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Testimony:

Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

For Release on Wednesday:

November 19, 2003:

Bioterrorism:

A Threat to Agriculture and the Food Supply:

Statement for the Record by Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director Natural 
Resources and Environment:

GAO-04-259T:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-259T, a Statement for the Record for the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study:

When the President created the Department of Homeland Security, he 
included U.S. agriculture and food industries in the list of critical 
infrastructures needing protection. The Secretaries of Agriculture 
and of Health and Human Services have publicly declared that the U.S. 
food supply is susceptible to deliberate contamination. GAO was asked 
to provide an overview of the potential vulnerabilities of the food 
supply and agriculture sector to deliberate contamination and to 
summarize four recent GAO reports that identified problems with 
federal oversight that could leave the nations agriculture and food supply vulnerable to deliberate contamination.

What GAO Found:

Bioterrorism attacks could be directed at many different targets in 
the farm-to-table food continuum, including crops, livestock, food 
products in the processing and distribution chain, wholesale and 
retail facilities, storage facilities, transportation, and food and 
agriculture research laboratories. Experts believe that terrorists 
would attack livestock and crops if their primary intent was to cause 
severe economic dislocation. The U.S. agriculture sector accounts for 
about 13 percent of the gross domestic product and 18 percent of 
domestic employment. Terrorists may decide to contaminate finished 
food products if harm to humans was their motive. 

Four recent GAO reports found gaps in federal controls for protecting 
agriculture and the food supply. Thus, the United States would be 
vulnerable to deliberate efforts to undermine its agriculture 
industries, deliberate tampering of food during production, and the 
release of deadly animal diseases, some of which also affect humans. 
GAO found, for example, border inspectors were not provided guidance 
on foot-and-mouth disease prevention activities in response to the 
2001 European outbreak, inspection resources could not handle the 
magnitude of international passengers and cargo, and new technology 
used to scan shipments at a bulk mail facility was operating only part-
time and in only that facility. Such careful controls over imported 
foods can help to prevent pathogens from contaminating U.S. cattle 
with devastating diseases that have struck many other countries. GAO 
also found that federal overseers did not have clear authority to 
impose requirements on food processors to ensure security at those 
facilities. Finally, GAO found security problems at Plum Islanda 
large government-operated animal disease research facility. GAO found 
that scientists from other countries, facility workers, and students 
had access to areas containing high-risk pathogens without having 
completed background checks and the required escorts. 

Following are the four reports discussed in this testimony:

* Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain 
Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues, U.S. General Accounting 
Office, GAO-02-808 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002).

* Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other 
Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts, U.S. 
General Accounting Office, GAO-02-183 (Washington, D.C.: January 25, 
2002). 

* Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, but 
Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation, U.S. 
General Accounting Office, GAO-03-342 (Washington, D.C.: February 14, 
2003). 

* Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum 
Island Animal Disease Center, U.S. General Accounting Office,
GAO-03-847 (Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2003).

What GAO Recommends:

The four GAO reports included recommendations to (1) the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
to strengthen import checks for detecting mad cow and foot-and-mouth 
diseases and to address security matters at food processors; (2) FDA 
to strengthen enforcement of the feed ban; and (3) the Department of 
Homeland Security to correct security deficiencies at Plum Island. The 
agencies generally agreed with GAOs recommendations and have taken, 
or are in the process of taking, actions to address the problems GAO 
found. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-259T

To view the full statement, click on the link above. For more 
information, contact Lawrence J. Dyckman at 202-512-3841 or 
dyckmanl@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement for the record on 
the results of our work on potential threats, vulnerabilities, and 
risks faced by the nation's agriculture sector and its food supply. As 
you know, protecting the nation's agriculture industries and food 
supply has taken on increased sense of urgency in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. And there is now broad 
consensus that American farms, food, and agriculture systems, which 
account for about 13 percent of the nation's gross domestic product, 
are vulnerable to potential attack and deliberate contamination.

In his October 2001 executive order establishing the Office of Homeland 
Security, the President added agriculture and food industries to the 
list of critical infrastructure sectors needing protection--
acknowledging that the agriculture sector and the food supply are 
indeed vulnerable to bioterrorism. Both the Secretaries of Agriculture 
and of Health and Human Services have also publicly recognized that the 
U.S. food supply is susceptible to deliberate contamination. Within 
this backdrop, federal and state government agencies; industry; and 
academic institutions have taken steps, such as, assessing the 
potential threats, risks, and vulnerabilities and developing plans to 
rapidly detect and respond to any attack on the nation's agriculture 
sector and food supply.

This statement (1) provides a brief overview of the potential 
vulnerabilities of the food supply and agriculture sector to deliberate 
contamination and (2) summarizes four recent GAO reports identifying a 
range of problems with federal oversight that could leave the nation's 
agriculture sector and food supply vulnerable to intentional 
contamination. Included in this discussion are our 2002 reports on 
federal efforts to prevent devastating animal diseases--foot-and-mouth 
and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow--from 
entering the United States, and our 2003 reports on security at food-
processing facilities and at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. 
Plum Island studies serious animal diseases, including some that can 
cause illness and death in humans. The four reports are discussed in 
greater detail in appendix I, which also provides the link to each 
report on GAO's Web page.

Summary:

The U.S. agriculture and food sectors have features that make them 
vulnerable to bioterrorism attacks. These attacks could be directed at 
many different targets in the farm-to-table food continuum--including 
crops, livestock, food products in the processing and distribution 
chain, wholesale and retail facilities, storage facilities, 
transportation, and food and agriculture research laboratories. Indeed, 
chemicals and infectious pathogens could be intentionally introduced at 
various points in that continuum. Most experts believe that terrorists 
would choose to attack livestock and crops if their primary intent was 
to cause severe economic dislocation. Such an attack would cause severe 
disruption--the U.S. agriculture sector accounts for about 13 percent 
of the U.S. gross domestic product and 18 percent of domestic 
employment. On the other hand, terrorists would choose to contaminate 
finished food products if harm to humans was their motive.

Four recently issued GAO reports found gaps in federal controls for 
protecting agriculture and the food supply. As a result of those gaps, 
the United States would be vulnerable to deliberate efforts to 
undermine its agriculture industries, intentional tampering of food 
during production, and the release of deadly animal diseases, some of 
which also affect humans. We found, among other things, that the volume 
of imported items entering the United States made it impossible for 
border inspectors to physically inspect every incoming cargo container 
or each and every international passenger's luggage--key pathways 
through which foot-and-mouth disease could enter the country. We also 
found that new equipment used to scan shipments at one large import 
bulk mail facility was operating only part-time and in only that bulk 
mail facility. We also reported that discrepancies in the accuracy of 
documents provided by the importer posed a risk that BSE-contaminated 
food might not be flagged for further inspection. Those careful 
controls over imported foods help prevent pathogens from contaminating 
American cattle with devastating diseases that have struck many other 
countries. In addition, we found that federal overseers did not have 
clear authority to impose requirements on food processors to ensure 
security at those facilities. And finally, we found security problems 
at Plum Island. For example, several scientists from other countries, 
facility workers, and students had access to areas containing high-risk 
pathogens, even though their background checks were incomplete and they 
did not have the required escorts.

Overview of the Vulnerability of the U.S. Agriculture Sector and Food 
Supply to Intentional Contamination:

Our current agriculture and food sectors have features that make them 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These include the high concentration 
of our livestock industry and the centralized nature of our food-
processing industry. As a result, chemicals and infectious pathogens 
can be intentionally added at various points along the farm-to-table 
food continuum. Whether terrorists target food products or animals and 
crops for deliberate contamination, serious public health and economic 
consequences are at stake. The mere threat of such an attack would 
seriously undermine consumer confidence in the safety of our food 
supply and destabilize export markets.

The U.S. agriculture sector and food supply have been largely secure 
from deliberate contamination, except for a few such incidents. In 
1984, for example, in what federal agencies describe as the first 
recorded event of bioterrorism in the United States, a cult group 
poisoned salad bars at several Oregon restaurants with Salmonella 
bacteria. As a result, 750 people became ill. A recent, deliberate food 
contamination also highlights how easily someone intent on causing harm 
can do so. In January 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention reported that 92 persons became ill after purchasing ground 
beef from a Michigan supermarket that was intentionally contaminated 
with nicotine. An employee of the supermarket that sold the 
contaminated meat has been indicted for intentionally poisoning 200 
pounds of meat sold in his supermarket.

Naturally occurring outbreaks of diseases affecting livestock, as well 
as accidental contamination of food, further illustrate the potentially 
horrific effects of a deliberate and carefully choreographed event. For 
example, the United Kingdom has estimated that its outbreak of foot-
and-mouth disease resulted in over $10 billion (U.S.) in losses to 
tourism and the food and agriculture sectors and the slaughter of over 
4 million animals. Estimates of direct costs for a similar outbreak in 
the United States run as high as $24 billion with the destruction of 
about 13 million animals. Terrorists seeking ways to harm the United 
States could deliberately introduce foreign animal diseases into the 
country. In addition, according to a recent media report, the USDA 
calculated that a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak could spread to 25 
states in as little as 5 days. Furthermore, according to the media 
report, a simulation exercise by the National Defense University in 
June 2002 predicted that a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak could spread 
to more than one-third of the nation's cattle herds. As that exercise 
demonstrated, diseases affecting livestock could have significant 
impacts on the U.S. economy and consumer confidence in the food supply.

With regard to food, one large-scale U.S. foodborne illness outbreak in 
1994 sickened 224,000 people nationwide with Salmonella enteritis from 
eating a national brand of ice cream. That outbreak, though not 
deliberate in nature, is estimated to have cost about $18.1 million in 
medical care and time lost from work. Widely publicized illness 
outbreaks in 2002 resulted in illnesses, deaths, and costly food 
recalls. One involved ground beef produced by a plant in Colorado that 
caused at least 46 people in 16 states to become ill from E. coli 
O157:H7. The plant conducted a recall to remove about 18 million pounds 
of potentially contaminated beef that had entered commerce. The other 
outbreak involved fresh and frozen ready-to-eat turkey and chicken 
products. Those products, manufactured in a Pennsylvania plant, carried 
Listeria monocytogenes, caused 46 illnesses in eight states, as well as 
seven deaths and three stillbirths or miscarriages. The plant recalled 
approximately 27.4 million pounds of potentially contaminated poultry 
products that had entered commerce. However, most foodborne illnesses 
are not reported and the vast majority of foodborne outbreaks are never 
traced to a specific food source.

Recent GAO Reports Identified Weaknesses in U.S. Systems for Protecting 
Livestock and the Food Supply and Preventing the Release of Animal 
Diseases that Present Human Health Risks:

We recognize that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)--the federal agencies with primary 
responsibility for safeguarding our agriculture and food sectors--have 
stepped up their prevention and response efforts. In addition, we 
recognize the concerted efforts to better safeguard U.S. borders that 
have been taken over by the Department of Homeland Security, which also 
recently took over the operation of the Plum Island Animal Research 
Facility from USDA. Nevertheless, serious questions remain about 
whether the agriculture sector and the food supply are sufficiently 
prepared for deliberate acts of terrorism. Over the last 10 years, GAO 
has issued many reports that, in aggregate, portray a national food 
safety system that is fragmented and problem-laden. It is that system, 
however, on which the nation must depend to prevent, prepare against, 
and respond to bioterrorism events against our food supply.

Four recently issued GAO reports, in particular, identified weaknesses 
in federal systems for protecting U.S. livestock against devastating 
animal diseases and ensuring security at food-processing facilities and 
at Plum Island--the nation's principal diagnostics laboratory for 
foreign animal diseases, including some that can transfer to humans. 
The information from these four reports will not provide a 
comprehensive presentation of potential risks; there are certainly 
other potential targets in the farm-to-table food continuum, including 
the food transportation sector, that we have not yet examined for 
vulnerability to intentional contamination. These reports do, 
nonetheless, highlight weaknesses in U.S. systems for protecting 
critical agriculture and food safety sectors.

Two reports we issued in 2002--on foot-and-mouth disease and on mad cow 
disease--examined, among other things, U.S. measures for preventing 
those diseases from entering the United States.[Footnote 1] We found 
that, because of the sheer magnitude of international passengers and 
cargo that enter this country on a daily basis and the inspection 
resources that are available, completely preventing the entry of those 
diseases may be infeasible. Foot-and-mouth disease can be carried on 
the shoes of international passengers and the packages they carry, in 
international mail, and in garbage from international carriers. We 
found that USDA did not provide timely guidance to border inspectors 
for screening cargo and international passengers after foot-and-mouth 
disease struck Europe in 2001. We also reported that only one 
international bulk mail facility used new scanning equipment to help 
inspectors more accurately identify products potentially carrying 
animal diseases that could contaminate U.S. cattle.

Our 2003 report on food-processing security noted that experts from 
government and academia agreed that terrorists could use food products 
as a vehicle for introducing harmful chemical or biological agents into 
the food supply.[Footnote 2] We found that USDA and FDA had each, 
independently, published comprehensive security guidelines for 
processors to help them prevent or mitigate the risk of deliberate 
contamination at their facilities. Additionally, we reported that USDA 
and FDA did not have clear authority to require processors to take 
safety measures, such as installing fences, alarms, or outside 
lighting. These measures could improve security in the event of 
deliberate contamination. In addition, the field personnel at the two 
agencies did not have adequate training on security matters, which 
would hamper their ability to conduct informed discussion with 
processing plant personnel.

In September 2003, we also reported fundamental concerns with security 
at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center that leave the facility 
vulnerable to security breaches.[Footnote 3] We found that alarms and 
door sensors for the biocontainment area were not fully operational; 
outdoor lighting was not adequate to support security cameras; and 
certain assets, including the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank, were 
not adequately protected. Controls over access to the pathogens were 
also inadequate--scientists from other countries were given access to 
the biocontainment area without escorts while their background checks 
were incomplete; no background checks were done on students attending 
classes in the biocontainment area; and the cleaning crew were among 
the unauthorized staff entering the biocontainment area unescorted. 
Controlling access to pathogens is critical because a tiny quantity of 
pathogen could be removed without being detected and developed into a 
weapon. Lastly, we found that the security guards protecting the Island 
had been operating without authority to carry firearms or to make 
arrests; the facility's written plans for responding to a terrorist 
incident exceeded the capability of its security system and the 
emergency response plans were not adequately coordinated with state and 
local emergency and law enforcement responders. Our report noted that 
the Department of Homeland Security officials agreed with our 
identification of these problems and stated that they had initiated 
actions to address our concerns.

The four reports made recommendations to USDA, FDA, and the Department 
of Homeland Security for correcting the problems we found, and the 
agencies generally agreed with our recommendations. Appendix I 
discusses the four reports, our recommendations, and the agencies' 
positions in greater detail.

Contacts and Acknowledgments:

For future contacts regarding this statement, please contact Lawrence 
J. Dyckman at 202-512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to 
this statement included Maria Cristina Gobin, Erin Lansburgh, Charles 
Adams, and Clifford Diehl. This statement will also be available on the 
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

[End of section]

Appendix I: Recent GAO Reports Highlight Gaps in Federal Efforts to 
Protect Agriculture and the Food Supply:

Four recently issued GAO reports identified weaknesses in federal 
systems for protecting U.S. livestock against devastating animal 
diseases and ensuring security at food-processing facilities and at 
Plum Island--the nation's principal diagnostics laboratory for animal 
diseases. The following reports highlight weaknesses in U.S. systems 
for protecting critical agriculture and food safety sectors:

* Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain 
Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues, U.S. General Accounting 
Office, GAO-02-808 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002).

Because the livestock industry is a key element of the U.S. 
agricultural sector and economy, protecting U.S. livestock from foot-
and-mouth disease is an important federal responsibility. The 2001 
outbreak of this disease in the United Kingdom clearly illustrated the 
destruction that this highly contagious animal disease can cause to a 
nation's livestock industry and other sectors of the economy. Foot-and-
mouth disease is one of the most devastating viral animal diseases 
affecting cloven-hoofed animals--such as cattle and swine--and has 
occurred in most countries of the world at some point over the past 
century. The last foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the United States 
was in 1929.[Footnote 4] According to federal officials, even a single 
case of the disease would cause our trading partners to prohibit U.S. 
exports of live animals and animal products and could result in losses 
of between $6 billion and $10 billion a year while the country 
eradicated the disease and until it regained disease-free status.

As part of our study, we examined whether U.S. measures for preventing 
foot-and-mouth disease from entering the United States were effective 
and whether the United States could respond quickly and effectively to 
an outbreak of the disease if it were to occur.

We found that, because of the sheer magnitude of international 
passengers and cargo that enter this country on a daily basis, 
completely preventing the entry of foot-and-mouth disease may be 
infeasible. The volume of incoming items make it impossible for border 
inspectors to physically inspect every incoming cargo container or each 
international passenger's luggage. The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) has identified key pathways through which this highly contagious 
disease might enter the United States, such as on imported live animals 
or animal products; on the shoes of, or in packages carried by, 
international passengers; in international mail; and in garbage from 
international carriers. We also reported that, after the foot-and-mouth 
disease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001, USDA did not inform 
Customs of its decision to prohibit or restrict certain products or 
more vigilantly screen passengers arriving at U.S. ports of entry from 
the United Kingdom. USDA did not provide such official guidance until 
the Acting Commissioner of Customs formally requested such information 
more than a month after the outbreak began in the United Kingdom. USDA 
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are working to increase 
defenses against diseases entering through those pathways.

We further reported that, should preventive measures fail, and the 
United States experience an outbreak, the country would face challenges 
in responding quickly and effectively. While considerable planning and 
testing of emergency response plans had occurred, we noted several 
factors that could limit a rapid response to a foot-and-mouth disease 
outbreak, including (1) the need for rapid disease identification and 
reporting; (2) effective communication, coordination, and cooperation 
between federal, state, and local responders; (3) an adequate response 
infrastructure, including equipment, personnel, and laboratory 
capacity; and (4) clear animal identification, indemnification, and 
disposal policies.

Our report recommended that USDA develop a formal mechanism to notify 
Customs as outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease spread in other 
countries and develop uniform, nontechnical procedures that Customs 
inspectors could use to process international passengers and cargo 
arriving from disease-affected countries. USDA agreed with our 
recommendations. It said it would work with DHS to ensure that formal 
protocols are established for the seamless communication of animal 
disease risk information for border inspection.

* Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other 
Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts, U.S. General 
Accounting Office, GAO-02-183 (Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2002).

Mad cow disease--or BSE--is an always fatal, neuro-degenerative disease 
that had been found in cattle in 23 countries around the world at the 
time we issued this report. Cattle contract the disease through feed 
that contains protein derived from the remains of diseased animals. 
Scientists generally believe an equally fatal disease in humans--known 
as variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease--is linked to eating beef from 
cattle infected with BSE; over 100 people have died from the human 
variant. During long incubation periods--2 to 8 years in cattle and 
possibly up to 30 years in humans--the disease is undetectable.

As part of our study, we assessed the effectiveness of federal actions 
to prevent the emergence and spread of BSE and ensure compliance with 
the animal feed ban.

We found, among other things, that federal actions could not 
sufficiently ensure that all BSE-infected animals or products would be 
kept out of the United States or that if BSE were found, it would be 
detected promptly and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or 
enter the human food supply. The United States had imported about 125 
million pounds of beef (0.35 percent of total imported) and about 1,000 
cattle (0.003 percent of total imported) from countries that later 
discovered BSE--during the period when BSE would have been incubating. 
We reported that USDA's and the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) 
import inspection capacity had not kept pace with the growth of 
imports. We also found that the one international bulk mail facility 
that used the newest technology in scanning equipment that would help 
inspectors more accurately identify products that could carry BSE was 
not being used during periods of operation when inspectors were not on 
duty. We further reported that Customs found discrepancies with the 
accuracy of importer-provided information and, as a result, BSE-risk 
imports may go undetected.

We also reported that FDA's enforcement of the feed ban, which was put 
in place to prevent the spread of BSE if it were found in U.S. cattle, 
was limited and that FDA inspection data were flawed. FDA had not 
identified and inspected all firms subject to the ban and had not acted 
promptly to compel firms to keep prohibited proteins out of cattle feed 
and to label animal feed that cannot be fed to cattle. FDA's data on 
inspections of feed facilities were so severely flawed that the agency 
could not know the full extent of industry compliance.

We noted that, if BSE were found in the United States, the economic 
impact on the $56 billion beef industry could be devastating--consumers 
might refuse to buy domestic beef; beef exports could decline 
dramatically; and sales in related industries, such as hamburger chains 
and soup and frozen dinner manufacturers, could be similarly affected.

We recommended that USDA and FDA, among other things, develop a 
coordinated strategy to identify resources needed to increase 
inspections of imported goods and that FDA strengthen enforcement of 
the feed ban and its management of inspection data. USDA and FDA agreed 
with these recommendations. Additional funds were requested and 
approved to strengthen border inspections. FDA has increased the number 
of feed-ban compliance inspections, and implemented a new feed-ban 
inspection data system.

* Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, but 
Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation, U.S. General 
Accounting Office, GAO-03-342 (Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2003).

The food-processing sector is generally described as the middle segment 
of the farm-to-table continuum--it extends from the time livestock and 
crops leave the farm for slaughter and processing until food products 
reach retail establishments and the consumer. Experts from government 
and academia agreed that terrorists could use food products as a 
vehicle for introducing harmful chemical or biological agents into the 
food supply. In June 2002, the National Academies had also reported 
that terrorists could use toxic chemicals or infectious agents to 
contaminate food production facilities and that FDA should act promptly 
to extend the use of its Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
methods for ensuring food safety to deal with the risk of deliberate 
contamination.[Footnote 5] The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention had also reported on the need for vigilance in protecting 
food and water supplies. Within this context, in 2002 we examined 
federal efforts to enhance security at food-processing facilities.

We reported that the two agencies with primary responsibility for 
ensuring for food safety--USDA and FDA--had each, independently, 
published comprehensive security guidelines for food processors to help 
them identify measures to prevent or mitigate the risk of deliberate 
contamination at their production facilities. Both agencies encouraged 
processors to review their current operations and to adopt those 
measures that they believed would be best suited for their facilities. 
FDA's guidance contains over 100 suggested security measures and USDA's 
some 68 such items. Among other things, the guidelines included 
recommendations for improving personnel security by conducting 
screening and background checks and controlling entry into the 
facilities; securing hazardous materials by controlling access to 
storage areas; improving outside security by monitoring all access to 
the establishment; installing lighting; ensuring that in-house 
laboratories have comprehensive and validated security and disposal 
procedures in place; and that parking areas are a safe distance from 
the facility.

However, we also reported that USDA and FDA had determined that their 
existing statutes did not provide them with absolutely clear authority 
to impose security requirements at food-processing facilities. For 
example, neither agency had authority to require processors to 
implement measures to enhance security outside the food-processing 
environment, such as installing fences, alarms, or outside lighting. 
Nor did the agencies believe they had authority to require food 
processors to conduct employee background checks. Because of these 
uncertainties about their authority, the security guidelines they gave 
food processors are voluntary. Since the guidelines were voluntary, 
USDA and FDA have not been enforcing, monitoring, or documenting their 
implementation. We also found that most of USDA's and FDA's field staff 
had not received training on security matters. And, although the field 
staff were instructed to be vigilant and on "heightened alert," they 
were also told not to document or report their observations regarding 
security at the plants because the information could be obtained under 
a Freedom of Information Act request.

We also reported on recent congressional efforts to protect the 
nation's drinking water from terrorist acts that may offer a model for 
FDA and USDA to help them monitor security measures at food-processing 
facilities and to identify any gaps that may exist. Specifically, the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 requires community water systems to assess their vulnerability 
to terrorist attacks and develop emergency plans to prepare and respond 
to such events. They are also required to submit copies of their plans 
to the Environmental Protection Agency. The act specifically exempts 
these assessments from the Freedom of Information Act.

We concluded that FDA and USDA could not assess the industry's efforts 
to prevent or reduce their vulnerability to deliberate contamination. 
Lacking such baseline information, they could not be prepared to advise 
food processors on any additional actions needed. We also concluded 
that the lack of security training for field personnel hampered their 
ability to conduct informed discussion with facility personnel.

We recommended that FDA and USDA study their agencies' existing 
statutes and identify what additional authorities they may need 
relating to security measures. On the basis of the results of these 
studies, the agencies should seek additional authority from the 
Congress. While USDA agreed with our recommendation, FDA took no 
position. We also recommended that both agencies provide training for 
all field personnel to enhance their awareness and ability to discuss 
security measures with plant personnel. USDA and FDA agreed with the 
need for additional training.

* Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum 
Island Animal Disease Center, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-
847 (Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2003).

USDA scientists at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center are 
responsible for developing strategies for protecting the nation against 
animal diseases that could be accidentally or deliberately introduced 
in to the country. These scientists--often with the assistance of 
scientists from other countries--identify the pathogens that cause 
animal diseases in foreign countries and then work to develop vaccines 
against them. Some pathogens maintained at USDA's Plum Island 
laboratory, such as foot-and-mouth disease, are highly contagious to 
livestock and could cause catastrophic economic losses if they were 
released outside the facility. Questions about the security of Plum 
Island arose after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and when 
employees of the contractor hired to operate and maintain the Plum 
Island facilities went on strike in August 2002. About 10 months later, 
in June 2003, DHS became responsible for Plum Island while the USDA 
staff are continuing their research programs.

In September 2003, we reported that our review of security at Plum 
Island identified fundamental concerns that leave the facility 
vulnerable to security breaches. We found that immediately after the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, USDA began a concerted effort to 
assess security at many of its laboratories, including Plum Island. 
Using a risk management approach, USDA identified certain pathogens as 
the primary asset requiring protection, the potential threats to this 
asset, and the associated risk. USDA also began to upgrade security at 
Plum Island. For example, USDA hired armed guards to patrol the island 
and installed fingerprint recognition locks on freezers containing 
pathogens.

Despite these improvements, we identified shortcomings in Plum Island's 
security arrangements. We found that Plum Island's physical security 
was incomplete and limited. For example, the alarms and door sensors 
that were recommended for the biocontainment area were not fully 
operational; outdoor lighting was not adequate to support security 
cameras; and physical security was not sufficient for certain assets, 
including the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank. DHS officials said 
the alarms and door sensors will be in place by December 2003 and they 
were evaluating other physical security matters.

Furthermore, we found that Plum Island officials had not adequately 
controlled access to the pathogens. Eight scientists from other 
countries were given access to the biocontainment area without escorts 
while their background checks were incomplete; no background checks 
were done on students who regularly attended classes within the 
biocontainment area; and individuals entering the biocontainment area 
to perform nonlaboratory functions, such as cleaning, were not always 
escorted. Controlling access to the pathogens is particularly important 
because no security device is currently capable of detecting a 
microgram of pathogenic material. Therefore, a scientist could remove a 
tiny quantity of pathogen without being detected and potentially 
develop it into a weapon. Many facilities take measures to minimize 
this risk. For example, at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases, background checks must be updated regularly to 
evaluate the continued suitability and reliability of employees working 
with pathogens. According to DHS officials, they are taking action to 
revise policies for access to the biocontainment area.

We also found limitations in Plum Island's incident response 
capability. For example, the guard force had been operating without 
authority to carry firearms or to make arrests. Plum Island's incident 
response plan does not address what to do if an incident, such as a 
terrorist attack, exceeds the capability of the security system, and 
officials have not tested the facility's response capability to ensure 
its effectiveness. DHS officials told us they have started to take 
actions to fully address these incident response issues and are 
obtaining assistance from the Federal Protective Service.

Because of the strike that occurred in August 2002 and the hostility 
surrounding it, the risk that someone may try to steal pathogens has 
increased. One striker was convicted of tampering with the island's 
water distribution and treatment system as he walked off the job the 
day the strike began, and USDA officials suspect that this individual 
did not act alone. The intelligence community considers disgruntled 
employees as posing a security risk. Although USDA did consider the 
possibility that it could have a disgruntled worker, it did not 
reevaluate the level of risk, the assets requiring protection, or its 
incident response plans for Plum Island in light of specific events 
related to the strike. Furthermore, USDA did not discuss the defined 
threat with the intelligence community and local law enforcement 
officials to ensure that threats particular to Plum Island and its 
vicinity were taken into consideration.

We concluded that further actions are needed to provide reasonable 
assurance that pathogens cannot be removed from the facility and 
exploited for use in bioterrorism. Particularly, it is important to 
better secure the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank to ensure its 
availability for combating an outbreak. The lack of comprehensive 
policies and procedures for limiting access to pathogens unnecessarily 
elevates the risk of pathogen theft. Moreover, because physical 
security measures alone are not adequate to secure pathogens, all 
laboratories containing these materials face the challenge of 
developing other approaches to mitigate the risk of theft. By 
consulting with other laboratories to discover methods they are using 
to mitigate the risk to pathogens, Plum Island officials can learn more 
about safeguards being employed elsewhere.

We recommended that DHS (1) correct physical security deficiencies at 
Plum Island; (2) limit access to pathogens and identify ways to 
mitigate the inherent difficulty of securing pathogens; (3) enhance 
Plum Island's incident response capability; and (4) reconsider the 
risks and threats to Plum Island and revise the security and incident 
response plans as needed. DHS has agreed with the report and has 
started to implement these recommendations.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain 
Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues, U.S. General Accounting 
Office, GAO-02-808 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2002) and Mad Cow 
Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas 
Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts, U.S. General Accounting 
Office, GAO-02-183 (Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2002). 

[2] Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, but 
Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation, U.S. General 
Accounting Office, GAO-03-342 (Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2003). 

[3] Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum 
Island Animal Disease Center, U.S. General Accounting Office, 
GAO-03-847 (Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2003).

[4] The foot-and-mouth virus is relatively hardy and can survive in 
certain environments for considerable periods of time. For example, it 
can live in salted bacon for up to 183 days or in air-dried animal 
hides or skins for 6 weeks. Should a person step in manure from an 
infected animal, the virus can live on the shoes for up to 9 weeks in 
summer conditions or up to 14 weeks in winter. 

[5] USDA requires meat and poultry plants to use a Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point system and FDA requires that system for juices, 
fish, and shellfish.