EVERETT A. SISSON, PETITIONER V. BURTON B. RUBY, ET AL.

   No. 88-2041

   In The Supreme Court Of The United States

   October Term, 1989

   On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The
Seventh Circuit

   Brief For The United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Questions Presented
   Interest of the United States
   Statement
   Summary of Argument
   Argument:
      The Limitation of Liability Act should be construed
      not to encompass state-created liabilities
      arising from torts that lack a significant relationship
      to traditional maritime activity
      A. Until Richardson, the Limitation of Liability
         Act was understood to be coextensive with
         the system of admiralty and maritime law of
         which it was a part
      B. The 1884 amendment to the Limitation of
         Liability Act did not reflect an intention to
         extend the statute to non-maritime torts
         1. The language of the 1884 enactment
         2. The legislative history
      C. Since Richardson, lower federal courts have
         declined in practice to apply the Limitation
         of Liability Act to all non-maritime torts
      D. Other developments regarding the scope of
         admiralty jurisdiction support restricting the
         Limitation of Liability Act to maritime torts.
   Conclusion

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   The United States will address the following questions:

   1. Whether the Limitation of Liability Act applies to state-created
liabilities arising out of torts having no significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity.

   2. Whether, in determining the applicability of the Limitation of
Liability Act, this Court should reconsider its decision in Richardson
v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911).

                     INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

   The United States is frequently involved in proceedings arising
from the Limitation of Liability Act.  The United States is entitled
to the benefit of the Act if it is sued as an owner of a vessel.  46
U.S.C. App. 746, 789 (Supp. IV 1986).  See Eastern Transp. Co. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 675, 690-691 (1927).  The United States may
also assert claims as to which a vessel owner seeks to invoke the Act.
 E.g., States Steamship Co. v. United States, 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.
1958).  Finally, the United States may be a co-defendant with a vessel
owner who seeks to limit liability under the Act;  in such a case, the
amount of the government's liability to a third party may turn on
whether the vessel owner may limit his liability.  Cf. Republic of
France v. United States, 290 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1961).  The United
States has been involved in litigation in which the owner of a
recreational vessel has sought to limit liability.  See Carpenter v.
United States, 710 F. Supp. 747 (D. Nev. 1988).

   In connection with the Court's consideration of the petition, the
Solicitor General was invited to and did file a brief expressing the
views of the United States.

                               STATEMENT

   1. Originally enacted in 1851, the Limitation of Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. App. 181 et seq., provides that "(t)he liability of the owner
of any vessel" for "any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for
any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done,
occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such
owner or owners, shall not * * * exceed the amount or value of the
interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending."
/1/ An owner who wishes to enforce his rights under the Act "may
petition a district court of the United States of competent
jurisdiction for limitation of liability within the provisions" of the
Act.  46 U.S.C. App. 185.  /2/ In addition to filing a complaint under
the Act, the owner must either deposit with the court a sum equal to
the value of the vessel and pending freight or transfer his interest
in those assets to a trustee.  Ibid.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(1).

   When an owner has complied with these requirements, "all claims and
proceedings against the owner or the owner's property with respect to
the matter in question" are stayed Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(3);  see 46
U.S.C. App. 185.  Upon application by the owner, the district court in
which the limitation proceeding has been commenced is empowered to
"enjoin the further prosecution of any action or proceeding against
the (owner) or the (owner's) property with respect to any claim
subject to limitation in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(3).

   When a complaint has been filed under the Act, the district court
issues a notice to "all persons asserting claims with respect to which
the complaint seeks limitation, admonishing them to file their
respective claims (in that court)." Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(4).  In
the classic limitation of liability situation, in which there are
multiple claims against the owner and the total amount sought exceeds
the value of his interest in the vessel, the district court is
empowered to adjudicate all questions presented by the Act and the
underlying claims.  That court has jurisdiction to determine whether
the owner is entitled to the statutory limitation of liability -- an
issue that often turns on whether the casualty was within his "privity
or knowledge" and whether and in what amount the owner is liable to
each claimant.  See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty
Section 10-17 (2d ed. 1975).  If the owner establishes his entitlement
to the benefits of the Act, the court apportions the value of the
vessel and pending freight among the successful claimants.  /3/

   The Limitation of Liability Act does not itself confer jurisdiction
on the federal courts.  However, in Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 104 (1871), this Court held that the grant of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction to the district courts, 28 U.S.C. 1333, empowers
those courts to entertain proceedings under the Act.  The courts'
jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under the Act is as broad as, but
no broader than, the liabilities that are subject to limitation.

   One of the questions in this case is whether and to what extent
those liabilities include state-law liabilities arising from torts
that would not otherwise be within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  In 1886, in Ex parte Phenix Ins.
Co., 118 U.S. 610 (1886), this Court held that a federal district
court lacked jurisdiction to limit an owner's liability for
non-maritime torts -- i.e., those torts giving rise to claims that,
apart from the Limitation of Liability Act, would not fall within the
court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.  Twenty-five years later,
however, in Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 106 (1911), the Court
held that an 1884 amendment to the Limitation of Liability Act (now
codified at 46 U.S.C. App. 189) extended the statute to "all claims *
* * whether the liability be strictly maritime or from a tort
non-maritime." Thus, the Court concluded, the Act and the federal
courts' jurisdiction to administer it were not restricted to torts
that would otherwise be subject to adjudication in admiralty.

   This case again presents the issue addressed in Ex parte Phenix and
Richardson, albeit in an altered setting.  In the decades since
Richardson, there have been significant developments in the scope of
federal admiralty jurisdiction.  With the enactment in 1948 of the
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. App. 740, Congress
has enlarged the territorial scope of that jurisdiction to encompass
formerly non-maritime torts of the type specifically at issue in Ex
parte Phenix and Richardson -- i.e., injuries by vessels on navigable
waters to persons or property on land.  In Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), and Foremost Ins. Co.
v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982), this Court established that a
wrong occurring on navigable waters must also have a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity in order to qualify as a
maritime tort within the admiralty jurisdiction.  In light of these
developments, the Court is again called upon to consider whether
standards governing the availability of federal admiralty jurisdiction
over claims arising in tort are also applicable in determining the
scope of the Limitation of Liability Act.

   2. Petitioner Everett A. Sisson was the owner of the Ultorian, a
56-foot pleasure yacht.  On September 24, 1985, the Ultorian caught
fire while docked at the Washington Park Marina in Michigan City,
Indiana.  The yacht was destroyed, and the fire caused extensive
damage to the marina and to other vessels in the vicinity.  The owners
of the marina and the damaged vessels estimate that their losses
exceed $275,000.  Pet. App. 1a-2a, 25a.

   Petitioner commenced this action in federal district court to
obtain the benefits of the Limitation of Liability Act.  Alleging that
the fire had occurred without petitioner's privity or knowledge, the
complaint sought a judgment enjoining the pursuit of claims against
petitioner for damages arising from the fire, adjudicating
petitioner's liability on those claims, limiting petitioner's total
liability to the value of his interest in the Ultorian after the
casualty (approximately $800), and dividing that sum among any
successful claimants.  The complaint invoked the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States.  Compl. Paragraphs 8, 10,
13, prayer.

   The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.  The court of
appeals first held that the casualty involved in this case -- a fire
that began in the Ultorian's washer/dryer -- did not have the
"significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" required
under Executive Jet and Foremost for the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction.  Pet. App. 2a-14a.  /4/

   The court also held that the Limitation of Liability Act did not
provide an independent basis of federal jurisdiction.  The panel
acknowledged that Richardson had allowed recovery for non-maritime
torts, but questioned the continuing applicability of that case.  Pet.
App. 16a.  In its view, the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act
"eliminate(d) the need and reason for (Richardson)," ibid.  Moreover,
the court observed, to uphold admiralty jurisdiction in this case
"would be contrary to the policy of Executive Jet and Foremost," id.
at 18a.  "(W)hen a cause of action in tort does not bear any
connection to traditional maritime activity, there is no justification
for allowing the Limitation of Liability Act -- which provides for a
practice apparently defensible only in a traditional maritime context
-- to provide an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction." Ibid.

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   The provisions of the Limitation of Liability Act that define its
scope are phrased in very broad terms.  A section of the Act
originally enacted in 1851 limits a vessel owner's liability for "any
loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or
thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture" to the amount or value of the
owner's interest in the vessel.  46 U.S.C. App. 183.  In 1884,
Congress provided that an owner's liability would not exceed the
proportion of "any or all debts and liabilities" that his share of the
vessel bears to the whole.  46 U.S.C. App. 189.

   Richardson suggests that the language of the second of these
enactments -- "any or all debts and liabilities" -- should be applied
literally, so as to encompass liabilities arising from all maritime
and non-maritime torts.  Thus, under this rationale, the Act would
apply to the facts in this case even if this Court determined that it
involved only a non-maritime tort.  We believe, however, that
Richardson should be reconsidered and that the statute should be
construed to be coterminous with the remainder of the system of
maritime law of which it is a part.  In view of its history and the
niche that it occupies in federal law, the Limitation of Liability Act
is most plausibly construed as incorporating established limits on the
system of admiralty and maritime law.

   A. From its inception, the Limitation of Liability Act has been
understood as a statutory addition to the system of admiralty and
maritime law that is implicit in Article III's extension of the
federal judicial power to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction." In its earliest decisions construing the Act, this
Court recognized that the principle of limited liability had
originated in the maritime codes of European nations, and the Court
referred to that body of preexisting law in resolving a number of
issues presented by the Act.  The Court also held that federal courts,
sitting in admiralty, would be principally responsible for
administering the Act.  When in the 19th century the Act's
constitutionality was challenged on the ground that it exceeded
Congress's authority under then-prevailing conceptions of the Commerce
Clause, the statute was sustained as an exercise of Congress's
authority, inherent in Article III, to modify maritime law.  Not
surprisingly, therefore, this Court held initially that the Act had
the same scope as the pre-existing system of maritime law to which the
principle of limited liability had been added.

   B. Richardson departed from this settled understanding of the
relationship between the Limitation of Liability Act and federal
maritime law.  It construed the Act, as amended in 1884, to extend the
statutory principle of limited liability, and with it the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts in limitation proceedings, to all
liabilities that might be imposed upon a vessel owner, whether or not
those liabilities would otherwise have been cognizable in admiralty.
Although Congress has constitional authority to modify maritime law
(and thereby to expand to some degree the admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts), we question whether the 1884 enactment can fairly
be construed to effect the very substantial extension of admiralty
jurisdiction that Richardson attributed to it.  The language and
legislative history of the statute suggest no such sharp break from
the pre-existing understanding.

   C. In practice, decisions since Richardson have not applied the
Limitation of Liability Act to "any or all debts and liabilities" that
vessel owners may incur.  Lower federal courts have repeatedly
declined, we believe correctly, to limit liabilities with respect to
casualties on non-navigable waters to which maritime law does not
apply.  Those courts have recognized that literal adherence to
Richardson's interpretation of the Limitation of Liability Act is
inappropriate -- and that some link must exist between that Act and
the traditional concerns of maritime law.  It is fair to reconsider,
therefore, whether the Act is best understood to incorporate
established limits on maritime tort law rather than to embody its own,
heretofore unarticulated, standards for determining the liabilities
subject to limitation.

   D. Developments in the law of admiralty have undercut the basis for
Richardson's holding.  At the time of that decision, restricting the
Limitation of Liability Act to maritime torts would have exposed
shipowners to unlimited liability for a large class of torts that were
then considered non-maritime -- those involving injuries to persons
and property on land -- that would foreseeably arise from accidents on
navigable waters.  Since Richardson, however, the Extension of
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. App. 740, has extended federal
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to encompass those accidents.  In
addition, the Court's recent decisions have stressed that the
boundaries of federal admiralty jurisdiction should reflect the need
for uniform federal admiralty law, but should also avoid unnecessary
encroachment on state law.  The requirement that a tort bear some
nexus to traditional martiime activity reflects that concern.  These
developments call into serious question any rule that the owner of a
vessel may invoke federal law to limit his liability for a
"non-maritime" tort -- a term now understood to embrace tortious
conduct that lacks any "significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity."

         ARGUMENT

   THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED NOT TO
ENCOMPASS STATE-CREATED LIABILITIES ARISING FROM TORTS THAT LACK A
SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TO TRADITIONAL MARTIME ACTIVITY

   A. Until Richardson, The Limitation Of Liability Act Was Understood
To Be Coextensive With The System Of Admiralty And Maritime Law Of
Which It Was A Part

   The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 defined the liabilities
subject to limitation only in the most general terms.  On this and
other points, the Act was only an outline that "laid down a few
general principles and propositions, and left it to the courts to
enforce them and carry them into practical effect." Providence & New
York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 590 (1883).  /5/ In its
early decisions interpreting this broadly phrased statute, this Court
relied heavily upon the Act's antecedents in the maritime laws of
foreign nations, placed the Act squarely within our system of federal
maritime law, and ultimately tied the scope of the Act to the
boundaries of that system.

   The first major case involving the Act was Norwich Co. v. Wright,
supra;  that case presented the questions whether the Act applied to
damages arising from collisions, whether the owner's interest in a
vessel was to be measured before or after the casualty, and what
judicial proceedings were appropriate to enforce an owner's rights
under the Act.  After tracing the history of limited liability in the
maritime codes of continental European nations and similar English
statutes, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 116-120, /6/ the Court held that the
Act followed the "general maritime law" in applying the concept of
limited liability to all damages -- not just damages for injury to
cargo -- arising from a collision.  Id. at 121.  Similarly, the Court
held that the Act "adopt(ed) the rule of that (maritime) code" that an
owner's interest in a vessel was to be valued after the event giving
rise to the owner's liability.  Id. at 127.  /7/

   In keeping with the Act's origins in the maritime codes of foreign
nations, the Court also assigned responsibility for its implementation
to federal admiralty courts.  The Court explained (80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
at 123-124 (emphasis omitted)):

         The act does not state what court shall be resorted to, nor
      what proceedings shall be taken;  but that the parties, or any
      of them, may take "the appropriate proceedings in any court, for
      the purpose of apportioning the sum for which, &c." Now, no
      court is better adapted than a court of admiralty to administer
      precisely such relief. * * * Congress might have invested the
      Circuit Courts of the United States with the jurisdiction of
      such cases by bill in equity, but it did not.  It is also
      evident that the State courts have not the requisite
      jurisdiction.  Unless, therefore, the District Courts themselves
      can administer the law, we are reduced to the dilemma of
      inferring that the legislature has passed a law which is
      incapable of execution.  This is never to be done if it can be
      avoided.  We have no doubt that the District Courts, as courts
      of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, have jurisdiction of the
      matter * * *.

The Court issued Supplementary Rules of Practice in Admiralty to
detail procedures to be followed in such cases.  See G. Gilmore & C.
Black, supra, Section 10-14.

   In later cases, the Court emphasized not only that the Act had been
patterned after maritime law abroad, but also that it should be
understood as a statutory addition to the system of federal maritime
law implicit in Article III's extension of judicial power to "all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. Const. Art. III,
Section 2.  /8/ For instance, in The "Scotland", 105 U.S. 24, 29, 30
(1881), a case involving the Act'ss applicability to foreign vessels,
the Court outlined the sources of federal maritime law and found that
the Act "declares the rule which the law-making power of this country
regards as most just to be applied in maritime cases."

   In Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578
(1883), the Court upheld federal authority to stay state court
proceedings in deference to a pending federal proceeding to limit a
vessel owner's liability.  The Court reasoned that the Act was a
legitimate exercise of Congress's "power to make changes in the
maritime law of the country," id. at 589;  that the statutory
principle of limited liability was a subject "preeminently of
admiralty jurisdiction" since it was "nothing more than the old
maritime rule administered in courts of admiralty in all countries
except England, from time immemorial," id. at 593;  and that even "if
this were not so, the subject-matter itself is one that belongs to the
department of maritime law." Id. at 593-594.  Based upon this
understanding of the Act, the Court concluded that a federal district
court "has full jurisdiction and plenary power, as a court of
admiralty, to entertain and carry on all proper proceedings for due
execution of the law, in all its parts;  and its decrees, in cases
subject to its jurisdiction, are valid and binding in all courts and
places." Id. at 599.

   Having characterized the Limitation of Liability Act as a statutory
addition to the Nation's system of maritime law, administered by
federal admiralty courts, the Court next concluded, not suprisingly,
that the Act was coextensive with the territorial limits of the
admiralty jurisdiction.  In Ex parte Phenix, supra, the owner of a
steamer sought to limit its liability for multiple claims arising from
a fire caused by sparks from the steamer's smokestack.  Because the
fire occurred on land, claims for resulting damages fell outside
federal admiralty jurisdiction as then defined.  118 U.S. at 618-619.
See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35 (1865).  The Court noted
that the Act "(did) not purport to confer any jurisdiction upon a
District Court" and referred only to "any court of competent
jurisdiction," "leaving the question of such competency to depend on
other provisions of law." 118 U.S. at 617.  It held, accordingly, that
neither the Act nor the Supplementary Admiralty Rules extended the
admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts to a proceeding to limit
a vessel owner's liability for a non-maritime tort.  The Court added
that nothing in its earlier decisions "support(ed) the view that a
District Court can take jurisdiction in admiralty of a petition for a
limitation of liability where it would not have had cognizance in
admiralty originally of the cause of action involved." Id. at 624.
/9/

   In Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889),
the Court held that the Act could properly be applied to limit a claim
under a state wrongful death statute arising from a sinking in
navigable waters near Martha's Vineyard.  After reiterating that
Congress had authority to amend and modify maritime law "within these
boundaries and limits" of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the
Court continued (id. at 557):

         It being clear, then, that the law of limited liability of
      shipowners is a part of our maritime code, the extent of its
      territorial operation (as before intimated) cannot be doubtful.
      It is necessarily coextensive with that of the general admiralty
      and maritime jurisdiction, and that by the settled law of this
      country extends wherever public navigation extends -- on the sea
      and the great inland lakes, and the navigable waters connecting
      therewith.

Since the sinking in Butler occurred in navigable waters, the Court
concluded, the state's wrongful death remedy could not "prevent the
full operation of the maritime law on those waters" and the
state-created liability was subject to limitation.  Ibid.  /10/

   In In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1 (1891), this same understanding of the
Limitation of Liability Act served as the basis for this Court's
rejection of a constitutional challenge to the Act's application to
vessels allegedly involved only in intrastate commerce.  Referring to
an 1886 amendment to the Act extending it to inland navigation, the
Court explained (id. at 12):

         It is unnecessary to invoke the power given to Congress to
      regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
      states, in order to find authority to pass the law in question.
      The act of Congress which limits the liability of ship owners
      was passed in amendment of the maritime law of the country, and
      the power to make amendments is coextensive with that law.  It
      is not confined to the boundaries or class of subjects which
      limit and characterize the power to regulate commerce;  but, in
      maritime matters, it extends to all matters and places to which
      the maritime law extends.  /11/

   In short, until Richardson, all of this Court's cases were
consistent with the view that the Limitation of Liability Act was an
addition to the system of maritime law that applied "to all matters
and places to which the maritime law extends," but no farther.

   B. The 1884 Amendment To The Limitation Of Liability Act Did Not
Reflect An Intention To Extend The Statute To Non-Maritime Torts

   In Richardson v. Harmon, supra, the Court returned to the question
in Ex parte Phenix and reached the opposite conclusion.  In
Richardson, a steam barge had collided with a bridge, and the owners
of the barge initiated a proceeding to limit their liability in
federal court.  The Court acknowledged that, like the casualty in Ex
parte Phenix, the collision was a non-maritime tort and "as such not
within the cognizance of an admiralty court." 222 U.S. at 101.  It
also recognized that the original Limitation of Liability Act would
not have encompassed such a tort, noting that the 1851 enactment
"embraced liabilities for maritime torts, but excluded both debts and
liabilities for non-maritime torts." Id. at 103.  However, the Court
held that Section 18 of the Act of June 26, 1884, ch. 121, 23 Stat.
57-58, "was intended to add to the enumerated claims of the old law
'any and all debts and liabilities' not theretofore included,"
including non-maritime tort claims.  222 U.S. at 105.  "Thus
construed," the Court continued, "the section harmonizes with the
policy of limiting the owner's risk to his interest in the ship in
respect of all claims arising out of the conduct of the master and
crew, whether the liability be strictly maritime or from a tort
non-maritime, but leaves him liable for his own fault, neglect and
contracts." Id. at 106.

   In our view, however, neither the language nor the legislative
history of the 1884 statute supports construing it as such as sharp
break with the prior understanding of the Limitation of Liability Act.

   1. The Language of the 1884 Enactment. -- A prominent admiralty
treatise has said of the 1884 Act, "No doubt when more obscure
statutes are drafted, the Congress will draft them, but it is
difficult to believe that any future body of law makers will ever
surpass this extraordinary effort." G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra,
Section 10-13, at 845.  A major interpretive difficulty arose from the
fact that the 1884 statute was not styled as an amendment to the
Limitation of Liability Act;  thus, it might have been read to
supersede preexisting law, to modify it, or to clarify it without
substantial change.

   In Richardson, this Court concluded that in most respects the 1884
Act was not intended to alter the settled procedural and substantive
provisions of the 1851 Act.  The Court observed that the 1884 Act
declared "(n)o purpose to repeal or qualify any of the terms of the
existing liability law";  that the Act was "in pari materia with" the
earlier legislation;  and thus that it was unnecessary to conclude
that the 1884 Act was "a repealing act as to any of the qualifications
of the preceding limitations" contained in the earlier Act.  222 U.S.
at 103, 105.  See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra, Section 10-13.
Nevertheless, Richardson concluded that the 1884 Act substantially
expanded the nature of the liabilities subject to limitation.

   The text of the 1884 enactment, however, does not suggest any
intention fundamentally to alter the previously established relation
between the Limitation of Liability Act and federal maritime law, let
alone to single out that feature of the statute for a radical change.
The 1851 Act limited a vessel owner's liability for, inter alia, "any
act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned,
or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner" (46
U.S.C. App. 183(a)), whereas the 1884 amendment limited the
shipowner's liability "to the proportion of any or all debts and
liabilities that his individual share of the vessel bears to the
whole" (46 U.S.C. App. 189).  Nothing in these two formulations
suggests that the earlier enactment, but not the latter, should
incorporate limitations on federal maritime jurisdiction.

   2. The Legislative History. -- The legislative history of the 1884
limitation of liability provision is entirely silent on the question
whether it was intended to extend the concept of limited liability for
shipowners to non-maritime torts.  /12/ When the provision was
reported to the floor of the Senate, it was described, in modest
terms, as "not so great a change as appears on the face of the law."
15 Cong. Rec. 976 (1884) (remarks of Sen. Frye).  /13/ Later, in a
very brief exchange, one Senator suggested that its only purpose was
to protect shipowners from contractual liabilities.  /14/ There is no
indication that Congress considered -- or meant to depart from -- this
Court's understanding of the scope of the 1851 Act.

   In Richardson, the Court found support for its understanding of the
1884 enactment in a dictum in Butler, 130 U.S. at 554, that it was
"possible" that the 1884 amendment "was intended to remove all doubts
of the application of the limited liability law to all cases of loss
and injury caused without the privity or knowledge of the owner."
However, as we have shown, the Court in Butler evidenced no doubt
about whether the Act might extend to non-maritime torts;  to the
contrary, it emphasized the connection between the Limitation of
Liability Act and the general scope of maritime law.  The "doubts"
referred to in Butler evidently arose from "(v)arious attempts * * *
to narrow the objects of the statute," 130 U.S. at 550, even within
the limits of maritime law, for instance by excluding liabilities from
collisions and fire, See 130 U.S. at 550, 554.  Indeed, Butler
observed that the 1884 amendment was "explanatory of the intent of
Congress in this class of legislation," id. at 554, thus suggesting
that it was merely a clarification of the understanding of the statute
that Butler presented in some detail.

   We submit that the correctness of Richardson's analysis of the 1884
enactment on which it relied is, at the least, open to serious
question.

   C. Since Richardson, Lower Federal Courts Have Declined In Practice
To Apply The Limitation of Liability Act To All Non-Maritime Torts

   After Richardson, it has often been said that "(p)roceedings by
vessel owners to limit their liability as permitted by (the Limitation
of Liability Act) are within the admiralty jurisdiction even if the
claims limited against might not be sued upon in admiralty." 1 S.
Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty Section 225 (7th ed. 1989).  /15/
However, in practice, the Limitation of Liability Act has not been
held to apply to all cases to which this proposition extends.

   In particular, courts have refused to apply the Limitation of
Liability Act to claims arising from torts on non-navigable waters,
even though such claims would seem to fall within Richardson's
expansive interpretation of the debts and liabilities subject to the
Act.  /16/ Richardson held that the situs of a tort in relation to the
traditional bounds of maritime law was irrelevant to the application
of the Act, and its reasoning does not recognize a distinction between
torts occurring on land adjoining navigable waters and those taking
place elsewhere.  Thus, these lower court holdings, which at best are
difficult to square with Richardson's rationale, lend support to our
view that the Limitation of Liability Act can not reasonably be
applied without reference to limits on maritime law derived from other
sources.

   Petitioner does not refer to the cases involving torts on
non-navigable waters but attempts to sidestep them by confining his
attention to cases involving "non-maritime, or allegedly non-maritime
torts, which occur() upon, or in relation to navigable waters." Pet.
Br. 37 (emphasis added).  The implication is that the Act might fairly
be construed to require some "relation to navigable waters," thereby
preserving its inapplicability to non-navigable waters, but not to
embody whatever relationship to navigable waters and other standards
are required to confer admiralty jurisdiction generally.  Though
petitioner's suggestion conforms to the results in many, though not
all, of the reported cases, /17/ the statute provides no support for
such an intermediate standard -- somewhere between "any or all debts
and liabilities," whether maritime or non-maritime, and the generally
applicable standards for distinguishing between maritime and
non-maritime torts.  Rather than attempting to fashion such a
standard, this Court, we submit, should reconsider whether the
Limitation of Liability Act is coextensive with admiralty
jurisdiction.

   D. Other Developments Regarding The Scope Of Admiralty Jurisdiction
Support Restricting The Limitation Of Liability Act To Maritime Torts

   Two related developments in the area of admiralty jurisdiction
since Richardson also support reconsideration of its construction of
the Limitation of Liability Act.  First, Congress has eliminated the
artificial limit on admiralty jurisdiction that undoubtedly
contributed to that decision.  At the time Richardson was decided,
injuries caused by vessels on navigable waters to persons and property
on land fell outside admiralty jurisdiction.  Thus, as Richardson
noted, defining the Act to incorporate this gap in admiralty
jurisdiction would "leave an owner subject to a large class of
obligations arising from non-maritime torts," a result in conflict
with the purpose of the statute.  222 U.S. at 104.  The Extension of
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. App. 740, has since enlarged
admiralty jurisdiction to include "all cases of damage or injury, to
person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water,
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be donne or consummated on
land." /18/ Thus, reestablishing the link between the Limitation of
Liability Act and admiralty jurisdiction would not change the result
in Richardson or in other comparable cases involving damage or injury
on land.

   Second, this Court's recent decisions stress that the limits of
admiralty jurisdiction, while reflecting the importance of uniform
federal maritime law, must also avoid unnecessary encroachment on
state law.  In Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), for
instance, the Court refused to recognize federal admiralty
jurisdiction over an action by a longshoreman for damages arising from
an injury on a pier.  The Court noted that it was "dealing here with
the intersection of federal and state law" and that an extension of
federal jurisdiction would "intrude on an area that has heretofore
been reserved for state law." Id. at 211-212.  The Court concluded:
"At least in the absence of explicit congressional authorization, we
shall not extend the historic boundaries of the maritime law." Id. at
214.  The requirement that a tort bear a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity also reflects an unwillingness
unnecessarily to intrude on areas reserved for state law.  See
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. at
272-273.  The same concern supports excluding from the Limitation of
Liability Act tort claims that would otherwise be governed entirely by
state law.  Although permitting state law to define claims within its
scope, the Act in practice may extinguish or severely limit recovery
and may deny plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate in a state forum
of their choice.

   In view of present conceptions of federal admiralty jurisdiction,
we perceive no federal maritime interest that justifies such
limitations on state-created liabilities arising from torts having no
significant relationship with traditional maritime activities.  In
general, construing the Limitation of Liability Act not to encompass
such liabilities would affect only state law claims arising from
accidents involving vessels not on navigable waters and whatever
pleasure boat accidents may be held not to have a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.  See MLA Br. 21-22.
/19/ The purpose of the Limitation of Liability Act, which was to
encourage investment in the shipping industry, Norwich Co. v. Wright,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 121;  3 A. Jenner, E. Flynn & J. Loo, Benedict
on Admiralty Sections 6-7 (7th ed. 1989), does not support protecting
vessel owners from claims of this type, particularly where the effect
is to interfere with state law that would otherwise be completely
outside the scope of federal maritime law.  /20/

   Although the interpretation of the Limitation of Liability Act that
we advocate is inconsistent with the reasoning of Richardson, we
submit that the doctrine of stare decisis should not foreclose
reconsideration of that case's validity as applied in the modern
context.  See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 109 S. Ct. 2363,
2370-2371 (1989).  As has been shown, Richardson itself departed from
the previously settled understanding of the Act.  Its interpretation
of the 1884 limited liability statute is open to question, and its
suggestion that liabilities are subject to limitation without any
regard to the boundaries of federal maritime law has, in practice,
been ignored in cases involving non-navigable waters.  Significantly,
there has been "intervening development of the law," through both "the
growth of judicial doctrine" and "further action by Congress," that
has "removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings" of Richardson,
and that decision is now difficult to reconcile with the contemporary
understanding of the proper division between state and federal law.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. at 2370-2371.
Moreover, Richardson had no occasion to consider the precise issue
presented here -- whether the Limitation of Liability Act applies to
an accident even if the accident falls outside admiralty jurisdiction
because it bears no significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity.

                      * * * *

   In summary, we believe that under the rationale of the Richardson
decision, the Limitation of Liability Act would apply to the facts of
this case whether or not the accident in suit involves a maritime
tort.  But the holding of Richardson should, in our view, be
reconsidered for two reasons.  First, the original understanding of
the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 was that the Act did not
extend to non-maritime torts, and we submit that the 1884 enactment
relied on in Richardson did not abrogate that understanding.  Second,
events since Richardson -- particularly the enactment of the Extension
of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act and decisions by this Court that refine
the scope of admiralty jurisdiction -- have further undercut
Richardson's validity.  Thus, with respect to liability in tort, the
Limitation of Liability Act should again be held to apply only to
those torts that would otherwise be within the scope of federal
admiralty jurisdiction.  Under this view, the applicability of the
Act, and the existence of federal jurisdiction, should depend on
whether the casualty at issue qualifies as a maritime tort.

                              CONCLUSION

   For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reconsider its
decision in Richardson v. Harmon and hold that the Limitation of
Liability Act does not provide an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.

   Respectfully submitted.

   KENNETH W. STARR

      Solicitor General

   DAVID L. SHAPIRO

      Deputy Solicitor General

   STEPHEN L. NIGHTINGALE

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   APRIL 1990

   /1/ 46 U.S.C. App. 183.  Unless otherwise noted, all citations to
the Appendix to Title 46 of the United States Code are to Supplement
IV (1986) of the Code.

   /2/ Federal jurisdiction over such a proceeding is exclusive.  See
Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 594-595
(1883).  This Court established the procedures for limitation
proceedings when, in connection with its decision in Norwich Co. v.
Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871), it issued "Supplementary Rules
of Practice in Admiralty." The same basic procedures -- albeit with
some modifications reflecting amendments to the statute and the
unification in 1966 of the law and admiralty "sides" of the district
courts -- have been carried forward in Supplemental Rule F of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

   /3/ The Act has been construed to preserve the claimants' choice of
forum for their claims in some circumstances.  In cases in which there
is only a single claimant or it has been established that the total
value of the claims against the owner does not exceed the value of the
vessel and pending freight, claimants are generally allowed to
adjudicate the owner's liability in the courts in which they commenced
their actions against the owner.  See Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531
(1931);  Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147 (1957).  If the
district court determines that the vessel owner is not entitled to
limitation, it retains jurisdiction to hear the merits of the
underlying claims.  Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pac.
Co., 273 U.S. 207 (1927).  However, the claimants are ordinarily
entitled to resume their actions, if they choose.  In re Wood, 230
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956).

   The Limitation of Liability Act may also be pleaded as a defense to
an action to recover against the shipowner.  See The "Scotland", 105
U.S. 24, 34-35 (1881).

   /4/ The court of appeals interpreted this Court's decisions as
confining the admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases "either to cases
directly involving commercial maritime activity, or to cases involving
exclusively non-commercial activities in which the wrong (1) has a
potentially 'disruptive impact' on maritime commerce and (2) involves
the 'traditional maritime activity' of navigation." Pet. App. 8a.  In
the court's view, the present case, which involved a fire at a marina
for recreational vessels, did not satisfy that jurisdictional test.

   Our brief does not address the question of the correctness of this
holding by the court below.

   /5/ The Act was passed with no debate in the House and less than a
day's discussion in the Senate.  See Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2d Sess.
713-720, 738, 776-777 (1851).  See also H.R. Rep. No. 33, 31st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1850) (reporting a similar bill during the previous
session).  Discussion of the bill on the floor of the Senate suggests
that its purpose was to place American commercial shipping on an equal
footing with English and other foreign competition.  Senator Davis
explained (Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 714 (1851):

      I will only say, that (the proposed legislation) is the adoption
      of a system which has been several years in operation in
      England, with certain alterations merely, as I understand it, to
      adapt it to the affairs of this country, and nothing more.  It
      is simply placing our mercantile marine upon the same footing as
      that of Great Britain.  We are carriers side by side with that
      nation, in competition with them, and we cannot afford very well
      to give them any great advantage over us without affecting our
      interest very seriously.

Accord, e.g., id. at 715 (remarks of Sen. Hamlin), 716-717 (remarks of
Sen. Rantoul).  See also H.R. Rep. No. 33, supra.

   Notwithstanding the emphasis on the English origins of the
legislation, this Court subsequently construed it to differ from the
English model in several respects.  See Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 104, 124, 127 (1871);  The "Benefactor", 103 U.S. 239, 243,
246-247 (1880);  Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109
U.S. 578, 597 (1883).

   /6/ See also The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126-128 (1894);
The "Scotland", 105 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1881).

   /7/ In England, a shipowner had been required to post the value of
the vessel and freights as of the time of a casualty -- i.e., before
it was damaged.  The adoption of the rule of the European maritime
codes meant that the owner's liability -- as this case reflects --
would often be limited to the value of a vessel that had been sunk,
lost, or severely damaged.  See The "Benefactor", 103 U.S. 239,
246-247 (1880);  The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 490-493 (1886).

   /8/ This provision is now understood to encompass three grants of
constitutional authority (Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-361 (1959)):

      (1) It empowered Congress to confer admiralty and maritime
      jurisdiction on the "Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"
      which were authorized by Art. I, Section 8, cl. 9.  (2) It
      empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty
      and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to
      draw on the substantive law "inherent in the admiralty and
      maritime jurisdiction," * * * and to continue the development of
      this law within constitutional limits.  (3) It empowered
      Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the
      limits of the Constitution.

This conception of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article III
was firmly established when the Court was determining the place of the
Limitation of Liability Act in federal law.  See The Lottawanna, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572-578 (1875).

   /9/ As amicus Maritime Law Association notes (MLA Br. 13), the
Court stopped short of a square holding that the Limitation of
Liability Act had no possible application to non-maritime torts, as it
reserved the question "whether or not the statutory limitation of
liability extends to the damages sustained by the fire in question, so
as to be enforceable in an appropriate court of competent
jurisdiction." 118 U.S. at 625.  However, that reservation was
inconsistent with cases decided before and after Ex parte Phenix.  In
Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 123, the Court had
foreclosed the possibility of state court jurisdiction, saying that
"State courts have not the requisite jurisdiction" to administer the
Act.  In Richardson, moreover, this Court understood Ex parte Phenix
to have held that non-maritime liabilities were beyond the bounds of
the Limitation of Liability Act prior to the 1884 enactment.  The
Court observed that the original Act "embraced liabilities for
maritime torts, but excluded both debts and liabilities for
non-maritime torts," 222 U.S. at 103, and it construed the 1884 Act as
having enlarged the category of liabilities subject to the Act, not as
having filled a jurisdictional gap.

   /10/ Butler reserved the question whether state law could create a
remedy enforceable in admiralty for injuries incurred on navigable
waters.  130 U.S. at 558.  This Court subsequently eliminated that
doubt, in two steps, in favor of recognition of such remedies in
admiralty.  First, in The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 399 (1907), the Court
concluded that, whether or not an action to recover on a state
wrongful death remedy could be initiated in a federal admiralty court,
such a remedy could be recognized in a limitation of liability
proceeding.  The Court explained that state law created "an obligatio,
a personal liability of the owner (of a vessel) to the claimants"
which "admiralty would not disregard, but would respect * * * when
brought before it in any legitimate way" and that, in a limitation of
liability proceeding, "all claims to which the admiralty does not deny
existence must be recognized." Id. at 405-406.  Accord La Bourgogne,
210 U.S. 95, 138-139 (1908).  Second, in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U.S. 233, 240-242 (1921), the Court held that when state law
provided a wrongful death remedy applicable to an admiralty cause of
action, the remedy could be enforced in a federal admiralty suit.
(Later, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
the Court recognized a federal wrongful death remedy in admiralty
cases.)

   Amicus Maritime Law Association argues that Butler and The Hamilton
established that "claims not falling within the general maritime
jurisdiction could be brought in a limitation of liability
proceeding," suggesting that Richardson did not reflect a major change
in the law.  MLA Br. 18.  But throughout the period prior to Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra, it was far from clear that state wrongful
death claims arising from maritime torts were outside general maritime
jurisdiction.  See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. at 241 (citing
preexisting authority for the conclusion it reached);  The Harrisburg,
119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886) (reserving the question whether a state
wrongful death statute could be enforced in admiralty).  More
fundamentally, both Butler and The Hamilton dealt with maritime torts
on navigable waters, and thus in holding that state wrongful death
remedies were subject to a limitation proceeding, the Court had no
occasion to consider whether the Limitation of Liability Act applied
outside the preexisting boundaries of admiralty law.

   /11/ Evidently, the Court viewed Congress's authority to prescribe
rules of admiralty to be broader than its authority under the Commerce
Clause.  The Court had previously upheld the Act's application to the
high seas under the Commerce Clause, Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S.
541 (1881), but chose not to rely on the same constitutional provision
in In re Garnett.

   It is now established that Congress has authority to enact
legislation touching areas of maritime concern that effectively extend
admiralty jurisdiction to accidents that might otherwise be considered
non-maritime.  See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
318 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1943).  However, that power is not without limits.
 See id. at 43.  Moreover, in considering whether Congress intended,
in its 19th century enactments, to extend maritime law, it should be
borne in mind that the constitutional authority for such a step would
have been open to debate.  See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55
(1932) ("In amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress
cannot reach beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent in
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.  Unless the injuries to which
the Act relates occur upon the navigable waters of the United States,
they fall outside that jurisdiction.").

   /12/ In 1884, the House and the Senate considered separate bills
providing a variety of forms of relief for the shipping industry.
H.R. 2228, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884);  S. 1448, 48th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1884).  Congress ultimately passed the House bill, although it
was extensively amended to incorporate provisions from the Senate
bill.  The provision to limit shipowners' liability originated in the
Senate bill.  Although the proposed shipping legislation was debated
at length in both Houses, the limitation of liability provision
received only very brief attention on the floor of the Senate, 15
Cong. Rec. 976, 3970-3972 (1884), and none on the floor of the House.
See also 15 Cong. Rec. 5440 (1884) (conference committee report).

   /13/ Senator Frye's remarks, though somewhat obscure, suggest that
the impetus for the legislation was concern that large investors might
be held responsible for the entire amount of debts incurred in the
shipping ventures that they undertook with partners of lesser means
and, therefore, that they should be given protection comparable to
that provided by the corporate form.  He stated (15 Cong. Rec. 976
(1884)):

         Section 18 limits the individual liability of a ship-owner
      for any and all debts and liabilities to the proportion that his
      individual share of the vessel bears to the whole.  That is not
      so great change as appears on the face of the law.  By statute
      to-day any shareholder in a vessel is liable for no more than
      the value of the share for any tort of the master or in case of
      collision or in any other way except by contract.  But those
      provisions of the law are not generally understood.  They follow
      the English and the French law almost word for word.  There is
      to-day a feeling among the capitalists of this country that it
      is exceedingly dangerous to put capital into a ship where there
      may be twenty owners and only one of them really a man of
      wealth, and he responsible for the entire debt contracted.  The
      English have the same limited liability provided for in this
      section, only in another form.  They have a general law of
      "limited liability," by which any dozen men desiring to build a
      ship or a steamer can simply incorporate themselves for that
      single purpose, and then their liability under that act of
      incorporation shall be the owner's share of the vessel and no
      more.  The bill which we report does the same thing, only in
      another form.  It is believed that it will remove a difficulty
      under which our capitalists have labored, will give them courage
      to invest in ships, and will do a great deal more towards
      encouraging ship-building and ship-owning than really the law
      itself which we report would authorize.

Accord 15 Cong. Rec. 3650 (1884) (remarks of Sen. Frye).  See also id.
at 3970-3971.

   /14/ 15 Cong. Rec. 3971 (1884) (remarks of Sen. Vest):

         Mr. MILLER, of California.  Why is not the provision in the
      Revised Statutes as it stands now sufficient?

         Mr. VEST.  IT does not apply to contracts at all, only to
      torts.

   /15/ See, e.g., Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 386 (1941)
(Limitation of Liability Act "extends to tort claims even when the
tort is non-maritime");  Detroit Trust Co. v. The Barlum, 293 U.S. 21,
44-45 (1934);  Hartfort Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pac. Co.,
273 U.S. 207, 217 (1927) (court of admiralty acquires the right to
marshal "all claims, whether of strictly admiralty origin or not");
The No. 6, 241 F. 69 (2d Cir. 1917);  The Rochester, 230 F. 519, 521
(W.D.N.Y. 1916);  The Irving F. Ross, 8 F.2d 313 (D. Mass. 1923);  In
re Highland Nav. Corp., 24 F.2d 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1927);  The Atlas
No. 7, 42 F.2d 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1930);  In re Colonial Trust Co., 124 F.
Supp. 73, 75 (D. Conn. 1954);  The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271, 273 (D.
Mass. 1941).

   /16/ E.g., In re Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A., Ltd., 878
F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1989);  Marroni v. Matey, 492 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.
Pa. 1980);  In re Howser's Petition, 227 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.C. 1964);
In re Madsen's Petition, 187 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1960);  In re
Stephens, 341 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ga. 1965):  But cf. In re Reading's
Petition, 169 F. Supp. 165 (N.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 959 (2d
Cir. 1959).

   /17/ In addition to this case, there are several decisions in which
courts have declined to apply the Limitation of Liability Act to torts
that have been determined to be non-maritime.  Lewis Charters, Inc. v.
Huckins Yacht Corp., 871 F.2d 1046 (11th Cir. 1989);  Clinton Bd. of
Park Comm'rs v. Claussen, 410 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Iowa 1976).

   /18/ See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 209-210
(1971);  Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209-210
(1963);  United States v. Matson Nav. Co., 201 F.2d 610, 613-616 (9th
Cir. 1953).

   /19/ Under the interpretation we propose, the Limitation of
Liability Act would incorporate both judicial and statutory
refinements of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.  Thus, when
Congress creates a statutory maritime liability that effectively
extends the scope of admiralty jurisdiction, see, e.g., O'Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943) (Jones Act applies
to onshore injury to deckhand on vessel), such a liability will be
subject to limitation.  Similarly, the Act would incorporate the
expansion of jurisdiction effected by the Extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act and any subsequent extensions of that nature.  Of
course, in creating maritime liabilities, Congress may exempt them
from the Limitation of Liability Act, as it has in connection with
certain actions under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. App.
764 (certain foreign-law claims may be brought in admiralty in the
United States "without abatement in respect to the amount for which
recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the
contrary notwithstanding").

   /20/ Hypothesizing that a single accident may give rise to maritime
and non-maritime claims, amicus Maritime Law Association suggests that
our interpretation of the Act would "defeat the objectives of
concursus (the resolution of claims against an owner in a single
proceeding) and a single fund for all claims to have proceedings in
different courts." MLA Br. 21.  Moreover, MLA continues, even in cases
involving damage inflicted solely on land, "the expertise of an
admiralty court is useful in determining the shipowner's liability and
whether it is entitled to limit that liability." Ibid.  This argument
is circular.  The very question at issue is whether the limited
liability concursus, single fund, and expertise of an admiralty court
should be available for non-maritime torts.  Moreover, it will be
rare, under modern admiralty analysis, that a maritime tort will give
rise to maritime and non-maritime claims.  A plaintiff injured by a
maritime tort may invoke admiralty jurisdiction in seeking both
remedies available under federal law and state remedies that do not
unduly interfere with the characteristic features of the maritime law.
 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 339
(1973).  Those state remedies that do interfere with maritime law are
preempted, whether asserted in federal or state court.  The only torts
that may generate a mix of maritime and non-maritime claims would be
cases in which a party could invoke a federal statutory remedy, such
as the Jones Act, for what would otherwise be a non-maritime tort.
Although the Court need not now consider the proper treatment of that
unusual situation, we believe it would not be inappropriate to hold
that the state claim is outside the scope of the Limitation of
Liability Act.  Cf. Hines, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 717 (6th
Cir. 1977).

   Petitioner's amici also rely on a 1936 amendment to the Act, now
codified at 46 U.S.C. App. 185, that provides that a vessel owner "may
petition a district court of the United States of competent
jurisdiction for limitation of liability * * *." MLA Br. 14 & n.3;
American Auto Br. 21.  This amendment is irrelevant to the issues
before the Court.  By its terms, it does not confer any jurisdiction
on the district courts;  its reference to a court of "competent
jurisdiction" indicates that jurisdiction must be derived from some
other source.  See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d
924, 932-933 (D.C. Cir.) (construing virtually identical language in
the Administrative Procedure Act), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
Further, it does not purport to define the scope of the Act.  Because
the Limitation of Liability Act is a part of the maritime law, federal
jurisdiction to administer its terms is conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1333;
that jurisdiction, however, is no broader than the liabilities subject
to limitation under the Act.