(Bench Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1 
 
Syllabus 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 
METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
No. 05705. Argued October 10, 2006Decided April 17, 2007 
Under authority of the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) regulates interstate telephone com-
munications using a traditional regulatory system similar to what 
other commissions have applied when regulating other common car-
riers.  Indeed, Congress largely copied language from the earlier In-
terstate Commerce Act, which authorized federal railroad regulation, 
when it wrote Communications Act 201(b) and 207, the provisions 
at issue.  Both Acts authorize their respective commissions to declare 
any carrier charge, regulation, or practice in connection with the 
carriers services to be unjust or unreasonable; declare an unrea-
sonable, e.g., charge to be unlawful; authorize an injured person 
to recover damages for an unlawful charge or practice; and state 
that, to do so, the person may bring suit in a court of the United 
States.  Interstate Commerce Act 1, 8, 9; Communications Act 
201(b), 206, 207.  The underlying regulatory problem here arises at 
the intersection of traditional regulation and newer, more competi-
tively oriented approaches.  Legislation in 1990 required payphone 
operators to allow payphone users to obtain free access to the long-
distance carrier of their choice, i.e., access without depositing coins.  
But recognizing the free call would impose a cost upon the pay-
phone operator, Congress required the FCC to promulgate regula-
tions to provide compensation to such operators.  Using traditional 
ratemaking methods, the FCC ordered carriers to reimburse the op-
erators in a specified amount unless a carrier and an operator agreed 
to a different amount.  The FCC subsequently determined that a car-
riers refusal to pay such compensation was an unreasonable prac-
tice and thus unlawful under 201(b).  Respondent payphone opera-
2 GLOBAL CROSSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. 
 METROPHONES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
Syllabus 
 
tor brought a federal lawsuit, claiming that petitioner long-distance 
carrier (hereinafter Global Crossing) had violated 201(b) by failing 
to pay compensation and that 207 authorized respondent to sue in 
federal court.  The District Court agreed that Global Crossings re-
fusal to pay violated 201(b), thereby permitting respondent to sue 
under 207.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
Held: The FCCs application of 201(b) to the carriers refusal to pay 
compensation is lawful; and, given the linkage with 207, 207 au-
thorizes this federal-court lawsuit.  Pp. 719. 
 (a) The language of 201(b), 206, and 207 and those sections his-
tory, including that of their predecessors, Interstate Commerce Act 
8 and 9, make clear that 207s purpose is to allow persons injured 
by 201(b) violations to bring federal-court damages actions.  The dif-
ficult question is whether the FCC regulation at issue lawfully im-
plements 201(b)s unreasonable practice prohibition.  Pp. 79. 
 (b) The FCCs 201(b) unreasonable practice determination is rea-
sonable, and thus lawful.  See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843844.  It easily fits 
within the language of the statutory phrase.  Moreover, the underly-
ing regulated activity at issue resembles activity long regulated by 
both transportation and communications agencies.  Traditionally, the 
FCC, exercising its rate-setting authority, has divided revenues from 
a call among providers of segments of the call.  Transportation agen-
cies have similarly divided revenues from a larger transportation 
service among providers of segments of the service.  The payphone 
operator and long-distance carrier resemble those joint providers of a 
communication or transportation service.  Differences between the 
present unreasonable practice classification and more traditional 
regulatory subject matter do not require a different outcome.  When 
Congress revised the telecommunications laws in 1996 to enhance 
the role of competition, creating a system that relies in part upon 
competition and in part upon the role of tariffs in regulatory supervi-
sion, it left 201(b) in place.  In light of the absence of any congres-
sional prohibition, and the similarities with traditional regulatory ac-
tion, the Court finds nothing unreasonable about the FCCs 201(b) 
determination.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229.  
Pp. 912. 
 (c) Additional arguments made by Global Crossing, its supporting 
amici and the dissentsthat 207 does not authorize actions for vio-
lations of regulations promulgated to carry out statutory objectives; 
that no 207 action lies for violations of substantive regulations 
promulgated by the FCC; that 201(a) and (b) concern only practices 
that harm carrier customers, not carrier suppliers; that the FCCs 
unreasonable practice determination is unlawful because it is in-
 Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 
 
Syllabus 
adequately reasoned; and that 276 prohibits the FCCs 201(b) clas-
sificationare ultimately unpersuasive.  Pp. 1219. 
423 F. 3d 1056, affirmed. 
 BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 
C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., 
joined.  SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed dissenting opinions.