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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

September 2003:

Airport Passenger Screening:

Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining:

GAO-03-1173:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-1173, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study:

Passenger screening is critical to the security of our nations 
aviation system, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks. The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) is tasked with securing all modes of transportation, including 
the screening of airline passengers. TSA has met numerous requirements 
in this regard, such as deploying more than 50,000 federal screeners 
at over 440 commercial airports nationwide. To determine whether TSAs 
passenger screening program is achieving its intended results, GAO is 
conducting an ongoing evaluation of TSAs efforts to (1) ensure that 
passenger screeners are effectively trained and supervised, (2) 
measure screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (3) 
implement and evaluate the contract screening pilot program. 

What GAO Found:

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was tasked with the 
tremendous challenge of building a large federal agency responsible 
for securing all modes of transportation, while simultaneously meeting 
ambitious deadlines to enhance the security of the nations aviation 
system. Although TSA has made significant progress related to its 
passenger screening program, challenges remain.

TSA recognized that ongoing training of screeners on a frequent basis, 
and effective supervisory training, is critical to maintaining and 
enhancing skills. However, TSA has not fully developed or deployed 
recurrent or supervisory training programs. Although TSA has not yet 
deployed these programs, it has taken steps in establishing recurrent 
and supervisory training, including developing six recurrent training 
modules that will soon be deployed to all airports, as well as working 
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Graduate School to 
tailor its off-the-shelf supervisory course to the specific training 
needs of TSAs screening supervisors.

TSA currently collects little information regarding screener 
performance in detecting threat objects. The primary source of 
information collected on screeners ability to detect threat objects 
is covert testing conducted by TSAs Office of Internal Affairs and 
Program Review. However, TSA does not consider the results of these 
tests as a measure of screener performance, but rather a snapshot of 
a screeners ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in 
time. Additionally, TSA does not currently use the Threat Image 
Projection system, which places images of threat objects on x-ray 
screens during actual operations and records whether screeners 
identify the threat. However, TSA plans to fully activate the Threat 
Image Projection system with significantly more threat images than 
previously used, as well as implement an annual screener certification 
program in October 2003. TSA also recently completed a screener 
performance improvement study and is taking steps to address the 
deficiencies identified during the study.

As required by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA 
implemented a pilot program using contract screeners in lieu of 
federal screeners at 5 commercial airports. However, TSA has not yet 
determined how to evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot 
program airports, or prepare for airports potentially applying to opt-
out of using federal screeners, as allowed by the act, beginning in 
November 2004. Although TSA has not begun evaluating the performance 
of the pilot program airports, it plans to award a contract by October 
1, 2003, to compare the performance of pilot screeners with federal 
screeners and determine the reasons for any differences. Numerous 
airport operators have contacted TSA to express an interest in 
obtaining more information to assist in their decision regarding 
opting-out of using federal screeners.

What GAO Recommends:

Because our evaluation is ongoing and our results are preliminary, we 
are not making any recommendations.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Scope and Methodology:

Recurrent and Supervisory Training Programs Not Fully Developed:

Little Information Exists to Measure Screeners' Performance in 
Detecting Threat Objects:

An Assessment of the Contract Screening Pilot Program Has Not Yet 
Begun:

TSA Continuing to Work to Identify Appropriate Staffing Levels at the 
Nation's Airports:

Appendix I: Examples of Information Collected and Maintained in the 
Transportation Security Administration's Performance Management 
Information System:

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Abbreviations:

AAAE: American Association of Airport Executives:

ACI: Airports Council International:

ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act:

DOT: Department of Transportation:

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:

FSD: Federal Security Directors:

LMS: On-Line Learning Management System:

OIAPR: Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review:

OIG: Office of Inspector General:

OJT: on-the-job training:

PMIS: Performance Management Information System:

SOP: standard operating procedure:

TIP: Threat Image Projection:

TSA: Transportation Security Administration:

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

September 24, 2003:

The Honorable John Mica 
Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Aviation 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Passenger screening is a critical component to the security of our 
nation's aviation system. Passenger screeners use metal detectors, X-
ray machines, explosive trace detection machines, and physical searches 
to examine passengers and their baggage to identify threat objects. On 
November 19, 2001, prompted by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), with a primary goal of strengthening the security of the 
nation's aviation system. ATSA created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and mandated specific improvements to aviation 
security, including the federalization of passenger screening at over 
440 commercial airports in the United States by November 19, 2002.

TSA was tasked with the tremendous challenge of building a large 
federal agency responsible for securing all modes of transportation, 
while simultaneously meeting ambitious deadlines to federalize aviation 
security as mandated by ATSA. TSA has met numerous requirements related 
to its passenger screening program, including deploying more than 
50,000 federal screeners at over 440 commercial airports nationwide, 
developing and implementing a basic screener training program, and 
establishing a pilot program at 5 airports where screening of 
passengers and property would be conducted by private screening 
companies and overseen by TSA.

To determine whether TSA's passenger screening program is achieving its 
intended results, the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, requested that we review various 
aspects of the program. Specifically, the Subcommittee asked that we 
evaluate TSA's efforts to (1) ensure that passenger screeners are 
effectively trained and supervised, (2) measure screener performance in 
detecting threat objects, (3) implement and evaluate the contract 
screening pilot program, and (4) address airport-specific staffing 
needs, while reducing the screener workforce. On September 5, 2003, we 
briefed the Subcommittee staff on our preliminary observations of TSA's 
passenger screening program based on our work to date.

This report summarizes and updates the information presented at that 
briefing. Because our work is still on going, the observations 
discussed in this report are preliminary.

In conducting our work, we obtained and reviewed TSA documentation 
related to screener training, testing and supervision; the contract 
screening pilot program; screener staffing levels; and airport security 
concerns. We also interviewed relevant officials at TSA headquarters 
and field offices, airports, and several aviation associations. A more 
detailed description of our scope and methodology is contained later in 
this report.

Results in Brief:

TSA has deployed basic and remedial screener training programs, but has 
not fully developed or deployed a recurrent or supervisory training 
program to ensure to ensure that screeners are effectively trained and 
supervised. However, recognizing that training of screeners on a 
frequent basis and effective supervision are critical to screener 
performance, TSA has taken some positive steps in this direction. These 
steps include designing an On-Line Learning Management System (LMS) 
that will be fielded in October 2003, and working with the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Graduate School to tailor its off-
the-shelf supervisory course to the specific training needs of TSA's 
screening supervisors.

TSA currently collects little information to measure screener 
performance in detecting threat objects. The primary source of 
information collected on screeners' ability to detect threat objects is 
operational testing conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and 
Program Review (OIAPR).[Footnote 1] However, TSA does not consider the 
results of OIAPR's covert tests as a measure of screener performance, 
but rather a "snapshot" of a screener's ability to detect threat 
objects at a particular point in time, and as a system-wide performance 
indicator. In addition, the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system, which 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) deployed in late 1999 to 
measure and improve screener performance in detecting threat objects, 
was shut down immediately following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks for fear that it would result in screening delays and 
panic.[Footnote 2] However, TSA officials reported that they have 
recently begun fielding TIP to airports, with significantly more threat 
images than used by the FAA. Further, TSA has not yet implemented an 
ATSA requirement for an annual proficiency review for all screeners, 
but plans to begin implementing an annual screener certification 
program in October 2003. TSA also developed a Performance Management 
Information System (PMIS) to collect and maintain information on the 
performance of TSA's passenger and baggage screening operations. 
However, PMIS contains little information on screener performance in 
detecting threat objects.[Footnote 3]

Consistent with ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract 
screeners at 5 commercial airports, but has not yet determined how to 
evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot program airports. 
However, TSA plans to award a contract by October 1, 2003, to compare 
the performance of pilot screeners with federal screeners and determine 
the reasons for any differences. While the purpose of the screener 
pilot program is to determine the feasibility of using private 
screening companies rather than federal screeners, TSA initially 
required private screening companies to adhere to all of the procedures 
and protocols used by federal screeners. However, TSA recently provided 
the contractors with some flexibility, such as allowing them to 
determine and maintain their own staffing levels and to make 
independent hiring decisions. ATSA also gives airport operators the 
option of applying to transition from using federal screeners to 
private screeners beginning in November 2004; however, TSA has not 
begun to plan for the possible transition of airports from a federal 
system to a private screening company. Numerous airport operators have 
contacted TSA to express an interest in obtaining more information to 
assist in their decision regarding using private screeners.

To address airport-specific staffing needs and accomplish workforce 
reduction goals, TSA developed a staffing model to determine staffing 
levels at each airport, and recently hired an outside consultant to 
assist the agency in determining whether identified staffing levels are 
appropriate. Federal Security Directors (FSD), who are responsible for 
overseeing security at each of the nation's commercial airports, have 
expressed concern that they have had limited authority to respond to 
airport specific staffing needs, such as reacting to fluctuations in 
daily and/or seasonal passenger flow. TSA headquarters officials 
acknowledged that their initial staffing efforts created imbalances in 
the screener workforce and have taken steps to correct identified 
imbalances, such as such as authorizing the hiring of part-time 
screeners at over 200 airports--the first of which began working on 
September 15, 2003.

Because our observations are preliminary and our evaluation is ongoing, 
we are not making recommendations at this time.

TSA officials reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Background:

ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) to ensure security for all modes of transportation, to include 
aviation.[Footnote 4] ATSA set forth specific enhancements to aviation 
security for TSA to implement and established deadlines for completing 
many of them. These enhancements included federalizing passenger 
screeners at more than 440 commercial airports by November 19, 
2002;[Footnote 5] screening checked baggage for explosives by December 
31, 2002; enhancing screener training standards; and establishing and 
managing a 2-year pilot program at five airports--one in each airport 
category--where screening of passengers and property would be conducted 
by a private screening company and overseen by TSA. Additionally, ATSA 
included a provision that allows airport operators to apply to opt-out 
of using federal screeners in favor of private screeners beginning 
November 19, 2004.

Prior to the passage of ATSA, air carriers were responsible for 
screening passengers and most used private security firms to perform 
this function. Longstanding concerns existed regarding screener 
performance in detecting threat objects. Inadequate training and poor 
supervision, along with rapid turnover and inadequate attention to 
human factors, were historically identified as key contributors to poor 
screener performance.[Footnote 6] As early as 1987, we reported that 
too little attention had been paid to (1) individual aptitudes for 
effectively performing screening duties; (2) the sufficiency of 
screener training and screeners' ability to comprehend training; and 
(3) the monotony of the job and distractions that reduced screeners' 
vigilance.[Footnote 7] Additional studies have shown that effective 
training can lead to more effective performance and lower turnover 
rates for passenger screeners.

Concerns have long existed over screeners' inability to detect threat 
objects during covert tests at passenger screening checkpoints. In 
1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the potentially 
dangerous objects FAA agents carried through checkpoints during tests-
-a level that was considered "significant and alarming."[Footnote 8] In 
1987, screeners did not detect 20 percent of the objects during the 
same types of tests.[Footnote 9] In addition, we reported that FAA 
tests conducted between 1991 and 1999 showed that screeners' ability to 
detect objects was not improving, and in some cases was worsening. In 
tests conducted in the late 1990s, as the testing objects became more 
realistic and more closely approximated how a terrorist might attempt 
to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners' ability to detect dangerous 
objects declined even further.[Footnote 10]

Scope and Methodology:

Our preliminary observations are based on our review of TSA 
documentation related to screener training, testing, and supervision; 
the contract screening pilot program; screener staffing levels; and 
airport security concerns. We interviewed TSA headquarters' officials 
in Arlington, Virginia; and interviewed FSDs, their staffs, and 
screeners at 12 commercial airports throughout the nation;[Footnote 11] 
10 airport operators; officials at 5 air carriers; and officials from 4 
aviation associations--American Association of Airport Executives 
(AAAE), Airports Council International (ACI), Air Transport 
Association, and Regional Airline Association. We also reviewed our 
prior reports that addressed issues related to the performance of 
airport passenger screeners. We conducted our work from May through 
September 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Because our review is still ongoing, the results 
presented in this report are preliminary.

To complete our work, we will continue to collect and review TSA 
documentation related to each of our four objectives, including 
obtaining and analyzing the results of TSA's operational tests. We will 
also administer a survey to all 158 FSDs to obtain their perspectives 
on general and airport specific information related to each of our four 
objectives. Additionally, we will visit at least 8 additional airports 
to conduct interviews with FSDs, their staffs, members of the screener 
workforce, and airport operators. We will also interview 
representatives of all 5 pilot program airports, as well as airport 
operators at all category X airports, to obtain information on their 
coordination with TSA and their plans, if any, to apply to opt-out of 
the federal screening program beginning November 19, 2004. Finally, we 
will continue to meet with TSA headquarters officials to obtain current 
information related to the issues addressed in this report. We 
anticipate issuing a final report in April 2004.

Recurrent and Supervisory Training Programs Not Fully Developed:

TSA developed basic and remedial screener training programs, but has 
not fully developed or deployed a recurrent or supervisory training 
program to ensure that screeners are effectively trained and 
supervised. Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger 
screeners' ability to detect threat objects. Studies have shown that 
on-going training can lead to more effective performance and lower 
turnover rates for passenger screeners. According to TSA, there are 
three key elements of passenger screener training: (1) basic training, 
(2) remedial training, and (3) recurrent training. As required by ATSA, 
TSA established a basic screener-training program comprised of 40 hours 
of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training (OJT). TSA 
reported that all of its screeners who work independently have 
completed basic screener training and that those who failed an 
operational test received required remedial training.[Footnote 12]

Basic Training:

TSA requires screeners to complete a minimum of 40 hours of classroom 
instruction and 60 hours of OJT prior to making independent screening 
decisions. This requirement is an increase over FAA's basic training 
requirements when it oversaw passenger screening, which called for 12 
hours of classroom instruction and 40 hours of OJT. According to TSA 
officials, all screeners who work independently have met the basic 
screener training requirements.[Footnote 13] TSA contractors are 
responsible for delivering and tracking basic screener classroom 
training, while OJT is tracked locally at each airport. TSA encourages, 
but does not require, screening managers, who are responsible for 
overseeing screening functions to participate in classroom training, 
even if they do not have prior screening experience. Nevertheless, 2 of 
the 12 FSDs we interviewed said that they require their screening 
managers to observe basic screener training.

Remedial Training:

Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any screener 
who fails an operational test and prohibits screeners from performing 
the screening function related to the test they failed until they 
successfully complete the training.[Footnote 14] FSDs must certify that 
screeners identified as requiring remedial training complete the 
training before they can perform the screening function identified as a 
performance weakness. TSA's Aviation Operations Division is responsible 
for tracking the completion of remedial training following the failure 
of covert tests. The tracking of remedial training initiated for 
reasons other than failing a covert test is the responsibility of the 
FSDs or their designees. TSA reported that all screeners requiring 
remedial training have received the training.[Footnote 15]

Recurrent Training:

TSA has not fully developed or deployed a recurrent training program, 
but has recognized that ongoing training of screeners on a frequent 
basis is critical to maintaining and enhancing screener skills. 
According to agency officials, TSA established a training task force 
comprised of airport Training Coordinators, screeners, and headquarters 
officials to conduct an assessment of training needs. As a result of 
the task force's suggestions, TSA is developing six recurrent training 
modules--the first of which TSA plans to deploy to all airports 
beginning in October 2003. TSA plans to release each of the remaining 
five modules as they are finalized, which they anticipate will occur 
throughout 2004. TSA officials also said that they designed and are 
currently pilot testing an On-Line Learning Management System (LMS) 
comprised of 366 various training courses, which they expect to field 
in October 2003. Officials said that they were not further along in 
implementing their recurrent training modules or LMS due to budget 
considerations.

Fourteen of the 22 passenger screeners and supervisors we interviewed 
expressed the need for recurrent training.[Footnote 16] They were 
particularly interested in receiving additional training related to 
recognizing x-ray images of threat objects. In addition, 10 of the 12 
FSDs we interviewed reported implementing their own locally developed 
recurrent training courses rather than waiting for the training modules 
to be deployed by headquarters. TSA's OIAPR found that screeners at 
airports that conducted frequent, on-going training performed better 
during covert tests--TSA's form of operational testing--than screeners 
who did not receive recurrent training.

Supervisory Training:

TSA describes its screening supervisors as the key to a strong defense 
in detecting threat objects. In September 2001, we reported on the 
results of our survey of aviation stakeholders and aviation and 
terrorism experts concerning options for conducting screening. The 
respondents identified better supervision as one of the factors 
necessary for improving screener performance.[Footnote 17] 
Additionally, DOT's Office Inspector General (OIG) recently reported 
that screener supervisors are the key to effective screening,[Footnote 
18] and TSA's OIAPR identified a lack of supervisory training as a 
cause for screener testing failures. FSDs and TSA headquarters 
officials recognize the need to enhance the skills of screening 
supervisors through supervisory training.TSA is currently working with 
USDA to tailor its off-the-shelf supervisory course to the specific 
needs of TSA's screening supervisors. TSA recently reported that it is 
sending supervisors to the basic USDA supervisor's course until the 
customized course is fielded, which it expects to occur in April 2004. 
To supplement the classroom training, TSA also plans to establish a 
supervisory training module for recurrent training. We plan to review 
TSA's training initiatives further during the remainder of our 
evaluation.

Little Information Exists to Measure Screeners' Performance in 
Detecting Threat Objects:

Currently, the results of TSA's OIAPR's operational, or covert, testing 
is the only indication of screener performance in detecting threat 
objects. However, TSA does not view the results of OIAPR's covert 
testing as a measure of screener performance, but rather as a 
"snapshot" of a screener's ability to detect threat objects at a 
particular point in time. Although OAIPR conducts fewer covert tests of 
passenger screeners than previously conducted by the FAA, TSA considers 
its tests more rigorous than FAA's tests because they more closely 
approximate techniques terrorists might use. In addition to conducting 
operational testing, TSA plans to fully activate the Threat Image 
Projection system and implement a screener certification program in 
October 2003 to collect additional information on screener performance. 
TSA also developed a Performance Management Information System to 
collect and maintain information on the performance of its passenger 
and baggage screening operations. However, PMIS contains little data on 
screener performance in detecting threat objects. TSA officials said 
that they plan to expand PMIS to collect some performance information, 
but did not identify a timeframe for when the data will be collected.

Operational Testing:

TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a 
screener, conducted by TSA, on any screener function to assess the 
screener's threat item detection ability and/or adherence to TSA-
approved procedures. When a screener fails a test, he or she is 
required to receive immediate remedial training, and is prohibited from 
performing the function related to the failed test until he or she 
satisfactory completes the training. Currently, OIAPR's covert testing 
is the only source of operational testing conducted of passenger 
screeners. These tests are designed to identify systematic problems 
affecting the performance of screeners in the areas of training, 
policy, and equipment. TSA does not view the results of OIAPR's covert 
testing as a measure of screener performance, but rather a "snapshot" 
of a screener's ability to detect threat objects at a particular point 
in time and as an indicator of systemwide screener performance. OIAPR 
testing to date has shown weaknesses in screeners' ability to detect 
threat objects. Testing conducted by the DOT's OIG, the Department of 
Homeland Security's OIG, and GAO have also identified screener 
performance weaknesses.

Prior to the creation of TSA, FAA conducted thousands of covert tests 
annually of passenger screeners. Most of these tests were compliance 
tests in which FAA agents attempted to get nine test objects, such as 
guns and grenades, past screeners conducting x-ray, metal detector, and 
physical searches at airport checkpoints. The DOT OIG described these 
tests as unlike the techniques that terrorists would employ.[Footnote 
19] In 1997, FAA incorporated simulated improvised explosive devices 
into its compliance testing and performed, on average, more than 2,000 
of these test each year. In addition to compliance tests, FAA's special 
headquarters based testing unit, often called the Red Team, conducted 
more realistic tests using harder to detect threat objects by agents 
not known to screeners. [Footnote 20]

TSA's OIAPR has conducted fewer covert tests than conducted by FAA, but 
considers its testing methods more rigorous than either of FAA's 
compliance or Red Team tests because they more closely approximate 
techniques terrorists might use. OIAPR officials further said that 
their tests are intentionally designed to have a high probability of 
failure in an effort to identify vulnerabilities and areas needing 
improvement. Additionally, unlike testing conducted under FAA, OIAPR 
staff that perform the tests reported that they provide immediate 
feedback to screeners, their managers, and the FSDs to explain how they 
beat the system and provide instant remedial training. We plan to 
review OIAPR's operational testing in more detail during the remainder 
of our evaluation.

Based on an anticipated increase in staff from about 100 in fiscal year 
2003 to 200 in fiscal year 2004, OIAPR plans to conduct twice as many 
covert tests next year. In addition, TSA recently established 5 mission 
support centers located throughout the country, which according to TSA, 
will be staffed with OIAPR personnel available to conduct additional 
covert tests.[Footnote 21] These centers will also be staffed with 
mobile testing teams that will work with FSDs in their region to 
conduct screener training using some of the test objects OIAPR uses in 
its covert tests.

Threat Image Projection (TIP) System:

In late 1999, to help screeners remain alert, train them to become more 
adept at detecting harder to spot threat objects, and continuously 
measure screener performance, FAA began deploying TIP. TIP places 
images of threat objects on x-ray screens during actual operations and 
records whether screeners identify the threat object.[Footnote 22] By 
frequently exposing screeners to a variety of images of dangerous 
objects on the x-ray screens, the system provides continuous OJT and 
allows for immediate supervisory feedback, on-the-spot training, and 
remedial training.

According to TSA officials, TIP was shut down immediately following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks due to concerns that it would result 
in screening delays and panic, as screeners might think that they were 
actually viewing a threat object. TSA officials recognize that TIP is a 
key tool in maintaining and enhancing screener performance, and said 
that they had begun reactivating TIP with significantly more images 
than FAA had in place. TSA officials said that TIP had not been 
reactivated sooner due to a lack of automated data collection via 
cellular modems; competing priorities; a lack of training; and a lack 
of resources needed to deploy TIP activation teams.

Annual Screener Certification:

ATSA requires that each passenger screener receive an annual 
proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet all 
qualifications and standards required to perform the screening 
function. Although TSA has not yet implemented this requirement, it 
plans to develop an annual screener certification program comprised of 
three components, including (1) image recognition test; (2) knowledge 
of standard operating procedures (SOPs); and (3) practical 
demonstration of skills, to be administered by a contractor. TSA has 
not yet determined the level of performance that screeners must achieve 
to be certified, but officials said that they plan to require 
performance at a high, but reasonable level. Officials also said that 
they plan to remediate and retest screeners who fail any portion of the 
test, but have not yet determined the number of times a screener may 
retake the test before termination. Certification is scheduled to begin 
in October 2003 and to be completed at all 442 airports by January 
2004, in the order in which the airports began federal screening 
operations. TSA officials recently reported that they awarded a 
contract to conduct the practical demonstration component of the test; 
however, TSA has not developed a schedule for when the program will be 
fielded to the airports. We plan to review TSA's annual screener 
certification program during the remainder of our evaluation.

Performance Management Information System:

TSA's Performance Management Information System--PMIS--for passenger 
and baggage screening operations contains little data on screener 
performance in detecting threat objects. PMIS collects information on 
workload, staffing, and equipment and is used to identify some 
performance and policy issues, such as the level of absenteeism, 
average time for equipment repairs, and status of TSA's efforts to 
meets goals for 100 percent baggage screening.[Footnote 23] (See app. I 
for examples of information collected and contained in PMIS.) 
Additionally, TSA uses PMIS data to identify needed changes to 
SOPs.[Footnote 24] Officials further reported that PMIS has the ability 
to generate reports that enable TSA to track its progress toward 
meeting its performance goals as well as to generate reports by region, 
FSD, airport, and/or individual screening checkpoint. PMIS has been 
deployed to all airports with federal screeners. FSDs are responsible 
for designating a staff person to enter performance data into PMIS on a 
daily basis.

TSA officials reported that they are planning to integrate performance 
information from various systems into PMIS to assist the agency in 
making strategic decisions. TSA also recently reported that it is 
developing a screener performance index, which is supposed to include 
information such as the results of TIP tests, training tests, and 
certification tests. We plan to review these plans in more detail 
during the remainder of our evaluation.

Screener Performance Improvement Study:

TSA is taking steps to improve screener performance. In July 2003, TSA 
completed a Screener Performance Improvement Study, which was designed 
to identify root causes for gaps between current screener performance 
and TSA's desired performance--defined as 100 percent interception of 
prohibited items coming through the passenger screening checkpoints. As 
part of its study, TSA identified four significant screener performance 
deficiencies. TSA concluded that four key factors contributed to the 
identified deficiencies: (1) lack of skills, knowledge, or information; 
(2) low motivation; (3) ineffective work environment; and (4) incorrect 
or missing incentives. To address the screener performance deficiencies 
identified in the study, TSA developed several key solutions, including 
the need to establish adequate training facilities at airports; staff 
airports adequately to allow time for training; reconfigure checkpoints 
to eliminate distractions; implement TIP at all airports; and enhance 
supervisory skills. According to TSA officials, the appropriate TSA 
components are currently developing action plans for each of the 
deficiencies identified in the Performance Improvement Study. The plans 
are to include action steps, timelines, required resources, and 
anticipated outcomes. We plan to review these plans during the 
remainder of our evaluation.

An Assessment of the Contract Screening Pilot Program Has Not Yet 
Begun:

TSA has implemented a pilot program using contract screeners at 5 
airports, but has not determined how to evaluate and measure the 
performance of the pilot program airports. The purpose of the 2-year 
pilot program is to determine the feasibility of using private 
screening companies rather than federal screeners. Initially, TSA 
required private screening companies to adhere to all of the procedures 
and protocols used for federal screeners. However, TSA recently 
provided the pilot contractors with some flexibility, such as allowing 
them to determine and maintain their own staffing levels and make 
independent hiring decisions. While TSA has not yet determined how to 
evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot program airports, it 
plans to award a contract by October 1, 2003, to compare the 
performance of pilot screeners with federal screeners and determine the 
reasons for any differences. TSA officials said that the Office of 
Management and Budget requested that they include in their evaluation 
ways to allow more innovation by contract screening companies.

Although ATSA allows airports to apply to opt-out of using federal 
screeners beginning in November 2004, TSA has not begun to plan for the 
possible transition of airports from a federal system to a private 
screening company. Airports Council International officials said that 
numerous airports have contacted them expressing an interest in 
obtaining more information to assist in their decision regarding 
opting-out. Six of the 10 airport operators we interviewed said that 
they had not made any decisions regarding opting-out, and all 10 said 
they had not received any information from TSA regarding the 
option.[Footnote 25] However, the airport operators said that they 
would like information to assist them in deciding whether to opt-out, 
such as determining who bears responsibility for funding the screening 
contract; airport liability in the event of an incident linked to a 
screener failure; how well the current pilot program airports are 
performing; performance standards to which contract screeners will be 
held; and TSA's role in overseeing contracted screening.

TSA Continuing to Work to Identify Appropriate Staffing Levels at the 
Nation's Airports:

Initially, TSA headquarters determined screener-staffing levels for all 
airports without actively seeking input from FSDs. Eight of the 12 FSDs 
we interviewed said that they had limited authority to respond to 
airport specific staffing needs, such as reacting to fluctuations in 
daily and/or seasonal passenger flow. However, TSA headquarters 
officials said that during the second stage of their workforce 
reduction process, they solicited input from FSDs, airport officials, 
and air carriers. TSA headquarters officials acknowledged that their 
initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the screener workforce 
and have taken steps to correct identified imbalances, such as such as 
authorizing the hiring of part-time screeners at over 200 airports--the 
first of which began working on September 15, 2003.

TSA determined the current screener staffing levels using a computer-
based modeling process that took into account the number of screening 
checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating passengers; the number 
of airport workers requiring screening; projected air carrier service 
increases and decreases during calendar year 2003; and hours needed to 
accommodate screener training, leave, and breaks.[Footnote 26] TSA 
recently hired an outside consultant to conduct a study of screener 
staffing levels at various airports. TSA officials stated that they 
will continue to review the staffing allocation provided through the 
modeling efforts to assess air carrier and airport growth patterns, and 
adjustments will be made as appropriate. We plan to review TSA's 
efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels for passenger 
screeners during the remainder of our evaluation.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days 
after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and interested 
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, or wish to discuss it 
further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or Jack Schulze, Assistant 
Director, at (202) 512-4390. Key contributors to this report are listed 
in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Cathleen A. Berrick 
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

Signed by Cathleen A. Berrick: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Examples of Information Maintained in TSA's Performance 
Management Information System:

Category of information collected: Checkpoint: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of prohibited items.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of weapons surrendered at sweep screening[B].

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of cleared Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) alarms.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collectedIncidents: Percent of absenteeism.

Category of information collected: Incidents: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of incidents.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of arrests.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of evacuations.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collectedFeedback: Number of disruptive passengers.

Category of information collected: Feedback: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Customer complaints.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Discourteous treatment.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Nonstandard screening.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collectedHuman Resources--Employee Census: Lost, stolen, or damaged 
items.

Category of information collected: Human Resources--Employee Census: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Total active authorized screeners.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of Screeners on light duty.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of Screening managers.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: FSD staff.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of screeners trained on baggage only/passenger only/
cross-trained.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collectedTSA-wide: Screener retention.

Category of information collected: TSA-wide: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Federalization progress.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of airports complete.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Machines not in use.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Percent of airports using the CAPPS II system.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collectedSizing: Average wait time at passenger screening checkpoints 
for federalized airports.

Category of information collected: Sizing: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of gates in use.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of checkpoints.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of lanes.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of ETS, x-ray machines, explosive detection systems 
(EDS) machines.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collectedBaggage status: Number of enplanements.

Category of information collected: Baggage status: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: EDS/ETS shortage.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: EDS/ETD inoperable.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Training shortage.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Staffing shortage.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Staff absent.

Category of information collected: Baggage metrics: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Explosive materials.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Drugs.

Examples of information collected[A]: Category of information 
collected: Number of bags opened.

Examples of information collected[A]: Number of screeners on 
duty.

Category of information collected: Attainment: 

Examples of information collected[A]: Individual airport 
measures to achieve change in threat level by date and time.

Source: TSA.

[A] For each of the data elements for which data are reported, the 
Performance Management Information System also contains several subsets 
of information. For example, the number of prohibited items includes 
information on the number of weapons (by category of weapon, such as 
deadly/dangerous weapon) surrendered at the checkpoint, at a gate, at a 
secondary screening point, etc.

[B] TSA officials described sweep screening as a method of screening in 
which screeners randomly stop passengers in the airport concourse for 
additional screening.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Cathy A. Berrick (202) 512-8777:

Jack Schulze (202) 512-4390:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Lisa Brown, 
Christopher Jones, Stuart Kaufmann, Thomas Lombardi, Jan Montgomery, 
Edward Stephenson, Maria Strudwick, and Susan Zimmerman were key 
contributors to this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a 
screener, conducted by TSA, on any screener function to assess the 
screener's threat item detection ability and/or adherence to TSA-
approved procedures.

[2] TIP places images of threat objects on x-ray screens during actual 
operations and records whether screeners identify the threat. TIP was 
designed by FAA to help screeners remain alert, train them to become 
more adept at detecting harder to spot threat objects, and continuously 
measure screener performance. 

[3] TSA officials recently reported that they plan to modify PMIS to 
collect data on screener performance in the future.

[4] The Homeland Security Act, signed into law on November 25, 2002, 
transferred TSA to the new Department of Homeland Security.

[5] The December 31, 2002, deadline was extended to December 31, 2003, 
in some cases by the Homeland Security Act.

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Long-Standing 
Problems Impair Airport Screeners' Performance, GAO/RCED-00-75 
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000). "Human factors" refers to the 
demands a job places on the capabilities of, and the constraints it 
imposes on, the individuals performing the function. Reports on the 
human factors involved in checkpoint screening date back more than 20 
years and include repetitive tasks screeners perform, the close and 
constant monitoring required to detect threat objects, and the stress 
involved in dealing with the public, who may dislike being screened or 
demand faster action to avoid missing their flights.

[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Slow Progress in 
Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems, GAO/
T-RCED-00-125 (Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2000). 

[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities 
Still Exist in the Aviation Security System, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-142 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2000).

[9] See footnote 8.

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts 
Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation's Airports, 
GAO-01-1162T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001).

[11] As of September 19, 2003, we have visited the following 12 
commercial airports: Baltimore-Washington International; Dallas-Ft. 
Worth International; Dallas Love-Field; Kansas City International; 
Little Rock National; Orlando International; Orlando Sanford; Portland 
International; Seattle-Tacoma International; Tampa International; 
Washington-Dulles International; and Washington Reagan National.

[12] The PMIS currently reports the breakdown of those screeners 
trained for passenger and baggage screening as well as the number of 
cross-trained screeners by airport.

[13] We plan to verify whether passenger screeners received basic 
training as required during the remainder of our evaluation.

[14] Screening supervisors and managers may also require screeners to 
participate in corrective action training based on their observations 
of performance deficiencies, such as failure to follow a standard 
operating procedure. 

[15] We plan to verify whether identified passenger screeners received 
3 hours of remedial training as required by TSA during the remainder of 
our evaluation.

[16] As we did not select statistical samples of passenger screeners 
and supervisors to interview, the views of those we interviewed should 
not be considered representative of the views of all screeners and 
supervisors at the airports we visited.

[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities 
in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security Operations, 
GAO-01-1171T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2001). The survey respondents 
identified compensation and improved training as the highest priorities 
of improving screener performance. In addition to identifying a need 
for better supervision, they also believed that the implementation of 
performance standards, team and image building, awards for exemplary 
work, and certification of individual screeners would improve screener 
performance.

[18] Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, before the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 22, 2003.

[19] At the May 22, 2003, hearing of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, DOT's IG, described FAA's 
standard protocols for testing how well screeners performed when using 
uncluttered carry-on bags with a firearm or simulated bomb inside. The 
IG said that it would be difficult for a screener to miss a test object 
when undergoing such a covert test.

[20] Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems 
Detecting Dangerous Objects, GAO/RCED-00-159 (Washington, D.C.: June 
2000). The tests performed by FAA's Red Team, a special headquarters 
based unit, were considered their most realistic tests because they 
used weapons and improvise devices, a wider variety of bags with more 
clutter in them, and headquarters-based agents who were not likely to 
be recognized by the screeners.

[21] The mission support centers are located in Atlanta, Dallas, 
Detroit, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. 

[22] TIP is designed to test screeners' detection capabilities by 
projecting threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as 
they are screened, or projecting images of bags containing threat 
objects onto the x-ray screen as live baggage is screened. Screeners 
are responsible for positively identifying the threat image and calling 
for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, TIP identifies to the 
screener whether the threat is real and then records the screener's 
performance in a database that FAA could access to analyze performance 
trends. TIP exposes screeners to threat images on a routine basis to 
enable them to become more adept at recognizing threat objects. The 
system records the screeners' responses to the projected images and 
provides a measure of their performance while assisting in keeping them 
alert. 

[23] TSA officials said that PMIS also contains other metrics, 
including human resources, sizing, checkpoint, feedback, and incidents.

[24] For example, using PMIS data, TSA determined that passengers were 
unintentionally leaving money at the screening checkpoints when they 
were divesting themselves of all objects that could possibly cause the 
walkthrough metal detectors to alarm. In response to this finding, TSA 
established a protocol instructing screeners on how to address this 
issue. 

[25] Three of the remaining four airport operators we interviewed said 
they were not currently considering opting out of using federal 
screeners. At the pilot program airport we visited, the airport 
operator said that the airport plans to continue using contract 
screeners.

[26] TSA's screener workforce totaled 55,600 on March 31, 2003. Due 
primarily to budget constraints, the agency was directed to cut 3,000 
positions to result in a screener workforce of 52,600 on June 1, 2003. 
An additional 3,000 positions were cut for a workforce of 49,600 full-
time equivalents on September 30, 2003, the end of the fiscal year. TSA 
officials predicted that, based on the fiscal year 2004 budget, the 
screener staffing level will be down to 45,000 full-time equivalents by 
the end of fiscal year 2004.

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