Board of Contract Appeals
                 General Services Administration
                      Washington, D.C. 20405

                                                                                                                             

          APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED;
         RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION GRANTED;
   GSBCA 16504 MODIFIED ON RECONSIDERATION: September 30, 2005
                                                                                                                             

                      GSBCA 16504-R, 16610-R

                ADVANCED INJECTION MOLDING, INC.,

                                             Appellant,

                                v.

                 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,

                                             Respondent.

     Douglas Lund, President of Advanced Injection Molding, Inc., Forest Grove, OR,
appearing for Appellant.

     Michael J. Noble, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,
Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.

Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), NEILL, and GOODMAN.

DANIELS, Board Judge.

     Both parties have moved for reconsideration of the Board's decision in Advanced
Injection Molding, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 16504, et al. (July 21,
2005).  In that decision, the Board resolved a claim made by the General Services
Administration (GSA) in a case docketed as GSBCA 16504, as well as three claims made by
the contractor, Advanced Injection Molding, Inc. (AIM), in a case docketed as GSBCA
16610.  In GSBCA 16504, the Board held that GSA erroneously had paid more money than
provided by contract for signs manufactured by AIM, and that GSA was entitled to recover
from AIM the amount of the overpayments.  In GSBCA 16610, the Board denied AIM's
three claims   that GSA had "wrongfully auctioned off" AIM's contract by awarding
purchase orders to another vendor, violated the minimum order limitation of the contract by
issuing purchase orders in dollar amounts of less than a certain figure, and damaged AIM's
ability to obtain credit by making a claim for a refund of the overpayments.

     AIM has moved for reconsideration of the Board's decision on the ground that the
decision was based on "misstatements of . . . facts" by GSA.  Those misstatements, according
to AIM, were "inaccurate, false and misrepresented what actually occurred."  AIM has also
asked for additional discovery regarding the actions addressed in the alleged misstatements.

     GSA has moved for reconsideration of the decision as to GSBCA 16504 on the
ground that the Board has erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Government was
not entitled to interest on the portion of its claim which was upheld.

     AIM's motion is denied.  In resolving the cases, the Board accepted statements made
in a declaration by a GSA contract specialist regarding the insertion, into purchase orders
issued to AIM, of prices different from those required by the contract.  AIM presented legal
argument, but no evidence, challenging these statements.  The Board found the statements,
uncontroverted as they were, to be credible.  In asking for reconsideration, AIM has not
pointed to any evidence, in the record or newly discovered, as reason for altering this finding. 
With particular reference to one of its own claims, regarding the issuance of the purchase
orders to another vendor, AIM did present an affidavit of its president that the issuance of
these purchase orders "violated that contract" between GSA and AIM.  This statement is
legal argument, not evidence, and cannot serve as the basis of any finding.

     In asking for additional discovery, AIM ignores the fact that it agreed to a schedule
for resolving the cases which ended discovery at a particular time and envisioned what came
to pass   resolution through a decision rendered on the basis of evidence submitted by both
parties.  The time for discovery is long past.  In any event, the principal concern as to which
AIM seeks more information   the cause of the insertion of the incorrect prices into the
purchase orders   is not important to the resolution of the Government claim.  What is
important is that the prices were incorrect, and that as a result of their insertion, AIM was
overpaid for the signs it supplied.  Any additional information would not change the outcome
of the cases.

     GSA's motion is atypical in that it is not founded on any of the usual bases for asking
for reconsideration of a decision.  See Rules 132, 133 (48 CFR 6101.32, .33 (2004)). 
Nevertheless, it deserves serious attention.  In evaluating a request for reconsideration, a
tribunal must "strike a delicate balance between two countervailing impulses: the desire to
preserve the finality of judgments and the incessant command of the [tribunal's] conscience
that justice be done in light of all the facts."  Koll Construction Co. v. General Services
Administration, GSBCA 12306-R, 94-2 BCA   26,599, at 132,344 (1993) (quoting Seven
Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  "Reconsideration is always appropriate where the tribunal is convinced that
correcting the original decision may be necessary to avoid a manifest injustice."  Twigg Corp.
v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14639-R, 99-1 BCA   30,310, at 149,877.  The
tribunal would be so convinced where the movant "point[s] to controlling decisions or data
that the [tribunal] overlooked   matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected
to alter the conclusions reach[ed] by the [tribunal]."  Rowe, Inc. v. General Services
Administration, GSBCA 15217-R, 03-1 BCA   32,215, at 159,328-29 (quoting Shrader v.
CSX Transportation, Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)).  We grant GSA's motion
because the agency has persuaded us, by pointing to controlling law, that an injustice will
occur if we allow our original decision to remain uncorrected as to the matter of interest
owed by AIM.

     Earlier, GSA asked the Board to award it interest on the amount we required AIM to
refund to the Government, but the agency cited no authority which would empower us to
make the award.  Neither the contract between the parties nor the Contract Disputes Act of
1978, 41 U.S.C.    601-613 (2000), under which we decided these cases, requires the
contractor to pay interest on a refund of an overpayment.  We were unable to find a provision
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which mandated the payment of interest, either. 
Consequently,  we did not award any interest on the amount of the Government claim which
we found to be justified.

     In asking for reconsideration, GSA asserts that the Board is obliged to recognize the
Government's right to interest under by the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C.   3717. 
We agree.

     As the Supreme Court explained many years ago, "A suit upon a contractual
obligation to pay money at a fixed or ascertainable time is a suit to recover damage for its
breach, including both the principal amount and interest by way of damage for delay in
payment of the principal after the due date."  Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S.
289, 295-96 (1941) (emphasis added).  Thus, "It is a 'longstanding rule that parties owing
debts to the Federal Government must pay prejudgment interest where the underlying claim
is a contractual obligation to pay money.'"  United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 533 (1993)
(quoting West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 (1987)).

     In the Debt Collection Act, Congress provided that "[t]he head of an executive,
judicial, or legislative agency shall charge a minimum annual rate of interest on an
outstanding debt on a United States Government claim owed by a person."  31 U.S.C. 
 3717(a)(1).  The term "debt," as used in this section, is synonymous with "claim" and means
"any amount of funds or property that has been determined by an appropriate official of the
Federal Government to be owed to the United States by a person, organization, or entity other
than another Federal agency."  Id.   3701(b)(1).  A "claim" specifically includes "over-
payments."  Id.   3701(b)(1)(C).  The Supreme Court has commented that in writing the law
as it did, "Congress . . . tightened the screws, so to speak, on the prejudgment interest
obligations of private debtors to the Government" by "requir[ing] federal agencies to collect
prejudgment interest against persons."  United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 536, 537; see also
S. Rep. No. 97-378, at 17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3377, 3393 (noting that
a purpose of the interest provision of the Debt Collection Act was to force agencies to assess
and collect interest on debts owed to the Government); 3 General Accounting Office,
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, ch. 13,   4 (2d ed. 1994) (relating generally to the
impact of the Debt Collection Act on the collection of interest on Government claims).

     The Board found in its original decision as to GSBCA 16504 that AIM owes GSA a
debt in the principal amount of $52,157.48, the sum by which the agency overpaid the
contractor for the signs it purchased.  The debt was originally asserted by a GSA contracting
officer.  The FAR specifies that a contracting officer is a "responsible official" for
"ascertaining and collecting [the Government's] contract debts [and] charging interest on the
debts."  48 CFR 32.600, .601.  A contracting officer is therefore "an appropriate official of
the Federal Government" for the purpose of determining that funds are owed to the
Government, to use the phraseology of the Debt Collection Act.  AIM is an "entity other than
another Federal agency," so its debt is encompassed by that Act.  Interest under the Act
"accrues from the date . . . notice of the amount due is first mailed to the debtor," 31 U.S.C. 
 3717(b)(2)   here, the date of the contracting officer's decision, June 24, 2004.  The
"minimum annual rate of interest" to be paid on the debt "is equal to the average investment
rate for the Treasury tax and loan accounts for the 12-month period ending on September 30
of each year, rounded to the nearest whole percentage point."  Id.   3717(a)(1).  The Secretary
of the Treasury establishes this rate periodically.  Id.   3717(a)(1), (2).

     We note that generally, Government contracts include a clause which mandates that
the contractor pay interest on amounts due to the Government at rates established under the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978.  48 CFR 32.614-1(a), 52.232-17.  Where this clause is
included in the contract, the clause   and not the Debt Collection Act   is the authority for
the Government to assess and collect interest due.  Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. United
States, 52 Fed. Cl. 567, 584-87 (2002) (applying 31 U.S.C.   3717(g)(1)).  Inclusion of the
clause in contracts like the one between GSA and AIM, which are for the acquisition of
commercial items, is discretionary, however, and the clause is not a part of this contract.  48
CFR 12.301(d), (e); Appeal File, Exhibit 11 at 18-20.  Nevertheless, having upheld the
contracting officer's determination of AIM's debt to GSA in the amount of $52,157.48, we
acknowledge the Government's right to interest on that amount pursuant to the Debt
Collection Act.

                             Decision

     AIM's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.  GSA's motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED.  Our decision is MODIFIED ON RECONSIDERATION to recognize that
in GSBCA 16504, GSA is entitled to interest on the principal amount of $52,157.48.  Interest
is due in an amount calculated from June 24, 2004, to the date of payment, at the rate or rates
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury under the Debt Collection Act of 1982.

                                   _________________________
                                   STEPHEN M. DANIELS
                                   Board Judge

We concur:

_________________________               _________________________
EDWIN B. NEILL                     ALLAN H. GOODMAN
Board Judge                             Board Judge