NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
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    requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
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                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    --------
                                   No. 95-1228
                                    --------
        UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JERRY E. WELLS AND KENNETH R. STEELE
                                 ___

       ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
                                 EIGHTH CIRCUIT

                               [February 26, 1997]

  JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

  The principal issue before us is whether materiality of falsehood is an
element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally
insured bank, 18 U. S. C. S1014.  We hold that it is not.
                                        I

  In 1993, the Government charged respondents, Jerry Wells and Kenneth Steele,
with violating and conspiring to violate the cited statute as officers and part-
owners of Copytech Systems, Inc., a lessor of office copiers for a monthly fee
covering not only use of the equipment but any service that might be required. 
To raise cash, Copytech sold its interest in the income stream from these
contracts to banks.
   In Count I of the indictment, the Government charged respondents with
conspiring to violate S1014 by concealing from several banks the true
contractual terms. (Ftnote. 1)  Respondents supposedly conspired to provide the
                   (Ftnote. 1)
banks with versions of lease contracts purporting to indicate that Copytech's
customers were responsible for servicing the equipment when, in fact, secret
side agreements

                    
____________________

   1)  Title 18 U. S. C. S371 makes it a crime to "conspire . . . to commit any
   1)  
offense against the United States."  

                                95-1228 - OPINION

2                            UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

placed that responsibility on Copytech at no further cost to the lessees.  See
App. 24-25; 63 F. 3d 745, 748 (CA8 1995).  The Government alleged that
respondents concealed the service obligations in order to avoid tying up needed
cash in reserve accounts, which the banks might have required Copytech to
maintain if they had known of the company's servicing obligations.  Id., at 748.
                                                                    ____
  In Count II, respondents were charged with violating S1014 by giving a bank
forgeries of respondents' wives' signatures on personal guaranties designed to
enable the bank to pursue the wives' assets if Copytech defaulted on any
liability to the bank.  See App. 21, 30-31; 63 F. 3d, at
748. (Ftnote. 2)  Each count of the indictment charged respondents with
     (Ftnote. 2)
submitting one or more statements that were both false and "material."  App. 24,
25, 29, 30-31.
  At the end of the trial, the District Court instructed the jury, at the
Government's behest, that withholding a "material fact" made a statement or
representation false, id., at 41, 42, and defined a material fact as one "that
                      ____
would be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to engage or not
to engage in a particular transaction," id., at 42.  Although there was no
                                        ____
controversy over the law as stated in these instructions, the Government argued
that materiality was for the judge to determine, while respondents said it was
an issue for the jury.  63 F. 3d, at 749, nn. 3 and 4.  Following Eighth Circuit
precedent then prevailing, the District Court agreed with the Government and
told the jury that "[t]he materiality of the statement . . . alleged to be false
. . . is not a matter with which you are

                    
____________________

   2)  The Government also charged respondents with three other counts of
   2)  
violating S1014.  The District Court dismissed one count prior to trial and
granted judgment of acquittal on the other two.  63 F. 3d, at 748; Brief for
Respondents 2; Brief for United States 3, n. 1.

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                            3
                                          ____

concerned and should not be considered by you in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant[s]," App. 43.  The jury convicted respondents on both
counts, the court treated the statements as material, and respondents appealed.
  While the appeal was pending, we decided United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S.
                                           _____________    _______
___ (1995), in which the parties agreed that materiality was an element of 18
U. S. C. S1001, but disputed whether materiality was a question for the judge or
jury, id., at ___ (slip op., at 3).  Applying the rule that "[t]he Constitution
      ____
gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine . . . his guilt of
every element of the crime with which he is charged," we held that the jury was
entitled to pass on the materiality of Gaudin's statements, id., at ___ (slip
                                                            ____
op., at 17).  When the Court of Appeals in this case requested supplemental
briefing on the applicability of Gaudin, respondents argued that under S1014
                                 _______
materiality is an element on which they were entitled to a jury's determination;
the Government argued, for the first time, that materiality is not an element
under S1014, so that no harm had been done when the judge dealt with the issue. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, vacated their convictions and
sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial.  63 F. 3d, at 749-751.
  We granted the Government's petition for certiorari to decide whether
materiality of a false statement or report is an element under
S1014. (Ftnote. 3)  517 U. S. ___ (1996).  We
       (Ftnote. 3)

                    
____________________

   3)  Most, but not all, of the Federal Courts of Appeals have held that
   3)  
materiality is an element.  Compare United States v. Lopez, 71 F. 3d 954, 960
                                    _____________    _____
(CA1 1995), cert. denied, 518 U. S. ___ (1996); United States v. Ryan, 828 F. 2d
                                                _____________    ____
1010, 1013, n. 1 (CA3 1987); United States v. Bonnette, 663 F. 2d 495, 497 (CA4
                             _____________    ________
1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 951 (1982); United States v. Thompson, 811 F. 2d
                                           _____________    ________
841, 844 (CA5 1987); United States v. Spears, 49 F. 3d 1136, 1141 (CA6 1995);
                     _____________    ______
United States v. Staniforth, 971 F. 2d 1355, 1358 (CA7 1992); Theron v. United
_____________    __________                                   ______    ______
States Marshal, 832 F. 2d 492, 496-497 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1059
______________
(1988); United States v. Haddock, 956 F. 2d 1534, 1549 (CA10), cert. denied, 506
        _____________    _______
U. S. 828 (1992); United States v. Rapp, 871 F. 2d 957, 964 (CA11), cert. denied
                  _____________    ____
sub nom. Bazarian v. United States, 493 U. S. 890 (1989) (all holding
________ ________    _____________
materiality to be an element of S1014) with United States v. Cleary, 565 F. 2d
                                            _____________    ______
43, 46 (CA2 1977) (concluding that materiality is not an element), cert. denied
sub nom. Passarelli v. United States, 435 U. S. 915 (1978).
________ __________    _____________

                                95-1228 - OPINION

4                            UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

now vacate and remand.
                                       II
  We first address respondents' efforts to block us from reaching the question
on which we granted certiorari.  Given the Government's proposal for jury
instructions to the effect that materiality is an element under S1014,
respondents argue that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 and the doctrines
of "law of the case" and "invited error" each bar the Government from taking the
position here that materiality is not an element.  None of these reasons stands
in our way to reaching the merits.
  Rule 30 (applicable in this Court, see Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 1, 54(a)),
provides that "[n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge [given
to the jury] . . . unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict."  But the Government is not challenging the jury instruc-
tion in an effort to impute error to the trial court; it is merely arguing that
the instruction it proposed was harmless surplusage insofar as it was directed
to the jury.
  As for the two doctrines, respondents are correct that several Courts of
Appeals have ruled that when the Government accepts jury instructions treating a
fact as an element of an offense, the "law of the case" doctrine precludes the
Government from denying on appeal that the crime includes the element.  See
United States v. 
_____________

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                            5
                                          ____

Killip, 819 F. 2d 1542, 1547-1548 (CA10), cert. denied sub nom. Krout v. United
_______                                                ________ _____    ______
States, 484 U. S. 987 (1987); United States v. Tapio, 634 F. 2d 1092, 1094 (CA8
_______                       _____________    ______
1980); United States v. Spletzer, 535 F. 2d 950, 954 (CA5
       _____________    _________
1976). (Ftnote. 4)  They are also correct that Courts of Appeals have stated
       (Ftnote. 4)
more broadly under the "invited error" doctrine "`that a party may not complain
on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the [district] court
. . . to commit.'"  United States v. Sharpe, 996 F. 2d 125, 129 (CA6) (quoting
                   ______________    _______
Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F. 2d 59, 60 (CA6 1991)), cert. denied, 510
______   _______________________
U. S. 951 (1993).  But however valuable these doctrines may be in controlling
the party who wishes to change its position on the way from the district court
to the court of appeals, they cannot dispositively oust this Court's traditional
rule that we may address a question properly presented in a petition for
certiorari if it was "pressed [in] or passed on" by the Court of Appeals, United
                                                                          ______
States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 42 (1992) (internal quotation marks and em-
______    _________
phasis omitted).  Accordingly, we have treated an inconsistency between a
party's request for a jury instruction and its position before this Court as
just one of several considerations bearing on whether to decide a question on
which we granted certiorari. (Ftnote. 5)  See Spring-
                             (Ftnote. 5)      _______

                    
____________________

   4)  In this context, the "law of the case" doctrine is something of a
   4)  
misnomer.  It does not counsel a court to abide by its own prior decision in a
given case, but goes rather to an appellate court's relationship to the court of
trial.  See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
S4478 (1981).  
   5)  Respondents offer variations on their "law of the case" and "invited
   5)  
error" doctrines.  In addition to arguing that the "law of the case" doctrine
holds the Government to the position it took on the jury instructions,
respondents contend this doctrine holds the Government to the position it
adopted in the indictment.  See Brief for Respondents 14-16 (citing United
                                                                    ______
States v. Norberg, 612 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1979)).  For the reasons set forth in the
______    _______
text, this latter version of the doctrine does not stand in our way to reaching
the question presented.  
 Along with arguing that the Government "invited error" in the District Court
by proposing its jury instructions, respondents claim that the Government
invited error in the Court of Appeals by failing to argue that materiality is
not an element of S1014 in its initial brief to that court.  This claim is
wrong.  After the Court of Appeals requested supplemental briefing, the
Government argued that materiality is not an element of S1014 and therefore
hardly "invited" that court's contrary ruling.

                                95-1228 - OPINION

6                            UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

field v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 259-260 (1987). (Ftnote. 6)  Here, it seems
                                               (Ftnote. 6)
_____    ______
sensible to reach the question presented.
  The question of materiality as an element was raised before the Court of
Appeals, ruled on there, clearly set forth in the certiorari petition, fully
briefed, and argued.  Nor would reaching the issue excuse inattention or reward
cunning.  For some time before respondents' trial in 1993, the Eighth Circuit
had assumed that the Government was bound to prove a false statement's materi-
ality as an element under S1014, see 63 F. 3d, at 750-751; United States v.
                                                           _____________
Ribaste, 905 F. 2d 1140, 1143 (CA8 1990); United States v. McKnight, 771 F. 2d
________                                  _____________    _________
388, 389 (CA8 1985), and had treated this issue as one for the judge, not the
jury, see United States v. Ribaste, supra, at 1143.  Since the Government was
          _____________    ________ ______
confident that it had evidence of materiality to satisfy the Circuit rule, it
had no reason not to address the element when

                    
____________________

   6)  In Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S., at 259, the Court dismissed the writ
   6)     ___________    ______
of certiorari on prudential grounds in part because the petitioner there, like
the Government here, sought "to revers[e] a judgment because of [jury]
instructions that petitioner accepted, and indeed itself requested."  In
contrast to the case at hand, however, the petitioner in Kibbe had not, in the
                                                         _____
Court of Appeals, raised an issue critical to resolving the question presented
in its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals had not consid-
ered that related issue, and the petitioner had not explicitly raised that
related issue in its certiorari petition, id., at 258-260.  See also United
                                          ___                        ______
States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 43, n. 3 (1992) (discussing Kibbe).
______    _________                                           _____

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                            7
                                          ____

it drafted the indictment and its proposed jury instructions.  When Gaudin
                                                                    ______
rendered it reversible error to assign a required materiality ruling to the
court, the Government suddenly had reason to contest the requirement to show
materiality at all.  Nothing the Government has done disqualifies it from the
chance to make its position good in this Court.
                                       III
  We accordingly consider whether materiality of falsehood is an element under
S1014, understanding the term in question to mean "ha[ving] a natural tendency
to influence, or [being] capable of influencing, the decision of the
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," Kungys v. United States, 485
                                                ______    ______________
U. S. 759, 770 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States
                                                                   _____________
v. Gaudin, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2). (Ftnote. 7)  We begin with the text. 
                                           (Ftnote. 7)
   _______ ______
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 739 (1989). 
    ___________________________________    _____
Section 1014 criminalizes "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report
. . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action" of an FDIC-insured
bank "upon any application, advance, . . . commitment, or loan." 18 U. S. C.
S1014.  Nowhere does it further say that a material fact must be the subject of
the false statement or so much as mention materiality. (Ftnote. 8)  To the
                                                       (Ftnote. 8)
contrary,

                    
____________________

   7)  The Court of Appeals here also appears to have understood materiality to
   7)  
have this meaning.  See 63 F. 3d, at 750 (relying on United States v. Adler, 623
                                                     _____________    _____
F. 2d 1287, 1291 (CA8 1980), which defined "materiality" as having "a natural
tendency to influence or [being] capable of influencing" an entity's decision
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
   8)  The pertinent text of S1014 is: "Whoever knowingly makes any false
   8)  
statement or report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for
the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . any institution the
accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . .
, upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement,
repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan, or any change or extension of any of
the same, by renewal, deferment of action or otherwise, or the acceptance,
release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both."  

                                95-1228 - OPINION

8                            UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

its terms cover "any" false statement that meets the other requirements in the
statute, and the term "false statement" carries no general suggestion of
influential significance, see Kungys v. United States, supra, at 781; cf. Kay v.
                              ______    ______________ ______             ___
United States, 303 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1938).  Thus, under the first criterion in the
______________
interpretive hierarchy, a natural reading of the full text, see United States v.
                                                                _____________
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542-543 (1940), materiality would
_______________________________
not be an element of S1014. (Ftnote. 9)
                            (Ftnote. 9)
  Nor have respondents come close to showing that at common law the term "false
statement" acquired any implication of materiality that came with it into S1014. 
We do, of course, presume that Congress incorporates the common-law meaning of
the terms it uses if those "`terms . . . have accumulated settled meaning under
. . . the common law'" and "`the statute [does not] otherwise dictat[e],' "
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Community
________________________    _______                                    _________
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, supra, at 739). 
_________________________    _____ ______

                    
____________________

   9)  JUSTICE STEVENS argues that the four criminal acts other than "false
   9)  
statement" listed in S1014 would in fact involve material misstatements, and
that it follows on the theories of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis that
                                   _______________     _________________
false statements must also be shown to be material.  Post, at 12, n. 12.  But
                                                     ____
this does not follow.  The question is not whether the specified categories of
statements will almost certainly be material statements in point of fact; like
false statements made for the purpose of influencing a lender, the four other
criminal acts will virtually always involve material misstatements.  The
question, however, is whether materiality must be proven as a separate element,
and on that question a list of criminal acts, none of which is expressly
described as "material," is no premise for the dissent's conclusion under the
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis canons.
_______________     _________________

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                            9
                                          ____

Respondents here, however, make no claims about the settled meaning of "false
statement" at common law; they merely note that some common-law crimes involving
false statements, such as perjury, required proof of materiality.  See Brief for
Respondents 23-24.  But Congress did not codify the crime of perjury or compara-
ble common-law crimes in S1014; as we discuss next, it simply consolidated 13
statutory provisions relating to financial institutions, and, in fact, it
enacted a separate general perjury provision at 18 U. S. C. S1621, see 62 Stat.
773. (Ftnote. 10)
     (Ftnote. 10)

                    
____________________

   10)  Nor does Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490 (1981), help 
   10)           _________    ______________
respondents here.  In Fedorenko, we agreed with the Government that, even though
                      _________
the phrase "willfully make a misrepresentation" in S10 of the Displaced Persons
Act, 62 Stat. 1013, did not use the term "material," it nonetheless applied only
to willful misrepresentations about "material" facts, 449 U. S., at 507-508, and
n. 28.  The dissent argues we should reach a similar conclusion here, because
Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 781 (1988), made it clear that
______    ______________
"misrepresentation" and "false statement" were on par at common law.  Post, at
                                                                      ____
5-6, and n. 6.  But the passage from Kungys quoted by the dissent addressed the
                                     _______
historic meaning of the term "material," see 485 U. S., at 769, not the common-
law meaning of "misrepresentation" or "false statement."  Although Kungys
                                                                   ______
supports the view that "materiality" has the same meaning in criminal statutes
that prohibit falsehoods to public officials, whether the statutes refer to
misrepresentations, see id., at 772-776, or to some form of false statements,
                        ___
see id. at 779-782, that does not mean that "misrepresentation" and "false
    ___
statement" are identical in carrying an implicit requirement of materiality. 
Indeed, Kungys distinguished between the common-law meaning of "misrepresenta-
        ______
tion" and "false testimony," concluding that while the former had been held to
carry a materiality requirement in many contexts, the terms "false" or "falsity"
did not as frequently  carry such an implication.  Id., at 781.
                                                   ___
 More fundamentally, we disagree with our colleague's apparent view that any
term that is an element of a common law-crime carries with it every other aspect
of that common-law crime when the term is used in a statute.  JUSTICE STEVENS
seems to assume that because "false statement" is an element of perjury, and
perjury criminalizes only material statements, a statute criminalizing "false
statements" covers only material statements.  See post, at 5-6.  By a parity of
                                                  ____
reasoning, because common-law perjury involved statements under oath, a statute
criminalizing a false statement would reach only statements under oath.  It is
impossible to believe that Congress intended to impose such restrictions sub
                                                                         ___
silentio, however, and so our rule on imputing common-law meaning to statutory
________
terms does not sweep so broadly.  

                                95-1228 - OPINION

10                           UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

  Statutory history confirms the natural reading.  When Congress originally
enacted S1014 as part of its recodification of the federal criminal code in
1948, 62 Stat. 752, it explicitly included materiality in other provisions
involving false representations. (Ftnote. 11)  Even more significantly, of the
                                 (Ftnote. 11)
13 provisions brought together by S1014, 10 had previously contained no express
materiality provision and received none in the recodifica-
tion, (Ftnote. 12) while 3 of the 13 had contained express materiality
      (Ftnote. 12)
requirements

                    
____________________

   11)  See 18 U. S. C. S1621, 62 Stat. 773 (entitled "Perjury generally," and
   11)  
prohibiting statements under oath regarding "any material matter which [one]
does not believe to be true"); 18 U. S. C. S1001, 62 Stat. 749 (entitled
"Statements or entries generally," and prohibiting, inter alia, "knowingly and
                                                    __________
willfully falsif[ying] . . . a material fact").
   12)  See 7 U. S. C. S1514(a) (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it
   12)  
to be false . . . for the purpose of influencing"); 12  U. S. C. S981 (1946 ed.)
("knowingly mak[ing] any false statement in an application for [a] loan"); 12
U. S. C. S1122 (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, for
the purpose of obtaining . . . any advance"), 12 U. S. C. S1123 (1946 ed.)
("willfully overvalu[ing] any property offered as security"); 12 U. S. C. S1248
(1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement . . . knowing the same to be false"), 12
U. S. C. S1312 (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, for
the purpose of obtaining"), 12 U. S. C. S1313 (1946 ed.) ("willfully
overvalu[ing] any property offered as security"), 12 U. S. C. S1441(a) (1946
ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, . . . for the purpose of
influencing"), 12 U. S. C. S1467(a) (1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing
it to be false, . . . for the purpose of influencing"); 15 U. S. C. S616(a)
(1946 ed.) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it to be false . . . for the purpose
of obtaining . . . or for the purpose of influencing").

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                           11
                                          ____

and lost them in the course of consolidation. (Ftnote. 13)  See Williams v.
                                              (Ftnote. 13)      ________
United States, 458 U. S. 279, 288 (1982).  The most likely inference in these
______________
circumstances is that Congress deliberately dropped the term "materiality"
without intending materiality to be an element of S1014.  See United States v.
                                                              _____________
Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1994). (Ftnote. 14)  While two of the three
                                     (Ftnote. 14)
________
offenses from which the express materiality requirement was dropped used the
term "representation," see n. 12, supra, and thus could have included a
                                  ______
materiality element implicitly, see Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S., at 781
                                    ______    ______________
(noting that "misrepresentation" had been held to imply materiality), the
remaining eleven would not have, as was clear from the opinion of the Court in
Kay v. United States, 303
___    ______________

                    
____________________

   13)  See 7 U. S. C. S1026(a) (1946 ed.) (making a "material representa-
   13)  
tion"); 12  U. S. C. S596 (1946 ed.) (making a "material statement"); and 12
U. S. C. S1138d(a) (1946 ed.) (making a "material representation").  
   14)  JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that because he can discern no meaningful
   14)  
difference between the subject matter and penalties involved in the 42 sections
of the United States Code criminalizing false statements that expressly include
a materiality requirement, and the 54 sections criminalizing false statements
that lack an express materiality requirement, we must infer that Congress
intended all of the sections to include a materiality element.  See post, at
                                                                    ____
6-11.  In other words, Congress must have thought that including materiality in
42 statutes was surplusage.  This, of course, is contrary to our presumption
that each term in a criminal statute carries meaning.  See Bailey v. United
                                                           ______    ______
States, 516 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 8).  Moreover, the dissent's
_______
approach to statutory interpretation leads to remarkable results.  The statutes
cited by the dissent contain a variety of different requirements; for example,
some criminalize statements only if they were made with a particular intent,
see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. S1919; 33 U. S. C. S931, while others do not, see, e.g.,
7 U. S. C. S13(a)(3); 7 U. S. C. S6407(e).  Under our colleague's reasoning,
unless a court could readily discern a meaningful difference between these two
categories of statutes, apart from the language used, it should import the mens
                                                                           ____
rea requirements expressly appearing in some sections to those that lack them.  
___

                                95-1228 - OPINION

12                           UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

U. S. 1 (1938).  Kay had construed one of the ten statutes that were later
                 ___
mirrored in the language of S1014; (Ftnote. 15) when the petitioner claimed that
                                   (Ftnote. 15)
the statements she had made could not "endanger or directly influence any loan
made by" the decisionmaker, id., at 5, we thought her arguments unimpressive,
                           _____
ibid., and explained that
______

     "[i]t does not lie with one knowingly making false statements with intent
     to mislead the officials of the Corporation to say that the statements
     were not influential or the information not important.  There can be no
     question that Congress was entitled to require that the information be
     given in good faith and not falsely with intent to mislead.  Whether or
     not the Corporation would act favorably on the loan is not a matter which
     concerns one seeking to deceive by false information.  The case is not

                    
____________________

   15)  Compare S8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, 48 Stat. 134, (providing
   15)  
that "[w]hoever makes any statement, knowing it to be false, or whoever
willfully overvalues any security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the
action of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation or the Board or an association upon
any application, advance, discount, purchase, or repurchase agreement, or loan,
under this Act, or any extension thereof by renewal deferment, or action or
otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not
more than two years, or both") with S1014 as enacted in 1948, 62 Stat. 752
(providing that "[w]hoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or
willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the purpose of influ-
encing in any way the action of [enumerated institutions] upon any application,
advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement,
commitment, or loan, or any change or extension of any of the same, by renewal,
deferment of action or otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of
security therefor, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both").  

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                           13
                                          ____

   one of an action for damages but of criminal liability and actual damage is
   not an ingredient of the offense."  Id., at 5-6. (Ftnote. 16)
                                                    (Ftnote. 16)
                                       ____

  Although some courts have read Kay as holding only that there is no need for
                                 ___
the Government to prove that false statements actually influenced the
decisionmaker, see, e.g., United States v. Goberman, 458 F. 2d 226, 229 (CA3
                    _____ _____________    _________
1972), the opinion speaks of the importance of the statements as well as their
efficacy, and no one reading Kay could reasonably have assumed that criminal
                             ___
falsity presupposed materiality.  Since we presume that Congress expects its
statutes to be read in conformity with this Court's precedents, see, e.g., North
                                                                     _____ _____
Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 4), and since
______________    _______
the relevant language of the statute in Kay was substantially like that in
                                        ___
S1014, Kay stands in the way of any assumption that Congress might have under-
       ___
stood an express materiality provision to be redundant.
  Respondents' remaining arguments for affirmance are unavailing.  They contend
that Congress has ratified holdings of some of the Courts of Appeals that
materiality is an element of S1014 by repeatedly amending the statute without
rejecting those decisions.  But the significance of subsequent congressional
action or inaction necessarily varies with the circumstances, and finding any
interpretive help in congressional behavior here is impossible.  Since 1948,
Congress has amended S1014 to modify the list of covered institutions and to
increase the maximum penalty, (Ftnote. 17) but without ever
                              (Ftnote. 17)

                    
____________________

   16)  We ultimately did not uphold the conviction in Kay, 303 U. S., at 9-10,
   16)                                                 ____
but vacated the lower court's judgment so that it would be free to address a
separate issue relating to the indictment.
   17)  See Pub. L. 91-609, S915, 84 Stat. 1815 (adding FDIC-insured banks to
   17)  
the list of covered institutions); Pub. L. 101-73, S961(h), 103 Stat. 500
(increasing the maximum punishment from its 1948 level of a $5,000 fine and two
years' imprisonment to $1,000,000 and 20 years' imprisonment); Pub. L. 101-647,
S2504(g), 104 Stat. 4861 (increasing the maximum prison term to 30 years).  

                                95-1228 - OPINION

14                           UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

touching the original phraseology criminalizing "false statement[s]" made "for
the purpose of influencing" the actions of the enumerated institutions.  We thus
have at most legislative silence on the crucial statutory language, and we have
"frequently cautioned that `[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional
silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law,'" NLRB v. Plasterers,
                                                           ____    ___________
404 U. S. 116, 129-130 (1971) (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61,
                                       ________    ______________
69 (1946)).  But even if silence could speak, it could not speak unequivocally
to the issue here, since over the years judicial opinion has divided on whether
S1014 includes a materiality element, see n. 3, supra, and we have previously
                                                ______
described the elements of S1014 without any mention of materiality, see Williams
                                                                        ________
v. United States, 458 U. S., at 284.  It would thus be impossible to say which
   ______________
view Congress might have endorsed.  See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517,
                                        _______    ______________
527-532 (1994). (Ftnote. 18)
                (Ftnote. 18)
   Respondents also rely on the 1948 Reviser's Note to S1014, which discussed
the consolidation of the 13 provisions into one, and explained that, apart from
two changes not relevant here, (Ftnote. 19) the consolidation "was
                               (Ftnote. 19)

                    
____________________

   18)  If we were to rely on legislative history, the reports would be of no
   18)  
help to respondents.  See H. R. Rep. No. 91-1556, pp. 70-71 (1970) (addressing
the amendment adding FDIC-insured institutions, describing the statute as
"provid[ing] penalties for making false statements or reports in connection with
loans or similar transactions");  H. R. Rep. No. 101-54, pt. 1, p. 400 (1989)
(on the amendment increasing the maximum prison term to 20 years and a
$1,000,000 fine, describing S1014 as "deal[ing] with false statements in loan
and credit applications");  H. R. Rep. No. 101-681, pt. 1, p. 175 (1990) (on the
amendment increasing the maximum prison term to 30 years, describing S1014 as
"relating to fraudulent loan or credit applications").
   19)  The two substantive changes were: the adoption of a single punishment,
   19)  
which was identical to the punishment set forth in the majority of the
predecessor statutes; and the enumeration of a uniform definition of the types
of transactions covered by the statute, which was a newly phrased "composite" of
the then-existing terms.  See Historical and Revision Notes following S1014, 18
U. S. C., p. 247.

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                           15
                                          ____

without change of substance," Historical and Revision Notes following S1014, 18
U. S. C., p. 247.  Respondents say that the revisers' failure to mention the
omission of materiality from the text of S1014 means that Congress must have
"completely overlooked" the issue.  Brief for Respondents 29-30.  But surely
this indication that the "staff of experts" who prepared the legislation, Muniz
                                                                          _____
v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454, 470, n. 10 (1975), either overlooked or chose to say
   ________
nothing about changing the language of three of the former statutes does nothing
to muddy the ostensibly unambiguous provision of the statute as enacted by
Congress, cf. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S.
              ______________________________    ___________________
102, 108 (1980) ("[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive").  In
any event, the revisers' assumption that the consolidation made no substantive
change was simply wrong.  As respondents candidly conceded at oral argument,
they failed to discover a single case holding that any of the predecessor
statutes lacking a materiality requirement implicitly contained one, and after
our decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938), Congress could not
                ___    ______________
have assumed that a materiality element was implicit in a comparable statute
that was silent on the issue, see supra, at 10-11.  Dropping the materiality
                                  ______
element from the three statutes could not, then, reasonably have been seen as
making no change.  Those who write revisers' notes have proven fallible before. 
See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 532, n. 11
    ______________________________    ________

                                95-1228 - OPINION

16                           UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

(1967). (Ftnote. 20)
        (Ftnote. 20)
  Respondents next urge that we follow the reasoning of some Courts of Appeals
in reading materiality into the statute to avoid the improbability that Congress
intended to impose substantial criminal penalties on relatively trivial or
innocent conduct.  See 63 F. 3d, at 751; United States v. Williams, 12 F. 3d
                                         _____________    _________
452, 458 (CA5 1994); United States v. Staniforth, 971 F. 2d 1355, 1358 (CA7
                     _____________    ___________

                    
____________________

   20)  The dissent contends that, because McClanahan v. United States, 12
   20)                                     ___________   _____________
F. 2d 263, 264 (CA7 1926), and United States v. Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. 402, 403
                               ______________   ________
(SD Iowa 1935), "held or assumed that" two statutes without an explicit
materiality requirement nonetheless carried an implicit one, the revisers likely
assumed that all of the statutes consolidated in S1014 contained a materiality
requirement.  Post, at 3-4.  Neither case, however, held that one of S1014's
              ____
predecessor statutes contained a materiality requirement.  In Kreidler, the
                                                              ________
defendant challenged his indictment under S8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act
(the same provision at issue two years later in Kay, see n. 14, supra), arguing
                                                ____            _____
that a statement "must be material and calculated to deceive," Kreidler, 11
                                                               ________
F. Supp., at 403.  The District Court simply "assume[d]" the statement "must be
relevant and material," and then found that the indictment satisfied those
requirements. Id., at 403-404.  The question in McClanahan was whether the
              ___                               __________
defendant's prosecution under S31 of the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, 39 Stat.
382, 12 U. S. C. S 981 (1946 ed.), was beyond Congress's constitutional power
because the statute did "not limit the [punishable] statement to such as relate
or are material to the proposed loan."  12 F. 2d, at 263.  The court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute.  While stating that it "would in all proba-
bility be concluded" that "wholly frivolous and unrelated" false statements made
in a loan application "did not supply the basis for a prosecution under section
31," the court made it clear that this was dicta, because it explained in the
very next sentence that "there [was] no question of the relevancy of the alleged
false statements knowingly made" in the case before it.  Id., at 264.  In deter-
                                                         ____
mining what the revisers might have thought the words of S1014 meant, we think
it far more likely that they would have relied on the clear implication of our
1938 decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1, rather than on the dicta
                 ___    ______________
from two earlier District or Appeals Court cases.  

                                95-1228 - OPINION

                             UNITED STATES v. WELLS                           17
                                          ____

1992).  But we think there is no clear call to take such a course.  It is true
that we have held S1014 inapplicable to depositing false checks at a bank, in
part because we thought that it would have "ma[d]e a surprisingly broad range of
unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law," Williams v. United States,
                                                  ________    ______________
supra, at 286-287, n. 8, and elsewhere thought it possible to construe a
______
prohibition narrowly where a loose mens rea requirement would otherwise have
                                   ________
resulted in a surprisingly broad statutory sweep, see United States v. X-
                                                      _____________    __
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 71-72 (1994).  But an unqualified reading of
_____________________
S1014 poses no risk of criminalizing so much conduct as to suggest that Congress
meant something short of the straightforward reading.  The language makes a
false statement to one of the enumerated financial institutions a crime only if
the speaker knows the falsity of what he says and intends it to influence the
institution.  A statement made "for the purpose of influencing" a bank will not
usually be about something a banker would regard as trivial, and "it will be
relatively rare that the Government will be able to prove that" a false
statement "was . . . made with the subjective intent" of influencing a decision
unless it could first prove that the statement has "the natural tendency to
influence the decision," Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S., at 780-781.  Hence
                         ______    ______________
the literal reading of the statute will not normally take the scope of S1014
beyond the limit that a materiality requirement would impose.
  Finally, the rule of lenity is no help to respondents here.  "The rule of
lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from which aid can be
derived,' . . . we can make `no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.'"  Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 14)
             ____    ______
(quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993), and Ladner v. United
         _____    ______________                                ______    ______
States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958)).  Read straightforwardly, S1014
_______

                                95-1228 - OPINION

18                           UNITED STATES v. WELLS
                                          ____

reveals no ambiguity, its mens rea requirements narrow the sweep of the statute,
                          ________
and this is not a case of guesswork reaching out for lenity.
                                       IV
  Respondents advance two further reasons to affirm the Court of Appeals's
judgment, even on the assumption that materiality is not an element.  According
to respondents, the trial judge's instruction that "[t]he materiality of the
statement . . . alleged to be false . . . is not a matter with which you are
concerned and should not be considered by you in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant[s]," App. 43, probably left the jurors with the
impression that the statements as alleged would have been material, and that
impression could have improperly influenced the jury in passing on the elements
of falsity and purpose.  Respondents also suggest that because the indictment
alleged materiality, any ruling that materiality need not be shown in this case
would impermissibly "amend" the indictment contrary to the Fifth Amendment's
requirement that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury."  U. S. Const., Amdt. 5.  Since respondents failed to raise either of
these issues in their briefs before the Court of Appeals and that court did not
pass on these questions, we leave it to the Court of Appeals on remand to take
up the propriety of raising these issues now and to address them if warranted.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                                               It is so ordered.
                                                               _________________