From:	SMTP%"phayes@cs.uiuc.edu"  6-MAR-1996 15:16:57.91
To:	STAPP
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Subj:	Re: Reply to Hayes 4

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Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 17:18:31 -0600
To: STAPP@theorm.lbl.gov
From: phayes@cs.uiuc.edu (Pat Hayes)
Subject: Re: Reply to Hayes 4

Henry, your name got left out, sorry!!
Pat
------------

>X-Sender: phayes@tubman.cs.uiuc.edu
>Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 19:01:02 -0600
>To: "Gregg Rosenberg" <ghrosenb@phil.indiana.edu>
>From: phayes@cs.uiuc.edu (Pat Hayes)
>Subject: Re: Reply to Hayes 4
>Cc: klein@adage.berkeley.edu, phayes@cs.uiuc.edu, A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk,
>        keith@imprint.co.uk, mckee@neosoft.com, brings@rpi.edu,
>        patrickw@cs.monash.edu.au
>
>...
>If Greggs account of Henrys position is right, then indeed I have been
>badly misunderstanding him. I more or less agree with
>Stapp-according-to-Rosenberg. We must leave the decision to Henry, I guess.
>
>
>Are indeed we all agreed that P=F ? Henry has been most insistent that this
>is false, but if what he meant was that it is true, then maybe we should
>try to come to terms on a more useful common vocabulary.
>
>This entire argument has had nothing to do with AI, or whether knowing F
>enables one to infer all of P.
>
>>
>>That said, Henry has also just produced the correct answer to Pat's challenge
>>concering the identity F=P. I found his presentation a little 
>>confusing, though, so I am anticipating Pat might too. To try and head off a
>>further round of talk, I'm going to try to make the point Henry just made
>>in slightly different language.
>>
>>Everyone seems agreed that one can know P without knowing it is F. 
>
>My understanding of Henrys position is precisely the opposite: that the
>fact that one can know P in a special way, but not know F that way, entails
>that P is NOT the same as F. (No corner-quotes here, notice: this means
>knowing an entity, not a proposition.)
>
>For
>>instance, as a child does. Similarly, everyone I think is agreed that
>>one can know F without knowing the facts about P. As, for example, it
>>seems that I do (unlike Pat, all my work in AI never gave me the magic
>>insight into how it explained everything I knew about P). 
>
>Ive never even THOUGHT such a claim, let alone expressed it. (If AI
>succeeded, we'd have an artifical mind, To discover what it *felt* like *to
>it*, you'd have to ask it, not me.)
>
>So, then, there
>>is a prima facie problem: If F=P, how can one come to know about one 
>>but not know about the other? This is a classic problem in phil (at least
>>since Frege), and has a standard solution. The solution is that F and
>>P are presentations of the same thing under different aspects. In the evening
>>star and morning star example, both MS and ES are presentations of Venus, but
>>in different relations to observers on earth.
>
>I think you mean, <F> and <P> are presentations.(where these are
>cornerquotes) F and P are experiences and neural events.
>
>>Now, the question is this: given two prima facie different aspects, what
>>conditions must be met if they are to be aspects of the same object?
>>
>>The answer is this: Once one has all the facts about that object, the
>>facts about *both* aspects must be entailed by that complete set. 
>
>No: that is a consequence of the actual identity condition, which is simply
>that there is one object to which <P> and <F> both refer.
>
>All this talk of 'aspects' and entailment seems to be quite off on a
>tangent. (I suspect, an epistemological tangent concerning how we could
>*know* that an identity were true??)
>
>For
>>instance, once one has all the facts about Venus, the fact that 
>>Venus = Morning Star and that Venus = Evening Star is entailed.
>>Venus satisfies the prior identification conditions of both MS and
>>ES. By transitivity of identity, MS=ES.
>>
>>In this debate it is important, especially for Pat, to realize most
>>sides *agree* that P and F are different aspects of the same thing. The
>>disagreement is whether or not both aspects are physical. So Pat is making
>>a stronger claim. He claims that they are both *physical* aspects of
>>the brain, and, further, that F is the same aspect as P (i.e., F=P).
>
>Not at all! I never said anything about 'aspects', or claimed that the
>language of P had to be physical. To say that P = F is not to say that <P>
>= <F> (imagine the quoted symbols replaced by the appropriate
>descriptions.)
>
>>What would make Pat's claim true? How could it be tested? 
>
>WAAAIIITTT a minute here!  This has been happening to me a lot lately in
>these arguments!!  Im NOT claiming that P=F or any other damn thing about
>mental life. All I was doing was suggesting that SUCH A CLAIM IS COHERENT;
>that at last it cannot be ruled out. Henry argued that it was impossible,
>and I suggested a flaw in his reasoning. 
>
>>........ The interesting and worthwhile project is justifying
>>the identity without assuming it. 
>
>The identity might be part of a theory which makes testable predictions. To
>hypothesise an identity is a perfectly reasonable way to conduct science:
>light IS electromagnetic radiation (A philosopher can be heard muttering,
>'but you can't *see* magnetism, so there must be a category error...')
>
>>
>>It is pretty trivial that the physical facts about the brain will entail the 
>>facts about F, its functioning. Unfortunately, as Henry and many others have 
>>pointed out, the physical facts don't entail the facts about P. 
>
>This claim is entirely moot. Nothing like this has been 'shown'to be true
>by anyone. Such a demonstration would have to rule out, a priori, entire
>fields of investigation that have not yet even been thought of. 
>
>If it comes to a bet between the creativity of scientists and the
>imaginative limitations of philosophers like Ned Block, I'm with the
>scientists every time.
>
>.....
>
>Pat
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>Beckman Institute                                 (217)244 1616 office
>University of Illinois           (217)328 3947 or (415)855 9043 home
>405 North Mathews Avenue                          (217)244 8371 fax        
>            
>Urbana, IL. 61801                              Phayes@ai.uiuc.edu 
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Beckman Institute                                 (217)244 1616 office
University of Illinois           (217)328 3947 or (415)855 9043 home
405 North Mathews Avenue                          (217)244 8371 fax        
            
Urbana, IL. 61801                              Phayes@ai.uiuc.edu 
----------------------------------------------------------------------