HERB'S WELDING, INC., ET AL, PETITIONERS V. ROBERT H. GRAY, JR., ET
AL.

   No. 83-728

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1983

   On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit

   Brief for the Federal Respondent

                       PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

   In addition to the parties named in the caption, United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. is a petitioner, and the Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, is
a respondent.

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statute involved
   Statement
   Summary of argument
   Argument:
      An offshore petroleum worker who is injured on a
      fixed drilling platform in state territorial waters
      while providing maintenance services for the
      platform is covered under the Longshoremen's and
      Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
      A. In amending the LHWCA in 1972 to extend
          federal coverage to certain land-based injuries
          Congress required proof of "status" of an
          employee and "situs" of an injury
      B. Respondent Gray was "engaged in maritime
          employment" within the meaning of Section 2(3)
          of the LHWCA
      C. Respondent Gray was injured on a covered situs
          within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the
          LHWCA
      D. Petitioners' contention that Gray is not covered
          under the LHWCA is inconsistent with the
          principles that the Act must be read liberally and
          should be construed to promote Congress's
          objective of a uniform compensation system for
          maritime workers
   Conclusion

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A9) is reported
at 703 F.2d 176.  The opinion of the court of appeals denying
rehearing (Pet. App. A10-A13) is reported at 711 F.2d 666.  The
initial decision and order of the Benefits Review Board (Pet. App.
A19-A37) is reported at 12 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 752.  The decision
and order of the Benefits Review Board following remand (Pet. App.
A46-A49) is not reported.  The decisions and orders of the
administrative law judge (Pet. App. A14-A18, A39-A45) are not
reported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 18, 1983,
and a petition for rehearing was denied on August 8, 1983 (Pet. App.
A10-A13).  The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on October
14, 1983, and was granted on March 19, 1984.  The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                           STATUTE INVOLVED

   Section 2(3) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA or the Act), 33 U.S.C. 902(3), provides:

         The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime
      employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged
      in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship
      repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not
      include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any
      person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any
      small vessel under eighteen tons net.

   Section 3(a) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 903(a), provides in pertinent
part:

         Compensation shall be payable under this (Act) in respect of
      disability or death of an employee but only if the disability or
      death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
      of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
      dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
      area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
      repairing, or building a vessel).  * * *

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether a worker, injured on a fixed drilling platform in the
territorial waters of the State of Louisiana in the course of
providing maintenance services for platforms located in territorial
waters and on the Outer Continental Shelf, is covered under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901 et
seq.

                               STATEMENT

   1. Respondent Robert H. Gray, Jr. was employed by petitioner Herb's
Welding, Inc., a company that provided welding services to marine oil
field rigs.  /1/ Gray was assigned to the Bay Marchand marine oil and
gas field, which is located both in Louisiana territorial waters and
on the Outer Continental Shelf (i.e., on both sides of the line that
marks the three-mile boundary).  /2/ His duties included repairing and
maintaining oil and gas lines and the fixed platform production
structures from which the lines ran.  While on duty Gray lived, ate
and slept on a platform situated in Louisiana waters and worked on
platforms located throughout the field, in both Louisiana waters and
Outer Continental Shelf waters.  /3/ He was transported to his daily
work sites by boat or helicopter.  Pet. App. A2.  Approximately 25% of
Gray's working time was spent on platforms located on the Outer
Continental Shelf (id. at A26).

   On July 11, 1975, the day of his injury, Gray was assigned to a
platform located in the navigable waters of Louisiana (Pet. App. A2).
The platform, which was owned by Chevron Oil Company, was fed by a gas
flow line that extended out to the Outer Continental Shelf (id. at
A11, A26).  While Gray was welding a gas line on the platform, an
explosion occurred;  in trying to run from the area, he sustained a
knee injury.  Petitioner United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company,
the workers' compensation carrier for Herb's Welding, paid benefits to
Gray under the Louisiana workers' compensation statute.  However, the
carrier refused to pay benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or the Act), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.
Pet. App. A2.  /4/

   2. Gray filed a claim for LHWCA benefits with the Department of
Labor, contending that he was entitled to such benefits by virtue of
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
1333(b).  Pet. App. A15.  The OCSLA provides that an individual who is
injured as a result of offshore petroleum operations on the Outer
Continental Shelf is entitled to receive LHWCA benefits.  /5/
Following a hearing, an administrative law judge determined that Gray
was not entitled to LHWCA benefits because he was not "engaged in
maritime employment" within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. 902(3).  Pet. App. A14-A18.

   Gray appealed to the Benefits Review Borad pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
921(b).  In a divided decision (Pet. App. A19-A37), the Board ruled
that Gray was covered by virtue of the OCSLA and thus was entitled to
LHWCA benefits (Pet. App. A26).  The Board concluded that the
administrative law judge had erred in requiring Gray to show that he
was "engaged in maritime employment" when he claimed LHWCA benefits by
virtue of the OCSLA (Pet. App. A22).  The Board reasoned that Gray's
employment as a welder on platforms in both territorial waters and on
the Outer Continental Shelf was "integrally related to the operations
enumerated in Section 1333 of the OCSLA" and that "his injury was
incurred as a result of such activity" (Pet. App. A26).  The Board did
not reach the question whether Gray was covered under the terms of the
LHWCA itself.  The Board's dissenting member believed that the OCSLA
was not applicable because the platform on which Gray was injured was
located in territorial waters (Pet. App. A27-A37).  /6/

   3. Petitioners sought judicial review of the Board's decision
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 921(c).  The court of appeals affirmed without
addressing the Board's analysis of coverage under the OCSLA.  The
court determined instead that Gray was covered under the terms of the
LHWCA itself.  Pet. App. A1-A9.

   The court of appeals decided initially that "the LHWCA can reach an
offshore oil field worker injured upon a fixed platform located in
Louisiana waters" (Pet. App. A3).  It concluded that fixed offshore
platforms "are eseential to and customarily used in the loading and
unloading of crews, supplies and oil" and that they serve a function
identical to that of wharves over navigable waters (id. at A4).  The
court noted that workers injured on movable drilling barges in both
territorial waters and on the Outer Continental Shelf are covered
under the LHWCA, as are workers injured on fixed platforms on the
Outer Continental Shelf (Pet. App. A4).  The court declined to create
a "curious hole in LHWCA coverage" by denying benefits to workers,
like Gray, who are injured on fixed platforms in territorial waters
(Pet. App. A5).

   The court of appeals then concluded that the situs and status tests
for LHWCA coverage were met in this case (Pet. App. A6-A9).  The court
held that the situs of the injury was within the "expanded shoreside
coverage of the Act" (id. at A7), because the platform on which Gray
was injured functioned as a wharf and, "(b)y its location, extending
from an island it adjoins navigable waters" (ibid.).  The court held
that the status test was satisfied because Gray's duties were "a
central part" of the offshore drilling process, which constitutes
"maritime commerce" (id. at A8-A9).

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   A. The court of appeals correctly concluded that respondent Gray, a
marine welder injured on a fixed drilling platform in Louisiana
territorial waters, was covered by the LHWCA.  In 1972 Congress
extended LHWCA coverage by redefining the term "navigable waters" to
include, inter alia, piers, wharves, and "other adjoining area(s)
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel." 33 U.S.C. 903(a).  At the same time Congress
provided that in order to be covered under the LHWCA an employee must
be "engaged in maritime employment." 33 U.S.C. 902(3).  Thus
eligibility for LHWCA coverage now depends on proof of both "status"
of the employee and "situs" of the injury.

   B. Gray meets the status test for LHWCA coverage because his duties
were "maritime" in nature.  The work in which Gray was engaged --
maintenance of offshore oil and gas lines and fixed platforms -- is
essential to the offshore drilling process, which has become a major
maritime activity.  Even if Gray's work on offshore oil operations
were insufficient by itself to support the conclusion that he was
engaged in maritime employment, the combination of his work on
offshore oil operations and the fact that he was required to spend
time on navigable waters in the regular course of his employment would
satisfy the status requirement.

   The conclusion that Gray was engaged in maritime employment is not
inconsistent with this Court's holdings in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97 (1971), which concern admiralty tort jurisdiction and the
intent of Congress in enacting the OCSLA, not the LHWCA.  Nor did
Congress reject LHWCA coverage of all offshore oil workers when it
failed to enact proposed legislation on that subject in 1972.
Congress's action most likely reflects its desire not to deprive crew
members engaged in offshore oil operations of their more lucrative
Jones Act recoveries and a belief that existing legislation and the
1972 amendments would afford LHWCA coverage to all noncrew offshore
oil workers.

   C. Gray also meets the situs requirement for LHWCA coverage.
Offshore drilling platforms are surrounded by water;  in addition,
they bear considerable resemblance to piers and wharves in their
structure and appearance and are customarily used in the loading and
unloading of crews, supplies and oil.  Even if only a part of the
platform on which Gray was injured was used for loading and unloading,
the entire platform qualifies as a covered situs.

   D. Petitioners' contention that Gray is not covered by the LHWCA is
inconsistent with the principles that the Act must be construed
liberally in favor of coverage and that the 1972 amendments should be
read in a manner consistent with Congress's goal of creating a uniform
compensation system for maritime workers.  Congress was particularly
concerned about avoiding situations in which workers would walk in and
out of LHWCA coverage in the course of their employment.  Since
offshore oil workers are clearly covered by the LHWCA in connection
with injuries on either fixed platforms or movable rigs on the Outer
Continental Shelf and in connection with injuries on movable rigs in
territorial waters, it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress
meant to exclude coverage of the remaining category of injuries --
those that take place on fixed platforms in territorial waters.
Offshore oil workers in any of these locations face similar maritime
hazards in connection with their employment.

   Exclusion of LHWCA coverage for injuries incurred on fixed
platforms in territorial waters would be particularly anomalous in the
case of a worker like Gray.  Because he regularly travelled on water
in the course of his employment and worked on platforms on the Outer
Continental Shelf for 25% of his time, Gray was covered by the LHWCA
in connection with injuries sustained during a substantial part of his
employment.  It is most unlikely that Congress intended to withhold
uniform LHWCA coverage in such circumstances.

                               ARGUMENT

 AN OFFSHORE PETROLEUM WORKER WHO IS INJURED ON A FIXED DRILLING
PLATFORM IN STATE TERRITORIAL WATERS WHILE PROVIDING MAINTENANCE
SERVICES FOR THE PLATFORM IS COVERED UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

   The court of appeals correctly concluded that respondent Gray, a
marine welder who was injured on a fixed drilling platform in
Louisiana territorial waters, was covered by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.  In
amending the LHWCA in 1972, Congress sought to create a system of
uniform coverage for injuries to maritime workers, thereby avoiding
situations in which such workers would walk in and out of coverage
during the course of their employment.  Petitioners' contention that
Gray's injury was not covered under the LHWCA rests on the unlikely
supposition that Congress, contrary to its general concern for uniform
coverage, would have wanted to retain a situation in which offshore
petroleum workers would move in and out of LHWCA coverage during the
course of their working day, as they switched back and forth between
fixed platforms and movable platforms or other vessels, and between
jobs in territorial waters and jobs on the Outer Continental Shelf.
Like the court of appeals, we see no indication that Congress intended
such a "curious hole in LHWCA coverage" (Pet. App. A5).  We show below
that Gray was "engaged in maritime employment" within the meaning of
Section 2(3) of the LHWCA and was working at a covered situs under
Section 3(a) of the Act at the time he was injured.  Accordingly, he
qualifies for coverage under the LHWCA.

 A. In Amending the LHWCA in 1972 to Extend Federal Coverage to
Certain Land-Based Injuries, Congress Required Proof of "Status" of an
Employee and "Situs" of an Injury

   In order to understand the criteria for LHWCA coverage against
which Gray's claim must be measured, some background is useful.
Congress enacted the LHWCA in 1927 to provide a federal workers'
compensation remedy for certain maritime injuries.  See Calbeck v.
Travelers Insurance Co. 370 U.S. 114, 117-124 (1962).  In 1972,
Congress made its "first significant effort to reform the 1927 Act and
the judicial gloss that had been attached to it." Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 261 (1977).  The 1972 amendments
increased the level of benefits paid under the Act and overruled
several cases in which this Court had defined the respective rights of
longshoremen, shipowners, and employers.  Id. at 261-262.  The
amendments also expanded the coverage of the Act.  In particular,
Congress sought to end anomalies that had existed under the Act, with
the goal of producing a uniform compensation scheme for maritime
workers.

   The original LHWCA provided for coverage of all work-related
injuries that occurred on navigable waters.  See Calbeck v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 370 U.S. at 124;  Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Industries,
317 U.S. 249 (1942).  Coverage under the original Act stopped at the
water's edge -- the boundary known as the Jensen line.  /7/ Nacirema
Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 219 (1969).  In Nacirema
Operating Co., the Court held (id. at 219-220) that longshoremen whose
injuries occurred on a pier attached to land were not covered by the
LHWCA and could receive benefits only under state workers'
compensation statutes.  The Court noted, however, that Congress had
the constitutional power to provide for compensation for injuries to
maritime workers occurring on land (id. at 223-224) and that "there
was much to be said for the uniform treatment of longshoremen
irrespective of whether they were performing their duties upon the
navigable waters (in which case they would be covered under Calbeck),
or whether they were performing those same duties on a pier."
Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, No. 81-897 (Jan. 11,
1983), slip op. 19 (describing the Court's statement in Nacirema
Operating Co.).

   In enacting the 1972 LHWCA amendments Congress responded to the
Court's comments in Nacirema Operating Co. by extending LHWCA coverage
shoreward.  Congress recognized that the substantial increases in
LHWCA benefit levels it was enacting in 1972 heightened the apparent
irrationality of the Jensen line that had demarcated the boundaries of
federal coverage.  Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S.
at 261-263.  Congress considered the workers' compensation benefits
offered by many states to be inadequate.  S. Rep. 92-1125, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1972).  In its report on the 1972 amendments, the Senate
committee stated:  "It is apparent that if the Federal benefit
structure embodied in (the) Committee bill is enacted, there would be
a substantial disparity in benefits payable to a permanently disabled
longshoreman, depending on which side of the water's edge the accident
occurred * * *." Id. at 13.  As the LHWCA then stood, the amount of
benefits an injured longshoreman or other maritime worker received
depended on "the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury
occurred on land or over water." Ibid.  The Senate committee also
observed that, with the advent of modern cargo-handling techniques,
much of the longshoreman's work had shifted onto land.  Ibid.  See
also H.R. Rep. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).

   Congress extended LHWCA coverage ashore by bringing certain areas
landward of the Jensen line within the definition of "navigable
waters." Amended Section 3(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 903(a), directs
that compensation be paid for death or disability resulting from an
injury "occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building
way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)." /8/
Congress perceived this shoreward extension of coverage as solving a
longstanding problem for longshoremen, ship repairmen, and other
"amphibious" workers who, under the original Act, had moved in and out
of LHWCA coverage during the course of their working day.  In
Congress's view, the amended LHWCA would provide a "uniform
compensation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be
covered by this Act for part of their activity." S. Rep. 92-1125,
supra, at 13;  H.R. Rep. 92-1441, supra, at 10-11.  See Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273.

   The original LHWCA had included only a test based on "situs," i.e.,
whether an injury occurred on navigable waters.  /9/ When it expanded
the situs test to cover certain shoreside areas in 1972, Congress
faced the problem that many employees working in the newly covered
areas (e.g., truck drivers picking up or delivering cargo) had only a
transitory connection with the waterfront.  Because of the diversity
of employees who worked in these areas, "'it became necessary to
describe affirmatively the class of workers Congress desired to
compensate.'" Perini North River Associates, slip op. 20 (quoting
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 264).  Congress
therefore amended the definition of "employee" under Section 2(3) of
the Act to refer to "any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman,
shipbuilder, and shipbreaker * * *." 33 U.S.C. 902(3).  /10/ The 1972
amendments thus moved from a test of eligibility for compensation
based only on situs to a test requiring proof of both the status of
the employee and the situs of the injury.  Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 264-265.  As we now show, Gray satisfies
both parts of this test.

 B. Respondent Gray Was "Engaged in Maritime Employment" Within the
Meaning of Section 2(3) of the LHWCA

   The court of appeals correctly concluded that respondent Gray was
"engaged in maritime employment" within the meaning of Section 2(3) of
the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 902(3), and that he therefore meets the status
test for LHWCA coverage.  /11/

   1. Gray meets the status test by virtue of the fact that his duties
were integral to the offshore drilling process and were therefore
"maritime" in nature.  The courts of appeals, including the court
below, have determined the status of land-based workers on the basis
of whether their activities have a "realistically significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity" (Pet. App. A8).  See,
e.g., Thornton v. Brown & Root, Inc., 707 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, No. 83-243 (Jan. 9, 1984);  Mississippi Coast
Marine, Inc. v. Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994, 997-998 (5th Cir. 1981);  Odom
Construction Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981);  cf. Fusco v. Perini North River
Associates, 622 F.2d 1111, 1113 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1131 (1981);  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976);  see also Boudreaux v.
American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034, 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).  And cf. Foremost Insurance
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982).  Petitioners do not
challenge the applicability of this test.  /12/

   The court of appeals correctly applied the "realistically
significant relationship" test in this case.  As the court remarked,
"(o)ffshore drilling -- the discovery, recovery and sale of oil and
natural gas from the sea bottom -- is maritime commerce" (Pet. App.
A9).  Therefore, workers engaged in the offshore drilling process are
"engaged in maritime employment." See Jenkins v. McDermott, Inc., No.
83-3425 (5th Cir. June 14, 1984), slip op. 4148-4149;  Thronton v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 707 F.2d at 153;  Boudreaux v. American Workover,
Inc., 680 F.2d at 1052-1053, aff'g 664 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1981);
Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378, 383-384 (5th Cir. 1981);
Voison v. O.D.E.C.O. Drilling, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 715, 718 (E.D. Tex.
1982).  /13/ Offshore oil exploration and production involve extensive
facilities and operations on navigable waters.  The panel in Boudreaux
explained the close relationship between offshore oil operations and
maritime commerce (664 F.2d at 466;  footnotes omitted):

      The production of oil and natural gas from the beds of navigable
      bodies of water and the ocean bottom has become a maritime
      activity.  This is a major industry with peculiar
      maritime-related problems.  Employment in an industry that
      provides approximately 40,000 jobs, and untold millions of
      dollars in revenues and that takes place primarily upon the
      navigable waters of the United States, bears "a significant
      relationship to . . . commerce on navigable waters."

   Petitioners and amici contend that there is nothing in offshore oil
operations that can be regarded as inherently "maritime," apparently
because oil exploration and production activities take place on land
as well.  See Pet. Br. 11;  Kerr-McGee Am. Br. 6;  Texaco, et al. Am.
Br. 12-16.  But, of course, many activities that are clearly
"maritime" in nature (e.g., unloading cargo and transporting
passengers) have close counterparts in land-based enterprises.  Thus,
the fact that the petroleum industry operates on land as well as
offshore does not deprive the latter operations of their maritime
character.  See, e.g., Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1049 n.30;  Hullinghorst
Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).

   Moreover, there are significant differences between petroleum
industry operations on land and offshore.  Special equipment and
techniques suited to a marine environment are necessary in connection
with offshore operations.  Many offshore operations are conducted from
vessels, particularly during the exploration stage.  Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972:  Hearings on
S.2318, S.525 and S.1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 833 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as Hearings).  Even after fixed platforms are in
place and production begins, much activity takes place on the water,
including transportation of personnel, supplies, and equipment to and
from the platforms.  /14/ The oil and gas themselves may be
transported through underwater pipes.

   Although not all offshore petroleum operations take place directly
on the water, it seems appropriate to characterize all such operations
as maritime in nature.  While fixed offshore platforms are not
regarded as vessels (see page 29 note 23, infra), they are
nevertheless surrounded by water and clearly exist in a marine
environment.  The work performed on fixed offshore platforms is likely
to be similar in many respects to that performed on movable
structures.  And, of particular significance, offshore operations,
whether on movable or fixed structures, are accompanied by many of the
same hazards associated with other maritime activity, including
inclement weather, wet surfaces, danger of drowning, and so on.  See
Hearings, supra, at 550-551 (statement of E. Leland Richardson,
representing the International Association of Drilling Contractors);
id. at 594 (remarks of John R. Martzell, representing the Louisiana
Trial Lawyers Association);  id. at 831;  Robertson, Injuries to
Marine Petroleum Workers:  A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 Tex.
L. Rev. 973, 994-996 (1977);  Alston, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Fixed
Offshore Drilling Platforms:  A Radical Plea Reconsidered, 28 Loy. L.
Rev. 379, 402-403 (1982).  See also Lemelle v. B.F. Diamond
Construction Co., 674 F.2d 296, 298 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1177 (1983) (noting in support of a finding of LYWCA coverage
that bridge demolition and construction pose many of the same hazards
and working conditions as more traditional work on navigable waters).
/15/ Although offshore petroleum operations may not qualify strictly
as "traditional" maritime activity, because they did not become
technologically feasible until relatively recently, there is no reason
not to identify all such operations as "maritime" in view of their
close connection to the sea.

   Gray's work as a welder in the Bay Marchand field was an integral
part of the offshore oil operations.  Construction and maintenance of
maritime equipment located on landside facilities such as piers and
wharves have consistently been found to constitute maritime
employment.  See Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, supra (pier
repair);  Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1980)
(pier construction);  Odom Construction Co. v. Dep't of Labor, supra
(maintenance of mooring blocks);  Graziano v. General Dynamics Corp.,
663 F.2d 340 (1st Cir. 1981) (maintenance of shipyard buildings and
machinery);  Prolerized New England Co. v. Benefits Review Board, 637
F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981)
(maintenance of scrap metal cargo processing machinery);  Price v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 618 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1980) (maintenance of
shoreside shiploading machinery);  Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. Graham, 573 F.2d 167 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
979 (1978) (maintenance of shipbuilding machinery);  Garvey Grain Co.
v. Director, OWCP, 639 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1981) (maintenance of grain
cargo processing and loading machinery).  Likewise, Gray's work -- the
maintenance of marine oil and gas lines and fixed platforms that are
essential to the maritime activity of offshore oil production -- was
maritime in nature.

   2. Even if employment in offshore petroleum operations alone were
not sufficient to confer status on a worker for purposes of LHWCA
coverage, offshore oil workers like Gray, who are required to spend a
portion of their time on navigable waters in the course of their
employment, satisfy the status test.  Gray testified that he was
transported between platforms, sometimes by helicopter, but "(u)sually
by boat" (Jan. 20, 1978 Tr. 32).  It appears that on some days Gray
traveled not only to and from the platform on which he slept and ate,
but also between different platforms in the course of performing a
series of tasks.  See id. at 43-45.  Even when he was on the
platforms, Gray was working in close proximity to the water.  See page
30 note 25, infra.

   As the court of appeals recognized (Pet. App. A4-A5), workers
traveling over or through water en route to offshore drilling platform
worksites are performing maritime activities within the coverage of
the LYWCA.  Workers could receive LHWCA benefits for injuries incurred
in the course of such travel even before the 1972 amendments.  See
Nalco Chemical Corp. v. Shea, 419 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1969) (under
the pre-1972 Act, an employee injured while traveling to offshore
platforms worked for an "employer" within the scope of Section 2(4) of
the Act, because travel over water constituted "maritime employment").
 /16/ In Perini North River Associates this Court made clear that all
employment that takes place on the water was "traditionally covered"
by the LHWCA before its amendment in 1972 (slip op. 22, quoting S.
Rep. 92-1125, supra, at 16) and continues to be within the scope of
amended Section 2(3), since Congress did not intend to withdraw that
traditional coverage.

   It is apparent that Gray was not on the water "transiently (or)
fortuitously" (Perini North River Associates, slip op. 27 n.34);
rather, he was required to be on water as a regular part of his
employment.  Thus, at least during the time he spent on the water, he
was "engaged in maritime employment" within the meaning of Section
2(3) of the LHWCA.  Perini North River Associates, slip op. 27.  That
fact, combined with the maritime nature of offshore petroleum
operations in general, is plainly enough to confer on Gray the
requisite status for LHWCA coverage in connection with all aspects of
his offshore work, including that performed on fixed platforms.  Cf.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273 (Congress
wanted to provide full coverage for persons "whose employment is such
that they spend at least part of their time in indisputably
longshoring operations and who, without the 1972 Amendments, would be
covered for only part of their activity").

   3. Petitioners contend (Br. 7-10) that the court of appeals'
conclusion that offshore drilling is maritime commerce conflicts with
this Court's holdings in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395
U.S. 352 (1969), and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
But these decisions do not concern coverage under the LHWCA;  rather,
they involve admiralty tort jurisdiction, with its strict requirement
of injury on the water, and the intent of Congress in enacting certain
provisions of theOuter Continental Shelf Lands Act.  /17/ See
Robertson, supra, 55 Tex. L. Rev. at 1010;  cf. Perini North River
Associates, slip op. 22-23 n.29 (noting that Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), which concerns the
application of federal admiralty tort jurisdiction to an airplane
crash into navigable waters, was not relevant to determination of
LHWCA coverage).

   The section of the OCSLA the Court considered in Rodrigue and
Huson, 43 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 1333(a)(2), provided that the laws of the
adjacent states would apply to artificial islands and fixed structures
on the Outer Continental Shelf to the extent they were not
inconsistent with federal laws and regulations.  In Rodrigue, the
Court determined that under Section 1333(a)(2) Louisiana law, rather
than the federal Death on the High Seas Act, governed a wrongful death
action arising out of an injury on an artificial island oil drilling
platform located on the Outer Continental Shelf.  In Chevron, the
Court similarly determined that the Louisiana statute of limitations,
rather than the admiralty doctrine of laches, governed a tort action
based on an injury on an artificial island drilling rig on the Outer
Continental Shelf.  The Court based these holdings in part on its
conclusion that, for admiralty law purposes, such drilling platforms
should not be treated as vessels or navigational aids.  Rodrigue, 395
U.S. at 359-361;  Huson, 404 U.S. at 100-105.  Because admiralty law
did not apply to injuries on land or "extensions of land" (such as
piers or ramps running into the sea), the Court concluded that state
law would govern by virtue of Section 1333(a)(2).  /18/

   The Court also concluded in Rodrigue that even if admiralty law
would have applied to artificial island drilling rigs under
traditional principles, it was clear from the legislative history of
the OCSLA that Congress did not intend that result.  There was
affirmative evidence that Congress intended such structures to be
treated as islands, or as federal enclaves within a landlocked state.
The Court pointed out that although Congress was aware that it could
have extended the admiralty jurisdiction to these artificial islands,
it concluded that application of maritime law would be inappropriate,
particularly in view of the special relationship between workers on
the artificial islands and the adjacent shore to which they commuted.
Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 361-366.

   Rodrigue does not stand for the proposition that offshore oil work
on fixed platforms is nonmaritime;  rather, it is based on the premise
that injuries on fixed platforms -- like injuries on piers or jetties
(395 U.S. at 360) -- are not within the admiralty jurisdiction because
they do not take place on navigable waters.  See Robertson, supra, 55
Tex. L. Rev. at 1010-1011 n.247.  Unlike admiralty law, the LHWCA no
longer requires that an injury occur on navigable waters;  as we
described above, Congress has extended LHWCA coverage landward in
order to avoid the anomalies in coverage that resulted from the
pre-1972 constraint.  Moreover, unlike the legislative history of
Section 1333(a)(2) of the OCSLA, the legislative history of the 1972
LHWCA amendments does not reflect any special concern that state
statutes should govern offshore platform workers;  indeed, as we
explained above, Congress's preference was for expanded federal
coverage in the area of workers' compensation, because it perceived
state benefits to be inadequate.  /19/

   If anything, Rodrigue and Chevron help Gray, rather than
petitioners.  The Court suggested in those cases that fixed offshore
platforms are analogous to extensions of land such as piers and
wharves.  /20/ The latter clearly are instrumentalities of maritime
commerce covered by Section 2(3) of the LHWCA, even though they may
not be subject to admiralty jurisdiction.  Likewise, offshore drilling
operations that take place on extensions of land in the form of fixed
platforms are properly characterized as maritime in nature for
purposes of the LHWCA, even if they are not subject to admiralty law.
/21/

   4. Petitioners also contend (Br. 14-15) that Gray cannot be within
the intended coverage of the LHWCA because Congress explicitly
rejected the inclusion of offshore oil workers under the Act when it
considered the "Tower bill." See S.1547, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
(Marine Petroleum Workers' Compensation Act of 1971), reprinted in
Hearings, supra, at 24-27.  The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc in
Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d at 1053, correctly
rejected that contention.  As the Boudreaux court explained, the Tower
bill would have extended LHWCA coverage to all marine petroleum
extraction workers, with the result that crew members on movable rigs
and other vessels would have lost the right to the more generous
damages available under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688.  See 117 Cong.
Rec. 10490-10491 (1971) (introductory statement of Sen. Tower);
Hearings, supra, at 257-258 (remarks of Sen. Tower);  id. at 395-397,
402, 411, 413-414, 421 (remarks of Joseph Shelton, representing the
International Association of Drilling Contractors);  id. at 530-532
(remarks of E. Leland Richardson).  Representatives of maritime
workers who qualified as seamen voiced strong opposition to the
proposed elimination of the Jones Act remedy.  See id. at 574-590
(remarks and statement of William Moody, representing the Maritime
Trades Department, AFL-CIO);  id. at 591-613 (remarks and statement of
John R. Martzell).

   At the time the Tower bill was proposed, it was undisputed that
noncrew offshore oil workers injured on any type of platform on the
Outer Continental Shelf were covered by the LHWCA by virtue of the
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1333(b).  See page 4 note 5, supra.  In
addition, it was clear that noncrew workers who were injured on
movable rigs in territorial waters were covered by the LHWCA, since
such rigs are considered vessels (see page 29 note 23, infra).
Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d at 1053;  Hearings,
supra, at 395-397 (remarks of Joseph Shelton);  id. at 487 (excerpt
from The Jones Act Committee Report on Investigative Phase);  id. at
511-514, 531-532 (remarks of E. Leland Richardson);  id. at 592-594
(remarks of John R. Martzell).  It seems most likely that Congress
rejected the Tower bill because it believed that existing legislation,
combined with the 1972 amendments, would afford LHWCA coverage to all
noncrew offshore oil workers, and because it did not wish to deprive
crew members of their more lucrative Jones Act recovery.  See
Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1053.  /22/

 C. Respondent Gray Was Injured on a Covered Situs Within the Meaning
of Section 3(a) of the LHWCA

   The court of appeals correctly concluded that the location of
Gray's injury -- a fixed marine petroleum production platform -- falls
within the expanded shoreside coverage of the amended LHWCA.  Before
1972, when coverage of the Act extended only to injuries "occurring
upon * * * navigable waters," 44 Stat. 1426, fixed platform injuries
that occurred within state territorial boundaries were not
compensable, because, unlike floating barges and other types of mobile
drilling rigs, fixed platforms are not vessels.  See Robertson, supra,
55 Tex. L. Rev. at 992-994.  /23/ However, the 1972 amendments to the
Act expanded the definition of "navigable waters" to include, inter
alia, piers, wharves, and terminals, as well as "other adjoining
area(s) customarily used by an employer in loading (or) unloading * *
* a vessel." 33 U.S.C. 903(a).

   The statutory reference to "other" adjoining areas is broad enough
to include fixed platforms.  /24/ Such platforms are, of course,
completely surrounded by water.  Like piers, fixed platforms generally
are elevated above water, with supports that reach down to the seabed.
 See Hearings, supra, at 480, 484.  Since fixed platforms are of
limited size, /25/ an individual standing on such a platform
presumably is always aware that he is working close to (and in many
cases directly above, see illustrations at Hearings, supra, at 480,
484) navigable waters.  As the court of appeals observed (Pet. App.
A4), petroleum production platforms serve the functions of wharves in
that they are "essential to and customarily used in the loading and
unloading of crews, supplies and oil." Indeed, as we noted above (page
26 note 20, supra), this Court in Rodrigue suggested that artificial
island drilling rigs were similar in some respects to structures such
as piers and wharves.  The similarity is not surprising in view of the
fact that production of oil from coastal waters apparently began from
piers in the Santa Barbara Channel.  Hearings, supra, at 831.

   Amici Texaco, et al., contend (Br. 7) that nothing in the record
indicates that any part of the platform on which Gray was injured was
used to load or unload vessels.  The court of appeals' contrary
conclusion is supported by the testimony that Gray himself and his
equipment were transported between platforms "(u)sually by boat" (Jan.
20, 1978 Tr. 32;  see also Pet. App. A2).  In any event, there is no
reasonable basis on which to dispute the court of appeals' conclusion.
 See Kerr-McGee Am. Br. 3.

   Amici Texaco, et al., also contend (Br. 7) that a claimant must
show that his injury occurred in the particular part of a covered
adjoining area that was customarily used for loading and unloading
vessels.  The record does not indicate Gray's exact location on the
platform at the time of his injury.  But this Court's decision in
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo makes clear that when a
facility adjoins the water and at least a portion of the facility is
used for loading and unloading vessels, the entire facility is a
covered situs.  In Caputo the Court rejected the empoloyer's claim
that a pier used only for stripping and stuffing containers, ratehr
than for direct loading and unloading of vessels, was not a covered
situs.  In the Court's view, the pier was part of an "entire terminal
facility," some of which was indisputably used for loading and
unloading vessels.  432 U.S. at 279-281.  Thus, the Court rejected the
very argument amici make here.  See also Prolerized New England Co. v.
Benefits Review Board, 637 F.2d at 38-39 ("expansive construction of
'adjoining area' is necessary * * * to avoid resurrecting the evil of
shifting coverage that Congress sought to avoid in the 1972
amendments");  Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504,
514-516 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981)
(entier "area" adjoining water is covered situs).  /26/

 D. Petitioners' Contention That Gray Is Not Covered Under the LHWCA
Is Inconsistent With the Principles That the Act Must Be Read
Liberally and Should Be Construed to Promote Congress's Objective of a
Uniform Compensation System for Maritime Workers

   Petitioners contend (Br. 13-15) that Congress could not have meant
to bring offshore oil workers like Gray within the coverage of the
LHWCA, since it did not specifically refer to such workers when it
enacted the 1972 amendments.  That contention is inconsistent with
this Court's repeated recognition that the Act must be given an
expansive construction to fulfill its remedial purposes.  And, more
important, petitioners' claim disregards Congress's intent to create a
uniform compensation system for maritime workers.  Under petitioners'
interpretation of the Act, workers like Gray would walk in and out of
LHWCA coverage during the course of their employment, as they moved
from boat to fixed rig to movable rig, and as they switched from
assignments in territorial waters to assignments on the Outer
Continental Shelf.  That construction is cleraly at odds with
congressional intent.

   1. To the extent there is uncertainty about the scope of the LHWCA,
it should be resolved in favor of coverage.  This Court has held that
the Act must be "'liberally construed in conformance with its purpose,
and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.'" Northeast
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 268 (quoting Voris v.
Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953)).  See also Perini North River
Associate, slip op. 18.  Courts applying this principle have held that
the "broadest ground (the Act) permits of should be taken." De
Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 1944),
quoted with approval in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S.
at 130.  This Court has specifically characterized the 1972 amendments
as "remedial" legislation that reflects solicitude for maritime
workers and a "broad() congressional purpose of expanding coverage."
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 725-726 (1980);  P.C.
Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. at 83;  Northeast Marine Terminal Co.
v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 268.  In view of the remedial nature of the
1972 amendments, it would be inappropriate to read them as foreclosing
LHWCA coverage for offshore oil workers in Gray's position simply
because Congress did not state expressly that such workers are to be
covered.

   2. Exclusion of workers like Gray from LHWCA coverage would be
clearly inconsistent with Congress's express purpose of creating a
uniform compensation system for maritime workers through enactment of
the 1972 amendments.  As we explained above (at 13), Congress was
particularly concerned with removing situations in which employees
would walk in and out of LHWCA coverage in the course of their working
day, as they had under the original Act.  This Court has recognized on
several occasions that the provisions for LHWCA coverage should be
construed expansively in order to achieve Congress's goal of uniform
coverage for employees who regularly move between land and water.
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. at 83-84;  Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 268.

   In Caputo the Court held that a checker and a terminal laborer were
"engaged in maritime employment" for purposes of the status
requirement of the amended LHWCA, even though they were not directly
involved in unloading a vessel.  The Court expressly rejected a "point
of rest" theory, under which maritime employment would include only
that portion of the unloading process that takes place before the
longshoring gang places cargo on the pier, in large part because it
viewed that theory as inconsistent with the congressional intent to
provide expanded, uniform coverage.  432 U.S. at 274-277.  The Court
likewise concluded that the situs test for coverage had been met,
despite the fact that the checker was injured in a part of the
terminal that was not used for the immediate loading and unloading of
vessels.  See id. at 279-281;  page 31, supra.  In Ford the Court
rejected a definition of "maritime employment" that would have
required that on the day of his injury on land the employee could have
been assigned to work on navigable waters.  Since both claimants in
that case were engaged in duties longshoremen normally perform in the
course of transferring goods between ship and land transportation, the
Court concluded that they were an integral part of the loading and
unloading process and were therefore engaged in maritime employment,
even though neither claimant moved cargo directly to or from a vessel.
 444 U.S. at 81-84.  The Court noted that this result served the
congressional purposes of expanding coverage to onshore maritime
duties, applying a simple uniform standard, and reducing the number of
employees walking in and out of coverage.  Id. at 83-84 & n.18.

   In view of Congress's goal of a uniform compensation system and its
concern with avoiding situations in which employees would walk in and
out of coverage in the course of their employment, Congress could not
have intended to exclude LHWCA coverage for injuries of those marine
petroleum workers who happen to be working on fixed platforms in
territorial waters.  Offshore oil workers who are injured in other
locations are entitled to receive LHWCA benefits.  /27/ In 1953,
Congress extended LHWCA coverage to injuries resulting from petroleum
production-related activities on the Outer Continental Shelf, through
enactment of the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1333(b).  See page 4 note
5, supra.  Accordingly, LHWCA compensation is available for injuries
sustained on either floating rigs (Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640
F.2d 523, 530 & n.21 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981)) or
fixed rigs (Smith v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 1154, 1156 (5th Cir.
1975)) on the Shelf.  LHWCA coverage also exists for workers injured
on movable rigs in territorial waters, because such rigs are treated
as vessels.  See page 29 note 23, supra.  A conclusion that Congress
meant to exclude from LHWCA coverage the remaining category of
injuries to marine petroleum employees -- those that occur on fixed
rigs in territorial waters -- would reintroduce the "checkered"
coverage that the 1972 amendments to the Act were designed to
eliminate.  See generally Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,
supra.  /28/

   Moreover, such a distinction would make little sense.  Even a
glance at the illustrations of different types of rigs, included in
the 1972 Senate hearings, shows how similar movable rigs and fixed
platforms may be.  For example, both jack-up barges (see Hearings,
supar, at 482) and fixed platforms (see id. at 484) are supported by
structures that reach down into the seabed, although the former are
regarded as vessels and the latter are not.  As we noted above (at
19), all offshore petroleum workers -- whether on fixed or movable
rigs, whether in territorial waters or on the Outer Continental Shelf
-- face special maritime hazards.  Denial of benefits only in the case
of those offshore oil workers who incur injuries on fixed platforms in
territorial waters would clearly frustrate the congressional goals of
expansive coverage and uniformity.  See generally P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v.
Ford, 444 U.S. at 83-84.  As the court below recognized, it would not
be defensible to "create (such) a curious hole in LHWCA coverage"
(Pet. App. A5;  footnote omitted).

   Denial of LHWCA benefits to an individual like Gray would be
particularly anomalous.  Gray is an amphibious worker -- one who
walked in and out of coverage under the old Act.  He was subject to
assignment to jobs on a number of different platformsthroughout the
Bay Marchand oil field.  Gray was clearly covered under the LHWCA in
connection with injuries he might incur while traveling to and from
the drilling rigs on which he worked.  He was also covered with
respect to any injury he might incur while working on rigs located on
the Outer Continental Shelf (on which he spent 25% of his working
time).  To the extent Gray may have worked on movable rigs in
territorial waters, he would have received LHWCA benefits for any
injuries he experienced on such rigs.  See pages 27-28, supra.  /29/
Gray would even have been covered in connection with an injury he
suffered while he worked on a fixed platform in territorial waters if,
e.g., he had been standing on a boat while welding the side of the
platform.  Congress could hardly have wanted a worker's right to
receive LHWCA benefits to depend on the "fortuitous circumstance" (S.
Rep. 92-1125, supra, at 13) of whether his injury occurred while he
was standing on a platform or directly beside it.

   Congress intended that maritime employees like Gray, who previously
had been covered during part of their employment, would receive
uniform LHWCA coverage under the 1972 amendments.  See Perini North
River Associates, slip op. 21 n.27;  P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444
U.S. at 83;  Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at
273-274.  Therefore, it is most unlikely that Congress intended to
deny LHWCA coverage to Gray and others like him during the time they
were working on fixed rigs located in territorial waters.  /30/

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   KENNETH S. GELLER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   CAROLYN F. CORWIN

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   FRANCIS X. LILLY

      Solicitor of Labor

   KAREN I. WARD

      Associate Solicitor

   ALLEN H. FELDMAN

      Counsel for Appellate Litigation

   JOSHUA T. GILLELAN II

   STEVEN J. MANDEL

      Attorneys Department of Labor

   JULY 1984

   /1/ Petitioners' opening brief (at ii) indicates that Herb's
Welding, Inc. is no longer in existence.

   /2/ In general, lands under navigable waters that are within three
miles of the coast line are under state jurisdiction.  Submerged lands
beyond this boundary are part of the Outer Continental Shelf and are
subject to federal jurisdiction.  43 U.S.C. 1301(a), 1331(a).

   /3/ Gray normally was on duty seven days in a row, alternating with
seven days off duty.  See Jan. 20, 1978 Tr. 31.

   /4/ Benefits available under the LHWCA were greater than the
benefits Gray received under the Louisiana workers' compensation
statute.  See Pet. App. A3, A42;  Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447
U.S. 715, 724 (1980).

   /5/ 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1333(b) provides in pertinent part:

         With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting
      from any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted
      on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for,
      developing, removing or transporting by pipeline the natural
      resources, or involving rights to the natural resources, of the
      subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, compensation
      shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and
      Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

   /6/ The Benefits Review Board remanded the case for further
proceedings in accordance with its decision.  However, petitioners
proceeded to file a petition for review with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  The court of appeals granted the
motion of the Director, OWCP, to dismiss the petition for review,
without prejudice to refiling after entry of the final order of the
Benefits Review Baord (Pet. App. A38).  The administrative law judge
then issued a decision and order establishing the amount of benefits
to which Gray was entitled (id. at A39-A45), and the Benefits Review
Board affirmed (id. at A46-A49).

   /7/ In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), this
Court held that a state could not apply its workers' compensation
statute to an injury sustained on a gangplank between a vessel lying
in navigable waters of the United States and a wharf because the
federal government has the sole power, under the admiralty clause of
the Constitution, to regulate such maritime injuries.  Congress
eventually enacted the LHWCA in response to the Jensen decision.  See,
e.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 717-718 (1980).

   /8/ Prior to 1972, the parenthetical provided only that dry docks
were included within the term "navigable waters of the United States."
See former Section 3(a) of the Act, 44 Stat. 1426 (previously codified
at 33 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 903(a)).

   /9/ The original Act also defined the term "employee," but only in
negative terms.  The definition excluded seamen and persons engaged by
a master to load, unload, or repair small vessels.  See former Section
2(3), 44 Stat. 1425 (previously codified at 33 U.S.C. (1970 ed.)
902(3)).

   /10/ The original LHWCA used the term "maritime employment," but
only as part of the definition of "employer." The latter term was
defined as "an employer any of whose employees are employed in
maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any dry dock)." Section 2(4), 44 Stat.
1425.  The courts rarely discussed the "maritime employment"
requirement of the original Act, because the requisite "maritime
employment" nexus was generally assumed to exist in the case of any
employee injured while working on the water.  See Perini North River
Associates, slip op. 12;  G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty
428 (2d ed. 1975);  see also Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S.
334, 339-342 (1953);  Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 U.S.
128, 131-134 (1930).

   /11/ The parties stipulated that Gray was injured in the course of
his employment (Pet. App. A15).  Petitioners do not appear to contend
that Herb's Welding was not an "employer" within the meaning of
Section 2(4) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 902(4).  Section 2(4) now defines
that term as "an employer any of whose employees are employed in
maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel)."

   /12/ In Perini North River Associates, slip op. 19-21, this Court
rejected application of the "significant relationship" test to
employees injured on navigable waters because, in establishing the
separate situs and status tests in the 1972 LHWCA amendments, Congress
did not intend to withdraw coverage from employees "traditionally
covered by the Act, who were injured in the course of their employment
on navigable waters as previously defined" (id. at 21 n.27).  The
Court did not reach the question whether the test properly applied to
workers injured on land (ibid.).  See Pet. App. A8.

   The term "maritime employment" is not limited to occupations
specifically enumerated in Section 2(3) of the Act.  See, e.g., S.
Rep. 92-1125, supra, at 13, 16;  H.R. Rep. 92-1441, supra, at 10-11,
14.  See also Perini North River Associates, slip op. 21 n.27;  P.C.
Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. at 77-78 n.7;  Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 265 n.25.  The "significant
relationship" test provides a reasonable criterion for determining
which land-based workers, other than those specifically enumerated in
the statute, can be said to be engaged in maritime employment.

   /13/ The Benefits Review Board held in two decisions that offshore
oil workers on fixed platforms were not engaged in maritime employment
for purposes of LHWCA coverage.  See Toups v. Chevron Oil Co., 7 Ben.
Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 261 (1977);  Anderson v. McBroom Rig Bldg. Serv.,
Inc., 5 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 713 (1977).  However, in those cases
the Board relied primarily on several older Fifth Circuit decisions
that involved alleged maritime torts.  As we show below (at 23-25),
such decisions do not control the question of LHWCA coverage.

   /14/ Two general classes of structures are used in exploring for
and producing oil and gas found beneath the ocean.  See Robertson,
Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers:  A Plea for Radical
Simplification, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 982 (1977);  Hearings, supra, at
480-486 (diagrams of structures);  id. at 592-594 (descriptions of
structures).  One class of structures floats, or is capable of being
floated, from site to site.  Such structures include submersible and
semi-submersible barges, jack-up rigs, and drill ships.  The second
class of structures, which includes artificial islands and fixed
platforms, is attached to the ocean bottom.  Robertson, supra, 55 Tex.
L. Rev. at 982.  Most exploratory drilling is done from floating
structures, rather than from fixed platforms.  Ibid.  Once oil is
discovered, fixed platforms are used to handle drilling of development
wells and production.  Hearings, supra, at 833.

   /15/ As respondent Gray ntoes (Br. 11 n.3), the Bureau of Labor
Statistics has conducted a study of injuries incurred by workers in
connection with oil and gas well-drilling and servicing activities.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 2179, Injuries
in Oil and Gas Drilling and Services (Aug. 1983).  The Bureau's
survey, which covered injured workers in 12 states and offshore rigs
in the Gulf of Mexico (id. at 19), does not separate statistics for
offshore workers from those for other workers.  The Bureau's study
shows (id. at 1) that the injury rate for oil and gas field services
(19.4 per 100 workers) is more than twice the rate for all industries
(8.1 per 100 workers), and that approximately 40% of the workers
surveyed complained about worksite conditions, most often slippery
surfaces, limited work areas, and poor weather conditions (id. at 3,
17).  While these conditions are not unique to offshore workers, they
presumably are likely to occur more frequently on offshore rigs than
in land-based operations.

   /16/ See also Ward v. Director, OWCP, 684 F.2d 1114, 1116-1117 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983) (employment of
fish-spotter airplane pilot, assisting fleet of fishing boats,
possessed significant relationship to maritime activities).  Cf.
Ledoux v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 609 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1980)
(crash of helicopter being sued to ferry personnel and supplies to and
from offshore drilling structures bears the type of significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity necessary to involve
admiralty jurisdiction).

   /17/ The OCSLA does include a section, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1333(b),
providing that workers injured as a result of petroleum operations on
the Outer Continental Shelf will receive LHWCA benefits.  See page 4,
note 5, supra.  However, that provision was not at issue in Rodrigue
and Chevron, which involved tort actions by workers against parties
other than their employers.

   /18/ The Court in Rodrigue also noted that the Death on the High
Seas Act would provide far less comprehensive remedies to artificial
island workers than would state law as adopted by the OCSLA.  395 U.S.
at 361.

   /19/ Amici Texaco, et al., likewise err in relying (Br. 14-15) on
Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644
F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981), an admiralty
tort case that arose under the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. 740.
 The Fifth Circuit itself has rejected the application of Sohyde
Drilling to LHWCA cases because it concerns the question "whether the
wrong asserted -- the injury complained of -- bore a significant
relationship to maritime activity." Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d
at 384 n.10.  That question is different from the LHWCA inquiry
whether an individual's employment bore a significant relationship to
maritime activity.  See id. at 384 nn. 9, 10.  In distinguishing
Sohyde Drilling, the Fifth Circuit has noted the difference in the
legislative purposes underlying the Admiralty Extension Act and the
LHWCA.  See Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d at 1050
n.31.

   /20/ In discussing the application of admiralty law to artificial
island drilling rigs, the Court in Rodrigue noted that "(a)dmirlaty
jurisdiction has not been construed to extend to accidents on piers,
jetties, bridges, or even ramps or railways running into the sea" (395
U.S. at 360);  that the accidents on the rigs "had no more connection
with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on piers"
(ibid.);  and that "the legislative history (of the OCSLA) shows that
accidents on (artificial island drilling rigs), which under maritime
principles would be no more under maritime jurisdiction than accidents
on a wharf located above navigable waters, were not changed in
character by the (OCSLA)" (395 U.S. at 366).

   /21/ There is no question that Congress intended to reach beyond
the traditional scope of admiralty jurisdiction when it used the term
"maritime" in the 1972 LHWCA amendments.  For example, Congress
expressly included activities such as shipbuilding within the
definition of maritime employment, despite the fact that shipbuilding
was not traditionally regarded as "maritime" for purposes of admiralty
contract jurisdiction.  See, e.g., People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857).

   /22/ Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), relied on
by petitioners (Br. 17), is inapposite.  Victory Carriers involved not
the LHWCA but rather the attempted invocation of admiralty
jurisdiction in a longshoreman's suit against a shipowner based on
injuries sustained on a wharf.  The case arose before Congress
extended LHWCA coverage to such locales, and it was alleged that the
state workers' compensation remedy available to the longshoreman
provided inadequate benefits.  The Court nevertheless declined to
extend admiralty jurisdiction in the absence of congressional
authorization.  The Court did note that "if denying federal remedies
to longshoremen injured on land is intolerable, Congress has ample
power under Arts. I and III of the Constitution to enact a suitable
solution." 404 U.S. at 216 (footnote omitted).  Of course, that is
precisely what Congress did in expanding LHWCA coverage in 1972.

   /23/ Because of their mobility, floating rigs are treated as
vessels.  See, e.g., Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432,
436-437 (5th Cir. 1966);  Hendon v. Marathon-LeTourneau, 414 F.Supp.
1282 (S.D. Miss. 1976).  Injuries on the rigs are therefore "injuries
occurring upon the navigable waters," compensable under both the
original LHWCA and the 1972 amendments.  See, e.g., Perini North River
Associates, supra;  Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d at
1052, 1053;  Robertson, supra, 55 Tex. L. Rev. at 986-987.  Stationary
rigs are not regarded as vessels.  Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 395 U.S. at 359-361;  Bertrand v. Shell Oil Co., 489 F.2d 293,
295 (5th Cir. 1973).

   /24/ In several decisions a Department of Labor administrative law
judge has concluded that a fixed offshore platform is a covered situs.
 Neal v. Wilson Wireline Services, 2 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) (ALJ) 88
(1975);  Henning v. Vacco Wireline Service, 2 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB)
(ALJ) 87 (1975);  Wiley v. Wilson Wireline Services, 2 Ben. Rev. Bd.
Serv. (MB) (ALJ) 86 (1975).

   /25/ The area of the upper deck of a fixed drilling platform often
is in the range of 200 feet square.  See Hearings, supra, at 834;  see
also id. at 836 (referring to a platform with a 150-foot square deck).

   /26/ We do not suggest, e.g., that the entirety of any island would
qualify as a covered situs merely because its shores were used for
loading or unloading.  The artificial "islands" and fixed platforms
used in the maritime petroleum industry are of limited size (see note
25, supra) and resemble piers and wharves far more than they resemble
natural islands.  See, e.g., Hearings, supra, at 480, 484, 485, 830,
833.

   It is of no consequence that the platform on which Gray was injured
may not have been "used for loading and unloading by Gray's employer,
Herb's Welding, but by the platform's owner (Chevron)" (Kerr-McGee Am.
Br. 3 n.3).  The platform is a covered situs if it is customarily used
for significant maritime activity by any statutory employer.  See
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d at 515;  Odom
Construction Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d at 114-115.  Cf.
Novelties Distribution Corp. v. Molee, 710 F.2d 992, 994-997 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, No. 83-538 (Jan. 23, 1984);  Hullinghorst
Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d at 757.  There is no suggestion
that Chevron was not an employer within the meaning of the LHWCA.  See
33 U.S.C. 902(4).

   /27/ We do not refer here to offshore oil workers who are part of
the crew of a vessel.  LHWCA coverage does not extent to any offshore
oil worker who qualifies as a master or member of a crew of a vessel.
See 33 U.S.C. 902(3);  43 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1333(b)(1).  Masters and
crew members retain the traditional remedies available to seamen,
including recovery under the Jones Act.

   /28/ Senator Eagleton, who chaired the hearings on the 1972
amendments to the LHWCA, expressed the view that it should not make a
difference, for coverage purposes, whether fixed platforms were
located in territorial waters or on the Outer Continental Shelf.
Hearings, supra, at 594.

   /29/ Many offshore employees presumably divide their time between
fixed platforms and movable structures.  See, e.g., Pippen v. Shell
Oil Co., 661 F.2d at 383 n.6, noting Pippen's testimony that
approximately 75% of his offshore work as a wireline operator was on
inland barges and floaters, as opposed to fixed platforms.

   /30/ As we argued in our Brief in Opposition (at 10-11), we believe
that Gray was entitled to LHWCA benefits for the additional reason
that he was injured "as the result of operations conducted on the
outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for, developing,
removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural resources * * * of
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf," and thus came
within the terms of the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1333(b).  The
Benefits Review Board adopted this reasoning, but the court of appeals
did not address the issue directly.  Cf. Pet. App. A10-A13.  If the
Court should reject our argument that Gray was covered under the terms
of the LHWCA itself, we believe that the proper course would be for
the Court to remand to the court of appeals for consideration of the
alternative argument for coverage based on the OCSLA.