Equal employment Opportunity Commission v. Woodridge Corp
 01-1045


 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
 _________________________

 No. 01-1045
 _________________________

 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

  Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

 WOODBRIDGE CORP.,

  Defendant-Appellee.
 ______________________________________________________

 On Appeal from the United States District Court
 for the Western District of Missouri
 ______________________________________________________

  REPLY BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
 OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

 ______________________________________________________


 GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS
 Associate General Counsel

 PHILIP B. SKLOVER
 Associate General Counsel

 VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD
 Assistant General Counsel

 JULIE L. GANTZ
 Attorney

 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 1801 L Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20507
 (202) 663-4718
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii

 INTRODUCTION 1

 ARGUMENT  5

 CONCLUSION 19

 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
 _________________________

 No. 01-1045
 _________________________

 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

  Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

 WOODBRIDGE CORP.,

  Defendant-Appellee.

 ______________________________________________________

 On Appeal from the United States District Court
 for the Western District of Missouri
 ______________________________________________________

 REPLY BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
 OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 ______________________________________________________


 INTRODUCTION

  The Commission alleges in this action that Woodbridge Corp. violated
  Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 
  12101 et seq., by withdrawing offers of employment from a group of
  applicants because it believed they had or were likely to develop carpal
  tunnel syndrome ("CTS") due to abnormal scores they received on a test
  designed to screen for the condition.  The district court granted
  defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the rejected
  applicants did not have a disability because Woodbridge did not regard
  them as substantially limited in working.  The court determined that
  there was insufficient evidence that Woodbridge regarded the rejected
  applicants as unable to perform jobs other than the particular jobs at
  defendant's plant for which they applied.
  In our opening brief, we explained why this ruling was erroneous.
  We noted that Woodbridge acknowledges that it believed that individuals
  who failed the neurometry test had CTS or would contract CTS, and that
  it considered applicants with abnormal neurometry results ineligible
  for any of the hourly production jobs with the company due to the high
  levels of repetitive motion required.  EEOC Br. at 20-21.  We noted that
  the physicians at Occupational Medicine Associates ("OMA"), on whom
  Woodbridge relied, advised in general terms that those with abnormal
  neurometry scores should not work in jobs requiring repetitive motion.
  EEOC Br. at 27.  We argued that this evidence would support an inference
  that Woodbridge regarded the applicants as unfit for any work requiring
  hand and wrist motion comparable to that involved in the Woodbridge
  production jobs.  EEOC Br. at 28-29.
  We then argued that such a perceived limitation would be a "substantial"
  limitation on working because, if it were true, it would mean that the
  applicants were precluded from a broad range of jobs for which they were
  otherwise qualified.  In making this argument, we relied on the report
  of vocational expert, Sherry Browning ("Browning report"), which found
  that a majority of manual labor jobs in the Kansas City area to which the
  applicants had access require the same or greater levels of repetitive
  hand and wrist motion.  EEOC Br. at 9-13, 23-25.  Accordingly, we argued,
  the evidence would support a finding that the rejected applicants had
  a disability within the meaning of the ADA because they were regarded
  by Woodbridge as substantially limited in working.
  In its brief as appellee Woodbridge offers no meaningful response to
  these arguments.  Instead of explaining why it is not logical to infer
  from the company's actions that it regarded the rejected applicants as
  unfit for jobs requiring repetitive motion comparable to that required
  in its production jobs, Woodbridge insists that it cannot be found
  to have regarded the applicants as substantially limited in working
  because its officials steadfastly maintained that they never thought
  about other jobs.  This Court should reject this "ostrich" defense,
  because, as the district court noted, "if courts were to adopt this view
  then every employer sued under the ADA would simply argue that they only
  regarded the employee as restricted from performing the particular job
  for which they were considered," and this would "eviscerate the purpose
  behind the 'regarded as' prong of the ADA."  See EEOC Br. Addendum at 7
  (Order at 7).
  Woodbridge also argues that its belief that the applicants are unfit for
  the foam production jobs in question does not reflect a perception that
  they are substantially limited in working because the Woodbridge jobs
  are "very unique."  Def. Br. at 28.  There is nothing in the record to
  suggest that the jobs in question are unique with respect to repetitive
  motion.  On the contrary, the Browning report - which Woodbridge ignores
  in making this argument - concludes, based on a careful examination
  of Woodbridge's operations, that there are tens of thousands of jobs
  in the Kansas City area demanding similar levels of repetitive motion.
  IIC.A.307 (Browning Rpt. at 20).
  Notwithstanding defendant's repeated assertions that there is no
  evidence that Woodbridge regarded the applicants as substantially
  limited in working, the record contains sufficient evidence to support
  a finding that the applicants are disabled under the ADA.  At best,
  defendant's arguments indicate that there are factual questions that
  cannot be decided on summary judgment.
  We submit this reply to respond to the arguments raised by the defendant
  and to refocus the discussion on the issues raised by the Commission's
  appeal and the evidence supporting the Commission's arguments.

 ARGUMENT

  1.  In our opening brief, we argued that a jury could find, as a matter
  of logic and common sense, that if Woodbridge believed the rejected
  applicants were unfit for the Woodbridge production jobs because they
  had or were susceptible to CTS, Woodbridge must also believe they
  could not perform other jobs that required the same or higher levels
  of repetitive motion.  EEOC Br. at 20-22.  Accordingly, contrary to
  defendant's assertion, it is strongly in dispute whether "Woodbridge
  believed that the claimants were generally employable."  Def. Br. at 24.
  As we argued in our opening brief, the undisputed facts support a
  logical inference that Woodbridge's perception that the rejected
  applicants were unable to perform high levels of repetitive motion
  extended beyond the Woodbridge production jobs.  It is undisputed
  that the applicants were rejected for the production jobs because of
  their abnormal neurometry scores indicating to defendant that they had
  or would contract CTS.  See, e.g., EEOC Br. at 5 (citing the record);
  W.App.113 (Fulps Dep. at 60) ("if the doctor said that they were at risk,
  then - then it was our obligation not to put them in that situation").
  It is also undisputed that Woodbridge rejected the applicants because
  CTS is caused or exacerbated by repetitive hand and wrist motion and
  the foam production jobs require high levels of repetitive motion.
  EEOC Br. at 4, 5 (citing the record).
  Woodbridge contends that it was "impossible for Woodbridge to have
  regarded the claimants as unable to work in jobs outside of Woodbridge"
  because three of its decisionmakers testified that they never formed
  an opinion about their general employability.<1>  Def. Br. at 30.
  As we pointed out in our opening brief, the decision-makers' testimony
  that they were not considering the rejected applicants' ability to do
  other jobs does not compel an award of summary judgment.  We explained
  that no affirmative evidence was required that Woodbridge officials
  consciously reflected on the implications of their perceptions on the
  applicants' overall employment prospects.  EEOC Br. at 26.  The district
  court correctly rejected this defense.  An employer cannot escape the
  logical implications of its actions by merely asserting that it did
  not think about them.<2>  See EEOC Br. at 13, 22 (citing the district
  court order).
  In our opening brief, we pointed out that the OMA physicians stated
  broadly that individuals with CTS should not perform jobs requiring
  repetitive motion, and that these comments by OMA physicians that were
  relied upon by Woodbridge provide additional support for the inference
  that Woodbridge regarded the applicants as substantially limited in
  working.  EEOC Br. at 27-28.  It is undisputed that Woodbridge relied on
  OMA's advice in determining whether to withdraw conditional offers.<3>
  See, e.g., IIIC.A.890 (Haffey Affidavit at 4)("If the post hire physical
  comes back with a Dr.'s comment that someone is at high risk of injury
  if placed in a repetitive motion job, then I don't hire them."); W.App.98
  (Morgan Dep. at 143) (Woodbridge withdrew offers based on OMA's comments
  that "recommended not hiring because of something relative to carpal
  tunnel, be it an abnormal reading or something along that line");
  see generally EEOC Br. at 6 (citing the record).  On their face the
  comments are broadly worded advisements against repetitive motion
  or general statements about an increased risk of CTS; none of them
  mention particular Woodbridge jobs to avoid.  See, e.g., IIIC.A.747
  (Anderson medical rpt.) ("patient may be at increased risk for CTS if
  required to do repetitive motion type job"); see also EEOC Br. at 6-7
  (citing medical forms).
   Woodbridge argues in response that the OMA doctors' comments should
   be read in context to refer only to the Woodbridge production jobs.
   Def. Br. at 36.  Defendant is free to argue that theory to a jury.
   However, in deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate,
   this Court must accept the evidence in the light most favorable to
   the Commission, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.
   See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);
   Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
   587 (1986).  A jury could reject Woodbridge's argument that OMA's
   comments were meant to refer to only the Woodbridge production jobs
   and instead accept these comments as they are written - as general
   warnings about performing repetitive motion jobs.<4>  Moreover, even
   if OMA's comments were limited to the Woodbridge production jobs,
   summary judgment would still be inappropriate because a jury could
   infer from Woodbridge's perceptions about the rejected applicants'
   inability to perform the production jobs that it regarded them as
   precluded from any job requiring as much or more repetitive motion.
  2.  The district court concluded that Woodbridge's view that the
  rejected applicants were unqualified for foam production jobs at its
  plant did not support an inference that the company believed they were
  substantially limited in working because the
 Woodbridge jobs had "unique requirements."  EEOC Br. Addendum at 10
 (Order at 10).  We argued the court's characterization of the Woodbridge
 production plants as unique is not supported by the record, and that
 the only evidence in the record comparing the Woodbridge jobs to other
 jobs supports a finding that there are thousands of jobs in the Kansas
 City labor market with comparable levels of repetitive motion that would
 utilize training, knowledge, skills, and abilities similar to those of
 the rejected applicants.  EEOC Br. at 23-25.
  Woodbridge argues in response that its production jobs are "very
  unique jobs" that are "fast-paced and require high speed, high volume,
  strenuous repetitive motion of the hands and wrists."  Def. Br. at 28-29.
  Woodbridge also states that the jobs in question are the only foam
  production jobs in the area, and that the production line moves at the
  rate of 50 feet per minute.  Id. at 2-3, 24, 29.  As support for these
  statements, Woodbridge cites only evidence detailing the tasks involved
  in the production jobs.<5>  See id. at 2-3.  The company refers to
  no evidence comparing the requirements of the foam production jobs to
  other jobs potentially available to the applicants.  Woodbridge cannot
  convincingly argue that these jobs are "unique" without reference to
  any other jobs in the relevant labor market.
  The number of other jobs in the Kansas City area from which the
  applicants would be disqualified if they were physically impaired
  in the way Woodbridge perceived them is relevant in determining
  whether Woodbridge believed that the applicants' "overall employment
  opportunities are limited."  Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,
  188 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 1999).  Accordingly, the Commission offered
  evidence comparing Woodbridge's production jobs to other jobs in the
  labor market.  The Browning report constitutes probative evidence that
  would support a finding that many thousands of jobs in the Kansas City
  area require the same high levels and duration of repetitive motion and
  that the applicants are therefore perceived as substantially limited
  in working.  Browning carefully analyzed the Woodbridge jobs so she
  could compare the tasks, skills, and duration required of the Woodbridge
  production jobs to ascertain which other jobs in the Kansas City area
  had comparable levels of repetitive motion.  She performed an on-site
  analysis of the production jobs at the Woodbridge plant, observing and
  videotaping the motions required.  IIC.A.290 (Browning Rpt. at 3).
  She also reviewed job descriptions and ergonomic analyses and job
  safety analyses provided by Woodbridge regarding the production jobs.
  Id.  Browning "identified those variables which most accurately and
  comprehensively described the repetitive motion at the level of hands
  and wrists" and "selected the Level and Frequency ratings for those
  variables within the Woodbridge production jobs."  IIC.A.301 (Browning
  Rpt. at 14).  She matched variables found in the Woodbridge production
  jobs - manual dexterity; wrist-finger speed; using hands on objects,
  tools, controls; and making repetitive motions - to other jobs in the
  Kansas City metropolitan area.<6>  IIC.A.302 (Browning Rpt. at 15).
  Browning's analyses revealed that the rejected applicants would
  be precluded from tens of thousands of other jobs in the Kansas
  City area as well as the Woodbridge production positions if they
  actually could not safely perform repetitive hand and wrist motion.
  IIC.A.307 (Browning Rpt. at 20).  Such evidence supports a finding
  that the Woodbridge production jobs are not special or unique in the
  universe of manual labor jobs available to the rejected applicants,
  and that the applicants are perceived as precluded from a class of jobs
  or broad range of jobs.  See EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., No. 95C4956, 1996
  WL 400037, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1996) ("[w]here an employer fails
  to hire a job applicant based on a perceived impairment that forecloses
  a broad range of jobs in an industry, or even within a large company,
  the employer regards that applicant as disabled under the ADA").
  Defendant criticizes the Browning report for its "broad sweeping
  generalizations" about the Woodbridge production jobs and argues that
  Browning concluded that the applicants were regarded as unable to
  perform jobs of "Instrumental Musician, Farmer, Watchmaker, Plumber,
  and Jeweler."  Def. Br. at 38.  On the contrary, Browning tailored her
  loss of access inquiry to each applicant based on that individual's
  education and training; leisure and work history; medical history;
  and skills.  IIC.A.296-301 (Browning Rpt. at 9-14); see also EEOC
  v. Joslyn Mfg., 1996 WL 400037, at *6 ("[t]he court must ask whether
  the perceived impairment creates a significant barrier to employment for
  the particular job seeker").  For example, Delores Anderson did not lose
  access to the jobs of musician, farmer, watchmaker, plumber, or jeweler
  because she never performed a job with skills that are transferable to
  those jobs.  See, e.g., IIC.A.353-55 (Anderson Loss of Access from job
  titles); IIC.A.363 (Delores Anderson -- Loss of Access from Claimant's
  Work History Using OES Data).  The Browning report offers compelling
  evidence of the "number and types of jobs utilizing similar training,
  knowledge, skills or abilities, within the geographical area, from
  which the individual is also disqualified."  Sutton v. United Airlines,
  527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999), citing 29 C.F.R.  1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A),(B).
  The Browning report demonstrates why this case may be distinguished
  from Sutton, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999),
  or Shipley v. City of University City, 195 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 1999).
  See Def. Br. at 23-24, 26-28.  In those cases, the courts determined
  that there was insufficient evidence to show that the plaintiffs were
  precluded from more than one particular job.  If accepted by a fact
  finder, the Browning report establishes that the applicants were viewed
  as limited in a way that precluded them from a majority of the manual
  labor jobs in the Kansas City area -- between 59 and 99.5% -- because
  so many of these jobs available to the rejected applicants based on
  their backgrounds require comparable or higher levels of repetitive
  motion as the Woodbridge jobs.  See EEOC Br. at 9-13, 23-25 (citing
  Browning report).
  Woodbridge argues that EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012 (7th
  Cir.  2001), supports the district court's award of summary judgment
  in this case.  On the contrary, Rockwell supports the Commission's
  position in this appeal.  In Rockwell, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
  summary judgment against the Commission, holding that a jury could not
  find Rockwell regarded the claimants as substantially limited in their
  ability to work because the EEOC had not offered quantitative evidence
  "of the number and types of other jobs in Southern Illinois from
  which the job applicants would be excluded because of their perceived
  impairments." Id. at 1017-18.  The Rockwell court indicated that, had the
  Commission offered evidence "concerning the demographics of the Southern
  Illinois employment market," it would have survived summary judgment.
  Id. at 1018.  Because the Commission has offered precisely the type of
  evidence the Seventh Circuit required in Rockwell, the Rockwell decision
  offers no basis for affirmance of the district court's award of summary
  judgment and instead supports reversal.
  3.  The Commission's theory in this case is that Woodbridge perceived
  applicants who failed the neurometry test as having CTS and excluded
  them from the production jobs with high levels of repetitive motion
  that could be unsafe for such individuals.  We have never maintained
  that the rejected applicants had any impairment that actually limited
  their ability to work.<7>  Nonetheless, Woodbridge spends a significant
  portion of its brief detailing jobs that the applicants secured after
  they were turned away by Woodbridge.  Def. Br. at 12-17, 31-32.  In a
  case alleging that a group of individuals is perceived by an employer
  to be disabled, subsequent work history is manifestly irrelevant.
  See, e.g., Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998)
  ("[plaintiff's] subsequent work history could, at most, reflect her
  lack of an actual disability, and it therefore sheds no light whatever
  on whether, at the time of her termination, [defendant] regarded her
  impairment as substantially limiting her ability to work").  There is
  no reason the applicants should not have obtained other jobs after
  being rejected by Woodbridge - there was nothing wrong with them.
  Moreover, the fact that all the applicants obtained similar types of
  manual labor jobs, such as assembly line or food service positions,
  only serves to corroborate Browning's assessment of the types of
  jobs to which they had access.  See IIC.A.290 (Browning Rpt. at 3).
  See also Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1996)
  (person's expertise, background, and job expectations are relevant
  factors in defining the class of jobs used to determine whether an
  applicant is disabled).
  Woodbridge's interpretation of the record represents at best a
  possible view of the evidence in this case; however, another reasonable
  interpretation is that Woodbridge viewed the applicants as substantially
  limited in working.  A fact finder could choose the latter option.
  Consequently, summary judgment was improper.





   CONCLUSION

  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should
  be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

 Respectfully submitted,

       GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS
       Associate General Counsel

       PHILIP B. SKLOVER
       Associate General Counsel

       VINCENT J. BLACKWOOD
       Assistant General Counsel




        ___________________________________
                               JULIE L. GANTZ
       Attorney
       U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
 OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
       1801 L Street, N.W.
       Washington, D.C. 20507
                               (202) 663-4718



 April 23, 2001

 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE


  Pursuant to FRAP 32(a)(7)(C), I certify that this brief has been prepared
  in monospaced (nonproportionally spaced) typeface using Corel Word
  Perfect 8, Courier New 12-point font, and the textual portion contains
  3991 words.  A diskette containing the text of the brief is enclosed;
  the diskette has been scanned for viruses and is virus-free.


         _________________________
       Julie L. GantzCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


  I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing brief and an electronic
  copy on diskette have been mailed first class, postage prepaid, to:

 Michael L. Blumenthal, Esq.
 CONSTANGY, BROOKS & SMITH
 2600 Grand Blvd, Suite 300
 Kansas City, MO 64108




 ____________________________
 Julie L. Gantz, Esq.

 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
 1801 L Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20507






 April 23, 2001

 1 In fact, one of these decisionmakers testified that he
 could not state an opinion about whether any job with repetitive hand
 and wrist motion could produce the same risk of injury as the Woodbridge
 production jobs "without having documentation by somebody that studied
 those jobs."  W.App.75 (Haffey II Dep. at 204).  The Browning report
 provides precisely this kind of documentation.  See infra pp. 12-15.

 2 Woodbridge also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because
 the rejected applicants testified in their depositions that they did
 not know what evidence established that Woodbridge regarded them as
 substantially limited in working.  Def. Br. at 25-26.  To the extent
 this is a variation of the argument that only affirmative statements by
 Woodbridge that it considered the applicants' general employability will
 suffice, it is wrong for the reasons stated in the text.  Moreover, there
 is no reason to expect the applicants to explain the legal theory behind
 the Commission's claims.  Terms of art such as "regarded as disabled"
 or "substantially limited in working" characterize discrimination in
 terms that may not appear to be discrimination to a layperson.

 3 Defendant argues that it withdrew offers from the rejected applicants
 due to OSHA concerns, not workers' compensation costs.  See Def. Br. at
 4 n.1, 30. There is support in the record for the Commission's assertion
 that workers' compensation costs were in fact a concern and that OMA was
 aware of this.  See IC.A.218 (minutes of April 27, 1997, meeting between
 OMA and Woodbridge stating that "Randy clearly established his concerns
 were from a liability issue and potential work comp cases he would be
 taking on if they were to hire someone with even a slight problem");
 IC.A.181-82, 183-86 (Morgan Dep. at 26-27, 35-38) (workers' compensation
 cost information "helped us to better understand the total cost of
 the injuries and what injuries were costing us the most"); IC.A.177-78
 (Haffey II Dep. at 214-15) (acknowledging that workers' compensation
 premiums increase when employees file claims based on CTS); W.App.103
 (Morgan Dep. at 208)(OMA was Woodbridge's "gatekeeper, more or less,
 on our workers' compensation cases, injuries.").  However, Woodbridge's
 motivation for relying on the neurometry test is not at issue in this
 appeal since it is not relevant to the question of whether Woodbridge
 perceived the rejected applicants as substantially limited in working.


 4 That the comments on the medical exam forms were meant to be general
 is also substantiated by testimony of the OMA physicians elsewhere in
 the record.  As we discussed in our opening brief, Dr. Foster stated
 repeatedly that persons with CTS cannot safely perform any job requiring
 repetitive hand and wrist motions, including typing or assembly line work.
 See EEOC Br. at 7-8, 27 (citing the record).  Dr. Walker testified that
 persons with CTS should not perform production jobs at Woodbridge nor
 any other repetitive motion jobs.  Id. at 8, 27 (citing record).


 5 Some of testimony in the record directly undermines Woodbridge's
 attempts to depict the jobs as involving a high degree of repetitive
 motion.  For example, the testimony of Woodbridge's production supervisor
 suggests that there is nothing unusual about these production jobs.
 See W.App.14 (Butler Dep. at 67) (refusing to state that inserter job is
 "very repetitive"); W.App.18-19 (Butler Dep. at 77-78) (stating it would
 take "some strength and force" to pull seat cushions from the molds but
 stating he cannot quantify the amount of strength and force and doesn't
 know if they come out "fairly easily" or not).


 6 Browning compared the Woodbridge production jobs to those in the
 labor market requiring "frequent or constant" handling according to the
 Dictionary of Occupational Titles and O*Net, both of which are products
 of the U.S. Department of Labor and are commonly used by professionals
 in making comparisons between jobs.  "Handling" is defined as "seizing,
 holding, grasping, or otherwise working with hand or hands."  IIC.A.298
 (Browning Rpt. at 11).  The term "frequent" refers to handling 1/3 to
 2/3 of the work day, while "constant" describes more than 2/3 of the
 work day.  Id.

 7 Although the issue of actual disability is not presented, defendant
 asserts that "carpal tunnel syndrome is not a 'disability' as
 defined by the ADA."  See Def. Br. at 21 n.3 (emphasis in original).
 This categorical statement is antithetical to the case-specific
 inquiry required by the ADA.  See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483, quoting 20
 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App.  1630.2(j) ("The determination of whether an
 individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or
 diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect
 of that impairment on the life of the individual").  Furthermore a
 number of courts have found that individuals with CTS could qualify as
 disabled under the ADA.  See, e.g., Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
 of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000) (undisputed that
 plaintiff with bilateral CTS was disabled within the meaning of the
 ADA); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 675-76 (7th
 Cir. 1998) (employees with CTS offered sufficient evidence that they
 were substantially limiting in working to overcome summary judgment);
 Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1999) (plaintiff
 adduced sufficient evidence that her CTS was both recurrent and permanent
 and that she was substantially limited in working); Wellington v. Lyon
 County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) (there was a
 question of fact as to whether former school janitor suffering from CTS
 was substantially limited in working).