UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, PETITIONERS V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET
AL.

   No. 82-545

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1982

   The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the United States of America, petitions for
a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in this case.

   Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinion below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutes and regulations involved
   Statement
   Reasons for granting the petition
   Conclusion

                             OPINION BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-181a) /1/ is not
yet officially reported.  The rules which were the subject of the
review proceedings in the court of appeals were promulgated by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 39 Fed. Reg. 14188 (1974) (original
fuel cycle rule), 42 Fed. Reg. 13803 (1977) (interim fuel cycle rule),
43 Fed. Reg. 15613 (1978) (amended interim rule), and 44 Fed. Reg.
45362 (1979) (final fuel cycle rule).

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 182a-184a) was
entered on April 27, 1982.  A petition for rehearing was denied on
June 30, 1982 (Pet. App. 185a-187a).  The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                   STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

   Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C 4332, is reproduced in Pet. App. 431a-434a.  The original,
interim, and amended interim versions of the Table S-3 Rule are
reproduced in Pat. App. 237a-239a, 254a-258a, and 271a-273a.  The
final version of the Table S-3 Rule, 10 C.F.R. 51.20(e), 51.23(c), is
reproduced in Pet. App. 378a-383a.

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   1. Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission violated the National
Environmental Policy Act in adopting a "fuel cycle" rule (which
specifies environmental releases from high level waste disposal and
other uranium fuel cycle operations, for use in nuclear power plant
environmental impact statements) because the rule does not permit
reconsideration, in individual licensing proceedings, of uncertainties
in the prospects for safe high-level waste disposal.

   2. Whether the original and interim versions of the "fuel cycle"
rule forbade consideration in individual cases of health,
socioeconomic, cumulative, and similar effects from the releases
specified in the rule, and were consequently invalid.  /*/

                               STATEMENT

   In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
548-549 (1978), this Court reversed a decision of the D.C. Circuit
which had held invalid the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commmission's ("NRC") /2/ original rule addressing the environmental
impact of the nuclear fuel cycle for purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ("NEPA"), and
remanded the case for review of the rule in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act.  The court of appeals consolidated that
case with petitions for review of later versions of the same rule and
again held the rule (in all its versions) invalid.  Petitioners seek
review of that judgment.

   1. In 1974 the NRC, after considering public comments and holding
an informal rulemaking hearing, promulgated a rule which provided for
consideration of the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle
in the environmental impact statement ("EIS") which accompanies
licensing proceedings for nuclear reactors.  39 Fed. Reg. 14188.  The
rule included a table ("Table S-3") stating the natural resources used
and effluents released annually be fuel cycle activities supporting a
typical light water nuclear reactor.  /3/ The rule stated that in
individual licensing proceedings the environmental impact from a
proposed reactor should be as set out in Table S-3, and that "(n)o
further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required."
Id. at 14191.

   The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("NRDC") and others
challenged the Table S-3 rule in the D.C. Circuit, /4/ which held the
rule invalid because of perceived inadequacies in the rulemaking
procedures.  Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d
633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  The court of appeals found that "(r)egarding
most phases of the fuel cycle, * * * (the materials underlying the
table) did an adequate, even admirable job * * * .  However, with
regard to the two phases of the fuel cycle which are the focal points
for this appeal, reprocessing and waste disposal, that kind of
detailed explanation and support * * * was noticeably absent * * * ."
Id. at 647 (footnote omitted).  The court attributed that deficiency
to the absence of any "genuine dialogue" (id. at 653), itself the
result of procedural inadequacies.

   On October 18, 1976, in response to that decision, the NRC
initiated proceedings to review the portion of the rule dealing with
radioactive waste disposal.  41 Fed. Reg. 45849.  It prepared a new
in-depth survey of that problem, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Environmental
Survey of the Reprocessing and Waste Management Portions of the LWR
Fuel Cycle, NUREG-0116 (1976), and invited comments on the survey.  In
March, 1977 the NRC promulgated a new ("interim") Table S-3 rule which
differed only slightly from the original rule;  soon thereafter NRDC
petitioned for review of the interim rule (No. 77-1448 (D.C. Cir.)).

   2. In 1978 this Court reversed the court of appeals' decision
invalidating the original Table S-3 rule.  Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, supra.  The Court noted that the NRC's authority
to deal with fuel cycle issues by informal rulemaking, rather than
adjudication, was not seriously questioned.  435 U.S. at 535 n.13.  It
then concluded that so long as the NRC had complied with the statutory
minima it should be allowed to fashion its own rules of procedure for
rulemaking, free from additional requirements that a reviewing court
might believe would produce a better record.  Since nothing in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, or NEPA directed the use
of procedures more formal or adjudicatory than those the NRC had
employed, the court of appeals had erred in its invalidation of the
fuel cycle rulemaking on procedural grounds.  435 U.S. at 541-548.
This Court conceded that the court of appeals might, on remand, find
insufficient substantive justification in those proceedings to sustain
the rule.  /5/

   3. Before this Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, the NRC had
reopened hearings to determine whether it should make the interim fuel
cycle rule final.  42 Fed. Reg. 26987 (1977).  On July 27, 1979, on
the basis of an extensive rulemaking record, it did so.  44 Fed. Reg.
45362.  The notice of final rulemaking devoted substantial discussion
to the impacts and uncertainties associated with disposal of
high-level radioactive waste (id. at 45367-45369).  In particular, the
NRC acknowledged uncertainties regarding:  (i) the likelihood of
finding a suitable repository for such waste, and (ii) the probability
that the repository would perform as expected.  Concerning the latter
issue, however, it concluded that "(t)he only apparent natural
mechanisms cited which might reasonably cause major releases involved
very low probability catastrophic events," while more likely
occurrences such as leakage of water into the repository "would take
tens of thousands of years" to transport radioactive materials out of
the repository area (id. at 45369).  The Commission stated that, "(g)
iven the staff's assumption that volatile fission products are totally
released before the repository is sealed, * * * taking post-sealing
releases as zero does not significantly reduce the overall
conservatism of the table" (ibid.).  Regarding the former issue -- the
likelihood of finding a suitable disposal site -- the NRC found the
evidence "tentative but favorable," and the record "as strong * * * as
(it) can be made on the issue" (id. at 45368).

   Consequently the final rule, which now applies to NEPA aspects of
reactor licensing proceedings, does not permit reconsideration by
individual Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards /6/ of the NRC's
conclusion that high-level waste can be disposed of as described in
Table S-3.  10 C.F.R. 51.20(e) & Table S-3, n.1, 51.23(c), 51.26(a).
The Commission rejected a suggestion by NRDC that it allow such
reconsideration, stating:

      On the individual reactor licensing level, where the proceedings
      deal with fuel cycle issues only peripherally, the Commission
      sees no advantage in having licensing boards repeatedly weigh
      for themselves the effect of uncertainties on the selection of
      fuel cycle impacts for use in cost-benefit balancing.  This is a
      generic question properly dealt with in this rulemaking as part
      of choosing what impact values should go into the fuel cycle
      rule.  The Commission concludes, having noted that uncertainties
      exist, that for the limited purpose of the fuel cycle rule it is
      reasonable to base impacts on the assumption which the
      Commission believes the probabilities favor, i.e., that
      bedded-salt repository sites can be found which will provide
      effective isolation of radioactive waste from the biosphere.

   44 Fed. Reg. 45369 (1979) (footnote omitted).  On the other hand,
such matters as health, socioeconomic, cumulative, and similar effects
from the environmental releases listed in the table must, according to
the final rule, be litigated in individual cases.  10 C.F.R. 51.20(e)
& Table S-3, n.1, 51.23(c), 51.26(a);  44 Fed. Reg. 45371 (1979).

   4. NRDC (No. 79-2131 (D.C. Cir.)) and the State of New York (No.
79-2110 (D.C. Cir.)) filed petitions for review which were
consolidated with the pending challenges to the original and interim
versions of the rule.  The court held all three versions invalid (Pet.
App. 1a-181a).

   a. Judge Bazelon, joined by Judge Edwards (sitting by designation),
concluded that the final rule and its predecessors violated Section
102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), because they required
licensing boards in individual proceedings to assume that high-level
waste could be disposed of a indicated in Table S-3.  Judge Bazelon
conceded that the NRC had considered and disclosed the uncertainties
attending that judgment in promulgating the fuel cycle rule.  /7/ He
also said that he did "not decide * * * the reasonableness of the
Commission's conclusion that the probabilities favor the zero-release
assumption" (Pet. App. 35a n.96).  He nevertheless found that waste
disposal presented "significant environmental risks" -- which he
defined as "the product of the environmental damage that could occur
and the probability of its occurrence" (id. at 36a & n.100).  Such
risks were themselves environmental "costs" for NEPA purposes (id. at
37a), and Section 102(2)(C) required "that environmental costs be
considered 'at every stage where an overall balancing of environmental
and nonenvironmental factors is appropriate'" (Pet. App. 46a, quoting
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).  Because proceedings before a licensing board
were such a stage, the rule was invalid because it removed waste
disposal costs from the "ledger" (Pet. App. 44a) of costs and benefits
drawn up ;  by licensing boards in individual actions.  /8/

   b. The court also held that the original and interim rules were
invalid because they precluded consideration of the tangible health,
socioeconomic, cumulative, and similar effects caused by the impacts
specified in Table S-3.  /9/ NEPA requires, the court stated, that
such effects be disclosed in an EIS (Pet. App. 53a).  See 40 C.F.R.
1508.7, 1508.8.  But the original and interim rules directed that "the
contribution of the environmental effects of * * * fuel cycle
activities * * * shall be as set forth in the following Table S-3 * *
* .  No further discussion of such environmental effects shall be
required." 39 Fed. Reg. 14191 (1974);  42 Fed. Reg. 13806 (1977).
/10/ Although the court did not find that the language of the rules
unambiguously forbade consideration of health and similar effects, it
believed that the rule had been so interpreted.  The court relied in
particular on the NRC's statement (44 Fed. Reg. 45364 (1979)) that the
rule "at least initially was apparently interpreted as cutting off
further discussion of fuel cycle impacts" (Pet. App. 57a).  /11/

   c. Judge Wilkey dissented (Pet. App. 117a-181a).  He found the
majority's opinion "no more than a giant step sideways from an
analysis rejected unanimously by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee"
(id. at 180a).  Insofar as NEPA required consideration and disclosure
of environmental consequences during the planning stage of agency
actions, he said, its demands were satisfied by the NRC's careful
consideration and explicit disclosure of any uncertainties attending
waste disposal.  The Act did not impose the further procedural
requirement, added by the court, that those uncertainties be
reconsidered in individual licensing proceedings (id. at 158a-163a).
Judge Wilkey also concluded that the court had exceeded the limits on
substantive review of agency decisions (id. at 166).  The choice to
proceed with reactor licensing in light of the uncertainties
recognized by the Commission was "a quintessential policy judgment"
(ibid.; emphasis in original), and by invalidating the rule because of
its disagreement with that choice, the court had intervened in
problems whose solution -- if it is to be different from that advanced
by the NRC -- is to be found along avenues of political redress (id.
at 167a, n.147).

                   REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

   The Court has concluded that NEPA imposes essentially procedural
requirements, and does not permit the judiciary to substitute its
judgment for that of an agency concerning the weight to be given the
environmental consequences of its actions.  The court of appeals'
decision ignores that direction.  It also imposes on the NRC the
court's own view, found nowhere in the Act, of the procedures an
agency should follow in considering the environmental concerns made
relevant by NEPA.  Together with the court's separate ground for
overturning the original and interim versions of the rule, these
conclusions will have serious implications for existing and future
nuclear reactor licenses.

   1. Section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. 4332(2), states that

         all agencies of the Federal Government shall --

                               * * * * *

         (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
      for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
      affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
      statement by the responsible official on --

         (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action * * * .

   It goes on to say that the responsible official shall consult with
other interested federal agencies, and that copies of the statement
and comments on it shall be made available to the public, "and shall
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes"
(ibid.).  This Court has held that Section 102(2)(C) serves two
purposes:  "The first is to inject environmental considerations into
the federal agency's decisionmaking process by requiring the agency to
prepare an EIS.  The second aim is to inform the public that the
agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking
process." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981).

   It is beyond dispute that the NRC fulfilled those two purposes in
this case.  The final Table S-3 rule was promulgated on the basis of a
record which included hundreds of pages of NRC staff analysis, more
than 1100 pages of prepared direct testimony, two rounds of witness
questions prepared by participants and several hundred pages of
responses, more than 1200 pages of transcript of oral hearings,
written rebuttal testimony of participants, concluding statements, a
137-page report by the hearing board which summarized the record and
outlined the significant issues, further written statements from
participants, and oral argument before the Commission.  44 Fed. Reg.
45366-45367 (1979).  Much of that record dealt with the issue of waste
disposal.  The notice of final rulemaking devoted significant
discussion to the uncertainties associated with disposal of high-level
radioactive waste (id. at 45367-45369).  It explicitly addressed both
the likelihood of finding a suitable repository for such waste, and
the probability that the repository would perform as expected.  The
court of appeals recognized that the Commission had "repeatedly
acknowledged the uncertainties involved in its 'judgments'" (Pet. App.
35a n.97), and had engaged in "investigation, analysis, and
deliberation prior to the Rule's promulgation" (id. at 43a).

   The NRC concluded, on the basis of the record and its own
deliberations, that salt deposits (the medium proposed for disposal)
had been found in 24 of the 50 states (44 Fed. Reg. 45368 n.22
(1979)).  Because no specific site had yet been chosen, the evidence
could only be "tentative" (44 Fed. Reg. 45368 (1979));  but what
evidence there was, "coupled with the absence of any strong argument
that a site cannot be found, probably affords as strong a record as
can be made on the issue" of finding a suitable repository (ibid.).
/12/ Concerning the escape of effluents from such a repository, the
NRC noted that the table incorporated the conservative assumption
"that the spent fuel storage canisters and the fuel rod cladding will
be corroded (before a repository is closed) * * * , and (that all)
volatile materials in the fuel will escape to the environment"
(ibid.).  Given that assumption, and the improbability that materials
would escape after sealing (see page 6, supra), the NRC concluded that
the table overall represented a conservative (inflated) statement of
environmental impacts.  It thus directed that the fuel cycle rule
should be the basis for evaluating, in individual licensing
proceedings, "the environmental effects of * * * management of * * *
high level wastes related to uranium fuel cycle activities * * * ." 10
C.F.R. 51.20(e).  It also saw "no advantage in having licensing boards
repeatedly weight for themselves the effect of uncertainties on the
selection of fuel cycle impacts for use in cost-benefit balancing" (44
Fed. Reg. 45369 (1979)).

   Despite those clear conclusions, the court of appeals held that
because the potential harm from undisposed-of spent fuel was so great,
the disposal problem was one which must be included on the ledger of
costs and benefits in each licensing proceeding even if the
probability of harm occurring was low (see Pet. App. 36a-37a, n.100).
The requirement imposed by the court can be understood only if one
assumes that the uncertainty associated with waste disposal should be
decisive in some cases.  The NRC, by contrast, concluded that whatever
uncertainty attended the disposal problem should not be a reason for
withholding a license in any individual case.  See pages 12-13, supra.
 /13/ Ultimately, the disagreement between the court of appeals and
the Commission is a disagreement about the proper weight to assign,
for NEPA purposes, to a risk of environmental harm that the NRC has
determined is not great.

   The court of appeals held that the NRC could not determine in
advance that the disposal issue should not be decisive, because it
might make a difference "if a plant's cost-benefit balance is close"
(Pet. App. 47a).  But that view of the matter rests on an accounting
metaphor wholly inappropriate to the issues determined by licensing
boards.  The court itself (id. at 44a (the cost-benefit analysis may
require "fictional values")) and respondent NRDC (Court of Appeals
Joint Appendix Supplement 1390 (the uncertainties are "(n)
on-quantifiable")) recognized that the values and drawbacks being
considered were not quantifiable.  Thus the "closeness" of any case is
not an objectively determinable fact;  it rests on a comparison of
ultimately incommensurable factors.  In making such a comparison it is
not irrational to determine in advance that one of those factors
should not be given decisive weight in any individual case.

   The last time this case was before this Court, it concluded that
"NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but
its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.  * * * It is to
insure a fully informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily
a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals * * * would have reached
had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency."
Vermont Yankee, supra, 435 U.S. at 558.  Since then this Court has
made the point more explicitly:  "(O)nce an agency has made a decision
subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court
is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental
consequences;  it cannot "'interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be
taken.'" Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227-228 (1980), quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21
(1976).  The choice about whether to proceed in light of an
acknowledged risk is precisely the kind of discretionary decision that
Congress has left with the Commission.  (See Pet. App. 171a-180a
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).

   2. The court of appeals not only exceeded the limitations on
substantive review of agency NEPA determinations, it also directed
that its view of the weight to be given the waster disposal issue
should be implemented by procedures nowhere required in the Act.  This
Court has repeatedly stressed that "the only procedural requirements
imposed by NEPA are those stated in the plain language of the Act."
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, supra, 435 U.S. at 548;
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra, 427 U.S. at 405-406;  cf. Weinberger v.
Catholic Action of Hawaii, supra, 454 U.S. at 144-145 (agency "not
required to prepare a 'hypothetical' EIS nowhere mentioned in NEPA").

   In Vermont Yankee, supra, this Court also rejected the court of
appeals' conclusion that the NRC was "required to 'develop new
procedures to accomplish the innovative task of implementing NEPA
through rulemaking.'" 435 U.S. at 548.  It upheld as sufficient under
both NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, the
process by which the Table S-3 Rule in question here was adopted.  The
rule directs that an applicant's environmental report, and the draft
and final environmental impact statements, shall take Table S-3 as the
basis for evaluating the environmental impact of the fuel cycle.  10
C.F.R. 51.20(e), 51.23(c), 51.26(a).  The rule and the background
materials supporting it, when incorporated into an EIS, provide
precisely the kind of "detailed statement by the responsible official"
concerning environmental impacts that the Act requires.  42 U.S.C.
4332(2)(C).  It is also an example of the sort of timely consideration
of environmental issues contemplated by NEPA;  done generically, in
advance of particular licensing proceedings, it "accompan(ies) the
proposal through the existing agency review process * * * " (ibid.).

   Fearful that this procedure -- though fully consistent with the Act
-- does not provide sufficiently focused consideration of the
uncertainties regarding waste disposal, the court of appeals has
proposed two methods for structuring the thought processes of the
decision-maker.  In order to verify that the risk of environmental
harm from spent fuel is explicitly weighed against the benefits of any
proposed power plant, the court directed that that risk be treated as
an environmental cost, and entered on the "ledger" of costs and
benefits to be drawn up in each case (Pet. App. 44a).  It also
required that the risks of non-disposal be considered by Atomic Safety
and Licensing Boards (id. at 46a).  /14/

   NEPA does not mention performance of the kind of cost/benefit
analysis demanded by the court of appeals.  Its most pointed statement
on the subject is simply that agencies should develop procedures for
giving "unquantified environmental * * * values * * * appropriate
consideration * * * along with economic and technical considerations"
(42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(B)).  That is not to suggest that cost/benefit
analysis is not a procedure useful for implementing NEPA;  it is in
fact the method generally required by NRC in environmental impact
statements.  10 C.F.R. 51.20(b), 51.23(c), 51.26(a).  But as the D.C.
Circuit has recognized in other contexts, it is inappropriate to
demand that an agency cast its NEPA decisions in cost-benefit form
where, as here, there is no scientific basis for quantified
cost-benefit estimates.  See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1979);  Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1133 (5th Cir. 1974).

   It is equally irrational to invalidate the fuel cycle rule because
it fails to permit individual licensing boards to reconsider the NRC's
determination that disposal uncertainties do not warrant denial of
reactor licenses.  Because that conclusion is a policy judgment rather
than a factual finding, it is inevitable that different boards (like
different courts) would assign different weights to the uncertainty,
even in cases that presented otherwise similar costs and benefits.
Moreover, because the Commission itself retains authority to review
licensing board decisions, 10 C.F.R. 2.762, 2.786, affording boards
the opportunity to disagree with its conclusions could well accomplish
nothing more than delay in the issuance of licenses.  /15/

   3. The court of appeals not only held all three versions of the
Table S-3 rule invalid for failure to allow licensing boards to
reconsider the effect of disposal uncertainties;  it also held the
original and interim versions of the rule invalid because -- it
concluded -- they forbade consideration in individual proceedings of
the health, socioeconomic, and cumulative effects of the environmental
impacts listed in the table.  /16/ What the original and interim rules
said was that "the contribution of the environmental effects of * * *
fuel cycle activities * * * shall be as set forth in the following
Table S-3 * * * .  No further discussion of such environmental effects
shall be required." 39 Fed. Reg. 14191 (1974);  42 Fed. Reg. 13806
(1977).  Obviously the rule was intended to preclude further
discussion of the amounts of effluents released annually by a reactor
of a given size;  if it were not, the NRC would have accomplished
little by its attempt to make a generic determination of effluents and
the use of resources.

   As the final rule makes clear, however, there is a difference
between the amounts of effluents caused by reactor construction and
operation, and the tangible consequences that those efflents have on
human health, economy, society, and so on.  10 C.F.R. 51.23(c).  Cf.
40 C.F.R. 150814.  To say, as the original and interim rules did, that
effluent releases shall be "as set forth" in Table S-3 obviously says
nothing about the consequences of such releases, which have not been
"set forth" in any version of the table.  It was only "such
environmental effects" as were "set forth" that individual proceedings
were precluded from discussing further.

   It is true, as the NRC pointed out when it promulgated the final
rule, that the language of the earlier versions "at least initially
was apparently interpreted as cutting off" discussion of the effects
of effluent releases.  44 Fed. Reg. 45364 (1979).  It was for that
reason that the language of the rule was changed in the amended
interim (see note 10, supra) and final versions.  But even the notice
accompanying the original version stated that the table was "to be
used as a basis for evaluating the environmental effects in a
cost-benefit analysis for a reactor," 39 Fed. Reg. 14190 (1974)
(emphasis added), language that suggests the table was not meant to
foreclose discussing the consequences of effluent releases.  That the
NRC staff did not address such matters during the first three years
after promulgation of the original rule is attributable not to any
direction in the rule, but to the fact that the

      repeated observation (in the notice of rulemaking) that fuel
      cycle effects were "insignificant" amounted to a Commission
      judgment implicit in the rule that no discussion of these
      effects was formally required.

   44 Fed. Reg. 45364 (1979).  But when the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Appeal Board suggested the desirability of discussing health
effects for comparing nuclear with coal plants, /17/ the staff sought
and received permission from licensing boards to introduce evidence of
public health consequences.  Cf. In re Public Service Company of
Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),
7 N.R.C. 179, 187 (1978).

   The court of appeals, in invalidating the earlier versions of the
rule, pointed to no case where evidence concerning health or similar
consequences of the releases in Table S-3 was excluded from licensing
proceedings.  Its action amounts to holding those rules invalid on
behalf of hypothetical intervenors in proceedings now closed, because
of an effect the rules were not intended to have.  What this Court
said in Vermont Yankee should apply with equal force here (435 U.S. at
553):  "(W)hile it is true that NEPA places upon an agency the
obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental
impact of a proposed action, it is still incumbent upon intervenors
who wish to participate to structure their participation so that it is
meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the intervenors' position
and contentions.  This is especially true when the intervenors are
requesting the agency to embark upon an exploration of uncharted
territory * * * ."

   4. If not reexamined by this Court, the decision of the court of
appeals could have a substantial impact on electric utilities that
rely on nuclear generating facilities.  We are informed by the NRC
that there are 46 plants with pending applications for construction or
operation licenses.  If the Commission is required to amend the fuel
cycle rule to conform to the court of appeals' decision, and to allow
individual licensing boards to weigh case-by-case the effect of the
disposal issue, those licenses could be subject to significant delays.
 Another 22 plants are under construction, and some of those will seek
operating licenses in the near future.  Moreover, although the court
stated that it reserved decision on the validity of licenses already
issued (Pet. App. 69a), its invalidation of the original, interim, and
final rules would seem inevitably to affect operating plants.  The
District of Columbia Circuit recently held that NEPA imposes on the
NRC a continuing obligation to reassess the environmental impacts of a
licensing decision in light of changed circumstances or newly
available information.  People Against Nuclear Energy v. NRC, 678 F.2d
222, 231-232 (D.C. Cir. 1982), petition for cert. pending, No. 82-358
(filed Aug. 30, 1982).  If the court should determine that the
invalidity of the earlier and current rules triggers that obligation,
proceedings would have to be reopened for many of the 69 operating
plants licensed since NEPA was enacted.

   Those consequences are unwarranted.  As this Court said the last
time it reviewed this case (Vermont Yankee, supra, 435 U.S. at
557-558;  emphasis in original):

      Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or
      it may not.  But Congress has made a choice to at least try
      nuclear energy, establishing a reasonable review process in
      which courts are to play only a limited role.  The fundamental
      policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the
      state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the
      federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency
      action.  Time may prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear
      energy, but it is Congress or the States within their
      appropriate agencies which must eventually make that judgment.

                              CONCLUSION

   The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   CAROL E. DINKINS

      Assistant Attorney General

   LOUIS F. CLAIBORNE

      Deputy Solicitor General

   JOHN H. GARVEY

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   DAVID C. SHILTON

      Attorney

   LEONARD BICKWIT, JR.

      General Counsel

   MARTIN G. MALSCH

      Deputy General Counsel

   E. LEO SLAGGIE

      Acting Solicitor Nuclear Regulatory Commission

   SEPTEMBER 1982

   /*/ The proceedings in the court of appeals encompassed four
consolidated cases:  Nos. 74-1586, 77-1448, 79-2110, and 79-2131 (D.C.
Cir.).  Petitioners in those proceedings were Natural Rescources
Defense Council, Inc. (Nos. 74-1586, 77-1448, and 79-2131),
Consolidated National Intervenors (No. 74-1586), and the State of New
York (No. 79-2110).  Respondents in all four cases were the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the United States.
Intervenors in various of the consolidated cases were:  Baltimore Gas
and Electric Company, Boston Edison Company, Carolina Power & Light
Company, Commonwealth Edison Company, The Connecticut Light and Power
Company, Consumers Power Company, The Detroit Edison Company, Exxon
Nuclear Company, Inc., The Hartford Electric Light Company, Long
Island Lighting Company, New England Electric System, Niagara Mohawk
Power Corporation, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Northeast
Utilities Service Company, Omaha Public Power District, Pacific Gas
and Electric Company, Pacific Legal Foundation, Pennsylvania Power &
Light Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Power Authority of the
State of New York, Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc., Public
Service Electric and Gas Company, Rochester Gas and Electric
Corporation, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Southern California
Edison Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Virginia Electric and
Power Company, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, the State of
Wisconsin, and Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

   /1/ Because the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by
Commonwealth Edison Company, et al., reproduces all of the materials
required by Rule 21(k), we refer to the appendix to that petition,
rather than duplicate the materials found there.  Hereinafter, "Pet.
App." signifies that appendix.

   /2/ The licensing and regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy
Commission were transferred to the NRC by the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.  For the sake of clarity we will
refer to both agencies as "NRC."

   /3/ These activities include uranium mining and milling, the
production of uranium hexafluoride, isotopic enrichment, fuel
fabrication, reprocessing of irradiated fuel, transportation of
radioactive materials, and management of low level wastes and high
level wastes.  10 C.F.R. 51.20(e).

   /4/ This case is No. 74-1586 (D.C. Cir.).  The case was
consolidated at that time with a challenge to the award of an
operating license for a plant to be operated by Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp.

   /5/ In the same opinion the Court also reversed the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
consolidated in this Court with Vermont Yankee.  In Aeschliman the
court of appeals found an EIS fatally defective for failure to explore
energy conservation as an alternative to construction of the proposed
plant.  435 U.S. at 536-537.  This Court held that the NRC, "unlike
the Court of Appeals, (had properly) recognized that the Licensing
Board's decision had to be judged by the information then available to
it." Id. at 553.  At the time the EIS was prepared, the need for and
the means of energy conservation were not matters given much
attention.  Moreover, the intervenors had done little to focus the
NRC's consideration on those issues.  Id. at 550-554.

   /6/ The Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards are the first step in
the licensing process for nuclear plants.  Their decisions are
reviewable by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, and
ultimately by the NRC.  See 10 C.F.R. 2.721, 2.785, 2.786.

   /7/ "In * * * the Statements of Consideration for the interim and
final Rules, the Commission repeatedly acknowledged the uncertainties
involved in its 'judgments'" (Pet. App. 35a n.97).  "(T)he Commission
(engaged in) investigation, analysis, and deliberation prior to the
Rule's promulgation * * * " (id. at 43a).

   /8/ NRDC also argued that the fuel cycle rule was invalid because
it did not permit consideration of other uncertainties in addition to
the disposal problem.  The court found that NRDC had not "indicated
where those uncertainties lie or what values in the Table obscure
them" (Pet. App. 50a).  It nevertheless indicated that the NRC on
remand was expected to extend its assessment of uncertainties to the
entire Table (id. at 52a).

   /9/ Judge Wilkey did not concur in this portion of Judge Bazelon's
opinion.  He also did not address the issue in his dissenting opinion;
 he did state at one point, however, that the original rule "permitted
no further discussion of (environmental) effects in individual
proceedings" (Pet. App. 138a, n.60).

   /10/ In 1978 the interim rule was amended so that it specifically
permitted consideration of such effects.  43 Fed. Reg. 15613,
15616-15617.  As we have mentioned, page 7 above, the final version of
the rule requires that they be considered.

   /11/ Judge Bazelon, joined by Judge Wilkey, rejected New York's
argument that the effluent-release values in Table S-3 assumed the use
of technology that is economically infeasible (Pet. App. 61a-69a).

   /12/ The Commission noted its intent "to conduct a generic
proceeding to reassess the outlook for the availability of safe waste
disposal methods in light of new data and recent developments in the
Federal waste management program" (44 Fed. Reg. 45369 (1979)).  See 44
Fed. Reg. 61372 (1979).  That proceeding is now nearing conclusion.
More than 50 participants have taken part, and a hearing was held
before the NRC Commissioners in January 1982.  We are informed by the
NRC that it intends to reach a decision before June 30, 1983.

   /13/ In a proposed narrative statement to accompany the fuel cycle
rule the NRC states that it "has found * * * that the fuel cycle
impacts addressed by Table S-3 cannot significantly affect the
cost-benefit balance for a light water reactor." 46 Fed. Reg. 15155
(1981).

   /14/ The court stated that NRC might exclude consideration of such
risks if it could determine that they were offset in all cases by
generic benefits (Pet. App. 44a).  It also realized that
implementation of its proposal could "involve instructing
case-specific decision-makers to insert fictional values into their
cost-benefit analyses" (ibid.).

   /15/ In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court held invalid a Commission rule that
said individual licensing proceedings would not reexamine, for NEPA
purposes, the effect a proposal would have on water quality, provided
it conformed to standards set in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act.  In an approach relied on by the court of appeals in this case
(see Pet. App. 46a), the court held that the Commission's rule
violated NEPA's mandate of "a case-by-case balancing judgment * * * ."
449 F.2d at 1123.  The next year Congress amended the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act to overrule the court's decision.  33 U.S.C.
1371(c)(2).

   /16/ The court's invalidation did not extend beyond April of 1978,
when the interim rule was amended to make clear that such effects were
proper subjects for consideration in individual proceedings (Pet. App.
60a).  See 43 Fed. Reg. 15616-15617 (1978).

   /17/ In re Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant
Units), 5 N.R.C. 92, 103 (1977).