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What I Didnt Find in Africa	hrrp:www.nytimes.com/2flO3~O7O6/op~nion/O6 WILS.htmi?pagewa...

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	July 6, 2003	   EXHIBIT
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	What I Didnt Find in Africa	Cr. 394(ID)

By JOSEPH C. WILSON 4th

W ASIIINGTON

Did the B~ish administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Husseins weapons programs to
justify an invasion of Iraq?

Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little	f
choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraqs nuclear weapons program was I
twisted to exaggerate the fraqi threat.

For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, 1 was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as
charg6 d~affaires inBaghdad,.I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was
also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H. W. Bushs
ambassadorto Gabon and S~o Tom6 and Pnfncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa
policy forthe National Security Council.

It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about
Africas suspected link to Iraqs nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that
unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? Thats me.

In February 2002,1 was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President
Dick Cheneys office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I
was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium
yellowcake  a form of lightly processed ore  by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990s. The agency
officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out the story so they could provide a response to the
vice president~s office.

After consulting with the State Departments African Affairs Bureau (and through it with Barbro
Owens-Kirkpatrick, the United States ambassador to Niger), I agreed to make the trip. The mission I
undertook was discreet but by no means secret. While the C.I.A. paid my expenses (my time was
offered pro bono), I made it abundantly clear to everyone I met that I was acting on behalf of the United
States government.

In late February 2002, 1 arrived in Nigers capital, Niamey, where I had been a diplomat in the mid-70s
and visited as a National Security Council official in the late 90s. The city was much as I remembered
it. Seasonal winds had clogged the air with dust and sand. Through the haze, I could see camel caravans
crossing the Niger River (over the John F. Kennedy bridge), the setting sun behind them. Most people
had wrapped scarves around their faces to protect against the grit, leaving only their eyes visible.

The next morning, I met with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick at the embassy. For reasons that are
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understandable. the embassy staff has always kept a close eye on Nigers uranium business. I was not
surprised, then, when the ambassador told me that she knew about the allegations of i~ranium sales to
Iraq  and that she felt she had already debunked them in her reports to Washin~tom Nevertheless, she
and I agreed that my time would be best spent interviewing people who had been in government when
the deal supposedly took place, which was before her arrival.

I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current
government officials, fomier government officials, people associated with the countrys uranium
business, It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever
taken pl~ce.

Given the structure of the consortiurns that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for
Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Nigers uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and
Continak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the
government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notif~y the consortium, which in
turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines
are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the
minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, theres simply too much
oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.

(As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents
had glaring errors  they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government 
and were probably forged. And then theres the fact that Niger formally denied the charges.)

Before I left Niger, i briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also
shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, 1 arrived in Washington and
promptly proviiied a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State
Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as
there was nothing secret about my trip.

Though I did not file a written report, there should be at least four documents in United States
government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include the ambassadors report of
my debriefing in Niantey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a C.I.A. report summing up
my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been
delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to
know that this is standard operating procedure.

I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate,
arguing that a strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.) In
September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a white paper
asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence,
the report cited Iraqs attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.

Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to
	buy uranium from Africa.

The next day, I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and suggested that if the president
had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He
replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that
produce uranium: (}abon, South Africa or Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didnt
know that in December, a month before the presidents address, the State Department had published a
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fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case.

Those are the facts surrounding my efforts. The vice presidents office asked a serious question. I wa~
asked to help formulate the answer. I did so, and I have every confidence that the answer I provided
was circulated to the appropriate officials within out- government.

The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information
was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the
information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate
argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses. (Its worth remembering that in his
March Meet the Press appearance, Mr. Cheney said that Saddarn Hussein was trying once again to
produce nuclear weapons.) At a minimum, Congress, which authorized the use of military force at the
presidents behest, should want to know if the assertions about Iraq were warranted.

I was convinced before the war that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam
Hussein required a vigorous and sustained international response to disarm him. Iraq possessed and had
used chemical weapons; it had an active biological weapons program and quite possibly a nuclear
research program  all of which were in violation of United Nations resolutions. Having encountered
Mr. Hussein and his thugs in the mn-up to the Persian Gulf war of 1991, I was only too aware of the
dangers he posed.

But were these dangers the sarhe ones the administration told us about? We have to find out. Antencas
foreign policy depends on the sanctity of its information. For this reason, questioning the selective use
of intelligence to justif~ the war in Iraq is neither idle sniping nor revisionist history,t as Mr. Bush has
suggested. The act of war is the last option of a democracy, taken when there is a grave threat to our
national security. More than 200 American soldiers have lost their lives in Iraq already. We have a duty
to ensure that their sacrifice caine for the right reasons.

Joseph C. Wilson 4th, United States ambassador to Gabon from 1992 to 1995. is an international
business consultant.

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