[Federal Register: April 25, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 80)]
[Notices]               
[Page 20579-20602]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr25ap02-118]                         

[[Page 20579]]

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Part II

Federal Emergency Management Agency

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology; 
Notice

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation 
Methodology

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

ACTION: Notice of correction.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is correcting 
certain provisions of the exercise evaluation areas published in the 
September 12, 2001 Federal Register notice entitled ``Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology'' (66 FR 47526-
47546). Today's notice supersedes our notice of September 12, 2001 and 
republishes that notice in its entirety with corrections.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The corrections contained in this notice are effective 
April 25, 2002.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vanessa E. Quinn, Chief, Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness Branch, Technological Services Division, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., Washington DC 20472; 
(202) 646-3664; vanessa.quinn@dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

    The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is correcting 
certain provisions of the exercise evaluation areas published in the 
September 12, 2001 Federal Register notice entitled ``Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology'' (66 FR 47526-
47546). On September 12, 2001, we (FEMA) published the Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise evaluation areas and associated 
criteria, effective as of October 1, 2001, for use when evaluating REP 
exercises. After publication, we need to clarify some of the 
information in the September notice. Today we supersede the September 
12, 2001 notice and republish it with corrections.

Revisions to September 12, 2001, Federal Register Notice

    Each item (a) through (n) that we list below describes a revision 
of the September notice and states the rationale for the change.
    (a) We inserted a sentence after the third sentence in the preamble 
discussion of Criterion 1.b.1 as follows:

    However, FEMA will evaluate all facilities, as a baseline, 
during the first exercise under the new Evaluation Criteria.

    Rationale: FEMA added the language to clearly state FEMA's intent 
to evaluate all facilities, during the first exercise under the new 
Criteria, as a baseline.
    (b) We revised the Extent of Play for Criterion 1.e.1, second 
paragraph, to read:

    All instruments should be inspected, inventoried, and 
operationally checked before each use. Instruments should be 
calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. 
Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without 
a manufacturer's recommendation should be calibrated annually. 
Modified CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with 
the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label 
indicating such calibration should be on each instrument, or 
calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, 
instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of 
readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above 
considerations should be included in 4.a.1 for field team equipment; 
4.c.1 for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to 
analytical equipment); reception center and emergency worker 
facilities' equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical 
facilities' equipment under 6.d.1.

    Rationale: The revision corrects the disconnect where the note 
implies that field team equipment is not included in this criterion but 
the opening sentence of the same paragraph mentions field team 
equipment. The revision also makes it clear that considerations do not 
apply to analytical equipment in 4.a.1.
    (c) We revised the Extent of Play for Criterion 1.e.1, sixth 
paragraph, to read:

    Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage 
locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage 
location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted 
during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification 
submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. 
Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date 
indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO 
may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory 
indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with 
U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

    Rationale: The change deletes the misinformation that FEMA can 
issue letters extending the shelf life of potassium iodide (KI).
    (d) We revised the Intent for Sub-Element 2.b, first sentence, to 
read:

    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to use all 
available data to independently project integrated dose and compare 
the estimated dose savings with the protective action guides.

    Rationale: The change clarifies what is meant by ``independently 
projected dose'' by specifying that ``all available data,'' from any 
source, can be used by the ORO.
    (e) We deleted reference to ``Evacuation Time Estimates'' in Sub-
element 2.b and in Extent of Play for Criterion 2.c.1.
    Rationale: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3 deletes Evacuation 
Time Estimates as a consideration when formulating protective actions.
    (f) We revised Criterion 3.b.1 to read:

    KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision 
to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the 
administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized 
individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e).

    Rationale: The change deletes ``(not the general public),'' since 
it may be confusing to some individuals.
    (g) We deleted ``decide upon and'' from Criterion 3.c.2, and moved 
the text that follows from the Extent of Play for Criterion 3.c.2 to 
the Extent of Play for Criterion 2.c.1.

    Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and 
notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions 
that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for 
students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be 
actual.
    In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or 
officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the 
capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for 
students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision making 
process for protective actions considers (that is, either accepts 
automatically or gives heavy weight to) protective action 
recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL at which these 
recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective 
actions for that ECL, and the location of students at the time (for 
example, whether the students are still at home, en route to the 
school, or at the school).

    Rationale: Evaluation Area 2 addresses protective action 
decisionmaking, and Evaluation Area 3 addresses protective action 
implementation. Thus, the decision process for the school population 
was moved from Evaluation Area 3 to Evaluation Area 2.
    (h) We revised the Extent of Play for Criterion 3.e.2, first 
paragraph, to read:

    Development of measures and strategies for implementation of 
Ingestion Pathway Zone (IPZ) protective actions should be 
demonstrated by formulation of protective action information for the 
general public and food producers and processors. This includes 
either pre-distributed public information material in the IPZ or the 
capability for the

[[Page 20581]]

rapid distribution of appropriate pre-printed and/or camera-ready 
information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and 
businesses. OROs should demonstrate the capability to control, 
restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial 
sectors. Exercise play should include demonstration of 
communications and coordination between organizations to implement 
protective actions. Actual field play of implementation activities 
may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with 
agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the IPZ 
should be demonstrated, but actual communications with food 
producers and processors may be simulated.

    Rationale: The change incorporates the option of pre-distributing 
the information.
    (i) We revised the Extent of Play for Criterion 3.f.1, first 
paragraph, to read:

    Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to coordinate 
and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not 
previously evacuated, to an area where radiological contamination 
will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the 
relocation PAGs. OROs should also demonstrate the capability to 
provide for short-term or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived 
in areas that have residual radiation levels above the (first-, 
second-, and fifty-year) PAGs.

    Rationale: The change clarifies the differences among short-,
intermediate-, and long-term relocation.
    (j) We revised the Intent for Sub-Element 4.a to read:

    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise 
necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and 
particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In 
addition, NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability 
to use field teams within the plume emergency planning zone to 
measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to 
detect radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In 
the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible 
release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby 
population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are 
available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these 
methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it 
is important to collect field radiological data in order to help 
characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and 
procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

    Rationale: The change corrects a disconnect and lack of clarity 
between this criterion and Criteria 2.b.1 and 2.b.2.
    (k) We added language to the Extent of Play for Criterion 5.a.1 as 
follows:

    Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with route alerting as the 
primary method of alerting and notifying the public should 
demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, 
following the decision to activate the alert and notification 
system, in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time 
requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. 
At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The 
selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, 
the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every 
six years. All alert and notification activities along the route 
should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be 
used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as 
agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile 
public address system will be conducted at some agreed upon 
location. The initial message should include the elements required 
by current FEMA REP guidance.

    Rationale: For some jurisdictions, route alerting is the primary 
alert and notification method, and we added this language for use when 
evaluating those jurisdictions.
    (l) We revised the second paragraph of the Extent of Play for 
Criterion 6.b.1 to read:

    The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be 
set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route 
markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control 
measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for 
a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor 
the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor 
areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door 
handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that 
were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should 
also be checked.

    Rationale: The change corrects a disconnect where the preamble of 
the September Federal Register notice says that references to air 
filters have been deleted, while the extent of play still referenced 
monitoring of air intake systems.
    (m) We added the following footnote 1 to the title of Table 2, 
Federal Evaluation Process Matrix, as follows:

    1. See Evaluation Criteria for Specific Requirements.

    Rationale: The statement in the footnote applies as a general rule, 
not just for the Sub-Elements noted in the September 12, 2001, notice.
    (n) We added the following footnote 4 to Table 2, Federal 
Evaluation Process Matrix, Sub-Element 3.b:

    4. Should be demonstrated in every biennial exercise by some 
organizations and should be demonstrated at least once every six 
years by every ORO with responsibility for implementation of KI 
decision.

    Rationale: The change highlights the requirement for some Offsite 
Response Organizations (ORO) to demonstrate the criterion at every 
exercise.

Revised September 12, 2001 Federal Register Notice

    Accordingly, this notice supersedes our notice of September 12, 
2001, Exercise Evaluation Methodology, 66 FR 47526-47546, and 
republishes that document with corrections, beginning with the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION portion of the preamble.

    Dated: April 19, 2002.
Michael D. Brown,
General Counsel.
    The corrected notice follows:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) has revised the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise 
Manual (REP-14) dated September 1991 by adopting the six Exercise 
Evaluation Areas described in this notice and deleting the thirty-four 
REP-14 Objectives that are set out in Section D of REP-14.\1\ This is 
an interim measure. FEMA is currently working on a REP Handbook, a 
comprehensive compilation of REP guidance. The REP Handbook will 
incorporate the new Exercise Evaluation Areas and portions of REP-14 
that pertain to the conduct of exercises. When the new reference book 
is issued, REP-14 will be withdrawn.
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    \1\ Adoption of the proposed Evaluation Criteria renders much of 
Section C.2 of REP-14 obsolete. Pages C.2-3 and C.2-4 of REP-14 
speak to the frequency with which particular REP-14 objectives will 
be exercised. FEMA is adopting the Federal Exercise Evaluation 
Matrix, which appears later in this document as Table 2, in place of 
the exercise objective groupings which appear on Pages C.2-3 and 
C.2-4 of REP-14.
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    Adoption of the new Evaluation Areas rendered a companion manual 
entitled Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation 
Methodology (REP-15) dated September 1991 obsolete. REP-15 is rescinded 
effective January 1, 2002, which is the date upon which all subsequent 
exercises will be evaluated in accordance with the new criteria.
    FEMA published the proposed evaluation areas and the Evaluation 
Module in the Federal Register on June 11, 2001 for sixty days of 
public comment, 66 FR 31342. The public comment period closed on August 
10, 2001. We received 83 comments by the deadline. Representatives of 
State and local public health, environmental and emergency management 
agencies submitted the majority of comments. We also received 
thoughtful and constructive comments from licensees of nuclear power 
plants, the general public and a public interest group.

[[Page 20582]]

    Under a Memorandum of Understanding between FEMA and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), 44 CFR 353, App. A (2000 edition), FEMA 
provides the NRC with an opportunity to review and comment on emergency 
planning and preparedness guidance issued by FEMA's Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness (REP) program. The NRC received a copy of the 
Federal Register notice and provided comments on August 10, 2001.

Background on Exercise Evaluation

    FEMA conducts and evaluates exercises through the REP program to 
assess the capability of Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) to 
respond to an emergency involving a commercial nuclear power plant, in 
accordance with FEMA regulations published in 44 CFR part 350.\2\ 
Although section 350.9 is the portion of part 350 that primarily speaks 
to exercises, section 350.9 does not specifically address the standards 
for conduct and evaluation of the exercises. These standards are in 44 
CFR 350.5(a) which states:
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    \2\ The preamble to 44 CFR part 350 is published at 46 FR 44332 
[September 28, 1983].

    ``Section 50.47 of [the NRC's] Emergency Planning Rule [10 CFR 
Parts 50 [Appendix E] and 70 as amended and the joint FEMA-Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 
Radiological Response Plants and Preparedness In Support of Nuclear 
Power Plants (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev 1 November, 1980) \3 4\ * * 
* are to be used in reviewing, evaluating and approving State and 
local radiological emergency plans and preparedness and in making 
any findings and determinations with respect to the adequacy of the 
plans and the capabilities of State and local government to 
implement them. Both the planning and preparedness standards and 
related criteria contained in NUREG-0654 are to be used by FEMA and 
the NRC in reviewing and evaluating State and local government 
radiological emergency plans and preparedness.'' \5\
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    \3\ This document is hereafter referred to as NUREG-0654.
    \4\ The planning standards and related criteria have been 
clarified, interpreted, and modified by FEMA Policy Memoranda, 
Guidance Memoranda, and REP Series documents.
    \5\ See also, 44 CFR 350.13(a) which states in relevant part 
``The basis upon which [FEMA] makes the determination for withdrawal 
of approval [of a State or local radiological emergency plan] is the 
same basis used in reviewing plans and exercises, that is, the 
planning standards and related criteria in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1, 
Rev. I.''

    Planning Standard N of NUREG-0654 addresses the conduct of 
exercises. The Planning Standard states that ``Periodic exercises are 
(will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response 
capabilities * * * and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises 
* * * are (will be) corrected.'' Evaluation criterion N.1.a of NUREG-
0654 defines an exercise as ``an event that tests the integrated 
capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within 
emergency preparedness plans and organizations.''
    The Planning Standard N criteria contain several requirements for 
exercises. All exercises must simulate an emergency that results in 
offsite radiological emergency releases that would require response by 
offsite authorities.\6\ Scenarios should be varied from year to year 
and conducted under various weather conditions; some exercises or 
drills should be off-hours and unannounced.\7\ In other respects, the 
Planning Standard N criteria contemplate that exercises will be 
conducted as set forth in NRC and FEMA rules and in exercise evaluation 
guidance.\8\
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    \6\ The NRC staff comment noted that an acceptable exercise 
scenario could involve a sufficient fission product accumulation in 
containment without a release, notwithstanding the language of 
Planning Standard N. FEMA believes that exercise scenarios that 
involve offsite radiological emergency releases provide a better 
test of an ORO's integrated response capability.
    \7\ See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a and 1.b.
    \8\ See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a (rules) 
and 3 (exercise evaluation guidance).
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    In September 1991, FEMA published the current exercise evaluation 
guidance, which is REP-14. REP-14 established a series of 34 objectives 
(REP-14 Objectives) that interpret and apply the guidance contained in 
NUREG-0654. A companion document, REP-15, contained a series of forms 
and checklists keyed to the 34 REP-14 Objectives for use by exercise 
evaluators in documenting performance. FEMA circulated both documents 
for public comment.\9\
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    \9\ On March 27, 1991, FEMA noticed the availability of REP-14 
and REP-15 for public comment in the Federal Register [56 FR 12734. 
FEMA announced that REP-14 and REP-15 were final and effective in 
subsequent Federal Register notices, 57 FR 4880 (February 10, 1992) 
corrected by 57 FR 10956 (March 31, 1992).
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    REP-14 also established the frequency with which each of the 
objectives would be demonstrated in exercises. The REP-14 Objectives 
were divided into three groups. Thirteen objectives in the first group 
would need to be demonstrated in every exercise. Every exercise should 
demonstrate 9 objectives in the second group by some but not all 
responding organizations as the scenario dictates, provided that all 
responding organizations must demonstrate the objective once every six 
years. Another eleven objectives must be demonstrated once every six 
years.\10\
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    \10\ See, REP-14, pages C-2.3 to C-2.4. REP-14 Objective 34 was 
not included in any of the three groups because it is not 
demonstrated by OROs. Objective 34 addresses demonstration of 
emergency response capability by nuclear power plant licensees in 
the event that State and local government decline to participate in 
radiological emergency planning and preparedness.
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Public Comment on the Proposed Evaluation Areas

    The new approach to exercise evaluation discussed in this notice is 
the outgrowth of a multi-year strategic review of the REP program. We 
explained the strategic review process that led to the formulation of 
this approach in the June 11, 2001 Federal Register notice, 66 FR 
31343-31344. A key recommendation of the strategic review process was 
that FEMA streamline the exercise evaluation process by making the 
criteria less prescriptive and more ``results-oriented.''
    A number of commenters felt that the proposal published on June 11 
substantially met this objective. A State emergency management agency, 
writing for itself and two counties noted, ``In general, we feel that 
the proposals are a substantial improvement over previous evaluation 
methodologies. The document is much less prescriptive and establishes 
the basis for an outcome-based evaluation.'' Another State observed. 
``This proposal showed that FEMA not only listened to the OROs'' 
concerns, but took our advice to heart and followed through with its 
commitment to make the exercise evaluation process more performance-
based and less subjective.'' However, several other commenters felt 
that the document remained too prescriptive. We have examined their 
suggestions and have made adjustments to certain of the criteria where 
appropriate. A public interest group suggested that certain of the 
evaluation criteria appear to significantly lower performance 
standards. We considered each of their examples, but we disagree with 
their conclusions.
    The NRC staff observed, ``As a result of a staff level review of 
the [Federal Register notice] and our participation in the strategic 
review process, it is our belief that exercises conducted and evaluated 
pursuant to the revised methodology will continue to provide FEMA with 
sufficient basis to support reasonable assurance recommendations to the 
NRC.''
    Two commenters, representing State agencies, suggested that FEMA 
periodically review the evaluation criteria to determine whether 
further improvements are needed. FEMA accepts the suggestion. The 
initial review of the evaluation criteria will commence in January 2003 
when data from the first full year of exercises conducted under the new 
criteria will be available.

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Discussion of the New Evaluation Criteria

Evaluation Area 1--Emergency Operations Management

    Evaluation Area 1 has five sub-elements: (a) Mobilization, (b) 
facilities, (c) direction and control, (d) communications equipment and 
(e) equipment and supplies to support operations.
    Criterion 1.a.1 requires that the OROs use effective procedures to 
alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities 
in a timely manner. FEMA previously noted that one of the more 
difficult issues to arise from the strategic review is how OROs 
demonstrate their twenty-four hour staffing capability in an exercise. 
The evaluation criteria associated with Planning Standard ``A'' of 
NUREG-0654 require that ``each principal organization shall be capable 
of continuous (twenty-four-hour) operations for a protracted period.'' 
\11\These criteria also require that each State and local response 
organization be capable of twenty-four-hour emergency response, 
including 24 hour per day staffing of communications links.\12\
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    \11\ Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.4.
    \12\ Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.1.e
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    REP-14 Objective 30.1,\13\ which implemented these criteria, 
required all agencies responsible for providing twenty-four-hour 
staffing to demonstrate a shift change once every six years. The shift 
change was demonstrated by providing a ``one-for-one replacement * * * 
of key staff'' responsible for communications, direction and control of 
operations, alert and notification of the public, accident assessment, 
information for the public and the media, radiological monitoring, 
protective response and medical and public health support.\14\
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    \13\ Objective 30.1 is criterion 1 under Objective 30. We refer 
REP-14 evaluation criteria in this manner throughout this document.
    \14\ REP-14 page D.30-1.
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    REP-14 Objective 30.2 requires outgoing staff members to 
demonstrate the capability to brief their replacements on the current 
status of the simulated emergency. The purpose of this demonstration is 
to assure that the transition from the outgoing to the incoming shift 
is accomplished without discontinuity in operations.
    The dissatisfaction within the REP community about Objective 30 
seemed to stem from time constraints associated with the exercise. OROs 
will bring a second shift (often composed of volunteers who must take 
time away from other responsibilities) in for the exercise, only to 
discover that there is little time left in the exercise for the second 
shift to actually demonstrate their capabilities.
    In response to these concerns, new evaluation criterion 1.a.1 
eliminates the requirement that OROs demonstrate a shift change once 
every six years. In order to assure that OROs have sufficient staffing 
to support twenty-four hour operations, we will require that they 
certify this capability in the Annual Letter of Certification. 
Additionally, FEMA REP site specialists will review ORO 24-hour 
staffing capabilities during Staff Assistance visits. This approach is 
consistent with Planning Standard ``A'' of NUREG-0654 and its 
associated criteria, neither of which requires the demonstration of a 
shift change. Many comments suggested that FEMA approach verification 
of 24-hour capability in this manner.
    We also expressed concern in the June 11 Federal Register notice 
whether key personnel on the off-hours shifts can perform as well as 
the primary responders. We sought comment on whether the evaluation 
criteria should require OROs to demonstrate their twenty-four hour 
response capability by alternating the key staff that participate in 
the biennial exercises from among the shifts.\15\
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    \15\ We defined key positions in this proposal in the same way 
that they were defined in REP-14 Objective 30.1.
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    The commenters overwhelmingly opposed FEMA's proposal to rotate 
exercise participation among shifts. Several of these commenters noted 
that they do rotate REP exercise participation among their shifts but 
would prefer that FEMA not prescribe that this be done. Other 
commenters suggested that given the frequent turnover of personnel in 
the emergency management community, most responders have an opportunity 
to participate in evaluated exercises at one time or another. Some 
commenters argued that they should be graded on the performance of 
their primary team and noted that people who occupy most key functions 
have adequate opportunities to train in non-graded exercises and 
exercises to prepare for non-radiological incidents. Commenters also 
argued that those who occupy key positions in their organizations would 
remain in place throughout the emergency response, except for 
relatively brief rest and sanitation breaks. Even then, they could be 
called back to address a critical issue. Still other commenters 
expressed concern that emergency management volunteers are being asked 
to participate in an increasing number of exercises, each directed at a 
specific hazard. These commenters were concerned that the cumulative 
exercise burden might cause volunteers to drop out. Others noted the 
availability of interstate mutual aid personnel to supplement local 
staff. FEMA generally found these arguments to be valid.
    In the June 11 Federal Register notice, FEMA proposed that a shift 
change briefing occur during every exercise, regardless of whether a 
shift change is actually demonstrated. After considering the comments 
we have concluded that we will not require the demonstration of shift 
change briefings. Evaluation criterion 1.c.1 already requires that 
periodic briefings occur during the course of an exercise. To require a 
simulated shift change briefing would not only lengthen the exercise 
but also require a redundant demonstration of a briefing capability.
    We sought comments about whether FEMA should begin exercises on 
weekends, holidays or off-hours. The comments from the emergency 
management community were uniformly negative. Some commenters responded 
that emergency management has advanced to the level that off-hours 
response to actual incidents is routine. Other commenters felt that the 
cumulative burden of actual off-hours responses and off-hours exercises 
on volunteers was too great.
    The NRC staff, on the other hand, suggested that off-hours and 
unannounced exercises were helpful since actual events often happen in 
the off-hours. Evaluation Criterion 1.b of Planning Standard ``N'', as 
interpreted by subsequent guidance, requires off-hours exercises. 
Additionally Planning Standard ``N'' suggests that some exercises 
should be unannounced. In light of this language, FEMA believes that 
the new exercise evaluation criteria should provide for off-hours and 
unannounced exercises, but will defer consideration of a standard until 
it has finalized a policy on granting exercise credit for participation 
in actual emergency response activities and equivalent drills and 
exercises. We believe that many OROs will be able to demonstrate their 
ability to mobilize personnel quickly at any time of the day through 
documented performance in actual emergency responses and other 
equivalent drills and exercises. This is the reason that Planning 
Standard ``N'' suggests unannounced and off-hours exercises. We will 
publish the proposed credit policy and off-hours, unannounced exercise 
criteria in the Federal Register for comment before we implement them.

[[Page 20584]]

    Criterion 1.b.1 requires that the ORO demonstrate that its 
facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. Under the 
proposed exercise methodology, facilities will only be evaluated if 
they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. It 
seems redundant to require the re-evaluation of a facility every two 
years if the facility has not changed. However, FEMA will evaluate all 
facilities, as a baseline, during the first exercise under the new 
Evaluation Criteria. FEMA will require that OROs certify in the Annual 
Letter of Certification that their facilities are available and 
adequate to meet emergency response needs.\16\ FEMA reserves the right 
to audit the representations made in the Annual Letter of 
Certification.
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    \16\ This notice contains several new requirements for the 
Annual Letter of Certification. These requirements are effective for 
Annual Letters of Certification due January 31, 2002.
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    Criterion 1.d requires that communications capabilities be managed 
in support of emergency operations with communication links established 
and maintained with appropriate locations. The proper functioning of 
communications equipment is essential to success in any exercise, just 
as it is essential to success in any response to a real event. FEMA 
expects that both the primary and backup communications systems, which 
are required by Planning Standard F, Evaluation Criterion F.1 of NUREG-
0654, will be fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. FEMA 
will continue to require that the ORO demonstrate the functionality of 
the primary and at least one backup system at each exercise. If one of 
the two communications systems fails, but there was no adverse effect 
on exercise performance, then there will be no exercise issue. If the 
primary and a backup communications system fail, the ORO can prevent an 
exercise issue by using additional backup communications resources. 
However, if failure of communications systems has an adverse or 
potentially adverse effect on exercise performance, then FEMA will 
assess an exercise issue. In all cases, a failure in a communications 
system must be remedied no later than the next scheduled communications 
drill. We expect OROs to advise the REP program site specialist when 
the ORO has corrected a communications failure noted during an 
exercise.
    A commenter noted that new Evaluation Criterion 1.d.1 requires that 
primary and backup communications systems rely on separate power 
sources. This language does not appear in NUREG-0654 and has been 
deleted.
    Criterion 1.e.1 requires that equipment, dosimetry,\17\ supplies of 
potassium iodide (KI) and other required supplies are sufficient to 
support emergency operations. FEMA may or may not verify that these 
items are available and in good repair as a stand-alone item in every 
exercise. A commenter suggested that this represented a lowering of 
standards. We disagree. Exercise scenarios ordinarily require that 
equipment and supplies be put to use. If equipment and supplies are 
unavailable or non-functional, then the ORO may not be able to perform 
the emergency response activity at an acceptable level. Equipment and 
supplies that are not checked during an exercise will be checked during 
a Staff Assistance Visit. Additional assurance that equipment and 
supplies are available in appropriate quantities and are properly 
maintained will be obtained in the Annual Letter of Certification. The 
representations contained in the Annual Letter of Certification are 
subject to audit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The terms permanent-record dosimeter, non-self-reading 
dosimeter, and non-direct-reading dosimeter, which are used in 
various parts of this document, are intended to be synonymous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of comments addressed technical provisions of Evaluation 
Criterion 1.e.1. Three comments addressed the shelf life of KI 
supplies. KI is a non-prescription thyroid-blocking agent that can 
provide protection to the thyroid from the uptake of radioiodines. The 
commenters observed that, if properly stored, KI retains its potency 
for a longer period than the expiration date printed on the 
manufacturer's packaging would indicate. The shelf life of KI may be 
extended if a certified private or State laboratory's analysis 
determines that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. 
Pharmacopoeia standards. FEMA does not have an independent basis to 
determine whether KI supplies remain potent past their expiration date. 
Accordingly, we will defer to the prevailing certified laboratory and 
U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards when evaluating the availability of KI 
supplies under Criterion 1.e.1.
    Several comments also addressed emergency worker protective 
equipment. This was an area in which some commenters thought FEMA was 
too prescriptive. We considered each of the comments carefully. 
Evaluation criterion 1.e.1 previously required that CDV-700 survey 
instruments be calibrated annually. This is the generally accepted 
standard for unmodified CDV-700 instruments. We understand that a 
number of CDV-700 instruments have been modified. Modified CDV-700 
instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation 
of the manufacturer of the modification.
    Evaluation criterion 1.e.1 previously provided that all instruments 
should be operationally checked once each calendar quarter and after 
each use. We have revised this criterion to provide that instruments be 
checked before each use in an exercise. We will observe this check 
during exercises. We will not verify during exercises that instruments 
were checked quarterly. To assure compliance with Planning Standard H 
of NUREG-0654, we will require that the ORO represent that instruments 
have been checked in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0654 and 
its plans and procedures in the Annual Letter of Certification.

Evaluation Area 2--Protective Action Decisionmaking

    Evaluation Area 2 assesses the ORO's ability to render decisions 
about what protective actions members of the public and emergency 
workers need to take in the wake of an incident. It has five sub-
elements: emergency worker exposure control, radiological assessment 
and protective action recommendations and decisions for the plume phase 
of the emergency,\18\ protective action decision considerations for the 
protection of special populations, radiological assessment and 
decisionmaking for the ingestion pathway exposure\19\ and radiological 
assessment and decisionmaking concerning relocation, re-entry and 
return.
    Evaluation criterion 2.a.1 addresses radiation exposure control for 
emergency workers. In response to comments we have deleted language in 
the first two paragraphs of the extent of play that was regarded as 
unduly prescriptive by commenters.
    Various commenters suggested that FEMA not require a demonstration 
of the capacity to make decisions about authorizing emergency workers 
to receive radiation doses above the preauthorized levels and to manage 
workers who have received higher-level doses. FEMA believes that this

[[Page 20585]]

capability should continue to be demonstrated.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The plume phase of the emergency focuses on preventing 
exposure of a population to radiation through direct and contact 
with the plume.
    \19\ The ingestion pathway phase focuses on preventing exposure 
of a population to radiation through ingestion of food and water 
that may have been contaminated by radiation.
    \20\ This observation also applies to comments arguing the same 
point in connection with sub-element 3.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Evaluation criterion 2.b.2 requires OROs to demonstrate a decision 
making process for recommending the use of KI for the general public. 
The NRC staff suggested that this criterion should read, ``OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and 
administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to 
supplement sheltering and evacuation if the offsite planning 
authorities generally have determined that KI will be used as a 
protective measure for the general public under offsite plans.'' We 
agree in principle and have revised the criterion; however, it is 
important to emphasize that we will only evaluate an ORO's plan to 
distribute and administer KI to the general public if the ORO has 
voluntarily decided to use KI as a protective measure for the general 
public.
    The criterion requires that OROs alert and notify every public 
school system or district, in every exercise, using whatever method 
would be used to make the notification in the event of a real incident. 
A number of commenters who use technology such as auto-dialers and tone 
alert radios to make actual notifications objected to demonstrating the 
technology during exercises. The concern expressed was that some would 
not understand that the activation was part of an exercise and would 
panic. Since the systems are regularly tested, the argument that 
activation in connection with an exercise would cause panic seems 
improbable.
    Sub-element 2.d establishes procedures for ingestion pathway 
exercises. A number of comments suggested that FEMA not require 
ingestion pathway exercises unless federal agency participation is 
sufficient to support State and local efforts. As Chair of the Federal 
Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, FEMA is taking the 
lead in encouraging increased federal participation in ingestion 
pathway exercises. However, the OROs are still obligated to demonstrate 
that they can make ingestion pathway decisions independent of federal 
participation under Planning Standards J and N of NUREG-0654. 44 CFR 
350.9(c)(4) requires ingestion pathway exercises to be conducted 
whether or not the federal agencies elect to participate.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ These observations also apply to comments submitted with 
respect to Evaluation Criteria 3.e.1 and 3.e.2, 4.b.1 and 4.b.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Evaluation criterion 2.e.1 requires demonstration of the capability 
to make decisions on the relocation, re-entry and return of the general 
public following a severe accident at a nuclear power plant. One 
commenter inquired whether the criterion requires that the ORO provide 
dosimetry to members of the public entering a restricted zone who are 
escorted by personnel wearing dosimetry. FEMA believes that everyone in 
the restricted zone needs to be able to track his or her dose. 
Accordingly, we believe that this criterion, which is based in part on 
evaluation criterion K.3.a of Planning Standard ``K,'' requires that 
each individual in the restricted zone have a non-self-reading 
(permanent-record) dosimeter. It is sufficient for the escorts to 
possess direct reading dosimetry.
    A commenter suggested that FEMA retain the standard and optional 
approaches to re-entry and relocation decisionmaking in REP-14. We 
understand that the optional approach is more conservative than the 
standard approach, which we have incorporated in the new evaluation 
areas. If the ORO's plan and procedures provide that the optional 
approach will be employed in re-entry and relocation decisionmaking, 
then FEMA will evaluate performance under the optional approach.

Evaluation Area 3--Protective Action Implementation

    Evaluation Area 3 assesses the ORO's ability to implement 
protective actions, including evacuation. It contains six sub-elements: 
implementation of emergency worker exposure control, implementation of 
KI decisions, implementation of protective actions for special 
populations, implementation of traffic and access control, 
implementation of ingestion pathway decisions, and implementation of 
relocation, re-entry and return decisions.
    Criterion 3.a.1 provides that OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to provide appropriate dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and 
instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. One 
commenter suggested that each emergency worker in the field does not 
require a personal dosimeter charger. We agree; however, every 
emergency worker should have reasonable access to a dosimeter charger. 
OROs should demonstrate the ability to provide dosimetry that is 
appropriate in relation to the responsibilities of the emergency 
workers.
    The new criterion makes it clear that emergency workers can refer 
to published procedures and confer with co-workers in responding to 
evaluator inquiries about dosimetry, just as they would, if necessary, 
in a real incident. One commenter thought that this amounted to a 
``monumental lowering of standards'' and suggested that some emergency 
workers may be ``clueless'' about how to read dosimetry. We disagree. 
Emergency workers are trained in the proper use of dosimetry. We 
anticipate that in a real situation they would refer to printed 
materials and confirm readings with other members of their team.
    Criterion 3.c.1 evaluates implementation of protective actions for 
special populations other than schools. OROs must demonstrate a 
capability to alert and notify special populations, transportation 
providers (including special resources for people with disabilities), 
and establish reception facilities. The availability of resources to 
transport special populations out of the plume exposure pathway is key. 
For this reason, we proposed that OROs actually contact at least 1/3 of 
their transportation providers during each exercise to determine 
whether buses and drivers would be available if the exercise were an 
actual emergency. We received a significant number of comments that 
suggested we delete this requirement. Some commenters thought the 
demonstration proves only that their list of telephone numbers is 
correct. Other commenters felt that some actual contacts should be 
demonstrated but that the number of contacts should be negotiated in 
the extent of play agreement. We agree with these commenters and have 
modified Criterion 3.c.1 accordingly.
    Criterion 3.c.2 evaluates the capability to implement protective 
action decisions for schools and day care centers.
    A number of comments addressed the extent to which private schools 
and day care centers must participate in REP exercises. We note that 
there are variations in the amount of control that OROs exercise over 
private schools and day care centers. A number of commenters suggested 
that FEMA should not require demonstration of actual or simulated 
contacts with day care centers. If the ORO's plan provides that private 
schools and/or day care providers are to be treated as special 
populations for the purpose of notification, then FEMA believes it is 
reasonable to ask that the ORO demonstrate the ability to execute this 
portion of the plan. However, if the plan regards some or all private 
schools and/or day care centers (such as those located in private 
homes) as part of the

[[Page 20586]]

general population, rather than a special population, these facilities 
fall outside of Criterion 3.c.2. Therefore, the ability to make 
individual contacts need not be demonstrated. Since there are 
considerable differences in the way that ORO plans and procedures 
relate to private schools and day care centers, we believe it is more 
appropriate to address whether and how these facilities will 
participate in exercises through the Extent of Play agreement rather 
than the evaluation criteria.
    In the June 11 Federal Register notice FEMA reserved the right to 
interview bus drivers and/or bus escorts (if a plan provides that the 
buses will be escorted) to determine their familiarity with evacuation 
routes. In response to comments, we will make every effort to interview 
bus drivers and/or escorts out of sequence from the exercise, during 
their regular duty day, in order to reduce costs to OROs.
    Criterion 3.d.1 evaluates the capability to establish and maintain 
appropriate traffic control and access points. A commenter suggested 
that FEMA should not interview public safety personnel about traffic 
and access control plans but confine these interviews to determining 
whether the public safety workers can adequately use personal 
protective equipment. We believe that both topics are equally 
important. Interviews may include such topics as re-entry criteria, 
location of congregate care centers and evacuation routes.

Evaluation Area 4--Field Measurement and Analysis

    Evaluation Area 4 assesses the capability of OROs to conduct and 
analyze field radiation measurements. It has three sub-elements: plume 
phase field measurements and analysis, post plume phase field 
measurements and sampling, and laboratory operations. A commenter asked 
how high range instruments referred to in Criterion 4.a.1 should be 
operationally tested. The criterion requires that the ORO demonstrate 
their established policy. FEMA will observe that the operational check 
is performed in accordance with the ORO's policy. The location where 
these operational checks will occur can be negotiated in the extent of 
play agreement.
    Another commenter suggested that the ORO should not be required to 
send field teams to measure the plume centerline or peak plume 
measurement under Criterion 4.a.2. The commenter observed that 
protective action decisions could be formulated based upon plant 
conditions before release and measurements at the plume edges. 
Criterion 4.a.2 allows the ORO to rely on plume centerline and peak 
plume measurements collected by the nuclear power plant licensee. 
However, if this data is not available from the licensee, then the 
decision as to whether this data is necessary to sufficiently 
characterize the plume rests with the ORO. A commenter thought 
Criterion 4.a.2 was too prescriptive in describing how the transfer of 
samples to a radiological laboratory should occur. The criterion 
requires that standard chain of custody procedures be observed in 
transferring samples. We do not believe that it is unduly prescriptive.

Evaluation Area 5--Emergency Notification and Public Information

    Evaluation Area 5 looks at the ORO's ability to notify the public 
of an incident and to effectively communicate protective action 
decisions. It contains two sub-elements: activation of the prompt alert 
and notification system and emergency information and instructions for 
the public and the media.
    Proposed Criteria 5.a.1, 5.a.2 and 5.a.3 address activation of the 
prompt alert and notification system. We are publishing criteria 5.a.1 
and 5.a.3 in final form, but are deferring final publication of 
proposed Criterion 5.a.2. Criterion 5.a.1 requires that the alert and 
notification system be activated in a timely manner following 
notification to the ORO by the nuclear power plant of an incident that 
requires activation of the alert and notification system but does not 
immediately require urgent action by the public. Whether decisionmakers 
initiate the alert and notification system in a ``timely manner'' will 
be judged in relation to the scenario. We will also evaluate the 
quality of the public notification. A commenter felt that the term 
``timely manner'' is too subjective. We disagree. The decision on 
whether and when to initiate the alert and notification sequence in 
situations where no urgent action is required by the public is a matter 
of judgment. The ORO is expected to exercise this judgment in 
accordance with its plans and procedures.
    Proposed criterion 5.a.2 required that activities associated with 
the alert and notification system in a ``fast breaker'' situation must 
be completed within fifteen minutes of the time that ORO officials have 
received verified notification from the nuclear power plant of a 
situation that immediately requires urgent public action. The proposed 
criterion was based on NRC regulations that appear in 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix E.IV.D. Many commenters addressed the ``fast breaker'' 
provision in the June 11 Federal Register notice. Pursuant to Section 
III.E of the Memorandum of Understanding between FEMA and the NRC, the 
NRC has requested that FEMA defer publishing Criterion 5.a.2 in final 
at this time. Since Criterion 5.a.2 derives from NRC regulations, it is 
especially appropriate that FEMA honor this request.
    Proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 indicated that the content of the 
initial informational message should be consistent with current FEMA 
guidance. FEMA published a companion notice in the September 12, 2001 
edition of the Federal Register, 66 FR 47525-47548, addressing the 
minimum required content for initial informational messages.
    Criterion 5.a.3 addresses backup alerting and notification of the 
general public in the event of a failure in the primary alert and 
notification system. It also addresses alerting of people who are 
located in ``exception areas'' and are not notified by the Emergency 
Alert System, tone alert radios or other technology. Criterion 5.a.3 
requires that the completion of the alert and notification sequence for 
exception areas and backup alerting and notification be completed 
within 45 minutes of the decision by offsite emergency officials to 
notify the public of an emergency situation. REP-14 required completion 
of the notification within ``approximately'' 45 minutes for backup 
alerting and within 45 minutes for exception areas. The new criterion, 
which sets a 45-minute standard for both, more closely conforms to the 
requirements set forth in Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654 and in FEMA REP-10. 
One commenter suggested that the REP-14 criterion be retained. Another 
suggested that FEMA establish a ``goal of 45 minutes'' for completion 
of the sequence. We will not require that this capability be 
demonstrated during periods in which weather or road conditions create 
a safety hazard for mobile teams attempting to meet the 45-minute 
deadline.
    Criterion 5.b.1 tests whether OROs provide accurate emergency 
information and instructions to the public and the news media in a 
timely fashion. While FEMA has determined that technical information 
such as Emergency Classification Levels need not be included in the 
initial alert and notification system message, this information should 
be made available to the news media with a plain language explanation 
for use in subsequent emergency information and instructions.

[[Page 20587]]

    The preamble to the June 11 Federal Register notice stated that the 
ORO should be prepared to explain the Emergency Classification Level 
and related technical information in plain language during an exercise. 
We agree with a commenter who observed that it is the obligation of the 
nuclear power plant licensee to explain the plant conditions that 
caused the Emergency Classification Level to be triggered. However, the 
ORO is required to explain the significance of the Emergency 
Classification Level and why protective action decisions have been made 
based upon the Emergency Classification Level. We also accepted 
comments that the so-called ``rumor control'' telephone line hereafter 
be referred to as the ``public inquiry hotline'' and that the term 
``press release'' be replaced with ``media release.''

Evaluation Area 6: Support Operations/Facilities

    Evaluation Area 6 assesses the capability of OROs to account for, 
monitor and decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers, and emergency 
worker equipment, to provide temporary care of evacuees and to assure 
that capabilities exist for transporting and treating injured 
individuals who have been exposed to radiation. These competencies are 
tested in the four sub-elements associated with Evaluation Area 6. We 
agree with a commenter who indicated that Criterion 6.a.1 does not 
require that an ORO demonstrate the ability to monitor the entire 
population of an Emergency Planning Zone within 12 hours of the 
incident. The new evaluation areas do not affect longstanding guidance 
that requires OROs to plan for and to demonstrate the ability to 
monitor 20% of the Emergency Planning Zone population within the 
twelve-hour timeframe.
    Several comments addressed the monitoring of vehicles that may need 
to be decontaminated. One commenter asked whether FEMA requires that 
vehicles used by members of the general public be monitored. NUREG-0654 
does not require that vehicles operated by members of the general 
public be monitored or decontaminated. FEMA has nevertheless required 
that procedures be in place to monitor and decontaminate vehicles if 
inspectors found that an occupant is contaminated. During an exercise 
these procedures at a minimum must be described to the evaluator.
    Other commenters thought that Criterion 6.b.1, which pertains to 
emergency worker vehicles, is too prescriptive about how vehicles are 
to be monitored. The criterion offers examples of places where 
radiation can accumulate. It is not intended to require that all of 
these areas be inspected. Another commenter suggested that we not 
mention air filters in Criterion 6.b.1 since they are inaccessible in 
modern cars. We have deleted this reference.
    In response to a comment concerning Criterion 6.d.1, we note that a 
person who has suffered a critical injury may be transported to a 
hospital that does not have the capability to monitor for radiation 
exposure. Under such circumstances, it is acceptable for the ORO to 
provide the monitoring capability at the hospital.

 Table 1.--Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas With NUREG-0654/FEMA
  REP-1, REV. 1 Planning Criteria and REP 14/15 Objectives and Criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Evaluation area/sub-element/        NUREG 0654           REP-14/15
            criterion                  criteria           objective &
-----------------------------------------------------------criterion----
1--Emergency Operations           ..................  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8,
 Management.                                           14, 17, 30
    1.a--Mobilization
    1.a.1: OROs use effective     A.4; D.3,4; E.1,2;  1.1, 1.2; 30
     procedures to alert,          H.4.
     notify, and mobilize
     emergency personnel and
     activate facilities in a
     timely manner.
    1.b--Facilities
    1.b.1: Facilities are         H.3...............  2.1
     sufficient to support the
     emergency response.
    1.c--Direction and Control
    1.c.1: Key personnel with     A.1.d; A.2.a,b....  3.1
     leadership roles for the
     ORO provide direction and
     control to that part of the
     overall response effort for
     which they are responsible.
    1.d--Communications
     Equipment
    1.d.1: At least two           F.1,2.............  4.1
     communication systems are
     available, at least one
     operates properly, and
     communication links are
     established and maintained
     with appropriate locations.
     Communications capabilities
     are managed in support of
     emergency operations.
    1.e--Equipment and Supplies
     to Support Operations
    1.e.1: Equipment, maps,       H.7, 10; J.10.a,    2.1; 5.1; 8.2;
     displays, dosimetry,          b, e, J.11; K.3.a.  14.2
     potassium iodide (KI), and
     other supplies are
     sufficient to support
     emergency operations.
2--Protective Action Decision     ..................  5, 7, 9, 14, 15,
 Making.                                               16, 26, 28
    2.a.--Emergency Worker
     Exposure Control
    2.a.1: OROs use a decision-   J.10.e,f; K.4.....  5.1, 5.3; 14.1
     making process, considering
     relevant factors and
     appropriate coordination,
     to ensure that an exposure
     control system, including
     the use of KI, is in place
     for emergency workers
     including provisions to
     authorize radiation
     exposure in excess of
     administrative limits or
     protective action guides.
    2.b--Radiological Assessment
     and Protective Action
     Recommendations and
     Decisions for the Plume
     Phase of the Emergency
    2.b.1: Appropriate            I.8,10; Supp. 3...  7.1
     protective action
     recommendations are based
     on available information on
     plant conditions, field
     monitoring data, and
     licensee and ORO dose
     projections, as well as
     knowledge of onsite and
     offsite environmental
     conditions.

[[Page 20588]]

    2.b.2: A decision-making      J.9; J.10.f,m.....  9.1; 14.1
     process involving
     consideration of
     appropriate factors and
     necessary coordination is
     used to make protective
     action decisions (PADs) for
     the general public
     (including the
     recommendation for the use
     of KI, if ORO policy).
    2.c--Protective Action
     Decisions Consideration for
     the Protection of Special
     Populations
    2.c.1: Protective action      J.9; J.10. d, e...  9.1; 15.1; 16.1
     decisions are made, as
     appropriate, for special
     population groups.
    2.d--Radiological Assessment
     and Decision-Making for the
     Ingestion Exposure Pathway
    2.d.1: Radiological           J.9, 11...........  26.1, 26.2
     consequences for the
     ingestion pathway are
     assessed and appropriate
     protective action decisions
     are made based on the ORO
     planning criteria.
    2.e--Radiological Assessment
     and Decision-Making
     Concerning Relocation, Re-
     entry, and Return

    2.e.1: Timely relocation, re- I.10; J.9; M.1....  28.1, 28.2, 28.3,
     entry, and return decisions                       28.4, 28.5
     are made and coordinated as
     appropriate, based on
     assessments of radiological
     conditions and criteria in
     the ORO's plan and/or
     procedures.
3--Protective Action              ..................  5, 11, 14, 15, 16,
 Implementation.                                       17, 27, 29
    3.a--Implementation of
     Emergency Worker Exposure
     Control
    3.a.1: The OROs issue         K.3.a, 3.b........  5.1, 5.2
     appropriate dosimetry and
     procedures, and manage
     radiological exposure to
     emergency workers in
     accordance with the plan
     and procedures. Emergency
     workers periodically and at
     the end of each mission
     read their dosimeters and
     record the readings on the
     appropriate exposure record
     or chart.
    3.b--Implementation of KI
     Decision
    3.b.1: KI and appropriate     J.10.e............  14.1, 14.3
     instructions are made
     available should a decision
     to recommend use of KI be
     made. Appropriate record
     keeping of the
     administration of KI for
     emergency workers and
     institutionalized
     individuals is maintained.
    3.c--Implementation of
     Protective Actions for
     Special Populations
    3.c.1: Protective action      J.10.c,d,g........  15.1, 15.2
     decisions are implemented
     for special populations
     other than schools within
     areas subject to protective
     actions.
    3.c.2: OROs/School officials  J.10.c,d,g........  16.1, 16.2, 16.3
     decide upon and implement
     protective actions for
     schools.
    3.d--Implementation of
     Traffic and Access Control
    3.d.1: Appropriate traffic    J.10.g,j..........  17.1, 17.2, 17.3
     and access control is
     established Accurate
     instructions are provided
     to traffic and access
     control personnel.
    3.d.2: Impediments to         J.10.k............  17.4
     evacuation are identified
     and resolved.
    3.e--Implementation of
     Ingestion Pathway Decisions
    3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates   J.9,11............  27.1
     the availability and
     appropriate use of adequate
     information regarding
     water, food supplies, milk
     and agricultural production
     within the ingestion
     exposure pathway emergency
     planning zone for
     implementation of
     protective actions.
    3.e.2: Appropriate measures,  J.9,11............  11.4; 27.2; 27.3
     strategies and pre-printed
     instructional material are
     developed for implementing
     protective action decisions
     for contaminated water,
     food products, milk, and
     agricultural production.
    3.f--Implementation of
     Relocation, Re-entry, and
     Return Decisions
    3.f.1: Decisions regarding    M.1,3.............  29.1, 29.2, 29.3,
     controlled re-entry of                            29.4
     emergency workers and
     relocation and return of
     the public are coordinated
     with appropriate
     organizations and
     implemented.
4--Field Measurement and          ..................  6, 8, 24, 25
 Analysis.
    4.a--Plume Phase Field
     Measurement and Analyses
    4.a.1: The field teams are    H.10 I.7,8,9......  6.1; 8.1, 8.2
     equipped to perform field
     measurements of direct
     radiation exposure (cloud
     and ground shine) and to
     sample airborne radioiodine
     and particulates.
    4.a.2: Field teams are        I.8,11; J.10.a;     6.3, 6.4
     managed to obtain             H.12.
     sufficient information to
     help characterize the
     release and to control
     radiation exposure.

[[Page 20589]]

    4.a.3: Ambient radiation      I.9...............  6.4, 6,5; 8.3,
     measurements are made and                         8.4, 8.5, 8.6
     recorded at appropriate
     locations, and radioiodine
     and particulate samples are
     collected. Teams will move
     to an appropriate low
     background location to
     determine whether any
     significant (as specified
     in the plan and/or
     procedures) amount of
     radioactivity has been
     collected on the sampling
     media.
    4.b Post Plume Phase Field
     Measurements and Sampling
    4.b.1: The field teams        I.8; J.11.........  24.1
     demonstrate the capability
     to make appropriate
     measurements and to collect
     appropriate samples (for
     example, food crops, milk,
     water, vegetation, and
     soil) to support adequate
     assessments and protective
     action decision-making
    4.c--Laboratory Operations
    4.c.1: The laboratory is      C.3; J.11.........  25.1, 25.2
     capable of performing
     required radiological
     analyses to support
     protective action decisions.
5--Emergency Notification and     ..................  10, 11, 12, 13
 Public Information.
    5.a--Activation of the
     Prompt Alert and
     Notification System
    5.a.1: Activities associated  10 CFR Part 50,     10.1
     with primary alerting and     Appendix E.IV.D;
     notification of the public    E.5,6,7.
     are completed in a timely
     manner following the
     initial decision by
     authorized offsite
     emergency officials to
     notify the public of an
     emergency situation. The
     initial instructional
     message to the public must
     include as a minimum the
     elements required by
     current FEMA REP guidance.
    5.a.2: [Reserved]
    5.a.3: Activities associated  Appendix 3: B.2.c;  10.2, 10.3
     with FEMA approved            E.6.
     exception areas (where
     applicable) are completed
     within 45 minutes following
     the initial decision by
     authorized offsite
     emergency officials to
     notify the public of an
     emergency situation. Backup
     alert and notification of
     the public is completed
     within 45 minutes following
     the detection by the ORO of
     a failure of the primary
     alert and notification
     system.
    5.b--Emergency Information
     and Instructions for the
     Public and the Media
    5.b.1: OROs provide accurate  E.5,7; G.3.a;       11.1, 11.2, 11.3;
     emergency information and     G.4.c.              12.1, 12.2; 13.1,
     instructions to the public                        13.2
     and the news media in a
     timely manner.
6--Support Operation/Facilities.  ..................  18, 19, 20, 21, 22
    6.a--Monitoring and
     Decontamination of Evacuees
     and Emergency Workers and
     Registration of Evacuees
    6.a.1: The reception center/  J.10.h; J.12;       18.1, 18.2, 18.3,
     emergency worker facility     K.5.a.              18.4, 18.5; 22.1,
     has appropriate space,                            22.2
     adequate resources, and
     trained personnel to
     provide monitoring,
     decontamination, and
     registration of evacuees
     and/or emergency workers.
    6.b--Monitoring and
     Decontamination of
     Emergency Worker Equipment
    6.b.1: The facility/ORO has   K.5.b.............  22.1; 22.3
     adequate procedures and
     resources for the
     accomplishment of
     monitoring and
     decontamination of
     emergency worker equipment,
     including vehicles.
    6.c--Temporary Care of
     Evacuees
    6.c.1: Managers of            J.10.h; J.12......  19.1, 19.2
     congregate care facilities
     demonstrate that the
     centers have resources to
     provide services and
     accommodations consistent
     with American Red Cross
     planning guidelines. (Found
     in MASS CARE--Preparedness
     Operations, ARC 3031)
     Managers demonstrate the
     procedures to assure that
     evacuees have been
     monitored for contamination
     and have been
     decontaminated as
     appropriate before entering
     congregate care facilities.
    6.d--Transportation and
     Treatment of Contaminated
     Injured Individuals
    6.d.1: The facility/ORO has   F.2; H.10;          20.1, 20.2, 20.3,
     the appropriate space,        K.5.a,b; L.1; L.4.  20.4, 20.5;
     adequate resources, and                           21.1,21.2, 21.3,
     trained personnel to                              21.4
     provide transport,
     monitoring decontamination,
     and medical services to
     contaminated injured
     individuals.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20590]]

Revised Exercise Evaluation Areas

    The six exercise evaluation areas and associated criteria, as 
corrected, are as follows:

Evaluation Area 1--Emergency Operations Management

Sub-Element 1.a--Mobilization

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and 
staff emergency facilities.
    Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, 
and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely 
manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4).
Extent of Play
    Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive 
notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the 
notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel 
in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation 
of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive 
to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be 
completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-
positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with 
the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a 
normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or 
residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence 
demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent of play 
agreement.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.b--Facilities

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the 
emergency response.
    Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency 
response. (NUREG-0654, H.3).
Extent of Play
    Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion 
if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. 
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that 
support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some of the areas 
to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, 
ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to 
support operations).
    Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency, unless 
noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.c--Direction and Control

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control 
their overall response to an emergency.
    Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO 
provide direction and control to that part of the overall response 
effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b).
Extent of Play
    Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out 
essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the 
staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, 
coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of 
requirements and requests.
    All activities associated with direction and control must be 
performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or 
indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.d--Communications Equipment

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should establish reliable primary 
and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key 
emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate 
contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), 
Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its 
facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.
    Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, 
at least one operates properly, and communication links are established 
and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities 
are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2).
Extent of Play
    OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system 
are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a 
communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise 
performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. 
Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units 
should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise 
messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to 
access at least one communication system that is independent of the 
commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all 
message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the 
conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated 
communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities 
exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be 
commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or 
procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a 
communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated 
in the extent of play agreement.
    All activities associated with the management of communications 
capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless otherwise noted above or in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.e--Equipment and Supplies To Support Operations

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and 
supplies adequate to support the emergency response.
    Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium 
iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency 
operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7,10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a).
Extent of Play
    Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and

[[Page 20591]]

consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans 
and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and 
displays is encouraged.
    All instruments should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally 
checked before each use. Instruments should be calibrated in accordance 
with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series 
instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's 
recommendation should be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 
instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation 
of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration 
should be on each instrument, or calibrated frequency can be verified 
by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure 
activity should have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of 
the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 4.a.1 
for field team equipment; 4.c.1 for radiological laboratory equipment 
(does not apply to analytical equipment); reception center and 
emergency worker facilities' equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and 
medical facilities' equipment under 6.d.1.
    Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent 
record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for 
issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed 
from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow 
individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum 
exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.
    Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least 
annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-138s, due to their documented 
history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for 
electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary. This 
leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through 
documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or 
through a staff assistance visit.
    Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain 
inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated 
on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity 
lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan and/or 
procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within 
the plume pathway EPZ.
    Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) 
will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or 
through documentation of current inventory submitted during the 
exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, 
and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of 
KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or 
blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a 
certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply 
remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.
    At locations where traffic and access control personnel are 
deployed, appropriate equipment (for example, vehicles, barriers, 
traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their 
availability described.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Evaluation Area 2--Protective Action Decision-Making

Sub-Element 2.a--Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to assess and 
control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a 
decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans and 
procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be 
exceeded for specific missions.
    Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended 
accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be 
permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-
established administrative reporting limits (that take into 
consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits) 
identified in the ORO's plans and procedures.
    Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering 
relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an 
exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for 
emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure 
in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-
0654, K.4, J.10. e, f).
Extent of Play
    OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based 
on their emergency plans and procedures.
    Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make 
decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of 
pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving 
radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.
    As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make 
decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective 
measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid 
dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for 
KI administration.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.b.--Radiological Assessment and Protective Action 
Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to use all 
available data to independently project integrated dose and compare the 
estimated dose savings with the protective action guides. OROs have the 
capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most 
appropriate in a given emergency situation. OROs base these choices on 
PAGs from the ORO's plans and procedures or EPA 400-R-92-001 and other 
criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee protective action 
recommendations, coordination of protective action decisions with other 
political jurisdictions (for example, other affected OROs), 
availability of appropriate in-place shelter, weather conditions, and 
situations that create higher than normal risk from evacuation.
    Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are 
based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring 
data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of 
onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and 
Supplement 3).
Extent of Play
    During the initial stage of the emergency response, following 
notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective 
actions, the

[[Page 20592]]

ORO should demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, 
described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop protective action 
recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available 
information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring 
data, if available.
    When the licensee provides release and meteorological data, the ORO 
also considers these data. The ORO should demonstrate a reliable 
capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of 
calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the 
need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario. 
In all cases, calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. 
Projected doses should be related to quantities and units of the PAG to 
which they will be compared. PARs should be promptly transmitted to 
decision-makers in a prearranged format.
    Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by 
the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee with 
respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of different 
models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences 
should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO 
should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine 
projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration 
of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make 
protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the 
recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 
10.f, m).
Extent of Play
    Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
make both initial and subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate the 
capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the 
situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant 
status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff.
    The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on 
the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information 
on plant conditions. The decision-makers should demonstrate the 
capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these 
projections.
    If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective 
measure for the general public under offsite plans, then the ORO should 
demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and 
administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to 
supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision should be based on 
the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared 
with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making 
process should involve close coordination with appropriate assessment 
and decision-making staff.
    If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should 
communicate and coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions to 
the affected jurisdictions.
    All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed 
based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be 
in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in 
the extent of play agreement.

Sub-element 2.c--Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the 
Protection of Special Populations

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
determine protective action recommendations, including evacuation, 
sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for special 
population groups (for example, hospitals, nursing homes, correctional 
facilities, schools, licensed day care centers, mobility impaired 
individuals, and transportation dependent individuals). Focus is on 
those special population groups that are (or potentially will be) 
affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as 
appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, 
e).
Extent of Play
    Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where 
doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, 
except for situations where there is a high-risk environment or where 
high-risk groups (for example, the immobile or infirm) are involved. In 
these cases, examples of factors that should be considered are: weather 
conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation 
assets, risk of evacuation versus risk from the avoided dose, and 
precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an 
institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administration of 
KI should be considered by the OROs.
    Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and 
notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that 
are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. 
Contacts with public school systems/districts must be actual.
    In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials 
of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to 
make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Officials 
should demonstrate that the decision making process for protective 
actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives heavy 
weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the 
ECL at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies 
for protective actions for that ECL, and the location of students at 
the time (for example, whether the students are still at home, en route 
to the school, or at the school).''
    All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, 
including consideration of available resources, for special population 
groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as 
they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.d.--Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the 
Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the means to assess the 
radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate 
them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate protective 
action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion pathway.
    During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of 
radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural 
products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would likely 
occur during the plume phase of the accident and, depending on the

[[Page 20593]]

nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or 
years.
    Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion 
pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are 
made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.11).
Extent of Play
    We expect that the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) will take 
precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to 
minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in 
accordance with their respective plans and procedures. Often such 
precautionary actions are initiated by the OROs based on criteria 
related to the facility's Emergency Classification Levels (ECL). Such 
actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored 
feed and to use protected water supplies.
    The ORO should use its procedures (for example, development of a 
sampling plan) to assess the radiological consequences of a release on 
the food and water supplies. The ORO's assessment should include the 
evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of 
water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from 
potentially impacted areas, the characterization of the releases from 
the facility, and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the 
release. During this assessment, OROs should consider the use of 
agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The 
radiological impacts on the food and water should then be compared to 
the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plan and/or 
procedures. (The plan and/or procedures may contain PAGs based on 
specific dose commitment criteria or based on criteria as recommended 
by current Food and Drug Administration guidance.) Timely and 
appropriate recommendations should be provided to the ORO decision-
makers group for implementation decisions. As time permits, the ORO may 
also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the 
resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.
    The ORO should demonstrate timely decisions to minimize 
radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given 
assessments and other information available. Any such decisions should 
be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with 
neighboring and local OROs.
    OROs should use Federal resources, as identified in the Federal 
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for 
example, compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of 
this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and 
other resources participating.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.e.--Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making 
Concerning Relocation, Re-Entry, and Return

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to make 
decisions on relocation, re-entry, and return of the general public. 
These decisions are essential for the protection of the public from the 
direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a 
severe accident at a nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions 
are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the 
radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or 
procedures. (NUREG-0654, I.10; J.9; M.1).
Extent of Play
    Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to estimate 
integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these estimates 
with PAGs, apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals 
in the general public who have not been evacuated but where projected 
doses are in excess of relocation PAGs, and control access to evacuated 
and restricted areas. Decisions are made for relocating members of the 
evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation 
levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted 
should be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in 
deposited materials, calculated exposure rates versus the PAGs, and 
field samples of vegetation and soil analyses.
    Re-entry: Decisions should be made regarding the location of 
control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for 
emergency workers and members of the general public who need to enter 
the evacuated area temporarily to perform specific tasks or missions.
    Examples of control procedures are: the assignment of, or checking 
for, direct-reading and non-direct-reading dosimetry for emergency 
workers; questions regarding the individual's objectives and locations 
expected to be visited and associated time frames; availability of maps 
and plots of radiation exposure rates; advice on areas to avoid; and 
procedures for exit including: monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and 
equipment; decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper 
disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency 
worker radiation exposure records.
    Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop a 
strategy for authorized re-entry of individuals into the restricted 
zone, based on established decision criteria. OROs should demonstrate 
the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (for 
example, police patrols), for maintenance of essential services (for 
example, fire protection and utilities), and for other critical 
functions. They should demonstrate the capability to use decisionmaking 
criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for 
various reasons, such as to maintain property (for example, to care for 
farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or to retrieve important 
possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control 
should be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the 
restricted zone. OROs should demonstrate the capability to establish 
policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to re-
enter the restricted zone. The extent that OROs need to develop 
policies on re-entry will be determined by scenario events.
    Return: Decisions are to be based on environmental data and 
political boundaries or physical/geological features, which allow 
identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the 
general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the 
restricted area that is based on the relocation PAG.
    Other factors that the ORO should consider are, for example: 
conditions that permit the cancellation of the Emergency Classification 
Level and the relaxation of associated restrictive measures; basing 
return recommendations (that is, permitting populations that were 
previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an 
unrestricted basis) on measurements of radiation from ground 
deposition; and the capability to identify services and facilities that 
require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures 
and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and 
facilities are: medical and social services, utilities,

[[Page 20594]]

roads, schools, and intermediate term housing for relocated persons.

Evaluation Area 3--Protective Action Implementation

Sub-Element 3.a--Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs 
should have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, 
use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and 
permanent record dosimetry; the reading of direct-reading dosimetry by 
emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation 
dose record for each emergency worker; and establishing a decision 
chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur 
radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always 
applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as 
appropriate.
    Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and 
procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in 
accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers 
periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and 
record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. 
(NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b).
Extent of Play
    OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate 
direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and 
instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For 
evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as 
dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative 
reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to 
consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and 
maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life 
saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.
    Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation 
exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. 
Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage 
radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.
    During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate 
the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and 
turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker should report 
accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and 
procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan 
and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to 
authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other 
actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek 
authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at 
least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to 
contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure 
levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (for example, 
written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.
    Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a 
direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members 
will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and 
adequate control of exposure can be effected for all members of the 
team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who 
are assigned to low exposure rate areas, for example, at reception 
centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and 
communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters 
or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work 
area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team 
member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry. 
Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as 
farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other 
members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated area following or 
during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological 
exposure commensurate with completing their missions.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.b--Implementation of KI Decision

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
provide radioprotective drugs for emergency workers, institutionalized 
individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, to the general 
public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very 
difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to 
have the capability to provide KI to emergency workers and 
institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general 
public is an ORO option and is reflected in ORO's plans and procedures. 
Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, 
storage, and means of the distribution of radioprotective drugs.
    Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available 
should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record 
keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and 
institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e)
Extent of Play
    Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the 
capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized 
individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, 
to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions 
made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain 
lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have 
ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they 
were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the 
designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, 
the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate 
the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on 
the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made 
for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be 
provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the 
ORO's plan and/or procedures.
    Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of 
procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use 
of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

[[Page 20595]]

Sub-Element 3.c--Implementation of Protective Actions for Special 
Populations

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
implement protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or 
sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special 
populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a 
radiological release from a nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for 
special populations other than schools within areas subject to 
protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).
Extent of Play
    Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and 
notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and 
emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, 
nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, 
transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability 
to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the 
ORO's plans and procedures.
    Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be 
actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play. Some contacts 
with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the 
extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.
    All implementing activities associated with protective actions for 
special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions 
for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).
Extent of Play
    Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to 
implement protective action decisions for students. The demonstration 
shall be made as follows: At least one school in each affected school 
system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the 
implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling 
the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by 
describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If 
evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to 
coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception 
centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be 
demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process. If 
accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school 
personnel, including decision making officials (for example, 
superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher) and 
at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable), 
should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the 
evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between 
school officials and the buses, if required by the plan and/or 
procedures, should be verified.
    Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability 
to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages 
to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of 
protective actions for schools.
    The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, 
private kindergartens and day care centers that participate in REP 
exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans and procedures as negotiated in 
the Extent of Play Agreement.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.d.--Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement 
protective action plans, including relocation and restriction of access 
to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, 
establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and 
removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.
    Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is 
established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access 
control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j).
Extent of Play
    OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and 
staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with 
protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and 
relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability 
to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions 
to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate 
changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is 
controlled.
    Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate 
knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be 
demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with 
the extent of play agreement.
    In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access 
by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should 
demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies 
with authority to control access.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and 
resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k)
Extent of Play
    OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the 
scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning 
impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with 
impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all 
contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.e--Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs 
should have the capability to implement protective actions, based on 
criteria recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance, 
for the ingestion pathway zone (IPZ), the area within an approximate 
50-mile radius of the nuclear power plant. This sub-element focuses on 
those actions required for implementation of protective actions.
    Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and 
appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, 
milk, and agricultural production within the

[[Page 20596]]

ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation 
of protective actions. NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).
Extent of Play
    Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to secure and use 
current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry 
producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain 
producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to 
implement protective actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ. OROs 
should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other 
resources (for example, compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if 
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration 
the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed 
instructional material are developed for implementing protective action 
decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural 
production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).
Extent of Play
    Development of measures and strategies for implementation of 
Ingestion Pathway Zone (IPZ) protective actions should be demonstrated 
by formulation of protective action information for the general public 
and food producers and processors. This includes either pre-distributed 
public information material in the IPZ or the capability for the rapid 
distribution of appropriate pre-printed and/or camera-ready information 
and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses. OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent 
distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play 
should include demonstration of communications and coordination between 
organizations to implement protective actions. Actual field play of 
implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications 
and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls 
within the IPZ should be demonstrated, but actual communications with 
food producers and processors may be simulated.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.f--Implementation of Relocation, Re-Entry, and Return 
Decisions

Intent
    This sub-Element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability 
to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for relocation, re-entry, 
and return. Implementation of these decisions is essential for the 
protection of the public from the direct long-term exposure to 
deposited radioactive materials from a severe accident at a commercial 
nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of 
emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are 
coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-
0654, M.1, 3).
Extent of Play
    Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to coordinate 
and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not 
previously evacuated, to an area where radiological contamination will 
not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. 
OROs should also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term 
or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas that have 
residual radiation levels above the 
(first-, second-, and fifty-year) PAGs.
    Areas of consideration should include the capability to communicate 
with OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population 
of the procedures for relocation, and the notification of, and advice 
for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status 
in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due 
to high levels of contamination. OROs should also demonstrate the 
capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding 
relocation decisions.
    Re-entry: OROs should demonstrate the capability to control re-
entry and exit of individuals who need to temporarily re-enter the 
restricted area, to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure 
and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of 
contamination outside the restricted area. Monitoring and 
decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.
    Examples of control procedure subjects are: (1) The assignment of, 
or checking for, direct-reading and non-direct-reading dosimetry for 
emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objectives 
and locations expected to be visited and associated timeframes; (3) 
maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to 
avoid; and procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, 
vehicles, and equipment, decision criteria regarding contamination, 
proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and maintenance of 
emergency worker radiation exposure records.
    Return: OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement 
policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were 
evacuated during the plume phase. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that 
require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures 
and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and 
facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, 
and intermediate term housing for relocated persons.
    Communications among OROs for relocation, re-entry, and return may 
be simulated; however all simulated or actual contacts should be 
documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.
    OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and 
other resources (for example, compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if 
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration 
the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Evaluation Area 4--Field Measurement and Analysis

Sub-Element 4.a--Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary 
to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate 
deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-
0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams 
within the plume emergency planning zone to measure airborne

[[Page 20597]]

radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to detect radioactive 
particulate material in the airborne plume. In the event of an accident 
at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material 
may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although 
accident assessment methods are available to project the extent and 
magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large 
uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field 
radiological data in order to help characterize any radiological 
release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field 
measurement efforts.
    Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field 
measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and 
to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; 
I.7, 8, 9).
Extent of Play
    Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and 
supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include 
instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the 
presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be capable of 
measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological 
protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity 
on the air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of 
the instrument and the ORO's plans and procedures. An appropriate 
radioactive check source should be used to verify proper operational 
response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than 
1 R/hr) and for high range instruments when available. If a source is 
not available for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist to 
operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a 
high range instrument can make useful readings.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient 
information to help characterize the release and to control radiation 
exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a).
Extent of Play
    Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate 
the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and 
direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before 
deployment.
    Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and 
to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a 
factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be directed to 
take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide 
information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.
    If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has 
been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from 
OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by 
State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain 
peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether 
peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. 
The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all 
field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination 
concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, to a 
radiological laboratory should be demonstrated.
    OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal 
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for 
example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this 
criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other 
resources participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and 
recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate 
samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background 
location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan 
and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the 
sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I. 9).
Extent of Play
    Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report 
measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne 
radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team 
coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If 
samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the 
appropriate authority should consider the need for expedited laboratory 
analyses of these samples. OROs should share data in a timely manner 
with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination 
control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-
custody form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with 
the ORO's plan and/or procedures.
    OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and 
other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, 
etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in 
the exercise.
    All activities must be must be based on the ORO's plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.

Sub-Element 4.b--Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs 
should have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude 
and locations of radiological hazards in the IPZ and for relocation, 
re-entry and return measures. This sub-element focuses on the 
collection of environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are 
essential for decisions on protection of the public from contaminated 
food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.
    Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make 
appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (for 
example, food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support 
adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-
0654, I.8; J.11).
Extent of Play
    The ORO's field team should demonstrate the capability to take 
measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to 
enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support 
re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are 
available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is 
appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, 
instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form 
for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO's plan 
and/or procedures.
    Ingestion pathway samples should be secured from agricultural 
products and

[[Page 20598]]

water. Samples in support of relocation and return should be secured 
from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received 
radioactive ground deposition.
    OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and 
other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, 
etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in 
the exercise.
    All activities must be must be based on the ORO's plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.

Sub-Element 4.c--Laboratory Operations

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and 
environmental samples to support protective action decision-making.
    Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required 
radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-
0654, C.3; J.11).
Extent of Play
    The laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to follow 
appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging of 
information, preventing contamination of the laboratory, preventing 
buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross 
contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (for 
example, milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the 
laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to prepare samples 
for conducting measurements.
    The laboratory should be appropriately equipped to provide analyses 
of media, as requested, on a timely basis, of sufficient quality and 
sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as anticipated by the 
ORO's plans and procedures. The laboratory (laboratories) instrument 
calibrations should be traceable to standards provided by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to 
analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident should be 
as described in the plans and procedures. New or revised methods may be 
used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (for example, 
transuranics or as a result of a terrorist event) or if warranted by 
circumstances of the event. Analysis may require resources beyond those 
of the ORO.
    The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical 
techniques and contamination control procedures.
    OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and 
other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, 
etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in 
the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Evaluation Area 5--Emergency Notification and Public Information

Sub-Element 5.a--Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs 
should have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public 
within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this 
sub-element are derived from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D.), and FEMA-REP-10, 
``Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for 
Nuclear Power Plants.''
    Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and 
notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following 
the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to 
notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional 
message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required 
by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR part 50, appendix E.IV.D and 
NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7).
Extent of Play
    Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate 
the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an 
initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident 
and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the 
decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance 
with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation 
should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subject to 
specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The 
initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA 
REP guidance.
    Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with route alerting as the 
primary method of alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate 
the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, following the 
decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a timely 
manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in 
accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. At least one route 
needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should 
vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route 
should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and 
notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, 
the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but 
not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual 
testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some 
agreed upon location. The initial message should include the elements 
required by current FEMA REP guidance.
    For exercise purposes, timely is defined as ``the responsible ORO 
personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the 
appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and 
without undue delay.'' If message dissemination is to be identified as 
not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will 
document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not 
considered timely.
    Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as 
they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. 
Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not required. The alert 
signal activation may be simulated. However, the procedures should be 
demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.
    The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an 
instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an 
interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification 
system.
    All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans 
and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.
    Criterion 5.a.2: [Reserved]

[[Page 20599]]

    Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception 
areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the 
initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify 
the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of 
the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by 
the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. 
(NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c).
Extent of Play
    Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-approved exception 
areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design 
Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the 
capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the 
exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by 
authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an 
emergency situation. The 45-minute clock will begin when the OROs make 
the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the 
first time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message 
should, at a minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at 
the plant and where to obtain additional information.
    For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be 
demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from 
exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be 
demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification 
activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message 
that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually 
broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of the 
mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon 
location.
    Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed 
within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of 
the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting only 
needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the ORO's 
plan and/or procedures and the extent of play agreement, if the 
exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary 
system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to 
function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and 
demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route 
should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used 
is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon 
in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address 
system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.
    All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans 
and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.

Sub-Element 5.b--Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public 
and the Media

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
disseminate to the public appropriate emergency information and 
instructions, including any recommended protective actions. In 
addition, NUREG-0654 provides that OROs should ensure that the 
capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes 
the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an 
emergency. NUREG-0654 also provides that a system should be available 
for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the 
public inquiry hotline.
    Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and 
instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. 
(NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c).
Extent of Play
    Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be 
provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be 
subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely 
is defined as ``the responsible ORO personnel/representatives 
demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/
instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.'' If 
message dissemination is to be identified as not having been 
accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a 
specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.
    The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions 
are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate 
officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and 
applicable instructions (for example, evacuation instructions, 
evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when 
evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, 
information concerning protective actions for schools and special 
populations, public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the 
public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. 
The ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency 
Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this 
information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. 
OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear 
and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion 
pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use 
familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.
    The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including 
previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as 
well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure 
that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not 
repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate 
the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated 
at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or 
procedures.
    OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency 
information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or 
procedures.
    If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should 
demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion 
pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in 
accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.
    OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, 
concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent 
dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the 
capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and 
distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from 
the news media. All information presented in media briefings and media 
releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and 
other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent 
emergency information (for example, EAS messages and media releases) 
and media information kits should be available for dissemination to the 
media.

[[Page 20600]]

    OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for 
dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should 
demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information 
for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. 
Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects 
false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be 
included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the 
public, media briefings, and/or media releases.
    All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans 
and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.

Evaluation Area 6--Support Operation/Facilities

Sub-Element 6.a--Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and 
Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement 
radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency 
workers, while minimizing contamination of the facility, and 
registration of evacuees at reception centers.
    Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has 
appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide 
monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or 
emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a).
Extent of Play
    Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration 
facilities for evacuees/emergency workers should be set up and 
demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in 
the extent of play agreement. This would include adequate space for 
evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include \1/3\ of the 
monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the 
population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Before using 
monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process 
of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.
    Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees 
should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring 
productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning 
zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours. This 
monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that 
can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an 
appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals per 
monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures 
specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of 
monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The 
monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per 
monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine 
whether the twelve-hour requirement can be meet. Monitoring of 
emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. 
However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a 
minimum of two emergency workers.
    Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and 
conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately 
showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should 
demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. 
Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means 
(for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from 
potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to 
separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes 
of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store 
contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further 
contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any 
individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed 
concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and 
personal belongings.
    Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for 
determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the 
procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately 
decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the 
ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be 
determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level 
radiation source.
    The capability to register individuals upon completion of the 
monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The 
registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment 
of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the 
individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of 
decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio 
recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for 
registration.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the 
ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 6.b--Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker 
Equipment

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement 
radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker 
equipment, including vehicles.
    Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and 
resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of 
emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b).
Extent of Play
    The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor 
equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) plans and procedures. Specific 
attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in 
contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff 
should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for 
decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance 
levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.
    The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be 
set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, 
instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in 
place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of 
one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire 
surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as 
radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should 
be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact 
with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.
    Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and 
equipment

[[Page 20601]]

that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by 
interview.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the 
ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of 
play agreement.

Sub-Element 6.c--Temporary Care of Evacuees

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) demonstrate the capability to 
establish relocation centers in host areas. The American Red Cross 
(ARC) normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under 
existing letters of agreement.
    Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate 
that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations 
consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS 
CARE--Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the 
procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for 
contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before 
entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12).
Extent of Play
    Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may 
be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator 
should conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through 
observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are 
consistent with ARC 3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary to 
set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. 
Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations 
for various services and providing those services to simulated 
evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and 
simulation of this objective, exercise demonstration expectations 
should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements.
    Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to 
ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been 
decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering 
the facility. This capability may be determined through an interview 
process.
    If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would 
be difficult or expensive to transport (for example, cots, blankets, 
sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically 
available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such 
items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources 
with locations and estimates of quantities.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the 
ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of 
play agreement.

Sub-Element 6.d--Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured 
Individuals

Intent
    This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with 
the capability to provide medical services.
    Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, 
adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, 
monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated 
injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4).
Extent of Play
    Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts will 
not delay urgent medical care for the victim.
    Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the 
capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical 
facilities. An ambulance should be used for the response to the victim. 
However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended 
time, any vehicle (for example, car, truck, or van) may be used to 
transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal communications 
between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility 
should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport 
to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing 
the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include 
reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. Additionally, the 
ambulance crew should demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the 
ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, 
or whom to contact for such information.
    Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport, done en 
route, or deferred to the medical facility. Before using a monitoring 
instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of 
checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring 
activities should be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. 
Appropriate contamination control measures should be demonstrated 
before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.
    The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to activate 
and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and 
supplies should be available for the treatment of contaminated injured 
individuals.
    The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make 
decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, to follow 
appropriate decontamination procedures, and to maintain records of all 
survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for the 
collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination of the 
individual should be demonstrated or described to the evaluator.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the 
ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of 
play agreement.

Frequency for Evaluation of New Criteria

    The REP-14 objectives are currently evaluated at the frequency 
described on Pages C-2.3 and C-2.4 of REP-14. Adoption of the new 
Exercise Evaluation Areas renders these pages obsolete. Table 2 
establishes the minimum frequency with each of the Exercise Evaluation 
Areas would be exercised. FEMA is open to ORO proposals to voluntarily 
exercise certain criteria more frequently than the minimums listed 
below.

[[Page 20602]]

                                 Table 2.--Federal Evaluation Process Matrix \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Consolidates REP-14
 Evaluation area and sub-elements      objective(s)                       Minimum frequency \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Emergency Operations            1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 14,
 Management.                        17, 30.
    a. Mobilization..............  ...................  Every Exercise.
    b. Facilities................  ...................  Every Exercise.
    c. Direction and Control.....  ...................  Every Exercise.
    d. Communications Equipment..  ...................  Every Exercise.
    e. Equipment and Supplies to   ...................  Every Exercise.
     Support Operations.
2. Protective Action               5, 7, 9, 14, 15,
 Decisionmaking.                    16, 17, 26, 28.
    a. Emergency Worker Exposure   ...................  Every Exercise.
     Control.
    b. Radiological Assessment &   ...................  Every Exercise
     Protective Action
     Recommendations & Decisions
     for the Plume Phase of the
     Emergency.
    c. Protective Action           ...................  Every Exercise.
     Decisions for the Protection
     of Special Populations.
    d. Radiological Assessment     ...................  Once in 6 yrs.
     and Decisionmaking for the
     Ingestion Exposure Pathway
     \3\.
    e. Radiological Assessment &   ...................  Once in 6 yrs.
     Decisionmaking Concerning
     Relocation, Re-entry, and
     Return \3\.
3. Protective Action               5, 14, 15, 16, 17,
 Implementation.                    27, 29.
    a. Implementation of           ...................  Every Exercise.
     Emergency Worker Exposure
     Control.
    b. Implementation of KI        ...................  Once in 6 yrs.\4\
     Decision.
    c. Implementation of           ...................  Once in 6 yrs.\5\
     Protective Actions for
     Special Populations.
    d. Implementation of Traffic   ...................  Every Exercise.
     and Access Control \6\.
    e. Implementation of           ...................  Once in 6 yrs.
     Ingestion Pathway Decisions.
    f. Implementation of           ...................  Once in 6 yrs.
     Relocation, Re-entry, and
     Return Decisions.
4. Field Measurement and Analysis  6, 8, 24, 25.......
    a. Plume Phase Field           ...................  Every Full Participation Exercise.\2\
     Measurements and Analysis.
    b. Post Plume Phase Field      ...................  Once in 6 yrs.
     Measurements and Sampling.
    c. Laboratory Operations.....  ...................  Once in 6 yrs.
5. Emergency Notification and      10, 11, 12, 13.....
 Public Information.
    a.1 Activation of the Prompt   ...................  Every exercise.
     Alert and Notification
     System.
    a.3 Notification of Exception  ...................  Every exercise-as needed.
     Areas and/or Backup Alert
     and Notification System
     within 45 Minutes.
    b. Emergency Information and   ...................  Every exercise.
     Instructions for the Public
     and the Media.
6. Support Operations/Facilities.  18, 19, 20, 21, 22.
    a. Monitoring and              ...................   Once in 6 yrs.\5\
     Decontamination of Evacuees
     and Emergency Workers and
     Registration of Evacuees.
    b. Monitoring and              ...................   Once in 6 yrs.\5\
     Decontamination of Emergency
     Worker Equipment.
    c. Temporary Care of Evacuees  ...................  Once in 6 yrs.\7\
    d. Transportation and          ...................  Every exercise.
     Treatment of Contaminated
     Individuals.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Evaluation Criteria for specific requirements.
\2\ Each State within the 10-mile EPZ of a commercial nuclear power site shall fully participate in an exercise
  jointly with the licensee and appropriate local governments at least every two years. Each State with multiple
  sites within its boundaries shall fully participate in a joint exercise at some site on a rotational basis at
  least every two years. When not fully participating in an exercise at a site, the State shall partially
  participate at that site to support the full participation of the local governments.
\3\ The plume phase and the post-plume phase (ingestion, relocation, re-entry and return) can be demonstrated
  separately.
\4\ Should be demonstrated in every biennial exercise by some organizations and should be demonstrated at least
  once every six years by every ORO with responsibility for implementation of KI decision.
\5\ All facilities must be evaluated once during the six-year exercise cycle.
\6\ Physical deployment of resources is not necessary.
\7\ Facilities managed by the American Red Cross (ARC), under the ARC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, will be
  evaluated once when designated or when substantial changes occur; all other facilities not managed by the ARC
  must be evaluated once in the six-year exercise cycle.

[FR Doc. 02-10222 Filed 4-24-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-02-P