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United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

January 2005:

Chemical and Biological Defense:

Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and 
Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers:

GAO-05-8:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-8, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely 
that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) 
weapons against U.S. forces. Consequently, DOD doctrine calls for U.S. 
forces to be sufficiently trained to continue their missions in an NBC-
contaminated environment. Given longstanding concerns about the 
preparedness of DODs servicemembers in this critical area, GAO has 
undertaken a body of work covering NBC protective equipment and 
training. For this review, GAO was asked to determine the following: 
(1) To what extent do Army and Marine Corps units and personnel 
attending combat training centers participate in NBC training, and to 
what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC tasks at the 
centers to service standards? (2) Do the Army and the Marine Corps 
report NBC training at the centers in a standardized format that allows 
the services to identify lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-
center comparisons?

What GAO Found:

Army and Marine Corps combat training centers provide a unique 
opportunity for units to perform advanced training under conditions 
that approximate actual combat, thereby enabling units to assess and 
build upon skills learned at home stations. Although DOD and both 
services have stressed the importance of including NBC defense in all 
types of training, they have not established minimum NBC-related tasks 
for units attending the centers. Commanders sometimes reduce NBC 
training to focus on other priority areas. As a result, the extent of 
NBC training actually conducted at these centers varies widely, and 
some units receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two 
Army training centers estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 
a typical unit training rotation for a brigade-sized unitwhich may 
include up to 4,000 soldiersexperienced NBC events that required only 
about 5 percent of these troops to train in full NBC protective 
clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. For the Marine Corps, no NBC 
training was conducted during combined arms exercises at its training 
center for at least 5 years prior to January 2004. The Marine Corps 
began to introduce NBC training into its combined arms exercises in two 
rotations that occurred in January and February 2004 but suspended it 
because of other priorities related to preparing units for ongoing 
operations. Without minimum NBC tasks, the services often miss the 
opportunity to use the centers unique environment to improve units 
proficiency in NBC defense. 

When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers noted that many 
units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army standards. For example, 
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most brigades attending one center 
did not meet standards for basic NBC tasks such as donning protective 
gear, seeking overhead shelter, and conducting unmasking procedures. 
Observers at the Army centers often cited inadequate home-station 
training as the reason units were not performing basic NBC tasks to 
standards. Skills in these basic tasks are normally acquired during 
training at home stations and lay the foundation for acquiring more 
complex skills associated with large-unit NBC training. When units 
arrive at the centers with inadequate basic NBC skills, they may not be 
able to take full advantage of the unique and more complex large-unit 
NBC training opportunities offered at these centers. 

The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on 
NBC training at the centers in a way that can be used to identify 
trends over time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. 
Army and Marine Corps doctrine stresses the importance of identifying 
lessons learned during training to enable tailored training at home 
stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that similar problems 
will occur during operations. Because service guidance does not require 
standardized reporting formats, the training centers submit different 
types of after-action reports that might or might not mention NBC 
training. This lack of standardized reporting represents opportunities 
lost to the services to collect comparable data to identify NBC 
training trends and lessons learned.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending that DOD direct the services to (1) establish 
minimum NBC tasks for units participating in training exercises at the 
centers and (2) standardize reporting formats on NBC training that 
occurs at the centers. DOD agreed with the reports findings and 
recommendations and is now taking the necessary actions for 
implementation when operating conditions permit.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-8.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 
House of Representatives:

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units Often Do 
Not Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards:

Army and Marine Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does Not Fully 
Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine 
Corps:

Appendix III: NBC Classroom Courses Introduced into the Marine Corps 
Combined Arms Exercise Program in January 2004:

Appendix IV: Different Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for 
After-Action Reporting for the Army's CTCs:

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Table:

Table 1: NTC's Assessment of Brigades' Performance of NBC Tasks during 
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003:

Figure:

Figure 1: Soldiers at CMTC Undergoing NBC Training:

Abbreviations:

CALL: Center for Army Lessons Learned:

CMTC: Combat Maneuver Training Center:

CTC: Combat Training Center:

DOD: Department of Defense:

GAO: Government Accountability Office:

JRTC: Joint Readiness Training Center:

NBC: nuclear, biological, and chemical:

NTC: National Training Center:

TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command:

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

January 28, 2005:

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely 
that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons 
(NBC) against U.S. forces as a means of offsetting superior 
conventional warfare capabilities, for gaining an asymmetrical 
advantage, or as an act of terrorism. Consequently, DOD policies 
require U.S. forces to be provided with NBC protective equipment and to 
be sufficiently trained not only to survive an NBC attack but also to 
continue to perform their missions in a contaminated environment. Given 
long-standing concerns about the preparedness of DOD's servicemembers 
in this critical area, you requested that we undertake a body of work 
covering DOD's management of its NBC protective equipment and training. 
This report is one of a series on this subject that we have issued at 
your request.

For this review, you asked that we examine the contribution of the 
Army's and Marine Corps' combat training centers (CTCs) in preparing 
servicemembers for surviving and accomplishing their missions under NBC 
conditions. For the Army, these centers include the National Training 
Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the 
Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). The Marine Corps' combat 
training center is located at Twentynine Palms, California. These two 
military services introduce NBC training to their servicemembers in 
basic training and continue with formal and on-the-job training at NBC 
schools and home stations and during collective training field 
exercises, such as those offered at the CTCs. The CTCs are large ground-
combat training sites where units can train collectively in a realistic 
battlefield environment, including live fire.[Footnote 1] The centers 
represent an opportunity for units to train on their mission- essential 
tasks and to discover--through training lessons learned provided by 
expert observers/controllers--areas requiring additional training at 
their home stations or elsewhere that could improve their ability to 
perform on an actual battlefield. Specifically, you asked that we 
answer the following questions: (1) To what extent do Army and Marine 
Corps units and their personnel attending CTCs participate in NBC 
training, and to what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC 
tasks to service standards while at the CTCs? (2) Do the Army and the 
Marine Corps report NBC training at the CTCs in a standardized format 
that allows the services to identify trends and lessons learned and to 
do cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?

To obtain information on NBC training that occurred at the Army's and 
Marine Corps' CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we interviewed 
officials and analyzed relevant documents at each of the centers and 
other Army and Marine Corps organizations related to NBC and CTC 
training. We determined that the data and documents we reviewed were 
sufficiently reliable for answering the above questions. We performed 
our review from March 2003 through October 2004 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. A more thorough 
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

Results in Brief:

The Army's and the Marine Corps' CTCs provide a unique opportunity for 
brigade-sized units to perform advanced training under a variety of 
conditions that are designed to approximate actual combat as closely as 
possible, thereby enabling units to assess and build upon skills 
learned at home station. Despite the unique opportunities offered by 
these centers, the amount of NBC training that Army and Marine Corps 
personnel and units experienced at the centers varied widely during 
fiscal years 2002 and 2003. When units did undergo NBC training at the 
centers, they often did not perform to the level of proficiency defined 
by the services as acceptable. Furthermore, neither service has 
identified the minimum NBC tasks for units attending CTCs. Neither do 
the services always report their lessons learned on NBC training in a 
useful manner.

Although DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have all stressed the 
importance of including NBC defense as a condition under which units 
must perform their missions in training exercises, they have not 
established minimum NBC-related tasks for units attending the centers. 
Commanders are given discretion to prioritize training needs, and 
sometimes they reduce NBC training to allow time for units to focus on 
other priority areas. As a result, the extent of NBC training actually 
conducted at Army and Marine Corps CTCs varies widely, and some units 
receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two Army CTCs 
estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, on average, a typical 
brigade-sized unit--which may include up to 4,000 soldiers--experienced 
NBC events that required only about 5 percent of these troops to train 
in the full NBC protective clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. 
For the Marine Corps, no NBC training was conducted during combined 
arms exercises at the Marine Corps' training center for at least 5 
years prior to January 2004. The Marine Corps began to introduce NBC 
training into its combined arms exercises in two training rotations 
that occurred in January and February 2004, but this training was then 
suspended because of other training priorities related to preparing 
units for ongoing operations. In the absence of minimum NBC tasks, the 
services often miss the opportunity to use the unique environment of 
the CTCs to improve the proficiency of units in NBC defense.

When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers/controllers at the 
CTCs noted that many units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army 
standards. For example, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most 
brigades attending one center did not meet standards for basic NBC 
tasks, such as donning protective gear, seeking overhead shelter, and 
conducting unmasking procedures. Observers/controllers at the Army's 
CTCs often cited inadequate home-station training as the reason that 
units did not perform basic NBC tasks to these standards. Skills in 
these basic tasks are normally maintained during training at home 
stations and lay the foundation for acquiring the more complex skills 
associated with large-unit NBC training. When units arrive at these 
CTCs with inadequate basic NBC skills, they may not be able to take 
full advantage of the unique and more complex large-unit NBC training 
opportunities available at these CTCs.

Army and Marine Corps policies and doctrine stress the importance of 
capturing lessons learned during training, which enable units to tailor 
training at home stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that 
the same problems will occur during operations. However, the services 
do not always report lessons learned on NBC training at the CTCs in a 
way that can be used to identify trends over time and allow for cross- 
unit and cross-CTC comparisons. Because the services' policies do not 
require standardized reporting formats to capture NBC training that 
occurs at the CTCs, the training centers submit different types of 
after-action reports and lessons learned that might or might not 
mention NBC training. For example, while Army CTC observers/controllers 
produce extensive written and recorded video material that is intended 
to help commanders identify needs for subsequent training to address 
their units' training needs, including training in NBC tasks, there is 
little consistency in the Army's after-action reports in the structure, 
format, and content when NBC training is described. The Marine Corps' 
after-action reporting system for exercises at Twentynine Palms does 
not include any discussion of NBC training because NBC training has 
been included only twice in combined arms exercises during the last 5 
years and because Marine Corps orders do not require the discussion of 
NBC training even when it does occur. NBC lessons learned during 
training rotations at the CTCs would be very useful for the services in 
their attempts to anticipate, train for, and minimize the occurrence of 
NBC problems during operations. Consequently, the lack of standardized 
reporting to capture NBC training lessons learned at CTCs represents 
opportunities lost to Army and Marine Corps units to benefit from other 
units' training experiences and to better identify needs for subsequent 
home-station and other NBC training to prepare units for missions.

We are making recommendations to establish minimum NBC training tasks 
for units attending training exercises at the CTCs and to standardize 
reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at the CTCs. Our 
recommendations are intended to help ensure that the NBC training 
opportunities offered to Army and Marine Corps units attending their 
combat training centers are maximized and that NBC lessons learned at 
these centers are uniformly recorded and archived. DOD agreed with the 
report's findings and recommendations and established programs to fully 
implement the recommendations when operating conditions permit.

Background:

The Army has three large combat training centers that train brigade- 
sized units during exercises, referred to as "rotations," that last for 
13 to 25 days: the National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin, 
California; the Joint Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Polk, 
Louisiana; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center, located at 
Hohenfels, Germany.[Footnote 2] Figure 1 illustrates NBC training being 
conducted at the Army's Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, 
Germany. The Marine Corps has an Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine 
Palms, California, where it trains brigade-sized units in a combined 
arms exercise that similarly allows Marine Corps units to train to 
perform their missions in large maneuver areas and to fire their ground 
and air weapons.

Figure 1: Soldiers at CMTC Undergoing NBC Training:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Both the Army and the Marine Corps believe that it is important to 
leave to commanders' discretion, on the basis of the approved wartime 
mission-essential task list, the decisions on what particular missions 
require most of their units' time while at the CTCs and the extent to 
which units need to train to perform their missions under NBC 
conditions. At the same time, the Army and the Marine Corps also 
believe that the CTCs provide a unique opportunity for units to conduct 
realistic training that approximates actual combat and that complements 
units' home-station training. This opportunity includes, among many 
other things, the possibility for units to train to perform their 
mission-essential tasks under NBC defense conditions, with the benefit 
of real-time feedback from observers/controllers who are NBC training 
experts. In its regulation on the CTC program, the Army states that the 
CTCs provide the "capstone collective live training event in the 
combined arms training strategies." The regulation stresses the 
importance of home-station training in preparing units for their CTC 
rotations: "Homestation training," the regulation states, "should 
prepare units to gain the maximum benefit from their CTC 
experience."[Footnote 3] The Army's CTC plan states that:

"A CTC experience is the closest thing to combat the Army's soldiers, 
leaders, staffs and units ever experience. It is a battlefield where 
soldiers can die, come back to life, correct their mistakes, and fight 
again. . . . the Army must look at harnessing the role of the CTCs in 
developing doctrine and collecting data so it can maximize their 
potential and draw the right conclusions from lessons learned in a 
training environment."[Footnote 4]

During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 57 active and reserve component 
rotations took place at the three Army CTCs. Rotation costs are 
significant: In 1999 we reported that the Army spent about $1 billion a 
year to provide training at the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC.[Footnote 
5] These centers are equipped with instrumentation and simulators that 
allow the units to have their battle effectiveness measured, recorded, 
and commented on by observers/controllers, who are Army subject-matter 
experts for NBC defense and other mission areas. During fiscal years 
2002 and 2003, approximately 12 active and reserve battalion-sized 
Marine units underwent combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms.

DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have all stressed the importance of 
fully integrating NBC scenarios into their training exercises, whether 
conducted at a unit's home station, at a CTC, or elsewhere. The U.S. 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction acknowledges 
that NBC weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists 
represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United 
States.[Footnote 6] At the DOD level, Joint Publication 3-11, Joint 
Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 
Environments, states that "US forces must be prepared to conduct and 
sustain operations in NBC environments with minimal degradation" and 
urges that individuals and organizations train often and realistically 
while wearing NBC protective clothing so that they are better prepared 
for the constraints it imposes on communication, vision, and 
movement.[Footnote 7]

Army and Marine Corps regulations, orders, and doctrine similarly 
stress the importance of fully integrating NBC scenarios into training 
exercises. For example, Army Regulation 350-1, "Army Training and 
Education," which establishes Army-wide baseline NBC defense training 
policy, requires that NBC defense tasks, such as contamination 
avoidance, protection, and decontamination, be fully integrated into 
units' mission training, including field training exercises. 
Specifically, Army Regulation 350-1 states that "The NBC defense 
training must be fully integrated into unit exercises . . . for both 
offensive and defensive operations."[Footnote 8] This integration is 
intended to develop and test the capability of commanders, staffs, and 
units to perform their missions under extended NBC conditions. In other 
words, NBC skills are not seen as isolated tasks, but NBC defense is 
viewed as a condition under which units should be able to do their 
mission-essential tasks. Similarly, Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, 
paragraph 6, establishes Marine Corps-wide baseline NBC defense 
training requirements and states that "Every unit and commander will 
fully integrate NBCD [NBC defense] training into every combat, combat 
support, combat service support, and command and control exercise 
during offensive and defensive operations, to include live fire 
evolutions." [Footnote 9] Like the Army, the Marine Corps intends to 
integrate NBC training into its exercises in order to develop and test 
the ability of Marines at all levels not only to survive an NBC attack 
but to perform their missions under NBC conditions.

Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders also require after-action 
reporting for unit training exercises, including those that occur at 
the CTCs. The Army believes that it is important to capture lessons 
learned during training in order to identify combat-relevant lessons 
learned that will enhance the Army's ability to perform its missions 
and that will support tailored training for anticipated conditions of 
combat. Army regulations for the JRTC and the CMTC state that NBC 
defense training should be addressed in every training unit commander's 
after-action report, but guidance for the NTC and the overall Army 
lessons learned program does not. Like Army regulations, Marine Corps 
orders state that after-action reports should be prepared for all 
training exercises and maintained in a central lessons learned 
facility. The Marine Corps uses training lessons learned to identify 
unit strengths and weaknesses that must be addressed for the overall 
benefit of the Marine Corps.[Footnote 10]

NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units Often Do 
Not Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards:

Although the Army and the Marine Corps stress in their doctrine, 
regulations, or orders the need to fully integrate NBC training into 
training exercises and both have defined what they consider to be 
essential NBC skills, neither has established minimum NBC tasks for 
units to perform while they are training at the CTCs. They believe that 
it is important to leave decisions on the amount and type of training 
that occur at the CTCs to commanders. Consequently, during fiscal years 
2002 and 2003, Army and Marine Corps units and personnel attending the 
CTCs received widely varying amounts of NBC training, with some 
receiving little or none. Furthermore, Army units that do undergo NBC 
training at the CTCs often do not perform to the proficiency levels 
defined by the Army as acceptable. Based on commanders' discretion, 
both services' CTC exercises currently are oriented toward preparing 
units for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and do not emphasize NBC 
defense training. Because of this variation in NBC training at the 
CTCs, the Army and the Marine Corps often miss the unique opportunity 
offered by the CTCs to be assured through objective observer/controller 
assessments that every servicemember who trains at a CTC has training 
in a minimum number of NBC tasks essential to survive and perform in an 
NBC-contaminated environment.

Army and Marine Corps Have Defined Essential NBC Skills but Do Not 
Specify That Minimum Tasks Must Be Trained at the CTCs:

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications 
what they believe are the essential NBC skills that all soldiers and 
Marines should have. Also, as described in the background section of 
this report, both services stress in their doctrine, regulations, or 
orders the need to fully integrate NBC defense training into their 
exercises.

The Army has defined what it considers are the NBC skills essential for 
soldiers to know in its Army Universal Task List.[Footnote 11] Army 
commanders select training tasks, including NBC training tasks, from 
this and other task lists. For each task, the Army provides an extended 
definition, along with suggested ways to measure a soldier's 
proficiency in doing the task. For example, for the task of using 
individual and collective NBC protective equipment, one measure a 
commander may select to evaluate a soldier's competence includes the 
time it takes a soldier to don chemical protective gear in response to 
enemy use of NBC weapons. In addition, the Army requires that units 
conduct weapons qualifications on individual and crew-served weapons 
with personnel wearing chemical protective equipment.[Footnote 12] 
Neither the task list nor the regulation specifies where such training 
is to be conducted.

U.S. Forces Command, which oversees the training and readiness of U.S.- 
based Army operational forces, has issued a list of predeployment NBC 
tasks, but it also does not specify where training for these tasks must 
take place. Forces Command directs that soldiers spend approximately 8 
hours per quarter under NBC defense conditions. These tasks are all in 
the Army's most basic NBC skill level category and include wearing and 
maintaining chemical protective equipment and identifying chemical 
agents.

Like the Army, the Marine Corps has defined what it considers to be NBC 
tasks essential for Marines to know, both to survive an NBC attack and 
to continue performing the unit's mission. In Marine Corps Order 
3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense (NBCD) Training," 
the Marine Corps lists essential individual survival standards, such as 
maintaining and wearing protective chemical equipment, detecting 
chemical agents, and decontaminating one's skin and equipment. It also 
lists essential "basic operating standards," such as using crew and 
personal weapons while wearing NBC protective gear, maintaining NBC 
equipment, avoiding contamination while continuing the mission, and 
decontaminating units if necessary.[Footnote 13] The order does not 
state that any of these tasks must be included in exercises such as the 
combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms.

Appendix II provides a listing of Army and Marine Corps definitions of 
essential NBC skills.

NBC Training at Army CTCs Varies Widely:

NBC training at the Army's CTCs varies widely, and many Army subunits 
receive little NBC training at the CTCs. For example, in fiscal years 
2002 and 2003, observers/controllers from the NTC and the JRTC 
estimated that only about 5 percent of soldiers underwent NBC training 
during a brigade rotation that required them to wear their full 
protective gear for at least 18 hours.[Footnote 14] This is because 
Army regulations do not mandate that NBC training must occur at the 
CTCs, leaving commanders to decide what skills training to include in 
the unit's CTC rotation. For the NBC training that did occur at the 
CTCs, observers/controllers frequently reported that the units did not 
perform even basic NBC tasks to the level of proficiency defined as 
acceptable by the Army.

Many Army Subunits Receive Little NBC Training at the CTCs:

During our review of Army CTC training that occurred during fiscal 
years 2002 and 2003, we found that, while most units were exposed to 
some NBC training at the CTCs, the overall percentage of Army battalion-
or brigade-sized units that received extensive NBC training during a 
rotation was small. One measure of intensive unit training under NBC 
defense conditions is the extent to which soldiers are required to 
dress and operate for extended periods of time in their individual 
protective clothing, including their masks and gloves. NTC training 
officials estimated that, on average since fiscal year 2002, a typical 
20-to 25-day brigade rotation--which may include up to 4,000 soldiers--
includes NBC events that cause the entire unit to don the full chemical 
protective suit for a total of 2 to 3 hours and about 150 to 200 
soldiers to train in full protective gear for a total of 18 to 24 
hours. In other words, only about 5 percent of the brigade is affected 
by NBC training that requires wearing full protective gear for more 
than 2 to 3 hours. Similarly, an Army JRTC training official reported 
that during a typical brigade rotation, an average of only 200 soldiers 
operate in full protective gear for a total of 16 to 20 hours. The 
number of personnel who receive this training at the JRTC ranges from 
as few as 50 soldiers up to 400 or more, depending on the type of 
contamination and the location of the attack, and the time that a 
soldier spends in protective gear can range from as little as 1 hour to 
as much as 48 hours.[Footnote 15]

Army Unit Commanders Determine Units' Training at the CTCs:

Because Army regulations do not state what NBC training must occur at 
the CTCs, the commander of the unit to be trained may choose not to 
emphasize it during the unit's CTC rotation. Typically, up to 180 days 
before the rotation is to start, the brigade commander, in coordination 
with the division or other senior commander, begins to coordinate with 
the CTC to specify what training objectives will be included in the 
unit's training rotation. A unit rotation traditionally emphasizes the 
warfighting skills a unit requires to perform its mission and combat 
operations. Because training to survive and operate under potential NBC 
conditions is generally treated as a condition of training for all 
mission-essential tasks for units, rather than as a separate mission 
task, the CTCs, which develop the training scenarios, generally propose 
some types of NBC conditions in all rotations. However, unit commanders 
may specify that a CTC include more or fewer NBC conditions in training 
scenarios.

During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the Army's CTCs generally included 
three to seven chemical events in each standard rotation's training 
scenarios. A particular chemical attack by an "enemy" is generally 
targeted at a specific area of the simulated battlefield and thus 
involves those units that may be affected by a chemical attack in that 
area. Chemical events during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 included the 
simulated use of chemicals that were categorized as "persistent" 
(defined as lasting for 24 hours or more) and "nonpersistent" (defined 
as lasting for 24 hours or less) and that were delivered by "enemy" 
artillery, rockets, aircraft bombs, truck bombs, rucksack bombs, and 
spray. At the NTC and the CMTC, observers/controllers use CS (tear) gas 
to simulate chemical agents. Flares, ground-burst simulators, air-burst 
simulators, or spray tanks mounted on helicopters may also be used to 
simulate enemy chemical weapons. At the JRTC and the NTC, observers/ 
controllers also frequently simulate a biological event by such means 
as simulating that the "enemy" has sabotaged the water supply by 
poisoning it with a biological contaminant.

The CTCs have increasingly emphasized training rotations specifically 
tailored to preparing units for expected deployments. These rotations 
might or might not include chemical or biological events. Many of the 
units completing the tailored rotations at the Army's CTCs in fiscal 
years 2002 and 2003 later deployed for combat operations in Afghanistan 
or Iraq. NBC defense training at CTCs has been emphasized less for 
units training for Bosnia and Kosovo or for Afghanistan and Iraq after 
NBC weapons were not found there. Because the NBC defensive training 
for each soldier varies so widely at the CTCs, the Army continues to 
have no assurance that all servicemembers attending a CTC have trained 
on a minimum number of essential NBC tasks.

Units Often Did Not Perform NBC Tasks to Army Standards:

Our review of after-action reports from the three Army CTCs for fiscal 
years 2002 and 2003 indicated that units frequently arrived at the CTCs 
at the beginning of their training periods without having mastered 
basic NBC skills. Observers/controllers frequently comment on units' 
NBC skills when they first arrive at training at the NTC to assess the 
units' needed level of NBC training and note that, often, units do not 
perform even basic NBC tasks to the level of proficiency that the Army 
defines as acceptable. Observers/controllers at all three CTCs noted 
that because units had not adequately prepared for basic NBC training 
at their home stations, they were not able to fully train on the more 
sophisticated collective and mission tasks under NBC conditions that 
could be practiced at the CTCs. Of the three CTCs, the NTC had the most 
complete information on the NBC skills of the units being trained 
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Unlike the other CTCs, the NTC often 
uses a standard format to assess incoming units on six basic NBC tasks 
while they are receiving their equipment and assembling to begin 
training. For example, one of these early NTC training scenarios 
subjects a brigade arriving at a deployment destination to an attack by 
a chemical weapon. Table 1 summarizes the assessments made by NTC 
observers/controllers of the NBC skills of brigades that arrived for 
training during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The table lists the six NBC 
tasks assessed at the NTC and shows whether the brigades did or did not 
perform the tasks to the level of proficiency defined as acceptable by 
the Army. Most brigades failed to perform to standard NBC tasks 3, 4, 
and 6, which are ranked at the most basic skill level, called skill 
level 1.

Table 1: NTC's Assessment of Brigades' Performance of NBC Tasks during 
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003:

NBC task: 1. Employ NBC warning and reporting system; 
Performance standard: Army tasks, skill levels 3 and 4: The unit must 
plot and disseminate appropriate NBC warnings. Higher-level 
headquarters staff must execute effective command and control; 
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 0; 
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 5.

NBC task: 2. Employ chemical alarms and detectors; 
Performance standard: Each task force must have at least one M-8 
chemical agent detector paper/M-22 alarm operational and properly 
positioned around the perimeter, personnel, vehicles, and equipment. M-
9 chemical agent detector paper must be checked in each unit after the 
chemical weapon attack; 
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 1; 
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 9.

NBC task: 3. Go to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture level 4 within 8 
minutes; 
Performance standard: Army common tasks, skill level 1: 100 percent of 
soldiers must don complete Mission-Oriented Protective Posture level 4 
in 8 minutes. All zippers, buttons, and ties must be correctly 
fastened. Boots and gloves must be tucked into chemical protective 
equipment. No simulated gear is authorized; 
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 2; 
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 7.

NBC task: 4. Seek overhead shelter; 
Performance standard: Army common tasks, skill level 1: 100 percent of 
soldiers must seek the best available overhead cover when appropriate; 
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 0; 
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 10.

NBC task: 5. Perform NBC reconnaissance mission; 
Performance standard: The NBC reconnaissance unit must reach the 
objective, conduct appropriate NBC reconnaissance, maintain 
communication with higher headquarters staff throughout the operations, 
and have a team providing security; 
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 4; 
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 1.

NBC task: 6. Conduct unmasking procedures using M256 kits; 
Performance standard: Army common tasks, skill level 1: Soldiers must 
confirm the presence or absence of an agent. At least one M256 kit 
should be assigned per task force; 
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 2; 
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 5.

Source: NTC.

Notes: Each number in the table represents an entire brigade that was 
assessed in its performance of the listed task during its NTC rotation. 
The numbers do not total 10 because not all brigades were tested on all 
tasks. An entire brigade is assessed as performing a task "to standard" 
or "not to standard." In some cases, supplementary notes indicate what 
percentage of the entire brigade succeeded in the task and what 
percentage failed. Or supplementary notes might indicate which 
battalions in the brigade failed a particular task. An entire brigade 
would be described as not going to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 
level 4 (or the highest level of protection) within 8 minutes when some 
of its battalions failed to do so. In some cases, a battalion failed to 
go to this level of protection within 8 minutes because some personnel 
did not have complete chemical protective suits. For other tasks, the 
unit of measure differs. For example, for the task of employing 
chemical alarms and detectors, supplementary notes generally state how 
many of the total chemical alarms that were placed were operational. 
For the task of performing NBC reconnaissance, the brigade is judged on 
the performance of its NBC reconnaissance unit.

[End of table]

We were unable to compile summaries, such as the NTC summary in table 
1, of how well brigades did in basic NBC tasks at the JRTC and the CMTC 
because these centers did not routinely assess and collect this 
information. However, JRTC and CMTC after-action reports frequently 
noted deficiencies in units' NBC training attributable to their 
incomplete preparation at home stations. For example, for several 
rotations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, JRTC observers/controllers 
reported that soldiers and leaders lacked training and knowledge of 
critical NBC tasks. Observers/controllers recommended that units 
"Develop an NBC training plan at home station that addresses the 
individual, leader, and collective soldier skills necessary to sustain 
operations in an NBC environment." A similar CMTC recommendation called 
for "more emphasis on NBC training and integration at home station."

The observation that units do not get adequate NBC training at their 
home stations is not new and has been repeatedly reported by DOD and 
the Army. In 1998, for example, the DOD Office of the Inspector General 
reported that unit commanders generally were not fully integrating 
chemical and biological defense into their units' collective mission 
training exercises. The report noted that "units rarely trained for 
their mission-essential tasks under [chemical/biological] 
conditions."[Footnote 16] In 2002, the Army Audit Agency reported that 
it had evaluated training for chemical and biological defense provided 
to soldiers at the unit level and found that this training needed to be 
more effectively integrated and supplemented.[Footnote 17] In DOD's 
2002 report to Congress on its Chemical and Biological Defense Program, 
the department stated that the Army's CTCs continued to see units at 
the company, battalion, and brigade levels that were unable to perform 
all NBC tasks to standard.[Footnote 18] The report concluded that this 
less-than-satisfactory performance at the CTCs was directly 
attributable to a lack of home-station NBC training. The report stated 
the need for increased emphasis in educating senior leaders on the 
necessity for NBC training and expressed concern that NBC training 
consist not only of NBC survival but also of continuous operations in 
an NBC environment.

We have also reported for more than a decade on problems with Army 
units' inadequate home-station training. In 1991, we reported that Army 
home-station training lacked realism and often did not include NBC 
training.[Footnote 19] In 1996, we reported that officials from Army 
major commands, corps, divisions, and individual units said that 
chemical and biological defense skills not only tended to be difficult 
to attain and were highly perishable but were also often given a lower 
priority because of, among other things, too many other higher priority 
taskings.[Footnote 20] In 1999, we noted that training units lacked 
proficiency when they arrived at the training centers, and as a result, 
the content of the CTC training was frequently modified to provide less 
challenging scenarios than would normally be expected.[Footnote 21] We 
also reported that, although units should have been proficient at 
battalion-level tasks when they arrived at the CTCs, many had trained 
only up to company level, and the units' leaders struggled with the 
more complicated planning and synchronization tasks required for the 
battalion-and brigade-level exercises conducted at the 
centers.[Footnote 22]

NBC Training Was Not Conducted at the Marine Corps' Combined Arms 
Exercises at Twentynine Palms:

No NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at the 
Marine Corps' training center at Twentynine Palms for at least 5 years 
prior to our review.[Footnote 23] While Marine Corps orders and 
doctrine emphasize the need to include NBC defense training in combined 
arms exercises, they do not provide any clearly articulated NBC defense 
training tasks or requirements that must be accomplished in conjunction 
with these exercises. In the absence of specific training requirements, 
NBC defense training has historically been left up to the discretionary 
control of the unit commander, and Marine Corps commanders decided to 
remove it to make room for other training. According to a Marine Corps 
training official, unit commanders gave several reasons that NBC 
defense training at the combined arms exercise was given a lower 
priority, including that it was difficult to perform tasks in 
cumbersome and uncomfortable protective gear, chemical training was 
time-consuming, and the likelihood of NBC warfare was perceived as low.

In November 2001, the Naval Audit Service issued a report on infantry 
and armor readiness in the Marine Corps.[Footnote 24] One of its 
findings was that the Marine Corps was not fully integrating chemical 
and biological training into its collective unit exercises in a 
consistent manner. The Naval Audit Service attributed this condition to 
the fact that Marine Corps officers did not consider chemical and 
biological training a high priority, even though they considered it 
important. One of the Naval Audit Service's recommendations was for the 
Marine Corps to "integrate [chemical and biological defense] training 
into unit field exercises under realistic conditions, and insure that 
[chemical and biological defense] training is appropriately integrated 
into such major events as Combined Armed Exercises . . . ." In a 
February 2004 memorandum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the 
Commanding General of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command 
stated that in response to the Naval Audit Service's recommendation, 
NBC training and assessment had been added to the formal schedule at 
the combined arms exercise program in January 2004. The memorandum 
stated that "Due to world events, it continues to be a challenge 
concerning the 'full integration' of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 
Defense [NBCD] training into unit exercise programs."

In 2003, in response to the Naval Audit Service's recommendation, the 
Marine Corps began its planning for introducing NBC training into the 
combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. In that year, the Marine 
Corps assigned two NBC staff specialists to Twentynine Palms to begin 
devising a training plan for the combined arms exercise program. Also, 
chemical protective equipment was obtained for use at Twentynine Palms 
by rotating Marine Corps units. In January 2004, the Marine Corps 
introduced NBC defense classroom courses and one field exercise into 
the combined arms exercise program. Appendix III provides a listing of 
the classroom NBC courses that were introduced in the first week of 
rotations in fiscal year 2004 and were conducted at the platoon to 
company levels.

According to a Marine Corps official, eight combined arms exercise 
rotations were conducted in fiscal year 2004. NBC training was 
introduced into the third and fourth rotations in January and February, 
respectively. Rotations five and six concentrated on stability and 
support operations but did include NBC classroom training. Rotations 
seven and eight, for reserve units, also received the NBC classroom 
training but no NBC field exercises. Planned rotations 9 and 10 were 
canceled. The Marine Corps is introducing a shortened, revised combined 
arms exercise scenario that is more oriented to current operational 
requirements. Exercise revisions include an emphasis on small-unit 
leadership and stability and support operations, which encompass 
asymmetric and counterinsurgency operations. A Marine Corps official 
told us that the current design of the revised combined arms exercise 
scenario does not include NBC training. However, an extensive home- 
station training period for units precedes attendance at the revised 
combined arms exercise, and Marine Corps units are required to 
accomplish NBC training required for their units' mission-essential 
tasks. According to the Marine Corps, when it resumes its standard 
combined arms exercise rotations, units will participate in whatever 
NBC task training the combined arms exercise scenarios include at that 
time.

NBC Lessons Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan Reflect Problems 
Identified at Training Centers:

For both the Army and the Marine Corps, lessons learned during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom identified many NBC skill deficiencies that 
were highlighted earlier by observers/controllers during individual 
brigade rotations through the Army's CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and 
2003. These continuing deficiencies illustrate the importance of 
requiring Army and Marine Corps units to establish minimal NBC defense 
training tasks for units training at their respective CTCs. Problems 
identified by both the Marine Corps and the Army during this operation 
included:

* units arriving without appropriate NBC equipment and suits,

* units arriving without necessary individual and collective NBC skills,

* units unable to properly set up and operate their NBC detection 
equipment,

* chemical personnel not included in battlefield decisions, and:

* units unable to properly decontaminate their equipment.

Many of these problems were also noted in the Army's lessons learned 
reporting from earlier conflicts, including those in the Balkans, 
Somalia, and Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Establishing minimal NBC 
tasks for units attending CTCs could provide an opportunity for units' 
NBC defense capabilities to be objectively assessed and for CTC 
observers/controllers to identify units' NBC equipment shortfalls. This 
information may aid commanders in decisions on units' training needs.

Army and Marine Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does Not Fully 
Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends:

The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on 
NBC training at the CTCs in a way that can be used to identify trends 
over time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army 
and Marine Corps regulations and orders strongly encourage after-action 
reporting for all training exercises, including those that occur at the 
CTCs. However, Army and Marine Corps after-action reviews of CTC 
training do not always discuss NBC training and, when they do, the 
reporting is not standardized to allow for uniform reporting to fully 
support the identification of NBC trends.

Army and Marine Corps Regulations and Orders State That Lessons Learned 
Should Be Reported for CTC Training:

Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders state that after-action 
reports and lessons learned should be prepared to capture the results 
of training that occurs at the CTCs, but they do not always state that 
NBC training must be covered in these documents or encourage NBC 
training results to be presented in a standardized format. As a result, 
different types of after-action reports and lessons learned are 
prepared for CTC training, and these documents might or might not 
mention NBC training.

The Army's regulation that establishes the purpose and objectives of 
its CTC program states that as part of their mission to provide 
realistic joint combined arms training, the CTCs will provide the Army 
and joint participants with feedback to improve warfighting, to 
increase units' readiness for deployment and warfighting, and to 
provide a data source for lessons learned.[Footnote 25] This regulation 
also requires that each CTC conduct doctrinally based after-action 
reviews for each unit that undergoes a rotation at a CTC.[Footnote 26] 
The Army regulation on the Army's lessons learned system requires that 
these after-action reports be submitted to the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL) no later than 120 days from the end of an 
exercise.[Footnote 27] Each of the Army's CTC regulations describes a 
general format to be used in the after-action reports and lists 
specific topics to be included. Though the CTC and lessons learned 
regulations agree on some general points, they differ on what should be 
covered specifically in after-action reports. For example, the JRTC and 
CMTC regulations indicate that NBC defense training should be addressed 
in the training unit commander's after-action report, but the CTC, NTC, 
and overall Army lessons learned program regulations do not. Appendix 
IV includes specific details of how the various Army regulations differ 
in recommended formats for after-action reports.

Like the Army regulations, the Marine Corps order on its lessons 
learned system states that after-action reports should be prepared for 
all training exercises.[Footnote 28] However, the Marine Corps order 
for the combined arms exercise program at Twentynine Palms does not 
specify that written after-action reports must be prepared, only that a 
structured debrief be conducted upon the conclusion of each event or 
exercise. Though not required by Marine Corps order, Twentynine Palms 
does prepare a Microsoft PowerPoint (computer software) presentation 
describing events that took place during the final 3 days of the 
exercise.[Footnote 29] For the two rotations in 2004 in which NBC field 
training was included in the combined arms exercise, NBC training was 
not included in after-action reporting because it did not occur during 
the 3 training days covered by the reporting.

Army's CTC Reports Might or Might Not Contain Information on NBC 
Training:

All Army regulations do not require that NBC training completed at a 
CTC be discussed in the written after-action reports that are prepared 
for each training rotation at the three Army CTCs, and thus the reports 
do not always include information on NBC training. These reports are 
primarily intended to be feedback for the units being trained to help 
them assess their own training levels and craft home-station training 
plans to address identified deficiencies. The after-action reporting 
and supplementary materials provided to the units that are trained, 
such as videos of training, are called "take-home packages" and may 
include as many as five or six compact discs containing Microsoft 
PowerPoint presentations and summaries of observers/controllers. The 
structure, format, and content of the after-action reporting vary by 
center.

The NTC typically includes Microsoft PowerPoint briefings and written 
after-action reports for the units training during each rotation. When 
subunits of a brigade experience NBC "events," or NBC training 
scenarios, during their rotations, observers/controllers generally 
include a description of the units' performance in an "NBC executive 
summary," which cites areas in which subunits need to improve 
proficiency, along with specific recommendations for home-station 
training and citations of applicable NBC-related field manuals. When 
subunits do not experience NBC events, this section is absent from 
after-action reporting for the overall unit. Nowhere in the report does 
the NTC include an overall brigade summary for the entire rotation 
period of 20 to 25 days that indicates the number of NBC events that 
occurred during a single rotation, the percentage of subunits that 
conducted NBC tasks, the type of tasks performed, or how well all 
individual subunits did. The NTC does include, in many cases, an 
assessment of a brigade's NBC skills in its first week of training. Out 
of the 21 rotations conducted by the NTC during fiscal years 2002 and 
2003, take-home packages for 12 brigades contained such scorecards, 
which assessed units' ability to perform six essential NBC tasks when 
they first arrived for training.

Like a take-home package for the NTC, a take-home package prepared by 
the JRTC contains multiple types of documents and after-action 
reporting. One document lists the types of NBC events planned for the 
rotation and their timing. When NBC events are not planned for the 
rotation, this document is absent, and when planned NBC events are 
canceled, there is no documentation stating that these scenario events 
did not occur or why. Neither is there a document that contains an 
overall summary of how many NBC events occurred during a single 
rotation, the percentage of subunits performing NBC tasks and the type 
of tasks performed, or how well all individual subunits did. Unlike the 
NTC, the JRTC includes no "scorecard" for assessing units' ability to 
perform basic NBC tasks. When subunits do experience NBC events, JRTC 
observers/controllers cite areas in which subunits need to "sustain" or 
"improve" proficiency, along with specific recommendations for home- 
station training and citations of applicable NBC field manuals.

A CMTC take-home package also contains multiple Microsoft PowerPoint 
briefings, written after-action reporting, and videotapes. However, a 
package might or might not mention NBC training that occurred during a 
rotation, as this is not a mandatory reporting section. When a subunit 
experiences an NBC event, an observer/controller may mention how the 
unit performed if the subunit's performance was considered to be 
notable. When NBC events are discussed in an after-action report, CMTC, 
like NTC and JRTC, includes general observations of a unit's 
performance, comments on what it did well, and recommendations for 
improvement. Because there is no overall NBC summary document, however, 
CMTC's take-home packages seldom provide information on how many NBC 
events occurred during a rotation, what these events were, what 
percentage of the overall rotating unit participated, and how well they 
did on particular NBC tasks. Because no NBC section is required, it is 
not possible to calculate what percentage of CMTC rotations experience 
NBC events.

Twice a year, CALL publishes "trends" documents for each Army CTC. 
These publications cover all rotations that occurred during a 6-month 
period and expunge any information from the reporting that would 
identify a particular unit. The trends documents are compiled from 
after-action reports prepared for CTC training. They are prepared by 
observers/controllers and given to CALL representatives at each CTC, 
who then forward these reports to CALL analysts at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. When NBC training is determined to reveal a "trend" to report, 
it is included in the trends publications. Individual take-home 
packages and after-action reports that identify particular units are 
not generally made available. Rather, they are protected to prevent 
them from becoming public "report cards." CALL is now limited in its 
ability to identify NBC trends in its trends reports because NBC 
training completed at CTCs is not now uniformly reported in a 
standardized format that can reliably provide comparable data to 
support the identification of NBC trends.

The Army has a large portion of CTC after-action reports located in a 
database at CALL. However, because each CTC sends different or no 
information on NBC training, CALL does not have information available 
that would make it possible to do cross-unit or cross-center 
comparisons. CALL also stores compact discs and videotapes, some of 
which are entered into the electronic database. The CALL representative 
at each CTC maintains some portions of the take-home packages on site. 
However, at least in part because the take-home packages are considered 
the property of the units being trained, they are not made widely 
available. Also, many of the Army's after-action reports for NBC 
training at the CTCs for fiscal years 2002 to 2003 were not received, 
not locatable, or never loaded into the database located at CALL for 
archiving and subsequent research. We found during our visit to CALL 
that its researchers were very skilled in performing database analysis, 
but they were limited by incomplete and nonstandard reporting for NBC 
training data.

Marine Corps' Written After-Action Reports Do Not Include NBC Training 
Information:

The Marine Corps' written after-action reporting system does not 
address NBC training conducted in the combined arms exercise primarily 
because NBC training has not been included in that training. At 
Twentynine Palms, a final written exercise report containing lessons 
learned is prepared by the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training 
Command for the last 3 days of the combined arms exercise. However, the 
command does not prepare written after-action reports for the other 
major segments of the exercise. After-action feedback is primarily 
given orally throughout the exercise period. This oral feedback is 
based on observations by observers/controllers assigned to each unit 
being trained. In the combined arms exercises that included NBC 
training in 2004, the written final exercise reports did not include 
any lessons learned on NBC operations because this training did not 
occur during the final 3 days. At that time, NBC exercise scenarios had 
not been fully integrated into the combined arms exercises.

The Marine Corps has no formal evaluation requirements for the combined 
arms exercise. The applicable Marine Corps order states that "A 
structured debrief will be conducted upon conclusion of each event or 
exercise." A Microsoft PowerPoint briefing on the final 3 days of the 
exercise does identify training objectives that the participant forces 
used to guide them through their training exercises, and in a sample 
briefing we reviewed, we found an assessment of the unit's performance 
for each training objective. However, NBC operations were not 
identified as a training objective, and the briefing included no 
lessons learned or recommendations for NBC defense training. NBC 
content is being added to the standard combined arms exercise scenario. 
However, the standard combined arms exercises have recently been 
replaced by revised combined arms exercises oriented toward current 
operations, and the revised combined arms exercise scenarios for 
Twentynine Palms contain no NBC defense training.

In addition, the Marine Corps has not been archiving at any central 
location its reporting on any unit training--NBC or otherwise-- 
completed at Twentynine Palms or submitting related training issues to 
its lessons learned system. Therefore, no after-action reports on the 
combined arms exercises that occur at Twentynine Palms are being placed 
into the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System's database. The Marine 
Corps recently determined that its overall lessons learned system was 
not functioning well. In December 2003, a working group that studied 
the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System found that problems with 
reporting and maintaining lessons learned were Marine Corps-wide. A 
Marine Corps information paper reported that throughout the Marine 
Corps, only eight reports had been submitted to the Marine Corps 
Lessons Learned System in 2002. The information paper also stated that 
the Marine Corps plans to implement an improved Web-based lessons 
learned system in the future. It also plans to establish a permanent 
organization to collect, review, and maintain this improved lessons 
learned system. Separately, an Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team 
was formed in 2001 to collect lessons learned in Afghanistan. In 2003, 
the team was restructured to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Conclusions:

The CTCs represent a rare opportunity for Army and Marine Corps units 
to perform advanced training under conditions that are designed to 
approximate actual combat as closely as possible, thereby enabling 
units to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. The 
services stress the importance of including NBC defense training in 
their exercises. Yet only a small percentage of the servicemembers 
passing through the CTCs encounter NBC defense training tasks because 
an Army or Marine Corps regulation or order requiring it is lacking. We 
recognize that commanders' discretion in determining unit training 
plans for CTC rotations is, and should continue to be, a central part 
of Army and Marine Corps training doctrine. However, until units are 
required to perform at least minimum NBC tasks while attending the 
CTCs, the services will continue to risk missing a unique opportunity 
to (1) uniformly assess these units' proficiency while they are 
operating in a field environment and (2) leverage the benefits of an 
objective assessment by an expert staff of units' NBC skills.

NBC lessons learned during training rotations at the combat training 
centers would be very useful for the services in their attempts to 
anticipate and train for NBC problems that may occur later during 
operations. Service regulations or orders specify that (1) all units at 
CTCs should conduct doctrinally based after-action reviews of events 
supported by observers/controllers, (2) lessons learned should be 
entered into an archived database, and (3) training unit commanders' 
after-action reports should be analyzed for trends and lessons learned. 
However, service regulations or orders do not now state that NBC 
training at the CTCs must be captured in a standardized format. In the 
absence of such a requirement, the Army's archived NBC data on training 
at the CTCs will remain incomplete or noncomparable and thus will not 
fully support research and reporting on NBC trends and lessons learned. 
The Marine Corps also does not employ a standard method of reporting 
NBC training at Twentynine Palms or providing the Marine Corps' trend 
and lessons learned reporting systems with NBC training information. 
Until the Marine Corps standardizes the reporting formats to capture 
service-defined NBC training at Twentynine Palms, it will be unable to 
analyze, over time, the units' NBC skills at these exercises, the 
effectiveness of NBC training at Twentynine Palms, or NBC trends and 
lessons learned. Overall, improvements to collecting, archiving, and 
using NBC training data could help the services capitalize on their 
substantial investment in maintaining CTCs and in sending units to 
train there, as well as to monitor the quality of NBC training and 
units' NBC skill levels.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To ensure that the NBC training opportunities offered to Army and 
Marine Corps units from training at their combat training centers are 
maximized and that NBC lessons learned at these centers are uniformly 
recorded and archived, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following two actions:

* Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending training 
exercises at CTCs.

* Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at 
the CTCs.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of 
the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the 
following two actions:

* Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending the combined arms 
exercise at Twentynine Palms.

* Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs 
during a combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In written comments, DOD stated that it agreed with the findings and 
recommendations of the report and that the Army and Marine Corps have 
established programs to implement the recommendations. Army and Marine 
Corps officials indicated that they are currently taking those actions 
necessary to develop the NBC content to be included in future CTC 
rotations and modify their after-action reporting systems and 
regulations to ensure that NBC training completed at CTCs is 
appropriately reported. However, because of current operational 
requirements, full implementation of NBC training at CTCs will be 
delayed. DOD's comments are printed in their entirety in appendix V.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the 
Army, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9619 or e-mail me at pickups@gao.gov. 
Additional contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To determine the extent to which Army and Marine Corps units 
participate in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training at the 
combat training centers (CTC) and the extent to which these units and 
personnel perform NBC tasks at the centers to service standards, we 
interviewed appropriate officials and reviewed pertinent documents and 
after-action reports at the following locations:

* Office of the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 
Washington, D.C;

* Center for Army Lessons Learned, Battle Command Training Program, 
Combined Arms Center-Training, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas;

* U.S. Army Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, and the Army 
Maneuver Support Center Academic Library, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri;

* Training Division, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson, 
Georgia;

* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, 
Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;

* Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;

* Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana;

* Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany;

* Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; and:

* Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.

To compile a collection of planning documents and after-action reports 
for the Army CTC rotations that occurred during fiscal years 2002 and 
2003, we visited and obtained documents from various locations. The 
largest collection of planning documents and after-action reports was 
located at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), though we also 
obtained some documents from other locations, including the CTCs. We 
were able to obtain at least some parts of after-action reporting for 
41 of the 57 rotations that occurred at the National Training Center 
(NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat 
Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The 
following organizations provided us with the planning documents and 
after-action reports for units attending the CTCs:

* Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;

* National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;

* Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and:

* Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

To determine the extent of NBC training completed at the Army CTCs 
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we analyzed all available planning 
and after-action reports. As mentioned in our report, we found that NBC 
training that occurred was not always discussed in after-action 
reports; that subunits of an entire brigade experienced chemical or 
biological events that did not affect the overall brigade; and that 
observers/controllers frequently noted deficiencies in units' basic NBC 
skills, often attributing them to inadequate home-station training. 
Because the CTCs' formatting of NBC reporting differed and none 
contained an overall summary document of all the NBC training that 
occurred during a single rotation, we were not able to definitively 
determine whether we had been able to collect all pertinent documents, 
though we did examine all of the reporting that the CTCs and CALL said 
was available.

The Marine Corps provided us with only two after-action reports for 
combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. It told us that there was 
no central repository for these after-action reports and that only two 
reports were located. However, because NBC training had not been 
introduced to the combined arms exercise until January 2004 and was 
suspended thereafter, we were able to determine that no after-action 
reports on NBC training would have been submitted. The one after-action 
report that the Marine Corps provided us with, for the January 2004 
combined arms rotation, did not mention NBC training because this 
training did not occur during the last 3 days of the exercise--the only 
time period captured in the after-action report.

To determine whether the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training 
at the CTCs in a standardized format that allows the services to 
identify trends and lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross- 
center comparisons, we collected all available after-action reports 
from the above-listed locations. These reports were all part of the 
after-action reporting contained in "take-home packages"--that is, the 
materials prepared for the units to take with them to document training 
completed and to aid in units' development of home-station training 
plans. Because these reports contained particular names of units and 
comments on unit performance, they are not made generally available, 
which required us to obtain these reports from lessons learned 
repositories and the CTCs. We also compared these reports with general 
trends documents prepared by the Army and the Marine Corps, which 
expunge units' identification and summarize the results of groups of 
rotations, and learned that not all NBC training at CTCs was reported 
because of the lack of standardized reporting formats.

We conducted our review from March 2003 through October 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine 
Corps:

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications 
what they believe are the essential nuclear, biological, and chemical 
(NBC) skills that all soldiers and Marines should have. In no case, 
however, do service regulations or orders prescribe where the training 
must take place. Specifically, applicable documents do not state that 
any particular NBC tasks must be included in training that units 
receive while they are at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), but they 
do state that NBC training should be incorporated into all types of 
exercises. The services' guidance and policy have left it to the 
discretion of commanders to determine where their units should train in 
the required NBC skills. The following is a listing of Army and Marine 
Corps definitions of essential NBC skills.

Army Universal Task List:

In Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, the Army provides a 
common, doctrinal foundation and catalog of the Army's tactical 
missions, operations, and collective tasks. A commander can use this 
list as a menu in developing the unit's mission-essential task list. 
The NBC tasks cited in the Army's Universal Task List are:

* take measures to avoid or minimize the effects of NBC attacks and 
reduce the effects of NBC hazards,

* identify NBC hazards,

* warn personnel/units of contaminated areas,

* report NBC hazards throughout the area of operations,

* use individual/collective NBC protective equipment,

* perform immediate decontamination,

* perform operational decontamination,

* perform thorough decontamination,

* perform area decontamination, and:

* perform patient decontamination.

NBC Tasks Required by Army Forces Command:

The tasks listed by U.S. Army Forces Command,[Footnote 30] which are 
all skill level-1 NBC survival-oriented tasks, are:

* protect yourself from chemical and biological injury/contamination 
using your M40-series protective mask with hood,

* replace the canister on your M40-series protective mask,

* maintain your M40-series protective mask with hood,

* react to chemical or biological hazard/attack,

* protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination with chemical 
protective equipment,

* identify chemical agents using M8 detector paper,

* protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination when drinking from 
your canteen while wearing your protective mask,

* administer first aid to a nerve agent casualty,

* administer nerve agent antidote to self (self-aid),

* decontaminate your skin using the M291 skin decontaminating kit,

* decontaminate your skin and personal equipment using an M258A1 
decontamination kit, and:

* decontaminate your individual equipment using the M295 individual 
equipment decontamination kit.

In addition, the Army requires that "Units will conduct weapons 
qualification on individual and crew-served weapons with personnel 
wearing protective equipment."[Footnote 31]

Marine Corps' NBC Survival Standards:

The Marine Corps lists NBC "survival standards" for each individual in 
Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 
Training." They are as follows:

* Identify North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC markers.

* Properly maintain Individual Protective Equipment.

* Properly don, clear, and check their field protective mask within 9 
seconds of an NBC alarm or attack.

* Properly don the appropriate individual protective clothing and 
assigned field protective mask to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 
Level 4.

* Perform basic functions (e.g., drinking, waste removal, sleep) while 
in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Level 4.

* Perform NBC detection measures with issued detection equipment, i.e., 
M256A1 Chemical Detection Kit, M8 detection paper, M9 detection tape, 
and DT 236 radiac detector.

* Decontaminate skin and personal equipment using M291 skin 
decontamination kit or other appropriate decontaminants.

* Perform individual (emergency) Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 
equipment exchange.

* React to a nuclear attack.

* React to a chemical attack.

* React to a biological attack.

* Take the specific actions required to operate efficiently before, 
during, and after NBC attacks to reduce the effects of NBC 
contamination.

* Recognize or detect chemical agent contamination and perform 
immediate decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing, 
equipment, position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.

* Treat a chemical agent casualty.

* Be able to drink water from a canteen or other water container while 
masked.

* Be able to properly format and send an NBC 1 report.

Marine Corps' NBC Basic Operating Standards:

The Marine Corps lists NBC "basic operating standards" for units in 
Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 
Training." They are as follows:

* The unit will maintain its collective nuclear, biological, and 
chemical defense equipment in a high state of serviceability at all 
times.

* The unit must be proficient in taking the specific actions required 
to operate efficiently before, during, and after NBC attacks to reduce 
the effects of NBC contamination.

* The unit must be able to recognize or detect chemical agent 
decontamination and perform immediate individual and operational 
decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing, equipment, 
position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.

* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in contamination avoidance 
procedures when crossing NBC-contaminated areas.

* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in performing primary military 
duties, to include the use of crew/personal weapons and minimum/basic 
combat skills, while wearing Individual Protective Equipment for 
extended periods.

* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in operational and thorough 
decontamination procedures.

* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the principles of collective 
protection, including passage through contamination control areas, 
where applicable.

* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the use of dosimetric 
devices; chemical and biological detection; and monitoring equipment, 
where applicable.

* The unit must be able to send and receive NBC-1 reports and plot NBC- 
3 reports.

* The unit must be able to properly conduct monitor/survey missions as 
directed by higher headquarters personnel.

* The unit must be able to conduct unmasking procedures.

[End of section]

Appendix III: NBC Classroom Courses Introduced into the Marine Corps 
Combined Arms Exercise Program in January 2004:

NBC training objective: 
* Perform unit actions before, during, and after a nuclear, biological, 
and chemical (NBC) attack; 
* Exercise the NBC warning and reporting system; 
* Conduct thorough decontamination; 
* Monitor and survey decontamination operations; 

Course title and description: Command Brief (1 hour): All NBC personnel 
will receive this instruction as a one-time prerequisite to nuclear, 
biological, and chemical defense instruction.

Course title and description: Vulnerability Analysis (2 hours): 
Students learn to source, develop, and contribute to unit intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield; conduct hazard assessments; and finally 
develop and recommend courses of action from NBC.

Course title and description: Control Center (Nuclear) (3 hours): 
Students rehearse the use of the NBC warning and reporting procedures 
for nuclear detonations. Includes manual plotting methods, 
communication protocols, and operational aspects. Time of stay/exit, 
shielding, and decay problems are illustrated.

Course title and description: Control Center (Chem-Bio) (2 hours): This 
course instructs and rehearses the student in the use of the NBC 
warning and reporting procedures for chemical and biological attack. 
Includes manual plotting methods, communication protocols, and 
operational aspects. Incident response through consequence management.

Course title and description: Joint Warning and Reporting Network (3 
hours): This is the prescribed automated platform for integration of 
NBC warning and reporting to command and control systems and networks.

Course title and description: Radiation Safety/Depleted Uranium (1 
hour): Designed to be refresher instruction for the unit. Addresses 
types and characteristics of ionizing radiation, medical effects, and 
protection standards/tasks. Reviews the current inventory of 
radioactive sources in the Department of Defense's use and the handling 
of accidents.

Course title and description: Unit Sustainment (3 hours): Formerly 
referred to as "decontamination," sustainment is the units' effort to 
recover personnel and equipment for continued use on the battlefield. 
This period of instruction develops the principles of decontamination 
and updates the NBC specialist/officer on the latest equipment and 
decontaminants.

Course title and description: Special Sustainment (1 hour): The special 
requirements for decontamination of casualties and aircraft are 
instructed per current doctrine. Instruction covers site reconnaissance 
and the development of best practices in areas that every unit may not 
encounter.

Course title and description: Biodefense and Medical Management (2 
hours): Designed for both NBC and medical personnel, the lecture covers 
casualty identification, triage, and decontamination requirements. Part 
2 of this instruction highlights the biological sampling and modeling 
of the battlefield; how to collect, escort, and ship etiologic agents; 
laboratory protocols; reporting requirements; and fundamentals of 
epidemiology.

Course title and description: Joint Mission Essential Task List (1 
hour): Class begins with a review of mission-essential task development 
and NBC tasks at the strategic national, strategic theater, and 
operational levels. Lecture then details the Marine Corps' Task List 
and the seven mission-essential task areas for the Marine Air Ground 
Task Force, focusing on sense, shape, shield, and sustain. Puts Marine 
Air Ground Task Force requirements into perspective and sets the stage 
for joint and combined operations.

Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Different Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for 
After-Action Reporting for the Army's CTCs:

Army Regulation 11-33 (Army Lessons Learned): 

After Action Report, Part I: Executive Summary (completed by 
commander): 
* Mission objectives; 
* General description; 
* Dates, locations, and major participants; 
* Significant issues; 
* Limitations; 

After Action Report, Part II: Lessons Learned; 
* Observation; 
* Discussion; 
* Lessons learned; 
* Recommended action; 
* Comments; 

After Action Report, Part III: Optional; 
* Chronology of events; 
* Operation (plans/orders); 
* Standing operating procedures; 

U.S. Army, Europe, Regulation 350-50 (CMTC Training): 

After Action Report, Part I: Executive overview: 
* Mission objectives; 
* General description; 
* Participating units (including specific information) such as troop 
list, number of personnel who participated, and number and type of 
vehicles used; 
* Required task organization (must coincide with the current 
modification table of organization and equipment, broken down by 
vehicle type, unit requirement, and unit shipped); 
* Optional and added units (broken down by vehicle type, unit 
requirement, and unit shipped); 
* Significant issues; 
* Limitations; 
* Funding (including personnel, transportation type and cost, total 
vehicle transportation cost, and total cost reimbursed to the Combat 
Maneuver Training Center [CMTC]); 

After Action Report, Part II: Lessons Learned; 
* Observation; 
* Discussion; 
* Lessons learned; 
* Recommended action; 
* Comments; 

Tactical lessons learned, to include command and control; maneuver 
(offense/defense); fire support; intelligence; air defense; 
mobility/countermobility; electronic warfare; nuclear, biological, 
chemical defense; and combat service support; 

Administrative and logistics lessons learned (including deploying to, 
training at, and redeploying from the CMTC); 

General narrative comments, to include the following:
 
* Benefits of training at the CMTC; 
* Recommendations for doctrinal improvement; 
* Recommendations and lessons learned on preparatory training; 
* Recommendations for improving the training exercise; 

Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1 (NTC Training): 

Tactical lessons learned. Address the Battle Functions; Administrative 
lessons learned, including deployment, redeployment, equipment draw, 
and regeneration; 
* Benefits of training at the National Training Center (NTC); 
* Recommendations for doctrinal improvement; 
* Recommendations/lessons learned on preparatory training, including 
comments on usability of the Army Training and Evaluation Program or 
any other training and training support product developed by the 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); 
* Recommendations for improvement of the NTC experience; 
* Logistics or Resource Management lessons learned; 

Forces Command Regulation 350-50-2 (JRTC Training): 

Tactical lessons learned. Address the battlefield operating system; 
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense; electronic warfare; 
deployment; and any other pertinent topics; 

Administrative lessons learned, including deployment, redeployment, and 
any other pertinent topics; 
* Benefits of training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC); 
* Recommendations for improving existing doctrine; 
* Recommendations for improving preparatory training, including 
comments on the usability of TRADOC publications or other training 
support products; 
* Recommendations for improving the JRTC experience.

Sources: U.S. Army, "Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development 
and Application," Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989); "Training: 
Combat Maneuver Training Center," U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50 
(Aug. 4, 1994); "Training at the National Training Center," Forces 
Command Regulation 350-50-1 (July 1, 2002); and "Training at the Joint 
Readiness Training Center," Forces Command Regulation 350-50-2 (June 
15, 1998).

Note: CTC = Combat Training Center.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:

November 29, 2004:

Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Pickup:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-05-8, "CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE: Army and Marine 
Corps Need to Establish Minimum Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat 
Training Centers," dated October 22, 2004 (GAO Code 350328).

We have reviewed the draft report and our comments to the GAO's draft 
recommendations are enclosed. We fundamentally agree with the overall 
findings and recommendations of the report. The Army and Marine Corps 
have established programs to implement these recommendations. However, 
due to current operational requirements, most units currently training 
at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) are currently conducting training 
that commanders determine are essential for accomplishment of their 
directed missions. Full implementation of Nuclear Biological Chemical 
(NBC) training at CTC rotations is being deferred in order to focus on 
those tasks.

When missions, threats, and operating conditions allow, both Services 
will return to more traditional CTC training events with the GAO's 
recommendations fully implemented.

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on this report.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Paul W. Mayberry: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
Readiness:

GAO-05-8/GAO CODE 350328:

"CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE: ARMY AND MARINE CORPS NEED TO 
ESTABLISH MINIMUM TASKS AND IMPROVE REPORTING FOR COMBAT TRAINING 
CENTERS"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish the minimum nuclear, 
biological, and chemical (NBC) tasks for units attending training 
exercises at combat training centers. (Page 30/Draft Report):

Doll) RESPONSE: Concur with comment. While the Army is instituting a 
plan to train NBC tasks within the next year for all units during the 
reception phase of CTC rotations, the implementation of this plan will 
be delayed. The CTCs are currently conducting mission rehearsal 
exercises (MRE) prior to deployment in support of Operations Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The MREs focus exclusively on those tasks 
that commanders determine are essential for accomplishment of their 
directed mission. The NBC training will be fully implemented when 
missions, threats, and operating conditions allow.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to standardize reporting formats to 
capture NBC training that occurs at the combat training centers. (Page 
30/Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army will standardize the training unit after 
action report formats for CTC rotations in the next published revisions 
to specifically include NBC training.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps to establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending the 
combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms. (Page 31/Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. The Marine Corps is prepared to 
integrate NBC training in their Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) on short 
notice. However, full implementation has been delayed due to focus of 
CAX training being modified to prepare units for threats that 
commanders have determined are essential for accomplishment of their 
directed mission. The NBC training will be fully implemented when 
missions, threats, and operating conditions allow.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs 
during a combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms. (Page 31/Draft 
Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. The Marine Corps is developing a 
standardized system for recording CAX NBC training that will provide 
current trend information necessary to identify deficiencies and take 
corrective actions. This system will be available when current 
missions, threats and operating conditions allow a return to the more 
traditional CAX training program. 

[End of section]

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

William W. Cawood, Jr., (202) 512-3959:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to the contact named above, Beverly Schladt, Mike Avenick, 
Matthew Sakrekoff, James Lawson, Leslie Bharadwaja, Gerald Winterlin, 
Jim Melton, R.K. Wild, Dave Mayfield, and Jay Smale made key 
contributions to this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] At the NTC, brigades conduct live-fire offense and defense 
missions. At the JRTC and CMTC, live-fire training is focused at the 
company level.

[2] The Army has a fourth primary CTC, called the Battle Command 
Training Program, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This report will 
concentrate on the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC because the training at 
these "maneuver" combat training centers consists principally of live 
training. The Battle Command Training Program, which is called the 
"traveling CTC," conducts computer-assisted Command Post Exercises. 

[3] U.S. Army, "Combat Training Center Program," Army Regulation 350-50 
(Jan. 24, 2003). 

[4] Department of the Army, Combat Training Center Master Plan (Aug. 
30, 2003), p. 1-5.

[5] See GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's 
Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/NSIAD-99-210 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 1999). In fiscal year 2004 dollars, this 
amount would be $1.1 billion. 

[6] NSPD-17/HSPD-4 [unclassified version], National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002), p. 1.

[7] DOD, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical (NBC) Environments, Joint Publication 3-11 (July 11, 2000), 
pp. III-6 and III-7.

[8] U.S. Army, "Army Training and Education," Army Regulation 350-1 
(Apr. 9, 2003), paragraph 4-11. 

[9] U.S. Marine Corps, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 
(NBCD) Training," Marine Corps Order 3400.3F (Mar. 1, 2004). See also 
U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) Program," 
Marine Corps Order 3500.11E (Nov. 21, 2001). 

[10] Army regulations and Marine Corps orders containing provisions on 
preparing lessons learned at the CTCs include U.S. Army, "Army Lessons 
Learned Program: System Development and Application," Army Regulation 
11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989); U.S. Army, "Training at the National Training 
Center," Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1 (July 1, 2002); U.S. Army, 
"Training at the Joint Readiness Training Center," Forces Command 
Regulation 350-50-2 (June 15, 1998); U.S. Army, "Training: Combat 
Maneuver Training Center," U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50 (Aug. 4, 
1994); U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Lessons Learned System," Marine 
Corps Order 5000.17A (Apr. 25, 1994); and U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine 
Corps Combined Arms Exercise Program," Marine Corps Order 3500.11E 
(Nov. 21, 2001).

[11] U.S. Army, The Army Universal Task List, Field Manual 7-15, 
Section 5.3 (Oct. 4, 2002).

[12] Army Regulation 350-1, paragraph 4-11(c)5.

[13] Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, enclosure 1.

[14] The rotation period is 24 hours per day times about 25 days, for a 
total of about 600 hours.

[15] In 2001 an Army-directed study conducted by the RAND Corporation 
found that a brigade's subunits did not always experience intensive NBC 
training while at the NTC in fiscal years 1999 to 2001. This study 
showed that, on average, units faced an NBC event on only about half of 
their training missions; almost 40 percent of the units never 
encountered NBC conditions during their entire rotation; and one-third 
of the battalions never conducted decontamination. The RAND study also 
showed that NBC events at the NTC varied widely in their scope and 
intensity, ranging from something as simple as avoiding a contaminated 
area to a full-scale attack with a persistent chemical agent that 
required a unit to decontaminate its equipment. (See the RAND 
Corporation article, "NBC at the NTC: Distraction or Necessity?" 
[2001]. This article is a summary of a longer RAND report that the Army 
has not yet released.)

[16] Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Unit 
Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training, Report No. 98-174 
(Arlington, Va.: July 17, 1998).

[17] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Unit-Level Training for Chemical and 
Biological Defense, A-2002-0486-IME (Alexandria, Va.: July 10, 2002).

[18] Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program, 
Annual Report to Congress, Volume I (Apr. 2002) p. 120.

[19] GAO, Army Training: Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not 
Always Reliable, GAO/NSIAD-91-72 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 1991).

[20] GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains 
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems, GAO/NSIAD-96-103 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1996).

[21] GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat 
Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-92 (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 26, 1999).

[22] GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat 
Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/NSIAD-99-210 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 17, 1999).

[23] Twentynine Palms normally conducts 10 combined arms exercise 
rotations per fiscal year, lasting 22 days for active duty forces and 
15 days for reserve component forces. These exercises emphasize 
warfighting skills required for a unit's mission-essential tasks. 
However, in recent years, training at Twentynine Palms has emphasized 
preparation for "real-world" missions, such as stability and support 
operations and combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.

[24] Naval Audit Service, Marine Corps Infantry/Armor Readiness 
Reporting, N2002-0011 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001).

[25] Army Regulation 350-50, paragraph 1-5(b).

[26] Individual CTC regulations also contemplate the preparation and 
dissemination within command channels of extensive after-action 
reports. (See Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1, Forces Command 
Regulation 350-50-2, and U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50.)

[27] U.S. Army, "Army Programs: Army Lessons Learned Program: System 
Development and Application," Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989). 
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, as executive agent for the 
Army Lessons Learned Program, is responsible for establishing a 
facility that has the resources to "receive, process, archive, analyze, 
and disseminate information from the combat training centers and major 
training." This facility is the Center for Army Lessons Learned, 
located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

[28] Marine Corps Order 5000.17A.

[29] Marine Corps Order 3500.11E.

[30] The Forces Command list of NBC tasks is contained in its message 
dated July 17, 2003, "Training Guidance for Follow-on Forces Deploying 
ISO Operation Iraqi Freedom."

[31] U.S. Army, "Army Training and Education," Army Regulation 350-1 
(Apr. 9, 2003).

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