236 
to 206), though there was some evidence that drug activity 
had been displaced. 

Encouraged by these results, the police sought to install 
more barriers in Belmont, but the community opposed 
this on the grounds that the barriers were ugly and were 
not a substitute for proper policing. Even after 
"beautification" of the two existing concrete barriers 
(which were replaced by posts and chains in a mulched 
garden), community objections to installing more barriers 
persisted, and the police withdrew the plan. 

 Matt White, crime analyst for the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 
Department, evaluated this project, 
with advice from Herman Goldstein 
and the author of this guide. The 
report has not been published, 
though the Charlotte-Observer has 
published an article about the 
initiative (Markoe 2001). 


Image of street with barriers
Beautified street barriers in Charlotte, North Carolina, helped
control neighborhood violent crime and drug problems.

Research design: Adequate. A careful analysis was done, 
but only two barriers were installed. 

6. A Run-Down, Inner-City Neighborhood With Long-
Established Street Prostitution, in London 

Finsbury Park, a run-down North London neighborhood, 
was known for years as an area to solicit prostitutes. 
Residents, disheartened by police failure to control the 
problem, petitioned the local authority to reduce vehicle 
access to the area, in hopes of deterring men from 
cruising for prostitutes. As a result, seven streets were 
closed in 1985. This was preceded by an intensive police 
crackdown that involved a range of interventions directed 
toward prostitutes and their clients, pimps, and local 
landlords who rented short-term accommodation. 

As judged by official crime statistics, resident surveys, 
traffic counts, and interviews with prostitutes, this 
combined approach was successful. It increased residents' 
sense of security, reduced the traffic volume, reduced 
serious crimes by about 50 percent, and improved the 



relationship between the police, the public, and the local 
authority. Finally, it did not displace the problems to 
adjacent communities. This seemed due to the prostitutes' 
lack of deep commitment to their profession. Few were 
addicted or controlled by pimps. In fact, the most 
common reasons they gave for being prostitutes were that 
they could earn more money from that than from other 
types of work, they enjoyed the independence, and they 
enjoyed meeting a variety of men. Many of them came to 
Finsbury Park from outlying areas on cheap "away day" 
rail tickets. Together with other women, they rented rooms 
in one of the many local boarding houses or residential 
hotels, or they conducted business in clients' cars. When 
not working as prostitutes, many of them worked as 
barmaids, go-go dancers, or shop assistants. 

The prostitutes' relatively light commitment to their work, 
and the availability of alternative ways to make money, 
might help explain why the researchers could find little 
evidence of their displacement to nearby areas in London. 
Of 253 women arrested for prostitution in 1984 (the year 
before the street closures), only 65 were still involved in 
prostitution in North London as of 1991. Another 50 had 
convictions in other parts of the country, but for the 
remaining 138 women, there was no record of their having 
been involved in prostitution after Finsbury Park was 
"closed down."19 

Research design: Strong. Multiple before-and-after 
measures were used. A careful attempt was made to 
measure displacement. 


7. A Middle-Class, Residential Area With a Recent 
Problem of Street Prostitution, in London 

A similar project in Streatham, an inner-city suburb in 
South London, also reduced street prostitution and related 
problems, but overall, it was not as successful as the 
Finsbury Park project. Again, the impetus for the project 
grew from local residents who sought to create a 
partnership with the police and the local authority to 
develop a traffic management scheme, introduced in 
December 1989.20 Several streets were closed, and "no 
entry" signs were installed. 

The traffic management scheme achieved many of its 
goals. Traffic was reduced, especially late at night, and 
cruising for prostitutes declined by 60 percent. 
Furthermore, burglary, assault, and street robbery 
decreased. Residents' fear of crime decreased, and there 
was also evidence of improved dialogue with the police 
and increased community cohesion. However, there was 
substantial "benign" displacement of the problem to the 
nearby park and main commercial street"benign" because 
prostitution there was considered less offensive than in the 
residential area. The reason given for the greater amount 
of displacement in Streatham was that the prostitutes 
there were much more committed to prostitution than 
those in Finsbury Park. 

Research design: Strong. Multiple before-and-after 
measures were used. Some attempt was made to measure 
displacement. 



8. Downtown Prostitution Strolls in Vancouver, 
British Columbia 

At one time or another between 1970 and 1989, 
downtown Vancouver had numerous prostitution strolls. 
Pressure from local residents and businesses generated 
numerous initiatives to "get tough" with the prostitutes. 
These included a series of police crackdowns, a "shame 
the johns" campaign, civil injunctions forbidding 
prostitutes from entering certain areas, and the installation 
of a series of "traffic diverters" to prevent cars from 
cruising in the strolls. 

An evaluation of these initiatives concluded that, in every 
case, the prostitutes adapted to the changes. They moved 
to new strolls in the downtown area or changed their way 
of doing business.21 With regard to the traffic diverters, 
the evaluation reported that shortly after these were 
installed, a local newspaper published a photo of a woman 
sitting astride one of them, waiting for a customer. Other 
prostitutes were reported as saying that the diverters "were 
'good for business' because they slowed traffic down 
nicely." The evaluation proposed that the traffic diverters 
and other measures to prevent prostitution had failed in 
Vancouver (while appearing to have worked in London) 
because more of the Vancouver women might have been 
supporting heroin habits or had fewer opportunities to 
engage in off-street prostitution. 

Research design: Weak. An interesting and persuasive case 
is made for adaptation and displacement as the result of 
street closings (and other measures), but very limited use 
is made of data. 


9. A Citywide Program of Street Closures in St. Louis 

In January 1984, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police 
Department initiated "Operation Safestreet," a 
multifaceted program with five components: (1) "Project 
Porch Light," in which people were asked to keep porch 
lights on from dusk until dawn; (2) "Project Home 
Security," which target-hardened homes, (3) traditional 
"Neighborhood Watch"; (4) "Operation Safestreet 
Newsletter," which regularly informed residents of the 
current crime situation; and (5) "Project Quiet Street," a 
traffic management program using street closures and 
diversions. 

This program was phased in for the entire city over four 
years. Project Quiet Street generated considerable public 
debate, two lawsuits, and one unsuccessful recall election 
of an alderman. Negative public reaction grew from the 
failure to involve citizens at the planning stageresidents 
began to be involved only after the program began. 
Consequently, after four years, only two out of nine 
targeted neighborhoods had permanent barriers in place. 

Results were studied in only one of those neighborhoods, 
but a comparison was made with a nearby "control" area 
that did not have street closures. It was found that crime 
rates fluctuated randomly, with no real decrease 
attributable to the street closures. However, a review of 
five years of data following introduction of the barriers 
showed lower rates of increases in burglary where streets 
were modified.22 

Evaluation design: Adequate. The study is distinguished by 
an unusually long follow-up, but only one neighborhood 
was studied. 



10. A Citywide "Alley-Gating" Program in Liverpool, 
England 

Liverpool is an older city in the United Kingdom. Much of 
the city's housing consists of row houses, which can be 
accessed from lanes running behind them. These lanes 
have contributed to high burglary rates in many parts of 
the city, and for a number of years, the city has pursued an 
intensive program of "alley-gating." This involves 
installing robust, lockable gates to block alleys and thus 
restrict burglars' access to the rear of houses. Gate keys 
are available only to residents of the houses secured by the 
gates.23 

A recent evaluation covered a total of 3,178 alley gates, 
protecting 106 blocks of housing.24 The gates protected 
distinct blocks of adjacent housing, typically containing 
around 360 houses. It was found that burglary decreased 
by approximately 37 percent in the gated areas, and that 
burglary declined in direct proportion to the number of 
gates installed over time. Moreover, there was a large 
reduction in burglaries where offenders gained access via 
the rear of the property. There was a small increase in the 
proportion of burglaries where offenders gained access 
through the front or side of the property, indicating 
possible displacement, but the changes observed were 
unrelated to the timing and intensity of implementation. 
Finally, burglaries declined in nearby areas not within the 
boundaries of the alley-gating scheme, suggesting there 
had been a diffusion of benefits to unprotected houses. 

A simple cost-benefit analysis indicated that once the gates 
had been in place for a year or more, they became cost-
beneficial, with a return of around $1.86 for every dollar 
spent. 


Shane Johnson 
Image of alley gates
Alley gates, installed extensively in Liverpool, England,
have proven a cost-effective method of reducing
residential burglaries.

Research design: Strong. In fact, the combination of the 
large number of alley gates covered in the evaluation, the 
effort made to examine displacement/diffusion, and the 
cost-benefit analysis undertaken make this by far the 
strongest study reviewed here. 

11. An Affluent Suburban City in Florida 

Miami Shores was once a quiet suburban community near 
Miami. Following major growth in Miami-Dade County, 
commuter traffic increased, and soon after, crime also 
increased substantially. In 1986, city officials decided to 
close 67 streets as part of a citywide strategy to curb 
traffic, speeding, and crime problemsprimarily property 
crime. The referendum on the street closures passed with 
a 58 percent majority vote, despite much negative publicity 
generated by a small but vocal minority. Implementation 
started in July 1988 and ended in March 1991. In August 
1992, a second phase of 28 street closures was proposed, 
but only eight were approved in the referendum. 


 

A before-and-after examination of crime rates found that 
Miami Shores showed small declines for burglary, larceny, 
and auto theft. Rates were unchanged for robbery and 
aggravated assault. In contrast, Miami showed significant 
increases for all of the above crimes, and Miami-Dade 
County showed a general upward trend across crime 
categories. The evaluators attributed the generally 
favorable results in Miami Shores to the barriers.25 

Research design: Weak. This was a large study, but the 
evaluation did not explore alternative explanations for the 
unchanged crime rates in Miami Shores compared with the 
rest of Miami-Dade County. Nor did it examine possible 
displacement. 



Endnotes 

1 Bevis and Nutter (1978); Wagner (1997). 
2 Beavon, Brantingham, and Brantingham (1994). 
3 White (1990). 
4 Greenberg and Rohe (1984). 
5 Crowe and Zahm (1994). 
6 Gladwell (2000). 
7 Felson and Clarke (1998). 
8 Felson and Clarke (1998). 
9 Eggers and O'Leary (1995). 
10 Santa Ana Police Department (1993); Lauderhill Police Department (1996); 
Halton Regional Police Service (2002); Miami Police Department (2002). 
11 La Crosse Police Department (1994); Savannah Police Department (1995). 
12 Blakely and Snyder (1997). 
13 Gardiner (1978); Fowler, McCalla, and Mangione (1979); Fowler and 
Mangione (1982). 
14 Poyner (1983). 
15 Donnelly and Kimble (1997); Newman (1996); Dayton Office of 
Management and Budget (1994). 
16 Vernon and Lasley (1992). 
17 Lasley (1998). 
18 Zavoski et al. (1999). 
19 Matthews (1997, 1993). 
20 Matthews (1993). 
21 Lowman (1992). 
22 Wagner (1997). 
23 Johnson and Loxley (2001). 
24 Bowers, Johnson, and Hirschfield (in press). 
25 Atlas and LeBlanc (1994). 



References 

Atlas, R., and W. LeBlanc (1994). "The Impact on Crime 
of Street Closures and Barricades: A Florida Case 
Study." Security Journal 5(3):140-145. 

Beavon, D., P. Brantingham, and P. Brantingham (1994). 
"The Influence of Street Networks on the Patterning 
of Property Offenses." In R. Clarke (ed.), Crime 
Prevention Studies, Vol. 2. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice 
Press. 

Bevis, C., and J. Nutter (1978). Changing Street Layouts To 
Reduce Residential Burglary. Minneapolis: Minnesota 
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Blakely, E., and M. Snyder (1997). Fortress America: Gated 
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About the Author 

Ronald V. Clarke 

Ronald V. Clarke is a professor at the School of Criminal 
Justice, Rutgers University. He previously headed the 
British government's criminological research department, 
where he had a significant role in developing situational 
crime prevention and the British Crime Survey. Clarke is 
the founding editor of Crime Prevention Studies, and his 
publications include Designing Out Crime (HMSO 1980), The 
Reasoning Criminal (Springer-Verlag 1986), Business and Crime 
Prevention (Criminal Justice Press 1997), and Situational 
Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (Harrow and Heston 
1997). Together with Herman Goldstein, he has recently 
been working on problem-oriented policing projects for 
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (N.C.) Police Department. 
Since 1998, he has chaired the selection committee for the 
annual Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in 
Problem-Oriented Policing. Clarke holds a docorate in 
psychology from the University of London. 



Recommended Readings 

 
A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 
Environments, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 
guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 
to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 
public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 
provides guidance on whether and how to conduct cost-
effective surveys. 
 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An 
Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, by 
John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide is 
a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. It 
provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 
problem-oriented policing efforts. 
 
Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 
accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 
pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 
document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs. 
 
Crime Prevention Studies, 
edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 
volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 
opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 
initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems. 


 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing:The 1999 
Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This document 
produced by the National Institute of Justice in 
collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 
provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 
annual award program that recognizes exemplary problem-
oriented responses to various community problems. A 
similar publication is available for the award winners from 
subsequent years. The documents are also available at 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij. 
 
Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 
Reduction, 
by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 
Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 
describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or 
ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 
England and Wales. 
 
Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for 
Crime Prevention, 
by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 
Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 
1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 
theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have 
practical implications for the police in their efforts to 
prevent crime. 
 
Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 
Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 
analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 
can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 
policing practices. 



 
Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 
(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 
Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 
policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 
how a police agency can implement the concept. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime 
Prevention, by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice 
Press, 2003). Provides a through review of significant 
policing research about problem places, high-activity 
offenders, and repeat victims, with a focus on the 
applicability of those findings to problem-oriented 
policing. Explains how police departments can facilitate 
problem-oriented policing by improving crime analysis, 
measuring performance, and securing productive 
partnerships. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 
First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 
Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 
developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 
future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 
is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
 
Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 
Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 
(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 
rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 
problem-solving process, and provides examples of 
effective problem-solving in one agency. 


 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime 
and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 1998) (also available at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief introduction to 
problem-solving, basic information on the SARA model 
and detailed suggestions about the problem-solving process. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 
Studies, 
Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 
methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 
20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives. 
 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving, 
by Rana Sampson 
and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 
at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 
police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 
problems. 
 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement, 
by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 
police to analyzing problems within the context of 
problem-oriented policing. 
 
Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 
Managers, 
Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 
LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 
many of the basics of research as it applies to police 
management and problem-solving. 



Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides series: 

1. 
Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-00-2 
2. 
Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-01-0 
3. 
Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-02-9 
4. 
Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. Rana 
Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7 
5. 
False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5 
6. 
Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-05-3 
7. 
Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1 
8. 
Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-07-X 
9. 
Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8 
10. 
Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke. 
2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6 
11. 
Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X 
12. 
Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8 
13. 
Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6 
14. 
Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4 
15. 
Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-14-2 
16. 
Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-15-0 
17. 
Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-16-9 
18. 
Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-17-7 
19. 
Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-18-5 


20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly. 

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3 

21. 
Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 
ISBN: 1-932582-27-4 
22. 
Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-30-4 
23. 
Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 
Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2 
24. 
Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-33-9 
25. 
Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004 ISBN: 1-932582-35-3 
26. 
Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor and Kenneth J. Peak. 
2004 ISBN: 1-932582-36-3 

27. Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004 ISBN: 1-932582-39-8 

Response Guides series: 

 
The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns. 

Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X 

 
Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should You Go 
Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004 1-932582-40-1 
Problem-Solving Tools series: 

 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for 
Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-19-3 

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides 
Disorder at Budget Motels 
Domestic Violence 
Mentally Ill Persons 
Robbery of Taxi Drivers 
Student Party Disturbances on College Campuses 
Vandalism and Break-Ins at Schools 


Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Street Racing 
Bomb Threats in Schools 
Drug-dealing in Open-Air Markets 
Ilicit Sexual Activity in Public Places 
Drunk Driving 
Cruising 
Bank Robbery 

Problem-Solving Tools 
Analyzing Repeat Victimization 
Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem-Solving 

Other Related COPS Office Publications 

 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement. Timothy S. Bynum. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 
20 Years. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and 
Michael S. Scott. 2000. 
 
Community Policing, Community Justice, and 
Restorative Justice: Exploring the Links for the 
Delivery of a Balanced Approach to Public Safety. 

Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999. 

 
Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and 
Advancing Community Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl. 
2000. 
 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 
Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships. Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. 1998. 
 
Bringing Victims into Community Policing. The 
National Center for Victims of Crime and the Police 
Foundation. 2002. 


 
Call Management and Community Policing. Tom 
McEwen, Deborah Spence, Russell Wolff, Julie Wartell 
and Barbara Webster. 2003. 
 
Crime Analysis in America. Timothy C. OShea and 
Keith Nicholls. 2003. 
 
Problem Analysis in Policing. Rachel Boba. 2003. 
 
Reducing Theft at Construction Sites: Lessons 
From a Problem-Oriented Project. Ronald V. Clarke 
and Herman Goldstein. 2003. 
 
The COPS Collaboration Toolkit: How to Build, 
Fix, and Sustain Productive Partnerships. Gwen O. 
Briscoe, Anna T. Laszlo and Tammy A. Rinehart. 
2001. 
 
The Law Enforcement Tech Guide: How to plan, 
purchase and manage technology (successfully!). 

Kelly J. Harris and William H. Romesburg. 2002. 

 
Theft From Cars in Center City Parking 
Facilities - A Case Study. Ronald V. Clarke and 
Herman Goldstein. 2003. 

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 
Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call 
the Department of Justice Response Center at 800.421.6770 
or visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 


FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20530 

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the 
COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below. 

e08042481 Updated Date: September 16, 2004 
ISBN: 1-932582-40-1