Federal Continuity Directive 1 
(FCD 1) 

November 6, 2007 

Federal Continuity Directive 1 
(FCD 1) 

 6, 2007 

Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1) 

Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and 
Requirements 

 

 

February 2008 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. PURPOSE .............................................................................................................................1 

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE ..........................................................................................1 

3. SUPERSESSION ..................................................................................................................1 

4. AUTHORITIES....................................................................................................................1 

5. REFERENCES.....................................................................................................................1 

6. POLICY................................................................................................................................1 

7. BACKGROUND...................................................................................................................2 

8. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................3 

9. ELEMENTS OF A VIABLE CONTINUITY CAPABILITY..............................................7 

10. COORDINATION WITH STATE, LOCAL, TERRITORIAL, AND TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENTS, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR .........................................................11 

11. CONTINUITY PLAN OPERATIONAL PHASES AND IMPLEMENTATION..............12 

12. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES...................................................................................12 

13. POINT OF CONTACT .......................................................................................................21 

14. DISTRIBUTION.................................................................................................................21 

ANNEX A. PROGRAM PLANS AND PROCEDURES ...................................................... A-1 

ANNEX B. RISK MANAGEMENT.......................................................................................B-1 

ANNEX C. BUDGETING AND ACQUISITION OF RESOURCES....................................C-1 

ANNEX D. ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS................................................................................ D-1 

ANNEX E. ORDERS OF SUCCESSION ..............................................................................E-1 

ANNEX F. DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY ................................................................... F-1 

ANNEX G. CONTINUITY FACILITIES.............................................................................. G-1 

ANNEX H. CONTINUITY COMMUNICATIONS.............................................................. H-1 

ANNEX I. VITAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT .................................................................I-1 

ANNEX J. HUMAN CAPITAL..............................................................................................J-1 

ANNEX K. TEST, TRAINING, AND EXERCISE (TT&E) PROGRAM............................ K-1 

ANNEX L. DEVOLUTION OF CONTROL AND DIRECTION .........................................L-1 

ANNEX M. RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS ................................................................M-1 

ANNEX N. CONTINUITY PLAN OPERATIONAL PHASES AND 

 IMPLEMENTATION.........................................................................................N-1 

ANNEX O. ACRONYMS...................................................................................................... O-1 

ANNEX P. GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................ P-1 

ANNEX Q. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES .............................................................. Q-1 


 

 

 

FEDERAL CONTINUITY DIRECTIVE 1 (FCD 1) 

 

Number Date Office 

FCD 1 February 2008 FEMA National Continuity Programs 

 

TO: HEADS OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 

SUBJECT: FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH NATIONAL CONTINUITY PROGRAM 

1. PURPOSE: This Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) provides direction to the Federal 
executive branch for developing continuity plans and programs. Continuity planning 
facilitates the performance of executive branch essential functions during all-hazards 
emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations. The ultimate goal of 
continuity in the executive branch is the continuation of National Essential Functions 
(NEFs). 
2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE: The provisions of this FCD are applicable to the 
executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C.  101, including the Department of Homeland 
Security, independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C.  104(1), Government 
corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C.  103(1), and the United States Postal Service. The 
departments, agencies, and independent organizations are hereinafter referred to as 
agencies. The continuity program elements outlined herein are for use at all levels of 
Federal executive branch organizations regardless of their location, and are also useful 
reference documents for non-Federal Government and private sector entities. 
3. SUPERSESSION: The provisions of this FCD supersedes: 

 

a. Federal Preparedness Circular 60, Continuity of the Executive Branch of the Federal 
Government at the Headquarters Level During National Security Emergencies, and 
b. Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations, 
June 15, 2004. 

4. AUTHORITIES: 
See Annex Q  Authorities and References. 

5. REFERENCES: 
See Annex Q  Authorities and References. 

6. POLICY: It is the policy of the United States to maintain a comprehensive and effective 
continuity capability composed of Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of 
Government (COG) programs to ensure the preservation of our form of Government under 
the Constitution and the continuing performance of NEFs under all conditions (National 
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD)-20, National Continuity Policy). Continuity requirements must be incorporated into 


the daily operations of all agencies to ensure seamless and immediate continuation of 
Primary Mission Essential Function (PMEF) capabilities so that critical government 
functions and services remain available to the Nations citizens. Continuity planning will 
occur simultaneously with the development and execution of Federal agency programs. This 
means that organizations must incorporate redundancy and resiliency as a means and an end. 
In support of this policy, the Federal executive branch has developed and implemented a 
continuity program which is composed of efforts within individual agencies to ensure that 
their Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) continue to be performed during a wide range of 
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related 
emergencies. These efforts include plans and procedures, under all readiness levels, that 
delineate essential functions, specify succession to office and emergency delegations of 
authority, provide for the safekeeping of vital records, identify a range of continuity facilities 
and locations, provide for interoperable communications, provide for human capital 
planning, validate these capabilities through tests, training, and exercises (TT&E), specify a 
devolution of control and direction, and provide for reconstitution. All agencies, regardless 
of their size or location, shall have in place a viable continuity capability to ensure continued 
performance of their agencys essential functions under all conditions. 
7. BACKGROUND: Continuity planning is simply the good business practice of ensuring the 
execution of essential functions through all circumstances, and it is a fundamental 
responsibility of public and private entities responsible to their stakeholders. Todays 
asymmetric threat environment and the potential for no-notice emergencies, including 
localized acts of nature, accidents, technological emergencies, and military or terrorist attackrelated 
incidents, have increased the need for robust continuity capabilities and planning that 
enable agencies to continue their essential functions across a broad spectrum of emergencies. 
This, coupled with the potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 
has emphasized the importance of continuity programs that ensure continuity of essential 
government functions throughout the Federal executive branch. 
Historically, the Federal Government has defined continuity efforts using the terms COOP, 
COG, and ECG, as defined in Figure 1. 

Figure 1 

"COOP," or Continuity of Operations, is an effort within individual organizations (i.e., Federal executive branch 
departments and agencies) to ensure that MEFs and PMEFs continue to be performed during a wide range of 
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies. 

"COG," or Continuity of Government, means a coordinated effort within each branch of Government (e.g., the 
Federal Government's executive branch) to ensure that NEFs continue to be performed during a catastrophic 
emergency. 

"ECG," or Enduring Constitutional Government, means a cooperative effort among the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches of the Federal Government, coordinated by the President, as a matter of comity with 
respect to the legislative and judicial branches and with proper respect for the constitutional separation of powers 
among the branches, to preserve the constitutional framework under which the Nation is governed and the 
capability of all three branches of government to execute their constitutional responsibilities and provide for 
orderly succession, appropriate transition of leadership, interoperability, and support of NEFs during a 
catastrophic emergency. 


The lessons we have learned from such catastrophic events as the attacks of September 11, 
2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 demonstrate the need to reemphasize continuity as a 
good business practice to be incorporated into day-to-day planning, in order to reduce 
vulnerability, and ensure continuity. 

On May 4, 2007, the President issued the National Continuity Policy (Policy) in 
NSPD-51/HSPD-20, which sets forth a new vision to ensure the continuity of our 
Government. Pursuant to NSPD-51/HSPD-20, and in accordance with the National 
Continuity Policy Implementation Plan, the President directs the executive branch to reorient 
itself and to utilize an integrated, overlapping national continuity concept to ensure the 
preservation of our Government and the continuing performance of essential functions. 

Continuity responsibility and planning should not be a separate and compartmentalized 
function performed by independent cells of a few planners in each agency. It must be fully 
integrated into all aspects of an organizations daily operations, thus creating a culture of 
continuity. 

8. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT: An organizations resiliency is directly related to the 
effectiveness of its continuity capability. An organizations continuity capabilityits ability 
to perform its essential functions continuouslyrests upon key components and pillars, 
which are in turn built on the foundation of continuity planning and program management. 
These pillars are Leadership, Staff, Communications, and Facilities. The continuity program 
staff within an agency shall coordinate and oversee the development and implementation of 
continuity plans and supporting procedures. 

 

Pillars 1 and 2: People  Leadership and Staff 

 

Continuity of leadership is critical to ensure continuity of essential functions. Organizations 
must provide for a clear line of succession in the absence of existing leadership and the 
necessary delegations of authority to ensure that succeeding leadership has the legal 
authorities to carry out their duties. Continuity of leadership during crisis, especially in the 
case of senior positions like the President and heads of agencies, is important to reassure the 
Nation and give confidence to its citizens that the principal or appropriate successor is 
managing the crisis and ensuring the performance of essential functions. Leaders are needed 
to set priorities and keep focus. 

 

Leaders and staff must be sufficiently trained to be able to perform their duties in a continuity 
environment. To ensure that required skill sets are available, personnel should be both crosstrained 
and vertically trained to be able to perform the functions of their peers and the 
persons above and below them in an emergency. 

 

Pillar 3: Communications and Technology 

 

The capability to communicate is critical to daily operations and absolutely essential in a 
crisis. The Nations domestic and international telecommunications resources, including 
commercial, private, and Government-owned services and facilities, are essential to support 
continuity plans and programs. All organizations must identify the communication 
requirements needed to perform their essential functions during both routine and continuity 


conditions. Communication systems and technology must be interoperable, robust, and 
reliable. Planners must consider the resilience of their systems to operate in disaster 
scenarios that may include power and other infrastructure problems. 

 

Organizations must use technology to perform essential functions as an intrinsic part of daily 
operations, utilizing voice, data, and video solutions as appropriate. Communications and 
business systems, including hardware and software for continuity operations, should mirror 
those used in day-to-day business to assist continuity leadership and staff in a seamless 
transition to crisis operations. 

 

Pillar 4: Facilities 

 

Facilities are the locations where essential functions are performed by leadership and staff. 
Organizations should have adequate, separate locations to ensure execution of their 
functions. Physical dispersion should allow for easy transfer of function responsibility in the 
event of a problem in one location. 

 

Foundation: Continuity Planning and Program Management 

 

While an organization needs leaders, staff, communications, and facilities to perform its 
essential functions, it also needs well thought out and detailed plans for what to do with those 
key resources. Planning must include all of the requirements and procedures needed to 
perform essential functions. 

 

Other key continuity concepts include geographic dispersion, risk management, security, 
readiness and preparedness. Geographic dispersion of an organizations normal daily 
operations can significantly enhance the organizations resilience and reduce the risk of 
losing the capability to perform essential functions. Geographic dispersion of leadership, 
data storage, personnel, and other capabilities may be essential to the performance of 
essential functions following a catastrophic event and will enable operational continuity 
during an event that requires social distancing (e.g., pandemic influenza). 

 

Risk management is the process to identify, control, and minimize the impact of uncertain 
events. Security is a key element to any continuity program to protect plans, personnel, 
facilities, and capabilities to prevent adversaries from interdicting continuity plans and 
operations. In order to ensure the safety and success of continuity operations, an effective 
security strategy must address personnel, physical, and information security. 

 

Readiness is the ability of an organization to respond to an incident. While readiness is a 
function of planning and training, it is ultimately the responsibility of leadership to ensure an 
organizationthrough normal procedures or with a continuity plancan perform its 
essential functions before, during, and after an incident. Federal and non-Federal 
Government (NFG) organizations outside the National Capital Region (NCR) may consider 
creating a continuity readiness posture similar to the executive branchs Continuity of 
Government Readiness Conditions (COGCON) system that establishes readiness levels in 
order to provide a flexible and coordinated response to escalating threat levels or actual 
emergencies, focusing on possible threats to the NCR (see Annex N). Other alert systems 
include Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Homeland Security Advisory System 


(HSAS), which provides guidance to the public on the status of our homeland security, and 
the United States Federal Response Stages for Pandemic Influenza. 

 

Continuity Program Management Cycle 

A standardized continuity program management cycle ensures consistency across all Federal 
Government continuity programs and supports the foundation and pillars that comprise the 
Nations continuity capability. It establishes consistent performance metrics, prioritizes 
implementation plans, promulgates best practices, and facilitates consistent cross-agency 
continuity evaluations. Such a cyclic-based model that incorporates planning, training, 
evaluating, and the implementation of corrective actions, gives key leaders and essential 
personnel the baseline information, awareness, and experience necessary to fulfill their 
continuity program management responsibilities. The continuity program management cycle 
consists not only of its programmatic elements but also must include the plans and 
procedures that support implementation of the continuity program. These plans and 
procedures must also be evaluated pre- and post-event, tested or exercised, and assessed 
during the development of corrective action plans. Objective evaluations and assessments, 
developed from tests and exercises, provide feedback on continuity planning, procedures, and 
training. This feedback in turn supports a corrective action process that helps to establish 
priorities, informs budget decision making, and drives improvements in plans and 
procedures. This continuity program management cycle, as illustrated in Figure 2, should be 
used by all organizations as they develop and implement their continuity programs. 

Figure 2 


To support the continuity program management cycle, agencies will develop a continuity 
multiyear strategy and program management plan that provides for the development, 
maintenance, and annual review of continuity capabilities, requiring an agency to: 

a. Designate and review MEFs and PMEFs, as applicable. 
b. Define both short-term and long-term goals and objectives for plans and procedures. 
c. Identify issues, concerns, and potential obstacles to implementing the program, as well as 
a strategy for addressing these, as appropriate. 
d. Establish planning, training, and exercise activities, as well as milestones for 
accomplishing these activities. 
e. Identify the people, infrastructure, communications, transportation, and other resources 
needed to support the program. 
f. Forecast and establish budgetary requirements to support the program. 
g. Apply risk management principles to ensure that appropriate operational readiness 
decisions are based on the probability of an attack or other incident and its consequences. 
h. Incorporate geographic dispersion into the organizations normal daily operations, as 
appropriate. 
i. Integrate the organizations security strategies that address personnel, physical, and 
information security to protect plans, personnel, facilities, and capabilities, to prevent 
adversaries from disrupting continuity plans and operations. 
j. Develop and implement a Corrective Action Program (CAP) that draws upon evaluations, 
after-action reports, and lessons learned from TT&E and real world events. 

See Annex A  Program Plans and Procedures 

Risk Management 

The assessment and management of risk underlies the full spectrum of our national 
continuity program management, including decisions about when, where, and how to invest 
in resources that eliminate, control, or mitigate risks. In the face of multiple and diverse 
catastrophic possibilities, it is accepted that risk - a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences - is a permanent condition. Therefore, a risk-based framework must be applied 
across all national continuity efforts in order to identify and assess potential hazards 
(including their downstream effects), determine what levels of relative risk are acceptable, 
and prioritize and allocate resources among all national continuity partners, both public and 
private, to ensure national continuity under all manner of incident conditions. Applying a 
disciplined approach to managing risk will help to achieve best progress, long term success, 
and overall effectiveness and efficiency. 

 

See Annex B  Risk Management 

Budgeting 

Budgeting for and acquiring resources for continuity capabilities is one of the most important 
components of continuity planning. These budgetary requirements will directly support the 
ability of subordinate components and of regional- and field-level offices to meet all the 
criteria of a viable continuity capability as stated in this FCD. 


See Annex C  Budgeting and Acquisition of Resources 

9. ELEMENTS OF A VIABLE CONTINUITY CAPABILITY: NSPD-51/HSPD-20 
outlines the overarching continuity requirements for agencies. These requirements are 
discussed in more depth in the Key Considerations and Concept of Operations section of 
the National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan. These key components are further 
delineated into the following elements of continuity. 

 

a. ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS. The identification and prioritization of essential functions is 
a prerequisite for continuity planning, because they establish the planning parameters that 
drive an agencys efforts in all other planning and preparedness areas. During an event that 
disrupts or has the potential to disrupt normal activities and that necessitates the activation of 
continuity plans, the resources and staff available to an agency will likely be limited, and 
therefore the agency will not be able to perform all of its normal government functions. 
Therefore, a subset of those government functions that are determined to be critical activities 
are defined as the agencys essential functions. These essential functions are then used to 
identify supporting tasks and resources that must be included in the agencys continuity 
planning process. 

The National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan has established three categories of 
essential functions: NEFs, PMEFs, and MEFs. The ultimate goal of continuity in the 
executive branch is the continuation of NEFs. To achieve that goal, the objective for 
executive agencies is to identify their MEFs and PMEFs, as appropriate, and ensure that 
those functions can be continued throughout, or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of normal 
activities. 

 

The eight National Essential Functions (NEFs) (listed in Annex D of this document) 
represent the overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the 
Nation and will be the primary focus of the Federal Governments leadership during and in 
the aftermath of an emergency. 

 

Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) are those agency MEFs that must be 
performed to support or implement the performance of the NEFs before, during, and in the 
aftermath of an emergency. PMEFs are defined as those functions that need to be 
continuously performed during an event or resumed within 12 hours of an event, and that 
need to be maintained for up to 30 days after an event or until normal operations can be 
resumed. 

 

Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) are a broader set of essential functions that includes 
not only an agencys PMEFs, but also all other agency functions that must be continued 
throughout or resumed rapidly after a disruption of normal activities but that do not rise to 
the level of being PMEFs. MEFs are those functions that enable an organization to provide 
vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the public, and sustain the 
industrial/economic base during disruption of normal operations. 

 

When identifying an agencys essential functions and categorizing them as MEFs or PMEFs, 
organizations with incident management responsibilities must be sure to incorporate these 


into their continuity planning requirements for performing these functions. Integration of 
continuity planning with incident management planning and operations include 
responsibilities delineated in the National Response Framework (NRF) and is linked to an 
organizations ability to conduct its PMEFs. 

See Annex D  Essential Functions 

b. ORDERS OF SUCCESSION. Agencies are responsible for establishing, promulgating, 
and maintaining orders of succession to key positions. Such orders of succession are an 
essential part of an agencys continuity plan to ensure that agency personnel know who 
assumes the authority and responsibility of the agencys leadership if that leadership is 
incapacitated or becomes otherwise unavailable during a continuity situation. Orders should 
be of sufficient depth to ensure that the agency can manage and direct its essential functions 
and operations while remaining a viable part of the Federal Government throughout any 
emergency. 

See Annex E  Orders of Succession 

c. DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY. To ensure a rapid response to any emergency 
requiring the implementation of its continuity plan, an agency should delegate authorities for 
making policy determinations and other decisions, at the headquarters (HQ), field, satellite, 
and other organizational levels, as appropriate. It is vital to clearly establish delegations of 
authority, so that all agency personnel know who has the right to make key decisions during 
a continuity situation. Generally, a predetermined delegation of authority will take effect 
when normal channels of direction and control are disrupted and will lapse when those 
channels are reestablished. 

See Annex F  Delegations of Authority 

d. CONTINUITY FACILITIES. As part of their continuity planning, all agencies must 
identify alternate facilities; alternate uses for existing facilities; and as appropriate, virtual 
office options including telework. Risk assessments will be conducted on these facilities to 
provide reliable and comprehensive data to inform risk mitigation decisions that will allow 
agencies to protect assets, systems, networks, and functions while determining the likely 
causes and impacts of any disruption. All agency personnel shall be briefed on agency 
continuity plans that involve using, or relocating personnel to alternate facilities, existing 
facilities, or virtual offices. Continuity personnel must be provided supplemental training 
and guidance on relocation procedures. 

See Annex G  Continuity Facilities 

e. CONTINUITY COMMUNICATIONS. The ability of an agency to execute its essential 
functions at its continuity facilities depends on the identification, availability, and 
redundancy of critical communications and information technology (IT) systems to support 
connectivity among key government leadership personnel, internal agency elements, other 
agencies, critical customers, and the public, during crisis and disaster conditions. The 
capabilities of communications and IT systems (e.g., secure and nonsecure voice systems, 
video conferencing, and fax and other messaging capabilities) to be used during an incident 


should mirror those capabilities used during day-to-day operations, and the choice of 
communications and IT systems should consider how resilient those systems are and how 
capable they are of operating under conditions that may involve power or other infrastructure 
disruptions. All necessary and required communications and IT capabilities must be 
operational as soon as possible following a continuity activation, and in all cases within 12 
hours of continuity activation. Agencies need to plan accordingly for essential functions that 
require uninterrupted communications and IT support. 

See Annex H  CONTINUITY COMMUNICATIONS 

f. VITAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT. Another critical element of a viable continuity 
plan and program includes the identification, protection, and ready availability of electronic 
and hardcopy documents, references, records, information systems, and data management 
software and equipment (including classified and other sensitive data) needed to support 
essential functions during a continuity situation. Agency personnel must have access to and 
be able to use these records and systems to perform essential functions and to reconstitute 
back to normal agency operations. To ensure performance of essential functions, agencies 
will pre-position and regularly update duplicate Emergency Operating Records. 

See Annex I  Vital Records Management 

g. HUMAN CAPITAL. 

Leadership and Staff. People are critical to the operations of any organization. Choosing the 
right people for an organizations staff is vitally important, and this is especially true in a 
crisis situation. Leaders are needed to set priorities and keep focus. During a continuity 
event, emergency employees and other special categories of employees will be activated by 
an agency to perform assigned response duties. One of these categories is continuity 
personnel, referred to as the Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) members. 

 

Human Capital Considerations. An agencys continuity program, plans, and procedures 
should incorporate existing agency-specific guidance and direction for human capital 
management. These can include guidance on pay, leave, work scheduling, benefits, 
telework, hiring, etc., authorities and flexibilities. An agencys Continuity Coordinator (or 
continuity manager) should work closely with the agencys Chief Human Capital Officer or 
Director of Human Resources to resolve human capital issues related to a continuity event. 
Human capital issues can be solved typically at the agency level through the agencys Chief 
Human Capital Officer or Director of Human Resources, or their designees, using available 
laws, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management regulations and guidance, as well as agency 
implementing instructions. 

The planning and preparedness related to leadership, staff, and human capital considerations 
for a continuity event encompasses the following six activities: 

 

1) Agencies must develop and implement a process to identify, document, communicate 
with and train continuity personnel. 
2) Agencies must provide guidance to continuity personnel on individual preparedness 
measures they should take to ensure response to a continuity event. 


3) Agencies must implement a process to communicate the agencys operating status to all 
staff. 
4) Agencies must implement a process to contact and account for all staff in the event of an 
emergency. 
5) Agencies must identify a human capital liaison from the agencys human resources staff 
to work with the Continuity Coordinator or continuity manager when developing the 
agencys emergency plans. 
6) Agencies must implement a process to communicate their human capital guidance for 
emergencies (pay, leave, staffing and other human resources flexibilities) to managers 
and make staff aware of that guidance in an effort to help agencies continue essential 
functions during an emergency. 

See Annex J  Human Capital 

h. TEST, TRAINING, AND EXERCISE (TT&E). An effective TT&E program is 
necessary to assist agencies to prepare and validate their organizations continuity 
capabilities and program and the Federal executive branchs ability to perform MEFs and 
PMEFs during any emergency. This requires the identification, training, and preparedness of 
personnel capable of performing their continuity responsibilities and implementing 
procedures to support the continuation of agency essential functions. 

 

Training provides the skills and familiarizes leadership and staff with the procedures and 
tasks they must perform in executing continuity plans. Tests and exercises serve to assess 
and validate all the components of continuity plans, policies, procedures, systems, and 
facilities used to respond to and recover from an emergency situation and identify issues for 
subsequent improvement. All agencies must plan, conduct, and document periodic TT&Es 
to prepare for all-hazards continuity emergencies and disasters, identify deficiencies, and 
demonstrate the viability of their continuity plans and programs. Deficiencies, actions to 
correct them, and a timeline for remedy must be documented in an organizations CAP. 

See Annex K  Test, Training, and Exercises 

i. DEVOLUTION OF CONTROL AND DIRECTION. Devolution is the capability to 
transfer statutory authority and responsibility for essential functions from an agencys 
primary operating staff and facilities to other agency employees and facilities, and to sustain 
that operational capability for an extended period. 

Devolution planning supports overall continuity planning and addresses the full spectrum of 
threats and all-hazards emergency events that may render an agencys leadership or staff 
unavailable to support, or incapable of supporting, the execution of the agencys essential 
functions from either its primary location or its alternate location(s). Agencies shall develop 
a devolution option for continuity, to address how those agencies will identify and conduct 
its essential functions during an increased threat situation or in the aftermath of a catastrophic 
emergency. 

See Annex L  Devolution of Control and Direction 


j. RECONSTITUTION. Reconstitution is the process by which surviving and/or 
replacement agency personnel resume normal agency operations from the original or 
replacement primary operating facility. Reconstitution embodies the ability of an agency to 
recover from an event that disrupts normal operations and consolidates the necessary 
resources so that the agency can resume its operations as a fully functional entity of the 
Federal Government. In some cases, extensive coordination may be necessary to procure a 
new operating facility, if an agency suffers the complete loss of a facility or in the event that 
collateral damage from a disaster renders a facility structure unsafe for reoccupation. 

See Annex M  Reconstitution Operations 

10. COORDINATION WITH STATE, LOCAL, TERRITORIAL, AND TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENTS, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: The Federal Governments NEFs, 
prescribed in NSPD-51/HSPD-20, cannot be performed without the robust involvement of 
NFGs and the private sector. State, local, territorial, and tribal governments play an integral 
role in determining the needs of the public and in ensuring that essential functions (e.g., 
police and fire services, emergency medical care, road construction, public education) 
continue on a daily basis. The Federal Governments COOP, COG, and ECG plans and 
operations shall be appropriately integrated with the emergency and continuity plans and 
capabilities of State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and 
prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of authority. 

 

Agencies should coordinate with regional entities, State, local, territorial, and tribal 
governments, and private sector owners and operators of the Nations critical infrastructure 
and key resources (CI/KR) as appropriate, to build relationships and ensure unity of effort 
by: 

a. Incorporating their capabilities into the agencys continuity planning and exercise 
activities to the extent possible. 
b. Identifying hazards relevant to the agencys mission and location. 
c. Partnering with these entities to develop continuity plans that are coordinated with 
Federal plans to the extent possible. 
d. Participating in continuity working groups (CWGs), information sharing, training, and 
exercises, as appropriate. 
e. Coordinating occupant emergency plans (OEPs), shelter-in-place plans, and regional and 
local evacuation plans. 
f. Participating in existing alert and notification networks and credentialing initiatives, as 
appropriate. 
g. Identifying interdependencies and ensuring resiliency with critical infrastructure and 
services at all levels. 
h. Coordinating continuity resource and security requirements, as appropriate. 
i. Working with organizations such as DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Regional/State-level CWGs, DHS/Office of Infrastructure Protection, and the 
various CI/KR Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating 
Councils (GCCs), Federal Executive Boards (FEBs) and Federal Executive Associations 
(FEAs) to augment and strengthen coordination efforts. 
j. Participating in other coordinating activities, as appropriate. 


 

11. CONTINUITY PLAN OPERATIONAL PHASES AND IMPLEMENTATION: 
A continuity plan is implemented to ensure the continuation or rapid resumption of essential 
functions during a continuity event. Agencies should develop an executive decision-making 
process that allows for a review of the emergency and a determination of the best course of 
action based on the agencys readiness posture. An agencys continuity implementation 
process will include the following four phases: readiness and preparedness, activation and 
relocation, continuity operations, and reconstitution. The four phases are implemented as 
illustrated in Figure 3. 

Figure 3 

See Annex N  Continuity Plan Operational Phases and Implementation 

12. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: The following responsibilities are assigned to the 
leadership or leadership of designated entities listed below, as outlined in the National 
Continuity Policy Implementation Plan. 
a. The President is responsible for leading the activities of the Federal Government for 
ECG. 
b. The National Continuity Coordinator (NCC) is responsible for: 
1) Providing continuity policy coordination among all agencies, monitoring 
performance, and reporting to the President as appropriate. 
2) Periodically reviewing and, as necessary, coordinating the revision of the NEFs. 
3) Overseeing the Continuity Policy Coordination Committee (CPCC), which was 
established consistent with HSPD-1 of October 29, 2001 (Organization and 
Operation of the Homeland Security Council). The CPCC is chaired by a designee 
of the NCC and is the main day-to-day forum for continuity policy coordination. 
4) Establishing a Continuity Advisory Group (CAG) as a sub-CPCC group focused on 
interagency implementation of continuity programs. 

Readiness and Preparedness 
Activation and Relocation 
Continuity Operations 
Reconstitution 
Event/Threat 

5) Establishing an interagency board (IAB), as a working group of the CPCC to review 
and recommend validation of potential PMEFs submitted by agencies for submission 
to the NCC for final approval. 
6) Within 30 days of IAB review, considering identified PMEFs for validation and 
approval. 
7) Coordinating with FEMA in developing a continuity assessment tool for the agencies 
to measure continuity readiness against requirements contained in NSPD-51/ HSPD- 
20 and reporting the continuity assessment results to the President. 
8) Within the annual budget process and on an ongoing basis, assisting OMB and 
agencies with continuity budget development and prioritization, including long-term 
equipment life cycle replacements and upgrades. 
9) On an ongoing basis, ensuring coordination of continuity acquisition functions with 
DHS and the General Services Administration (GSA). 
10) On an ongoing basis, coordinating the integration of national continuity test, training, 
and exercise programs. 
11) Annually submitting a report to the President that assesses (a) the ability of executive 
branch departments and agencies to perform their PMEFs, (b) the scope and 
effectiveness of legislative, executive, and judicial branch coordination, and the 
nature and level of executive branch support, to perform the NEFs and achieve 
common continuity goals, and (c) the scope and effectiveness of coordination among 
State, local, territorial, and tribal governments and the private sector to perform the 
NEFs and achieve common continuity goals. 
12) Coordinating, without exercising directive authority, the development and 
implementation of continuity policy for agencies. 
13) Maintaining and revising as necessary the various agency PMEFs and MEFs in order 
to meet requirements for continuity, including ECG, COG, and COOP. 

c. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) is responsible for 
coordinating with the NCC on the development and implementation of continuity policy 
for executive departments and agencies. 
d. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for: 
1) On an ongoing basis, serving as the Presidents lead agent for coordinating overall 
continuity operations and activities and domestic incident management of executive 
departments and agencies, and in such role performing the responsibilities set forth in 
NSPD-51/HSPD-20 and in HSPD-5. 
2) Coordinating the implementation, execution, and assessment of continuity activities 
and programs. 
3) Quarterly, ensuring FEMAs Continuity Coordinator chairs meetings of the CAG and 
reports to the CPCC. 
4) On an as-needed basis in coordination with the CAG and in consultation with the 
CPCC, developing and promulgating Federal Continuity Directives that establish 


continuity planning requirements, continuity plan templates, TT&E programs 
including required continuity training, types and frequency of exercises, and 
assessment criteria to ensure agencies develop and maintain a robust TT&E program. 
5) In coordination with the CPCC, issuing FCDs on Continuity Requirements to include 
the formalized and standardized process for the identification of MEFs, and revising 
through annual or as needed Directives thereafter, and the identification and 
submission of potential PMEFs that are consistent and supporting of the NEFs for 
review by the IAB, consolidating the agencies PMEFs, and compiling and 
submitting potential PMEFs to the NCC. 
 Include a standardized checklist to allow agencies to assess their PMEFs through 
a risk management process; 
 Include guidance on how the PMEF links to/supports NEF(s); and 
 Include guidance on impact statements if a specific PMEF is not conducted. 

6) Within 30 days after submission of agency MEFs and potential PMEFs, compiling 
submissions and providing them to the NCC for IAB review and validation. 
7) On an annual basis, developing, leading, and conducting an integrated COOP and 
COG continuity training exercise, incorporated into the National Exercise Program 
(NEP), and reporting the results to the NCC. 
8) Providing continuity direction, training, and coordination of continuity exercises, as 
well as providing continuity program and biennial assessments of department and 
agency continuity capabilities and reporting the results to the President through the 
NCC. 
9) Developing, leading, and conducting the Federal executive branch continuity training 
and exercise program, which shall be incorporated into the NEP developed pursuant 
to HSPD-8 of December 17, 2003 (National Preparedness), in consultation with an 
official designated by the Chief of Staff to the President. 
10) Coordinating the integration of Federal executive branch continuity plans and 
operations with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments and private sector 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to provide for 
the delivery of essential services during an emergency. 
11) On an ongoing basis, ensuring that the DHS National Operations Center (NOC), 
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), and FEMA Operations Center 
(FOC) maintain 24-hour operations to ensure appropriate responses for continuity, 
incident management activities, and for emergency operations. 
12) On an ongoing basis, ensuring that the National Preparedness Goal, the Target 
Capabilities List, and State and Local Homeland Security Grant Programs criteria 
provide guidance to State, local, tribal and territorial governments on continuity 
priorities and implementation guidelines. 
13) On an ongoing basis, ensuring that DHS makes available continuity planning and 
exercise funding in the form of grants, as provided by law, to State, local, territorial, 
tribal governments and the private sector. 


14) On an ongoing basis, ensuring that the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
supports the Nations continuity plans and programs and provides guidance to private 
sector entities and operators of CI/KR on continuity priorities and implementation 
guidelines. 
15) Not less than quarterly, conducting assessments of continuity communications 
capabilities in consultation with an official designated by the Chief of Staff to the 
President. 
16) Establishing a familiarization briefing on MEF and PMEF identification for agency 
Continuity Coordinators (Assistant Secretary-level). 
17) Annually updating training courses for agency continuity planners on the 
identification and development of PMEFs and MEFs, in addition to maintaining 
ongoing continuity training courses. 
18) Within 30 days after receipt of technical requirements from the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP), as Executive Agent of the National Communications 
System (NCS), providing the Director of OSTP, and Department of Defense (DOD) 
with an implementation plan for a comprehensive Continuity Communications 
Architecture (CCA), which shall include the minimum requirements necessary to 
finalize selection of a secure communications system by DOD. 
19) Within 90 days after receipt of technical requirements from OSTP, through the NCS, 
developing, implementing, and beginning maintenance of a comprehensive CCA. 
20) On an as-needed basis, revising and promulgating integrated continuity planning 
guidance to NFGs and others as appropriate. 
21) On an as-needed basis, providing critical infrastructure assistance and support in 
accordance with HSPD-7 and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. 
22) On an as-needed basis, providing cybersecurity assistance and support in accordance 
with HSPD-7 and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. 
23) Developing regional and State level CWGs to, at a minimum, conduct annual 
continuity conferences to address joint Federal and NFG continuity planning and 
other elements of a viable continuity program. 
24) Developing and promulgating continuity planning guidance to State, local, territorial, 
and tribal governments. Guidance should include procedures and models for 
development of PMEFs, orders of succession, delegations of authority, devolution, 
reconstitution, establishment of alternate facilities, interoperable communications, the 
safeguarding of vital resources, facilities, and records, and a test, training, and 
exercise program that will ensure a viable continuity program. 
25) Providing planning guidance to NFGs on development of internal MEFs. Guidance 
will be based on the requirement of continuing the performance of essential functions. 
26) Providing critical infrastructure assistance and support for the Nations continuity 
plans and programs in accordance with guidance in HSPD-7. Organizations 
established to support the NIPP will be members of and support the activities of the 


CWGs, including supporting the activities of the DHS/FEMA regional and State level 
CWGs. 
27) Developing and promulgating continuity planning guidance for private sector critical 
infrastructure owners and operators. Guidance should be integrated into the NIPP 
and be supported by CI/KRs Coordinating Councils and Committees in accordance 
with guidance in HSPD-7. 
28) Inviting the private sector to participate in government training and exercises, where 
appropriate. 
29) Developing, operating, and maintaining a continuity Readiness Reporting System 
(RRS) which will measure and report both the individual and aggregate ability of 
agencies to continue their PMEFs in support of the required NEFs. This system 
identifies near real-time COOP and COG programmatic capabilities and requires 
monthly or as required data input from system users. 
30) Coordinating with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (APHS/CT) in developing a continuity assessment tool for the 
agencies to measure continuity readiness against requirements contained in NSPD- 
51/HSPD-20. 

e. Heads of Federal Government executive agencies are responsible for: 
1) On an ongoing basis, ensuring performance of agency PMEFs. 
2) On an ongoing basis, incorporating continuity requirements into daily agency 
operations. 
3) On an ongoing basis, ensuring the agency has continuity plans for dealing with a 
national or localized emergency situation and ensuring the continued performance of 
all PMEFs in support of the NEFs, as well as continued performance of MEFs. 
4) Appointing a senior accountable official, at the Assistant Secretary or equivalent 
level, as the Continuity Coordinator for the department or agency. 
5) Annually submitting a report to the NCC certifying that the agency has a continuity 
capability plan that includes the items in Paragraph 11 of NSPD-51/ HSPD-20. 
6) On an ongoing basis, consistent with sections 11(e) and 19(c) of NSPD-51/ HSPD-20, 
planning, programming, and budgeting for secure continuity communications 
capabilities. 
7) Within 90 days after DHSs guidance, reviewing and revising MEFs and identifying 
and submitting potential PMEFs. To support the PMEF approval and implementation 
process, agency heads are responsible for: 
a. Validating and approving their identified PMEFs and MEFs, as appropriate, and 
accompanying Business Process Analysis (BPAs). 
b. Identifying and submitting to the NCC through the IAB their respective MEFs 
and potential PMEFs that support NEFs. 


c. After validation of agency PMEFs and annually thereafter, ensuring key leaders 
and support staff are provided familiarization training of agency PMEFs and 
MEFs. 
d. After validation of agency PMEFs, ensuring PMEF and MEF interdependencies 
are coordinated internally, at the interagency level, and with private sector 
partners. 
e. In consultation with the NCC, periodically reviewing and revising their PMEFs 
and MEFs. 

8) During development of PMEFs, coordinating and integrating with Federal and non- 
Federal Government organizations; State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; 
and private sector entities on those relevant activities essential to PMEFs and MEFs. 
9) On an ongoing basis, participating in DHSs NEP. 
10) On an ongoing basis, incorporating Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Circular A-11 guidance, or other OMB guidance on continuity as provided, when 
developing continuity budgets. 
11) As required, submitting Continuity Readiness Reports and other reports as requested, 
through the RRS. 
12) Developing a CAP to assist in documenting, prioritizing, and resourcing continuity 
issues identified during TT&E, assessments, and emergency operations. 
13) Planning, programming, and budgeting for continuity capabilities (including for 
planning, conducting, and supporting annual TT&E programs). For continuity 
funding requests, incorporate OMB guidance from Circular A-11, to ensure proper 
accounting of spending related to homeland security. 
14) Evaluating program readiness, to ensure the adequacy and capability of continuity 
plans and programs. 
15) Promulgating and disseminating continuity guidance to all subordinate elements 
including regional and field offices. 
16) Emphasizing geographic dispersion of leadership, staff, and infrastructure, as 
appropriate, in order to increase survivability and maintain uninterrupted Government 
functions. 
17) Executing continuity plans and complying with the requirements and assigned 
responsibilities under the COGCON program. 
18) Participating in and conducting testing, as appropriate, to ensure viability of 
communications systems. 

f. The Director of OMB is responsible for: 
1) As necessary, in coordination with the NCC, issuing continuity planning guidance for 
the development of continuity budget requests. 
2) Annually conducting an assessment of executive agency continuity funding requests 
and performance data that are submitted by executive branch agencies as part of the 


annual budget request process in order to monitor progress in the execution of the 
National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan and continuity budgets. 
3) Annually reconciling agency continuity funding requests and performance data with 
Continuity Readiness Reporting and annual continuity assessments compiled by 
FEMA. 

g. The Director of OSTP is responsible for: 
1) Annually reviewing and revising as required, minimum requirements for continuity 
communications for executive branch departments and agencies, in consultation with 
the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the Director of OMB, and the Chief of Staff to the 
President (as well as the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security). 
2) Establishing and chairing a Continuity Communications Architecture Board (CCAB). 
3) Within 30 days after validation of PMEFs, distributing requirements for, and updating 
as needed, a comprehensive CCA in consultation with the APHS/CT, the APNSA, the 
Director of OMB, and the Chief of Staff to the President (as well as the Secretaries of 
Defense and Homeland Security). 
4) On an ongoing basis, monitoring the development, implementation, and maintenance 
of a CCA to integrate continuity components, in consultation with the APHS/CT, the 
APNSA, the Director of OMB, and the Chief of Staff to the President (as well as the 
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security). 
5) Quarterly and annually, reviewing assessments of continuity communications 
capabilities and reporting the results and recommended remedial actions to the NCC. 

h. The Official Designated by the Chief of Staff to the President is responsible for: 
1) On an ongoing basis, advising the President, Chief of Staff to the President, the 
APHS/CT, and the APNSA on COGCON operational execution options. 
2) On an ongoing basis, ensuring that the executive branchs COOP and COG policies, 
in support of ECG efforts, are appropriately coordinated with those of the legislative 
and judicial branches in order to ensure interoperability and allocate national assets 
efficiently to maintain a functioning Federal Government. 
3) On an ongoing basis, consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security in order to 
ensure synchronization and integration of continuity activities among the four 
categories of executive agencies. 

 

i. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for: 
1) Within 60 days after the publication by DHS of the CCA implementation plan, 
identifying the secure, integrated, COG communications for use by the President, the 
Vice President, and, at a minimum, Category I executive agencies. 
2) Upon identification and implementation, continuously maintaining the secure, 
integrated, COG communications for the President, the Vice President, and, at a 
minimum, Category I executive departments and agencies. 


3) Not less than quarterly, assisting the Secretary of Homeland Security, and an official 
designated by the Chief of Staff to the President, with assessments of continuity 
communications capabilities. 
4) On an ongoing basis, assisting DHS in conducting continuity training and exercises 
and in providing assistance during emergencies and disasters. 

j. The Director of National Intelligence is responsible for: 
1) Every two years, producing an assessment for the NCC of the foreign and domestic 
threats to the Nations COG. 
2) On an ongoing basis, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Secretary of Defense, provide geospatial products to support continuity planning, 
training, and exercise activities. 
3) During emergencies and disasters, providing geospatial continuity operational support 
to DHS to assist in response and recovery operations. 

k. The Director of U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is responsible for: 
1) Developing and promulgating personnel guidance to support Federal executive 
branch continuity plans and programs. 
2) Establishing telework guidance to support agency continuity programs. 
3) In coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, providing guidance to and 
coordinating with the FEBs to assist in facilitating planning meetings and exercises to 
develop effective continuity programs among participating Federal executive 
agencies and, where appropriate, NFGs, including respective State, local, territorial, 
and tribal governments and private sector owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure in their planning and preparedness activities. 
4) On an ongoing basis, assisting DHS in conducting continuity training, exercises, 
assessments, and other preparedness activities. 
5) Submitting a report to the NCC on the possibility of creating an occupational 
specialty for continuity and an associated training program, and, if approved, working 
with FEMA to include the information in a FCD. 
6) Assuring that FEBs assist and coordinate continuity efforts before, during, and after 
an emergency. 
7) Providing guidance to agencies on developing personnel policies that address 
continuity plans and procedures, including alternate work options. 

l. The Administrator of the GSA is responsible for: 
1) On an ongoing basis, coordinating the provision of executive branch facilities to 
support continuity operations and maintaining the database for all agency alternate 
facilities. 
2) On an ongoing basis, facilitating a coordinated and seamless executive branch 
continuity infrastructure and providing and maintaining a centralized procurement 
system for all agency continuity infrastructure requirements. 


3) On an ongoing basis, assisting the Secretary of Homeland Security in conducting 
continuity TT&Es, assessments, and other preparedness activities. 
4) During and in the aftermath of emergencies and disasters, assisting the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and affected agencies in their recovery and reconstitution. 

m. The Chairman of the Small Agency Council is responsible for, on an ongoing basis, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, providing a forum for 
development and integration of continuity policies and programs among the Federal 
Government organizations represented on the Council. 
n. FEBs and FEAs are responsible for, on an ongoing basis, providing assistance where 
practicable in coordinating continuity activities for FEB and FEA members. 
o. Federal Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities are responsible for providing 
intelligence through existing channels to NFGs as appropriate, using official processes 
and communications methods. 
p. Department and Agency Continuity Coordinators are responsible for: 
1) Ensuring effectiveness and survivability of the organizations continuity capability. 
2) Representing their organization and offering practical recommendations on continuity 
policy. 
3) Representing their agency on the CAG or designating a representative to attend in 
their place. 
4) Working with their agency heads to complete the MEF and PMEF identification 
process. 
5) Ensuring that Continuity Managers and Planners are provided the authority and are 
positioned at a level to effectively oversee the day-to-day management of their 
continuity program. 
6) As required, ensuring that Continuity Readiness Reports, and other reports as 
requested, are submitted through the RRS. 

q. Continuity Managers and Planners are responsible for: 
1) Managing day-to-day continuity programs. 
2) Representing their agency on the CAG and working groups, as appropriate. 
3) Reporting to the Continuity Coordinator, as appropriate. 
4) Working with their agencies heads and in conjunction with their agencies 
Continuity Coordinators to complete the process of MEF and PMEF identification. 
5) Fully understanding their organizations and monitoring the direction, guidance, and 
best practices of both the government and the private sector to develop the most 
relevant and robust continuity programs. 
6) Ensuring that the Continuity Coordinator is apprised of the overall status of the 
continuity program. 
7) Providing other support to the Continuity Coordinator as directed. 


r. Individuals are responsible for: 
1) Understanding their continuity roles and responsibilities within their respective 
organizations. 
2) Knowing and being committed to their duties in a continuity environment. 
3) Understanding and being willing to perform in continuity situations to ensure an 
organization can continue its essential functions. 
4) Ensuring that family members are prepared for and taken care of in an emergency 
situation. 

13. POINT OF CONTACT: Should you have any questions or need additional assistance with 
the information contained in the FCD, please contact the Assistant Administrator FEMA, 
National Continuity Programs Directorate, at 202.646.4145. 
14. DISTRIBUTION: This FCD is distributed to the heads of Federal agencies, senior policy 
officials, emergency planners, and other interested parties. 

 


PROGRAM PLANS AND PROCEDURES 

An effective continuity program is implemented through its related continuity plans and 
procedures and an effective continuity test, training, exercise, and operational capability to 
support those plans and procedures. An essential part of developing a comprehensive continuity 
plan is the establishment of planning and procedural objectives and requirements. Metrics shall 
be used to measure an agencys ability to meet its continuity requirements. 

 

PLANNING OBJECTIVES: Continuity planning is an effort to document and ensure the 
capability of continuing agency essential functions during a wide range of potential emergencies. 
The objectives of a continuity plan include: 

1. Ensuring that an agency can perform its Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and Primary 
Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs), if applicable, under all conditions. 
2. Reducing the loss of life and minimizing property damage and loss. 
3. Executing a successful order of succession with accompanying delegation of authorities 
in the event a disruption renders that agencys leadership unavailable, or incapable of 
assuming and performing their authorities and responsibilities of office. 
4. Reducing or mitigating disruptions to operations. 
5. Ensuring that the agency has facilities where it can continue to perform its MEFs and 
PMEFs, as appropriate, during a continuity event. 
6. Protecting personnel, essential facilities, equipment, records, and other assets, in the 
event of a disruption. 
7. Achieving the agencys timely and orderly recovery and reconstitution from an 
emergency. 
8. Ensuring and validating continuity readiness through a dynamic and integrated continuity 
test, training, and exercise (TT&E) program and operational capability. 

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINUITY PLANS AND PROCEDURES: Agencies shall 
develop and maintain continuity plans and procedures that, when implemented, provide for the 
continued performance of their essential functions under all circumstances, and the integration 
with other government and non-government organizations as appropriate. Each individual 
agencys continuity program should be tailored to ensure that organizations MEFs and PMEFs, 
as appropriate, can be performed under all conditions. 

 

Risk management principles shall be applied to all elements of continuity planning. Risk 
management is the process to identify, control, and minimize the impact of uncertain events. 
Although there are many well-documented methodologies for risk managementsome of these 
are referred to as risk analysismost require an assessment and understanding of three basic 
concepts: 

 

 The consequences of not protecting valuable assets (i.e., people, information, and facilities) 
and/or not performing essential functions. 
 The threat environment (as it relates to a particular agency or area of concern). 
 The level of vulnerability to the relevant threats. 


 

Reviewing an organizations risks and risk management programs must take into consideration 
additional factors such as the probabilities of events occurring, mission priorities, and impact 
assessments. Further, cost may also be a factor to consider, because informed decisions about 
acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk will ultimately drive the expenditure of resources (i.e., 
money, people, and time) to mitigate risk. Risk can never be fully mitigated, because no 
organization can afford to counter every threat to its mission. Successful continuity planning, 
then, demands an intelligent analysis and prioritization of where and when to focus resources and 
to apply funding and other assets. 

 

A continuity threat assessment integrates a historical review of past events that have affected 
normal operations (e.g., natural disasters; disruptions of communication, power, and other 
utilities; threats to public safety) with a dynamic analysis of other potential forms and likelihoods 
of threats, such as acts of terrorism (from both foreign and domestic agents) and war. 

 

As an integral part of risk management, an organizations leaders must think beyond the internal 
effects of their inability to perform PMEFs and MEFs. Agency heads and staff at all levels must 
also consider the interdependencies between and among agencies that share critical roles in the 
delivery of National Essential Function (NEF) capabilities. To the extent possible, agencies 
should partner with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, as well as with owners and 
operators of private-sector critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR), to develop 
continuity plans that are consistent with the Federal Governments plans. 

 

A continuity plan and its supporting procedures shall be developed and documented so that, 
when implemented, the plan and procedures will provide for the continued performance of an 
organizations essential functions under all circumstances. The continuity plan must do the 
following: 

1. Identify MEFs and PMEFs, if applicable. 
2. Address the key elements of continuity: essential functions, orders of succession, 
delegations of authority, alternate facilities, interoperable communications, vital records, 
human capital, TT&E, devolution, and reconstitution. 
3. Establish, for the position of organizational head as well as for supporting key positions, 
orders of succession and preplanned delegations of authority, to ensure there is an orderly 
and predefined transition of leadership and delegation of authority within an agency 
during any emergency. Succession orders and delegations of authority must be planned 
and documented in advance and in accordance with applicable laws, to ensure the 
performance of an agencys MEFs and PMEFs. 
4. Identify and establish procedures to ensure vital resources, facilities, and records are 
safeguarded, available, and accessible to support continuity operations. Vital resources 
should include personnel, equipment, systems, infrastructures, supplies, and other assets 
required to perform an agencys MEFs and PMEFs. 
5. Identify provisions for the acquisition of necessary personnel and resources for continuity 
operations on an emergency basis. These provisions must be available for up to 30 days 
or until normal operations can be resumed. 


6. Identify and provide for the availability and redundancy of critical communications 
capabilities at primary sites, alternate sites, in transit, and other continuity sites including 
telework sites, as appropriate, to ensure the performance of the agencys MEFs and 
PMEFs and to support connectivity between and among key government leaders, internal 
elements, other executive agencies, critical partners, and the public. Category I and 
select Category II agencies shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Secretary of Defense to obtain and operate secure and integrated Continuity of 
Government (COG) communications. Classified information should be documented in 
classified annexes to relevant continuity and communications plans. 
7. Provide the ability to recover from the effects of an emergency and reconstitute 
operations and resources, so that the agency can return to a fully operational condition in 
the aftermath of an incident. Agencies shall coordinate and plan as necessary to ensure a 
return to normal operations. 
8. Identify the components, processes, and requirements for the identification, training, and 
preparedness of personnel who are capable of relocating to alternate facilities to support 
the continuation of the performance of MEFs and PMEFs. 
9. Identify the components, processes, and requirements that ensure the continued 
performance of an agencys MEFs and PMEFs. 
10. Outline a process for determining the agencys readiness posture and for decisionmaking 
regarding its corresponding actions to implement continuity plans and procedures. 
11. Establish alert and notification procedures for all continuity personnel throughout all 
phases of a continuity event, including processes for monitoring the Department of 
Homeland Securitys (DHS) Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), the Federal 
Government Response Stages for Pandemic Influenza, intelligence, and other advisory 
information. Establish internal procedures for executing changes to the Continuity of 
Government Readiness Conditions (COGCON), as appropriate. These procedures should 
also consider regional, State, territorial, tribal governments or private sector continuity 
preparedness or activation directions. Establish a process for reporting continuity 
readiness and activation status in accordance with guidance provided in Annex M, 
Reconstitution Operations, and Annex N, Continuity Plan Operational Phases and 
Implementation. 
12. Define the roles and responsibilities of those individuals who support the agencys 
continuity program. 
13. Establish and maintain appropriate point of contact (POC) rosters of trained continuity 
personnel who are fully equipped and who have the authority to perform essential 
functions, including the execution of the devolution of control plan. 
14. Establish and maintain the appropriate relocation procedures and guidance for continuity 
personnel. 
15. Provide the ability to communicate with and coordinate activities with non-continuity 
personnel. 
16. Ensure that the continuity plan can be implemented both with and without warning. 
17. Ensure that in all cases, PMEFs will be either performed continuously during the course 
of an event or resumed within 12 hours of an event. 


18. Ensure that the continuity plan can become operational within the minimal acceptable 
period for MEF disruption, but in all cases within 12 hours of plan activation. 
19. Ensure that sustained operations can be maintained for up to 30 days after an event or 
until normal business activities can be resumed. This includes planning for the 
challenges posed by extended events (like a pandemic) that occur in repeated waves. 
20. Ensure there is a provision for an all-hazards risk assessment of all agency continuity 
facilities. 
21. Identify and prepare all agency continuity facilities. 
22. Recommend content and maintenance of drive-away kits. 
23. Establish contingency plans for the performance of PMEFs and MEFs in the event key 
resources, including Emergency Operating Records, supplies, and personnel, are not 
available. 
24. Include provisions and procedures for assisting all agency staff, especially those who are 
disaster victims, with special human capital concerns following a catastrophic disaster. 
25. Provide guidance to all staff in developing Family Support Plans which will increase 
personal and family preparedness throughout the organization. 

CONTINUITY REQUIREMENTS AND METRICS: From the list of continuity requirements 
(see below), agency heads shall use the key questions and metrics guidance below to annually 
certify to the NCC that their organizations have a robust continuity capability. 


Table 1: Continuity Requirements and Metrics 

 

For each of the seven continuity requirements, agency heads will self-identify a simple grading 
system, consistent with the Presidents Management Agenda to show status: 

 

Green for success, 

Yellow for mixed results, and 

Red for unsatisfactory. 

 

 


RISK MANAGEMENT 

Risk management is a process to identify, control, and minimize the impact of uncertain events. 
This process supports the overarching Continuity Program Management Cycle by identifying (1) 
the critical risks to organizational readiness and (2) the strategies that best mitigate the risks. 

 

The recommended risk management cycle is 
made up of five analytical and management 
phases (see Figure 4): (1) setting strategic 
goals and objectives, and determining 
constraints; (2) assessing the risks; (3) 
evaluating alternatives for addressing these 
risks; (4) selecting the appropriate 
alternatives; and (5) implementing the 
alternatives and monitoring the progress 
made and the results achieved. This cycle 
was introduced by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO)1 in 2005. The 
GAO risk management cycle, while generic, 
provides a useful framework for maximizing the readiness of an organization to perform its 
Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) and Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) in the 
face of risks from a broad spectrum of hazards facing the organization, both manmade and 
natural. This process organizes information about the possibility of a spectrum of unwanted 
outcomes into an inclusive, orderly structure that helps decision makers make more informed 
choices about risks to the organizations readiness across the four pillars that comprise the 
Nations continuity capability: leadership, staff, facilities, and communications. The continuity 
requirements detailed in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-51/ Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-20 Paragraph 11 provide a set of key questions and metrics to 
help guide the risk management process. 

 

The following sections describe the key elements that an organizations analysis team must 
address in each of the phases of the risk management cycle. 

 

Phase 1  Strategic Goals, Objectives, and Constraints 

This phase involves establishing the scope and structure of the risk-informed decision making 
process. Critical steps in this phase include: 

 Understand and define the decision. For this effort, the critical question is: How should 
I invest my limited resources across the four continuity pillars  leadership, staff, 
facilities and communications  to ensure that my organization satisfies its continuity 
requirements? 
 Determine who should be involved. Input from key stakeholders is essential to a sound 
risk management process. The analysis team should identify and solicit input from 

1 Government Accountability Office; Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure Federal Requirements, 
Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges, March 2005, GAO-05-327 

 


stakeholders who should be involved in making the decision, and those who will be 
affected by actions resulting from the decision making process. 
 Identify the factors that will influence the decisions. The decision to invest resources 
to meet continuity requirements is not based on only one factor. Decision makers must 
simultaneously weigh multiple factors, including costs, timelines, and risks. 

 

Phase 2  Risk Assessment 

This phase involves following a structured process for understanding the problem facing an 
organization. Simply, this process provides this understanding by answering the following three 
questions: (1) what can go wrong, (2) what is the likelihood that the undesired event might occur, 
and (3) what would be the impact should it occur? Critical steps in this phase include: 

 Inventory the critical functions provided by the organization. The analysis team 
should leverage the functions identified during the PMEF Identification and Analysis 
process (see Annex D). 
 Identify the hazards that can impact delivery of the critical functions. This step 
would include exploring potential natural events, intentional man-made events, and nonintentional 
man-made events that could adversely affect the ability of the organization to 
perform PMEFs. Natural hazards are those where the occurrence is beyond the control of 
the organization, including earthquakes, floods, ice storms, winter weather, and external 
fires. Intentional man-made hazards are also beyond the direct control of the 
organization and could include events such as external sabotage, and terrorism. Nonintentional 
man-made events, such as power outages, fires, explosions, equipment 
failures, or human errors are generally within the control of the organization. 
 Develop continuity hazard scenarios. All of the assessment steps should be performed 
within the context of a set of scenarios, each of which is a unique combination of a 
particular hazard and the organizations PMEF. Within each scenario, the analysis team 
should consider risks to all four continuity pillars, as appropriate, recognizing that in 
most cases, all of the pillars must be available in order to deliver the function. The 
following steps outline the elements of the scenario risk assessment: 
 Determine the risk information needed to assess the risk. Describe the 
information necessary to assess the risk for each scenario. For each information item, 
specify the information type, precision, and certainty required, and the analysis 
resources available. 
 Assess the risk. For each scenario, the analysis team should assess the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence, where: 
o Threat is the likelihood of a type of attack that might be attempted, or that the 
scenario will occur. 
o Vulnerability is the likelihood that an attacker would succeed with a particular 
attack type, or that the scenario will result in the expected level of 
consequence. 
o Consequence is the potential impact of a particular attack, or the negative 
impact of the scenario. 

For this effort, consequence should be expressed in terms of failure to deliver the 
National Essential Functions (NEFs) (see Annex D). When evaluating 
consequences, the analysis team should consider both short- and long-term 


 

impacts for disasters and accidents as well as intended and unintended effects 
from intentional attacks. 

 

Depending on the nature of the scenario, the analysis team can use different tools 
to assess the scenarios risk. For instance, the team may be able to leverage 
historical accident reporting databases to assess the risk of accident scenarios; 
while detailed stochastic models may be available for assessing the risk of natural 
hazard scenarios. For scenarios where historical data or detailed modeling are 
scarce, subject matter expertise must be leveraged to produce the risk assessment. 

 Identify existing safeguards/countermeasures. For each scenario, the analysis 
team should identify the existing safeguards that are in place to reduce either the 
likelihood (e.g., security countermeasures) or consequence (e.g., redundant 
capabilities) of the hazard. 

 

Phase 3  Evaluation of Alternates 

For many scenarios, the current risk may be considered to be at an acceptable level. For those 
scenarios where the current level of risk is deemed to be unacceptable, action(s) must be taken to 
mitigate the risk. These actions must (1) provide a beneficial return on investment, (2) be 
acceptable to stakeholders, and (3) not cause other significant risk. Critical steps in this phase 
include: 

 Develop alternate risk management strategies. The analysis team should engage the 
appropriate stakeholders to determine how the risks for each scenario can be managed 
most effectively. These alternate strategies should be completely developed and 
documented by addressing all of the critical factors (e.g., cost, schedule). 
 Assess the risk impact of the proposed strategies. The analysis team should reassess 
the risk of each scenario based on the implementation of each alternative strategy. This 
step will provide the risk reduction value of each of the alternate strategies. 

 

Phase 4  Management Selection 

Once the alternative strategies have been fully developed and their risk reduction value has been 
quantified, the risk management process moves to the management selection phase, where 
decision makers choose the collection of alternatives for implementation. The alternatives will 
be evaluated based on consideration of all of the previously identified critical factors, including 
effectiveness (risk reduction), efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. 

 

Another critical factor that should be considered is the confidence or belief that the alternative 
will achieve the projected level of performance. The effect of many of the alternative strategies 
may be well understood by the organization. For instance, these alternatives may have a proven 
track record of performance within other similar organizations, or they may have been 
extensively studied. The performance of other alternatives with less of a history may not be as 
well understood. The analysis team may believe that these less understood alternatives will 
achieve a level of satisfactory performance; however, their confidence is at a lower level. 


During the management selection 
phase, decision makers need an 
understanding of both anticipated 
performance and confidence to ensure 
that the proper suite of actions is t 
Figure 5 represents a simple decision 
support matrix that recommen 
approaches for dealing with different 
levels of anticipated performance an 
confidence. 

 

Finally, decision makers must 
recognize that this process is cyclical 
and many of the alternatives will be 
implemented in subsequent cycles due 
to limitations in resources and time. 

 

Phase 5  Implementation & Monitoring 

Critical steps in this phase include: 

 Implement the chosen mitigation strategies. This step involves the implementation of 
the mitigation strategies identified during the management selection phase. These 
strategies should reduce the risk that the organization will be unable to meet the 
continuity requirements. 
 Develop metrics to measure effectiveness. The analysis team must develop a collection 
of metrics, both qualitative and quantitative, to measure the organizations ability to meet 
the continuity requirements. The metrics identified in NSPD-51/HSPD-20 Paragraph 11 
for each of the continuity requirements should serve as a guide in crafting the metrics. 
 Monitor organizational performance. After the strategies have been implemented and 
the metrics have been developed, the organization should monitor the effectiveness of the 
actions taken to manage risk. The goal of the monitoring phase is to verify that the 
organization is getting the expected results from its risk management decisions. Key 
inputs into the monitoring phase include testing, training, and exercising. The results of 
the monitoring step will inform subsequent iterations of the risk management cycle. 

 

Summary 

 

The risk management cycle involves a series of basic steps that can be performed at different 
levels of detail with varying degrees of formality, depending on the situation. The key to using 
this process is completing each step in the most simple, practical way to provide information to 
the decision maker. 

  Work to improve 
confidence 
 Aggressively 
prepare to select 
another strategy 
confidence 
 Change 
implementation of 
current strategy 
 Implement new 
strategy 
Unsatisfactory 
(below goal) 
Unsatisfactory 
(Low) 
Satisfactory 
(High) 
Anticipated Perfo 
Confidence 
OR 
AND 
 Work to improve 
confidence 
 Aggressively 
prepare to select 
another strategy 
confidence 
 Change 
implementation of 
current strategy 
 Implement new 
strategy 
Unsatisfactory 
(below goal) 
Unsatisfactory 
(Low) 
Satisfactory 
(High) 
Anticipated Perfo 
Confidence 
OR 
AND 
Figure 5 

BUDGETING AND ACQUISITION OF RESOURCES 

Agencies must identify the people, communications, facilities, infrastructure, and transportation 
requirements, which are necessary to the successful implementation and management of an 
agencys continuity program. To support these programs, it is necessary to align and allocate the 
budgetary resources needed to acquire and then implement these requirements. Through the 
budgeting and planning process, an agencys leaders and staff will ensure critical continuity 
resources are available to continue performing the agencys essential functions before, during, 
and after a continuity event. 

 

As directed in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-51/ Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-20 and in the National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan, all 
agencies must identify and provide continuity funding and specific budgetary requirements for 
all levels of their organizations, including subordinate components and regional- and field-level 
offices. These budgetary procedures and requirements will directly support and enable agencies 
ability to meet the criteria outlined in this Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) for a viable 
continuity capability. 

 

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews all funding requests for 
continuity activities and evaluates department and agency performance in executing continuity 
budgets. The Director, in coordination with the National Continuity Coordinator (NCC), issues 
guidance to assist departments and agencies with continuity budget submissions. 

 

Actions according to the Implementation Plan for the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) 

1. As necessary, in coordination with the NCC, issue continuity planning guidance for the 
development of continuity budget requests. 

2. Annually conduct an assessment of agency continuity funding requests and performance 
data that are submitted by executive branch agencies as part of the annual budget request 
process in order to monitor progress in the execution of the Plan and continuity budgets. 

3. Annually reconcile agency continuity funding requests and performance data with 
Continuity Readiness Reporting and annual continuity assessments compiled by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

 

To ensure effective continuity capabilities, the agency must 

1. Use a risk management methodology to identify, prioritize, and justify the allocation of 
continuity budgetary resources. 
2. Integrate continuity budgets with a multiyear strategy and a program management plan, 
and link the budgets directly to objectives and metrics set forth in that plan. 
3. Provide for the acquisition of those resources necessary for continuity operations on an 
emergency basis. 
4. Budget for and acquire continuity capabilities in accordance with NSPD-51/HSPD-20 
and the National Communications Systems (NCS) Directive 3-10 (continuity 
communications), as applicable. 

 


 

Budget and Acquisitions Considerations 

When developing continuity budgets or making acquisition decisions, an agency should also 
consider: 

1. Identifying the budgetary requirements for addressing continuity interdependencies in the 
performance of internal and other agencies essential functions. 
2. Coordinating with the General Services Administration (GSA) to use pre-established 
procurement mechanisms. 
3. Additional continuity factors such as probabilities of occurrence, mission priorities, and 
impact assessments, as part of the continuity risk management methodology. 

Further, cost may also be a consideration, because informed decisions about acceptable and 
unacceptable levels of risk will ultimately drive the expenditure of resources (i.e., money, 
people, and time) to mitigate risk. 


ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS 

The Federal executive branch recognizes that the entire spectrum of government functions may 
not be performed or needed in the immediate aftermath of an emergency. Indeed, in a crisis, 
resources may be scarce. Allocating resources based on sound planning helps to ensure that the 
delivery of essential functions and services will remain uninterrupted across a wide range of 
potential emergencies and provides a mechanism for the resumption of all functions as resources 
become available. 

 

All agencies must identify and prioritize their essential functions as the foundation for continuity 
planning. Essential functions, broadly speaking, are those functions that enable an organization 
to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the general public, and 
sustain the industrial/economic base during an emergency. The goal of this annex is to assist 
with the identification, prioritization, and resourcing of these essential functions. 

 

This annex is divided into two sections. The first, Mission Essential Functions (MEFs), 
addresses the identification of government functions and fundamental continuity planning based 
on the determination of which of these is considered a MEF, and their individual priority in the 
overall mission of an agency. The second, Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs), 
addresses the connection between an agencys MEFs and the National Essential Functions 
(NEFs), which ensure continuity at the highest levels of government. 

 

SECTION 1: MEFs 

Agencies at every level of government provide a broad cross-section of government functions. 
The task of separating MEFs from those government functions is an early and critical component 
of continuity planning. Preparing a list of all the government functions performed by an agency 
is a prerequisite to identifying those specific actions which must be performed in order to 
implement one or more essential functions. The process used to identify organizational functions 
may vary, depending on the mission and structure of an organization. 

 

The identification of government functions will focus on defining the activities an agency 
conducts to accomplish its mission and serve its stakeholders. It is critical to recognize the 
difference between government functions and the tasks that support them. While these tasks 
should not be included on the list of government functions, it is important to identify them for 
ensuring the capability to implement both government functions and essential functions. 
Identification of these government functions and supporting tasks will be beneficial in 
implementing continuity programs and reconstitution plans after an event. 

 

An agency should carefully review all of its missions and functions before determining those that 
are essential. Improperly identifying functions as essential or not identifying as essential 
those functions that are, can impair the effectiveness of the entire continuity program, because 
other aspects of the plan are designed around supporting these functions. If an agency fails to 
identify a function as essential, that agency will not identify the requirements and resources to 
support that function in an emergency and will not make the necessary arrangements and 
coordination to perform that function. If an agency identifies too many functions as essential, 
the agency risks being unable to adequately address all of them. In either case, the agency 


Figure 7 

increases the risk that it will not be able to perform all of its essential functions during a 
continuity event. 

 

Planning related to essential functions must also include identifying those agency partners who 
are critical to program delivery, testing the effectiveness of data exchange among the 
organizations partners, developing complementary continuity plans with those partners, sharing 
key information on readiness with partners and the public, and taking steps to ensure that the 
performance of the agencys essential functions will be sustained during a continuity event. 
There must be careful consideration of agency and other partner interdependencies, to ensure the 
continued delivery and performance of essential functions across a full spectrum of threats and 
all-hazards emergencies. 

 

While this Directive is primarily directed at the executive branch of 
the Federal Government, continuity cannot occur without the 
commitment and dedication of many partners who play integral 
roles in ensuring homeland security and providing critical functions 
and services to the Nations citizens. 

 

These partners include the following (see Figure 6): 

 Federal Government: legislative branch, executive branch 
(including all departments and agencies), and judicial branch; 
 State, local, territorial, and tribal governments; and 
 Private sector critical infrastructure owners and operators. 

 

To support its continuity requirements, the Federal executive branch prioritizes the following 
three categories of essential functions: 

 Mission Essential Functions (MEFs): The limited set of agency-level government 
functions that must be continued after a disruption of normal activities. 
 Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs): A subset of agency MEFs that directly 
support the National Essential Functions. 
 National Essential Functions (NEFs): The eight functions the President and national 
leadership will focus on to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency. 

 

The following relationship between government functions and Mission Essential Functions is 
illustrated in Figures 7 and 8. 

 

Government functions (see Figure 7) are the collective functions of 
agencies, as defined by the Constitution, statute, regulation, 
presidential direction, or other legal authorities, and the functions of 
the legislative and judicial branches. The activities of State, local, 
territorial, and tribal governments and private sector organizations 
often support Federal Government functions, particularly in the 
protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR). 
These interdependencies rely upon a greater interoperability between 
and among these partners, to facilitate a more rapid and effective 
response to and recovery from any emergency. 

Figure 6 


 

MEFs are described as the limited set of agency-level government 
functions (as depicted in Figure 8) that must be continued throughout, 
or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of normal activities. MEFs are 
those functions that enable an organization to provide vital services, 
exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the public, and sustain 
the industrial and economic base, during the disruption of normal 
operations. Once identified, MEFs serve as key continuity planning 
factors for agencies to determine appropriate staffing, communications, 
information, facilities, training, and other continuity requirements. 

 

Process  MEF Identification and Analysis 

Identifying department and agency MEFs is a prerequisite for continuity because it establishes 
the parameters that drive the department and agency efforts in all other planning and 
preparedness areas. For a government function to be identified as a MEF, the National 
Continuity Policy Implementation Plan provides the following guidance (see Figure 9). 

 

MEF Initial Screening Aid 

Is the function directed by law, presidential directive, or 
executive order? 

If yes, identify which: 

YES 

NO 

Did a Business Process Analysis (BPA) determine that the 
function must be performed under all circumstances either 
uninterrupted, with minimal interruption, or requiring 
immediate execution in an emergency? 

YES 

NO 

If the answer to one or both of these questions is No, the function is probably not a MEF. 

Figure 9 

 

Agencies will do the following when identifying and analyzing MEFs (see Figure 10): 

 Review their organizations functions as directed by applicable law, presidential 
directives, executive orders, or other executive branch directives, to identify their MEFs. 
 Conduct a MEF BPA to identify and map the functional processes, workflows, activities, 
personnel expertise, systems, data, and facilities inherent to the execution of each 
identified MEF (e.g., define how each MEF is performed and executed, using a businessprocess 
flow map) that must be performed under all circumstances either uninterrupted, 
with minimal interruption, or requiring immediate execution in an emergency. 
 Identify those MEFs that provide vital interdependent support to a MEF performed by 
another agency or by an Emergency Support Function (ESF) under the National 
Response Framework (NRF). 
 Identify those MEFs that require vital support from another agency to ensure the 
execution of their mission and identify when and where the particular interdependency is 
executed within the BPA business-process flow. 
 Validate and approve the identified MEFs and BPA analysis by each agency head. 

 

Figure 8 


PROCESS FOR MEF IDENTIFICATION 

 

 

 

 

Figure 10 

Text Box: UAgencies identify their MEFs
1) Reference laws, presidential directives, executive orders, and other authorities that dictate what the agency must perform.
2) Utilize survey methods and/or interviewing processes to gain subject matter expertise input from respective divisions or lines of business.
3) Agency Continuity Coordinator reviews, validates, and confirms identified MEFs through consultation with agency head.
Agencies identify their MEFs 
1) Reference laws, presidential directives, executive orders, and other authorities that 
dictate what the agency must perform. 
2) Utilize survey methods and/or interviewing processes to gain subject matter expertise 
input from respective divisions or lines of business. 
3) Agency Continuity Coordinator reviews, validates, and confirms identified MEFs 
through consultation with agency head. 
Agency conducts 
BPA for each 
identified MEF 
(Led by Agency 
Continuity Coordinator 
and continuity staff). 
1 STEP #1 
Outline each MEF in a business process mapping 
format (i.e., inputs, outputs, resources, systems, 
facilities, expertise, authorities) that impact the 
ability to complete the MEF products/services. 
STEP #2 
Identify internal and external interdependencies that are 
part of and/or influence each MEF business process. 
STEP #3 
Ensure that all identified MEF interdependencies are 
inserted into the proper location within the MEF 
business process flow map(s). 
STEP #4 
Provide complete BPA package and results to the 
agency Continuity Coordinator for review, validation, 
and approval, in consultation with agency head. 
2
3 
Joint effort between NCC and agency Continuity Coordinator to identify and 
confirm MEF(s) that must serve as PMEF(s). Final agency PMEF(s) submitted 
to National Continuity Coordinator (NCC) for further BPA and Business Impact 
Analysis (BIA). 
4 

SECTION 2: PMEFs 

Once MEFs have been identified and analyzed, the planning process for identifying the 
PMEFs can begin. Directly linking PMEFs to an NEF requires Federal executive agencies to 
identify the most critical functions that must continue during an emergency, as well as the 
planning required to perform those functions. This model may serve as a template for other 
government organizations and for private sector entities. 

 

 

PMEFs are those agency Mission Essential Functions, validated by 
the NCC, which must be performed in order to support the 
performance of the NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of an 
emergency (see Figure 11). PMEFs are defined as those functions 
that need to be continuous or resumed within 12 hours after an event 
and maintained for up to 30 days or until normal operations can be 
resumed. 

 

 

In accordance with National Security Presidential Directive 
(NSPD)-51/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-20, 
the eight NEFs represent the overarching responsibilities of the 
Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation and shall be the 
primary focus of the Federal Governments leadership during and in 
the aftermath of an emergency (see Figure 12). 

Figure 11 

Figure 13 shows the interdependencies of the key partners and the functions of continuity. 
Independent government entities at all levels and individual private sector companies are 
intimately connected and work together in critical partnership to ensure continuation of essential 
functions. 

 

 

 

NEFs 

The eight NEFs are the foundation for all continuity programs and capabilities and represent the 
overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation during a 
crisis, and therefore sustaining the following NEFs shall be the primary focus of the Federal 
Government leadership during and in the aftermath of an emergency that adversely affects the 
performance of government functions. These are categories of functions performed by one or 
more agencies; they are not new authorities, requirements, or functions. 

 

1. Ensuring the continued functioning of our form of government under the Constitution, 
including the functioning of the three separate branches of government. This NEF 
includes Federal executive branch functions that respect the roles and maintain the check 
and balance relationship among all three branches of the Federal Government. 
2. Providing leadership visible to the Nation and the world, and maintaining the trust and 
confidence of the American people. This NEF includes Federal executive department 
and agency functions to demonstrate that the Federal Government is viable, functioning, 
and effectively addressing any emergency. 
3. Defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic, and preventing or interdicting attacks against the United States or its people, 
property, or interests. This NEF includes Federal executive department and agency 
functions to protect and defend the worldwide interests of the United States against 
foreign or domestic enemies, honor security agreements and treaties with allies, 
implement military operations ordered by the President, maintain military readiness, and 
maintain preparedness to achieve national objectives. 

Figure 13 


Figure 14 

4. Maintaining and fostering effective relationships with foreign nations. This NEF 
includes Federal executive department and agency functions to maintain American 
foreign policy. 
5. Protecting against threats to the homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes 
or attacks against the United States or its people, property or interests. This NEF 
includes Federal executive department and agency functions to protect against, prevent, 
or interdict attacks on the people or interests of the Nation and to identify, neutralize, and 
prosecute those who have committed or intend to commit violations of the law. 
6. Providing rapid and effective responses to and recovery from the domestic consequences 
of an attack or other incident. This NEF includes Federal executive department and 
agency functions to implement response and recovery plans, including, but not limited to, 
the implementation of the National Response Plan. 
7. Protecting and stabilizing the Nations economy and ensuring public confidence in its 
financial systems. This NEF includes Federal executive department and agency functions 
to respond to and recover from the economic consequences of an attack or other major 
impact on national or international economic functions or activities. 
8. Providing for critical Federal Government services that address the national health, 
safety, and welfare needs of the United States. This NEF includes Federal executive 
department and agency functions that ensure that the critical Federal-level health, safety, 
and welfare services of the Nation are provided during an emergency. 

PMEF Initial Screening Aid 

 

Does the function directly support a NEF? 

Process  PMEF Identification and Analysis 

 

PMEF identification is an iterative process performed by each department and agency in 
coordination with the NCC. In order to identify and analyze PMEFs, the following actions will 
take place (see Figure 15): 

 

 Upon MEF approval by each department or agency head, a joint effort between the NCC 
and each department or agency Continuity Coordinator and staff will result in a preliminary 
identification of PMEFs that potentially support NEFs. The joint effort will culminate in 
the department or agencys submission of PMEF identification results to the NCC for 
further interagency analysis. 

If yes, identify which: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

 

Does the function need to be continued uninterrupted or need 
to be resumed within 12 hours, regardless of circumstance? 

 

 

The answers to both of these must be YES for the function to be considered a PMEF. 

 

YES NO 

 

 

 

YES NO 

 


 An interagency board (IAB), established by the NCC, conducts a review of submitted 
potential PMEFs and validates the PMEFs relationship to the NEFs. A BIA will be used 
to ensure that the PMEFs are appropriate and relevant. 
 Upon confirmation that the IAB has determined that a department or agencys MEF shall 
serve as a PMEF, each department and agency will revisit the prioritization of their MEF 
recovery timelines to ensure PMEFs criticality. 
 The IAB will conduct a BPA to identify and map interagency PMEF processes, workflows, 
activities, expertise, systems, data, and facilities inherent to the interagency execution of 
each NEF. The BPA should also define the PMEFs relationship to the NEF. In other 
words, the BPA will define how each NEF is executed via business process flow mapping 
(i.e., NEF serving as the end product output and interagency PMEFs serving as the 
functional inputs). 
 The IAB must also conduct an analysis of interagency PMEF interdependencies within 
each NEF to accurately depict each department or agencys PMEF execution capability and 
dependencies. The IAB will conduct NEF-specific BIAs to: (1) identify potential single 
points of failure that may adversely affect the execution of the interagency PMEF support 
to NEFs; (2) define the impact of downtime (i.e., impact of delayed PMEF recovery on 
NEF execution); and (3) define potential PMEF process alternatives/work-around 
solutions. 
 The NEF BPAs, BIAs, and the interagency list of PMEFs are submitted to the NCC for 
final approval. 

 

The immediacy of maintaining or recovering essential functions capability is driven by the 
results of the MEF and NEF BPAs and the NEF BIAs. Subsequently, the described risk 
management approach requires an emphasis on the geographic dispersion, redundancy, and 
survivability of leadership, staff, and infrastructure. Planners should assume that they will have 
no warning of the threats that we face in todays world. Threats might come from known or 
unknown sources. The nature of asymmetric threats is that they do not necessarily emanate from 
a single, fixed, and understood actor; asymmetric threats are, in many ways, less predictable and 
less understood, requiring planners to consider different approaches to plan for, mitigate, and 
respond to threats. 

 

A successful BPA will identify gaps within a department or agency and areas where more than 
one department or agency has responsibilities. This gap identification provides departments and 
agencies an opportunity to fill the gap and ensure successful execution of essential functions and 
preparation for incident management. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
primary incident management responsibility, many different departments and agencies at 
multiple levels are involved in successfully navigating a critical incident management scenario. 

 

Continuity requirements must be incorporated into the daily operations of all executive 
branch agencies to ensure seamless and immediate continuation of PMEF capabilities. 

 


Figure 15 

PROCESS FOR PMEF IDENTIFICATION 

 

 

 

Interagency Board (IAB) PMEF Business Process Analysis (BPA) 

IAB conducts a BPA to identify and map interagency PMEF processes, workflows, 
activities, expertise, systems, data, and facilities inherent to the interagency execution 
of the NEF. 

IAB PMEF Interdependencies Analysis 

IAB conducts further detailed PMEF BPA to identify and map interagency PMEF 
interdependencies required to execute support to the NEF. 

IAB NEF-specific Business Impact Analysis (BIA) 

The IAB conducts a detailed NEF BIA to: 

1) Identify interagency potential single points of failure which may adversely 
affect the execution of the NEF; 

2) Define the impact of PMEF downtime and/or failure on the execution of the 
NEF(s); 

3) Define mandated timelines for recovery for PMEF support to each NEF; and 

4) Identify, create, and formalize PMEF process alternatives/workarounds to 
execute NEFs. 

IAB Submits NEF BPA & BIA Reports to the NCC 

IAB compiles and submits final NEF BPA Mapping and BIA Report with findings 
and recommendations for mitigation, risk reduction, and risk management actions for 
each NEF. Risk management options shall include policy development, business 
process reengineering, asset dispersion, continuity system(s) design redundancy and 
survivability requirements, and other relevant options. 

NCC Reviews BPA/BIA Findings to: 

1) Identify continuity program shortcomings; 

2) Determine program shortcomings to initiate policy revision and development 
efforts; 

3) Define future continuity program requirements and standards of performance; 

4) Relate continuity program budget and funding requirements to risk 
management; and 

5) Manage and lead the Federal Government continuity program efforts as the 
NCC. 


ORDERS OF SUCCESSION 

Agency leadership is responsible for establishing, promulgating, and maintaining orders of 
succession to key positions. It is critical to have a clear line of succession to office established in 
the event an agencys leadership becomes debilitated or incapable of performing its legal and 
authorized duties, roles, and responsibilities. The designation as a successor enables that 
individual to act on behalf of and exercise the powers of a principal in the event of that 
principals death, incapacity, or resignation. Orders of succession enable an orderly and 
predefined transition of leadership within the organization. Orders of succession are an essential 
part of an agencys continuity plans and should reach to a sufficient depth and have sufficient 
breadthat least three positions deep and geographically dispersed where feasibleto ensure 
the agency can perform its essential functions while remaining a viable part of the Federal 
Government during the course of any emergency. 

As a minimum, orders of succession must do the following: 

1. Establish an order of succession for the position of agency head. There should be a 
designated official available to serve as acting head of the agency until that official is 
appointed by the President or other appropriate authority, replaced by the permanently 
appointed official, or otherwise relieved. 
a. Geographical dispersion, including of regional, field, or satellite leadership in the 
standard agency line of succession, is encouraged and ensures roles and responsibilities 
can transfer in all contingencies. 
b. Where a suitable field structure exists, appropriate personnel located outside of the 
subject region should be considered in the order of succession. 

2. Establish orders of succession for other key agency leadership positions, including but not 
limited to administrators, regional or field directors, key managers, other key mission 
essential personnel or their equivalent positions. Orders of succession should also be 
established for devolution counterparts in these positions. 
3. Describe orders of succession by positions or titles, rather than by the names of the 
individuals holding those offices. To ensure their legal sufficiency, coordinate the 
development of orders of succession with the agencys general counsel. 
4. Establish the rules and procedures designated officials must follow when facing the issues of 
succession to office. 
5. Include in the succession procedures the conditions under which succession will take place, 
in accordance with applicable laws and agency or department directives, the method of 
notification; and any temporal, geographical, or organizational limitations to the authorities 
granted by the orders of succession. 
6. Include orders of succession in the vital records and ensure they are available at all continuity 
facilities in the event the continuity plan is activated. 
7. Revise orders of succession, as necessary, and distribute the revisions promptly as changes 
occur. 


8. Develop and provide a duties and responsibilities briefing to the designated successors to the 
position of agency head, when named, and other key positions, on their responsibilities as 
successors and on any provisions for their relocation. Designated successors must receive 
annual refresher briefings. 


DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY 

To ensure a rapid response to any emergency and to minimize disruptions that require 
implementation of continuity plans, agencies should pre-delegate the authority to make policy 
determinations and decisions, at the headquarters (HQ), regional, field, satellite, and other levels 
and agency locations, as appropriate. A delegation of authority identifies who is authorized to 
act on behalf of the agency head or other officials for specified purposes and ensures that 
designated individuals have the legal authorities to carry out their duties. To the extent possible, 
these authorities should be identified by title or position, and not by the individual office holders 
name. Generally, predetermined delegations of authority will take effect when normal channels 
of direction are disrupted and will terminate when these channels are reestablished. Delegation 
of authority is an essential part of an agencys continuity plans and should reach to a sufficient 
depth and have sufficient breadthat least three positions deep and geographically dispersed 
where feasibleto ensure the agency can perform its essential functions while remaining a 
viable part of the Federal Government during the course of any emergency. To ensure their legal 
sufficiency and clarity, these delegations of authority must have the following characteristics: 

 

1. A delegation of authority must document in advance (where designated) the legal authority 
for officials (including those below the level of agency head) to make key policy decisions 
during a continuity situation. 
2. To ensure that an agencys Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) and Mission 
Essential Functions (MEFs) are performed, delegations of authority must be planned and 
documented in advance of an incident and in accordance with applicable laws, including by: 
a) Delineating the limits of authority and accountability. 
b) Outlining explicitly in a statement, the authority (including any exceptions to that 
authority) of an official so designated to exercise agency direction, and the authority of 
an official to re-delegate functions and activities, as appropriate. 
c) Defining the circumstances under which delegation of authorities would take effect and 
would be terminated. 

3. Delegations of authority must ensure that those officials who might be expected to assume 
authorities in a continuity situation are properly informed and trained, as required, to carry 
out their emergency responsibilities. Training of these officials will be conducted at least 
annually. 
4. Delegations of authority must ensure the orderly (and predefined) transition of leadership, for 
the position of agency head as well as for key supporting positions, within an agency during 
an emergency and be closely tied to succession. 
5. Include delegations of authority in the vital records and ensure they are available at all 
continuity facilities in the event the continuity plan is activated. 

 


CONTINUITY FACILITIES 

As part of their continuity plans and procedures, all agencies shall designate: alternate facilities; 
alternate usages of existing facilities; and as appropriate, virtual office options including 
telework. In addition, agencies shall prepare their personnel for the possibility of an 
unannounced relocation to these facilities. Preparations include establishing procedures for the 
orientation of continuity personnel and for conducting operations and administration at all 
alternate facilities. 

 

Daily operating facilities must be evaluated for hardness in accordance with Interagency Security 
Commission Standards or applicable agency standards (i.e., the ability to withstand natural 
disasters and utility failures and to protect people who need to shelter-in-place). While the 
hardness of daily operating facilities is a key consideration, alternate facilities must also be 
identified for the relocation of a limited number of key leaders and staff. Those facilities should 
replicate essential capabilities by providing systems and configurations that are used in daily 
activities. Additionally, it is financially prudent to structure and configure alternate facilities 
such that daily activities can be replaced or augmented with those required during an emergency 
(often referred to as dual-use facilities). 

Planning Requirements 

Alternate facilities must provide: 

1. Sufficient space, equipment and other resources to sustain the agencys Mission Essential 
Functions (MEFs) and Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs), as appropriate, and 
Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) and support staff. 
2. The capability to perform MEFs and PMEFs as soon as possible after an emergency or 
other continuity event with minimal disruption of operations and in all cases within 12 
hours after an event, the ability to maintain this capability for up to 30 days after an event 
or until normal business activities can be resumed, and the capability to perform these 
MEFs under all threat conditions including the possible use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs). Some essential functions cannot be interrupted and alternate 
facilities must include support for these continuous operations. 

3. Reliable logistical support, services, and infrastructure systems. 

4. Consideration for the health, safety, and security of employees who have been relocated 
to those sites. 

5. Interoperable communications, including the means for secure communications if 
appropriate, with all identified essential internal and external organizations, as well as 
with customers and the public. 

6. Computer equipment, software, and other automated data processing equipment 
necessary to carry out MEFs and PMEFs. 

7. Capabilities to access and use vital records necessary to facilitate the performance of 
essential functions. 

 


 

Alternate Facility Options 

At a minimum, agencies shall identify and maintain an alternate facility. An alternate facility 
may be classified as one of the following two types: 

1. Hot Site: An alternate facility that already has in place the computer, 
telecommunications, other information technology, environmental infrastructure, and 
personnel required to recover critical business functions or information systems. 
2. Warm Site: An alternate facility that is equipped with some computer, 
telecommunications, other information technology, and environmental infrastructure, 
which is capable of providing backup after additional personnel, equipment, supplies, 
software, or customization are provided. 

Alternate facilities may make use of existing agency or other space  

1. Remote/offsite training facilities. These facilities may include an agency training facility 
located near the agencys normal operating facility, but far enough away to afford some 
geographical dispersion. 
2. Regional or field offices. Some agencies have a regional office or a field office that 
could be used as an alternate facility. 
3. Remote headquarters (HQ) operations. Some agency HQ operations are so extensive that 
their operations and the facilities required to support them extend beyond the geographic 
expanse of the agency HQ host city, and necessitate an additional HQ location(s) 
elsewhere. One of these locations could serve as an alternate facility. 
4. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)/Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for colocation 
with another agency  One agency may relocate to another agencys facilities. 
The agency that is relocating could occupy available space in the receiving agencys HQ 
facility, training facilities, field offices, or other available space. 
5. Space procured and maintained by the General Services Administration (GSA)  An 
agency may request the GSA to assign federally owned or leased space to accommodate 
that agencys need for alternate facilities. 
6. Space procured and maintained by another agency  Some agencies (other than the GSA) 
offer space procurement services that could be used by agencies to support the need for 
alternate facilities. 
7. Participation in a joint-use alternate facility  With this option, agencies must ensure that 
shared facilities are not overcommitted during a continuity situation. 
Several agencies may pool their resources to acquire space they can use jointly as an 
alternate facility. An agency may co-locate with another agency at an alternate-facility, 
but each agency should have individually designated space and other resources at that 
location to meet its own needs (i.e., support its PMEFs and MEFs). 

 

8. Alternate use of existing facilities  In certain types of continuity situations (e.g., a 
pandemic), a combination of facilities may be used to support continuity operations (e.g., 
social distancing). 


In addition to an alternate facility, agencies may consider implementing other or nontraditional 
continuity facility options including: 

 

1. Virtual offices  To be effective, this option must provide access to vital records and 
databases to support the agencys PMEFs and MEFs and the robust communications 
necessary to sustain an agencys PMEFs and MEFs. 
a) Work at home/telework. Many agencies have programs that allow employees to 
work from home. This capability should be leveraged to allow some continuity 
personnel to fulfill their MEFs while at home or at another off-site location. 
b) Telecommuting facilities. These can include federally funded or other telecommuting 
facilities. These facilities can accommodate, on a prearranged basis, some continuity 
personnel, to allow them to fulfill their MEFs at those locations. 
c) Mobile office. This capability includes the use of mobile fly-away kits that can 
include continuity equipment such as laptop computers, cell phones, and satellite 
communications equipment, which can be readily transported to a remote location. 

Planning Considerations 

The following must be considered when identifying and preparing alternate facilities for 
continuity operations. 

1. Location of Facilities. Agencies will conduct an all-hazards risk assessment for all 
continuity facilities. The assessment will include identification of all hazards that may 
affect the facility; a vulnerability assessment that determines the effects of all hazards on 
the facility; a cost-benefit analysis of implementing risk mitigation, prevention, or control 
measures; and a formal analysis by management of acceptable risk. Alternate facilities 
must be located in an area where the potential disruption of the agencys ability to initiate 
and sustain operations is minimized. When identifying and preparing alternate facilities, 
maximum use should be made of existing local or field infrastructures, including 
consideration for other supporting options such as telecommuting locations, work-athome/
telework agreements, virtual offices, and joint or shared facilities. Additionally, 
alternate facilities: 
a. Must be operational as soon as possible upon continuity activation with minimal 
disruption of operations, but in all cases within 12 hours after activation of a 
continuity plan, and be capable of sustaining operations for up to 30 days after an 
incident or until normal business operations can be resumed. Agencies will identify 
essential functions that cannot be disrupted for any period of time and must be 
continued under all conditions in their continuity plans, and must provide support for 
their performance from alternate facilities. 
b. Must have sufficient distance between the facility location or threatened area and 
other facilities (hazardous materials sites, nuclear power plants) or locations (areas 
subject to natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes) that are potential 
sources of disruptions or threats. 
c. Must have access to essential support resources such as food, water, fuel, medical 
facilities, and municipal services (e.g., fire, police). 


d. Accessibility will include a defined transportation support plan that describes 
procedures for events with both warning and no warning. 
e. Should be selected in locations that provide the alternate sites with power, 
telecommunication services, and Internet access, separate from those grids that 
provide their services to the primary facility, whenever possible. 

2. Construction. Facilities should be selected and constructed so that they are not uniquely 
susceptible to risks associated with such natural disasters as earthquakes, tornadoes, 
hurricanes, or floods. Alternate facilities must have emergency/back-up power 
capability, so that essential functions and operations can continue in the event the primary 
source of power is disrupted. 
3. MOA/MOU. If the alternate facility is neither owned nor leased by the agency, a signed 
MOA/MOU must be prepared with the owner or occupant of the facility. This 
MOA/MOU must be reviewed annually. It is recommended that agencies coordinate 
with GSA for assistance in identifying relocation sites. MOAs/MOUs should specify: 
a. The required activation time between notifying the owner/occupant of the 
requirement to use the facility and the facility being available for occupancy by the 
agency as an alternate. 
b. Space and services to be provided at the facility. 
c. Sole use of allocated space by the agency during the period of occupancy. 

4. Space. An agencys alternate facility space requirements must be sufficient to support all 
of the agencys continuity staffing requirements. Contiguous space is desirable; 
however, noncontiguous space may be acceptable if there is adequate communications 
between ERG members. 
5. Preparation. After selecting appropriate sites for continuity operations, pre-positioning of 
critical resources, coordination with the site facility managers, and agreements between 
the agency and property owners are necessary to ensure the continued availability of 
facility space and services. Agencies must have all necessary supplies and equipment 
pre-positioned or have detailed site preparation and activation plans in order to achieve 
full operational capability within 12 hours of notification. 
6. Billeting. All continuity plans will address housing to support continuity personnel at or 
near the alternate facility site (e.g., billeting within facility; other locations, including 
motels; or at ERG members homes if within commuting distance to the alternate 
facility). 
7. Site Transportation. Transportation resource requirements, including transportation 
to/from the site, and on the site should be included, as applicable. 
8. Communications. The communications resources at the alternate facility must be 
sufficient to enable performance of all essential functions. This includes providing 
sufficient quantity and mode/media to allow for effective interaction with other agency 
elements (e.g., regional offices), other agencies, stakeholders and other recipients of the 
agencys essential functions or services, and other government and private sector 
organizations (including key operations centers) critical to the performance of that 


agencys essential functions. Secure and non-secure communications requirements 
should be incorporated, as applicable. 
9. Security. Procedures for the safety and security of relocated personnel, information, data, 
and equipment must be included in all continuity plans. Alternate facilities must afford 
sufficient levels of physical and information security to protect against all threats as 
identified in the facilitys risk assessment and physical security surveys by the agencys 
security office, the Federal Protective Service, or a qualified security contractor. This 
includes sufficient personnel to provide perimeter, access, and internal security, as 
required by agency policy. Technologies that control site access, conduct site 
surveillance, and provide early warning of unauthorized intrusion, should also be 
considered as part of the alternate facilitys physical security program. 
10. Life Support. Life support items (e.g., food, water, medical services, sanitation, hygiene, 
power) should be readily available and in sufficient quantities to sustain, at a minimum, 
30 days of operations, with the capability to sustain operations beyond that period for 
extended-duration events such as a pandemic. In addition, personnel and support items 
such as medical supplies, medical records, and housekeeping supplies should be 
maintained at the facility or brought to the facility during relocation. 

The Acquisition Process 

The process of acquiring an alternate facility includes: (1) identifying alternate facility 
requirements, (2) selecting and acquiring the alternate facilities, and (3) reevaluating alternate 
facilities. These steps should be performed in consultation with the GSA whenever possible. 

 

Once selected, alternate facilities must be periodically reevaluated for their suitability and 
functionality. This should be done at least annually and whenever the agencys continuity plans 
are reviewed and updated, to ensure that the facilities meet the agencys continuity requirements. 

 

The Reporting Process 

GSA will create and maintain a central database of all alternate facilities. All agencies are 
required to identify their alternate facilities and provide the necessary data on those facilities to 
GSA. To support this requirement, all agencies will report the locations of their alternate 
facility(ies) to GSAs Emergency Management Office or their Regional GSA Office, as 
appropriate, on GSA Alternate Facility Reporting Form, SF-336. 

 

 

 

 


CONTINUITY COMMUNICATIONS 

The success of continuity programs is dependent on the availability of robust and effective 
communications to provide Federal intra- and interagency connectivity. An agencys ability to 
execute its essential functions at its headquarters (HQ) and at its alternate or other continuity 
facilities, as well as the ability of the agencys senior leadership to collaborate, develop policy 
and recommendations, and act under all-hazards conditions, depends upon the availability of 
effective communications systems. These systems must support full connectivity, under all 
conditions, among key government leadership, internal elements, other agencies, critical 
customers, and the public. 

 

In accordance with the National Communications Systems (NCS) Directive 3-10, NCS Manual 
3-10-1, and other established communications requirements, an agency must: 

1. Implement minimum communications requirements for its HQs and its alternate and 
other continuity facilities, as appropriate, which support the continuation of that agencys 
Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs); 
2. Possess interoperable and available communications capabilities in sufficient quantity 
and mode/media, and that are commensurate with that agencys responsibilities during 
conditions of an emergency; 
3. Possess communications capabilities that can support the agencys senior leadership 
while they are in transit to alternate facilities; 
4. Ensure that the communications capabilities required by this Directive are maintained 
and readily available for a period of sustained usage of no less than 30 days or until 
normal operations can be reestablished, and that all continuity staff are properly trained, 
as appropriate, in the use of these communications capabilities; 
5. Satisfy the requirement to provide assured and priority access to communications 
resources; and 
6. Have sufficient communications capabilities to accomplish the agencys essential 
functions from an alternate facility. If the agencys alternate facility is shared with 
another agency, also have a signed agreement with that agency which ensures that each 
has adequate access to communications resources. 

 

All agencies that support National Essential Functions (NEFs) shall possess, operate, and 
maintain, or have dedicated access to, communications capabilities at both their HQ and alternate 
facility locations, as well as mobile communications capabilities, to ensure the continuation of 
those agencies essential functions across the full spectrum of hazards, threats, and emergencies, 
including catastrophic attacks or disasters. 

 

Those agencies that do not support NEFs shall possess, operate, and maintain, or have dedicated 
access to, communications capabilities at both their HQ and alternate facility locations, as well as 
mobile communications capabilities as required, to ensure the continuation of those agencies 
essential functions. 

 

All agencies will review their continuity communications programs to ensure they are fully 
capable of supporting pandemic and other related emergencies and give full consideration to 
supporting social distancing operations including telework and other virtual offices. 


 

Agencies may expand or migrate, as appropriate, their communications capabilities to make use 
of emerging technologies, but agencies should ensure that any additional communications 
capabilities they may obtain are compatible with existing equipment and complement the 
established requirements. 

 

The NCS, a component of the Department of Homeland Securitys National Protection and 
Programs Directorate, is responsible for: 

 

1. Within 30 days after receipt of technical requirements from the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP), as Executive Agent of the National Communications System 
(NCS), providing the Director of OSTP and Department of Defense (DOD) with an 
implementation plan for a comprehensive Continuity Communications Architecture 
(CCA), which shall include the minimum requirements necessary to finalize selection of 
a secure communications system by DOD. 
2. Within 90 days after receipt of technical requirements from OSTP, through the NCS, 
developing, implementing, and beginning maintenance of a comprehensive CCA. 

 

Agencies may request an exemption from one or more of these minimum communications 
requirements by submitting a request by letter through the Office of Manager of the NCS to the 
National Continuity Coordinator (NCC). The request must identify the specific requirement and 
provide a detailed justification for the requested exception. A lack of funds is not considered a 
valid justification for an exemption. 

 


VITAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT 

The identification, protection, and ready availability of vital records, databases, and hardcopy 
documents needed to support Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) and Mission 
Essential Functions (MEFs) under the full spectrum of all-hazards emergencies are critical 
elements of a successful continuity plan and program. 

 

In this document, vital records refers to information systems and applications, electronic and 
hardcopy documents, references, and records needed to support PMEFs and MEFs during a 
continuity event. 

 

Categories of vital records include the following: 

Emergency Operating Records. These include records and databases essential to the 
continued functioning or the reconstitution of an agency during and after a continuity event. 
Examples of these records are emergency plans and directives, orders of succession, 
delegations of authority, staffing assignments, and related policy or procedural records. 
These records provide an agencys continuity personnel with the guidance they need to 
conduct operations during a continuity situation and to resume normal operations at the 
conclusion of that situation. Agencies must identify and preposition Emergency Operating 
Records needed to continue essential functions. 

Rights and Interests Records. These include records critical to carrying out an agencys 
essential legal and financial functions, and vital to the protection of the legal and financial 
rights of individuals who are directly affected by that agencys activities. These records 
include those with such value that their loss would significantly impair the execution of 
essential agency functions, to the detriment of the legal or financial rights and entitlements of 
the agency and the affected individual(s). Examples of these records are accounts receivable 
files; contracting and acquisition files; official personnel records; Social Security, payroll, 
retirement, and insurance records; and property management and inventory records. Any 
Rights and Interests Records considered critical for continued performance of essential 
functions should be included in the Emergency Operating Records and maintained at the 
appropriate alternate continuity facility. 

Other vital records required to support PMEFs and MEFs will also be included in an agencys 
continuity planning and preparedness. 

 

Each agency has different functional responsibilities and business needs. An agency must decide 
which records are vital to its operations, and then must assign responsibility for those records to 
the appropriate personnel, who may be a combination of continuity personnel, personnel in the 
chief information officers department, and records management personnel. An effective vital 
records program should have the following characteristics: 

 

1. An official vital records program: 
a. Identifies and protects those records that specify how an agency will operate in an 
emergency or disaster. 
b. Identifies those records necessary to the agencys continuing operations. 


c. Identifies those records needed to protect the legal and financial rights of the 
Government and citizens. 

2. A vital records program must be incorporated into the overall continuity plans, and it 
needs a clear authority to include: 
a. Policies. 
b. Authorities. 
c. Procedures. 
d. The written designation of a vital records manager. 

3. As soon as possible after activation of continuity plans, but in all cases within 12 hours of 
such activation, continuity personnel at the alternate facility must have access to the 
appropriate media for accessing vital records, such as: 
a. A local area network. 
b. Electronic versions of vital records. 
c. Supporting information systems and data. 
d. Internal and external e-mail and e-mail archives. 
e. Hard copies of vital records. 

4. Agencies should strongly consider multiple redundant media for storing their vital 
records. 
5. Agencies must maintain a complete inventory of records (such as those identified in the 
previous paragraphs on Emergency Operating Records and Rights and Interests Records), 
along with the locations of and instructions on accessing those records. This inventory 
will be maintained at a back-up/offsite location to ensure continuity if the primary site is 
damaged, destroyed, or unavailable. Agencies should consider maintaining these 
inventories at a number of different sites to support continuity operations. 
6. Agencies must conduct a vital records and database risk assessment to: 
a. Identify the risks involved if vital records are retained in their current locations and 
media, and the difficulty of reconstituting those records if they are destroyed. 
b. Identify offsite storage locations and requirements. 
c. Determine if alternative storage media is available. 
d. Determine requirements to duplicate records and provide alternate storage locations 
to provide readily available vital records under all conditions. 

7. Appropriate protections for vital records will include dispersing those records to other 
agency locations or storing those records offsite. When determining and selecting 
protection methods, it is important to take into account the special protections needed by 
different kinds of storage media. Microforms, paper photographs, and computer disks, 
tapes, and drives, all require different methods of protection. Some of these media may 
also require equipment to facilitate access. 


Table 2: Identification of Vital Records 

8. At a minimum, vital records must be annually reviewed, rotated, or cycled so that the 
latest versions will be available. 
9. A vital records plan packet must be developed and maintained. The packet will include: 
a. A hard copy or electronic list of key agency personnel and continuity personnel with 
up-to-date telephone numbers. 
b. A vital records inventory with the precise locations of vital records. 
c. Updates to the vital records. 
d. Necessary keys or access codes. 
e. Alternate facility locations. 
f. Access requirements and lists of sources of equipment necessary to access the records 
(this may include hardware and software, microfilm readers, Internet access, and/or 
dedicated telephone lines). 
g. Lists of records recovery experts and vendors. 
h. A copy of the agencys continuity plans. 

This packet will be annually reviewed with the date and names of the personnel 
conducting the review documented in writing to ensure that the information is current. A 
copy will be securely maintained at the agencys alternate facilities and other locations 
where it is easily accessible to appropriate personnel when needed. 
10. A vital records program must include a training program for all staff to include periodic 
briefings to managers about the vital records program and its relationship to their vital 
records and business needs. Staff training should focus on identifying, inventorying, 
protecting, storing, accessing, and updating the vital records. 
11. A vital records program must include an annual review of the program to address new 
security issues, identify problem areas, update information, and incorporate any 
additional vital records generated by new agency programs or functions or by 
organizational changes to existing programs or functions. The review will provide an 
opportunity to familiarize staff with all aspects of the vital records program. It is 
appropriate to conduct a review of the vital records program in conjunction with 
continuity exercises. 
12. There must be annual testing of the capabilities for protecting classified and unclassified 
vital records and for providing access to them from the alternate facility. 

Table 2 may be useful in assisting agencies in identifying and managing their vital records. 

Vital Records 

Form of Record 
(e.g., hardcopy, 
electronic) 

Pre-Positioned 
at Alternate 
Facility 

Hand Carried 
to Alternate 
Facility 

Storage 
Location(s) 

Maintenance 
Frequency 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


HUMAN CAPITAL 

In a continuity event, continuity personnel and other special categories of employees will be 
activated by an agency to perform their assigned response duties. Continuity personnel will also 
be referred to as members of the emergency relocation group (ERG). In addition to supporting 
the human capital needs of the agencys continuity personnel, agencies are responsible for 
managing their other human capital resourcesthose employees who have not been designated 
as continuity or ERG personnel, but who will nevertheless be potentially affected by a continuity 
event. Agency plans and procedures for these employees should be addressed in the continuity 
plans as well as in other types of emergency response planning documents, such as the agencys 
Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) or shelter-in-place plans. 

 

Because of the need for agencies to be prepared for all-hazards emergencies and disasters, an 
agency must ensure that its human capital strategies for its continuity staff are adaptable to 
changing circumstances and a variety of emergencies, and that these strategies and procedures 
are regularly reviewed and updated as appropriate, as part of the agencys Corrective Action 
Program (CAP). 

 

This annex is divided into three sections: Continuity Leadership and Staff; All Staff; and Human 
Capital Considerations. 

 

Continuity Personnel 

 

This section addresses those employees (i.e., Continuity or ERG personnel) who perform the 
agencys essential functions during a continuity event. The following activities are associated 
with planning and preparedness for continuity personnel: 

 

1. Agencies must develop and implement a process to identify, document, 
communicate with and train continuity personnel. The identification of an agencys 
continuity personnel is a critical part of ensuring that an agency can successfully respond 
to a continuity event. Specific factors an agency should consider in developing and 
implementing this process include identifying: 

a. Personnel who perform essential functions as determined through the business 
process analysis (BPA) (discussed in Annex D). 
b. Personnel who perform the supporting tasks that enable the performance of 
essential functions. 
c. Skill sets necessary to perform specific essential functions or to support tasks that 
enable the performance of those essential functions. 

 
Each agency head has the authority to identify and designate those personnel that the 
agency head judges to be critical to agency operations in any given emergency situation 
such as a continuity event. There are no standard definitions or categories in this regard, 
and agency heads (or their designees, as applicable) are free to make such determinations 
based on the agencys unique mission requirements and circumstances; such designations 
may even vary according to the particular nature of an emergency. 


 

By identifying not only the personnel who currently perform essential functions or 
supporting tasks but also those who possess the skill sets necessary to perform these 
functions and tasks, an agency can reach beyond that set of individuals who traditionally 
perform these roles to respond during a continuity event that may require augmentation 
of the standing cadre of continuity personnel. 

 

Agencies must ensure that continuity personnel are officially informed of their roles or 
designations by providing documentation to ensure that continuity personnel know and 
accept their roles and responsibilities. This process and its supporting documentation 
will help ensure that all continuity personnel receive the necessary guidance and support 
and know prior to, during, and after a continuity event what the agency expects of them. 
Agencies may customize this process to best suit their specific needs and requirements. 

 

In addition to their continuity planning requirements, continuity personnel must 
understand their roles and responsibilities and participate in their agencys continuity 
tests, training, and exercise (TT&E) program. 

 

2. Agencies must provide guidance to continuity personnel on individual preparedness 
measures they should take to ensure response to a continuity event. Continuity 
personnel have individual and specific responsibilities outside of their professional 
obligations. By taking personal preparedness measures, such as a personal readiness kit 
or family preparedness planning, continuity personnel will be able to respond to a 
continuity event with a greater level of confidence that they can meet their individual 
responsibilities and obligations. Continuity personnel must implement personal 
preparedness measures to ensure their ability to respond to a continuity event. 

 

All Staff 

 

This section addresses the continuity planning and programming concerns that are applicable to 
all agency employees regardless of their connection to the ERG. The following activities are 
associated with continuity planning and preparedness for all agency staff regardless of their 
status with the ERG: 

 

3. Agencies must implement a process to communicate the agencys operating status to 
all staff. Agencies should follow the dismissal or closure procedures established for the 
facility or geographic region affected by an emergency situation that prevents significant 
numbers of employees from reporting for work on time or that requires agencies to close 
all or part of their activities. Agencies in the Washington, DC, area should follow the 
Washington, DC, Area Dismissal or Closure Procedures which are available through 
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Operating Status for the Washington, DC, area 
on the OPM website: http://www.opm.gov/emergency. Federal Executive Boards (FEBs) 
and Federal Executive Associations (FEAs) should coordinate similar dismissal or 
closure procedures in other major metropolitan areas. In addition, agencies must 
communicate how, and the extent to which, employees are expected to remain in contact 
with their agencies during any closure situation. 


 

4. Agencies must implement a process to contact and account for all staff in the event 
of an emergency. Agencies should have procedures in place to contact employees in the 
event of an emergency. Agencies should establish alternative means for employees to 
contact the agency in the event an emergency causes a disruption to the regular means of 
communication with the agency. These communications could be conducted by either 
establishing a toll free telephone number or a website that would allow employees to 
notify the agency of their status. 

 

Human Capital Considerations 

 

This section addresses the unique human capital related requirements and other issues that are 
required to support an effective continuity plan and program. An agencys Continuity 
Coordinator (or continuity manager) should work closely with the agencys Chief Human Capital 
Officer or Director of Human Resources to resolve human capital issues related to a continuity 
event. Human capital issues can be solved typically at the agency level through the agencys 
Chief Human Capital Officer or Director of Human Resources, or their designees, using 
available laws, U.S. Office of Personnel Management regulations and guidance, as well as 
agency implementing instructions. The planning and preparedness related to human capital for a 
continuity event includes the following activities: 

 

5. Agencies must identify a human capital liaison from the agencys human resources 
staff to work with the Continuity Coordinator or continuity manager when 
developing the agencys emergency plans. An agencys Continuity Coordinator should 
work closely with the agencys Chief Human Capital Officer or Director of Human 
Resources to resolve human capital issues related to a continuity event. The Chief 
Human Capital Officer or Director of Human Resources will ensure that the agencys 
policies remain current and relevant to changing environments or evolving threats. An 
agencys continuity programs, plans, or procedures should include agency-specific 
guidance and direction for continuity personnel on a wide range of human capital areas. 
Additional guidance is available at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management website at 
http://www.opm.gov. 

6. Agencies must implement a process to communicate their human capital guidance 
for emergencies (pay, leave, staffing and other human resources flexibilities) to 
managers and make staff aware of that guidance in an effort to help agencies 
continue essential functions during an emergency. Working with the Chief Human 
Capital Officer or Director of Human Resources, agencies must institute a process to 
communicate their human capital guidance for emergencies to managers, such as 
guidance on pay, leave, work scheduling, benefits, telework, hiring, etc., authorities and 
flexibilities. Pay, leave, staffing, and other human resources flexibilities available to 
agencies during an emergency are available through the agencies human capital or 
human resources offices and on the U.S. Office of Personnel Management website at 
http://www.opm.gov/emergency. In addition to communicating their human capital 
guidance to managers, agencies must institute methods for staff to become aware of and 


familiar with the human capital guidance during emergencies such as utilizing an intranet 
website or employee orientation briefing. 

 

Agency Continuity Coordinators should consult with their Chief Human Capital Officer or 
Director of Human Resources on ways to meet the six requirements of human capital planning 
for continuity identified above. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management will work with the 
Chief Human Capital Officers Council and Directors of Human Resources to provide additional 
guidance as necessary. 


TEST, TRAINING, AND EXERCISE (TT&E) PROGRAM 

An effective TT&E program is necessary to assist agencies to prepare and validate their 
organizations capabilities and program, and to the Federal executive branchs ability to perform 
Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) and Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) during 
any emergency. This requires the identification, training, and preparedness of personnel capable 
of performing their continuity responsibilities and implementing procedures to support the 
continuation of agency essential functions. 

 

The testing, training, and exercising of continuity capabilities is essential to demonstrating, 
assessing, and improving an agencys ability to execute its continuity program, plans, and 
procedures. Training familiarizes continuity personnel with their roles and responsibilities in 
support of the performance of an agencys essential functions during a continuity event. Tests 
and exercises serve to assess, validate, or identify for subsequent correction, all components of 
continuity plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities used in response to a continuity 
event. Periodic testing also ensures that equipment and procedures are kept in a constant state of 
readiness. An agencys TT&E program should be part of a multiyear TT&E plan that addresses 
continuity TT&E requirements, resources to support TT&E activities, and a TT&E planning 
calendar. The following details the specific requirements for each component: 

 

Testing 

An agencys test program must include: 

 

1. Annual testing of alert, notification, and activation procedures for continuity personnel, 
and quarterly testing of such procedures for continuity personnel at agency headquarters. 
2. Annual testing of plans for recovering vital records (both classified and unclassified), 
critical information systems, services, and data. 
3. Annual testing of primary and backup infrastructure systems and services (e.g., power, 
water, fuel) at alternate facilities. 
4. Annual testing and exercising of required physical security capabilities at alternate 
facilities. 
5. Testing and validating equipment to ensure the internal and external interoperability and 
viability of communications systems, through monthly testing of the continuity 
communications capabilities outlined in Annex H (e.g., secure and nonsecure voice and 
data communications). 
6. Annual testing of the capabilities required to perform an agencys MEFs, as identified in 
the business process analysis (BPA). 
7. Conducting annual testing of internal and external interdependencies identified in the 
agencys continuity plan, with respect to performance of an agencys and other agencies 
MEFs. 
8. A process for formally documenting and reporting tests and their results. 
9. Reporting the test results as directed by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

 


Training 

An agencys training program must include: 

1. Annual continuity awareness briefings (or other means of orientation) for the entire 
workforce. 
2. Annual training for personnel (including host or contractor personnel) who are assigned 
to activate, support, and sustain continuity operations. 
3. Annual training for the agencys leadership on that agencys PMEFs and MEFs, 
including training on their continuity responsibilities. 
4. Annual training for all agency personnel who assume the authority and responsibility of 
the agencys leadership if that leadership is incapacitated or becomes otherwise 
unavailable during a continuity situation. 
5. Annual training for all predelegated authorities for making policy determinations and 
other decisions, at the headquarters, field, satellite, and other organizational levels, as 
appropriate. 
6. Personnel briefings on agency continuity plans that involve using, or relocating to, 
alternate facilities, existing facilities, or virtual offices. 
7. Annual training on the capabilities of communications and information technology (IT) 
systems to be used during a continuity event. 
8. Annual training regarding identification, protection, and ready availability of electronic 
and hardcopy documents, references, records, information systems, and data management 
software and equipment (including classified and other sensitive data) needed to support 
essential functions during a continuity situation. 
9. Annual training on an agencys devolution option for continuity, to address how each 
agency will identify and conduct its essential functions during an increased threat 
situation or in the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency. 
10. Annual training for all reconstitution plans and procedures to resume normal agency 
operations from the original or replacement primary operating facility. 

 

Training must prepare continuity personnel to respond to all emergencies and disasters and 
ensure performance of the agencys essential functions. These include interdependencies both 
within and external to the agency. As part of its training program, the agency must document the 
training conducted, the date of training, those completing the training, and the training 
facilitator/instructor. Agencies must also submit an annual report on their training program to 
FEMA. Specific reporting requirements and guidance shall be updated annually by FEMA. 

 

Exercises 

An agencys continuity exercise program focuses primarily on evaluating capabilities or an 
element of a capability, such as a plan or policy, in a simulated situation. Agencys should refer 
to HSEEP for additional exercise and evaluation guidance. 

 

An agencys exercise program must include: 

1. Compliance with the DHS-mandated National Exercise Program (NEP), as appropriate. 
2. An annual opportunity for continuity personnel to demonstrate their familiarity with 
continuity plans and procedures and to demonstrate the agencys capability to continue its 
essential functions. 


3. An annual exercise that incorporates the deliberate and preplanned movement of 
continuity personnel to an alternate facility or location. 
4. An opportunity to demonstrate intra- and interagency communications capabilities. 
5. An opportunity to demonstrate that backup data and records required to support essential 
functions at alternate facilities or locations are sufficient, complete, and current. 
6. An opportunity for continuity personnel to demonstrate their familiarity with the 
reconstitution procedures to transition from a continuity environment to normal activities 
when appropriate. 
7. An opportunity for continuity personnel to demonstrate their familiarity with devolution 
procedures. 
8. A comprehensive debriefing or hotwash after each exercise, which allows participants to 
identify systemic weakness in plans and procedures and to recommend revisions to the 
agencys continuity plan. 
9. A cycle of events that incorporates evaluations, after-action reports, and lessons learned 
into the development and implementation of a corrective action program (CAP). 
10. Organizational participation: conducting and documenting annual assessments of their 
continuity TT&E programs and continuity plans and programs, and then reporting these 
findings as directed to FEMA. 
11. Organizational assistance to FEMA in conducting annual full-scale continuity exercises 
and biennial assessments of the agencys continuity program with reports submitted to 
the National Continuity Coordinator (NCC) and the President. 
12. Each department and agency shall develop a CAP to assist in documenting, prioritizing, 
and resourcing continuity issues identified during TT&E, assessments, and emergency 
operations. The purpose of a CAP is to accomplish the following: 
a. Identify continuity deficiencies and other areas requiring improvement and provide 
responsibilities and a timeline for corrective action. 
b. Identify program and other continuity funding requirements for submission to 
department and agency leadership and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
c. Identify and incorporate efficient acquisition processes, and where appropriate, 
collect all interagency requirements into one action. 
d. Identify continuity personnel requirements for department and agency leadership and 
their supporting Human Resource Offices and the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM). 

 

The NEP, under the leadership of the Secretary of Homeland Security, is a mechanism for 
examining the preparation of the United States Government and its officers and other officials, 
and for adopting policy changes that might improve such preparations. The principal focus of 
the NEP is a series of exercises designed for heads of agencies and other key officials, which 
examines and evaluates emerging national-level policy issues. The NEP also addresses the 
coordination of exercise efforts. 

The NEP does not preclude or replace exercise programs conducted by individual agencies, but it 
allows and encourages agencies to align their exercise programs to United States governmentwide 
priorities. This may result in internal exercises that serve as building blocks toward an 
agencys participation in NEP events, or it may result in proposals for incorporating an 
individual agencys continuity exercises within a NEP event. The HSEEP is a capabilities- and 
performance-based exercise plan that provides a standardized policy, methodology, and language 


for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating all exercises. The HSEEP is a pillar of the 
NEP framework. 

Separate from their participation in NEP events, agencies must develop and maintain a continuity 
TT&E program for conducting and documenting TT&E activities. 


DEVOLUTION OF CONTROL AND DIRECTION 

Devolution planning supports overall continuity planning and addresses catastrophes and other 
all-hazards emergencies that render an agencys leadership and key staff unavailable to or 
incapable of performing its essential functions from either the agencys primary or alternate 
facilities. Devolution planning also addresses notice and no notice events. A continuity plans 
devolution option should be developed so that it addresses how an agency will identify and 
transfer its essential functions and/or leadership authorities away from the primary facility or 
facilities, and to a location that offers a safe and secure environment in which essential functions 
can continue to be performed. The devolution option may be used when the agencys alternate 
facility is not available, or the option can be activated as a continuity measure. 

 

At a minimum a devolution plan will: 

1. Include the following elements of a viable continuity capability: program plans and 
procedures, budgeting and acquisitions, essential functions, orders of succession and 
delegations of authority specific to the devolution site, interoperable communications, 
vital records management, staff, test, training, and exercise (TT&E), and reconstitution. 
2. Identify essential functions, define tasks that support those essential functions, and 
determine the necessary resources to facilitate those functions immediate and seamless 
transfer to the devolution site. 
3. Include a roster that identifies fully equipped and trained personnel who will be stationed 
at the designated devolution site and who will have the authority to perform essential 
functions and activities when the devolution option of the continuity plan is activated. 
4. Identify what would likely activate or trigger the devolution option. 
5. Specify how and when direction and control of agency operations will be transferred to 
and from the devolution site. 
6. List the necessary resources (i.e., equipment and materials) to facilitate the performance 
of essential functions at the devolution site. 
7. Establish and maintain reliable processes and procedures for acquiring the resources 
necessary to continue essential functions and to sustain those operations for extended 
periods. 
8. Establish and maintain a capability to restore or reconstitute agency authorities to their 
pre-event status upon termination of devolution. 

 

Devolution plans, responsibilities, and capabilities will include all elements of continuity 
planning including tests, annual training of devolution staff, and at a minimum, biennial 
exercises to ensure devolution capabilities are prepared and capable of performing an agencys 
essential functions. 

All devolution preparedness activities will be documented in writing with dates of TT&E and 
names of staff participating in the TT&E. 

A corrective action program (CAP) will be established and documented to support an agencys 
devolution program. 


RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS 

Agencies must identify and outline a plan to return to normal operations once agency heads or 
their successors determine that reconstitution operations for resuming normal business operations 
can be initiated. Agencies must: 

1. Provide an executable plan for transitioning back to efficient normal operational status 
from continuity operations status, once a threat or disruption has passed. 
2. Coordinate and pre-plan options for agency reconstitution regardless of the level of 
disruption that originally prompted the agency to implement its continuity plans. These 
options must include moving operations from the continuity or devolution location to 
either the original operating facility or, if necessary, to a new operating facility. 
3. Outline the necessary procedures, whether under a standard continuity operations 
scenario or under a devolution scenario, for conducting a smooth transition from the 
relocation site to a new facility. 

 

Implementation actions associated with reconstitution include: 

1. Informing all personnel that the actual emergency, or the threat of an emergency, no 
longer exists, and instructing personnel on how to resume normal operations. 
2. Supervising either an orderly return to the normal operating facility or a move to another 
temporary facility or to a new permanent operating facility. 
3. Verifying that all systems, communications, and other required capabilities are available 
and operational and that the agency is fully capable of accomplishing all essential 
functions and operations at the new or restored facility. 

4. Organizations are required to notify their agency HQ upon continuity reconstitution. 
Agency HQ Points of Contact (POCs) must notify the FOC at 540.665.6100 or at 
800.634.7084. Agency HQ POCs shall submit a Continuity Status Reporting Form only 
if it contains more information beyond what has been reported to the FOC, to fema-ncpcoop@
dhs.gov or Fax to 940.323.2822, using the form and procedures provided by 
FEMAs National Continuity Programs Directorate. 
5. Conducting an after-action review of the effectiveness of the continuity plans and 
procedures, identifying areas for improvement, documenting these in the agencys 
corrective action program (CAP), and then developing a remedial action plan as soon as 
possible after the reconstitution. 
6. Identifying which (if any) records were affected by the incident, and working with the 
records office (or similar function in the agency) to ensure an effective transition or 
recovery of vital records and databases and other records that had not been designated as 
vital records. 

 

 

 

 


CONTINUITY PLAN OPERATIONAL PHASES 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 

An agency must be prepared to implement executive decisions that are based upon a 
review of the emergency, and that then determine the best course of action based on the 
agencys readiness posture. The agency should integrate implementation procedures and 
criteria into their continuity plans. The agencys continuity plan must address four phases 
of: (1) readiness and preparedness, (2) activation and relocation, (3) continuity 
operations, and (4) reconstitution. 

 

Readiness and Preparedness 

Readiness is the ability of an organization to respond to a continuity event. Although 
readiness is a function of planning and training, it is ultimately the responsibility of an 
agencys leadership to ensure that an organizationthrough normal procedures or with a 
continuity plancan perform its mission essential functions before, during, and after allhazards 
emergencies or disasters. This phase includes all agency continuity readiness 
and preparedness activities including development, review, and revision of plans, TT&E, 
risk management, etc. 

 

The implementation of a continuity plan and its associated procedures may require the 
use of primary and/or alternate or other facilities, depending upon the emergency and its 
effect on normal operations. Examples of scenarios that may require continuity 
operations activation include the following: 

1. An agency receives, or the region the agency is located in receives, notification of 
a credible threat, which leads the agency to enhance its readiness posture and 
prepare to take actions as necessary. 
2. An agency experiences an emergency or a disruption that does not require 
movement of all continuity personnel to an alternate site. Some disruptions may 
require that key personnel remain onsite to conduct essential functions; other 
disruptions may prevent some or all personnel from getting to the agencys 
primary location; and yet others may require implementing a social distancing 
strategy which would require the use of primary, alternate and other relocations, 
such as telework. 
3. An agency headquarters (HQ) continuity staff or facilities are unavailable, 
necessitating a shift of operations to a regional, field or other location 
(devolution). 
4. A single agency facility is temporarily unavailable, and the agency either 
accommodates that facilitys operations and personnel at another of its own 
facilities, or transfers those operations and personnel to a facility of another 
agency. 
5. Many, if not all, agencies must evacuate the immediate or larger geographically 
affected area. 

 

Organizations outside the National Capital Region (NCR) may consider creating a 
continuity readiness posture similar to the executive branchs Continuity of 


Government Readiness Conditions (COGCON) system for the NCR, which is presented 
in Table 3. 


Table 3: COGCON Matrix 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT 
READINESS CONDITIONS (COGCON) MATRIX 

 


Activation and Relocation (0-12 Hours) 

The agency will provide a process or methodology for attaining operational capability at 
all continuity sites as soon as possible and with minimal disruption to operations, but in 
all cases within 12 hours of activation. Agencies will also identify those essential 
functions that must be continued without disruption and will ensure these can be 
conducted, under all conditions. The process should include the activation of plans, 
procedures, and schedules for the continuation of essential functions, as well as for the 
personnel, vital records and databases, and equipment involved with these functions, with 
minimal disruption. The activation and relocation phase includes the following activities: 

1. The occurrence of an event or the threat of an event. 
2. Review, analysis, and decision to activate continuity plans. 
3. Alert and notification of continuity personnel. 
4. Relocation, if necessary, to alternate or other continuity facilities. 
5. An accountability analysis of continuity personnel. 
6. Identification of available leadership. 
7. Determination and reporting of operational capabilities to the FEMA Operations 
Center (FOC). 

Organizations are required to notify their agency HQ upon activation of continuity plans. 
Agency HQ Points of Contact (POCs) must notify the FOC at 540.665.6100 or at 
800.634.7084, and submit a Continuity Status Reporting Form to fema-ncpcoop@
dhs.gov or Fax to 940.323.2822, using the form and procedures provided by 
FEMAs National Continuity Programs Directorate, of any activation of continuity plans 
(regardless of the agencys location) and of the time of execution or activation of calldown 
procedures. The POCs should also courtesy copy the National Operations Center 
(NOC). 

 

Activation and relocation plans or procedures should include the following: 

1. A decision matrix for continuity plan activation: 
a. With warning during duty hours and non-duty hours. 
b. Without warning during duty hours and non-duty hours. 

2. Notification of: 
a. Alternate facilities and on site support teams. 
b. The FOC (by the agencys HQ) of continuity plan activation and relocation 
(Subordinate agency organizations will notify their respective agency HQ of 
continuity plan activation and relocation, and HQ will in turn notify the FOC). 
c. Other POCs, as appropriate. 
d. Employees (continuity personnel and non-deployed personnel). 

3. Instructions on moving to an alternate facility, including directions to the site(s) 
and maps of routes from the primary location to the alternate or other continuity 
facility or location. 
4. Identification of what drive-away kits should contain and how those kits will be 
maintained. 
5. Instructions on moving vital records (those that have not been prepositioned) from 
the primary to the alternate facility. 


6. Instructions on procuring necessary equipment/supplies that are not already in 
place. 

 

Continuity Operations 

This phase includes the following activities to continue essential functions: 

1. Accounting for all agency personnel. 
2. Performing essential functions (which depend on the situation). 
3. Establishing communications with supporting and supported agencies, customers, 
and stakeholders. 
4. Preparing for the reconstitution of the Agency. 

Plans or procedures will include: 

1. Reception in-processing and accounting for continuity personnel. 
2. Transition of responsibilities to the deployed continuity personnel. 
3. Guidance for nondeployed personnel. 
4. Identification of replacement personnel and augmentees, as necessary. 
5. Execution of all essential functions at the alternate facility. 
6. Activation of processes and procedures to acquire the resources necessary to 
continue essential functions and to sustain operations. 
7. Notification of agencies that the affected agency interacts with, customers, and 
stakeholders of activation of continuity plans and status (agency headquarters will 
notify the FOC and all other appropriate POCs of the agencys alternate location, 
operational and communications status, and anticipated duration of relocation, if 
known. The FOC will notify agencies of any additional continuity reporting 
requirements). 
8. Redeployment plans for phasing down alternate facility operations and returning 
operations, personnel, records, and equipment to the primary or other operating 
facility, when appropriate. 

 

Reconstitution 

Reconstitution is normally conducted using a priority-based phased approach, in which 
most critical functions are transferred last. Those functions that were discontinued 
because of the emergency should be reconstituted first. All personnel should be informed 
that the necessity for continuity operations no longer exists. Instructions for resumption 
of normal operations are provided, including supervising an orderly return to the normal 
operating facility, moving to another temporary facility, or to a new permanent facility. 
All organizations will report their location status to higher HQ. HQ elements will report 
movement status to the FOC. The FOC will relay this information to the NOC and the 
FEMA National Continuity Programs Directorate. The process of reconstitution will 
generally start immediately after an event concludes, and can run concurrently with the 
recovery process. Some of the activities involved with reconstitution include: 

1. Assessing the status of affected facilities. 
2. Determining how much time is needed to repair the affected facility and/or to 
acquire a new facility. 
3. Supervising facility repairs. 


4. Notifying decision makers of the status of repairs, including estimates of when the 
repairs will be completed. 
5. Implementing a priority-based phased approach to reconstitution. 

There should be an after-action review of the effectiveness of continuity plans and 
procedures as soon as possible, including an identification of aspects of the plans and 
procedures that need to be corrected, followed by development of a corrective action 
program (CAP). 


LIST OF ACRONYMS 

APHS/CT 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism 

APNSA 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 

BIA 

Business Impact Analysis 

BPA 

Business Process Analysis 

CAG 

Continuity Advisory Group 

CAP 

Corrective Action Program 

CCA 

Continuity Communications Architecture 

CCAB 

Continuity Communications Architecture Board 

CI/KR 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 

COG 

Continuity of Government 

COGCON 

Continuity of Government Readiness Conditions 

COOP 

Continuity of Operations 

CPCC 

Continuity Policy Coordination Committee 

CWG 

Continuity Working Group 

DHS 

Department of Homeland Security 

DOD 

Department of Defense 

ECG 

Enduring Constitutional Government 

ERG 

Emergency Relocation Group 

ESF 

Emergency Support Function 

FCD 

Federal Continuity Directive 

FE 

Functional Exercise 

FEA 

Federal Executive Association 

FEB 

Federal Executive Board 

FEMA 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FOC 

FEMA Operations Center 

FSE 

Full-Scale Exercise 

GAO 

Government Accountability Office 

GCC 

Government Coordinating Council 

GSA 

General Services Administration 

HQ 

Headquarters 

HSAS 

Homeland Security Advisory System 

HSEEP 

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 

HSPD 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

IAB 

Interagency Board 

IT 

Information Technology 

MEF 

Mission Essential Function 


MOA/MOU 

Memorandum of Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding 

NCC 

National Continuity Coordinator 

NCR 

National Capital Region 

NCS 

National Communications System 

NEF 

National Essential Function 

NEP 

National Exercise Program 

NFG 

Non-Federal Governments 

NICC 

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center 

NIMS 

National Incident Management System 

NIPP 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

NOC 

National Operations Center 

NRF 

National Response Framework 

NSPD 

National Security Presidential Directive 

OEP 

Occupant Emergency Plan 

OMB 

Office of Management and Budget 

OPM 

Office of Personnel Management 

OSTP 

Office of Science and Technology Policy 

PMEF 

Primary Mission Essential Function 

POC 

Point of Contact 

RRS 

Readiness Reporting System 

SCC 

Sector Coordinating Council 

TT&E 

Test, Training, and Exercise 

TTX 

Tabletop Exercise 

WMD 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 


GLOSSARY 

Activation  Once a continuity plan has been implemented, whether in whole or in part, 
it is considered activated. 

Agencies  Federal departments and agencies means those executive departments 
enumerated in 5 U.S.C.  101, together with the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C.  104(1), Government 
corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C.  103(1), and the United States Postal Service 
(USPS). The departments, agencies, and independent organizations are referred to in this 
document as agencies. 

Agency head  The highest-ranking official of the primary occupant agency, or a 
successor or designee who has been selected by that official. 

All-hazards  The spectrum of all types of hazards including accidents, technological 
events, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, warfare, and chemical, biological including 
pandemic influenza, radiological, nuclear, or explosive events. 

Alternate facilities  Locations, other than the primary facility, used to carry out 
essential functions, particularly in a continuity event. Alternate facilities refers to not 
only other locations, but also nontraditional options such as working at home 
(teleworking), telecommuting, and mobile-office concepts. 

Automated data processing (ADP) equipment  Equipment that performs data 
processing largely by automatic means. 

Business impact analysis (BIA)  A method of identifying the effects of failing to 
perform a function or requirement. 

Business process analysis (BPA)  A method of examining, identifying, and mapping 
the functional processes, workflows, activities, personnel expertise, systems, data, and 
facilities inherent in the execution of a function or requirement. 

Catastrophic emergency  Any incident, regardless of location, that results in 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the U.S. 
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or government functions. 

Category  This term refers to the categories of agencies listed in Annex A to NSPD- 
51/HSPD-20. 

Communications  Voice, video, and data capabilities that enable the leadership and 
staff to conduct the mission essential functions of the organization. Robust 
communications help ensure that the leadership receives coordinated, integrated policy 
and operational advice and recommendations and will provide the ability for 
governments and the private sector to communicate internally and with other entities 
(including with other Federal agencies, State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, 
and the private sector) as necessary to perform their Mission Essential Functions (MEFs). 


Continuity  An uninterrupted ability to provide services and support, while maintaining 
organizational viability, before, during, and after an event. 

Continuity capability  The ability of an organization to continue to perform its 
essential functions, using Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of 
Government (COG) programs and continuity requirements that have been integrated into 
the organizations daily operations, with the primary goal of ensuring the preservation of 
our form of government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of 
National Essential Functions (NEFs) under all conditions. Building upon a foundation of 
continuity planning and continuity program management, the pillars of a continuity 
capability are leadership, staff, communications, and facilities. 

Continuity Communications Architecture (CCA)  An integrated, comprehensive, 
interoperable information architecture, developed utilizing the OMB-sanctioned Federal 
Enterprise Architecture Framework, that describes the data, systems, applications, 
technical standards, and underlying infrastructure required to ensure that Federal 
executive branch departments and agencies can execute their Primary Mission Essential 
Functions and Mission Essential Functions in support of National Essential Functions and 
continuity requirements under all circumstances. 

 

Continuity Coordinators  Representatives of executive branch departments and 
agencies at the assistant secretary (or equivalent) level. 

Continuity of Government (COG)  A coordinated effort within each branch of 
government (e.g., the Federal Governments executive branch) to ensure that NEFs 
continue to be performed during a catastrophic emergency. Note, this term may also be 
applied to non-Federal governments. 

Continuity of Government Readiness Condition (COGCON)  COGCON is a system 
for establishing, measuring, and reporting the readiness of executive branch continuity 
programs, which is independent of other Federal Government readiness systems. (See 
Table 3 in Annex N for a detailed COGCON matrix.) 

Continuity of Operations (COOP)  An effort within individual agencies to ensure they 
can continue to perform their Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and Primary Mission 
Essential Functions (PMEFs) during a wide range of emergencies, including localized 
acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies. 

Continuity Personnel - Those personnel, both senior and core, who provide the 
leadership advice, recommendations, and functional support necessary to continue 
essential operations 

Continuity Policy Coordination Committee (CPCC)  A committee led by HSC 
established to comprehensively address national level continuity program coordination, 
integration, oversight, and management. This forum institutionalizes national security 
policy development, implementation, and oversight for continuity programs. The 
Committee serves in a continuity oversight and management role with membership at the 
assistant secretary level from the following organizations: the Office of the Vice 
President; the Homeland and National Security Councils; the White House Military 


Office; the Office of Management and Budget; the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy; the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security; the 
Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; the United States Secret Service; the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other observers may be invited to attend. 

Continuity program management cycle  An ongoing, cyclical model of planning, 
training, evaluating, and implementing corrective actions for continuity capabilities. 

Corrective action program (CAP)  An organized method to document and track 
improvement actions for a program. The CAP System is a web-based tool that enables 
Federal, State, and local emergency response and homeland security officials to develop, 
prioritize, track, and analyze corrective actions following exercises or real world 
incidents. Users may enter data from a finalized After Action Report/Improvement Plan, 
track the progress of corrective action implementation, and analyze and report on trends 
in improvement plans. 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) An interdependent network of 
vital physical and information facilities, networks, and assets, including the 
telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, and transportation sectors, that 
private business and the Government rely upon (including for the defense and national 
security of the United States). Critical infrastructures are those systems and assets so 
vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on 
national security (including national economic security) and/or national public health or 
safety. 

Delegation of authority  Identification, by position, of the authorities for making policy 
determinations and decisions at HQ, field levels, and all other organizational locations. 
Generally, pre-determined delegations of authority will take effect when normal channels 
of direction have been disrupted and will lapse when these channels have been 
reestablished. 

Devolution  The capability to transfer statutory authority and responsibility for essential 
functions from an agencys primary operating staff and facilities to other agency 
employees and facilities, and to sustain that operational capability for an extended period. 

Drive-away kit  A kit prepared by, and for, an individual who expects to deploy to an 
alternate location during an emergency. The kit contains items needed to minimally 
satisfy an individuals personal and professional needs during deployment. 

Emergency operating records  Records that support the execution of an agencys 
essential functions. 

Emergency relocation group (ERG)  Pre-designated staff who move to an alternate 
facility to continue essential functions in the event that their normal work locations are 
threatened or have been incapacitated by an incident. 

ERG member  A person who has been assigned responsibility to report to an alternate 
facility, as required to perform agency essential functions or other tasks related to 
continuity operations. 


Emergency Support Function (ESF)  From the National Response Plan (NRP), a 
grouping of government and certain private sector capabilities into an organizational 
structure to provide support, resources, and services. The NRP groups functions as 
follows: 

ESF #1 

Transportation 

ESF #2 

Communications 

ESF #3 

Public Works and Engineering 

ESF #4 

Firefighting 

ESF #5 

Emergency Management 

ESF #6 

Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services 

ESF #7 

Resource Support 

ESF #8 

Public Health and Medical Services 

ESF #9 

Urban Search and Rescue 

ESF #10 

Oil and Hazardous Materials Response 

ESF #11 

Agriculture and Natural Resources 

ESF #12 

Energy 

ESF #13 

Public Safety and Security 

ESF #14 

Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation 

ESF #15 

External Affairs 

 

Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG)  A cooperative effort among the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government, coordinated by 
the President, as a matter of comity with respect to the legislative and judicial branches 
and with proper respect for the constitutional separation of powers among the branches. 
The ECG effort is intended to preserve the constitutional framework under which the 
Nation is governed and the capability of all three branches of Government, during a 
catastrophic emergency, to execute their constitutional responsibilities and to provide for 
orderly successions, appropriate transitions of leadership, interoperability, and support of 
NEFs. 

Essential functions  The critical activities performed by organizations, especially after 
a disruption of normal activities. There are three categories of essential functions: NEFs, 
PMEFs, and MEFs. 

Executive departments and agencies  Executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 
101, along with DHS, independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C.  104(1), 
Government corporations as defined by 5U.S.C.  103(1), and the United States Postal 
Service. 

Facilities  Locations where an organizations leadership and staff operate. Leadership 
and staff may be co-located in one facility or dispersed across many locations and 
connected by communications systems. Facilities must be able to provide staff with 
survivable protection and must enable continued and endurable operations. 

Federal Continuity Directive (FCD)  A document developed and promulgated by 
DHS, in coordination with the CAG and in consultation with the CPCC, which directs 


executive branch departments and agencies to carry out identified continuity planning 
requirements and assessment criteria. 

Federal Executive Associations (FEAs)  A forum, modeled after but independent of 
the Federal Executive Boards, for communication and collaboration among Federal 
agencies outside of Washington, DC, utilized to help coordinate the field activities of 
Federal departments and agencies in localized sections of the Nation. 

Federal Executive Boards (FEBs)  A forum, established by Presidential Directive in 
1961, for communication and collaboration among Federal agencies outside of 
Washington, DC, utilized to help coordinate the field activities of Federal departments 
and agencies primarily in our Nations larger cities. With approximately 88% of all 
Federal employees working outside of the National Capital Region, the national network 
of 28 FEBs serves as a cornerstone for strategic partnerships in Government. 

FEMA Operations Center (FOC)  A continuously operating entity of DHS, which is 
responsible for monitoring emergency operations and promulgating notification of 
changes to COGCON status. 

Full-Scale Exercise  A full-scale exercise is a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional, multidiscipline 
exercise involving functional (e.g., joint field office, emergency operations 
centers) and "boots on the ground" response (e.g., continuity staff relocating to their 
alternate sites to conduct scenario driven essential functions). 

Functional Exercise  A functional exercise examines and/or validates the coordination, 
command, and control between various multi-agency coordination centers (e.g., 
emergency operations centers, joint field office). A functional exercise does not involve 
any "boots on the ground" (i.e., first responders or emergency officials responding to an 
incident in real time). 

Government Functions  Government functions include both the collective functions of 
the heads of agencies as defined by statute, regulations, presidential direction, or other 
legal authority, and the functions of the legislative and judicial branches. 

Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) A series of tools used by DHS that 
provide the public with guidance on the status of the Nations homeland security. The 
system combines threat information with vulnerability assessments, and communicates 
this information to public safety officials and the public. The system includes Homeland 
Security Threat Advisories, Homeland Security Information Bulletins, and the Threat 
Level System. 

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)  A capabilitiesbased 
and performance-based program that furnishes standardized policies, doctrines, and 
terminologies for the design, development, performance, and evaluation of homeland 
security exercises. The National Exercise Program (NEP) uses the HSEEP as a common 
methodology for exercises. The HSEEP also provides tools and resources to facilitate the 
management of self-sustaining homeland security exercise programs. 


Hot Site An alternate facility that already has in place the computer, 
telecommunications, other information technology, environmental infrastructure, and 
personnel required to recover critical business functions or information systems. 

Interagency Board (IAB)  A working group established by the NCC to review and 
recommend validation of potential PMEFs submitted by agencies for submission to the 
NCC for final approval. 

Interoperability  Interoperability has two meanings: (1) The ability of systems, 
personnel, or agencies to provide services to and accept services from other systems, 
personnel, or agencies, and to use the services so exchanged so that these organizations 
can operate together effectively; (2) A condition that is realized among electronic 
communications operating systems or grids and/or among individual electronic 
communications devices, when those systems and/or devices allow the direct, seamless, 
and satisfactory exchange of information and services between the users of those systems 
and devices. 

Interoperable communications  Communications that provide the capability to 
perform essential functions, in conjunction with other agencies, under all conditions. 

Leadership  The senior decisionmakers who have been elected (e.g., the President, 
State governors) or designated (e.g., Cabinet Secretaries, chief executive officers) to head 
a branch of Government or other organization. 

Memorandum of Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding (MOA/MOU)  
Written agreements between departments/agencies that require specific goods or services 
to be furnished or tasks to be accomplished by one agency in support of the other. 

Mission Essential Functions (MEFs)  The limited set of agency-level Government 
functions that must be continued throughout, or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of 
normal activities. 

Multiyear strategy and program management plan  A process that ensures the 
maintenance and continued viability of continuity plans. 

National Communications System (NCS)  A system governed by Executive Order 
12472 and comprised of the telecommunications assets of 24 Departments and Agencies. 
DHS serves as the Executive Agent for the NCS, which is responsible for assisting the 
President, the National Security Council, the Director of OSTP, and the Director of OMB 
in (1) the exercise of telecommunications functions and their associated responsibilities 
and (2) the coordination of planning for providing the Federal Government, under all 
circumstances (including crises and emergencies, attacks, and recovery and reconstitution 
from those events), with the requisite national security and emergency preparedness 
communications resources. 

National Continuity Policy  It is the policy of the United States to maintain a 
comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of Continuity of Operations 
and Continuity of Government programs in order to ensure the preservation of our form 
of government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of National 


Essential Functions under all conditions. (NSPD 51/HSPD 20, National Continuity 
Policy) 

National Essential Functions (NEFs)  The eight functions the President and the 
Nations leadership will focus on to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic 
emergency; NEFs, therefore, must be supported by COOP and COG capabilities. 

National Exercise Program (NEP)  The NEP is the Nations overarching exercise 
program formulated by the National Security Council / Homeland Security Council 
(NSC/HSC), and executed by the Federal Interagency. All interagency partners have 
adopted HSEEP as the methodology for all exercises that will be conducted as part of the 
NEP. 

National Incident Management System (NIMS)  HSPD-5 directed the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to develop and administer a NIMS to integrate effective practices in 
emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for 
incident management. The NIMS will enable responders at all levels to work together 
more effectively to manage domestic incidents no matter what their cause, size, or 
complexity. The benefits of the NIMS include a unified approach to incident 
management, standardized command and management structures, and an emphasis on 
preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management. 

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC)  A DHS entity, which operates 
24 hours a day, seven days a week, to maintain operational and situational awareness of 
the Nations critical infrastructure and key resources and to provide a process and 
mechanism for coordination and information sharing with government and industry 
partners. 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)  Pursuant to HSPD-7, the NIPP 
provides a coordinated approach to critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) 
protection roles and responsibilities for Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector 
security partners. The NIPP sets national priorities, goals, and requirements for effective 
distribution of funding and resources which will help ensure that our government, 
economy, and public services continue in the event of a terrorist attack or other disaster. 
The plan is based on the following: 

 Strong public-private partnerships which will foster relationships and facilitate 
coordination within and across CI/KR sectors. 
 Robust multi-directional information sharing which will enhance the ability to assess 
risks, make prudent security investments, and take protective action. 

Risk management framework establishing processes for combining consequence, 
vulnerability, and threat information to produce a comprehensive, systematic, and 
rational assessment of national or sector risk. 

National Operations Center (NOC)  A DHS entity, which operates 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, which is the primary national level hub for domestic situational 
awareness, common operational picture, information fusion, information sharing, 
communications, and coordination pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and 
domestic incident management. The NOC is responsible for collecting and fusing 


information from Federal, State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector agencies. 
Information on domestic incident management is shared with Emergency Operations 
Centers at all levels through the Homeland Security Information Network. 

Normal operations  Generally and collectively, normal operations refer to the broad 
functions undertaken by an organization when it is assigned responsibility for a given 
functional area; these functions include day to day tasks, planning and execution of tasks. 

National Response Framework (NRF)  A guide for conducting comprehensive, 
national, all-hazards incident management. The NRF incorporates public and private 
sector participation at all levels, from Federal agencies to the State and community level, 
and also emphasizes the importance of personal preparedness by individuals and their 
families. 

Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP)  A short-term emergency response program that 
establishes procedures for safeguarding lives and property. 

Orders of succession  Provisions for the assumption of senior agency offices during an 
emergency in the event that any of those officials are unavailable to execute their legal 
duties. 

Plan  A proposed or intended method of getting from one set of circumstances to 
another. A plan is often used to move from the present situation towards the achievement 
of one or more objectives or goals. 

Program  A group of related initiatives managed in a coordinated way, so as to obtain a 
level of control and benefits that would not be possible from the individual management 
of the initiatives. Programs may include elements of related work outside the scope of 
the discrete initiatives in the program. 

Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs)  Those department and agency 
Mission Essential Functions, validated by the NCC, which must be performed in order to 
support the performance of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of an emergency. 
PMEFs need to be continuous or resumed within 12 hours after an event and maintained 
for up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed. 

Readiness Reporting System (RRS)  Department of Homeland Security program to 
collect and manage continuity capability data and assessments of executive branch 
departments and agencies and their status to perform their Priority Mission Essential 
Functions (PMEFs) in support of the National Essential Functions (NEFs). The RRS will 
be used to conduct assessments and track capabilities at all times under all conditions, to 
include natural disasters, manmade incidents, terrorism, and war. 

Reconstitution  The process by which surviving and/or replacement agency personnel 
resume normal agency operations from the original or replacement primary operating 
facility. 

Recovery  The implementation of prioritized actions required to return an 
organizations processes and support functions to operational stability following an 
interruption or disaster. 


Rights and interests records  records that are necessary to protect the legal and 
financial rights of both the Federal Government and the persons who are affected by its 
actions. 

Risk analysis  The process by which risks are identified and evaluated. 

Risk assessment  The identification and assessment of hazards. 

Risk management  The process of identifying, controlling, and minimizing the impact 
of events whose consequences are or may be unknown, or events that are themselves 
fraught with uncertainty. 

Survivable communications  The establishment and maintenance of an assured end-toend 
communications path during all phases of an all hazard event. 

Tabletop Exercise (TTX)  A tabletop exercise involves key personnel discussing 
simulated scenarios in an informal setting. 

Telecommuting locations  Those locations equipped with computers and telephones 
that enable employees to work at home or at a location closer to their home than their 
main office. 

Telework  The ability to work at a location other than the official duty station to 
perform work or emergency duties. This may include, but is not limited to, using 
portable computers, personal computers, high-speed telecommunications links, and 
mobile communications devices. 

Test, training, and exercise (TT&E)  Measures to ensure that an agencys continuity 
plan is capable of supporting the continued execution of the agencys essential functions 
throughout the duration of a continuity event. 

Virtual offices  An environment where employees are not collocated and rely 
exclusively on information technologies to interact and conduct their work across 
distance from multiple geographic locations. 

Vital records  Electronic and hardcopy documents, references, and records to support 
essential functions during a continuity event. The two basic categories of vital records 
are (1) emergency operating records and (2) rights and interests records. 

Warm Site  An alternate facility that is equipped with some computer, 
telecommunications, other information technology, and environmental infrastructure, 
which is capable of providing backup after additional personnel, equipment, supplies, 
software, or customization are provided. 

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)  Weapons that are capable of killing a lot of 
people and/or causing a high-order magnitude of destruction, or weapons that are capable 
of being used in such a way as to cause mass casualties or create large-scale destruction. 
WMDs are generally considered to be nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological 
devices, but WMDs can also be high-explosive devices. 


Work-at-home  When employees carry out their work duties at their residence rather 
than their official duty station. 


AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES 

The following are the authorities and references for this FCD. 

AUTHORITIES: 

1) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.  404), July 26, 1947. 
2) Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.  101 et seq.), November 25, 2002. 
3) Executive Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management, July 20, 1979, as 
amended. 
4) Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency 
Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984, as amended. 
5) Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 
November 18, 1988, as amended. 
6) Executive Order 13286, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security, February 
28, 2003. 
7) National Security Presidential Directive 51/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 20, National Continuity Policy, May 9, 2007. 
8) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection, December 17, 2003. 
9) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness, December 
17, 2003. 
10) National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan, August 2007. 
11) National Communications System Directive 3-10, Minimum Requirements for 
Continuity Communications Capabilities, July 25, 2007. 

 

REFERENCES: 

1) 36 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1236, Management of Vital Records. 
2) 41 Code of Federal Regulations 101.20.103-4, Occupant Emergency Program. 
3) Presidential Decision Directive 62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to 
the Homeland and Americans Overseas, May 22, 1998. 
4) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1, Organization and Operation of the 
Homeland Security Council, October 29, 2001. 
5) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, Homeland Security Advisory System, 
March 11, 2002. 
6) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents, 
February 28, 2003. 
7) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a Common Identification 
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 27, 2004. 


8) National Infrastructure Protection Plan, January 2006. 
9) National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, November 1, 2005. 
10) National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, May 2006. 
11) National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, April 2007. 
12) National Incident Management System (NIMS), March 1, 2004. 
13) NIST Special Publication 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information 
Technology Systems, June 2002. 
14) NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems, December 2006. 
15) NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
Continuity Programs, 2007 Edition.