THIS  OPINION WAS INITIALLY ISSUED  UNDER PROTECTIVE ORDER AND IS
   BEING RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC IN REDACTED FORM ON JANUARY 14, 1993
 
        
             _____________________________________________
 
                       DENIED:  December 23, 1992
             _____________________________________________
 
 
                             GSBCA 12053-P
 
                               PRC INC.,
 
                                           Protester,
 
                                   v.
 
                         DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
 
                                           Respondent,
 
                                  and
 
                          MAXIMA CORPORATION,
 
                                           Intervenor.
 
        John S. Pachter,  Arthur I. Leaderman, Jonathan  D. Shaffer,
   and  Eun  K.  (Julie)  Chung  of  Smith,   Pachter,  McWhorter  &
   D'Ambrosio, Vienna, VA, counsel for Protester.
 
        Michael  J. Coster,  Deborah Keith  Meyers,  and Douglas  S.
   Wood,   Office   of   the  General   Counsel,   Immigration   and
   Naturalization Service,  Department of  Justice, Washington,  DC,
   counsel for Respondent.
 
        Edward J. Tolchin,  Brian Taylor Goldstein, and  Patricia V.
   Fettmann   of  Fettmann  &  Tolchin,  Fairfax,  VA,  counsel  for
   Intervenor.
 
   Before Board Judges DANIELS, PARKER, and VERGILIO.
 
   PARKER, Board Judge.
 
        In this  protest,  filed  on September  25  and  amended  on
   October 26, 1992, PRC  Inc. alleges that the award  of a contract
   for  automatic  data  processing services  by  the  Department of
   Justice's Immigration and  Naturalization Service (INS)  violated
   statute  and  regulation.     Maxima  Corporation,  the  contract
   awardee,  has intervened  on  the  side of  INS.   After  sorting
   through  PRC's numerous  complaints  about  the  conduct  of  the
   procurement, we hold that the award  to Maxima should stand.  The
   procurement,  although  not  perfect,  was  fairly  conducted and
   resulted  in  a well-supported  award  to  Maxima.    Finding  no
   violation of statue or regulation, we deny the protest.
 
 
                            Findings of Fact
 
   Procurement Integrity
 
        On  August 16, 1991,  months before the  instant procurement
   began, Maxima filed  a Freedom of Information Act  (FOIA) request
   with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for
   PRC's  billing invoices for a facilities management contract that
   PRC holds with NASA.                                             
                                                                    
                                                NASA informed Maxima
   that it  would provide  the invoices  but would  withhold certain
   information regarding direct labor, fringe benefits, overhead and
   general  and  administrative  expenses  (G&A)  as   "confidential
   commercial  or financial  information," the  disclosure  of which
   could cause competitive harm to PRC.  Protester's Exhibit 12.
 
        NASA's   redactions  of   the   PRC  invoices   were  wholly
   inadequate.  From  the invoices, one  can easily calculate  PRC's
   G&A  rate during  February 1991,  Protester's Exhibit 2,  and its
   fringe benefit  and overhead  rates as  of May  1990, Protester's
   Exhibit 3; Transcript at  399-401, 703-04.  Although  a company's
   current fringe  benefit, overhead, and  G&A rates  are among  its
   most  sensitive financial  information, the  parties have  argued
   vigorously about the  significance of the more than  one year old
   information provided by the NASA invoices.
 
        In  June 1992,  before Maxima submitted  its best  and final
   offer  (BAFO) for the  INS procurement, Maxima's  Chief Operating
   Officer  compared  the  rates  offered  by  Maxima  for  the  INS
   procurement to PRC's rates as calculated  from the NASA invoices.
   Protest File Supplement, Exhibit 107; Transcript at 860.         
                                                                    
                                                                    
                                                                    
     Transcript  at 837-38.   Although  we  offer no  opinion as  to
   whether  Maxima  used  PRC's  rates  as  a  "final  check" before
   submitting  its BAFO  for the  INS procurement, the  record shows
   that Maxima did not change those rates from its initial proposal.
                                    
   Commitment to Provide the Required Number of Hours
 
 
        The  solicitation at  issue here  sought  offers to  provide
   facility operations support  services.  Protest File,  Exhibit 2.
   To obtain services under the contract, INS will issue task orders
   for  a particular  number  of  hours,  specifying  the  personnel
   categories required to perform the task.  Offerors were  required
   to propose prices  for a total of 1,664,000 hours of labor.  This
   figure results from  multiplying 2,080 hours times  the number of
   positions  required to be  filled over a  five year period.   The
   2,080 hour figure is the product of the number of weeks in a year
   (52)  and  the  number  of  work  hours  in  a  week  (40).   The
   solicitation  required that  the  labor  hour  prices  be  "fully
   loaded," id. at  B-1, and that payments to  the contractor "shall
   be computed by multiplying the appropriate hourly rates described
   in [the] schedule by the number of direct labor hours performed,"
   id. at  I-1 (incorporating Federal  Acquisition Regulation  (FAR)
   clause 52.232-7 by reference).
 
        The solicitation did not state, however, that all  the hours
   proposed  must be "productive" hours, and in this connection, PRC
   and  Maxima  interpreted  the  solicitation  differently.     PRC
   proposed 1,664,000  productive labor  hours, all  of which  could
   theoretically be ordered by the Government.  Costs for vacations,
   holidays  and other  types of  paid leave  were accounted  for in
   PRC's  overhead or  "wrap" rate,  which  was added  to the  basic
   hourly  wage for  each employee.    In other  words, PRC  offered
   1,664,000  hours  of productive  labor, with  the price  for each
   labor hour  including an add-on  for the  cost of  non-productive
   time.  Protest File,  Exhibit 21.  If the Government  ordered the
   full number of hours, however, some of  the work would have to be
   performed by  unidentified substitute personnel while  the people
   offered to perform the contract are on leave.
 
        Maxima, on the other  hand, interpreted the 2,080 hours  for
   each of  the positions  as constituting  one "man-year"  for each
   person.   Stated  differently, Maxima  read  the solicitation  as
   requesting  a fixed number of  people to work  on a yearly basis,
   including vacations,  holidays, and  other types  of paid  leave.
   Accordingly, Maxima's offer  provided that such  "non-productive"
   time would  be billed  to the Government  as direct  labor hours.
   Thus, the 1,664,000 hours bid by Maxima  included both productive
   and non-productive time for the offered employees.  Protest File,
   Exhibit 21.   Maxima's  overhead rate did  not include  costs for
   this non-productive time.   If INS does ultimately  ask Maxima to
   provide  1,664,000 productive hours, Maxima is willing to provide
   them at its "normalized" rates (see below).  Transcript at 832.
   Price Normalization
 
 
        INS never considered the issue of whether Maxima had offered
   to provide 1,664,000  hours of productive labor.   See Transcript
   at 260.  INS expected that offerors would propose only productive
   hours,  but   believes  that   Maxima's  interpretation  is   not
   prohibited by the solicitation.   In order to make an  "apples to
   apples" comparison  of prices, however,  INS needed to  make some
   calculations.    Essentially,  what INS  did  was  to "normalize"
   Maxima's price by  adding 160 extra hours per  employee (80 hours
   for vacation  and 80  hours for holidays)  at the  offered hourly
   rate to account for the unproductive time that would be billed to
   the Government.  In other words, INS determined  that in order to
   obtain  the  price  of  2,080  productive  hours  from  a  Maxima
   employee, the Government would have to order 2,240 total hours of
   that  employee's   time.    This   normalization  process   added
   $2,465,534 to Maxima's total evaluated price.
 
        The normalization of prices performed by INS was almost, but
   not quite, correct.  PRC's  expert opines that the correct number
   of hours to be added per employee is 220, which is made up of the
   original 160 hours  for vacations and holidays plus  40 hours for
   sick leave and 20 hours for  training.  This would add $3,839,880
   to  Maxima's price.    Transcript  at  687-89.   Maxima's  expert
   believes the  correct number  to be  173.   Id. at  883-900.   No
   matter  which of  the figures  is used,  however, Maxima's  total
   price  is still  less than  PRC's  total price.   Maxima's  total
   evaluated price (before any normalization) was $32,644,812; 
                 Protest File, Exhibit 21.
 
 
   Grade Creep
 
        The  hourly  wage  rates  for  the  offered  employees  were
   obtained  in part  by a  process  called crosswalking.   In  this
   process, which  was required  by the  solicitation, each  offeror
   attempts to match each of the position descriptions  contained in
   section J of the solicitation with a job description contained in
   the Service Contract Act Directory  of Occupations.  In this way,
   a  minimum  wage rate  is established  for each  position.   If a
   proper crosswalk is not performed, the offeror may not be able to
   hire  qualified personnel at  its offered rates.   Theoretically,
   the Government's  costs could go  up if it permitted  the winning
   contractor  to substitute  higher-priced  personnel to  perform a
   particular task.  The Board heard  evidence from both protester's
   and intervenor's  expert witnesses  concerning  whether a  proper
   crosswalk had  been accomplished by  Maxima.  On this  point, the
   Board finds the testimony of Dr. Ira Weinberg, Maxima's expert in
   employee  compensation,  to  be  particularly  persuasive.    Dr.
   Weinberg explained the  proper method for performing  a crosswalk
   and then  performed crosswalks for the positions  that PRC claims
   were improperly  performed.   According to  Dr. Weinberg,  Maxima
   performed a proper  crosswalk for each position and  will have no
   trouble  hiring  personnel to  perform  the work  at  its offered
   prices.  Transcript at 627-40.  We do not repeat his testimony in
   detail here; suffice it to say that we found his testimony  to be
   well supported, highly credible, and most persuasive.
 
   Wage Rate Escalation
 
 
 
   Maxima treated eleven of the thirteen positions as subject to the
   SCA.    The  duties  to be  performed  by  those  who fill  these
   positions, however, are the same for both offerors; the employees
   must meet the specific requirements set forth in section J of the
   solicitation.  The  SCA and its implementing  regulations require
   that  contractors pay covered employees a minimum prevailing wage
   rate as determined by the Department of Labor.  See Protest File,
   Exhibit 3.  If, during the  life of the contract, the  prevailing
   wage  rate  increases, the  contractor  is  required to  pay  the
   increased amount to the  employee but the Government  absorbs the
   cost of this escalation.  Id.
 
 
        Consistent with the  solicitation, neither offeror  included
   costs for  potential wage  rate increases.   PRC claims  that the
   Government's  determination of the  costs that it  will incur for
   this  contract  must  take  into  account  these  potential  wage
   increases, which  PRC's expert estimates at 3.6 percent per year.
   Thus, it argues  that INS should have added  $676,168 to Maxima's
   evaluated price to cover estimated wage  increases for the eleven
   covered employees,                                               
                                    Transcript at  693-94.   Even if
   the  amounts  suggested by  PRC  were  added  to  both  offerors'
   evaluated prices, however, Maxima's proposed price is still less.
   The result is the same if the amount proposed by PRC to cover the
   non-productive hours is also added.  See Protester's Exhibit 11.
 
   Resum  Certifications
 
        The solicitation required each offeror to supply resum s for
   the personnel proposed to work on the contract.  Section J of the
   solicitation  required that both  the offeror and  the individual
   certify  (by signing  the  resum ) that  the  information in  the
   resum   is true  and complete  and  that the  individual will  be
   available  to  work on  task  orders issued  under  the contract.
   Protest File, Exhibit 2.  In addition, section L.9.3 required the
   offeror  to furnish   letters    of commitment  for proposed  key
   personnel and to
   provide  resum s in  the format  described  in section  J.   Id.,
   Exhibits 2, 11.
 
 
        By  written clarification,  INS  notified the  offerors that
   "resum   certification  as  described  in  Section J  .  .  .  is
   sufficient for  current,  full-time  employees  of  the  offeror.
   Additionally, letters  of commitment  must be  submitted for  all
   proposed key personnel  who are not current,  full-time employees
   of the offeror."  Protest File, Exhibit 4, Amendment 2.
 
        Maxima  misread  the  solicitation  provisions  relating  to
   resum   certification.   Maxima  supplied  resum s  for  its  own
   current,  full-time employees that included neither the offeror's
   nor the individual's certification of availability to work on the
   contract.    Maxima's BAFO;  Transcript  at  981-82.   INS  never
   noticed Maxima's oversight; if it  had, INS would have  discussed
   the  deficiency during negotiations  with Maxima.   Transcript at
   175, 208-10.   Now, however, INS regards the matter as "at most a
   technical violation of the RFP  requirements which did not in any
   way  either  decrease  the value  of  Respondent's  contract with
   [Maxima] or  prejudice the evaluation  of the  merits of  [PRC's]
   proposal."  Respondent's Post-hearing Brief  at 11.  PRC does not
   allege, nor is there any evidence, that Maxima did not intend to,
   or cannot, supply the offered personnel.
 
   Evaluation Criteria
 
        Section M of  the solicitation states how  proposals were to
   be evaluated:
 
        M.1  GENERAL
 
             a.   Award shall  be made to  the responsible
             offeror  whose proposal,  conforming to  this
             solicitation,  is   determined  to   be  most
             advantageous to the  Government in accordance
             with   the  evaluation   of  both   mandatory
             requirements and subjective technical factors
             listed  in this  section,  as well  as  price
             considerations. . . .
 
             . . . .
 
             d.   Any    award    resulting    from   this
             solicitation will be made to that  responsive
             responsible Offeror  whose proposal  conforms
             to this  RFP and  is evaluated  as being  the
             most  advantageous  to  the  INS.    For  the
             purpose  of  selecting a  successful  offeror
             for the award
 
             of  the  contemplated  contract,  technical  merit
             shall  be  considered more  important  than price.
             However,  as Technical  scores  become more  equal
             then   the  importance   of  price   becomes  more
             significant.      Furthermore,  prices   will   be
             evaluated for realism.
 
             . . . .
 
        M.2  EVALUATION OF MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS
 
             Proposals shall be prepared according to  and
             in compliance with  the instructions given in
             section  L.     All  offerors  must   clearly
             demonstrate   their  ability   to  meet   all
             requirements specified in the RFP. . . .
 
        M.3  SUBJECTIVE TECHNICAL EVALUATION
 
             The Government will develop a technical score
             and  narrative  evaluation of  the  Offerors'
             proposals based  on these factors.   Offerors
             are  reminded when  preparing proposals  that
             the  information  in   Volume  II,  Technical
             Proposal and Volume  III, Management Proposal
             will   be   the  basis   for   the  technical
             evaluation   and,   therefore,   should  give
             careful  consideration   to  the   Section  L
             proposal  preparation  instructions  and  the
             evaluation factors in paragraph M.5.
 
   Protest File, Exhibit 2.  Section M.5 provided a  list of factors
   and subfactors with corresponding point  values.  The factors and
   subfactors  precisely  match  the  twelve  specific  requirements
   categories in section C of the solicitation.  One thousand points
   were available.  Id.
 
        INS  first evaluated the proposals to determine whether they
   met the mandatory requirements; both PRC's and Maxima's proposals
   passed  this test.   INS then performed  the subjective technical
   evaluation described in  section M.3.  Maxima scored 357.49 total
   points, while PRC  scored 352.805 points.   Protest File, Exhibit
   21.
 
        During  PRC's   debriefing,  INS  explained   that  offerors
   received points only for "added  value" and "innovation," but not
   for  meeting the mandatory  requirements.  Transcript  at 441-43,
   450-53.  This  unfortunate choice of words caused  PRC to believe
   that  offers had  been  evaluated  only on  how  much the  offers
   exceeded the requirements  rather than on  how well offerors  met
   the requirements. 
   PRC  thus believed  that its  offer had  been evaluated  based on
   factors  not set forth in the solicitation.   Id. at 396, 408-12,
   440-53.
 
 
        In fact, the  proposals were scored  based upon the  factors
   set forth  in section  M.5.   As  the chairman  of the  Technical
   Evaluation Panel testified:
 
             Q    It's   been   alleged   in   Protestor's
             documents   that   in  this   technical   and
             subjective evaluation you awarded points only
             for innovation.  Is this a correct statement?
 
             A    That's   incorrect.      The   Technical
             Evaluation Panel considered added value to be
             many things.   Innovation  was to  a part  of
             that.   We  looked  at  improved methods  for
             performing the  work, the  total methodology,
             new   approaches   for    doing   the   work.
             Innovation   could   be  considered.      The
             efficiency,    the    effectiveness,    their
             approaches . . . .
 
             Q    I just want to  make it absolutely clear
             that it was not limited to innovation only.
 
             A    No,  it was  not  limited to  innovation
             only.
 
   Transcript at 187-88.  The chairman further testified:
 
             JUDGE PARKER:   .  .  . But  I'm  hearing all
             this  stuff now about, well, if they just met
             the requirements,  you basically got  a zero,
             and then it  was only for these  "innovative"
             items or -- what's the word?
 
             THE WITNESS:   Added value.
 
             JUDGE PARKER:  Added value.   So I guess what
             I'm asking you  is did you do the normal type
             of technical evaluation,  but just give it  a
             different   name,  or   did  you   really  do
             something different?
 
             THE WITNESS:   We did the normal evaluation.
 
             JUDGE PARKER:  In  other words, . . . are you
             saying   that the  score that they  got under
             the
 
             subjective  evaluation, did it go to how well they
             would meet the requirements --
 
             THE WITNESS:   Yes.
 
             JUDGE PARKER:  -- in addition  to extras that
             it would offer?
 
             THE WITNESS:   Yes.  It  was  a  [sic]  added
             value,  and the how well turns into the added
             value.
 
             JUDGE PARKER:  .  .  .   I  noticed  that  in
             Section  M, you have a list of the subjective
             technical  factors  and, of  course,  they're
             just the same as the headings for the Section
             C requirements, right?
 
             . . . .
 
             Is that  what you're  telling me?   It's  how
             well the  offeror stated  that it could  meet
             the requirements and --
 
             THE WITNESS:   How  well they  were going  to
             perform the requirements.
 
   Id. at 221-22.
 
   Alleged Arbitrary Technical Scoring
 
        PRC  claims  that  the  Technical  Evaluation  Panel   (TEP)
   arbitrarily and irrationally scored the proposals in three areas:
   Help   Desk   Operational   Support,  Systems   Maintenance   and
   Management, and Corporate Personnel Qualification and Experience.
   Protester's Brief at 23.  The TEP, made up of mid-level employees
   with extensive hands-on experience with  the types of tasks to be
   performed  under  this  contract,   scored  the  proposals  after
   extensive  discussion,  and  submitted  a  final  report  to  the
   contracting  officer.   Protest File,  Exhibit  20.   Then, after
   briefing  the Source Selection Advisory  Council on its work, the
   TEP prepared a supplement to its report which explained in detail
   the basis  for  the scores  awarded.   Protest  File  Supplement,
   Exhibit 103.  After reviewing in detail the proposals themselves,
   TEP  report and  supplement, and  the  testimony concerning  this
   issue, we  find no support  for PRC's allegation that  the scores
   awarded were unreasonable or inconsistent.
 
                               Discussion
 
        PRC's numerous objections to the conduct of this procurement
   cannot  overcome one  central fact:   Maxima's  proposal  was the
   highest rated  technically and offered  the lowest price.   To be
   sure, both  INS and  Maxima made mistakes.   As  discussed below,
   however, none of the mistakes affected either the fairness or the
   outcome of the competition.
 
   Procurement Integrity
 
        Maxima  obtained more than one year old PRC rate information
   as a result of  a Freedom of Information Act request  to NASA for
   billing  invoices  under a  contract  that  PRC holds  with  that
   agency.    NASA  failed  properly  to  redact the  requested  PRC
   invoices such  that Maxima  was  able to  calculate PRC's  fringe
   benefit rate, overhead rate, and G&A rate.   PRC  maintains  that
   Maxima's  alleged use  of the  PRC rate  information as  a "final
   check" before submitting  its BAFO should disqualify  Maxima from
   this competition.
 
        We think PRC makes too much of this matter.  First, there is
   no   evidence  that  Maxima  actually  used  the  information  in
   connection with the contract at issue here;                      
                                                                    
                                   More importantly, even  if Maxima
   did  use the PRC rates  as a "final  check" before submitting its
   BAFO for the  contract at issue here,  there is no  evidence that
   the information affected the competition.  Maxima did  not change
   its offered rates from its initial proposal.                     
                                                                    
                     
        PRC cites  a number of cases in support of its argument that
   Maxima should be excluded from  the competition, but we find none
   of them applicable  here.  In each of the cited cases, an offeror
   either gained  a competitive  advantage as  a result  of improper
   conduct, or the contracting  officer determined a behavior  to be
   so  egregious  that  continued  participation  by  the  offending
   offeror  would impact the  integrity of the  competitive process.
   See, e.g., NFK  Engineering, Inc. v. United States,  805 F.2d 372
   (Fed. Cir. 1986)  (contracting officer properly excluded  offeror
   which  hired  an   agency  official  actively  involved   in  the
   procurement process); Compliance  Corp. v. United States,  22 Cl.
   Ct. 193 (1990), aff'd, 960 F.2d 157 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (contracting
   officer  properly  excluded  offeror based  upon  its  attempt to
   obtain a copy  of another offeror's proposal from  an employee of
   the competitor); University Systems, Inc. v. Department of Health
   and Human Services, GSBCA 12039-P, 1992 BPD   380 (Nov. 19, 1992)
   (contracting officer  properly removed  offeror from  competition
   for submitting a false certification).
 
        Here,  Maxima did  not set out  to obtain  PRC's proprietary
   information; it filed a  Freedom of Information Act request  with
   another agency and received information  that NASA did not intend
   to  release.   The  somewhat dated  information was  of debatable
   significance.     There  is  no  evidence  that  the  information
   disclosed by NASA affected the  procurement at issue here.  Under
   these circumstances, we agree with  INS that the integrity of the
   procurement   process  has  not  been  compromised  and  we  find
   reasonable  INS's  decision  not to  disqualify  Maxima  from the
   competition.
 
   Commitment to Provide the Required Number of Hours
 
 
        PRC  maintains that Maxima's offer should have been rejected
   because it fails to commit to the required number of "productive"
   hours.  Maxima read the solicitation as asking offerors to fill a
   fixed   number  of  positions  at  2,080  hours  per  "man-year,"
   including  vacations, holidays  and other  types  of paid  leave.
   Accordingly, Maxima  proposed to bill such  "non-productive" time
   as direct labor hours.   INS expected that offerors would propose
   only   "productive"    hours,   but   believes    that   Maxima's
   interpretation of the  solicitation is reasonable.   As discussed
   below,  we  agree  with  INS  and  further  find   that  Maxima's
   interpretation did not affect the competition in a material way.
 
        It  is true  that Maxima  did not  propose to  provide 2,080
   hours  of productive labor  per person  per year;  depending upon
   which expert one  chooses to believe,  Maxima's offer commits  to
   provide somewhere  between 1,860  and 1,907  hours of  productive
   labor per  position per year.   The difference  is the amount  of
   paid leave to  be taken.  Several  factors convince us  that this
   difference  is not  material.   First,  Maxima's  reading of  the
   solicitation  was reasonable.   The solicitation did  not specify
   that the  2,080 hours  per position per  year must  be productive
   hours; in  fact, it implied  otherwise.  Specific  personnel with
   specific  qualifications were required  to be proposed,  and were
   evaluated,  for each  position.   If INS  decided to  order 2,080
   hours  for a  particular position,  it would  have to  accept the
   services of an unidentified substitute while the offered employee
   was on leave.
 
        Second,  the number  of "non-productive"  hours included  in
   Maxima's offer is small in relation  to the total number of hours
   required.    There is  no  evidence that  PRC went  to  any extra
   trouble or expense to offer all productive hours; its argument is
   merely that  Maxima's  offer  does  not  meet   the  requirements
   of  the
   solicitation.[foot #] 1     The   difference   between  the   two
   approaches is further  minimized by  the fact  that the  services
   called for  in the  contract will be  ordered by  individual task
   orders.   In other  words, there  is no  guarantee that  INS will
   require the full 2,080 hours per person.
 
 
        Finally,  Maxima has  agreed,  albeit  after  the  fact,  to
   provide 1,664,000  productive hours if  requested to by INS.   We
   are faced  here with  an unusual situation.   After  a reasonable
   price  normalization to  account for  the  difference in  pricing
   methodologies (see below), Maxima's offer is not only technically
   superior, but less expensive for  any number of hours.   In these
   circumstances,  the  prejudice  to PRC  in  permitting  Maxima to
   commit to the  maximum number of hours after the  fact is greatly
   outweighed by  the prejudice that  would accrue to Maxima  if the
   Board sent  the procurement back for another  round of BAFOs.  If
   Maxima merely  changed the format  (as opposed to the  amount) of
   its pricing, Maxima  would be a sitting duck for PRC, which knows
   the  winning price.   A  cut-throat  price auction  would be  the
   likely result.
 
        In making decisions on the merits of protests, this Board is
   charged by  statute to "accord due weight to the policies of this
   section [of the Competition in  Contracting Act] and the goals of
   economic  and  efficient  procurement  .   .  .  ."    40  U.S.C.
     759(f)(5)(A)  (1988).   We  do  not set  aside  contract awards
   unless  we find "significantly  sufficient" violations of  law or
   regulation.    Anderson  Consulting,  GSBCA   10833-P,  91-1  BCA
     23,474, 1990 BPD    396, aff'd, 959 F.2d 929  (Fed. Cir. 1992).
   We find no  such violation here.  Maxima's  interpretation of the
   solicitation  and  its  resulting  pricing  methodology  did  not
   materially affect the competition.
 
   Price Normalization
 
        As  discussed in  our  findings  of  fact,  because  of  the
   difference in pricing  methodologies, INS had to  "normalize" the
   prices in order  to make a  meaningful comparison of  them.   INS
   determined  that  it would have to  add 160 hours at  the offered
   rate for  each Maxima  employee to account  for the  unproductive
   time that would  be billed to the  Government.  In this  way, INS
   could determine the price of  2,080 productive hours per employee
   for purposes of  comparison with PRC's offer.   PRC believes that
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 1 In this connection, PRC also argues that Maxima's
   offer fails to  conform to the  requirements of the  solicitation
   because Maxima's  hourly  rates  were  not "fully  loaded."    We
   disagree.   Maxima's prices  contain the same  elements as  PRC's
   prices, albeit in  different form.  PRC accounted  for paid leave
   as  part of  overhead; Maxima  proposed  to bill  these hours  as
   direct charges.  We view this complaint as yet another example of
   PRC's emphasis of form over substance.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   INS should have added the price of 220 hours for each employee to
   account for sick leave and  training, in addition to the vacation
   and holiday time covered by INS's  normalization.  Even if PRC is
   correct,  however, Maxima's offer  is still cheaper  by more than
   $2,000,000.   Thus, regardless of  the merits of PRC's complaint,
   it could not have been prejudiced by the alleged violation.
 
   Grade Creep
 
 
        For the reasons  discussed in our findings of  fact, we find
   no  merit to PRC's  allegations that Maxima  performed inadequate
   "crosswalks."  Because INS reasonably determined that Maxima will
   be able to  hire qualified personnel at its  offered rates, there
   is no reasonable risk that Maxima will  not be able to perform at
   its offered prices.
 
   Wage Rate Escalation
 
                                                              
   Maxima treated eleven of the thirteen positions as subject to the
   SCA.   Because the Government pays  increases in prevailing wages
   for these employees, PRC argues that INS should have adjusted the
   prices to account for the additional wage increases (estimated at
   3.6 percent per  year) that it would  have to pay if  Maxima were
   awarded  the  contract.    Again  the count  fails  for  lack  of
   prejudice.  Even  if we accept PRC's argument  that employees who
   would  perform the  same jobs  should be treated  differently for
   purposes of  the Service  Contract Act,  Maxima's offer  is still
   less expensive than PRC's offer.
 
   Resum  Certifications
 
        PRC maintains that Maxima should  be ineligible for award of
   the  contract  because  it failed  to  provide  certifications of
   availability for some offered personnel.  We agree with INS that,
   in this case,  Maxima's oversight is not material.   First, there
   is  no evidence,  or even  an  allegation, that  Maxima will  not
   provide the  offered employees.  Maxima is  bound by the terms of
   its  offer to provide the offered employees and intends to do so.
   The question thus  becomes whether lack of certification,  in and
   of itself, should disqualify Maxima from receiving the award.
 
        This Board has considered many  times the issue of "bait and
   switch" in  connection with  service  contracts.   The issue  has
   always been whether the  offeror actually intended to supply  the
   offered personnel, or merely proposed highly qualified  personnel
   for  purposes of  evaluation  with  the  intention  of  switching
   personnel after award of the  contract.  In these cases, we  have
   held that an offeror must,  in good faith, propose personnel that
   it intends to provide to work on the contract and that failure to
   do so supports elimination from the competition.  Electronic Data
   Systems Federal Corp., GSBCA 9869-P, 89-2 BCA    21,665, 1989 BPD
     69, aff'd sub  nom. Planning Research  Corp. v. United  States,
   971 F.2d  736 (Fed. Cir.  1992); Sterling Federal  Systems, Inc.,
   GSBCA   10381-P,  90-2   BCA    22,802,   1990   BPD    70;   PSI
   International,  Inc. v. Department of Energy, GSBCA 11521-P, 92-2
   BCA   24,775, 1992 BPD   35;  CBIS Federal, Inc. v. Department of
   the Interior, GSBCA 12092-P, 1992 BPD   340, at 7 (Nov. 6, 1992).
 
 
        As discussed above, that situation  does not exist here.  We
   view Maxima's failure to provide the required certifications as a
   technical  violation  that  neither  invalidated the  competitive
   nature  of  the  procurement nor  prejudiced  PRC.    Under these
   circumstances, INS's  decision to  ignore Maxima's  oversight was
   reasonable.
 
   Evaluation Criteria
 
        PRC  argues  that  INS  failed to  evaluate  the  offers  in
   accordance  with  the  solicitation because  it  failed  to award
   points  for meeting the minimum requirements of the solicitation.
   We find that  INS followed the evaluation procedure  set forth in
   the solicitation.
 
        Section  M.2 of  the solicitation  provided  for an  initial
   evaluation of proposals  to determine whether they  complied with
   the  stated requirements.   INS performed this  evaluation, which
   was not scored, and both PRC and Maxima passed the test.  Section
   M.3  then provided for a "Subjective Technical Evaluation," which
   would be scored using the evaluation factors set forth in section
   M.5.  The section M.5 evaluation factors matched the requirements
   categories  in section C, the statement of work.  Because PRC was
   told in its  debriefing, in an unfortunate choice  of words, that
   INS  awarded points  in  this second  evaluation only  for "added
   value," PRC believed  that the evaluation was  conducted contrary
   to  the terms of the solicitation  in that no points were awarded
   for  how well an  offeror proposed to  meet the section  M.5 (and
   section C) requirements.
 
        In fact, offerors  were scored on how well  they proposed to
   meet the  requirements.  The  "added value" which  the evaluators
   looked for in scoring the  proposals really was nothing more than
   a determination  of how  well the offerors  proposed to  meet the
   requirements.  Naturally,  proposals   which  offered  innovative
   or 
   efficient methods for accomplishing  the required tasks  received
   higher scores than those  that did not; such  an analysis is  the
   very essence of a subjective technical evaluation.
 
   Alleged Arbitrary Technical Scoring
 
 
        In  a final effort  to reverse  its fortunes,  PRC maintains
   that  the  Technical  Evaluation  Panel  assigned  arbitrary  and
   irrational scores to the  proposals in several areas.  This  is a
   difficult  ground  on which  to  prevail  because the  law  vests
   considerable discretion in the judgment of technical  evaluators.
   Computer Sciences Corp.,  GSBCA 11497-P, 92-1 BCA    24,703, 1992
   BPD   6.   For a protester to prevail  in a such a  challenge, it
   must prove that  the evaluation was clearly erroneous -- an abuse
   of discretion  demonstrating a  "gross disparity or  unfairness."
   Corporate Jets, Inc., GSBCA 11049-P, 91-2 BCA    23,998, 1991 BPD
     111; Health Systems  Technology Corp., GSBCA 10920-P,  91-2 BCA
     23,692, 1991  BPD   20.   Although the  scores assigned  by the
   technical evaluators may  not have been the exact  same scores we
   would have  assigned, as explained  in our findings of  fact, PRC
   has not shown that the scores were unreasonable.
 
                                Decision
 
        Like most  procurements, this one  was not perfect.   In the
   final  analysis, however, Maxima was awarded the contract because
   it  offered the  highest rated  technical proposal at  the lowest
   price.   Nothing PRC has  shown during this protest  changes that
   fact.   The protest  is DENIED.   The suspension  of respondent's
   delegation of procurement authority lapses by its terms.
 
 
 
                                      _________________________
                                      ROBERT W. PARKER
                                      Board Judge
 
   We concur:
 
 
 
   _______________________
   STEPHEN M. DANIELS
   Board Judge
 
 
   ________________________
   JOSEPH A. VERGILIO
   Board Judge