CHARLIE WAYNE ROSE, APPELLANT V. BARBARA ANN MCNEIL ROSE AND STATE
OF TENNESSEE

   No. 85-1206

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1986

   On Appeal from the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Division

   Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Question Presented
   Interest of the United States
   Statement
   Summary of argument
   Argument:
       A. The federal statutory scheme precludes state
          jurisdiction over veterans disability benefits
       B. This Court's decisions establish that state
          courts are without authority to reduce the amount
          of disability benefits available to the veteran
   Conclusion

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2) deprives
a state court of jurisdiction to order child support payments to be
paid out of federal veterans' disability benefits.

                     INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

   The issue in this case is whether state courts may allocate
portions of a veteran's federal disability benefits for the support of
his children.  The power asserted by the state courts would interfere
with the authority of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to
apportion disability benefits.  The United States has a substantial
interest in maintaining federal control over the veterans' disability
benefit program, which serves not only to provide for the veteran
disabled in federal military service, but also to support current
military personnel needs.

   The Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States at the jurisdictional state of this case.

                               STATEMENT

   Appellant is a totally disabled Vietnam veteran whose only income
derives from disability benefits he receives from the Veterans
Administration and the Social Security Administration.  His Social
Security disability benefits amount to $281 a month (J.S. App. 8a).
He also receives, on his own behalf, $3,323 a month in veteran's
disability benefits.  /1/ These benefits are based on the fact that
appellant is a triple amputee who is blind in one eye (J.S. App. 2a)
and therefore, because of these wartime injuries, meets the statutory
standard of being so nearly helpless as to be in need of regular aid
and attendance (38 U.S.C. 502(b)).  /2/ In addition, he receives $99 a
month from the Veterans Administration on behalf of his two minor
children, pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. 315(1)(C) (West Supp. 1986).  They
receive $94 a month from the Social Security Administration (J.S. App.
7a).  See 42 U.S.C. 402(d).

   Appellant and appellee Barbara Ann McNeil Rose were divorced in
October 1983;  the divorce decree ordered appellant to pay $800 a
month in child support (J.S. App. 7a, 1a-2a, 17a).  In 1984, appellant
refused to continue the payments (J.S. App. 7a), and the district
court held him in contempt (J.S. App. 11a).  /3/ Appellant appealed
this ruling to the state court of appeals, arguing that neither his
Social Security nor his VA disability benefits are subject to state
court support orders.  /4/ The court of appeals rejected this argument
(J.S. App. 1a-5a), and the state supreme court denied permission to
appeal (J.S. App. 22a).  This Court noted probable jurisdiction on
June 30, 1986.

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   In 38 U.S.C. 314, Congress has specified in great detail the
precise sums to be paid as monthly benefits to veterans disabled in
active wartime military service.  The payments are based entirely on
the degree of disability, and provide an additional supplement to
those who, like appellant, are so nearly helpless that they need
regular assistance to perform essential personal functions.  To assure
that the disabled veteran himself receives the benefit of these sums,
38 U.S.C. 3101 broadly exempts these benefits from taxation, from
creditors' claims, and from "seizure by or under any legal or
equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt" by the
veteran.  Both the specificity with which the Congress has determined
the amounts necessary for the disabled veteran's support and the
anti-attachment provision are inconsistent with the state's assertion
of authority to reweigh the respective needs of the veteran and his
children for these federally-provided funds.  In addition, such an
assertion of authority is inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. 211(a), which
provides that the decisions of the Administrator on matters relating
to veterans' benefits are not subject to judicial review.  Although
that Section in terms bars only review in federal courts, state court
actions preempting the Administrator's benefit determinations are
inconsistent with the statutory purpose of achieving uniformity of
administration reflected in that Section.

   The federal statute does recognize that a disabled veteran's
children who are not in his custody may have a legitimate claim to
some part of his benefits, but it vests the evaluation of such claims
in the Adminsitrator of Veterans Affairs.  Not having availed herself
of the statutorily-prescribed procedures, appellee Barbara Rose is in
no position to assert, either in the state courts or in this Court,
that the subsistence needs of her children are not adequately
satisfied by the federal benefits that they are currently receiving.
Such contentions should be made to the Administrator in a claim for
apportionment of appellant's disability benefits.

   This Court's decisions support our position.  In Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), the anti-attachment provision in the
Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. 231m, which closely
parallels 38 U.S.C. 3101, was held to preempt a state court award of
an interest in federal retirement benefits (community property under
state law) as part of a property settlement in a divorce proceeding.
The Court's analysis, which recognized that the state court award
reduced the amounts Congress provided to the former employee in order
to achieve the statutory purposes, applies with at least equal force
here.  Indeed, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the Court
followed Hisquierdo in holding military retirement pay immune from
division as community property in a divorce settlement.  The same
result is required a fortiori here, where the federal payments reflect
the special needs of the seriously disabled veteran.  The garnishment
provision enacted in the Social Security Act amendments of 1975 and
1977 (42 U.S.C. 659, 662(f)), relied upon by the Court in Hisquierdo
and McCarty, similarly supports the result we urge here.  That
provisions specifically excepts settlements at issue in those cases,
but also the veteran's disability benefits at issue here.  Thus, in
deciding that federal payments that constitute remuneration for
employment should generally be subject to garnishment for child
support, Congress focussed on veterans' disability payments and again
confirmed that (except as otherwise provided in the federal program)
they should be reserved for the use of the veteran.

                               ARGUMENT

 A. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY SCHEME PRECLUDES STATE JURISDICTION OVER
VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS

   There is a clear national obligation to provide for those disabled
in military service to their country.  In addition, the provision of
military disability benefits furthers current military personnel needs
and general social goals.  /5/ Congress has therefore, since the
Revolutionary War period, provided for disability pensions for
veterans injured in active military service in wartime (McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 212-213 (1981)).  See generally Subcomm. on
Investigations of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., Dual Compensation Paid to Retired Uniformed
Services' Personnel in Federal Civilian Positions 18-20 (Comm. Print
1978).

   1. The current disability benefit provisions, contained in 38
U.S.C.A. 314 (West Supp. 1986), are based entirely on the degree of
disability, without regard to military rank or length of service.
Indeed, 38 U.S.C. 314 is remarkable for the specificity with which it
details the precise amount to be paid for each degree of disability,
with particular attention to certain types of injuries (see 38
U.S.C.A. 314(k)-(p)) (West Supp. 1986).  In addition, recognizing that
some veterans, like appellant, will be so nearly helpless that they
require constant assistance in performing essential personal
functions, the statute provides for the payment of a monthly aid and
attendance allowance of $998, or -- where the veteran needs a "higher
level of care" -- of $1,487 (38 U.S.C.A. 314(r)) (West Supp. 1986).
The very specificity with which Congress has defined the sums to be
provided for the support of the disabled veteran strongly suggests
that it did not intend to permit those sums to be reduced by the
states.  See pages 14-16, infra.

   Nor is that conclusion left only to implication.  Congress took
explicit care to assure that the sums it has so carefully specified
are preserved for the support of the disabled veteran himself.  Thus,
38 U.S.C. 3101 restricts the extent to which the benefits may be
assigned, exempts them from taxation and from the claims of creditors,
and broadly provides that such benefits "shall not be liable to
attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable
process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary."
/6/

   That provision is controlling here.  Its comprehensive language
refutes appellee Tennessee's contention (Mot. to Dis. or Aff. 5) that
it should not be applied to child support claims because "the
obligation to support dependents is not a debt in the usual sense."
The federal statutory exemption on its face encompasses far more than
conventional debts.  Moreover, the exemption "should be liberally
construed * * * to protect funds granted by the Congress for the
maintenance and support of the beneficiaries thereof" (Porter v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962)).  /7/

   2. Veterans' disability benefits are funded by annual
appropriations.  In contrast to the employee covered by the Social
Security system, the service member makes no contribution to the
veterans' benefit retirement system during the period of his active
service.  /8/ Congress is under no legal compulsion to appropriate
these funds;  the courts have repeatedly recognized that veterans'
pension benefits are "gratutities and establish no vested rights in
the recipients so that they may be withdrawn by Congress at any time
and under such conditions as Congress may impose." Milliken v.
Gleason, 332 F.2d 122, 123 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
1002 (1965);  deRodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1257-1258
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972) (collecting cases).

   One such condition is contained in 38 U.S.C. 211(a), which makes
the decision of the Administrator final on "any question of law or
fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors."
/9/ In Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-374 (1974), the Court
refused to interpret the ban on judicial review as extending to
constitutional claims, but it nowhere suggested any doubt about the
propreity of such a ban on judicial review of "those decisions of law
or fact that arise in the administration by the Veterans'
Administration of a statute providing benefits for veterans" (415 U.S.
at 367 (emphasis in original)).

   Section 211(a) explicitly bars only any "other official or any
court of the United States" from reviewing the Administrator's benefit
decisions.  In light of the desire for uniformity of administration
upon which the provision is substantially based (Johnson v. Robinson,
415 U.S. at 369-373, summarizing relevant legislative history), it is
clear, however, that Congress could not have intended to permit review
of the Administrator's decision in state courts.  Even more
inconsistent with this underlying congressional desire for uniformity
of administration is the decision of the court below.  That decision
permits a state court to allocate a veteran's disability benefits in
conformance with state policies, wholly without regard to any
determination by the Administrator.

   3. Such state interference in the federal regulatory scheme is not
justified by any gap in the federal system.  Congress has recognized
that apportionment of a veteran's benefits may sometimes be
appropriate to provide for his children when they are not in his
custody.  Rather than leaving such apportionment decisions to the
varied policies and procedures of the state courts, however, Congress
preferred to rely on the expert case-by-case judgment of the
Administrator of Veterans Affairs.  Accordingly, in 38 U.S.C. (& Supp.
II) 3107, Congress specifically provided for the apportionment of
benefits by the Administrator:

         (a) All or any part of the compensation, pension, or
      emergency officers' retirement pay payable on account of any
      veteran may --

                      * * *

         (2) if the veteran is not living with the veteran's spouse,
      or if the veteran's children are not in the custody of the
      veteran, be apportioned as may be prescribed by the
      Administrator.

Implementing regulations promulgated by the Veterans Administrtion
permit apportionment of all or any part of disability benefits if a
claim is filed seeking such apportionment when "the veteran is not
residing with his or her spouse, or (when) the veteran's children are
not residing with the veteran and the veteran is not reasonably
discharging his or her responsibility for the spouse's or children's
support." 38 C.F.R. 3.450(a)(1)(i).  /10/

   The statute and regulations thus clearly indicate that the decision
concerning the appropriateness of any apportionment of a veteran's
disability benefits is one that Congress has placed entirely within
the discretion of the Administrator, /11/ and that he has established
procedures under which he exercises that discretion on a case-by-case
basis.  /12/ We are informed by the Veterans Administration that no
claim for apportionment of appellant's disability benefits to provide
for the support of his minor children has been received to date, so
the Administrator has not had the opportunity to exercise his
discretion in this case.  Appellee Barbara Rose's preference for the
state forum in which to press her child support claims, however,
affords no adequate basis for refusing to require compliance with the
procedures established pursuant to the mandate of Congress.  Since she
has not utilized those procedures, she should not be heard to claim in
this Court that the federal benefits currently received by the minor
children are insufficient.  Such claims must be made to the
Administrator in an application for apportionment of appellant's
disability benefits.  /13/

 B. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS ESTABLISH THAT STATE COURTS ARE WITHOUT
AUTHORITY TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF DISABILITY BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO THE
VETERAN

   1. It has long been recognized that domestic relations law is
generally within state control.  As this Court stated in In re Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890), "(t)he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the law of
the States and not to the laws of the United States." Even when it is
alleged that state law conflicts with a federal statute, this Court
has limited its review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination
of whether Congress "positively required by direct enactment" that
state law be preempted.  Westmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
As this Court stated in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581
(1979), a "mere conflict in words is not sufficient.  State family and
family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial'
federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand the state
law be overridden" (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966)).  Nevertheless, this Court in Hisquierdo itself, and on
several other occasions, has held that under the Supremacy Clause
federal law did indeed override conflicting state domestic relations
law.  /14/ This case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from
Hisquierdo and its progeny.  Accordingly, the same conclusion is
appropriate here.

   In Hisquierdo, the Court concluded that a federal statutory
provision barring assignment, garnishment or attachment of railroad
retirement benefits preempted a state court award of an interest in
those benefits (considered community property under state law) as part
of a property settlement in a divorce proceeding.  In analyzing the
anti-attachment provision of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45
U.S.C. 231m, the Court noted (439 U.S. at 584) that it "pre-empts all
state law that stands in its way." /15/ The Court observed that
Congress had provided the precise amount it considered appropriate for
an employee's retirement, and that this amount was designed to
encourage an eligible employee to retire.  As the Court explained,
reducing the former employee's retirement pay by assigning part of it
to a divorced spouse in a property settlement would reduce the
incentive to retire and to that extent would frustrate the
congressional purpose in enacting the retirement program (439 U.S. at
585).

   Similarly, in the instant case, Congress has provided compensation
designed to meet both the requirements of disabled veterans and the
personnel needs of the military.  In 38 U.S.C. 314, Congress
established the precise amount of disability benefits to be paid to a
veteran as seriously injured as appellant;  it further protected the
veteran from the dissipation of those funds by providing that those
benefits should be entirely exempt from the claims of creditors and
from "attachment, levy or seizure by or under any legal or equitable
process whatever" (38 U.S.C. 3101(a)).  If the state court order were
allowed to redirect a portion of this benefit to the veteran's
dependents, the disabled veteran, like the former railroad employee in
Hisquierdo, would receive less than Congress had deemed necessary to
achieve the dual statutory purposes.  /16/ Moreover, as in Hisquierdo,
the exercise of such state authority is also inconsistent with the
applicable federal anti-attachment provision, which "prevents the
vagaries of state law from disrupting the national scheme, and
guarantees a national uniformity that enhances the effectiveness of
congressional policy" (439 U.S. at 584).

   In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the Court considered
the relationship of a federal statutory bar on attachment and a state
court order treating military retirement pay as community property in
a divorce settlement.  Applying the Hisquierdo analysis (see 439 U.S.
at 583), the Court first determined that there was a conflict between
the federal retirement provisions and the community property right
asserted;  it then analyzed that conflict to decide whether the
application of community property principles would threaten serious
harm to "clear and substantial" federal interests (453 U.S. at 232).
The Court found that the community property right asserted would
"'diminish that portion of the benefit Congress has said should go to
the retired (service member) alone'" (453 U.S. at 233 (quoting
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 590)).  In addition, military personnel
management would be disrupted because allowing community property
rights to take precedence would diminish the value of retired pay as
an inducement for enlistment or reenlistment and would lessen the
incentive to retire.  This would hinder the congressional objective of
maintaining a competent, youthful military (453 U.S. at 234-235).

   Similarly, in the instant case, federal law must take precedence in
order to insure that disabled service members will receive adequate
income and therefore are encouraged to retire rather than conceal
disability, and to maintain the incentive for military service
provided by disability programs.  Here, as in McCarty, "(s)tate courts
are not free to reduce the amounts that Congress has determined are
necessary for the retired member" (453 U.S. at 233).  /17/

   2. In both Hisquierdo (439 U.S. at 586-587) and McCarty (453 U.S.
at 230-232), the Court relied in its analysis on the 1975 and 1977
amendments to the Social Security Act.  In these amendments, Congress
provided that, notwithstanding any contrary law, federal benefits may
be reached by garnishment to satisfy a child support or alimony
obligation (42 U.S.C. 659).  Congress however, specifically excepted
from the definition of alimony "transfer(s) of property * * * in
compliance with any community property settlement" (42 U.S.C. 662(c)).
 Thus Congress had demonstrated its intent that community property
claims should not be allowed to "deflect( ) other federal benefit
programs from their intended goals" (Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 587;  see
McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230).  Accordingly, the Court held that a state
court order reflecting a community property settlement in a divorce
proceeding could not be allowed to override this express congressional
enactment.

   The garnishment statute similarly demonstrates congressional intent
regarding veterans' disability benefits.  It provides that federal
benefits may be garnished for child support if they are "moneys (the
entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due
from, or payable by, the United States" (42 U.S.C. 659(a)).  As we
explained, pages 6, 8, supra, veterans' disability benefits are not
remuneration for employment.  Moreover, a definitional provision
specifically excludes "any payments by the Veterans' Administration as
compensation for a service-connected disability or death." /18/ 42
U.S.C. 662(f)(2).  /19/

   As in Hisquierdo and McCarty, therefore, Congress has made clear
its intent.  While Congress believed that the need to provide
financial support for a family could justify garnishment of some
federal benefits, it specifically determined that the veterans'
disability benefit program is not to be subject to garnishment.  /20/
It has, indeed, specifically insulated disability payments under the
program from "attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or
equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the
beneficiary" (38 J.S.C. 3101(a));  and it has vested exclusive
authority to apportion such benefits in the Administrator of Veterans
Affairs (see pages 10-12, supra).  Just as in Hisquierdo and McCarty,
therefore, a state court order in a divorce proceeding may not take
precedence over what Congress has ordained.

                              CONCLUSION

   The decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted,

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Assistant Attorney General

   LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

      Deputy Solicitor General

   HARRIET S. SHAPIRO

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   MICHAEL JAY SINGER

   CHRISTINE R. WHITTAKER

      Attorneys

   AUGUST 1986

   /1/ The figures given represent current benefits under 38 U.S.C.A.
314 (West Supp. 1986);  the figures in J.S. App. 8a are those received
under the superseded statute.

   /2/ Pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. 314(o), (p) and (r) (West Supp. 1986),
a veteran who is totally disabled is entitled to a monthly disability
benefit not to exceed $2.325, plus a monthly attendance allowance of
up to $1,487 if he is so nearly helpless as to require the regular
attendance of another person (38 U.S.C. 502).  See 38 C.F.R. 3.352,
defining criteria for determining permanent need for regular aid and
attendance.

   /3/ The court concluded that the children's Social Security
benefits were in addition to the $800 a month support order, but set
off the children's VA benefits (then $90) against the $800 (J.S. App.
7a).  The appellate court agreed (J.S. App. 4a).

   /4/ In this Court, appellant does not contest the award insofar as
it requires him to use his Social Security benefits to pay child
support (J.S. 16).  He also has apparently been turning the children's
VA benefits over to them (see J.S. App. 7a), and does not contest his
obligation to do so.

   /5/ Disability payments help maintain a fit military force by
encouraging those eligible for benefits to retire, rather than to
conceal their disability and continue in active service for economic
reasons.  They also, like other fringe benefits, facilitate
recruitment, helping to attract competent personnel.  Furthermore,
adequate disability benefits avoid the possibility that the support of
disabled veterans will be a burden on local communities.

   /6/ Congress has included a provision protecting military benefits
against attachment or garnishment since 1873, when it stated that a
military pension "shall inure wholly to the benefit of (the)
pensioner." Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, Section 33, 17 Stat.
575-576.  In subsequent reenactments, Congress has continued to make
clear and reaffirm that its purpose is to exempt veterans' benefits
from creditor actions as well as from taxation.  See Trotter v.
Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933);  Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962).

   /7/ This Court held in Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra, that veterans' benefit funds retain their exempt status after
being deposited in the veteran's savings and loan account.  The
federal government retained sufficient interest in the funds, even
after they passed into the veteran's possession, to protect them from
creditors.  See also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-649
(1961), upholding the constitutionality of federal statute asserting
federal right to property of intestate veterans who die without heirs
in government facilities, against claim by state under its escheat
laws.  The Court in Oregon relied on the congressional power to raise
armies and the consequent power "to pay pensions and to build
hospitals and homes for veterans" (id. at 648).  The same powers that
extend to requiring the property of the veteran "wards" of the federal
government (id. at 649) to pass to the federal, rather than the state,
government also justify protecting that property in the veteran's
hands against the claims of creditors, including the state.

   /8/ Military personnel, however, have been required since 1957 to
contribute to the Social Security system (Servicemen's and Veterans'
Survivor Benefits Act, ch. 837, Section 402, 70 Stat. 870).  See 42
U.S.C. 410(l) and (m).  A service member who, like appellant, meets
that Act's eligibility requirements is entitled to Social Security
disability benefits.

   /9/ Section 211(a) provides in pertinent part:

         the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
      fact under any law administered by the Veteran's Administration
      providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or
      survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
      any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction
      to review any such decision by an action in the nature of
      mandamus or otherwise.

   /10/ The Veterans Administration Manual M-21-1 (ch. 26, Paragraph
26.01) (Aug. 1, 1979) further regulates the apportionment of
disability awards.  It provides in pertinent part:

         Apportionment of a competent veteran's benefits may be made
      only upon receipt of a claim therefor (emphasis in original) * *
      * :

         (1) To an estranged spouse and child or children in the
      spouse's custody.

         (2) To a child or children (not living with) the veteran (and
      to whom the veteran is not reasonably contributing);  except
      that a claim for apportionment on their behalf should be invited
      when consistent with the equities.

   /11/ There is no merit to appellee Tennessee's suggestion (Mot. to
Dis. or Aff. 7) that the Administrator's apportionment authority is
not exclusive because Section 3107 provides that he "may," not that he
"shall," order apportionment.  Clearly, the statutory term reflects
the fact that the Administrator is under no obligation to apportion in
all cases that meet the statutory criteria:  he is to exercise his
discretion.  There is no suggestion in the statute that this
discretion can be superseded by state court determinations.

   /12/ The records of the Veterans Administration reflect that the
July 1986 disability benefits of 27,263 veterans were apportioned.

   /13/ The statutory restriction extends only to the apportionment of
the VA benefits themselves.  It does not affect the state court's
power to consider the veteran's total income, including his VA
benefits, in determining the amount of child support to be paid from
any other income he may have.  Thus, in this case, the state court
could appropriately have ordered appellant to pay any sum up to $281 a
month -- the total amount of his Social Security disability payments
-- for child support, in addition to the amounts the children receive
directly from the VA and Social Security.  See n.18, infra.  It would
then also be appropriate for the Administrator to consider that state
court order in deciding how much, if any, of the appellant's VA
disability benefits should be apportioned to his children.

   /14/ In a number of instances prior to Hisquierdo this Court had
held that under the Supremacy Clause federal law overrode state family
law.  In McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905), federal homestead law,
which allowed a widow to establish title to federal land settled by
her husband, overrode a state law that would have allowed the daughter
to inherit her father's expectation that the title would issue to him.
 In three cases, survivorship rules in federal savings bond and
military life insurance systems prevailed over state community
property law.  Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964);  Free
v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962);  Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655
(1950).  And see United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (federal
statute providing for devolution of veteran's property overrides state
intestacy law).

   /15/ That provision does not differ in any significant way from 38
U.S.C. 3101(a).  Indeed, Section 3101(a) is, if anything, more
sweeping.

   /16/ Because policies that maximize the fitness of the nation's
active duty military personnel have a higher national priority than
those that have the same effect on railroad employees, the
considerations requiring federal preemption are even stronger in this
case than in Hisquierdo.  See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236
(1981).  Cf. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. at 649.

   /17/ Accepting the Court's invitation in McCarty, 453 U.S. at
235-236, Congress considered the "plight of an ex-spouse of a retired
service member" and enacted, in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, Tit. X, 96 Stat. 730 et seq., a
new section, 10 U.S.C. 1408, to permit state courts to allocate
military retired pay in divorce proceedings.  See H.R. Conf. Rep.
97-749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1982).  Significantly, however, the
statute specifically excludes from its provisions the "retired pay of
a member retired for disability" (10 U.S.C. 1408(a)(4)).

   /18/ In contrast, Social Security disability payments -- "payments
* * * under the insurance system established by subchapter II of this
chapter" -- are subject to garnishment by virtue of the 42 U.S.C.
662(f)(2) definition.

   /19/ VA disability payments may, however, be garnished if paid to
"a former member of the Armed Forces who is in receipt of retired or
retainer pay if such former member has waived a portion of his retired
pay in order to receive such compensation" (42 U.S.C. 662(f)(2)).
Appellees do not claim that appellant is such a person.

   /20/ The power of Congress to bar the garnishment of veterans'
benefits is based on sovereign immunity.  See Buchanan v. Alexander,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846);  Smith v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 388 (1918).
In passing the Social Security amendments, Congress intended partially
to waive sovereign immunity in order to permit garnishment of the pay
of federal employees who might otherwise fail to make alimony or child
support payments.  See S. Rep. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54
(1974).  See also Diaz v. Diaz, 568 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977);  Young
v. Young, 547 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tenn. 1980);  Meadows v. Meadows, 619
P.2d 598 (Okla. 1980).  While Congress made the United States subject
to certain garnishment proceedings, principles of sovereign immunity
require that the the statutory provisions be strictly construed.  In
any event, as we have shown, veterans' disability benefits are
explicitly excluded from the waiver of immunity.

   Of course, this case, like Hisquierdo and McCarty, involves no
direct attempt to garnish federal benefits, nor any other state court
order requiring the federal agency to make payment directly to the
federal beneficiary's dependents.  That circumstance did not deter the
Court from analyzing the practical effects of the state court orders
in Hisquierdo and McCarty;  the same analysis is appropriate here.
See also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. at 648-649.