EDWIN MEESE III, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AND JOSEPH
E. CLARKSON, APPELLANTS V. BARRY KEENE

   No. 85-1180

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1985

   On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California

   Jurisdictional Statement

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutory provisions involved
   Questions presented
   Statement
   The questions are substantial
   Conclusion
   Appendix A
   Appendix B
   Appendix C
   Appendix D
   Appendix E
   Appendix F
   Appendix G

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinions of the district court (App., infra, 1a-31a, 36a-42a)
are reported at 619 F.Supp. 1111.  The earlier opinion of the district
court issuing a preliminary injunction (App., infra, 44a-65a) is
reported at 569 F.Supp. 1513.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the district court (App., infra, 32a-34a) was
entered on September 13, 1985.  A notice of appeal to this Court
(App., infra, 35a) was filed on October 11, 1985.  On October 29,
1985, the district court granted appellants' timely motion to alter or
amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and the judgment was
accordingly modified (App., infra, 40a).  A notice of appeal to this
Court from the amended judgment of October 29 (App., infra, 43a) was
filed on November 12, 1985.  On November 17, 1985, Justice Rehnquist
extended the time within which to docket the appeal to and including
January 9, 1986.  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1252.  /1/

                     STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

   The relevant provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22
U.S.C. 611 et seq., are set forth at App., infra, 66a-70a.

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   1. Whether the use of the term "political propaganda" in the
Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq., which is
expressly defined in the Act in a neutral and valid way, violates the
First Amendment because in common usage the word "propaganda" might be
understood to have a pejorative meaning.

   2. Whether appellee, who is not a foreign agent under the Act and
is not subject to the requirements or sanctions of the Act, has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory term
"political propaganda" on the ground that the use of that term is
alleged to have chilled his exercise of First Amendment rights.

                               STATEMENT

   1. This case arises under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
(FARA), 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.  As Congress has explained, it is

      the policy and purpose of this Act * * * to protect the national
      defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United
      States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in
      propaganda activities and other activities for or on behalf of
      foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other
      foreign principals so that the Government and the people of the
      United States may be informed of the identity of such persons
      and may appraise their statements and actions in the light of
      their associations and activities.

   22 U.S.C. 611 note.

   FARA establishes a comprehensive scheme of registration, reporting,
and disclosure for "agents" of "foreign principals." The Act defines
"foreign principal" to include "a government of a foreign country." 22
U.S.C. 611(b)(1).  In addition, it defines "agent of a foreign
principal" to mean in relevant part "any person who acts as an agent,
representative, employee, or servant * * * of a foreign principal" and
"who directly or through any other person * * * engages within the
United States in political activities for or in the interests of such
foreign principal * * *." 22 U.S.C. 611(c).

   An agent of a foreign principal as defined in the Act is required
to file a registration statement with the Attorney General.  The
registration statement shall include, among other things, the agent's
name and nationality;  a comprehensive statement of the nature of the
agent's business;  the name of every foreign principal for whom the
agent is acting;  the terms of the agreement between the agent and the
foreign principal;  the activities engaged in by the agent, including
a detailed statement of any political activities;  and the
compensation or reimbursement received by the agent and the
expenditures made by the agent.  22 U.S.C. 612.

   In addition to filing a registration statement, an agent of a
foreign principal is required to submit to the Attorney General a copy
of any "political propaganda for or in the interests of such foreign
principal" that the agent transmits in the United States mails or by
any means of interstate or foreign commerce.  22 U.S.C. 614(a).  /2/
The Act defines the term "political propaganda" to include any
communication that

      is reasonably adapted to * * * in any * * * way influence a
      recipient or any section of the public within the United States
      with reference to the political or public interests, policies,
      or relations of a government of a foreign country * * * or with
      reference to the foreign policies of the United States * * *.

   22 U.S.C. 611(j).

   The agent must mark any such materials with an identification
statement that sets forth the relation between the agent and the
materials, explains that the agent is registered with the Department
of Justice under the Act and discloses the name of the agent and the
foreign principal, advises that the agent's registration statement and
the disseminated materials are available for inspection at the
Department of Justice, and contains a disclaimer that registration of
the agent does not indicate approval by the United States of the
contents of the materials.  22 U.S.C. 614(b);  see also 22 U.S.C.
614(c).  The standard form of the identification statement for films
does not use the statutory term "political propaganda" and reads as
follows:

      This material is prepared, edited, issued or circulated by (name
      and address of registrant) which is registered with the
      Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. under the Foreign Agents
      Registration Act as an agent of (name and address of foreign
      principal).  Dissemination reports on this film are filed with
      the Department of Justice where the required registration
      statement is available for public inspection.  Registration does
      not indicate approval of the contents of this material by the
      United States Government.

   PX I to Original Compalint (Mar. 24, 1983).

   The labeling requirement is applicable only to agents of foreign
principals under the Act and does not apply to subsequent
disseminators or recipients of the materials, such as appellee.  In
fact, such people are free to remove the identification statement that
the foreign agent was required to affix to the materials (App., infra,
49a, 54a-55a n.2).

   2. The National Film Board of Canada (Ottawa) produces films in
Canada.  It is an agency of the government of Canada and thus a
"foreign principal" under the Act.  The National Film Board of Canada
(New York office) (NFBC-NY) is the agent of the National Film Board of
Canada (Ottawa) in the United States and since 1947 has registered
with the Attorney General pursuant to FARA (App., infra, 5a).  In
complying with the labeling provisions of FARA, the NFBC-NY does not
routinely include the required identification statement in its
materials but instead submits the films to the Department of Justice
for a determination of the ones that are covered by the Act (App.,
infra, 48a).

   In 1982, the NFBC-NY submitted to the Department a list of 62 films
and videotapes that it had distributed during that year.  The
Department reviewed five of the films and concluded that three of them
included "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Act.  Two of
the films, Acid from Heaven and Acid Rain:  Requiem or Recovery,
address the subject of acid rain;  the third film, If You Love This
Planet, concerns nuclear war.  App., infra, 45a, 48a.

   3. a. In March 1983, appellee, an attorney and California state
legislator, commenced the instant action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California to challenge the
constitutionality of the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign
Agents Registration Act.  Appellee alleged that he desired to exhibit
the three Canadian films but was "deterred from exhibiting the films
by a statutory characterization of the films as 'political
propaganda'" and that "if he were to exhibit the films while they bore
such characterization, his personal, political, and professional
reputation would suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to
practice his profession would be impaired" (App., infra, 45a).
Plaintiff sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against
application of the Act to the three films.

   The district court denied the government's motion to dismiss and
granted appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction (App., infra,
44a-65a).  Although the court found that appellee had no standing to
challenge the labeling requirement imposed on the agent (id. at
54a-55a) it held that he did have standing to chalenge the validity of
the use of the term "political propaganda" in the Act.  The court
concluded that appellee's "status as a would-be exhibitor * * *
differentiates him from citizens generally," that appellee "is likely
and reasonably to be understood as using the film to communicate (his)
own ideas," and that "a statute which inhibits the exhibitor's ability
to exhibit also impinges on the exhibitor's ability to communicate"
(id. at 51a-52a).  The court also found that appellee's complaint
"adequately alleges an injury that is both real and immediate:
exhibition of the films which the statute characterizes as 'political
propaganda' will brand (appellee), as an exhibitor, as a purveyor of
propaganda, which will have an adverse impact on (appellee's)
professional and personal reputation" (id. at 52a).  Finally, the
court determined that the alleged injury could fairly be traced to the
government's actions and could be remedied by judicial relief:
"(appellee) has made the requisite showing by alleging that the Act
characterizes the films that (he) wants to exhibit as 'political
propaganda,' that such a characterization necessarily denigrates the
contents of the films and vilifies (appellee) as a purveyor of
propaganda, and that as a result of such vilification clients and
constituents will peremptorily reject the ideas that (appellee) hopes
to communicate" (id. at 53a).

   With respect to the merits of appellee's claim, the district court
determined that "the present action raises a substantial question
warranting litigation" (App., infra, 57a).  In particular, the court
rejected the government's argument that the phrase "political
propaganda" as defined in the Act does not denigrate the materials
covered by the statute.  It found that "'(p)olitical propaganda' is
ordinarily and commonly understood to mean material that contains
half-truths, distortions, and omissions," and that "(t)o characterize
a particular expression of political ideas as 'propaganda' is to
denigrate those ideas" (id. at 59a).  Furthermore, relying on the
legislative history of the original 1938 Act, the court also came "to
the tentative conclusion that Congress did, in fact, intend to
denigrate the affected materials by the use of the term 'political
propaganda'" (id. at 60a).  The court therefore concluded that
"Congress could easily have imposed an identification requirement
without denigrating the affected materials" (id. at 58a) and that
"Congress was acting artlessly when it defined the term 'political
propaganda'" (id. at 62a);  in the court's view, "Congress must
ultimately respect the limits of the English language * * *.  This
Court therefore harbors some doubt about the power of Congress to
select a term which has a widely understood negative connotation and
to designate it as a term of art theoretically having no negative
connotation" (id. at 62a-63a).

   Based on these conclusions, the district court entered a
preliminary injunction preventing the defendants "from imposing any of
the requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act on the (three
films in question) pending the disposition of this action" (App.,
infra, 65a).  Although recognizing that appellee had no standing to
challenge the labeling requirement applicable to the NFBC-NY, the
court concluded that "it is impossible to give (appellee) any
effective relief pendente lite without exempting the films which
(appellee) wants to exhibit from the requirements of the Act.  The
labelling requirement only has application to those materials termed
in the statute 'political propaganda.' It is the term 'political
propaganda,' however, about which (appellee) complains * * *.  (S)o
long as defendants are enjoined from employing that definition, they
must be enjoined from requiring labelling and reports in accordance
with (the Act)" (id. at 64a).

   b. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment to
appellee on his request for a permanent injunction (App., infra,
1a-31a).  The court first adhered to its prior ruling that appellee
had standing to contest the validity of the statutory language because
he alleged that "he is deterred from * * * (exhibiting the three
Canadian films) by the government's characterization of the materials
as 'political propaganda'" (id. at 6a;  see also id. at 13a-14a).  The
court reasoned that appellee was complaining "not * * * of a 'chilling
effect' on the exercise of his First Amendment rights" but instead "of
a species of censorship" (id. at 10a) /3/ and that "it is patently
absurd to suggest that one whose expression has been censored by the
government lacks standing to complain of that censorship" (ibid.).
Moreover, the court found it "immaterial" that appellee, because he
was not the agent of a foreign principal under FARA, was not subject
to the registration, labeling, or reporting requirements of the Act
(id. at 12a);  rather, the court concluded that "(t)he statute puts
(appellee) to the Hobson's choice of foregoing the use of the three
Canadian films for the exposition of his own views or suffering an
injury to his reputation" (id. at 15a), and that this establishes "the
indirect way in which the statute abridges his freedom of speech"
(ibid.).  Finally, the court recognized that in upholding appellee's
standing it had "part(ed) company" (id. at 13a) with the contrary
decision in Block v. Smith, 583 F.Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal
pending, No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. argued Feb. 12, 1985).

   Turning to the merits, the district court explained that appellee
"is not challenging the power of Congress to require that materials
produced by or under the aegis of a foreign government be labeled as
to source" (App., infra, 16a).  In fact, the court recognized that
"(a) revelation of source as a means of impeaching the persuasive
force of any piece of advocacy is wholly legitimate, and, indeed,
consistent with the loftiest conceptions of the First Amendment" (id.
at 25a).  Hence, as the court found, it "can hardly be gainsaid" that
the disclosure purpose of the Act "serves rather than disserves the
First Amendment" (id. at 27a)

   Rather than challenging the substantive validity of FARA, appellee
"asserts that the use of the phrase 'political propaganda' to describe
the materials subject to the Act so denigrates the materials that they
are made unavailable to (appellee) as a medium for the expression of
his own views and that the freedom of speech guaranteed to (appellee)
by the First Amendment is, therefore, abridged" (App., infra, 2a;  see
also id. at 27a).  Thus, "the question presented is whether Congress
may, consistent with the Constitution, apply a denigrating phrase to
those materials (covered by FARA) thereby rendering the materials
unavailable to American citizens who wish to use the materials as
media for personal expression" (id. at 16a).

   The district court acknowledged that "political propaganda" is "a
term of art to describe every sort of communicative or expressive
medium intended or reasonably adapted to influence persons within the
United States with respect to * * * foreign or domestic policies"
(App., infra, 2a;  see also id. at 16a, 17a, 18a, 20a, 21a, 30a).  The
court also recognized that the Act contains a "neutral statutory
definition" of the term (id. at 20a) that "carries no negative
connotation" (ibid.).  And the court further found that "there are
dictionary meanings of the word 'propaganda' that do not suggest a
negative connotation" (ibid.).  /4/

   Nevertheless, the district court held that "Congress is without the
constitutional power to use the phrase 'political propaganda' to
describe the materials subject to the statute's labeling requirement,
because those materials are 'core' First Amendment materials and
because the use of such a term abridges (appellee's) freedom of
speech" (App., infra, 22a).  Relying on dictionary definitions of
"propaganda" and the affidavits of academics and journalists, the
court found, "as a matter of fact, that the phrase 'political
propaganda,' and particularly the word 'propaganda,' is a
'semantically slanted word'" and that "the term 'propaganda' as used
in ordinary speech is a word of reproach" (id. at 19a (citation
omitted)).  On that basis, the court determined that "whoever
disseminates materials officially found to be 'political propaganda'
runs the risk of being held in a negative light by members of the
general public" (id. at 26a).  Concluding that the First Amendment
proscribes "a statute whose purpose is entirely proper, but which
inadvertently burdens speech by the terms in which it is couched" (id.
at 24a), the court held that "the use by Congress of an inflammatory
phrase to designate (or denigrate) clearly protected First Amendment
materials abridges (appellee's) speech" (id. at 21a).

   In addition, the district court concluded that "the suppression of
speech was part of the intent of Congress in adopting the challenged
portion of the Foreign Agents Registration Act" (App. infra, 24a).
The court conceded that from the enactment of FARA in 1938 "(t)he
purpose of (the statute) has always been, at least in part, to give
notice to the recipients of materials * * * (from a) foreign
government of the source of such materials" (id. at 3a), that the
original Act "as primarily intended as a 'sunshine' statute" (id. at
24a (emphasis in original)), and that, in connection with subsequent
amendments, "Congress deemed it appropriate to modify the xenophobic
tenor of the original Act and to emphasize the 'sunshine' aspect of
the law" (id. at 4a).  Nonetheless, the court decided that "Congress
enacted the portion of FARA at issue in order to suppress or restrict
that which it found abhorrect.  Despite its employment of a wholly
legitimate means to that end, Congress used the appellation,
'political propaganda,' which it understood and intended as a term of
opprobrium, and by which it intended to discourage or suppress speech"
(id. at 25a).

   Finally, the district court ruled that the abridgement of speech
that it had found could not be justified on the ground that the
statute was narrowly drafted to further a compelling governmental
interest.  Looking to the need for the specific statutory language in
question, the court found that there was "no justification compelling
or otherwise for the use of the phrase 'political propaganda'" (App.,
infra, 28a).

   For these reasons, the district court held that Congress's use of
the phrase "political propaganda" was unconstitutional.  Emphasizing
its view that such usage did not reflect "the best solution to a
knotty problem of draftsmanship" (App., infra, 29a), the court
reasoned that "(h)owever difficult it may be to draft a statute, it is
surely not beyond reason to demand that those whose business is
communication communicate with their audience in terms of their
audience's linguistic conventions" (ibid.).  Accordingly, the court
permanently enjoined enforcement of "any portion of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act which incorporates the term 'political propaganda' as
a term of art.  22 U.S.C. Sections 611(j) and 614(a) (b) and (c)"
(App., infra, 31a).  The court also stated that these provisions were
severable from the remainder of FARA and that its decision did not
adjudicate the validity of any other part of the Act (id. at 30a).

   c. The government timely moved to alter the district court's
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  Although the government
did not seek reconsideration of the court's basic holding of
unconstitutionality, it did request substantive modification of the
terms of the injunction entered by the court.  The court granted this
motion and limited its order to enjoining enforcement of the
provisions of 22 U.S.C. 611(j) and 614(a)-(c) with respect to the
three films at issue in this case (App., infra, 36a-42a).

                     THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

   The district court's decision in this case, holding
unconstitutional the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, represents an erroneous and unprecedented exercise
of the power of judicial review.  Although not questioning the
substantive validity of the Act, and indeed finding that the Act
affirmatively promotes First Amendment values, the district court
concluded that the statute is linguistically invalid because of the
terminology Congress used.  And in reaching its conclusion the
district court disregarded the express provision in the Act that
defines "political propaganda" in a neutral and constitutionally
unobjectionable way comporting with accepted dictionary meanings of
the term.  The district court thus struck down the statute not because
of what it does but because of what it says and, more particularly,
because of the way the statute says it and the possibility that its
language might be misunderstood to have a meaning exactly contrary to
the statutory definition provided by Congress.

   Moreover, the district court's ruling comes in a case in which the
plaintiff lacked standing to sue.  By permitting such actions to be
brought, the decision below opens up the federal courts to litigants
who have no cognizable interest at stake and seek to use the judicial
process to air political grievances or publicize policy disputes.

   Accordingly, this Court's review under 28 U.S.C. 1252 is plainly
warranted.  Because the error in the district court's decision is
manifest, we suggest that the Court should summarily reverse the
judgment below.

   1. a. The power of judicial review "to judge the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress * * * (is) 'the gravest and most delicate duty
that * * * (a court) is called upon to perform.'" Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981), quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148
(1927) (Holmes, J.).  See also Regan v. Time, Inc., No. 82-729 (July
3, 1984), slip op. 10;  United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21
(1960);  Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).  In undertaking such review, "(t)he question for (the
courts), of course, is not whether Congress could have done a better
job, but whether the job it did violates (the Constitution)." Regan v.
Time, Inc., slip op. 12-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).  And in answering that question, courts
must be mindful of "the strong presumption in favor of the validity of
congressional action" (Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982))
and give "'great weight to the decisions of Congress'" (Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted)).

   In invalidating the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, the court below adopted an erroneous method
of analysis and departed from the proper role of the federal
judiciary.  In effect, the district court undertook to review and edit
Congress's choice of statutory language.  However, just as courts
"naturally do() not review congressional enactments as a panel of
grammarians" (Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960), so too
Article III judges are not professors whose job it is to grade
Congress on its legislative drafting skills or mastery of English
usage.  See also Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972);
Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344 (1932);  Cole v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 240 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result).  The district court's "red pencil" approach to constitutional
adjudication is fundamentally misconceived.

   The Foreign Agents Registration Act expressly defines the term
"political propaganda" to mean

      any * * * communication * * * which is reasonably adapted to * *
      * influence a recipient or any section of the public within the
      United States with reference to the political or public
      interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign
      country * * * or with reference to the foreign policies of the
      United States * * *.

   22 U.S.C. 611(j).  Thus, "political propaganda" is used as a broad,
generic designation of the materials covered by the Act.  /5/ The
district court conceded that the phrase "political propaganda" in FARA
is a "term of art" (App., infra, 2a, 16a, 17a, 18a, 20a, 21a, 30a) and
that the "statutory definition" of the term is "neutral" (id. at 20a)
and "carries no negative connotation" (ibid.).  In addition, the court
acknowledged that this statutory definition accords with "dictionary
meanings of the word 'propaganda' that do not suggest a negative
connotation" (ibid.) /6/ In these circumstances, the district court
erred in striking down Congress's use of the term "political
propaganda." /7/

   As this Court has recognized, it is "both within the right and the
wisdom of Congress not to trust to the colloquial or the dictionary
meaning of * * * (a word), but to write its own." 62 Cases of Jam v.
United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951).  Where, as in this case, an
Act of Congress contains its own definition, the "statutory
definition() of terms * * * prevail(s) over colloquial meanings."
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945).
"Statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words, of
course" (Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201
(1949)), and serve to exclude other meanings of those terms (Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 & n.10 (1979)).  See also Summit Valley
Industries, Inc. v. Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 456
U.S. 717, 722 (1982);  NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322,
324-325 (1951);  United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916).

   The district court refused to accept the reasonable statutory
definition of "political propaganda," but instead looked to "the
conventions of ordinary usage" (App., infra, 20a) and concluded that
"the term 'propaganda' as used in ordinary speech * * * is a word of
reproach" (id. at 19a).  However, "definition by the average man or
even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration of subtle
shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us
by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all
others." Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1935).  Where
Congress "has attempted to secure precision and certainty by * * *
supplying its own glossary," courts are not "free in despite of it to
choose a meaning for (themselves)" (id. at 95, 96).  The district
court's approach would "pervert the process of interpretation" by
"'mak(ing) a fortress out of the dictionary.'" Farmers Reserve &
Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 775, 764 (1949) (citation omitted).

   In addition, the Constitution does not, as the district court
believed, require Congress to devise "the best solution to a knotty
problem to draftsmanship" or "demand that those whose business is
communication communicate with their audience in terms of their
audience's linguistic conventions" (App., infra, 29a).  Nothing in the
Constitution commands that Congress draft statutes in language that,
to the satisfaction of federal judges, is not capable of being
misunderstood.  On the contrary, such a rule is precluded by both the
imprecision inherent in the English language and a proper regard for
the constitutional separation of powers and the realities of the
legislative process.  As this Court explained in United States Civil
Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 577-579 (1973):

      There might be quibbles about the meaning of * * * (the
      statutory phrase);  but there are limitations in the English
      language with respect to being both specific and manageably
      brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not
      satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set
      out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common
      sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without
      sacrifice to the public interest.

   See also Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157
(1972).  Thus, "almost any word or phrase may be rendered vague and
ambiguous by dissection with a semantic scalpel," but "(t)his kind of
semantic inquiry" "amounts to little more than verbal calisthenics"
and "should not occupy the time of federal courts." Cole v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 240 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring in the
result).

   Even where constitutionally protected activities are involved, it
is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess Congress's decisions
on issues that are inherently matters of judgment and discretion.  In
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82-84 (1976), for instance, this Court
sustained the $10 and $100 thresholds for the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act (2 U.S.C.
431 et seq.).  Although recognizing that the threshold levels "are
indeed low" and "may well discourage participation by some citizens in
the political process" (424 U.S. at 83), the Court nonetheless
rejected the constitutional challenge to those provisions (ibid.):

      (W)e cannot require Congress to establish that it has chosen the
      highest reasonable threshold.  The line is necessarily a
      judgmental decision, best left in the context of this complex
      legislation to congressional discretion.

   A similar analysis should apply to Congress's use of one word or
phrase rather than another in drafting a statute;  legislative choices
of language are generally not susceptible to constitutional review by
the courts.  And here, as elsewhere, it must be remembered that a
judge's view of what is wise or desirable is not the same as what the
Constitution requires.  See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services, 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981).  Questions of policy and judgment in
selecting from among available alternatives are the province of
Congress, not the federal judiciary.  See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 542-543 n.25 (1979);  Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S.
578, 591 (1973).  It is the responsibility of the legislature rather
than the courts to consider claims that laws are assertedly
improvident or inartful, and "judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has
acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).

   The district court's decision is also irreconcilable with other
settled principles governing judicial review of the constitutionality
of federal statutes.  This can be seen in several ways.  For example,
if the Foreign Agents Registration Act had not used the shorthand term
"political propaganda" but instead had repeated the lengthy (and
neutral) statutory definition in every instance, the validity of the
statute would, under the district court's opinion, be beyond question.
 Thus, the proper judicial response to the district court's concern
about the use of the word "propaganda" should have been to define the
term in a neutral and constitutionally acceptable manner;  such a
ruling would be analogous to a clarifying or narrowing construction to
correct a statute that is vague or overbroad on its face.  See, e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972);  United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).  But in this case, of course, no
such ruling is necessary, since FARA itself already provides a
constitutionally valid definition of the phrase.  The challenged Act
is no more unconstitutional than if Congress, rather than using the
term of art "political propaganda" at all, had inserted the complete
and unassailable definition of that term throughout the statute.

   Likewise, suppose Congress had used the statutory term "political
propaganda" but had supplied no definition of the phrase.  If the
statute were challenged on the ground that it had (or might possibly
be understood to have) a pejorative meaning that violated the First
Amendment, a federal court would "have a duty" (United States v. 12
200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)) to follow the
"cardinal principle" (Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) of
construing the statute, if fairly possible, to avoid the
constitutional defect.  See also, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 769 n.24 (1982).  As the Court has explained this doctrine, there
is "a strong presumption that the law-making body intended to act
within, and not in excess of, its constitutional authority" (Plymouth
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 546 (1914)), and courts
"cannot * * * lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade * * *
(constitutional) freedoms" (Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)).  Thus, "(t)he judicial
function is 'not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if
consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with
constitutional limitations.'" Selective Service System v. Minnesota
Pub. Service Research Group, No. 83-276 (July 5, 1984), slip op. 8
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, a court confronted with the
undefined term "political propaganda" would seek to interpret the
statute in a neutral way that both accorded with Congress's intent and
would be constitutionally permissible.  But surely the Foreign Agents
Registration Act is open to no greater challenge because Congress
itself offered such a definition on the face of the statute.  The
district court hence erred in not reading the Act, consistently with
Congress's explicit definition, to use the term "political propaganda"
in a neutral rather than pejorative fashion.  /8/

   Finally, even if "political propaganda" were considered to be a
pejorative term notwithstanding the statutory definition and the
foregoing principles of judicial review, such usage would not render
the Act unconstitutional.  First, any disparagement that may be
involved in the government's characterization of advocacy as
"propaganda" does not infringe the advocate's freedom of speech.  If
an Executive official publicly described the Canadian films as
"propaganda," or if a congressional committee conducted an
investigation and issued a report calling the films "propaganda," it
could hardly be thought that the First Amendment rights of prospective
exhibitors of the films would be violated.  See National Student Ass'n
v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  Such a
categorization, even if intended to denigrate the films by conveying
the idea that they are false and distorted, would not amount to an
unconstitutional restraint or abridgement of an exhibitor's
opportunity to use the films in expressing his own point of view.  /9/
The Foreign Agents Registration Act, to the extent it embodies a
pejorative meaning of the term "political propaganda" at all, stands
on no different constitutional footing.

   Moreover, given the operation of the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, any use of the term "political propaganda" in a pejorative sense
does not violate the First Amendment.  As explained above (see page 4,
supra), the identification statement that the registered foreign agent
must put on disseminated materials is entirely neutral and does not
even use the statutory term "political propaganda." /10/ Similarly, in
connection with a registered foreign agent's submission of covered
materials, the Department of Justice makes no public statement that
the materials are "political propaganda." Thus, in the administration
of the Act, the phrase "political propaganda" is not publicly used but
rather appears only in internal Department of Justice documents and
communications with the agent.  And, of course, the use of the term
"political propaganda" on the face of the Act is explicitly
accompanied by the neutral definition in the statute itself.

   Accordingly, the sole basis for any asserted First Amendment
violation here is that the media or other third parties might publicly
utilize the phrase "political propaganda" without adequately conveying
the statutorily prescribed definition of this term of art.  But the
possibility that some people might thereby misunderstand the meaning
intended by Congress, and that as a result prospective exhibitors
would "run() the risk of being held in a negative light" (App., infra,
26a), is too attenuated and remote to support a First Amendment claim.
 As this Court stated in upholding the constitutionality of the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (2 U.S.C. 261 et seq.), any such
"restraint is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship."
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).

   b. In invalidating the statutory language, the district court
relied not only on the assumed "chilling" effect of the term
"political propaganda" but also on the conclusion that Congress
"understood and intended (the phrase) as a term of opprobrium" and
"intended (it) to discourage or suppress speech" (App., infra, 25a).
However, we doubt that such congressional intention would suffice to
render the Act unconstitutional.  See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 382-385 (1968).  If, as discussed above, the statute
passed by Congress does not impermissibly "chill" expression, it is
hard to see why a court should strike down the legislation simply
because Congress hoped that there would be a "chilling" effect.

   But in any event, there is no basis for the district court's
conclusion that Congress intended "political propaganda" as a term of
disparagement designed to deter free expression.  The Foreign Agents
Registration Act was adopted in 1938.  At that time, the Act did not
use the phrase "political propaganda" or provide for the labeling of
such materials;  rather, its primary requirement was the registration
of agents of foreign principals.  The Act was based on a
recommendation of the McCormack Committee that "Congress should enact
a statute requiring all publicity, propaganda, or public-relations
agents or other agents or agencies, who represent in this country any
foreign government or a foreign political party or foreign industrial
or commercial organization, to register." H.R. Rep. 153, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1935).  Finding that such agents were seeking "to
influence the external and internal policies of this country" (H.R.
Rep. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937)), Congress enacted FARA "to
require all persons who are in the United States for political
propaganda purposes * * * to register * * * and to supply information"
(ibid.).

   From the outset, Congress made clear that the Act was a disclosure
or "sunshine" law:

         The bill does not in any way impair the right of freedom of
      speech, or of a free press, or other constitutional rights.

                      * * * * *

         Such propaganda is not prohibited under the proposed bill.
      The purpose of this bill is to make available to the American
      public, the sources that promote and pay for the spreading of
      such foreign propaganda.  Our National Food and Drug Act
      requires the proper labeling of various articles, and
      safe-guards the American public in the field of health.  This
      bill seeks only to do the same thing in a different field, that
      of political propaganda.

   H.R. Rep. 1381, supra, at 2-3.  By shining "the spotlight of
pitiless publicity" on foreign agents, Congress sought to ensure that
"our people * * * (would) know the sources" of the information they
were receiving (id. at 2.).

   To be sure, as the district court noted (App., infra, 25a),
Congress expressed concern about the activities of foreign agents in
this country to spread the dogma of Naziism, fascism, and communism.
That is hardly surprising, given the perilous times of national and
international danger in which the legislation was born.  But Congress
did not prohibit such activities or construct a statutory scheme
designed to suppress them;  indeed, contrary to the purpose attributed
to it by the district court, Congress could scarcely have thought that
proselytizers of those views would have been "chilled" into submission
by any purported stigma associated with the word "propaganda." Rather,
the approach chosen by Congress was to require the full disclosure of
information to the public.  As the district court acknowledged (App.,
infra, 25a), "a revelation of source as a means of impeaching the
persuasive force of any piece of advocacy is wholly legitimate, and,
indeed, consistent with the loftiest conceptions of the First
Amendment." /11/

   In 1942, the Act was amended to add the term "political propaganda"
and to require that such materials be labeled with an identification
statement and a copy submitted to the government.  The legislation
expressly declared that "the policy and purpose of this Act * * * (are
to) requir(e) public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda
activities and other activities for or on behalf of * * * foreign
principals so that the Government and the people of the United States
may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their
statements and actions in the light of their associations and
activities." 22 U.S.C. 611 note.  This disclosure purpose is further
reflected in the broad and neutral statutory definition of "political
propaganda," which, as previously discussed, provides that the term
"includes any * * * communication or expression * * * reasonably
adapted to * * * influence a recipient * * with reference to the
political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government
of a foreign country * * * or with reference to the foreign policies
of the United States." 22 U.S.C. 611(j).

   The legislative history of the 1942 amendment confirms the
disclosure rationale of the statute and the neutral sense in which
Congress used the term "political propaganda." For example, the House
Report stated that "(i)t cannot be emphasized too strongly that these
amendments do not change the fundamental approach of the statute,
which is one not of suppression or of censorship, but of publicity and
disclosure * * * * *.  With all this information (required by the
amendment) at their disposal, recipients of such propaganda can
properly appraise its worth." H.R. Rep. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
4 (1941);  see also H.R. Rep. 2038, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1942).  In
addition, the Senate Report explained that the term "political
propaganda" is "comprehensively defined" in order to ensure that "all
political propaganda disseminated by agents of foreign principals"
would be subject to the requirements of the Act;  thus, the definition
of "political propaganda" was intended to be "a broad one," since
Congress considered it "desirable that any material which (a foreign
agent) disseminates that may be classed as political propaganda be
properly labeled and copies filed." S. Rep. 913, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 (1941);  see also S. Rep. 1227, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1942).  This
explicit legislative history refutes the district court's conclusion
that it was Congress's purpose to suppress objectionable expression by
using the term "political propaganda" in a narrow and pejorative
sense.  /12/

   The Foreign Agents Registration Act was further amended in 1966.
After stating that the amendments were "designed to strengthen the
basic purposes of the original act," Congress explained the statutory
scheme as follows:

      The act is intended to protect the interests of the United
      States by requiring complete public disclosure by persons acting
      for or in the interests of foreign principals where their
      activities are political in nature or border on the political.
      Such public disclosures as required by the act will permit the
      Government and the people of the United States to be informed as
      to the identities and activities of such persons and so be
      better able to appraise them and the purposes for which they
      act.

   H.R. Rep. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) (emphasis added);  S.
Rep. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955) (emphasis added).  Congress
also noted that the 1966 amendments were "aimed at better focusing the
act on those individuals attempting to influence Government policies
through political activities" (ibid.).  Thus, once again, Congress
recognized that the statute was intended to be a "sunshine" law that
covers all types of political activity and is not confined to those
that could be pejoratively characterized as "propaganda."

   In sum, both the Act on its face and its consistent legislative
history indicate that FARA is a neutral disclosure statute and that
the term "political propaganda" is simply a broad generic designation
of the materials covered by the Act.  There is no basis to conclude,
as the district court did, that the term "political propaganda" was
used in a narrow, derogatory sense in order to suppress speech that
Congress found objectionable.

   2. The preceding discussion also demonstrates that appellee lacked
standing to bring this suit.

   Article III of the Constitution establishes "irreducible minimum"
requirements for standing.  Valley Forge College v. Americans United,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).  These requirements "are not satisfied
merely because a party requests a court of the United States to
declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of
relief historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a
familiar ring to those trained in the legal process" (id. at 471).
Instead, "(a) plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable
to the defendant's unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief." Allen v. Wright, No. 81-757 (July 3, 1984), slip
op. 12-13.

   Thus, "Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's
authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury.'" Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 472 (citation
omitted).  This injury "must be * * * 'distinct and palpable'" rather
than "'abstract' or 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Allen v. Wright,
slip op. 13 (citation omitted).  Moreover, the requisite
injury-in-fact must be one caused by "'the challenged action of the
defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of
some third party not before the court.'" Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 736 (1981), quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).  And of course the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing his standing.  See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501-502, 517-518 (1975).

   Under this controlling standard, the district court erred in
holding that appellee had standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents Registration
Act.  It is undisputed that appellee is not an "agent of a foreign
principal" under the Act and is not subject to any of the requirements
or sanctions prescribed by the Act.  It is also undisputed that the
identification statement with which the registered agent must label
the films does not use the phrase "political propaganda," and in any
event appellee is entirely free to remove that label when he exhibits
the films (see page 4, supra).  Nor does the government itself
publicly disclose that appellee is exhibiting films that constitute
"political propaganda" within the meaning of the Act (See page 20,
supra).  Thus, appellee is essentially a stranger to the Act.

   Appellee's claim that his First Amendment rights have been violated
is based on the assertion that some members of the public might learn,
through the media or otherwise, that the Canadian films have been
determined to be "political propaganda" under the Act;  that these
people might misunderstand or not be informed of the definition of
this term that Congress provided, and instead might ascribe to it a
pejorative meaning;  that they might, because of this pejorative
characterization, form a negative opinion of appellee himself as the
exhibitor of the films;  that as a result appellee might suffer an
injury to his reputation and consequent damage to his economic,
political, or social interests;  and that the prospect of such harm
has deterred appellee from exhibiting the films as part of his First
Amendment expression.  Such a chain of reasoning is simply too tenuous
and remote to allow appellee to invoke the power of the federal courts
to decide the constitutionality of an Act of Congress.  Furthermore,
appellee's real objection goes not to the statute that Congress
enacted, but rather to the actions of third parties and the
possibility that they might attribute to the term "political
propaganda" a meaning contrary to that intended by Congress.  /13/

   In holding that appellee's allegation of a "chilling effect"
sufficed to give him standing, the district court's decision is also
inconsistent with Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).  There, this
Court recognized that a plaintiff "who alleges that the exercise of
his First Amendment rights is being chilled" does not, "without more,"
have standing (id. at 12).  It noted that "in each of the() cases (in
which the Court had considered a "chilling effect" argument), the
challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either
presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions,
or compulsions that he was challenging" (id. at 11).  Thus, while the
Court's decisions "fully recognize that governmental action may be
subject to constitutional challenge even though it has only an
indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights," they

      have in no way eroded the "established principle that to entitle
      a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
      the validity of executive or legislative action he must show
      that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
      a direct injury as the result of that action" * * *.
      Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an adequate
      substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a
      threat of specific future harm * * *.

   Id. at 12-14;  see also United Public Workers v. Mitchell 330 U.S.
75, 86-91 (1947);  United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan,
738 F.2d 1375, 1378-1380 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  /14/

   The district court sought to avoid these principles on the theory
that appellee "is not * * * complaining of a 'chilling effect' on the
exercise of his First Amendment rights;  he is complaining of a
species of censorship" (App., infra, 10a).  Thus, the court concluded
that it is "immaterial" that "the statute is not, by its terms,
addressed to (appellee) personally" (id. at 12a).  However, contrary
to the district court's reasoning, no issue of censorship is involved
in this case.  No speech has been restrained or prohibited by the
government, no sanction or penalty has been imposed for engaging in
protected activity, no governmental licensing board has been
established, and no content-based regulation or unfettered official
discretion serves as a bar to free expression.  Compare, e.g., Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 577 (1965);  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 11;
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-505 (1952);  Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 716-717 (1931).  Rather, this case involves a
classic "chilling effect" argument that is controlled by Laird v.
Tatum.  /15/

                              CONCLUSION

   Probable jurisdiction should be noted.  Because the decision of the
court below is patently erroneous, we suggest that the Court should
reverse summarily.

   Respectfully submitted.

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Assistant Attorney General

   CAROLYN B. KUHL

      Deputy Solicitor General

   MARK I. LEVY

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   LEONARD SCHAITMAN

   HAROLD J. KRENT

      Attorneys

   JANUARY 1986

   /1/ Appellants' Rule 59(e) motion requested that the district court
narrow the substantive terms of the injunction that the court had
entered based on its constitutional ruling.  Because this timely
motion, which was granted by the district court on October 29, sought
to amend the September 13 judgment in a substantive and material way,
we believe that the finality of the judgment was suspended during the
pendency of the motion, and therefore that the time for filing a
notice of appeal did not begin to run until the court entered an
amended judgment on October 29.  See FCC v. League of Women Voters,
No. 82-912 (July 2, 1984), slip op. 7-9 n.10;  Communist Party of
Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 445-446 & n.4 (1974);  United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 41-42 & n.1 (1966);  see also Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982);  White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450-451 (1982).  Out
of an abundance of caution, however, we have filed notices of appeal
from both the original and the amended judgments and have obtained an
extension of time in order to permit the docketing of the appeal in a
manner that will be timely as measured from the date of either
judgment.

   /2/ The Act also requires the agent to submit to the Attorney
General a report setting forth the places, times, and extent of such
dissemination.  22 U.S.C. 614(a);  see also 22 U.S.C. 616(a).

   /3/ The court elaborated that "(a) 'chilling effect' occurs when an
actor is prospectively dissuaded from engaging in First Amendment
protected activities by a threat of government sanction.  Censorship,
by contrast, consists of present governmental interference with or
suppression of expression" (App., infra, 10a).

   /4/ The court also noted that the "the information required by the
disclosure statement seems wholly innocuous" (App., infra, 5a).  As
explained above (see page 4, supra), the identification statement
affixed to the films does not use the term "political propaganda."

   /5/ The district court did not suggest that the term "political
propaganda," either on its face or as applied in the administration of
the Act, constitutes a content-based standard or discriminates against
certain viewpoints or issues.  We note that in 1983, when the Canadian
films in this case were classified, other films designated as
"political propaganda" included Flight of Soviet Jewry:  Let My People
Go, which was disseminated in the interest of the Consulate General of
Israel, and Berlin Means Business and More, distributed in the
interest of the Berlin Economic Development Corporation.

   /6/ All standard dictionaries include a definition of "propaganda"
as the systematic or widespread dissemination or promotion of ideas or
doctrines.  See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1817 (1976 ed.) ("dissemination of ideas, information, or rumor for
the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a
person";  "doctrines, ideas, arguments, facts, or allegations spread
by deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to
further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause";  "a publication
or display having the purpose or effect of furthering or hindering a
cause");  8 Oxford English Dictionary 1466 (1978 ed.) ("(a)ny
association, systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the
propagation of a particular doctrine or practice");  Random House
Dictionary of the English Language 1152 (1966 ed.) ("information,
rumors, etc., deliberately spread widely to help or harm a person,
group, movement, institution, nation, etc.").

   /7/ We also note that Congress has used the term "propaganda" in a
neutral sense in a number of other statutes.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
4107;  26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), 2522(b), 4945(d);  36 U.S.C. 1304.
Likewise, this Court has recognized the neutral meaning of the word in
referring to a variety of activities as "propaganda." See, e.g.,
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974);  National
Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 280 n.14
(1974);  NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 279 (1960).

   /8/ Similarly, if Congress had defined the term "political
propaganda" in a manner that was unconstitutional in part, the
doctrine of severability would require that, insofar as it would be
consistent with legislative intent, a court strike down only the
invalid portion of the statute and uphold the remainder.  See Brockett
v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., No. 84-28 (June 19, 1985);  New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24;  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 63.
Indeed, Congress included a severability clause in the Act (Ch. 263,
Section 12, 56 Stat. 258, 22 U.S.C. 611 note), which is an affirmative
indication of "the intention of Congress not only that an express
provision found to be unconstitutional should be disregarded without
disturbing the remainder of the statute, but also that any implication
from the terms of the Act which would render them invalid should not
be indulged." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 63.  To the extent that
the district court concluded that the term "political propaganda"
improperly incorporated a pejorative as well as a neutral meaning, it
should have confined its holding of unconstitutionality to the invalid
portion of the statute and left in place the valid portion --
precisely the result that would be reached by accepting the neutral
definition of the term that Congress has provided.

   /9/ In fact, in the real world of political activity, "it may be
just as likely that the added publicity about the films because of
this controversy may attract a larger audience for (an exhibitor)."
Block v. Smith, 583 F.Supp. 1288, 1295 n.7 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal
pending, No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. argued Feb. 12, 1985).  See also
Canadian Films and the Foreign Agents Registration Act:  Oversight
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1983).

   /10/ Furthermore, appellee, as an exhibitor, is under no obligation
to identify the source of the films and in fact is free to remove the
registration statement that the foreign agent is required to include
(see page 4, supra).

   /11/ See also, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64-68;  United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625-626;  Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 97-100 (1961);  id. at 138-140
(Black, J., dissenting);  Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236,
250-251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting);  Attorney General of the
United States v. Irish people, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (opinion of Wald, J.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983).

   /12/ In fact, President Roosevelt initially vetoed the 1942 Act
because he believed that it could interfer with the joint activities
of the United States and its wartime allies in areas of national
defense.  See S. Rep. 1227, supra, at 1-2;  88 Cong. Rec. 1139 (1942).
 In response, Congress enacted a limited exemption to the otherwise
applicable requirements of the Act for foreign governments whose
interests were deemed by the President to be vital to the defense of
the United States.  See 22 U.S.C. 613(f).  Furthermore,
contemporaneous judicial interpretation of the Act recognized that it
"sought to bring about a disclosure of the authorship and source of
that which appeared in publications and other media of dissemination
at the instance of * * * foreign governments * * *, whether friendly
or unfriendly, whether violent or mild." United States v. Kelly, 51
F.Supp. 362, 363 (D.D.C. 1943).  Given that the Act thus applied to
"mild" activities on the part of "friendly" governments and would
(absent the specific exemption) extend even to wartime activities on
behalf of our nation's allies, it can hardly be said that the Act was
deliberately intended to disparage and repress speech of which
Congress disapproved.

   /13/ We also note that appellee, despite his allegations of a
"chilling effect," in fact exhibited the films even before the
district court had entered a permanent injunction (see App., infra, 6a
n.2).

   /14/ As Judge Scalia explained in United Presbyterian Church (738
F.2d at 1378-1379 (emphasis in original)):

         "(C)hilling effect" * * * is foreclosed as a basis for
      standing by the Supreme Court's holding in Laird v. Tatum * * *.

         All of the Supreme Court cases employing the concept of
      "chilling effect" involve situations in which the plaintiff has
      unquestionably suffered some concrete harm (past or immediately
      threatened) apart from the "chill" itself. * * * "Chilling
      effect" is cited as the reason why the governmental imposition
      is invalid rather than as the harm which entitles the plaintiff
      to challenge it.

                      * * * * *

         (T)he standing question * * * (is) whether the fear (of a
      "chilling effect") constitutes cognizable harm.  On th(is)
      point, Tatum is clear and categorical:  "(a)llegations of a
      subjective 'chill' are not . . . adequate."

   /15/ In Block v. Smith, 583 F.Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal
pending No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. argued Feb. 12, 1985), suit was brought
by plaintiffs who, like appellee, are prospective exhibitors of these
three Canadian movies and seek to challenge the constitutionality of
the statutory term "political propaganda." The district court
dismissed the action for lack of standing.  While there may be some
differences in the allegations of standing in Block and the present
case, each court noted its disagreement with the other's ruling.  See
583 F.Supp. at 1296 & n.10;  App., infra, 13a.

                               APPENDIX