This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-94 
entitled 'Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak's Management of Northeast 
Corridor Improvements Demonstrates Need for Applying Best Practices' 
which was released on March 08, 2004.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a 
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, U.S. Senate: 

February 2004: 

INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL: 

Amtrak's Management of Northeast Corridor Improvements Demonstrates 
Need for Applying Best Practices: 

[Hyperlink, http: //www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-94]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-94, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In the 1990s, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) 
undertook the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project to make 
infrastructure improvements that would enable Amtrak to meet a 
statutory goal of providing 3-hour intercity passenger rail service 
between Boston and New York City. Amtrak shared responsibility for 
implementing the project with commuter rail authorities and state 
governments, and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) developed a 
master plan for the project and provided federal funds to Amtrak. GAO 
reviewed (1) the status of the project, (2) Amtraks management of the 
project, (3) FRAs oversight of the project, and (4) best practices for 
managing future large-scale rail infrastructure projects.

What GAO Found: 

Amtrak has not yet met the 3-hour trip-time goal established by the 
1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act although electrified 
service between Boston and New York City was initiated in January 2000 
and Amtrak began limited high-speed rail service in December 2000. 
Currently, this trip is scheduled to take 3 hours 24 minutes. 
Furthermore, 51 of 72 work elements that FRA identified in its 1994 
master plan as necessary to reduce trip times (e.g., electrify tracks 
and acquire high-speed trains), enhance capacity (e.g., construct 
sidings), rebuild or extend the life of physical assets (e.g., replace 
bridges), or make other improvements are incomplete or their status is 
unknown. Fifteen of these work elements are on non-Amtrak owned 
sections of track and are important for achieving and maintaining 3-
hour service as rail traffic increases over time. Through March 2003, 
Amtrak and others had spent about $3.2 billion on the project.

Neither Amtrak nor FRA exercised effective management or oversight of 
the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Amtraks management 
was not comprehensive, and it was focused primarily on the short term. 
Amtrak focused on managing the electrification and acquisition of new 
high-speed trains, and did not sufficiently address major 
infrastructure improvements needed to attain the trip-time goal. In 
addition, Amtrak did not fully integrate the interests of stakeholders 
(commuter rail authorities and state governments) into the project, 
even though work that involved them was critical to achieving 3-hour 
service. FRA served as a conduit for federal appropriations to the 
project but did not have the resources or the authority to oversee 
Amtraks management of the project. 

Best practicesincluding comprehensive planning, risk assessment and 
mitigation, comprehensive financial management, accountability and 
oversight, and incorporation of diverse stakeholders interestsprovide 
a framework for effectively managing future large-scale intercity 
passenger rail infrastructure projects. These best practices have 
proved effective in managing large-scale infrastructure projects and 
could assist in managing future projects like the Northeast High-Speed 
Rail Improvement Project.

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that Amtrak apply best practices for managing large-
scale infrastructure projects to future major intercity passenger rail 
projects and that FRA require these best practices and develop guidance 
for how to do this. GAO also recommends that FRA seek legislative 
authority to oversee such projects in the future. Amtrak did not 
comment directly on GAOs specific recommendations but said it was 
incorporating many of the best practices discussed in the report as 
part of its management restructuring. Amtrak also raised some issues 
concerning GAOs report findings. FRA agreed with our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-94.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact JayEtta Z. Hecker at 
(202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Has Not Achieved Trip-
Time Goal: 

Amtrak Did Not Exercise Effective Management of the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project: 

FRA's Oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 
Was Limited: 

Best Practices Framework Would Support Effective Management of Large-
Scale Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 
Work Elements, by Category and Status as of March 2003: 

Appendix III: Methodology Used to Develop a Framework of Best Practices 
for Managing Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects: 

Definition and Classification of Best Practices: 

Literature Reviewed and Organizations Contacted to Identify Best 
Practices: 

Limitations: 

Appendix IV: Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and Northeast 
High-Speed Rail Improvement Projects: 

Appendix V: Selected Sources of Best Practices for Managing Large-Scale 
Infrastructure Projects: 

GAO Products: 

Non-GAO Products: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the National Railroad Passenger Corporation: 

Tables: 

Table 1: FRA's Estimated Cost of the Project, by Major Category: 

Table 2: Amounts Spent by Amtrak on the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project, by Category of Spending, as of March 2003: 

Table 3: Best Practices, by Framework Category: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Ownership of the Northeast Corridor: 

Figure 2: Status of Work Elements Listed in FRA's 1994 Master Plan, by 
Milestones, as of March 2003: 

Figure 3: Geographic Location of Remaining Work Elements and Major 
Beneficiaries, as of March 2003: 

Figure 4: Growth in Estimated Cost of Route Electrification, May 1992 
to March 2003: 

Figure 5: Best Practices Framework for Managing Large-Scale 
Infrastructure Projects: 

Figure 6: Critical Path Method Graphical Representation of Project 
Schedule: 

Figure 7: NECIP Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1976 to 1998: 

Abbreviations: 

4R Act: Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act: 

Amtrak: National Railroad Passenger Corporation:: 

BART: Bay Area Rapid Transit: 

CDOT: Connecticut Department of Transportation: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

FHWA: Federal Highway Administration: 

FRA: Federal Railroad Administration: 

FTA: Federal Transit Administration: 

MBTA: Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority: 

MTA: Metropolitan Transportation Authority: 

NECIP: Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

PMO: project management oversight: 

Letter February 27, 2004: 

The Honorable John McCain: 
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Intercity passenger rail service is a critical component of the 
transportation system in the densely populated Northeast Corridor, 
which is generally defined as the area between Boston and Washington, 
D.C. The Northeast Corridor is the busiest passenger rail line in the 
country--some 200 million intercity and commuter rail passengers use 
this line, or some portion of it, each year. Although the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) is the primary owner of the 
Northeast Corridor between Washington, D.C., and New York City, track 
ownership between Boston and New York City is divided among Amtrak, 
commuter rail agencies, and state governments. Amtrak acquired its 
portion of the Northeast Corridor in 1976. Recognizing the importance 
of the Northeast Corridor and the need to make critical infrastructure 
improvements to the rail line, Congress established the Northeast 
Corridor Improvement Project in 1976. This project, which consisted of 
infrastructure improvements designed to enable high-speed rail service 
between Boston and Washington, D.C., was one of the largest rail 
infrastructure projects undertaken in recent times and represented the 
single largest federal investment in intercity passenger rail service 
in the last century.

In the 1990s, the focus of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project 
was on infrastructure improvements between Boston and New York City. In 
particular, in 1992 the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act 
directed the Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a 
program of improvements that would permit regularly scheduled, safe, 
and dependable rail passenger service between Boston and New York City 
in 3 hours or less. In 1994, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
issued such a plan. The plan contained three milestones--initiating 
electrified train service between Boston and New York City, initiating 
3-hour train service, and completing infrastructure improvements 
designed to enhance track capacity and extend the useful life of 
existing assets (called "recapitalization")--and identified 72 work 
elements that would be needed to complete the project. FRA estimated 
that the first milestone could be completed by mid-1997, the second by 
1999, and the third by the end of 2009. FRA also estimated that about 
$3.1 billion (1993 dollars)[Footnote 1] would be needed to enable 3-
hour service between Boston and New York City and complete capacity 
enhancement and recapitalization work to maintain this schedule. 
Improvements to achieve the 3-hour service included electrifying the 
route between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston;[Footnote 2] upgrading 
and improving tracks, signals, and other infrastructure; and acquiring 
26 high-speed passenger trains. Amtrak was responsible for managing 
these efforts, which collectively became known as the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project, and shared responsibility for 
implementing the project with several other entities, including 
commuter and freight railroads and state governments, which we refer to 
in this report as "stakeholders.": 

This report responds to your request that we examine Amtrak's 
management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. In 
particular, the report discusses (1) the status of the project, (2) 
Amtrak's management of the project, (3) FRA's oversight of the project, 
and (4) the use of best practices as a framework for managing future 
large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects. Best 
practices in the context of capital projects are defined as those 
"practices that have been successfully implemented by organizations 
recognized for their outstanding capital decision-making 
practices."[Footnote 3]

To determine the status of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project, we reviewed applicable laws related to both it and the 
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and reviewed documents on its 
cost, schedule, and status. To address Amtrak's management of the 
project, we reviewed documents related to the project's organization 
and management and interviewed Amtrak, FRA, and other officials about 
the project's management. To address FRA's oversight of the project, we 
reviewed laws related to FRA's legislative authorities, discussed FRA's 
oversight of the project with FRA officials, and reviewed documents 
related to the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) project 
management oversight program. Finally, to address the use of best 
practices as a framework for managing future large-scale intercity 
passenger rail projects, we conducted a literature search to identify 
best practices related to infrastructure management and discussed 
infrastructure management best practices with Amtrak, FRA, and other 
officials. We then synthesized this information into the framework 
presented. Appendix I discusses our overall scope and methodology, 
appendix II discusses our methodology for identifying best practices 
related to infrastructure project management, and appendix V lists GAO 
and other products associated with project management best 
practices.[Footnote 4]

Results in Brief: 

Amtrak has not yet met the statutory goal of 3-hour rail service 
between Boston and New York City, although it has reduced the scheduled 
trip time from about 4 hours to 3 hours 24 minutes. To achieve this 
reduction, it completed the first milestone in FRA's 1994 master plan-
-initiate electrified train service between Boston and New York City--
in January 2000, and it acquired enough high-speed trains to begin 
limited high-speed rail service in December 2000. However, it initiated 
these activities about 3 years later than planned. In addition, 
according to the latest available data (March 2003), only 5 of the 17 
work elements needed to complete the second milestone of FRA's 1994 
master plan--initiate 3-hour service--are complete. Progress toward 
achieving the third milestone--completing infrastructure improvements 
designed to enhance track capacity and extend the useful life of 
existing assets--has also been slower than planned. In total, as of 
March 2003, Amtrak, commuter rail authorities, and other stakeholders 
had completed 21 of the project's 72 work elements--51 of the work 
elements were incomplete or their status was unknown. According to FRA 
and commuter rail officials, several of the work elements that are 
incomplete or for which their status is unknown (such as realignment of 
curves) are important to achieving the 3-hour goal. As of March 2003, 
Amtrak, commuter railroads, and other stakeholders had spent about $3.2 
billion on the project. How much more work will be done is uncertain. 
Several Amtrak officials said they consider the project complete, even 
though the trip-time goal has not been met and many capacity 
enhancement and recapitalization work elements are incomplete or their 
status is unknown. Work is continuing, or is planned, for some of the 
master plan's work elements, but there does not appear to be an effort 
to complete the project or meet the trip-time goal.

Amtrak could have exercised more effective management of the Northeast 
High-Speed Rail Improvement Project had its management of the project 
been more comprehensive and had it focused greater attention on 
critical infrastructure issues needed to attain the 3-hour trip-time 
goal. Although FRA's 1994 master plan laid out the blueprint for the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, Amtrak did not adopt 
this plan and did not prepare a comprehensive management plan of its 
own. Instead, Amtrak generally focused on managing individual project 
components, particularly the electrification and acquisition of high-
speed trains. Although Amtrak senior management obtained a substantial 
amount of information about these two aspects of the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project, it did not consistently use this 
information effectively to minimize the impact of problems on the 
overall project. Amtrak also relied on annual appropriations to plan 
work rather than on a more comprehensive financial plan that considered 
long-term funding needs. Finally, although Amtrak worked closely with 
stakeholders--commuter railroads and state governments--to coordinate 
some project work, it did not fully integrate their interests into 
project goals. The participation of stakeholders was, and continues to 
be, essential for completing work critical for meeting the 3-hour trip-
time goal.

FRA provided little oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project. Although FRA--the primary federal agency 
supporting the project--was the conduit of millions of federal dollars 
to the project, FRA management adopted the position that it had only 
limited authority to oversee the project. FRA was legally responsible 
for and carried out other activities related to the project, such as 
conducting environmental assessments and developing safety regulations 
to accommodate high-speed rail service. FRA officials said they did not 
take an active role in overseeing the project because (1) the agency 
did not have the resources or the legislative authority to change 
Amtrak's project management, (2) Congress did not specifically 
authorize FRA to oversee the project, and (3) FRA did not have a formal 
mechanism to perform oversight. We agree with FRA's view that it had 
only limited authority to oversee the project. For fiscal year 2003, 
Congress increased FRA's responsibility to provide oversight of and 
accountability for federal funds used for intercity passenger rail 
service, but this responsibility extended only to fiscal year 2003 
funds.

Project management best practices can provide a framework for 
effectively managing future large-scale intercity passenger rail 
projects. Through our analyses of management approaches across a broad 
spectrum of national activities, we have identified key components of a 
best practices framework for project management. These components 
include (1) conducting comprehensive project planning, (2) assessing 
risks and identifying mitigation measures, (3) comprehensively managing 
project finances, (4) establishing accountability for and oversight of 
projects, and (5) incorporating stakeholders' interests in planning and 
implementing projects. Comprehensive planning helps manage and control 
projects' implementation. Assessing risks and identifying mitigation 
measures assist in meeting projects' goals by recognizing and 
responding to problems earlier. Comprehensively managing project 
finances is important for estimating and controlling projects' costs. 
Establishing accountability for and oversight of projects better 
ensures the prudent use of resources, including federal resources. 
Incorporating diverse stakeholders' interests helps facilitate 
projects' successful implementation by ensuring there is a clear 
understanding of roles, responsibilities, and potential concerns.

We make recommendations to Amtrak to adopt elements of the best 
practices framework when planning and implementing future large-scale 
infrastructure projects, like the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project. This includes developing project management and finance plans. 
We also make recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation to 
direct FRA to require managers of federally funded large-scale 
intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects to adopt elements of 
the best practices framework, including preparing project management 
and finance plans and conducting risk assessments, as part of their 
receipt of federal funds for such projects, and that FRA provide 
guidance on how to do this. Finally, we recommend that FRA seek 
legislation authorizing it to establish a program to oversee such 
federally funded large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure 
projects in the future.

We provided a draft of this report to Amtrak and the Department of 
Transportation for their review and comment. The president of Amtrak 
observed that our report raised many of the issues that he has had to 
address since he took office and that on a regular basis he has had to 
deal with many of the consequences of decisions made during the life of 
the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Although Amtrak said 
it was unable to comment because of matters under litigation, it 
believes our findings and conclusions were incomplete because we did 
not consider how the actions of contractors might have influenced 
Amtrak's management of the project. Amtrak also believes we placed too 
great a reliance on FRA's master plan to measure their project 
management. We recognize that contractor actions can influence project 
implementation and management. However, our findings are directed to 
Amtrak's overall management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project, including the preparation and use of comprehensive 
project management plans, rather than the actions of contractors or the 
planning and implementation of specific project components (e.g., high-
speed train acquisition). Although Amtrak agreed that FRA's statutorily 
required master plan constituted a blueprint for the project, we found 
that Amtrak did not use this plan to manage the project or create its 
own comprehensive management plan to oversee the program of 
improvements needed to bring 3-hour passenger rail service between 
Boston and New York City. Amtrak did not directly comment on our 
specific recommendations but instead said it was incorporating many of 
the best practices discussed in our report as part of its management 
restructuring. FRA responded for the Department of Transportation and 
agreed with our recommendations. FRA said that their proposed Passenger 
Rail Investment Reform Act would create an oversight program similar to 
what we are recommending. We continue to believe that the 
recommendations in this report are valid.

Background: 

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide 
intercity passenger rail service because existing railroads found such 
service to be unprofitable. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network, 
primarily over freight railroad tracks, providing service to 46 states 
and the District of Columbia. Amtrak owns about 650 miles of track, 
primarily on the Northeast Corridor between Boston and Washington, D.C. 
In fiscal year 2002, Amtrak served 23.4 million passengers, or about 
64,000 passengers per day. According to Amtrak, about two-thirds of its 
ridership is wholly or partially on the Northeast Corridor.

Amtrak acquired the Northeast Corridor in 1976 from the Consolidated 
Rail Corporation as part of the disposition of the Penn Central 
Transportation Company's assets. At the time, the Penn Central 
Transportation Company and certain other Northeastern railroads were in 
bankruptcy. As required by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 
1973, the purpose of this acquisition was to facilitate improved high-
speed passenger rail service. However, Amtrak is neither the exclusive 
owner nor the exclusive user of the Northeast Corridor. Although Amtrak 
is the owner and operator of the Northeast Corridor between New York 
City and Washington, D.C. (called the "south-end"), other 
organizations, including the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA), the Connecticut Department of Transportation (CDOT), 
and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York (MTA), own 
significant portions of the Northeast Corridor between Boston and New 
York City (called the "north-end"). (See fig. 1.) Both Amtrak and 
commuter rail trains operate on these segments of track: MBTA provides 
commuter rail service between Boston and Providence, Rhode Island; 
Shore Line East provides commuter rail service between New London and 
New Haven, Connecticut; and Metro-North Railroad provides commuter rail 
service between New Haven and New Rochelle, New York. In fiscal year 
2002, Amtrak accounted for 10 percent of the number of intercity and 
commuter rail trains operated on the north-end of the Northeast 
Corridor, and commuter railroads accounted for 90 percent.[Footnote 5] 
Six freight railroads also operate on the Northeast Corridor and, in 
fiscal year 2001, these freight railroads operated 38 trains per day on 
the Northeast Corridor. In contrast, in the same year Amtrak and 
commuter railroads operated approximately 470 trains per day on just 
the north-end of the Northeast Corridor.

Figure 1: Ownership of the Northeast Corridor: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) 
formally established the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project. Among 
other things, the 4R Act authorized Amtrak to make improvements to the 
right-of-way between Boston and Washington, D.C., needed to enable 
high-speed rail service, and it established certain goals for the 
project. In particular, within 5 years of the 4R Act's enactment, the 
project was to achieve regularly scheduled and dependable intercity 
passenger rail service between Boston and New York City in 3 hours 40 
minutes, and between New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2 hours 40 
minutes. The ultimate goal was to achieve service between Boston and 
New York City in 3 hours, and between New York City and Washington, 
D.C., in 2 hours 30 minutes. The act directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to determine the practicability of meeting these latter 
goals and authorized $1.75 billion to accomplish them as well as make 
certain other improvements on routes related to the Northeast Corridor 
(such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and Springfield, Massachusetts). The 
act did not specify a time by which these latter goals were to be met, 
but did require a status report within two years after the 4R Act was 
enacted. Under the act, FRA was the project manager. Amtrak was a 
subcontractor primarily responsible for track and signal work.

The Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-254) called for 
transferring responsibility for the Northeast Corridor Improvement 
Project from FRA to Amtrak by October 1985.[Footnote 6] FRA officials 
told us that at the time of this transfer, they generally considered 
the project to be complete in that additional funding for remaining 
major work elements was not envisioned. Although the project had 
achieved significant improvements to the entire Northeast Corridor, its 
principal focus had been on the south-end of the corridor because of 
the significant deterioration of the infrastructure on this segment of 
the line. An Amtrak official told us that the emphasis had been largely 
on addressing infrastructure maintenance and repair issues, not on 
enhancing the Northeast Corridor to accommodate high-speed rail 
service. Consequently, although the project met the 2-hour-40-minute 
trip-time goal on the south-end of the Northeast Corridor between New 
York City and Washington, D.C., it did not meet either the 3-hour-40-
minute or the 3-hour trip-time goals on the north-end of the Northeast 
Corridor between Boston and New York City. FRA attributed the failure 
to meet the trip-time goals for the north-end to a lack of funding, 
which prevented electrifying the line north of New Haven and making 
other improvements to track and structures. During the 1980s, funding 
for the project was reduced several times, and these reductions limited 
the scope of the project and led to the elimination of the north-end 
electrification work.

In 1992, the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act (P.L. 102-533) 
required the Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a 
new project, the goal of which was to provide intercity passenger rail 
service between Boston and New York City in 3 hours or less. The act 
authorized a total of $470 million for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to 
plan this effort and make capital investments. Amtrak established the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project in response to this act. 
In July 1994, FRA issued a master plan for the project that called for 
a series of improvements designed to meet the act's 3-hour trip-time 
goal and permit initiation of 3-hour service by 1999.[Footnote 7] FRA 
estimated a cost of about $3.1 billion (in 1993 dollars)[Footnote 8] 
for the project, of which about $1.9 billion (1993 dollars) would be 
required to achieve 3-hour rail service. The project was to be complete 
by the end of 2009. (See app. III for more information on the history 
of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project.): 

Since its inception in 1970, Amtrak has struggled to earn revenues and 
operate efficiently. These struggles have continued in recent years, 
leading to proposals for restructuring the provision of intercity 
passenger rail service. These proposals range from keeping Amtrak 
intact and providing increased funding to improve its equipment and 
infrastructure, to breaking Amtrak up and introducing competing rail 
service. The creation of a separate infrastructure company has also 
been proposed as a means to maintain and rehabilitate the Northeast 
Corridor and other infrastructure for providing intercity passenger 
rail service. Finally, a proposal has been made to delegate much of the 
responsibility for intercity passenger rail service to states and have 
states (acting through interstate compacts) provide a larger share of 
the funding and make decisions about intercity passenger rail service. 
As of September 2003, these proposals were pending before Congress. One 
or more of these proposals may influence how large-scale intercity 
passenger rail infrastructure projects are managed in the future.

The federal government is also likely to be involved in future large-
scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects as high-speed 
rail corridors are developed around the country. As of January 2002, 
there were 10 federally designated high-speed rail corridors 
nationwide. We reported in March 2001 that 34 states were participating 
in the development of high-speed rail corridors and that those states 
had invested more than $1 billion to improve local rail lines for that 
purpose.[Footnote 9] Federally designated corridors may be eligible for 
federal funds. The total cost to develop high-speed rail corridors is 
unknown. However, in April 2003, we reported that preliminary estimates 
of the cost to develop these corridors could be between $50 billion and 
$70 billion over the next 20 years.[Footnote 10]

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Has Not Achieved Trip-
Time Goal: 

Amtrak has not met the goal of 3-hour rail service between Boston and 
New York City, although it has reduced the scheduled trip time from 
about 4 hours in 1994 to 3 hours 24 minutes in 2003. To do this, it 
completed the first milestone in FRA's 1994 master plan--initiate 
electrified train service between Boston and New York City--in January 
2000, and it acquired enough high-speed trains to begin limited high-
speed rail service in December 2000. However, it initiated these 
activities later than planned, and, according to the latest available 
data (from March 2003), nearly three-quarters of the work elements (12 
of 17 work elements) needed to complete the second milestone--initiate 
3-hour service--are incomplete or their status is unknown.[Footnote 11] 
Progress toward completing the third and final milestone--completing 
infrastructure improvements designed to enhance track capacity and 
extend the life of existing track assets--has also been slower than 
planned. In total, as of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter rail authorities, 
and other stakeholders had completed 21 of the project's 72 work 
elements--51 were either incomplete or their status was unknown. Of 
these 51 work elements, according to FRA and commuter rail officials, 
several (such as realignment of curves) are important to achieving the 
3-hour goal. As of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and other 
stakeholders had spent about $3.2 billion on the project. How much more 
work will be done is uncertain. Several Amtrak officials said that they 
consider the project complete, even though the 3-hour trip-time goal 
has not been met and many work elements are incomplete. Work is 
continuing, or is planned, for some of the master plan's work elements, 
but there does not appear to be an effort to complete the project or 
meet the trip-time goal.

FRA's Master Plan Identified Milestones and Work Elements and Estimated 
Costs for the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project: 

FRA's 1994 master plan for the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project divided the project into three milestones and identified dates 
for their completion. These milestones were as follows: 

* Initiate electrified service. This milestone consisted of 16 work 
elements[Footnote 12] and required the completion of such things as the 
installation of an electrification system between Boston and New Haven-
-the line between New Haven and New York City was already electrified-
-and the realignment of curves on the Boston to New Haven segment of 
track. According to the master plan, the installation of the 
electrification system was expected to take the most time, and its 
completion would control the achievement of the first milestone. FRA 
estimated this milestone could be completed by mid-1997.

* Initiate 3-hour train service. This milestone consisted of 17 work 
elements and required the completion of such things as the partial 
delivery of high-speed trains (at least eight trains were expected to 
be delivered to meet this milestone) and the realignment of curves 
between New Haven and New Rochelle. FRA anticipated the initiation of 
limited 3-hour service between Boston and New York City in 1999, 
followed by full 3-hour service using all 26 high-speed trains in 2001.

* Complete capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements 
necessary to maintain 3-hour service. This milestone consisted of 43 
work elements and included the completion of several capacity 
enhancement and recapitalization projects, such as construction of 
passing sidings and the replacement of movable bridges--that is, 
bridges that can be lifted or pivoted to accommodate maritime traffic. 
This milestone was to be completed by the end of 2009 to accommodate 
projected intercity, commuter, and freight traffic levels in 2010.

To accomplish the project's three milestones, FRA's 1994 master plan 
also laid out the work elements in four categories. (See app. II for a 
list of all the work elements.) The categories were: 

* trip time reduction--20 work elements were designed to reduce trip 
times through such efforts as electrifying the line from Boston to New 
Haven and acquiring high-speed trains;

* capacity enhancement--18 work elements were designed to enhance 
capacity by, for example, reconfiguring interlockings to accommodate 
traffic growth;

* recapitalization--15 work elements were designed to rebuild or extend 
the useful life of the infrastructure by, for example, replacing 
bridges;[Footnote 13] and: 

* other--19 work elements, labeled as "other," including fiber optic 
communications lines and pedestrian bridges, were designed to provide 
more general benefits to rail passengers and others.

Under the master plan, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and state 
departments of transportation shared responsibility for implementing 
the work elements. According to FRA's analysis, some of these elements 
exclusively or primarily benefited Amtrak's intercity passenger rail 
service, while other elements primarily benefited commuter and freight 
rail service.

The 1994 master plan recognized that completing the work elements would 
be expensive. FRA estimated that the work elements designed to reduce 
trip times, enhance capacity, and perform recapitalization work would 
cost about $3.1 billion (in 1993 dollars). This worked out to about 
$1.3 billion for trip-time reductions, about $600 million for capacity 
enhancements, and about $1.2 billion for recapitalization. FRA did not 
include a cost estimate for the 19 other work elements.[Footnote 14] 
(See table 1.) Of the $3.1 billion cost estimate, FRA estimated that 
about $1.9 billion (about 60 percent) would be required to enable 3-
hour service between Boston and New York City. The 1994 master plan 
also did not assign funding responsibility to particular organizations, 
but it did indicate that about 40 percent of the project's estimated 
costs would cover work that would provide significant benefit to 
commuter railroads. The plan recognized that funding would come from a 
variety of sources, including direct appropriations to FRA, 
appropriations authorized under the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991, and state and local governments. The plan 
further recognized that allocating funding responsibility and 
identifying funding sources would involve negotiations between relevant 
parties.

Table 1: FRA's Estimated Cost of the Project, by Major Category: 

Dollars in millions.

Trip-time reduction; 
Number of work elements: 20; 
Estimated cost[A]: $1,255.1.

Capacity enhancement; 
Number of work elements: 18; 
Estimated cost[A]: 606.4.

Recapitalization; 
Number of work elements: 15; 
Estimated cost[A]: 1,230.4.

Other; 
Number of work elements: 19; 
Estimated cost[A]: [B].

Total; 
Number of work elements: 72; 
Estimated cost[A]: $3,091.9.

Source: GAO analysis of FRA data.

[A] In 1993 dollars.

[B] Not available.

[End of table]

Amtrak generally agreed with FRA's 1994 master plan in their written 
comments provided to FRA. However, in commenting on the plan, Amtrak 
did not agree with certain cost estimates or with all of the plan's 
work elements that FRA identified as essential to achieve the 3-hour 
trip-time goal. For example, Amtrak did not agree that FRA should have 
included some capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements 
(such as the installation of concrete ties in commuter rail territory) 
in its estimate of the cost to complete the project. However, Amtrak 
recognized that both the capacity enhancement and recapitalization work 
elements were ultimately essential to reliably and cost effectively 
support projected increases in rail service over the following 20 
years. Furthermore, Amtrak said that to achieve a reliable 3-hour 
schedule it was not depending on improvements to the non-Amtrak-owned 
sections of track (such as those owned by commuter rail authorities) 
that FRA had identified as essential to achieve the 3-hour trip-time 
goal. Finally, Amtrak stated its expectation that improvements such as 
capacity enhancements would be funded by the state or local agency or 
organization primarily benefiting from the improvement, even if that 
agency or organization did not own the track.

In subsequent discussions with Amtrak officials, they said that, while 
Amtrak had commented on FRA's master plan during its development and 
acknowledged its issuance, Amtrak did not adopt the plan or manage its 
high-speed rail projects in accordance with it. According to Amtrak, 
the master plan was never intended by Amtrak, Congress, or FRA to be 
used as a "blueprint" or planning directive for the high-speed work and 
that the document, once released, was virtually obsolete. This 
contradicts information that was provided during our work. At that 
time, both Amtrak and FRA officials agreed that the 1994 master plan 
was a blueprint for the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. 
A former Amtrak project director had told us that FRA's plan could be 
considered a baseline for the overall project.

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Has Not Achieved 3-Hour 
Goal and Is Far from Complete: 

Amtrak believed it could achieve a reliable 3-hour trip time by the 
summer of 1999--about 2 years earlier than FRA had projected in the 
master plan. Despite its belief that it could meet this goal by 1999, 
Amtrak has not yet done so, and progress on the project has been slower 
than FRA initially estimated. (See fig. 2.) As of March 2003, a total 
of 51 of the project's 72 work elements were not complete or their 
status was unknown. Most of these were in the third milestone. Although 
49 of the project's 72 work elements were supposed to have been 
completed before 2003, as of March 2003, less than 40 percent (19 of 
the 49 work elements) had actually been completed by that date. In 
addition, 2 other work elements that were: 

scheduled for completion after 2003 were actually completed by March 
2003.[Footnote 15]

Figure 2: Status of Work Elements Listed in FRA's 1994 Master Plan, by 
Milestones, as of March 2003: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: The total number of completed work elements shown in figure 2 is 
22, rather than 21, because 1 of the work elements that help to achieve 
two milestones (curve realignments) is partially complete (the portion 
needed to initiate electrified service) and partially incomplete (the 
portion needed to initiate 3-hour service).

[End of figure]

According to the master plan, Amtrak was scheduled to complete the 
first milestone--initiate electrified service--by mid-1997, but it did 
not initiate such service between Boston and New York City until 
January 2000, and the electrification was not substantially completed 
until July 2000[Footnote 16]--about 3 years later than expected. The 
electrification was delayed, in part, because Amtrak changed 
contractors in 1995 after the first electrification contractor went out 
of business and the contract was terminated. Amtrak then had to hire a 
new contractor to complete the work and lost about 2 years in work 
time. As of March 2003, 4 of the work elements for this milestone were 
still incomplete, including the line electrification work element, for 
which final acceptance is still pending.[Footnote 17]

Amtrak has yet to attain the second milestone--initiate 3-hour service. 
Amtrak did begin limited Acela Express high-speed train service in 
December 2000, but this service is scheduled to take 3 hours 24 minutes 
from Boston to New York, not 3 hours. The 3-hour goal has not been met, 
in part, because work elements on the 56-mile segment of track between 
New Haven and New Rochelle that is operated by Metro-North Railroad 
have not been completed. Amtrak did not believe work on this line 
segment was necessary to achieve 3-hour service. However, both FRA and 
commuter rail officials told us that work on this track segment is 
essential for achieving the 3-hour goal. Among the work elements that 
have not been completed is the reconfiguration of the New Rochelle 
("Shell") interlocking. Originally this was to include the construction 
of a "flyover" (elevated track), called the Shell Flyover. According to 
Amtrak officials, at-grade improvements are now planned rather than a 
flyover because of high costs. Work at New Rochelle is critical because 
of the severe train congestion in this area--Connecticut Department of 
Transportation officials said more than 200 commuter trains a day go 
through the Shell interlocking. As of March 2003, about three-quarters 
of the work elements (12 of 17 work elements) needed to reach this 
milestone were incomplete or their status was unknown. According to 
Amtrak, work on some elements under this milestone is actively under 
way. For example, the Stamford center island platforms were completed 
in the summer of 2003, and final curve modifications were under design. 
Amtrak said that this, in conjunction with completion of the 
Connecticut Department of Transportation's catenary[Footnote 18] 
program would, among other things, allow it to travel 90 miles per hour 
between New Haven and New Rochelle and generate about 7 minutes of 
trip-time savings.

Finally, progress toward the third milestone--complete capacity 
enhancement and recapitalization work--has been slower than planned, 
and nearly 90 percent of the work elements for this milestone (38 of 43 
work elements) were incomplete or their status was unknown as of March 
2003. Of the 38 work elements that were incomplete or their status was 
unknown, 2 were related to trip-time reduction (a noise and vibration 
study and construction of a transfer facility at Kingston, Rhode 
Island), 12 were categorized as capacity enhancement (including 
construction of passing sidings), 10 were recapitalization (including 
bridge replacements), and 14 were categorized as other (including 
construction of layover facilities and commuter parking).

As of March 2003, 15 of the 51 work elements (about 30 percent) that 
had not been completed or whose status was unknown were on track not 
owned by Amtrak. (See fig. 3.) Of these 15 work elements, Amtrak was 
expected to be the major beneficiary of 9. Some of these work elements, 
including certain curve realignments and track clearances, are critical 
for achieving the 3-hour trip time. For example, Amtrak is not 
currently able to use a key feature of the new high-speed trains--a 
mechanism that allows the trains to "tilt" and, therefore, take curves 
at a higher speed--in part, because track centers are too close on the 
segment of track between New Haven and New Rochelle. The Connecticut 
Department of Transportation and the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority of New York own this track. According to an Amtrak official, 
the tilt mechanism on the high-speed trains is turned off between New 
Haven and New Rochelle. FRA's 1994 master plan identified track 
curvature as the most severe constraint on trip time, and both FRA and 
commuter rail officials told us that curves on the north-end of the 
Northeast Corridor are a severe constraint on the achievement of faster 
trip times.

Figure 3: Geographic Location of Remaining Work Elements and Major 
Beneficiaries, as of March 2003: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: The above does not include 18 work elements that were not 
geographically specific--that is, they applied to all or a portion of 
the track between Boston and New York City (e.g., electrification and 
acquisition of high-speed trains), or involved studies or actions not 
tied to specific geographic locations.

[End of figure]

Through March 2003, a total of about $3.2 billion (2003 dollars) had 
been spent on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project--or 
just less than 90 percent of the $3.6 billion (2002 dollars)[Footnote 
19] project cost estimated in FRA's 1994 master plan. Amtrak has spent 
about $2.6 billion[Footnote 20] and three commuter railroads, two 
freight railroads, and two state governments have spent about $625 
million.[Footnote 21] Most of Amtrak's spending was for the acquisition 
of high-speed trains and related maintenance facilities (about $1.1 
billion),[Footnote 22] electrification of the route (about $717 
million), and track and infrastructure projects ($652 million). (See 
table 2). Of the amounts spent by commuter and freight railroads and 
the state governments, the most--about $141 million--was spent by the 
Connecticut Department of Transportation to replace a bridge. The 
Connecticut Department of Transportation also plans to spend an 
additional $250 million to replace catenary between the New York/
Connecticut state line and New Haven.

Table 2: Amounts Spent by Amtrak on the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project, by Category of Spending, as of March 2003: 

Dollars in milions.

Acquisition of trains, locomotives, and maintenance facilities; 
Amount spent: $1,127.2.

Electrification; 
Amount spent: 716.7.

Track and infrastructure; 
Amount spent: 652.1.

Environmental impact statement mitigation activities; 
Amount spent: 94.7.

Product development; 
Amount spent: 33.8.

Total; 
Amount spent: $2,624.5. 

Source: GAO analysis of Amtrak data.

Note: The spending in this table is shown in the categories Amtrak used 
to track project spending. Although requested, Amtrak was unable to 
reconcile its categories of spending to the work elements and three 
milestones contained in FRA's master plan.

[End of table]

While Amtrak did not track costs of improvements relative to the 
original projections, it is clear that the cost of some work elements 
was higher than expected. For example, the estimated cost of 
electrification increased from about $300 million in 1992 to about $727 
million in 2003. (See fig. 4.) As of March 2003, Amtrak had spent about 
$717 million. According to Amtrak's data, much of the cost increase 
(more than $200 million) was attributable to unexpected and unplanned 
items. Amtrak incurred approximately $120 million in unplanned costs 
because, according to an Amtrak official, the contractor frequently 
revised the geographic location of the electrification work, and each 
revision triggered the need for safety protection work, called "flag 
protection," that was provided by workers standing along the track and 
at highway-railroad grade crossings holding flags. Under collective 
bargaining agreements, Amtrak was required to advertise this work for 7 
to 10 days so that its unionized employees could express their interest 
in doing the work. The extra time required for Amtrak to comply with 
this requirement delayed the electrification work and increased 
Amtrak's costs.

Figure 4: Growth in Estimated Cost of Route Electrification, May 1992 
to March 2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[A] The original contract was terminated in late 1995. Amtrak spent $16 
million on this original contract. In subsequent bars the $16 million 
is included in contract 2 amounts.

[B] Contract 2 was scheduled for completion in October 1999.

[End of figure]

Similarly, the cost of acquiring trains, locomotives, and maintenance 
facilities also increased, from an original estimate of about $186 
million for 26 trains in FRA's 1994 master plan to about $800 million 
for 20 trains plus three maintenance facilities in 1996.[Footnote 23] 
Through March 2003, Amtrak had spent about $1.1 billion for these 
items. Amtrak attributed much of the cost increase to, among other 
things, the addition of the three maintenance facilities, various 
modifications to the trains, and a higher-than-expected bid to 
manufacture the trains. Amtrak also said that an additional $100 
million was incurred to add a second power car to each train (an extra 
20 power cars) to comply with new FRA passenger car safety standards. 
An Amtrak official said it was difficult to estimate the cost of 
trains, since the acquisition went from a relatively simple procurement 
of train equipment to a complex high-speed rail program that included 
the acquisition of equipment capable of traveling at speeds of up to 
150 miles per hour. The acquisition cost of both the trains and 
maintenance facilities was financed, and debt service on this financing 
began in fiscal year 2002 and will continue through fiscal year 2023 
for the high-speed trains and through fiscal year 2042 for the 
maintenance facilities unless an early buyout offer is exercised. 
Amtrak expects the interest on this financing to total about $426 
million.[Footnote 24]

Amtrak stated that FRA's involvement with the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project also affected project cost and schedule. (See below 
for a discussion of FRA's role in this project.) For example, according 
to Amtrak, the environmental impact statement that FRA developed for 
the project was over a year late and imposed significant and costly 
mitigation measures. Also, FRA's new track standards required 
development of the technologically challenging and expensive Advanced 
Civil Speed Enforcement System--a system for automatic train control on 
the entire Northeast Corridor. Because all trains that operate on the 
Northeast Corridor would be required to use this system, Amtrak agreed 
to fund the equipment upgrades for various railroads that use the 
Northeast Corridor, including commuter railroads.[Footnote 25] 
Finally, FRA's passenger car safety standards required the 20 
additional power cars discussed above as well as an expensive crash-
energy absorption system on the trains. FRA officials told us that 
Amtrak was intimately involved with development of the track and 
passenger car standards and that, in some instances, the standards were 
specifically developed to accommodate the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project. In general, FRA officials said there was no extra 
cost for Amtrak to comply with FRA's new safety regulations. However, 
they acknowledged the additional cost to develop the Advanced Civil 
Speed Enforcement System but said Amtrak could not operate high-speed 
trains without this system.

Some Consider Project Complete Even Though Work Is Not Finished: 

Several Amtrak officials told us that they consider the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project complete, even though Amtrak has not 
achieved the 3-hour goal and the work is not finished. As of March 
2003, 41 of the work elements identified in FRA's master plan were 
incomplete, and on an additional 10 work elements there was no 
information or their status was unknown. It is not clear how many work 
elements will be completed or whether Amtrak is committed to achieving 
the 3-hour goal. A former director of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project told us that Amtrak hopes to reduce the trip time 
to 3 hours 10 minutes in the future if funding is available. But the 
former director doubted there was much of a market for 3-hour service 
between Boston and New York City.[Footnote 26] In the past, however, 
Amtrak had stated that it was relying on meeting the 3-hour goal to 
help it attract the ridership and revenue needed to attain operational 
self-sufficiency, as called for in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability 
Act of 1997.[Footnote 27] As recently as 2000, the Chairman of Amtrak's 
Board of Directors testified before Congress that Amtrak would achieve 
the 3-hour trip-time goal between Boston and New York City.

Although several Amtrak officials told us they consider the project 
complete, work is continuing, or is planned, for some of the master 
plan's work elements. For example, Amtrak's most recent 5-year capital 
plan (covering fiscal years 2004 through 2008), issued in April 2003, 
includes 12 of the 51 work elements in FRA's master plan that, as of 
March 2003, were incomplete or whose status was unknown. These work 
elements consist primarily of replacing bridges, reconfiguring 
interlockings, and completing fire and life safety improvements in and 
around Pennsylvania Station in New York. Amtrak's 5-year capital plan 
also contains $52 million through fiscal year 2008 for the at-grade 
improvements at the Shell interlocking. In total, Amtrak's capital plan 
budgets about $380 million for the work elements associated with the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. However, there does not 
appear to be an effort to complete the project or meet the trip-time 
goal, and Amtrak did not characterize its recent capital plan as 
encompassing the completion of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project. Rather, the plan was characterized as aiming to 
stabilize the railroad by returning its plant and equipment to a state 
of good repair, controlling operating deficits, and restoring 
liquidity.

Commuter rail agencies and state governments along the north-end of the 
Northeast Corridor also plan to continue some of the work associated 
with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Commuter rail 
agencies and state governments we contacted said they planned to 
continue work on at least 20 of the work elements contained in the 1994 
master plan. For example, one commuter rail authority (Metro-North 
Railroad) plans to finish improving stations, rehabilitating movable 
bridges, and upgrading power, communications and signal systems. Two 
state governments (Connecticut and Rhode Island) said they plan to 
replace bridges and catenary on the New Haven rail line, as well as 
construct passing sidings and improve clearances for freight railroad 
operations. Commuter rail and state officials estimated that these work 
elements could cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Officials with the 
Connecticut Department of Transportation, for example, said their state 
plans to spend more than $800 million between 2003 and 2010 on at least 
9 work elements associated with the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project, including bridge and catenary replacements and 
station relocations.

Even though Amtrak has not reached the project's 3-hour goal and many 
important work elements remain to be completed, Amtrak officials 
maintain that they achieved noteworthy successes, particularly in light 
of the challenges they faced. Noting that Amtrak does not own major 
portions of the Northeast Corridor, that freight and commuter rail 
operations continued throughout the life of the project, and that 
funding was provided annually in varying amounts, Amtrak officials 
consider the electrification of the Northeast Corridor a significant 
success. According to one Amtrak official, the entire project 
represents a success, because the Northeast Corridor now enables 
freight trains to operate at 30 miles per hour while intercity 
passenger trains travel up to 150 miles per hour. The official said 
that some states outside the Northeast Corridor that are considering 
upgrading their rail lines to accommodate both freight traffic and 
high-speed passenger trains have sought assistance from Amtrak.

Amtrak Did Not Exercise Effective Management of the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project: 

Amtrak could have exercised more effective management of the Northeast 
High-Speed Rail Improvement Project had its management of the project 
been more comprehensive and had it focused greater attention on 
critical infrastructure issues needed to attain the 3-hour trip-time 
goal. Although FRA's master plan laid out the blueprint for the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, Amtrak did not adopt 
this plan and did not prepare a comprehensive management plan of its 
own. Instead, Amtrak generally focused on managing individual project 
components, particularly the electrification and acquisition of high-
speed trains. Although Amtrak senior management obtained a substantial 
amount of information about these two aspects of the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project, it did not consistently use this 
information effectively to minimize the impact of problems on the 
overall project. Amtrak also relied on annual appropriations to plan 
work rather than on a more comprehensive financial plan that considered 
long-term funding needs. Finally, although Amtrak worked closely with 
stakeholders--commuter railroads and state governments--to coordinate 
some project work, it did not fully integrate their interests into 
project goals. The participation of stakeholders was, and continues to 
be, essential for completing work critical for meeting the 3-hour trip-
time goal.

Amtrak's Project Management Was Focused on Selected Components, Not 
Attainment of Project Goals: 

Amtrak's management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project contributed to its inability to achieve project goals. Project 
management was not comprehensive but rather was focused on selected 
components, not project goals. As discussed earlier, FRA's 1994 master 
plan laid out the work elements needed to complete the project, 
estimated their costs, and identified those elements that would benefit 
Amtrak or others. However, Amtrak did not adopt this plan or manage to 
it. Instead, Amtrak focused on managing selected components of the 
project--primarily the work associated with electrifying the line 
between Boston and New Haven and acquisition of the high-speed trains. 
This occurred even though there were critical infrastructure 
improvements that were required in order to achieve the 3-hour trip 
time between Boston and New York City. Amtrak did not ignore 
infrastructure improvements, but as the project evolved, and costs 
increased and schedules slipped, the emphasis shifted to completing 
those infrastructure improvements required to begin electrified service 
between Boston and New York City, not those needed to achieve the 3-
hour trip-time goal. As of February 2004, some infrastructure 
improvements (such as reconfiguring the Shell interlocking) that are 
critical to achieving the 3-hour trip time had not been completed.

Amtrak received a substantial amount of information about selected 
components of the project. Amtrak's senior management and the Board of 
Directors received periodic information about the project, including 
monthly progress reports about the project. Amtrak also received 
monthly progress reports from the consortium manufacturing the high-
speed trains. Amtrak used integrated program schedules that were 
updated monthly to visually depict start and end dates for various 
project tasks. Such information allowed Amtrak management to track work 
status and to identify actual or potential problems. For example, an 
October 1996 monthly progress report on the high-speed trains noted 
that progress in this component was "significantly less" than had been 
planned, and by December 1996 the progress report noted that the high-
speed train acquisition program was no longer likely to finish on time, 
even with planned late finish dates.

Amtrak did not use the information it received to effectively manage 
problems that arose. While Amtrak attempted to take action to address 
various problems that developed, those actions did not prevent 
significant delays in completing either the electrification or high-
speed train work. For example, in 1997 Amtrak proposed hiring a second 
contractor to help install electric pole foundations when installation 
rates decreased to an unacceptable level, and, in 1998, Amtrak made 
acceleration payments to help finish the electrification work. Despite 
these efforts, the line between Boston and New Haven was not fully 
energized until July 2000--about a year later than planned.[Footnote 
28] Amtrak attempted to use recovery plans--plans designed to identify 
specific actions to be taken to get a project "back on track"--to 
address problems. But Amtrak did not assemble any program-level 
(projectwide) recovery plan for the project as a whole. A former 
project director said a program-level recovery plan was not used 
because the components of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project were not mutually dependent on each other.

Not assembling comprehensive project management or program-level 
recovery plans made it difficult for Amtrak's senior management and 
Board of Directors to effectively manage the project and assign 
accountability for project results. A comprehensive project management 
plan similar to FRA's 1994 master plan could have allowed senior 
management and the Board of Directors to clearly understand the status 
of the project at any given point and how problems in one project 
component could be affecting other project components. Such a plan 
could also have facilitated understanding how difficulties in one or 
more project components could affect the ultimate success of the entire 
project and achievement of project goals. For example, as noted 
earlier, FRA's 1994 master plan identified the planned improvements to 
Metro-North Railroad's New Rochelle interlocking (the "Shell 
interlocking") as critical for achieving 3-hour service. Metro-North 
officials said that Amtrak did not work collaboratively with them on 
improving the Shell interlocking but instead imposed its own solution 
for improving the interlocking. In the late 1990s, cost increases to 
the proposed flyover led Amtrak to scale back its design to an at-grade 
improvement. Based on the documents we reviewed, it was not clear that 
Amtrak's Board of Directors had an understanding of the effect of not 
completing either the Shell interlocking or other critical 
infrastructure improvements. Moreover, the lack of program-level 
recovery plans made it difficult to identify specific actions being 
taken to correct problems, who was responsible for these actions, when 
they would be completed, and expected outcomes. Such information was 
critical for maintaining accountability for the project and the 
conditions affecting the project's outcomes. Again, project documents 
we reviewed did not indicate that Amtrak's Board of Directors had a 
comprehensive understanding of project recovery efforts and expected 
outcomes.

Financial Management of the Project Was Also Not Comprehensive and Was 
Largely Focused on the Short Term: 

Amtrak's financial management of the project was also not 
comprehensive, and it also focused primarily on the short term. 
Amtrak's plans for financial management were similar to its project 
management plans, in that they addressed only individual work elements. 
In addition, these plans, which Amtrak called "spend plans," were based 
largely on annual appropriations and focused on spending for a single 
fiscal year. Although the spend plans contained many of the elements of 
a financial plan--such as the total cost of each major work element in 
current-year dollars, a cumulative estimate of expected spending on 
each of these elements through the end of the current fiscal year, and 
the cumulative spending on each element to date--they were not 
comprehensive and only allowed Amtrak to identify short-term funding 
shortfalls for individual work components and not longer-term funding 
needs and potential shortfalls for the entire project. The spend plans 
also did not track the three milestones and 72 work elements laid out 
in the FRA master plan or incorporate funding needs and spending by 
non-Amtrak stakeholders, both of which would have allowed a more 
comprehensive financial management of the entire project and 
potentially linked spending to a "useful segment." OMB defines a 
"useful segment" as a component that either (1) provides information 
allowing an organization to plan the capital project, develop the 
design, and assess benefits, costs, and risks before proceeding to full 
acquisition, or (2) results in a useful asset for which the benefits 
exceed the costs even if no further funding is appropriated.

Not having a stable, long-term source of funding for the project 
contributed to the effects of Amtrak's short-term approach to financial 
management. To fund its portion of the project, Amtrak relied on annual 
appropriations, and the amount of appropriations was not certain from 
year to year. Although direct appropriations for the project from 1992 
through 1998 (when direct appropriations ended) averaged just under 
$200 million per year, they ranged from $250 million in 1998 to $115 
million in 1996. According to FRA's master plan, about $265 million per 
year (in 1993 dollars) would be needed from all parties from 1995 
through 2001 to achieve 3-hour service. Both Amtrak and FRA officials 
told us that dependence on annual appropriations hurt the project, and 
one Amtrak official said this type of funding cycle constrained capital 
planning and financing for the project and focused on the short rather 
than long term.

Amtrak Worked With Stakeholders on Numerous Project Work Elements, but 
Did Not Fully Integrate Stakeholders' Interests into the Project: 

Amtrak worked with numerous stakeholders on certain work elements, but 
did not fully integrate their interests into the project. Not fully 
integrating stakeholders' interests--particularly, non-Amtrak track 
owners and users, such as commuter and freight railroads--into the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project hindered Amtrak's 
achievement of the project's goals, particularly along sections of the 
north-end of the Northeast Corridor that Amtrak does not own. In its 
1994 master plan, FRA emphasized that it was critical for Amtrak to 
involve other stakeholders in planning, designing, and financing the 
project to ensure its completion and to achieve the 3-hour trip time 
between Boston and New York City. The 1994 master plan also emphasized 
the importance of completing stakeholder-related work, including 
capacity enhancement, in order to ensure the future reliability of 
high-speed service in light of expected intercity and commuter rail 
traffic growth. According to Amtrak, one premise of the project laid 
out in the FRA master plan was that improvements made to benefit Amtrak 
were not to adversely affect other track users--that is, other track 
users were to be "held harmless" for these improvements. Amtrak 
officials said this premise significantly increased the importance of 
involving stakeholders. To help ensure that federal, state, and local 
concerns would be addressed, Amtrak established a project office in Old 
Saybrook, Connecticut.

Amtrak communicated with other Northeast Corridor track owners and 
users, holding regularly scheduled meetings and entering into work 
agreements with them. Amtrak worked with commuter rail and state 
officials to accommodate work that was required to begin electrified 
service between Boston and New York City. For example, Amtrak worked 
closely with MBTA on several work elements, including refurbishment of 
Canton Viaduct and construction of new platforms at the Route 128 
passenger rail station, to make sure electrified service could begin. 
Some officials we spoke with complimented Amtrak's handling of 
stakeholder involvement.

Yet other commuter rail and state officials believed that Amtrak did 
not fully integrate their interests into the project's goals. For 
example, some track users alleged that after Amtrak obtained their 
agreement to proceed with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project, it managed the project with little regard for their interests. 
In their view, Amtrak did the work required to accommodate high-speed 
trains and reduce trip times, but it did little to focus on capacity 
enhancement or other work needed to accommodate expected growth in 
commuter and freight rail traffic in future years--a key aspect of 
FRA's master plan for achieving and maintaining faster trip times. An 
official with the state of Rhode Island, for example, told us that 
Amtrak's management of corridor improvements "bogged down" its efforts 
to complete their Freight Rail Improvement Project--a program to 
facilitate and grow freight railroad traffic in Rhode Island. Regarding 
the latter, Amtrak observed that this project was significantly behind 
in its development and that it paid to do preliminary design work 
related to the project in order to facilitate placement of catenary 
poles for the electrification work. Officials from Metro-North Railroad 
also told us that Amtrak's agenda has generally been to take care of 
its own needs and spend money on its tracks, and commuter railroads 
could take care of their own needs. In their opinion, better 
cooperation and collaboration would have made the work go faster and 
more smoothly.

Completing the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project--
particularly the goal of 3-hour service between Boston and New York 
City--will continue to require collaboration between Amtrak and other 
stakeholders. Most of the work elements critical for achieving the 
trip-time goal that are not yet completed are on sections of track that 
Amtrak does not own, particularly on the 56-mile section of track owned 
by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York and the 
Connecticut Department of Transportation. According to Metro-North 
officials, hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funds will be 
needed to address infrastructure issues between New Haven and New 
Rochelle to achieve 3-hour service between Boston and New York City. 
They estimated that at least four bridges (costing $130 million to $150 
million each) would require replacement and most of the 60 curves 
between New Haven and New York City would require modification. This 
might not only be prohibitively expensive but also potentially require 
property acquisition, which, because the track is in an urban setting, 
could be difficult due to existing development and involve significant 
condemnation issues. A Metro-North Railroad official estimated that 
gaining 1 minute or so in trip-time savings could cost $200 million or 
more.

FRA's Oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 
Was Limited: 

Although providing millions of federal dollars to the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project, FRA--the primary federal agency 
involved with the project--provided little oversight of the project, 
generally because its management adopted the position that it lacked 
legislative authority to do so. Instead, FRA saw itself only as a 
conduit for funds from the federal government to Amtrak--a role 
entailing far less oversight than the Federal Transit Administration's 
role as the manager of a project management oversight program for the 
recipients of federal grants for major mass transit projects. FRA was 
also legally responsible for preparing environmental assessments for 
the project and developing track and passenger railcar safety 
standards, and it carried out these responsibilities. FRA officials 
said the agency provided little oversight because (1) it did not have 
the resources or the authority to change Amtrak's project management, 
(2) Congress did not grant FRA specific legislative authority to 
conduct such oversight, and (3) FRA did not have a formal mechanism 
(such as a project management oversight process) for providing 
oversight. We agree with FRA's view that it had limited authority to 
oversee the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. For fiscal 
year 2003, Congress increased FRA's responsibility to provide oversight 
of and accountability for federal funds used for intercity passenger 
rail service, but this responsibility extends only to fiscal year 2003 
funds.

FRA Adopted Position That It Had Limited Authority to Oversee the 
Project: 

In general, FRA adopted the position that it lacked specific authority 
to oversee the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. According 
to the agency, its primary responsibility is to enforce federal law as 
it relates to railroad safety. To protect railroad employees and the 
public, FRA carries out this responsibility by developing and 
administering safety statutes, regulations, and programs; conducting 
research on railroad safety and national transportation policy; and 
inspecting railroad track, equipment, signals, and railroad operating 
practices. It also plays a role in enforcing regulations applicable to 
the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. According to FRA 
officials, the agency did not have specific legislative authority to 
oversee the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. 
Consequently, it did not have any particular authority to direct 
Amtrak's management of the project by, for example, requiring Amtrak to 
prepare project management or finance plans.

FRA officials told us they saw themselves as responsible primarily for 
making federal funding available for the project. While FRA, as grantor 
for the government, is responsible for ensuring that grant funds are 
used for their intended purposes, FRA officials said they did not 
believe they were responsible for exercising any specific management 
oversight of continuing work on the Northeast Corridor improvements or 
for ensuring the success of high-speed rail after Amtrak assumed the 
responsibility for managing the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project 
in 1985. In their view, both of these responsibilities lay with Amtrak. 
Accordingly, FRA officials provided little guidance for planning or for 
assessing and mitigating risks to major capital rail projects after 
1985--a position they believed was consistent with congressional 
direction that limited FRA's oversight of grants to Amtrak before 
fiscal year 2003.

Under the 1985 grant agreement that transferred the Northeast Corridor 
Improvement Project to Amtrak, FRA retained responsibility to formally 
accept completed work and to audit the expenditure of funds to ensure 
that monies provided by the federal government were spent for their 
intended purposes. Amtrak was required to periodically provide reports 
concerning work status, budget, and accounting matters. Between 1986 
and 1998, the grant agreement was amended 21 times. Some of these 
amendments added work covered by the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project, such as the electrification work. In 1992, FRA and 
Amtrak amended the agreement to allow FRA to provide support to and 
coordination of the project. According to FRA, this included getting 
the environmental assessment started, preparing the 1994 Master Plan, 
and helping coordinate project activities among Amtrak, commuter 
railroads, and others. However, under the agreement Amtrak retained 
full authority to decide issues pertaining to property it owned and 
operated.

Given these circumstances, we agree with FRA's view that it was not 
authorized to exercise direct oversight of the project. Over time, 
Congress removed responsibility for the management and execution of 
improvements to the Northeast Corridor from FRA and gave it to Amtrak. 
As part of the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980, Congress 
directed the Secretary of Transportation to enter into an agreement 
with Amtrak to reallocate authority and responsibility for track 
improvements connected with the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project 
and to transfer responsibility for the project to Amtrak by October 1, 
1985. This transfer made Amtrak responsible for implementing project 
goals Congress had previously mandated, and thus relieved FRA of its 
responsibilities in this regard. Congress later imposed additional 
duties on the Secretary of Transportation in relation to Northeast 
Corridor improvements. For example, the 1992 Amtrak Authorization and 
Development Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a 
program master plan for Northeast Corridor improvements in consultation 
with Amtrak and commuter and freight railroads. Congress continued to 
reaffirm Amtrak's central role in managing these improvements and high-
speed rail work. Prior to 2003, there was no clear indication that 
Congress intended for FRA to reassume responsibility for conduct of the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Rather, according to 
FRA, Congress intended for the agency to principally act as a conduit 
of project funds appropriated for Amtrak's use. Therefore, we believe 
there is a basis in law for FRA acting primarily as a conduit of 
project funds and not to conduct oversight.

FRA's limited oversight role contrasts with the stronger oversight role 
that Congress assigned to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) in 
1987, when it directed FTA to establish a project management oversight 
program[Footnote 29] to better safeguard the federal investment in 
transit projects funded through the agency's fixed guideway grants 
program (called the "New Starts" program).[Footnote 30] Under the 
project management oversight program, contractors serve as an extension 
of FTA's technical staff to assess the project management and technical 
capacity of New Starts grantees and their capability to successfully 
implement major capital projects. In addition, contractors monitor 
projects to make sure they are on time, within budget, and in 
accordance with their plans and specifications. In 1998, FTA expanded 
its oversight efforts to include an assessment of grantees' financial 
capacity and the financial impact of major projects on existing transit 
systems. These reviews, conducted by independent accounting firms, 
assess a grantee's financial health and are performed before FTA 
commits funds for construction. The program is financed by a set-aside 
of funds available under various FTA programs.[Footnote 31] FRA does 
not have a project management oversight program similar to FTA's.

FRA Focused on Environmental and Safety Activities, Not Oversight: 

While FRA had little clear oversight responsibility for the project, it 
was involved with other activities, such as assessing the environmental 
impact of electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven and 
developing safety regulations for the high-speed rail service planned 
for the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project.[Footnote 32] 
Federal laws and requirements dictated FRA's involvement with these 
activities: 

* Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the 
Council of Environmental Quality's requirements, FRA's Procedures for 
Considering Environmental Impacts requires that either an environmental 
assessment or an environmental impact statement be prepared for all 
major FRA actions that could have a significant effect on the quality 
of the human environment. According to an FRA official, FRA prepared an 
environmental impact statement for the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project's electrification work because the project was 
considered to be a "major action" that could have significant impact on 
the environment.

* FRA, as the federal agency responsible for railroad safety, was also 
required to develop safety standards to facilitate the high-speed rail 
service planned under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project. The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992[Footnote 
33] required FRA to review and revise its track safety standards. As 
part of this review, in July 1997 FRA issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking to amend its track safety standards to include new standards 
for track to be used by high-speed trains. The revised standards, made 
final in 1998, included three additional classes of track that would 
permit passenger rail trains to travel up to 200 miles per 
hour.[Footnote 34] FRA officials said the standards for high-speed rail 
service were developed at Amtrak's request to accommodate train speeds 
of up to 150 miles per hour envisioned under the Northeast High-Speed 
Rail Improvement Project.

* In addition, the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 
required FRA to develop safety standards for passenger equipment, 
including passenger rail cars. Such standards did not previously exist. 
FRA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking establishing safety 
standards for passenger rail cars in 1996, a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in 1997, and a Final Rule in 1999. According to FRA, these 
standards reflected the agency's desire to ensure safety in the context 
of an ever more complex passenger railroad operating environment 
(including higher train speeds). These standards accommodate high-speed 
rail service.

Apart from these activities, FRA's direct involvement with the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project was limited, reflecting a 
decrease, FRA officials said, in the resources that FRA devoted to the 
project after the management of the Northeast Corridor Improvement 
Project was transferred from FRA to Amtrak in 1985. At that time, about 
50 to 60 individuals who had been detailed to FRA to work on the 
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project returned to the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA),[Footnote 35] and FRA closed its project office 
and reduced the number of FRA full-time employees working on the 
project from between 8 and 10 to less than 1. FRA officials said the 
latter individual was primarily responsible for monitoring the 
completion of outstanding work on the Northeast Corridor Improvement 
Project, ensuring compliance with the final environmental record of 
decision, and serving as an ombudsman between FRA and Amtrak. In 
addition, this individual helped coordinate the project with local 
agencies as well as commuter and freight railroads. Although FRA 
tracked federal spending on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project and checked on project progress, agency officials said FRA's 
authority to change how Amtrak managed this project was limited. FRA 
could raise matters of concern at meetings of Amtrak's Board of 
Directors, they said, but the agency was one of seven votes and had no 
unilateral authority to change Amtrak's decisions. Finally, FRA 
officials said, Congress did not specify a desire for them to be 
proactive in overseeing the project. Rather, in the officials' view, 
FRA was to serve largely as a conduit of federal funds to Amtrak and 
little else.

Amtrak's management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project was also subject to limited oversight from the Inspector 
General for Amtrak and the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) 
Inspector Generals. Although Amtrak's Inspector General devoted 8 to 10 
staff and created two groups to review the project's activities, much 
of this work was specific to contract matters rather than program 
management issues. Amtrak's Inspector General told us that ongoing 
claims disputes, criminal investigations, and litigation over the Acela 
Express trains have precluded his office from conducting broader audits 
of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project's program 
management. In addition, he said that because the project is not yet 
considered complete, it would not currently be appropriate to conduct a 
programmatic review of the project. Amtrak's Inspector General also 
told us there are certain lessons learned from the Northeast High-Speed 
Rail Improvement Project that he has recently reinforced with Amtrak's 
Chief Engineer. Similarly, DOT Inspector General officials said they 
had not conducted much oversight of the project either. The Amtrak 
Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 required the DOT Inspector 
General to annually assess the financial requirements of Amtrak. As a 
result, the office produced several reports on this issue. However, 
only one report issued by the DOT Inspector General directly addressed 
the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. This report 
discussed the progress of the electrification work.[Footnote 36]

In Amtrak's fiscal year 2003 appropriations legislation, Congress 
adopted measures to increase the Secretary of Transportation's 
responsibility for providing oversight of and accountability for the 
federal funds used for intercity passenger rail service. Among other 
things, these measures require that Amtrak transmit a business plan to 
the Secretary of Transportation and Congress, supplemented by monthly 
reports describing work completed, changes to the business plan, and 
reasons for the changes. The business plan was to describe the work to 
be funded using federal funds. Furthermore, on or after March 1, 2003, 
Amtrak was only permitted to use fiscal year 2003 and 2004 federal 
capital expense and improvement grant funds for purposes included in 
its business plans.[Footnote 37] Finally, Amtrak was required to agree 
to certain terms and conditions that would, among other things, improve 
its financial controls and accounting transparency and seek operating 
cost reductions. Although these measures acted to impact DOT's role 
with respect to the expenditure of federal funds provided to Amtrak, 
the measures apply only to expenditures financed with fiscal year 2003 
and 2004 funds and are not necessarily directed to the oversight of any 
particular infrastructure project that might be financed with funds 
provided prior to fiscal year 2003. FRA officials also said that the 
appropriations act did not provide any additional resources analogous 
to that given to FTA (such as a takedown from various program funds) to 
conduct oversight.

Best Practices Framework Would Support Effective Management of Large-
Scale Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects: 

Through our work on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 
and our analyses of reports and guidance published by our office, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), FTA, and FHWA,[Footnote 38] we 
have identified key components of a best practices framework for 
effectively managing large infrastructure projects, including future 
intercity passenger rail projects. These best practices offer guidance 
for project managers and decision makers and include the following: 

* Conduct comprehensive planning. Effective planning can include 
developing a preconstruction planning process, using the resulting 
preconstruction plans to implement a project, and evaluating the 
project's success by comparing the actual results with those 
planned.[Footnote 39]

* Assess risks and identify mitigation measures. Early identification 
and assessment of risks to a project allow for prompt intervention.

* Comprehensively manage the project's finances. Tools for financial 
management can include project financial plans that provide for 
accurately estimating and effectively controlling costs.

* Establish accountability and oversight for prudent use of resources. 
Assigning responsibility for a project and tying its performance to pay 
and personnel decisions can help ensure accountability for the 
project's results. Independent assessments of the project's plans and 
implementation can provide oversight to help protect the federal 
investment.

* Incorporate the interests of diverse stakeholders. Coordination and 
communication with stakeholders, including states, communities, and 
others are important in identifying problems, reaching agreement on 
solutions, and avoiding delays.

This framework applies to projects across their preconstruction, 
construction, and postconstruction phases (see fig. 5).

Figure 5: Best Practices Framework for Managing Large-Scale 
Infrastructure Projects: 

[See PDF for image]

[A] Preconstruction refers to the planning, preliminary engineering, 
design, and other work that precedes construction. Construction refers 
to the work involved in building a project. Postconstruction refers to 
evaluation of a project's results.

[B] Not applicable--postconstruction elements of risk assessment and 
financial management may be captured under project lessons learned or 
other categories.

[End of figure]

Conduct Comprehensive Project Planning: 

Comprehensive planning serves as a foundation for effectively managing 
large-scale infrastructure projects, both for agencies or organizations 
that manage multiple capital projects and for individual projects. Such 
planning helps manage and control one or more projects' implementation, 
costs, schedules, scope of work, and achievement of goals. As we 
reported in 1998, a long-term capital plan documents the specific 
projects an organization intends to pursue and the resources it expects 
to use over the long term and establishes priorities for 
implementation.[Footnote 40] Officials from four Class I railroads we 
contacted prepare and develop multiyear capital plans that establish 
organizational priorities and assist in developing current and future 
budgets for the successful completion of capital projects.[Footnote 41] 
Plans for individual projects can take years to complete. For instance, 
preconstruction planning for the Alameda Corridor Project lasted more 
than a decade.[Footnote 42] However, the time spent on planning can 
help organizations and agencies avoid costs and delays later. Officials 
from the Alameda Corridor Project credited that project's 
comprehensive, long-term planning process for helping them complete the 
20-mile corridor within budget and on schedule.

An important tool for comprehensive planning is the project management 
plan, which typically uses performance baselines for goals, costs, 
schedules, major milestones, and risks to manage and control a 
project's implementation. Developing a project management plan focuses 
organizations, including those managing large-scale intercity 
passenger rail projects, on implementation issues early in the life of 
a project. These plans are not intended to be rigid, but rather, 
flexible and dynamic. During implementation, the plans are updated and 
otherwise revised to reflect changes in the project, such as changes in 
its cost, schedule, or scope of work. After a project has been 
implemented, its success can be measured by comparing its actual cost, 
schedule, and other outcomes with those that were planned. The recently 
introduced Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act (S. 1501) would 
similarly require organizations managing and receiving funds for 
intercity passenger rail capital projects to submit a project 
management plan for the Secretary of Transportation's approval.

To help ensure effective uses of federal funds, FTA requires grantees 
agreeing to federal fixed guideway project funds to develop project 
management plans as a condition of receiving federal financial 
assistance. These plans typically include budgets, implementation 
schedules, procedures for controlling documents and keeping records, 
reporting requirements, and cost and schedule controls.[Footnote 43] 
When project management plans are not developed or used, projects can 
encounter problems, such as cost overruns and schedule delays. As we 
reported in March 2000, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) expansion 
project to San Francisco International Airport experienced costs that 
were $300 million more than estimated. According to FTA, this was in 
part due to management not fully committing to the project management 
plan.[Footnote 44] More specifically, managers did not update the plan 
or submit monthly budget and schedule updates. As a result, FTA said, 
cost and schedule trends were difficult to anticipate, and overruns 
were hard to manage effectively.

Assess Risks and Identify Mitigation Measures: 

Risk assessments allow project managers to identify and manage risks 
related to a project's costs, schedules, and other aspects and to 
develop mitigation measures that can increase the number of projects 
meeting established goals. Best practices suggest that managing 
organizations identify the risks to a project and their potential 
impact and then develop mitigation strategies. As we reported in 1998, 
early recognition of problems allows for prompt intervention, which 
increases the likelihood that corrective action will get the project 
back on track before there is significant deviation from its 
goals.[Footnote 45] Assessing and mitigating risks reduces the 
probability of later encountering problems that can cause cost 
increases and schedule delays. Potential risks to projects include cost 
increases, funding reductions, schedule delays, and environmental, 
political, and legal issues.

There are various techniques for performing risk assessments. Some of 
the Class I freight railroads we contacted (1) include a risk 
management group in planning a project to assess its risks, (2) conduct 
rigorous financial analyses, or (3) monitor monthly status reports to 
identify risks. FHWA and FTA suggest using what is called a critical 
path method to boost a project's efficiency and predictability, thereby 
potentially reducing its risks. This method relies on computer 
technology to identify the most efficient sequence of events to 
complete the project over the shortest time. The computer technology 
identifies each task to be completed and calculates a set schedule (see 
fig. 6). Managers can then visualize the impact of potential delays on 
the project's schedules and costs.

Figure 6: Critical Path Method Graphical Representation of Project 
Schedule: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Strategies for mitigating risks include developing recovery plans that 
may be integrated into the project management plan. Efforts to assess 
and mitigate risks can take place from the beginning to the end of a 
project. FHWA officials stated that no matter how much analysis is done 
before construction begins, unknowns can always threaten a project's 
estimated costs, schedules, and goals. When risks start to affect a 
project's progress, developing a recovery plan can help the managing 
organization reevaluate the project and outline changes to its scope, 
cost, schedule or other elements that will mitigate the negative 
effects of the risks. In the context of transit projects, FTA officials 
said recovery plans are not developed very often because FTA's project 
management oversight process acts as a first line of defense to 
identify and address potential problems. However, when recovery plans 
are developed, they are intended to demonstrate a managing 
organization's ability to complete a project, protect federal funding, 
and still achieve the project's goals in the form of transit benefits 
to the community. Recovery plans help get a project "back on track" by 
considering potential changes to its management, engineering, funding 
sources, and other elements.

Comprehensively Manage Project Finances: 

Comprehensive financial management through accurately estimating and 
controlling costs helps to ensure efficient uses of funds. Estimating 
and controlling costs is important because the costs of large-scale 
infrastructure projects can increase significantly. Best practices 
suggest that managing organizations review and refine cost estimates as 
projects move closer to implementation to improve accuracy. A project 
financial plan, which shows a project's estimated funding needs, 
funding sources, and funding responsibilities, is one tool for 
estimating and controlling costs. These plans enable project managers 
to compare actual costs with planned expenditures, identify deviations, 
and take actions to address potential problems.

Because of the large federal investment in major infrastructure 
projects and the need to ensure sufficient funding to complete them, a 
financial plan may be required for a project to receive federal 
financial assistance. For example, since 1998, the Transportation 
Equity Act for the 21st Century has required recipients of federal 
assistance under Title 23, United States Code, to submit annual 
financial plans to DOT for projects estimated to cost $1 billion or 
more.[Footnote 46] FHWA has developed guidance that requests that state 
financial plans include a total cost estimate for each project, annual 
updates and adjustments for inflation, estimates of future cost 
increases, a schedule for completing the project, a description of 
construction financing sources and revenues, a cash flow analysis, and 
a discussion of any other factors affecting the project's cost. 
According to FHWA's guidance, annual updates to these financial plans 
can also integrate changes in cost estimates that may arise as a 
project enters construction and its plans and designs are more 
complete. In July 2003, the DOT Inspector General testified before 
Congress that, in his opinion, financial plans should be prepared for 
projects costing $100 million or more.[Footnote 47] S. 1501 would 
require a detailed financial analysis to accompany grant requests for 
federal funds, plus a business plan describing capital and operating 
work to be funded, cost estimates, and a schedule for completion. 
Monthly supplemental reports to the business plans would also be 
required.

Accounting for the effects of inflation in a financial plan, as FHWA's 
guidance directs, can increase the accuracy of a multiyear project's 
cost estimate. Best practices suggest that cost estimates for multiyear 
projects account for inflation to avoid deviations between actual and 
estimated costs as years pass and the value of currency changes. The 
Boston Central Artery/Tunnel project,[Footnote 48] for example, which 
started in 1985, was originally expected to cost $2.6 billion, but as 
of May 2003, FHWA estimated that it would cost $14.6 billion--about $12 
billion more than originally estimated. According to one FHWA official, 
about half of this cost increase can be attributed to inflation. 
Although inflation has generally decreased since the 1980s, it can 
still have a significant impact on a project's costs, as illustrated by 
the Central Artery/Tunnel project.

A financial plan can also help control a project's costs after 
construction has begun by estimating the amount of funding needed to 
complete the project and the availability of that funding. This 
information helps an organization and its contractors to assess the 
impact of changes that can cause a project's schedules to slip and 
costs to rise. Particularly during the first years of a project's 
development and construction, the funding received can be considerably 
less than the funding requested, especially when the funding is 
incremental--that is, the practice of providing budget authority for 
only a portion of a capital acquisition or part of a usable asset. As 
we have reported, incremental funding without the certainty of future 
funding can result in poor planning, higher costs, delays, and even a 
project's termination.[Footnote 49] We have advocated full funding of 
capital projects--that is, providing budget authority for the full 
costs of a capital acquisition or project at the time decisions are 
made to provide financial resources--as a way to increase the 
recognition of implied commitments embodied in budgetary decisions. 
Because a financial plan can demonstrate the need for funding at 
particular times and the impact of funding delays on the project's 
costs and schedule, it can help an organization and its contractors 
stay within cost estimates and keep their project on schedule as well 
as determine full funding needs.

While incremental funding can create uncertainty and hamper planning, 
funding a project in meaningful phases can help to control costs. As we 
reported in 1998, best practices suggest breaking up a project's 
capital planning and budgeting cycle into phases before, during, and--
in some cases--after construction.[Footnote 50] Funding is provided for 
one of these phases at a time, and future funding is generally tied to 
achieving milestones. Under this approach, the initial design work can 
proceed far enough for higher-quality, more reliable cost estimates to 
be available for decision makers to consider before deciding whether to 
complete the design and construct the project--and before a substantial 
federal investment has been made. OMB and a 2000 DOT task force have 
also recommended establishing separate funding categories for 
preconstruction activities before making a commitment to full 
construction.[Footnote 51] Some large-scale infrastructure projects 
are already funded in phases. For example, projects funded by FTA's 
fixed guideway program ("New Starts") are funded through federal grant 
agreements after preconstruction work has given decision makers a sense 
of a project's costs, benefits, and financial viability.[Footnote 52]

Establish Accountability and Oversight for Prudent Use of Federal 
Resources: 

Best practices suggest that organizations be held accountable for 
adhering to planned budgets and schedules, achieving goals, and other 
project outcomes in order to ensure the prudent use of federal 
resources. By monitoring a project's performance against cost, 
schedule, and technical performance goals, as well as establishing 
incentives to meet those goals, organizations can increase the 
likelihood of the project's successful completion. Organizations can 
also hold project managers and other personnel accountable for the 
project's results. Some of the Class I freight railroads we contacted 
use internal sign-offs to assign responsibility for decisions about a 
project. They also often tie pay and personnel decisions to results. 
Under these decisions, project managers are held directly responsible 
for the project's success or failure. Large-scale infrastructure 
projects can also face external factors during implementation, such as 
reductions in funding from federal, state, or local jurisdictions, that 
might affect accountability decisions. In such circumstances, external 
factors can be recognized and accountability can be maintained by 
developing a system that only holds project managers responsible for 
their particular actions.

Independent oversight of a project is a best practice designed to 
promote the prudent use of federal resources. Independent assessments 
help protect the federal investment in a project by reviewing the 
implementation of its plans, monitoring its construction, and reporting 
problems. One method of providing independent oversight is to use an 
approach similar to FTA's project management oversight (PMO) program. 
As we reported in September 2000, this program has yielded benefits, 
including improved project controls and cost savings.[Footnote 53] For 
example, for one project in the San Francisco area, a PMO contractor's 
recommendation led the grantee to appoint a coordinator and prepare a 
comprehensive project management plan that has improved the 
implementation of three interrelated projects. We also reported that 
the PMO program has been instrumental in providing FTA with a better 
understanding of issues surrounding complex construction projects and a 
better awareness of potential problems that could lead to cost 
increases and schedule delays.[Footnote 54] For example, PMO 
contractors assigned to three projects identified significant cost 
increases and schedule delays early in construction and helped FTA and 
the grantees develop strategies to address these issues. In addition, 
financial assessments, also a part of FTA's PMO program, have helped 
ease FTA's concerns about grantees not having the capacity to complete 
new projects without adversely affecting their existing transit 
systems.

Incorporate the Interests of Diverse Stakeholders: 

Incorporating the interests of diverse stakeholders (including commuter 
and freight railroads and the public) into a project can increase its 
chances of success. This is especially important during the planning 
stages, when considering stakeholders' interests can help project 
managers identify needs and problems and develop action plans to 
address them. Best practices suggest frequent communication and 
involvement through such means as meetings and correspondence. These 
approaches allow stakeholders like local governments and others to 
convey their concerns and problems and work with project managers to 
address them.

Involving stakeholders in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as 
the Alameda Corridor Project, has shown positive results. This project 
developed community-based programs that provided business outreach, job 
training and development, and a conservation corps for community 
beautification. An official with this project said that managers 
frequently involved local jurisdictions along the route, and, in her 
opinion, their involvement helped achieve local buy-in and avoided 
delays through agreements that set the parameters of state and local 
reviews. For some highway and bridge projects, FHWA has included 
stakeholders by using neighborhood liaisons, community advisory 
councils, and public workshops.

Conclusions: 

Although federal investments in the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project have yielded infrastructure improvements and faster 
trip times, Amtrak did not act to comprehensively plan or manage the 
project. The trip-time goal has not been achieved, and work related to 
capacity enhancement and recapitalization is yet to be completed--much 
of which is on track Amtrak does not own and is critical if Amtrak is 
still planning to achieve a 3-hour trip time. Amtrak's management 
approach and poor integration of stakeholder interests into the project 
contributed to the project not meeting its goals. For example, Amtrak 
did not develop project management or finance plans that could have 
been used to better control costs and schedule delays. Amtrak also 
could have done a better job of integrating stakeholder interests into 
the project, which could have facilitated completion of work elements 
on track not owned by Amtrak.

The lack of federal oversight also hindered the project's successful 
implementation. As experience has shown with other federally financed 
infrastructure programs, including large transit projects, increased 
federal oversight has the potential not only to facilitate a project's 
management but also to facilitate early intervention to correct 
problems once they develop. Oversight is critical for protecting 
federal investments in capital projects. The Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project's performance has demonstrated that future large-
scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects, including any 
future projects to recapitalize the Northeast Corridor, will require 
better management and oversight. In our view, these projects would 
benefit from a project management framework that is rooted in best 
practices, including comprehensive planning and financial management, 
risk assessment and mitigation, clear accountability and oversight, and 
incorporation of diverse stakeholders' interests.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure that any future federally funded major intercity passenger 
rail infrastructure projects that might be undertaken by Amtrak are 
implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible, we recommend 
that the President of Amtrak work with Amtrak's Board of Directors to 
do the following: 

1. Adopt policies and procedures for managing infrastructure projects 
that are based on best practices for managing large-scale 
infrastructure projects, and require adherence to such policies and 
procedures before approving or initiating significant changes to such 
projects. These policies and procedures should address the following: 

* Preparation of comprehensive project management plans that are 
updated as needed.

* Preparation of comprehensive project financial plans that are updated 
at least annually.

* Requirements for assessing a project's risks and the methodologies 
for performing such assessments. The assessments should be 
comprehensive and include those risks that can be reasonably foreseen 
before construction begins. When warranted, a risk assessment should be 
prepared before a project is approved and updated as conditions 
indicate, and it should include measures to mitigate the potential 
identified risks. The risk assessment should clearly indicate the 
potential effects of the different types of risks that could be 
encountered, and especially how those risks could affect a project's 
costs and schedules.

* Preparation of program-level recovery plans. The policies and 
procedures should establish the conditions under which these plans 
would be prepared and the elements they would include.

* Mechanisms to ensure accountability for a project's success. Such 
mechanisms should clearly indicate the individuals responsible for 
implementing the project, the expectations for their performance and 
the ways their performance will be measured, and the potential 
consequences for failing to meet expectations.

2. Adopt policies and procedures to help ensure that appropriate 
stakeholders, especially those external to Amtrak, are included in 
project planning, decision making, implementation, and, where 
appropriate, mechanisms to indicate stakeholders' agreement with or 
approval of project management and financial plans.

To better ensure the future oversight of federally financed, large-
scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Transportation seek legislation authorizing it to 
establish a project management oversight-like program to oversee these 
types of projects in the future. The legislation should do the 
following: 

1. Specify the Federal Railroad Administration's responsibilities for 
the oversight of federal expenditures on major intercity passenger rail 
infrastructure projects and permit as necessary, to oversee such 
projects, the establishment and implementation of a project management 
oversight-like program at the Federal Railroad Administration similar 
to that authorized by the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation 
Act of 1987.

2. Require the Federal Railroad Administrator to develop regulations 
for administering the project management oversight-like program and to 
specify the requirements for complying with such a program.

3. Establish a funding mechanism to finance the program established by 
the Federal Railroad Administration. Among the mechanisms available is 
direct appropriation or a statutorily limited set-aside of funds 
appropriated for designated Federal Railroad Administration programs.

To ensure that federally funded major intercity passenger rail 
infrastructure projects are implemented as effectively as possible and 
to better ensure the protection of federal investments in such 
projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, subsequent 
to a clarification of the oversight authority of the Federal Railroad 
Administration, direct the Federal Railroad Administrator to do the 
following: 

1. Require managers of major intercity passenger rail infrastructure 
projects to adopt elements of the best practices framework, including 
the development of project management plans and financial plans and the 
assessment of risks to such things as the projects' costs, schedules, 
and implementation and completion. The risk assessment should identify 
measures, as appropriate, to mitigate the risks.

2. Require managers of major intercity passenger rail infrastructure 
projects to monitor the projects' implementation and, where 
appropriate, to develop project-level recovery plans once problems 
arise that threaten the projects' costs, schedules, or implementation 
or completion. Each plan should identify, at a minimum, the actions to 
be taken, the individuals or organizations responsible for the actions, 
the expected outcomes, and an implementation time frame.

3. Develop guidance, based on best practices, and make it available to 
states, railroads, and others to assist in managing large-scale 
intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects. The guidance could 
cover the preparation of such things as project management and finance 
plans, risk assessments, and recovery plans that address issues that 
threaten projects' costs, schedules, or implementation or completion.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to Amtrak and the Department of 
Transportation for their review and comment. Amtrak provided its 
comments in a letter from its President and Chief Executive Officer 
(see app. VI). In general, the President of Amtrak said that our report 
raised many of the issues that he has had to address since he took 
office and that on a regular basis he has had to deal with many of the 
consequences of decisions made during the life of the project. He 
further said that after he arrived he restructured Amtrak's management 
and budget processes because he believed that Amtrak had lost focus in 
a number of critical areas, including management of capital projects. 
In addition, he observed that as part of the management restructuring, 
project accountability, and budget-based financial reporting changes he 
has made since arriving at Amtrak in May 2002, Amtrak has incorporated 
many of the best practices discussed in our report. Amtrak did not 
comment on our specific recommendations directly but instead said they 
had incorporated many of the best practices as part of their management 
restructuring. FRA responded for the Department of Transportation and 
agreed with our recommendations and said that the Passenger Rail 
Investment Reform Act (S. 1501) incorporates many of our 
recommendations.

Amtrak stated that it was not in a position to provide specific 
comments on our findings or conclusions because of allegations related 
to ongoing litigation associated with the electrification and high-
speed train acquisition activities of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project. Although Amtrak said it was unable to comment on 
our report because of matters under litigation, it believes our 
findings and conclusions are incomplete because we did not consider how 
the actions of contractors might have negatively affected Amtrak's 
project management. For example, Amtrak believes the outcome of the 
Justice Department investigation of the electrification contractor 
would impact an assessment of its project management. In addition, 
Amtrak believes our reliance on FRA's master plan to establish the 
criteria for costs and schedules in measuring their management of the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project was misplaced. We 
recognize that contractor actions can influence the implementation and 
management of capital projects. However, our work focused on Amtrak's 
overall management of the project and the extent that Amtrak prepared 
and used comprehensive project management and financial plans in 
implementing the project, not the actions of contractors or the 
planning and implementation of specific project components (e.g., high-
speed train acquisition). As our report notes, Amtrak did not have 
comprehensive project management or financial plans for the project--
plans that could have been used to better control costs and schedule 
delays. We also disagree that our use of FRA's master plan to evaluate 
Amtrak's management of the project was misplaced. The Amtrak 
Authorization and Development Act of 1992 required this plan. It 
represented a comprehensive program of improvements that would permit 
regularly scheduled, safe, and dependable rail passenger service 
between Boston and New York City in 3 hours. Although Amtrak agreed 
that this plan constituted a blueprint for the project, we found that 
Amtrak did not use this plan to manage the project or create its own 
comprehensive project management plan. We do not believe that Congress 
meant for FRA's plan to be ignored and not used in scoping and managing 
the project, particularly in the absence of an Amtrak prepared plan.

Amtrak commented that it felt our conclusion about not fully 
integrating stakeholder interests was undeserved criticism. Amtrak said 
that it held countless meetings with stakeholders with often competing 
interests and entered into numerous agreements with them that specified 
their respective obligations and rights regarding work that was and was 
not contained in FRA's master plan. While we recognize the work that 
Amtrak did with various stakeholders, including state departments of 
transportation and commuter railroads, we continue to believe that 
Amtrak did not fully integrate stakeholder interests into project 
goals. The FRA master plan highlighted the criticality of stakeholder 
involvement in achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal. Amtrak's not 
achieving that goal is due, in part, to its inability to fully 
incorporate stakeholder interests into the project. Doing so could have 
identified stakeholder responsible work, the priority of such work, and 
required stakeholder financial contributions. Moreover, our report also 
states that some of the incomplete work elements on the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project as of March 2003 that were critical to 
achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal were on stakeholder owned property. 
This included infrastructure improvements such as curve realignments 
and at-grade improvements at the Shell interlocking. Preparation and 
use of a comprehensive project management plan would have not only 
helped identify these projects but also ensured they were prioritized 
so that project goals could be met.

Amtrak also commented that our report failed to adequately account for 
a change in the trip-time goal for the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project and the effects this change might have had on 
Amtrak's management of the project. Amtrak said that as early as 1995 
it was assumed that the 3-hour trip time could only be achieved using a 
non-stop high-speed train from Boston to New York. Regularly scheduled 
service with intermediate stops was planned for 3 hours and 10 minutes. 
Amtrak also questioned whether the cost effectiveness of making the 
infrastructure improvements necessary to achieve a 3-hour trip time 
would currently be financially justified by the net ridership increase 
resulting from such a trip-time reduction. This contradicts information 
we obtained during our review. As the report notes, following enactment 
of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, which prohibited 
Amtrak from using federal funds for operating expenses after 2002, 
Amtrak stated that it was relying on meeting the 3-hour trip-time goal 
to help it attract the ridership and revenue to attain this goal. As 
recently as 2000, the Chairman of Amtrak's Board of Directors testified 
before Congress that Amtrak would achieve the 3-hour trip-time goal 
between Boston and New York City. Such statements indicate that, rather 
than abandoning the 3-hour trip-time goal, Amtrak continued to publicly 
represent until at least 2000 that it would attain this goal--a goal 
established by the 1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act. 
Finally, our work focused on Amtrak's management of the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project in achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal. 
It was beyond the scope of this work to determine whether a 3-hour trip 
time should or should not have been the project goal or if further 
improvements would be financially justified in achieving this goal.

Finally, Amtrak commented that there was a need for dependable funding 
of capital projects. Amtrak's President observed that the Northeast 
High-Speed Rail Improvement Project suffered, especially in the early 
years, from a lack of certain and dependable federal funding and that 
the amount of financial support from year-to-year was inconsistent. In 
his opinion, the success of any future projects will require stable 
federal financial support and, without this, effective project planning 
and financial accountability would be extremely difficult. We agree 
that dependable financial support is important to the success of any 
capital project. However, as our report notes, comprehensive financial 
management is an equally important component in successfully planning 
and implementing capital projects. In particular, preparation and use 
of financial plans are important tools for estimating and controlling 
project costs. Financial plans are also important in demonstrating the 
need for funding at particular times and the impact of funding delays 
on project costs and schedules. We found that Amtrak had no 
comprehensive financial plan for the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project, and that Amtrak focused on the short-term, not 
long-term, funding needs of the project. Preparation and use of a 
comprehensive financial plan would not only have facilitated the 
effective use of the financial resources provided but also have 
potentially demonstrated the need for additional resources where 
warranted.

The Department of Transportation's FRA said that it was in agreement 
with our recommendations. FRA noted that the Passenger Rail Investment 
Reform Act (S. 1501) would incorporate all of our recommendations by 
creating a program based on the Federal Transit Administration model 
for oversight. According to FRA, the structure of the capital program 
in S. 1501 was closely modeled after the Federal Transit 
Administration's Transit New Starts program. It will have the same sort 
of eligibility criteria, require the same planning and analysis by 
applicants (including the development of project management plans with 
regular updates), and will include the same safety, procurement, 
management, and compliance reviews and audits as the Department 
undertakes with recipients of Federal Transit Administration funding. 
In addition, FRA said that S. 1501 proposes the same mechanism to fund 
the oversight of capital projects as used by the Federal Transit 
Administration, specifically authorizing the Secretary of 
Transportation to retain a portion of the grant to fund the 
Department's oversight activities.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days 
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of the 
report to congressional committees with responsibilities for intercity 
passenger rail issues; the President of Amtrak; the Secretary of 
Transportation; the Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration; 
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [Hyperlink, heckerj@gao.gov]. Key 
contributors to this report included Matthew Cail, Elizabeth 
Eisenstadt, Bert Japikse, Richard Jorgenson, Nancy Lueke, Steve Martin, 
and E. Jerry Seigler.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

JayEtta Z. Hecker: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology: 

To address the status of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project, we reviewed documents related to the project's costs and 
schedules. These documents, obtained from Amtrak, the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA), and others, included spending plans, progress 
reports, and correspondence between Amtrak and FRA on the status of the 
project and related issues. With the assistance of Amtrak, commuter 
rail agencies, the Connecticut and Rhode Island Departments of 
Transportation, CSX Transportation Inc., and the Providence and 
Worchester Railroad, we also determined the status of the Northeast 
High-Speed Rail Improvement Project's work elements as of March 2003. 
These work elements appeared in FRA's July 1994 master plan for the 
project. The information we compiled included, for each work element, 
the completion status, the actual or expected completion date, and the 
location of the work to be completed. Additionally, with the assistance 
of Amtrak, commuter rail agencies, the Connecticut and Rhode Island 
Departments of Transportation, and the freight railroads using the 
Northeast Corridor between Boston and New York City, we determined the 
amount of federal, state, and local funds spent on the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project through March 2003. To assess the 
reliability of the financial information obtained from Amtrak, commuter 
railroads, and others, we compared the financial data with original 
cost estimates and, to the extent feasible and appropriate, with 
contract documents. We found no obvious errors of completion or 
accuracy. In addition, we had extensive discussions with Amtrak and 
commuter railroad officials about project finances and our use of the 
financial data. Since the information was primarily used to illustrate 
the magnitude of changes in project and project component costs, we 
believe the data were sufficiently reliable for use in this report.

To address Amtrak's management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project, we reviewed applicable law related to this project 
and to the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, as well as the 
legislative history of certain changes to the high-speed rail project. 
We also reviewed documents showing how the project was organized and 
managed, including project management schedules, information on the 
electrification and train acquisition contracts, and quarterly status 
reports. We also reviewed memorandums, letters, and other information 
about cost and schedule issues, including an Amtrak-acquired assessment 
of cost and schedule issues related to its acquisition of the high-
speed trains. Finally, we discussed the project's management and 
implementation with Amtrak, FRA, commuter rail agencies, and other 
officials. We did not evaluate how, if at all, alternative structures 
for providing intercity passenger rail could affect the potential 
management of future large-scale infrastructure projects.

To address the federal government's oversight of the Northeast High-
Speed Rail Improvement Project, we reviewed FRA's legislative and 
regulatory authority in relation to railroads, and to Amtrak in 
particular. We also reviewed the October 1985 grant agreement between 
FRA and Amtrak (and its subsequent amendments) to identify oversight 
and reporting requirements related to the Northeast Corridor 
Improvement Project and to the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project. Finally, we reviewed information about FTA's project 
management oversight program, including the applicable law establishing 
the program and how it is funded. We also reviewed previous GAO reports 
discussing the program, its implementation, and the benefits 
attributable to it. We discussed with Amtrak, FRA, and Inspector 
General officials from the U.S. Department of Transportation the 
oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project and how 
this oversight was conducted. Our discussions with FRA officials 
covered their role in the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project, their legal authority to oversee the project, how they 
exercised the oversight of the project, how oversight of the project 
changed after Amtrak assumed responsibility for improvements on the 
Northeast Corridor in October 1985, and FRA's current authority and 
ability to oversee major passenger rail infrastructure projects.

To address the use of best practices as a framework for the management 
of large-scale passenger rail infrastructure projects, we conducted a 
literature search to identify best practices related to infrastructure 
management. The literature included previous GAO reports and guidelines 
on best practices related to the acquisition and management of capital 
assets. It also included publications from the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and the 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) addressing best practices and 
infrastructure project management issues. From this literature search, 
we compiled a list of best practices related to the management of 
large-scale infrastructure projects. We also discussed infrastructure 
management best practices with Amtrak, FRA, FHWA, FTA, and commuter 
rail officials. The Amtrak officials included managers and others 
associated with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. 
Finally, we discussed infrastructure management best practices with 
officials from four Class I freight railroads and the Alameda Corridor 
project in Los Angeles. We then synthesized this information into the 
best practices framework presented in this report.

We do not believe that our review of Amtrak's overall project 
management was materially or negatively affected by ongoing 
investigations and litigation. In November 2001, one of the contractors 
manufacturing the Acela Express trains (Bombardier) filed suit against 
Amtrak in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
seeking damages for, among other things, Amtrak's alleged interference 
with the manufacture of the equipment. In November 2002, Amtrak filed a 
countersuit against the manufacturers alleging, among other things, 
breach of contract. As of February 2004, these suits were still 
pending. In addition, Amtrak officials indicated that the Department of 
Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office were conducting investigations 
related to the contract for electrification work done under the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. As of February 2004, 
these investigations were also still pending. Nothing in this report is 
intended to have any impact on the outcome of these suits or 
investigations, and this work was not performed in relation to either 
the suits or the investigations.

Subsequent to completion of our audit work, and in response to Amtrak's 
October 2003 comments made on a draft of our report that, because of 
its concerns about the litigation, it had withheld critical documents 
during our work, Amtrak made available to us additional material 
related to their management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project. This included, among other things, monthly 
progress reports and quality manuals that were used for the 
electrification work and high-speed train acquisition, selected minutes 
from Amtrak Board of Directors meetings, and project schedules that 
were used to track the progress of various project components. We 
reviewed this material at both Amtrak's High-Speed Trainset office in 
Philadelphia and at Amtrak's headquarters in Washington, D.C. We also 
interviewed a former manager of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project who had not previously been available to us. We 
discussed with this individual Amtrak's management of the project. We 
used this additional information to further assess Amtrak's management 
of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, the effectiveness 
of this management, and the extent to which Amtrak involved 
stakeholders in project management.

We conducted our work from November 2002 through February 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 
Work Elements, by Category and Status as of March 2003: 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
(Work elements either contributing directly to lowering trip time or 
permitting higher speeds) 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Realign curves; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Reconfigure Shell interlocking; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Stamford, Conn. station center island platforms; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Reconfigure New Haven, Conn., terminal area; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Reconfigure Old Saybrook, Conn., station; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Track program (installation of concrete ties, track 
resurfacing/relining, ballast cleaning); 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Replace miter rails; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Canton Viaduct clearance improvements; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Install 25kV 60Hz center-fed system; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Provide clearance for electrification; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Noise and vibration mitigation program; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Install signal system compatible with electrification; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Extend centralized electrification and traffic control 
from New Haven to Providence; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Install positive stop/civil speed enforcement system; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Route 128 improvements; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Kingston, R.I., station intermodal transportation 
facility; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Construct Amtrak New Haven service facility; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Procure Amtrak high-speed trains; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Grade crossing elimination program; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Trip-time reduction; 
Work element: Install approach warning signs and bells; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
(Work elements providing additional capacity to preserve the 3-hour 
trip time while accommodating higher intercity, commuter, and freight 
train frequencies) 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Penn Station--extend platform 11 (tracks 20 and 21) and 
5x switch connection; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Reconfigure Harold interlocking; 
Status: Incomplete[A]. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: South station capacity improvements; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Reinstall Devon, Conn., to New Haven fourth track; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Construct Shore Line East passing sidings; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Construct New London, Conn., to Providence, R.I., 
passing sidings; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Construct Providence to Boston passing sidings; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Shore Line East both sides fully accessible stations; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Provide third track for freight service; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Reconfigure existing interlockings; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Install high-speed universal interlockings; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Install gauntlet tracks; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Install new interlockings; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Canton Junction, Mass., to Boston signal modifications; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Construct high level platforms; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Construct Amtrak Boston service facility; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Amtrak medium and heavy overhaul facility; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Capacity enhancement; 
Work element: Modify onboard cab signal equipment; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
(Work elements to reconstruct or extend the useful life of the 
railroad's physical assets or to comply with up- to-date building 
codes) 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Pelham Bay Bridge replacement; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Walk Bridge/Saga Bridge replacement; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Peck Bridge replacement; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Niantic Bridge replacement; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Groton Bridge replacement; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Convert open deck bridges; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Replace deteriorated bridges and culverts; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Replace/upgrade overhead bridges in Rhode Island; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Hellgate Line hanging beam removal; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: New Haven Line substation replacement; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: New Haven Line catenary replacement; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Commuter equipment testing; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Fence selected sensitive areas; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Penn Station fire, life safety improvements; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Recapitalization; 
Work element: Step and touch traction return mitigation; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
(Work elements planned by participating organizations in addition to 
those in the above categories) 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Reconfigure Kingston station; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct direct connection to Middleboro, Mass., 
secondary; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Maintenance and operating costs allocation study; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Freight clearance improvements; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: New Haven Line go/no-go signal improvements; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Install New Haven Line fiber optics system; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Install public address system; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct pedestrian bridges; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Shore Line East South Side station relocations; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Provide improved intercity and commuter parking; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Provide key station Americans with Disabilities Act 
access; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct Amtrak station improvements; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct Davisville, R.I., layover facility; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct Readville, Mass., layover facility; 
Status: Unknown. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct New Haven Line and Shore Line East New Haven 
car storage yard/New Haven Yard modifications; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct Providence layover facility; 
Status: Incomplete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Construct Connecticut Department of Transportation New 
Haven shop; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Extend Shore Line East from Old Saybrook to New London; 
Status: Complete. 

Category: Other work elements; 
Work element: Add Rhode Island Department of Transportation Kingston to 
Providence service; 
Status: Unknown. 

Source: GAO analysis of Amtrak, FRA, and commuter railroad data.

[A] According to Long Island Rail Road officials, this work element has 
been absorbed into another project.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Methodology Used to Develop a Framework of Best Practices 
for Managing Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects: 

This appendix discusses our development of a best practices framework 
for the management of large-scale infrastructure projects, including 
how we defined and classified best practices, what reports and 
organizations we consulted, and what limitations apply to our 
framework.

Definition and Classification of Best Practices: 

We defined best practices as those "practices successfully implemented 
by organizations recognized for their outstanding capital decision-
making practices."[Footnote 55] Best, or leading, practices can provide 
a beneficial model for other organizations to use to improve efficiency 
and performance. In this case, best practices form a framework to boost 
efficiency and performance when managing large-scale infrastructure 
projects.

We identified 28 best practices related to project management and 
grouped these 28 best practices into five umbrella categories to create 
a framework. (See table 2.) These umbrella categories include (1) 
conducting comprehensive project planning, (2) assessing risks and 
identifying mitigation measures, (3) comprehensively managing project 
financing, (4) establishing accountability and oversight, and (5) 
incorporating the diverse interests of stakeholders.

Table 3: Best Practices, by Framework Category: 

Conduct comprehensive project planning.

Prepare written, comprehensive, long-term plan: 

Good data and information systems, in addition to effective information 
control systems, are essential to supporting sound capital planning and 
decision making.

Establish goals; goals should be written, clear, and detailed.

Establish project master schedule; set milestones and implementation 
dates.

Project plan--a flexible and dynamic document that is reviewed and 
updated throughout project.

Project plan is used to manage and control project implementation; plan 
includes performance measurement baselines for scheduling and cost, 
major milestones, target dates, and risks associated with the project.

Conduct risk assessments: 

Conduct risk analysis and manage risks through mitigation measures.

Assess risks regarding schedule, cost, feasibility, and project 
failure.

Determine how risk affects the technical, legal, political, social, and 
financial aspects of the project from beginning to completion.

Conduct comprehensive financial management: 

Cost controls--techniques to restrain actual costs within the limits of 
the project budgets while satisfactorily accomplishing project 
objectives (critical during construction).

Consider full life-cycle costs of projects.

Develop good, firm, reasonable, realistic cost estimates; maintain cost 
baselines.

Incremental funding may result in project cancellation, schedule 
slippage, and rising costs; balance budgetary control and managerial 
flexibility when funding capital projects.

Allow for inflation in multiyear projects; include all costs in year of 
expenditures.

Encourage accountability and oversight: 

Adhere to planned budgets.

Follow planned schedules with minimal revisions.

Measure actual costs and schedules against those in project plan 
baseline; investigate deviations.

Strengthen accountability for achieving goals.

Can break up and fund project in separate phases; funding not 
guaranteed from one phase to the next (separate funding for planning).

Key management group functions as a single point-of-contact, and is 
responsible for project accomplishment.

Establish incentives for accountability--tie performance to pay and 
personnel decisions.

Hold project managers accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance goals.

Monitor project performance against goals (cost and schedule).

Conduct independent assessments and/or reviews.

Require reporting to external organizations.

Incorporate stakeholder interests: 

Involve federal, state, local, interest groups, 3rd party service 
providers, public, and other stakeholders in strategic planning.

Conduct public and community outreach, to include community wishes; 
satisfy objections; account for quality of life issues.

Communicate frequently with stakeholders.

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

Literature Reviewed and Organizations Contacted to Identify Best 
Practices: 

To identify the 28 best practices, we reviewed literature on, and 
interviewed organizations involved in, the management of large-scale 
infrastructure projects. This literature included previous GAO reports 
on or related to best practices; documents from OMB, FTA, and FHWA. We 
primarily relied on our 1998 Executive Guide: Leading Practices in: 

Capital Decision-Making as a base for the framework.[Footnote 56] We 
supplemented this literature with material from FTA's Project and 
Construction Management Guidelines, OMB's Capital Programming Guide, 
and other sources.[Footnote 57]

We also interviewed representatives of the following organizations to 
substantiate our selection of the best practices identified in the 
literature: 

* Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority,

* Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company,

* Connecticut Department of Transportation,

* CSX Corporation,

* Federal Highway Administration,

* Federal Railroad Administration,

* Federal Transit Administration,

* Long Island Rail Road,

* Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,

* Norfolk Southern Corporation,

* Providence and Worchester Railroad,

* Rhode Island Department of Transportation, and: 

* Union Pacific Railroad.

Limitations: 

Our report highlights the best practices we identified through our 
review of federal agency reports and interviews. As such, it is not 
intended to suggest that the identified best practices are the only 
methods for managing large-scale intercity passenger rail 
infrastructure projects or that other management methods are flawed. In 
addition, our best practices framework is not meant to be all-
inclusive. There may be other best practices that would also be 
applicable to the management of large-scale infrastructure projects. 
Finally, difficulties in managing the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project may have arisen even when best practices were used. 
Best practices serve as a useful framework for effectively managing 
large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects, but they 
are not meant to cover every aspect of project management and may not 
address all problems or difficulties that organizations encounter 
during project management.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and Northeast 
High-Speed Rail Improvement Projects: 

Although interest in improving passenger rail service on the Northeast 
Corridor dates to the 1960s, it was the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) that formally established the 
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP)--a program of 
infrastructure improvements designed to enable high-speed passenger 
rail service between Boston and Washington, D.C. Among other things, 
the 4R Act established certain goals for NECIP and authorized Amtrak to 
make necessary improvements in its rights-of-way between Boston and 
Washington, D.C., to enable high-speed rail service. In particular, by 
1981, Amtrak was to have achieved regularly scheduled and dependable 
intercity passenger rail service between Boston and New York City 
(called the "north-end" of the Northeast Corridor) in 3 hours 40 
minutes, and between New York City and Washington, D.C. (called the 
"south-end" of the Northeast Corridor), in 2 hours 40 minutes. The act 
further directed the Secretary of Transportation to determine the 
practicability of establishing regularly scheduled and dependable 
passenger rail service between Boston and New York City in 3 hours, and 
between New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2 hours 30 minutes. The 
4R Act authorized $1.75 billion to accomplish these goals. Congress 
appropriated about $1.5 billion for fiscal years 1976 to 1980.

FRA initially managed NECIP and developed a program of improvements 
that included rehabilitating and upgrading the line between Boston and 
Washington, D.C; electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven, 
Connecticut; and rehabilitating and upgrading the track electrification 
system between New York City and Washington, D.C. It also included 
repairing, rehabilitating, or replacing bridges; eliminating most 
railroad-highway grade crossings; and improving stations. Amtrak was a 
subcontractor to FRA and was primarily responsible for track and signal 
work. The project was to be substantially completed by 1981.

The project began to experience problems early. In a February 1978 
report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 
concluded that because of funding problems and a need to better 
coordinate elements of the project with various users of the Northeast 
Corridor (such as commuter and freight railroads), it was not likely 
that NECIP would be completed by 1981 and that additional investment in 
infrastructure improvements and passenger rail equipment would be 
required to achieve a 3-hour trip between Boston and New York City.
[Footnote 58] In January 1979, DOT further stated not only that the 
project had been inadequately planned, but also that another $750 
million would be needed to complete the project (for a total of $2.5 
billion). Completion would be delayed until at least 1983.[Footnote 59] 
In May 1980, the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 authorized 
an additional $750 million for NECIP. It also required FRA to transfer 
responsibility for the project to Amtrak by October 1, 1985. The 
project's legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned 
about the project's schedule delays and growing costs. Congress was 
also interested in seeing the project completed by the transfer date.

Funding difficulties during the 1980s led to changes in the project. 
(See fig. 7 for NECIP appropriations.) By January 1982, because of 
federal budget constraints, plans for the project had largely 
eliminated the construction of many larger-cost items, such as 
electrifying the line between New Haven and Boston. According to a 
former NECIP project director, these changes also resulted from a 
desire by the federal government to hold the project's cost escalation 
to predetermined levels.

Figure 7: NECIP Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1976 to 1998: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: In fiscal year 1998 direct appropriations for NECIP ended. 
However, after fiscal year 1998 funding for the project was obtained 
from other sources, including the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.

[End of figure]

When FRA transferred NECIP to Amtrak in October 1985, FRA officials 
generally considered the project complete in that additional funding 
for remaining major work elements was not envisioned.[Footnote 60] A 
total of about $1.2 billion (out of the $2.5 billion authorized) had 
been spent on the project at the time of transfer. Although NECIP 
achieved significant improvements to the Northeast Corridor's 
infrastructure and met some goals of the 4R Act, such as reducing the 
travel time between New York City and Washington, D.C., to 2 hours 40 
minutes, it failed to achieve other goals, such as reducing the travel 
time between Boston and New York City to 3 hours 40 minutes.[Footnote 
61] FRA primarily attributed this shortcoming to a lack of funds for 
electrifying the line from New Haven to Boston. Both FRA and Amtrak 
officials told us that NECIP had largely focused work on the south-end 
of the Northeast Corridor, not the north-end, because of significant 
deterioration of the infrastructure on the south-end resulting from 
years of deferred maintenance and neglect. In November 1986, DOT 
reported that when Congress authorized and funded NECIP in 1976, the 
Northeast Corridor had literally begun to disintegrate at both its 
northern and southern ends.[Footnote 62]

Between 1985 and 1990, funding for NECIP decreased sharply. During this 
time, appropriations for the project averaged about $21 million per 
year, compared with about $250 million annually during fiscal years 
1976 through 1984. As the result of efforts by various organizations in 
the mid-and late 1980s, including the Coalition of Northeast 
Governors,[Footnote 63] interest again rose in high-speed passenger 
rail service between New York City and Boston, because of its potential 
to mitigate increasing highway and air congestion, as well as air 
pollution levels. These efforts culminated in the 1992 Amtrak 
Authorization and Development Act. The act required the Secretary of 
Transportation to develop a master plan for a coordinated program of 
improvements that would result in regularly scheduled, safe, and 
dependable passenger rail service between Boston and New York City in 3 
hours or less. A total of $470 million was authorized for fiscal years 
1993 and 1994 to plan this effort and make capital investments. 
Congress actually appropriated $429 million. Amtrak established the 
Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project to implement this act.

In July 1994, FRA issued the master plan for the high-speed rail 
project required by the Amtrak Authorization and Development 
Act.[Footnote 64] The plan established three milestones for the 
project: (1) initiate electrified train service between Boston and New 
York City, (2) initiate 3-hour train service between these cities, and 
(3) complete the infrastructure improvements designed to enhance track 
capacity and extend the useful life of existing assets. FRA identified 
72 work elements to achieve these milestones. These work elements 
related to three main categories--trip-time improvement, capacity 
enhancement, and recapitalization of the infrastructure. The trip-time 
improvements, which included electrifying the line between Boston and 
New Haven and acquiring high-speed trains, were intended to either 
directly lower trip times or increase trains' operating speeds. The 
capacity enhancements, such as reconfiguring "interlockings" (where 
trains can switch from one track to another track), were intended to 
maintain the 3-hour trip time while accommodating the increased train 
traffic planned by Amtrak and other users of the Northeast Corridor. 
The recapitalization improvements, such as replacing various bridges, 
were intended to rebuild or extend the useful life of the Northeast 
Corridor.

FRA's plan estimated that the total cost of the trip time, capacity, 
and recapitalization improvements would be about $3.1 billion (in 
constant 1993 dollars) and that the project would be completed by 
January 1, 2010. Electrification was to be completed by the fall of 
1997, and there was to be full 3-hour service between Boston and New 
York City in 2001. The plan assumed adequate funding from the federal 
government and users of the Northeast Corridor (such as commuter 
railroads), as well as close coordination of the project's work 
elements between Amtrak and various stakeholders, such as states, 
transportation agencies, and commuter railroads. Coordination with 
stakeholders was particularly important, since (1) Amtrak did not own 
various sections of the north-end of the Northeast Corridor, including 
the sections between New Haven, Connecticut, and New Rochelle, New 
York, and between Boston and the Massachusetts/Rhode Island state line, 
and (2) there was significant commuter railroad traffic on the north-
end of the corridor.

Amtrak was the manager of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 
Project and began work using both contractors and its own workforce. It 
relied on contractors primarily to electrify the line and manufacture 
the high-speed trains. Amtrak used its own workforce to perform 
infrastructure work, such as track improvements and signal work. Amtrak 
initiated electrified service in January 2000, even though the 
electrification work was not substantially completed until July 
2000.[Footnote 65] High-speed rail service was initiated in December 
2000. Through March 2003, a total of about $3.2 billion had been spent-
-about $2.6 billion by Amtrak and an additional $625 million by 
commuter rail agencies and state governments.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Selected Sources of Best Practices for Managing Large-Scale 
Infrastructure Projects: 

GAO Products: 

Federal-Aid Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge 
Projects--Issues and Options. 
Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-764T] 
Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003.

Mass Transit: Many Management Successes at WMATA, but Capital Planning 
Could Be Enhanced. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-744] 
Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2001.

Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-99-32] 
Washington, D.C.: December 1998.

Non-GAO Products: 

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. FHWA 
Major Projects-Resource Manual for Oversight Managers. Washington, 
D.C.: January 2002. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/mega/mega.htm]
(viewed 5/19/03).

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. 
FHWA Guidance-Financial Plans. Washington, D.C.: May 2000. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/contracts/fpgatt.htm] 
(viewed 5/19/03).

Office of Management and Budget. Capital Programming Guide Version 1.0, 
Supplement to Circular A-11, Part 3: Planning, Budgeting, and 
Acquisition of Capital Assets. Washington, D.C.: July 1997.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration. EG&G 
Dynatrend Inc., Project and Construction Management Guidelines, 1996 
Update. Wellesley, Mass.: June 1996.

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Comments from the National Railroad Passenger Corporation: 

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION:

60 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, 
Washington, DC 20002 
tel 202 906.3960 
fax 202 906.2850:

AMTRAK: 

David L. Gunn:

President and Chief Executive Officer:

February 12, 2004:

Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker 
Director:

Physical Infrastructure Team:

United States General Accounting Office 
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Hecker:

Amtrak appreciates the opportunity to review GAO's Report on the 
management of Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Projects 
("Northeast Projects"). These Projects represented an important first 
step in this country in the development and implementation of high-
speed corridor service. Clearly, the success of future projects like 
this will depend on appropriate levels of funding, accountable project 
management and oversight, and comprehensive yet flexible project 
planning.

Upon my arrival as President and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak in 
May of 2002,1 immediately restructured Amtrak's management and budget 
processes. It was my belief that the Company had lost focus in a number 
of critical areas including management of Capital projects. We have 
gotten control of our budget and we have streamlined the organization - 
reducing duplication and establishing clear lines of authority and 
accountability. Our recently published Five-Year Strategic Plan is 
based on accountable project management and comprehensive budget-based 
financial controls.

The comments in the Report regarding Amtrak's management of the 
Northeast Projects, which spanned nearly a ten-year period, raise many 
of the same issues that I have had to address during my brief tenure at 
Amtrak. Indeed, on a regular basis, I deal with many of the 
consequences of decisions made during the life of these Projects. It is 
safe to say that I would have handled certain issues differently, but 
it would be unfair of me to comment, with the benefit of hindsight, on 
specific historical decisions. I would make two general observations, 
however.

1. It is clear that the Northeast Projects suffered, especially during 
the early critical years, from a lack of certain and dependable federal 
funding. The amount of financial support from year-to-year was 
inconsistent; in some years, funding was earmarked for specific 
projects, while in other years the funding was in the form of a general 
capital appropriation. Though I doubt that the 
nation will undertake soon another rail development project of the size 
and complexity of the Northeast Projects, the success of any future 
project will require certain and dependable federal financial support. 
Effective project planning and financial accountability is extremely 
difficult to achieve if the amount of and uses for financial support is 
uncertain from year-to-year. With regard to the Master Plan repeatedly 
referenced in your Report, it appears to have been more of a wish list 
than a plan. Amtrak apparently did not use it as a planning tool for 
the Northeast Projects and we have not used it in developing our 
current Strategic Plan applicable to Northeast Corridor infrastructure 
improvements. Our current plan to bring the Northeast Corridor to a 
state of good repair is, in fact, far more detailed than the Master 
Plan.

2. I note the Report recommendations regarding adoption of best 
practices for future projects. These practices strike me as common 
sense approaches to sound project management and financial 
accountability. While Amtrak does not currently have any projects of 
the magnitude of the Northeast Projects, we have incorporated, as 
appropriate, many of these practices as part of the management 
restructuring, project accountability and budget-based financial 
reporting changes that I have implemented since my arrival in May 2002. 
Amtrak's management of the Fire and Life Safety Tunnel Project in New 
York and the Oakland Maintenance Facility in California are examples of 
projects on which some of these changes are being implemented.

We have also enclosed additional general comments to the Report and we 
would appreciate their inclusion in the Report.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

David L. Gunn:

President and ChiefExecutive Officer:

Enclosures:

Comments of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation on the GAO's 
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, U. S. Senate concerning, Amtrak's Management of 
Northeast Corridor Improvements:

1. GAO's investigation of Amtrak's management of High Speed Rail 
Improvement Projects focused on three components: 1) Amtrak's 
acquisition of high speed electric trainsets and locomotives ("Trainset 
Acquisition Project"); 2) electrification of the Northeast corridor 
between New Haven and Boston ("Northend Electrification Project"); and 
3) other infrastructure improvements to the Northeast Corridor between 
New York City and Boston. GAO was informed by Amtrak at the beginning 
of the investigation that with respect to the Trainset Acquisition and 
Northend Electrification Projects - the two most significant components 
of Amtrak's high speed program in terms of budget (together, these 
Projects represent approximately two-thirds of the funds expended to 
date by Amtrak on its high-speed rail program) and scope - -Amtrak was 
involved in complex and extended litigation with the contractors for 
these Projects involving potentially millions of dollars of losses and 
damages. The GAO assured Amtrak that it did not intend to affect the 
course or result of the litigation and for the most part it 
successfully steered clear of issues relevant to the litigation during 
the course of the investigation.

Because of this ongoing litigation involving the Northend 
Electrification and Trainset Acquisition Projects, Amtrak is not in a 
position to provide specific comments with respect to the Report's 
findings and conclusions as such may be impacted by the specific 
allegations in these cases. However, Amtrak's inability to comment 
should not be considered agreement by Amtrak that the Report is 
factually accurate or complete, or that the GAO's investigation of 
these matters and release of the Report, at this time, are appropriate.

In general, Amtrak would note that issues related to project 
management, costs, schedule and utilization of best practices are 
directly related to allegations raised in the litigation of these 
Projects. This information is essential to understanding Amtrak's 
management of high-speed projects in general. The GAO did not consider 
in its Report how the actions of the contractors for these Projects 
affected Amtrak's management of these Projects and its overall program. 
For instance, the contractor for the Northend Electrification Project 
is currently being investigated by the United States Department of 
Justice ("DOJ") for possible civil and criminal fraud violations in 
connection with their handling of that Project. Given the working 
relationship between Amtrak and the contractor on this very important 
Project, the outcome of DOJ's investigation would most certainly impact 
a determination of whether the scheduling, budget and other aspects of 
Amtrak's management of the Project were appropriate. Accordingly, the 
GAO's investigation of Amtrak's management of these Projects and its 
high-speed program was limited, and Amtrak believes that the findings 
of fact and conclusions of the Report are necessarily incomplete.

2. The Report's reliance on the FRA Master Plan as the key source 
document to establish criteria for costs and schedules for measuring 
Amtrak's management of work elements included in that Plan is 
misplaced. Amtrak did not specifically adopt the Plan or manage its 
high-speed projects in accordance with it. The GAO acknowledges this 
fact in its Report yet insists nonetheless in measuring Amtrak's 
performance against the Plan. By 1994, when the Plan was released, 
Amtrak's high-speed work program was already fully underway. In fact, 
by that time, Amtrak was already in the process of replacing its 
initial electrification contractor and the Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Northend Electrification Project, which ultimately 
identified a number of new mitigation projects, was in process.

The FRA's Master Plan essentially amounted to a collection and 
integration of wish lists of potential projects identified by Amtrak, 
the FRA and the commuter authorities for ways to address deferred 
maintenance of the rail line, reduce trip time and improve reliability 
as the commuter and intercity service increased. The Plan predates any 
serious or in-depth engineering of the identified projects or any 
environmental reviews. Indeed, a number of the projects either proved 
inappropriate, not capable of implementation, or environmentally 
unjustified once further examined. The Master Plan does not attempt to 
prioritize the work or fully define the scope of any of the projects. 
Some of the improvements were, in fact, included in Amtrak's work 
program, only to be deleted at a later date due to cost - e.g., 
replacement of the Thames and Niantic River bridges. Other work 
continues to this day - e.g., Amtrak has an extensive program under way 
with Metro North and the State of Connecticut to continue the curve 
modification program and implement the Shell interlocking improvements. 
Because none of the complexities of this work was ever considered in 
the Master Plan, it does not represent an accurate cost estimate or 
work schedule for the various projects.

Finally, GAO's focus on the Master Plan as the exclusive measuring 
stick for evaluating progress on high-speed projects fails to take into 
account the dynamic nature of the overall program in particular as it 
relates to the initial 3-hour trip time goal between Boston and New 
York and the comparative costs and benefits associated with the various 
additional infrastructure projects necessary to achieve that goal. By 
as early as 1995, it was assumed that the 3-hour trip time could only 
be achieved using a non-stop high-speed train between Boston and New 
York. Regularly scheduled service with intermediate stops was planned 
for 3' 10". Amtrak's current schedule is approximately 15 minutes off 
that revised goal with elimination of this time possible once ACSES is 
fully implemented and other track improvements in Metro-North and 
ConnDot territory are completed. It is unclear if the costs of other 
infrastructure improvements necessary to further reduce the trip-time 
an additional 10 minutes (to a true 3-hour service) would be 
financially justified by the net ridership increase resulting from such 
a trip-time reduction. The Report fails to adequately account for this 
change in trip-time goal and the effect it may have had on Amtrak's 
management of high-speed projects.

3. The Report fails to note that Amtrak's leadership and resultant 
management philosophy and practices related to rail infrastructure 
projects have changed since May 2002; and that many of the "best 
practices" listed in the Report were followed during Amtrak's 
management of high-speed improvement projects and many more are being 
implemented on a systematic basis under current management.

4. The Report's conclusions that Amtrak did not fully integrate 
stakeholder interests and that it did the work required to accommodate 
high-speed trains and reduce trip times but did little to focus on 
capacity enhancements are an underserved criticism of Amtrak's 
management of its high-speed rail program. Amtrak held countless 
meetings with dozens of stakeholders of often competing interests along 
the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak entered into numerous agreements with 
stakeholders that specified the parties' respective obligations and 
rights with respect to many of the projects identified in the FRA's 
Master Schedule and many projects that were not identified (copies of 
these agreements were provided to GAO). In addition, the GAO's Report 
fails to note that many of the capacity related improvements listed in 
the Master Plan resulted from anticipated operation of 52 intercity 
trains per-day, a level that Amtrak does not plan to achieve. As a 
result, coordination of such projects with stakeholders proved 
unnecessary.

[End of section]

(544059): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] In this report, all financial amounts are in nominal dollars unless 
otherwise noted.

[2] In 1994, this section of the Northeast Corridor was not 
electrified, and Amtrak had to switch from electric to diesel 
locomotives at New Haven.

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Leading Practices 
in Capital Decision-Making, GAO/AIMD-99-32 (Washington, D.C.: December 
1998).

[4] In November 2001, one of the contractors manufacturing the Acela 
Express trains (Bombardier) filed suit against Amtrak in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking damages for, 
among other things, Amtrak's alleged interference with the manufacture 
of the equipment. In November 2002, Amtrak filed a countersuit against 
the manufacturers alleging, among other things, breach of contract. As 
of February 2004, these suits were still pending. In addition, Amtrak 
officials indicated that the Department of Justice and the U.S. 
Attorney's Office were conducting investigations related to the 
contract for electrification work done under the Northeast High-Speed 
Rail Improvement Project. As of February 2004, these investigations 
were also still pending. Nothing in this report is intended to have any 
impact on the outcome of these suits or investigations, and this work 
was not performed in relation to either the suits or the 
investigations. As discussed further in appendix I, this report does 
not analyze detailed information regarding either the high-speed trains 
or electrification procurements. However, we do not believe that such 
scope restraints negatively affected our ability to review and evaluate 
information on the overall management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 
Improvement Project and draw conclusions about how Amtrak managed the 
project.

[5] Number of trains is measured as the train volume at the point of 
maximum line utilization. Although Amtrak does not operate as many 
trains as commuter rail operators, it accounts for a larger percentage 
of train-miles. A train-mile is a train traveling 1 mile. In fiscal 
year 2002, Amtrak accounted for about 60 percent of train-miles on the 
north-end of the Northeast Corridor, compared with about 40 percent for 
commuter rail operators. 

[6] In September 1985, FRA entered into a grant agreement that 
transferred responsibility for the Northeast Corridor Improvement 
Project to Amtrak as of October 1, 1985. 

[7] U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, 
The Northeast Corridor Transportation Plan, New York City to Boston 
(July 1994). For purposes of this report, this plan is referred to as 
the "FRA master plan."

[8] This is about $3.6 billion in 2002 dollars.

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: Assessing 
the Benefits of Increased Federal Funding for Amtrak and High-Speed 
Passenger Rail Systems, GAO-01-480T (Washington, D.C.: March 2001).

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: Issues 
for Consideration in Developing an Intercity Passenger Rail Policy, 
GAO-03-712T (Washington, D.C.: April 2003).

[11] Status unknown means that either Amtrak did not know the status of 
the work element or we were unable to obtain information about a work 
element's status from Amtrak or commuter railroads. It should be 
recognized that not all work elements might be of equal importance, 
scale, or complexity. For example, completing electrification of the 
line between New Haven and Boston (which is considered 1 work element) 
is significantly more important to achieving project goals and more 
complex than something like eliminating a railroad-highway grade 
crossing (which is also considered to be 1 work element). Also, as 
discussed later in this report, not all of the work elements were 
located on Amtrak-owned track.

[12] The total number of work elements for all three milestones is 76, 
rather than 72, because FRA counted 4 work elements twice--curve 
realignments, constructing high-level platforms, reconfiguring 
existing interlockings (places where trains can be switched from one 
track to another track), and constructing passing sidings--since they 
could help achieve more than one milestone. 

[13] These items were also to restore track and other infrastructure to 
a "state of good repair." A state of good repair is the outcome 
expected from the capital investment needed to restore Amtrak's right-
of-way (track, signals, and auxiliary structures) to a condition that 
requires only routine maintenance. 

[14] FRA indicated that the cost estimates were based on information 
provided by government agencies and the railroads themselves. For those 
work elements for which cost estimates were not directly available, FRA 
contractors developed conceptual estimates.

[15] Of the 21 work elements completed by March 2003, all, or part of, 
5 work elements were completed early--that is, ahead of their scheduled 
completion date. This included 1 work element (replace/upgrade overhead 
bridges in Rhode Island) that was completed in 1999--about 10 years 
ahead of its scheduled completion date in 2009. It also included 1 work 
element--the track program (installation of concrete ties, track 
resurfacing, and ballast cleaning)--that was completed about 3 years 
ahead of its scheduled completion date. An Amtrak official told us that 
much of the track and infrastructure work was accelerated once delays 
in electrification began to occur.

[16] "Substantially complete" means that most of the construction work 
related to electrifying the line, such as installing foundations, 
erecting poles, and constructing electric substations and related 
facilities, had been completed. However, it does not mean that all the 
work was done or that there are no unresolved disputes concerning the 
work.

[17] For purposes of this report, we consider electrification 
incomplete since final acceptance of the system was still pending as of 
March 2003. It was still pending as of February 2004.

[18] The overhead wire that delivers the electricity to the locomotive 
for traction, or movement. 

[19] $3.1 billion in 1993 dollars.

[20] This figure does not include about $100 million in disputed costs 
between Amtrak and the electrification contractor.

[21] This represents information from Long Island Rail Road, Metro-
North Railroad, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, CSX 
Transportation Inc., Providence and Worchester Railroad, Connecticut 
Department of Transportation, and the Rhode Island Department of 
Transportation. 

[22] Of the $1.1 billion total for acquisition of trains, locomotives, 
and maintenance facilities, $753 million was financed. The $1.1 billion 
includes amounts spent for 15 high horsepower locomotives for non-high-
speed train operations on electrified lines, and about $5.7 million for 
the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System.

[23] In June 1992, Amtrak had estimated a cost of about $450 million 
for high-speed trains.

[24] This is interest on the permanent financing only. It does not 
include interest paid on interim loans used during construction of the 
equipment or facilities.

[25] According to an Amtrak official, phase I of this system was 
scheduled for completion in summer 2003 with phase II (to permit remote 
enforcement of speed restrictions) scheduled to be completed in 2005.

[26] Amtrak officials stated to us that they believe such a trip time 
is "achievable" with completion of the Metro-North improvements and 
completion of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System.

[27] The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 prohibited Amtrak 
from using federal funds for operating expenses after 2002. The 
prohibition against using federal funds for operating expenses does not 
apply when Congress specifically appropriates funds for Amtrak to cover 
operating expenses in a particular year, as Congress did for fiscal 
year 2003 (see the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003) and 
2004. 

[28] As of fall 2003, the electrification work had still not been 
completed and Amtrak had not accepted the final system.

[29] The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act 
of 1987 authorized FTA's project management oversight program. This 
program is codified at 49 U.S.C. 5327 and implemented through 
regulations codified at 49 C.F.R. part 633. 

[30] New Starts is an FTA program for starting fixed guideway projects 
to fund up to 80 percent of the cost of transit system projects that 
use separate and exclusive rights-of-way, as well as for extensions of 
existing systems.

[31] FTA's project management oversight program is financed from 0.75 
percent of funds available under 49 U.S.C. 5309, and 0.5 percent of 
funds available under 49 U.S.C. 5307 and 5311. In fiscal year 2002, 
FTA received about $29 million to conduct its project management 
oversight program.

[32] According to Amtrak, FRA had some involvement with the acquisition 
of the high-speed trains. This included numerous meetings between 
Amtrak and FRA officials and FRA participation in planning, 
requirements testing, and design work.

[33] As amended by the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 
1994.

[34] Federal regulations currently have nine classes of railroad track 
(Class 1 through Class 9) that permit passenger trains to operate at 
speeds of between 15 miles per hour (Class 1) and 200 miles per hour 
(Class 9). Track standards were prepared for speeds up to 200 miles per 
hour to accommodate the development of high-speed rail systems around 
the country.

[35] According to an FRA official, FHWA employees were detailed to work 
on Northeast Corridor Improvement Project activities because they had 
both engineering and infrastructure management expertise and because 
they would be needed only temporarily (up to 5 years), since the 
project was expected to be short term.

[36] U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, 
Amtrak's High-Speed Rail Electrification Project (December 1999).

[37] Additional restrictions were placed on grants to cover operating 
losses.

[38] See app. III for a discussion of the methodology we used to 
compile this framework and app. V for a list of best practices sources.

[39] Planning is linked to an organization's strategic goals, which are 
based on a needs assessment that identifies the need for a project.

[40] See GAO/AIMD-99-32. 

[41] The four Class I railroads we contacted were the Burlington 
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., Norfolk Southern Corporation, CSX 
Transportation Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company. In 2001, these 
were the four largest Class I railroads. For 2001, Class I railroads 
were those railroads that earned at least $266.7 million per year in 
revenue.

[42] Called the Alameda Corridor because of the street it parallels, 
the project created a 20-mile, $2.4 billion railroad express line 
connecting the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to the 
transcontinental rail network near downtown Los Angeles. The project 
eliminated approximately 200 street-level railroad crossings, thereby 
alleviating congestion and improving mobility for cargo. 

[43] U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, 
EG&G Dynatrend Inc., Project and Construction Management Guidelines, 
1996 Update (Wellesley, Mass.: June 1996).

[44] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Review of the Bay 
Area Rapid Transit District's Airport Extension Finance Plan, GAO/RCED-
00-95R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2000). 

[45] See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

[46] U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal-Aid Highways: Cost and 
Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge Projects--Issues and Options, 
GAO-03-764T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003).

[47] U.S. Department of Transportation, Controlling Costs and Improving 
the Effectiveness of Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit 
Administration Programs, CC-2003-148 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2003).

[48] The Central Artery/Tunnel project, an Interstate Highway System 
project in Boston is building or reconstructing about 7.5 miles of 
urban highways--about half of them underground. The project includes 
(1) extending Interstate 90 east, mostly in tunnels, through South 
Boston, under Boston Harbor (through the Ted Williams Tunnel), and to 
East Boston and Logan International Airport; (2) replacing the Central 
Artery--an elevated portion of Interstate 93 through downtown Boston--
with an underground roadway; and (3) replacing the I-93 bridge over the 
Charles River.

[49] See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

[50] See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

[51] Report of the ONE DOT Task Force on Oversight of Large 
Transportation Infrastructure Projects (December 2000).

[52] FTA terms these agreements "full funding grant agreements," where 
funding is committed subject to annual appropriations. 

[53] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Project Management 
Oversight Benefits and Future Funding Requirements, GAO/RCED-00-221 
(Sept. 15, 2000).

[54] See GAO/RCED-00-221.

[55] See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

[56] See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

[57] U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, 
EG&G Dynatrend Inc. Project and Construction Management Guidelines, 
1996 Update (Wellesley, Mass.: June 1996). Office of Management and 
Budget, Capital Programming Guide Version 1.0, Office of Management and 
Budget (Washington, D.C.: July 1997).

[58] U.S. Department of Transportation, Two-Year Report on the 
Northeast Corridor (February 1978).

[59] U.S. Department of Transportation, Northeast Corridor Improvement 
Project, Redirection Study (January 1979).

[60] Although NECIP was considered generally complete at the time of 
transfer, there were still a number of items, such as signal 
installation and construction of service facilities, to be finished. 
These were estimated to cost about $187 million. As part of the grant 
agreement, FRA required Amtrak to complete the construction of all 
elements of NECIP by September 1988.

[61] In November 1986, FRA reported that the trip time between Boston 
and New York City was 3 hours 57 minutes. See U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Northeast Corridor: Achievement and Potential 
(November 1986).

[62] See U.S. Department of Transportation (1986).

[63] The Coalition of Northeast Governors is a nonprofit organization 
formed to facilitate communication between the governors of states in 
the Northeast. It conducts studies of various issues, including 
transportation. The states represented are those in the Northeast, from 
New Jersey to Maine.

[64] U.S. Department of Transportation (1994).

[65] According to Amtrak, as of March 2003, the electrification work 
had not yet been fully completed, since the corporation had not yet 
accepted the work and certified it as complete. In addition, there were 
a number of contract claims that had been filed but not yet settled.

GAO's Mission: 

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading.

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street NW,

Room LM Washington,

D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 

 Voice: (202) 512-6000: 

 TDD: (202) 512-2537: 

 Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.

General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.

20548: