The National Security Restoration Act

Highlights:

The National Security Restoration Act reforms DOD to ensure that U.S. 
troops are only deployed to support missions in the U.S.'s national 
security interests, to reinvigorate a national missile defense and to 
accelerate the expansion of NATO.  Other provisions in the bill are 
designed to address concerns that readiness has suffered because defense 
spending has been cut too far and too quickly in order to pay for 
expensive social programs.

U.S. defense spending (as a percentage of GDP) is at its lowest level 
since World War II and many assert that any more military reductions 
could leave the U.S. unprepared to respond to unforeseen global threats.  
Despite severe personnel reductions and shortfalls in funding over the 
last 10 years, U.S. troops have been deployed more often and have taken 
part in more operations per year than ever before.  Presently, over 
48,000 U.S. personnel serve in unstable regions such as Haiti, Iraq, 
Bosnia, Macedonia, the Adriatic Sea, Rwanda and the Caribbean.

The National Security Restoration Act addresses this problem by:

restricting DOD from taking part in military operations that would place 
U.S. troops under foreign command;

requiring an accurate and comprehensive review of U.S. defense needs by 
authorizing a blue-ribbon panel of independent defense experts to assess 
military readiness, maintenance practices and general operational needs; 

restoring defense spending "firewalls" that prohibit the transfer of DOD 
funds to other departments and agencies in order to fund social spending 
programs unrelated to military readiness.  Future defense spending cuts 
are to be used only for deficit reduction; 

renewing the U.S.'s commitment to an effective national missile defense 
by requiring DOD to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems capable of 
defending the U.S. against ballistic missile attacks; and 

renewing the U.S.'s commitment to a strong North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) by urging the Clinton Administration to proceed with 
full NATO partnership discussions with nations that are striving to 
embrace democracy, enact free market economic reforms and place their 
armies under civilian control.

Provisions:

Restricting Multi-National and U.N. Command of U.S. Troops

Prohibition of Foreign Command of U.S. Armed Forces.  DOD is prohibited 
from taking part in military operations which place U.S. troops under 
foreign command.  The president may waive this provision if he certifies 
to Congress that operational control of our troops under foreign command 
is vital to U.S. national security interests.  No later than 10 days 
after this certification, the president must report to Congress with (1) 
a description of the vital national security interest that requires the 
placement of U.S. troops under foreign command; (2) the size, 
composition, mission and objectives of the U.S. troops involved and the 
estimated time the troops will serve under foreign command; (3) the 
U.S.'s cost for the mission; (4) the precise command and control 
relationship between the U.S. and the foreign command structure; and (5) 
the extent to which the U.S. troops will rely on non-U.S. military 
forces for security and self defense and an assessment of those forces' 
ability to carry out these duties.

Placing U.S. Troops Under Foreign Command for U.N. Peacekeeping 
Activities.  The bill stipulates that any special peacekeeping agreement 
negotiated between the president and the U.N. Security Council which 
places U.S. troops under foreign command must be approved by Congress.  
The president may not place U.S. troops under foreign command unless he 
(1) reports to Congress with the size, composition, mission and command 
structure of U.S. troops involved; (2) certifies that placing U.S. 
troops under foreign command is vital to national security; (3) retains 
the option to remove U.S. troops from peacekeeping activities at any 
time; and (4) guarantees that all U.S. troops placed under foreign 
leadership will remain under U.S. administrative command for discipline 
and evaluation.  The above stipulations must be met no less than 15 days 
before U.S. troops are placed under foreign command.

Notice to Congress of Proposed U.N. Peacekeeping Activities.  The 
president must report to Congress at least 15 days prior to any U.N. 
Security Council vote authorizing U.N. peacekeeping activities which 
involve the use of U.S. troops and funds.  The report is to include a 
description of U.S. force involvement, the mission of the U.S. troops, 
the cost and source of funding for the U.S.'s share of the mission, and 
an estimated termination date for troop involvement.

Transmittal to Congress of U.N. Resolutions and Reports.  Within 24 
hours after the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution authorizing 
peacekeeping activities involving U.S. troops, the president must submit 
the text and supporting documentation of the resolution to Congress.

Reports to Congress on U.S. Contributions For U.N. Peacekeeping 
Activities.  The president must (1) notify Congress within 15 days after 
the U.N. submits a billing statement to the U.S. for its share of 
peacekeeping activities and (2) notify Congress at least 15 days prior 
to disbursing funds for peacekeeping.

Budgeting for Annual U.S. Contributions For U.N. Peacekeeping 
Activities.  The president is directed to submit to Congress, along with 
his annual budget, a report with estimates of the U.S.'s fiscal year 
funding requirements for U.N. peacekeeping.  Beginning with the FY 1996 
budget, the president is to submit to Congress an estimate of all U.S. 
costs associated with U.N. peacekeeping for each of FY 1996, 1997 and 
1998.

Annual Reports to Congress on Peacekeeping.  No later than 90 days after 
enactment, and each year thereafter at the time of the president's 
annual budget submission, the president is to report to Congress on U.S. 
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping.  The report is to include (1) the 
number and nature of ongoing peacekeeping activities, (2) the priority 
and anticipated duration of each ongoing activity, (3) an assessment of 
each ongoing peacekeeping operation and its effect on U.S. national 
security, (4) the total costs of each U.N. peacekeeping mission and the 
U.S. contribution to each of these missions, and (5) an assessment of 
U.N. management of peacekeeping activities.  The initial report is to 
include the costs for all U.N. peacekeeping activities since October 
1945.  Subsequent reports are to include the same information for the 
preceding and current fiscal year

U.S. Reimbursement For In-Kind Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations.  Beginning in FY 1995, appropriated peacekeeping funds may 
not be used to pay the U.S. share of U.N. operations unless DOD 
certifies to Congress that the U.N. has reimbursed DOD for all goods and 
services that have been provided to the U.N. on a reimbursable basis.

Limitation on the Use of DOD Funds For U.N. Peacekeeping.  Beginning 
October 1, 1995, DOD Operations and Maintenance funds for U.S. 
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions are subject to congressional 
authorization.

Assessed Contributions For U.N. Peacekeeping Activities.  The bill 
expresses the sense of Congress that (1) the U.S. should not fund more 
than 25 percent of the total cost of any U.N. peacekeeping mission and 
(2) the U.N. should review each nation's assessed contributions for U.N. 
peacekeeping activities.

Buy America Requirement.  No U.S. funds may be contributed to the U.N. 
for peacekeeping activities unless the Secretary of State determines 
that U.S. manufacturers and suppliers are being given the opportunity to 
provide equipment, services and material for peacekeeping mission 
activities equivalent to those being given to foreign manufacturers and 
suppliers.

U.S. Personnel Taken Prisoner While Serving in Multilateral Peacekeeping 
Missions.  The bill expresses the sense of Congress that the president 
should take all necessary steps to (1) ensure that any U.S. military 
personnel captured during U.N. peacekeeping activities are to be treated 
as prisoners of war and (2) bring to justice all individuals responsible 
for the mistreatment, torture and death of American prisoners.

Provision of Intelligence to the U.N.  The U.S. is authorized to provide 
intelligence assets to the U.N. only if the president and the secretary 
general of the U.N. agree to the types of intelligence to be provided, 
the circumstances under which the intelligence assistance is to be 
provided, and the procedures to be observed by the U.N. to ensure the 
secrecy of the intelligence.  The president must report to Congress at 
least 30 days prior to entering into such an agreement.

U.N. Peacekeeping Budgetary and Management Reform.  The bill contains 
numerous budgetary reforms to ensure efficiency when the U.S. 
contributes funds to the U.N.  At the beginning of each fiscal year 
(beginning in FY 1995), 50 percent of all U.S. funds made available for 
U.N. peacekeeping must be withheld until the president certifies to 
Congress that (1) the U.N. has established an independent and objective 
Office of Inspector General to audit, inspect and investigate 
peacekeeping activities; and (2) the secretary general of the U.N. has 
appointed an inspector general who is proficient in accounting, 
financial analysis, law and public administration.

Comprehensive Review of U.S. Defense Needs

Independent Blue-Ribbon Panel.  The bill establishes a blue-
ribbon panel to conduct an accurate and comprehensive review of the 
U.S.'s national security needs, force readiness requirements and 
modernization plans.  This provision comes in response to critics of 
President Clinton's "bottom-up-review" who assert that it contained 
unrealistic financing for the established goals.

Restoring Budget Firewalls For Defense Spending

The bill stipulates that DOD funds may not be transferred to any other 
department or agency unless the secretary of Defense reports to 
Congress, at least 30 days before these funds are to be made available, 
with proof that it is vital to U.S. national security interests.  DOD 
may waive this provision during periods of national emergency declared 
by the president or Congress, however the waiver may not take effect 
until Congress has been notified.

Renewed Commitment to a National Missile Defense

DOD is directed to (1) develop for deployment at the earliest possible 
date a cost-effective, operational anti-ballistic missile defense system 
to protect the U.S. against ballistic missile threats (e.g., accidental 
or unauthorized launches or Third World attacks); (2) implement as 
quickly as possible advanced theater missile defense systems; and (3) 
report to Congress within 60 days of enactment with a plan for both 
missile defense systems.  

Renewed Commitment to a Strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

On January 10, 1994 leaders of the NATO member nations meeting in 
Brussels, Belgium issued an invitation to European countries that do not 
belong to NATO to participate in the Partnership for Peace program.  In 
that invitation, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to expand the 
organization to increase the security of the North Atlantic area.  NATO 
pointed out that many European countries that in the past had been 
adversaries, had rejected ideological hostility to the West and, in 
varying degrees, had begun to implement policies aimed at achieving 
democracy, protecting human rights and building free market economies.

The bill expresses the sense of Congress that (1) the U.S. should 
continue its commitment to an active leadership in NATO; (2) the U.S. 
should join with its NATO allies to redefine the alliance's role in the 
post-Cold War world (taking into account the changes in central and 
eastern Europe and the emerging security threats posed by nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction); (3) the U.S. 
should reaffirm that NATO military planning includes joint military 
operations outside of NATO jurisdiction; (4) that Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia should be in a position to further the 
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security 
of the North Atlantic area no later than January 10, 1999 (the bill also 
states that these countries should continue working toward democracy, 
free market economics and civilian control of their militaries); (5) the 
U.S. should assist these nations as they work towards inclusion in NATO; 
and (6) other European nations should be invited to join NATO in the 
future if they agree to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic. 

The president is given authority to establish a program to assist 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and other European 
countries that are working toward full membership to NATO.  The program 
is to assist the new nations with joint planning and military exercises 
with NATO forces and encourage greater interoperability of military 
equipment to achieve a uniform military doctrine.  The president may 
also provide assistance to other European countries emerging from 
communist domination if he certifies that they have made significant 
progress in embracing democracy and establishing free-market economies.

President's Report to Congress

Within one year after enactment, and at least once every year 
thereafter, the president is to report to Congress on the progress made 
by Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and other emerging 
European countries in their efforts to achieve full NATO membership.

Background:

The Present Landscape of the DOD Review Process

Bottom Up Review.  In 1990-91, the Bush Administration studied how U.S. 
military forces should be restructured after the end of the Cold War and 
produced a blueprint for a base force 20-25 percent smaller in budget 
and forces than the current structure.  In spite of this review, the 
Clinton Administration decided to undertake its own "bottom up review" 
-- making  its own assessment of  the U.S.'s post Cold War defense needs 
and making its own proposals to restructure the military to meet them.  
In September 1993, the bottom-up review (BUR) was released with its 
recommendation to cut an additional 10 percent on top of the Bush 
Administration proposals.  BUR's FY 1995-99 defense spending 
recommendation was $91 billion below the Bush Administration's adjusted 
baseline of $1,325 billion and $13 billion more than the Clinton 
Administration's own defense spending target of  $1,221 billion.  Former 
Defense Secretary Aspin expressed the administration's intent to trim 
down spending to meet the target.  The FY 1995 defense authorization 
bill was the first defense authorization measure drafted in accordance 
with BUR.

BUR's proposals are based on maintaining a force structure sufficient to 
win two major regional conflicts simultaneously (a strategy called win-
win).   BUR claims savings of  (1) $24 billion from cutting 160,000 more 
active duty personnel than the Bush administration, (2) $19 billion from 
infrastructure changes, including base closings, and cutting 115,000 
more civilian personnel than the Bush Administration, (3) $21 billion 
from realigning ballistic missile defense programs, and (4) $32 billion 
from reduced development and procurement of many systems.  Savings were 
also achieved in weapons modernization programs.

The Clinton Administration argues the BUR force structure reflects a 
cautious strategy  to maintain U.S. freedom of action in a still 
dangerous world.   The U.S. military will have greater strategic 
mobility, more firepower and be armed with "smart" and "brilliant" 
weapons.  Moreover, additional savings will be possible from changes in 
strategic nuclear programs and minor procurement programs, acquisition 
reform, and Vice President Gore's national performance review.

Critics have charged that (1) the win-win strategy is purely military -- 
that is, the Clinton Administration has yet to develop a national 
security strategy encompassing all its concerns and priorities; (2) the 
proposed force is inadequate; it is the same force that previous DOD 
analyses considered appropriate for less-demanding strategies; (3) the 
strategy overestimates the savings to be achieved from base closures; 
(4) the BUR force cannot be maintained within the Clinton 
Administration's own budget guidelines; (5) the Army, with only 10 
active divisions, will be hard pressed to support the win-win strategy 
while fulfilling peacekeeping missions around the globe; (6) cutting the 
aircraft carrier fleet from 13 to 11 will create gaps in global 
coverage; and (7) the Air Force may have too few long range attack 
aircraft, too few aerial tankers, and an insufficient airlift capacity 
to support two major regional conflicts.

The Current Outlook for Defense Spending

President Clinton's FY 1995 Defense Budget Request.  On February 7, 
1994, President Clinton presented his FY 1995 defense budget to 
Congress.  Recommending $263.7 billion in new BA and $270.7 billion in 
outlays, the plan continues the decline in military spending that began 
in the late 1980s.  Under the president's proposal, by FY 1997, BA for 
national defense will fall to about 40 percent of the FY 1985 spending 
peak (in constant, inflation-
adjusted dollars), with spending beginning to level off after that.

Late in 1993, discussion of the defense budget focused on a five-
year $50 billion gap between the projected cost of planned military 
programs and the amount available under budget plans formulated last 
year.  The projected gap was mainly due to higher estimates of inflation 
and a congressionally-mandated military pay raise. Subsequently, revised 
inflation estimates reduced the projected gap, and the president 
approved an increase of $11.4 billion over five years in defense funding 
to cover costs of the pay raise.  These changes narrowed the gap to 
about $20 billion, but the administration decided to postpone dealing 
with the shortfall until this year.
 
Following debate on the defense funding shortfall, the president 
reaffirmed support for his long-term defense spending plan by arguing in 
his State of the Union address against further cuts.  Perhaps partly 
because of the president's endorsement of the defense plan, debate over 
defense spending levels was relatively muted once the House and Senate 
considered the annual congressional budget resolution in March 1994.  In 
the House, a proposal to reduce FY 1995 defense budget authority by $2.4 
billion was defeated by a substantial margin.  But both chambers also 
rejected proposals to increase five-year defense spending levels by at 
least the $20 billion shortfall.  The Senate approved a measure to 
reduce caps on overall discretionary spending by $46 billion in BA and 
$26 billion in outlays.  Although many supporters of the measure argued 
that the cuts should not come from defense, critics warned that DOD 
would likely bear a large share of the reductions.  The House, which had 
no comparable provision, narrowly rejected a motion to instruct 
conferees to include these Senate-passed cuts, and the final conference 
agreement split the difference between the House and the Senate, cutting 
$13 billion in outlays over five years.  The allocation of the 
reductions is left to the appropriations committees.
 
Debate over the FY 1995 defense budget was heated, with a number of 
longer-term defense spending and policy issues emerging to the 
forefront.  Major issues included whether the administration budget is 
sufficient to maintain high levels of military readiness, whether the 
planned military force is large enough to support the military strategy 
articulated in BUR, and whether the necessary pace of weapons 
modernization will outrun likely weapons budgets after the turn of the 
century.

Spending Trends

Over the past several years, debate has focused not on whether defense 
spending should be cut, but rather by how much.  Proponents of greater 
and accelerated reductions have argued that with the end of the Cold 
War, funds previously allocated for defense are now free to be spent on 
urgent domestic needs.  With defense spending currently at its lowest 
level (as a percentage of GDP) since World War II, others have argued 
that downsizing must be done methodically and carefully, warning that 
quick and deep reductions in the past have left the U.S. unprepared to 
respond to unforeseen global threats.

A key issue in the current defense policy debate is whether the defense 
budget projected by the Clinton Administration for the next several 
years is sufficient to support a well-equipped, well-trained, high-
quality military force.  Defense analysts have generally assumed that if 
the size of the military force remains stable, then defense spending 
will and probably should grow moderately over time in order to purchase 
and operate more modern equipment and to improve the quality of life in 
the military.  Some observers see current defense budgets as comparable 
(in inflation-adjusted prices) to average Cold War-era budgets, and 
conclude that a continuing "Cold War level of funding" should suffice to 
support a substantially smaller, post-Cold War force.  Because defense 
spending normally has grown over time relative to the size of the force, 
however, such a comparison may not be very meaningful.  When the normal 
growth in defense funding per troop is taken into account, it appears 
that currently planned budgets will begin to fall below the historical 
trend over the next few years.  How well or how poorly the budget fits 
the force will depend on the impact of a slowdown in weapons 
modernization and on how well efforts to protect readiness are managed.  
Senior administration officials acknowledge that procurement funding has 
declined substantially in recent years, but, they say this is acceptable 
in the short run.  Judging by historical standards, however, significant 
increases in defense funding may be necessary in the future to maintain 
a capable force of the planned size unless there are significant changes 
in patterns of acquisition and operations. 

International Peacekeeping Operations

The U.S. participates in a number of peacekeeping operations worldwide, 
most of which are organized, carried out and paid for by the U.S. in 
association with U.N. efforts.  Currently, the incremental costs 
associated with the mission -- costs above and beyond normal peacetime 
operating expenses -- are funded through (1) supplemental 
appropriations, (2) DOD reprogramming, (3) absorption by DOD accounts, 
and (4) earmarkings in annual defense funding bills.  The U.S. has 13 
ongoing missions.   Last year, President Clinton requested $597 million 
for peacekeeping and Congress appropriated $401.6 million. 

Because of the rapid increase in both the number and cost of 
peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War, some members of 
Congress have expressed concern about the existing funding procedures.  
One solution is to create a new account to hold advanced funding of U.S. 
peacekeeping missions.  The Clinton Administration tried to do this in 
the FY 1994 defense budget, calling the account the Global Cooperative 
Initiative, but it was rejected by Congress.

The U.S. also funds peacekeeping operations through mandatory 
contributions to the U.N.  The U.S. is responsible for 25 percent of the 
U.N.'s normal operating budget  and 31.7 percent of the cost of each 
U.N.-sponsored  peacekeeping activity.  The peacekeeping assessment was 
raised from 30.4 percent to 31.7 percent last year to compensate for 
reduced contributions by the now-dissolved Soviet Union.  This increase 
added fire to existing concerns about the U.N.'s management practices, 
causing the administration to demand that the U.S. share be reduced to 
25 percent.   

At the end of the Cold War, partially fueled by the success of Operation 
Desert Storm,  enthusiasm for peacekeeping operations peaked.   But the 
mood quickly changed as  Americans monitored an inconclusive U.S. 
mission in Somalia and considered the possibility of many American 
deaths in a ground war in Bosnia.  On May 8, 1994, the Clinton 
Administration unveiled criteria the president will use to decide which 
peacekeeping efforts to support with money, troops or both.  Under these 
criteria, in order for the U.S. to vote in favor of a mission it must 
advance U.S. interests; result from a  threat to international peace and 
security; and  have clear, realistic objectives.  The criteria for 
deciding whether to commit troops to the mission, especially if combat 
is expected, are more stringent.  The directive also makes clear that 
American forces can never be placed under foreign command unless doing 
so would serve American security interests.   White House national 
security adviser Anthony Lake describes these guidelines as an attempt 
to reform and limit U.S. participation for such activities.