Unit XII-B

COURSE TITLE
Building Design for Homeland Security	TIME	135 minutes
 
UNIT TITLE
Case Study 

OBJECTIVES
1.	Explain building security design issues to a building owner for 
consideration prior to a renovation or new construction.
2.	Explain the identification process to arrive at the high risk asset- 
threat/hazard pairs of interest.
3.	Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the 
benefits in reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest.

SCOPE
The following topics will be covered in this unit:

1.	Activity:  Preparation and presentation of the highest risks identified 
by the assessment groups, the vulnerabilities identified for these 
risks, and recommended mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability 
and risk. The top three risks will be prioritized as well as the top 
three recommended mitigation measures with rationale and 
justification. This includes any consideration for changes to the Risk 
Matrix from knowledge gained in Units IX, X, and XI.

REFERENCES
1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings
a.	Pages 2-51 to 2-58
b.	Pages 3-50 to 3-52
c.	Chapter 5
d.	Appendix D
2.	FEMA 452, Risk Assessment:  A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-18
3.	Case Study  Appendix U:  Urban, HazardCorp Building
4.	Student Manual, Unit XII-B (info only  do not list on SM)
5.	Unit XII-B visuals (info only  do not list on SM)

REQUIREMENTS
1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student)
2.	FEMA 452, Risk Assessment:  A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (one per student)
3.	Instructor Guide, Unit XII-B
4.	Student Manual, Urban Case Study (U) (one per student)
5.	Overhead projector or computer display unit
6.	Unit XII-B visuals
7.	Risk Matrix poster and one box of dry-erase markers (one per team)
8.	Chart, paper, easel, and markers (one per team)


UNIT XII-B OUTLINE

Time
Page
XII. Case Study 

135 minutes
IG XII-B-1
1.	Introduction and Unit Overview

20 minutes
IG XII-B-5
2.	Activity:  45 minute Preparation and 60 minute 
Presentation by Groups

105 minutes
IG XII-B-21
3.	Review of School Solutions (Mitigations Measures, 
Blast, CBR, and Cost)

10 minutes but 
variable based on 
time available
IG XII-B-22
4.	Activity:  Case Study  Student Presentation of 
Results


IG XII-B-47


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT

*	Tailoring Content to the Local Area:  There is no specific content that can be linked to the 
local area. All actions of this instruction focus on the Case Study, Appendix U, HazardCorp 
Building.

The Instructor will review the Case Study, Appendix U, HazardCorp Building, DoD 
Antiterrorism Standards, DHS Interagency Security Committee criteria, and understand the 
parameters for the Design Basis Threat and Levels of Protection and their impact upon the 
assessment. Additionally, review of the school solution mitigation measures, blast analysis, 
CBR analysis, and costs will ensure a smooth presentation in a time-constrained 
environment.

The first part of this instruction unit is not so much to repeat the Case Study contents of Unit 
1, but to provide an opportunity for review and allow questions before students prepare their 
presentations within their assessment groups.

*	Optional Activity:  There are no optional activities in this unit.

*	Activity:  The students will prepare and present the top three risks identified by the 
assessment group, the vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and the top three 
recommended mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and risk. The group will prioritize 
the top three risks as well as the top three recommended mitigation measures with rationale 
and justification. Includes any consideration for changes from the knowledge obtained in 
Units IX, X, and XI.

*	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities.

*	Direct students to the appropriate page (Unit XII-B) in the Student Manual.

*	Instruct the students to read the activity instructions found in the Student Manual.

*	Tell students how long they have to work on the requirements.

*	While students are working, all instructors should closely observe the groups process and 
progress. If any groups are struggling, immediately assist them by clarifying the assignment 
and providing as much help as is necessary for the groups to complete the requirement in the 
allotted time. Also, monitor each group for full participation of all members. For example, 
ask any student who is not fully engaged a question that requires his/her viewpoint to be 
presented to the group.

*	At the end of the working period, reconvene the class. Ask for volunteer groups to determine 
the order of presentation. Capture the answers provided by the students for future update of 
the course.

*	After the students have completed their presentations, as time permits, present the school 
solution mitigation measures, blast analysis, CBR analysis, and associated costs and 
decision process. Be prepared to answer any student questions.

*	Ask for and answer questions.

*	See Editor Notes in 01Unit I (U) IG.doc for inserting slide thumbnails into this document and 
working with the table features for formatting rows on pages.




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VISUAL XII-B-1

 

Introduction and Unit Overview

This is Unit XII Case Study activity. This 
unit will review the HazardCorp Building site 
and building portfolio, DoD Antiterrorism 
Standards, and DHS Interagency Security 
Committee criteria, and the parameters for 
the Design Basis Threat and Levels of 
Protection.

Students will prepare and present the top 
three risks identified by the assessment 
groups, the vulnerabilities identified for these 
risks, and the top three recommended 
mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability 
and risk. The groups will prioritize the top 
three risks as well as the top three 
recommended mitigation measures with 
rationale and justification. Consider any 
changes to the Risk Matrix due to knowledge 
gained in Units IX, X, and XI.

VISUAL XII-B-2

 

Unit Objectives

At the end of this unit, the students should be 
able to:

1.	Explain building security design issues to 
a building owner for consideration prior 
to a renovation or new construction.

2.	Explain the identification process to 
arrive at the high risk asset-threat/hazard 
pairs of interest.

3.	Justify the recommended mitigation 
measures, explaining the benefits in 
reducing the risk for the high risk 
situations of interest.




VISUAL XII-B-3

 

HazardCorp Building (HZC)

This Case Study instruction unit will be a 
comprehensive review and practical 
application of FEMA 426.

In this unit, the following topics will be 
presented:

*	Company Functions
*	Company Infrastructure
*	Threats/Hazards (including Design Basis 
Threat and Levels of Protection)
*	Vulnerabilities (including Impact and 
Mitigation)

VISUAL XII-B-4

 

HazardCorp Building (HZC)

The HazardCorp Building and Building 
Management provide office space to a wide 
range of tenants in their 50 story high-rise 
structure.

The HazardCorp Building supports 
approximately 8,000 occupants (tenants and 
staff) on any given day and about 1,000 
visitors. The building has mixed uses with 
some tenants having multiple layers of 
security and others open to the general public 
or walk-in clients.  The latter is especially 
true of the retail space on the first floor and 
the meeting rooms on the second and third 
floors around the lobby atrium.

With over 2 million square feet of rentable 
space HZC is a small community in and of 
itself and Building Management must 
provide the services to keep this community 
functioning.

In the Urban environment there are close-by 
neighbors that any mitigation measure may 
impact, and, thus, HZC may need to 
coordinate with these neighbors when 
implementing mitigation measures.

VISUAL XII-B-5

 

HZC 5-Mile Building Radius

The HazardCorp Building is located in the 
downtown business district of a major urban 
city.
*	Several commercial iconic properties, 
several government offices, and various 
high-density attractions within 5-mile 
radius
*	Significant water access to various 
locations and because of the water, ground 
access is constrained by bridges, tunnels, 
and ferries.
*	While two major airports are over 5 miles 
from the building, what is not shown are 8 
heliports and two skyports inside the 5-mile 
radius.
*	A metropolitan subway also serves the 
business district and the nearest station is 
two blocks from the building.
*	The area around Hazard City is the No. 4 
intermodal port in the Western Hemisphere.  
Intermodal means the ability to move 
freight from ship to train to truck and back 
again.
*	There is extensive railroad trackage, some 
as close as within 1-1/2 miles of the 
building.
*	There is extensive petroleum and chemical 
storage west of the building location in 
addition to ships transiting the harbor areas.

VISUAL XII-B-6

 

HZC Local Imagery

The HazardCorp Building is bounded by city 
streets with high traffic volumes and is within 
0.05 miles of a nearby river.

There is a high density of population in the 
area, which swings between commercial and 
residential based upon time of day.

Due to the urban density seen, the potential 
for collateral damage due to a nearby incident 
must always be a consideration.

VISUAL XII-B-7

 

HZC Hazardous Material Sites

There are a significant number of hazardous 
materials use and waste sites in near 
proximity to the HazardCorp Building.
*	The vast majority are small generators such 
as gas stations, dry cleaning, and other 
commercial businesses. Large generators 
are identified by labels as seen on the slide. 
*	 Prevailing winds would push toxic releases 
from the two largest petroleum and 
chemical storage sites toward HZC. Winds 
shift out of the northwest during the winter 
and shift out of the southwest during the 
summer.
*	Rail and maritime transportation move 
significant hazardous materials through the 
area.
*	Maritime shipping lanes to the west of the 
building see large shipments of fertilizer, 
petroleum products, and liquid natural gas.
*	More than 2,000 trucks loads of hazardous 
materials are transported each day within 
city limits.
*	Airports have combined 1.06 million 
aircraft movements, 81 million passengers, 
and move 2.7 million tons of cargo each 
year.
*	Average 100 hazardous materials spills 
and releases each year in Hazard City

VISUAL XII-B-8

 

HZC Emergency Response

The local emergency response capabilities 
show primary police and medical facilities 
within 2 miles of the HazardCorp Building.
*	Multiple police jurisdictions in the area 
meaning all police locations would 
probably not respond to an incident at 
HazardCorp Building.
*	Fire facilities are more limited, with 2 fire 
stations nearby.  However, the other fire 
stations, while 2-3 miles from the building, 
must travel along transportation 
chokepoints to get over water, resulting in 
longer response times.
o	The building is ringed by 20- to 24-inch 
water mains with a single hydrant on 
each side of the building just off the 
sidewalk curb.
*	Multiple means of ingress and egress to the 
HazardCorp building site, mostly on 
secondary roads for the last 0.2 miles.

VISUAL XII-B-9

 

NOTE  Emphasize the columns locations in 
the atrium area.
*	Exterior wall columns at 15-foot spacing
*	Interior column spacing is approximately 
30 feet from the 4th to 49th floor.
*	Atrium columns from west to east have 
60-foot spacing.

HZC Building Data and Functional 
Layout

*	Outside the building the trash containers, 
USPS mailboxes, newspaper vending 
machines, Fed-Ex/UPS/DHL boxes and the 
like are kept to the edge of the sidewalk on 
the far east side of the plaza.
*	The plaza is otherwise bare, except for 8 
area lights on poles with a circular bench 
around the base of each light pole.
*	Multiple utilizes services following 
different routes into building, with some at 
loading dock and underground parking 
ramps.
*	Loading dock inside the building on the 
first floor
*	Trash is handled by a large dumpster 
located in the loading dock area with no 
special provisions in building structure.
*	Underground parking under building and 
plaza open to the general public.  There is 
one entrance/exit ramp under the building 
and one under the plaza.
*	Mailroom is renovated to DoD standards, 
receives all mail and shipping to building, 
provides full inspection of contents, and 
distributes to tenants and, by agreement, to 
specific tenants in other buildings within 2 
block radius.
*	The lobby has a 3 story atrium which 
affects the continuity of columns for 
foundation to roof.
*	Retail space is also on the first floor with 
access to the lobby internal to the building.  
Retail space also has exterior entrances.

VISUAL XII-B-10

 

HZC Occupancy

Note the following:
*	Other than some service entrances and fuel 
tanks, most utilities and associated 
equipment are located on the first floor and 
above, with most of it above the first floor.
*	Federal government offices are located on 
floors 8-13 and 27-28 which may benefit 
from applying ISC protection criteria.

VISUAL XII-B-11

 

HZC Car Bomb Blast Effects

The nominal range to effects chart radius of 
influence of a car bomb detonation at the 
front entrance (plaza side) indicates that the 
building would experience some damage, 
but likely not suffer progressive collapse.
*	The car bomb is restricted to the drop off 
area on the east side of the plaza.  If 
detonated in the street closer to the building 
the amount of damage could be higher due 
with the vehicles in controlled parking 
providing some protection.
*	Car bomb could be in a limousine which 
frequent area and are seen parking and 
standing for long periods of time.  The 
limousine could have a larger weapon yield 
than a standard sedan.
*	The front faade of the building is 
approximately 80 feet from the car bomb 
and only a portion of the red and orange 
rings are inside the building.

VISUAL XII-B-12

 

HZC Truck Bomb Blast Effects - 
Collateral

A truck bomb detonation on a nearby street 
(another building is the target) would cause 
significant damage to the HazardCorp 
Building, primarily glass breakage and 
potentially some structural damage based 
upon the ultimate size of the bomb.
*	Depending on adjacent building height, 
effects from reflected blast could increase 
the collateral damage and potential for 
casualties.
*	Random estimate of truck traffic within 
1,000 feet of building indicates 30 delivery 
trucks (18-foot-long enclosed bodies) 
transit area per hour and similar number of 
smaller delivery vans between 0600 and 
1800.  These numbers reduce to about 10 
delivery trucks and 10 delivery vans on 
average per hour between 1800 and 0600.

VISUAL XII-B-13

 

HZC Truck Bomb Blast Effect - Loading 
Dock

A truck bomb detonation at the HazardCorp 
Building Loading Dock would result in 
significant structural damage along with the 
strong potential for progressive collapse.  The 
constraint of the Loading Dock will direct 
more blast into the service entry affecting 
critical infrastructure, especially in the core 
area, although the open side of the Loading 
Dock will also vent much blast pressure.

VISUAL XII-B-14

 

HZC Building Data (Structural)

The structural system is steel moment frame, 
with a variety of configurations due to the 
unique aspects of the building.
*	The atrium results in discontinuous 
columns from foundation to roof with 
transfer trusses holding up the 4th floor and 
the more closely spaced columns above.
*	Point out the columns that are NOT 
supported by columns in the atriums 
(circled in red).  Thus the columns on the 
west and east side are prime for not being 
able to take the redistribution of load if one 
member is lost.

VISUAL XII-B-15

 

HZC Building Data (Envelope)

The building exterior is clad with an 
aluminum/glass curtain wall attached to the 
face of the building structure.
*	Floors 1-3:  3/8-inch thermally tempered 
single pane glass, including doorways on 
the first floor
*	Floors 4-8:  1/4-inch annealed double 
strength single-pane glass (double strength 
for wind load)
*	Floors 9 and above:  3/8- inch annealed 
double-strength single pane glass (thicker 
for higher wind loading at higher elevation)
*	The glazing pane size is 5 feet by 5 feet for 
vision glass and the same size or smaller 
for spandrel glass over structural elements 
due to the different floor heights.
*	The framing for the exterior glass is heavy 
weight aluminum with great ductility and 
strength resulting in each pane of glass 
reacting independently
*	The overhang on the plaza side entrance to 
the lobby will capture much of any blast 
wave and upward lift is expected to result 
in collapse upon resettling after the passing 
of the blast wave.

VISUAL XII-B-16

 

HZC Building Infrastructure (Fire 
Suppression and Electric Power)

Good sprinkler protecting throughout the 
building with alternate distribution paths and 
connections.  Certain floors have additional 
fire suppression measures due to their 
specific tenant needs.

Electric power is somewhat unique in that the 
Hazard City Electric Company substation is 
inside building at high voltage.  The building 
transformers are on the 4th floor to transform 
the 13,800 volts down to 480/277 volt 
distribution within the building.  Also, the 
substation is loop fed off the grid so that 
there is redundancy of high voltage supply to 
the substation.

VISUAL XII-B-17

 

HZC Building Infrastructure 
(Generators/Fuel Systems and HVAC)

There is extensive generator backup to the 
building and specific tenants and varying 
fuel supply for these various systems 
located in various parts of the building.
*	There are 4 fuel tanks located under the 
Loading Dock
*	There is a wide variance in duration of 
fuel capacity if all generators are working 
at maximum load.

HVAC is all air distribution using heat 
pumps for pinpoint air conditioning 
requirements not covered by the building 
systems as well as supplemental electric 
heating.

Note that the lighting system is an integral 
component of the heating system, so that 
lights should be left on all the time during 
the heating season.

HVAC has a responsive feature of 
overpressurizing adjacent floors not 
involved in a fire and exhausting the floor 
on which the fire has been detected.  Thus, 
the HVAC controls are complex and spread 
throughout the building.

VISUAL XII-B-18

 

HZC Building Infrastructure (Water and 
Natural Gas)

Water serving the building has two feeds 
from the utility mains that ring the building.
*	One feed is under loading dock
*	Potable water tanks on 3 mechanical 
room floors provide very limited backup 
for the number of people in the building.

Natural gas serves the restaurants on the 
first floor and is used for heating water and 
cooking in this location only.

VISUAL XII-B-19

 

HZC Building Infrastructure 
(Communications)

Between Building Management and tenants 
there are multiple redundancies for internet 
data connections and voice 
telecommunication connections outside the 
building.

There are also multiple redundancies for 
internal communications within the 
building.

Future expansion or speedy repair is built-
in with many spare conduits along service 
entrance routes.

Note that cell phones (which have antenna 
normally designed to distribute at ground 
level) have spotty coverage in the building 
due to the effect of the steel between the 
cell phone and the nearest cell tower.

VISUAL XII-B-20

 

HZC Building Infrastructure (Physical 
Security)

Security staff is adequate for current 
procedures, but will require additional 
personnel based upon recommended/required 
mitigation measures dealing with access 
control.

Currently, the tenants have the main security 
role for their purposes.

Other than the tenant utilities/infrastructure 
systems spaces, the building is open to the 
public with the lobby, 2nd and 3rd floor 
meeting rooms of the atrium, the mailroom 
and the retail spaces open to the public.

VISUAL XII-B-21

 

Threats/Hazards (Terrorism and 
Intelligence Collection)

Terrorism
*	No known specific targeting of 
HazardCorp Building
*	Certain tenants could be assessed by 
domestic or international terrorists as 
valuable targets.
*	Orange Threat Definition:  Credible 
intelligence indicates that there is a high 
risk of a local terrorist attack, but a 
specific target has not been identified.

Intelligence
*	Tenants with Government security 
clearances are potential targets for foreign 
intelligence services.
*	Threat includes commercial processes, 
financial information, and technology 
development that are the focus of 
commercial tenants of HazardCorp 
Building.

VISUAL XII-B-22

 

Threats/Hazards (Crime and Natural 
Hazards)

Crime
*	Almost all statistics for the Hazard City 
Business District are well above national 
averages

Natural hazards are especially diverse.
*	15 tornadoes/hurricanes/severe weather 
conditions per year
*	Flooding from weather conditions has 
occurred, but also from water main breaks.
*	HazardCorp Building is in evacuation zone 
for storm surges caused by severe weather, 
winds, and tides.
*	Moderate seismic activity
*	Active lightning area

VISUAL XII-B-23

 


Threats/Hazards (Hazardous Material and 
Other Technological Hazards)

Due to transportation, shipping, and storage 
in the area there are many hazardous 
materials that are technological hazards if an 
accident would occur.
*	Average 100 hazardous materials spills 
and releases each year in Hazard City

In addition to storm surges, there are many 
water line breaks each year throughout the 
city due to the age of the piping.
*	Thus, anything below grade is at risk, like 
the Underground Parking and the fuel 
tanks under the Loading Dock.

VISUAL XII-B-24

 

Design Basis Threat (1 of 2)

Explosive Blast: Car Bomb  
approximately 500 lb TNT equivalent. 
Truck Bomb  approximately 5,000 lb TNT 
equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class 
weapon)

Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill 
and toxic plume from tank farm, small 
quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) 
spills of HazMat materials (chlorine)

Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or in 
packages, smallpox distributed by spray 
mechanism mounted on truck or aircraft 
around metropolitan area.

Radiological: Small dirty bomb 
detonation within the 10-mile radius of the 
HIC building.

VISUAL XII-B-25

 

Design Basis Threat (2 of 2)

Criminal Activity / Armed Attack
Small arms weaponry that can be used 
outside or inside the building.

Cyber Attack
If connected to the internet, these building 
systems are more vulnerable.  However, the 
threat is still there by other means and all 
avenues of Cyber Attack must be covered.

VISUAL XII-B-26

 

Levels of Protection -- DHS

DHS Level IV Interagency Security 
Committee Criteria
*	Perimeter Security
*	Entry Security
*	Interior Security
*	Administrative Procedures
*	Blast/Setback Standards

This information based upon rented space is 
in the rear of the Appendix U Case Study.

VISUAL XII-B-27

 

Levels of Protection  DoD

DoD Low LOP, Primary Gathering Building 
o	50 or more people regularly in 
structure AND
o	Population density of greater than one 
person per 430 gross square feet (244 
gross square feet/person for this 
building)

*	Potential Structural Damage
*	Potential Door and Glazing Hazards
*	Potential Injury

In 2007 the level of protection against 
potential injury was increased such that 
fatalities are unlikely, vice a potential of up 
to 10%. Ditto, there is a potential for few 
serious injuries.

VISUAL XII-B-28

 

Levels of Protection  DoD (cont.)

DoD Low LOP, Primary Gathering Building 
Stand-off Distance

This is WITHOUT a Controlled Perimeter 
where VBIEDs (Vehicle Borne Improvised 
Explosive Devices) would be detected.

This is the normal situation in an urban 
setting.  The Ring of Steel in London, 
England, seeks to provide a Controlled 
Perimeter such that the larger size vehicle 
bomb can be detected and the Design Basis 
Threat inside the Ring of Steel could be 
reduced.

VISUAL XII-B-29

 

Levels of Protection (1 of 2)

UFC 4-010-01 Appendix B
    (22 January 2007)
DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for 
New and Existing Buildings Standards 1-12

What standards are applicable to the Case 
Study?
*	Std 1  Stand-Off Distances
*	Std 2  Unobstructed Space
*	Std 4  Access Roads
*	Std 5:  Parking Beneath Buildings or on 
Rooftops
*	Std 8  Building Overhangs
*	Std 10  Windows and Skylights
*	Std 11  Building Entrance Layout
*	Std 12  Exterior Doors

VISUAL XII-B-30

 

Levels of Protection (2 of 2)

UFC 4-010-01 Appendix B
    (22 January 2007)
DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for 
New and Existing Buildings Standards 13-22

What standards are applicable to the Case 
Study?
*	Std 18  Emergency Air Distribution 
Shutoff
*	Std 19  Utility Distribution and 
Installation
*	Std 20  Equipment Bracing
*	Std 21  Under Building Access

In addition to the standards, review the DoD 
Recommendations for New and Existing 
Buildings, Appendix U.

VISUAL XII-B-31

 

Members of the instructor staff should be 
available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed.

At the end of 45 minutes or so, reconvene the 
class and facilitate group reporting.

Case Study Activity

In this unit, the students will finalize the 
assessment, determine high priority risk 
concerns, recommend appropriate mitigation 
options, and present findings to the class. 

Activity Requirements
*	Working in assessment groups, refer to 
the Case Study and imbedded GIS 
portfolio to determine answers to the 
worksheet questions.

*	Then review results to identify 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures, and rank and prioritize the 
findings. (As a minimum, the 3 highest 
risks in terms of ratings and the 3 highest 
mitigation measures recommended in 
order of priority for funding)

VISUAL XII-B-32

 

Vulnerability Mitigation  Basis of 
Measures - Blast

Need to understand benefit versus cost.

Blast modeling concentrates upon worst case, 
but must work all scenarios. Since both 
positive and negative blast wave phases are 
used in retrofitting existing buildings, results 
were interesting and, in some cases 
unexpected.

The higher tier assessment indicates the first 
cut of possible approaches, but more analysis 
is needed to work with the architects and 
engineers in achieving a final design.

VISUAL XII-B-33

 

Vulnerability Mitigation  Basis of 
Measures - Plume

Plume modeling for CBR or HazMat follows 
similar approaches to indicate actions to 
consider, then followed by more detailed 
analysis to achieve the final design.

VISUAL XII-B-34

 

Vulnerability Mitigation  Basis of 
Measures  Cost

When comparing benefit versus cost, the cost 
is equally difficult to determine due to the 
still immature nature of anti-terrorism / force 
protection costing information.

The costing used in this presentation assumes 
10% overhead, 10% profit, an Area Cost 
Factor of 1.0, and adjusted for July 2006.

For your actual situation you can then adjust 
the dollar values given for your conditions.

VISUAL XII-B-35

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Site / Vehicle 
Bomb)

The plaza side of the building has the drop-
off area and significant street frontage
*	Since no traffic calming is possible, K12 
rating after analysis is selected
*	408 LF of frontage
*	Looking at options available, the planters 
are selected due to the price
*	Street furniture would be part of this 
approach, but that would be applicable to 
all approaches

VISUAL XII-B-36

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Site / Vehicle 
Bomb)

The other three sides of the building would 
continue with controlled parking which 
would require signage to be installed.

If controlled parking could not be instituted, 
then bollards will have to be installed with 
the K ratings as indicated.

Due to cost the controlled parking seems the 
best option, and, in fact, provides greater 
stand-off than the bollards.

VISUAL XII-B-37

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Site / Vehicle 
Bomb)

Protect Loading Dock / Building  The final 
perimeter stand-off control around the 
property line
*	Need K12 rated barriers
*	Drop Arm barriers are the choice to 
control access from the curb
*	Less expensive and easier to maintain 
under all forms of weather

VISUAL XII-B-38

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Site / Vehicle 
Bomb)

Reroute Traffic
*	Traffic Study is the starting point
*	Memorandums of Understanding 
(Agreements) with tenants, neighbors, 
and police to reroute
*	Possibly use Ring of Steel concept and 
cover a wider area of the area
*	As a minimum, change traffic flow for 
the west side street from south to north to 
have more space for queuing vehicles that 
will seek to access underground parking
o	Slower processing due to access 
control
o	Space for inspection at higher threat 
conditions when required
o	Additional Security at Loading Dock 
could control access to the street
o	May need Drop Arm (like at Loading 
Dock) across street for access control 
to street
o	Could relocate the installation of 
vehicle barriers from the under 
building parking entrance / exit to the 
entrance and exit points of the west 
side street
o	Must upgrade barriers to K12 at 
ends of street
o	See next slide for access control of 
under building parking

VISUAL XII-B-39

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Site / Vehicle 
Bomb)

Segregate Underground Parking
*	Under building  tenants, staff, and vetted 
only
*	Under plaza  retain public access as 
parking in urban area is a premium
*	K8-rated drop arm vehicle barriers on 
both entrance and exit lanes
*	Signage to denote which underground 
parking entrance to use

VISUAL XII-B-40

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Architectural  
Security / Vehicle Bomb)

Access control for loading dock
*	Additional personnel is high cost, but can 
perform screening at curb as part of 
procedures
*	Alternate  pre-screen away from 
building
o	Requires facility
o	Required more personnel
o	Add more stand-off (Ring of Steel 
concept)
*	Time of day access
o	Requires additional personnel to cover
o	Personnel may be able to be shifted
o	Reduces target value as fewer people 
in building
*	Mix or match measures to achieve final 
solution

VISUAL XII-B-41

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Architectural  
Security / Vehicle Bomb)

Access control for segregated under building 
parking
*	Electronic access control
*	Manned access control
*	Electronic access control less expensive
*	Can shift from under building parking 
ramps to ends of west side street per 
rerouting traffic measure
o	Match with relocated vehicle barriers
o	Must evaluate queuing potential all at 
loading dock area
o	Additional personnel at loading dock 
during day could perform access 
control, especially if deliveries shifted 
to night

VISUAL XII-B-42

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Architectural / 
Vehicle Bomb)

Strengthen overhead anchorage elements
*	First 3 floors will see the brunt of any 
vehicle blast situation  add anchorage, 
especially in atrium area
*	Canopy of main entrance at plaza needs 
similar strengthening  needs more 
information for design

VISUAL XII-B-43

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Architectural - 
Security / Vehicle Bomb)

Move Control Center to 4th floor
*	Building Security
*	Fire Control
*	Building Management Systems

Alternate is a backup control center on 4th 
floor

Not exactly an inexpensive action!

VISUAL XII-B-44

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Architectural - 
Security / Vehicle Bomb)

Lobby redesign
*	Close off all entrances to public except 
main entrance at plaza
*	Other entrances get electronic access like 
elevators and stairwells under building 
for tenants and staff
*	Close off retail space access to lobby
*	Channel visitors through x-ray and 
magentometers
o	Requires personnel based upon 
throughput required at peak times

VISUAL XII-B-45

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Structural 
Systems / Vehicle Bomb)

Blast analysis of exterior perimeter columns
*	Encase on first two stories in concrete 
and wrap in 1/4-inch steel wrap (seismic 
upgrade technique)

Harden loading dock to protect rest of 
building
*	Reinforced concrete walls on three sides 
with 1/2-inch steel plate on ceiling and 
floor
*	Floor with steel plate may require 
additional treatment for traction under 
different conditions
*	Additional protection may be needed for 
fuel tanks under loading dock

VISUAL XII-B-46

 

Column Hardening

The concrete and steel wrap has the 
following impact:

Large DBT
*	Original Stand-off  52 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  18 feet

Small DBT
*	Original Stand-off  14 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  5 feet

Vehicle barriers at curb and restricted 
parking coupled with column hardening 
provides desired level of protection as seen 
by the green contours.

VISUAL XII-B-47

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Structural 
Systems / Vehicle Bomb)

Harden columns along line between under 
building and public parking at building line
*	Expect columns to be more substantial 
than first to third floors due to vehicle 
dynamic loading
*	Same hardening technique applied
*	Small DBT only if not less due to 
additional screening and vetting
*	Resultant stand-off expected to be very 
small, but can increase thickness of wrap 
if more reduction is needed
*	Consider hardening all columns 
underneath building to mitigate 
progressive collapse

VISUAL XII-B-48

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Structural 
Systems / Vehicle Bomb)

Hardened wall between under building 
parking and public parking on all floors
*	Reinforced concrete
*	One vehicle barrier per parking level to 
all transit of vehicle between areas if exit 
ramps on either side became unusable for 
any reason
o	K4 rating or as designed
o	Rolling I-beam on building side of 
hardened wall and in front of columns
o	Only needed to be one vehicle passage 
wide for largest vehicle that can enter 
underground parking
o	Probably site fabricated due to 
difficulty in getting I-beam to each 
parking level

VISUAL XII-B-49

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Structural 
Systems / Vehicle Bomb)

Atrium columns
*	Encase in concrete to add mass and steel 
wrap to hold concrete together (consistent 
with other column hardening)
*	Only need the first floor as the DBT will 
be a hand-carried bomb
*	Add architectural stand-off by putting 
gypsum board on metal studs at 1 foot off 
column
*	Additional analysis may indicate that the 
architectural stand-off is sufficient and 
the concrete and steel wrap may not be 
needed, especially if vehicle barriers are 
installed that prevent entry into the lobby.

VISUAL XII-B-50

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Building 
Envelope / Vehicle Bomb)

Note that the window glass changes 
depending upon where you are in the 
building based upon life safety or wind 
loading design requirements.

Also the Federal Agency floors are upgraded 
to meet ISC criteria

On Floors 1-7 the cost of upgrading the 
window framing to greater than the 
commercial standard 1-inch thickness is 
usually excessive.  Thus, a 1-inch thick single 
pane glass, usually E-rated for energy 
conservation is the cost trade-off.

Also, reused the glass from Floors 1-3 on 
Floor 8 for a significant savings

The remaining upper floors are then 
protected with 15-mil Fragment Retention 
Film and silicone sealant all around between 
FRF and framing.

The following slides will show the benefits of 
these upgrades.

VISUAL XII-B-51

 

Window Hardening  Floor 1

While the original glazing meets ISC 
minimums, it does not provide the level of 
protection sought

Floor 1 is shown here, Floors 2-7 will have 
slightly smaller stand-off benefits due to the 
blast reflection angles impacting these higher 
floors.

The 1-inch thick Thermally Tempered Glass 
Laminated Single Pane has the following 
impact:

Large DBT
*	Original Stand-off  678 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  205 feet

Small DBT
*	Original Stand-off  277 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  77 feet

Hardening must be done in conjunction with 
other measures.  Main benefit is the reduction 
in collateral damage that can occur as seen by 
the smaller green contours versus the red 
contours.

NOTE:  The glass upgrade must be balanced 
with equivalent hardening of the curtain 
window wall framing and framing 
connections to the building structure.

VISUAL XII-B-52

 

Window Hardening  Floor 7

While the original glazing (1/4-inch double 
strength single pane) on Floor 7 with 15-mil 
FRF meets ISC minimums, it does not 
provide the level of protection sought

Floor 7 is shown here as Floor 7 is the 
highest floor of this upgrade of Floors 1-7.

The 1-inch thick Thermally Tempered Glass 
Laminated Single Pane has the following 
impact:

Large DBT
*	Original Stand-off  1,707+ feet (this is 
the limit of the analysis software)
*	Hardened Stand-off  180 feet (vice 205 
feet on Floor 1)

Small DBT
*	Original Stand-off  755 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  GSA 1 / 2 meaning 
the glass does not leave the frame (vice 
77 feet on Floor 1)

VISUAL XII-B-53

 

Window Hardening  Floor 8

Floor 8 is the highest floor with 1/4-inch 
double strength single pane glass.  It is the 
floor where the glass from existing Floors 1-3 
can be reused.

The 3/8-inch thick Thermally Tempered 
Glass Single Pane with 15-mil FRF and 4-
sided attachment with silicone sealant has the 
following impact:

Large DBT
*	Original Stand-off  1,707+ feet (this is 
the limit of the analysis software)
*	Hardened Stand-off  366 feet

Small DBT
*	Original Stand-off  755 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  GSA 1 / 2 meaning 
the glass does not leave the frame (vice 
77 feet on Floor 1)

This is equivalent to Floor 7 upgrade for 
small DBT, but twice the stand-off for large 
DBT.  Thus, it is also for collateral damage.

VISUAL XII-B-54

 

Window Hardening  Floor 9

Floor 9 is the start of the elevated wind 
loading design  3/8-inch double strength 
single pane glass.  It is also the lowest 
Federal agency floor.

The 3/8-inch thick Double Strength Single 
Pane with 15-mil FRF and 4-sided 
attachment with silicone sealant has the 
following impact:

Large DBT
*	Original Stand-off  977 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  379 feet (vice 366 
feet on Floor 8)

Small DBT
*	Original Stand-off  380 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  GSA 1 to 3b 
meaning a one foot change in the 
software provides a great change in GSA 
rating (vice GSA 1 / 2 on Floor 8)

This hardening attempts to maintain 
equivalent hardening and balances the 
economy of scale using one upgrade over a 
range of floors.

VISUAL XII-B-55

 

Window Hardening  Floor 13

Floor 13 is the upper floor of the first range 
of Federal agency floors.

The 3/8-inch thick Double Strength Single 
Pane with 15-mil FRF and 4-sided 
attachment with silicone sealant has the 
following impact:

Large DBT
*	Original Stand-off  970 feet (vice 977 
feet on Floor 9)
*	Hardened Stand-off  358 feet (vice 379 
feet on Floor 9)

Small DBT
*	Original Stand-off  359 feet
*	Hardened Stand-off  GSA 1 / 2 (vice 
GSA 1 to 3b on Floor 9)

VISUAL XII-B-56

 

Window Hardening  Floor 27

Floor 27 is the lower floor of the upper range 
of Federal agency floors.

The 3/8-inch thick Double Strength Single 
Pane with 15-mil FRF and 4-sided 
attachment with silicone sealant has the 
following impact:

Large DBT
*	Original Stand-off  923 feet (vice 970 
feet on Floor 13)
*	Hardened Stand-off  109 / 222 feet (vice 
358 feet on Floor 13)

Small DBT
*	Original Stand-off  82 / 174 feet (vice 
359 feet on Floor 13
*	Hardened Stand-off  GSA 1 / 2 (vice 
GSA 1 / 2 on Floor 13)

NOTE:  The larger hardened stand-off 
distance is where the glass breaks and the 
negative phase of the blast wave pulls the 
glass out of the building.  The smaller 
hardened stand-off distance is where the 
glass breaks and is propelled into the building 
at a GSA 3a or greater rating.  Thus, the 
smaller distance is the critical one for 
occupants of the building, while the larger 
distance affects people on the sidewalk and 
streets below.

VISUAL XII-B-57

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Utility Systems / 
Vehicle Bomb)

Harden Utilities
*	All utilities transit the underground 
parking levels either horizontally or 
vertically or both
*	Enclosing the utility lines in steel will 
cost about $250/LF

Set up preplanned contingency fuel deliveries
*	Will cover consumption later
*	Have two additional suppliers other than 
the normal supplier who will provide fuel 
if called
*	Ensure these alternate suppliers would 
deliver from localities that will NOT be 
affected by the same incidents that can 
affect the primary supplier
*	All suppliers should be on backup power 
to ensure fuel pumps can fill fuel trucks

VISUAL XII-B-58

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Mechanical 
Systems / CBR Attack)

HVAC / Air Handling Shutdown

Due to the complexity of the HVAC system 
with pressurizing and exhausting the simplest 
approach would be to have the Fire Warden 
on each floor to shout down all air handling 
equipment.

To back up the Fire Wardens requires 
additional cost to connect all systems to 
Security Control.

VISUAL XII-B-59

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Mechanical 
Systems / CBR Attack)

Elevator Control / Shutdown

Just like the HVAC / Air Handling Systems 
need to be shut down on a moments notice, 
the 31 elevators require the same 
consideration

However, this requires some procedures put 
in place as to announcements about elevator 
use so that people can exit at the next floor 
prior to shutting down all elevators (do not 
trap people in elevators)

VISUAL XII-B-60

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Mechanical 
Systems / CBR Attack) (Chemical)

Consider carbon filters for Chemical Attack 
(vapors vice particles), such as Chlorine 
release that impacts the HZC Building.

Carbon filters are not cheap and they require 
procedures for use and maintenance to ensure 
they are capable when needed.

Balance filters versus Sheltering-in-Place as 
shown in the plume modeling in the 
following slides.

Note, if chlorine is the only vapor concern, it 
is of little consequence installing carbon 
filters since the first air intake is on the 4th 
floor of the HazardCorp Buildings and 
chlrorine is much heavier than air.
*	But would have to check the mail room 
as this upgrade was a retrofit and the 
fresh air intake may not be on the 4th 
floor.

VISUAL XII-B-61

 

IDLH -- Immediately Dangerous to Life or 
Health

EPRG -- Emergency Response Planning 
Guides

Chlorine Spill  Chlorine  Railroad Tank 
Car at Chemical Storage Facility (Plume 
Modeling)

In this case, the prevailing winds from the 
west take the chlorine leak plume from a 
railroad tank car at the chemical storage 
facility towards the HZC Building.
*	Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health 
(IDLH) refers to a concentration, formally 
defined as the maximum exposure 
concentration of a given chemical from 
which one could escape within 30 minutes 
without any escape-impairing symptoms 
or any irreversible health effects. The 
IDLH for chlorine is 10 ppm.
*	The ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne 
concentration below which it is believed 
that nearly all individuals could be 
exposed for up to 1 hr without 
experiencing or developing irreversible or 
other serious health effects or symptoms 
which could impair an individual's ability 
to take protective action. The ERPG-2 for 
chlorine is 3 ppm.

VISUAL XII-B-62

 

NOTE to instructor:  Chlorine is 
approximately 2.5 times heavier than air.

HZC Chlorine Release Parameters

This slide shows the information available 
from the CAMEO toxic industrial chemical 
(TIC) modeling program of EPA and NOAA 
and can be downloaded at 
http://archive.orr.noaa.gov/cameo/aloha.html.

*	Chlorine will not readily disperse into the 
atmosphere. It will hug the ground as it 
disperses and will settle in the lowest 
elevations.
*	Notice this release is a rapid release of 
15,000 gallons (87 tons) of chlorine 
through a 6-inch hole in the tank. The 
entire release occurs in approximately five 
minutes.

VISUAL XII-B-63

 

The ERPG-3 (not shown) is the maximum 
airborne concentration below which it is 
believed that nearly all individuals could be 
exposed for up to 1 hour without 
experiencing or developing life-threatening 
health effects.

Chlorine Release Footprint

This is a basic plume footprint for the rapid 
release of chlorine [15,000 gallons (87 tons) 
at 225 psi over 5 minutes].

The blue line indicates the relative building 
location versus spill site (about 1.5 miles).

Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health 
(IDLH) [30 minutes] was defined earlier.

Emergency Response Planning Guides 
(ERPG) are defined in thin three categories
*	The ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne 
concentration below which it is believed 
that nearly all individuals could be 
exposed for up to 1 hr without 
experiencing other than mild transient 
adverse health effects or perceiving a 
clearly defined, objectionable odor.
*	The ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne 
concentration below which it is believed 
that nearly all individuals could be 
exposed for up to 1 hr without 
experiencing or developing irreversible or 
other serious health effects or symptoms 
which could impair an individual's ability 
to take protective action.


VISUAL XII-B-64

 

Chlorine Concentrations at HZC

Bottomline:  In all circumstances it is best to 
remain indoors unless or until the facts 
related to the release are clear and it can 
determined safe evacuation is possible. For 
even more protection move to upper floors, 
especially if air intakes are also elevated and 
above the shelter floor - turn the HVAC on 
high (pressurize) until the odor of chlorine is 
noticed.

NOTE:  A chlorine concentration of 1,000 
ppm is immediately fatal.

If configured, HVAC carbon filters can be 
put into operation or go to shelter-in-place 
configuration and turn on pressurization 
units.


VISUAL XII-B-65

 

Chlorine Dose at HZC

Bottomline:  Once again it is clear that 
remaining indoors is the best option until or 
unless it is clear evacuation can be 
accomplished safely.  In an urban 
environment, complete evacuation from the 
plume area would take more than 18 minutes; 
thus, sheltering-in-place is the recommended 
procedure to follow in this case.

Any efforts to maintain a positive pressure in 
the building and seal exterior openings 
(particularly at the lowest levels) could 
further reduce infiltration and, therefore, the 
occupant dosage. Then once the odor of 
chlorine is detected coming from the HVAC 
ducts (this occurs at ERPG 1 concentrations) 
the HVAC should be turned off because it 
would indicate chlorine is being drawn into 
the facility and air circulation should cease.
*	Notice all of these actions require two 
things.
*	First some rapid awareness and 
notification that a potentially dangerous 
event has taken place. This typically 
requires some linkage with emergency 
responders (radio, computer, telephonic).
*	Secondly it is important to have rapid 
HVAC controls to respond, whether to 
turn the system off or to ramp it up to 
maximum capacity.

This cumulative dose chart demonstrates the 
reason evacuation should occur as soon as 
possible after the plume passes. Notice the 
outdoor dose increases dramatically from 18-
25 minutes (during plume passage) but after 
25 minutes there is no further increase, 
whereas the indoor dose continues to 
increase. This is due to the fact that any 
chlorine that enters the building during plume 
passage will continue to be circulated in the 
building for several hours since total air 
exchange in a building normally takes 3 to 4 
hours. In fact the dose for a person who 
remains indoors for the duration can 
eventually be nearly identical to the person 
who remains outdoors.

After the plume passes, this would be the 
time to purge the building to reduce indoor 
concentrations and the dose to people inside 
the building. While high concentrations are a 
concern for immediate effects, high dosage is 
a concern for long-term effects.

VISUAL XII-B-66

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Mechanical 
Systems / CBR Attack) (Chemical and 
Radiological)

To remove particulates, upgrading the filter 
to MERV 11, 12, or 13 is beneficial
*	Must confirm that Mechanical System 
can handle the pressure drop and there is 
sufficient space
*	OR must confirm the fan equipment must 
be upgraded and there is sufficient space
*	Difficult to estimate costs due to the 
many variable involved.

VISUAL XII-B-67

 

NOTE to instructor:  Carbon Monoxide (CO) 
is slightly lighter than air (vapor density of 
0.97 versus air at 1.0) and due to the heat of 
the fire the CO is even lighter so it disperses 
readily.

NOTE to instructor:  It is very difficult to 
model fires and the resultant smoke/toxic gas 
plumes, especially with the canyon effect that 
occurs in urban areas with high rise 
buildings.. These graphs are from a model 
called ALOFT-PC (A Large Open Fire plume 
Trajectory model) by National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). It can be 
downloaded online at 
http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire96/art053.htm
l

It must be noted that this model (as the name 
indicates) is only for fires resulting from a 
fuel spill. The user selects the type of fuel 
and the dimensions of the spill.

The major problem downwind is the fallout 
of particulates (witness the film footage of 
the 9/11 attacks in New York City). It is 
often assumed that high particulate filtration 
is only for biological agent attacks. They 
should also be considered where damage 
from particulates would cause serious 
problems due to loss of computers, 
electronics or communications equipment.

Fire Plumes  Smoke and Carbon 
Monoxide

Two points to consider are smoke particles 
that MERV 13 filters will capture and carbon 
monoxide, a lighter-than-air gas that kills by 
overcoming the oxygen in a room. The 
prevailing wind direction will push fire 
products toward the HazardCorp Building.  
In this case the fire is in the same general 
area as the chlorine release on an earlier 
slide.

The vertical line on the graphs indicates the 
location of the HZC Building and the 
horizontal line indicates the total height of 
that building (626 feet)

The smoke particles will be in higher 
concentrations at the upper floors of the HZC 
Building as shown in the upper left graphic. 
Filtering of these smoke particles is not only 
a concern from a human health standpoint, 
but also for sensitive electronic equipment, 
such as computer and communications.  The 
lower floors of HZC Building may be totally 
unaffected.

Alternately, the carbon monoxide will be at a 
reduced concentration and only on the 
highest floors, although not high enough to 
be instantly fatal. Like for particulate, the 
lower floors are completely unaffected and 
would allow for evacuation. Evacuation of 
personnel is normally the best course of 
action. Sheltering-in-place is not 
recommended in this case.

In most cases fires present little risk to 
persons except for those trapped indoors or 
extremely close to the event where carbon 
monoxide, heat or particulates can have 
severe or even fatal effects.

Fortunately the heat of the fire carries smoke 
and toxic gases rapidly up into the 
atmosphere.

VISUAL XII-B-68

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Mechanical 
Systems / CBR Attack) (Chemical and 
Radiological)

Install Chemical and/or Radiological 
Detectors
*	These detectors do have a level of 
acceptable reliability, especially 
Radiological Detectors
*	Cost depends upon amount of air 
movement (and sampling concentrations / 
trigger settings)
*	Radiological detectors are less expensive 
than Chemical Detectors
*	Not only sound an alarm, but also 
automatically shut down HVAC and 
close fast dampers on air intakes.

VISUAL XII-B-69

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Mechanical 
Systems / CBR Attack)

Lobby HVAC Redesign

*	Separate system like mailroom
*	Must cover Atrium and close off other 
parts of building

Safe Room / Sheltering-in-Place
*	Closed off areas  see FEMA 455
*	Filtered air units that can overpressurize 
the safe room
*	May install on selected floors

VISUAL XII-B-70

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Mechanical 
Systems / CBR Attack) (Biological)

Evaluate UVGI

*	Costly due to the many systems on each 
floor where it can be installed
*	Consider for the primary systems on each 
floor that predominantly does air 
recirculation vice fresh air intake, 
although both have their place 
*	Has health benefits for work force

CBR General

*	Occupant Emergency Plans needed for 
actions to take during external and 
internal CBR releases
*	For terrorist OR technological accident 
releases

VISUAL XII-B-71

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Security Systems 
/ Generic Measures)

Expand and upgrade CCTV coverage

*	Perimeter (entrances, streets, plaza)
*	Stairwells (fixed is satisfactory  include 
access keypads)
*	UG Parking (color pan-tilt-zoom and 
complete coverage)
*	Include sensors to assist personnel 
monitoring the CCTV so as to avoid 
boredom or miss critical activity

VISUAL XII-B-72

 


Vulnerability/Mitigation (Security Systems 
/ Generic Measures)

Expand Panic /Duress Keypads for General 
Public Use

*	Signage
*	Alternate input 911* for example rather 
than just the Duress PIN
*	Exapnd to Plaza Underground Parking
*	Include CCTV coverage of keypads

VISUAL XII-B-73

 

Vulnerability/Mitigation (Equipment Ops 
and Maintenance / Generic Measures)

Confirm Fuel Capacity against Maximum 
Consumption Annually

*	Rules of Thumb for initial analysis
*	

Confirm UPS Battery Capacity Annually
*	10 minutes to 2 hours stated in Case 
Study
*	Everything connected that needs to be 
connected?
*	10 minutes capacity can go to zero 
minutes easily, especially if backup 
generator does not start on first attempt
*	Most functions can last up to 4.75days at 
maximum generator load
*	National Financial Services Company, if 
all generators needed at maximum load, 
only can run for 9.66 hours.
o	Even with triple redundancy this 
would only give 28.9 hours of 
capacity
o	Supply lines have some capacity, but 
pumping becomes a problem


Transition

This completes the Building Design for 
Homeland Security instruction. In this 
course, you have learned how to perform a 
multihazard risk assessment of a building and 
have become familiar with the key concepts 
of how to protect buildings from manmade 
threats and hazards:

*	Asset Value
*	Design Basis Threat
*	Levels of Protection
*	Layers of Defense
*	Vulnerability Assessment
*	Risk Assessment
*	Mitigation Options

Using the approach and guidance provided in 
FEMA 426, the majority of building owners 
should be able to complete a risk assessment 
of their building in a few days and identify 
the primary vulnerabilities, mitigation 
options, and make informed decisions on the 
ability of their building to survive, recover, 
and operate should an attack or event occur.

Course certificates will be presented in the 
next unit.





UNIT XII-B CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF GROUP RESULTS
(Urban Version)

In this activity, students work with their groups to finalize their assessments, decide on high 
priority risk concerns, determine appropriate mitigation measures, and present findings to the 
class.  The student presenter(s) will decide on the number of asset-threat/hazard pairs to present 
and the mitigation measures to apply.  Of great importance is the groups rationale for the 
selection of these high risk asset-threat/hazard pairs and the rationale for the recommended 
mitigation measures.  In light of limited resources that building owners/decision makers have to 
work with, the presenter(s) will identify the top three asset-threat/hazard pairs that their 
assessment identified and the top three mitigation measures that they would recommend to have 
funded using those limited resources.  No Cost / Low Cost recommended mitigation measures 
are always welcome as procedural changes can derive significant benefit.

Requirements

1.	Based on findings from the previous activities completed in the previous 11 instruction units, 
complete the following table.  Ensure the top three risks and the top three mitigation measures 
are identified.

2.	Select one or two presenters from the assessment team to present the teams conclusions and 
their recommendations with rationale and justifications to the class in a 5-7 minute 
presentation.

NOTE:  There are no entries below for instructors as all potential information based upon 
school solutions to this point has already been included at the end of Units IX and X 
Instructor Guides. There are so many student assessment team approaches for selecting 
mitigation measures due to variations already seen that to provide a school solution for this 
instruction unit has very limited use.

They key to this instruction unit is the rationale of selection based upon the Risk Matrix 
developed by each student assessment team and how the mitigation measures selected are to be 
implemented.


Prioritized Asset-
Threat/Hazard Pair of 
Interest
Prioritized Mitigation 
Measures
Rationale



















?  Unit Plan:  II

Unit XII-B


IG II - 2
June 2000

IG XII-B-2
Course Title:  Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit XII-B:  Case Study



IG XII-B-1
Course Title:  Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit XII-B:  Case Study

INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY

Course Title:  Building Design for Homeland Security

Unit XII-B:  Case Study


IG XII-B-47