TITLE: Visibility and Vigilance: Metro's Situational Approach to Preventing Subway Crime.
SERIES: NIJ Research in Brief
AUTHOR: Nancy G. LaVigne
DATE: November 1997
PAGES: 20
BYTES:38,686
SUBJECT: crime prevention through environmental design


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National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis, Director

Research in Brief

November 1997
-----------------------------------------------------

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: How the design, management, and
maintenance characteristics of Metro, Washington, D.C.'s
subway system, have contributed to the system's safety and
appearance.

Key issues: Washington's subway system is recognized for
its unusually low crime rates. To determine whether Metro's
environment is responsible for its low crime rates, Metro's
design characteristics were reviewed and Metro's
management and maintenance policies were assessed to
observe the extent to which they embody situational crime
prevention measures that both theory and practice suggest
would be successful.

Key findings: Some of the factors found to contribute to
Metro's success include:

o High, arched ceilings that not only are architecturally
sound and aesthetically pleasing but also create a feeling of
openness that reduces passenger fears and provides them
with an open view of the station. Additionally, long and
winding corridors and corners were avoided to reduce
shadows and nooks that criminals and panhandlers could
occupy.

o A system that allows passengers to buy multiple-use
farecards in any dollar amount, cutting down the time
money is exposed to pickpockets and robbers. Farecards
also must be used on entry and exit from the system,
reducing the likelihood of fare evasion.

o Metro trains are equipped with graffiti- and
vandal-resistant materials to discourage potential offenders.
When graffiti artists or vandals do cause damage,
maintenance workers clean and repair damaged property
promptly.

o No public restrooms, lockers, or excess seats for potential
offenders to loiter. Fast food establishments are prohibited
because customers generate litter and provide victims for
robbers and pickpockets.

o Enforcement of "quality of life" violations, such as
smoking or eating on trains, and prompt reporting of all
vandalism and graffiti to maintenance personnel to ensure a
safe and clean environment.

o Continuously staffed entrance kiosks while Metro is open.
Station attendants are aided by closed-circuit televisions at
all unmanned entrances, tunnels, and platforms, and they
carry two-way radios to report crime and maintenance
problems.

Metro's crime rates have been stable and are a fraction of
those experienced by the subway systems in Atlanta,
Boston, and Chicago. Applying Metro's design,
maintenance, and crime prevention strategies may help new
or existing systems reduce crime in their subway stations.

Target audience: Urban planners, architects, criminologists,
transit police, and researchers.
 
----------------------------------------------------

Visibility and Vigilance: Metro's Situational Approach to
Preventing Subway Crime

by Nancy G. La Vigne



Washington, D.C.'s subway system (Metro) has experienced
lower than expected crime rates since its inception in 1976.
The case study reported here suggests that Metro's relative
safety, compared with mass transit systems in similar urban
areas, may be attributable to a combination of design
characteristics, management practices, and maintenance
policies that incorporate principles of situational crime
prevention and crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED).

This Research in Brief identifies factors in Metro's
environment that are consistent with situational crime
prevention,[1] which aims to reduce criminal opportunities
by:

o Increasing the perceived effort of offending.

o Increasing the perceived risk of offending.

o Decreasing the perceived reward of offending.

o Removing the "excuses" for offending  -- i.e., lax
conditions or attitudes that lead to criminality.

Results of analyses comparing Metro's crime statistics with
those of subway systems in Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago
are also presented. They reveal that crime rates in the Metro
system are generally lower and less variable than in
comparison systems. In addition, Metro's "in-ground" crime
rate is favorably contrasted to the above-ground rates at
each of its stations and the rates over time for the D.C.
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).

Methodological concerns

Demonstrating that Metro's environment explains its
unusually low crime rates, or even that Metro's crime rates
are unusually low, is not an easy task. Metro's design is
highly uniform from station to station, a characteristic that
Metro's architects deliberately planned to ensure that riders
could recognize and use the system with ease. (See
"Planning Metro.") The differences that do exist among
stations -- such as whether the station is elevated, the length
of the escalators, or whether the station connects two or
more lines -- are characteristics that are either unavoidable
due to construction restrictions or necessary to serve the
needs of Metro's ridership. Likewise, the maintenance of
Metro's stations is stringent throughout: Graffiti and litter
are removed within hours, lights are replaced promptly, and
structures damaged by vandalism or wear and tear are
removed or repaired immediately.

Metro's uniformity in design and maintenance, although
exemplary, nonetheless makes testing the impact these
variables might have on crime within Metro difficult: The
uniformity of design and maintenance variables from station
to station would yield little in the way of statistically
significant results. Given its design limitations, this study
required a series of tests that build upon one another. (See
exhibit 1.)

Situational crime prevention at Metro

Metro's environment has most of the opportunity-reducing
characteristics found in a recent compilation of situational
crime prevention techniques (see exhibit 2). These features
and their effectiveness are discussed below.

Increasing perceived effort. Metro characteristics that might
increase the perceived effort of offending include the
following:

o Target hardening. Metro's seats, windows, and fixtures
are constructed with materials resistant to graffiti writing
and vandalism to increase the effort associated with these
offenses. On Metro platforms, recessed walls and bars
installed in front of the walls discourage graffiti.[2]

o Controlling access. Because Metro's design limits the
number of stairways leading from street level to
underground stations, gaining entry to the system to commit
offenses requires more effort than would otherwise be the
case. Metro also closes during low-density (early morning)
hours. The risk of victimization is highest during off-peak
hours due to the absence of capable guardians (third parties)
to intervene; therefore, closing the Metro during these hours
reduces criminal opportunities.

o Deflecting offenders. Stations have escalators on both
ends of the platform to encourage passengers to occupy the
entire platform rather than congregating in the middle. This
design characteristic deflects pickpockets; the open
environment reduces jostling among passengers. In addition,
clear signage directing riders to the nearest exits and
transfer points as well as maps situated at exits, entrances,
and transfer locations reduce confusion and uncertainty
among riders, making them less vulnerable to
pickpocketing.

o Controlling facilitators of committing crime. Metro's
planners deliberately omitted public restrooms, luggage
lockers, and excess chairs and benches so that potential
offenders would not be encouraged to linger in the system
and assess their targets. Planners prohibited fast food
facilities to minimize robbery and pickpocket opportunities
and to decrease litter, thereby enhancing maintenance of a
clean environment.

Increasing perceived risks. Metro's entry and exit screening
policies, formal surveillance, employee surveillance, and
natural surveillance all contribute to Metro's appearance of a
high-risk place to commit crime.

Metro's automated fare collection system is designed to
reject counterfeit slugs and bills and to preclude the use of
one farecard by several passengers in succession, thus
increasing the risks of apprehension for fare evasion. Unlike
traditional token systems of older subways, farecards are
distance based and must be used on both entry and exit from
the system, increasing the risk of apprehension by 100
percent. The farecard system also allows passengers to
purchase cards of any dollar amount for multiple trips,
enabling them to reduce the frequency with which they
exchange cash for fares (thus exposing their wallets to
pickpockets).

Formal surveillance is achieved through Metro's transit
police, consisting of approximately 286 sworn officers and
officials. They are trained to be vigilant and to take
immediate action against "quality of life" violations by
making arrests and issuing citations.[3] Metro prohibits
riders from eating, drinking, smoking, playing radios,
transporting animals, or moving from one rail car to
another. These rules are clearly posted at the entrance to
and exit from the station platforms as well as on the rail cars
themselves, and they are stringently enforced by Metro
police. According to Angus B. MacLean, the first chief of
the Metro Transit Police, the transit police are so vigilant,
"Even today the word around town is, If you want to
commit crime, do it on the streets; you'll get caught doing it
downstairs'."[4] Transit police also have a role in
maintaining Metro's pristine environment. From the outset,
officers have been trained to report any maintenance
problems, such as burned-out lights, to the maintenance
department.[5]

Employee surveillance by station attendants supplements
formal surveillance of the system and contributes
significantly to Metro's safe environment. Metro stations are
staffed during all hours of rail operation. Attendants are
positioned in kiosks at the entrances to the platforms to
provide assistance to riders and keep an eye on potential
fare evaders.

All Metro stations have at least eight strategically placed
closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras so attendants can
monitor unstaffed entrances, tunnels, and platforms. CCTV
screens are located in each station attendant's kiosk to
increase employee surveillance, thereby increasing the risks
of apprehension.

Another key component of Metro's surveillance is its
communications system. All Metro employees, including
maintenance personnel, are equipped with two-way radios
so they can be located or alerted at any time.[6] In addition,
each rail car has passenger-to-operator intercoms to enable
passengers to alert drivers to dangerous situations or crimes
in progress. Blue light boxes containing emergency phones
and power-takedown buttons are located every 600 feet
along the right of way.

Employee surveillance is aided by Metro's design, which
was deliberately structured to ensure a high level of natural
surveillance. Metro's platforms are a uniform 600 feet long,
designed to accommodate a train of eight 75-foot-long cars.
The platforms have a minimal number of supporting
columns, which can provide cover for criminals. A high,
free-standing vaulted ceiling arches above the tracks, giving
the appearance of a wide-open design. These unobstructed
views also enable riders to observe goings-on as they wait
for trains.

Metro's natural surveillance characteristics include open
pathways to and from train railways that maximize natural
surveillance, thereby increasing the perceived risks of
committing crime. In addition, the trains are characterized
by a "straight through" design, enabling police to walk
freely between cars, thus increasing formal surveillance
capabilities. Metro's planners deliberately avoided long,
winding corridors and corners found in many older systems.
Such corners create shadows that could hide criminals and
serve as nooks that panhandlers and homeless people like to
occupy.[7]

Proper lighting also enhances natural surveillance. Lighting
within Metro is a minimum of one footcandle,[8] and all
new lighting is a minimum of two footcandles. Lighting is
recessed so it does not cast shadows. In addition, indented
walls provide greater reflection of light. As one of Metro's
original designers explained, the recessed lighting within the
high, arched ceilings was intended to "light the sky [and]
enhance the environment."[9]

Reducing anticipated rewards. Reducing the rewards of
crime can be as simple as removing the crime target or
reducing benefits or temptations associated with a particular
crime. In the case of Metro, the availability of public
telephones both within stations and immediately outside
enables riders to make pickup arrangements with a relative
or friend before boarding the train, thus reducing waiting
time within the system and the associated risk of
victimization.

Trains are strategically scheduled to minimize the time
riders are waiting on platforms, particularly during
off-hours. Such scheduling increases the chances of riders
arriving at stations just before trains depart. This reduces
opportunities for robberies by minimizing the time suitable
targets (riders waiting for trains) remain on the relatively
isolated platform.

Rewards of crime are also reduced through Metro's policy
of keeping the premises well maintained. Platforms, cars,
and corridors are free of litter; graffiti is removed within 24
hours; and vandalism damage is repaired promptly. These
actions diminish the psychic thrill for litterers, graffiti artists,
and vandals because neither they nor their friends are given
the chance to appreciate their work for long.[10]

Removing the excuses. Removing the excuses associated
with committing a crime is a new situational crime
prevention tenet,[11] based on the assumption that
individuals will be less likely to commit a crime if
prohibitions are clear or if public humiliation is the probable
result of a violation. Metro has established highly specific
and visible rules, with signage indicating proscribed
activities and violations. These rules, combined with the
"zero tolerance" enforcement approach adopted by transit
personnel, deter potential offenders by making them
accountable for any violations. A related means of removing
excuses is through "stimulating conscience," or evoking a
sense of guilt or shame associated with proscribed
behavior.[12] Metro uses its public address system for this
purpose; station managers broadcast public reprimands of
rule breakers.

Facilitating compliance with rules and laws is another
strategy that promotes personal accountability. For
example, Metro makes it difficult to justify littering by
placing an adequate number of trash receptacles and
newspaper recycling bins throughout each station. In
addition to facilitating compliance, an abundance of trash
receptacles helps transit employees to maintain a clean
environment, which may in turn promote a sense of
territoriality in law-abiding passengers and enhance their
willingness to intervene should the need arise.

Is Metro safer than one would expect?

Analyses comparing Metro's crime rates to those of the
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA),
the Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority (MBTA), and
the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) indicate that Metro's
crime rates are lower and that this difference is statistically
significant. Metro experiences far fewer serious crimes per
rider than comparison systems. 

Although data access difficulties precluded a detailed
comparison between Metro and a larger range of subway
systems, the systems examined are similar to Metro in size
and service area (see exhibit 1, footnote 2). But Metro's
crime rates are a small fraction of the other systems' (see
exhibit 3).[13] These data support the claim that Metro's
crime rates are unusually low.

Is Metro's safety explained by its environment?

An assessment of Metro's environment suggests that it has
the majority of opportunity-reducing characteristics
recommended by both crime prevention theory and practice.
The system is clean and well lit, affords favorable
circumstances for natural and employee surveillance, and is
characterized by strict enforcement of both rules and laws.

In addition to its environmental safeguards, Metro was
found to have stable crime rates over time, on a
station-by-station basis. This finding suggests that Metro's
environment also stable over time could be a powerful
explanation for the stability in crime rates. Thus,
environment cannot be eliminated from the list of potential
causal factors that might explain Metro's low crime
rates.[14]

Metro experiences less crime than one would expect given
the distribution of crime aboveground in the communities
Metro serves. With the exception of assaults, Metro's crime
rates by station do not covary with crime rates for the
census tracts where Metro stations are located. However,
the relationship between aboveground assaults by census
tract and belowground assaults in the Metro system is
positive and significant, suggesting that assaults may not be
as situationally influenced as other crime types.[15]

That offenders are less willing to perpetrate crimes on
Metro property than in the areas around Metro is also
supported by the fact that crime rates from station to station
vary less than rates among census tracts.[16] In addition, a
comparison of crime rates from 1983 through 1994 for
Metro (underground) and Washington, D.C. (above
ground), indicates that the two data sets do not covary,
again supporting the notion that Metro's crime rates are
independent of those occurring above ground. (See exhibit
4.)

Addressing rival hypotheses

It is probable that rival explanations exist that might
account, at least in part, for Metro's unusually low crime
rates, and these warrant attention. Some may argue, for
example, that Metro has such low crime rates because riders
do not represent a cross-section of Washington, D.C.'s
population; rather, they are predominantly white, middle- to
upper-middle-class working people. However, exhibit 5
indicates that Metro riders are less likely to be white, to
own their homes, and to be unemployed than the general
population in the D.C. SMSA.[17] They are also more
likely to be single, as indicated in exhibit 5.

These findings lend some validity to the argument that
Metro riders are more advantaged than the overall
Washington, D.C., SMSA population. However, the survey
did not include all riders living in areas that Metro currently
serves: It did not capture riders using Metro's Green Line
stations, which began operating in mid-1991 and were
expanded through 1993. These Green Line stations are
found in areas with lower income levels and higher
unemployment rates than most other Metro station
locations. In addition, the survey failed to capture two
important Metro rider subpopulations: tourists and persons
under age 18, such as high school and college students who
ride Metro to and from school. Although tourists are more
likely to be victims than offenders, students and youths in
general are more prone to offending than working people.

As an alternative to the ridership argument, an examination
could be made of the changes in crime rates as Metro
expanded its service area. Metro's unusually low crime rates
could be explained by the system's serving a very small area,
which is predominantly middle to upper middle class. This
argument became significantly less valid in 1991 when the
six stations on Metro's new Green Line began serving some
high-crime, inner-city points and southeast to Anacostia. By
the end of 1993, the Green Line was further extended
northwest to Greenbelt, adding another four stations.
However, an analysis of crime rates before and after this
additional construction does not indicate a significant
increase in crime rates for total crimes, Part 1 property
crimes, or Part 1 violent crimes.[18] 

More specifically, auto theft, pickpocketing, and assault
declined from 1989 to 1995, while robbery increased
slightly and grand larceny increased more markedly.[19]
These trends do not suggest a dramatic change in crime
following the addition of the Green Line, which can be
interpreted as further support for the hypothesis that Metro
has been relatively successful in insulating itself against
crime occurring above ground.

The ridership argument implies that those who ride the
subway regularly -- rather than the occasional, opportunistic
rider or the potential offender who loiters aboveground
without paying a fare and using the system -- are the same
people who are perpetrating crimes. Neither prior research
nor theory offers a basis to support or refute this notion.
The service area argument suggests that the type of people
who offend are in a racial minority, poor, uneducated, and
unemployed. The literature, however, does not universally
support such an argument.[20] The answer cannot be
gleaned from the data at hand, but these questions merit
further investigation in subsequent research on subway
crime.

Implications for theory and practice

Rival hypotheses excepted, the tests conducted for this
research, when considered in combination, generally support
the position that Metro is unusually safe and that something
unique exists about Metro's environment that explains its
low crime rates. Metro's design characteristics and
maintenance and management policies, which reflect
situational crime prevention principles, support the
hypothesis that what is special about Metro's environment is
that it reduces criminal opportunities. Metro's success
suggests that the environment can be manipulated to reduce
criminal opportunities. Further, it implies that potential
offenders weigh the risks of apprehension against the effort
and expected payoff and consider the presence of capable
guardians when weighing those risks.

Characteristics of Metro's environment, from design
elements to enforcement strategies, can be applied to new
or existing systems in an effort to reduce crime. Although
prior research indicates that the base rates of subway crime
are quite low and that individuals have a greater risk of
victimization above ground than below,[21] increasing
security on subway systems is an important public policy
objective. Fear of victimization has been found to be greater
underground than above.[22] 

Levels of passenger fear affect ridership and, therefore, have
widespread implications for urban policy, including issues of
traffic congestion and pollution created by alternative modes
of transportation, such as taxicabs, buses, and private
automobiles. These indirect costs not only affect the system
itself but also are ultimately translated into higher sales
taxes and cutbacks on governmental services. 

Thus, the benefits of implementing crime prevention tactics
on subways are far-reaching; reducing subway crime saves
money and increases revenues at the same time because
riders will be more willing to use the system. In an urban
area, the well-being of its subway system, in terms of low
crime rates and ample ridership, can affect the well-being of
the entire metropolitan area.

The fact that this study's hypotheses were supported with
the tests detailed above has important implications for crime
prevention. The majority of evaluations of crime prevention
efforts focus on interventions to address preexisting crime
problems, and these evaluations tend to study the impact of
an intervention over a relatively short time. Counter to this
typical approach to crime prevention evaluation, this study
enables researchers not only to determine the impact of a
comprehensive preventive effort created before a crime
problem occurred but also to assess the impact of these
measures over a significant period. Metro appears as
relatively crime-free today as the day it began operating in
1976. This is particularly impressive considering that
Washington, D.C., still ranks high in crime rates among
cities its size.

Further efforts to evaluate a mix of preventive measures
should be encouraged. In addition, studies of subway
offenders in terms of who they are, where they live, where
they commit their crimes, and what kinds of crime they
commit are needed if researchers and others are to truly
understand the nature and distribution of subway crime and
how it can be prevented.

-----------------------------------------------------

Nancy G. La Vigne, Ph.D., is director of the Crime
Mapping Research Center at the National Institute of
Justice. Her research areas incluce geographic analyses of
crime, situational crime prevention, and community
policing. This study was conducted under NIJ award
number 96-0022 (intramural).

-----------------------------------------------------

Notes

[1]. Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention:
Successful Case Studies, New York, New York: Harrow
and Heston, 1992, 1997.

[2]. Deiter, R.H., The Story of Metro: Transportation and
Politics in the Nation's Capital, Glendale, California:
Interurban Press, 1990; and Mooney, B., "Metro: Building
Rapid Rail Transit in the National Capital Region,"
transcript, Washington, D.C.: 1976.

[3]. Personal interview, June 14, 1994, Washington, D.C.,
with B.E. Morrow, then chief of the Metropolitan Transit
Police, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA).

[4]. Personal communication, September 13, 1995, with
Angus B. MacLean, former police chief, Metropolitan
Transit Police, WMATA.

[5]. Telephone interview, September 12, 1995, with John F.
Hyde, former deputy chief of the Metropolitan Transit
Police, WMATA.

[6]. Personal communication, September 13, 1995, with
Angus B. MacLean, former police chief, Transit Police,
WMATA.

[7]. Deiter, R.H., The Story of Metro: Transportation and
Politics in the Nation's Capital; and Mooney, B., "Metro:
Building Rapid Rail Transit in the National Capital Region."

[8]. A footcandle is a measure of illumination that equals
one lumen of light per square foot. Fennelly, L.J.,
Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention, 2d
ed., Stoneham, Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann,
1989.

[9]. Personal interview with Richard J. Bochner, supervisor,
Facilities and Planning Section, Office of Planning,
WMATA, May 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.; and personal
interview with Melvin Siegel, deputy director for
architecture, Office of Engineering and Architecture,
WMATA, May 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.

[10]. Sloan-Howitt, M., and G.L. Kelling, "Subway Graffiti
in New York City: 'Getting Up' vs. Meaning It and Cleaning
It,' " in R.V. Clarke (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention:
Successful Case Studies, New York, New York: Harrow
and Heston, 1992.

[11]. See Clarke, R.V., "Introduction," in R.V. Clarke (ed.),
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2d
ed., New York, New York: Harrow and Heston, 1997.

[12]. Ibid.

[13]. MARTA's coefficient of relative variation is smaller
than the three comparison systems, including Metro's
(although Metro's is smaller than CTA's and MBTA's). One
might speculate that MARTA's low coefficient is explained
by the same design characteristics that Metro possesses: the
system is relatively new, thus benefiting from more current
crime prevention measures, and the stations exhibit little
variation in design. An alternative possibility is that
variations in crime rates within subway systems may be
influenced by the land use of the place in which stations are
located, which may be more uniform in Atlanta than
Washington, D.C., Chicago, or Boston. This latter
hypothesis merits further 
investigation.

[14]. A further test of the implications of this stability would
be to compare Metro's year-to-year correlation coefficient
with that of other systems, which would indicate whether
such stability is a characteristic unique to Metro or common
to subway systems in general.

[15]. One explanation for the significant correlation between
assaults on Metro and those aboveground may be due to the
nature of the act itself. The genesis for an assault may
commence underground but actually take place
aboveground, or vice versa. Thus, it is possible that,
because assaults are less likely to begin and end in the same
location, the difference between crime settings is less
distinct to such offenders, and, therefore, the preventive
capabilities of Metro are less likely to influence offending
behavior.

[16]. Again, assaults are an exception to this finding. The
coefficient of variation for assaults is smaller by station than
by census tract, but it is not statistically significant, perhaps
because assaults are less place-specific than other crime
types.

[17]. See also La Vigne, N.G., Crime Prevention Through
the Design and Management of Built Environment: The
Case of the D.C. Metro, doctoral dissertation, Rutgers, The
State University of New Jersey, School of Criminal Justice,
Newark, New Jersey: 1996.

[18]. La Vigne, N.G., Crime Prevention Through the
Design and Management of Built Environment: The Case of
the D.C. Metro.

[19]. Ibid.

[20]. See Gabor, T., Everybody Does It!': Crime By The
Public, Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press,
1994.

[21]. Del Castillo, V., Fear of Crime in the New York City
Subway, doctoral dissertation, Fordham University,
Department of Sociology, New York, New York, 1992; and
Kenney, D.J., Crime, Fear, and the New York City
Subways: The Role of Citizen Action, New York, New
York: Praeger, 1987.

[22]. Wekerle, G.R., and C. Whitzman, Safe Cities:
Guidelines for Planning, Design, and Management, New
York, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1995; Levy,
N.J., Crime in New York City's Subways: A Study and
Analysis of Issues With Recommendations To Enhance
Safety and the Public's Perception of Safety Within the
Subway System, New York, New York: Senate
Transportation Committee, 1994; Kenney, D.J., Crime,
Fear, and the New York City Subways: The Role of Citizen
Action; and Schnell, J.B., A.J. Smith, K.R. Dimsdale, and
E.J. Thrasher, "Vandalism and Passenger Security: A Study
of Crime and Vandalism on Urban Mass Transit Systems in
the United States and Canada," Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1973.

-----------------------------------------------------

 Planning Metro

Metro's planners faced a multitude of concerns in designing
the rapid transportation system, not the least of which was
to ensure the safety and security of its passengers and the
residents living in areas serviced by the system. Concern
about passenger security was underscored by the fact that,
even in Metro's early planning stages in the 1960s,
Washington, D.C., had the tenth highest crime rate in the
country.[1]

The major players involved in Metro's planning included the
engineering firm of Deleuw, Cather & Co. and the
architectural firm of Harry M. Weese & Associates, both
based in Chicago. In the early 1970s, they were joined by
Angus B. MacLean, hired as the first chief of the Metro
Transit Police, and John F. Hyde, hired as deputy chief.
Both men contributed to the planning process during its
early stages to ensure that their security suggestions were
integrated into the architects' blueprints in a cost-efficient
and aesthetically pleasing manner.

Metro's architects and planners set out to design a system
that would deter criminals and make riders feel comfortable
and secure.[2] "We were dealing with a clean slate," said
Melvin Siegel, deputy director for architecture, Office of
Engineering and Architecture, Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority. "We didn't have many preconceived
notions that tended to prevail. Other subway architects and
designers tended to borrow directly from railroad
technology and design, which tends to lack creativity. We
had a creative committee [of fine arts] and a receptive
board."[3]

Metro's architects also were fortunate that many of their
efforts to create good architectural form -- one that was
structurally sound as well as free of embellishments -- also
promoted a secure environment. Instead of the tension
between aesthetics and security that is often observed with
target hardening and other design measures,[4] these two
factors were considered to make a "good marriage."[5] For
example, Metro's high, arched ceilings resolve some
structural requirements (the 600-foot platform requires high
ceilings) while also providing passengers with a feeling of
openness, thus reducing levels of fear.

Today, Metro consists of a route of 92 miles and 75
stations, with 8 more stations under construction; by early
2001, the total system will encompass 83 stations covering
103.06 miles. To reduce operating costs, Metro runs from
5:30 a.m. to midnight on weekdays and 8:00 a.m. to
midnight on weekends and holidays, when Metro services
are less likely to be used. Fares on Metro are distance
based, ranging from $1.10 to $3.25, and dependent on the
hours of travel, with rush-hour fares slightly more expensive
than off-peak fares.


[1]. Hyde, J.F., "CPTED Goes Underground," a
presentation made at the Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design Conference, Washington, D.C.,
December 10, 1993.

[2]. Personal interview with Melvin Siegel, deputy director
for architecture, Office of Engineering and Architecture,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA), May 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.; personal
interview with Richard J. Bochner, supervisor, Facilities and
Planning Section, Office of Planning, WMATA, May 21,
1995, Washington, D.C.; and telephone interview with John
F. Hyde, former deputy chief of the Metropolitan Transit
Police, WMATA, September 12, 1995.

[3]. Personal interview with Melvin Siegel, May 21, 1995,
Washington, D.C.

[4]. See Weidner, R., "Target-Hardening at a New York
City Subway Station: Decreased Fare Evasion At What
Price?," in R.V. Clarke (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol.
6., Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press, 1996.

[5]. Personal interview with Melvin Siegel, May 21, 1995,
Washington, D.C.

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Related Reading

Preventing Mass Transit Crime (Crime Prevention Studies,
vol. 6, Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press, 1996),
edited by Ronald V. Clarke, contains several chapters on
preventing crime in public transit settings. Below are the
chapter titles and authors.

Editorial Introduction: Crime and the Economics of Mass
Transit
Ronald V. Clarke

Redesigning Hell: Preventing Crime and Disorder at the
Port Authority Bus Terminal
Marcus Felson et al.

Eliminating Pay Phone Toll Fraud at the Port Authority Bus
Terminal in Manhattan
Gisela Bichler and Ronald V. Clarke

Target Hardening at a New York City Subway Station:
Decreased Fare Evasion -- at What Price?
Robert R. Weidner

Preventing Auto Theft in Suburban Vancouver Commuter
Lots: Effects of a Bike Patrol
Paul Barclay, Jennifer Buckley, Paul J. Brantingham,
Patricia L. Brantingham, and Terry Whinn-Yates

Safe Transport: Security by Design on the Washington
Metro
Nancy G. La Vigne

Designing for Security in Meteor: A Projected New Metro
Line in Paris
Marina L. Myhre and Fabien Rosso


Where Angel Fears to Tread: A Test in the New York City
Subway of the Robbery/Density Hypothesis
Ronald V. Clarke, Mathieu Belanger, and James A.
Eastman

The Environs of Rapid Transit Stations: A Focus for Street
Crime or Just Another Risky Place?
Richard Block and Sean Davis 

-----------------------------------------------------

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

-----------------------------------------------------

Author's acknowledgments: This Research in Brief would
not have been possible without the assistance of countless
individuals, the list of whom is too long to include here but
can be found in the document cited in endnote 17. In
particular, I would like to thank the Washington Area
Metropolitan Transit Authority, especially Chief Barry
McDevitt and the staff of the Metro Transit Police, for their
patience in responding to my countless requests for data and
information.

-----------------------------------------------------

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the
Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau
of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and
the Office for Victims of Crime.

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