February 25, 1996                 LBL-37163new.txt 


      The Hard Problem: A Quantum Approach.

              Henry P. Stapp

          Theoretical Physics Group
        Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
          University of California
         Berkeley, California 94720


               Contents


1. Introduction: Philosophical Setting.
2. A Quantum Model of the Mind/Brain.
3. Person and Self. 
4. Free-Will.
5. The Hard Problem.

Prepared for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies.

1. Introduction: Philosophical Setting.


In his  keynote paper  David Chalmers  defines  ``the hard  problem'' by posing
certain  ``Why'' questions  about  consciousness? Such  questions must be posed
within an   appropriate setting.  The way of  science  is to try  to deduce the
answer to many such questions from a few well defined assumptions.

Much about  nature can  be explained  in terms of  the  principles of classical
mechanics. The  assumptions, in this explanatory  scheme, are that the world is
composed exclusively of particles and fields governed by specified mathematical
laws that refer neither to any  individual person, nor to anyone's experiences.
These physical laws are supposed to be such that particles and fields, acting in
concert,  can  form  causally   efficacious  real  functional  entities  such as
driveshafts  and  propellers.  Similarly, surges of  electrical  and mechanical
activity in appropriately  designed material  substrates, composed of particles
and fields acting in concert, could  implement, in the world of matter, complex
functional  structures  and long  sequences of  logical  operations. Thus it is
conceivable that all of our behaviour,  and all of the internal processing that
occurs in our bodies and brains could  be {\it deduced}, at least in principle,
from the principles of classical mechanics and appropriate boundary conditions.

There is,  however, a problem  in principle  with  `experience'; i.e., with the
streams of  consciousness that  constitute our  psychological selves. Although,
according  to  the  principles of   classical  mechanics,  all of our  internal
processing, and functionally described body/brain activity, should in principle
be deducible from the principles of classical physics, and appropriate boundary
conditions---namely the  presence of a living  body/brain in a certain state of
readiness---and    although we  scientists  may  therefore  one day  be able to
identify a  particular functional  activity $F$ as the  unambiguous sign of the
presence of all of the causal and  functional properties needed to identify $F$
as the  brain  correlate of a  certain  feeling $F'$  that the  person calls `a
searing pain in my left  index finger',  nevertheless, it is impossible to {\it
deduce} simply from the  principles of classical  mechanics that $F$ {\it must}
be accompanied by the  felt {\it feeling} $F'$.  This is because the principles
of classical mechanics never mention  `feels', and hence these principles alone
cannot entail that certain  implementations of functional or logical structures
{\it must necessarily} be accompanied by `experiences'. 

Since the principles of classical mechanics do not include any notion that some
new sort of  ontological entities come  into being at some  level of functional
complexity,  one seems to  be led  either to the  notion that  there just IS an
extra  kind of   beingness,  conscious  experience,  that is  not  mentioned in
classical  mechanics, but that is part  of the full  description of nature, yet
plays no efficacious role in classical  dynamics; or to the notion that certain
implemented functional  (or logical) structures ARE  conscious experiences. The
first of  these  possibilities,  namely that  some new  kind of  beingness just
arises, but makes no physical difference, seems too capricious and unnatural to
be true. But what about the second possibility: {\it functionalism}?

The difficulty with functionalism, within the explanatory framework provided by
the principles of classical mechanics,  is that the two things that are claimed
to be  the  very  same  thing  are, as   initially    characterized,  described
differently, and these  differently described  things are moreover incapable of
being causally  connected  within the  framework of classical  mechanics, which
never  mentions one of  them. `Pains'  are known to  us from  childhood, and it
therefore does not resolve the problem of explaining their connection to brains
either to deny their  existence, or say that they  are something different from
the very feelings that they are defined to be. On the other hand, as one passes
from simple thermostats to more and more complex servo-mechanisms with more and
more complex  self-monitorings, and  memories, and  decision-making capacities,
etc., etc., all  implemented  ultimately in a material  structure assumed to be
exactly represented in terms of the  primitives of classical mechanics---namely
space, time, particles, fields, and local laws of motion---one can never arrive
at the point of being able to deduce from the principles of classical mechanics
the necessary  presence of a  `feeling of  pain'. The  classical principles are
therefore simply too impoverished to serve as a basis for a description for all
of nature,  including the felt  experiences that  constitute for each of us an
immediately present reality.

The principles  of classical  mechanics are,  of course,  unable to explain the
properties of the  materials from which living  brains are made, or the complex
chemical reactions that  are the basis of brain  dynamics. Quantum mechanics is
needed  for  that.  But  quantum   mechanics,  according  to  the the  orthodox
(Copenhagen)  interpretation,  involves a huge  conceptual  shift away from the
classical ideal: it  brings experiences of  observers into the physical theory.
The theory is  constructed to be  fundamentally `about'  our experiences, which
thereby become the  basic elements of  the theory. Thus  one need not go beyond
the  elements  of the  basic  physical  theory  to  accommodate   consciousness.
Conscious  experience is  already  there, and it is  there in a  mathematically
specified  way  that is  perfectly  suited to  give it a  central  and causally
efficacious role in mind/brain dynamics. Let me elaborate.

The key idea of the Copenhagen interpretation is encapsulated in two quotations:

``In our description of nature the  purpose is not to disclose the real essence
of phenomena but  only to track down  as far as possible  relations between the
multifold aspects of our experience'' [Bohr, 1934]

``Strictly    speaking, the    mathematical  formalism  of  quantum  theory and
electro-dynamics    merely  offers rules of   calculation for the  deduction of
expectations pertaining to observations  obtained under well-defined conditions
specified by classical physical concepts.'' [Bohr, 1958][See also Stapp, 1993]

Bohr is emphasizing here that science,  in the end, has to do with correlations
among our experiences: that our  experiences are the ultimate data that science
must   explain.  Hence  one can   renounce  the  classical   ideal of  giving a
mathematical description of the objective world itself in favor of constructing
a set of mathematical rules that allow us to compute expectations pertaining to
certain kinds of  experiences. Thus, in contrast to  classical mechanics, human
experiences occupy a basic primitive  place in quantum mechanics: the theory is
basically `about' experiences, even  though the mathematical formulation of the
``rules of calculation'' pertaining to  these experiences is based on a quantum
mechanical  generalization of  certain of the  ``matter-like''  properties that
occur in classical mechanics. The crucial point here is that quantum theory has
a larger base of  primitives than  classical mechanics,  and this base includes
experiences. [cf. Stapp, 1972]
 
The Copenhagen approach is essentially dualistic because the two things that it
deals with are, on the  one hand, our {\it  experiences } (of a certain special
type, namely classically describable perceptions) and, on the other hand, a set
of mathematical rules that allow us to compute expectations pertaining to these
experiences.  These rules  are  expressed in terms  of a  generalization of the
mathematical    structure that   occurred in   classical  mechanics,  and which
represented,  in that   idealization, the  ``objective  world of  particles and
fields''.

Bohr's pragmatic approach was  revolutionary in its day, and was opposed
by some of the most prestigious scientists of that time. In Einstein's opinion:

``Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought
independently of its being observed'' [Einstein, 1951, p.81]

This attitude of  Einstein, and of  many other scientists,  seems so reasonable
that one must ask why top scientists  interested in atomic physics, which seems
so far  removed from  psychology,  should bring  `our  experiences' into atomic
physics, and why  that move should be  accepted by the  scientific community as
the correct way of comprehending atomic  phenomena, and why  physical theory did
not thereby become devoid of objective content. 

The answers rest on two  points. The first is that  the Copenhagen claim is not
that physical  theory is about  {\it all} of our  experiences: it was claimed
that  physical  theory  is  about what  can be   called, for  purposes  of easy
identification,  our `classically  describable'  perceptions of the world about
us. The phrase `world about us' is meant to describe only how we refer to these
experiences, not to  specify any particular  ontological commitment. The phrase
`classically    describable' is  connected  to the  fact  that  visible objects
normally appear to  us to have a  reasonably well defined  location: a billiard
ball does not appear to us to be, simultaneosly, both at one end of a billiards
table and also at the other end. The second point is that the basic equation of
quantum mechanics, the Schroedinger  equation, applied universally, necessarily
leads, in some easily arranged  situations, to states in which the state of the
billiard  ball has  one part  that is  localized  at one  end of the  table and
another part that is localized at the other end of the table. 

The founders of quantum theory  resolved this contradiction between the form of
the  quantum state  and the  form of  our  experience by   postulating that the
quantum   state   represents  not the  full   reality  itself,  but  rather the
probabilities for,  or tendencies for,  our perceptions to  be various possible
specified  perceptions.  In this  formulation, the  experience  of the observer
becomes what the theory is `about', and this experience enters in a fundamental
way,  because it is  only by  bringing these   experiences, and  their de facto
classicality,  explicitly into  the overall  theory that the  theory is able to
account for  the  classicality that we  always  observe, but  which the quantum
mechanical equation of motion neither entails nor (generally) allows.

The key  point, in  the  context of the mind/brain  problem, is that  this most
orthodox interpretation of quantum  theory  brings the experiences of the human
observers into the basic physical  theory on at least a co-equal basis with the
`physical' or `matter-like' aspects of the description: the matter-like aspects
give only half of the dynamical and ontological story.

Under the pressure of diverse goals (e.g., to expand the scope of the theory to
include  cosmological  systems)  a number of   ``ontological  formulations'' of
quantum theory  have been created.  They attempt to give a  rationally coherent
description of  (what at least  could be) the  world itself,  not just a set of
rules that  allow us  to form  expectations  about our  future  experiences. An
underlying aim of  most of these  alternative  interpretations is to avoid
the explicit occurrence in the theory  of the experiences of observers. But all
of these interpretation  are dualistic in that they  have two kinds of entities
that obey different, though intertwined, dynamical laws. One of these two parts
is the  `wave  funtion'. This  part is the  quantum  analog of the  `matter' of
classical mechanics, in the sense that it normally evolves in accordance with a
local   deterministic  equation of  motion that  is the  quantum  analog of the
corresponding classical  equation of motion. The  other part is associated with
mind,   in  the  sense  that  it   `picks  out'  from  an    amorphous  mass of
potentialities, represented by the  first part, a sequence of particular actual
experiences of  the kind we  actually  experience. 

It  will  be  useful  to  give a   brief   description  of  these   alternative
formulations,   emphasizing  these two  aspects. This  will pave  the way to an
understanding of a  quantum theory of  the mind/brain  proposed in Stapp [1993]
and elaborated upon here. I shall  spend what may seem like a inordinate amount
of time on the model of David Bohm: this is because I shall treat all the other
proposals by contrasting them with Bohm's.

The simplest  quantum ontology  is that of  David Bohm (1952).  In the orthodox
(Bohr)  theory one spoke of the complementary ``particlelike'' and ``wavelike''
aspects  of a  quantum   system. That  was  confusing  because   particles stay
confined to tiny  regions while waves  spread out: the two  concepts contradict
each  other,  physically. This  is what  forced Bohr  into his  epistemological
stance, and his idea of ``complementarity''.

For a world consisting of a single  quantum entity Bohm's model would have both
{\it a  particle} and  {\it a wave}:  the particle  rides like a  surfer on the
wave. One easily sees how  the puzzling double-slit  experiment is explained by
this model: the wave goes  through both slits and  influences the motion of the
particle,  which goes  through just  one slit. This  model is  dualistic in the
sense of  having both a  particle and a wave.  But this  dualism is basically a
mind/matter   dualism,   because the  function  of the   ``particle'',  or more
specifically its generalization to the  many-particle universe, is basically to
specify what  {\it our  experiences}  will be.  There is a huge  gap in quantum
theory between the  information  contained in the ``wave''  and the information
contained in our  experience. The  purpose of, and need  for, the particle, and
its generalization  to the  many-particle universe, is  basically to supply the
information---not contained in the  wave (function)---that specifies {\it which
one} of the many  mutually  incompatible experiences  allowed by quantum theory
the  observer   actually  has. If  there  were no  need  to  describe  the {\it
experiential}  aspects of reality,  which are very  different in character from
what the  deterministically evolving wave  (function) describes, there would be
no need for the  ``particle-part'' of Bohm's  ontology. The critical assumption
in Bohm's  model is  precisely  the  assumption that  even though  the ``wave''
(i.e., wave  function of the universe)  might describe a  superposition of many
different brains of some one  particular scientist, say Joe Smith, and although
each these different superposed ``brains'' would correspond to Joe's perceiving
a different result of some experiment that he is performing, nevertheless, only
one of these brains will actually be illuminated by the light of consciousness,
and this particular brain---the one  that possesses consciousness---is picked 
out from the host of possibilities by the ``particle'' aspect of the theory: 
in Bohm's theory the contents of our consciousness is determined by what the
`particle' part of the universe is doing, not the wave part, and, in fact, the
only reason to bring in this particle part is, first, to account for the
empirical fact that we `experience' only one of the branches of the wave, and,
second, to determine which branch this is.

To explain how  this (and also  the other  models) work, I  shall often use the
term ``branches of the wave  (function)''. To visualize these branches, imagine
a large pond with an initially smooth  surface (no waves). A source of waves is
placed at the center, but is  surrounded by a barrier that has some gaps. These
gaps allow  ripples to spread  out only along  certain  beam-like regions, with
most  of the  surface  of the  pond  remaining   smooth. These  well  separated
beam-like regions of propagating  ripples I call ``branches'', or ``branches of
the wave (function)''.

The surface of a pond is only two  dimensional. But the quantum-mechanical wave
that corresponds to a universe consisting of $N$ particles would be a wave in a
$3N$-dimensional space. The ``branches  of the wave (function)'' will typically
be relatively  narrow beams of waves  in this  $3N$-dimensional space, and each
beam will  correspond, in a typical  measurement  situation, to some particular
``classically  describable'' result of  the measurement.  For example, one beam
may  describe,  at some  late  stage, a  particle  detector  having  detected a
particle;  {\it and} a  corresponding  pointer  having swung to  the right as a
consequence of the  detector's having detected the  particle; {\it and} the eye
and the low-level processing parts of  the brain responding to the light signal
from the pointer  in the  swung-to-the-right position;  {\it and} the top-level
neural activity  that corresponds to  the observer's  perceiving the pointer in
the swung-to-the-right  position: the other branch  would describe the particle
detector's   having  failed to  detect the   particle; {\it  and }  the pointer
remaining in the  center position;  {\it and} the eye and  low-level processing
parts of the brain  responding to the light signals  coming from the pointer in
the center position; {\it  and} the top-level  neural activity corresponding to
the observer's  perceiving the  pointer in the  center  position. The fact that
{\it both}  branches of the wave are  present  simultaneously is not surprising
once  one   recognizes  that  the wave   represents    essentially only  a {\it
probability for an experience to  occur}: there is, in a typical measurement, a
possibility for each of several possible experiential results to occur, and the
probability   function (or  wave  function) must   therefore have a  ``branch''
corresponding to each possibility. 

  Of   course,  the   observer,  Joe  Smith,  will  see  only  one  of  the two
possibilities: he will see {\it either} the pointer swung-to-the-right {\it or}
the or  the  pointer  remaining at the  center  position.  To  accommodate this
empirical fact  Bohm introduces his  ``surfer'' in the  $3N$-dimensional space.
The surfer is merely a point in the  $3N$-dimensional space that move always in
a direction  defined by  the shape of  the  $3N$-dimensional  wave at the place
where this point  is, and this rule of  motion for the  surfer ensures that the
surfer will end up in one  branch or another, not  in the intervening ``still''
part of  the  $3N$-dimensional  space. Each  branch  corresponds  to one of the
possible experiences. If the  ``surfer'' (which is just the moving point in the
$3N$-dimensional    space)  ends  up in  the  branch  that   corresponds to the
experience ``I see the pointer in the swung-right position'' then, according to
Bohm's theory,  this  perception of the  pointer  ``swung-to-the-right'' is the
experience  that actually  occurs: only the  single branch in  which the surfer
ends up will be  ``illuminated''; all others ``remains  dark''. Bohm's rules
for the  motion of  the  surfer ensure  that if  the  various  possible initial
conditions for the surfer are assigned appropriate ``statistical weights'' then
the statistical predictions of his theory about what observers will experiences
will agree  with the  those  given by the  orthodox  (Bohr) rules.  In this way
Bohm's causal model  reproduces the quantum statistical  predictions 
about what our experiences will be.

The two parts of Bohm's  ontology, namely the wave  in the 3N-dimensional space
and the `surfer', can  both be considered  `material', yet they are essentially
different because the waves describe  all the possibilities for what our actual
experiences   might be,  and  therefore  has a  beingness  that is  essentially
``potential'', whereas the trajectory of the surfer specifies the actual choice
from among the various alternative possibilities, and therefore has a beingness
that  represents  ``actuality''  rather than  mere   ``potentiality'': the wave
generates all the {\it possible} experiences, whereas the trajectory defined by
the surfer specifies which one of these possible experiences actually occurs.

Bohm's   model is  very  useful,  but as  a  model of  reality  it has  several
unattractive features.  The first is the ``empty  branches'': once two branches
separate they generally move further  and further apart in the $3N$-dimensional
space,  and  hence  if the   ``surfer''  gets in  one  branch  then  all of the
alternative ones become  completely irrelevant to  the evolution of experience:
the huge set of empty branches  continues to evolve for all of  eternity, but 
has no effect upon anyone's experience.

A more  parsimonious  ontological  theory, not  having these  superfluous empty
branches,  was  described by  Heisenberg  (1958). It  also  involves a  reality
consisting  of two  kinds of  things. His two  kinds of  things are   ``actual
events'', and ``objective tendencies for those events to occur''. The objective
tendencies can be taken  to be represented by the  wave on the 3$N$-dimensional
pond, and the actual  events can be represented by  sudden or abrupt changes in
this wave. Each such change ``collapses the wave'' to one of its branches. Thus
Bohm's ``surfer'', which specifies a {\it choice} between branches, is replaced
by an ``actual  event'', which  also specifies  a choice  between branches. But
whereas Bohm's  surfer has no  back-reaction on the wave,  each of Heisenberg's
actual   events   obliterates  all  branches  but  one.  The big   problem with
Heisenberg's  theory is to  find a reasonable  criterion for  the occurrence of
these actual events.

Wigner  (1961) and  von Neumann  (1932),  noting that  there is  nothing in the
purely  material  aspect of  nature that  singles out  where the  actual events
occur, suggest that these events should occur at the points where consciousness
enters: i.e., in conjunction with conscious events. This theory can be regarded
as the `ontologicalization' of the Copenhagen interpretation, in the sense that
the change of the state  that occurs when a  perception generates new knowledge
is basically subjective in the Copenhagen interpretation, but is interpreted as
an objective  change in the Wigner-von  Neumann  interpretation used here. This
ontology  is  the  most   parsimonious   possibility:  all of  the verified
predictions of quantum  theory can be reproduced by  limiting the actual events
to brain events that correspond to experiential events.

An argument based on survival of the species [Stapp, 1995] provides support for
the idea that actual events occurring in human brains will tend to occur at the
brain-wide level of activity that  corresponds to conscious events, rather than
at some microscopic (e.g., molecular, or individual-neuron) level.

This Wigner-von Neumann version of Heisenberg's theory will be discussed 
presently in some detail. But first a few remarks about the final major 
interpretation are needed.

In the  Everett  many-minds  theory the  basic quantum  mechanical  equation of
motion,  the   Schroedinger  equation,  holds  uniformly:  there are  no sudden
collapses of the wave function; all branches continue to exist. Moreover, it is
assumed  that,  because all of  the branches  exist,  all of the  corresponding
streams of conscious must also occur.

Since  the  various   branches  propagate  into   different  parts of  the $3N$
dimensional space  they will evolve  independently of each  other: the physical
``memory banks'',  associated with one  branch will not  affect, or be affected
by, the  brain activities  specified  by another  branch. Hence  each different
branches can be considered to define a  different ``self'', or ``psyche'', with
each of these  selves continually  dividing into different extentions of itself
into the  future.

At first sight this idea seems to  allow the whole theory to be reduced to just
one entity, the evolving  wave, with the different  psychological persons being
just ``aspects'' of  corresponding brain activities  on different branches. But
that is not  correct. The  branches of the  wave function  appear as parts of a
{\it conjunction} of branches: all branches on the `pond' exist simultaneously,
even though they  evolve  independently. But the  predictions of quantum theory
are an essential part of the theory,  and these statistical predictions pertain
to experiences that are `this experience' {\it or} `that experience', not `this
experience' {\it  and} `that  experience'. To speak of  probabilities one needs
something with an {\it or} character: something that can become associated with
{\it either} this branch {\it or} that branch, not both simultaneously. Just as
the different branches of a wave on a  pond are conjunctively present and hence
do not, by  themselves, provide any  ontological basis for  assigning different
probabilities to  these simultaneously  present things, so  also is the quantum
wave, by itself, insufficient for this task.

In Bohm's  theory  this extra  element of  the theory  was the  `surfer', which
determined the  experiences of the observers; in  Heisenberg's theory the extra
things were  the actual  events, which also  determined the  experiences of the
observers. In the Everett  interpretation the only  existing things besides the
waves are our  experiences, and there  is supposed to be a  separate experience
associated with each branch. Thus we end up again with a dualistic theory; with
a world that is  composed of the one  ``material''  universe represented by the
wave function, which evolves always according to the the Schroedinger equation,
plus, for each  named person, an great  profusion of many  minds, or streams of
consciousness:  the stream of  consciousness  of Joe Smith  must be continually
splitting into different  separate branches, with  at least one for each of the
perceptibly different results of any experiment that he performs. Consequently,
the  proponents  of the  theory  need to  develop,  in order  to  complete this
interpretation, some  coherent dualistic ontology  involving, for each of us, a
profusion of  branching  minds, each  known only to  itself, and  a theory that
assigns to each of these  `independent' (but  generally overlapping) branches a
well defined `subjective probability  to occur', even though these branches all
occur together in the full `objective' description of reality. 
 
In summary,  all the major  ontological  interpretations of  quantum theory are
dualistic,  in the sense  that they  have one  aspect or  component that can be
naturally  identified as the  quantum analog  of the {\it  matter} of classical
mechanics, and a second aspect that is associated with {\it choices} from among
the  possible  {\it  experiences}.  All   interpretations  are, in  this sense,
basically similar to the Wigner-von-Neumann interpretation to be explored here,
but are less parsimonious, in that  they involve either existing but unobserved
branches  (Bohm), or  existing but  unobserved  actual events  (Heisenberg), or
existing but inaccessible and unverifiable other branches of reality (Everett).

\noindent{\bf{2. A Quantum Model of the Mind/Brain}}

\medskip

The main features of the mind/brain theory proposed in Stapp [1993] are briefly
described in the following fourteen points: 

1. {\bf{Facilitation}}:  The pattern of  neurological  activity associated with
   any occurring  conscious thought is  ``facilitated'', in  the sense that the
   activation  of this  pattern causes  certain  physical changes  in the brain
   structure, and these changes {\it facilitate} subsequent activations of this
   pattern.

2. {\bf{Associative  Recall}}: The facilitation of  patterns mentioned above is
   such that the excitation  of a part of a  facilitated pattern has a tendency
   to excite the whole. Thus the sight  of an ear tends to activate the pattern
   of brain activity  associated with a previously  seen face of which this ear
   was a part.

3. {\bf{Body-World Schema}}: The physical body of the person in its environment
   is  represented within  the brain by  certain  patterns of  neural and other
   brain   activity.  Each  such   pattern has  {\it    components},  which are
   sub-patterns  that represent  various parts  or aspects of  the body and its
   environment, and  these components  are normally  patterns of brain activity
   that have been facilitated in conjunction with earlier experiences.

4. {\bf{Executive-Level  Template for Action:}} A  main task of the alert brain
   at each moment is  to construct a  template for the  impending action of the
   organism. This template is formed from patterns of neural and brain activity
   that,  taken  together,   represent a   coordinated plan  of  action for the
   organism. This   representation is  implemented in the  brain by means of an
   automatic causal spreading of neural excitations from the executive level to
   the rest of  the nervous  system.  This  subsequent activity  of the nervous
   system causes both motor responses and lower-level neural responses.

The   executive-level  templates are  based on  the  body-world  schema, in the
following  sense.  There are two  kinds of  templated  actions:  attentions and
intentions.  Attentions  {\it up date}  the  body-world schema:  they bring the
brain's  representation of the body in  its environment up  to date. Intentions
are  formulated in  terms of a  {\it  projected} (into  the  future) body-world
schema:  they  are  expressed  in  terms of an  image  of how  the  body in its
environment is  intended to be at a  slightly future time.  (Thus, for example,
the tennis player imagines how he will strike the ball, or where the ball he is
about to hit will land in his opponent's court).

5. {\bf{Beliefs and other Generalizations}}: The simple Body-World Schema, with
   attentional  and intentional  templated  actions, is the  primitive level of
   brain action: it gives the general  format. However ``beliefs'' can be added
   to the  landscape.  Also, each  templated  action has  both  intentional and
   attentional aspects. 

6. {\bf{Quantum Theory}}: The features mentioned above are key elements of this
   theory.  But they  are aspects  that hold  at the  level  corresponding to a
   particular  classically described  `branch'. But  classical mechanics cannot
   account for the  essential properties of the  materials (such as tissues and
   membranes) from which the brain is  made. Hence, an adequate basic theory of
   nature must show how the classically describable aspects of nature that seem
   important, and that we seem  to  experience, arise in  rational way from the
   quantum underpinning. 

7. {\bf{Superposition   of  Templates}}: An  analysis  [Stapp,  1993, 1996] of
   processes   occurring  in  synapses  shows  that if  there  were no  quantum
   collapses occurring in brains then a brain evolving according to the quantum
   laws  {\it   must}  evolve,  in   general,  into a  state  that   contains a
   superposition   of  different   ``branches'',  with each  of these  branches
   specifying the  template for a  different macroscopic  action. Each of these
   different templates for action will  evolve into a different response of the
   nervous system, and  consequently into a  difference macroscopic response of
   the organism. Thus without collapses the body/brain would evolve into a
   superposition of macroscopically distinguishable possibilities, just as a
   measuring device normally does.

8. {\bf{The Reduction Postulate}}: Following the Wigner-von-Neumann approach, I
   postulate that the  quantum collapse  of the brain state  occurs at the high
   level of the  template for  action. The   (Heisenberg-picture) state (of the
   universe)  undergoes the  collapse $$  \Psi_i\to\Psi_{i+1}  = P_i \Psi_i, $$
   where $P_i$ is a  projection operator  that acts on  appropriate macroscopic
   variables     associated  with  the   brain. It   picks  out and   saves, or
   ``actualizes'', {\it one} of the  alternative possible templates for action,
   and   eradicates all  others.  The  organism  will  then  proceed  to evolve
   automatically in accordance with this  one particular plan of action, rather
   than evolving (\'a la Everett) into a  superposition of states corresponding
   to {\it  all} of the  different  possible   macroscopically  distinguishable
   courses of  action that were  formerly  available to it.  Thus the ``quantum
   event'',  or  ``collapse  of the  wave   function'', {\it   selects} or {\it
   chooses}    one  of   the     alternative    possible    coherent   plans of
   action---previously  generated by the  purely mechanical  functioning of the
   brain---by  actualizing the  executive-level pattern of  brain activity that
   constitutes {\it one} of the alternative possible templates for action.

This collapse of  the wave function is  to be understood  not as some anomalous
failure of the laws of nature, but  rather as a natural consequence of the fact
that wave  function does not  represent  actuality itself, but  rather, in line
with the  ideas of  Heisenberg, merely  ``objective   tendencies'' for the next
actual event.

Each such  event is  represented,  within the  Hilbert space  description, as a
sudden  shift in  the wave  function,  or state  $\Psi_i$,  to a new  form that
incorporates the conditions or requirements imposed by the new actual event.

These `collapse'  events in the  Hilbert space are not  introduced willy-nilly:
they are needed to  block what will  otherwise  automatically occur, namely the
evolution of the wave  function to a form that  directly contradicts collective
human experience: all of us who see the pointer agree that the pointer does not
both swing to the right {\it and} also  remain motionless. Under the conditions
of the  measurement it  does one thing  {\it or}  the other, and  all of us who
witness what  it does,  and are able  communicate  our findings  to each other,
agree about which one of these two possible things actually occurs. 

9. {\bf{The  Psycho-Physical  Postulate}}:  Adhering to the  Wigner-von-Neumann
   approach, I postulate that the  physical brain event, namely the collapse of
   the wave function to the  branch that specifies  one particular template for
   action,  is  the  brain   correlate of a    corresponding   psychological or
   experiential  event. Thus the  occurrence or emergence  of the psychological
   command ``  raise the arm''  is represented  in the  physical description of
   nature by the  occurrence or  emergence of the physical  command ``raise the
   arm''. The causal relationship is discussed in point 15. 

Attending is a special kind intending: the intention, in the case of attending,
is to up-date the body-world schema. 

Notice an  important  difference  between the  context in which  the Wigner-von
Neumann idea is applied here, and the  context in which they themselves applied
it. They were considering a large  system consisting of some atomic system plus
a device that measures  some property of that  system plus the human observer's
body and, finally, his brain. In that  context the collapse at the level of the
observer's    consciousness   determined the  outcome  of the  earlier  distant
experiment on  the atomic  system. I am  focussing, however,  on the mind/brain
system itself, and  the role of the  collapse event in  determining principally
the  internal  dynamics of this  system.  This role is  more in  line with what
seems,  intuitively, to be the role of  conscious. For the  present purpose one
may assume that collapses occur already at the level of all quantum devices, so
that the principal effect of the  conscious event is then to determine only the
internal dynamics of the  brain, not the results of  any measurements performed
externally to the brain.

10. {\bf{The Efficacy of  Consciousness}}: In this model the choices associated
    with conscious  events are  dynamically  efficacious: each  such event {\it
    effects}  a decision  between  different  templates  for  action, and these
    different   templates  for  action  lead on  to  different   distingushable
    responses of the organism.

11. {\bf{Consciousness and  Survival}}: It is often  thought that consciousness
    emerges because it aids  survival. For this to be so consciousness
    must be   efficacious.  Yet in  the Bohm  and  Everett  models  (just as in
    classical  physics)   consciousness is  not  efficacious: all  behaviour is
    completely determined with no mention of any causal role for consciousness.
    Consciousness  would be  nonefficacious also in the  Heisenberg model if we
    did not follow  Wigner-von-Neumann  in associating  actualizing events with
    conscious events. (The survival issue is addressed in Stapp [1996])

12. {\bf{Conscious  Events and  Unconscious Processing}}:  The general temporal
    development  in the  brain proceeds  by periods  of  unconscious processing
    punctuated by conscious events. A conscious event actualizes a template for
    action that, by the automatic spreading of top-level neural activity to the
    rest of the nervous system, controls: 1) motor action, 2) the collection of
    new information (including the monitoring of ongoing processes), and 3) the
    formation of the next template for action.

13. {\bf{Overall Picture}}:  Classically only a  single ``next template'' would
    be formed.  This could be  achieved either  by the  formation of a resonant
    state that  sucks energy  from  competing  possibilities, or  by inhibitory
    signals, or by dropping into the  well of an attractor. But in any of these
    cases the quantum  uncertainties entail that the  quantum brain will, if no
    collapse  occurs,   necessarily  evolve into  a  superposition  of branches
    corresponding to the different alternative possible classical templates for
    action. One of these  virtual templates for  action will then emerge as the
    actual one, and the  automatic (unconscious)  neural processes will proceed
    to carry out  the  instructions encoded in  the template.  Thus there is an
    alternation  between discrete  conscious events and  periods of unconscious
    activity controlled by  the local deterministic  laws. Each of the discrete
    events chooses  from among the  alternative possible  allowed templates for
    action generated by the automatic action of the local deterministic laws of
    quantum mecanics,  and hence between  the different  associated macroscopic
    responses of the organism.

14. {\bf{The  Generality of  Psycho-Physical  Connection}}: My  focus above has
    been on  the human  mind/brain  system,  and on the  interplay  between the
    experiential and physical aspects of  nature in this particular system, for
    which we have both verbal reports  and personal knowledge pertaining to the
    form and content of the experiential  aspect. These special characteristics
    make the human mind/brain unique as  a subject of scientific study by human
    scientists. However, it is unreasonable to suppose that events of this kind
    are confined to  human beings. This  suggests,  therefore, that there is in
    nature a general `second  process' that includes  as a special case the one
    that is needed, according to (Wigner-Von Neumann) ontologicalization of the
    Copenhagen  interpretation, to bring  the quantum  process into accord with
    human experience.  In line with the  ideas of Wigner  and von Neumann, each
    such  event in  nature is  assumed  to be an   `experiential  reality' with
    physical   ramifications. But  the  specific  qualities of the  experiences
    associated  with  different  systems  can be  vastly  different  from human
    conscious  experiences, although all  are considered to  belong to the same
    ontological category.

To support  this  suggestion of a  universal  connection of  collapse events to
experience I  note, first  of all,  that, as Arthur  Eddington  observered, the
quantum  world  is more  like a  `giant  mind' than  like  the `giant  machine'
described by classical mechanics. For, the evolving state vector represents not
`substance',   but   rather a   `probability'  for   something  to  happen, and
probability is normally considered to  be a subjective or mental sort of thing,
not a material reality. The second  part of the quantum reality is the `actual'
event, which  Heisenberg  contrasts  with the  `potentia' from  which the event
arises.  The  `actual'  specifies  what is  able to  be  experienced:  only the
actualized   branches can be   experienced. This   connection of the  actual to
experience   is   tightened by  the   Wigner-von  Neumann   proposal,  which is
essentially to {\it identify} the  actual with experience. This proposal is the
quantum analog of the dictum `esse est percipi': to be is to be perceived. 

Technically there  is a specific need  for a tie-in of the  actualization event
with features  characteristic of  experience. This tie-in  has two aspects. The
first  is that  the  actualization   singles out a   `classically  describable'
structure. This is  a feature of  experience that is not  inherently present in
the  physical  aspect of  nature  represented by  the   (Schroedinger-directed)
evolving  wave  (function).  The great  and  essential  move of the  Copenhagen
interpretation  was  precisely  to realize  that  although no  classical aspect
naturally  pops  out from  the quantum  physical  reality,   represented by the
normally evolving wave, (certain of)  our experiences are, in fact, classically
describable, and hence the empirically  observed classical aspect of nature can
be brought  consistently into physical  theory by  introducing our (classically
describable)  experiences, per se,  directly into the  theory as the very thing
that  the theory  is  about. The  whole  history of  efforts  to go  beyond the
Copenhagen interpretation  is essentially the  history of attempts to find some
{\it other}  rationally coherent way  of explaining why  our perceptions of the
quantum   universe are   classically  describable.  The  present  suggestion is
essentially to accept,  following the Copenhagen  approach, that this classical
aspect does not come from  the physical side of  nature, but comes instead from
the experiential side. This makes the  experiential aspect of the actualization
events the {\it cause} of the classical character of the collapse events, which
otherwise appears to have no natural explanation.

15. {\bf Causation} 

This reference to `cause' raises the  general question of the cause of both the
occurrence of the actualizations and  of the form (e.g., the classical form) of
the actualizations. Much  can be said without  delving into the question of the
cause of the  event. Indeed, all of  contemporary quantum  mechanics is covered
without delving into that question, by  just accepting the statistical rules as
`given': then the cause of the events is effectively `pure chance'.

This occurrence of pure  chance is quite acceptable  in an admittedly pragmatic
interpretation of quantum theory, such as the Copenhagen interpretation. But it
is  not   acceptable, I   think, in  an   account  that   represents  itself as
ontological,  i.e., as a  putative description  of reality  itself. Thus if one
wishes, in an ontological context, to  discuss the `cause' of the occurrence of
an   actual   event   then  {\it     something}  is   needed  to    replace the
`irrational'---that's  Pauli's word for  it---element of pure chance: to embark
upon an  ontological  discussion of the  `cause' of the  actualizations entails
assuming that the element of `pure  chance' that occurs in contemporary quantum
theory  is  merely a mask  for our   ignorance of  the true  cause,  which must
necessarily be highly nonlocal [Mermin 1994, Stapp 1994].

The part of the dynamics that is matter-like is represented by the Schroedinger
(directed) evolution,  which is the contrary  of the collapses. This fact,
together  with the  general mind-like  quality of  the quantum  world mentioned
above,  suggests  that  the cause  of the   actualizations  must come from  the
experiential aspect of things.

The  orthodox  (Copenhagen)  interpretation is  based on the  fact that certain
features of the quantum state can be regarded as a superposition of states that
represent different  possible experiences. This  connection becomes more direct
when  the  quantum system  in  question is  the  brain  itself. The  process of
selection of the actual  experiential state from  the superposition of possible
ones  must, of   course,  depend upon  this   decomposition  into the  possible
experiential  states. So the  decomposition of  the Hilbert  space state vector
into the  possible  experiential  components  must play  a central  role in the
dynamical processes, at  least if one accepts the  naturalistic hypothesis that
the possible  experiences are  represented in  the same  mathematical structure
that  represents the   matter-like aspects  of nature.  This  suggests that the
selection   process  is   essentially a   competition  among  the  experiential
possibilities,  with the  winner becoming the  actual  experience, which is the
reality whose  coming into being is  represented by the  transition to the  new
quantum state. 

This conception of the  process of selecting the  actualized state entails that
the experiential aspect  of the actualization event  is, effectively, the cause
of this event, in  the sense that this  experience, in its  potential form, has
raised  itself above  its  competitors to  become the  actual  experience: each
actualization is a self-actualization.

In this  conception,  the  experienced  reality is the  coming  into being of a
psychologically  felt  command:  ``Do X!''  This  experiential  reality, in its
potential form, is  represented (or embodied) in  Hilbert space, and the coming
into actual being of this  representation (or  embodiment) constitutes a coming
into actual being  of both the  psychologically felt  command ``Do X!'' and the
physically implemented  command: ``Do X!''. This  connection is somewhat like a
dual-aspect theory, but  now in the context of a  physical theory that properly
accounts for {\it  all} brain  processes, and that,  following the ideas of the
quantum   physicists  Bohr,   Heisenberg,  von  Neumann,   Wigner, and  others,
incorporates human experience into the basic fabric of physical theory in order
fulfill  the  scientific  demand  for a  closed  rational  account of  physical
phenomena.

\newpage
\noindent{\bf{3. Person and Self}}

\medskip

According to William James:

``Such a  discrete   composition is  what  actually  obtains in our  perceptual
experience. We either perceive nothing, or something that is already there in a
sensible  amount. This fact is  what is known  in psychology  as the law of the
`threshold'. Either your experience is of no content, of no change, or it is of
a perceptible amount of content or change. Your acquaintance with reality grows
literally by buds or drops of  perception. Intellectually and on reflection you
can divide these into components, but as immediately given they come totally or
not at all.''[James, 1910, p. 1062] 


``...  however complex  the object may  be the  thought of it is  one undivided
state of consciousness.''[James, 1890, p. 276]


``The consciousness of Self involves a stream of thought, each
part of which as  `I' can (1)  remember those that went  before, and know the
things they knew; and (2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among
them as {\it `me'}, and {\it  appropriate} to these the rest... This {\it me}
is an empirical aggregate  of things objectively  known. The {\it I~} that knows
them cannot itself be an aggregate.  Neither for psychological purposes need it
be  considered to be  an  unchanging  metaphysical  entity like  the Soul, or a
principle like the pure Ego,  viewed as ``out of time''. It is a {\it Thought},
at each moment different from that of  the last moment, but  {\it appropriative
of the  latter},  together with  all that  the latter  called its  own ... {\it
thought is itself the thinker}, and psychology need not look beyond...''
(James. 1890, p. 401)

In line  with these  ideas of James,  and those of  the  preceding section, the
conception of a `person' that  emerges here is that of a sequence of discrete
psychological  (i.e.,  experiential or  conscious) events   bound together by a
matter-like structure, namely the  brain/body, which evolves in accordance with
the local  deterministic laws of  quantum mechanics. Each  conscious event is a
new entity  that rises  from the  `ashes' of the  old, which  consists of the
propensities for its occurrence carried by the brain/body.

A felt sense of  an enduring  `self'  is  experienced, and hence it
must, within this  theory, be  explained as an  aspect of  the structure of the
{\it  individual}  discrete  conscious  events. The  explanation  is this: each
conscious event has a ``fringe'' that surrounds the central image, and provides
the background in which the central image is placed. The slowly changing fringe
contains the consciousness of the  situation  within which the immediate action
is taking place; the historical setting including  purposes (e.g., getting some
food to  eat). The sense  of feeling  of self is in  this  fringe. It is not an
illusion,  because  the  physical  brain/body  is  providing   continuity and a
reservoir of  memories  that can be  called upon,  even though each thought is,
according to this model, a separate  entity. As explained by James---see also
Stapp (1993)---each thought, though  itself a single entity, has components that
are sequentially  ordered in a  psychological time, and  hence each thought has
within its own  structure  an aspect  that corresponds to  the flow of physical
time. 
\newpage

\noindent{\bf 4. Free-Will}

\medskip

Our experience  includes the  feeling that we  are `free'.  That feeling is, in
some sense, accurate. The whole  organism is free to make high-level choices in
which the various  perceived possible consequences  enter as whole experiential
units.   One's  fate is  not   controlled    exclusively by    mechanical local
deterministic laws, or by an avalanche microscopically entering chance elements
that would make a mockery of the idea of personal choice.

It might be objected that we are not free because, according to quantum theory,
our choices are determined by blind chance. That misses the point. In the first
place the choices are not blind. If the quantum events in the brain occurred at
the level of the neurons then the  choices would be blind, for the consequences
of each   individual choice  would be  screened  from view  by the  inscrutable
outcomes of  billions of  similar independent  random choices.  But the choices
being made by  the organism,  acting as a  unit, are choices  between plans for
actions that  have clear  and  distinctive  consequences for the  organism as a
whole, in terms of its future  behavior. The choice is made at the level of the
organism as a  whole, and the  event has a  distinctive `feel'  that accurately
portrays its consequences for the organism as a whole. The conditioning for
this event is an expression of  the  values and goals of the whole organism,
and the choice is implemented by a unified action of the whole organism that is
normally meaningful in  the life of the organism. And this meaning 
is felt as an essential aspect of the act of choosing.
 
The  final  `random'  decision between  the  alternative  possible  distinctive
actions of the organism is not some  wild haphazard stab in the dark, unrelated
to the  needs  or  goals of  the  organism. It  is a  choice  that is  governed
essentially  by  the number  of ways  in which  the  mechanistic  aspect of the
organism,  which has been  honed to construct  templates for  action concordant
with the needs of  the organism within  its environment,  can come up with that
particular template. Thus the choice  is not like the throw of an unconditioned
die. It  is a  carefully  crafted  choice that  tends to  be the  ``optiminally
reasonable''  choice under the  conditions defined by the  external inputs, and
the needs and goals of the organism. Each of the alternative possible templates
for a coherent  and  well-coordinated action  of the organism  emerges from the
quantum soup, and is given, by the quantum mechanism, a weighting that reflects
the interests of the organism as a  whole, within the context in which he finds
himself. The  choice is  conditioned  by these  personally  molded weights, and
therefore tends to be a decision that is optimally reasonable from the point of
view of the organism. This arrangement  avoids both the Scylla of a fate sealed
at the birth of the  universe by a microscopically  controlled blind mechanism,
and  also  the  Charybdis  of a   haphazard  wild  chance  that   operates at a
microscopic level, and is  therefore blind as  regards likely consequences. The
intricate interplay of  chance and determinism  instituted by quantum mechanics
effectively  frees the  organism to  pursue, in an  optimal way,  its own goals
based on its own values,  which have themselves  been created, from a wealth of
open possibilities, by its own earlier  actions. Each human being, though never
in full control of  the situation in  which he finds  himself, does create both
himself and  his actions,  through a  process of a   microscopically controlled
deterministic   evolution  punctuated by  organic  meaningful  choices that are
top-down in  the sense that  each one is  instituted by an  actualization event
that  selects as a  unit,  and feels  as a unit,  an  entire  top-level plan of
action. 

Within the contemporary  framework of quantum  theory that I have been adhering
to in the above three paragraphs there remains, in the end, an element of `pure
chance' that selects one  of the templates for  action `randomly'. Whether this
occurrence of pure chance  is a permanent feature  of basic physical theory, or
merely a temporary  excursion, no one knows. In my  own opinion this occurrence
of pure chance  is a  reflection of our state  of ignorance  regarding the true
cause, which must  in any case be  nonlocal, and hence  both difficult to study
and quite unlike the local causes that  science has dealt with up until now. In
another place [Stapp, 1996] I have  described in more detail the technicalities
of the actualization process, and also the possibility of replacing the element
of pure chance by a  nonlocal causal process that  makes the felt psychological
subjective `I', as it is represented  within the quantum-theoretic description,
rather than pure chance, the source of  the decisions between one's alternative
possible courses of action.
 
\newpage
\noindent{\bf 5. The Hard Problem}
\medskip

`The Hard Problem'  is the problem of  {\it conscious  experience}: What is it?
Why is it present at all? Why is it so different from the other part of Nature,
namely the objective aspect of  reality? Why is it personal, or subjective? Why
is it  so  fleeting,  whereas  matter is  permanent  and  conserved?  Can it be
`reduced'  to  matter?  Can any  purely  physical  account  explain  it? Is the
material  of which  the brain is  made  crucial, or is  it only  the functional
aspect that is  critical? Why  is it so  closely connected to  function? How do
functional aspects  become ontological  aspects, i.e. how  does function become
being? How  can  anything, and  in  particular  consciousness, be  added to the
already closed laws of physics? Is  experience a fundamental element of nature,
or derivative, or emergent? What are  the {\it bridging laws} that connect mind
to matter?

Chalmers asks these questions, and says that right now we have no candidate
theory that answers these questions. But we do!

Chalmers  suggests that  perhaps there is a  small loop-hole  in quantum theory
that might provide an opening for  consciousness. But there is not just a small
loop-hole: there  is a gigantic gap,  which consists of  {\it fully half of the
theory}, and this hole  provides an ideal home for  consciousness. For, quantum
dynamics consists  not only of the  mechanical process  that is governed by the
Schroedinger  equation, which  controls the  matter-like  aspect of nature, but
also an entirely  different `second process', which  involves a beingness of an
entirely    different  kind.  This   second  process  is  needed  to  bring the
experiential  aspect of nature into  concordance with the  physical part of the
theory, and to specify or determine what our experiences will actually be. 

The core  idea of Bohr  was to  recognize that  physics is  basically about our
experiences, and to introduce our experiences directly into the physical theory
in order to resolve a deep problem with the theory that otherwise arose. Bohr's
stance was cautious and pragmatic, and  avoided ontological commitment. But von
Neumann,  and  more   unambiguously  Wigner,  went the  next  step and  brought
consciousness into the  theory as a causal agent  that actively did what needed
to be done to  make the theory  work at the  ontological level  in the same way
that it worked  at the  practical level. The  ontology then  included conscious
experience as the co-equal partner of a more shadowy  world of `possibilities',
or, in Heisenberg's terminogy, of `objective tendencies' for transitions from
the possible to the actual. 

The new  ontology  is  fundamentally  different  from the   classical-mechanics
ontology in  many ways. The  first is the  physical  `possibilities' acquire an
ontological reality that is  mathematically represented or embodied. The second
is that possible  conceptual/experiential realities are represented or embodied
in this same structure. Thus the actualization of a conceptual/experiential
possibility is simultaneously an actualization of a corresponding physical 
reality. In this way concept evolves into implementing functional structure in
a mathematically described way.

Each actualization event has its physical side, which is just the `collapse' of
the wave function itself, and also its  experiential side. In a rational causal
theory the  collapse must have a  cause. This cause is not  to be found in that
physical  part of the  quantum  ontology:  considered from the  purely physical
standpoint the  collapse seems  to come from  nowhere, as an  unpredictable and
undetermined `bolt from the blue'. And  the collapse represents merely a sudden
`change  in   tendencies'  for  a  `change in    tendencies' for  a  `change in
tendencies' for ...etc.,  etc.: there is no  closure, no basic reality. For the
technical reasons mentioned earlier  the theory needs something that will bring
`classicality' into the dynamics, and  it needs a `cause' for the collapse, and
it needs a reality  to complement the  `potentia'. This  missing element is not
present in the physical  part of the theory. It  must be something that exists,
and the only thing that  we know exists, besides  the physical part of reality,
(which perhaps we  do not really  `know' at all, directly)  is the experiential
part. This part fills the various  needs perfectly, and, of course, needs to be
included in a complete description of nature. So we put the two parts of nature
together in the natural way that fits all these needs simultaneously.

How does this  theory answer  the questions, listed above, that Chalmers raised
about consciousness?
  
{\it What is consciousness?} It is the  part of nature that: 1) complements the
the   background  `physical'  aspect  by being  the  reality  that the  quantum
potentiality is the  potentiality for; 2) specifies  the classical character of
reality that is not  determined  by the  background physical
aspect of the  quantum,  which represents only an  amorphous potentiality, with
no inherent preference for a unique and specifically classical reality; and 
3) causes the physical state to collapse to a new form that incorporates the 
conditions specified by the new experiential new reality.

{\it Why is  consciousness  present at all?}  Because the  local-reductionistic
laws of physics,  regarded as a causal  description of  nature, are incomplete:
something  else is  needed to  cause the  collapse  events to  occur, to inject
`classicality'  into  nature, and to  provide the  reality that the quantum
state is the potentiality for.

{\it Why is  consciousness so  different from the other  part of Nature, namely
the physical aspect of reality?} The physical part of reality represents merely
the  possibilities  for an  actual  experience,  not the  actually  experienced
reality itself.
 
{\it  Why is   consciousness   subjective?} An   actualization  event  has many
components, all of which are integral parts of the whole. The totality contains
the slowly  changing  fringe of  the  experience that  constitutes  the `I', or
`psyche',  which  is felt  as the   experiencing  subject  and  actualizer. The
experiencing subject is  {\it part of the thought},  not an outside observer of
the thought: if the `I' were not {\it  part of the thought} then there could be
in the  thought no  awareness of `I'  as the  background  relative to which the
focus of the thought is the foreground. Thus it not that the thought belongs to
an `I', but rather that an `I'  belongs to the thought.

{\it Why  is a  thought so  fleeting,  whereas   matter(energy) is  conserved?}
Because a  thought is an element in a discrete sequence of events, whereas
`matter' is the continuously evolving `potentia' for such an event to occur.

{\it Can consciousness  be `reduced' to matter?}  ``Matter'' is the ground from
which the experiential  event springs: the whole  process is represented in the
Hilbert  space in  which the  quantum  analogue of  matter is  represented. But
rising out of the matter-like aspects  of nature lies another dynamics governed
by the experiential aspects of nature.

{\it  Can any  purely   physical  account  explain  it?} That  depends  on what
`physical' means.  The account given  here is physical in  that it is rooted in
quantum  mechanical  description of  nature. But  there is  something decidedly
unphysical  about the  idea of `pure  chance'. The  present  account allows the
orthodox(?) idea that  pure chance is an essential  part of nature's process to
be replaced by  the more  `physical' idea that  the collapse  process, which is
needed to  bring the quantum  mechanical  representation of  the physical world
into   concordance with  our  experience  of it, is  a  causal  process that is
representable in the Hilbert space of quantum theory. This proposal is based on
the  fact  (which is  the  key  element  upon  which the   orthodox  Copenhagen
interpretation   is  based) that  certain  aspects  of the  quantum  mechanical
superposition  of  the  physical  possibilities  can be  interpreted  also as a
superposition  of experiential  possibilities.  The dynamics  that controls the
emergence of one experienced reality  from the superposed comglomerate must, of
course, depend upon the set possible experiential realities.

{\it Is the  material of  which the  brain is made  crucial, or  is it only the
functional aspect that is critical?} Neither! What is important is the presence
in the  physical  substrate of   potentialities for  quantum  actualizations of
experiential structures.

{\it Why is consciousness so closely  connected to function?} Because the event
is an  actualization of a template for  action. The  biological reason for this
link of  actualization to  function is  undoubtedly  the  survival advantage it
confers. [Stapp, 1996]

{\it How do functional  aspects become ontological  aspects?} The actualization
events actualize functional structures.

{\it How can  consciousness be  added to the  already closed  laws of physics?}
Nothing efficacious could  be added if the laws  were already complete! But the
quantum laws are grossly incomplete  before consciousness, or some stand-in for
consciousness, is added.

{\it Is  experience a  fundamental element of  nature, or is  it derivative, or
emergent?}   It  is    fundamental  because  the    fundamental   realities are
experiential. On the  other hand, the particular  sort of consciousness that we
human beings  experience is  emergent, because  it represents  a highly evolved
form of the general ontological type. The complexity of a human experience is a
consequence  of the  complexity of the  body/brain  that  supports the physical
activity that supports. The complexity of the physical carrier has  undoubtedly
co-evolved with the complexity of the associated experiential reality.

{\it What are the {\it bridging laws} that connect mind to matter?}
They have been described here.

\newpage  
\noindent{\bf Acknowledgements.} This paper has greatly benefited from useful 
correspondences with David Chalmers, Gordon Globus, Jonathan Shear, and 
Aaron Sloman.

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footnote{This work was supported by the Director, Office of Energy 
Research, Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics, Division of High 
Energy Physics of the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract 
DE-AC03-76SF00098.}