UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., APPELLANTS V. MADISON D. LOCKE,
ET AL.

   No. 83-1394

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1984

   On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada

                       Brief for the Appellants

                       PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

   In addition to the parties listed in the caption, the United States
Department of the Interior;  William P. Clark, Secretary of the
Interior;  the Bureau of Land Management;  and Robert F. Burford,
Director of the Bureau of Land Management, are appellants;  and
Rosalie E. Locke, Sam Buccambuso, and Tony Buccambuso are appellees.

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions
      involved
   Statement
   Summary of argument
   Argument:
      I. Section 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and
          Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744(c), is
          consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
          Fifth Amendment
      A. Congress has the power to condition retention
          of an unpatented mining claim located on
          federal land on a claimant's complaince with
          the filing requirements of Section 314
      B. Section 314(c) is consistent with the
          requirements of procedural due process
      C. Section 314(c) does not create an impermissible
          irrebuttable presumption of abandonment
      II. Appellees did not retain their mining claims by
          filing one day late, because Section 314 is not
          satisfied by "substantial compliance" with its
          requirements
   Conclusion
   Appendix

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the district court (J.S. App. 1a- 13a) is reported
at 573 F. Supp. 472.  The opinion of the Interior Board of Land
Appeals (J.S. App. 16a-21a) is reported at 65 I.B.L.A. 122.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the district court (J.S. App. 14a) was entered on
October 24, 1983.  A notice of appeal (J.S. App. 15a) was filed on
November 21, 1983.  On January 10, 1984, Justice Rehnquist extended
the time for docketing an appeal to and including February 21, 1984,
and the Jurisdictional Statement was filed on that date.  Probable
jurisdiction was noted on June 4, 1984.  The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252.  See J.S. 19 n.20.

     CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

   The relevant constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions
are set out in App., infra, 1a-4a.

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   1. Whether Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744, violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the extent it provides that failure to file a
timely notice of intention to hold a mining claim or affidavit of
annual assessment work shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the claim.

   2. Whether Section 314 is satisfied by "substantial compliance"
with its requirements, so that appellees retained their mining claims
by filing one day late.

                               STATEMENT

   1. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA or the
Act), Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. (&
Supp. V) 1701 et seq.), made significant changes in the law governing
federal land management.  FLMPA represented a comprehensive effort by
Congress to modernize public land laws and to solve a number of
longstanding problems in the area of federal land policy.  Among these
problems were the lack of centralized information about mining claims
on federal lands and the unresolved status of the very large number of
stale claims.

   a. Under the general mining laws, 30 U.S.C. 22 et seq., United
States citizens may go on unappropriated, unreserved public lands in
order to prospect for and develop certain minerals.  An individual who
locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive possession of the
land for mining purposes and may extract and sell minerals he finds
there without paying any royalty to the United States.  30 U.S.C. 26.
After making a valuable mineral "discovery," the claimant may hold the
land indefinitely, provided he expends $100 per year in assessment
work on his claim.  30 U.S.C. 28.  If he fulfills certain statutory
conditions (including performance of $500 of development work), the
claimant may obtain a patent (i.e., purchase the land and minerals)
for a nominal sum;  however, he is not required to proceed to patent.
Until the claimant obtains a patent, paramount title to the land
remains in the United States.  See 30 U.S.C. 29.  Since enactment of
the general mining laws in the nineteenth century, Congress has
removed a number of minerals from their coverage.  /1/ In doing so,
however, it generally has left valid existing claims intact.  See,
e.g., 30 U.S.C. 193;  30 U.S.C. 615;  Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,
No. 81-1686 (June 6, 1983), slip op. 20-21 & n.15.

   Prior to the passage of FLMPA, significant problems had developed
as a result of the existence of numerous mining claims located on
federal lands, combined with the absence of any federal recording
system for such claims.  Most states imposed recording requirements
applicable to mining claims (as authorized by 30 U.S.C. 26), but there
was no general federal requirement that a mining claimant record an
unpatented mining claim or otherwise notify the Interior Department of
the existence of the claim.  By the mid-1970s it was estimated that
there were more than six million unpatented mining claims on public
lands other than national forests;  in addition, more than half of the
land in the National Forest System was thought to be covered by such
claims.  S. Rep. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975).  Many of the
claims were believed to be stale.  Ibid.  See also Public Land Law
Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land:  A Report to the
President and to the Congress 130 (1970).  However, as the Senate
committee explained, because of the absence of a federal recording
requirement, "Federal land managers do not have an easy way of
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or invalid
mining claim locations." S. Rep. 94-583, supra, at 65.  See also One
Third of the Nation's Land, supra, at 124 ("land managers do not know
where claims are located");  Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479
F. Supp. 309, 312 (D. Utah 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.
1981).

   The potential existence of unknown mining claims made it difficult
for federal land managers to take actions affecting federal lands for
fear of interfering with the rights accorded to claimants under the
federal mining laws.  Each time the Bureau of Land Management proposed
a sale or other conveyance of federal land, it was necessary to make a
lengthy search of records in the county recorder's office and to
produce a title abstract showing the existence or nonexistence of
outstanding mining claims.  Such searches in themselves constituted a
major administrative burden.  Moreover, if the county records
indicated the existence of mining claims -- even what appeared to be
only stale or abandoned claims -- it was necessary for BLM to initiate
a formal administrative adjudication to determine the validity of the
claims before proceeding further with the proposed action.  See
Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands:  A Study of Interior
Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219.

   b. In Section 314 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 1744, Congress set out the
basis for a federal recordation system that would serve the dual
purpose of ridding federal lands of stale mining claims and providing
federal managers with data that would allow them to make informed land
management decisions.  Section 314 includes two kinds of reporting
requirements.  Subsection (a) establishes an annual filing obligation.
 It requires the owner of an unpatented mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, within three years of that date and "prior to
December 31, of each year thereafter," to file with BLM a notice of
intention to hold the claim or an affidavit of assessment work
performed on the claim.  Those who locate claims after October 21,
1976, must make such filings "prior to December 31 of each year"
following the calendar year in which the claim was located.  The
second obligation -- an initial recordation requirement -- is imposed
by Section 314(b):  The owner of an unpatented claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, must, within three years of that date, file with BLM
a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate
of location.  Those who locate claims after October 21, 1976, must
file the required documents within 90 days of location.  /2/

   In Section 314(c) -- the provision at issue in this case --
Congress provided that failure to comply with the filing requirements
of Section 314(a) and (b) results in the invalidation of a mining
claim.  Section 314(c) states that, except in certain enumerated
circumstances, /3/ "(t)he failure to file such instruments as required
by subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed
conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim * * * by
the owner."

   c. The Department of the Interior has issued regulations
implementing Section 314.  43 C.F.R. 3833.2-1(b)(1) provides that the
owner of an unpatented mining claim located on federal land must file
evidence of annual assessment work or a notice of intention to hold
the claim in the proper BLM office "on or before December 30 of each
calendar year." Since 1982, the Department's regulations have provided
that filings due on or before December 30 will be considered timely
filed if they are postmarked on or before December 30 and received by
BLM by the close of business on the following January 19th.  43 C.F.R.
3833.0-5(m).  /4/ Under 43 C.F.R. 3833.4(a), the failure to file a
required instrument within the prescribed time period "shall be deemed
conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim * * *
and it shall be void."

   BLM enters into a central computer information from both initial
recordations and annual filings submitted pursuant to Section 314.
Every 60 days BLM prints out the information on mining claims on a
state-by-state basis.  The computer printouts are microfilmed and
distributed to BLM State Offices, to many state governments, and to
private subscribers.

   2. Appellees were mining claimants whose ten unpatented claims were
located on federal land in Nevada.  Since 1960 appellees have produced
gravel and building materials from these claims.  /5/ On October 19,
1979, appellees complied with the initial filing requirements under
Section 314 by filing the appropriate documents for each of their
claims.  However, in 1980 appellees waited until December 31 to hand
deliver their affidavits of annual assessment work to the BLM Nevada
State Office, thus missing the December 30 deadline set by statute and
regulation for the annual filing.  J.S. App. 1a-2a.  On April 4, 1981,
the chief of the Records and Data Management Branch of the BLM Nevada
State Office informed appellees that their claims had been declared
abandoned and void because they had failed to file a notice of intent
or proof of assessment work by December 30, 1980.  See J.S. App.
22a-24a.  /6/

   Appellees sought review of the BLM action, claiming, inter alia,
that they had been erroneously advised by unnamed BLM personnel as to
the proper filing date and that Section 314 and the implementing
regulations are unconstitutional and invalid because they resulted in
the taking of appellees' property without notice and opportunity to be
heard.  In June 1982 the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA)
affirmed the BLM determination (J.S. App. 16a-21a).  The IBLA
concluded that any reliance on erroneous information provided by a BLM
employee could not relieve a claimant of an obligation imposed by
statute or regulation.  It declined to rule on appellees'
constitutional claim on the ground that the Department of the Interior
was not a proper forum to consider the constitutionality of Section
314.  The IBLA noted, however, that the regulations at issue had been
upheld as consistent with the statute in Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United
States, 479 F. Supp. 309 (D. Utah 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 775 (10th
Cir. 1981).  The IBLA went on to conclude that the administrative
appeal afforded to appellees before the initial BLM determination
became final satisfied the requirements of due process.

   3. Appellees filed this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada, seeking review of the IBLA decision.
Appellees asserted, inter alia, that BLM's action was unconstitutional
and invalid because it resulted in taking of their property without
notice and opportunity to be heard and without compensation.
Appellees sought a declaration that Section 314 and the implementing
regulations are unconstitutional and an order permanently enjoining
appellants from enforcing the regulations against appellees.

   The district court granted summary judgment for appellees, holding
that Section 314 is an "unconstitutional violation of procedural due
process insofar as it creates an irrebuttable presumption of
abandonment for failure to timely file the annual assessment notice"
required by Section 314(a) (J.S. App. 10a).  /7/ The court initially
concluded that unpatented mining claims qualify as property interests
sufficient to warrant due process protection (id. at 3a).  It then
determined that Section 314 creates a forfeiture of appellees' claims,
since appellees had not indicated any intent to abandon the claims
(J.S. App. 3a-4a).  /8/ Applying the analysis set out in Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the district court determined that
extinguishment of claims pursuant to Section 314 amounts to a taking
without due process because the statute creates a conclusive
presumption of abandonment that is "not necessarily or universally
true in fact" (J.S. App. 5a) and because, in the court's view, there
are reasonable methods by which BLM could establish whether a miner
intends to abandon a claim when he fails to make a timely annual
filing (id. at 6a-7a).  The court concluded that BLM could easily
determine whether claimants had in fact abandoned their claims by
notifying them of their failure to meet a filing deadline and by
holding a preforfeiture hearing in cases in which there is a dispute
about whether abandonment has occurred (id. at 7a, 9a-10a).

   The district court went on to hold (J.S. App. 10a-12a) that even if
appellees had not been deprived of their due process rights, they
would still prevail because they had "substantially complied" with
Section 314 by submitting the required notices one day after the
statutory deadline.  In the court's view, the primary purpose of
Section 314 is to clear federal lands of stale claims, which is
accomplished by requiring the initial filing of location notices
pursuant to Section 314(b);  the requirement of annual filings
thereafter (under Section 314(a)) is intended to facilitiate
maintenance of a current index of unpatented claims "merely for the
convenience of federal land managers" (J.S. App. 11a).  Thus,
according to the court, a standard of substantial compliance with the
annual filing deadline would be consistent with the history and
purpose of Section 314 (J.S. App. 12a).  In addition, the court cited
Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 440 U.S. 48, 57 (1970), and several earlier
cases for the proposition that substantial compliance satisfies the
assessment work requirement under 30 U.S.C. 28.  The court reasoned
that it would be anomalous for the government to insist on strict
compliance with Section 314 when, at the same time, substantial
compliance is sufficient under 30 U.S.C. 28.  J.S. App. 12a.  /9/

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   I. The district court erred in holding unconstitutional Section
314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
1744(c), which provides that failure to file a timely notice of
intention to hold a mining claim or affidavit of annual assessment
work shall be "deemed conclusively" to constitute an abandonment of
the claim.  Contrary to the court's conclusion, Section 314(c) is
fully consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

   A. Congress clearly has the power to condition retention of an
unpatented mining claim located on federal land on a claimant's
compliance with the filing requirements of Section 314.  Congress
possesses broad constitutional authority to manage and control the
mineral resources of the public domain.  Mining claims located on
public lands are the product of Congress's exercise of that authority
and are subject to continuing regulation.

   Section 314 serves significant governmental purposes.  The filing
requirements of Section 314(a) and (b) provide the means for
collection of complete, up-to-date information about the status of
mining claims, which in turn permits federal managers to make informed
land use decisions.  Automatic invalidation of claims pursuant to
Section 314(c) following claimants' failure to comply with the filing
requirements provides an efficient mechanism for termination of state
claims.  It also provides an important incentive for compliance with
the filing requirements and allows federal managers to be certain
about the status of claims.  At the same time, Section 314 imposes
only minimal burdens on claimants.

   This Court concluded in Texaco, Inc v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982),
that Indiana clearly had the power to condition retention of a
property right in privately held lands on filing within a limited
period of time under its Mineral Lapse Act.  A fortiori Congress has
authority to impose such a condition with respect to claims located on
federal lands.

   B. Section 314(c) is consistent with the requirements of procedural
due process.  The Court's holding in Texaco v. Short makes it clear
that the district court here erred in concluding that claimants must
receive individual notice and a hearing before their claims become
invalid for failure to comply with the Section 314 filing
requirements.  The statute itself provides notice of the filing
deadlines and the consequences of failure to meet them.  The
three-year grace period between enactment and the effective date of
the statute afforded claimants a reasonable time within which to
become familiar with the new provisions.  Of course, there is no
question that appellees in this case were aware of Section 314, since
they previously had made a timely initial recordation pursuant to that
section.

   Following their apparent failure to make their 1980 annual filing
in a timely manner, appellees were notified and given an opportunity
to appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals the BLM determination
that their claims were invalid.  That proceeding, in which appellees
were free to submit any evidence that they had in fact complied with
Section 314, was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.  BLM
is not constitutionally required also to provide notice to claimants
before the self-executing feature of Section 314 may operate.  See
Texaco v. Short, 434 U.S. at 536-537.

   C. The district court erred in holding that Section 314(c) creates
an impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment under the
analysis of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).  The forfeiture
accomplished by Section 314(c) does not depend on any presumption that
a claimant who fails to comply with the filing requirements in fact
has abandoned his claim.  Rather, Congress has merely provided in
effect that failure to comply with the filing requirements will result
in extinguishment of a claim.  More recent decisions of this Court
suggest that it would be entirely inappropriate to apply the Vlandis
analysis in a manner that would invalidate the rational legislative
choice reflected in Section 314.  Even if the Vlandis analysis could
properly be applied to this case, provision of individual notice and a
hearing in which a claimant would have the opportunity to establish
nonabandonment is not a "reasonable" alternative to the approach
chosen by Congress, since such procedures could interfere
significantly with BLM's ability to manage federal lands effectively.

   II. The district court erred in its alternative holding that
Section 314(a) is satisfied by "substantial compliance," so that
appellees retained their mining claims by filing their affidavits of
annual assessment work one day late.  Nothing in the language of
Section 314 suggests that a claimant may retain his claim by filing
later than the precise deadline specified in the statute.  Congress's
failure expressly to permit late filing in Section 314, despite its
provision for certain other exceptions, reinforces the conclusion that
it did not intend to sanction deviations from the statutory deadlines.
 The legislative history does not provide support for a substantial
compliance standard.  In addition, permitting less than total
compliance with the statute is at odds with Congress's goal of
enabling BLM to obtain complete, up-to-date information about the
status of mining claims on federal lands and to administer those lands
efficiently.

   The district court erred in relying on Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.,
400 U.S. 48 (1970), and other cases in which this Court has stated
that substantial compliance is enough to satisfy the annual assessment
work requirement under the general mining laws.  In view of the
differences between Section 314 and the provisions at issue in the
assessment work cases, the reasoning of those cases clearly does not
extend to Section 314.

                               ARGUMENT

 I. SECTION 314(c) OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF
1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744(c), IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

   As part of its major revision of the public land laws in 1976,
Congress conditioned the right to retain an unpatented mining claim
located on federal land on a claimant's compliance with certain filing
requirements.  Section 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744(c), provides that a failure to
comply with the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of Section 314
shall be "deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment" of a
claim.  Section 314(a) requires annual filing of either a notice of
intention to hold a claim or an affidavit of assessment work, while
Section 314(b) requires an initial recordation of a notice or
certificate of location.  Both subsections include specific deadlines
for filing of the required documents.  In this case appellees in 1980
failed to file affidavits of annual assessment work for their claims
"prior to December 31," as required by Section 314(a).  Following
appellees' failure to make a timely filing, the Bureau of Land
Management declared their claims invalid and the Interior Board of
Land Appeals affirmed.

   The district court, in reviewing the determination of invalidity,
held that Section 314(c) constitutes an "unconstitutional violation of
procedural due process insofar as it creates an irrebuttable
presumption of abandonment for failure to timely file the annual
assessment notice" required by Section 314(a) (J.S. App. 10a).  In
fact, as we show below, the condition Congress imposed is a reasonable
one that is clearly within its power and fully consistent with due
process.  Contrary to the district court's holding, Section 314(c)
does not create any impermissible irrebuttable presumption.  The
district court's use of the irrebuttable presumption analysis to
invalidate the rational legislative judgment reflected in Section 314
is plainly wrong.

 A. Congress Has the Power to Condition Retention of an Unpatented
Mining Claim Located on Federal Land on a Claimant's Compliance With
the Filing Requirements of Section 314

   As a preliminary matter, it is clear that Congress possesses
authority to condition retention of an unpatented mining claim located
on federal land on a claimant's compliance with the Section 314 filing
requirements.  /10/ Of course, Congress's power to manage and control
the mineral resources of the public domain is very broad.  The
Property Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, Section 3, Cl. 2,
provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations belonging to the United States." This
Court has repeatedly stated that "'(t)he power over the public land
thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.'" Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).  See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist.
v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-295 (1958);  Alabama v. Texas, 347
U.S. 272, 273 (1954);  FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952);
 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947);  Gibson v.
Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1872).  The Property Clause gives
Congress the power over public lands "'to control their occupancy and
use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the
conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them.'" Kleppe v.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 540 (quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917)).

   The mining claims to which Section 314 applies are creations of
Congress's exercise of that broad constitutional authority.  The right
to obtain such claims was conferred under the General Mining Act of
1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 et seq., which opened "all valuable mineral
deposits in lands belonging to the United States * * * to exploration
and purchase." Under that statute an individual who locates a claim
obtains a right of possession that allows him to remove and sell
minerals without any payment to the United States.  30 U.S.C. 26.  See
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., No. 81-1686 (June 6, 1983), slip op.
14.  The right to retain a claim is conditioned on, inter alia,
discovery of a valuable mineral deposit and performance of $100 of
assessment work each year.  30 U.S.C. 28.  Failure of a claimant to
perform the required assessment work entitles others to relocate the
claim.  A claimant who meets various statutory requirements (including
performance of $500 of development work) and who tenders a nominal sum
is entitled to a patent, which confers ownership rights to the land
and minerals.  30 U.S.C. 29.  Until a patent is obtained, however, the
United States retains paramount title to the land.  See 30 U.S.C. 29;
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963);  Wilbur
v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316-317 (1930);
Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 763 (1876).

   As the product of legislative action pursuant to Congress's
constitutional power to regulate federal lands, a mining claim located
on such lands is clearly subject to Congress's continuing authority to
impose statutory conditions on its retention.  See Best v. Humboldt
Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. at 339 ("The United States, which holds
the legal title to the lands, plainly can prescribe the procedure
which any (mining) claimant must follow to acquire rights in the
public sector").  That authority unquestionably extends to the filing
requirements of Section 314, which serve significant governmental
interests.

   As we explained in the statement (at 3-4), Congress had multiple
purposes in enacting Section 314.  It wished to rid federal lands of
millions of stale mining claims;  and it also sought to provide for
centralized collection by federal land managers of comprehensive and
up-to-date information on the status of mining claims.  Such
centralized record-keeping allows federal managers to make informed
and efficient land use decisions, consistent with Congress's overall
objective of improving federal land management.  /11/ Prior to
enactment of Section 314, federal land managers lacked a source of
readily available and up-to-date information about the status of
claims.  Thus, before they could proceed with any action that would
affect a piece of federal land, they were required to undertake
cumbersome title searches in county courthouses and to initiate
administrative adjudications to determine the validity of any
outstanding claims they discovered.  See page 4, supra.  The Section
314 filing requirements eliminate this significant administrative
burden.  /12/

   Automatic invalidation of claims by the terms of Section 314(c)
following a claimant's failure to comply with the filing requirements
plays a significant part in fulfilling Congress's objectives.  Most
obviously, it promotes administrative convenience by providing a
self-executing mechanism for terminating stale claims.  Such a
mechanism avoids the delay that would be involved in identifying all
claims and making countless individual determinations of whether a
given claim is stale or not.  /13/ Automatic invalidation of claims
under Section 314(c) also serves as an enforcement mechanism for the
filing requirements.  Without an effective penalty, there would be
little incentive for claimants to make timely filings or, indeed, to
make any filings at all.  /14/ The threat of invalidation provides the
powerful motivation to comply that is essential to an "accurate and
perpetual inventory of mining claims on the public lands and of those
persons who assert an interest in (such) claims." Topaz Beryllium Co.
v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Utah 1979);  aff'd, 649
F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981).  The automatic invalidation mechanism also
allows federal land managers to be certain about the current status of
a claim, so that they can act expeditiously and with confidence in
taking steps that affect particular lands.

   Section 314 imposes only minimal burdens on mining claimants.  Of
course, the individual claimant is in the best position to know
whether he intends to retain his claim and to take the necessary steps
to preserve his rights.  A claimant is required simply to make a
single initial recordation, followed by annual filings of either a
notice of intention to retain the claim or an affidavit of annual
assessment work.  The initial location notice and annual assessment
work affidavit are familiar documents that many claimants were
required to record locally prior to the enactment of Section 314.  See
30 U.S.C. 28;  J.S. App. 6a.  Filing deadlines are clearly set out in
the statute and regulations.  An annual filing may be made at any time
during the calendar year "prior to December 31."

   If there were any doubt about the power of Congress to condition
retention of a mining claim on compliance with the Section 314 filing
requirements, it would be dispelled by this Court's decision in
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).  The Court in Texaco
considered the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act, which provided that a vested
mineral interest in privately held land would be extinguished
following a 20-year period of nonuse if the owner did not file a
statement of claim with the State within a two-year period.  The Court
concluded that there was no question that Indiana possessed the power
"to condition the retention of a property right upon the performance
of an act within a limited period of time." 454 U.S. at 529;  see also
id. at 540 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that there was no real
dispute concerning "Indiana's power to control, define, and limit
interests in land within its boundaries" or that "extinguishment of a
mineral owner's rights may be an appropriate sanction for a failure to
register").  /15/

   Texaco involved the actions of a state government with respect to
vested interests in privately held land.  A fortiori, imposition of a
similar condition on retention of unpatented claims located on federal
lands is within the power of Congress.  /16/ And, as we have shown,
Section 314 furthers legitimate governmental objectives, while
imposing minimal burdens on claimants.  Thus, Congress cannot be said
to have exercised its power in an arbitrary manner.  Compare Texaco,
454 U.S. at 529-530.  And see Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d
618, 629 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981) ("The
legislative history of (Section 314) makes it clear that on their face
the filing requirements are neither an arbitrary nor irrational way of
realizing * * * permissible governmental objectives.");  id. at
629-630 (rejecting the contention that the provisions of Section
314(c) are unreasonably harsh in requiring that mining claims be
conclusively deemed abandoned upon failure to file).

 B. Section 314(c) Is Consistent With the Requirements of Procedural
Due Process

   The district court held (J.S. App. 9a) that Section 314(c) fails to
meet procedural due process requirements essentially because an
individual who fails to file a timely notice of intention to hold a
mining claim or affidavit of annual assessment work does not receive
notice and a hearing before his claim becomes invalid under the terms
of the statute.  In fact, Section 314(c) comports fully with the
requirements of procedural due process.  /17/

   Like the appellants in Texaco v. Short, appellees in this case
contended that their property rights had been extinguished without
adequate notice.  /18/ The reasons the Court articulated in rejecting
the challenge to the Indiana statute considered in Texaco also support
the conclusion that the appellees here were not deprived of notice in
violation of due process.

   Publication of Section 314 effectively placed claimants on notice
of its provisions.  Section 314, like the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act in
Texaco, spells out filing deadlines and the consequences of failure to
make timely filings.  "Generally, a legislature need do nothing more
than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable
opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply."
Texaco, 454 U.S. at 532.  "'All persons are charged with knowledge of
the provisions of statutes and must take note of the procedure adopted
by them.'" Id. at 532 n.25 (quoting North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman,
268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925)).  See also, e.g., FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380, 384-385 (1947);  Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233,
243 (1944).

   As the Court observed in Texaco, property owners in particular may
be presumed to be aware of statutory changes affecting their rights.
"It is well established that persons owning property within a State
are charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting
the control or disposition of such property." 454 U.S. at 532
(footnote omitted).  "All persons having property located within a
state and subject to its dominion must take note of its statutes
affecting the control or disposition of such property and of the
procedure which they set up for those purposes." Anderson Nat'l Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. at 243 (citations omitted), quoted with approval
in Texaco, 454 U.S. at 533 n.27.  These principles apply with even
greater force in the case of individuals, like the appellees in this
case, who have claims located on public lands.  Such individuals
obtained their claims in the context of a system of governmental
regulation and therefore should have a heightened awareness that their
rights could be affected by statutory or regulatory changes.

   Of course, the Court noted in Texaco (454 U.S. at 532), there
generally must be some reasonable period within which individuals have
an opportunity to become familiar with a new statute that affects
existing rights.  See also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of
University & School Lands, No. 81-2337 (May 2, 1983), slip op. 12
n.23;  Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1902).  In Texaco the
Court concluded that the two-year grace period provided by the Indiana
Mineral Lapse Act provided ample notice of the statutory filing
requirement and forfeiture provision and was therefore consistent with
due process.  The Court noted that "(a) legislative body is in a far
better position than a court to form a correct judgment concerning the
number of persons affected by a change in the law, the means by which
information concerning the law is disseminated in the community, and
the likelihood that innocent persons may be harmed by the failure to
receive adequate notice." 454 U.S. at 532 (footnote omitted).  See
also Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. at 63;  Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S.
628, 633-634 (1877).  The Court was unable to conclude that the
Indiana statute was "so unprecedented and so unlikely to come to the
attention of citizens reasonably attentive to the enactment of laws
affecting their rights:  that the two-year grace period was
constitutionally inadequate.  454 U.S. at 533.

   The grace period provided by Section 314 is more generous than the
one the Court in Texaco found to be consistent with due process.
Although FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners of existing claims were not
required to make an initial recordation or annual filing until October
1979.  Thus, claimants had three years within which to become familiar
with the Section 314 filing requirements and the consequences of
failure to comply with them, compared with the two-year grace period
under the Indiana statute.  Moreover, the statutory change at issue
here may have been more predictable than that considered in Texaco,
since mining claimants on public land cannot help being aware that
their claims are subject to an ongoing system of statutory conditions
and administrative regulation.  Congress's judgment that three years
was a sufficient period within which claimants could become familiar
with the provisions of Section 314 was clearly reasonable and is
entitled to deference.

   In any event, in the circumstances of this case the question of
reasonable notice of the existence of the new statute is largely
irrelevant.  This case involves the obligation to comply with the
December 30 deadline of Section 314(a), which comes after the due date
of the initial recordation and filing required by Section 314.  Those
whose claims are rendered invalid on the ground that they failed to
comply with the annual filing requirement by definition were aware of
the existence of Section 314 because they already had complied with
the initial recordation requirement.  Here appellees acknowledged in
their Complaint (at 4 Paragraph 12) that they filed certificates of
location, maps, and affidavits of assessment work for their claims in
October 1979, as required by Section 314(a) and (b).  See also Mot. to
Aff. 3.  Moreover, it is clear that appellees knew specifically about
the existence of the annual filing requirement of Section 314(a),
because they in fact submitted such a filing, albeit in an untimely
manner.  /19/ Thus, appellees cannot claim that they themselves were
unaware of the Section 314 filing requirements;  instead, they can
only admit that they failed to examine the statute and regulations
closely enough to ascertain the relevant due date under Section 314(a)
.

   Appellees contended below that they had a constitutional right to
individualized notice and a hearing prior to invalidation of their
claims for failure to make a timely annual filing for 1980, and the
district court agreed.  But here, as in Texaco, "it is essential to
recognize the difference between the self-executing feature of the
statute and a subsequent judicial (or administrative) determination
that a particular lapse did in fact occur" (454 U.S. at 533).  Here
appellees received notice following their apparent failure to file in
a timely manner and an opportunity to present evidence of compliance
with Section 314 before the BLM determination of invalidity became
final.  Appellees took advantage of this opportunity by pursuing an
appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals.  The IBLA did not hold
an evidentiary hearing in appellees' case, but that is because
appellees themselves advised the Board that they had hand delivered
their affidavits of assessment work to BLM on December 31, 1980,
rather than "prior to December 31," as Section 314(a) requires.  As
the IBLA stated in its opinion, "a hearing is not required in the
absence of assertions of facts which, if proved true, would entitle
(appellees) to the relief sought" (J.S. App. 20a).  /20/

   Appellees are therefore left with the contention that the
self-executing feature of Section 314(c) -- automatic invalidation of
a claim following failure to comply with the filing requirements of
Section 314(a) and (b) -- may not take effect unless they previously
received individual notice.  But as the Court in Texaco noted (454
U.S. at 536), such a claim "has no greater force than a claim that a
self-executing statute of limitations is unconstitutional." /21/

   In Texaco the Court held that due process did not require
individualized preforfeiture notice before a vested mineral interest
lapsed in accordance with the self- executing terms of the Indiana
Mineral Lapse Act.  The Court specifically rejected the suggestion
"that each citizen must in some way be given specific notice of the
impact of a new statute on his property before that law may affect his
property rights" (ibid.).  Like the Indiana statute, Section 314 sets
out in clear terms "the circumstances in which a property interest
will lapse through the inaction of its owner" (454 U.S. at 537).  Due
process therefore does not require individualized notice before a
claim becomes invalid by operation of law under Section 314(c).  /22/

   Although the government argued below /23/ that this case is
governed by Texaco v. Short, the district court did not even mention
Texaco in its opinion.  However, another district court has
distinguished Texaco.  In Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (D.
Mont. 1982), the court declared Section 314(c) unconstitutional in a
case involving invalidation of claims following failure to make an
initial recordation in a timely manner, as required by Section 314
(b).  See page 10 note 9, supra.  On the government's petition for
rehearing, the district court distinguished Texaco on the ground that
the Indiana statute at issue there provided for lapse only in cases in
which a mineral interest had not been used for 20 years, while under
Section 314 property rights may be lost as a result of failure to
file, "notwithstanding actual proprietary use of the property." Rogers
v. United States, No. CV-80-114-H (D. Mont. June 15, 1983), slip op.
2.  /24/

   The Rogers court's effort to distinguish Texaco is unavailing.  In
large part the attempted distinction appears to follow from the
court's erroneous perception of Section 314(c) as creating an
impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment (a perception
shared by the district court in this case).  We explain the error of
that perception in the following section.  In any event, the fact that
Congress did not include nonuse as a necessary predicate to
invalidation of a claim under Section 314(c) does not render the
holding in Texaco inapplicable to this case.  As we explained in the
preceding section, it is clearly within Congress's power to condition
retention of a mining claim located on federal lands on compliance
with the reasonable filing requirements of Section 314 alone.  See
pages 15-23 & note 15, supra.  The procedural due process standard
applicable to invalidation of a claim under such a provision is not
more demanding than that applied to a statute that conditions
retention of a fee interest on a combination of nonuse and failure to
comply with a filing requirement.  Indeed, if anything, individuals
who are actively mining claims located on public land should be more
likely to keep abreast of statutory and regulatory changes that may
affect their interests than are those who have allowed their interests
in privately held lands to lie dormant.  /25/

   The district court also held that due process may require a
preforfeiture hearing in the case of a claimant who fails to comply
with a Section 314 filing deadline.  In the district court's view, a
hearing would give the claimant an opportunity to establish that he
had not abandoned his claim. See J.S. App. 9a.  But that is not the
relevant issue under Section 314(c);  rather, the inquiry focuses
solely on whether the claimant filed an instrument that complies with
Section 314(a) or (b).  As we noted above (at 28-29), a claimant has a
full opportunity to present evidence on that issue in the proceeding
before the Interior Board of Land Appeals.  /26/

 C. Section 314(c) Does Not Create an Impermissible Irrebuttable
Presumption of Abandonment

   Despite the apparent consistency of Section 314 with the
requirements of due process, the district court concluded (J.S. App.
5a-10a) that Section 314(c) is unconstitutional.  The court based this
conclusion on its determination that Section 314(c) creates an
impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment, citing Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).  In fact, the irrebuttable presumption
analysis of Vlandis has no application to this case.

   In Vlandis the Court considered Connecticut's practice of charging
higher tuition to students who were not bona fide residents while
denying to individuals who previously had lived outside the State any
opportunity to establish that they had become bona fide residents.
The Court held that Connecticut's irrebutable presumption of
nonresidence violated due process because the presumption was not
necessarily or universally true in fact and because the State had
reasonable alternative means of determining bona fide residence.

   In this case, the district court purported to apply the Vlandis
analysis to reach the conclusion that Section 314 likewise violates
due process.  The court determined that Section 314(c) creates a
conclusive presumption of abandonment that is not necessarily or
universally true in fact, since failure to make a timely filing under
Section 314 does not always signify intent to abandon a claim.  The
court further concluded that there are reasonable alternative means of
determining whether a claimant in fact has abandoned a claim, i.e.,
through individual notice and a preforfeiture hearing.

   The district court was misled, we submit, in reading Section 314(c)
as cancelling mining claims for which the annual filing requirement
has not been met because that default demonstrates abandonment in
fact.  Although Section 314(c) uses the words "deemed conclusively to
constitute an abandonment," it does not create a presumption at all.
It is clear that Congress did not intend invalidation of a claim to
turn on abandonment or intent to abandon in the ordinary, common law
sense of those terms.  /27/ Instead, it merely provided in effect that
failure to file the required instruments in compliance with Section
314(a) and (b) would result in extinguishment of a claim.  /28/ Of
course, it would have been more straight-forward if Congress had
stated:  "All claimants who fail to comply with the filing
requirements of Section 314(a) and (b) shall forfeit their claims."
However, Section 314(c) is not the less constitutional for its
circumlocutory draftsmanship.  Congress's choice of statutory language
cannot invalidate a provision if its operation and effect are
otherwise permissible.  See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 23-24 (1976).  And see United States v. Union Pacific R.R.,
353 U.S. 112, 117-118 (1957).

   Moreover, Section 314(c) does not present the sort of dilemma the
Court perceived in Vlandis.  There the Connecticut legislature had
established bona fide residency as the factor that would qualify an
individual for a lower tuition charge, but denied certain individuals
who previously had lived outside the State any opportunity to
introduce evidence that they met the requirement.  Such individuals
thus were completely foreclosed from establishing eligibility for the
lower tuition charge.  Here Congress has not set up abandonment as the
statutory standard and then precluded introduction of evidence on that
issue;  rather, it has simply required that a claimant comply with the
filing requirements of Section 314 in order to retain his claim.  That
condition is obviously not impossible or burdensome to meet and is
entirely within the control of the individual claimant.  Compare
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).

   We note that in more recent decisions this Court has suggested that
the irrebuttable presumption analysis of Vlandis has little or no
application to otherwise reasonable economic regulatory measures.  In
Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, the Court declined to apply the Vlandis
analysis to duration-of-relationship Social Security eligibility
requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage
earners.  In a passage of particular relevance to this case, the Court
noted that the Vlandis analysis would be wholly inappropriate as
applied to, e.g., a statute that established time limits for assertion
of rights under the Social Security Act.  The Court explained in Salfi
(422 U.S. at 773) that a court should not secondguess the judgment of
the legislature about "whether such a flat cutoff provision was
necessary to protect the Secretary from stale claims, whether it would
be possible to make individualized determinations as to any prejudice
suffered by the Secretary as the result of an untimely filing, and
whether or not an individualized hearing on that issue should be
required in each case." The Court noted further that application of
the Vlandis analysis to legislation involving economic regulation
"would turn the doctrine of (Vlandis) into a virtual engine of
destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore
been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution" (422 U.S. at 772).

   The Court concluded in Salfi that Congress could rationally adopt a
prophylactic approach such as the duration-of-relationship eligibility
requirement, since "any imprecision from which it might suffer was
justified by its ease and certainty of operation" (422 U.S. at 780).
See also Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
377 (1973) (declining to conclude that a prophylactic regulatory
measure was equivalent to a conclusive presumption of the existence of
determinative facts).  And see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. at 22-24 (declining to invalidate a statute regulating purely
economic matters on the ground that it was worded in terms of a
conclusive presumption of total disability).  In this case, too,
Congress acted reasonably in adopting a self-executing provision that
minimizes administrative burdens and furthers the goal of efficient
administration of the public domain.  That rational legislative
judgment, like the provision at issue in Salfi, should not be
invalidated on the basis of a superficial application of the Vlandis
analysis.  /29/

   Even if the irrebuttable presumption analysis of Vlandis were
applicable to this case, the district court erred in concluding (J.S.
App. 9a-10a) that the second prong of the Vlandis analysis is
satisfied on the ground that notice and hearing procedures constitute
a "reasonable and practicable" alternative to the approach Congress
has chosen.  As we have explained (see page 19-20, supra), Section 314
serves a number of functions, some of which have little relation to
the question of abandonment.  Notice and an opportunity to prove
nonabandonment would not promote these functions and, in fact, could
be sufficiently burdensome to impair them.  For example, as we noted
(at 19), if BLM must notify a claimant before invalidation of a claim
may occur, there would be no effective incentive for claimants to
comply with the filing requirements on their own initiative;  thus,
BLM might be required to provide individual notice to virtually all
claimants.  Provision of a hearing for those who wished to show that
they had not abandoned their claims would amount to at least a partial
return to the time-consuming system of claim-by-claim adjudication
that BLM was required to use before enactment of Section 314.  See
page 4.  The delay in resolution of the status of disputed claims that
would result from tardy filings or hearings on the issue of
abandonment could impede significantly the ability of federal managers
to make land use decisions, thereby frustrating the overall purpose of
FLPMA.

   Even if Congress had expressed concern only with eliminating
abandoned claims when it enacted Section 314(c), notice and hearing
procedures would not necessarily be required as a "reasonable and
practicable" alternative to the system Congress established.  It is
true that it would be possible for BLM to give notice to each claimant
who fails to make a required annual filing, since the initial
recordations made by claimants have provided BLM with a listing of
claims in existence as of October 1979 (or as of some more recent date
for new claims).  /30/ But it is not at all clear that due process
would require that the burden be placed on BLM (which presumably would
have to contact each claimant, inquire whether a claim has been
abandoned, and, if necessary, conduct a hearing), rather than on
individual claimants, who are in the best position to know whether
they intend to hold their claims and to take responsibility for
advising BLM of their intentions.

 II. APPELLEES DID NOT RETAIN THEIR MINING CLAIMS BY FILING ONE DAY
LATE, BECAUSE SECTION 314 IS NOT SATISFIED BY "SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE"
WITH ITS REQUIREMENTS

   The district court held in the alternative (J.S. App. 10a-12a) that
appellees "substantially complied" (id. at 1a) with the requirements
of Section 314 by filing their 1980 affidavits of assessment work one
day late, i.e., on December 31 of that year.  But, contrary to the
district court's view, Section 314 is not satisfied by less than full
compliance with its terms.

   The language of Section 314 appears absolute and does not suggest
that some form of "substantial compliance" with the filing deadlines
would suffice to avoid invalidation of a claim.  Section 314(a)
expressly provides that annual filings must be made "prior to December
31" of each year.  Filing a notice on December 31 is plainly not the
same as filing it prior to December 31.  /31/ Section 314(c) on its
face indicates that, except in certain enumerated circumstances (not
including late filing, see pages 5-6 note 3, supra), any failure to
comply with the filing requirements of subsections (a) and (b) will
result in invalidation of a mining claim.  We are unaware of any
principle of statutory construction that would support the conclusion
that such apparently absolute filing deadlines set by Congress may be
read broadly to permit filing on some later date.  /32/

   Congress clearly knew how to make exceptions to the Section 314
requirements.  In Section 314(c) itself Congress expressly described
certain circumstances in which failure to comply with the filing
requirements would not result in invalidation of a claim.  In
addition, Congress recently provided some relief for claimants who
have forfeited oil and gas placer claims through failure to meet the
Section 314 deadlines.  Under 30 U.S.C. 188(f), if the Secretary of
the Interior concludes that such failure was "inadvertent,
justifiable, or not due to lack of reasonable diligence on the part of
the owner," he may issue a noncompetitive oil and gas lease, even
though forfeiture of the claim normally would have subjected the land
to competitive leasing.  /33/ The absence of any comparable provision
for claims of the type held by appellees strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend to permit anything less than full compliance
in connection with those claims.  See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).  /34/

   The district court itself acknowledged (J.S. App. 10a) that the
language of Section 314 does not support a "substantial compliance"
standard.  However, it purported to find support for such a reading of
Section 314 in the legislative history and purpose of the statute.  In
fact, there is no such support.

   The House Report states flatly that "(f)ailure to comply with
(Section 314(a) and (b)) constitutes abandonment of the claim." H.R.
Rep. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).  It does not suggest in
any way that late filing would be permissible.  And a construction of
Section 314 that permits less than total compliance with the filing
requirements would be at odds with Congress's goal of enabling BLM to
obtain complete and up-to-date information on the status of mining
claims on federal lands.  Of course, the conclusion that these
particular claimants should not be held to have forfeited their claims
by filing one day late admittedly will not interfere in any measurable
way with BLM's ability to obtain information.  But the district court
did not define the outer limits of substantial compliance, and,
indeed, in the absence of any legislative guidelines, it would be
difficult to do so.  BLM cannot be certain from the district court's
opinion whether claimants should be allowed to file a day late, a
month late, a year late, or more.

   The district court's decision might allow BLM to establish a clear
cut-off point for substantial compliance with Section 314.  But it
seems almost certain that disappointed claimants would dispute BLM's
judgment about what compliance is "substantial." And if the period
within which claimants may file in order to meet a substantial
compliance standard turns out to be more than a few months, it could
significantly retard BLM's ability to collect and tabulate information
about the status of mining claims.  It is quite unlikely that Congress
would have intended that BLM would face such complications in
administering what otherwise appear to be absolute filing deadlines.

   The district court reasoned that a substantial compliance standard
for annual filings would not be inconsistent with the legislative
purpose because Congress was primarily interested in the elimination
of stale claims (J.S. App. 11a), /35/ which would be accomplished
through the initial recordation requirement.  In the court's view, the
provision for annual filings was "merely for the convenience of
federal land managers" (ibid.).  But as we explained above (at 19-20),
elimination of stale claims is only one of the purposes served by
Section 314;  that section also provides an efficient mechanism for
collection of up-to-date, certain information about the status of
unpatented mining claims, thus facilitating federal land use planning.
 /36/ The latter purpose is by no means unimportant, particularly in
view of the overall objectives of FLPMA.  The district court's attempt
to support its reading of the statute through denigration of the
purpose of the annual filing requirement is simply unjustified.

   In support of its conclusion that less than full adherence to the
terms of the filing requirements is sufficient under Section 314, the
district court relied on decisions in which this Court has suggested
that substantial compliance satisfies the requirement under the
general mining laws, 30 U.S.C. 28, that a claimant perform assessment
work in the amount of $100 during each year.  See Hickel v. Oil Shale
Corp., 400 U.S. 48, 57 (1970);  Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development
Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935);  Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic,
supra.  The Court indicated in those cases that not every default in
assessment work results in loss of a mining claim.  In particular, the
Court concluded in Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. and Krushnic
that failure to expend $100 on a claim in a single year would not
result in forfeiture of the claim if the claimant had satisfied the
assessment work requirement in subsequent years or if its substantial
attempts to resume such work had been frustrated by actions of the
United States.

   The assessment work cases cited by the district court do not
control this case.  The Sectin 314 filing requirements impose
obligations above and beyond annual assessment work and the other
conditions established by the general mining laws.  As we explained
above (at 3-4), Congress intended that the new filing requirements
would eliminate the unsatisfactory situation that had existed under
the general mining laws, including the need to prove through
time-consuming case-by-case adjudication whether a claimant had met
statutory requirements.  Congress's objective of improving on the old
system, rather than simply continuing it, argues against reading into
Section 314 the Court's gloss on a provision of the general mining
laws.  /37/

   Moreover, Section 314 is clearly distinguished from the provisions
at issue in the pre-FLPMA assessment work cases.  Under 30 U.S.C. 28
failure to meet the annual assessment work requirement renders a claim
open to relocation, but not if the original locator has resumed work
on the claim prior to any relocation. It was this express allowance
for preservation of a claim through resumption of work that allowed
the Court in Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. and Krushnic to
conclude that a failure to perform assessment work in a single year
did not result in forfeiture of the claim.  In contrast, there is no
provision in Section 314 for any grace period to accommodate the late
filing.  In addition, the savings clause at issue in the pre-FLPMA
assessment work cases, 30 U.S.C. 193, did not provide expressly that a
failure to comply with the annual assessment work requirement would
invalidate the claim automatically;  rather, it stated only that a
claim must be "maintained in compliance with the laws under which
initiated" in order to avoid being brought within the leasing system.
In contrast, in Section 314(c) Congress provided that failure to
comply with the filing requirements of subsections (a) and (b) "shall
be deemed conclusively" to constitute abandonment of the claim.  That
language is absolute and provides no support for the district court's
view that Section 314 is satisfied by "substantial compliance" with
its requirements.  434 F.Supp. at 649, 650 n.1.  Officers and
directors of a

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the district court should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   F. HENRY HABICHT, II

      Assistant Attorney General

   LOUIS F. CLAIBORNE

      Deputy Solicitor General

   CAROLYN F. CORWIN

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   DAVID C. SHILTON

   ARTHUR E. GOWRAN

      Attorneys

   JULY 1984

   /1/ See 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq. (oil, gas, oil shale, coal, and other
energy and fertilizer minerals);  30 U.S.C. 611 (sand, gravel, and
other building and construction minerals).  The minerals on public
lands that Congress has removed from the coverage of the general
mining laws are now generally subject to leasing or other contractual
arrangements.  See 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

   /2/ Both subsection (a) and subsection (b) require an initial
submission by October 1979 in the case of claims located prior to
October 21, 1976.  However, only subsection (a) requires annual
filings thereafter.  For ease of reference, we will refer to
subsection (a) as the annual filing requirement and to subsection (b)
as the initial recordation requirement.  This case involves the
failure to make a timely annual filing required by subsection (a).

   /3/ Section 314(c) provides that it shall not be considered a
failure to file "if the instrument is defective or not timely filed
for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of
some but not all of the owners of the mining claim."

   /4/ This amendment was prompted by the overload on the United
States Postal Service caused by holiday mail during the latter part of
December.  See 47 Fed. Reg. 56305 (1982).

   /5/ Appellees located their claims in 1952 and 1955, prior to the
effective date of the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. 611,
which prospectively withdrew common varieties of building and
construction minerals from the coverage of the general mining laws.
See page 3 & note 1, supra;  Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., slip op.
20-21 n.15.

   /6/ The form letter appellees received (J.S. App. 22a-24a) advised
them that they could relocate their claims subject to valid
intervening rights of third parties or the United States.  In fact,
appellees may not relocate their claims because common varieties of
sand and gravel have been withdrawn from the coverage of the general
mining laws.  See note 5, supra.

   The appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement reproduces the letter
sent to appellee Madison D. Locke, J.S. App. 22a- 24a.  The other
three appellees received identical letters.

   /7/ The court did not address appellees' request for an injunction
against enforcement of Interior Department regulations.

   /8/ The court noted (J.S. App. 5a-6a) that during the 1979-1980
assessment year appellees produced over $1,000,000 worth of gravel and
sand from their claims.

   /9/ The United States District Court for the District of Montana
has declared Section 314(c) unconstitutional in a case involving
invalidation of claims based on failure to record timely notices of
location required by Section 314(b).  Rgoers v. United States, 575 F.
Supp. 4 (1982).  The court in Rogers applied an irrebuttable
presumption analysis similar to that employed by the district court in
this case.  Id. at 9-11.  However, the court in Rogers rejected the
contention that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy
Section 314.  575 F. Supp. at 8-9.  The government did not seek review
of the judgment in Rogers because it failed to file a notice of appeal
to this Court within the 30-day time limit set by 28 U.S.C. 2101(a).

   /10/ Appellees did not raise below the question of congressional
authority to enact Section 314;  the district court also did not refer
to that issue.  However, this Court in Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516,
525-530 (1982), concluded that it was appropriate to consider such an
issue before addressing constitutional challenges based on procedural
due process.

   /11/ Congress stated in the declaration of policy set out in FLPMA,
"the national interest will be best realized if the public lands and
their resources are periodically and systematically inventoried and
their present and future use is projected through a land use planning
process coordinated with other Federal and State planning efforts." 43
U.S.C. 1701(a)(2).

   /12/ BLM has advised us that the Section 314 filing requirements
have indeed facilitated actions involving federal lands.  For example,
the State of Utah recently selected 223,000 acres pursuant to the
indemnity selection program under 43 U.S.C. 853.  In the course of a
month, BLM was able to use the data base generated with the aid of
Section 314 filings to identify 32,000 of those acres as covered by
valid mining claims;  that information was then used in reaching an
agreement on acreage available for the State's indemnity selection.
BLM estimates that prior to passage of Section 314, it would have
taken four months of research at county courthouses, an additional 60
days for publication in the Federal Register and local newspapers, and
perhaps several years to determine the status of claims through
validity examinations and mining contest hearings in order to
accomplish a similar result.

   Thus far, the major benefits of the Section 314 recordation program
have been in the area of land conveyance and disposal of isolated,
unmanageable tracts pursuant to Section 203 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 1713.
Information generated by the program has also aided in the demarcation
of active mineral exploration areas, which in turn facilitates the
planning of new areas of mining and industrial activity on public
lands.

   /13/ Of course, many stale claims presumably were eliminated as a
result of claimants' failure to make initial recordations by October
1979.  However, annual filings serve to weed out additional claims
that have become stale since October 1979, thus continuously freeing
up public land for relocation by other miners or for other uses.

   /14/ Past experience indicates that filing requirements will not be
effective unless there is some enforcement mechanism.  Prior to the
passage of Section 314, there were several statutory recording
requirements applicable under special circumstances.  See, e.g., Act
of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 797, Section 4, 69 Stat. 683, 30 U.S.C. 623
(requiring recordation and reporting for claims on lands withdrawn for
power site development).  BLM has advised us that because there was no
statutory penalty for noncompliance (see MacDonald v. Best, 186 F.
Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1960)), it rarely received the required filings.

   /15/ The Indiana statute required filing of a statement of claim
only if a mineral interest had not been used for a period of 20 years.
 It seems clear, however, that the authority to condition retention of
an interest on filing is not confined to situations in which property
has not been used in recent years.  A filing requirement that applies
to both active and inactive interests, such as that imposed by Section
314, can serve many legitimate purposes, as we explained at pages
19-20, supra.

   /16/ Congress's power undoubtedly encompasses the authority to
impose a new condition in connection with mining claims already in
existence at the time FLPMA was enacted.  Texaco, too, involved a
statute that provided for extinguishment of existing interests if
owners failed to meet new requirements.  As the Court's discussion in
Texaco (454 U.S. at 526-529) shows, provisions that affect interests
created before their enactment have been upheld in a number of cases.

   Appellees cannot contend that they obtained their claims with the
expectation that the claims would never be subject to the condition
that claimants comply with reasonable filing requirements.  Compare,
e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-148 (1982);
 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977);
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514-515 (1965).  Claimants
have always been subject to certain statutory requirements that form
part of a system of regulation of federal lands;  thus, they cannot
object if Congress chooses to alter those conditions prospectively in
order to achieve reasonable legislative objectives.  See, e.g., FHA v.
The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958).  And cf. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., Nos. 83-245 and 83-291 (June 18,
1984) (retroactive legislation in previously regulated area did not
violate due process);  Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
14-20 (1976) (same).

   The functions served by Section 314 bear some resemblance to the
purposes underlying the enactment at issue in City of El Paso v.
Simmons, supra.  There the Court held that a Texas Statute that
limited the right of reinstatement of contractual claims to purchase
public land to five years from the date of forfeiture did not violate
the Contract Clause.  Although the right of reinstatement had not been
so limited at the time individuals entered into the contracts, the
Court noted that the State possessed reserved power to safeguard the
vital interests of its people.  The Court determined that the Texas
statute of repose served important state objectives, including
clarification of land titles, elimination of massive litigation over
titles, and effective administration of property by the State, while
the measure taken to induce purchasers to comply with their contracts
was quite mild.  379 U.S. at 509-517.  Of course, the standard under
the Due Process Clause is less searching than that applicable to
states under the Contract Clause.  Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., v.
R.A. Gray & Co., slip op. 14-15.

   /17/ At the oustset, we note that the property interest at issue in
this case is somewhat weaker than the interest considered in Texaco v.
Short.  The severed mineral interests in Texaco were defined by state
law as "vested" and as entitled to the same protection as fee simple
titles.  See 454 U.S. at 519 n.5.  The mining claims here are
unpatented and are defined in terms of a "right of present and
exclusive possession." Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280
U.S 306, 316 (1930);  Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 460
(1920).  Until a claimant proceeds to patent, paramount title to the
lands on which the claims are located remains in the United States.
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. at 336.  This Court has
repeatedly characterized mining claims as "property in the fullest
sense of that term." Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280
U.S. at 316;  Bradford v. Morrison, 212 U.S. 389, 394-395 (1909);
Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 283 (1881);  Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S.
at 767.  However, such claims remain subject to conditions set by
Congress, and the Interior Department has authority to issue
regulations affecting claims and to determine their validity.  Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. at 336;  Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. at 460.

   /18/ Appellees also claimed (Complaint 6-7 Paragraph 17) that
Section 314(c) effected a taking of their property without just
compensation.  The district court did not address the just
compensation issue;  however, it did characterize Section 314(c) as
effecting a taking of appellees' property interests (J.S. App. 4a).

   This Court's decision in Texaco makes it clear that the district
court's characterization is incorrect.  In Texaco the Court explained
(454 U.S. at 530) that a statute under which property is deemed to be
abandoned upon the owner's failure to take reasonable actions imposed
by law does not amount to a "taking" that requires just compensation
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  There is no "taking"
because it is the owner's failure to do the required act, rather than
any action of the government, that directly causes extinguishment of
the property right.  The Court noted in Texaco that it had "never
required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his
own neglect:  and that "after abandonment, the former owner retains no
interest for which he may claim compensation" (ibid.).

   The action required by Section 314 -- filing of standard documents
in a timely manner -- is clearly reasonable and within the capability
of any claimant.  Thus, invalidation of a claim following a claimant's
failure to comply with the statutory requirements does not effect any
taking.

   /19/ This case therefore differs from Texaco v. Short, in which the
record did not indicate whether the appellants were aware of the
enactment of the Mineral Lapse Act.  See 454 U.S. at 522.  Appellees
in this case apparently were aware of not only the filing
requirements, but also the effect on their claims of a failure to
comply with the requirements.  In their Complaint (at 4 Paragraph 12)
they stated that they made their initial recordation and filing prior
to October 21, 1979, "in order to protect (their) ten mining claims
from forfeiture." Appellees' account of their efforts to comply with
the 1980 annual filing requirement (see Mot. to Aff. 3) also suggests
that they were aware that a failure to comply with that requirement
would result in forfeiture.

   /20/ The relevant issue in determining whether a claim has become
invalid by operation of Section 314(c) -- whether a claimant has
complied with the filing requirements of Section 314 -- is quite
different from, e.g., the issues relevant to the determination
considered in Cameron v. United States, supra.  In Cameron the Court
considered the authority of the Interior Department to nullify an
unpatented mining claim on the basis of inconsistency with
requirements of the general mining laws.  The Court concluded that the
agency could nullify a claim after proper notice and an administrative
hearing.  252 U.S. at 460.  The relevant issues in such a case --
whether there had been a mineral discovery within the limits of the
claim, whether the land was mineral in character, and whether the
claimant otherwise had complied with requirements of the general
mining laws (id. at 456) -- are best determined in a hearing.

   /21/ This Court has upheld the constitutionality of statutes of
limitations that may operate to extinguish causes of action existing
at the time of enactment of the statute, so long as the legislature
provides a reasonable grace period within which suits may be brought
on those existing causes of action.  See, e.g., Block v. North Dakota,
slip op. 12 n.23;  Soper v. Lawrence Bros., 201 U.S. 359, 369 (1906)
(Holmes, J.);  Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. at 632-634.  See also, e.g.,
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. at 240-241 (statute governing
disposition of abandoned bank deposits);  Montoya v. Gonzales, 232
U.S. 375, 378 (1914) (Holmes, J.) (adverse possession);  Wilson v.
Iseminger, supra (extinguishment of ground rents);  Jackson v.
Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 289-290 (1830) (recording statute).
And see City of El Paso v. Simmons, supra (limiting to five years the
right of reinstatement of contractual claims to purchase public
lands).  There is no suggestion in these cases that individual notice
and a hearing must be afforded to those whose interests are affected
by such statutes.

   Of course, there are many other situations in which failure to
comply with a filing deadline results in loss of an important right or
other penalty. An obvious example is the time periods within which a
party must act in order to preserve his right to judicial review.
This Court has held that the requirement of a timely notice of appeal,
filed within the deadlines set out in Fed. R. App. P. 4, is "mandatory
and jurisdictional" and that failure to file a timely notice deprives
the appellate court of jurisdiction to act.  See Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982);  Browder v. Director,
Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978).  The
deadlines for filing in this Court (see 28 U.S.C. 2101) are also
jurisdictional.  See Dep't of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942).
Indeed, this case is before the Court only because we ourselves lost
the opportunity to obtain review of Rogers v. United States, 575 F.
Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1982), in which another district court held Section
314(c) unconstitutional;  following the decision in Rogers, government
attorneys failed to file a notice of appeal to this Court within the
30-day time limit set by 28 U.S.C. 2101(a).  And see U.C.C. Section
9-302 (1977) (requiring filing of a financing statement in order to
perfect a security interest);  U.C.C. Section 9-403(2) (1972)
(providing that perfection lapses after a five-year period unless a
creditor files a continuation statement);  26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1)
(providing a penalty for failure to file a timely tax return).  Again,
there is no suggestion that due process requires individual notice to
those who may lose property or otherwise suffer penalties if they fail
to meet these deadlines.

   /22/ Indeed, since the federal government itself is the owner of
the land on which the mining claims affected by Section 314 are
located, the case for individualized preforfeiture notice is even
weaker here than in Texaco.  Under the Indiana statute it would have
been relatively nonburdensome for each surface owner to provide
preforfeiture notice to the owners of the mineral interests on his
land.  Here, there would be a considerable burden on the federal
government if it were required to notify each delinquent claimant.  It
was reasonable for Congress instead to place on claimants themselves
the minimal burden of complying with the Section 314 filing
requirements.

   BLM has advised us that, beginning in 1980, its practice has been
to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several months before the
annual filing deadline in an effort to promote compliance with the
statute.  Thus, every claimant who has made an initial recordation
should receive advance warning that the December 30 deadline for
annual filing is approaching.  The 1980 reminder notice stated
explicitly:  "You must file on or before 12/30/80.  Failure to file
timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim abandoned."
We assume that appellees received a reminder notice from BLM in 1980.
However, the record does not indicate whether or not appellees in fact
received a notice.

   We do not believe such advance warning is constitutionally
required;  rather, it is a matter of administrative judgment within
BLM's discretion.  In any event, it would be far-fetched to suggest
that, once BLM provides a reminder notice in advance of the filing
date, the Constitution would require yet another reminder after the
filing date had passed.

   /23/ See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 34-36.

   /24/ Of course, the distinction between the two statutes is
probably due in large part to their differing purposes.  Nonuse was
relevant under the Indiana statute because its primary purpose was to
encourage productive use of private lands.  See 454 U.S. at 551-552
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  Section 314 provides an administratively
convenient method of clearing stale claims from federal lands, serves
as an enforcement mechanism that enables collection of up-to-date
information about the status of mining claims, and allows federal
managers to make land use decisions with some certainty.  See pages
19-20, supra.  Nonuse has only limited relevance to those functions.

   /25/ In support of their conclusion that the Indiana Mineral Lapse
Act provided insufficient notice to owners of mineral interests, the
dissenters in Texaco cited Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957),
although they acknowledged that Lambert did not control there because
"the imposition of criminal sanctions giv(es) rise to a rigor in the
application of due process standards that would be inappropriate where
only interests in property are at stake * * *" (454 U.S. at 547 n.4
(Brennan, J., dissenting;  emphasis in original)).  In Lambert the
Court characterized the California registration statute at issue there
as "entirely different" from other licensing or registration statutes
relating to the regulation of business activities, because
"circumstances which might move one to inquiry as to the necessity of
registration are completely lacking" (355 U.S. at 229).

   Section 314 is clearly distinguishable from the California law
considered in Lambert.  The filing requirements under Section 314 form
part of a comprehensive system of regulation of public lands.  See
H.R. Rep. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1976);  S. Rep. 94-583,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975).  Indeed, claimants have always been
subject to some regulation under the provisions of the general mining
laws.  Thus, they have good reason to keep informed about any new
statutory or regulatory requirements.  In an area subject to an
ongoing system of governmental regulation, lack of notice of filing
requirements may not be a defense even to the imposition of criminal
penalties.  See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607-610
(1971) (proof of specific intent unnecessary in connection with the
crime of possessing an unregistered firearm).  See also United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,281 (1943) (criminal penalties may "serve
as an effective means of regulation");  United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250, 253-254 (1922).

   /26/ As this Court noted in Texaco, 454 U.S. at 534-536, the
reasoning of cases such as Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), which provide that due process requires
notice and opportunity for an appropriate hearing in cases involving
deprivation of property by adjudication, does not apply to the
self-executing feature of a statute;  rather, it applies to a judicial
proceeding brought to determine, e.g., whether lapse of a mineral
estate did or did not occur.  Thus, Mullane governed the proceedings
associated with appellees' appeal to the IBLA, but not the
self-executing invalidation of their claims pursuant to Section
314(c).

   /27/ In effect, Section 314(c) simply assigns a new definition to
the term "abandonment" for purposes of that provision.  As the House
report accompanying the legislation states, "(f)ailure to comply with
(Section 314(a) and (b)) constitutes abandonment of the claim." H.R.
Rep. 94-1163, supra, at 11.

   /28/ Section 314(c) does not amount to a legislative determination
that, contrary to fact, all (or even some) claimants who fail to file
a timely annual notice have actually abandoned their claims.  It
expresses instead a determination that claimants who fail to comply
with the filing requirements should lose their claims.  In the
framework of mining law, denominating those claims "abandoned"
produces that result.  See 2 The American Law of Mining Section 8.5A
(Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation ed. 1982).

   This was Congress's understanding of the "deemed conclusively"
language.  The Senate version of the bill provided that any claim for
which the claimant has not applied for a patent within ten years
"shall be conclusively presumed to be abandoned and shall be void."
122 Cong. Rec. 4039 (1976).  Senator McClure described that provision
as follows:  "In essence, what the bill does is say that if there is
an unpatented mining claim on the public domain * * * they would have
to proceed to patent within 10 years or relinquish the claim." Id. at
4052.  See also Public Land Policy and Management Act of 1975:
Hearings on H.R. 5224 and H.R. 5622 Before the Subcomm. on Public
Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 224 (1975) (remarks of Jack O. Horton, Assistant Secretary
of the Interior) (under the administration's proposal for recordation
of mining claims, "(f)ailure to comply would render the claim
invalid").

   /29/ Commentators have criticized the irrebuttable presumption
analysis employed in Vlandis.  See Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions:
An Illusory Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 449, 472-473 (1975);  Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 1534, 1556 (1974).

   In Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. at 536 n.28, the Court declined to
reach the question whether a state could indulge in an assumption of
abandonment if the statutory period of nonuse were shorter than 20
years or if "the interest affected is such that concepts of 'use' or
'nonuse' have little meaning." We do not believe that the Court
intended to imply in any way that the federal government could not
condition retention of a mining claim located on public land on
compliance with reasonable filing requirements alone, without regard
to use or nonuse.  See page 21 note 15.

   /30/ As we noted (at 31 note 22), BLM's current practice is to send
out annual reminders to claimants several months before the due date
of the annual filings required by Section 314(a).  In addition, it
sends notices to those whose claims have been declared void because of
failure to comply with the Section 314 filing requirements.  See,
e.g., J.S. App. 22a-24a.

   The district court appears to have recognized (J.S. App. 9a) that
it would have been impossible for BLM to use such procedures in
connection with the initial recordation requirement under Section 314
because it could not have identified and adjudicated each of the
millions of claims that had been located on federal lands over the
years.  Cf. Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. at 11 (expressing
the view that allowing a hearing to a mining claimant prior to
invalidating his unpatented mining claim for failure to make an
initial recordation would not be overly burdensome to the government).

   /31/ The legislative history does not indicate why Congress chose
to require filing of annual notices "prior to" December 31, rather
than on or before December 31.  It may well be that Congress wished to
require filing by the end of the calendar year and that the earlier
deadline resulted from careless draftsmanship.  See Sherwood,
Mining-Claim Recordation and Prospecting Under the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, 23 Rocky Mtn. L. Inst. 1, 25 (1977).
However, the supposition that Congress might not have meant what it
said would not warrant reading of the statute that is contrary to its
plain language.  See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).  Of course, there is nothing to prevent
Congress from setting any filing deadline it wishes whether or not a
different time might seem more natural.

   Perhaps it might be argued that the words "prior to December 31"
should be read as though Congress had said "prior to the close of
business on December 31." However, we are unable to conclude that the
words of the statute can be stretched this far.  The natural reading
of "prior to December 31" is on or before December 30.  Any confusion
on this point would be dispelled by the Secretary's regulation, which
states that claimants must make their annual filings" on or before
December 30 of each calendar year." 43 C.F.R. 3833.2-1(b)(1).
Claimants are charged with knowledge of the regulation.  See 44 U.S.C.
1507;  Heckler v. Community Health Services, No. 83-56 (May 21, 1984),
slip op. 12-14;  FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384-385.

   As we noted above (at 6), the Secretary has revised the
implementing regulations to provide that annual notices will be
considered timely filed if they are postmarked on or before December
30 and are received at the proper BLM office by the following Jauary
19th.  While that amendment is a liberalization of the previous
regulation (which required that annual notices actually be received at
the BLM office on or before December 30), it does not depart from the
plain words of the statute.  Rather, it rests on the Secretary's
interpretation of the term "(f)ile," which is not defined by the
statute itself.  Congress has delegated to the Secretary the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of
FLPMA.  See 43 U.S.C. 1740.

   /32/ In fact, under normal rules of statutory construction, time
requirements imposed on an individual generally are mandatory and are
strictly construed against that individual.  See 2A C. Sands, Statutes
and Statutory Construction Section 57.19, at 445 (4th ed. 1973).
Moreover, the language of public land grants generally is strictly
construed against the grantee and in favor of the government.  See
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978);
United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 353 U.S. at 116;  3 C. Sands,
Statutes and Statutory Construction Section 64.07, at 137 (4th ed.
1974).

   The court in Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. at 8, concluded
that the plain language of Section 314(c) provides no support for a
theory of substantial compliance.  The court noted that "(c)arving out
such a substantial compliance exception would clearly defy the 'plain
meaning' rule of statutory construction." 575 F. Supp. at 8 (citing
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,201 (1976)).

   /33/ In addition, Congress has established grace periods in
connection with other requirements under the mining laws.  For
example, 30 U.S.C. 188(b) provides that certain oil and gas leases
will terminate automatically upon the lessee's failure to make annual
rental payments on or before the anniversary date of the lease.
However, Congress also provided that the Secretary may reinstate the
lease if the lessee pays or tenders the annual fee within 20 days of
the anniversary date and can show that the failure to make a timely
payment was justifiable or not due to a lack of reasonable diligence.
30 U.S.C.  188(c).  See Ramoco, Inc. v. Andrus, 649 F.2d 814 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1032 (1981).

   /34/ If Congress should conclude that the results of the operation
of Section 314(c) are too harsh in cases like that of appellees, it
presumably could modify the provision or enact some other form of
relief, as it did in the case of oil and gas placer claims.

   /35/ The district court cited the Senate Report (S. Rep. 94-583,
supra, at 65) for the proposition that Congress was primarily
interested in the elimination of stale claims when it enacted Section
314.  J.S. App. 11a.  But the Senate bill did not include a provision
for annual filings;  instead, it required that a claimant make an
initial recordation and proceed to patent within ten years in order to
retain a claim.  Thus, the comments in the Senate Report do not
reflect the legislative purpose underlying the annual filing
requirement.  The Conference Committee rejected the approach of the
Senate bill and instead adopted the House amendments, which contained
both the initial recordation requirement and the annual filing
requirement.  H.R. Rep. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976).

   /36/ See Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. at 314,
in which the court stated:

      The Act has a multitude of purposes -- not just the cleansing of
      the public domain of dormant and unpursued mining claims.  Some
      purposes, among others, are land use planning and management;
      the identification of lands subject to valid locations and
      invalid locations;  and the identification of unauthorized
      occupanices.

   /37/ And see 2 The American Law of Mining, supra, Section 8.20E, at
244 (suggesting that for all practical purposes Virginia-Colorado and
Krushnic have been overruled).

                               APPENDIX