JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLANT V. NATIVIDAD
CASTILLO, ET AL.

   No. 85-250

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1985

   On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas

   Brief for the Appellant

                       PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

   Appellant John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, was named as a
defendant in each of four consolidated cases before the district
court.

   The plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-81-260, in addition to
Natividad Castillo, were Fernando Sosa;  Petra Sosa, for herself and
as next friend of Roberto Sosa, Saul Sosa, Roy Sosa, Eduardo Sosa,
Catalina Castillo, Natividad Castillo, and Graciela Castillo, Minors;
Blanca Martinez, for herself and as next friend of Venessa Marie
Martinez, Minor;  Sara Cortez, for herself and as next friend of Perla
Ruby Cortez and Sylvia Cortez, Minors;  Elias Ruiz;  and Belinda Ruiz,
for herself and as next friend of Marciela Ruiz and Cindy Ruiz,
Minors.  The non-federal defendants were Marlin Johnston, in his
capacity as the Director of the Department of Human Resources;  and
Jose Campos, in his capacity as the Program Director for the
Brownsville Food Stamp Office of the Department of Human Resources.

   The plaintiff in Civil Action No. B-82-7 was Sylvia Nieto, for
herself and as next friend of Rolando Nieto, Minor.  The non-federal
defendants were Marlin Johnston, in his capacity as the Director of
the Department of Human Resources;  and Cruz Cervantes, in his
capacity as the Supervisor for the Raymondville Food Stamp Office of
the Department of Human Resources.

   The plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-82-21 were Robert Cody, Jerry
Cody, for themselves and as next friend of Gary Cody and Robin Cody.
The non-federal defendants were Marlin Johnston, in his capacity as
the Director of the Department of Human Resources;  and Rene Zamora,
in his capacity as the Program Director of the Harlingen Food Stamp
Office of the Department of Human Resources.

   The plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-83-106 were Cecilia
Villafranca, for herself and as next friend of Alberto Trevino and
Eric Villafranca, Minors;  and Gregorio Alvarado;  Maria Alvarado, for
herself and as next friend of Claudio Alvarado, Gregorio Alvarado,
Jr., and Mauricio Alvarado, Minors.  The non-federal defendants were
Marlin Johnston, in his capacity as the Director of the Department of
Human Resources;  and Jose Campos, in his capacity as the Program
Director for the Brownsville Food Stamp Office of the Department of
Human Resources.

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Parties to the proceeding
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Questions presented
   Statutory provision involved
   Statement
      A. The Food Stamp Program
      B. The Present Controversy
   Summary of argument
   Argument:
      The Food Stamp Act's definition of "household"
      does not violate equal protection principles of the
      Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
      A. The household definition distinguishes
         between groups composed of family members and
         groups composed of unrelated persons based on
         rational considerations that advance legitimate
         governmental interests
      B. The household definition is not subject to
         heightened equal protection scrutiny
      C. The judgment of Congress on questions of
         social welfare policy is entitled to deference
         from the courts
   Conclusion

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The memorandum and order of the district court (J.S. App. 1a-8a) is
unreported.  The supplemental memorandum of the district court (J.S.
App. 9a-13a) is also unreported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The order of the district court was entered on April 23, 1985.  A
notice of appeal was filed on May 17, 1985 (J.S. App. 14a).  On July
8, 1985, Justice White extended the time within which to docket this
appeal to and including August 15, 1985.  The jurisdictional statement
was filed on August 14, 1985 and probable jurisdiction was noted on
November 18, 1985.  The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C.
1252.

                     STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

   Section 3(i) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. 2012(i),
provides in pertinent part:

      "Household" means (1) an individual who lives alone or who,
      while living with others, customarily purchases foods and
      prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the
      others, or (2) a group of individuals who live together and
      customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home
      consumption;  except that parents and children, or siblings, who
      live together shall be treated as a group of individuals who
      customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home
      consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the
      parents, or siblings, is an elderly or disabled member. * * *

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether Section 3(i) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C.
2012(i), which provides that parents and children, or siblings, who
live together shall generally constitute a single "household" for food
stamp entitlement purposes, violates equal protection principles of
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by discriminating against
family members or impermissibly burdening family decisions to live
together.

                               STATEMENT

   The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 2011 et seq.,
establishes a public welfare program, funded by the Department of
Agriculture and administered by state agencies, that supplements the
food purchasing power of low-income households.  This appeal involves
four consolidated suits, brought by potential benefit recipients
(appellees) against the Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary) and
state welfare administrators.  The suits challenge the
constitutionality of Section 3(i) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), which
defines the term "household" for food stamp entitlement purposes.  The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held
that Section 2012(i) is unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement
against appellees.  The court reasoned that the statute violates equal
protection principles of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
by creating a classification that discriminates against family members
and that impermissibly burdens family decisions to live together.  /1/

                       A. The Food Stamp Program

   1. The Food Stamp program is a federally-funded, state-administered
effort that "permit(s) low-income households to obtain a more
nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food
purchasing power." 7 U.S.C. 2011.  Households with aggregate income
and financial resources below specified national standards may
participate.  7 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 2014.  They receive coupons (food
stamps) that can be used for food purchases at retail stores.  7
U.S.C. 2013.

   Although the federal government is responsible for establishing
eligibility standards, see 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 2014, the states have
primary responsibility for distributing food stamps.  See 7 U.S.C. (&
Supp. II) 2020;  Atkins v. Parker, No. 83-1660 (June 4, 1985), slip
op. 2.  State agencies are authorized to allot food stamps to each
eligible household in an amount based on the cost of a "thrifty food
plan," reduced by 30% of the household's income.  7 U.S.C. 2017.  The
"thrifty food plan" is a diet, determined by the Secretary, that
adequately feeds an average family of four.  7 U.S.C. 2012(o).  /2/
The cost of the diet is used to calculate standard household
allotments, based on household size, that "tak(e) into account
economies of scale." Ibid.; see 7 C.F.R. 273.10(e)(4).

   The cost of the thrifty food plan diet is updated annually, through
general notices in the Federal Register, to reflect changes in the
price of food.  See 7 U.S.C. 2012(o);  7 C.F.R. 273.10(e)(4).  Under
the present plan, a one-member household is entitled to a maximum food
stamp allotment of $80 per month, a four-member household is entitled
to a maximum of $268 per month, and an eight-member household is
entitled to a maximum of $483 per month.  See 50 Fed. Reg. 36641,
36642 (1985).  As these figures demonstrate, the per capita allotment
diminishes with increasing household size to reflect the economies of
group food purchase and preparation.  Specifically, the maximum
benefit for a family of eight is 90.1% of the benefits paid to two
families of four, and 75.5% of the benefits paid to eight
single-member households.  /3/

   2. The Food Stamp program is the Nation's second most costly
"needs-based" public assistance program.  See S. Rep. 97-128, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981).  Program outlays were over $11 billion in
1983, providing assistance to approximately 21 million participants.
See Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States
Government FY 1985, at 8-43;  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, at 122-123
(105th ed.).  The program has grown dramatically since its inception,
registering a 20-fold increase in outlays and a three-fold increase in
participation since 1970.  /4/

   The burgeoning growth of the Food Stamp program has produced public
concern over administrative inefficiency and recipient abuse.
Congress has held numerous hearings to investigate methods for Food
Stamp reform.  /5/ As a result of these hearings, Congress has enacted
various amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 to prevent waste and
fraud.  Congress has given specific attention to the term "household."
The definition of that term is central to the Food Stamp program
because food stamps are distributed on the basis of household units.
The concept of a "household" unit has proven to be a frequent source
of recipient abuse.

   The 1964 Act defined "household" broadly to include virtually any
single individual who prepared his own meals using separate cooking
facilities and virtually any group of individuals that functioned as a
single economic unit and shared common cooking facilities.  See 7
U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 2012(e).  However, as the Food Stamp program grew,
Congress gave the term a more exacting definition.  In 1971, Congress
amended the definition of "household" to exclude most groups of
related persons from participation in the Food Stamp program.  See 7
U.S.C. (Supp. II 1972) 2012(e).  This Court declared the amendment
unconstitutional, concluding that it represented purposeful
discrimination against "hippie communes." United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).

   In 1977, Congress again amended the definition, requiring groups of
individuals, whether related or unrelated, who customarily purchased
and prepared meals together, to be treated as a single household.  7
U.S.C. (Supp. I 1977) 2012(i).  The definition provided that
individuals, whether living alone or with others, could qualify as
distinct households provided that each customarily purchased food and
prepared meals separately.  Ibid.  The amendment was intended to end
the focus on cooking facilities and "economic units" in classifying
households, concentrating instead on "what the household members do
with their food money." H.R. Rep. 95-464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142
(1977).  /6/

   In 1981 and 1982, following extensive hearings revealing continuing
widespread abuse in the Food Stamp program, /7/ Congress once more
addressed the term "household." These changes, enacted together with
other program reforms as part of the 1981 and 1982 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Acts, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Tit. I, 95 Stat. 358 et seq.,
and Pub. L. No. 97-253, Tit. I, Subtit. E, 96 Stat. 772 et seq.,
precipitated the present litigation.

   The 1981 modifications addressed the application of the term
"household" to parents and children.  Congress provided that parents
and children who live together shall comprise a single household for
food stamp purposes, regardless of whether they purchase food and
prepare meals separately or together, unless one of the parents is at
least 60 years old.  7 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981) 2012(i).  The Senate
Report indicates that this change was "designed to prevent household
members from artificially claiming to be separate households although
they live and prepare meals together." S. Rep. 97-128, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31 (1981).  Families frequently attempted to increase their food
stamp benefits -- and to qualify for benefits for which they would
otherwise be ineligible -- by characterizing their members as separate
households sharing a single roof.  The amendment was intended to
eliminate that abuse.  /8/ The Senate Committee on the Budget
estimated that the change, together with a change eliminating boarders
from participation in the Food Stamp program, would save $195 million
in fiscal years 1982-1984.  See S. Rep. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
52-53 (1981).

   The 1982 modifications further refined the definition of
"household" to prevent food stamp abuses.  The principal change,
presently codified with the 1981 modifications at 7 U.S.C. 2012(i),
prohibits siblings, as well as parents and children, from increasing
their food stamp benefits by splintering into separate "households."
It was enacted with an accompanying provision excepting disabled and
elderly family members from the restriction.  See ibid.; 7 U.S.C.
2012(r).  These changes were adopted, together with other measures,
upon the advice of federal and state food stamp administrators.  See
H.R. Rep. 97-687, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 25 (1982).  The House
Committee on Agriculture estimated that they would result in savings
of $120 million in fiscal years 1983-1985.  Id. at 105.  /9/

   Thus, Congress's 1981 and 1982 modifications to the definition of
"household" reflect carefully structured refinements to reduce
widespread fraud in the Food Stamp program and to preserve the
public's limited welfare resources for the truly needy.  The present
definition, treating most parents and children, or siblings, who live
together as single households for food stamp entitlement purposes,
reflects a considered response to the persistent problem of family
groups mischaracterizing their food purchasing and preparation habits
to obtain undeserved food stamp benefits.

                      B. The Present Controversy

   In September 1981, Natividad Castillo, his wife Petra Sosa, and
their children, moved into the home of Sosa's daughter, Teresa Barrera
(J.A. 26).  The Castillo family applied for food stamp benefits from
the Brownsville, Texas Food Stamp Office.  Although the Barrera family
already received food stamps, the Castillos claimed that they were
entitled to their own food stamp allotment because they did not
purchase food in common with the Barreras and the two families were
not "living as one economic unit" (id. at 26-27).  The Food Stamp
Office denied the request, concluding that the Castillo and Barrera
families constituted a single household within the meaning of 7 U.S.C.
2012(i).  The Office indicated, however, that Barrera's food stamp
allotment would be supplemented to reflect an increase in the
household's size (J.A. 27).

   On October 7, 1981, the Castillo family sued state food stamp
officials in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, claiming, inter alia, that the denial of their food
stamp request violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Civ. No.
B-81-260).  Two days later, the district court issued a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the state agencies from denying the
Castillos food stamp benefits on grounds other than their family
income (J.A. 54-55).  The Castillos sought class certification and
amended their complaint to join the Secretary of Agriculture as a
defendant and to add additional plaintiffs who, like the Castillos,
were denied separate household status under the Food Stamp program
(J.A. 16-25).  /10/

   The district court did not act on the motion for class
certification;  however, it did consolidate the Castillos' suit with
three similar actions brought by family groups alleging that the
revised definition of the term "household" unconstitutionally denied
them separate household status and attendant food stamp benefits.
/11/ The court then considered the constitutional challenge to 7
U.S.C. 2012(i) on cross motions for summary judgment.  It ruled that
Section 2012(i) violates equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause by discriminating against family
members and impermissibly burdening family decisions to live together
(J.S. App. 1a-8a).

   The district court recognized that a social welfare program may
generally distinguish among benefit recipients provided that the
distinctions do not "'invidiously discriminate * * * on the basis of
criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative
goal'" (J.S. App. 3a-4a, quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,
772 (1975) ).  And the court acknowledged that Section 2012(i), which
was enacted to limit claims of separate household status among family
members, "conforms to the 'rational basis' test as it is pronounced in
Salfi" (J.S. App. 6a).  However, the court stated that "a great amount
of inconsistency surrounds Salfi," noting that "such a limitation does
not apply to gender-based classifications" (J.S. App. 6a, citing
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-212 (1977) ).

   The district court therefore queried "whether family-based
classifications are subject to such limitations" (J.S. App. 6a).  It
turned for guidance to Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977), and Cleveland Board of Education v. La-Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974).  Relying on those cases, the court concluded that "(i)t is
clear that family life-styles have been afforded a stricter standard
of review than the 'rational basis' test as it is pronounced in Salfi"
(J.S. App. 7a).

   The District court attached "even greater importance" (J.S. App.
7a) to this Court's decision in United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).  That decision held that a
provision of the Food Stamp Act, denying benefits to cohabiting,
unrelated individuals, was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause
because it represented a "bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group" (413 U.S. at 534).  The district court
reasoned that "if the Supreme Court is willing to protect unpopular
political groups it should even be more willing to protect the
traditional family value of living together" (J.S. App. 8a).

   The district court thus found that "(f)amily type classifications
are clearly deserving of the judicial scrutiny that was applied in
(Goldfarb)" (J.S. App. 7a).  It concluded, without further analysis,
that the provisions of Section 2012(i), limiting family member
eligibility for separate household status, "are discriminatory and in
violation of (appellees') Fifth Amendment rights" (J.S. App. 8a).  The
court permanently enjoined enforcement of these provisions against
appellees (ibid.).  /12/

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   The district court has declared unconstitutional a carefully
considered legislative initiative to correct widespread abuse in the
Food Stamp program.  The court's decision, by its own admission (J.S.
App. 3a), departs from established equal protection jurisprudence.  It
employs heightened scrutiny to a social welfare classification that
does not involve a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, justifying its
result through the unsupportable theory that Congress, in amending the
definition of "household" contained in 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), has
discriminated against families and impermissibly burdened their
fundamental rights.

   Congress amended Section 2012(i)'s definition of "household" in
response to documented reports of widespread food stamp abuses.
Congressional hearings, conducted in 1981 and 1982, revealed that
individuals who lived together as a single household frequently
claimed separate household status in order to receive increased food
stamp benefits.  Faced with the practical difficulties of verifying
separate household status, Congress chose to refine the definition of
"household" to prevent that abuse.  Congress specified that when
certain closely related persons -- namely, parents and children, or
siblings -- live together, they shall be treated as a single household
regardless of their claimed meal purchase and preparation habits.  To
ameliorate any hardship, Congress excepted elderly or disabled parents
and siblings from this provision.

   Section 2012(i)'s refined definition of "household" applies a
rational distinction between groups composed of related and unrelated
persons to combat a pervasive method of food stamp recipient abuse.
Congress reasonably concluded that closely related family members, who
are more likely to purchase and prepare meals together than unrelated
persons, should be treated as a single household for purposes of the
Food Stamp program.  This classification advances legitimate
government goals -- preserving public confidence in the integrity of
the Food Stamp program and assuring optimal allocation of the
government's limited public assistance resources -- in a wholly
reasonable manner.  The definition, carefully tailored to meet
specific congressional concerns, plainly withstands the "rational
basis" scrutiny applicable to equal protection challenges to social
welfare statutes.

   The district court plainly erred in concluding that Section 2012(i)
is subject to "heightened" equal protection scrutiny.  Family members,
the group subject to special treatment under the statute, do not
constitute a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class.  Furthermore, the
statute does not burden any fundamental rights.  Section 2012(i)'s
distinction between households composed of related and unrelated
persons does not have a direct and substantial impact on family living
arrangements.  Nor does it create an irrebutable evidentiary
presumption;  instead, it employs legitimate eligibility criteria to
achieve a legislative policy objective.

   The district court's ultimate conclusion -- that the Food Stamp
program must apply the same limitations to family groups that it
applies to groups of unrelated individuals -- has the practical effect
of ascribing constitutional status to a family member's decision to
purchase food and prepare meals apart from the parents, children, or
siblings with whom he lives.  This result cannot be reconciled with
equal protection principles or common sense;  moreover, it represents
a striking lack of deference to "the duly enacted and carefully
considered decision of a co-equal and representative branch of our
Government." Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,
No. 84-571 (June 28, 1985), slip op. 13.

                               ARGUMENT

 THE FOOD STAMP ACT'S DEFINITION OF "HOUSEHOLD" DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

 A. The Household Definition Distinguishes Between Groups Composed Of
Family Members And Groups Composed Of Unrelated Persons Based On
Rational Considerations That Advance Legitimate Governmental Interests

   Equal protection principles generally require that legislation
accord like treatment to similarly situated individuals.  See, e.g.,
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1,
1985), slip op. 6;  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).  But the
precept of equal protection does not preclude legislators from making
rational distinctions.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.  "A legislature must
have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly
approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate
competing concerns both public and private, and that account for
limitations on the practical ability of (government) to remedy every
ill." Ibid.; accord Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
In assessing an equal protection challenge, therefore, the judiciary
must give broad deference to the lines drawn by Congress, "the
appropriate representative body through which the public makes
democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic
problems." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).  "If the
goals sought are legitimate, and the classification adopted is
rationally related to the achievement of those goals, then the action
of Congress is not so arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment." Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84
(1971).  These principles, applied to the present case, confirm that
Congress acted well within its powers in amending the Food Stamp Act's
definition of the term "household."

   The Food Stamp Act is a central component of federal social welfare
legislation, providing essential benefits to needy households.
However, as noted above, the massive growth in the government's food
stamp expenditures has prompted serious public concern over the size,
effectiveness, and integrity of the Food Stamp program.  Congress, in
response, conducted extensive oversight hearings in 1981 and 1982,
which revealed a pressing need to combat widespread fraud and
recipient abuse.  /13/ In particular, Congress received reports from
federal, state, and local administrators that the Food Stamp Act's
definition of "household," set forth in 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), was
frequently subject to manipulation.  /14/ Congress found that it had
to deal with the practice of individuals who live together but feign
separate household status in order to obtain food stamp benefits to
which they would not otherwise be entitled.  See H.R. Rep. 97-106,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1981);  S. Rep. 97-128, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31 (1981).

   In remedying this abuse, Congress was confronted with a serious
practical problem.  There is simply no effective means of efficiently
determining whether persons who live together are falsely claiming
separate household status.  /15/ The inherent difficulty of verifying
whether persons are preparing meals separately or together renders
individual determinations virtually impossible.  Any meaningful
enforcement scheme would require huge commitments of investigative
resources to determine meal purchasing and preparation habits.
Indeed, an effective program might require rather elaborate, and
perhaps intrusive, surveillance and verification of personal
activities.

   Congress therefore elected to redefine the term "household" to
prevent the documented abuses.  No doubt, Congress could have
prohibited all groups of individuals who live together from claiming
separate household status for food stamp purposes.  Indeed, it
considered that solution.  See S. Rep. 97-504, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
24-25, 87-88 (1982).  But Congress, instead, carefully redefined
"household" to prevent only certain closely related family members
from claiming separate household status.  Congress recognized that
those persons were most likely to purchase food and prepare meals
together and were most conveniently situated to submit fraudulent
claims of separate household eligibility.

   Congress based its revision on an unremarkable observation of human
experience -- family members, bound together by close and lasting
emotional ties, are more liekly to share resources and
responsibilities than unrelated persons whose communality is based on
financial convenience.  That observation seems particularly true with
respect to parents who live with their children and siblings who live
with each other.  Thus, Congress determined that when those family
members live together and receive food stamps, they should be
precluded from claiming separate household status because their claims
are more likely to be fraudulent.

   At the same time, Congress was not insensitive to the needs of food
stamp recipients.  It specifically emphasized that the new provisions
would "not disqualify legitimately poor households that apply as a
single family unit, but merely require that family units apply as
single households, rather than splintering for the purpose of
receiving higher benefits." S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 32.  Moreover,
the provisions were carefully tailored to exclude the disabled and the
elderly from the single household requirement, assuring that "those
parents most likely to reside with their children, but who truly
maintain separate household status, will not be barred from
participation as separate households." Ibid.; see H.R. Rep. 97-687,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1982).  As the extensive legislative history
demonstrates, the refined definition of "household" was the product of
a conscientious and thorough deliberative process.  /16/

   Section 2012(i)'s amended definition of "household" is plainly
consistent with the equal protection principles of the Due Process
Clause.  In particular, Section 2012(i) withstands scrutiny under the
"rational basis" test applicable to public welfare programs set forth
in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).  In Salfi, this
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (1970 ed. & Supp. III) 416(c)(5) and (e)(2),
that imposed a nine-month duration-of-relationship requirement for
survivor's benefits.  422 U.S. at 767-785.  The Court stated (id. at
777):

      The question is whether Congress, its concern having been
      reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it
      legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded
      both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect
      against its occurrence, and that the expense and other
      difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent
      imprecision of a prophylactic rule.  We conclude that the
      duration-of-relationship test meets this constitutional
      standard.

This "rational basis" test, repeatedly applied by this Court in
rejecting equal protection attacks on social welfare legislation,
controls the present case.  /17/

   As in Salfi, Congress was faced with the "administrative
difficulties of individual eligibility determinations" (422 U.S. at
784).  It responded by establishing a definition of "household" that
would "eliminate the potential for this type of program abuse." H.R.
Rep. 97-106, supra, at 119;  see also S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 32.
The modifications to the previous "household" definition represent
Congress's legitimate policy determination that the Food Stamp
program, and its millions of beneficiaries, would benefit from a
definition of "household" that prevents fraudulent claims.  See Salfi,
422 U.S. at 784.  Congress rationally concluded "that generalized
rules were appropriate to its purposes and concerns" and "that the
difficulties of individual determinations outweigh the marginal
increments in the precise effectuation of congressional concern which
they might be expected to produce" (id. at 785).

   Section 2012(i) imposes a reasonable prophylactic rule that
prevents the unjust distribution of food stamp benefits resulting from
recipient abuse.  As in the case of any statutory provision, there
might be room to debate the legislature's ultimate policy perspective.
 But that does not determine the constitutional question.  See United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 (1980);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972);  Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. at 487.  The different treatment that Section
2012(i) accords to family members advances a legitimate government
interest -- preserving the integrity of benefit distributions -- in a
way that cannot be described as "patently arbitrary or irrational."
Fritz, 449 U.S. at 177 (1980);  see also, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. at 84;  Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).  /18/
Thus, Section 2012(i) plainly withstands "rational basis" scrutiny.
Steinberg v. United States Department of Agriculture, 613 F. Supp.
432, 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, No. 85-6028 (2d Cir. July 16, 1985)
(unpublished order), petition for cert. pending, No. 85-5624 (filed
Oct. 10, 1985);  Levesque v. Block, No. C82-437-L (D.N.H. Jan. 26,
1983), slip op. 7-8, aff'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 175 (1st
Cir. 1983).

 B. The Household Definition Is Not Subject To Heightened Equal
Protection Scrutiny

   The district court acknowledged (J.S. App. 6a) that Section 2012(i)
"conforms to the 'rational basis' test as it is pronounced in Salfi."
The court should have ended its inquiry upon that conclusion.
Instead, it discerned a need for heightened scrutiny.  The court's
analysis plainly strays from firmly-established equal protection
principles.  A legislative choice is subject to heightened scrutiny
only if it "employs a classification that is inherently invidious or
that impinges on fundamental rights." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at
230.  /19/ Section 2012(i)'s treatment of certain family members who
live together as a single household fits neither of these categories.

   Family members plainly do not represent a "suspect" or
"quasi-suspect" class.  /20/ They fall far short of even the most
minimal requirements for that characterization.  See, e.g., City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985),
slip op. 6-13 (declining to recognize the mentally retarded as a
"quasi-suspect" class).  Family members have not been subject to
historic discrimination, they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group,
and they are neither a minority nor a politically powerless segment of
society.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam).  To the contrary, families have
traditionally received favored status in American cultural and
political processes.  /21/ Likewise, members of low-income families --
the sub-group served by the Food Stamp program -- do not meet suspect
class requirements.  The inclusion of poverty as an additional class
characteristic does not change the constitutional calculus.  See San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

   Furthermore, this case does not involve fundamental rights.
Contrary to appellees' contentions (Mot. to Dis. 7-9) Section 2012(i)
does not create a classification system that infringes a "fundamental
right" of food stamp recipients to make choices concerning family
living arrangements.  This Court has held that certain family-based
decisions do enjoy constitutionally protected status.  /22/ When the
government seriously intrudes on basic choices concerning the
composition of the marriage or family unit, the Court has "examine(d)
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and
the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation."
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).  But such
scrutiny has been applied only when the government regulation, at a
minimum, "directly and substantially" interferes with family choices.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-387 & n.12 (1978);  see id. at
403-404 (Stevens, J., concurring);  Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58
(1977).

   Unlike the zoning provisions at issue in Moore, which prohibited a
grandmother from living together with her grandchild, or the statute
in Zablocki, which provided that members of a certain class could not
marry, Section 2012(i) does not have a direct and substantial impact
upon family living arrangements.  Section 2012(i) does not prevent any
group of persons, related or unrelated, from living or dining
together.  Its definition of "household" merely reflects a
congressional determination, concededly rational, that closely related
persons who live together should receive food stamp benefits based on
the economic needs of a single household that purchases food and
prepares meals together.  Section 2012(i) ensures that the amount of a
family's food stamp entitlement reflects the economies of scale that a
family can enjoy in jointly purchasing and preparing meals.  The
statute simply adjusts food stamp benefits in light of the cooperative
arrangements that families can generally employ;  it does not amount
to a constitutionally significant intrusion on family living
arrangements.  See Steinberg v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 613 F. Supp. at 435.

   Indeed, Section 2012(i)'s impact on family living arrangements is
no different from that of a broad variety of other legislative
provisions that consider family status in allocating financial burdens
and benefits.  For example, the Internal Revenue Code determines
individual income tax liability on the basis of marital, family, and
dependent relationships.  See e.g., 26 U.S.C. 1-2.  Similarly, an
individual's eligibility for federally subsidized educational
assistance is frequently determined on the basis of his family's
financial resources.  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. 1089.  And, of course,
other welfare programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and Medicaid, provide assistance according to family-based
criteria.  See 42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.;
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 48 (1981).  As these examples
indicate, federal law routinely allocates financial burdens and
benefits through general rules that utilize family status as indicia
of financial resources and need.  There is nothing novel -- much less
unconstitutional -- in Section 2012(i)'s use of rational, family-based
criteria in determining Food Stamp eligibility and benefit levels.

   Admittedly, Section 2012(i) may encourage families to take
advantage of the savings available in joint meal purchase and
preparation;  by the same token, it may discourage family members from
purchasing food and preparing meals separate and apart from the
parents, children, or siblings, with whom they live.  But these
limitations on the "right" to dine separately hardly amount to the
kind of interference with family relationships that this Court has
found constitutionally significant.  See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
at 386-387 ("reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed");  Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 58 (Social
Security provisions terminating a child's benefits upon marriage do
not violate equal protection principles even though they "may have an
impact on (the child's) desire to marry, and may make some suitors
less welcome than others.").

   In particular, Section 2012(i) does not disrupt family bonds by
preventing -- or even discouraging -- closely related individuals from
living together.  Section 2012(i)'s definition of "household"
restricts a family's food stamp entitlement in only one respect:  it
measures the entitlement in light of the economies of scale derived
from joint food purchase and preparation.  Thus, Section 2012(i) may
provide family members with an increased incentive to reap these
economies by buying food and preparing meals together;  however, it
generally provides no incentive to live apart simply to collect
increased food stamp allotments, because the separate living
arrangements would impose a corresponding increase in food preparation
costs.  Even in those limited instances where it could conceivably
create such an incentive, the result cannot reasonably be
characterized as an intrusion on the family unit.  /23/

   Likewise, Section 2012(i) does not impair a fundamental liberty
simply because it denies increased benefits to family members who
claim to maintain separate households under one roof.  Congress has no
obligation to underwrite the full range of possible family living
arrangements.  Even where the Due Process Clause has been held to
"protect against unwarranted government interference with freedom of
choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not
confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all
the advantages of that freedom." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
317-318 (1980);  see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-474 (1977).
Family members may sincerely desire to share the same living quarters
while purchasing food and preparing meals separately;  however, the
public is not obligated to subsidize that unconventional choice.
Congress certainly can create a financial incentive for family members
to purchase food and prepare meals together without disturbing a
family member's "range of choices" concerning family living
arrangements.  See McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-318;  Maher, 432 U.S. at
474.  /24/

   The district court and appellees have suggested other insubstantial
grounds for heightened scrutiny.  The district court maintained (J.S.
App. 7a) that heightened scrutiny was required by this Court's
decision in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973).  In Moreno, the Court applied equal protection
principles to invalidate provisions of the Food Stamp Act that
excluded benefits to households composed of unrelated persons.
Examining the scant legislative history behind that exemption, the
Court concluded that the provisions had no purpose other than "a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group." 413 U.S.
at 534.  However, the Court clearly employed "rational basis" scrutiny
to reach that result.  Id. at 532-534.  Thus, Moreno offers no support
for applying heightened scrutiny to the present case.  /25/

   Appellees, relying on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), argue
(Mot. to Dis. 11) that "(e)ven if the government does not interfere
with the (appellees') right to live with closely related individuals,
this Court should look at the deprivation of food with heightened
scrutiny." This argument -- not made below -- is frivolous.  Section
2012(i) set forth a condition on food stamp eligibility and benefits;
it does not prevent appellees from pursuing alternatives, other than
food stamps, for obtaining food.  Appellees do not have an inherent
fundamental right to federal food purchasing assistance.  Neither
Plyler nor any other decision of this Court supports that proposition.
 See McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.

   Plyler addressed a state statute that completely denied a public
education to the children of undocumented aliens.  This Court stated
that the case raised unique concerns because education, while not a
fundamental right, "has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric
of our society." 457 U.S. at 221.  It noted that "'education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.'"
Id. at 222 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) ).  The Court further observed that "denial of an education to
some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals
of the Equal Protection Clause:  the abolition of governmental
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis
of individual merit." 457 U.S. at 221-222.  The Court specifically
stated that public education is not "some governmental 'benefit'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." Id.
at 221.

   Food stamps have none of the distinctive attributes of public
education.  Instead, as appellees concede (Mot. to Dis. 12), they are
a standard form of social welfare payment, providing the needy with
direct funds for the limited purpose of purchasing food items.  Like
other social welfare programs, the Food Stamp program is subject to
recipient fraud and abuse.  The revised definition of "household"
represents a legitimate classification designed to preserve the
integrity of the food stamp system.  Classifications of this type,
familiar to all social welfare programs, are not subject to heightened
scrutiny.  See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216;  Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
at 776-777.

   Appellees' intimation (Mot. to Dis. 7, 8, 13) that Section 2012(i)
creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption is also
insubstantial.  As this Court has made clear, legislation that
satisfies equal protection requirements "'is perforce consistent with
the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment.'" Salfi, 422 U.S.
at 770 (quoting Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. at 81).  In any event,
Section 2012(i) does not create an evidentiary presumption;  rather,
it is a legitimate legislative classification.  See Salfi, 422 U.S. at
771-772.  Section 2012(i) "does not purport to speak in terms of the
bona fides" of the family members' household status and "then make
plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissible." 422 U.S.
at 772.  Instead, it provides that "benefits * * * are available upon
compliance with an objective criterion, one which the Legislature
considered to bear a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy
objectives to be used as the test for eligibility." Ibid.

   In sum, Section 2012(i) does not establish a legislative
classification requiring heightened equal protection scrutiny.
Rather, it represents a considered legislative initiative designed to
improve the operation of a social welfare program.  The question,
therefore, is whether Section 2012(i) is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective.  As the district court acknowledged
(J.S. App. 6a), the statute easily meets the "rational basis" test.
/26/

 C. The Judgment Of Congress On Questions Of Social Welfare Policy Is
Entitled To Deference From The Courts

   When judging the constitutionality of a federal statute, this Court
gives significant deference "to the duly enacted and carefully
considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our
Government." Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,
No. 84-571 (June 28, 1985), slip op. 13.  In particular, "(t)his Court
has granted a 'strong presumption of constitutionality' to legislation
conferring monetary benefits, Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S., at 185,
because it believes that Congress should have discretion in deciding
how to expend necessarily limited resources." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. at 238.  Accord Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 591 n.32
(1982).  Appellees nonetheless urge this Court to declare Section
2012(i)'s definition of "household" unconstitutional largely on public
policy grounds.

   Appellees suggest (Mot. to Dis. 9-11), for example, that families
receiving food stamps may be unable to employ the cooperative meal
preparation envisioned by Section 2012(i) because of working
schedules, health problems and small cooking and dining facilities.
They argue (Mot. to Dis. 10-11) that food stamp recipients are likely
to suffer from communicable disease or require special diets and,
therefore, may be precluded from eating together.  They also assert
(id. at 12) that Section 2012(i)'s household definition has an
especially harsh impact on children of low-income families.

   Appellees' arguments are debatable.  But whatever their merit, they
"are addressed to an inappropriate forum" (United Steelworkers v.
Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150 (1965) ).  See, e.g., Hogan, 457
U.S. at 590-592;  Wilson, 450 U.S. at 238-239.  Congress, rather than
the judiciary, is charged with establishing the Food Stamp program's
eligibility requirements and benefit levels, and the courts "do not
sit to pass on policy or the wisdom of the course Congress has set."
Heckler v. Turner, No. 83-1097 (Feb. 27, 1985), slip op. 27.  "The
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy,
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely (the Court) may think a political
branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).

   Section 2012(i)'s refined definition of "household" represents an
important congressional initiative to reduce fraud in the Food Stamp
program.  It responds to documented abuses, "plac(ing) a reasonable
control on a situation that State and local administrators have
identified as * * * requir(ing) congressional action." S. Rep. 97-504,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982).  If the district court's invalidation
of Section 2012(i) is permitted to stand, millions of dollars in food
stamp benefits will ultimately be paid to the undeserving, reducing
public confidence in the integrity of welfare distributions and
diverting the Nation's limited resources from the truly needy to those
who choose to abuse the Food Stamp program.

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the district court should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted.

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   RICHARD K. WILLARD

      Assistant Attorney General

   KENNETH S. GELLER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   JEFFREY P. MINEAR

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   JANUARY 1986

   /1/ Several courts have rejected equal protection challenges to
Section 2012(i).  See Steinberg v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 613 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, No. 85-6028 (2d
Cir. July 16, 1985) (unpublished order), petition for cert. pending,
No. 85-5624 (filed Oct. 10, 1985);  Levesque v. Block, No. C82-437-L
(D.N.H. Jan. 26, 1983), aff'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 175
(1st Cir. 1983).  A number of pending suits present similar equal
protection challenges.  See Tripp v. Block, No. 85-1203 Civ. T17 (M.D.
Fla. filed July 25, 1985);  Ma v. Block, Civ. No. 85-64-D-1 (S.D. Iowa
filed Mar. 25, 1985);  Rogers v. Mansour, Civ. No. K-84-507 (W.D.
Mich. removed from state court Nov. 26, 1984);  Robinson v. Block,
Civ. No. 84-4229 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 12, 1984).

   /2/ The Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) develops the thrifty food plan on the basis of dietary
standards, the nutrient content of foods, and food consumption
patterns among low-income households.  See 48 Fed. Reg. 34700-34707
(1983).  See also Consumer Nutrition Division, Human Nutrition
Information Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, The Thrifty Food
Plan, 1983 (Aug. 1983).

   /3/ The economy of scale factors are calculated on the basis of an
extensive nationwide survey, conducted by the Department of
Agriculture, of food costs for families of different sizes.  See
Consumer and Food Economics Institute, Agricultural Research Service,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, The Effect of Household Size on the
Cost of Diets That Are Nutritionally Equivalent (Sept. 1975).

   /4/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1985, at 123 (105th ed.).  In 1965,
approximately 633,000 persons participated in the Food Stamp program,
representing a federal outlay of $33 million (ibid.).  By 1970,
participation had grown to nearly 6.5 million persons, representing a
federal outlay of $550 million (ibid.).  In 1975, nearly 20 million
persons participated, representing a federal outlay of over $4.3
billion (ibid.).

   /5/ See, e.g., Oversight of the Food Stamp Program:  Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and
the Subcomm. on Nutrition of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (hereinafter
cited as 1984 Senate Hearings);  Food Stamp Program:  Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition
of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982)
(hereinafter cited as 1982 House Hearings);  Proposed Reauthorization
of the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 (Food Stamps):  Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II (1981) (hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate
Hearings);  Fraud in Food Stamp Program:  Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition of the House
Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (hereinafter cited
as 1981 House Hearing);  Options for Reforming the Food Stamp Program:
 Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);  General Farm Program and Food Stamp
Program (Food Stamps):  Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 2 (1969);  see also, e.g.,
Staff of the Subcomm. on Departmental Operations of the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Field Investigation of the
Operation of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 (Comm. Print 1970).

   /6/ The House Committee expressly observed that "some persons who
constitute (a single) eating unit may currently be certified as
separate households because they are separate economic units.  The
Committee believes that their eating unit status, not their economic
unit status, is what is relevant to the food stamp program." H.R. Rep.
95-464, supra, at 143.

   /7/ See 1982 House Hearings;  1981 Senate Hearings;  1981 House
Hearing.  The Chairman of the Senate Committee cited estimates by the
Administration and congressional investigators that from 11% to 20% of
food stamp benefits were issued in error.  1981 Senate Hearings 3
(statement of Chairman Helms).  A Department of Agriculture spokesman
suggested in the House hearing that losses through fraud might range
as high as $1 billion.  1981 House Hearings 10 (statement of Deputy
Assistant Secretary Bode).  See also 1982 House Hearings 4 (statement
of Rep. Coleman, citing estimates that $1 billion in food stamps are
issued in error each year).

   /8/ The Senate Committee on the Budget explained the need for
revision as follows (S. Rep. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53
(1981) ):

      Because small households are provided more food stamps per
      person and because the same standard deduction is applied to
      income regardless of household size, a residential unit that
      splits into several smaller households can, under present law,
      receive larger total benefits than would be the case if the
      individuals applied as a single, larger household.

The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry noted (S.
Rep. 97-128, supra, at 31):

         Current law results in some individuals claiming separate
      household status for purposes of obtaining food stamp benefits
      to which they would not otherwise be entitled.  This results
      when the individual claims separate household status and
      indicates he has zero gross income.  The individual could be
      certified as a separate household although, in fact, he is being
      supported by his parents.

That Committee added (id. at 32):

         By allowing an exception for parents 60 years of age and
      older, those parents most likely to reside with their children,
      but who truly maintain separate household status, will not be
      barred from participation as separate households.

See also H.R. Rep. 97-106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 118-119 (1981).

   /9/ The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
recommended that all related persons be treated as a single household
unless one of the related persons is elderly or disabled.  See S. Rep.
97-504, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, 87-88 (1982).  However, the House
proposal, limited to parents, children, and siblings, was adopted in
conference.  See H.R. Cong. Rep. 97-759, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63
(1982).

   /10/ Appellees Blanca Martinez and her child, added as plaintiffs
in Civil Action No. B-81-260, live with Martinez's parents (J.A. 31).
According to Martinez's October 27, 1982 affidavit, the combined
family group received food stamps as a single household (id. at 32).
Appellees Sara Cortez and her children, also added as plaintiffs in
Civil Action B-81-260, live with Cortez's parents (id. at 33).
According to Cortez's October 28, 1982, affidavit, the family group
received food stamps as a single household (id. at 34).  Appellees
Elias Ruiz and his family, likewise added as plaintiffs in Civil
Action B-81-260, live with Ruiz's mother (J.A. 35).  Ruiz's February
27, 1984 affidavit does not indicate whether the family group received
food stamps as a single household (see id. at 35-36).

   /11/ In Civil Action No. B-82-7, appellees Sylvia Nieto and her
child live with Sylvia Nieto's parents (J.A. 37).  Nieto's January 11,
1982 affidavit does not indicate whether the combined family group
received food stamps as a single household (see id. at 37-38).  In
Civil Action No. B-82-21, appellees Robert Cody and his family live
with Robert Cody's mother (J.A. 39, 41).  According to Cody's January
22, 1982 affidavit, the combined family group received food stamps as
a single household (id. at 40).  In Civil Action No. B-83-106,
appellees Cecilia Villafranca and her children live with Cecilia
Villafranca's brother (J.A. 50).  Their combined household income
exceeds the food stamp eligibility requirements (J.S. App. 3a).
Appellee Gregorio Alvarado and his family, also plaintiffs in Civil
Action No. B-83-106, live with Alvarado's sister (J.A. 52).
Alvarado's May 19, 1983 affidavit does not indicate whether the
combined family group received food stamps as a single household (see
id. at 52-53).

   /12/ The district court granted relief based on appellees'
affidavits, prepared as early as 1981, describing transient living
situations and indicating an immediate need for food stamps (J.A.
26-42, 50-53).  Thus, it is possible that appellees are no longer in
need of the relief provided by the district court.  However,
appellees' counsel informs us that at least some of the appellees
continue to live with parents, children, or siblings and continue to
qualify for relief under the injunction.  In all events, this dispute
would not be mooted if appellees simply ceased receiving food stamp
benefits.  The injunction has not been vacated;  furthermore, the
Secretary may seek repayment of overissuances in the event that the
court's decision is overturned (7 U.S.C. 2022).  See Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, No. 82-206 (June 12, 1984), slip op.
5-9.

   /13/ See generally 1982 House Hearings;  1981 Senate Hearings;
1981 House Hearing.

   /14/ See, e.g., S. Rep. 97-504, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982)
("tightening of the household definition was the leading
recommendation for change made in response to a recent survey by the
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry)");  id. at
26 ("(h)ousehold size has consistently been determined to be the
second most likely source of recipient fraud resulting in
overissuances;  income is first");  H.R. Rep. 97-687, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 25 (1982) (revision of the household definition was among "the
suggestions made by State program administrations, officials from the
General Accounting Office, and the Department (of Agriculture)'s
Inspector General");  S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 32 ("(t)hese current
practices of artificially splitting households is (sic) an abuse which
has been reported frequently to the (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry) in correspondence from local and State
administrators");  1982 House Hearings 45 ("(t)he vast majority of
overissuances and underissuances for this $10.6 billion program stem
from errors in determining correct income, assets, and household
size") (statement of Henry Eschwege, Director, Community and Economic
Development Division, General Accounting Office);  1981 Senate
Hearings 31-32, 42, 305-306, 308, 310-311 (testimony and prepared
statements of S.L. Puett, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Human
Services).

   /15/ As a spokesman for the General Accounting Office observed,
"(i)t is very difficult to verify separate household status for people
living together." 1982 House Hearings 47 (statement of Henry Eschwege,
Director, Community and Economic Development Division).  Individual
determinations are impractical because, as a Texas food stamp fraud
investigator explained, "(t)he complexity of the program works to the
advantage of those determined to abuse it." 1981 Senate Hearings 52
(statement of E. Richards, Investigator General, Texas Department of
Human Resources).  The very size of the program prevents individual
investigations.  Id. at 51 (noting an investigation backlog of 10,000
cases in Texas alone).

   /16/ See H.R. Conf. Rep. 97-759, supra, at 62-63;  S. Rep. 97-504,
supra, at 24-27, 87-88, 111, 119;  H.R. Rep. 97-687, supra, at 25,
75-76, 83-84, 105;  S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 52-53;  S. Rep. 97-128,
supra, at 31-32;  H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 118-119.

   /17/ See e.g., Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 588-593 (1982)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to federal limitations that
result in higher Medicaid benefits to recipients of Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) than to persons who are self-supporting);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 230-239 (rejecting an equal
protection challenge to a federal limitation on SSI eligibility that
provides benefits only to residents in public institutions who receive
Medicaid funds for their care);  Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170,
174-178 (1978) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to federal
limitations on payment of SSI benefits to persons who reside outside
the United States for a period greater than 30 days);  Mathews v.
DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (rejecting an equal protection challenge
to a federal limitation on payment of Social Security benefits to the
divorced wives of retirees);  Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-516
(1976) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a federal
limitation on payment of Social Security benefits to surviving
illegitimate children who are unable to establish dependency on the
putative parent).

   /18/ Congress quite reasonably chose "to avoid the burden and
expense of specific case-by-case determination." Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 509 (1976).  Nonetheless, it attempted to tailor its
definition of "household," to the extent possible, to minimize
hardships on particular family arrangements.  For example, Congress
provided specific exceptions from the houshold definition for the
elderly and the disabled.  Even these exceptions may, of course,
"leave some comparatively needy person outside the favored circle"
(Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 238).  But that result is inevitable
in the course of legislative line-drawing:

      "Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it
      the line or point seems arbitrary.  It might as well or nearly
      as well be a little more to one side or the other.  But when it
      is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no
      mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision
      of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is
      very wide of any reasonable mark."

Id. at 239 n.23 (quoting Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277
U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ).  See also, e.g., United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176;  Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 549;  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 487.

   /19/ See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216-217;  City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam);
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 312 (1976)
(per curiam);  San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).

   /20/ The district court suggested (J.S. App. 6a), without clear
explanation, that this Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977), recognizing gender as a "quasi-suspect"
classification, justified heightened scrutiny in the present case.
Appellees, however, have not contended that family members are subject
to invidious class discrimination.  See Mot. to Dis. 7-13.

   /21/ See generally Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy -- Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463 (1983).

   /22/ For example, the right to marry and have children receives
special constitutional protection.  See, e.g., Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974) (invalidating
oppressively restrictive maternity leave regulations);  Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state statute banning
interracial marriage).

   /23/ We perceive only one situation in which Section 2012(i)'s
"household" definition might theoretically encourage family members to
live apart.  In some circumstances, a family that is ineligible for
food stamp benefits based on its combined household income might
become eligible if the individual members lived apart and applied for
benefits separately.  It appears doubtful that family members would
choose to live separately simply to qualify for food stamps;  the
increased cost of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the
value of the food stamp benefits.  Nonetheless, family members intent
upon receiving food stamps might conceivably adjust their living
arrangements to satisfy the eligibility criteria.  The availability of
that option, however, does not constitute government impairment of any
fundamental family right.  The government does not intrude upon family
relationships simply because family members with combined income in
excess of public welfare eligibility requirements may choose to adjust
their lifestyles to qualify for welfare benefits.

   /24/ By the same token, Section 2012(i) does not infringe the
constitutional rights of family members, presently living apart and
receiving food stamp benefits, who wish to live together and preserve
the same benefit level.  At bottom, these family members are simply
demanding "a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to
avail (themselves) of the full range of protected choices." McRae, 448
U.S. at 316.

   /25/ The district court also misconstrued Moreno in concluding that
the decision would preclude food stamp benefit limitations even in the
absence of "a congressional pronouncement of a desire to harm" (J.S.
App. 8a).  Moreno clearly turned on a finding that Congress's sole
reason for enacting the challenged legislation was its desire to
disadvantage a "politically unpopular group," rather than to serve a
legitimate government interest.  413 U.S. at 534.  Thus, contrary to
the district court's statement, Congress's motivation was critical to
the Court's conclusion.  See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 87 (1976);
Levesque v. Block, slip op. 5-7.

   /26/ Although the Court need not reach the issue, we believe
Section 2012(i) would withstand the "intermediate" level of scrutiny
that the district court mistakenly required.  The sheer magnitude of
food stamp fraud and the impossibility of policing it on a
case-by-case basis provide "an exceedingly persuasive justification"
for redefining the term "household" to prevent widespread systematic
abuses.  Cf. Heckler v. Mathews, No. 82-1050 (Mar. 5, 1984), slip op.
19.  Likewise, the judicious deliberation and weighing of competing
interests that accompanied the redefinition indicates that the changes
were "plainly adopted 'through reasoned analysis rather than through
the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate,
assumptions.'" Mathews, slip op. 20 (quoting Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982) ).  Thus, Section
2012(i)'s definition of "household" is substantially related to
important government objectives.