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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

June 2003:

Firearms ControlS:

Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls 
in Key Areas:

GAO-03-688:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-688, a report to Congressional Requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study:

In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General 
reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not 
account for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in July 2001, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449 of its firearms 
were lost or stolen. Given the possible threat that lost, stolen, or 
missing firearms poses to the public, GAO assessed (1) the consistency 
of federal agencies firearms controls with federal internal control 
standards and related criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and 
Treasury agencies with established firearms controls and improvements 
made to strengthen and enforce controls.

What GAO Found:

GAO found that all 18 federal agencies reviewed, which accounted for 
over 95 percent of federal officers and agents authorized to carry 
firearms, had policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding 
firearms that were consistent with federal internal control standards 
and related criteria. However, agencies could strengthen their 
controls in key areas that have been consistently recognized as 
important for effective inventory management. These areas include

* recording and tracking firearms inventory data; 

* maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms inventories; 

* ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and

* requiring investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, 
for individuals determined not to have followed firearms 
accountability procedures.

Although agencies established policies and procedures to control 
firearms, audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and the 
Treasury found that agencies did not always follow established 
procedures, or implement procedures, for conducting periodic 
inventories, reporting and investigating missing firearms, and 
securing firearms inventories. Since these weaknesses were identified, 
we found that agencies have implemented, or are in the process of 
implementing, actions to strengthen their firearms controls. 

In addition, 15 of the 18 federal agencies GAO reviewed reported a 
total of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their 
possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002, further 
indicating the need for stronger controls. Of these firearms, 188 were 
recovered, leaving 824 firearms still missing. While we could not 
determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that were reported 
lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms generally 
accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies total firearms 
inventories. In independent reviews of selected missing firearms 
cases, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury identified 
instances of firearms recovered in connection with criminal activity 
or during the course of criminal investigations.

What GAO Recommends:

To provide better assurance that firearms are safeguarded from loss, 
theft, or misuse, Department officials should reassess, and modify if 
necessary, existing firearms controls based on generally accepted 
internal control standards. The agencies should also document firearms 
controls in agency policies and procedures so they can be consistently 
understood and applied.

Officials generally agreed with GAOs findings. Two agencies agreed 
with our recommendation, and three said they had taken actions 
consistent with the recommendation. A fourth agency expressed concern 
about GAOs recommendation, saying its existing controls were 
effective.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-688.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at 
(212) 512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov.

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Agencies' Policies and Procedures Were Consistent with Internal Control 
Standards, but Agencies Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas:

Audits Found Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and Treasury 
Agencies, but Improvements Are Being Made:

Majority of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed Reported Missing 
Firearms:

Conclusion:

Recommendations:

Agency Comments:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and 
Weapons Components:

Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and Weapons 
Components:

Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/or Chemical 
Agents, and Ammunition:

Agencies Used Inventory Counts and Other Methods to Control Weapons and 
Weapons Components:

Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies 
and Procedures:

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire:

Appendix V: Follow-up Survey Questionnaire:

Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls Over 
Firearms and Other Sensitive Property:

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services:

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior:

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice:

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service:

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs:

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002:

Table 2: Reporting and Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP, DEA, FBI, 
INS, and USMS:

Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered, and Unaccounted for 
between September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies:

Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Included in Our 
Survey of Federal Firearms Control Policies, Procedures, and Practices:

Table 5: Agencies' Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms and 
Weapons Components:

Table 6: Agencies' Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for Explosives, 
Gas and/or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition:

Table 7: Key Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and 
Procedures as Reported by Selected Federal Law Enforcement Agencies:

Table 8: Justice, Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other 
Sensitive Property:

Abbreviations:

ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms:

BEP: Bureau of Engraving and Printing:

BJS: Bureau of Justice Statistics:

BOP: Bureau of Prisons:

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:

INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:

IRS/CI: Internal Revenue Service - Criminal Investigation:

NCIC: National Crime Information Center:

NIHN: ational Institutes of Health:

OIG: Office of the Inspector General:

TIGTA: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration:

USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:

VA: Department of Veterans Affairs:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

June 13, 2003:

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 
Chairman 
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 
Ranking Minority Member 
Committee on the Judiciary 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable John D. Dingell 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Robert C. "Bobby" Scott 
Ranking Minority Member 
Subcommittee on Crime 
Committee on the Judiciary 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith 
House of Representatives:

In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) reported that over 500 firearms belonging to the U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) were lost, stolen, or 
missing.[Footnote 1] Four months later, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) disclosed that 449 of its firearms were lost or 
stolen.[Footnote 2] The loss of firearms and other weapons by federal 
law enforcement agencies may pose serious risks to the public, 
including the risk that missing firearms may be used to inflict bodily 
harm or to further criminal activity.

Given these losses, you expressed concern that federal agencies with 
personnel authorized to carry firearms may lack adequate controls for 
securing and accounting for their firearms. Accordingly, we determined:

* the extent to which agencies' policies and procedures for controlling 
and safeguarding firearms were consistent with federal internal control 
standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and management 
organizations;

* whether reviews conducted by the Departments of Justice and 
Treasury[Footnote 3] identified instances of noncompliance with 
firearms policies and procedures, and whether agencies took actions to 
correct identified weaknesses, particularly related to (1) conducting 
inventories, (2) investigating missing firearms, and (3) disciplining 
employees; and:

* the number of firearms that federal agencies identified as lost, 
stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 
and July 2002.

You also requested that we determine how federal agencies maintain 
control and accountability over weapons other than firearms and 
associated weapons components. Information on these weapons and weapons 
components can be found in appendix II.

To evaluate agencies' policies and procedures for controlling and 
safeguarding firearms, the number of missing agency firearms, and 
agencies' control over other weapons and weapons components, we 
reviewed the firearms control activities of 18 agencies with personnel 
authorized to carry firearms and make arrests[Footnote 4] within the 
executive branch of the federal government. We selected these agencies 
from four strata: those with 1,000 or more law enforcement personnel, 
those with 500-999 law enforcement personnel, those with 100-499 law 
enforcement personnel, and those with less than 100 law enforcement 
personnel.[Footnote 5] Together, these agencies employed over 95 
percent of approximately 80,000 federal officers and agents authorized 
to make arrests and carry firearms, as of June 2000. Table 1 identifies 
the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed and the number of 
firearms reported by the agencies as of their most recently completed 
inventories, at the time of our survey.

Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002:

Agency: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Date of completed 
firearms inventory as of July 2002: January 2002; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 21,125.

Agency: Bureau of Engraving and Printing; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: June 2002; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 527.

Agency: Drug Enforcement Administration; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: September 2001; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 14,921.

Agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: January 2002; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 49,600.

Agency: Federal Bureau of Prisons; Date of completed firearms inventory 
as of July 2002: April 2002; Number of firearms inventoried[A]: 19,023.

Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: June 2001; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 188.

Agency: Federal Protective Service; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: December 2001; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 1,806.

Agency: Immigration and Naturalization Service; Date of completed 
firearms inventory as of July 2002: August 2001; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 54,930.

Agency: Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation; Date of 
completed firearms inventory as of July 2002: September 2001; Number of 
firearms inventoried[A]: 5,467.

Agency: National Institutes of Health; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: June 2002; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 263.

Agency: National Park Service; Date of completed firearms inventory as 
of July 2002: September 2001; Number of firearms inventoried[A]: 
10,718.

Agency: U.S. Customs Service; Date of completed firearms inventory as 
of July 2002: April 2002; Number of firearms inventoried[A]: 24,751.

Agency: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: September 2001; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 5,234.

Agency: U.S. Marshals Service; Date of completed firearms inventory as 
of July 2002: October 2001; Number of firearms inventoried[A]: 14,495.

Agency: U.S. Mint; Date of completed firearms inventory as of July 
2002: October 2001; Number of firearms inventoried[A]: 1,026.

Agency: U.S. Postal Inspection Service; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: December 2002[B]; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 6,228.

Agency: U.S. Secret Service; Date of completed firearms inventory as of 
July 2002: December 2001; Number of firearms inventoried[A]: 9,396.

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs; Date of completed firearms 
inventory as of July 2002: March 2003[C]; Number of firearms 
inventoried[A]: 3,319.

Total; Number of firearms inventoried[A]: 243,017.

Source: GAO survey of agencies.

[A] Data were not independently verified.

[B] The U.S. Postal Inspection Service provided information as of 
December 2002.

[C] The Department of Veterans Affairs does not have a centralized 
inventory, but maintains inventory records at its more than 100 
facilities. For our review, officials calculated its total firearms 
inventory as of March 2003.

[End of table]

We surveyed the 18 agencies to determine their policies and procedures 
for controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories, and the numbers 
of firearms lost, stolen, or not in their possession, and subsequently 
recovered, between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also reviewed 
agency policies and procedures, federal internal control standards, and 
other criteria for controlling inventories to determine whether 
agencies' policies and procedures for safeguarding firearms were 
consistent with established criteria.

To determine whether the Departments of Justice and the Treasury 
identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and 
procedures and have taken action to correct identified weaknesses, we 
reviewed the results of audits conducted by these departments of their 
respective agencies' firearms control practices. We also interviewed 
agency officials and obtained documentation identifying corrective 
action taken in response to departmental reviews. Appendix I contains 
detailed information on the scope and methodology we used during our 
review.

Results in Brief:

All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies 
and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms that were 
generally consistent with federal internal control standards and 
related criteria. These controls addressed (1) recording and tracking 
of firearms inventory data; (2) maintaining, controlling, and 
accounting for firearms inventories; (3) personal and supervisory 
accountability for firearms; and (4) investigations, and discipline 
when deemed appropriate, for individuals determined not to have 
followed firearms accountability procedures. Although agencies had 
policies and procedures to control and safeguard firearms, agencies 
could strengthen their controls in some of these areas. In addition, 
agencies did not always document these controls in their policies and 
procedures.

Audits conducted by Justice's and Treasury's OIGs and the Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found weaknesses in 
agency procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms. 
Specifically, they found that some agencies did not conduct periodic 
firearms inventories or report and investigate instances of missing 
firearms, as required by their policies and procedures. However, the 
OIGs and TIGTA found that agencies generally disciplined employees who 
did not appropriately control their firearms or report missing 
firearms. In response to these audits, agencies have taken, or are in 
the process of taking, action to correct all identified weaknesses.

Although agencies generally established policies and procedures to 
control and safeguard firearms, 15 of the 18 we reviewed reported a 
total of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their 
possession at some point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002. Of these firearms, 188 were recovered during the same time 
period, leaving 824 firearms still missing. While we could not 
determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that were reported 
lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms generally 
accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies' total firearms 
inventories.[Footnote 6] Agencies reported that some losses occurred 
despite employees taking appropriate precautions, and some missing 
firearms did not pose a threat to the public. However, audits conducted 
by Justice's and Treasury's OIGs identified instances in which firearms 
were recovered in connection with criminal activity or during a 
criminal investigation.

In order to assist federal law enforcement agencies in more effectively 
securing firearms, we are recommending that agencies strengthen their 
policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms 
inventories in the key control areas consistently recognized as 
important for effective inventory management and document those 
controls in agency policies and procedures.

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the 
Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health and 
Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally agreed 
with the information presented and suggested technical changes that 
have been incorporated where appropriate. The National Institutes of 
Health, Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U.S. 
Postal Inspection Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs commented 
on the recommendation. The National Institutes of Health and the Fish 
and Wildlife Service agreed with the recommendation and identified 
actions they have taken to strengthen firearms controls. The U.S. 
Postal Inspection Service also identified changes it has made, or is 
making, to its policies and procedures to strengthen its controls over 
firearms, consistent with our recommendation.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) expressed concerned about our 
recommendation, saying that its controls were effective in preventing 
firearms losses, as evidenced by its not having any missing firearms 
during the time period of our review. Although the department did not 
report missing firearms during this time period, the potential exists 
that firearms could be lost or stolen at some point in the future. 
Accordingly, we believe that the department as well as other agencies 
we reviewed should periodically assess their firearms controls, 
particularly when their organization or operations have changed or when 
firearms have been identified as missing, to determine whether their 
controls have been effective or should be modified.

Written comments that we received from the Departments of the Interior, 
Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the National Institutes of Health; and 
the U.S. Postal Service are included in appendixes VII through XI.

Background:

In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity 
Act[Footnote 7] requiring executive agencies to establish and maintain 
controls that, among other things, provide reasonable assurance that 
assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and 
misappropriation. The act also mandated that GAO's internal control 
standards[Footnote 8] serve as the framework for agencies to use in 
establishing and maintaining their internal control systems. Among 
other things, GAO's internal control standards require agencies to 
establish physical controls to secure and safeguard vulnerable assets 
such as cash, securities, inventories, and equipment, which might be 
vulnerable to loss or unauthorized use. In March 2002, GAO published a 
supplemental guide for inventory controls,[Footnote 9] which summarized 
fundamental principles that have been successfully implemented by seven 
private sector firms noted for outstanding inventory management.

GAO internal control standards provide that in establishing internal 
controls, agencies should assess the risks associated with asset losses 
and establish control activities to help ensure those risks are 
addressed. The standards further require that agencies document and 
monitor control activities to ensure they are appropriately implemented 
and are effective in addressing risk inherent in agency operations.

In addition to the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act and GAO 
standards, two other organizations issued advisory criteria addressing 
inventory controls. In June 1995, the Joint Financial Management 
Improvement Program issued advisory criteria for implementing and 
maintaining inventory systems.[Footnote 10] The criteria addressed 
management's responsibility to provide guidelines for developing, 
documenting, and implementing physical controls to safeguard and 
provide accountability for inventory items. Furthermore, in August 
1983, the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, 
Inc., an independent accrediting authority for law enforcement 
agencies,[Footnote 11] published accreditation standards to include 
procedures for inventory and property control.

Agencies' Policies and Procedures Were Consistent with Internal Control 
Standards, but Agencies Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas:

All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies 
and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms, one of the 
first steps in developing and implementing an effective system of 
internal control. These controls were generally consistent with federal 
internal control standards and related criteria issued by law 
enforcement and management organizations. However, agencies could 
strengthen controls in key areas consistently identified as important 
for effective inventory management. Strengthening controls could assist 
agencies in ensuring their firearms are secured from loss, theft, or 
unauthorized use.

Federal Standards and Other Criteria Provide Guidance for Controlling 
and Safeguarding Firearms:

In order to assess the consistency of selected agencies' policies and 
procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms with established 
criteria, we reviewed federal and other internal control standards 
designed to help ensure that assets, including firearms, are protected 
against damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use. The criteria 
included GAO's internal control standards and supplemental inventory 
guidelines, advisory criteria issued by the Joint Financial Management 
Improvement Program for maintaining inventory systems, and 
accreditation standards for inventory and property control issued by 
the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.

Our analysis of federal internal control standards and other related 
criteria found four key areas that were consistently identified as 
important for effective inventory management. These four areas include 
(1) recording firearms inventory data in property management records 
and systems (inventory data); (2) controlling and safeguarding firearms 
inventories (inventory control); (3) assigning responsibility for 
safeguarding firearms and overseeing the conducting of firearms 
inventories (personal and supervisory accountability); and (4) 
investigating missing firearms and considering employee discipline when 
requirements for maintaining and controlling firearms are not met 
(investigations and discipline).

Within each of these four areas, federal internal control standards and 
related criteria identify specific controls designed to assist agencies 
in controlling and safeguarding their firearms inventories. For 
example, in the area of inventory control, the standards and criteria 
recommend that agencies (1) have written policies and procedures for 
issuing agency firearms to individuals, organizational units, and 
functional areas; (2) conduct periodic inventory counts of firearms; 
(3) use occasions other than periodic inventories to confirm employees' 
possession of assigned firearms; and (4) limit access to secured 
firearms storage areas and facilities to authorized personnel.

We compared agency policies and procedures for maintaining firearms 
with controls identified in federal internal control standards and 
related criteria for each of the four key control areas. Appendix III 
identifies, for each agency reviewed, whether the agency established 
policies and procedures addressing specific controls recommended by GAO 
and other management organizations within each of the four areas.

Inventory Data--Agencies Required the Recording and Update of Firearms 
Data:

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established controls to 
record and update firearms inventory data in agency property records 
and property management systems, consistent with standards issued by 
GAO and other management organizations. Specifically, we determined 
whether agencies had written policies and procedures requiring the 
update of property records and systems (1) upon their receipt of new 
firearms, (2) as a result of discrepancies identified during periodic 
firearms inventories, and (3) upon the removal of firearms from agency 
inventories.

The recording and update of firearms inventory data is an important 
component of maintaining and controlling agency firearms. Data on 
activities that monitor the receipt and removal of firearms from 
inventory, as well as discrepancies found during periodic inventories, 
are needed to ensure management has adequate oversight over agency 
firearms. The absence of these controls could result in management 
being unaware of the number and location of firearms they have on-hand, 
and could result in a lack of appropriate oversight over these assets.

The majority of agencies we reviewed usually required in their policies 
and procedures the recording and update of firearms inventory data. 
Specifically, 16 of the 18 agencies required that the date of receipt 
and the specific identification of the firearm, as well as the person 
and unit to which the firearm was assigned, be reported in property 
management records as new firearms are received. In addition, 17 of the 
18 agencies required that adjustments be made to firearms inventory 
records as a result of discrepancies identified during physical 
inventory counts. Sixteen agencies also required the update of property 
management records upon the removal of firearms from agency 
inventories.

Inventory Control--Agencies Required the Recording of Firearms Data and 
Periodic Inventories, but Could Strengthen Other Controls:

In the area of inventory control, we surveyed agencies to determine 
whether they established written policies and procedures, consistent 
with federal internal control standards and related criteria, 
addressing the (1) issuance of agency firearms to individuals, 
organizational units, and functional areas; (2) conducting of periodic 
inventory counts of firearms and the manner in which inventories should 
be conducted; and (3) use of occasions other than periodic inventories 
to confirm employees' possession of assigned firearms. We also surveyed 
agencies to determine whether they (4) limited access to secured 
firearms storage areas and facilities to authorized personnel.

The issuance of firearms, periodic checks of firearms on-hand, and 
limited access to firearms storage areas are important in ensuring that 
agencies appropriately safeguard their firearms. Agencies often learn 
of missing or stolen firearms when conducting periodic inventories, or 
when they use occasions other than inventories to confirm employee's 
possession of firearms. Without these controls, management may not be 
alerted when firearms are not appropriately maintained, or when stored 
firearms are not adequately protected from loss, theft, or unauthorized 
use.

The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and 
procedures for issuing firearms and conducting firearms inventories, 
but could strengthen other inventory controls. Specifically, agencies 
generally had written policies and procedures addressing the issuance 
of agency firearms to individuals (18 out of 18) and organizational 
units (16 out of 16 that reported the control applicable). In addition, 
all 18 agencies required the conducting of periodic inventory counts of 
firearms, and 15 of these agencies required that the objectives, 
timing, and instructions for the counts be established. However, only 
11 of the 18 agencies required that persons assigned responsibility for 
conducting inventories be trained in inventory counting procedures.

In addition, 15 of the 18 agencies required counters to verify firearm 
ID numbers and descriptive information about the firearm during 
inventory counts. However, 9 agencies did not preclude individuals from 
counting firearms if they had firearms custodial responsibilities. 
Furthermore, only 2 of these 9 agencies established compensating 
procedures such as using count teams of 2 or more members, or ensuring 
that counters have no prior knowledge of the firearms inventory being 
counted.

Agencies also varied in using occasions other than inventories to 
verify employees' possession of an assigned firearm and limiting access 
to secured firearms storage areas. Fifteen of the 18 agencies surveyed 
confirmed an employee's possession of an assigned firearm during 
firearms retraining or retesting. However, only 8 of the 18 agencies 
required unannounced inspections to verify employees' possession of 
assigned firearms. In addition, of the 15 agencies that reported this 
control applicable, only 7 required limited access to firearms storage 
areas and facilities.

Personal and Supervisory Accountability--Agencies Required that 
Firearms Be Safeguarded, but Could Strengthen Other Controls:

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established policies and 
procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards and 
related criteria, requiring individuals to (1) safeguard assigned 
firearms from damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use, and (2) store 
firearms in lock boxes or secure gun cases, or use trigger locks. We 
also surveyed agencies to determine whether (3) job descriptions 
included requirements for conducting inventories, (4) individual 
performance in conducting inventories is assessed during performance 
evaluations, and (5) whether supervisory oversight is provided over 
periodic firearms inventories.

Internal controls addressing an individual's responsibility in 
maintaining assigned firearms, and a supervisor's responsibility in 
overseeing the control of those firearms, are needed to help ensure 
firearms policies are adhered to and firearms are appropriately 
secured. In order to be accountable for safeguarding firearms, 
employees and supervisors must be made aware of their responsibilities 
related to firearms control. The lack of these controls could make 
responsibilities related to firearms control unclear and result in 
difficulties in holding appropriate individuals accountable for failing 
to follow established procedures.

The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and 
procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms, but 
could strengthen controls for conducting and overseeing firearms 
inventories. Specifically, 17 of the 18 agencies had policies and 
procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms from 
damage, theft, loss, and unauthorized use. In addition, all 18 agencies 
required that firearms be secured in lock boxes or secured gun cases or 
that trigger locks be used. However, only 12 agencies assigned 
responsibility for conducting firearms inventories in job descriptions, 
and only 7 agencies assessed individuals' performance in conducting 
firearms inventories during performance evaluations. In addition, only 
11 of the 18 agencies required that supervisors oversee periodic 
firearms inventories.

Investigations and Discipline--Agencies Required Investigations of 
Missing Firearms and Discipline When Deemed Appropriate:

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written 
policies and procedures, in accordance with federal internal controls 
standards and related criteria, to ensure that instances of missing 
firearms are investigated, and employees are appropriately disciplined 
for not safeguarding firearms or reporting missing firearms. 
Specifically, we determined whether agencies had policies and 
procedures requiring that (1) missing firearms be investigated, (2) 
investigations of missing firearms be conducted by an independent body, 
(3) missing firearms be reported to the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC),[Footnote 12] (4) disciplinary action be taken for 
failing to report missing firearms, and (5) disciplinary action be 
taken for failing to properly safeguard assigned firearms.

Federal internal control standards and related criteria provide that 
agencies should have the ability to investigate instances of missing 
firearms and consider appropriate disciplinary action to enforce 
compliance with firearms controls. Instances of missing firearms should 
be investigated to identify the reasons the firearms were missing and 
to provide management with information to implement any corrective 
actions needed. In addition, procedures requiring the discipline of 
individuals who did not appropriately secure their firearm or report a 
missing firearm could act as a deterrent to others in failing to adhere 
to these controls.

The agencies we reviewed generally had written policies and procedures 
requiring that incidents of missing or stolen firearms be appropriately 
investigated and reported. Specifically, all 18 agencies required that 
physical count discrepancies of firearms be investigated, and 17 
agencies required that written instructions for investigating such 
discrepancies be developed. In addition, 15 agencies had written 
policies and procedures requiring that an independent body conduct the 
investigations, and 15 agencies required that missing firearms be 
reported to the NCIC.

Agencies also generally required disciplinary action for employees 
failing to report missing firearms and for not adhering to firearms 
accountability procedures. Fifteen of the 18 agencies required that 
disciplinary action be taken for employees failing to report missing 
firearms. In addition, 14 agencies required disciplinary action for 
employees failing to appropriately safeguard their firearms.

Agencies Did Not Always Document Firearms Controls in Policies and 
Procedures:

Agencies did not always document their controls for maintaining and 
controlling firearms inventories in policies and procedures. Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government issued by GAO require 
that internal control activities be clearly documented in management 
directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. Although we 
found that agencies documented most of the firearms controls reviewed, 
16 of the 18 agencies reported implementing some firearms controls as a 
matter of practice, without documenting the controls in their policies 
and procedures. Only the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 
and INS reported documenting in their policies and procedures all of 
the controls we reviewed.

Appendix III identifies, for the four areas reviewed, whether agencies 
relied on control activities that were not documented in their policies 
and procedures. In the area of inventory data, for example, 1 agency 
reported updating property management records and systems to identify 
out-of-service and disposed of firearms, but did not include this 
requirement in its policies and procedures. Another agency reported 
adjusting inventory records as a result of physical inventories, but 
did not require this in its policies and procedures.

In the inventory control area, 13 of the 18 agencies surveyed reported 
conducting some aspect of inventory control that was not required by 
their policies and procedures. For example, 9 agencies reported taking 
measures to ensure the integrity of firearms counts, and 9 agencies 
reported limiting access to secured firearms storage areas, but did not 
include these controls in their policies and procedures.

Agencies also reported following unwritten practices to hold 
individuals accountable for firearms inventories and to help ensure 
that inventories are properly performed. For example, 5 agencies 
reported assessing individuals' participation in inventories during 
performance evaluations, and 2 agencies reported providing supervisory 
oversight of firearms inventories, without including these requirements 
in their policies and procedures.

Regarding the investigation of missing firearms and associated employee 
discipline, 2 agencies reported requiring that an independent body 
investigate missing firearms, but did not include this requirement in 
their policies and procedures. In another example, 3 agencies reported 
that while employees who fail to safeguard their firearms are subject 
to disciplinary action, disciplinary action was not required by the 
agencies' policies and procedures.

Controls that are not included in policies and procedures may not be 
consistently applied throughout the agency and may not be effective in 
helping ensure that firearms are appropriately controlled and 
safeguarded. Without documented controls, individuals may not know the 
controls are required, and management may not be able to enforce their 
use. Agencies that rely on unwritten practices to protect their 
firearms run the risk that those controls may not be followed, and 
their firearms may not be appropriately secured.

Key Controls Provide Framework for Controlling and Safeguarding 
Firearms, but Appropriate Mix of Controls Should be Based on Agency 
Needs:

The key control areas identified in federal internal control standards 
and other criteria--inventory data, inventory control, personal and 
supervisory accountability, and investigations and discipline--provide 
a framework to assist agencies in building their systems of firearms 
controls. However, internal control guidance recommends that agencies 
tailor these controls to reflect their unique needs and circumstances, 
as well as their relative risks for firearms losses. Agency management 
is ultimately responsible for implementing the combination of controls 
deemed reasonable to effectively control and safeguard their firearms, 
based on agency needs.

Firearms control needs may vary depending on an agency's operations and 
structure. For example, law enforcement employees at the Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing (BEP) and the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) generally secure fixed buildings and store their firearms in one 
or few central locations when they are off-duty. Conversely, employees 
at the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and INS conduct 
investigations nationwide and generally keep their firearms with them 
at all times. As a result, BEP and NIH may require different methods 
for conducting firearms inventories than may be needed at the FBI, DEA, 
and INS. In addition, the FBI, DEA, and INS may wish to use other 
occasions to check an employee's possession of an assigned firearm, 
along with annual inventories, such as unannounced inspections and 
checks during retraining or testing in firearms use.

Audits Found Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and Treasury 
Agencies, but Improvements Are Being Made:

Audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs and 
TIGTA found that agencies did not always comply with agency policies 
and procedures for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories or 
establish needed controls. Specifically, the audits found that some 
agencies did not conduct periodic inventories of firearms or report and 
investigate instances of missing firearms, as required. However, the 
audits found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not 
appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. 
Although these weaknesses were found, agencies have taken, or are in 
the process of taking, actions to improve their controls over firearms 
inventories. See appendix VI for a detailed listing of audits conducted 
by the OIGs and TIGTA of their agencies' controls over firearms.

Justice's OIG Found that Agencies Did Not Always Control and Maintain 
Firearms as Required:

The Department of Justice's OIG reviewed the firearms control 
activities of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), DEA, U.S. Marshals Service 
(USMS), FBI, and INS from March 1999 through March 2002,[Footnote 13] 
to assess the effectiveness of agencies' controls over firearms and to 
determine what actions were taken by the agencies in response to the 
identification of lost or stolen firearms. The OIG reported that some 
agencies did not always conduct periodic physical inventories of 
firearms or investigate instances of missing firearms, but generally 
disciplined employees who did not report or control missing firearms as 
required by their policies and procedures. In addition, the OIG found 
that employees did not always report missing firearms or follow 
established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving 
firearms from separating employees.

Justice Agencies Did Not Always Conduct Periodic Firearms Inventories:

Justice's OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS did not conduct periodic 
physical inventories of firearms as required by their policies and 
procedures. The FBI required that periodic inventories be conducted 
every 2 years, while the DEA and INS required annual physical 
inventories of firearms.[Footnote 14] Despite these requirements, the 
OIG found that until it began its review in 2001, FBI had not completed 
a firearms inventory since prior to 1993. In addition, the OIG found 
that DEA and INS did not properly conduct or document past inventories, 
including not inventorying all firearms. For example, INS had not 
completed inventories in accordance with its policies and procedures, 
including tracking inventory adjustments and confirming that that 
appropriate property was inventoried. The OIG found that BOP and USMS 
were generally current in conducting firearms inventories.

According to the OIG, FBI and DEA officials stated that they had not 
conducted or completed required inventories for a variety of reasons, 
including not having the required funds to conduct the inventories and 
relying on other methods to verify inventories.[Footnote 15] For 
example, FBI officials said that they did not conduct all required 
inventories due to budgetary and equipment limitations and due to the 
reassignment of personnel who had conducted inventories in the past. At 
DEA, officials stated that they relied on the physical check of 
assigned firearms during agents' annual firearms qualifications as a 
substitute for the required annual inventories. Despite this reliance, 
however, DEA still reported firearms as lost or stolen from its 
inventories.

Justice Agencies Did Not Always Investigate Missing Firearms, but 
Generally Disciplined Responsible Employees:

While BOP and DEA initiated investigations of all missing firearms, FBI 
and INS did not always initiate investigations, as required by agency 
policies and procedures, or could not provide documentation that 
investigations were conducted. Justice requires that component agencies 
investigate instances of missing property, including firearms, and 
grants agencies the authority to discipline employees determined not to 
have followed property control procedures. However, the OIG determined 
that 29 of 74 missing firearms incidents at the INS between January 
1996 and September 1999 were not investigated. In addition, the OIG 
could not find evidence that the FBI investigated 141 of 212 missing 
firearms incidents reported for the period October 1999 through January 
2002.

Although the OIG found that investigations of missing firearms were not 
always initiated, they found that investigations of missing firearms 
usually resulted in employees found responsible for the loss being 
disciplined.[Footnote 16] For example, at the DEA, 10 of 15 missing 
firearms cases reviewed for the period October 1999 through August 2001 
resulted in disciplinary action, including letters of reprimand and 
recommendations for suspensions without pay. In another example, the 
OIG concluded that 37 of 70 investigations of missing property 
(firearms[Footnote 17] and laptops) at the FBI from October 1999 
through January 2002, resulted in recommendations for disciplinary 
action, including letters of censure and suspensions without pay.

Justice Agencies Did Not Always Report Missing Firearms or Secure and 
Retrieve Firearms:

Justice's OIG found that agencies did not always report, or report in a 
timely manner, missing firearms internally or to the NCIC. The OIG 
further found that some agencies did not always follow established 
procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from 
separating employees. Table 2 identifies the average time taken for 
employees to report missing firearms within their agency and the number 
of missing firearms reported to the NCIC.

Table 2: Reporting and Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP, DEA, FBI, 
INS, and USMS:

Agency: BOP; Average time taken to report firearms losses internally 
after discovery: 0.5 days; Number of missing firearms not reported to 
NCIC: Reporting not required[A].

Agency: DEA; Average time taken to report firearms losses internally 
after discovery: 15 days; Number of missing firearms not reported to 
NCIC: 3 of 16.

Agency: FBI; Average time taken to report firearms losses internally 
after discovery: 4.3 years; Number of missing firearms not reported to 
NCIC: 14 of 276.

Agency: INS; Average time taken to report firearms losses internally 
after discovery: NA[B]; Number of missing firearms not reported to 
NCIC: 394 of 539.

Agency: USMS; Average time taken to report firearms losses internally 
after discovery: 7 days; Number of missing firearms not reported to 
NCIC: 2 of 6[C].

Source: GAO analysis of Justice data.

[A] BOP did not require the reporting of missing firearms to NCIC.

[B] The OIG's data regarding the timing of reported firearms losses 
within INS were not comparable to data obtained from the other 
components.

[C] According to the OIG, USMS identified that the two firearms had not 
been reported to NCIC because both were destroyed and were, therefore, 
accounted for.

[End of table]

The OIG found that the average timeframe for employees reporting 
missing firearms within their agency ranged from the same day at the 
BOP to 4.3 years at the FBI.[Footnote 18] While the USMS required the 
immediate reporting of missing firearms, and DEA required reporting 
within 48 hours, the FBI and BOP did not include a timetable for 
reporting missing firearms in their policies and procedures. The OIG 
attributed delays for reporting missing firearms at the FBI to the 
absence of a required timetable for reporting missing firearms, but 
concluded that the BOP generally reported missing firearms in a timely 
manner due to firearms being stored in a central location. The OIG 
could not determine whether USMS experienced delays in reporting 
missing firearms because agency loss reports did not identify the date 
the loss was discovered. The OIG found reporting delays of 1 to 89 days 
in 11 of the 16 DEA lost firearms cases examined, but did not identify 
the reasons for these delays.

The OIG also found that the agencies had inconsistent practices for 
reporting missing firearms to the NCIC. The OIG discovered that all 
agencies reviewed, with the exception of BOP,[Footnote 19] had policies 
and procedures requiring that missing firearms be reported to NCIC. 
However, the OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS had not reported from 2 
to more than 300 of their missing firearms to the NCIC, and that only 
USMS had reported all missing firearms.[Footnote 20] Reporting missing 
firearms to NCIC would assist agencies in retrieving lost or stolen 
firearms recovered by the law enforcement community, since the NCIC 
system is generally regarded by law enforcement agencies as the primary 
nationwide method for tracking stolen firearms.

In addition, Justice's OIG found that some agencies did not always 
follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or 
retrieving firearms from separating employees. Specifically, the OIG 
found that 4 of 16 firearms losses at DEA, for the period October 1999 
through September 15, 2001, occurred as a result of vehicle thefts. In 
some cases, the employees stored their firearms in unattended vehicles, 
despite internal policies prohibiting this practice. At FBI, the OIG 
found that some of the 52[Footnote 21] firearms stolen from FBI or 
privately owned vehicles, during the period October 1999 through 
January 2002, were due to firearms not being properly secured in 
vehicles. In addition, 3 of the 6 firearms losses at USMS were due to 
thefts from vehicles.[Footnote 22] Both FBI and USMS allowed the 
storage of firearms in vehicles either temporarily (FBI) or 
indefinitely (USMS), as long as the vehicle was secured and the firearm 
was placed in a locked container.

The OIG also found weaknesses in the agencies' use of accountable 
property checklists designed to retrieve property from separating 
employees, sometimes resulting in instances of firearms not being 
retrieved. Department of Justice policies require that each agency 
develop, maintain, and distribute an accountable property checklist for 
employees to complete prior to separating from the department to help 
facilitate the return of agency property, including firearms. Despite 
this requirement, the OIG found weakness in the use of these checklists 
at all of the agencies reviewed, including (1) failure to enforce the 
use of the checklist; (2) lack of relevant accountable signatures; and 
(3) failure to include key identifying information, such as the 
firearm's serial number. As a result, firearms were not always 
retrieved from separating employees. For example, the OIG reported that 
in 2001, FBI found that at least 31 firearms of separated employees 
could not be accounted for.

Treasury's OIG and TIGTA Found Agencies Safeguarded Firearms, but Could 
Strengthen and Enforce Controls in Some Areas:

Treasury's OIG and TIGTA reviewed the firearms control activities of 
the ATF, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, BEP, the U.S. Mint, 
and Internal Revenue Service/Criminal Investigation (IRS/CI) for fiscal 
years 1999 through 2001. The purpose of these reviews was to determine 
whether the agencies' inventory practices were sufficient for 
controlling items that, if lost or stolen, might compromise the 
public's safety, national security, or ongoing criminal investigations. 
The OIG and TIGTA concluded that the agencies generally conducted 
periodic firearms inventories; investigated instances of missing 
firearms; and disciplined employees for not maintaining firearms as 
required by agency policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined 
that the U.S. Mint did not follow all policies and procedures related 
to conducting periodic inventories or identify its firearms from its 
property management records. In addition, TIGTA determined that IRS/CI 
did not appropriately record and report missing firearms data.

Treasury Agencies Generally Conducted Firearms Inventories, 
Investigated Missing Firearms, and Disciplined Employees:

Treasury's OIG and TIGTA found that the agencies reviewed, with the 
exception of the U.S. Mint, conducted periodic inventories at least 
annually, as required by their internal policies and procedures. For 
example, at ATF, the OIG concluded that frequent, independent physical 
inventories reduced the risk that weapons would be lost or stolen 
without being promptly detected. At IRS/CI, TIGTA found that property 
inventories were conducted locally on an annual basis and in accordance 
with established policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined 
that the U.S. Mint had not conducted a complete annual physical 
inventory of firearms during fiscal years 1999, 2000, or 2001, and the 
firearms inventory completed in October 2001 was not conducted in 
accordance with agency policies and procedures.

In addition, Treasury found that ATF, U.S. Customs Service, Secret 
Service, and IRS/CI investigated instances of firearms losses and 
appropriately considered employee discipline, as required by agency 
policies and procedures.[Footnote 23] For example, the OIG determined 
that ATF's Professional Review Board investigated 15 of 16 instances of 
missing firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through 
September 30, 2001, and appropriately considered employee discipline in 
each of those cases. The board recommended employee suspensions in 9 of 
the cases and no disciplinary action in 3 of the cases. The remaining 3 
cases were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG's 
review.

The OIG also determined that the U.S. Customs Service's Board of 
Survey, the unit responsible for investigating missing firearms, 
investigated all 72 missing firearms identified during the period 
October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001. The OIG determined that 
employees were held financially responsible for losses in 26 of the 
cases and not financially responsible in 37 of the cases. The remaining 
7 cases were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG's 
review.

U.S. Mint and IRS/CI Did Not Always Record or Report Firearms 
Information:

The OIG determined that the U.S. Mint could not provide a listing of 
firearms from its property management records to support reported 
firearms inventories, as required by their policies and procedures. The 
OIG concluded that without this list it would not be possible to 
reconcile the firearms that were on-hand against recorded inventory 
counts, resulting in the possibility that missing firearms might not be 
identified. The OIG concluded that these and other factors, including 
the number and storage of its firearms at several locations, increased 
the Mint's risk of lost or stolen firearms.

TIGTA reported that it could not determine the number of IRS/CI missing 
firearms from its management information system and that the hard copy 
reports of IRS/CI missing firearms were not always prepared or 
completed. Specifically, TIGTA found that IRS/CI's inventory management 
system did not differentiate between lost or stolen firearms and, as a 
result, TIGTA could not rely on that system to identify IRS/CI missing 
firearms inventories accurately. Although TIGTA was able to review and 
comment on hard copy reports from IRS/CI field offices in order to 
identify missing firearms, TIGTA found that some of these reports were 
not completely prepared.

Justice and Treasury Agencies Are Taking Action to Strengthen and 
Enforce Firearms Controls:

Justice and Treasury agencies have taken many actions designed to 
strengthen and enforce firearms controls, based on recommendations made 
by the OIGs and TIGTA. Specifically, in reports issued in March 2001 
and August 2002, Justice's OIG made a total of 63 recommendations to 
INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS designed to improve firearms control 
activities. Treasury's OIG and TIGTA also made five firearms-related 
recommendations in reports to the U.S. Mint in May 2002 and to IRS/CI 
in November 2001 and March 2002. According to the OIGs and TIGTA, 
agencies agreed to all recommendations and have taken, or are in the 
process of taking, corrective action addressing all identified 
weaknesses.

Specifically, the INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS have implemented 29 of 
the 63 recommendations made by the Justice OIG, and are in the process 
of implementing the remaining 34 recommendations. Of the 34 
recommendations that have not been implemented, management has begun 
taking corrective actions and is working with the OIG to ensure their 
efforts address the weaknesses identified. Completed and ongoing 
actions include establishing procedures requiring periodic firearms 
inventories on an annual basis and the appropriate segregation of 
duties during physical inventories. The agencies are also requiring 
that missing firearms be immediately reported and minimum timeframes 
for completing investigations of missing firearms be established. In 
addition, agencies are requiring that all missing firearms cases be 
adjudicated and that controls for securing firearms in vehicles and 
recovering firearms from separating employees be strengthened.

In addition, the U.S. Mint and IRS/CI have implemented all five 
recommendations made by the Treasury OIG and TIGTA. The U.S. Mint now 
requires the performance and documentation of an independent physical 
inventory of firearms annually and the reconciliation of those 
inventories against property management records. Furthermore, IRS/CI 
agreed to change its inventory management system to be able to 
differentiate between lost, stolen, and damaged items in their property 
management system, and now requires that missing firearms reports be 
completely prepared. IRS/CI also established guidelines addressing the 
types of lost or stolen equipment that should be referred to TIGTA for 
investigation.

Majority of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed Reported Missing 
Firearms:

Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported 
firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during 
some point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Agency 
officials reported that although some firearms were lost due to 
negligence, some losses occurred despite appropriate precautions being 
taken by employees. Audits conducted by Justice's and Treasury's OIGs 
found that some missing firearms were recovered during the commission 
of a crime, or in connection with a criminal investigation.

Fifteen of 18 Agencies Surveyed Reported Missing Firearms:

Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported 
1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession 
during some point in time between September 1998 and July 
2002.[Footnote 24] As of July 2002, 188 of these firearms had been 
subsequently recovered, leaving 824 still missing.[Footnote 25] While 
we could not determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that 
were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms 
generally accounted for less than one percent of agencies' total 
firearms inventories.[Footnote 26] Only BEP, the U.S. Mint, and 
Veterans Affairs reported having no lost, stolen, or missing firearms. 
Agencies identified missing firearms using internal reporting systems, 
through which personnel reported weapons as missing, and from periodic 
physical inventories of firearms. Table 3 identifies firearms as lost, 
stolen, or otherwise not in an agency's possession for the 18 agencies 
surveyed, those firearms subsequently recovered, and those firearms 
still missing as of July 2002.

Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered, and Unaccounted for 
between September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies:

Agency: ATF; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 
16; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 7; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 9.

Agency: BEP; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 0; 
Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 0; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 0.

Agency: BOP; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 2; 
Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 0; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 2.

Agency: DEA; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 
63; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 4; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 59.

Agency: FBI; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 
458[B]; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and 
July 2002[A]: 72; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 386.

Agency: Federal Emergency Management Administration; Firearms 
identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency's possession 
between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 2; Firearms subsequently 
recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 0; Firearms 
still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency's possession as of 
July 2002[A]: 2.

Agency: Federal Protective Service; Firearms identified as lost, 
stolen, or otherwise not in the agency's possession between September 
30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 3; Firearms subsequently recovered between 
September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 0; Firearms still lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 3.

Agency: Fish and Wildlife Service; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, 
or otherwise not in the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 
and July 2002[A]: 27; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 
30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 1; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise 
not in the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 26.

Agency: INS; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 
114[C]; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and 
July 2002[A]: 13; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 101[D].

Agency: IRS/CI; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not 
in the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 
6; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 3; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 3.

Agency: National Institutes of Health; Firearms identified as lost, 
stolen, or otherwise not in the agency's possession between September 
30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 3; Firearms subsequently recovered between 
September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 0; Firearms still lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 3.

Agency: National Park Service; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and 
July 2002[A]: 196; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 
30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 63; Firearms still lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 133.

Agency: Postal Inspection Service; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, 
or otherwise not in the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 
and July 2002[A]: 14; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 
30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 0; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise 
not in the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 14.

Agency: U.S. Customs Service[E]; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, 
or otherwise not in the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 
and July 2002[A]: 94; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 
30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 20; Firearms still lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 74.

Agency: USMS; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 
10; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 3; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 7.

Agency: U.S. Mint; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise 
not in the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 0; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 
and July 2002[A]: 0; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 0.

Agency: U.S. Secret Service; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and 
July 2002[A]: 4; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 
1998 and July 2002[A]: 2; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not 
in the agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 2.

Agency: VA; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 0; 
Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and July 
2002[A]: 0; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 0.

Agency: Total; Firearms identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
the agency's possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002[A]: 
1,012; Firearms subsequently recovered between September 30, 1998 and 
July 2002[A]: 188; Firearms still lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the 
agency's possession as of July 2002[A]: 824.

Source: GAO survey of these agencies.

[A] Data were not independently verified.

[B] FBI reported that 458 of its firearms were lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession during the period September 
30, 1998 through July 2002. FBI reported to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that, as of July 2001, 449 of its firearms were not accounted 
for; of these firearms, 161 were training weapons.

[C] INS reported that 114 of its firearms were lost, stolen, or 
otherwise not in the agency's possession during the period September 
30, 1998 through July 2002. The more than 500 missing INS firearms 
reported by the Justice OIG included those firearms found missing 
during an INS agencywide inventory conducted in August 1998.

[D] INS officials said that of the 101 missing firearms, 13 were lost; 
74 were stolen; and 14 were otherwise missing.

[E] The U.S. Customs Service reported 22 lost and 72 stolen firearms; 
it also reported additional firearms destroyed in the World Trade 
Center bombing.

[End of table]

Of the 1,012 firearms that agencies reported lost, stolen, or otherwise 
not in their possession,[Footnote 27] most missing firearms were 
pistols (541). Agencies also reported 187 revolvers or other handguns, 
157 training weapons, 92 shotguns, 38 rifles, 19 submachine guns, and 1 
stun gun as missing.

Agency officials recognized that firearms were sometimes lost due to 
negligent behavior, such as employees not properly securing firearms in 
locked vehicles, as required by agency policies and procedures. 
However, officials also identified that some firearms were lost despite 
appropriate precautions being taken by the employee. For example, one 
agency reported that four firearms were stolen while in the custody of 
the airlines, and that the theft did not occur due to the negligent 
behavior of the employee. Specifically, the firearms were checked in a 
locked, hard-sided gun case, in accordance with agency policies and 
procedures. Due to the manner in which the agencies recorded missing 
firearms data, they usually could not readily identify, for the missing 
firearms we reviewed, the number of firearms determined to have been 
lost due to negligence.

Agencies also identified cases where lost firearms, although not in the 
agency's possession, were not recoverable and could not be used to harm 
the public. For example, several agencies reported firearms being lost 
in the ocean or in a river. These weapons were considered unrecoverable 
and therefore did not pose a threat to the public.

Justice and Treasury Audits Identified Instances of Recovered Firearms 
Used in Criminal Activity:

Audits conducted by Justice's and Treasury's OIGs identified several 
incidents where missing firearms had been recovered in connection with 
criminal activity or during a criminal investigation.[Footnote 28] The 
OIGs made this determination during separate audits of agency controls 
over weapons, laptops, and other sensitive items at FBI, DEA, INS, U.S. 
Secret Service, and U.S. Customs.[Footnote 29]

For example, Justice's OIG reviewed 16 missing firearms cases reported 
to the DEA Board of Professional Conduct, for the time period October 
1, 1999 through November 15, 2001, and found that 3 had been recovered 
by local law enforcement during an arrest of an individual for a 
handgun violation, and 2 in connection with searches during unrelated 
criminal investigations. In another example, Treasury's OIG reviewed 10 
of 13 firearms reported missing and recovered by U.S. Customs Service, 
for the time period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, and 
found that 5 of the 10 firearms had been recovered in connection with a 
robbery, a drive-by shooting, or during the execution of a search 
warrant.

Conclusion:

The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act requires that executive 
agencies establish and maintain controls that provide reasonable 
assurance that all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, 
unauthorized use, and misappropriation. Standards and guidance for 
effectively maintaining and controlling firearms inventories are 
available to assist federal law enforcement agencies in designing 
controls to safeguard their firearms. Although these controls provide a 
framework to assist agencies in controlling and safeguarding their 
firearms, agencies should tailor these controls to meet their unique 
needs and circumstances, as well as their risks for firearms losses. 
Accordingly, the appropriate mix of controls may vary for each federal 
law enforcement agency.

When agencies discover lost, stolen, or missing firearms, they should 
reassess their firearms controls to determine why they were not 
effective and if they should be modified. This is particularly 
important when agencies find that existing controls have not been 
implemented or have been implemented but have not prevented the loss of 
agency firearms, as was the case with some agencies reviewed by the 
Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs. Internal controls that have 
been established to safeguard firearms, but were not appropriate 
controls based on the agencies' needs, or were not implemented or 
properly applied, provide little assurance that firearms are safe from 
loss, theft, or misuse.

In addition, agencies should document their firearms controls in 
policies and procedures. Without documenting these controls, employees 
may not know of their requirement, and the controls may not be 
uniformly applied agencywide. In addition, it may be difficult for 
management to enforce a control that is not required by policy and 
procedures, such as disciplining employees who do not adhere to 
firearms controls.

The need for an assessment of firearms controls, and documentation of 
controls in policies and procedures, is demonstrated by the majority of 
agencies reviewed reporting missing firearms. These firearms may pose a 
serious risk to the public, including the risk that they may be used to 
inflict bodily harm or to further criminal activity.

Recommendations:

The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, 
Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security; the Director of the National 
Institutes of Health, and the Postmaster General should:

* periodically assess existing policies and procedures designed to 
control and safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been 
effective, or should be modified to help prevent future firearms 
losses. In assessing firearms controls, agencies should use as guides 
(1) internal control standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial 
Management Improvement Program, and Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies, Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the Department 
of Justice OIG, Department of the Treasury OIG, and TIGTA of agencies 
firearms controls, and:

* document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the 
maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently 
understood and applied.

Agency Comments:

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the 
Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the 
Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department 
of Health and Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials 
generally agreed with the information presented. Six agencies provided 
technical changes that have been incorporated, as appropriate. Four 
agencies--the NIH, Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the 
Interior), U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and Department of Veterans 
Affairs--provided comments on the report recommendation. NIH and Fish 
and Wildlife Service agreed with the recommendation and identified 
actions taken to strengthen their controls over firearms. The U.S. 
Postal Inspection Service also identified actions taken to strengthen 
firearms controls consistent with the recommendation. The Department of 
Veterans Affairs expressed concerned about our recommendation, saying 
that its controls were effective in preventing firearms losses. 
Appendixes VII, VIII, X, and XI include the written comments from these 
four agencies. In addition, although the Department of Justice did not 
comment on the recommendation, its letter presents general observations 
regarding standards for control over agency firearms and is included in 
appendix IX.

NIH agreed with the recommendation, saying that in response to a review 
conducted by the department's OIG, NIH has taken numerous steps to 
strengthen its controls over firearms. These efforts include updating 
and including accurate descriptions of firearms in its firearms 
inventory database, and appointing and training property custodial 
officers for the NIH Police Branch. The Fish and Wildlife Service also 
agreed with the recommendation, and said that as a result of an 
internal assessment, the Service will (1) develop a Web-based firearm 
training guide addressing various internal controls over firearms, (2) 
conduct unscheduled random checks of firearms against property records, 
and (3) annually review reports of any lost and/or stolen firearms to 
determine if policies and procedures should be modified to prevent 
future losses.

Although not saying whether it agreed with our recommendation, the U.S. 
Postal Inspection Service said that it had reviewed the Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government and will assess these 
standards along with the results of a firearms review conducted by the 
Inspection Service Firearms Task Force. In addition, the Service 
provided us with a copy of its proposed policy update that it plans to 
incorporate into its firearms inventory and accountability procedures. 
We appreciate that the Service provided the proposed update and look 
forward to receiving the final updated policy.

VA expressed concerned about our recommendation, saying that its lack 
of firearms losses during the time period of our review was due to its 
having appropriate internal controls over firearms. VA further said 
that its police officers document the handling of firearms on a daily 
basis; generally do not remove their firearms from department property; 
check their assigned firearms out of and into the armory each day; 
conduct monthly inventories of all firearms, ammunition, and magazines; 
have unannounced inventories and spot checks; and conduct independent 
annual inventories of firearms.

Although VA did not report missing firearms during the time period of 
our review, the potential exists that firearms could be lost or stolen 
at some point in the future. Accordingly, we believe that VA and other 
agencies we reviewed should periodically assess their firearms 
controls, particularly when their organizations or operations have 
changed, or when firearms are identified as missing. These assessments 
should be conducted to determine whether established controls have been 
effective, are still relevant, or should be modified. For example, VA 
recently reported that as of March 2003, police officers at more than 
100 of its field sites were assigned firearms. Prior to 2000, officers 
at only 27 sites were armed. We believe that this is a good example of 
when an organizational change necessitates a reevaluation of an 
agency's firearms controls to reduce the risk of potential firearms 
losses. We further believe that federal internal control standards and 
other criteria included in our report provide a useful framework from 
which to conduct these assessments, and identify appropriate firearms 
controls when an agency's environment has changed, or when existing 
controls have not been effective.

In addition, six agencies requested that we change some of their 
original responses to our survey regarding firearms controls, usually 
to identify that they had a written policy and procedure addressing a 
specific control. We made these technical changes in all cases in which 
the agency provided documentation of its policy. However, if the agency 
said that the policy change was planned but had not yet been made, we 
did not change the original response and look forward to receiving 
documentation identifying changes that have been incorporated into its 
policy.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its content 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this 
report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Attorney 
General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the Postmaster 
General. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site 
at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please call me 
on (202) 512-8777. Key contributors are listed in appendix XII.

Cathleen A. Berrick, 
Acting Director 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

Signed by Cathleen A. Berrick:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

We reviewed federal law enforcement agencies' control over firearms to 
determine (1) the extent to which these agencies' policies, procedures, 
and practices for controlling and safeguarding firearms were consistent 
with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by 
law enforcement and management organizations; (2) whether reviews 
conducted by the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury 
identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and 
procedures, and whether agencies have taken actions to correct 
identified weaknesses, particularly regarding (a) conducting 
inventories, (b) investigating missing firearms, and (c) disciplining 
employees; and (3) the number of firearms that selected federal law 
enforcement agencies identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in 
their possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also 
determined how selected agencies maintained control and accountability 
over weapons other than firearms and weapons components. (See app. 
II.):

To answer objectives 1 and 3, and to determine how agencies maintained 
and controlled weapons other than firearms and weapons components, we 
selected for review 18 out of 33 federal civilian law enforcement 
agencies in the executive branch identified by the Department of 
Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), as of June 2000, as 
having personnel with the authority to carry firearms and make 
arrests.[Footnote 30]

We systematically selected the agencies for our review. First, we 
stratified the 33 agencies according to size, based on whether the 
agency had (1) 1,000 or more, (2) 500--999, (3) 100--499, or (4) less 
than 100 law enforcement personnel. We then selected all agencies with 
1,000 or more law enforcement personnel (11 agencies) and the 2 
agencies with the largest number of law enforcement personnel in each 
of the remaining 3 strata (6 agencies in total). To account for all 
Department of Justice and Treasury law enforcement agencies, we also 
included BEP, which fell into the 100--499 strata (1 agency). These 18 
agencies employed about 96 percent (76,510) of the total personnel 
employed by the federal civilian law enforcement agencies (79,910) that 
are authorized to carry firearms and make arrests, as reported in the 
BJS. Table 4 identifies the 18 agencies selected for review, along with 
the strata from which they were selected.

Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Included in Our 
Survey of Federal Firearms Control Policies, Procedures, and Practices:

Agency: BEP; Number of personnel authorized to arrest and carry 
firearms in 2000[A]: 211; Agencies categorized by number of personnel 
authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: Yes; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Number of personnel 
authorized to arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 1,967; Agencies 
categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry 
firearms: 1,000 or more: Yes; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 100-499: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: DEA; Number of personnel authorized to arrest and carry 
firearms in 2000[A]: 4,161; Agencies categorized by number of personnel 
authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: Yes; Agencies 
categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry 
firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel 
authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: No; Agencies 
categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry 
firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: FBI; Number of personnel authorized to arrest and carry 
firearms in 2000[A]: 11,523; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: Yes; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: Federal Bureau of Prisons; Number of personnel authorized to 
arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 13,557; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or 
more: Yes; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the 
arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: 
No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the 
arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: Federal Protective Service; Number of personnel authorized to 
arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 803; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or 
more: No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized 
the arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: Yes; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: 
No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the 
arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: FEMA Security Division; Number of personnel authorized to 
arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 33; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or 
more: No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized 
the arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized 
by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-
499: No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized 
the arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: Yes.

Agency: INS; Number of personnel authorized to arrest and carry 
firearms in 2000[A]: 17,654; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: Yes; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: IRS-Criminal Investigation Division; Number of personnel 
authorized to arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 2,726; Agencies 
categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry 
firearms: 1,000 or more: Yes; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 100-499: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: National Institutes of Health Police; Number of personnel 
authorized to arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 39; Agencies 
categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry 
firearms: 1,000 or more: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 100-499: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: Yes.

Agency: National Park Service (Interior); Division of Ranger 
Activities; U.S. Park Police; Number of personnel authorized to arrest 
and carry firearms in 2000[A]: No; Agencies categorized by number 
of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: 
Yes; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest 
and carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: U.S. Customs Service; Number of personnel authorized to arrest 
and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 10,522; Agencies categorized by number 
of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: 
Yes; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest 
and carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; Number of personnel authorized 
to arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 888; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or 
more: No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized 
the arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: Yes; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: 
No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the 
arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: U.S. Mint; Number of personnel authorized to arrest and carry 
firearms in 2000[A]: 354; Agencies categorized by number of personnel 
authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: Yes; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: USMS; Number of personnel authorized to arrest and carry 
firearms in 2000[A]: 2,735; Agencies categorized by number of personnel 
authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: Yes; Agencies 
categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry 
firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel 
authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: No; Agencies 
categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry 
firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: U.S. Postal Inspection Service; Number of personnel authorized 
to arrest and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 3,412; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or 
more: Yes; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the 
arrest and carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by 
number of personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: 
No; Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the 
arrest and carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: U.S Secret Service; Number of personnel authorized to arrest 
and carry firearms in 2000[A]: 4,039; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: Yes; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs/Veterans Health Administration/
Police Service[B]; Number of personnel authorized to arrest and carry 
firearms in 2000[A]: 342; Agencies categorized by number of personnel 
authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 1,000 or more: No; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: 500-999: No; Agencies categorized by number of 
personnel authorized the arrest and carry firearms: 100-499: Yes; 
Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the arrest and 
carry firearms: Less than 100: No.

Source: GAO analysis of BJS data.

[A] By 2003, some agencies reported increases in the number of 
personnel with the authority to make arrests and carry firearms. For 
example, ATF reported to have 2031 personnel; VA, 2,200 personnel; and 
Customs, approximately 14,165 personnel with such authorities. b VA has 
authority to arm its police officers under 38 U.S.C. 904. An initial 
pilot program to arm its officers was established at 5 VA sites and 
then expanded to 12 sites. Prior to 2000, police officers at 27 sites 
were armed; as of March 2003, more than 100 sites have armed officers.

[End of table]

We surveyed the 18 agencies using a detailed questionnaire. We 
pretested the questionnaire with 2 of the 18 agencies and a third 
federal law enforcement agency, not included in the final survey, and 
made relevant changes to the questions based on these pretests. We also 
surveyed the 18 agencies using a follow-up questionnaire to obtain 
additional related information. See appendixes IV and V for the initial 
and follow-up questionnaire, respectively.

In the questionnaire, we asked agencies about their firearms 
inventories and the policies, procedures, and practices currently in 
place to control their firearms. We also asked agencies to provide the 
results of their most recently completed 100-percent inventory since 
September 30, 1998, and the date of the inventory. We asked the 18 
agencies to identify their policies and procedures related to recording 
firearms inventory data, controlling firearms inventories, ensuring 
personal and supervisory accountability for agency firearms, and 
investigating missing firearms and administering associated employee 
discipline. We also asked agencies to identify the number of firearms 
reported missing since September 30, 1998, the number of those missing 
firearms recovered up to the time of our survey, and the sources of the 
missing firearms information.

To determine how federal law enforcement agencies maintained control 
and accountability over weapons other than firearms and weapons 
components, specifically ammunition, explosives, and gas and chemical 
agents, we surveyed the 18 agencies regarding their policies, 
procedures, and practices for tracking and controlling these items.

Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors. 
However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may 
introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For 
example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in 
the sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how 
the data are entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce 
unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in the 
development of the questionnaires, the data collection, and the data 
editing and analysis to minimize these nonsampling errors. In addition, 
to the extent possible, we obtained and reviewed agencies' firearms 
control policies and procedures to verify their responses to our 
questionnaire.

To answer objective 2, we reviewed the results of audits conducted by 
the Departments of Justice and Treasury Offices of Inspector General 
(OIG) and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
(TIGTA). These audits evaluated the extent to which Justice and 
Treasury law enforcement agencies adhered to internal controls over 
firearms inventories and other sensitive properties and were completed 
between March 2001 and August 2002. (See app. VI for audit reports and 
dates issued.) In addition, we reviewed documents from selected Justice 
and Treasury law enforcement agencies detailing their firearms control 
policies, procedures, and practices. We also reviewed selected 
agencies' internal reports on compliance with firearms control policies 
and procedures and interviewed officials on corrective actions taken in 
response to OIG and TIGTA recommendations.

We conducted our review between August 2001 and May 2003 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms and 
Weapons Components:

Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and Weapons 
Components:

Federal law enforcement agencies generally reported establishing 
inventory controls to account for weapons other than firearms and 
weapons components. The 18 agencies we surveyed reported maintaining 
accountability for their stocks of explosives, gas and/or chemical 
agents, and ammunition through conducting periodic physical inventory 
counts of the items, or maintaining running balances through perpetual 
inventories. Agencies also reported using other methods, such as 
tracking the distribution of items to individuals or organizational 
units and limiting access to areas in which inventories are stored, or 
a combination of methods, to account for the inventories.

Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/or Chemical 
Agents, and Ammunition:

The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having 
explosives, gas and/or chemical agents, and ammunition. Table 5 
identifies weapons other than firearms and weapons components reported 
by the agencies surveyed.

Table 5: Agencies' Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms and 
Weapons Components:

Agency: ATF; Explosives: Yes; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: BEP; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: BOP; Explosives: Yes; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: Customs; Explosives: Yes; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: DEA; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical agents: No; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: FBI; Explosives: Yes; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: Federal Protective Service; Explosives: No; Gas and/or 
chemical agents: Yes; Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: Fish and Wildlife Service; Explosives: No; Gas and/or 
chemical agents: No; Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: FEMA[A]; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical agents: 
No; Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: INS; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: IRS/CI; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: U.S. Mint; Explosives: Yes; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: National Park Service; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical 
agents: No; Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: NIH; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical agents: No; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: U.S. Postal Service; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical 
agents: No; Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: U.S. Secret Service; Explosives: Yes; Gas and/or chemical 
agents: Yes; Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: USMS; Explosives: Yes; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: VA; Explosives: No; Gas and/or chemical agents: Yes; 
Ammunition: Yes.

Agency: Total; Explosives: 7; Gas and/or chemical agents: 12; 
Ammunition: 18.

Source: GAO survey of these agencies.

[A] FEMA is the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[End of table]

While all 18 agencies reported having ammunition, only 7 reported 
having explosives, and 12 reported having gas and/or chemical agents. 
Seven agencies reported inventory in all three categories, including 
BOP, FBI, USMS, ATF, U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Mint, and U.S. 
Secret Service.

Agencies reporting inventories of explosives and gas and chemical 
agents responded that the weapons were primarily diversionary devices, 
defensive chemical sprays, and chemical projectiles. Included were 
items such as flash-bangs that distract with a flash and bang effect 
and smoke grenades that dispense chemically based inflammatory agents 
or membrane irritants.

Agencies Used Inventory Counts and Other Methods to Control Weapons and 
Weapons Components:

The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having 
accountability procedures for weapons other than firearms and weapons 
components, and these agencies generally reported that they relied on 
inventories to account for these items. As shown in table 6, the 
agencies reported that they controlled weapons and weapons components 
through monthly and annual inventory counts, or by maintaining a 
running summary of the quantities on hand through perpetual 
inventories.

Table 6: Agencies' Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for Explosives, 
Gas and/or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition:

[See PDF for image]

[A] Other refers to a variety of practices in addition to those 
identified that agencies used to account for ammunition, explosives, or 
gas/chemical weapons. For example, Customs reported using quarterly or 
trimester inventories to account for these items.

[B] At the time of our survey, ATF reported that it was in the final 
stage of review for a draft order "Ammunition Accounting Procedures" to 
safeguard its ammunition.

[C] The Fish and Wild Life Service controlled ammunition by monitoring 
its distribution and limiting access to supply.

[D] FEMA is the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[End of table]

In addition to relying on monthly, annual, and periodic inventories to 
control weapons other than firearms and weapons components, some 
agencies reported using additional procedures, or a combination of 
procedures, to account for their inventories. For example, IRS/CI 
reported controlling ammunition and pepper spray by tracking their 
distribution to field installations from a headquarters procurement 
office, while the National Park Service reported that it controlled 
ammunition by monitoring its distribution to law enforcement personnel. 
In addition, the Fish and Wildlife Service reported that it controlled 
ammunition by monitoring its distribution and limiting access to 
supply. In another example, the FBI reported maintaining its supply of 
gas and/or chemical agents at a military storage facility, thereby 
reducing access and the potential for unauthorized use or loss.

In addition, the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, Secret Service, and the VA 
reported using a combination of methods to account for these weapons 
and weapons components. For example, the FBI reported controlling 
access to ammunition supplies in addition to maintaining a record of 
each time ammunition was received or disbursed. INS reported that, in 
addition to conducting annual inventories of ammunition and gas and 
chemical agents, it maintains logs at all locations that record 
receipts from manufacturers and issuances for operational purposes. In 
another example, the ATF reported controlling explosives by maintaining 
a separate record of acquisitions and removals; keeping a daily, 
perpetual record of transactions; and conducting annual inventories and 
inspections.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency Policies and 
Procedures:

Table 7: Key Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and 
Procedures as Reported by Selected Federal Law Enforcement Agencies:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Follow-up Survey Questionnaire:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls Over 
Firearms and Other Sensitive Property:

Table 8: Justice, Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other 
Sensitive Property:

Report title: Justice, Office of the Inspector General; Report number: 
No; Report issue date: No.

Report title: The Department of Justice's Control Over Weapons and 
Laptop Computers - Summary Report; Report number: Report No. 02-31; 
Report issue date: August 2002.

Report title: The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Control Over Weapons and 
Laptop Computers; Report number: Report No. 02-30; Report issue date: 
August 2002.

Report title: The Drug Enforcement Administration's Control Over 
Weapons and Laptop Computers; Report number: Report No. 02-28; Report 
issue date: August 2002.

Report title: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Control Over 
Weapons and Laptop Computers; Report number: Report No. 02-27; Report 
issue date: August 2002.

Report title: Immigration and Naturalization Service Management of 
Property; Report number: Report No. 01-09; Report issue date: March 
2001.

Report title: The U.S. Marshals Service's Control Over Weapons and 
Laptop Computers; Report number: Report No. 02-29; Report issue date: 
August 2002.

Report title: Treasury, Office of Inspector General; Report number: 
No; Report issue date: No.

Report title: Protecting the Public: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms' Control Over Sensitive Property Is Adequate; Report number: 
OIG-02-097; Report issue date: June 19, 2002.

Report title: Protecting the Public: Bureau of Engraving and Printing's 
Control Over Sensitive Property Needs To Be Improved; Report number: 
OIG-02-092; Report issue date: May 30, 2002.

Report title: Protecting the Public: U.S. Customs' Control Over 
Sensitive Property Needs To Be Improved; Report number: OIG-02-109; 
Report issue date: August 5, 2002.

Report title: Protecting the Public: U.S. Mint's control Over Sensitive 
Property Needs To Be Improved; Report number: OIG-02-094; Report issue 
date: May 30, 2002.

Report title: Protecting the Public: U.S. Secret Service's Control Over 
Selected Sensitive Property Is Adequate; Report number: OIG-02-095; 
Report issue date: June 6, 2002.

Report title: Treasury, Inspector General for Tax Administration; 
Report number: No; Report issue date: No.

Report title: Management Advisory Report: Follow-on Review of Lost or 
Stolen Sensitive Items of Inventory at the Internal Revenue Service; 
Report number: Reference Number:; 2002-10-065; Report issue date: March 
2002.

Report title: Management Advisory Report: Review of Lost or Stolen 
Sensitive Items of Property at the Internal Revenue Service; Report 
number: Reference Number:; 2002-10-030; Report issue date: November 
2001.

Source: Compiled by GAO.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services:

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Public Health Service:

National Institutes of Health Bethesda, Maryland 20892:

www.nih.gov:

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice:

U.S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 
20548:

Dear Ms. Berrick:

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report 
entitled "Firearms Controls: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, 
but Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas (GAO-03-688). Enclosed are 
the comments of the National Institutes of Health.

Sincerely,

Elias A. Zerhouni M.D. 
Director:

Signed by Elias A. Zerhouni:


Enclosure:

Comments of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) On the U. S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) Draft Report "Firearms Control: Federal 
Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in Key 
Areas," GAO-03-688:

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report 
on this important subject. We concur with the recommendations and note 
that NIH has taken actions to implement them. Following is a summary of 
the actions we have taken.

Recommendations:

The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Health 
and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security; and the 
Postmaster General should:

* Assess existing policies and procedures designed to control and 
safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been effective, or 
should be modified to help prevent future firearms losses. In assessing 
firearms controls, agencies should use as guides 1) internal control 
standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial Management Improvement 
Program, and Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, 
Inc; and 2) audits conducted by the Department of Justice OIG, 
Department of the Treasury OIG, and TIGTA of agencies firearms 
controls, and:

* Document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the 
maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently 
understood and applied.

NIH Comments:

The Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General recently 
completed an extensive review of NIH's controls over firearms. In 
response to the findings and recommendations in that report, NIH has 
reviewed its policies and procedures and taken numerous steps to 
increase its internal controls over firearms. NIH is updating its 
firearms inventory database; ensuring that accurate descriptions of 
firearms are recorded in the database in a timely manner; reconciling 
the firearms inventory with the bar code file and related purchase, 
transfer, and disposal documents; appointing and training two property 
custodial officers for the NIH Police Branch; and ensuring that all 
property and inventory officials have a current, accurate inventory of 
firearms once all these actions are completed.

We believe that these, and other measures we have already undertaken, 
will safeguard our firearms.

[End of section]

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior:

United States Department of the Interior:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240:

MAY 23 2003:

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice U.S. General Accounting 
Office:

441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Berrick:

Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior the opportunity 
to review and comment on the draft U.S. General Accounting Office 
report entitled, "Firearms Controls: Federal Agencies Have Firearms 
Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas," (GAO-03-688) 
dated May 5, 2003. In general, we agree with the findings, except as 
discussed in the enclosure, and agree with the recommendations in the 
report.

The enclosure provides specific comments from the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the National Park Service. We hope our comments 
will assist you in preparing the final report.

Sincerely,

P. Lynn Scarlett 
Assistant Secretary - Policy, Management and Budget:

Signed by P. Lynn Scarlett: 

Enclosure:

Enclosure:

U.S. General Accounting Office Draft Report "Firearms Controls: Federal 
Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls in Key 
Areas" (GAO-03-688):

Specific Comments:

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service:

Recommendations:

The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Health 
and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security; and the 
Postmaster General should:

1. Assess existing policies and procedures designed to control and 
safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been effective, or 
should be modified to help prevent firearms losses. In assessing 
firearms controls, agencies should use as guides (1) internal control 
standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial Management Improvement 
Program, and Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, 
Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the Department of Justice OIG, 
Department of the Treasury OIG, and TIGTA of agencies firearms 
controls.

Response: Concur. Our assessment of existing policies and procedures 
indicates that, although the Fish and Wildlife Service is properly 
controlling and safeguarding firearms, certain controls, as indicated 
below, could be improved.

2. Document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the 
maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently 
understood and applied.

Response: Concur. Controls to strengthen the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the FWS' firearm program will be accomplished in the 
following manner: 1) Develop a web based internet firearm training 
guide for the purpose of providing instructions for supervisor 
oversight of firearm counters, definition and selection criteria of 
firearm counters, methods for conducting a firearm inventory, a 
checklist for firearm storage and facility practices, and who may 
determine a firearm to be inoperative. 2) Conduct unscheduled random 
checks of firearms against property detail records. 3) Annually conduct 
a review of completed Report of Surveys for any lost and/or stolen 
firearms to determine if policies and/or procedures need to be modified 
to prevent future losses and prevention of theft. In addition, policy 
manuals in Part 310, Personal Property Management, and Part 445, Law 
Enforcement Administration, are under revision.

Titles of Responsible Officials: Chief, Office of Law Enforcement and 
Assistant Director for the National Wildlife Refuge System, with 
support as needed by Assistant Director - Business Management and 
Operations:

Target Date: December 31, 2003:

Appendix II:

FWS suggests that GAO use the term "nearly all of the agencies" instead 
of "generally" when discussing reported use of inventories, for 
clarity.

Page 30 - Both sections indicate that all agencies GAO reviewed 
inventory "explosives, gas and/or chemical agents, and ammunition." FWS 
reported to GAO that FWS does not inventory these items, therefore, the 
statement is not accurate for FWS.

Pages 30 and 31 - GAO indicates that Table 5 identifies weapons other 
than firearms and weapons components reported by the agencies surveyed 
to be in their inventories. FWS is listed in Table 5 with an X under 
Ammunition. If GAO's intent is to report inventories in Table 5, then 
the Table's Heading should be clarified, and FWS should be excluded.

Page 31 - Please change the first sentence under Table 5 to: "While 
nearly all 18 agencies ... ".

Page 32 - The statement regarding FWS appears to be out of context 
because no other agencies are mentioned. We suggest that the statement 
be included, in appropriate context, in the discussion of other 
agencies' methods on page 34, or deleted since a similar statement is 
in the footnote on page 34.

Page 34 - Please edit footnote b as follows: The Fish and Wildlife 
Service controlled ammunition by monitoring its distribution and 
limiting access to supply.

National Park Service:

The National Park Service concurs with the findings and recommendations 
in the draft audit report, with exception to the reference in the chart 
on page 37, which states that there is no policy, procedure, or 
practice on supervisory oversight of firearms inventories. According to 
Personal Property Management Handbook #44, Section 9.4 "Accountability 
and Control of Firearms and Ammunition", the Superintendent/Manager of 
each park/office is responsible for designating (in writing) a Firearms 
Custodial Officer and for ensuring that each Custodial Officer 
maintains accurate records on assignments and issuances of firearms and 
ammunition. In addition, the Superintendent/Manager ensures that annual 
inventories for fireanns are conducted and that these property records 
accurately reflect the firearms that are physically on hand. The chart 
on page 37 should be changed to W for written policy or procedure for 
the NPS under supervisory oversight of firearms inventories.

[End of section]

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Justice:

U.S. Department of Justice:

JUN - 2 2003:

Cathleen A. Berrick:

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice U.S. General Accounting 
Office:

441 G. Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:

Washington, D.C. 20530:

Dear Ms. Berrick:

On May 5, 2003, The General Accounting Office (GAO) provided the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) copies of its draft report entitled 
Firearms Control: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could 
Strengthen Controls in Key Areas (GAO -03-688) and requested comments 
by:

May 23, 2003. The draft was reviewed by representatives of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (ATF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), United States Marshals Service (USMS) and 
Justice Management Division (JMD). The DEA and JMD did not submit 
comments to be included in the DOJ's response. The ATF noted that on 
page 27 of the report, the latest statistic regarding number of agents 
authorized and allowed to carry firearms should be 2031 not 1967. Thus, 
the DOJ's substantive comments address the information GAO presents 
regarding the USMS, the FBI, and the BOP activities related to securing 
firearms and laptops. These comments are outlined below.

Page 1, First Paragraph: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
disclosed that, similarly, 449 of its firearms were lost or stolen. The 
loss of firearms and other weapons by federal law enforcement agencies 
may pose serious risks to the public, including the risk that missing 
firearms may be used to inflict bodily harm or to further criminal 
activity.":

The FBI points out that of the 449 weapons reported lost or stolen, 161 
were nonfunctional training weapons. While the FBI acknowledges that 
the loss of any firearm is unacceptable, it is inappropriate for the 
GAO report to create a false impression about serious risk to the 
public, including the risk that missing firearms that are nonfunctional 
may be used to inflict bodily harm or to further criminal activity.

The Firearms Training Unit (FTU) "Congressional Briefing Material " 
submitted to the Congress, OPEA and the OIG made it clear that the 
conversion of inert weapons, especially training weapons, to live fire 
capability would be virtually impossible, requiring a skilled gunsmith, 
machinist, and /or specialized parts available only through licensed 
dealers or the manufacturer.

Additionally, while an inert firearm could be used in the commission of 
a crime, these non functioning weapons pose no more danger to the 
public than the realistic toys or replica firearm criminals 
occasionally use. We are not aware of and the OIG report does not cite 
any instances where a
lost/stolen nonfunctional weapon was converted to a live fire weapon or 
used in the commission of a crime.

Also, while 161 nonfunctional weapons are reported as lost/stolen, a 
portion of these weapons were given to local/state training 
institutions. The local/state agencies later destroyed their training 
weapons but could not report to the FBI the serial numbers of training 
weapons destroyed. Subsequently, these weapons were reported as lost 
due to the lack of verification that they had been destroyed.

Page 15: Caption: "Justice Agencies Did Not Always Investigate Missing 
Firearms, But Generally Disciplined Employees.":

Third paragraph, first sentence: "While ... and USMS did not always 
initiate investigations as required by agency policies and procedures, 
or could not provide documentation identifying that investigations were 
conducted.":

The USMS disagrees with this statement because its policy requires all 
losses of firearms to be reported to the Office of Property Management 
and to the Office of Internal Affairs (OIA). Upon receipt of the USMS 
Report of Lost or Stolen Property, Form 134, with an attached local 
police report, OIA initiates an investigation of all missing, lost or 
stolen weapons. Based on the information contained on the reporting 
documents, OIA makes a determination if further investigation is 
required. If local police reports contain sufficient information to 
determine there was no employee misconduct, the case is considered 
closed by OIA. In addition, the Office of Property Management is 
required to refer all losses of firearms to the Board of Survey (the 
Board) which makes an independent determination: The Board may, at its 
discretion, request an internal investigation and/or internal audit.

Third paragraph, eleventh line: "...and four of six missing firearms 
cases at the USMS, between October 1999 and August 2001, were not 
investigated by the agencies.":

The USMS disagrees with this statement because the four cases were 
reviewed by the Office of Internal Affairs. In three of the cases, 
determinations were made that no further action was warranted. In the 
fourth case, a determination was made that an investigation was 
warranted. The investigation was initiated and is currently in process.

Page 17, First Paragraph: "The OIG found that the average time frame 
for employees reporting missing firearms within their agency ranged 
from the same day at the BOP to 4.3 years at the FBI".

The OIG report states that "Although the BOP did not have a time 
requirement, we did not detect severe reporting delays. However, at the 
BOP, as well as at the DEA, FBI, and USMS, we were unable to analyze 
the timing of some of the loss reports because in many instances the 
documents did not provide the date the loss was discovered. Generally, 
the forms did not have a field in which to record such data".

It is not clear how this average by the OIG was determined. A review of 
internal reports of loss by the FBI revealed that the reporting of some 
weapons to the FTU/National Firearms Program Unit (NFPU) was lengthy 
even though there were indications that local offices completed 
internal notification on a timely basis. These notifications were not 
forwarded to the FTU/NFPU or the Property Management Unit, who maintain 
official records for all weapons. As a result, even though the stolen 
weapons were reported at the time of the theft, reporting to the FTU/
NFPU did not take place until such time as the weapons were recalled 
for destruction. The lack of reporting instances of loss or theft to 
the FTU/NFPU resulted in a higher average than actual for a reporting 
time frame thus skewing the average reporting by the FBI.

Page 17, Second Paragraph: "...the OIG found that the FBI, DEA, and INS 
had not reported from two to more than 300 of their missing firearms to 
the NCIC".

Prior to 2000, the NCIC database did not have a missing category for 
weapons. If a weapon was not categorized as stolen, it could not be 
entered into the NCIC based on its lost status. If lost weapons were 
entered, they would be listed in the stolen category. In many 
instances, lost or missing weapons were not entered in the NCIC simply 
due to the lack of a lost category.

Additionally, certain items entered into the NCIC would be deleted if 
not updated after a certain period of time, Programming changes were 
made specifically to address weapons but in some instances, weapons 
which had been entered were deleted prior to this programming change. 
Upon DOJ's review of lost/stolen weapons, it appeared that a number of 
weapons were not entered when in fact they had been and were 
subsequently deleted.

Page 36: Appendix III: "Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency 
Policies and Procedures":

Inventory data: "Organizational unit or functional area to which 
firearm is assigned." Code "N" indicates that the USMS has no policy/
procedure in this area.

The USMS states that the correct code should be "W" indicating the 
presence of a written policy or procedure. The organizational unit 
(organization cost center code) to which a firearm is assigned, is a 
mandatory data element on all USMS property management forms and the 
USMS-ARGIS automated property management system. This error was brought 
to GAO's attention previously.

Page 37: Appendix III: "Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency 
Policies and Procedures":

Personal and supervisory accountability: "Individuals must store 
firearms in ... Other." Code "N" indicates that the USMS has no policy/
procedure in this area.

The USMS states that the correct code should be "W" indicating the 
presence of a written policy or procedure. The USMS weapons policy 
indicates that the following storage methods are authorized: safe, 
vault, weapons locker, child safety lock, gun vault, locked storage 
locker.

Additional Comments:

The BOP believes that a couple of issues in the report need to be 
expanded. The GAO indicates that during the three-year review period 
two weapons were missing from the BOP and were not immediately reported 
to the NCIC . Though the GAO acknowledges on page 18 that neither of 
these weapons was lost nor stolen from an employee's vehicle, the BOP 
believes it is important to highlight, within the final report, the 
circumstances surrounding these weapons. Our internal investigations 
revealed one of the weapons was lost by an airline from checked baggage 
during an employee's official travel to firearms training. The second 
weapon was discovered missing by BOP staff after the transfer of 
several weapons by mail between facilities. Although neither of these 
weapons was reported to the NCIC (which was not a policy of the BOP), 
they were appropriately reported within the agency, resulting in 
thorough investigations. In response to this issue, the BOP has 
subsequently reported the loss of these weapons to the NCIC. In 
addition, we have initiated revisions to our policies requiring all 
lost, stolen, or missing weapons be immediately (no later than the next 
working day) reported to the NCIC.

The second issue is regarding the status of open recommendations from 
the OIG's review of firearms and laptop computers. The BOP expects to 
close the remaining resolved recommendations from this report with the 
issuance of several revisions to its internal policies. The review and 
comment process has taken longer than anticipated, and the revised 
target date for the issuance of these policy revisions is October 31, 
2003.

Conclusion:

The time period for review of lost/stolen weapons for the FBI spans 
more than 60 years. During most of this, weapons inventory and 
accountability were accomplished utilizing manual inventory records. 
Computerized records and the ability to cross reference serial numbers 
throughout the FBI using a computer database was nonexistent until the 
early 1990s. Although the time frame under review by both the DOJ OIG 
and GAO was approximately 23 months, the actual span of time under 
review was much greater.

Finally, over the past two decades, the concern over the accountability 
of weapons has increased. Prior to that time, weapons were treated as 
property and controls were not as strict as today. All federal agencies 
are being judged on today's standards for the practices of yesterday. 
An understanding of current and past practices as well as society must 
be made in order to better evaluate each agency. We do things 
differently today based on what we have learned from the past.

I hope the comments will be beneficial in completing the final 
document. If have any questions concerning any of the comments, please 
contact Vicky Caponiti or me on (202) 514-0469.

Sincerely,

Paul R. Corts:

Assistant Attorney General for Administration:

Signed by Paul R. Corts:

cc:

Andrea G. Nicholson JMD Audit Liaison:

Jamie Haight BOP Audi Liaison:

Carol Campbell ATF Audit Liaison:

Marji Snider:

DEA Audit Liaison:

Melissa Willig FBI Audit Liaison:

Isabel Howell USMS Audit Liaison:

Andrew Hruska ODAG:

[End of section]

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Postal Service:

LEE R. HEATH:

CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR:

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE:

May 27, 2003:

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick Acting Director:

Homeland Security and Justice U.S. General Accounting Office Washington 
DC 20548-0001:

Dear Ms. Berrick:

The following comments are in response to your draft audit report dated 
May 5, 2003, on Firearms Controls. The report was addressed to the 
Postmaster General, John E. Potter, and has been provided to us for 
response. Firearms control is a very sensitive and important subject; 
therefore, it is our intent to clarify several key items.

The following responses are in reference to Table 7, Page 36, Key 
Firearms Control Activities:

in Agency Policies and Procedures as Reported by Selected Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies.

Inventory Control Guidance for Firearms Counts:

Timing of counts established.

The report finding indicates the Inspection Service has an unwritten 
practice concerning the timing of counts. The finding should indicate 
the Inspection Service does have a written policy or procedure 
concerning the timing of counts. As per Section 155.4 of the Inspection 
Service Manual (ISM), "During the first week of January, employees are 
required to verify accountable property listed in the Inspection 
Service Data Base Information System Accountable Property Module." (See 
attached Exhibit 1). Firearms are included in the annual verification 
of accountable property. Weapon checks during semi-annual 
qualifications also include verification of serial numbers. 
Additionally, an agency-wide physical inventory of all weapons is 
conducted annually as directed through Inspection Service National 
Communications. (See attached Exhibit 2).

Inventory Control: Integrity of Inventories:

Employees involved in controlling and safeguarding firearms precluded 
from counting firearms.

The report finding indicates the Inspection Service does not have any 
policies, procedures, or practices concerning this issue. A policy 
update will be issued and incorporated into the IS-135, Firearms 
Handbook containing recommendations to the inspectors in charge to 
provide a separation of duties, to the extent practicable, while 
conducting weapons inventories. Local management will maintain 
oversight and responsibility for conducting firearms inventories and 
will assign resources as appropriate.

Firearms coordinators responsibilities are currently assigned to one or 
more individuals based upon the size and geographic boundaries of the 
division. These individuals are identified and trained in accordance 
with the IS-135, Firearms Handbook guidelines. In instances where 
Inspection Service field offices are not located in proximity to 
another office, it may not be possible to provide two member count 
teams due to resource constraints; extensive travel necessary to 
conduct the inventory; or excessive costs.

Counters have no prior knowledge of inventory.

The report finding indicates this is an unwritten practice. Assistance 
to firearms coordinators is provided by certified armorers or other 
personnel during semi-annual qualifications. These individuals assist 
with the review of serial numbers on weapons to ensure they are 
assigned as recorded in the national inventory. Assistants do not have 
prior knowledge of the firearms inventory. The IS-135, Firearms 
Handbook, will be updated to provide for a separation of duties while 
conducting weapons inventories to the extent practicable, and counters 
with no prior knowledge of our weapons inventory will continue to be 
utilized.

The practice of using two-member or more count teams.

The report finding indicates no Inspection Service policy, procedure, 
or practice provides for two-member or more count teams. As stated 
above, this practice is generally followed during inventory counts 
taken during semi-annual qualifications through assistance provided by 
certified armorers and other personnel. Written policy guidelines, 
however, will be incorporated into the IS-135, Firearms Handbook, to 
provide for count teams to the extent practicable. The use of two-
member teams will be determined by the inspector in charge, based upon 
available division resources.

Description of Control: Access Limited to Secured Firearms Storage Area 
or Facilities:

* Single person has access.

The report finding indicates the Inspection Service does not have 
policies, procedures, or practices concerning single person access. The 
Inspection Service maintains multiple divisions, and each division 
maintains multiple domiciles often over wide geographical areas. As 
such, it is necessary for us to maintain multiple facilities and 
storage areas throughout the country. Single person access, therefore, 
is not feasible for the Inspection Service.

Single person and his/her designee.

This is based upon the needs of the division as outlined above.

Single person, his/her designees, and others with one time access.

This is based upon the needs of the division as outlined above. 
Personal and Supervisory Accountability. Individuals Must Store 
Firearms in:

Other.

The report finding indicates the Inspection Service does not have any 
policies, procedures, or practices in this area. The report finding 
should indicate written policies are in place. On December 31, 2002, 
the Inspection Service responded to Fred Berry at GAO relative to this 
issue indicating 'Yes (1); it depends on where the weapon is stored." 
We included appropriate references from the IS-135, Firearms Handbook, 
which provides 
guidelines for storage of weapons at home, at work, and in vehicles. 
(See attached Exhibit 3).

Personal and Supervisory Accountability: Individuals are Held 
Accountable for Firearms Inventory:

* Individuals' performance in conducting firearms inventories assessed 
during performance evaluations.

The report finding indicates the Inspection Service does not have 
policies, procedures, or practices concerning performance evaluations 
for individuals conducting firearms inventories. The Inspection Service 
does maintain written policies and procedures mandating periodic 
performance evaluations of all employees. This includes evaluation of 
the performance duties of those employees responsible for conducting 
firearms inventories. Employees whose performance evaluations indicate 
they fail to meet the duties and responsibilities of their assignments 
are subject to corrective actions. In addition, inability to properly 
account for firearms will result in an internal affairs investiga-tion 
and adverse action as warranted by the case. If it is determined an 
employee falsifies firearms records, the employee is subject to 
corrective action up to and including removal. (See attached Exhibit 4, 
ISM, Section 122.54F):

Supervisory Oversight.

The report finding indicates the Inspection Service does not have 
policies, procedures, or practices conceming supervisory oversight of 
firearms inventories. The Inspection Service does maintain written 
policies and procedures regarding this control. Section 155.21 of the 
ISM states that management oversight and responsibility for accountable 
property rests with the inspector in charge. This has also been 
incorporated in our update of the IS-135, Firearms Handbook, and 
included with our response to Barbara Stolz of the GAO on March 26, 
2003. (See attached Exhibits 5 and 6).

GAO Recommendations, Page 25:

* The Inspection Service has reviewed the Standards for Internal Control 
in the Federal Government and will assess these standards along with 
the results submitted by the Inspection Service Firearms Task Force.

* Internal controls cited in the GAO report as not being fully 
documented in current Inspection Service policies will be incorporated 
in the update of Inspection Service IS-135, Firearms Handbook. On March 
26, 2003, the Inspection Service provided Barbara Stolz of the GAO with 
a proposed policy update outlining firearms inventory and 
accountability procedures, including the annual verification of 
firearms and ammunition. This proposed policy update will be 
incorporated into the IS-135, Firearms Handbook, after an independent 
review of the Inspection Service firearms program, by the newly 
appointed Inspection Service Firearms Task Force. The main 
responsibility of the Firearms Task Force is to review policy and 
procedures on firearms and to physically inventory all Inspection 
Service firearms.

Based on the results of the GAO review, the Inspection Service provided 
Firearms Module Training from April 22-23, 2003, to all firearms 
coordinators and back-up personnel at each division to ensure weapons 
inventory entries are correctly made in our national firearms inventory 
control system. The training also reviewed upcoming policy changes 
cited in this response relative to our firearms program.

The United States Postal Inspection Service is committed to ensuring 
the highest level of control over our firearms program and will 
continue implementation of program enhancements as warranted. Thank you 
for the opportunity to respond to the draft report.

If you have any questions or require further explanation regarding our 
response, please contact Deputy Chief Inspector, James J. Rowan, Jr., 
at (202) 268-5425 or Assistant Chief Inspector, Nicole A. Johnson, at 
(202) 268-6545.

L. R. Heath:

Chief Postal Inspector:

Signed for L. R. Heath:

Attachments:

[End of section]

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs:

THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS WASHINGTON:

May 23, 2003:

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick Director (Acting) Homeland Security and Justice 
U.S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Berrick:

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has reviewed your draft report, 
FIREARMS CONTROLS: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls, but Could 
Strengthen Controls in Key Areas (GAO 03-688). VA comments on the draft 
report are outlined in detail in the enclosure.

VA officials recently met with GAO staff to clarify and provide 
additional information correcting several discrepancies in the survey 
tables. VA has provided additional comments in support of its existing 
policies regarding the internal controls on firearms as it relates to 
GAO's recommendation.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report.

Sincerely yours,

Anthony J. Principi:

Signed by Anthony J. Principi:

Enclosure:

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COMMENTS TO GAO DRAFT REPORT, FIREARMS 
CONTROLS: Federal Agencies Have Firearms Controls but Could Strengthen 
Controls in Key Areas (GAO 03-688):

GAO recommends that the Attorney General; the Secretaries of the 
Treasury, Interior, Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, and 
Homeland Security; and the Postmaster General should:

* assess existing policies and procedures designed to control and 
safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been effective or 
should be modified to help prevent future firearm losses. In assessing 
firearms controls, agencies should use as guides (1) internal control 
standards issued by GAO, the Joint Financial Management Improvement 
Program, and Commission On Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies, 
Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the Department of Justice OIG, 
Department of the Treasury OIG, and TIGTA of agencies firearms 
controls, and:

* document internal control in agency policies and procedures to the 
maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently 
understood and applied.":

Comment: VA is concerned with the recommendation to assess existing 
policies based on the findings in the report. VA finds no basis in the 
report's narrative to indicate VA lacking appropriate policies or 
internal controls. To the contrary, VA currently has clearly 
established policies and internal controls over firearms and 
ammunition.

For example, the report notes that VA had no lost, stolen, or missing 
firearms during the period of the review. This excellent record is 
based on existing controls and the fact that VA police officers 
document the handling of firearms on a daily basis. Specifically,

* VA police officers generally do not remove their firearms from 
Department property.

* Officers must check their assigned firearm out of and back into the 
armory each day. This creates a perpetual inventory.

* VA police officers conduct monthly inventories of all firearms, 
ammunition, and magazines.

* Unannounced inventories and spot checks are conducted of all firearms, 
ammunition, and magazines.

* Property management staff conducts independent annual inventories.

VA policies and procedures also call for additional actions when it is 
determined that a firearm is missing. These include immediate 
notification to the FBI, VA's Office of Security & Law Enforcement 
(OS&LE), local police, the:

National Crime Information Center, and VA's Property Management staff.

A final check includes biennial on-site inspections conducted by OS&LE 
to review and verify daily check-out/in logs; monthly inventories of 
firearms, ammunition, and magazines; semi-annual unannounced 
inspections by the Chief of Police of all firearms, ammunition, and 
magazines; any reports concerning firearms which are missing, lost, or 
stolen (if applicable); and physical inventory of all Department-owned 
firearms during the inspection of the armory.

VA Requested Changes to Several Tables:

Concerning the table on page 27, BJS data from September 2000 indicates 
that VA has 342 persons authorized to make arrests and carry firearms. 
Although that data was correct at the time, VA notes that currently 
2,200 persons are authorized to make arrests and carry firearms. GAO 
staff has agreed to make the change.

Regarding the table on page 36, VA officials met with GAO staff and it 
was agreed that the "unwritten policy (U)" entry would be changed to 
"written policy (W)" as VA provided the written policy to GAO on March 
28, 2003. See VA Handbook 7127 and 7127/1 (Change 1 to 7127), part 2, 
paragraph 5106-1, Adjustment Vouchers.

Regarding the table on page 37, VA officials met with GAO staff and it 
was agreed that the "did not respond (N/R)" entries would be changed to 
"not applicable (N/A).":

[End of section]

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Fredrick D. Berry, Miguel A. Salas, Barbara A. Stolz, Christine F. 
Davis, Katherine M. Davis, Stuart M. Kaufman, David P. Alexander, 
Delois N. Richardson, Daniel C. Harris, and Miko D. Johnson made key 
contributions to this report.



FOOTNOTES

[1] Of the more than 500 missing firearms, INS identified 497 as 
missing during an August 1998 agencywide inventory. An additional 42 
firearms were subsequently identified as missing by Justice's OIG 
during an audit of INS property management.

[2] FBI officials reported that 161 of the reported 449 lost or stolen 
weapons were nonfunctional training weapons that could not easily be 
converted to live firearms. In addition, officials said that some of 
the 161 training weapons had been given to state/local training 
institutions and were subsequently destroyed.

[3] When we initiated our review, INS was part of the Department of 
Justice; U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms were part of the Department of the 
Treasury. With the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, INS, 
U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Secret Service were transferred to the 
Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. The Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was transferred to the Department of 
Justice as of January 24, 2003 (P.L. 107-296).

[4] Henceforth, these agencies will be referred to as federal law 
enforcement agencies. 

[5] We selected all 11 agencies in the 1,000 or more stratum, the 2 
largest in each of the 3 remaining strata, and 1 additional Treasury 
agency to account for all Justice and Treasury law enforcement 
agencies.

[6] Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were 
developed from different bases, such as inventory counts or internal 
agency reporting systems, and are based on different time periods, they 
are not directly comparable.

[7] 31 U.S.C. 3512.

[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in 
the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
1999).

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Best Practices in 
Achieving Consistent, Accurate Physical Counts of Inventory and Related 
Property, GAO-02-447G (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2002).

[10] The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program is a financial 
management improvement program involving the Department of the 
Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Personnel 
Management, GAO, and other agencies under the statutory authority of 
the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 [see 31 U.S.C. 3511 
(d)]. The purpose of the program is to promote the efficient management 
of assets and provide useful financial information on federal 
government operations.

[11] The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, 
Inc., was established as an independent accrediting authority in 1979 
by four major law enforcement membership associations: International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black Law 
Enforcement Executives, National Sheriffs' Association, and Police 
Executive Research Forum. The purpose of the accreditation program is 
to improve law enforcement operations by developing standards 
addressing a wide range of law enforcement topics.

[12] NCIC, located in the FBI, provides a computerized database for 
ready access by authorized users to criminal justice information, 
including information on stolen firearms. 

[13] The BOP, DEA, and USMS audits identify firearms that were missing 
between October 1999 and August 2001. The FBI audit identifies firearms 
that were missing between October 1, 1999 and January 21, 2002. The INS 
audit identifies firearms that were determined missing during an 
agencywide inventory of firearms conducted in August 1998, therefore, 
reflecting losses over an extended period. 

[14] Prior to 1998, INS required that firearms inventories be conducted 
every 2 years.

[15] The OIG did not report the reasons why INS had not conducted 
inventories in accordance with its policies and procedures.

[16] The OIG reported that BOP did not recommend disciplinary action 
for the two missing firearms cases the OIG reviewed, but did not 
identify whether the BOP should have recommended disciplinary action 
for those cases. For the 12 USMS cases reviewed, the OIG found that no 
disciplinary action was taken because USMS did not find employee 
negligence. The OIG's review of INS, undertaken during a different time 
period, did not address the issue of disciplining employees who lost 
firearms. 

[17] The OIG did not report how many of the 70 investigations at the 
FBI were of missing agency firearms.

[18] Justice commented that while local officials completed internal 
notification on a timely basis, the notifications of lost firearms were 
not always forwarded to the National Firearms Program or Property 
Management Units until such time as the weapons were called for 
destruction. The failure to report losses or thefts to the National 
Firearms Program resulted in the OIG determining a higher average 
reporting time.

[19] BOP officials said that they are in the process of revising their 
policies to require the immediate reporting of all lost, stolen, or 
missing firearms to the NCIC.

[20] Justice said that prior to 2000, NCIC only had a category for 
stolen firearms, not lost or missing firearms, resulting in some lost 
or missing firearms not being reported. Additionally, officials 
reported that some firearms that the OIG identified as not being 
entered into NCIC were entered, but subsequently deleted, because the 
information was not updated after a certain time period. 

[21] The OIG did not report how many of the 52 cases (out of total of 
the 212 missing firearms cases reviewed) of FBI firearms stolen from 
vehicles were the result of the firearms not being properly stored.

[22] The loss of two BOP firearms for the period October 1999 through 
February 2002 were determined to have not been lost or stolen from 
employees vehicles. BOP stated that while these missing firearms were 
not reported to NCIC, they were reported to the agency and were 
investigated. The investigations found that the airlines lost one 
weapon from checked baggage and the second was discovered missing after 
the transfer of several weapons by mail between facilities. In 
addition, the OIG did not report firearms losses from vehicles at INS.

[23] Treasury's OIG determined that the U.S. Mint and BEP did not have 
any firearms losses for the periods October 1, 1998 through September 
30, 2001.

[24] Of these missing firearms, 178 had been converted to dummy 
firearms (e.g., training weapons) and rendered inoperable. FBI 
officials said that these weapons could not be easily converted to live 
firearms. 

[25] Agencies could not identify which firearms recovered or still 
missing were dummy firearms. 

[26] Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were 
developed from different bases, such as inventory counts or internal 
agency reporting systems, and are based on different time periods, they 
are not directly comparable.

[27] FBI data came from the Justice OIG report.

[28] To determine if missing agency firearms were used in connection 
with criminal activity, the OIGs reviewed missing firearms recovered 
from October 1, 1999 through August 27, 2001, and October 1, 1998 
through September 30, 2001, respectively. For DEA, the Justice OIG 
reviewed cases for the period October 1, 1999 through November 15, 
2001.

[29] See appendix VI for a complete listing of related reports issued 
by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs.

[30] Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2000 
(Washington, D.C.: July 2001). Although the survey on which this report 
was based included certain OIGs, we did not include these offices in 
our review.

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