DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD



December 2, 1993



MEMORANDUM FOR:     G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

COPIES:             Board Members

FROM:               D. Thompson
                    Senior Technical Specialist

SUBJECT:            Report on Rocky Flats Emergency Response
                    Exercise "Ready 93"


1.   Purpose:  This report documents DNFSB staff (and outside
     expert) observations made during the conduct of Emergency
     Preparedness Exercise Ready 93, which was conducted during the
     morning of October 27, 1993 by the DOE Rocky Flats Office
     (RFO) and the EG&G Company (EG&G).

2.   Summary:  Overall, DNFSB staff evaluators consider the
     exercise to have been successful.  However, there are a number
     of areas in which improvement is needed.  These include:

              The on-scene response team was slow in making its
               assessment of radiological hazards at the simulated
               accident scene.  Radiological Protection
               Technicians (RPT) were slow to respond to the scene
               of the simulated accident.  The Incident Commander
               (senior on-scene representative) was slow to
               request radiological data at the scene of the
               simulated accident, leading to delays in making
               needed information available to the Crisis Manager.

              Some questions exist with regard to habitability of
               the newly renovated Emergency Operations Center
               (EOC).  Specifically, the heating, ventilation, and
               air conditioning system for the building in which
               the EOC is located is not isolable, thus subjecting
               the EOC to the possibility of high level
               contamination under certain meteorological and
               accident source term conditions.  This situation is
               significant because there are no advance
               arrangements for an alternate location for the EOC. 
               RFO is aware of the problem, but has apparently
               encountered budgetary restrictions in attempting to
               resolve it.

              There is a need for continued emphasis on routine
               accident response practices, such as: proper use of
               personnel dosimetry and protective equipment;
               improved communications between dose assessors and
               decision makers; provision of clear, concise and
               timely information to responders and employees
               regarding the status of the accident and the
               response to it; effective use of available audio-
               visual equipment in the EOC; and the use of good
               contamination control practices by the field survey
               teams.

3.   Background:  Exercise Ready 93, an emergency preparedness
     exercise designed primarily to test the actions of members of
     RFO and EG&G response teams, was conducted during the morning
     of October 27, 1993 at the Rocky Flats Plant, near Boulder,
     Colorado.  DOE Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
     did not participate; a control cell, consisting of individual
     Headquarters personnel simulated Headquarters involvement; the
     State of Colorado participated to a limited degree.  Exercise
     Ready 93 was based on a simulated truck accident on the site,
     resulting in the dumping of approximately 3-5 kilograms of
     Plutonium-bearing incinerator ash.  Simulated source term and
     meteorological conditions led to projected doses exceeding
     prescribed Protective Action Levels (PAL), requiring the
     activation of the emergency response of EG&G and RFO to
     protect both on-site workers and off-site public.

     DNFSB staff evaluators utilized the Federal Emergency
     Management Agency (FEMA) evaluation methodology set forth in
     FEMA-REP-15,  "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise
     Evaluation Methodology", dated September 1991.

4.   Discussion/Observations:

     Specific objectives in nine subject areas, listed below, were
     identified by RFO and EG&G as goals for Exercise Ready 93. 
     Stated objectives were evaluated by DNFSB staff evaluators,
     except as noted in the detailed discussions in Attachment A. 
     Most of the objectives were satisfactorily achieved, although
     some minor deficiencies were noted.  The nature and extent of
     those deficiencies are set forth in Attachment A. 

              Notification and Mobilization
              Emergency Assessment, Classification, Command and
               Control, and Mitigation
              Emergency Response
              Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment
              Radiological Dose Assessments and Control
              Public Information
              Occupational Health Department Response
              Reentry and Recovery
              Exercise Scenario, Conduct and Control
          
5.   Future Staff Actions:

     The staff intends to review both the DOE-RFO and the EG&G
     evaluation reports, when they are issued, and will monitor the
     conduct of future emergency preparedness exercises.                          Attachment A

1.  Notification and Mobilization

Objective:          Demonstrate the
                    capability to alert and
                    fully mobilize personnel
                    for both emergency
                    facilities and field
                    operations in accordance
                    with the RFP Emergency
                    Preparedness Plan.

Discussion/Observations:

At the Rocky Flats Plant, a Plant Shift Superintendent is assigned
to the Emergency Operations Center 24 hours a day.  It is the Plant
Shift Superintendent's responsibility to initiate actions in
response to any unusual condition occurring during his tour of
duty, including responding to any on-site incident to serve as
Incident Commander at the scene.  Communications channels covering
the Fire and Security forces are monitored full-time, and
telephone, radio and extensive data processing devices are readily
available.

Exercise Ready 93 was initiated on October 27, 1993 by a 7:35 am
call from a passerby to the site 911 number.  The caller reported
a traffic accident involving an overturned truck, with several
overturned "white barrels" and powdery material spread on the
ground.  The Plant Shift Superintendent declared the incident as a
Site Area Emergency thereby activating the Emergency Operations
Center and initiating automated notification calls to members of
the Crisis Management Team and the Crisis Management Support Team.
The Plant Shift Superintendent departed for the accident scene at
7:39.

The first members of the Crisis Management Support Team arrived at
the Emergency Operations Center by 7:53; by 7:57, the Emergency
Response Organization was declared operational by the Crisis
Manager, the EG&G Deputy Manager.  He concurred in the earlier
Site Area Emergency declaration made by the Incident Commander, and
directed that a site-wide announcement of the emergency be made
with instructions to all employees to remain under cover until
further notice.

Responding units from the RFP Fire Department approached the
accident scene from downwind, thus exposing themselves and their
equipment to possible contamination.  They quickly recognized their
error and left the area to take a more circuitous route to permit
an approach from upwind, thus providing the means for wider
contamination.  Having made the initial mistake, the proper
reaction would have been to remain in place, recognizing that
additional movement of the vehicles would only make matters worse.

Mobilization of on-scene resources was generally good, with the
exception of a slow response from Radiological Protection
Technicians (RPT's).  The accident scene was within 100 yards of
the entrance to Building 371, from which a RPT team was available,
but the first RPT did not report to the accident scene until more
than 40 minutes after initiation of the exercise.  An additional
five RPT's responded about 15 minutes later.  Post-exercise
comments by controllers indicated that there may have been some
problem between Building 371 RPT's and Security Force members who
required the RPT's to remain sheltered for some period of time. 
The first portable air sampler arrived at the accident scene about
55 minutes into the exercise.

Designated Field Survey Team (FST) members were notified to report
to the dispatch point, in accordance with the RFP Emergency
Preparedness Plan, approximately 20 minutes after initiation of the
exercise.  The last FST member arrived approximately 18 minutes
later.  The first FST left the staging point approximately 30
minutes after the teams were notified to respond - slightly more
than 50 minutes after start of the exercise.  These times are
marginally acceptable.

FST responders observed that the staging point was in the simulated
plume, but took no action to relocate.  Staging of FST equipment
was done on the ground outside the trailer used as the pre-
designated FST staging point, despite awareness of the location in
the plume, resulting in simulated contamination of all the staged
equipment.  Some of the responders did not use respiratory
protection.  At least one FST was slow in wearing pocket
dosimeters; the same team noted high readings on their pocket
dosimeters when they were finally used, but made no move to rezero
them.

Workers in the buffer zone outside the plant perimeter at the time
the exercise was conducted were not notified to take cover,
according to a debriefing report of one of the RFP evaluators.  

DNFSB staff evaluators consider this objective to have been
achieved, but note that weaknesses exist in the timely and
effective mobilization of resources - both at the accident scene
and for off-site field surveys - and in radiation safety and
contamination control practices of responders.
 
2.  Emergency Assessment, Classification, Command and Control,
and Mitigation

Objectives:         a.  Demonstrate the
                    capability to properly
                    assess and classify an
                    emergency event, and
                    perform command and
                    control and mitigation
                    activities during
                    emergency operations.

               b.  Demonstrate the capability to
               make timely and appropriate
               protective action recommendations
               (PARs) to the State of Colorado.

Discussion/Observations:

The prompt declaration of the Site Area Emergency by the Plant
Shift Superintendent, and the endorsement of that declaration by
the Crisis Manager upon his arrival at the Emergency Operations
Center were proper and in accordance with the Emergency
Preparedness Plan.

By 8:07 am, the Crisis Manager had determined that the combination
of release of material that was likely to be radioactive (based on
the color of the drums involved and the spill on the ground) and
the prevailing meteorological conditions warranted upgrading the
seriousness of the incident to General Emergency, requiring
notification of off-site officials and dispatch of Field Survey
Teams.  He did make that declaration, initiated off-site
notifications and ordered an announcement over the site public
address system to that effect.

From the start of the exercise, the Crisis Manager was decisive,
confident, and forthcoming with information for the entire
Emergency Response Organization, using the EOC public address
system frequently to inform the team of the status of the emergency
and providing them with the basis for his decisions.  He also
arranged for frequent site-wide announcements concerning the
exercise, thus keeping the entire on-site work force aware of what
was happening.

Delays in gathering of radiological data from the accident scene,
and some initial communications problems involving the Field Survey
Teams led to frustration on the part of the Crisis Manager based on
his inability to obtain timely and accurate information on which to
base Protective Action Recommendations to the state and local
officials responsible for instituting protection of the off-site
public.  Despite these frustrations, the Crisis Manager acted
conservatively and in accordance with the RFP Emergency
Preparedness Plan, recommending to off-site officials that they
direct Take Cover actions for potentially affected members of the
public.

When radiological data became available from both the accident
scene and the off-site Field Survey Teams, the performance of the
Hazards Assessment Center team became more responsive, and hand
drawn sketches of the plume were presented to the Crisis Manager.
At no time during the exercise, however, were timely and accurate
isopleths or even general plume path information plotted on the
overlay maps available in the Crisis Management Team room.

No early action was taken to dispatch portable air sampling
equipment to the simulated accident scene, nor was air sampling
requested by the Incident Commander.  It was nearly an hour after
initiation of the exercise before air sampling at the accident
scene was begun.

FST members initiated air sampling in the vicinity of the pre-
designated staging point in timely fashion, and concluded they were
in the plume.  Programmable portable air sampling equipment
available and assigned to the FST's was not effectively utilized to
establish arrays to locate the plume off-site.  There appeared to
be a lack of coordination in the planning for the conduct of off-
site field surveys, with FST's passing one another on the road in
apparently random patterns.

DNFSB staff evaluators consider that the objective of demonstrating
the capability to perform command and control and mitigation
activities was achieved.  The objectives of demonstrating the
capability to properly assess and classify events and to make
timely and appropriate protective action recommendations were, at
best, only barely achieved.  Considerable improvement is called
for: (1) in the timely deployment of portable air sampling
equipment to the accident scene; (2) in control of the Field Survey
Teams; (3) at off-site locations; and (4) in the hazards assessment
function within the Emergency Operations Center.3.  Emergency Response

Objectives:         a.  Demonstrate the
                    capability to respond to
                    an emergency utilizing
                    appropriate equipment and
                    procedures for
                    determining field
                    radiation.

               b.  Demonstrate the capability and
               availability of resources required
               by the protective force to control
               traffic flow and access control.

               c.  Demonstrate timely evacuation
               and accountability for building and
               emergency response personnel, as
               required.

               d.  Demonstrate the capability to
               maintain EMO staffing on a
               continuous, 24-hour basis through an
               actual shift change. 

Discussion/Observations:

As noted in the discussion under Objective 1. above, the timeliness
of the response of designated members of the FST's was marginally
acceptable.  Equipment pre-designated for use by FST's was
appropriate, available and generally ready for use.  The initial
mistake of staging the equipment outdoors, and in the plume, was
never corrected nor ameliorated in any fashion, despite recognition
by presumably knowledgeable individuals that that error resulted in
contaminating the entire suite of equipment so staged.  FST members
appeared to be technically competent to perform their duties, but
the discipline of their own exposure and contamination control
measures was lax, at best.

Appropriate on-site protective action (Take Cover) was implemented
in timely fashion for workers not directly involved in the
emergency response.   DNFSB evaluators did not observe
accountability practices for non-involved employees.

At the accident scene, one of the simulations involved minor
injuries to the two people in the truck.  One of the victims was
unconscious at the time the Fire Department arrived on the scene
and the responding fireman encountered difficulty in determining
the condition of that victim, due to the impediments of his own
personnel protection (full-face respirator and heavy gloves).

During the initial on-scene response, the Incident Commander
removed his own respiratory protection in order to communicate
better, despite the fact that air samples to confirm the safety of
that action had not been performed.  The Incident Commander
remained without respiratory protection for about eight minutes
until a Fire Department officer prompted him to protect himself. 
At that time, the Incident Commander donned a half-face respirator
- unsuitable protection for protection against plutonium, which was
a likely constituent of the spillage.

DNFSB staff evaluators did not observe directly the involvement of
the RFP Security Forces in the response to the emergency, although
it was observed that security personnel had established traffic
control points to limit access to the accident site.  Based on that
limited observation, no assessment of whether or not that objective
was achieved is offered.

DNFSB evaluators were informed prior to the start of the exercise
that in the initial planning for Exercise 93, DOE-RFO planners
envisioned a somewhat broader and lengthier exercise.  It appears
that the objective of demonstrating the capability for extended
operation in the Emergency Operations Center may have been
desirable under that more ambitious scenario.  However, no
opportunity to demonstrate that capability was provided in the
final exercise.

DNFSB staff evaluators conclude that, in general, Objective 3.a.
was satisfactorily demonstrated, despite the disclosure of some
pronounced weaknesses in survey practices.  Objectives 3.b. and c.
were not observed in sufficient detail to determine the adequacy of
their demonstration.  Objective 3.d. was not demonstrated in this
exercise.4.  Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment

Objectives:         a.  Demonstrate the
                    adequacy of facilities,
                    equipment, displays, and
                    other materials to
                    support emergency
                    response.

               b.  Demonstrate the capability to
               communicate with appropriate
               emergency personnel at facilities
               and in the field.

Discussion/Observations:

The physical plant for the Emergency Operations Center at RFP has
been extensively modified recently; Ready 93 was the first exercise
conducted since the upgrading was completed.  As part of the
upgrade, the number of people assigned to the Crisis Management
Team was substantially reduced, and a new organizational element -
the Crisis Management Support Team - was established.

The support team room is located just outside the Crisis Management
Team space, with a large picture window separating the two.  The
seven-person Crisis Management Team is seated around one side of a
large conference table facing the window, thus overlooking the
support team room.  Each member of the Crisis Management Team is
supplied with reference material and appropriate communications
equipment.  The support team members (approximately 20 in number)
are seated at individual carrels, each supplied with reference
material and appropriate communications equipment.

Status information projection screens and television monitors are
placed strategically to permit all members of both the Crisis
Management Team and the support team to see them without
obstruction.  These display elements were used very effectively
throughout the exercise, with the exception of inadequate use of
the plume plotting capability discussed under Objective 2 above and
the failure to post closure actions against tasks logged onto the
task assignment board.  Rectifying the latter deficiency is
desirable to ensure that, once assigned to response organizations
for resolution, tasks are actually completed in reasonable time
frames; corrective action should be simply a matter of establishing
and following a standard operating procedure.

In contrast to the situation at several other emergency response
facilities, there is little pedestrian traffic between the two team
rooms described above.  This reduced traffic flow is made possible
by two full-time staff members assigned responsibility for the flow
of information to and from the Crisis Management Team: (1) a
liaison person working from a podium at the back of the Crisis
Management Team room, who acts as a highly qualified communicator
of information needs of the Crisis Management Team; and (2) an
experienced, senior EG&G manager assigned to supervise all
activities of the support team and to provide clear and concise
information to the Crisis Management Team.  The resulting reduction
in traffic and noise to distract the decision-makers was very
effective; participants were uniform in their post-exercise
endorsement of the changes.

The Hazards Assessment Center is a separate space within the
Emergency Operations Center where competent Radiological Protection
personnel assemble to calculate projected doses and to track any
plume from releases.  A very sophisticated computer model operates
24 hours a day in this space, monitoring actual meteorological data
frequently and averaging those data every few minutes, then
applying the result to a calculated maximum credible on-site
release of radioactive material, and plotting the resulting plume
path and isopleths on a real-time basis.  For purposes of
exercises, however, the operation of this model with real
meteorological data is temporarily suspended in order to insert
simulated data for control of any given exercise.  That was the
case for Exercise Ready 93, as well.

During the early portion of the exercise, radio communications
between the FST Coordinator and the teams were poor, apparently due
to some malfunction of the Coordinator's radio.  The problem was
corrected reasonably expeditiously, however.  Communications
protocol and discipline was somewhat lax initially, but improved
later.

A recurring problem prevalent during many emergency preparedness
exercises throughout the department - that of communications
between field and headquarters response elements - was observed to
only a limited extent during Exercise Ready 93.  It appears likely
that this was true because the DOE Headquarters Emergency
Operations Center was not activated for this exercise.  Instead,
Headquarters activities were only simulated through a control cell,
consisting of individual Headquarters staff members playing roles
sketched out in the exercise scenario.  These role players remained
at their normal work stations and directed questions and responses
to the RFP participants as though they were the full Headquarters
emergency response organization.

Within the RFP Crisis Management Team, one senior staff member was
assigned sole responsibility for communicating with state and local
representatives and with DOE Headquarters.  That individual, and a
DOE colleague assigned to the Colorado State EOC for liaison
purposes, were kept extremely busy during the exercise.  Both these
individuals were apparently adept at providing timely information
needed by these outside groups, avoiding diversion of the Crisis
Manager and other senior responders from their primary
responsibility for dealing directly with the real-time problems at
hand.  It was clear, however, from eavesdropping in the Crisis
Management Team Room on one side of several conversations, that it
was largely by dint of this individual's powers of persuasion and
his unwillingness to accede to what he perceived as unreasonable
demands, that callers were dissuaded from interjecting their
concerns on the Crisis Manager personally.

The intakes for the heating, ventilation and air conditioning
system serving the Emergency Operating Center cannot be isolated. 
This is a potential problem, since under certain source term and
meteorological conditions, the center could become sufficiently
contaminated that evacuation would be mandatory.  Since no advance
provision for an alternate location for the center has been made,
it is conceivable that, under these conditions, only ad hoc
management of an emergency might be possible.  DOE-RFO managers are
aware of this problem, which has not been resolved, apparently
because of budgetary considerations.

DNFSB staff evaluators consider that Objective 4.a. was
satisfactorily demonstrated, but point out the continuing
habitability issue and the lack of suitable arrangements for an
alternate location for the Emergency Operations Center.  With
regard to Objective 4.b., the evaluators consider that the
deficiencies observed during the early phase of dispatching field
survey teams were transitory in nature and do not reflect major
flaws in the preparedness status at RFP.  Thus, we conclude that
Objective 4.b. was also satisfactorily demonstrated. 5.  Radiological Dose Assessment and Control.

Objectives:         a.  Demonstrate the
                    capability to
                    continuously monitor and
                    control radiation
                    exposure to emergency
                    workers.

               b.  Demonstrate the capability to
               develop dose projections and
               protective action recommendations
               regarding worker and public safety.

               c.  Demonstrate the adequacy of
               procedures, facilities, equipment,
               and personnel in assessing radiation
               monitoring results and
               decontamination needs.

Discussion/Observations:

As noted in the discussion under Objective 1. above, RPT's were
slow in responding to the scene of the accident, and nearly an hour
passed before the first air samples were taken in the vicinity of
the spill.  Also as noted earlier, discipline regarding use of
respiratory protection was weak.  This weakness was also observed
among the FST's.

At the scene, nasal smears were taken at about 1 hours into the
exercise.  These smears were then placed in the middle of the road
surface near the accident scene, where they remained for the next
hour and a half.  They were moved only when it became necessary to
move a nearby truck.

The operation of the Hazard Assessment Center (HAC) staff was
impeded by early communications difficulties, not only between the
HAC and the Field Survey Teams, but also between the HAC and the
Crisis Management Team; e.g. a recommendation from the HAC to the
Crisis Manager to enlarge the coverage of the off-site Take Cover
zone was explicitly rejected by the Crisis Manager as technically
unsupported.

Appropriate procedures and equipment appeared to be in place, and
suitable numbers of personnel were available to provide for
assessment of radiation monitoring results and decontamination
needs.  DNFSB evaluators did not evaluate the qualifications of
these personnel, but did not note any indications of inadequate
training or capability.

Overall, DNFSB evaluators consider that Objective 5.a. was
achieved, but note that weaknesses were present both in the on-
scene response and in the self-protection practices of the FST's. 
Objective 5.b. was marginally achieved, with significant
improvement needed in the operation of the HAC; its communication
with and control of field personnel, both at an accident scene and
with off-site FST's; and in its responsiveness to and communication
with the Crisis Management Team.  Objective 5.c. was achieved, but
better discipline is called for in implementation of procedures and
practices.6.  Public Information

Objectives:         a.  Demonstrate the
                    capability to promptly
                    alert and notify the
                    public within the EPZ and
                    disseminate instructional
                    messages to the public on
                    the basis of decisions by
                    appropriate State and
                    local officials.

               b.  Demonstrate the capability to
               coordinate the development and
               dissemination of clear, accurate,
               and timely information to the news
               media and the public.

Discussion/Observations:

As noted in the discussion of Objective 1 above, the slow response
of Radiological Protection personnel led to delays in the
availability of technically accurate and complete information
regarding potentially affected off-site areas.  Nevertheless, the
actions prescribed in the RFP Emergency Preparedness Plan and the
decisions of the Incident Commander and Crisis Manager were
appropriate and conservative, leading to suitable Protective Action
Recommendations.

Because the scenario for Exercise Ready 93 included only limited
roles for state and local agencies, the objective of demonstrating
the capability to inform the public promptly and effectively of
appropriate protective actions could be only partially
demonstrated.

The Crisis Management Team generated and simulated transmission of
appropriate and timely notification messages to the news media. 
The State of Colorado did have personnel responding to exercise
messages sent to the State Emergency Operations Center, but there
was no state participation beyond that point, nor were real or
role-playing representatives of the news media actually involved in
the exercise.  The Joint Public Information Center was not
activated for Exercise Ready 93, apparently because of reluctance
of public information specialists in state and local jurisdictions
to participate.

Experience has shown that the dynamic interactions between exercise
participants and real or role-playing media and public
representatives is necessary in order to adequately demonstrate not
only transmission of messages, but also understanding of the same
messages by the receiving parties.  Thus, one cannot conclude that
the objective of demonstrating the dissemination of clear, accurate
and timely information to the media and the public was achieved in
full.  However, to the extent the initiation of appropriate
notifications and briefings is involved, the objective was
achieved.

DNFSB staff evaluators consider that these objectives were
reasonably achieved with regard to the preparation of appropriate
notifications, messages and releases.  However, greater emphasis on
realistic and active role playing of outside news media and hostile
public representstives is needed. 7.  Occupational Health Department


Objective:          Demonstrate the adequacy
                    of the equipment,
                    vehicles, procedures,
                    supplies, and personnel
                    of medical facilities
                    responsible for transport
                    and treatment of
                    contaminated and/or
                    injured or exposed
                    individuals.

Discussion/Observations:

Simulated on-scene emergency medical treatment practices for the
two victims was generally adequate, partly because the nature of
the simulated injuries was not life threatening.  As noted in the
discussion under Objective 3 above, personnel protective equipment
worn by a responding fireman impeded his ability to determine the
condition of an unconscious victim.  This was not a serious problem
in this exercise, but is the type of difficulty requiring frequent
and realistic practice to overcome, and could be a very significant
problem in more serious accident scenarios.

The response of the RFP Occupational Health Department was not
observed by the evaluators.  No participation by any local hospital
was included in the Exercise Ready 93 scenario.   evaluators were
informed in DOE-RFO briefings associated with conduct of the
exercise that although arrangements have been formalized with a
local hospital to provide assistance in the event of a real
emergency, those arrangements have never been tested in drills or
exercises.

DNFSB staff evaluators consider that these objectives were
adequately demonstrated to the extent they were observed.  However,
the difficulties encountered at the accident scene deserve
attention by emergency medical technicians in their ongoing
training program, and arrangements are needed for the participation
of the supporting local hospital in an future exercises.
8.  Reentry and Recovery

Objective:          Demonstrate the
                    capability to develop
                    decisions on relocation,
                    reentry, and return.

Discussion/Observations:

When the situation at the accident scene had been stabilized; i.e.
victims had been transported to the Occupational Health Department
and spilled material had been covered, thus terminating the
release; the Crisis Manager initiated planning for recovery and
reentry activities.  He appointed a knowledgeable supervisor, by
name, to head the planning operation, arranged for that supervisor
to present preliminary plans to the Crisis Management Team, saw to
it that appropriate comments on preliminary plans were
incorporated, lifted the on-site Take Cover order, and left final
implementation of the plan in the hands of the appointed
individual.

The Crisis Manager noted, for the benefit of the Emergency
Management Organization, that although the on-site problem was
under control, the off-site emergency remained active, since, at
the time, the path and magnitude of the plume had not been clearly
identified.

DNFSB staff evaluators consider that to the extent the Crisis
Manager arranged for recovery from the on-site problem, this
objective was satisfactorily achieved.  Subsequent decisions by the
appointed supervisor were not observed.9.  Exercise Scenario, Conduct, and Control

Objective:          Demonstrate the ability
                    to develop a scenario,
                    conduct, control, and
                    evaluate an exercise that
                    allows the participants
                    to demonstrate the stated
                    objectives.

Discussion/Observations:

The RFP staff responsible for Emergency Preparedness drills and
exercises developed a satisfactory scenario, rehearsed their
evaluators and controllers well, controlled information concerning
the scenario and controller messages to be used during the
exercise, provided for necessary logistical support to conduct the
exercise, briefed controllers, evaluators and observers in
appropriate detail, performed assigned tasks during the exercise
with a minimum of confusion, and conducted "hot wash" debriefs in
the immediate post exercise time frame as well as more detailed
debriefs of participants in the days following Exercise Ready 93.

Last minute withdrawals of some of the expected off-site
participants forced modifications in the exercise plan, not all of
which were fully reflected in exercise documentation; e.g.
retention of inappropriate objectives associated with relationships
with off-site public and news media.

Controllers and evaluators were observant and responsive during the
exercise and generally candid and forthcoming in their immediate
post-exercise critiques.  Participants were also frank and
forthcoming in their post-exercise self-assessments and in
providing comments and suggestions for improvement in future
exercises.  There were a few instances during the
controller/evaluator debriefs in which individual
controllers/evaluators appeared to be too accommodating, reflecting
possible bias through overly favorable assessments and defensive
statements regarding participant deficiencies.  On the whole,
however, this was not a big problem.

Formal, written evaluation reports on the exercise by DOE-RFO and
EG&G had not been completed at the time the present report was
written.

DNFSB staff evaluators consider that this objective was
satisfactorily achieved.