No. 95-30756
                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                        FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                          CORTEZ T. BRIDGES,
                                        Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.
                        CITY OF BOSSIER CITY,
                                        Defendant-Appellee.
                ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                     FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
                  BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
                                DEVAL L. PATRICK
                                  Assistant Attorney General
                                JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
                                SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS
                                  Attorneys
                                  Department of Justice
                                  P.O. Box 66078
                                  Washington, D.C. 20035-6078
                                  (202) 514-2174
                                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                         PAGE
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . .  5
ARGUMENT:
    THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CITY
    DID NOT "REGARD" BRIDGES AS HAVING A DISABILITY . . . . 8
    A. Where An Employer Rejects An Applicant
       Because Of An Assumption About The Limiting
       Effects Of An Impairment, A Presumption
       Arises That The Employer "Regards" The
       Applicant As Substantially Limited In A Major
       Life Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
    B. The City "Regarded" Bridges As Having A
       Substantially Limiting Impairment . . . . . . . .   14
       1. The city "regarded" Bridges as
          disqualified from the "class" of
          firefighting jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 15
       2. Because the city "regarded" Bridges
          as disqualified from a "class of
          jobs," the Court need not decide
          whether it also "regarded" him as
          disqualified from a broad range of
          jobs in various classes . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
                        TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993),
  cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994) . . . . . . . . . 5, 18
Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation,
  and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . .18
                                - i -
01-05342
CASES (continued):                                        PAGE
Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . .  17
Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723
  (5th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 16
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088
  (D. Haw. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16, 18
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 112
  (11th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . .19
Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203 (4th Cir.), cert.
  denied, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994),
  cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . .19
Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244
  (6th Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
  (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 6, 14
Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992) . . .18
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
  101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C.
  12101 et seq.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .passim
        42 U.S.C. 12102(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
        42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
    Title I, 42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.  . . . . . . . . . . .  1
        42 U.S.C. 12111(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
        Section 102, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) . . . . . . . . . 4, 8
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h)(1) (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995) . . . . . . .  10, 11, 15, 16
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1995)  . . . . . . . . . 10, 15
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C) (1995) . . . . .  . . . . . . 11
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(l)(1) (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(l)(3) (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(j) (1995) . . . . . . passim
                                - ii -
01-05343
REGULATIONS (continued):                                  PAGE
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(l) . . . . . . . . . . 12, 18
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) .  6, 14
H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 3, 101st Cong.,
  2d Sess. (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6, 12, 13, 18
MISCELLANEOUS:
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
  Occupational Outlook Handbook (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S. Office of Personnel Mgt., Handbook of Occupational
  Groups and Series (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S. Dep't of Commrce, Economics and Statistics Admin.,
  Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population
  and Housing: Classified Index of Industries and
  Occupations (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
                                - iii -
01-05344
                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                        FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                            No. 95-30756
                         CORTEZ T. BRIDGES,
                                                Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.
                        CITY OF BOSSIER CITY,
                                                Defendant-Appellee.
             ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
              BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
                     INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
        This case involves the construction of the term "disability"
in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq..
It arises in the context of an employment discrimination suit
against a local government under Title I of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
12111 et seq.. The Attorney General has principal authority to
enforce the provisions of Title I against public employers, and
this Court's decision could have a significant effect on those
enforcement responsibilities.
                        STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
        Whether an individual who is refused employment as a fire-
fighter because he suffers from a mild form of hemophilia is
"regarded as having" a disability and therefore protected by the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (ADA).
01-05345
                                - 2 -
                        STATEMENT OF THE CASE
        1. This case arises under the employment provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. It involves the Bossier City
Fire Department's rejection of Cortez Bridges's application for
employment as a firefighter. Bridges, the plaintiff, suffers
from Hemophilia B, a deficiency in the blood clotting factor
known as Factor IX (Memo. R. 1).1/ Physicians classify cases of
hemophilia into three groups based on their seriousness: severe,
moderate, and mild. Id. at 2. Bridges has a mild case, which is
the rarest form of hemophilia. Ibid. "Mild hemophiliacs, unlike
severe hemophiliacs, do not suffer from spontaneous bleeding --
bleeding in the joints resulting from no apparent trauma." Ibid.
Although individuals with mild hemophilia do "face a risk of
increased bleeding secondary to trauma," id. at 3, the district
court found no persuasive evidence that Bridges had ever suffered
excess bleeding as a result of his condition. See id. at 3-4.
        The district court found that Bridges "has led a normal,
active life, apparently unhindered by his blood condition. He
participated in athletics and played in the school band through-
out high school." Id. at 1-2. During junior college, Bridges
became certified as an emergency medical technician (EMT); he
currently works as an EMT at a local casino. Id. at 2. He also
serves in the National Guard as the commander of a Bradley
1/"Memo. R.   " refers to page numbers in the district court's
Memorandum Ruling of June 30, 1995. "  Tr.  " refers to pages
in the transcript of trial proceedings for the dates indicated.
"R.  " refers to entries on the district court's docket sheet.
01-05346
                                - 3 -
fighting vehicle. Ibid. "As a National Guard member, he has
successfully completed the initial boot camp and successive
summer training exercises without incident." Ibid. And Bridges
has twice had surgery for unrelated conditions; on neither
occasion did he bleed excessively. Id. at 3-4. As the plain-
tiff's medical expert testified, Bridges's medical history
indicates that any trauma sufficient to cause Bridges to suffer a
bleeding incident would also be sufficient to require medical
attention in most other people. 5/10/95 Tr. 238.
        After completing his EMT training in 1992, Bridges desired
to become a paramedic. Id. at 19-20. In the Bossier City Fire
Department, all paramedics must first serve as firefighters.
Accordingly, Bridges applied in January of 1992 to become a
firefighter. Id. at 20. He passed the civil service examination
in May of 1992. Id. at 21. After passing a drug test and a
polygraph test, Bridges was extended an offer of employment
beginning July 15, 1992. Id. at 22-24. However, that offer was
conditional on his passing a physical examination. Id. at 24.
At the examination, Bridges informed the examining physician of
his mild hemophilia; the doctor recommended that Bridges not be
hired. Id. at 25-36. The city followed the physician's recom-
mendation and withdrew its conditional offer of employment. Id.
at 34-36. As the district court found, "[t]he City rejected
plaintiff because it feared his condition rendered him a danger
to himself and others if employed as a fire fighter. At trial,
the City repeatedly cited his potential for excess bleeding
01-05347                     - 4 -
secondary to trauma as the source of this danger." Memo. R. 1.
        2. On March 2, 1994, Bridges initiated this action (R. 1:
Complaint). His complaint alleged that the city's withdrawal of
its employment offer violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Section 102 of the ADA prohibits discrimination in the
terms and conditions of employment "against a qualified individu-
al with a disability because of the disability." 42 U.S.C.
12112(a). Bridges contended that he was a "qualified individual"
because he could perform the essential functions of the position
of firefighter, see 42 U.S.C. 12111(8), and that he had a "dis-
ability" because the city regarded him as being disabled.
        After a three-day bench trial, the district court granted
judgment for the city on June 30, 1995 (Memo. R. 8). The court
concluded that the city did not regard Bridges as having a
"disability" within the meaning of the ADA. Id. at 5-8. Because
"[t]he legal definition of disability * * * [turns] on whether
the City regarded plaintiff as having a substantially limiting
impairment," the district court concluded that Bridges must prove
that "the City acted because it considered his condition substan-
tially limiting." Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original). The court
held that Bridges had failed to meet that burden: "The evidence
demonstrated that the City acted because it considered his
condition prevented plaintiff from working in the one position he
sought, firefighter." Id. at 7. While the city apparently
considered Bridges to be disqualified "from employment in other
fields with extremely high exposure to trauma," such employment
01-05348                      - 5 -
would constitute only "a narrow range of jobs." Ibid. Thus, in
the district court's view, the city did not view Bridges's
hemophilia as imposing a substantial limitation on his "ability
to work in general." Ibid.
                INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
        The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from
rejecting applicants because of untested assumptions about the
limiting effect of physical or mental conditions. It instead
requires them to make individualized determinations of an ap-
plicant's condition and the extent to which that condition limits
the applicant from working in the job at issue. To this end, the
Act protects not only those individuals who actually have a
disability, but also persons who are "regarded" by employers as
having a disability. 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(C).
        The ADA provision protecting individuals who are "regarded
as" disabled was taken from an identical provision in the Reha-
bilitation Act. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385,
1391 & n.18 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386
(1994). In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987), the Supreme Court explained Congress's purpose in adding
the "regarded as" protection: by adding that provision, "Con-
gress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id. at
284. In passing the ADA, Congress reaffirmed Arline's holding
that "discrimination on the basis of mythology" was "precisely
01-05349                      - 7 -
philia as preventing him from performing only a "narrow range" of
jobs involving routine exposure to extreme trauma.
        The district court's conclusion was error. The city reject-
ed Bridges because of an untested assumption that persons with
hemophilia cannot perform the job of firefighter without endan-
gering themselves and others. When an employer rejects an
applicant because of such a stereotype, a presumption arises that
the employer regards the applicant as substantially limited in a
major life activity. As Congress recognized when it enacted the
ADA, an employer who relies on an assumption that a physical or
mental condition disqualifies an individual from a particular job
is likely to apply a similar stereotype to conclude that the
person is disqualified from a range of other jobs.
        Moreover, the city "regarded" Bridges as substantially
limited in working if it perceived him as significantly restrict-
ed in the ability to perform either a "class of jobs" or a "broad
range of jobs in various classes." Bridges clearly satisfies the
first prong: "class of jobs." The record demonstrates that the
city considered Bridges's hemophilia as disqualifying him for the
entire "class" of firefighting jobs. Under the city's policy,
persons with hemophilia are uniformly excluded from any fire-
fighting position. By determining that his condition disquali-
fied him from any job in his chosen field of firefighting --
indeed, any position as an emergency medical technician or
paramedic as well -- the city "regarded" Bridges as substantially
limited in the ability to work. Because Bridges satisfies the
01-05350                      - 8 -
"class of jobs" prong, this Court need not consider whether the
city also perceived him as excluded from a "broad range of jobs
in various classes."
                                ARGUMENT
           THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CITY
              DID NOT "REGARD" BRIDGES AS HAVING A DISABILITY
        Title I of the ADA protects "qualified individual[s] with a
disability" from discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C.
12112(a). Under the Act, "disability" has two core aspects: (1)
a physical or mental "impairment"; and (2) substantial limitation
of a "major life activity." The ADA defines "disability" as
follows (42 U.S.C. 12102(2)):
                The term "disability" means, with respect to an
        individual --
                  (A) a physical or mental impairment that
                substantially limits one or more of the major
                life activities of such individual;
                  (B) a record of such an impairment; or
                  (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
This case involves the third prong of the definition of disabili-
ty: "being regarded as having such an impairment." Although the
city rejected Bridges because of an assumption that any person
with hemophilia is disqualified for any firefighter position, the
district court concluded that the city did not "regard" Bridges
as having a disability. In the court's view, "the City acted
because it considered his condition prevented plaintiff from
working in the one position he sought, firefighter." Memo. R. 7.
Therefore, the district court concluded, the city did not per-
ceive Bridges's hemophilia as "substantially limiting." Ibid.
        That conclusion was error. A plaintiff can demonstrate that
01-05351                     - 9 -
he or she is "regarded as" having a disability by showing that he
or she "[h]as a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by [an
employer] as constituting such limitation." 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(1)(1) (1995). Bridges satisfies this test. Bridges's
hemophilia is clearly a physical "impairment." See 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(h)(1) (1995) ("impairment" includes any physiological
disorder affecting, inter alia, hemic and lymphatic systems). 2/
Moreover, it is clear from the record and the district court's
findings that the city treated that impairment as a substantial
limitation on a major life activity.
A.      Where An Employer Rejects An Applicant Because Of An
        Assumption About The Limiting Effects Of An Impairment, A
        Presumption Arises That The Employer "Regards" The Applicant
        As Substantially Limited In A Major Life Activity
        1. Major life activities include "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i)
(1995). Here, both the parties and the district court focused on
the major life activity of "working." 3/ An individual is sub-
2/Although the error did not affect the substance of its analy-
sis, the district court incorrectly proceeded under 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(1)(3) (1995), which allows a plaintiff to demonstrate that
an employer treated him or her as having a substantially limiting
impairment although the plaintiff actually has no impairment
whatsoever. See Memo. R. 6. Because hemophilia clearly consti-
tutes an "impairment," the essential question before the district
court was whether the city regarded that impairment as substan-
tially limiting.
3/That focus may not have been appropriate in this case. Both
this Court's case law and the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance
dictate that a court should "first examine whether [the plain-
                                                   (continued...)
01-05352                     - 10 -
stantially limited in working if he or she is "significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995).
        There are two alternative means for a plaintiff to prove
that he or she is substantially limited in working. First, the
plaintiff can show that he or she is significantly restricted in
the ability to perform "a class of jobs." Ibid. That showing
requires consideration of "[t]he job from which the individual
has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number
and types of [other] jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities * * * from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment." 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1995). Alternatively, the plaintiff can
demonstrate a significant restriction in the ability to perform
3/(...continued)
tiff's] impairment substantially limits a major life activity
other than working." Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d
723, 726 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1995). Only if the court finds that
the plaintiff is not substantially limited in any other major
life activity should it proceed to consider the major life
activity of working. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(j)
(1995). Here, the evidence that the city considered Bridges to
be at risk of excess bleeding secondary to trauma might well
support a conclusion that the city regarded him as substantially
limited in life activities other than working. This Court need
not decide that question, however, for the record developed in
the district court makes clear that the city regarded Bridges as
substantially limited in working.
01-05353
                                - 11 -
"a broad range of jobs in various classes." 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995). That showing requires consideration of
"[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs
not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities *
* * from which the individual is also disqualified because of the
impairment." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C) (1995) (emphasis
added). Either showing is sufficient to establish a substantial
limitation.
        2. Here, of course, Bridges did not seek to prove that he
actually was substantially limited in the major life activity of
working. He instead contended that the city "regarded" him as
such. In a "regarded as" case, the requirements of proof must
reflect the fact that it is the employer's perception -- and not
the employee's actual limitation -- that is at issue. In partic-
ular, it is unrealistic to expect that an employer will consider
whether an applicant is qualified for any job other than that for
which he or she applied. An employer thus cannot successfully
defend against a claim that it "regarded" an applicant as dis-
abled merely by asserting that it did not consider the applicant
unqualified for any other job. Rather, where an employer refuses
to hire an individual because of a stereotypical assumption about
the limiting effects of an impairment, one can reasonably assume
that the employer, if faced with the question, would have applied
the same stereotypes to consider the individual disqualified for
a range of jobs. As the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance explains,
01-05354                     - 12 -
"if an individual can show that an employer or other covered
entity made an employment decision because of a perception of
disability based on 'myth, fear or stereotype,' the individual
will satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the definition of disabil-
ity." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(1) (1995); see also H.R.
Rep. No. 485, Pt. 3, supra, at 30 ("Thus, a person who is reject-
ed from a job because of the myths, fears and stereotypes associ-
ated with disabilities would be covered under this third test,
whether or not the employer's perception was shared by others in
the field and whether or not the person's physical or mental
condition would be considered a disability under the first or
second part of the definition.").
        There are three principal reasons for presuming that an
employer who deems an individual disqualified for a particular
job because of a stereotype about disability would apply a
similar assumption to consider the individual disqualified for a
range of jobs. First, Congress recognized that the same stereo-
types that lead to exclusion from a single employment opportunity
often lead to exclusion from a range of other opportunities. See
H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 3, supra, at 30 (noting that
"[s]ociologists have identified common barriers that frequently
result in employers excluding disabled persons"); accord 29
C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(1) (1995). Thus, "if a person is
disqualified on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or
mental condition, and the employer can articulate no legitimate
job-related reason for the rejection, a perceived concern about
01-05355                     - 13 -
employing persons with disabilities could be inferred and the
plaintiff would qualify for coverage under the 'regarded as'
test." H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 3, supra, at 30-31.
        Second, it is unfair to put an individual who has been
rejected for employment because of a physical or mental impair-
ment to the difficult factual burden of proving the precise
extent to which the employer thought he or she was limited in the
ability to work. Even in an "actual disability" case, where the
plaintiff must demonstrate that an impairment in fact disquali-
fies him or her from holding a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes, the plaintiff need not make "an onerous
evidentiary showing." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(j)
(1995). In a "regarded as" case, where the plaintiff must prove
only that the employer perceived him or her as disabled, the
required showing should be even less onerous -- particularly
where, as here, the employer admittedly took adverse action
because of a perceived impairment. Because evidence of what the
employer perceived is peculiarly within the possession of the
employer -- and because the employer's perception may well be
irrational -- a plaintiff should not be forced to provide a
detailed rendering of the jobs for which the employer believed
him or her to be disqualified.
        Third, and most important, the essential purpose of the
"regarded as" provision is to eliminate discrimination on the
basis of the "accumulated myths and fears about disability and
disease." Arline, 480 U.S. at 284. The ADA "is premised on the
01-05356                      - 14 -
obligation of employers to consider people with disabilities as
individuals and to avoid prejudging what an applicant or employee
can or cannot do on the basis of that individual's appearance or
any other easily identifiable characteristic, or on a precon-
ceived and often erroneous judgment about an individual's capa-
bilities based on 'labeling' of that person as having a particu-
lar kind of disability." H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 2, supra, at 58.
An employer who rejects an individual's job application because
of an untested assumption about the limitations imposed by the
applicant's physical or mental impairment is violating the
central command to treat applicants based on their individual
abilities. Such a rejection is sufficient to demonstrate that
the employer "regarded" the applicant as disabled and to subject
the employment decision to coverage under the ADA.
B. The City "Regarded" Bridges As Having A Substantially
   Limiting Impairment
        The district court's factual findings make clear that the
city rejected Bridges because it erroneously believed that his
hemophilia rendered him unable to perform the job of firefighter.
See Memo. R. 1. Rather than treating Bridges as an individual
and determining whether his mild case of hemophilia would prevent
him from performing the job, the city made a categorical decision
that any person with any type of hemophilia would be disqualified
for any firefighting position. That type of stereotyping itself
warrants the presumption that the city "regarded" hemophilia as
substantially limiting a major life activity.
        Even apart from that presumption, however, Bridges has
01-05357                     - 15 -
established that the city "regarded" his hemophilia as substan-
tially limiting his ability to work. As noted, an individual can
be substantially limited in working by being "significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes." 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995) (emphasis added). The district court
found that the city regarded Bridges as disqualified from any
firefighting position -- indeed any position "with extremely high
exposure to trauma." Memo. R. 7. And it is undisputed that the
city's decision also excluded Bridges from any position as an
emergency medical technician or paramedic within the fire depart-
ment. Those facts dictate the conclusion that the city "regard-
ed" Bridges as unable to perform an entire "class of jobs" -- the
"class" of firefighting jobs. The city therefore "regarded"
Bridges as disabled, whether or not it also considered him
disqualified for "a broad range of jobs in various classes."
        1. The city "regarded" Bridges as disqualified from the
           "class" of firefighting jobs
        The applicable regulations define a "class of jobs" as a
group of jobs requiring the same "training, knowledge, skills or
abilities." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1995). A person who
is significantly restricted in the ability to perform only one
position is not substantially limited in working. 4/ Nor is a
4/29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(j) (1995) (noting that "an
individual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of a
minor vision impairment, but who can be a commercial airline co-
pilot or a pilot for a courier service, would not be substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working").
01-05358
                                - 16 -
person who is unable to perform in a "specialized job or profes-
sion requiring extraordinary skill, prowess or talent." 29
C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(j) (1995). Rather, to be signifi-
cantly restricted in the ability to perform a "class" of jobs, an
individual must be restricted in employment in an entire field.
See, e.g., Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 727 (plaintiff's disability did
not prevent her from performing the "entire class" of welding
jobs; it only affected "functioning in a welding position requir-
ing substantial climbing"). Because the determination whether an
individual is excluded from a class of jobs draws content from an
inquiry into the individual's "job expectations and training,"
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (D. Haw.
1980), an individual is substantially limited in working if he or
she is significantly restricted in the ability to work in his or
her "chosen field." Id. at 1099. As the E.E. Black court
explained (ibid.):
        A person, for example, who has obtained a graduate
        degree in chemistry, and is then turned down for a
        chemist's job because of an impairment, is not likely
        to be heartened by the news that he can still be a
        streetcar conductor, an attorney or a forest ranger. A
        person who is disqualified from employment in his
        chosen field has a substantial handicap to employment,
        and is substantially limited in one of his major life
        activities.
The EEOC regulations adopt this analysis, see 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995) (plaintiff's restrictions must be "com-
pared to the average person having comparable training, skills
01-05359
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and abilities"), as have several courts.5/
        Here, it is clear that the city regarded Bridges's hemophil-
ia as disqualifying him from working in his "chosen field."6/
It is undisputed that Bridges had successfully completed training
to be an emergency medical technician and that he aspired and
expected to become a paramedic. 5/10/95 Tr. 19-20. To perform
either of these jobs, the city required that Bridges first become
a firefighter.7/ But the city regarded Bridges as unqualified
for any line position within the fire department simply because
of his hemophilia. 5/12/95 Tr. 93-95. Therefore, the city
"regarded" Bridges's hemophilia as a substantial limitation on
his ability to work.8/
5/See, e.g., Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203, 205 (4th Cir.)
(question is whether plaintiff was "foreclosed * * * generally
from obtaining jobs in her field"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 59
(1994); cf. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126
(11th Cir. 1993) ("probable" that individuals with skin condition
were substantially limited in working where fire department's "no
beard" rule prevented them from working as firefighters); but see
Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (dicta stating
that "[b]eing declared unsuitable for the particular position of
police officer is not a substantial limitation of a major life
activity").
6/Moreover, several recognized job classification schemes list
firefighting occupations as a separate classification. See U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook
Handbook 297-298 (1994); U.S. Office of Personnel Mgt., Handbook
of Occupational Groups and Series 13 (1993); U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin., Bureau of the Census,
1990 Census of Population and Housing: Classified Index of
Industries and Occupations xviii (1992).
7/In Bossier City, all EMTs and paramedics must also train and
serve as firefighters. 5/10/95 Tr. 101; 5/12/95 Tr. 84, 93-95.
8/It is true that not all employers would necessarily regard
Bridges's hemophilia as disqualifying for all firefighting,
                                                   (continued...)
01-05360                        - 18 -
        In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court relied
principally on this Court's decision in Chandler, supra. There,
this Court held that "[a]n employer's belief that an employee is
unable to perform one task with an adequate safety margin does
not establish per se that the employer regards the employee as
having a substantial limitation on his ability to work in gener-
al." Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1393. In Chandler, the employer
recognized the plaintiffs' "ability to perform most of the duties
associated with their respective positions." Ibid. It accurate-
ly believed them to be disqualified from only one particular task
of their jobs: driving. Ibid. A variety of courts have simi-
larly held that an individual is not substantially limited in
working merely because he cannot perform a specific task or work
8/(...continued)
paramedic, and EMT positions. Indeed, as the district court
noted, Bridges had worked as an EMT at a local casino "since his
rejection by the City." Memo. R. 7-8. But the relevant question
is whether the city treated Bridges's hemophilia as a substantial
limitation on his ability to work. Whether Bridges's impairment
actually imposed such a substantial limitation, or whether other
employers perceived the impairment as substantially limiting, has
no bearing on this question. Where an employer refuses to hire
an individual because of a perceived impairment, a legal presump-
tion arises "that all employers offering the same job or similar
jobs would use the same requirement or screening process." E.E.
Black, Ltd., 497 F. Supp. at 1100; accord Cook v. Rhode Island,
Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 25-
26 (1st Cir. 1993). Congress endorsed this rule in the legisla-
tive history to the ADA. See H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 3, supra, at
30 (person who is rejected for a job on the basis of a perceived
disability is "regarded as" disabled "whether or not the employ-
er's perception was shared by others in the field"); accord 29
C.F.R. Pt. 1630 App.  1630.2(1) (1995); but see Welsh v. City of
Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[Plaintiff's]
assumption that other fire departments would also misapply the
standards regarding employment of firefighters so as to disquali-
fy him is only speculation."). For the reasons stated, Welsh is
inconsistent with Congress's intent in enacting the ADA.
01-05361                     - 19 -
at a specific job site.9/ Here, however, the employer's reasons
for disqualifying the plaintiff did not relate to specific tasks
or a specific job site. Rather, the city acted on the basis of
an unfounded presumption that Bridges's hemophilia disqualified
him from the entire class of firefighting jobs. See Memo. R. 1;
5/11/95 P.M. Tr. 39; 5/12/95 Tr. 84, 93-95. That categorical
disqualification demonstrates that the city "regarded" Bridges as
substantially limited in his ability to work.
        2. Because the city "regarded" Bridges as disqualified from
           a "class of jobs," the Court need not decide whether it
           also "regarded" him as disqualified from a "broad range
           of jobs in various classes"
        In concluding that the city did not regard Bridges as
substantially limited in working, the district court focused only
on whether the city perceived him as disqualified from a broad
range of jobs in various classes. In order to determine whether
an employer perceives an individual as disqualified from a broad
range of jobs, a court must first determine the basis on which
the employer believed the individual to be disqualified from the
9/See Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723-724 (2d
Cir. 1994) (employer did not regard plaintiff as substantially
limited in working where her allergy to "peculiar fumes" within
one room in the employer's hospital did not limit her ability to
work in her field in general), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095
(1995); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)
(employer did not regard acrophobic utility systems repairperson
as substantially limited in working where his condition disquali-
fied him only from work at one plant where utility repair in-
volved significant climbing and not from utility repair work in
general); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244,
1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (employer did not regard cross-eyed postal
worker as substantially limited in working where his condition
prevented him only from working with a particular high-speed mail
sorting machine and not from working in the field generally).
01-05362
                                - 20 -
particular job at issue. Then the court must consider the number
of other jobs from which the individual would also be disquali-
fied on that basis. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(j) (1995).
        The district court engaged in the first of these steps; it
determined that the city's basis for rejecting Bridges's applica-
tion for the firefighting position would also disqualify him from
working in "other fields with extremely high exposure to trauma."
Memo. R. 7. However, the district court then went on summarily
to conclude that such employment "would constitute a narrow range
of jobs." Ibid. The district court could point to no evidence
to support that finding. Indeed, appellant contends (Br. 4, 12)
that the evidence demonstrates that a broad range of jobs involve
such exposure to trauma. This Court need not decide that ques-
tion, however, for the city clearly "regarded" Bridges as dis-
qualified for the entire class of firefighting jobs.
                                CONCLUSION
        The judgment of the district court should be reversed.
                                        Respectfully Submitted,
                                        DEVAL L. PATRICK
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          (Signature)
                                        __________________________________
                                        JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
                                        SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS
                                          Attorneys
                                          Department of Justice
                                          P.O. Box 66078
                                          Washington, D.C. 20035-6078
                                          (202) 514-2174
01-05363
                        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
        I hereby certify that on December 14, 1995, two copies of
the Brief For The United States As Amicus Curiae were served by
first-class mail, postage prepaid, on the following counsel of
record:
                Pamela R. Jones, Esq.
                Walker, Tooke, Lyons & Jones
                1700 Irving Place
                Shreveport, LA 71101
                Kenneth Mascagni, Esq.
                Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway
                P.O. Box 22260
                Shreveport, LA 71120-2260
                                   (Signature)
                                ______________________________
                                SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS
                                  Attorney
                                  Department of Justice
                                  P.O. Box 66078
                                  Washington, D.C. 20035-6078
                                  (202) 514-2174
01-05364