ASSET VALUE, THREAT/HAZARD, VULNERABILITY, AND RISK   


Mitigating the threat of terrorist attacks against high occupancy buildings is a 
challenging task. It is difficult to predict how, why, and when terrorists may attack. 
Many factors must be considered in creating a safe building environment. This 
chapter presents several methodologies for architects and engineers to quantify risk 
and to identify the most effective mitigation measures to achieve a desired level of 
protection against terrorist attacks at an acceptable cost. The methodologies 
presented herein can be used for new buildings during the design process, as well as 
for existing buildings undergoing renovation. Sections 1.1 to 1.5 will discuss the 
assessment process, asset value assessment, threat/hazard assessment, vulnerability 
assessment, risk assessment, and risk management to help architects and engineers 
identify the best and most cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures for each 
buildings unique security needs. Section 1.6 presents the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist to support the assessment process.
One of the primary objectives of this manual is to establish a common framework of 
terminology and the transfer of design concepts that have been in use by the United 
States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD), military services, the Department of State 
(DOS), and the General Services Administration (GSA) to commercial practice. The 
beginning point is to establish a basis for design by identifying the threat or hazard to 
be designed against. Within the military services, intelligence community, and law 
enforcement, the term "threat" is typically used to describe the design criteria for 
terrorism or manmade disasters. Within the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and other civil agencies, the term "hazard" is used in several different 
contexts. "Natural hazard" typically refers to a natural event such as a flood, wind, or 
seismic disaster. "Human-caused (or manmade) hazards" are "technological hazards" 
and "terrorism." These are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they 
originate from human activity. Furthermore, "technological hazards" are generally 
assumed to be accidental and that their consequences are unintended. For the sake of 
simplicity, this manual will use the terms "threat" and "hazard" when referring to 
terrorism and manmade disasters, respectively. 
Terrorism and physical attacks on buildings have continued to increase in the past 
decade. The geographical isolation of the United States is not a sufficient barrier to 
prevent an attack on U.S. cities and citizens. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 demonstrate the far-
reaching incidents and diverse natures and targets of recent terrorist attacks.
Design of buildings to survive natural hazards is a concept that is well understood by 
the design community. Many years of historical and quantitative data, and 
probabilities associated with the cycle, duration, and magnitude of natural hazards 
exist. Conversely, design of buildings that can survive the threat and impact of a 
terrorist attack is based on qualitative factors that evaluate organization requirements, 
recovery efforts and impacts, and loss of personnel and infrastructure, but have no 
predictable period of recurrence or damage probability. Terrorist attacks are often 
categorized as low probability, but potentially high consequence, events. Building 
designs must include physical security measures as an integral part of the design 
process. 
This chapter presents selected methodologies to determine asset value, analyze the 
threat/hazard, and evaluate vulnerabilities to complete the risk assessment. These 
elements of information become the input for determining relative levels of risk. 
Higher risk hazards may require more complex mitigation measures to reduce risk. 
Mitigation measures are conceived by the design professional and are best 
incorporated into the building architecture, building systems, and operational 
parameters, with consideration for life-cycle costs. 
In order to create a safe environment, many factors must be considered. Figure 1-3 
depicts the assessment process presented in this document to help identify the best 
and most cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures for a buildings own unique 
security needs. The first part of the assessment process identifies the value of a 
buildings assets (described in Section 1.1) that need to be protected. The second step 
is to conduct a threat assessment wherein the threat or hazard is identified, defined, 
and quantified (see Section 1.2). For terrorism, the threat is the aggressors (people or 
groups) that are known to exist and that have the capability and a history of using 
hostile actions, or that have expressed intentions for using hostile actions against 
potential targets, as well as on whom there is current credible information on tar-
geting activity (surveillance of potential targets) or indications of preparation for 
terrorist acts. The capabilities and histories of the aggressors include the tactics they 
have used to achieve their ends.
After conducting a threat assessment, the next step is to conduct a vulnerability 
assessment (see Section 1.3). A vulnerability assessment evaluates the potential 
vulnerability of the critical assets against a broad range of identified threats/hazards. 
In and of itself, the vulnerability assessment provides a basis for determining 
mitigation measures for protection of the critical assets. The vulnerability assessment is 
the bridge in the methodology between threat/hazard, asset value, and the resultant 
level of risk.
The next step of the process is the risk assessment (see Section 1.4). The risk 
assessment analyzes the threat, asset value, and vulnerability to ascertain the level of 
risk for each critical asset against each applicable threat. Inherent in this is the 
likelihood or probability of the threat occurring and the consequences of the 
occurrence. Thus, a very high likelihood of occurrence with very small consequences 
may require simple low cost mitigation measures, but a very low likelihood of 
occurrence with very grave consequences may require more costly and complex 
mitigation measures. The risk assessment should provide a relative risk profile. High-
risk combinations of assets against associated threats, with identified vulnerability, 
allow prioritization of resources to implement mitigation measures.
When starting the design process for any new building or the renovation of an existing 
one, various owner, statutory, and building use inputs are required. These inputs must 
be integrated to ensure that mandatory building code requirements are met, the 
building will meet the owners functional needs, and natural and manmade hazards 
are mitigated to an acceptable level. In some cases, mitigation measures to enhance 
security may be in conflict with other design intentions. The assessment process helps 
to ensure an understanding of risk, so that it can be consciously addressed within the 
design process with available resources.
For natural hazards (earthquakes, grassland and forest fires, floods, and winds) and 
building fire hazards (technological accidents), information is available in building 
codes, industry standards, and FEMA guidelines. For manmade hazards, the suggested 
course of action is less well defined. The United States has not yet developed building 
standards similar to those of the United Kingdom, which has a greater history of 
contending with repeated terrorism on its home soil. Helpful information may be 
found in a strategic plan or a site master plan, or it may have to be developed during 
initial design through interviews with building owners, staff, occupants, utility 
companies, local law enforcement, and others. 
There are many tools and techniques available to the designer for the development of 
new building designs, the renovation of existing buildings, and mitigation of 
vulnerabilities. Advances in commercial satellite imagery, Geographic Information Sys-
tems (GIS) (see Figures 1-4 and 1-5), structural hardening, glass fragmentation films, 
physical security systems, and many other building related technologies provide the 
design professional with numerous tools to design buildings to better protect occu-
pants from terrorist acts. 
Another challenge for the design team is to present appropriate information to the 
building owner/decision-maker in a manner that allows him or her to make a rational, 
informed decision. Ideally, design basis threats will be identified and agreed upon at 
the earliest stages of design (no later than preliminary design). The reason for this is 
twofold. First, the designer must have a known quantity against which to design. 
Second, by considering all threats/hazards (especially manmade threats) early in the 
design, there are potential synergies among mitigating actions. One mitigation 
strategy can be beneficial against more than one hazard for little difference in cost. As 
an example, designing moment frame connections between floors and columns and 
reinforcing exterior walls can mitigate against winds, explosive blasts, and earthquakes. 
Thus, in order to design mitigation measures for manmade hazards, the designer 
must have some appreciation of the assessment of threat/hazard, asset value, 
vulnerability, and risk to assist the building owner/decision-maker. 
Based on the methodologies discussed in this chapter, the assessment process follows 
a logical flow:
_	Asset Value
 Identify criticality of assets 
 Identify number of people in a building
_	Threat/Hazard Assessment
 Identify each threat/hazard
 Define each threat/hazard
 Determine threat level for each threat/hazard
_	Vulnerability Assessment
 Identify site and building systems design issues
 Evaluate design issues against type and level of threat
 Determine level of protection sought for each mitigation measure against each 
threat
_	Risk Assessment
 Likelihood of occurrence
 Impact of occurrence (loss of life, property, and function)
 Determine relative risk for each threat against each asset
 Select mitigation measures that have the greatest benefit/cost for reducing risk
The goal of the assessment process is to achieve the level of protection sought through 
implementation of mitigation measures in the building design. These measures may 
reduce risk by deterring, detecting, denying, or devaluing the potential threat 
element prior to or during execution of an enemy attack. Mitigation measures may 
also reduce risk of damage or injury by providing an acceptable level of protection if 
the hazard does occur, which may also serve to further deter an aggressor. For 
example, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City became the target of an 
aggressor when he was deterred from attacking his primary target, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) building, because it was too difficult to get the attack vehicle 
close to the FBI building. He was able to park immediately adjacent to the Murrah 
Federal Building and successfully target the office of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms (ATF), which was located in the Murrah Federal Building.
The remainder of this chapter describes the general concepts of asset value, 
threat/hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessments for manmade disasters and presents 
several methodologies and techniques that can be used by an organization in 
conducting these assessments.
1.1 ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT
This section will describe how to perform an asset value assessment (the first step of 
the assessment process), to identify people and the asset value. To facilitate identifying 
people and the value of a buildings assets, it is useful to conduct interviews of the 
people who are most familiar with them. Inputs from building owners, facility staff, 
and tenants, as well as any others who can help identify the most valuable assets, 
should be sought. In order to conduct productive interviews, a list of areas to be 
covered should be generated and prioritized prior to the actual interviews. Thorough 
planning and research to generate relevant questions will aid the process and yield 
better results.
An asset is a resource of value requiring protection.1 An asset can be tangible (e.g., 
tenants, buildings, facilities, equipment, activities, operations, and information) or 
intangible (e.g., processes or a companys reputation). In order to achieve the greatest 
risk reduction at the least cost, identifying and prioritizing a buildings critical assets is 
a vital first step in the process to identify the best mitigation measures to improve its 
level of protection prior to a terrorist attack. Recognizing that people are a buildings 
most critical asset, the process described below will help identify and prioritize 
infrastructure where people are most at risk and require protection.
Identifying a buildings critical assets is accomplished in a two-step process:
Step 1: Define and understand the buildings core functions and processes
Step 2: Identify building infrastructure
_	Critical components/assets
_	Critical information systems and data
_	Life safety systems and safe haven areas
_	Security systems
1.1.1 Identifying Building Core Functions
The initial step of an asset value assessment is the determination of core functions and 
processes necessary for the building to continue to operate or provide services after an 
attack. The reason for identifying core functions/processes is to focus the design team 
on what a building does, how it does it, and how various threats can affect the building. 
This provides more discussion and results in a better understanding of asset value. 
Factors that should be considered include:
_	What are the buildings primary services or outputs?
_	What critical activities take place at the building?
_	Who are the buildings occupants and visitors?
_	What inputs from external organizations are required for a buildings success?
1.1.2 Identifying Building Infrastructure
After the core functions and processes are identified, an evaluation of building 
infrastructure is the next step. To help identify and value rank infrastructure, the 
following should be considered, keeping in mind that the most vital asset for every 
building is its people:
_	Identify how many people may be injured or killed during a terrorist attack that 
directly affects the infrastructure.
_	Identify what happens to building functions, services, or occupant satisfaction if a 
specific asset is lost or degraded. (Can primary services continue?)
_	Determine the impact on other organizational assets if the component is lost or 
can not function.
_	Determine if critical or sensitive information is stored or handled at the building.
_	Determine if backups exist for the buildings assets.
_	Determine the availability of replacements.
_	Determine the potential for injuries or deaths from any catastrophic event at the 
buildings assets.
_	Identify any critical building personnel whose loss would degrade, or seriously 
complicate the safety of building occupants during an emergency. 
_	Determine if the buildings assets can be replaced and identify replacement costs if 
the building is lost.
_	Identify the locations of key equipment.
_	Determine the locations of personnel work areas and systems.
_	Identify the locations of any personnel operating "outside" a buildings controlled 
areas.
_	Determine, in detail, the physical locations of critical support architectures:
 Communications and information technology (IT - the flow of critical 
information)
 Utilities (e.g., facility power, water, air conditioning, etc.)
 Lines of communication that provide access to external resources and provide 
movement of people (e.g., road, rail, air transportation)
_	Determine the location, availability, and readiness condition of emergency 
response assets, and the state of training of building staff in their use.
1.1.3 Quantifying Asset Value
After a list of a buildings assets or resources of value requiring protection have been 
identified, they should be assigned a value. Asset value is the degree of debilitating 
impact that would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the buildings assets. 
There are many scales that can be used, each with advantages and disadvantages. 
Because some people are used to working with linguistic scales, although many 
engineers and designers prefer numerical systems, this publication will use a 
combination of a seven-level linguistic scale and a ten-point numerical scale as shown 
in Table 1-1. Obviously, the key asset for every building is its people (e.g., employees, 
visitors, etc.). They will always be assigned the highest asset value as in the example 
below.
Table 1-1: Asset Value Scale

Asset Value
Very High
10
High
8-9
Medium 
High
7
Medium
5-6
Medium 
Low
4
Low
2-3
Very Low
1

Very High  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have exceptionally grave 
consequences, such as extensive loss of life, widespread severe injuries, or total loss of 
primary services, core processes, and functions.
High  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have grave consequences, such as 
loss of life, severe injuries, loss of primary services, or major loss of core processes and 
functions for an extended period of time.
Medium High  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have serious 
consequences, such as serious injuries or impairment of core processes and functions 
for an extended period of time.
Medium  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have moderate to serious 
consequences, such as injuries or impairment of core functions and processes.
Medium Low  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have moderate 
consequences, such as minor injuries or minor impairment of core functions and 
processes.
Low  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have minor consequences or 
impact, such as a slight impact on core functions and processes for a short period of 
time.
Very Low  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have negligible 
consequences or impact.
Asset Value Example. A nominal list of assets for a typical building with assigned value 
is presented in Table 1-2. Please note that this is a nominal example; each building 
should tailor its list to its own unique situation.
1.2THREAT/HAZARD ASSESSMENT
1.2.1 Threat/Hazard Identification
With any manmade hazard, it is important to understand who are the people with the 
intent to cause harm. For those people, it is essential to understand their weapons, 
tools, and tactics, realizing that weapons, tools, and tactics can change faster than a 
building can be modified against the threat. The threat/hazard assessment 
information should be sought from local law enforcement, local emergency 
management, the FBI, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Homeland Security Offices 
(HSOs) at the state level. For technological hazards, it is also important to gather 
information from the local fire department and hazardous materials (HazMat) unit, 
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), and State Emergency Response 
Commission (SERC). LEPC and SERC are local and state organizations established 
under a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) program. They identify critical 
facilities in vulnerable zones and generate emergency management plans. 
Additionally, most fire departments understand which industries in the local area 
handle the most combustible materials and the HazMat unit understands who handles 
materials that could have a negative impact upon people and the environment. In 
many jurisdictions, the HazMat unit is part of the fire department.
The aggressors (those people with intent to do harm) seek publicity for their cause, 
monetary gain (in some instances), or political gain through their actions. These 
actions injure or kill people; destroy or damage facilities, property, equipment, or 
resources; or steal equipment, material, or information. Their methods can be forced 
entry tools, vehicles, and surveillance (visual/audio; stand-off or planted). Their 
weapons can include incendiary devices; small arms (rifles and handguns); stand-off 
military-style weapons (rocket propelled grenades or mortars) (see Figure 1-6); 
explosives; and chemical, biological, and radiological agents (CBR, individually or 
combined with explosives to aid in dispersion). 
Explosives include homemade and stolen industrial and military varieties, packaged 
from small to very large (mail bombs to vehicle bombs). Aggressor tactics run the 
gamut: moving vehicle bombs; stationary vehicle bombs; exterior attacks (thrown 
objects like rocks, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs); stand-off 
weapons attacks (military or improvised larger direct and indirect fire weapons); 
ballistic attacks (small arms handled by one individual); covert entries (gaining entry 
by false credentials or circumventing security with or without weapons); mail bombs 
(delivered to individuals); supply bombs (larger bombs processed through shipping 
departments); airborne contamination (CBR agents used to contaminate the air 
supply of a building as notionally (hypothetically) demonstrated in Figure 1-7); and 
waterborne contamination (CBR agents injected into the water supply).
Table 1-3 provides insight into the various manmade hazards to consider and can be 
used as a tool for threat assessments. Note that Table 1-1 combines aspects of tools, 
weapons, explosives, and tactics. Chapters 4 and 5 provide additional information on 
manmade hazards, and Appendix C provides a complete list of CBR agents.
Table 1-3 provides the designer with a general profile of events associated with a 
spectrum of threats/hazards. The next sections will begin the process of quantifying a 
buildings "design basis" by applying a systems engineering evaluation process to 
determine a buildings critical functions, infrastructure, and vulnerabilities using an 
understanding of the aggressors, potential threat elements, a more refined definition 
of the threat/hazard, and methods to evaluate the risk. There are several 
methodologies and assessment techniques that can be used. Historically, the U.S. 
military methodology (with a focus on explosive effects, CBR, and personnel 
protection) has been used extensively for military installations and other national 
infrastructure assets. The DOS adopted many of the same blast and CBR design 
criteria, and the GSA further developed criteria for federal buildings as a result of the 
attack on the Murrah Federal Building. The Department of Commerce (DOC) 
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) established an assessment framework, 
which focused on information technology infrastructure. 

1.2.2 Threat Definition of Physical Attack on a Building
To stop a terrorist or physical attack on a building is very difficult; any building or site 
can be breached or destroyed. However, the more secure the building or site and the 
better the building is designed to withstand an attack, the better the odds the building 
will not be attacked or, if attacked, will suffer less damage. Terrorists generally select 
targets that have some value as a target, such as an iconic commercial property, 
symbolic government building, or structure likely to inflict significant emotional or 
economic damage such as a shopping mall or major seaport. A manmade 
threat/hazard analysis requires interface with security and intelligence organizations 
that understand the locality, the region, and the nation. These organizations include 
the police department (whose jurisdiction includes the building or site), the local 
state police office, and the local office of the FBI. In many areas of the country, there 
are threat coordinating committees, including FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, that 
facilitate the sharing of information. A common method to evaluate terrorist threats is 
to analyze five factors: existence, capability, history, intention, and targeting.
Existence addresses the questions: Who is hostile to the assets, organization, or 
community of concern? Are they present or thought to be present? Are they able to 
enter the country or are they readily identifiable in a local community upon arrival?
Capability addresses the questions: What weapons have been used in carrying out past 
attacks? Do the aggressors need to bring them into the area or are they available 
locally?
History addresses the questions: What has the potential threat element done in the 
past and how many times? When was the most recent incident and where, and against 
what target? What tactics did they use? Are they supported by another group or 
individuals? How did they acquire their demonstrated capability?
Intention addresses the questions: What does the potential threat element or 
aggressor hope to achieve? How do we know this (e.g., published in books or news 
accounts, speeches, letters to the editor, informant)?
Targeting addresses the questions: Do we know if an aggressor (we may not know 
which specific one) is performing surveillance on our building, nearby buildings, or 
buildings that have much in common with our organization? Is this information 
current and credible, and indicative of preparations for terrorist operations 
(manmade hazards)?
The threat/hazard analysis for any building can range from a general threat/hazard 
scenario to a very detailed examination of specific groups, individuals, and tactics that 
the building may need to be designed to repel or defend against.
A terrorist or aggressor will analyze the building or target as shown in Figure 1-8 to 
determine the type of attack, type of weapon, and tactics to employ to defeat the 
building or critical mission/business function. 
The Homeland Security Advisory System has five threat levels that provide a general 
indication of risk of terrorist attack. In Table 1-4, the five factors commonly used to 
evaluate terrorist threats have been layered onto the Homeland Security Advisory 
levels. If the anticipated threat or projected use of the building warrants it, a detailed 
threat analysis should be developed in coordination with local law enforcement, 
intelligence, and civil authorities in order to more quantitatively determine the 
vulnerability or risk. Having conducted a threat analysis and having a good conceptual 
idea of the preliminary building design and site layout, the next step is to conduct a 
vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses that can be exploited by an aggressor 
and to help identify specific design features and establish operational parameters to 
mitigate them.

1.3VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Knowing the expected threat/hazard capability allows the designer to integrate the 
threat knowledge with specific building and site information by conducting a 
vulnerability assessment. A vulnerability assessment is an in-depth analysis of the 
building functions, systems, and site characteristics to identify building weaknesses 
and lack of redundancy, and determine mitigations or corrective actions that can be 
designed or implemented to reduce the vulnerabilities. A vulnerability assessment 
should be performed for existing buildings and the process incorporated into the 
design for new construction and renovation.
Table 1-5 contains vulnerability and consequence aspects and provides an objective 
approach to determine a relative value of vulnerability for the building or site. An 
alternate method for determining a relative value is presented in Table 1-6, from the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), as applicable to GSA buildings. This method 
provides a suggestion of "security measures" for typical sizes and types of sites, in 
addition to a transferable example of appropriate security measures for typical loca-
tions and occupancies. Tables 1-5 and 1-6 address operational, consequential, and 
inherent characteristics that contribute to vulnerability. They are a first step and 
should be used in conjunction with a more detailed vulnerability assessment such as 
the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (see Table 1-22).
Table 1-7 is an example of one approach to implement minimum building design 
standards to mitigate terrorist events following the methodology of Table 1-6. Note 
that an evaluation or vulnerability assessment still needs to be done before 
incorporating any mitigation measures. 

Level*
*
Typical Location
Examples of Tenant 
Agencies***
Security Measures 
(based on evaluation) 
 I
10 Employees (Federal)
2,500 Square Feet
Low Volume Public Contact
Small "Store Front" Type 
Operation 
Local Office
District Office
Visitor Center
USDA Office
Ranger Station
Commercial Facilities
Industrial/Manufacturing 
Health Care
High Security Locks
Intercom
Peep Hole (Wide View)
Lighting w/Emergency 
Backup Power
Controlled Utility 
Access 
Annual Employee 
Security Training
  II
11 - 150 Employees (Federal) 
2,500 - 80,000 Square Feet
Moderate Volume Public Contact
Routine Operations Similar to 
Private Sector and/or Facility 
Shared with Private Sector
Public Officials
Park Headquarters
Regional/State Offices
Commercial Facilities
Industrial
Manufacturing
Health Care
Entry Control Package 
w/Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV)
Visitor 
Control/Screening
Shipping/Receiving 
Procedures
Guard/Patrol Assessment
Intrusion Detection 
w/Central Monitoring
CCTV Surveillance 
(Pan-Tilt, Zoom System)
Duress Alarm w/Central 
Monitoring
 III
151 - 450 Employees (Federal) 
Multi-Story Facility
80,000 - 150,000 Square Feet
Moderate/High Volume Public 
Contact
Agency Mix:
 Law Enforcement Operations
 Court Functions
 Government Records
Inspectors General
Criminal Investigations
Regional/State Offices
GSA Field Office
Local Schools 
Commercial Facilities
Industrial
Manufacturing
Health Care
Guard Patrol on Site
Visitor 
Control/Screening
Shipping/Receiving 
Procedures
Intrusion Detection 
w/Central Monitoring
CCTV Surveillance 
(Pan-Tilt/Zoom System)
Duress Alarm w/Central 
Monitoring
 IV 
>450 Employees (Federal)
Multi-Story Facility
>150,000 Square Feet
High Volume Public Contact
High-Risk Law 
Enforcement/Intelligence 
Agencies
District Court
Significant Buildings and 
Some Headquarters
Federal Law Enforcement 
Agencies
Local Schools, 
Universities
Commercial Facilities
Health Care
Extend Perimeter 
(Concrete/Steel Barriers)
24-Hour Guard Patrol
Adjacent Parking 
Control
Backup Power System
Hardened Parking 
Barriers
  V
Level IV Profile and 
Agency/Mission Critical to 
National Security
Principal Department 
Headquarters
Agency-Specific

* SOURCE:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL FACILITIES, JUNE 28, 1995
  NOTES: ** ASSIGNMENT OF LEVELS TO BE BASED ON AN "ON-SITE" RISK ASSESSMENT/EVALUATION***EXAMPLES OF 
TYPICAL (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) TENANT AGENCIES FOR THIS LEVEL FACILITY
Table 1-5: Selected Extracts -- Recommended Standards Chart*



LEVEL

I
II
III
IV
V
PERIMETER SECURITY
Parking
Control of Facility Parking
D
D
M
M
M
Control of Adjacent Parking
D
D
D
S
S
Avoid Leases Where Parking Cannot be Controlled
D
D
D
D
D
Leases Should Provide Security Control for Adjacent Parking
D
D
D
D
D
Post Signs and Arrange for Towing Unauthorized Vehicles
S
S
M
M
M
ID System and Procedures for Authorized Parking (Placard, 
Decal, Card Key, etc.)
D
D
M
M
M
Adequate Lighting for Parking Areas
D
D
M
M
M
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Monitoring
CCTV Surveillance Cameras with Time Lapse Video Recording
D
S
S
M
M
Post Signs Advising of 24-Hour Video Surveillance
D
S
S
M
M
Lighting
Lighting with Emergency Power Backup
M
M
M
M
M
Physical Barriers
Extend Physical Perimeter with Barriers (Concrete and/or Steel 
Composition)
N/
A
N/
A
D
S
S
Parking Barriers
N/
A
N/
A
D
S
S
ENTRY SECURITY
Receiving/Shipping
Review Receiving/Shipping Procedures (Current)
M
M
M
M
M
Implement Receiving/Shipping Procedures (Modified)
D
S
M
M
M
Access Control
Evaluate Facility for Security Guard Requirements
D
S
M
M
M
Security Guard Patrol
D
D
S
S
S
Intrusion Detection System with Central Monitoring Capability
D
S
M
M
M
Upgrade to Current Life Safety Standards (Fire Detection, Fire 
Suppression Systems, etc.)
M
M
M
M
M
Entrances/Exits
X-Ray and Magnetometer at Public Entrances
N/
A
D
S
S
M
Require X-Ray Screening of All Mail/Packages
N/
A
D
S
M
M
Peep Holes
S
S
N/
A
N/
A
N/
A
Intercom
S
S
N/
A
N/
A
N/
A
Entry Control w/CCTV and Door Strikes
D
S
N/
A
N/
A
N/
A
High Security Locks
M
M
M
M
M
INTERIOR SECURITY
Employee/Visitor Identification
Agency Photo ID for all Personnel Displayed at all Times
N/
A
D
S
M
M
Visitor Control/Screening System
D
M
M
M
M
Visitor Identification Accountability System
N/
A
D
S
M
M
Establish ID Issuing Authority
S
S
S
M
M
Utilities
Prevent Unauthorized Access to Utility Areas
S
S
M
M
M
Provide Emergency Power to Critical Systems (Alarm Systems, 
Radio Communications, Computer Facilities, etc.)
M
M
M
M
M
Daycare Centers
Evaluate Whether to Locate Daycare Facilities in Buildings with 
High-Threat Activities
N/
A
M
M
M
M
Compare Feasibility of Locating Daycare in Facilities Outside 
Locations
N/
A
M
M
M
M
SECURITY PLANNING
Tenant Assignment
Collocate Agencies with Similar Security Needs
D
D
D
D
D
Do Not Collocate High-/Low-Risk Agencies
D
D
D
D
D
Administrative Procedures
Arrange for Employee Parking In/Near Building After Normal 
Work Hours
S
S
S
S
S
Conduct Background Security Checks and/or Establish Security 
Control Procedures for Service Contract Personnel
M
M
M
M
M
Construction/Renovation
Install Mylar Film on all Exterior Windows (Shatter Protection)
D
D
S
M
M
Review Current Projects for Blast Standards
M
M
M
M
M
Review/Establish Uniform Standards for Construction
M
M
M
M
M
Review/Establish New Design Standard for Blast Resistance
S
S
M
M
M
Establish Street Setback for New Construction
D
D
S
M
M

* SOURCE: EXTRACTS FROM U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STUDY "VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL FACILITIES," 
JUNE 28, 1995
In the preceding tables, determining which "level" most nearly reflects the site and 
building under design or renovation may help to identify which security standards 
would be most appropriate to apply. The GSA method provides a more detailed 
analysis of a building vulnerability and good suggestions for security measures that 
may be appropriate to design into a building for certain occupancies and sizes of 
facilities. A more quantitative evaluation or ranking of one building compared to 
another may be required in some instances (e.g., where a building owner and 
designer may need to know the relative risk of one building compared to an 
equivalent building on another site or on the same campus). 
The DOJ, Office of Justice Programs (OJP) provides an objective approach to 
determining vulnerability (see U.S. Department of Justice, Fiscal Year 1999 State 
Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Assessment and Strategy Development 
Tool Kit, May 15, 1999). DOJs Threat/Hazard Assessment uses seven factors that are 
Threat Assessment and Consequence Management oriented, and provides a 
quantitative means to rank buildings. It requires rating each of the seven areas and 
summing the ratings to determine the overall ranking for the building or site. This 
approach is as follows:
1. Level of Visibility (Table 1-8)
What is the perceived awareness of the targets existence and the visibility of the target 
to the general populace, or to the terrorist in particular?
2. Asset Value of Target Site (Individual Asset or Assets Accumulated within Building  
Table 1-9)
What is the usefulness of the asset(s) to the population, economy, government, 
company, or organization? Also consider the impact on continuity of operations, 
hampering of emergency response, and general potential consequences. Table 1-9 
could be used more than once if the value of the asset(s) impacts more than one 
critical area.
3. Target Value to Potential Threat Element/Aggressor (Table 1-10)
Does the target serve the ends of the aggressors identified in the Threat Assessment 
based on motivations (political, religious, racial, environmental, and special interests)? 
Table 1-10 should help to capture these motivations. 
4. Aggressor Access to Target (Table 1-11)
Does the target have available ingress and egress for a potential aggressor?

5. Target Threat of Hazard (Table 1-12)
Are CBR materials present in quantities that could become hazardous if released? 
These quantities could be on site or in relatively close proximity so that a theft or an 
accident could render them a hazard to the building or site. Take into consideration 
distance from building (a 1-mile radius is suggested around the building), the 
prevailing wind direction, the slope of the terrain, and the quantity of materials 
present. 
6. Site Population Capacity (Table 1-13)
What is the maximum number of individuals at the building or site at a given time? 
This could be standard worst case occupancy during an average day or peak 
occupancy at a designated time (e.g., a movie theater). 
Table 1-13: Site Population Capacity


Rating 
Value
0
0
1 to 250
1
251 to 500
2
501 to 1,000
3
1,001 to 
5,000
4
> 5,000
5

7. Potential for Collateral Damage (Mass Casualties - Table 1-14) Address potential 
collateral mass casualties within a 1-mile radius of the target site. Number ranges 
indicate inhabitants within a 1-mile radius of the site. 
Table 1-14: Potential for Collateral Damage (Mass Casualties)


Rating 
Value
 0-100
0
101 to 500
1
501 to 1,000
2
1,001 to 
2,000
3
2,001 to 
5,000
4
> 5,000
5

Each building is assessed and scored (see Table 1-15). Tables 1-15 and 1-16 contain a 
nominal example.

Table 1-15: Building Summary Sheet

Building/Target Name
Scor
e
Visibility
4
Criticality
3
Value
4
Access
2
Threat of Hazard
0
Site Population
3
Collateral Mass 
Casualties
3
Total Score
19

The total building score can be used to rank multiple buildings (see Table 1-16) and 
quantitatively provides an analysis of building vulnerability from a site perspective. 
Table 1-16: Building Ranking

Rankin
g
Building/Target 
Name
Total 
Score
1
ABC Building
23
2
DEF Building
19
3
GHI Building
14

This evaluation methodology can be applied to all building types (see Foreword). The 
result is independent of facility/occupancy type, except for the type of influence on 
population and siting.
An alternate approach is shown in Table 1-17, which uses a simplified matrix to rank 
the order of buildings using a numerical score of 1 (low) to 5 (high). The evaluation 
factors can be developed for each building use or owner-specific criteria. For Table 1-
17, the factors shown illustrate a health care provider scenario:
_		Criticality of Function: How critical is the building and function to the 
organization?
_		Location: Is the building near federal buildings, major transportation, or iconic 
properties?
_		Occupancy of Building: Are occupants mobile or non-ambulatory?
_		Involvement in Community: Does the building or staff provide unique 
capabilities? 
_		Critical External Commitments: Does the building support other organizations 
or missions?
The objective of Tables 1-1 through 1-17 or similar assessment methodologies is to 
provide an analysis of a building, facility, or site and to identify the buildings that are 
most vulnerable from a given threat/hazard matched against specific building type or 
function. Having the ranked list of buildings, the next step is to conduct an in-depth 
vulnerability assessment of the building. The building assessment is to evaluate specific 
design and architectural features and identify all vulnerabilities of the building 
functions and building systems. Frequently, single-point-vulnerabilities exist, which are 
critical functions or systems that lack redundancy and, if damaged by an attack, would 
result in immediate organization disruption or loss of capability. These are generally 
the highest risk vulnerabilities. Figure 1-9 illustrates the common system 
vulnerabilities.
1.4 RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk is the potential for a loss of or damage to an asset. It is measured based upon the 
value of the asset in relation to the threats and vulnerabilities associated with it. Risk is 
based on the likelihood or probability of the hazard occurring and the consequences 
of the occurrence. A risk assessment analyzes the threat (probability of occurrence), 
and asset value and vulnerabilities (consequences of the occurrence) to ascertain the 
level of risk for each asset against each applicable threat/hazard. The risk assessment 
provides engineers and architects with a relative risk profile that defines which assets 
are at the greatest risk against specific threats. Chapters 2 and 3 explore mitigation 
measures to reduce the vulnerability and risk for valuable assets with a high risk.
There are numerous methodologies and technologies for conducting a risk 
assessment. One approach is to assemble the results of the asset value assessment, 
threat assessment, and vulnerability assessment, and determine a numeric value of risk 
for each asset and threat/hazard pair in accordance with the following formula:
Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating
This methodology can be used for new buildings during the design process, as well as 
for existing structures. The first task is to identify the value of assets and people that 
need to be protected. Next, a threat assessment is performed to identify and define 
the threats and hazards that could cause harm to a building and its inhabitants. After 
threats and assets are identified, a vulnerability assessment is performed to identify 
weaknesses that might be exploited by a terrorist or aggressor. Using the results of the 
asset value, threat, and vulnerability assessments, risk can be computed.
After the architect and building engineer know how people and assets are at greatest 
risk against specific threats, they can then identify mitigation measures to reduce risk. 
Because it is not possible to completely eliminate risk, and every project has resource 
limitations, architects and engineers must analyze how mitigation measures would 
affect risk and decide on the best and most cost-effective measures to implement to 
achieve the desired level of protection (risk management). 
There are numerous checklists and techniques to use for conducting an individual 
building risk assessment. A simplified approach is presented in Tables 1-18 through 1-
21. The tables are used as a pre-assessment screening tool by the assessor who con-
ducts an interview with several key staff members (e.g., building owner, security, site 
management, key function representatives, etc.). The interview provides a consensus 
judgment of the relative risk or vulnerability of functions or systems and should also 
identify system interdependencies. Table 1-19 provides both a quantitative score and 
color code to objectively and visually determine the functions and systems that have 
been determined to be at risk. Engineers, architects, or experienced assessors could 
perform a short walk-through and conduct the pre-assessment interview of an existing 
building in less than a day. For a new building, the pre-screening results can be used 
by the designer to focus the design team on incorporating features and redundancies 
to reduce vulnerabilities and risk.
In the risk assessment approach presented in Tables 1-18 through 1-21, three factors 
or elements of risk are considered for each function or system against each threat 
previously identified. The first factor is the value of the asset or degree of debilitating 
impact that would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the asset. A value on a 
scale of 1 to 10 is assigned (as shown in Table 1-18), 1 being a very low impact or 
consequence and 10 being very high or an exceptionally grave consequence. The next 
factor is the threat rating or subjective judgment of a terrorist threat based on 
existence, capability, history, intentions, and targeting. Again, on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 is 
a very low probability and 10 is a very high probability of a terrorist attack. The third 
factor of risk is vulnerability, or any weaknesses that can be exploited by an aggressor. 
A value of 1 to 10 is assigned, 1 being very low or no weaknesses exist, and 10 being 
very high vulnerability, meaning one or more major weaknesses make an asset 
extremely susceptible to an aggressor. Multiplying the values assigned to each of the 
three factors provides quantification of total risk. The total risk for each function or 
system against each threat is assigned a color code in accordance with Table 1-19. The 
results of the risk assessment should be used to help prioritize which mitigation 
measures should be adopted, given limited resources, in order to achieve a desired 
level of protection. 

Table 1-18: Risk Factors Definitions

Very High
10
High
8-9
Medium 
High
7
Medium
5-6
Medium 
Low
4
Low
2-3
Very Low
1

Table 1-19: Total Risk Color Code


Low 
Risk
Medium 
Risk
High 
Risk
Risk Factors 
Total
1-60
61-175
 176

Table 1-21: Site Infrastructure Systems Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix*

Function
Cyber 
Attack
Armed Attack (single 
gunman)
Vehicle 
Bomb
CBR 
Attack
Site
48
80
108
72
Asset Value
4
4
4
4
Threat Rating
4
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
3
5
9
9
Architectural
40
40
135
20
Asset Value
5
5
5
5
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
1
2
9
2
Structural Systems
24
32
240
16
Asset Value
8
8
8
8
Threat Rating
3
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
1
1
10
1
Envelope Systems
84
112
189
112
Asset Value
7
7
7
7
Threat Rating
6
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
2
4
9
8
Utility Systems
112
56
168
42
Asset Value
7
7
7
7
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
2
2
8
3
Mechanical Systems
42
56
105
126
Asset Value
7
7
7
7
Threat Rating
6
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
1
2
5
9
Plumbing and Gas 
Systems
40
40
120
70
Asset Value
5
5
5
5
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
1
2
8
7
Electrical Systems
42
84
189
28
Asset Value
7
7
7
7
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
1
3
9
2
Fire Alarm Systems
162
108
216
36
Asset Value
9
9
9
9
Threat Rating
6
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
3
3
8
2
IT/Communications 
Systems
512

192
32
Asset Value
8
8
8
8
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability Rating
8
2
8
2

     * NOTIONAL DATA INSERTED FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES.
The functions and infrastructure analysis will identify the geographic distribution 
within the building and interdependencies between critical assets. Ideally, the 
functions should have geographic dispersion as well as a pre-determined recovery site 
or alternate work location. Similarly, critical infrastructure should have geographic 
dispersion and backup. Figure 1-10 shows an example of a building that has numerous 
critical functions and infrastructure collocated, which creates a single-point 
vulnerability as illustrated below. A bomb or CBR attack entering through the loading 
dock could impact the telecommunications, data, uninterrupted power supply (UPS), 
generator, and other key infrastructure systems.
As a minimum, those critical assets assessed to be at highest risk should receive an on-
site vulnerability assessment using the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in 
Table 1-22. The vulnerability assessment may change the risk rating of assets due to 
the identification of accessible critical nodes, the ease of attack using a common 
tactic, or some other factor that makes the building more attractive as a target or more 
susceptible to damage that could result in casualties or irrecoverable system damage. 
The photographs in Figure 1-11 illustrate some examples of single-point vulnerabilities 
of systems and infrastructure. 
1.5 RISK MANAGEMENT
Traditionally, the building regulatory system has addressed natural disaster mitigation 
(hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake, windstorm, and snow storm) through 
prescriptive building codes supported by well-established and accepted reference 
standards, regulations, inspection, and assessment techniques. Some manmade risks 
(e.g., HazMat storage) and specific societal goals (energy conservation and life safety) 
have also been similarly addressed. However, the building regulation system has not 
yet fully addressed most manmade hazards or terrorist threats.
Soon after September 11, 2001, the New York City Building Department initiated an 
effort to analyze the building code with regard to terrorist threats. The task force 
issued a report recommending code changes based on the attack on the World Trade 
Center. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has a committee on 
premises security and security system installation standards. These advances may some 
day result in the building regulatory system developing more prescriptive building 
codes to mitigate security threats.
In the absence of such regulations, the designer needs to understand on what threat 
the design is based. Just like seismic design requires an understanding of geology, soil 
structure, and the maximum credible earthquake accelerations possible at a given 
location, the site designer needs to comprehend the bomb size, vehicle size, and gun 
or other weapon size to provide an appropriate level of protection. The size of threat 
and desired level of protection are equally important to the design. For most cases 
across the United States, the threats and risks for a specific building will be low. For 
buildings at a higher threat and risk, higher standards and performance may be 
required. The Department of Defense (DoD), GSA, and DOS all have established 
processes to identify design basis threats for their facilities.
The typical building design and construction process is sequential, progressing from 
identifying building use and design goals through actual construction. This process is 
illustrated in Figure 1-12.
In every design and renovation project, the owner ultimately has three choices when 
addressing the risk posed by terrorism. He or she can:
1. Do nothing and accept the risk
2. Perform a risk assessment and manage the risk by installing reasonable mitigation 
measures
3. Harden the building against all threats to achieve the least amount of risk
Figure 1-13 is a graphical representation of the three choices. Since September 11, 
2001, terrorism has become a dominant concern. Life, safety, and security issues 
should be a design goal from the beginning. 
Table 1-22 contains key questions that designers may use to determine vulnerabilities 
of an existing building or a new construction in order to focus resources and minimize 
the impacts of potential terrorist attacks or technological accidents.
1.6 BUILDING VULNERABILTY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Table 1-22) is based on the checklist 
developed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and compiles many best 
practices based on technologies and scientific research to consider during the design 
of a new building or renovation of an existing building. It allows a consistent security 
evaluation of designs at various levels. The checklist can be used as a screening tool for 
preliminary design vulnerability assessment. In addition to examining design issues 
that affect vulnerability, the checklist includes questions that determine if critical 
systems continue to function in order to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and 
damage limitation, and to ensure that emergency systems function during a threat or 
hazard situation.
The checklist is organized into the 13 sections listed below. To conduct a vulnerability 
assessment of a building or preliminary design, each section of the checklist should be 
assigned to an engineer, architect, or subject matter expert who is knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Each assessor should consider 
the questions and guidance provided to help identify vulnerabilities and document 
results in the observations column. If assessing an existing building, vulnerabilities can 
also be documented with photographs, if possible. The results of the 13 assessments 
should be integrated into a master vulnerability assessment and provide a basis for 
determining vulnerability ratings during the assessment process. 

1. Site
2. Architectural
3. Structural Systems
4. Building Envelope
5. Utility Systems
6. Mechanical Systems (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and CBR)
7. Plumbing and Gas Systems
8. Electrical Systems
9. Fire Alarm Systems
10.  Communications and Information Technology (IT) Systems
11.  Equipment Operations and Maintenance
12.  Security Systems
13.  Security Master Pla


FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENC


FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENC


U.S. AIR FORC


Figure 1-1   Recent acts of terrorism (clockwise left to right, U.S. Pentagon, Arlington, VA; World 
Trade Center, New York, NY; Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City, OK


SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF STATE PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 200


Figure 1-2 Total facilities struck by international terrorist attacks in 1997-2002 and total facilities 
attacked in 2002


Figure 1-3The assessment process mode


Figure 1-4 Satellite imagery/GIS too


Figure 1-5 Satellite imagery/GIS too


Deter: The process of making the target inaccessible or difficult to defeat with the weapon or tactic 
selected. It is usually accomplished at the site perimeter using highly visible electronic security 
systems, fencing, barriers, lighting and security personnel; and in the building by securing access with 
locks and electronic monitoring devices.
Detect: The process of using intelligence sharing and security services response to monitor and 
identify the threat before it penetrates the site perimeter or building access points.
Deny: The process of minimizing or delaying the degree of site or building infrastructure damage or 
loss of life or protecting assets by designing or using infrastructure and equipment designed to 
withstand blast and chemical, biological, or radiological effects.
Devalue:  The process of making the site or building of little to no value or consequence, from the 
terrorists perspective, such that an attack on the facility would not yield their desired result


1 Appendix B is a glossary of assessment and security terminology. Appendix C contains chemical, biological, and radiological terms


Table 1-2: Nominal Building Asset Value Assessment

Asset
Value
Numeric 
Value
Site
Medium 
Low
4
Architectural
Medium
5
Structural Systems
High
8
Envelope Systems
Medium 
High
7
Utility Systems
Medium 
High
7
Mechanical Systems
Medium 
High
7
Plumbing and Gas Systems
Medium
5
Electrical Systems
Medium 
High
7
Fire Alarm Systems
High
9
IT/Communications 
Systems
High
8


Figure 1-6 Aggressor weapon


Figure 1-7 Estimated plume from a 1-ton chlorine spill in Washington, D


Table 1-3: Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards



Threat/Hazar
d
Application 
ode
Duratio
n
Extent of 
Effects;Static/Dynamic
Mitigating and 
Exacerbating 
Conditions


Improvised Explosive 
Device (Bomb)
- Stationary Vehicle
- Moving Vehicle
- Mail
- Supply
- Thrown
- Placed
- Personnel
Detonation of 
explosive device 
on or near target; 
via person, 
vehicle, or 
projectile. 
Instantaneous
; additional 
secondary 
devices may 
be used, 
lengthening 
the duration 
of the 
threat/hazard 
until the 
attack site is 
determined to 
be clear. 
Extent of 
damage is 
determined 
by type and 
quantity of 
explosive. 
Effects 
generally 
static other 
than 
cascading 
consequences
, incremental 
structural 
failure, etc. 
Blast energy at a 
given stand-off is 
inversely 
proportional to the 
cube of the distance 
from the device; 
thus, each 
additional increment 
of stand-off provides 
progressively more 
protection. 
Exacerbating 
conditions include 
ease of access to 
target; lack of 
barriers/shielding; 
poor construction; 
and ease of 
concealment of 
device.
Chemical Agent
- Blister
- Blood
- 
Choking/Lung/Pulm
onary
- Incapacitating
- Nerve
- Riot Control/Tear 
Gas
- Vomiting

Liquid/aerosol 
contaminants can 
be dispersed using 
sprayers or other 
aerosol 
generators; liquids 
vaporizing from 
puddles/containers
; or munitions.
Chemical 
agents may 
pose viable 
threats for 
hours to 
weeks, 
depending on 
the agent and 
the 
conditions in 
which it 
exists.
Contaminatio
n can be 
carried out of 
the initial 
target area by 
persons, 
vehicles, 
water, and 
wind. 
Chemicals 
may be 
corrosive or 
otherwise 
damaging 
over time if 
not 
remediated. 
Air temperature can 
affect evaporation of 
aerosols. Ground 
temperature affects 
evaporation of 
liquids. Humidity 
can enlarge aerosol 
particles, reducing 
the inhalation 
hazard. 
Precipitation can 
dilute and disperse 
agents, but can 
spread 
contamination. 
Wind can disperse 
vapors, but also 
cause target area to 
be dynamic. The 
micro-
meteorological 
effects of buildings 
and terrain can alter 
travel and duration 
of agents. Shielding 
in the form of 
sheltering in place 
may protect people 
and property from 
harmful effects. 


Table 1-3: Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards* (continued



Threat/Hazar
d
Application 
Mode
Duratio
n
Extent of 
Effects;Static/Dynamic
Mitigating and 
Exacerbating 
Conditions

Arson/Incendiar
y Attack
Initiation of fire or 
explosion on or 
near target via 
direct contact or 
remotely via 
projectile. 
Generally 
minutes to 
hours. 
Extent of 
damage is 
determined by 
type and 
quantity of 
device 
/accelerant and 
materials 
present at or 
near target. 
Effects 
generally static 
other than 
cascading 
consequences, 
incremental 
structural 
failure, etc. 
Mitigation factors include 
built-in fire detection and 
protection systems and 
fire-resistive construction 
techniques. Inadequate 
security can allow easy 
access to target, easy 
concealment of an 
incendiary device, and 
undetected initiation of a 
fire. Non-compliance 
with fire and building 
codes as well as failure to 
maintain existing fire 
protection systems can 
substantially increase the 
effectiveness of a fire 
weapon.
Armed Attack
- Ballistics 
(small arms)
- Stand-off 
Weapons 
(rocket 
propelled 
grenades, 
mortars) 
Tactical assault 
or sniper attacks 
from a remote 
location.
Generally 
minutes to 
days.
Varies, based 
upon the 
perpetrators 
intent and 
capabilities.
Inadequate security can 
allow easy access to 
target, easy concealment 
of weapons, and 
undetected initiation of an 
attack.
Biological Agent
- Anthrax
- Botulism
- Brucellosis
- Plague
- Smallpox
- Tularemia
- Viral 
Hemorrhagic 
Fevers
- Toxins 
(Botulinum, 
Ricin, 
Staphylococ-
cal 
Enterotoxin B, 
T-2 
Mycotoxins)
Liquid or solid 
contaminants can 
be dispersed using 
sprayers/aerosol 
generators or by 
point or line 
sources such as 
munitions, covert 
deposits, and 
moving sprayers. 
May be directed 
at food or water 
supplies.
Biological 
agents may 
pose viable 
threats for 
hours to 
years, 
depending 
on the 
agent and 
the 
conditions 
in which it 
exists.
Depending on 
the agent used 
and the 
effectiveness 
with which it is 
deployed, 
contamination 
can be spread 
via wind and 
water. Infection 
can be spread 
via human or 
animal vectors. 
Altitude of release above 
ground can affect 
dispersion; sunlight is 
destructive to many 
bacteria and viruses; light 
to moderate winds will 
disperse agents, but 
higher winds can break up 
aerosol clouds; the micro-
meteorological effects of 
buildings and terrain can 
influence aerosolization 
and travel of agents. 


Table 1-3: Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards* (continued



Threat/Hazar
d
Application 
Mode
Duratio
n
Extent of 
Effects;Static/Dynamic
Mitigating and 
Exacerbating 
Conditions

Cyberterroris
m
Electronic attack 
using one 
computer system 
against another.
Minutes to days.
Generally no 
direct effects on 
built environment. 
Inadequate security 
can facilitate access 
to critical computer 
systems, allowing 
them to be used to 
conduct attacks.
Agriterrorism
Direct, generally 
covert 
contamination of 
food supplies or 
introduction of 
pests and/or 
disease agents to 
crops and 
livestock.
Days to months.
Varies by type of 
incident. Food 
contamination 
events may be 
limited to discrete 
distribution sites, 
whereas pests and 
diseases may 
spread widely. 
Generally no 
effects on built 
environment. 
Inadequate security 
can facilitate 
adulteration of food 
and introduction of 
pests and disease 
agents to crops and 
livestock.
Radiological 
Agent
- Alpha
- Beta
- Gamma
Radioactive 
contaminants can 
be dispersed using 
sprayers/aerosol 
generators, or by 
point or line 
sources such as 
munitions, covert 
deposits, and 
moving sprayers. 
Contaminants 
may remain 
hazardous for 
seconds to years, 
depending on 
material used. 
Initial effects will 
be localized to 
site of attack; 
depending on 
meteorological 
conditions, 
subsequent 
behavior of 
radioactive 
contaminants may 
be dynamic. 
Duration of 
exposure, distance 
from source of 
radiation, and the 
amount of shielding 
between source and 
target determine 
exposure to 
radiation. 
Nuclear 
Device
Detonation of 
nuclear device 
underground, at 
the surface, in the 
air or at high 
altitude. 
Light/heat flash 
and blast/shock 
wave last for 
seconds; nuclear 
radiation and 
fallout hazards 
can persist for 
years. 
Electromagnetic 
pulse from a 
high-altitude 
detonation lasts 
for seconds and 
affects 
unprotected 
electronic 
systems. 
Initial light, heat, 
and blast effects of 
a subsurface, 
ground, or air burst 
are static and are 
determined by the 
devices 
characteristics and 
employment; 
fallout of 
radioactive 
contaminants may 
be dynamic, 
depending on 
meteorological 
conditions. 
Harmful effects of 
radiation can be 
reduced by 
minimizing the time 
of exposure. Light, 
heat, and blast 
energy decrease 
logarithmically as a 
function of distance 
from seat of blast. 
Terrain, forestation, 
structures, etc., can 
provide shielding by 
absorbing and/or 
deflecting blast, 
radiation, and 
radioactive 
contaminants. 


Table 1-3: Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards* (continued



Threat/Hazar
d
Application 
Mode
Duratio
n
Extent of 
Effects;Static/Dynamic
Mitigating and 
Exacerbating 
Conditions

Hazardous 
Material Release
(fixed site or 
transportation)
- Toxic 
Industrial 
Chemicals 
and Materials 
(Organic 
vapors: 
cyclohexane; 
Acid gases: 
cyanogens, 
chlorine, 
hydrogen 
sulfide; Base 
gases: 
ammonia; 
Special cases: 
phosgene, 
formaldehyde)
Solid, liquid, 
and/or gaseous 
contaminants 
may be 
released from 
fixed or mobile 
containers.
Hours to 
days.
Chemicals may be 
corrosive or 
otherwise 
damaging over 
time. Explosion 
and/or fire may be 
subsequent. 
Contamination 
may be carried out 
of the incident 
area by persons, 
vehicles, water, 
and wind.
As with chemical 
weapons, weather 
conditions will directly 
affect how the hazard 
develops. The micro-
meteorological effects of 
buildings and terrain can 
alter travel and duration of 
agents. Shielding in the 
form of sheltering in place 
may protect people and 
property from harmful 
effects. Non-compliance 
with fire and building 
codes as well as failure to 
maintain existing fire 
protection and containment 
features can substantially 
increase the damage from a 
hazardous materials 
release. 
Unauthorized 
Entry
- Forced
- Covert
Use of hand or 
power tools, 
weapons, or 
explosives to 
create a man-
sized opening 
or operate an 
assembly (such 
as a locked 
door), or use of 
false 
credentials to 
enter a 
building.
Minutes 
to hours, 
depending 
upon the 
intent. 
If goal is to steal 
or destroy physical 
assets or 
compromise 
information, the 
initial effects are 
quick, but damage 
may be long 
lasting. If intent is 
to disrupt 
operations or take 
hostages, the 
effects may last 
for a long time, 
especially if injury 
or death occurs.
Standard physical security 
building design should be 
the minimum mitigation 
measure. For more critical 
assets, additional 
measures, like closed 
circuit television or traffic 
flow that channels visitors 
past access control, aids in 
detection of this hazard.


Table 1-3: Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards* (continued



Threat/Hazar
d
Application 
Mode
Duratio
n
Extent of 
Effects;Static/Dynamic
Mitigating and 
Exacerbating 
Conditions


Surveillance
- Acoustic
- 
Electroni
c 
eavesdrop
ping
- Visual
Stand-off collection of 
visual information using 
cameras or high 
powered optics, acoustic 
information using 
directional microphones 
and lasers, and 
electronic information 
from computers, cell 
phones, and hand-held 
radios. Placed collection 
by putting a device 
"bug" at the point of 
use.
Usually 
months.
This is usually the 
prelude to the loss of an 
asset. A terrorist 
surveillance team spends 
much time looking for 
vulnerabilities and 
tactics that will be 
successful. This is the 
time period that provides 
the best assessment of 
threat because it 
indicates targeting of the 
building.
Building design, 
especially blocking 
lines of sight and 
ensuring the 
exterior walls and 
windows do not 
allow sound 
transmission or 
acoustic 
collection, can 
mitigate this 
hazard.


* SOURCE: FEMA 386-7, INTEGRATING HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS INTO MITIGATION PLANNING, SEPTEMBER 200


  


Figure 1-8 Facility system interaction


Table 1-4: Homeland Security Threat Condition



Threat Level
Threat Analysis Factors

Existenc
e
Capabilit
y
Histor
y
Intention
s
Targetin
g
Severe (Red)
_
_
_
_
_
High (Orange)
_
_
_
_
_
Elevated 
(Yellow)
_
_
_
_

Guarded (Blue)
_
_
_


Low (Green)
_
_





_ Factor must be present            _	Factor may or may not be presen


Please note the DHS does not use these threat analysis factors to determine threat level. 
SOURCE: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURIT


Table 1-5: Site/Building Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix (Partial Risk Assessment)*

Criteria
0
1
2
3
4
5
Scor
e
Asset Visibility

Existence 
not well 
known

Existence 
locally 
known

Existence 
widely 
known

Target Utility
None
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High

Asset Accessibility
Remote 
location, 
secure 
perimeter
, armed 
guards, 
tightly 
controlle
d access
Fenced, 
guarded, 
controlled 
access
Controlled 
access, 
protected 
entry
Controlled 
access, 
unprotected 
entry
Open 
access, 
restricted 
parking
Open 
access, 
unrestricte
d parking

Asset Mobility

Moves or 
is 
relocated 
frequently

Moves or is 
relocated 
occasionall
y

Permanent
/ fixed in 
place

Presence of 
Hazardous 
Materials
No 
hazardou
s 
materials 
present
Limited 
quantities, 
materials 
in secure 
location
Moderate 
quantities, 
strict 
control 
features
Large 
quantities, 
some 
control 
features
Large 
quantities, 
minimal 
control 
features
Large 
quantities, 
accessible 
to non-staff 
personnel

Collateral Damage 
Potential
No risk
Low 
risk/limite
d to 
immediate 
area
Moderate 
risk/limite
d to 
immediate 
area
Moderate 
risk within 
1-mile 
radius
High risk 
within 1-
mile radius
High risk 
beyond 1-
mile radius

Site 
Population/Capacit
y
0
1-250
251-500
501-1,000
1,001-
5,000
> 5,000







Total



* SOURCE: FEMA 386-7, INTEGRATING HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS INTO MITIGATION PLANNING, SEPTEMBER 200


Table 1-6: Classification Table Extracts


Table 1-7: Selected Extracts -- Recommended Standards Chart


M   Minimum Standard    S   Standard Based On Facility EvaluationD   Desirable (to minimize 
risk)              N/A  Not Applicabl


Table 1-7: Selected Extracts -- Recommended Standards Chart* (continued


M   Minimum Standard    S   Standard Based On Facility EvaluationD   Desirable (to minimize 
risk)             N/A  Not Applicabl




LEVEL

I
I
I
II
I
I
V
V


Table 1-8: Level of Visibility


Rating 
Value
Invisible  Classified location
0
Very Low Visibility  Probably not aware of 
existence
1
Low Visibility  Existence probably not well 
known
2
Medium Visibility  Existence is probably known
3
High Visibility  Existence is well known
4
Very High Visibility  Existence is obvious
5


Table 1-9: Criticality of Target Site


Rating 
Value
No Usefulness
0
Minor Usefulness
1
Moderate Usefulness
2
Significant 
Usefulness
3
Highly Useful
4
Critical
5


Table 1-10: Target Value to Potential Threat Element


Rating 
Value
None
0
Very 
Low
1
Low
2
Medium
3
High
4
Very 
High
5


Table 1-11: Aggressor Access to Target


Rating 
Value
Fenced, Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access by Pass Only, No 
Vehicle Parking within a designated minimum distance (such as 50 feet or 80 feet)
0
Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and Non-Staff 
Personnel, No Vehicle Parking within the designated minimum distance
1
Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and Non-Staff Personnel, 
No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within the designated minimum distance
2
Controlled Access of Visitors, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No Unauthorized 
Vehicle Parking within the designated minimum distance
3
Open Access to All Personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No Unauthorized 
Vehicle Parking within the designated minimum distance
4
Open Access to All Personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, Vehicle Parking 
within the designated minimum distance
5


Table 1-12: Target Threat of Hazard (WMD Materials)


Rating 
Value
No CBR materials present
0
CBR materials present in moderate quantities, under positive control, and in secured 
locations
1
CBR materials present in moderate quantities and controlled
2
Major concentrations of CBR materials that have established control features and are 
secured in the site
3
Major concentrations of CBR materials that have moderate control features
4
Major concentrations of CBR materials that are accessible to non-staff personnel
5


Table 1-17: Simplified Building Ranking Matrix

Building
Criticality 
of Function
Locatio
n
Occupancy 
of Building
Involvement 
in 
Community
Critical 
External 
Commitments
Total 
Score
Headquarter
s
2
5
3
1
4
15
Hospital 1
1
2
2
1
1
7
Hospital 2
3
2
3
4
4
16
Data Center
5
4
3
3
2
17


Figure 1-9 Common system vulnerabilitie


Table 1-20: Site Functional Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix*

Function
Cyber 
Attack
Armed Attack (single 
gunman)
Vehicle 
Bomb
CBR 
Attack
Administration
280
140
135
90
Asset Value
5
5
5
5
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
7
7
9
9
Engineering 
128
128
192
144
Asset Value
8
8
8
8
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
2
4
8
9
Warehousing
96
36

54
Asset Value
3
3
3
3
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
4
3
9
9
Data Center
360
128
216
144
Asset Value
8
8
8
8
Threat Rating
9
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
5
4
9
9
Food Service
2
32
48
36
Asset Value
2
2
2
2
Threat Rating
1
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
1
4
8
9
Security
280
140
168
126
Asset Value
7
7
7
7
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
5
5
8
9
Housekeeping
16
64
48
36
Asset Value
2
2
2
2
Threat Rating
8
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
1
8
8
9
Day Care
54
324
243
162
Asset Value
9
9
9
9
Threat Rating
3
4
3
2
Vulnerability 
Rating
2
9
9
9

    * NOTIONAL DATA INSERTED FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES


Table 1-20: Site Functional Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix* (continued



 
Function
Cyber 
Attack
Armed Attack (single 
gunman)
Vehicle 
Bomb
CBR 
Attack


Table 1-21: Site Infrastructure Systems Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix* (continued



Functio
n
Cyber 
Attack
Armed Attack (single 
gunman)
Vehicle 
Bomb
CBR 
Attack


Figure 1-10 Non-redundant critical functions collocated near loading doc


Figure 1-11 Vulnerability example


Figure 1-12 Typical building design and construction proces


Figure 1-13 Risk management choice


Table 1-22: Building Vulnerablilty Assessment Checklist



Sectio
n
Vulnerability 
Question
Guidanc
e
Observation
s


1         Sit

1.


What major structures surround the facility (site or building(s))?
What critical infrastructure, government, military, or recreation facilities are in the local area 
that impact transportation, utilities, and collateral damage (attack at this facility impacting the 
other major structures or attack on the major structures impacting this facility)?
What are the adjacent land uses immediately outside the perimeter of this facility (site or 
building(s))?
Do future development plans change these land uses outside the facility (site or building (s)) 
perimeter? 
Although this question bridges threat and vulnerability, the threat is the manmade hazard that can 
occur (likelihood and impact) and the vulnerability is the proximity of the hazard to the building(s) 
being assessed. Thus, a chemical plant release may be a threat/hazard, but vulnerability changes if 
the plant is 1 mile upwind for the prevailing winds versus 10 miles away and downwind. Similarly, a 
terrorist attack upon an adjacent building may impact the building(s) being assessed. The Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City was not the only building to have severe damage caused by the 
explosion of the Ryder rental truck bomb


Critical infrastructure to consider includes:
Telecommunications infrastructure
Facilities for broadcast TV, cable TV; cellular networks; newspaper offices, production, and distribution; 
radio stations; satellite base stations; telephone trunking and switching stations, including critical cable 
routes and major rights-of-way
Electric power systems
Power plants, especially nuclear facilities; transmission and distribution system components; fuel 
distribution, delivery, and storage
Gas and oil facilities
Hazardous material facilities, oil/gas pipelines, and storage facilitie


Banking and finance institutions
Financial institutions (banks, credit unions) and the business district; note schedule business/financial 
district may follow; armored car services
Transportation networks
Airports: carriers, flight paths, and airport layout; location of air traffic control towers, runways, passenger 
terminals, and parking areas
Bus Stations
Pipelines: oil; gas
Trains/Subways: rails and lines, railheads/rail yards, interchanges, tunnels, and cargo/passenger terminals; 
note hazardous material transported
Traffic: interstate highways/roads/tunnels/bridges carrying large volumes; points of congestion; note time 
of day and day of week
Trucking: hazardous materials cargo loading/unloading facilities; truck terminals, weigh stations, and rest 
areas
Waterways: dams; levees; berths and ports for cruise ships, ferries, roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and 
container ships; international (foreign) flagged vessels (and cargo)
Water supply systems
Pipelines and process/treatment facilities, dams for water collection; wastewater treatment 
Government services
Federal/state/local government offices  post offices, law enforcement stations, fire/rescue, town/city hall, 
local mayors/governors residences, judicial offices and courts, military installations (include type-Active, 
Reserves, National Guard)
Emergency services
Backup facilities, communications centers, Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), fire/Emergency Medical 
Service (EMS) facilities, Emergency Medical Center (EMCs), law enforcement facilities
The following are not critical infrastructure, but have potential collateral damage to 
consider: 
Agricultural facilities: chemical distribution, storage, and application sites; crop spraying services; 
farms and ranches; food processing, storage, and distribution facilities
Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities: apartment buildings; business/corporate 
centers; chemical plants (especially those with Section 302 Extremely Hazardous Substances); factories; fuel 
production, distribution, and storage facilities; hotels and convention centers; industrial plants; raw material 
production, distribution, and storage facilities; research facilities and laboratories; shipping, warehousing, 
transfer, and logistical centers
Events and attractions: festivals and celebrations; open-air markets; parades; rallies, demonstrations, 
and marches; religious services; scenic tours; theme parks
Health care system components: family planning clinics; health department offices; hospitals; 
radiological material and medical waste transportation, storage, and disposal; research facilities and 
laboratories, walk-in clinics
Political or symbolically significant sites: embassies, consulates, landmarks, monuments, 
political party and special interest groups offices, religious sites
Public/private institutions: academic institutions, cultural centers, libraries, museums, research 
facilities and laboratories, schools
Recreation facilities: auditoriums, casinos, concert halls and pavilions, parks, restaurants and clubs 
(frequented by potential target populations), sports arenas, stadiums, theaters, malls, and special interest 
group facilities; note congestion dates and times for shopping centers
References: FEMA 386-7, FEMA SLG 101, DOJ NCJ181200



1.2
Does the terrain place the building in a depression or low area?

Depressions or low areas can trap heavy vapors, inhibit natural decontamination by prevailing winds, and 
reduce the effectiveness of in-place sheltering.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guid



1.3

In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to park 
unacceptably close to a building in public rights-of-way


Where distance from the building to the nearest curb provides insufficient setback, restrict parking in the curb 
lane. For typical city streets, this may require negotiating to close the curb lane. Setback is common 
terminology for the distance between a building and its associated roadway or parking. It is analogous to stand-
off between a vehicle bomb and the building. The benefit per foot of increased stand-off between a potential 
vehicle bomb and a building is very high when close to a building and decreases rapidly as the distance 
increases. Note that the July 1, 1994, Americans with Disabilities Act Standards for Accessible Design states 
that required handicapped parking shall be located on the shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent 
parking to an accessible entrance.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.4

Is a perimeter fence or other types of barrier controls in place?
The intent is to channel pedestrian traffic onto a site with multiple buildings through known access control 
points. For a single building, the intent is to have a single visitor entrance.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
1.5

What are the site access points to the site or building?

The goal is to have at least two access points  one for passenger vehicles and one for delivery trucks due to the 
different procedures needed for each. Having two access points also helps if one of the access points becomes 
unusable, then traffic can be routed through the other access point.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

1.6

Is vehicle traffic separated from pedestrian traffic on the site?
Pedestrian access should not be endangered by car traffic. Pedestrian access, especially from public 
transportation, should not cross vehicle traffic if possible.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

1.7
Is there vehicle and pedestrian access control at the perimeter of the site



Vehicle and pedestrian access control and inspection should occur as far from facilities as possible (preferably 
at the site perimeter) with the ability to regulate the flow of people and vehicles one at a time.
Control on-site parking with identification checks, security personnel, and access control systems.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
1.8
Is there space for inspection at the curb line or outside the protected perimeter?
What is the minimum distance from the inspection location to the building



Design features for the vehicular inspection point include: vehicle arrest devices that prevent vehicles from 
leaving the vehicular inspection area and prevent tailgating.
If screening space cannot be provided, consider other design features such as: hardening and alternative location 
for vehicle search/inspection.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100   

1.9
Is there any potential access to the site or building through utility paths or water runoff




Eliminate potential site access through utility tunnels, corridors, manholes, stormwater runoff culverts, etc. 
Ensure covers to these access points are secured.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

1.10
What are the existing types of vehicle anti-ram devices for the site or building?
Are these devices at the property boundary or at the building



Passive barriers include bollards, walls, hardened fences (steel cable interlaced), trenches, ponds/basins, 
concrete planters, street furniture, plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains. Active barriers include pop-up 
bollards, swing arm gates, and rotating plates and drums, etc.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.11
What is the anti-ram buffer zone stand-off distance from the building to unscreened vehicles or 
parking



If the recommended distance for the postulated threat is not available, consider reducing the stand-off required 
through structural hardening or manufacturing additional stand-off through barriers and parking restrictions. 
Also, consider relocation of vulnerable functions within the building, or to a more hazard-resistant building. 
More stand-off should be used for unscreened vehicles than for screened vehicles that have been searched.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.12
Are perimeter barriers capable of stopping vehicles?
Will the vehicle barriers at the perimeter and building maintain access for emergency 
responders, including large fire apparatus


Anti-ram protection may be provided by adequately designed: bollards, street furniture, sculpture, landscaping, 
walls, and fences. The anti-ram protection must be able to stop the threat vehicle size (weight) at the speed 
attainable by that vehicle at impact. If the anti-ram protection cannot absorb the desired kinetic energy, 
consider adding speed controls (serpentines or speed bumps) to limit the speed at impact. If the resultant speed 
is still too great, the anti-ram protection should be improved.
References: Military Handbook 1013/14 and GSA PBS P-100



1.13
Does site circulation prevent high-speed approaches by vehicles



The intent is to use site circulation to minimize vehicle speeds and eliminate direct approaches to structures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100



1.14
Are there offsetting vehicle entrances from the direction of a vehicles approach to force a 
reduction of speed



Single or double 90-degree turns effectively reduce vehicle approach speed.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.1


Is there a minimum setback distance between the building and parked vehicles

Adjacent public parking should be directed to more distant or better-protected areas, segregated from employee 
parking and away from the building. Some publications use the term setback in lieu of the term stand-off.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1


Does adjacent surface parking on site maintain a minimum stand-off distance





The specific stand-off distance needed is based upon the design basis threat bomb size and the building 
construction. For initial screening, consider using 25 meters (82 feet) as a minimum, with more distance needed 
for unreinforced masonry or wooden walls.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1


Do standalone, aboveground parking garages provide adequate visibility across as well as into 
and out of the parking garage


Pedestrian paths should be planned to concentrate activity to the extent possible.
Limiting vehicular entry/exits to a minimum number of locations is beneficial.
Stair tower and elevator lobby design should be as open as code permits. Stair and/or elevator waiting areas 
should be as open to the exterior and/or the parking areas as possible and well lighted. Impact-resistant, 
laminated glass for stair towers and elevators is a way to provide visual openness.
Potential hiding places below stairs should be closed off; nooks and crannies should be avoided, and dead-end 
parking areas should be eliminated.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1


Are garage or service area entrances for employee-permitted vehicles protected by suitable 
anti-ram devices?
Coordinate this protection with other anti-ram devices, such as on the perimeter or property 
boundary to avoid duplication of arresting capability


Control internal building parking, underground parking garages, and access to service areas and loading docks 
in this manner with proper access control, or eliminate the parking altogether.
The anti-ram device must be capable of arresting a vehicle of the designated threat size at the speed attainable at 
the location.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1


Do site landscaping and street furniture provide hiding places



Minimize concealment opportunities by keeping landscape plantings (hedges, shrubbery, and large plants with 
heavy ground cover) and street furniture (bus shelters, benches, trash receptacles, mailboxes, newspaper 
vending machines) away from the building to permit observation of intruders and prevent hiding of packages.
If mail or express boxes are used, the size of the openings should be restricted to prohibit the insertion of 
packages.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.2


Is the site lighting adequate from a security perspective in roadway access and parking areas


Security protection can be successfully addressed through adequate lighting. The type and design of lighting, 
including illumination levels, is critical. Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) 
guidelines can be used. The site lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.2


Are line-of-sight perspectives from outside the secured boundary to the building and on the 
property along pedestrian and vehicle routes integrated with landscaping and green space


The goal is to prevent the observation of critical assets by persons outside the secure boundary of the site. For 
individual buildings in an urban environment, this could mean appropriate window treatments or no windows 
for portions of the building.
Once on the site, the concern is to ensure observation by a general workforce aware of any pedestrians or 
vehicles outside normal circulation routes or attempting to approach the building unobserved.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide
1.22
Do signs provide control of vehicles and people



The signage should be simple and have the necessary level of clarity. However, signs that identify sensitive 
areas should generally not be provided.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.23
Are all existing fire hydrants on the site accessible


Just as vehicle access points to the site must be able to transit emergency vehicles, so too must the emergency 
vehicles have access to the buildings and, in the case of fire trucks, the fire hydrants. Thus, security 
considerations must accommodate emergency response requirements.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100












2         Architectural


2.1

Does the site and architectural design incorporate strategies from a Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) perspective




The focus of CPTED is on creating defensible space by employing:
1. Natural access controls:
  Design streets, sidewalks, and building entrances to clearly indicate public routes and direct people away from 
private/restricted areas
  Discourage access to private areas with structural elements and limit access (no cut-through streets)
  Loading zones should be separate from public parking
2. Natural surveillance:
  Design that maximizes visibility of people, parking areas, and building entrances; doors and windows that 
look out on to streets and parking areas
  Shrubbery under 2 feet in height for visibility
  Lower branches of existing trees kept at least 10 feet off the ground
  Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks and streets to control pedestrian and vehicle circulation
  Adequate nighttime lighting, especially at exterior doorways
3. Territorial reinforcement:
  Design that defines property lines
  Design that distinguishes private/restricted spaces from public spaces using separation, landscape plantings; 
pavement designs (pathway and roadway placement); gateway treatments at lobbies, corridors, and door 
placement; walls, barriers, signage, lighting, and "CPTED" fences
  "Traffic-calming" devices for vehicle speed control
4. Target hardening:
  Prohibit entry or access: window locks, deadbolts for doors, interior door hinges
  Access control (building and employee/visitor parking) and intrusion detection systems
5. Closed circuit television cameras:
  Prevent crime and influence positive behavior, while enhancing the intended uses of space. In other words, 
design that eliminates or reduces criminal behavior and at the same time encourages people to "keep an eye 
out" for each other.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

2.


Is it a mixed-tenant building


Separate high-risk tenants from low-risk tenants and from publicly accessible areas. Mixed uses may be 
accommodated through such means as separating entryways, controlling access, and hardening shared 
partitions, as well as through special security operational countermeasures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.


Are pedestrian paths planned to concentrate activity to aid in detectio


Site planning and landscape design can provide natural surveillance by concentrating pedestrian activity, 
limiting entrances/exits, and eliminating concealment opportunities. Also, prevent pedestrian access to 
parking areas other than via established entrances.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.


Are there trash receptacles and mailboxes in close proximity to the building that can be used 
to hide explosive devices


The size of the trash receptacles and mailbox openings should be restricted to prohibit insertion of packages. 
Street furniture, such as newspaper vending machines, should be kept sufficient distance (10 meters or 33 feet) 
from the building, or brought inside to a secure area.
References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD UCF 4-010-01

2.


Do entrances avoid significant queuing



If queuing will occur within the building footprint, the area should be enclosed in blast-resistant construction. If 
queuing is expected outside the building, a rain cover should be provided. For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or combine staff and visitor entrances.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.


Does security screening cover all public and private areas?
Are public and private activities separated?
Are public toilets, service spaces, or access to stairs or elevators located in any non-secure 
areas, including the queuing area before screening at the public entrance


Retail activities should be prohibited in non-secured areas. However, the Public Building Cooperative Use Act 
of 1976 encourages retail and mixed uses to create open and inviting buildings. Consider separating entryways, 
controlling access, hardening shared partitions, and special security operational countermeasures.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7


2.


Is access control provided through main entrance points for employees and visitors?
(lobby receptionist, sign-in, staff escorts, issue of visitor badges, checking forms of personal identification, 
electronic access control systems


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities


2.


Is access to private and public space or restricted area space clearly defined through the 
design of the space, signage, use of electronic security devices, etc.



Finishes and signage should be designed for visual simplicity.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
2.


Is access to elevators distinguished as to those that are designated only for employees and 
visitors



Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

2.1


Do public and employee entrances include space for possible future installation of access 
control and screening equipment


These include walk-through metal detectors and x-ray devices, identification check, electronic access card, 
search stations, and turnstiles.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.1


Do foyers have reinforced concrete walls and offset interior and exterior doors from each 
other


Consider for exterior entrances to the building or to access critical areas within the building if explosive blast 
hazard must be mitigated.
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853 
2.1


Do doors and walls along the line of security screening meet requirements of UL752 "Standard 
for Safety: Bullet-Resisting Equipment"



If the postulated threat in designing entrance access control includes rifles, pistols, or shotguns, then the 
screening area should have bullet-resistance to protect security personnel and uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if 
present, should also be bullet-resistant.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.1


Do circulation routes have unobstructed views of people approaching controlled access points



This applies to building entrances and to critical areas within the building.
References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD UFC 4-010-01
2.1


Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means of locking mechanisms



References: GSA PBS-P100 and CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139
2.1


Are critical assets (people, activities, building systems and components) located close to any 
main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, maintenance area, loading dock, or interior 
parking?
Are the critical building systems and components hardened


Critical building components include: Emergency generator including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and 
water supply; Normal fuel storage; Main switchgear; Telephone distribution and main switchgear; Fire pumps; 
Building control centers; Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems controlling critical functions; Main 
refrigeration and ventilation systems if critical to building operation; Elevator machinery and controls; Shafts 
for stairs, elevators, and utilities; Critical distribution feeders for emergency power. Evacuation and rescue 
require emergency systems to remain operational during a disaster and they should be located away from 
potential attack locations. Primary and backup systems should be separated to reduce the risk of both being 
impacted by a single incident if collocated. Utility systems should be located at least 50 feet from loading 
docks, front entrances, and parking areas.
One way to harden critical building systems and components is to enclose them within hardened walls, floors, 
and ceilings. Do not place them near high-risk areas where they can receive collateral damage.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.1


Are high-value or critical assets located as far into the interior of the building as possible and 
separated from the public areas of the building



Critical assets, such as people and activities, are more vulnerable to hazards when on an exterior building wall 
or adjacent to uncontrolled public areas inside the building.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.1


Is high visitor activity away from critical assets



High-risk activities should also be separated from low-risk activities. Also, visitor activities should be 
separated from daily activities.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide
2.1


Are critical assets located in spaces that are occupied 24 hours per day?
Are assets located in areas where they are visible to more than one person


Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide


2.1


Are loading docks and receiving and shipping areas separated in any direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and service entrances, including electrical, telephone/data, fire 
detection/alarm systems, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.



Loading docks should be designed to keep vehicles from driving into or parking under the building. If loading 
docks are in close proximity to critical equipment, consider hardening the equipment and service against 
explosive blast. Consider a 50-foot separation distance in all directions.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.20
Are mailrooms located away from building main entrances, areas containing critical services, 
utilities, distribution systems, and important assets?
Is the mailroom located near the loading dock?

The mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the building with an outside wall or window designed for 
pressure relief.
By separating the mailroom and the loading dock, the collateral damage of an incident at one has less impact 
upon the other. However, this may be the preferred mailroom location.
Off-site screening stations or a separate delivery processing building on site may be cost-effective, particularly 
if several buildings may share one mailroom. A separate delivery processing building reduces risk and 
simplifies protection measures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100


2.21
Does the mailroom have adequate space available for equipment to examine incoming 
packages and for an explosive disposal container





Screening of all deliveries to the building, including U.S. mail, commercial package delivery services, delivery 
of office supplies, etc.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.2


Are areas of refuge identified, with special consideration given to egress


Areas of refuge can be safe havens, shelters, or protected spaces for use during specified hazards.
Reference: FEMA 386-7


2.23
Are stairwells required for emergency egress located as remotely as possible from high-risk 
areas where blast events might occur?
Are stairways maintained with positive pressure or are there other smoke control systems



Consider designing stairs so that they discharge into areas other than lobbies, parking, or loading docks.
Maintaining positive pressure from a clean source of air (may require special filtering) aids in egress by keeping 
smoke, heat, toxic fumes, etc,. out of the stairway. Pressurize exit stairways in accordance with the National 
Model Building Code.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139


2.2


Are enclosures for emergency egress hardened to limit the extent of debris that might 
otherwise impede safe passage and reduce the flow of evacuees?


Egress pathways should be hardened and discharge into safe areas.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
2.2


Do interior barriers differentiate level of security within a building


Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

2.2


Are emergency systems located away from high-risk areas



The intent is to keep the emergency systems out of harms way, such that one incident does not take out all 
capability  both the regular systems and their backups.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

2.2

Is interior glazing near high-risk areas minimized?
Is interior glazing in other areas shatter-resistant



Interior glazing should be minimized where a threat exists and should be avoided in enclosures of critical 
functions next to high-risk areas.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.2


Are ceiling and lighting systems designed to remain in place during hazard events?

When an explosive blast shatters a window, the blast wave enters the interior space, putting structural and non-
structural building components under loads not considered in standard building codes. It has been shown that 
connection criteria for these systems in high seismic activity areas resulted in much less falling debris that 
could injure building occupants.
Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 14 kilograms (31 pounds) or more to minimize the 
likelihood that they will fall and injure building occupants. Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of 
0.5 times the equipment weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the downward direction. 
This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment mountings for forces required by other criteria, 
such as seismic standards.
Reference: DoD UCF 4-101-0




3         Structural Systems


3.


What type of construction?
What type of concrete and reinforcing steel?
What type of steel?
What type of foundation?


The type of construction provides an indication of the robustness to abnormal loading and load reversals. A 
reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame provides greater ductility and redundancy than a flat-slab or flat-
plate construction. The ductility of steel frame with metal deck depends on the connection details and pre-
tensioned or post-tensioned construction provides little capacity for abnormal loading patterns and load 
reversals. The resistance of load-bearing wall structures varies to a great extent, depending on whether the walls 
are reinforced or un-reinforced. A rapid screening process developed by FEMA for assessing structural hazards 
identifies the following types of construction with a structural score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A higher score 
indicates a greater capacity to sustain load reversals.
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 to 8.5
Steel moment-resisting frames - 3.5 to 4.5
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5
Steel frames with cast-in-place concrete shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5
Steel frames with unreinforced masonry infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Concrete moment-resisting frames - 2.0 to 4.0
Concrete shear wall buildings - 3.0 to 4.0
Concrete frames with unreinforced masonry infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5
Precast concrete frame buildings - 1.5 to 2.5
Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 2.5
References: FEMA 154 and Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
3.2
Do the reinforced concrete structures contain symmetric steel reinforcement (positive and 
negative faces) in all floor slabs, roof slabs, walls, beams, and girders that may be subjected to 
rebound, uplift, and suction pressures?
Do the lap splices fully develop the capacity of the reinforcement?
Are lap splices and other discontinuities staggered?
Do the connections possess ductile details?
Is special shear reinforcement, including ties and stirrups, available to allow large post-elastic 
behavior?

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.3
Are the steel frame connections moment connections?
Is the column spacing minimized so that reasonably sized members will resist the design loads 
and increase the redundancy of the system?
What are the floor-to-floor heights?

A practical upper level for column spacing is generally 30 feet. Unless there is an overriding architectural 
requirement, a practical limit for floor-to-floor heights is generally less than or equal to 16 feet.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
3.4
Are critical elements vulnerable to failure?
The priority for upgrades should be based on the relative importance of structural or non-structural elements that 
are essential to mitigating the extent of collapse and minimizing injury and damage.
Primary Structural Elements provide the essential parts of the buildings resistance to catastrophic blast loads 
and progressive collapse. These include columns, girders, roof beams, and the main lateral resistance system.
Secondary Structural Elements consist of all other load-bearing members, such as floor beams, slabs, etc.
Primary Non-Structural Elements consist of elements (including their attachments) that are essential for life 
safety systems or elements that can cause substantial injury if failure occurs, including ceilings or heavy 
suspended mechanical units.
Secondary Non-Structural Elements consist of all elements not covered in primary non-structural elements, such 
as partitions, furniture, and light fixtures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.5
Will the structure suffer an unacceptable level of damage resulting from the postulated threat 
(blast loading or weapon impact)?  

The extent of damage to the structure and exterior wall systems from the bomb threat may be related to a 
protection level. The following is for new buildings: 
Level of Protection Below Antiterrorism Standards  Severe damage. Frame collapse/massive 
destruction. Little left standing. Doors and windows fail and result in lethal hazards. Majority of personnel 
suffer fatalities.
Very Low Level Protection  Heavy damage. Onset of structural collapse. Major deformation of primary 
and secondary structural members, but progressive collapse is unlikely. Collapse of non-structural elements. 
Glazing will break and is likely to be propelled into the building, resulting in serious glazing fragment injuries, 
but fragments will be reduced. Doors may be propelled into rooms, presenting serious hazards. Majority of 
personnel suffer serious injuries. There are likely to be a limited number (10 percent to 25 percent) of fatalities.
Low Level of Protection  Moderate damage, unrepairable. Major deformation of non-structural elements 
and secondary structural members and minor deformation of primary structural members, but progressive 
collapse is unlikely. Glazing will break, but fall within 1 meter of the wall or otherwise not present a 
significant fragment hazard. Doors may fail, but they will rebound out of their frames, presenting minimal 
hazards. Majority of personnel suffer significant injuries. There may be a few (<10 percent) fatalities.
Medium Level Protection  Minor damage, repairable. Minor deformations of non-structural elements and 
secondary structural members and no permanent deformation in primary structural members. Glazing will break, 
but will remain in the window frame. Doors will stay in frames, but will not be reusable. Some minor injuries, 
but fatalities are unlikely.
High Level Protection  Minimal damage, repairable. No permanent deformation of primary and 
secondary structural members or non-structural elements. Glazing will not break. Doors will be reusable. Only 
superficial injuries are likely.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

3.6
Is the structure vulnerable to progressive collapse?
Is the building capable of sustaining the removal of a column for one floor above grade at the 
building perimeter without progressive collapse?
In the event of an internal explosion in an uncontrolled public ground floor area, does the 
design prevent progressive collapse due to the loss of one primary column?
Do architectural or structural features provide a minimum 6-inch stand-off to the internal 
columns (primary vertical load carrying members)?
Are the columns in the unscreened internal spaces designed for an unbraced length equal to 
two floors, or three floors where there are two levels of parking?
Design to mitigate progressive collapse is an independent analysis to determine a systems ability to resist 
structural collapse upon the loss of a major structural element or the systems ability to resist the loss of a major 
structural element. Design to mitigate progressive collapse may be based on the methods outlined in ASCE 7-98 
(now 7-02). Designers may apply static and/or dynamic methods of analysis to meet this requirement and ultimate 
load capacities may be assumed in the analyses. Combine structural upgrades for retrofits to existing buildings, 
such as seismic and progressive collapse, into a single project due to the economic synergies and other cross 
benefits. Existing facilities may be retrofitted to withstand the design level threat or to accept the loss of a 
column for one floor above grade at the building perimeter without progressive collapse. Note that collapse of 
floors or roof must not be permitted.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100


3.7
Are there adequate redundant load paths in the structure?

Special consideration should be given to materials that have inherent ductility and that are better able to 
respond to load reversals, such as cast in place reinforced concrete, reinforced masonry, and steel construction.
Careful detailing is required for material such as pre-stressed concrete, pre-cast concrete, and masonry to 
adequately respond to the design loads. Primary vertical load carrying members should be protected where 
parking is inside a facility and the building superstructure is supported by the parking structure.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.8
Are there transfer girders supported by columns within unscreened public spaces or at the 
exterior of the building?

Transfer girders allow discontinuities in columns between the roof and foundation. This design has inherent 
difficulty in transferring load to redundant paths upon loss of a column or the girder. Transfer beams and girders 
that, if lost, may cause progressive collapse are highly discouraged.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.9
What is the grouting and reinforcement of masonry (brick and/or concrete masonry unit 
(CMU)) exterior walls?

Avoid unreinforced masonry exterior walls. Reinforcement can run the range of light to heavy, depending upon 
the stand-off distance available and postulated design threat.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 recommends fully grouted and reinforced CMU construction where CMU is selected.
Reference: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings states "Unreinforced masonry walls are 
prohibited for the exterior walls of new buildings. A minimum of 0.05 percent vertical reinforcement with a 
maximum spacing of 1200 mm (48 in) will be provided. For existing buildings, implement mitigating measures 
to provide an equivalent level of protection." [This is light reinforcement and based upon the recommended 
stand-off distance for the situation.] 

3.10
Will the loading dock design limit damage to adjacent areas and vent explosive force to the 
exterior of the building?
Design the floor of the loading dock for blast resistance if the area below is occupied or contains critical utilities.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.11
Are mailrooms, where packages are received and opened for inspection, and unscreened 
retail spaces designed to mitigate the effects of a blast on primary vertical or lateral bracing 
members


Where mailrooms and unscreened retail spaces are located in occupied areas or adjacent to critical utilities, 
walls, ceilings, and floors, they should be blast- and fragment- resistant.
Methods to facilitate the venting of explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to the outside of the 
structure may include blow-out panels and window system designs that provide protection from blast pressure 
applied to the outside, but that readily fail and vent if exposed to blast pressure on the inside.
Reference: GSA PBS-P10




4         Building Envelope


4.1

What is the designed or estimated protection level of the exterior walls against the postulated 
explosive threat?


The performance of the faade varies to a great extent on the materials. Different construction includes brick or 
stone with block backup, steel stud walls, precast panels, or curtain wall with glass, stone, or metal panel 
elements.
Shear walls that are essential to the lateral and vertical load bearing system and that also function as exterior 
walls should be considered primary structures and should resist the actual blast loads predicted from the threats 
specified. Where exterior walls are not designed for the full design loads, special consideration should be given 
to construction types that reduce the potential for injury.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100


4.2
Is there less than a 40 percent fenestration opening per structural bay?
Is the window system design on the exterior faade balanced to mitigate the hazardous effects 
of flying glazing following an explosive event? (glazing, frames, anchorage to supporting walls, 
etc.)
Do the glazing systems with a 12-inch (34-inch is better) bite contain an application of 
structural silicone?
Is the glazing laminated or is it protected with an anti-shatter (fragment retention) film?
If an anti-shatter film is used, is it a minimum of a 7-mil thick film, or specially manufactured 
4-mil thick film?

The performance of the glass will similarly depend on the materials. Glazing may be single pane or double 
pane, monolithic or laminated, annealed, heat strengthened or fully tempered.
The percent fenestration is a balance between protection level, cost, the architectural look of the building 
within its surroundings, and building codes. One goal is to keep fenestration to below 40 percent of the 
building envelope vertical surface area, but the process must balance differing requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an architect may favor window curtain walls; building codes require so much 
fenestration per square footage of floor area; fire codes require a prescribed window opening area if the window is 
a designated escape route; and the building owner has cost concerns.
Ideally, an owner would want 100 percent of the glazed area to provide the design protection level against the 
postulated explosive threat (design basis threat weapon size at the expected stand-off distance). However, 
economics and geometry may allow 80 percent to 90 percent due to the statistical differences in the 
manufacturing process for glass or the angle of incidence of the blast wave upon upper story windows (4th floor 
and higher).
Reference: GSA PBS-P100



4.3
Do the walls, anchorage, and window framing fully develop the capacity of the glazing material 
selected?
Are the walls capable of withstanding the dynamic reactions from the windows?
Will the anchorage remain attached to the walls of the building during an explosive event 
without failure?
Is the faade connected to backup block or to the structural frame?
Are non-bearing masonry walls reinforced?

Government produced and sponsored computer programs coupled with test data and recognized dynamic 
structural analysis techniques may be used to determine whether the glazing either survives the specified threats 
or the post damage performance of the glazing protects the occupants. A breakage probability no higher than 
750 breaks per 1,000 may be used when calculating loads to frames and anchorage.
The intent is to ensure the building envelope provides relatively equal protection against the postulated 
explosive threat for the walls and window systems for the safety of the occupants, especially in rooms with 
exterior walls.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

4.4
Does the building contain ballistic glazing?
Does the ballistic glazing meet the requirements of UL 752 Bullet-Resistant Glazing?
Does the building contain security-glazing?
Does the security-glazing meet the requirements of ASTM F1233 or UL 972, Burglary 
Resistant Glazing Material?
Do the window assemblies containing forced entry resistant glazing (excluding the glazing) 
meet the requirements of ASTM F 588?

Glass-clad polycarbonate or laminated polycarbonate are two types of acceptable glazing material.
If windows are upgraded to bullet-resistant, burglar-resistant, or forced entry-resistant, ensure that doors, 
ceilings, and floors, as applicable, can resist the same for the areas of concern.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.5
Do non-window openings, such as mechanical vents and exposed plenums, provide the same 
level of protection required for the exterior wall


In-filling of blast over-pressures must be considered through non-window openings such that structural 
members and all mechanical system mountings and attachments should resist these interior fill pressures.
These non-window openings should also be as secure as the rest of the building envelope against forced entry.
Reference: GSA PBS-P10




5         Utility Systems

5.


What is the source of domestic water? (utility, municipal, wells, lake, river, storage tank)
Is there a secure alternate drinking water supply?


Domestic water is critical for continued building operation. Although bottled water can satisfy requirements for 
drinking water and minimal sanitation, domestic water meets many other needs  flushing toilets, building 
heating and cooling system operation, cooling of emergency generators, humidification, etc.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.2
Are there multiple entry points for the water supply?

If the building or site has only one source of water entering at one location, the entry point should be secure.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.3
Is the incoming water supply in a secure location?

Ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the water supply and its components.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.4
Does the building or site have storage capacity for domestic water?
How many gallons of storage capacity are available and how long will it allow operations to 
continue?


Operational facilities will require reliance on adequate domestic water supply. Storage capacity can meet short-
term needs and use water trucks to replenish for extended outages.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities.

5.5
What is the source of water for the fire suppression system? (local utility company lines, 
storage tanks with utility company backup, lake, or river)
Are there alternate water supplies for fire suppression?

The fire suppression system water may be supplied from the domestic water or it may have a separate source, 
separate storage, or nonpotable alternate sources.
For a site with multiple buildings, the concern is that the supply should be adequate to fight the worst case 
situation according to the fire codes. Recent major construction may change that requirement.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.6
Is the fire suppression system adequate, code-compliant, and protected (secure location)?

Standpipes, water supply control valves, and other system components should be secure or supervised.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.7
Do the sprinkler/standpipe interior controls (risers) have fire- and blast-resistant separation?
Are the sprinkler and standpipe connections adequate and redundant?
Are there fire hydrant and water supply connections near the sprinkler/standpipe 
connections?
The incoming fire protection water line should be encased, buried, or located 50 feet from high-risk areas. The 
interior mains should be looped and sectionalized.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.8
Are there redundant fire water pumps (e.g., one electric, one diesel)?
Are the pumps located apart from each other?



Collocating fire water pumps puts them at risk for a single incident to disable the fire suppression system.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

5.9
Are sewer systems accessible?
Are they protected or secured?

Sanitary and stormwater sewers should be protected from unauthorized access. The main concerns are backup or 
flooding into the building, causing a health risk, shorting out electrical equipment, and loss of building use.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.10
What fuel supplies do the building rely upon for critical operation?
Typically, natural gas, propane, or fuel oil are required for continued operation.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.11
How much fuel is stored on the site or at the building and how long can this quantity support 
critical operations?
How is it stored?
How is it secured?

Fuel storage protection is essential for continued operation.
Main fuel storage should be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Access should be 
restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).
References: GSA PBS-P100 and Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.12
Where is the fuel supply obtained?
How is it delivered?

The supply of fuel is dependent on the reliability of the supplier.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.12
Are there alternate sources of fuel?
Can alternate fuels be used?

Critical functions may be served by alternate methods if normal fuel supply is interrupted.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.14
What is the normal source of electrical service for the site or building?

Utilities are the general source unless co-generation or a private energy provider is available.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.15
Is there a redundant electrical service source?
Can the site or buildings be fed from more than one utility substation?
The utility may have only one source of power from a single substation. There may be only single feeders from 
the main substation.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.16
How many service entry points does the site or building have for electricity?


Electrical supply at one location creates a vulnerable situation unless an alternate source is available.
Ensure disconnecting requirements according to NFPA 70 (National Fire Protection Association, National 
Electric Code) are met for multiple service entrances.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.17
Is the incoming electric service to the building secure?

 Typically, the service entrance is a locked room, inaccessible to the public.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.18
What provisions for emergency power exist? What systems receive emergency power and 
have capacity requirements been tested? 

Is the emergency power collocated with the commercial electric service?
Is there an exterior connection for emergency power?

Besides installed generators to supply emergency power, portable generators or rental generators available 
under emergency contract can be quickly connected to a building with an exterior quick disconnect already 
installed.
Testing under actual loading and operational conditions ensures the critical systems requiring emergency power 
receive it with a high assurance of reliability.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.19
By what means do the main telephone and data communications interface the site or building?
Typically, communication ducts or other conduits are available. Overhead service is more identifiable and 
vulnerable.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.20
Are there multiple or redundant locations for the telephone and communications service? 

Secure locations of communications wiring entry to the site or building are required.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.21
Does the fire alarm system require communication with external sources?
By what method is the alarm signal sent to the responding agency: telephone, radio, etc.?
Is there an intermediary alarm monitoring center?
Typically, the local fire department responds to an alarm that sounds at the station or is transmitted over phone 
lines by an auto dialer.
An intermediary control center for fire, security, and/or building system alarms may receive the initial 
notification at an on-site or off-site location. This center may then determine the necessary response and 
inform the responding agency.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.22
Are utility lifelines aboveground, underground, or direct buried?

Utility lifelines (water, power, communications, etc.) can be protected by concealing, burying, or encasing.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-



6        Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR)


6.


6.1
Where are the air intakes and exhaust louvers for the building? (low, high, or midpoint of the 
building structure)
Are the intakes and exhausts accessible to the public?



Air intakes should be located on the roof or as high as possible. Otherwise secure within CPTED-compliant 
fencing or enclosure. The fencing or enclosure should have a sloped roof to prevent the throwing of anything 
into the enclosure near the intakes.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states that air intakes should be on the fourth floor or higher and, on buildings with 
three floors or less, they should be on the roof or as high as practical. Locating intakes high on a wall is 
preferred over a roof location.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 states that, for all new inhabited buildings covered by this document, all air 
intakes should be located at least 3 meters (10 feet) above the ground.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 states: "An extension height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will place the intake out 
of reach of individuals without some assistance. Also, the entrance to the intake should be covered with a sloped 
metal mesh to reduce the threat of objects being tossed into the intake. A minimum slope of 45 is generally 
adequate. Extension height should be increased where existing platforms or building features (i.e., loading 
docks, retaining walls) might provide access to the outdoor air intakes".
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: Exhausts are also a concer n during an outdoor release, especially if exhaust fans 
are not in continuous operation, due to wind effects and chimney effects (air movement due to differential 
temperature). 

6.2
Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means of locking mechanisms?
Is access to mechanical areas similarly controlled?

Roofs are like entrances to the building and are like mechanical rooms when HVAC is installed. Adjacent 
structures or landscaping should not allow access to the roof.
References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959

6.3
Are there multiple air intake locations?

Single air intakes may feed several air handling units. Indicate if the air intakes are localized or separated. 
Installing low-leakage dampers is one way to provide the system separation when necessary.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities


6.4
What are the types of air filtration? Include the efficiency and number of filter modules for 
each of the main air handling systems?
Is there any collective protection for chemical, biological, and radiological contamination 
designed into the building?

MERV  Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value
HEPA  High Efficiency Particulate Air
Activated charcoal for gases
Ultraviolet C for biologicals
Consider mix of approaches for optimum protection and cost-effectiveness.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.5
Is there space for larger filter assemblies on critical air handling systems?

Air handling units serving critical functions during continued operation may be retrofitted to provide enhanced 
protection during emergencies. However, upgraded filtration may have negative effects upon the overall air 
handling system operation, such as increased pressure drop.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.6
Are there provisions for air monitors or sensors for chemical or biological agents?


Duct mounted sensors are usuallly found in limited cases in laboratory areas. Sensors generally have a limited 
spectrum of high reliability and are costly. Many different technologies are undergoing research to provide 
capability. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.7
By what method are air intakes and exhausts closed when not operational?

Motorized (low-leakage, fast-acting) dampers are the preferred method for closure with fail-safe to the closed 
position so as to support in-place sheltering.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.8
How are air handling systems zoned?
What areas and functions do each of the primary air handling systems serve?
Understanding the critical areas of the building that must continue functioning focuses security and hazard 
mitigation measures.
Applying HVAC zones that isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, and other entry and storage areas from 
the rest of the building HVAC zones and maintaining negative pressure within these areas will contain CBR 
releases. Identify common return systems that service more than one zone, effectively making a large single 
zone.
Conversely, emergency egress routes should receive positive pressurization to ensure contamination does not 
hinder egress. Consider filtering of the pressurization air.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959


6.9
Are there large central air handling units or are there multiple units serving separate zones?

Independent units can continue to operate if damage occurs to limited areas of the building.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.10
Are there any redundancies in the air handling system?
Can critical areas be served from other units if a major system is disabled?


Redundancy reduces the security measures required compared to a non-redundant situation.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.11
Is the air supply to critical areas compartmentalized?
Similarly, are the critical areas or the building as a whole, considered tight with little or no 
leakage?
During chemical, biological, and radiological situations, the intent is to either keep the contamination 
localized in the critical area or prevent its entry into other critical, non-critical, or public areas. Systems can be 
cross-connected through building openings (doorways, ceilings, partial wall), ductwork leakage, or pressure 
differences in air handling system. In standard practice, there is almost always some air carried between 
ventilation zones by pressure imbalances, due to elevator piston action, chimney effect, and wind effects.
Smoke testing of the air supply to critical areas may be necessary.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959




6.12
Are supply, return, and exhaust air systems for critical areas secure?
Are all supply and return ducts completely connected to their grilles and registers and 
secure?
Is the return air not ducted?

The air systems to critical areas should be inaccessible to the public, especially if the ductwork runs through the 
public areas of the building. It is also more secure to have a ducted air handling system versus sharing hallways 
and plenums above drop ceilings for return air. Non-ducted systems provide greater opportunity for introducing 
contaminants.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.13
What is the method of temperature and humidity control?
Is it localized or centralized?
Central systems can range from monitoring only to full control. Local control may be available to override 
central operation.
Of greatest concern are systems needed before, during, and after an incident that may be unavailable due to 
temperature and humidity exceeding operational limits (e.g., main telephone switch room).
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
6.14
Where are the building automation control centers and cabinets located?
Are they in secure areas?
How is the control wiring routed?


Access to any component of the building automation and control system could compromise the functioning of 
the system, increasing vulnerability to a hazard or precluding their proper operation during a hazard incident.
The HVAC and exhaust system controls should be in a secure area that allows rapid shutdown or other activation 
based upon location and type of attack.
References: FEMA 386-7, DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.15
Does the control of air handling systems support plans for sheltering in place or other 
protective approach?

The micro-meteorological effects of buildings and terrain can alter travel and duration of chemical agents and 
hazardous material releases. Shielding in the form of sheltering in place can protect people and property from 
harmful effects.
To support in-place sheltering, the air handling systems require the ability for authorized personnel to rapidly 
turn off all systems. However, if the system is properly filtered, then keeping the system operating will provide 
protection as long as the air handling system does not distribute an internal release to other portions of the 
building.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139
6.16
Are there any smoke evacuation systems installed?
Does it have purge capability?

For an internal blast, a smoke removal system may be essential, particularly in large, open spaces. The 
equipment should be located away from high-risk areas, the system controls and wiring should be protected, and 
it should be connected to emergency power. This exhaust capability can be built into areas with significant risk 
on internal events, such as lobbies, loading docks, and mailrooms. Consider filtering of the exhaust to capture 
CBR contaminants.
References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959
6.17
Where is roof-mounted equipment located on the roof? (near perimeter, at center of roof)

Roof-mounted equipment should be kept away from the building perimeter.
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853
6.18
Are fire dampers installed at all fire barriers?
Are all dampers functional and seal well when closed?

All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor air, return air, bypass) must be functional for proper protection within the 
building during an incident.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139
6.19
Do fire walls and fire doors maintain their integrity?
The tightness of the building (both exterior, by weatherization to seal cracks around doors and windows, and 
internal, by zone ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and fire doors) provides energy conservation benefits and 
functional benefits during a CBR incident.
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959
6.20
Do elevators have recall capability and elevator emergency message capability?

Although a life-safety code and fire response requirement, the control of elevators also has benefit during a CBR 
incident. The elevators generate a piston effect, causing pressure differentials in the elevator shaft and 
associated floors that can force contamination to flow up or down. 
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959
6.21
Is access to building information restricted?

Information on building operations, schematics, procedures, plans, and specifications should be strictly 
controlled and available only to authorized personnel.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959
6.22
Does the HVAC maintenance staff have the proper training, procedures, and preventive 
maintenance schedule to ensure CBR equipment is functional?

Functional equipment must interface with operational procedures in an emergency plan to ensure the equipment 
is properly operated to provide the protection desired.
The HVAC system can be operated in different ways, depending upon an external or internal release and where in 
the building an internal release occurs. Thus maintenance and security staff must have the training to properly 
operate the HVAC system under different circumstances, even if the procedure is to turn off all air movement 
equipment. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 5195



7        Plumbing and Gas System


7.


What is the method of water distribution?


Central shaft locations for piping are more vulnerable than multiple riser locations.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.2
What is the method of gas distribution? (heating, cooking, medical, process


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.3
Is there redundancy to the main piping distribution?
Looping of piping and use of section valves provide redundancies in the event sections of the system are 
damaged.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.4
What is the method of heating domestic water?
What fuel(s) is used?

Single source of hot water with one fuel source is more vulnerable than multiple sources and multiple fuel types. 
Domestic hot water availability is an operational concern for many building occupancies.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.5
Where are gas storage tanks located? (heating, cooking, medical, process)
How are they piped to the distribution system? (above or below ground)


The concern is that the tanks and piping could be vulnerable to a moving vehicle or a bomb blast either directly 
or by collateral damage due to proximity to a higher-risk area.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.6
Are there reserve supplies of critical gases?

Localized gas cylinders could be available in the event of damage to the central tank system.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilitie




8        Electrical Systems
8.1
Are there any transformers or switchgears located outside the building or accessible from the 
building exterior?
Are they vulnerable to public access?
Are they secured?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities


8.2
What is the extent of the external building lighting in utility and service areas and at normal 
entryways used by the building occupants?



Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.3
How are the electrical rooms secured and where are they located relative to other higher-risk 
areas, starting with the main electrical distribution room at the service entrance?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.4
Are critical electrical systems collocated with other building systems?
Are critical electrical systems located in areas outside of secured electrical areas?
Is security system wiring located separately from electrical and other service systems?

Collocation concerns include rooms, ceilings, raceways, conduits, panels, and risers.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities


8.5
How are electrical distribution panels serving branch circuits secured or are they in secure 
locations?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.6
Does emergency backup power exist for all areas within the building or for critical areas only?
How is the emergency power distributed?
Is the emergency power system independent from the normal electrical service, particularly 
in critical areas?


There should be no single critical node that allows both the normal electrical service and the emergency backup 
power to be affected by a single incident. Automatic transfer switches and interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns.
Emergency and normal electrical equipment should be installed separately, at different locations, and as far apart 
as possible.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

8.7
How is the primary electrical system wiring distributed?
Is it collocated with other major utilities?
Is there redundancy of distribution to critical areas?

Central utility shafts may be subject to damage, especially if there is only one for the building.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilitie






9         Fire Alarm System


9.1
Is the building fire alarm system centralized or localized?

How are alarms made known, both locally and centrally?

Are critical documents and control systems located in a secure yet accessible location


Fire alarm systems must first warn building occupants to evacuate for life safety. Then they must inform the 
responding agency to dispatch fire equipment and personnel.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.2
Where are the fire alarm panels located?
Do they allow access to unauthorized personnel?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.3
Is the fire alarm system standalone or integrated with other functions such as security and 
environmental or building management systems?
What is the interface?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.4
Do key fire alarm system components have fire- and blast-resistant separation?




This is especially necessary for the fire command center or fire alarm control center. The concern is to similarly 
protect critical components as described in Items 2.19, 5.7, and 10.3.

9.5
Is there redundant off-premises fire alarm reporting?

Fire alarms can ring at a fire station, at an intermediary alarm monitoring center, or autodial someone else. See 
Items 5.21 and 10.5




10        Communications and IT Systems


10.1
Where is the main telephone distribution room and where is it in relation to higher-risk areas?
Is the main telephone distribution room secure?

One can expect to find voice, data, signal, and alarm systems to be routed through the main telephone 
distribution room.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

10.2
Does the telephone system have an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)?
What is its type, power rating, and operational duration under load, and location? (battery, on-
line, filtered)


Many telephone systems are now computerized and need a UPS to ensure reliability during power fluctuations. 
The UPS is also needed to await any emergency power coming on line or allow orderly shutdown.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.3
Where are communication systems wiring closets located? (voice, data, signal, alarm)
Are they collocated with other utilities?
Are they in secure areas?
Concern is to have separation distance from other utilities and higher-risk areas to avoid collateral damage.
Security approaches on the closets include door alarms, closed circuit television, swipe cards, or other logging 
notifications to ensure only authorized personnel have access to these closets.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

10.4
How is the communications system wiring distributed? (secure chases and risers, accessible 
public areas)


The intent is to prevent tampering with the systems.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.5
Are there redundant communications systems available?


Critical areas should be supplied with multiple or redundant means of communications. Power outage phones 
can provide redundancy as they connect directly to the local commercial telephone switch off site and not 
through the building telephone switch in the main telephone distribution room.
A base radio communication system with antenna can be installed in stairwells, and portable sets distributed to 
floors.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7



10.6
Where are the main distribution facility, data centers, routers, firewalls, and servers located 
and are they secure?
Where are the secondary and/or intermediate distribution facilities and are they secure?

Concern is collateral damage from manmade hazards and redundancy of critical functions.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.7
What type and where are the Wide Area Network (WAN) connections?
Critical facilities should have two Minimum-Points-of-Presence( MPOPs) where the telephone companys 
outside cable terminates inside the building. It is functionally a service entrance connection that demarcates 
where the telephone companys property stops and the building owners property begins. The MPOPs should 
not be collocated and they should connect to different telephone company central offices so that the loss of one 
cable or central office does not reduce capability.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.8
What are the type, power rating, and location of the uninterruptible power supply? (battery, 
on-line, filtered)
Are the UPS also connected to emergency power?


Consider that UPS should be found at all computerized points from the main distribution facility to individual 
data closets and at critical personal computers/terminals.
Critical LAN sections should also be on backup power.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.9
What type of Local Area Network (LAN) cabling and physical topology is used? (Category (Cat) 
5, Gigabit Ethernet, Ethernet, Token Ring) 

The physical topology of a network is the way in which the cables and computers are connected to each other. 
The main types of physical topologies are:
Bus (single radial where any damage on the bus affects the whole system, but especially all portions 
downstream)
Star (several computes are connected to a hub and many hubs can be in the network  the hubs can be critical 
nodes, but the other hubs continue to function if one fails)
Ring (a bus with a continuous connection - least used, but can tolerate some damage because if the ring fails at a 
single point it can be rerouted much like a looped electric or water system)
The configuration and the availability of surplus cable or spare capacity on individual cables can reduce 
vulnerability to hazard incidents.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
10.10
For installed radio/wireless systems, what are their types and where are they located?(radio 
frequency (RF), high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), medium wave (MW))

Depending upon the function of the wireless system, it could be susceptible to accidental or intended jamming 
or collateral damage.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities


10.11
Do the Information Technology (IT - computer) systems meet requirements of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability?
Ensure access to terminals and equipment for authorized personnel only and ensure system up-time to meet 
operational needs.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.12
Where is the disaster recovery/mirroring site?


A site with suitable equipment that allows continuation of operations or that mirrors (operates in parallel to) 
the existing operation is beneficial if equipment is lost during a natural or manmade disaster. The need is based 
upon the criticality of the operation and how quickly replacement equipment can be put in place and operated.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
10.13
Where is the backup tape/file storage site and what is the type of safe environment?(safe, vault, 
underground)
Is there redundant refrigeration in the site?
If equipment is lost, data are most likely lost, too. Backups are needed to continue operations at the disaster 
recovery site or when equipment can be delivered and installed.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
10.14
Are there any satellite communications (SATCOM) links?(location, power, UPS, emergency 
power, spare capacity/capability)


SATCOM links can serve as redundant communications for voice and data if configured to support required 
capability after a hazard incident. 
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
10.15
Is there a mass notification system that reaches all building occupants? (public address, pager, 
cell phone, computer override, etc.)
Will one or more of these systems be operational under hazard conditions? (UPS, emergency 
power) 

Depending upon building size, a mass notification system will provide warning and alert information, along 
with actions to take before and after an incident if there is redundancy and power.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

10.16
Do control centers and their designated alternate locations have equivalent or reduced 
capability for voice, data, mass notification, etc.?(emergency operations, security, fire alarms, 
building automation)
Do the alternate locations also have access to backup systems, including emergency power?


Reference: GSA PBS-P10





11        Equipment Operations and Maintenanc


11.


Are there composite drawings indicating location and capacities of major systems and are they 
current? (electrical, mechanical, and fire protection; and date of last update)
Do updated operations and maintenance (O&M) manuals exist?
Within critical infrastructure protection at the building level, the current configuration and capacity of all 
critical systems must be understood to ensure they meet emergency needs. Manuals must also be current to 
ensure operations and maintenance keeps these systems properly functioning. The system must function during 
an emergency unless directly affected by the hazard incident.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.2
Have critical air systems been rebalanced?
If so, when and how often?
Although the system may function, it must be tested periodically to ensure it is performing as designed. 
Balancing is also critical after initial construction to set equipment to proper performance per the design.
Rebalancing may only occur during renovation.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.3
Is air pressurization monitored regularly?
Some areas require positive or negative pressure to function properly. Pressurization is critical in a hazardous 
environment or emergency situation.
Measuring pressure drop across filters is an indication when filters should be changed, but also may indicate 
that low pressures are developing downstream and could result in loss of expected protection.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139


11.4
Does the building have a policy or procedure for periodic recommissioning of major 
Mechanical/Electrical/Plumbing (M/E/P) systems?



Recommissioning involves testing and balancing of systems to ascertain their capability to perform as 
described.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.5
Is there an adequate O&M program, including training of facilities management staff?

If O&M of critical systems is done with in-house personnel, management must know what needs to be done and 
the workforce must have the necessary training to ensure systems reliability.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.6
What maintenance and service agreements exist for M/E/P systems?
When an in-house facility maintenance work force does not exist or does not have the capability to perform the 
work, maintenance and service contracts are the alternative to ensure critical systems will work under all 
conditions. The facility management staff requires the same knowledge to oversee these contracts as if the work 
was being done by in-house personnel.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.7
Are backup power systems periodically tested under load?


Loading should be at or above maximum connected load to ensure available capacity and automatic sensors 
should be tested at least once per year.
Periodically (once a year as a minimum) check the duration of capacity of backup systems by running them for 
the expected emergency duration or estimating operational duration through fuel consumption, water 
consumption, or voltage loss.
Reference: FEMA 386-7


11.8
Is stairway and exit sign lighting operational?


The maintenance program for stairway and exit sign lighting (all egress lighting) should ensure functioning 
under normal and emergency power conditions.
Expect building codes to be updated as emergency egress lighting is moved from upper walls and over doorways 
to floor level as heat and smoke drive occupants to crawl along the floor to get out of the building. Signs and 
lights mounted high have limited or no benefit when obscured.
Reference: FEMA 386-




12        Security System


            Perimeter System

12.


Are black/white or color CCTV (closed circuit television) cameras used?
Are they monitored and recorded 24 hours/7 days a week? By whom?
Are they analog or digital by design?    
What are the number of fixed, wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras used?        
Who are the manufacturers of the CCTV cameras?
What is the age of the CCTV cameras in use? 
Security technology is frequently considered to complement or supplement security personnel forces and to 
provide a wider area of coverage. Typically, these physical security elements provide the first line of defense in 
deterring, detecting, and responding to threats and reducing vulnerabilities. They must be viewed as an integral 
component of the overall security program. Their design, engineering, installation, operation, and 
management must be able to meet daily security challenges from a cost-effective and efficiency perspective. 
During and after an incident, the system, or its backups, should be functional per the planned design.
Consider color CCTV cameras to view and record activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at 
primary entrances and exits. A mix of monochrome cameras should be considered for areas that lack adequate 
illumination for color cameras.
Reference: GSA PBS P-100

12.2
Are the cameras programmed to respond automatically to perimeter building alarm events?
Do they have built-in video motion capabilities?

 

The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the number of screens increases. Tying the alarm 
system or motion sensors to a CCTV camera and a monitoring screen improves the man-machine interface by 
drawing attention to a specific screen and its associated camera. Adjustment may be required after installation 
due to initial false alarms, usually caused by wind or small animals.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.3
What type of camera housings are used and are they environmental in design to protect against 
exposure to heat and cold weather elements? 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.4
Are panic/duress alarm buttons or sensors used, where are they located, and are they 
hardwired or portable?
 


Call buttons should be provided at key public contact areas and as needed in offices of managers and directors, in 
garages and parking lots, and other high-risk locations by assessment.
Reference: GSA PBS P-100

12.5
Are intercom call boxes used in parking areas or along the building perimeter?

See Item 12.4.
12.6
What is the transmission media used to transmit camera video signals: fiber, wire line, 
telephone wire, coaxial, wireless? 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.7
Who monitors the CCTV system? 

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
12.8
What is the quality of video images both during the day and hours of darkness?
Are infrared camera illuminators used?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
 
12.9
Are the perimeter cameras supported by an uninterruptible power supply, battery, or 
building emergency power?


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.10
What type of exterior Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensors are used? (electromagnetic; fiber 
optic; active infrared; bistatic microwave; seismic; photoelectric; ground; fence; glass break 
(vibration/shock); single, double, and roll-up door magnetic contacts or switches) 
Consider balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exterior doors, including overhead/roll-up doors, and 
review roof intrusion detection.
Consider glass break sensors for windows up to scalable heights.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
12.11
Is a global positioning system (GPS) used to monitor vehicles and asset movements? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Interior Security

12.12
Are black/white or color CCTV cameras used?
Are they monitored and recorded 24 hours/7 days a week? By whom?
Are they analog or digital by design?
What are the number of fixed, wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras used?
Who are the manufacturers of the CCTV cameras?
What is the age of the CCTV cameras in use? 

See Item 12.1.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.13
Are the cameras programmed to respond automatically to interior building alarm events?
Do they have built-in video motion capabilities?
 
The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the number of screens increases. Tying the alarm 
system or motion sensors to a CCTV camera and a monitoring screen improves the man-machine interface by 
drawing attention to a specific screen and its associated camera.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.14
What type of camera housings are used and are they designed to protect against exposure or 
tampering? 


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.15
Do the camera lenses used have the proper specifications, especially distance viewing and 
clarity? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.16
What is the transmission media used to transmit camera video signals: fiber, wire line, 
telephone wire, coaxial, wireless? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.17
Are the interior camera video images of good visual and recording quality? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.18
Are the interior cameras supported by an uninterruptible power supply source, battery, or 
building emergency power? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.19
What are the first costs and maintenance costs associated with the interior cameras? 


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.20
What type of security access control system is used?
Are the devices used for physical security also used (integrated) with security computer 
networks (e.g., in place of or in combination with user ID and system passwords)? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.21
What type of access control transmission media is used to transmit access control system signals 
(same as defined for CCTV cameras)? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.22
What is the backup power supply source for the access control systems? (battery, uninterruptible 
power supply) 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.23
What access control system equipment is used?

How old are the systems and what are the related first and maintenance service costs? 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.24
Are panic/duress alarm sensors used?
Where are they located?
Are they hardwired or portable? 

Call buttons should be provided at key public contact areas and as needed in offices of managers and directors, in 
garages and parking lots, and other high-risk locations by assessment.
Reference: GSA PBS P-100
12.25
Are intercom call-boxes or a building intercom system used throughout the building? 

See Item 12.24.
12.26
Are magnetometers (metal detectors) and x-ray equipment used? 
At what locations within the building? 

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

12.27
What type of interior IDS sensors are used: electromagnetic; fiber optic; active infrared-motion 
detector; photoelectric; glass break (vibration/shock); single, double, and roll-up door magnetic 
contacts or switches? 


Consider magnetic reed switches for interior doors and openings.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
12.28
Are mechanical, electrical, gas, power supply, radiological material storage, voice/data 
telecommunication system nodes, security system panels, elevator and critical system panels, 
and other sensitive rooms continuously locked, under electronic security, CCTV camera, and 
intrusion alarm systems surveillance? 

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
12.29
What types of locking hardware are used throughout the building?
Are manual and electromagnetic cipher, keypad, pushbutton, panic bar, door strikes, and 
related hardware and software used?

As a minimum, electric utility closets, mechanical rooms, and telephone closets should be secured.
The mailroom should also be secured, allowing only authorized personnel into the area where mail is screened 
and sorted. Separate the public access area from the screening area for the postulated mailroom threats.
All security locking arrangements on doors used for egress must comply with NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

12.30
Are any potentially hazardous chemicals, combustible, or toxic materials stored on site in non-
secure and non-monitored areas? 

The storage, use, and handling locations should also be kept away from other activities. 
The concern is that an intruder need not bring the material into the building if it is already there and accessible.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.31
What security controls are in place to handle the processing of mail and protect against 
potential biological, explosive, or other threatening exposures? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.32
Is there a designated security control room and console in place to monitor security, fire 
alarm, and other building systems?
Is there a backup control center designated and equipped?
Is there off-site 24-hour monitoring of intrusion detection systems?
Monitoring can be done at an off-site facility, at an on-site monitoring center during normal duty hours, or at a 
24-hour on-site monitoring center.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
12.33
Is the security console and control room adequate in size and does it provide room for 
expansion?
Does it have adequate environment controls (e.g., a/c, lighting, heating, air circulation, backup 
power)?
Is it ergonomically designed?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.34
Is the location of the security room in a secure area with limited, controlled, and restricted 
access controls in place?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.35
What are the means by which facility and security personnel can communicate with one 
another (e.g., portable radio, pager, cell phone, personal data assistants (PDAs))?
What problems have been experienced with these and other electronic security systems?


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.36
Is there a computerized security incident reporting system used to prepare reports and track 
security incident trends and patterns? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.37
Does the current security force have access to a computerized guard tour system? 

This system allows for the systematic performance of guard patrols with validation indicators built in. The 
system notes stations/locations checked or missed, dates and times of such patrols, and who conducted them on 
what shifts. Management reports can be produced for recordkeeping and manpower analysis purposes.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.38
Are vaults or safes in the building?
Where are they located?
Basic structural design requires an understanding of where heavy concentrations of floor loading may occur so as 
to strengthen the floor and structural framing to handle this downward load. Security design also needs this 
information to analyze how this concentrated load affects upward and downward loadings under blast conditions 
and its impact upon progressive collapse. Location is important because safes can be moved by blast so that 
they should be located away from people and away from exterior windows.
Vaults, on the other hand, require construction above the building requirements with thick masonry walls and 
steel reinforcement. A vault can provide protection in many instances due to its robust construction.
Safes and vaults may also require security sensors and equipment, depending upon the level of protection and 
defensive layers needed.
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-85
Security System Documents
12.39
Have security system as-built drawings been generated and are they ready for review? 

Drawings are critical to the consideration and operation of security technologies, including its overall design 
and engineering processes. These historical reference documents outline system specifications and layout 
security devices used, as well as their application, location, and connectivity. They are a critical resource tool 
for troubleshooting system problems, and replacing and adding other security system hardware and software 
products. Such documents are an integral component to new and retrofit construction projects.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities





12.40
Have security system design and drawing standards been developed? 


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.41
Are security equipment selection criteria defined? 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.42
What contingency plans have been developed or are in place to deal with security control 
center redundancy and backup operations?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.43
Have security system construction specification documents been prepared and standardized?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.44
Do all security system documents include current as-built drawings? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.45
Have qualifications been determined for security consultants, system designers/engineers, 
installation vendors, and contractors? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.46
Are security systems decentralized, centralized, or integrated?
Do they operate over an existing IT network or are they a standalone method of operation? 

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.47
What security systems manuals are available?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.48
What maintenance or service agreements exist for security systems?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilitie


13         Security Master Pla


13.

Does a written security plan exist for this site or building?
When was the initial security plan written and last revised?
Who is responsible for preparing and reviewing the security plan?
The development and implementation of a security master plan provides a roadmap that outlines the strategic 
direction and vision, operational, managerial, and technological mission, goals, and objectives of the 
organizations security program.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
13.2
Has the security plan been communicated and disseminated to key management personnel and 
departments?



The security plan should be part of the building design so that the construction or renovation of the structure 
integrates with the security procedures to be used during daily operations.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.3
Has the security plan been benchmarked or compared against related organizations and 
operational entities?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.4
Has the security plan ever been tested and evaluated from a benefit/cost and operational 
efficiency and effectiveness perspective?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.5
Does the security plan define mission, vision, and short- and long- term security program goals 
and objectives?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.6
Are threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks adequately defined and security 
countermeasures addressed and prioritized relevant to their criticality and probability of 
occurrence?


Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
13.7
Has a security implementation schedule been established to address recommended security 
solutions?




Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.8
Have security operating and capital budgets been addressed, approved, and established to 
support the plan?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.9
What regulatory or industry guidelines/standards were followed in the preparation of the 
security plan?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.10
Does the security plan address existing security conditions from an administrative, operational, 
managerial, and technical security systems perspective?


Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.11
Does the security plan address the protection of people, property, assets, and information?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.12
Does the security plan address the following major components: access control, surveillance, 
response, building hardening, and protection against CBR and cyber-network attacks?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.13
Has the level of risk been identified and communicated in the security plan through the 
performance of a physical security assessment?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.14
When was the last security assessment performed?
Who performed the security risk assessment?



Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

13.15
Are the following areas of security analysis addressed in the security master plan? 
Asset Analysis: Does the security plan identify and prioritize the assets to be protected in accordance 
to their location, control, current value, and replacement value?
Threat Analysis: Does the security plan address potential threats; causes of potential harm in the 
form of death, injury, destruction, disclosure, interruption of operations, or denial of services?(possible 
criminal acts [documented and review of police/security incident reports] associated with forced 
entry, bombs, ballistic assault, biochemical and related terrorist tactics, attacks against utility 
systems infrastructure and buildings)
Vulnerability Analysis: Does the security plan address other areas associated with the site or 
building and its operations that can be taken advantage of to carry out a threat?(architectural design 
and construction of new and existing buildings, technological support systems [e.g., heating, air 
conditioning, power, lighting and security systems, etc.] and operational procedures, policies, and 
controls)
Risk Analysis: Does the security plan address the findings from the asset, threat/hazard, and 
vulnerability analyses in order to develop, recommend, and consider implementation of appropriate 
security countermeasures?
This process is the input to the building design and what mitigation measures will be included in the facility 
project to reduce risk and increase safety of the building and people.
Reference: USA TM 5-853, Security Engineerin


Table 1-22: Building Vulnerablilty Assessment Checklist* (continued



*Sources: 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (CDC/NIOSH)Publication No. 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building 
Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, May 2002
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)FEMA 154, Rapid Visual Screening of 
Buildings for Seismic Hazards: A Handbook, 1988 (also, Applied Technology Council (ATC-
21) by same name)
FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning, September 2002
SLG 101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Chapter 6, Attachment G, 
Terrorism, April 2001
General Services Administration (GSA)PBS  P100, Facilities Standards for Public 
Buildings Service, November 2002
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)LBNL PUB-51959, Protecting Buildings 
from a Biological or Chemical Attack: Actions to Take Before or During a Release, January 
10, 2003
U.S. Air Force (USAF)Installation Force Protection Guide, 1997
U.S. Army (USA)Technical Manuals (TM) 5-853-1/-2/-3/-4, Security Engineering, May 12, 
1994
U.S. Department of Commerce, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (DOC 
CIAO)Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1, October 1998
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), UFC 4-010-01, DoD 
Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, July 31, 2002
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)National Criminal Justice (NCJ) NCJ181200, Fiscal Year 
1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Assessment and Strategy 
Development Tool Kit, May 15, 2000
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)Physical Security Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities, Recommendations of the National Institute of Building Sciences 
Task Group to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 6 September 2002