No. 95-858

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

RONALD CHICK, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

DREW S. DAYS, III
Solicitor General

JOHN C. KEENEY
Acting Assistant Attorney
General

J. DOUGLAS WILSON
Attorney

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars petition-
er's prosecution for 17 substantive counts of sell-
ing illegally modified electronics equipment and one
count of conspiracy to "assemble, possess, and sell" il-
legally modified electronics equipment after the for-
feiture of illegally modified equipment different from
that forming the basis for the substantive counts.

(I)

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion below . . . . 1
Jurisdiction . . . . 1
Statement . . . . 2
Argument . . . . 6
Conclusion . . . . 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) . . . . 4, 7, 8
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) . . . . 6
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) . . . . 5, 6
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961) . . . . 11
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) . . . . 10, 12
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) . . . . 11
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)  . . . . 10, 11-12
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975) . . . . 11
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) . . . . 6
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) . . . . 11
United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, No. 95-630 (Feb. 20, 1996) . . . . 9
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947) . . . .11
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) . . . . 10, 12
United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992) . . . . 5, 10, 11
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) . . . .  11
United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. granted, No. 95-346 (Jan. 12, 1996) . . . . 7
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) . . . . 6, 10
United States v. 184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir.
1995) . . . . 7
United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995) . . . . 7, 8-9

(III)

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                  

IV

Cases-Continued:              

Page

United States v. Ramirez-Burgos, 44 F.3d 17 (1st
Cir. 1995) . . . . 8
United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.
1995) . . . . 7
United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1995) . . . . 7
United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.
1995), cert. granted, No. 95-345 (Jan. 12 1996) . . . . 7
Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995) . . . . 8

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const.: 
Amend. V (Double Jeopardy Clause)  . . . . 2, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13
Amend. VIII (Excessive Fines Clause) . . . . 7
18 U.S.C. 371 . . . . 2
18 U.S.C. 2511 . . . . 3, 9
18 U.S.C. 2512(1)(b) . . . . .2, 3
18 U.S.C. 2513 . . . . 3, 5, 9
18 U.S.C. 3731 . . . . 8
21 U.S.C. 881(a) . . . . 12
21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4) . . . . 6
21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) . . . . 6-7
21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7) . . . . 7, 12

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                     

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995                                

No. 95-858

RONALD CHICK, PETITIONER 

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA   
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
                    
OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-
15a) is reported at 61 F.3d 682. The order of the dis-
trict court denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
(Pet. App. 17a-20a) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
July 14, 1995. A petition for rehearing was denied on
August 31, 1995. Pet. App. 16a The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on November 29, 1995. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).

(1)

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                     

2

STATEMENT

A grand jury in the Western District of Wash-
ington returned an 18-count superseding indictment
charging petitioner with conspiracy to sell illegally
modified satellite descramblers, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 371, and 17 counts of selling illegally modified
satellite descramblers, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2512(1)(b). Before trial, petitioner moved to dismiss
the indictment, on the ground that the prosecution
was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The dis-
trict court denied the motion, and petitioner took an
interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals affirmed.
Pet. App. 1a-15a.
1. On March 30, 1993, an FBI special agent ob-
tained warrants to search petitioner's Seattle home
and a storage locker that petitioner had rented. The
affidavit in support of the application alleged that
petitioner recently had illegally modified or sold
illegally modified television "descrambler modules"
that allowed users to receive cable and satellite
television channels for which they had not paid. Gov't
C.A. Br. 3. On April 1, 1993, federal law enforcement
officers executing the warrant seized a variety of
television and electronics equipment, including more
than 50 satellite television descramblers. Pet. App.
2a. 
2. On November 19, 1993, the government filed
a civil complaint seeking forfeiture of some of the
equipment seized from petitioner's residence. The
complaint alleged that on March 19, 1993, a con-
fidential informant had purchased an illegally modi-
fied cable descrambler from petitioner and that
petitioner had given the informant 44 key codes nec-
essary to obtain encrypted cable television programs.

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                    

3

Gov't C.A. Br. 4. Based on that incident, the com-
plaint alleged that the seized equipment was used to
intercept scrambled or encrypted satellite video com-
munications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511, and there-
fore was subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 2513.
Pet. App. 2a-3a.
On August 30, 1994, petitioner and the government
entered into a consent judgment to settle the for-
feiture action. In the consent judgment, petitioner
agreed to the forfeiture of 13 categories of equipment
seized from his home "without further adjudication of
any issue of fact or law." The forfeited equipment
consisted primarily of various types of descram-
blers and descrambler modules. The government also
agreed to return a substantial quantity of the seized
electronics equipment, including tools, stereo equip-
ment, televisions, remote controls, and some descram-
biers. Gov't C.A. Br. 4; Pet. App. 3a.
On July 26, 1994, petitioner and his sister, Renate
Ann Chick, were charged with conspiracy to "assem-
ble, possess, and sell" satellite descrambler modules
that would allow the descrambling of satellite tele-
vision programming without payment of subscription
fees. Pet, App. 3a. The indictment further alleged, as
overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and as
individual counts, that petitioner had sold illegal
descrambler units on 12 different occasions, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. 2512(1)(b). Gov't C.A. Br. 5. On
October 18, 1994, the grand jury returned a super-
seding indictment that added five more counts charg-
ing that petitioner had sold illegal descrambler units.
Pet. App. 3a.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment, alleg-
ing that the prior civil forfeiture of some of the
equipment seized from" his home had punished him for

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                         

4

the conduct charged in the indictment and thus that
his conviction on the indictment" would constitute a
second punishment for the same offense, in violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court
denied the motion. Pet. App. 17a-20a. The court
assumed without deciding that the prior civil for-
feiture constituted punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. It held, however, that the
criminal prosecution did not seek to punish petitioner
for the "same offense" as the civil forfeiture. Id. at
18a-19a. According to the district court, the civil
forfeiture rested on petitioner's possession of certain
illegal descrambling devices. By contrast, the dis-
trict court held, the indictment alleged that peti-
tioner had sold different illegal descrambling devices.
Id. at 19a. The court also found" that the conspiracy
charged in the indictment was a different offense from
the forfeiture based on petitioner's possession of the
devices. Id. at 18a.
4. Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal, and the
court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1a-15a. The court
first found that it had jurisdiction over petitioner's
appeal. Id. at 4a-8a. Citing Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651 (1977), the court held that the district
court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
was an immediately appealable collateral order. The
court acknowledged that "[t]he constitutional right
directly involved in Abney was the right to avoid a
second trial" and that petitioner's "claimed right is
the right to avoid a second punishment." Pet. App. 6a-
7a. It held, however, that petitioner could bring an
immediate appeal because "if the defendant is con-
victed, and punishment imposed, then the constitu-
tional right not to be doubly punished is lost, even if
vindicated on appeal." Id. at 7a.

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                     

5

On the merits, the court of appeals held that for-
feiture under 18 U.S.C. 2513, the statute under which
the government had sought forfeiture of the seized
equipment, constituted punishment for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held, how-
ever, that the civil forfeiture did not impose punish-
ment for the "same offense" as any of those charged
in the indictment against petitioner. The court noted
that the civil forfeiture rested on allegations that
petitioner used the forfeited equipment "to intercept
electronic communications in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2511." Pet. App. 12a. By contrast, the indictment
charged that petitioner had conspired to "assemble,
possess, or sell" satellite descrambler equipment and
that petitioner had sold illegally modified descram-
blers on specific occasions. Applying the test set
forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932), the court held that "the counts contained
in the superseding indictment were based on dis-
tinctly different offenses from the offense "which
underlies the civil forfeiture action." Pet, App. 12a-
13a. The court also held that the conspiracy charged in
the indictment was a separate offense from the civil
forfeiture "offense" because "the offense of con-
spiracy requires proof of at least two fads which the
forfeiture action did not i.e., (1) proof of an agreement
to commit the substantive offense; and (2) proof of
participation by the defendant."  Pet. App. 14a.
Finally, the court relied on this Court's decision in
United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389 (1992), which
held that "a substantive crime and a conspiracy to
commit that crime are not the `same offense' for
double jeopardy purposes." On the basis of that hold-
ing, the court of appeals held that "the Double Jeop-

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                    

6

ardy Clause would not be violated by the forfeiture of
electronic equipment used by [petitioner] to intercept
electronic communications in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2511 and then a subsequent prosecution of [peti-
tioner] for conspiring to use the same equipment for
the same illegal purposes." Pet. App. 14a-15a.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner raises two challenges to the court of
appeals' rejection of his double jeopardy claim. First,
he contends (Pet. 13-22) that the court erred because
it applied the test set forth in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), to determine whether the
civil forfeiture imposed punishment for the "same
offenses" as those charged against him in the crim-
inal indictment. Second, he asserts that the court of
appeals erroneously concluded that the conspiracy
charged in the indictment and the offenses underlying
the conspiracy are not the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes. Those claims do not warrant
further review.
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the impo-
sition of multiple punishments for the same offense in
separate proceedings. See North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). In United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989), this Court held that after impo-
sition of a criminal punishment, the Clause's "multi-
ple punishments" prohibition barred imposition of a
civil penalty that is "so extreme and so divorced from
the Government's damages and expenses as to con-
stitute punishment." Id. at 442. Subsequently, in
Austin v. United Slates, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), the
Court held that a forfeiture of certain property used
to facilitate narcotics offenses, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                     

7

881(a)(4) and (a)(7), is subject to review under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Relying on Halper and Austin, the Ninth Circuit
has held that a civil forfeiture of drug proceeds under
21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) invariably constitutes punishment
for purposes of the multiple punishments prong of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v.
$405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
No. 95-346 (Jan. 12, 1996) (to be argued Apr. 17, 1996).
But see United States v. 184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d
Cir. 1995) (forfeiture of proceeds of drug trafficking is
wholly remedial and accordingly does not inflict
"punishment"); United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551
(6th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d
295 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573
(1994). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that
the forfeiture of property used to facilitate the com-
mission of a drug crime, under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7),
constitutes punishment for that crime. See United
States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, No. 95-345 (Jan. 12, 1996) (to be argued Apr..
17, 1996).
Petitioner's" claim rests on the premise that the
forfeiture of the satellite descrambler units seized
from him likewise constitutes punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. Even if correct, that claim is not
properly before this Court, because the court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider it. In Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651. (1977), this Court held
that a pretrial order rejecting a claim of former jeop-
ardy may be raised by a defendant in an interlocutory
appeal when it is premised on the right not to be
"twice put to trial for the same offense." Id. at 661
(emphasis omitted). The Court suggested, however,

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                     

8

that a pure multiple punishments claim, such as
petitioner raises, would not be similarly appealable,
because "that, aspect of the right can be fully
vindicated on an appeal following final judgment." Id.
at 660.
This Court's decision in Witte v. United States, 115
S. Ct. 2199 (1995), does not warrant a different result.
In that case, the Court recognized that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from "at-
tempting a second time to punish criminally] for the
same offense." Id. at 2204 (emphasis partially omit-
ted). Witte, however, presented no question of appel-
late jurisdiction, because the. district court had
dismissed the indictment on double jeopardy grounds,
see id. at 2203-2204, and the court of appeals accord-
ingly had jurisdiction over the government's appeal
under 18 U.S.C. 3731. For that reason, the Witte
Court addressed only whether the petitioner's claim
was premature, not whether it was appealable. The
fact that a double jeopardy claim may be ripe for
adjudication by a district court (as is true of many
other pretrial claims, including suppression claims)
does not mean that a court's rejection of the claim is
immediately appealable on an interlocutory basis.
Because the right not to be subject to impermissible
multiple punishments can be completely vindicated on
appeal from a conviction and sentence, the court of
appeals erred in asserting appellate jurisdiction over
petitioner's interlocutory appeal. 1.

___________________(footnotes)             

1 The courts of appeals are divided over this issue. Com-
pare United States v. Ramirez-Burgos, 44 F.3d 17, 18-19 (1st
Cir. 1995) (finding no right of interlocutory appeal for multiple
punishments claim) with Pet. App. 4a-8a (finding right of ap-
peal); United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995)

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                    

9

2. In any event, petitioner's double jeopardy claims
are without merit.
a. Substantive counts. Even if the statute under
which petitioner's equipment was forfeited, 18 U.S. C.
2513, generally defined the "same offense" as the
substantive offenses charged in the present indict-
ment under 18 U.S.C. 2511, petitioner would not be
entitled to relief. That is because, even if the same
offense (or greater- and lesser-included offenses) sup-
ported both the forfeiture proceeding and the sub-
stantive criminal charges, petitioner committed that
offense multiple times on separate occasions. There
is no reason why he may not receive a separate pun-
ishment for each violation.
The government obtained the forfeiture of the
seized equipment because that equipment had been
"used, sent, carried, manufactured, assembled, pos-
sessed, sold, or advertised" in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2511. Thus, if the forfeiture constituted "punish-
ment," it imposed punishment on petitioner for using,
manufacturing, possessing, or selling the seized
equipment in violation of Section 2511. The 17 sub-
stantive counts of the indictment, however, are not
based on petitioner's use, manufacture, possession, or
sale of the seized equipment. Instead, those counts
charge him with the sale of illegal satellite descram-
bler modules between 1990 and March 19, 1993. Noth-
ing in the record suggests, and petitioner does not
claim, that any of the forfeited equipment was the
same equipment that he is charged with illegally
selling in Counts 2 through 18 of the indictment.
Thus, if petitioner is convicted on Counts 2 through

___________________(footnotes)                                

(same); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir. 1995)
(same), cert. denied, No. 95-630 (Feb. 20, 1996).

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                    

10                     

18, he will be punished for the individual sales that
form the basis for those counts, not for the illegal use
of different equipment that he forfeited to the
government. Cf. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378,
385 (1992) (offenses are distinct when they involve "no
common conduct").
For the reasons given above,  petitioner would not
be assisted even if he were correct in contending (Pet.
14-22) that the court of appeals erred in employing
the Blockburger "same elements" test to determine
 whether the prior civil forfeiture imposed punishment
for the "same offenses" as those charged in the sub-
stantive counts of the criminal indictment.  Never-
theless, petitioner's contention that the Blockburger
test does not apply to multiple punishment cases is
without merit.  This Court has expressly held that
the "same elements" test announced in Blockburger
v. United States applies " [i]n both the multiple
punishment and multiple prosecution contexts."
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993).
In Dixon, moreover, the Court overruled Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which had construed the
Double Jeopardy Clause to protect against successive
uses of the "same conduct" in criminal prosecutions
against a defendant. 2. 

___________________(footnotes)

2 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), and
Department of  Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct.
1937 (1994), are not to the contrary.  The only issue before the
Court in Halper was whether, following a criminal conviction, 
"a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for the purposes
of double jeopardy analysis."  490 U.S. at 436.  Similarly, the
Court in Kurth Ranch stated that "we ask only whether the
tax [imposed following the criminal conviction in that case] has
punitive characteristics that subject it to the constraints of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause."  114 S. Ct. at 1945.  In both cases, the  

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------

11

b. Conspiracy count. Petitioner's challenge to the
conspiracy count is equally unfounded, Petitioner
acknowledges (Pet. 22-23) that in Felix, this Court
held that "a substantive crime and a conspiracy to
commit that crime are not the `same offense' for
double jeopardy purposes," See Felix, 503 U.S. at 389. 
Accord Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778
(1985); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 781-782
(1975); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975);
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961);
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643-644
(1946). That rule is based on the fact that proof of a
conspiracy requires proof of an agreement, while
proof of a substantive offense does not. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). Thus,
even if the government's proof at trial of the alleged
conspiracy would include evidence of the conduct that
led to the forfeiture, the conspiracy is a separate
offense from the "offense" punished by the forfeiture.
Petitioner argues (Pet. 25) that the court of ap-
peals' decision "stretches Felix too far by suggesting
that punishment for a substantive crime and a later
attempt to impose punishment for a conspiracy to
commit that same crime will never lead to a double
jeopardy violation." Nothing in Felix suggests that
the Court intended to impose any limitations on its
holding, however; to the contrary, the Court referred
to the rule it stated in Felix as "established doctrine"
and refused to limit its application by applying the
"same conduct" test of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508

___________________(footnotes)

Court therefore had no occasion to consider whether the
"offenses" underlying the civil penalty or tax and that
underlying the criminal prosecution were the same.

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                    

12

(1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993). 
Nor is there any merit to petitioner's assertion
that the Court's decision in Department of Revenue
of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994),
casts doubt on the validity of Felix. In Kurth Ranch,
the Court held that, following the criminal prose-
cution of the Kurths, a proceeding initiated to collect
a tax on the "possession and storage" of illegal drugs
"was the functional equivalent of a successive crim-
inal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a
second time 'for the same offense.'" Id. at 1948. The
Court declined to address the claim that respondents
who had been convicted only of conspiracy to commit
the underlying drug offenses lacked standing to
challenge the tax, because that claim had not been
raised below. See id. at 1942 n.9. Accordingly, the
Court had no occasion to consider the application of
the Felix rule in Kurth Ranch.
3. There is no reason to hold this case pending the
disposition of United States v. Ursery, No. 95-345, and
United States v. $405,089.23, No. 95-346 (both cases to
be argued Apr. 17, 1996). In $405,089.23, the Ninth
Circuit held that civil judicial forfeiture of drug
proceeds under 21 U.S.C. 881(a) invariably consti-
tutes punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Ursery, the Sixth Circuit held the civil judicial
forfeiture of property used to facilitate a drug crime
under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7) always amounts to punish-
ment for double jeopardy purposes.
The government's brief in those consolidated cases
argues that civil forfeiture followed by criminal
prosecution does not raise double jeopardy concerns,
that the forfeitures at issue do not constitute punish-
ment, that civil forfeiture and the criminal offense on

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------                    

13

which it rests are never the "same offense" under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and that parallel civil for-
feiture and criminal proceedings constitute a single
proceeding for purposes of the multiple punishments
prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Although this Court's acceptance of the govern-
ment's arguments in Ursery and $405,089.23 would
provide additional grounds on which to reject peti-
tioner's claims, a decision favorable to the respon-
dents in those cases would not provide petitioner with
a ground for relief. As set forth above, petitioner
cannot obtain dismissal of the substantive counts of
the indictment under any view of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. And a straightforward application of Felix is
dispositive of petitioner's challenge to the conspiracy
count.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

Respectfully submitted.

DREW S. DAYS, III
Solicitor General

JOHN C. KEENEY
Acting Assistant Attorney General

J. DOUGLAS WILSON
Attorney

MARCH 1996

---------------------------------------- Page Break ----------------------------------------