Title: National Evalution of Weed and Seed: Las Vegas Case Study.
Series: Research Report
Author(s): Terence Dunworth, Gregory Mills, Scott Decker, and Kristen
Jacoby
Published: National Institute of Justice, August 1999
Subject(s): Drug law enforcement, drug abuse prevention and education,
community policing, crime mapping, police manpower deployment, and
problem oriented policing
42 pages
99,000 bytes

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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice

National Evaluation of Weed and Seed

Case Study: Las Vegas, Nevada

Research Report

Executive Office for Weed and Seed
National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC20531

Janet Reno
Attorney General

Raymond C. Fisher
Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson
Assistant Attorney General

Noel Brennan
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis
Director, National Institute of Justice

-------------------------------

Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov

National Institute of Justice
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

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National Evaluation of Weed and Seed

Las Vegas Case Study

RESEARCH REPORT

Terence Dunworth, Ph.D.
Project Director

Gregory Mills
Deputy Project Director

Prepared by

Scott Decker
Las Vegas Site Leader

Terence Dunworth
Gregory Mills
Kristen Jacoby

August 1999

NCJ 175697


National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis
Director

Steve Edwards
Program Monitor

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Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice,
by Abt Associates Inc., under contract #95-DD-BX-0134. Points of view
or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.

-------------------------------

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of a number of
participants in the Las Vegas Weed and Seed effort, including Bobby
Siller, former FBI Special Agent in Charge; Kathryn Landreth, U.S.
Attorney; Jerry Keller, Sheriff, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department; Richard Winget, Undersheriff, Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department; Franklin Simpson, Weed and Seed Program Manager;
and March Theede, Cooperative Extension, University of Nevada-Reno.
Special thanks is extended to Robin Skone-Palmer of the U.S. Attorney's
office and to Lt. Jim Dillon of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department, without whose assistance this project could not have been
completed.

The authors of this case study would also like to acknowledge the
cooperation of Corrine Digilio, Meadows Village Seed Coordinator, and
Cynthia Sanders, West Las Vegas Seed Coordinator, who provided
information and assisted in arranging site visits. The authors would also
like to thank Mayor Jan Jones for facilitating interaction with the city
office.
Contents

Acknowledgments
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Case Study Objective and Methodology
3.0 Site History and Description
3.1 City Characteristics
3.2 Target Area Characteristics and Nature of Problems
3.3 Other Funding Sources
4.0 Program Structure and Chronology
4.1 Formal Organization and Structure for Weed and Seed Program
4.2 Proposed Goals and Strategies
4.3 Budget Information
4.4 Information Systems
4.5 Site Monitoring, Reporting, and Local Evaluation
5.0 Key Implementation Issues and Interpretation
5.1 Role of Grantee Organization
5.2 Management Structure and Control
5.3 Local Politics
5.4 Operational Goals
5.5 Approach to Weeding
5.6 Approach to Community Policing
5.7 Approach to Seeding
5.8 Concluding Observations
6.0 Effects of Weed and Seed
6.1 Analysis of Crime Data
6.2 Survey of Community Residents
7.0 Future Directions and Degree of Institutionalization

List of Exhibits

Exhibit 3.1: Las Vegas Weed and Seed Areas
Exhibit 3.2: Part 1 Crimes per 1,000 Residents
Exhibit 4.1: Weed and Seed Budget Summary
Exhibit 6.1: Annual Part 1 Crime Data, Las Vegas
Exhibit 6.2: Part 1 Crimes per Capita by Month
Exhibit 6.3: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents, Las Vegas
Exhibit 6.4: Perceptions of the Neighborhood, Las Vegas
Exhibit 6.5: Victimization, Las Vegas
Exhibit 6.6: Police Response, Las Vegas
Exhibit 6.7: Community Involvement, Las Vegas
Exhibit 6.8: Perceptions of Social Services and Other Programs, Las
Vegas
Exhibit 6.9: Perceptions of the Weed and Seed Program, Las Vegas

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1.0 Introduction

Unveiled in 1991, Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious
attempt to improve the quality of life in America's cities. The ultimate
goals of Weed and Seed are to control violent crime, drug trafficking, and
drug-related crime in targeted high-crime neighborhoods and to provide a
safe environment, free of crime and drug use, in which law-abiding
citizens can live, work, and raise their families. Weed and Seed,
administered by the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS), is
grounded in the philosophy that targeted areas can best be improved by a
two-pronged strategy of "weeding" out violent offenders, drug traffickers,
and other criminals by removing them from the targeted area and
"seeding" the area with human services and neighborhood revitalization
efforts. Community policing is intended to serve as the bridge between
weeding and seeding.

Three key objectives emphasize the government-community partnership
spirit that is at the heart of Weed and Seed:

1. To develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy to control and
prevent violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime in targeted
high-crime neighborhoods.

2. To coordinate and integrate existing and new Federal, State, local, and
private sector initiatives, criminal justice efforts, and human services,
concentrating those resources in the project sites to maximize their impact
on reducing and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-
related crime.

3. To mobilize community residents in the targeted sites to assist law
enforcement in identifying and removing violent offenders and drug
traffickers from their neighborhoods and to assist other human service
agencies in identifying and responding to service needs of the target area.

Weed and Seed sites thus draw on the resources of a variety of agencies at
all levels of government, private and other public organizations, and
individual residents.

Specific strategies and program components designed to achieve these
three objectives fall into one of four Weed and Seed program elements:

1. Law enforcement. Weed and Seed's law enforcement goals are the
identification, arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of
narcotics traffickers and violent criminals operating in the target area.

2. Community policing. An objective of community policing is to
establish mutual trust between law enforcement and the public. This is the
bridge between weeding and seeding: law enforcement officials enlist the
community for help in identifying criminal activity and locating
perpetrators; simultaneously, police help the community solve problems.

3. Prevention, intervention, and treatment. This element of the program is
intended to reduce risk factors and to enhance protective factors that are
associated with drug abuse, violence, and crime in the target area. "Safe
havens" in the target areas typically coordinate the prevention,
intervention, and treatment activities.

4. Neighborhood restoration. The goal of this element is to enable
residents in the target area to improve their community morale, their
neighborhood's physical appearance (buildings, parks, streets, lighting, and
so forth), and local business conditions.

An important structural feature of Weed and Seed is the local steering
committee. EOWS requires that each site have a steering committee,
formally chaired by the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the site is
located, that is responsible for "establishing Weed and Seed's goals and
objectives, designing and developing programs, providing guidance on
implementation, and assessing program achievement."[1]

Steering committee members include representatives from key local, State,
and Federal agencies, as well as other stakeholders in the Weed and Seed
target area, such as business leaders, tenant association leaders, and other
community activists. The requirement to convene a steering committee
reflects EOWS's belief that, for neighborhood revitalization to work, all
key stakeholders must participate in decisions that affect the target area.

Funded sites were divided into two groups: officially recognized sites and
demonstration sites. Officially recognized sites were currently
implementing Weed and Seed strategies in their jurisdiction, had
submitted to EOWS documentation summarizing their strategy, but had
not yet received full funding from EOWS. After EOWS designated a site
as "officially recognized," the site was eligible for demonstration status
and full Weed and Seed funding.

2.0 Case Study Objective and Methodology

This case study is one of eight completed for the National Evaluation of
Weed and Seed, under the direction of the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ). In 1994, NIJ selected the following eight sites for the national
evaluation:

o Four demonstration sites that first received funding in FY 1994:

--Hartford, Connecticut
--Las Vegas, Nevada
--Sarasota and Manatee Counties, Florida
--Shreveport, Louisiana

o Two demonstration sites awarded continuation funding in FY 1994:

--Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
--Seattle, Washington

o Two officially recognized sites:

--Akron, Ohio
--Salt Lake City, Utah

Three of these sites (Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, and Sarasota/Manatee)
were also recipients of funds from the National Performance Review
Laboratory (NPRL).[2]

This case study documents the activities implemented under the Weed and
Seed program in Las Vegas and assesses the program's impact at this site.
The final cross-site evaluation report compares the eight sites and presents
overall conclusions on the Weed and Seed program.

The evaluation activities undertaken for this case study included: (1)
onsite observation of program activities; (2) inperson interviews with
program staff, key law enforcement personnel, community leaders, service
providers, and participants; (3) review of program documents; (4) a survey
of target area residents; and (5) analysis of computerized crime and arrest
records provided by the local police department.

3.0 Site History and Description

The Las Vegas Weed and Seed site is in transition. The transitional state is
a consequence of uncertainties regarding the funding arrangements for the
grant. Since the program's inception, the city of Las Vegas had been the
grantee. Although the city announced its intent to relinquish that role in
April 1997, it now has resumed the grantee role. Weeding efforts have
been run through the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD). A Weed and Seed manager and two safe haven coordinators
have been responsible for the seeding efforts, operating out of a program
office in the community. Two neighborhoods within the city of Las Vegas
were designated as Weed and Seed target areas: Meadows Village and
West Las Vegas.

3.1 City Characteristics

Las Vegas is Nevada's largest city and America's fastest growing major
city. Between 1990 and 1996, the city's population grew by 13 percent,
from 393,521 to 443,391. In 1990, 72 percent of the city's population was
white, 11 percent was black, 12 percent was Hispanic, and the balance of
the population was Asian, American Indian, or "Other." Nearly one-
quarter of the population was less than 18 years old. Although 76 percent
of Las Vegas residents in 1990 had graduated from high school, only 13
percent had attained a college degree. The median income in the city was
$30,590, and 11.5 percent of residents lived below the poverty level.
Unemployment, measured at the time of the 1990 census, stood at slightly
more than 6 percent, but has since declined as the city has experienced a
major construction boom. Job opportunities in the construction and service
sectors have attracted large numbers of immigrants, especially Hispanic
residents.

Las Vegas is large in geographic area, covering 83 square miles, and is
situated in the northwest corner of Clark County--Nevada's most populous
county, with 1.2 million residents. The county includes seven other cities,
including North Las Vegas, which has recently been approved for
inclusion in the Weed and Seed effort.[3]

The entertainment industry is the city's economic base. As a magnet for
national and international tourism, Las Vegas hosts more than 29 million
visitors each year. This creates a variety of challenges for the city, in both
law enforcement and social services.

3.2 Target Area Characteristics and Nature of Problems

Meadows Village and West Las Vegas were each designated Weed and
Seed target areas because of their experience with crime, particularly drug
sales, violence, and youth crime. As such, these neighborhoods were
viewed as appropriate sites for Weed and Seed-type interventions. Exhibit
3.1 shows the location of the two target areas within the city's boundaries.

Meadows Village, formerly known as the "Naked City" from its days as
home to many of the city's dancers, is located at the north end of "the
strip," the axis along Las Vegas Boulevard where the city's major casinos,
resort hotels, and tourist attractions are located. Meadows Village lies in
the shadow of the Stratosphere, one of the city's largest casino-hotels.[4]
The community occupies a small and shrinking geographic area, as
residential property has been increasingly taken over for commercial or
business purposes. This has caused a decline in the neighborhood's
population, which was 4,867 in 1990. The majority of residences are rental
units. Hispanics comprise nearly one-half of the population (47 percent). A
substantial fraction of the Hispanic residents do not speak English as their
native language. The balance of the nonwhite population is about equally
distributed between black (7 percent) and Asian/Pacific (7 percent)
residents. The area's 1990 unemployment rate was 14.4 percent, more than
twice the citywide rate. Gang problems are significant in the community.

West Las Vegas, the other Weed and Seed site, had 15,629 residents in
1990 and has experienced modest recent population growth.[5] There are
a number of subsidized housing developments in the neighborhood, and
the majority of residences are rental. Blacks are the predominant ethnic
group, making up 78 percent of the residents in 1990. Whites make up 16
percent of the population, and the balance is a mix of other ethnic groups.
The unemployment rate was 17 percent in 1990, even higher than
Meadows Village. The crime problems in West Las Vegas consist
primarily of drug use and violence related to both drugs and gangs.

Exhibit 3.2 shows the trend in annual crime rates between calendar years
1993 and 1996 for Meadows Village, West Las Vegas, the entire city of
Las Vegas, and the Nation for Part 1 crimes per 1,000 residents.[6] The
Las Vegas Weed and Seed program started in October 1994, nearly
midway through the 4-year time interval shown in the exhibit.

Throughout 1993-96 the crime rates for the two target areas and Las Vegas
citywide exceeded the nationwide average, both for violent crime and
property crime. The rates for Meadows Village were three to four times
the national average in 1993 and then rose substantially between 1993 and
1996, with a dramatic increase in 1996. For West Las Vegas, the rates
were approximately twice the corresponding nationwide level in 1993.
Then, as occurred citywide, the West Las Vegas crime rates rose in 1994
and 1995, then decreased in 1996.

Of particular interest are the differing trends in the two neighborhoods in
the first 2 years following implementation of Weed and Seed, 1995 and
1996. As shown in exhibit 3.2, the Meadows Village crime rate first fell,
then rose. The reverse occurred in West Las Vegas, with crime rising in
1995 and then falling in 1996. In section 6, we will return to an analysis of
the crime rates in the two target areas, and seek to explain these patterns in
light of the differing characteristics of the communities and their Weed
and Seed efforts. 

3.3 Other Funding Sources

In addition to Weed and Seed funding, which is detailed in section 4.3,
Las Vegas receives funding for a variety of services provided to areas that
overlap, in part or in whole, the two Weed and Seed neighborhoods. In
West Las Vegas, the city's Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program is quite active. These Federal moneys are used to
supplement seeding activities not funded by Weed and Seed. In addition,
West Las Vegas is part of the area that has been federally designated as an
Enterprise Community. These two funding sources have been
supplemented by a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) technical assistance grant that has developed eight neighborhood
associations and boards (known as the West Las Vegas Neighborhood
Advisory Boards) to provide training and to develop neighborhood-level
improvements through cleaning up empty lots and improving properties. 

The Federal AmeriCorps program also provides support for ongoing
seeding initiatives in the Weed and Seed target areas. The Las Vegas
office of the University of Nevada-Reno secured funding for six
AmeriCorps volunteers, who worked in both Meadows Village and West
Las Vegas.

A hallmark activity in Las Vegas is the Southern Nevada Enterprise
Community (SNEC). SNEC is a state economic development program that
serves to develop and help implement locally and federally funded grant
initiatives, including initiatives in both Weed and Seed neighborhoods. It
has served as a catalyst, particularly in West Las Vegas, for the expansion
of seeding efforts. Similarly, the Las Vegas School District has been active
in supporting and enhancing seeding activities.

With respect to community policing, it is interesting to note that the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has not participated in any of the
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant programs of the
U.S. Department of Justice until quite recently.

4.0 Program Structure and Chronology

4.1 Formal Organization and Structure for Weed and Seed Program

The management structure for the Las Vegas Weed and Seed program has
undergone several changes since its inception in 1994. In the first 2 years
of operation, a large Weed and Seed steering committee functioned as the
key decisionmaking body. This steering committee had representatives
from a variety of law enforcement and social service groups and was
chaired by the U.S. Attorney for the region. The Weed and Seed program
manager had broad responsibility, and a representative from the city
planning agency played a substantial role in program management. 

Under this early arrangement, the Weed and Seed steering committee
played an active role in management and goal setting for the Las Vegas
effort. The committee's monthly meetings were well attended and typically
covered a full agenda, with most decisions reached by consensus. 

In 1996, this structure changed significantly. A Weed and Seed executive
committee was installed as the first-line management structure. The chief
executives--or their designees--of the key agencies were represented in this
group: the U.S. Attorney, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Special Agent in Charge, the mayor of Las Vegas, the deputy chief of the
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, and the Clark County
executive. The U.S. Attorney and the FBI Special Agent in Charge were
the most active participants in this group. A city fiscal analyst worked with
the Weed and Seed program manager in submitting required financial
reports. The Weed and Seed steering committee was chaired by the U.S.
Attorney.

The other change of substance wrought by this new structure was the
separation of Weed subcommittees from Seed subcommittees. The Weed
and Seed program manager was also designated seeding program manager,
with supervisory responsibility for the safe haven coordinators in both
West Las Vegas and Meadows Village. Five Seed subcommittees (grants,
community empowerment, planning and strategies, youth focus, and
administration/budget) were developed, each with its own chair. These
subcommittee chairs formed the seeding committee, which reported to the
Weed and Seed steering committee, not the seeding program manager. The
police captains from the target areas served as the community-oriented
policing patrol supervisors, and were represented in the Weed
subcommittees.[7]

U.S. Attorney's Office. Since the inception of Weed and Seed efforts in
Las Vegas, the U.S. Attorney's Office has played an important role in the
program. In addition to chairing the executive and steering committees,
the U.S. Attorney has committed resources for Federal prosecution of
Weed and Seed cases. In addition, the Law Enforcement Coordinating
Committee (LECC) coordinator has remained exceedingly active and
effective in Weed and Seed efforts in Las Vegas, chairing the steering
committee in the U.S. Attorney's absence and running the meetings when
the U.S. Attorney is present. The coordination role played by the U.S.
Attorney's Office has been a substantial part of the success achieved by
Las Vegas.

FBI Special Agent in Charge. The FBI Special Agent in Charge has also
taken a very active role in management and oversight of the Weed and
Seed effort. In addition to supporting weeding efforts with staff, resources,
and space, the FBI Special Agent in Charge is familiar with the operation
of the seeding side of the program. He was instrumental in the change in
administrative structure in 1996, which he viewed as essential to
establishing the credibility of Weed and Seed and strengthening its fiscal
management. He was also active in the 1997 creation of academic
scholarships for low-income youths in the Weed and Seed target areas.
This initiative, spearheaded by the mayor of Las Vegas, provided funds for
tuition and books for disadvantaged high school graduates attending the
Community College of Southern Nevada.

Weeding committee. The weeding committee is composed of high-ranking
and operational representatives from both the FBI and LVMPD, and the
U.S. Attorney. As described later in section 4, the weeding strategy has
remained consistently focused on overtime community-policing patrols in
both target neighborhoods, with a joint FBI-LVMPD task force targeting
its efforts on drugs in the West Las Vegas neighborhood. The LVMPD
supervisory representative assigned to the task force has played an
important role, as a visible and active bridge between seeding and weeding
efforts. One characteristic of Weed and Seed in Las Vegas was the
exceptional level of cooperation between law enforcement and seeding
efforts. This was facilitated by the involvement of LVMPD personnel in
seeding efforts and the willingness of seeding participants to include law
enforcement groups in their activities.

Seeding committee. The seeding committee has undergone more change
than the weeding committee. The current structure has allowed for five
subcommittees, each of which reported regularly to the steering
committee. The meetings of the seeding committee were less frequent and
broader in scope than those of the weeding committee. Although those
involved in weeding have made frequent suggestions for seeding
strategies, there was less feedback regarding strategy and targets from the
seeding committee to the weeding group.

Grantee. The grantee for the Las Vegas Weed and Seed project has been
the city of Las Vegas. Initially, this process worked smoothly. However, a
number of factors have conspired to make this arrangement less
satisfactory. The movement of the grant from the jurisdiction of the city
manager to more direct control by the mayor created most of these
dilemmas. It is clear that the mayor and the city manager did not share the
same vision for the city, nor did they share a common vision regarding the
best process by which grants should be managed. In December 1996, the
mayor and city council created an Office of Federal, State, and Local
Initiatives and appointed a director of this office. Less than a year later, in
April 1997, the city announced its intention to withdraw as the fiscal agent
for the Weed and Seed grant. In addition, invoices and reimbursements
were slowed considerably by this process. The University of Nevada-Reno
was proposed as a possible replacement for the city as fiscal agent when
the city announced its intention to withdraw. However, this arrangement
could not be finalized, and the intervention of the EOWS director was
required. The outcome was that the city continued in the role that it
planned to renounce, and the director of the Office of Federal, State, and
Local Initiatives once again became responsible for fiscal management.

4.2 Proposed Goals and Strategies

The goals of the Weed and Seed program are simple but ambitious:

o "Weed" out violence, gangs, drug trafficking and drug-related crime
from high-crime neighborhoods.

o "Seed" these neighborhoods with social services and economic
revitalization, providing a safe and healthy environment for citizens to
live, work and raise their families.

In planning its weeding efforts, the joint FBI-LVMPD task force had as its
primary goal the suppression of gangs, drugs, and juvenile violent crimes.
This has been done primarily through a strategy that used drug arrests as a
tool to gain access to offenders involved in violence or gangs. The task
force has worked as an undercover unit with an intelligence-gathering
strategy that linked intelligence to ongoing and new investigations. Part of
the task force strategy involved developing a list of the 50 most disruptive
and violent offenders. This list was developed in a process that included
intelligence, gang, narcotics, and repeat offender units. These
investigations were of a long-term nature and in general have been
targeted at high-level drug dealers.

The second weeding goal was of a more immediate nature, to strengthen
community-oriented policing in both Meadows Village and West Las
Vegas. Community-oriented enforcement efforts have been implemented
through traditional patrol, foot patrol, and bicycle patrol. These policing
patrols have worked with local businesses. Enforcement efforts have been
coupled with active police participation in community events, including
job and safety fairs, bicycle rodeos, and school open houses.

A primary seeding goal was the early prevention, intervention, and
treatment of community problems. This goal was accompanied by the
strategy of trying to engage community-based organizations and
nontraditional service providers in grant writing efforts. This engagement
was accomplished by issuing a request for proposals to community groups,
providing technical assistance in the form of grant writing workshops, and
reviewing proposals to determine which groups would receive funding.

Neighborhood restoration is another primary seeding-related goal of the
Las Vegas effort. This effort has focused on improving existing housing
stock, improving the appearance and utility of existing property, and
attracting new investment to neighborhoods. The strategy for achieving
this goal involves work with the West Las Vegas Neighborhood Executive
Board and the Meadows Village Neighborhood Advisory Board to support
existing community activities. In addition, this strategy includes a public
relations component designed to advertise the efforts and
accomplishments of the program in the area. The funding of service
providers is the key strategy to achieve the goal of neighborhood
restoration.

Weed and Seed program activities

The weeding activities included the joint FBI-LVMPD task force and the
three overtime community-oriented patrol units, two in West Las Vegas
and one in Meadows Village.

Seeding activities were more extensive. For Meadows Village, the seeding
efforts focused on the different cultural needs of neighborhood residents.
The issues of literacy and education have been critical in this
neighborhood, and the mix of activities was designed to address these
needs.

o Positive Choices received $12,903 to teach parents and their children
about substance abuse prevention techniques. The program focuses on
interpersonal skills.

o Boy Scouts of America received $10,000 to fund a scout troop in the
Fremont School, located in Meadows Village. 

o Classroom on Wheels received $20,000 to provide a comprehensive
bilingual preschool program for children ages 3-5. Bilingual parenting
classes are also available to parents.

o Community Leadership received $5,000 to offer civics education
regarding the functions of government at the State and Federal levels.

o Get Smart Homework received $8,560 to provide direct assistance to
students with their homework. The high rate of illiteracy and lack of
English skills among parents in Meadows Village makes this a critically
needed program.

o Yes We Can Learn English received $30,000 to provide English as a
second language (ESL) training several times a week. 

o Horizon Project received $20,596 to provide high school classes for
students in need of remedial help or seeking a graduation equivalency
diploma.

Many of these services have been provided at the Stupak Community
Center, where the safe haven coordinator's office was located. For
example, the Horizon Project has utilized a computer lab available at the
Stupak Center.

Although there has been some movement in and out of the seeding
funding mix in Meadows Village, each of these agencies has received
funding for a considerable period of time, and most have been funded
from the outset of seeding in late 1994.

The seeding activities in West Las Vegas have involved an average of
1,300 youths per month. There is a program administrative office in the
neighborhood, but--unlike Meadows Village--there is no single
community center out of which these programs operate. Each of the West
Las Vegas service programs noted below was funded as a subgrantee
through the competitive Weed and Seed review process described above.
One consequence of adopting this strategy for funding subgrantees was
that these organizations gained sophistication in grant writing skills,
thereby enabling them to better compete for other funds, both during and
after the Weed and Seed funding.

o Variety Day Home received $5,000 to train staff to implement
peacemaking strategies as a way of disciplining the children and
encouraging nonviolent and nonconfrontational behavior.

o The HHD Youth Organization received $7,000 to help low- and
moderate-income at-risk youths become contributing citizens. It
accomplished this goal through programs available before and after school
and through a summer day camp experience.

o The Community Health Center received $10,000 to increase the
percentage of women receiving prenatal care during the first trimester of
pregnancy.

o Project Youth received $5,000 to provide life skills training to at-risk
youths. Classes in conflict resolution and self-esteem building are offered
based on the Teens, Crime and the Community model.

o Las Vegas Stealth Track Club received $15,000 to provide alternative
nontraditional activities for at-risk youths. Clinics stress the importance
and value of life skills.

o Committed 100 Men Helping Boys received $5,000 to conduct Rites of
Passage Instructional programs during the summer. These programs stress
the importance of individual responsibility and decision making.

o Prince Hall Masonic Youth Group received $10,000 to provide leisure
activities, vocational skills, and conflict resolution skills. Education and
academic achievement are stressed by this program.

o Austin Dancers received $10,000 to provide low-income youths an
opportunity to learn about and develop their skills in the performing arts.

o Agassi Boys and Girls Club received $3,000 to provide career-related
leadership and training activities to low-income youths.

o Doolittle Community Center received $12,000 to provide sports and
related activities for low-income youths.

Note that these West Las Vegas activities focused exclusively on youths.
In contrast, Meadows Village targeted a substantial share of its seeding
efforts on parents and other adults.

Mix of Weed and Seed activities

The Las Vegas Weed and Seed effort shows considerable balance. That is,
the effort could not be characterized as emphasizing weeding over seeding,
or vice versa. In the first 2 years of the program (1994-1996), there was
considerable negative local publicity regarding the Weed and Seed
program, and the publicity surrounding the results of the local evaluation
(described later in section 4.5) contributed to a generally negative
perception among several community groups. In particular, there was
concern that the program would target only young minority males. There
was organized opposition to the program, culminating in negative
publicity in the local newspaper, as well as a challenge to the even-
handedness of the enforcement efforts in the courts. These concerns were
mitigated as Weed and Seed progressed, particularly as the seeding effort
gained momentum and genuinely involved grassroots community groups
and met fundamental community needs. 

The fact that both weeding and seeding administrators actively
participated in steering committee meetings reflected their respective
desires to achieve program coordination. In addition, weeding groups
helped plan the seeding aspects of the program. For example, officers from
both the community-oriented policing groups in the target neighborhoods
and LVMPD headquarters regularly attended, participated in and, in some
instances, helped direct seeding activities. This was true of a recent job fair
held at a West Las Vegas school. In addition, the seeding coordinators
continued to work closely with their respective community-oriented
policing patrols, providing information regarding problem areas, suspects,
and community concerns. LVMPD personnel, including the sheriff,
undersheriff, captain, and lieutenant, consistently expressed the belief that
too much weeding creates suspicion in the community and is
counterproductive. Although this anecdotal evidence did not prove the
balance between weeding and seeding in Las Vegas, it was typical of the
activities that characterized program operation.

Training and socialization

There was a considerable amount of training on both the weeding and
seeding sides of the program. The overwhelming majority of training
occurred within each functional group; that is, weeding and seeding
training sessions were conducted separately. The exceptions to this
practice were general training sessions held early in the life of the
program, which were designed to introduce providers to the broad outlines
of the program.

Training for weeding providers (FBI and LVMPD officers) began with a
visit to San Diego, California, by command personnel from each agency to
observe the operation of that city's initiative. Based on that visit and the
programmatic and strategic goals of the Las Vegas effort, a local training
program was developed and implemented. This training included the
following elements: (1) completion of firearms training system; (2)
training by SWAT personnel in building entries, searches, downed officer
rescues, and firearms; (3) search and seizure training provided by the
former district attorney; (4) defensive tactics instruction; (5) cultural
awareness training; (6) training in foot and mobile surveillance techniques;
(7) training in the preparation and submission of cases to the prosecutor;
and (8) street survival techniques.

All officers, Federal and local, who participated in the task force received
this training, and officers who transferred into the task force were required
to receive this training as well. An advantage of this training is that it was
offered by individuals outside the current organizations, thus adding to the
knowledge base of participants rather than reinforcing training already
received or available within the department.[8]

Training for potential seeding providers included a 2-day workshop in
grant preparation and management. The goals of the workshop were to
improve skills in grant preparation and to enhance the quality of funding
proposals. In addition, the seeding manager and the two safe haven
coordinators attended training conferences held by EOWS in a variety of
locations, including an employment conference hosted in Las Vegas and a
training conference in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1997.

4.3 Budget Information

Las Vegas submitted its first application for Weed and Seed support in
June 1994, became an officially recognized Weed and Seed site in
September 1994, and received its first Federal funding under the program
in October 1994. An earlier grassroots effort dating back to October 1992
had produced a number of decisions that shaped the emerging program
with respect to problem area identification, general strategic decisions, and
the forging of public-private partnerships. In addition, the city was
designated as a Southern Nevada Enterprise Community (SNEC) in 1994.
That decision had an impact on the further formulation and definition of
Weed and Seed goals.

The fiscal year (FY) 1994 application requested funding in the amount of
$222,688, with $173,161 allocated for seeding activities and the balance
for weeding activities. The city of Las Vegas was designated as the
grantee. The Weed and Seed committee initiated the hiring process for a
program manager at that time, and a manager was hired in March 1994.

Activities in this first year of funding were oriented initially toward law
enforcement. Toward this end, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (using Bureau of Justice Assistance funds and asset forfeiture
funds approved through Weed and Seed) provided two overtime
neighborhood patrol units in West Las Vegas and one similar patrol unit in
Meadows Village. All three patrols were funded as overtime units, with a
strong commitment to community-oriented policing. A Weed and Seed
task force was also organized, comprised of officers from the LVMPD and
the FBI. This task force targeted drug, gang, and gun activity in the West
Las Vegas area and has been the centerpiece of that area's weeding efforts.

FY 1995 funding was requested (in the amount of $254,457) to create a
balance between law enforcement and prevention during the second year
of funding. The major focus of seeding programs was to provide child care
in Meadows Village and to coordinate programs and services in both
Meadows Village and West Las Vegas. In the first year of Weed and Seed
funding, nine different seeding programs received funding: Classroom on
Wheels, Clark County Social Services' Community Health Centers,
Horizon School Project, Family Cabinet (a program that includes three
separate interventions focused on interpersonal skills, English language
skills acquisition, and homework support), School District Project Arts,
Frontier Girls Scouts, Family and Youth Parenting Project, HABLE
(afterschool tutoring in the math area), and Project Youth Life Skills. In
addition, a survey to determine area needs assessment was completed. The
program expansion for FY 1995 included economic development efforts in
both target neighborhoods; education; home environment; day care;
leadership development; and the HUD training program, Step-up.

The application for FY 1996 requested $540,000. As was the case in the
preceding fiscal year, the city of Las Vegas was the grantee, and the city
manager's office was the organizational unit designated to manage the
grant. The overtime neighborhood patrol squads (one in Meadows Village
and two in West Las Vegas) continued in FY 1996. A new item in the
proposal was funding for cultural sensitivity training, in response to the
diversity of both neighborhoods. Bicycle patrol was an additional
ingredient added for the FY 1996 weeding effort. Funds were requested
for eight bicycles, their maintenance, and related equipment.

The seeding side of the FY 1996 proposal continued much of what had
been in place the previous year. The Weed and Seed program manager
continued in his position, with a full-time coordinator to be hired in West
Las Vegas and a second part-time coordinator in Meadows Village (to
create a full-time coordinator in Meadows Village). The budget proposed
hiring an administrative assistant, but this position was combined with the
part-time position in Meadows Village. Rather than specifying individual
seeding projects in the proposal, a request for proposal process was
initiated. Under this scheme, groups in the target areas could submit
proposals for funding to support program efforts in five specific areas: (1)
ESL; (2) substance abuse programs; (3) parenting education and support; 
(4) youth activities/gang diversion; and (5) education for youths and
adults. A total of $181,735 was requested. Finally, $37,500 was requested
for the purposes of a local evaluation.

The FY 1997 grant continued the major outlines of the three previous
years' grants. First, the Weed and Seed task force continued using asset
forfeiture funds. Second, the overtime community-oriented patrols were
extended another year, with the same balance between Meadows Village
and West Las Vegas. Third, the Weed and Seed program manager
continued to manage the two neighborhood coordinators, one in Meadows
Village and one in West Las Vegas. The request for proposal process for
local seeding grantees continued, but the local evaluation was deleted from
the budget.

During FY 1997, a number of important issues emerged, including the
decision to seek recognition as a Weed and Seed training site. This
decision stemmed from the Weed and Seed steering committee's view that
this was the only way to continue local funding. At the same time,
administrative problems began to emerge as it became clear that the fiscal
and management oversight by the city of Las Vegas had not functioned
effectively. In April 1997, the city announced its intention not to continue
as the fiscal agent. 

By that time, a considerable amount of FY 1997 funds were unused,
resulting in part from the city's reluctance to process funding requests.
Among service providers, attention focused on unexpended funds and the
availability of carryover money. There was growing antagonism toward
the city's role, especially following the city's decision to withdraw as fiscal
agent for the grant. These circumstances created misgivings among
steering committee members and confusion regarding program goals. 

These structural problems caused considerable delay and confusion about
the application for FY 1998 funding. Despite a number of obvious
successes in goal-setting, implementation, and outcomes, as of mid-1997,
Las Vegas lacked an entity to function as the recipient for grant funds. A
considerable amount of scrambling ensued to find a suitable agency to fill
this critical role. A relatively new member of the Weed and Seed steering
committee, from the University of Nevada-Reno (UNR) College of
Cooperative Extension-Southern Area, stepped forward. This member had
considerable experience working with youth programs and direct service
delivery to youths in extension and school systems. In addition, she had
written a number of grants, enhancing her suitability for the task of
submitting the new proposal. UNR prepared a proposal for FY 1998
funding. Ideally this would have been submitted to EOWS in June 1997.
Submitting the proposal in a timely fashion was critical, given the change
in fiscal agent, the large volume of carryover funds, and concerns about
the program's future in light of the city's withdrawal of support. At the
same time, the city initiated a "close-out" process that would deobligate
unexpended funds, requesting a fiscal and programmatic summary from
each agency that received Weed and Seed funds. 

However, procedural delays within UNR prevented the proposal for FY
1998 funding from moving forward in a timely fashion. The proposal
finally cleared the UNR signature process and went to EOWS. In early
December 1997, the EOWS staff member monitoring Las Vegas informed
UNR that the budget would need to be revised due to reduced funding. At
the same time, there was growing concern among several members of the
Weed and Seed steering committee regarding the process used to develop
the proposal. The UNR representative stated the position that the proposal,
until it was approved at EOWS, was a confidential university document; in
essence it was embargoed. This position was challenged by a number of
steering committee members who argued that the program was owned by
the community and, as a consequence, must be reviewed and approved by
the community. This debate consumed substantial time at many of the
Weed and Seed steering committee meetings and led to heated debate on
several occasions. 

The UNR proposal ultimately was withdrawn in December 1997. This
process occurred in conjunction with a site visit from the director of
EOWS. The director and the EOWS program monitor for the Las Vegas
site spent 2 days in meetings with the Weed and Seed steering committee,
individual committee members, and Las Vegas city officials. These
meetings led to a decision by EOWS that UNR would not serve as the
fiscal agent for the grant during the next year.

Although the process for selecting a fiscal agent had not yet been
specified, several things had become clear at this juncture. First, the Las
Vegas site was viewed as an important and successful site and would not
be abandoned by EOWS. Second, EOWS wished the city of Las Vegas to
resume its role, perhaps in a revised form, as the fiscal agent for the grant.
Third, the Las Vegas Weed and Seed site would be allowed to carry over
unexpended funds.

4.4 Information Systems

The Weed and Seed operation in Las Vegas has made limited use of
information systems. The joint FBI-LVMPD task force has made use of
computers to record surveillance information, keep track of "buy" money,
and link the task force to other crime data. The money to pay informants
has been especially critical in aiding investigations, as the informant base
has grown substantially. 

4.5 Site Monitoring, Reporting, and Local Evaluation

The monthly steering committee meeting was a site for much of the
reporting of Weed and Seed efforts. Each safe haven coordinator and the
seeding coordinator spoke to the operation of their program, its impact,
and future plans. In addition, the weeding participants representing the
joint FBI-LVMPD task force reported on their activities to the extent that
ongoing investigations allowed for the release of details. These individuals
were joined by the appropriate supervisor of the community-oriented
patrols in each target neighborhood.

The issue of monitoring was a bit more formal. One consequence of the
expanded role of the executive committee was the requirement for greater
accountability in monitoring seeding expenditures. A monthly report was
required that detailed the services provided, the number of individuals who
received those services, the funding amount for each agency, and the plans
for the next month. In addition, the seeding program manager met monthly
with the FBI Special Agent in Charge. Monitoring of law enforcement
activities was done within the LVMPD, and the accountability of the chain
of command typically was the vehicle through which this was achieved.

The local evaluation in Las Vegas initially was conducted by faculty in the
criminal justice department at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas
(UNLV). The report concluded that the program had been ineffective, and
that community- and problem-oriented policing had not been effectively
implemented. The evaluators offered five recommendations: (1) better
integration of goals and strategies; (2) development of a strategic plan with
specific objectives; (3) determining the extent to which community-
oriented policing is being offered in Meadows Village; (4) increased
community participation; and (5) better documentation of services by
funded agencies. This report, presented on November 15, 1995, was not
well-received by program administrators, who considered it ill-informed
and misguided. The report's conclusions were reached after less than 2 full
years of funding had been received--well before implementation had been
completed--and were generally regarded by the program administrators as
premature. The evaluation provided little information that was used by the
program administrators to guide subsequent action. 

Prior to the presentation of the report, the UNLV coauthors had attended a
number of steering committee meetings. Following the report, the
relationship soured between the local evaluators and the Weed and Seed
participants, as the evaluators were quoted in local media regarding the
ineffectiveness of the program. This led to the termination of the
relationship between the UNLV evaluators and the Las Vegas Weed and
Seed site.

5.0 Key Implementation Issues and Interpretation

5.1 Role of Grantee Organization

As noted above, the city of Las Vegas has been the grant recipient for the
Weed and Seed initiative in Las Vegas since the program's inception. This
arrangement has produced both the best of times and the worst of times for
the Las Vegas Weed and Seed program. Early in the city's tenure as
grantee (i.e., during the first 2 years of the program), this arrangement
operated quite effectively. However, by 1996, it became clear that the city
no longer desired to be the fiscal agent for a program over which it did not
exert supervisory control. A variety of signals were sent by the city
regarding its desire to withdraw from a more active role in the
management of grant funds. The director of the mayor's Office of Federal,
State, and Local Initiatives brought this issue to a head, advising the
mayor in April 1997 that the city should no longer serve as the fiscal agent
for the grant.[9]

This decision created a variety of dilemmas for the Las Vegas Weed and
Seed effort. For example, EOWS had planned to recognize Las Vegas for
its achievements at the annual Weed and Seed training conference in
August 1997. It was in the midst of these plans, however, that the city
decided to withdraw from its role in the program. When questioned about
that decision, the mayor indicated that it was made by a member of her
staff and that she accepted the recommendation as a matter of course. 

5.2 Management Structure and Control

One of the most important aspects of the decisionmaking process in Las
Vegas' Weed and Seed program has been the transition from a
management structure in which the steering committee was supplanted by
the executive committee. One of the consequences of this move was to
isolate key operating staff, including the program manager and the safe
haven coordinators in Meadows Village and West Las Vegas, from any
strategic discussions and decisions. In the early stages of the Las Vegas
effort, the steering committee made most management and operational
decisions. The expanded role of the executive committee in the second and
third year of the grant caused some concern among steering committee
members. 

Ironically, even in the face of a strong executive committee, operational
decisionmaking remained decentralized. This was equally true on both the
weeding and seeding sides of the program. For example, local community
residents and community policing officers provided most of the day-to-day
direction of community policing activities. Similarly, the safe haven
coordinators made important decisions in the daily lives of their programs
that were not subject to the scrutiny of either the executive or steering
committees. 

Thus, although the arrangement of centralized policy decisions and
decentralized operational decisions created tensions, it did not interfere
with the implementation of ongoing weeding and seeding activities.

5.3 Local Politics

Because the city of Las Vegas had served initially as the fiscal agent for
the grant, this had placed the mayor--a highly visible and charismatic
leader--in a prominent role in the local Weed and Seed effort. It is
apparent that city programs are strongly identified with the mayor. During
the early years of the program, the mayor had disagreements with the city
manager, whose authority had blocked some of the mayor's initiatives. In
early 1998, the city manager resigned. In addition, the Clark County
Sheriff is an elected official whose first-term election occurred early in the
Weed and Seed tenure, in January 1995. The sheriff and the mayor had a
public disagreement widely reported by the local media regarding the level
of weeding in the Meadows Village neighborhood. (The issue partly
involved the Stratosphere, a major hotel and tourist entertainment
attraction located on the edge of Meadows Village, one of whose owners
was a highly visible supporter of the mayor.) These public disagreements
made very visible the effect of political forces on the allocation of
resources and level of effort.

The location of the Weed and Seed program within the city government
was important for other reasons. The appointment to Weed and Seed jobs,
especially the seeding manager and the two safe haven coordinators, were
important ways for the mayor to be seen as reinforcing her ties to the
community (even though these hiring decisions were formally made by the
steering committee, in conjunction with the program manager). In
addition, the fiscal management of Weed and Seed through the mayor's
Office of Federal, State, and Local Initiatives was also portrayed as
another example of the mayor's commitment to diverse neighborhoods in
the city. City politics did not appear to have influenced day-to-day
decisionmaking; rather it affected the broad structure of programs and
personnel. 

5.4 Operational Goals

As noted earlier, the seeding goals included the early prevention,
intervention, and treatment of community problems. Neighborhood
restoration is another primary goal of the Las Vegas effort. Weeding goals
were defined in a more concrete fashion and included the suppression of
gangs, drugs, and juvenile violent crimes. In addition, the task force
strategy developed a list of the 50 most violent offenders. A related goal
was to provide community-oriented policing strategies and enforcement in
both Meadows Village and West Las Vegas. One issue that arose
regarding the setting of goals was whether weeding could ever fade away
and be fully supplanted by seeding. The consensus among Weed and Seed
participants in Las Vegas was that this should never happen and that
continued weeding was a necessary component for program success. 

Did the goals change over time? The goals did not change substantially
from their identification in proposals to their implementation. Because the
seeding goals were defined in general terms, they could include a variety
of intervention outcomes. The weeding goals, which were well defined
and carefully implemented from the outset, remained relatively constant.
One of the goals that emerged over the life of the program was the strategy
of weeding and seeding participants working together. Although this was
not a formally articulated goal at the outset of the program, it later became
a central and important focus of the Las Vegas effort. Underlying this
evolution was the appreciation for partnership that grew out of joint
meetings between Weed and Seed participants. 

How were goals defined operationally and who defined them? The
monthly steering committee meetings provided the forum in which goals
were operationally defined. Particularly in the early stages of the grant,
these meetings focused on formative issues, such as trying to forge
consensus regarding goals and objectives, as well as strategies and
coalitions to be pursued. It is interesting to note that law enforcement
played an active role in helping to define seeding goals. 

How well-accepted were these goals? The goals appeared to be well-
accepted among Weed and Seed partners. There were some occasional
political concerns regarding the goals, but such intrusions were infrequent. 

What were the criteria for success? For law enforcement, success was
defined in terms of the arrest and successful prosecution of the 50
individuals identified as the most violent criminals. In addition, drug and
violent crime arrests were operational measures of the community policing
goals. For seeding participants, operational definitions produced an
emphasis on the number of clients served; this was the primary criteria for
success.

5.5 Approach to Weeding

Differences between weeding activities and other previous enforcement
efforts

The primary difference between weeding and other enforcement was
found in the activities of the Joint LVMPD-FBI task force that operated in
West Las Vegas. The task force expended 80 percent of its effort on long-
term investigations to address major or violent offenders and 20 percent on
short-term investigations that addressed the more immediate complaints of
citizens regarding crime in their neighborhoods. The task force was not
responsible for responding to radio calls (except for exceptional events)
and had the freedom to pursue the links between cases and focus its efforts
on long-range investigations. As such, it could target higher-level
offenders than might be possible under traditional methods of patrol or
detective investigation. The opportunity to draw upon the expertise,
experience, and resources of the FBI enhanced the quality of the output
from the task force. The cooperation between the two groups had other
positive benefits, as well, including the creation of stronger bonds between
the organizations. Finally, Weed and Seed grant funds provided resources
not normally available to LVMPD, enabling it to accomplish objectives
requiring more resources, for such items as training, "buy" money, and
specialized equipment. 

The community-oriented patrols in the target neighborhoods expanded
community- and problem-oriented policing in Las Vegas. Although some
general debate continues regarding the long-term impact of overtime, it is
clear that the overtime patrols in the target neighborhoods have reinforced
the value of community-oriented policing for the LVMPD. Officers began
to see community policing as an important mission, and their successes led
to further reinforcement of this strategy. Successes included community
involvement in addition to traditional measures of law enforcement
success, such as arrests.

Implementation strategies

The implementation of these weeding strategies depended largely on
training, selection, and the chain of command. The joint task force
received extensive training and was closely monitored by the police
command structure.

Operations and arrests. A large volume of arrests and prosecutions can be
linked directly to the task force. As of March 17, 1997, the task force was
responsible for 137 arrests for State crimes, 40 Federal arrests, 50 search
warrants executed, 147 firearms seized, and $182,666 in assets acquired
by the LVMPD. A number of the more successful cases were handled by
the task force. A number of their investigations focused on activity in and
around the Colony Club, a long-time venue for drug dealers in West Las
Vegas. The Colony Club was closed, 12 Federal arrests and convictions
were obtained, and 5 arrests were made on State charges. Perhaps the most
notorious case involved a West Las Vegas landlord long suspected of
having ties to gangs and drug sales. He rented property to the Back Street
Crips in return for a share in their drug profits. Over a 2-year period, 25
search warrants were executed at properties owned by this landlord. The
warrants resulted in 9 arrests for Federal charges (with the landlord found
guilty on four of these), and 43 State felony or misdemeanor arrests. At the
time of this report, the landlord was awaiting sentencing on Federal
charges. He has been a significant focus of community attention and a
strong symbol of the effectiveness of Weed and Seed to the West Las
Vegas neighborhood.

Prosecutions

There have been 40 Federal prosecutions of Weed and Seed task force
cases. In 27 of these cases, the defendant pleaded guilty prior to trial and
received felony convictions. Two went to trial and were convicted
following trial, and 11 are awaiting trial. 

Between February 1995 and March 1997, 137 subjects were arrested on
State charges and were presented to the State district attorney. Among
these, 57 had their charges dismissed, 9 of which are being reviewed for
recharging. Another 29 of the 137 subjects are awaiting trial, 9 are wanted,
and 9 were arrested on outstanding warrants. A total of 14 received felony
convictions, and 11 received misdemeanor convictions. 

5.6 Approach to Community Policing

The Las Vegas approach to community policing--most evident in the
overtime patrols, but also present in the task force--was quite
straightforward. The community policing focus was to improve the quality
of life for residents by responding to the most visible forms of crime and
disorder in target neighborhoods.[10] One squad of LVMPD officers
provided the community policing and was supplanted by a squad of
bicycle patrol officers. In addition, the involvement of weeding officers in
seeding events--such as bicycle fairs, school activities, and safe haven
events--was instrumental in establishing the view in the community that
cooperation with officers was not a one-way street. Being seen interacting
with residents and acting on their concerns was understood to be the best
way to gain their trust and ensure their cooperation. 

As part of the community policing approach, a "First Tuesday" series of
meetings between area captains and neighborhood residents was
implemented in the target neighborhoods. These meetings provided good
followup to citizen concerns and increased the accountability of law
enforcement. The police became more likely to take seriously and act upon
the concerns expressed by residents at these meetings due to the presence
of command rank personnel.

It should be noted that not every relationship between police and residents
in the target areas has been so positive. A gang member was shot in 1997
by a police officer, and many grassroots individuals have been concerned
in the wake of this incident about the relationship between the police
department and the community. The police department acted quickly in
investigating this act. 

5.7 Approach to Seeding

Community organizations and organizing

In each Weed and Seed target neighborhood, community outreach and
organizing were central to the seeding activities. This was especially so in
Meadows Village, where outreach to new immigrants--many of whom did
not speak English--was crucial for their involvement in program activities.
The community is small and quite dense, making the Stupak Community
Center a true center for neighborhood activities. The presence of a full-
time safe haven coordinator in both Meadows Village and West Las Vegas
enabled each community to staff its safe haven for most daytime and many
evening hours. 

From the start, outreach has been viewed as an important objective of both
safe havens, as such efforts were seen as involving more participants in the
program and strengthening the bonds between safe haven activities and the
broader community. Such outreach has proven more difficult in West Las
Vegas, however, as the target community is much larger, more dispersed
geographically, and consequently less likely to see the safe haven site as a
center of activity.

It is important to note that both target communities lack much in the way
of social fabric. Accordingly, community organization activities by the
seeding personnel have helped strengthen that fabric, making it more
likely that the community can heal itself and provide its own solutions
over the long term. 

Focus of seeding programs

Seeding programs had a strong community focus, accounting for the
differences between the seeding efforts in the two target neighborhoods. In
Meadows Village, the need for acculturation--including training in
English, American customs, life skills, and the value of education--was
great. As a consequence, the safe haven coordinator in this neighborhood
emphasized programs and outreach efforts that deal with these needs. In
West Las Vegas, on the other hand, there was a considerable need for
afterschool programs, mentoring, and community involvement. The safe
haven coordinator in this neighborhood solicited programs designed to
achieve these ends. In each neighborhood, a sensitivity to cultural issues
was at the forefront of program selection, implementation, and oversight.
Absent attention to such issues, it was unlikely that programs would be
well-received by residents. 

Community involvement in seeding activities

There was at least anecdotal evidence that the participation of community
residents in social services programs in general has increased as a
consequence of the seeding activities specifically supported by Weed and
Seed funds. For example, the LifeLine (adult education and parenting
training) program in Meadows Village reaches out to the extended families
of individuals identified as directly in need to create a support network and
expand the breadth of the services. The demand for programs in English as
a second language (ESL) was great in Meadows Village, as well.
Graduates of the ESL programs offered through Weed and Seed have
returned to the Stupak Community Center to tutor and teach additional
participants, demonstrating the ripple effect that such programs have had. 

There was similar evidence in West Las Vegas that community
participation in non-Weed and Seed social services was increased as a
consequence of Weed and Seed funding and the attention that Weed and
Seed has drawn to the community's needs. The Dog Catchers Club held a
free summer camp in 1997 to meet the needs of 5- to 17-year-olds with no
activities. Using very modest funds from Weed and Seed, this organization
served more than 1,000 children, using funds donated by residents,
businesses, and other individuals. This program received mention for its
efforts in USA Today in mid-July 1997. These examples show the effect
seeding activities had in drawing new support to the program and the
community. 

Scope, reach, and intensity of seeding activities

The following list identifies the service providers funded by Weed and
Seed in Meadows Village, as well as the number of individuals they
served:

o LifeLine, a family life center, served 16 fathers and 18 women.

o Positive Choices, which teaches fundamental skills and values, provided
50 sessions each with 18 families in 1996.

o Yes We Can Learn English, which provides ESL training, ran 4 classes
with 30 to 40 students in each class at 3 different locations and offered 500
hours of training per year.

o Camp Stupak, an 8-week summer camp, served 100 children per day.

o Alternative Education, aimed at at-risk high school students, served 70
students per year.

o Boy Scouts, which provides traditional scouting experiences with an
urban focus that emphasizes self-esteem and mentoring, had between 24
and 28 boys participate in the local troop.

In West Las Vegas, the following service providers were funded:

o Community Health Centers, which provided early prenatal care to 140
women per month.

o Doolittle Community Center, which provided sports activities for nearly
1,000 women per year.

o Prince Hall, which provided training in manners and appropriate
behavior to 24 boys and 55 girls each year.

o The Austin Dancers, which provided encouragement for education and
appropriate behavior through dance with 10 boys and 20 girls receiving
instruction twice a week.

o The Variety Day Home, which provided day care services for 218
children between the ages of 6 months and 5 years. 

o Project Youth, which provided life skills training through outreach to
150 to 200 youths in their housing projects.

o Stealth Track Club, which provided mentoring and involvement in
neighborhood projects for 136 boys and girls by involving them in track
activities, including national-level competitions.

o HDD, also known as the "Dogcatchers," provided summer camp and
afterschool activities to more than 1,000 children each year and sponsored
12 boys' and 3 girls' basketball teams in 1997. 

o Committed 100 Men Helping Boys, which provided mentoring and role
models during 8- to 10-week sessions for 20 young men. 

Improvement in community services

Seeding participants have sought and received funding from the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development as well as the Nevada
Arts Council. Both Weed and Seed sites also received State of Nevada
juvenile justice funds and State family preservation and support funds. In
each of these instances, service providers received a request for proposal
(RFP) and need to prepare a funding proposal. Weed and Seed
administrators felt that the success of these providers in competing for
such funds was in some part a result of the requirement that seeding
participants go through an RFP process and receive training in proposal
preparation. 

5.8 Concluding Observations

One of the most important outcomes of the Weed and Seed effort in Las
Vegas was the involvement of law enforcement in seeding efforts. The
regular, supportive presence of police at seeding activities was perhaps the
single most remarkable aspect of the effort in Las Vegas. In particular, the
LVMPD command person on the task force was a visible presence at
nearly every seeding activity. This was noted by seeding personnel,
including safe haven coordinators and groups funded by seeding efforts,
and was an important factor contributing to the support of law
enforcement by seeding participants, and ultimately by neighborhood
residents. This was mirrored by the neighborhood community-oriented
patrols, whose members also became involved in seeding activities. For
example, a Back-to-School Fair, cohosted by the West Las Vegas Weed
and Seed site, drew substantial law enforcement participation and support.
Such support was not limited merely to attendance. Law enforcement
officers also became involved in trying to find jobs for program
participants, generate support in the local community, and participate in
programs. 

On the weeding side, the use of a high-level task force along with
community-oriented patrols appeared to bring favorable results in West
Las Vegas (as will be discussed further in section 6). The task force
targeted high-level offenders with long-term investigations, the kind that
routine neighborhood patrols cannot deal with effectively. The
neighborhood patrols provided the regular interaction and support of
citizens that cannot be achieved through a task force approach. This
combination of enforcement strategies was well thought out and provided
comprehensive and complementary forms of enforcement.

The use of Federal prosecution, especially for task force cases, was
another noteworthy lesson from the Las Vegas effort. Federal prosecutions
allowed for the commitment of more resources to high-profile cases and
typically resulted in convictions carrying longer sentences or a more
certain nature. In addition, the burden on local prosecution resulting from
additional law enforcement resources could be shared with another
agency. 

The use of community centers as safe haven sites also proved an effective
strategy for promoting participation in seeding activities. The community
centers conferred a certain degree of legitimacy to programs hosted there.
They also provided a ready-made clientele (of residents already served
through other activities based at the center), shortened start-up time, and
reduced costs. In addition, they were well-known to residents and typically
had a number of constituencies, including other program services.

6.0 Effects of Weed and Seed

This chapter examines the effects of the Weed and Seed program in Las
Vegas, with respect to:

o Rates of crime, as estimated through analysis of data provided by
LVMPD.

o Attitudes toward public safety, police responsiveness, and neighborhood
quality of life, as measured through a survey of residents in West Las
Vegas.

In both analyses that follow, the available data do not allow one to
attribute effects specifically to the Weed and Seed program. The findings
must therefore be interpreted as very preliminary indications of program
results. 

6.1 Analysis of Crime Data

This analysis uses police data to examine the trends in crime rates before
and after the implementation of Weed and Seed in Las Vegas. Of course,
any observed changes in crime rates in the target area during this time
period might reflect factors other than Weed and Seed. For instance,
changes in crime reporting may cause the reported crime rates to rise or
fall independently of any shift in true crime incidence. Changes in the
regional or national economic context may also affect local crime
trends, either favorably or unfavorably. Additionally, an observed
reduction in crime for the target area may occur through displacement of
crime to adjacent or nearby areas, where crime rates would
correspondingly rise.

Citywide, incident-level police data and geomapping methods were used
to track crime patterns in Las Vegas. The incident-level police data
identify each reported crime by its date and its street address. Geomapping
methods then enable one to associate each reported crime with a particular
geographic subarea within the city. For each subarea and specified time
period, one can then construct a crime rate in terms of crimes per 1,000
residents.

Of particular interest here is the comparison of crime rates between
Meadows Village, West Las Vegas, and all other areas of the city
combined. The rest-of-city jurisdiction provides a logical comparison area
to measure possible changes in local crime reporting, shifts in local
economic conditions or other contextual factors, and the possibility of
crime displacement. In evaluating Weed and Seed, it is also important to
align the data to examine whether any shift occurred after October 1994,
regarded as the start date of the city's Weed and Seed program.

Exhibit 6.1 compares average monthly Part 1 crime rates between
Meadows Village, West Las Vegas, and the rest-of-city area, as measured
over annual periods from October-September and expressed in terms of
crimes per 1,000 residents. For the year prior to Weed and Seed, October
1993-September 1994, the Part 1 crime rates for the two target areas were
much higher than the rest-of-city average--for Meadows Village, more
than twice as high.

The 2 years following implementation of Weed and Seed was a period
during which the crime rate remained stable in the rest-of-city area. In
Meadows Village, a first-year drop in the crime rate (from 17.2 to 16.0)
was more than offset by a second-year rise (to 18.8). In contrast, West Las
Vegas experienced a steady drop in its crime rate, first from 9.8 to 9.4 and
then to 9.2.

The two target areas clearly underwent differing experiences during the
early Weed and Seed years. For Meadows Village, one possible
interpretation is that initial weeding activity had a favorable impact on
crime, but these gains were reversed because weeding was not sustained
and seeding efforts never "took root." Given the transiency of this and
nearby neighborhoods, it is perhaps not surprising that a crackdown effort
would yield only short-term results at best. That is, briefly heightened
enforcement has little deterrent effect when one wave of perpetrators is
soon replaced by another. Similarly, if those who participate in seeding
efforts soon leave the community, there can be little lasting impact in
preventing crime.

In contrast, because the West Las Vegas area is a more stable population
with established community infrastructure, both weeding and seeding
activities could (and seemingly did) produce a more favorable result. It
may also reflect the fact that, as the second Weed and Seed area, West Las
Vegas stood to benefit from what city officials and program staff learned
from their initial experience in Meadows Village. Moreover, West Las
Vegas was the focus of additional resources not committed to Meadows
Village. These included the forms of non-Weed and Seed funding
mentioned in section 3.3, an additional community-oriented policing unit
(two, versus one in Meadows Village), and--perhaps more importantly--
the joint LVMPD-FBI task force devoted to antidrug enforcement in the
West Las Vegas community. 

The contrasting crime trends in the two target areas is displayed
graphically in exhibit 6.2, using monthly data for Part 1 crimes per 1,000
residents. Separately for Meadows Village, West Las Vegas, and the rest-
of-city area, the exhibit shows the monthly Part 1 crime rate and a fitted
curve that reflects historical trends from January 1993 through December
1996.

This exhibit shows how the Meadows Village crime rate increasingly
diverged upward from the relatively stable rest-of-city rate. Over the same
time period, the West Las Vegas crime rate has moved toward
convergence with the lower, rest-of-city rate. 

Exhibit 6.2 shows the month-to-month volatility of the crime rate,
especially for a relatively small community such as Meadows Village.
Note that the fitted curve for Meadows Village does not capture the
downturn in this area's crime rate that occurred in late 1996. If this latter
trend indeed continued into 1997, the previously described divergence
from the rest-of-city area may have been only a short-lived pattern.

6.2 Survey of Community Residents

Survey methods used in 1995 and 1997

In Las Vegas, as in the other seven cities participating in the national
evaluation, a survey of target area residents was conducted at two separate
time intervals. During March-July 1995, the Institute for Social Analysis
conducted a total of 1,531 interviews among the eight sites. In December
1997-January 1998, Abt Associates Inc. conducted a total of 1,995
interviews with a separate group of residents in the same eight target areas.
The following discussion refers to these data collection efforts as the 1995
and 1997 surveys.

General survey design and operations

The objective of the survey data collection and analysis was to measure
changes in citizens' awareness of the Weed and Seed program and their
opinions about police activity, crime, public safety, and the general quality
of life in their neighborhoods. In the interest of comparing the findings
obtained from the two surveys, the 1997 survey was designed with the
following features:

o For each site, the geographical boundaries of the survey area were the
same as in 1995.

o The wording of questions from the 1995 survey was retained verbatim in
1997. For selected questions, additional response categories were added in
1997 to provide a more complete range of possible responses. For these
items, care was taken in the analysis to aggregate responses in ways that
would preserve the comparability of the findings between 1995 and
1997.[11]

There were also some notable differences in the methods used in the two
surveys, as follows: 

o The 1995 survey consisted of inperson interviews, based on city-
provided address lists. The 1997 interviews were conducted by telephone,
based on listed telephone numbers for residential addresses within the
survey area.

o The 1995 survey consisted of 83 substantive items. The 1997 survey
included only a subset of these, 31 substantive items. (For both surveys,
the count excludes items related to respondent demographic characteristics
and other basic interview data.) The 1995 interviews required 30 to 40
minutes. The 1997 interviews typically lasted 12 to 15 minutes.

The decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone interviewing and a
shortened instrument was based on the difficulties experienced in 1995 in
completing the targeted number of 400 interviews per site. (In none of the
sites was this target reached.) The 1997 survey design called for 300
completed interviews per site.

Survey details specific to the Las Vegas site

For Las Vegas, the survey area in both 1995 and 1997 was West Las
Vegas. The 1995 survey was conducted during April-June 1995, with 246
completed interviews. The 1997 survey was conducted during December
1997-January 1998, with 300 completed interviews. Note that both
surveys occurred after the date considered here as the start date for the
Weed and Seed program in Las Vegas, October 1994.

Survey findings

The findings from the interviews conducted in Las Vegas in 1995 and
1997 are shown in exhibits 6.3 through 6.9 and are discussed below.

Demographic characteristics of survey respondents (Exhibit 6.3)

The average age of respondents was 47 and 50 years in 1995 and 1997,
respectively. The employment status of 1997 respondents was better in
comparison to those interviewed in 1995, with 41 percent working full
time in 1997 versus 20 percent in 1995. Additionally, the percentage of
respondents reporting themselves as unemployed was lower in 1997 (8
percent) than in 1995 (14 percent).

Childless households accounted for 49 and 66 percent of respondents in
1995 and 1997, respectively. Households containing 3 or more children
decreased from 23 percent in 1995 to 10 percent in 1997. The distribution
of respondents with respect to the number of adults in the household was
very similar in the two surveys; the proportion of respondent households
with 1 or 2 adults was 72 percent in 1995 and 76 percent in 1997.

The ethnic and gender distribution of respondents differed little in 1997
from 1995. Blacks made up 82 percent of respondents in 1995 and 78
percent in 1997. Respondents were disproportionately female in both
surveys, 59 percent in 1995 and 57 percent in 1997.

Perceptions of the neighborhood (Exhibit 6.4)

There was no significant difference between the responses from the 1995
and 1997 samples with respect to either the general satisfaction of
residents with their neighborhood "as a place to live" or the extent to
which residents felt safe out alone during the day. Respondents did feel
somewhat safer after dark in 1997 than in 1995. The 1997 respondents
were also more likely than those in 1995 to indicate that their
neighborhood had become a better place to live in the past 2 years--28
percent in 1997 versus 21 percent in 1995. Among the remaining
questions in this portion of the survey, there was a significant difference
between the two samples in perceptions of burglary and violent crime;
residents were less likely in 1997 than in 1995 to regard either as a "big
problem." 

Victimization (Exhibit 6.5)

Reported victimization was significantly lower the 1997 respondents
compared to the 1995 respondents for robbery, personal assault, and
assault with a weapon. There was no significant difference between the
responses for the two survey samples with respect to burglary
victimization.

Police response (Exhibit 6.6)

There were significant differences in the responses for 1997 (versus 1995)
in residents' perceptions of police effectiveness in controlling the street
sale and use of illegal drugs. With respect to visible police presence in the
neighborhood, residents were less likely in 1997 to report having observed
police officers "walking around or standing on patrol" or "chatting/having
a friendly conversation with people in the neighborhood." There was,
however, a significant difference in the perceptions of general police
responsiveness to community concerns. Those regarding the police as
"very responsive" constituted 37 percent of respondents in 1997, compared
to 26 percent in 1995.

One possible interpretation of these seemingly contradictory findings is
that the perceived presence of police in the neighborhood is a result of
both proactive and reactive police activity. Even if the proactive police
presence is greater--as one expects with community policing--the overall
perceived police presence may decline, with fewer calls for service.
Residents might then regard the police as more responsive, even though
the police are not as visible in the neighborhood.

Community involvement (Exhibit 6.7)

The reported community involvement among West Las Vegas residents
was significantly higher among the 1997 respondents than among the 1995
respondents, in all areas addressed by both surveys. This included
attendance or participation in antidrug rallies, vigils, and marches (an
increase from 2 percent to 8 percent), citizen patrols (an increase from 5
percent to 10 percent), neighborhood watch programs (an increase from 12
percent to 20 percent), and neighborhood cleanup projects (an increase
from 18 percent to 27 percent in 1997).

Perceptions of social services and other programs (Exhibit 6.8)

Compared to their 1995 counterparts, the 1997 respondents reported
significantly higher satisfaction with all categories of social services and
other programs addressed in the surveys. The percentage indicating that
they were "very satisfied" increased from 20 percent to 30 percent
between1995 and 1997 with respect to the availability of sports,
recreation, and other programs for youths; drug treatment services
increased from 7 percent to 18 percent, and satisfaction with job
opportunities grew from 9 percent to 18 percent.

Perceptions of the Weed and Seed program (Exhibit 6.9)

The 1997 survey showed a significant increase in name recognition for the
Weed and Seed program (53 percent versus 22 percent in 1995). Among
the 1997 respondents, however, there was relatively low recognition of
particular neighborhood-specific programs. Only 15 percent were aware of
the Las Vegas Stealth Track Club, and only 17 percent had heard of Prince
Hall Masonic Youth Group. Finally, 35 percent of the 1997 respondents
were familiar with the Austin Dancers performing arts group.

7.0 Future Directions and Degree of Institutionalization

Given the political turmoil and organizational instability that has marked
Las Vegas' experience with the Weed and Seed program, it is to the credit
of those implementing the weeding and seeding activities that the program
appears to have contributed to some favorable outcomes. In particular, as
described in section 6, both the police data and survey data for West Las
Vegas indicate some reduction in Part 1 crimes (relative to the rest of the
city) and improved perceptions of public safety and police responsiveness.
Meadows Village has not shown any similar reduction in crime, perhaps
reflecting the profound challenges to law enforcement and social services
presented by a highly transient neighborhood, one substantially populated
by foreign-born residents with limited literacy and language skills.

In both target areas, however, program participants have reported
improvements in the their quality of life, in terms of new-found personal
efficacy and increased social capital. These outcomes can be seen most
clearly in improved life skills, language proficiency, and job readiness.
Community leaders reported significantly improved neighborhood housing
conditions and increased willingness of residents to report illegal activity.
"Troubled" properties, locations where drugs were openly sold, have been
more effectively targeted by the police. Weeding participants have
provided input to the Las Vegas Housing Authority regarding design
features for enhancing safety. These recommendations are being
implemented in the Weeks Plaza housing project and include controlled
access, license plate checks, security fences, and other measures. 

There are many ironies in the Las Vegas experience. On the one hand, the
city's program had a number of features that would normally point to
success--strong early support from the city, a committed joint task force to
plan and implement weeding activities in West Las Vegas, a combination
of high-level enforcement efforts ranging from active Federal prosecution
to community-oriented police patrols, police involvement in neighborhood
seeding efforts, and competent staff in key positions, including the
program manager and safe haven coordinators. Indeed, the program was
slated for national recognition by the Executive Office for Weed and Seed,
and the city applied to become a national training site.

On the other hand, the program has been plagued by a lack of consensus
and leadership at higher levels. The senior staff within the city government
were perceived by those overseeing the program as unable to effectively
handle the necessary fiscal and administrative arrangements. The city's
decision to withdraw as the fiscal agent for Weed and Seed, and the
subsequent inability of the University of Nevada-Reno to assume this
responsibility, caused disruptions in funding and the delivery of services
and distracted the attention of the steering committee and program
administrative staff.

This experience may suggest the need for greater Federal oversight of
local fiscal management, and perhaps even some greater degree of Federal
fiscal control. Although either approach would violate the local control
principle that guides Weed and Seed, closer Federal monitoring and
possible direct assistance may be appropriate in some situations. At a
minimum, effective Federal oversight requires sensitivity to the
administrative capacities within the local government, with attention to
early warning signals that may indicate program distress and may
sometimes call for a more active Federal role.

After the timeframe for completion of this case study, additional changes
to the Weed and Seed program in Las Vegas were discussed among the
key local actors and the staff of the U.S. Attorney's Office and EOWS. The
options included the administration of the program through a newly
created tax-exempt organization. Information was requested regarding
these plans, but none was provided. The specific nature of the changes and
their potential for restoring stability to program funding and oversight
were thus unclear.

Notes

1. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, "Operation Weed and Seed
Implementation Manual," p. 2-1.

2. The National Performance Review Task Force (now renamed the
National Partnership for Reinventing Government) designated a number of
governmental organizations or activities as National Performance Review
Laboratories (now Reinvention Laboratories) to test "reinventing
government" initiatives. These labs have developed more efficient ways of
delivering government services by creating new partnerships between
entities, streamlining bureaucratic processes, and empowering
organizations to make substantial changes. The mission of the Weed and
Seed Reinvention Laboratory is to develop more effective mechanisms
that combine and deliver Federal, State, and local resources in Weed and
Seed sites.

3. This report does not address the Weed and Seed program activities in
North Las Vegas.

4. The neighborhood is bounded by Industrial Road on the west,
Commerce/Las Vegas Boulevard on the east, Oakey on the north, and
Sahara on the south. It is contained wholly within census tract 11.

5. The West Las Vegas neighborhood is bounded by Comstock Street,
Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, Interstate Highway 15, and the Oran K.
Gragson Highway. It includes census tracts 30.1, 30.2, and 35.

6. This crime measure includes four categories of violent crime--homicide,
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault--and three categories of property
crime--burglary, larceny, and auto theft. 

7.A decision on the future structure of the Las Vegas Weed and Seed
operation has not been made. EOWS recommended the re-introduction of
a large steering committee, similar to that which functioned during the
first several years of the grant. In addition, EOWS provided technical
assistance in forging a new management structure, and a "Vision 2003"
strategic planning committee was appointed to oversee the implementation
of a reorganization plan recommended by an EOWS-funded consultant. At
this time, it is unclear whether the structural problems that have surfaced
in Las Vegas will ultimately hinder the ability of the program to continue
to provide effective Weed and Seed interventions.

8. In FY 1997, task force members provided training for officers in Reno,
Nevada, as they attempted to develop and implement a Weed and Seed
task force.

9. In subsequent communications with the Office of Federal, State, and
Local Initiatives, the director indicated that:

It was through attendance at a steering committee meeting that the city
first learned that the Weed and Seed initiative might not receive funding to
continue its programming beyond the 3-year demonstration period. Based
upon this information, the city manager indicated that unless the
Department of Justice (DOJ) continued to fund this project, the city would
not continue as grantee. The mayor was made aware of the possible loss of
funding by the city manager and indicated that unless funding was
available from DOJ, the city's general fund could not continue as grantee
of the Weed and Seed program.

10. These crimes most often include drug sales and gang activity but have
been extended to weapons possession and use, as well as other forms of
violent crime.

11. For example, in questions on "how good a job are the police doing" in
different aspects of law enforcement, the 1995 survey allowed the
respondent to indicate "a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor
job." The 1997 survey also allowed the respondent to indicate "a very poor
job." The findings below have aggregated the "poor job" and "very poor
job" responses for 1997 before comparing the pattern of responses with
1995. 

-------------------------------

About the National Institute of Justice 

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a component of the Office of
Justice Programs, is the research agency of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as
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