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entitled 'Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in 
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2004.

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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

October 2004:

Homeland Security:

Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs:

GAO-05-81:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-81, a report to congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for 
the immigration enforcement and services programs of the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS 
bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 
This transfer creates a great opportunity for DHS to address long-
standing management and operational problems within INS. The Homeland 
Security Act requires GAO to review the transfer of immigration 
functions to DHS. In response, this report assesses the status of (1) 
communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2)
integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3) 
administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE. 

What GAO Found:

Most of the field officials with whom GAO spoke generally characterized 
communication and coordination with other DHS immigration programs in 
their geographic area as good or excellent. Other officials noted, that 
in some areas related to investigative techniques and other operations, 
unresolved issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, 
and ICE give rise to disagreements and confusion, with the potential 
for serious consequences. According to headquarters and field 
officials, some guidance has been made available to the field, and 
there are plans to provide more. 

Most ICE field officials GAO contacted said they have taken initial 
steps toward integrating the former immigration and customs 
investigators, such as establishing cross-training and pay parity. Most 
of these officials said, however, that additional important steps 
remained to be completed to fully integrate investigators. They 
reported that the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE 
operations has caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new 
integrated culture. Headquarters officials said they were responding to 
these challenges. 

Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about a new shared 
services system for mission support when interviewed 3 to 4 months 
after the system was instituted. They also expressed frustration with 
problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll 
systems, which are not a part of the shared services system. 
Additionally, the realignment of staff for shared services, along with 
other events, has resulted in some mission staff being assigned 
administrative work as a collateral duty, which may affect mission 
productivity.

Key practices used by other public and private organizations that have 
undergone successful mergers and transformations may be helpful to DHS 
in addressing the challenges raised in this report and in transforming 
immigration enforcement and services. These key practices include 
establishing communication strategies to create shared expectations and 
involving employees to gain ownership for changes.

Reorganization of INS into DHS: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that DHS use key practices to create a mechanism for 
periodically obtaining and considering employee feedback on their ideas 
and concerns and provides specific guidance on roles and 
responsibilities and administrative services. DHS commented on a draft 
of this report and generally agreed with our findings and 
recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-81.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 
512-8777 or Stanar@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Communication and Coordination Generally Considered Good or Excellent 
by Program Officials, yet Some Cite a Need for Clearer Guidance on 
Roles and Responsibilities:

Some Steps Taken and Some Steps Remain to be Completed in Integrating 
Immigration and Customs Investigators into ICE:

Many Officials Expressed Difficulty Understanding Administrative 
Services:

Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Transformations:

Conclusions:

Recommendations:

Agency Comments:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: Summary of Interview Responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs 
Regarding Communication and Coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE 
Programs:

Figures:

Figure 1: Immigration Programs in DHS:

Figure 2: Division of CBP, CIS, and ICE Roles Under DHS's Shared 
Services:

Figure 3: Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Organizational 
Transformations:

Abbreviations:

ASAC: associate special agent in charge: 
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 
COSS: Customs Overtime Scheduling System: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
FFMS: Federal Financial Management System: 
FLETC: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: 
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service: 
RAC: resident agent in charge: 
SAC: special agent in charge: 
TECS: Treasury Enforcement Communications System:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

October 14, 2004:

Congressional Committees:

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and led to the most substantial reorganization 
of the federal government since the 1940s.[Footnote 1] The duties and 
responsibilities of several former agencies were transferred to DHS, 
including responsibility for immigration enforcement and services. 
These functions were transferred from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), which was abolished in 2003. Transfer of 
the immigration functions creates a great opportunity for DHS to 
successfully address long-standing management and operational problems 
within INS that we have reported over the years.

Our past work on transformations has shown that it is unrealistic to 
expect DHS to have fully resolved these difficult and long-standing 
problems after just one and a half years in operation. As we have 
reported,[Footnote 2] successful organizational transformations can 
take 5 to 7 years to implement, and the three DHS bureaus with primary 
responsibility for immigration functions--U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--are in the process of 
transformation as they develop new ways of dealing with each other and 
managing their performance. We have also reported that in the short 
term, the experience of private sector mergers is that productivity and 
effectiveness, for example, decline as attention is concentrated on 
critical and immediate issues. Given the gravity of DHS's mission, a 
focus on critical and immediate issues is understandable. Nevertheless, 
because any failure by DHS to effectively carry out its mission could 
expose the nation to very serious consequences, it is important that 
DHS start immediately to take advantage of its unique opportunity to 
transform immigration management and program operations and provide the 
immigration enforcement and services that the American people need.

The Homeland Security Act requires us to review the transfer of 
functions from INS to DHS, and identify issues associated with the 
transition.[Footnote 3] This report is intended to satisfy the 
requirements of the mandate. To help formulate the objectives to 
respond to this mandate, we spoke with immigration experts in the 
public and private sectors and representatives of pro-and anti-
immigration advocacy groups in the Washington, D.C., area, and reviewed 
prior reports that we and others have issued. From these efforts, we 
identified three issues that, early in the transition, appeared to 
represent significant management challenges and that we believed 
related to a range of mission and mission support activities. Thus, 
this report assesses the status of (1) communication and coordination 
among immigration programs in DHS, (2) integration of immigration and 
customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative services and 
systems used following the transition into DHS. We did not assess 
program performance or DHS's overall response to long-standing problems 
in this review. Additionally, our analysis was based on a snapshot in 
time, primarily during the first half of fiscal year 2004, and it is 
possible our results may be different if our interviews were conducted 
today.

In assessing the integration of immigration and customs investigators 
in ICE, we briefly discuss the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs), 
which transferred from the Department of the Treasury. Customs was 
responsible for enforcing customs laws in regulating legitimate 
commercial activity and for safeguarding U.S. borders against the 
illegal entry of goods. Before September 11, 2001, Customs' enforcement 
activities focused primarily on preventing the smuggling of drugs into 
the United States.

To address the objectives, we reviewed laws; CBP, CIS, and ICE 
transition documents; policies; and other relevant documents. We also 
interviewed officials at headquarters who were responsible for managing 
ICE's detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations programs; 
CIS's adjudications program; and CBP's Border Patrol and inspections 
programs between September 2003 and August 2004. We interviewed ICE, 
CIS, and CBP officials responsible for developing plans for the 
transition in September 2003. We interviewed officials in CBP, CIS, and 
ICE field offices between December 2003 and March 2004 in the following 
cities: Arlington, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New York; 
Miami, Florida; Detroit, Michigan; and San Diego, California, and with 
the U.S. Border Patrol field offices in Miami, Detroit, and San Diego. 
We selected these locations because of their geographic dispersion, 
their proximity to major ports of entry, and the relative proximity of 
ICE, CBP, and CIS offices to one another. In these locations, we talked 
with officials responsible for inspections, the Border Patrol, and 
inspectors in CBP; officials responsible for adjudications and 
adjudicators in CIS; and managers, supervisory investigators, and 
investigators in ICE. Baltimore and Arlington were used as preliminary 
site visits to form our interview questions. In the remaining four 
cities and all remaining ICE field offices, we used a structured 
interview to obtain information and opinions relevant to our objectives 
from the two most senior ICE officials.[Footnote 4] In total, this 
meant interviewing 49 SACs and ASACs in ICE's field offices. Many of 
these officials provided specific examples to help explain their 
arguments, which we did not verify.

We conducted our review between August 2003 and August 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A 
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology appears in 
appendix I.

Results in Brief:

Most of the field officials in the CBP, CIS, and ICE offices with whom 
we spoke generally characterized communication and coordination with 
other DHS immigration programs in their geographic area as good or 
excellent. They attributed their positive views mainly to working 
relationships that existed before the transition of INS to DHS--
particularly with inspections (in CBP), adjudications (in CIS), and 
detention and removal (in ICE). While CBP, CIS, and ICE headquarters 
offices have issued guidance on the various programs' roles and 
responsibilities, some field officials in all three bureaus said they 
would like additional guidance to provide a clearer understanding of 
such roles and responsibilities. Officials noted that in some cases, 
unresolved disagreements and confusion regarding the roles and 
responsibilities of the DHS immigration bureaus related to various 
investigative techniques and other operational issues has the potential 
for serious consequences. As one example, field officials told us that 
conflicting positions by ICE and the Border Patrol over an 
investigative technique known as controlled deliveries has hampered 
communication and coordination and can not only hinder the 
accomplishment of ICE's mission but potentially put ICE investigators 
at risk.[Footnote 5] According to headquarters and field officials, 
there are plans to issue more guidance on operational roles and 
responsibilities. Specifically, CBP and ICE plan to issue more guidance 
clarifying the roles and responsibilities of Border Patrol agents and 
investigators (in such areas as investigative techniques used in border 
operations, asset forfeiture, and information sharing), although they 
could not provide a specific date when the guidance would be issued to 
the field.

Top officials in ICE's special agent in charge (SAC) offices said that, 
although they had taken initial steps toward integrating the former 
immigration and customs investigative workforces at the time of our 
review, additional important steps remained to be completed at many 
offices to fully integrate investigators. The initial steps most SACs 
said their offices have taken include (1) assigning investigators from 
the former INS and Customs offices to work in new investigative groups 
that are in the same physical location, (2) providing classroom-based 
cross-training and on-the-job-training so former INS investigators know 
the laws and perform the functions of legacy Customs investigators and 
vice versa; and (3) resolving the pay disparity between former INS and 
Customs investigators. However, many of these officials reported that 
the continuation of former INS and Customs investigators working in 
separate locations has been an obstacle to integration. A headquarters 
official told us that ICE has begun to co-locate some SAC offices and 
that other offices would be co-located as existing leases expire. ICE 
officials currently estimate that it would cost $150 million to co-
locate all SAC offices immediately. Field officials also reported that 
the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE operations has 
caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated culture. 
ICE headquarters officials told us that they are prioritizing the 
establishment of uniform policies and that until a new ICE policy is 
established, SAC offices are required to use the policies of the former 
agencies. In addition, many field officials said that the lack of 
unique public identifiers such as badges, credentials, and uniforms has 
held up creation of a unified ICE agency and caused frustration and 
embarrassment. In August 2004, ICE headquarters officials confirmed 
there had been a delay in issuing symbols such as badges and raid 
jackets and that such symbols were either already available or were in 
the final stages of development.

In an attempt to provide more efficient administrative mission support 
services, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing systems 
and processes called "shared services." In December 2003, DHS 
instituted a shared service system in which certain mission support 
services--such as human resources--are provided by one bureau to the 
other bureaus. Certain mission support services were not incorporated 
into the shared services system. Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE 
expressed confusion about shared services when we interviewed them 3 to 
4 months after the system was instituted. Many field officials said 
they did not know what constitutes shared services, what processes they 
should use for receiving assistance from a shared service provider, or 
how many of their staff administrative positions would be reassigned to 
positions in other offices as shared service providers. DHS 
headquarters officials acknowledged in June 2004 (6 months after the 
initiation of shared services) that although a communication strategy 
was in place, communicating information about shared services was a 
"work in progress" and that it was the responsibility of the individual 
bureaus (both those providing and those receiving services) to 
communicate to their field staff about how the shared services process 
worked. CBP, CIS, and ICE officials also expressed frustration with 
problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll--which 
are administrative systems managed within the agencies and not a part 
of shared services. At least in part because of problems with funding 
codes in the travel software, some ICE staff have waited for months to 
be reimbursed for government travel. Some ICE field officials also 
expressed concern about their ability to manage their budgets and 
payroll problems, because of the systems used for these functions. Some 
mission staff in CBP, CIS, and ICE field offices also told us that 
inspectors, investigators, and adjudicators have been assigned 
administrative functions full-time or as a collateral duty because (1) 
some administrative staff from their office were reassigned to other 
offices to serve as shared service providers, (2) the increase in staff 
because of mergers in inspections and investigations and, (3) hiring 
freezes. One effect of assigning mission staff to administrative work 
is that because they are not spending all of their time on duties 
needed to accomplish the program's mission, they are not reaching the 
full potential of the program position.

Carrying out this transformation will not be an easy or quickly 
realized task, so it is understandable that challenges have arisen. In 
July 2003, to help agencies like DHS in such transformations, we 
reported on nine key practices that have been found at the center of 
successful mergers and transformations.[Footnote 6] While all nine key 
practices are important in this transformation, we believe two would be 
particularly helpful to DHS in addressing the longstanding and new 
challenges identified in this report relating to the transformation of 
immigration programs in DHS: (1) establishing a communication strategy 
to create shared expectations and report related progress and (2) 
involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership of 
the transformation. While we did not assess in this review the degree 
to which these practices are being used, we did identify certain parts 
of the key practices that have not been fully integrated into 
immigration strategies, such as establishing a feedback mechanism to 
identify and address employee concerns.

To help DHS address the challenges to the overall transformation of 
immigration programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security help ensure that all parts of the key practices we identified 
are used to address the new and pre-existing challenges related to 
immigration enforcement and services. In particular, DHS should create 
a mechanism to periodically obtain employee feedback, clarify roles and 
responsibilities for field staff in the three bureaus with immigration 
responsibilities, and provide additional detailed guidance on processes 
and procedures to follow for the provision of shared administrative 
services.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In its response, 
DHS generally agreed with our overall findings and recommendations and 
requested that we add more context in some areas, such as the 
department's communication and employee feedback efforts. We discuss 
some of these efforts in the relevant portions of this report but note 
that many of these efforts were ongoing at the time the concerns were 
raised during our fieldwork. DHS also said that our fieldwork coincided 
with the implementation of the shared services initiative and, as such, 
it did not believe the field managers views expressed in this report 
accurately portray the initiative or the current level of comprehension 
of the initiative. While things change over time, we believe that the 
views expressed at the time of our interviews indicate a need in the 
field for additional detailed guidance on the shared administrative 
services initiative.

Background:

The primary mission of DHS is, among other things, to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The creation 
of DHS brought together 22 agencies with responsibility for securing 
the borders and coastal waters, transportation sector, ports, and 
critical infrastructure (such as telecommunications systems), among 
other things. In addition, DHS consolidated some nonsecurity agencies 
such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency's natural disaster 
response functions and maritime safety and drug interdiction by the 
Coast Guard. The creation of DHS was also intended to coordinate the 
sharing of homeland security information and foster closer coordination 
with federal agencies that were not incorporated into DHS, such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State.

Under INS, and now within DHS, immigration enforcement and service are 
complex, multifaceted functions. Immigration enforcement includes, 
among other things, patrolling 8,000 miles of international boundaries 
to prevent illegal entry into the United States; inspecting over 500 
million travelers each year to determine their admissibility; 
apprehending, detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; 
disrupting and dismantling organized smuggling of humans and contraband 
as well as human trafficking; investigating and prosecuting those who 
engage in benefit and document fraud; and enforcing compliance with 
programs such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 
(SEVIS) and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication 
Technology (US-VISIT). Immigration service includes providing services 
or benefits to facilitate entry, residence, employment, and 
naturalization of legal immigrants; processing millions of applications 
each year; making the right adjudicative decision in approving or 
denying the applications; and rendering decisions in a timely manner.

Some background about the long-standing management problems at INS is 
useful to set the stage for the transformation task DHS inherited. In 
this respect, over the years, we have written numerous reports that 
identified management challenges INS experienced in its efforts to 
achieve both effective immigration law enforcement and service 
delivery. In assuming the responsibility for immigration enforcement 
and services, DHS inherits many of these management challenges. For 
example, in 1997 we reported that INS lacked clearly defined priorities 
and goals and that its organizational structure was fragmented both 
programmatically and geographically. Additionally, after a 
reorganization in 1994, field managers still had difficulty determining 
whom to coordinate with, when to coordinate, and how to communicate 
with one another because they were unclear about headquarters offices' 
responsibilities and authority. We also reported that INS had not 
adequately defined the roles of its two key enforcement programs--
Border Patrol and investigations--which resulted in overlapping 
responsibilities, inconsistent program implementation, and ineffective 
use of resources. INS's poor communication led to weaknesses in 
policies and procedures. In later reports, we reported that broader 
management challenges affected efforts to implement programs to control 
the border, deter alien smuggling, reduce immigration benefit fraud, 
reduce unauthorized alien employment, remove criminal aliens, and 
manage the immigration benefit application workload and reduce the 
backlog.[Footnote 7]

INS was abolished, effective in 2003, by the Homeland Security Act of 
2002,[Footnote 8] and its functions were transferred to three agencies 
within the Department of Homeland Security. INS's Immigration Services 
Division, responsible for processing applications for immigration 
benefits, was placed in CIS, which reports directly to the Deputy 
Secretary of DHS. INS's interior enforcement programs--investigations, 
intelligence, and detention and removal--were placed in ICE. Within 
ICE, investigators and intelligence analysts from former INS and the 
U.S. Customs Service were merged into the investigations and 
intelligence offices, while staff from former INS's detention and 
removal program were placed in the detention and removal office. CBP 
incorporated inspectors from former INS, Customs, and Agriculture and 
Plant Health Inspection Service, as well as former INS's Border Patrol 
agents. CBP and ICE both report to the Undersecretary for Border and 
Transportation Security, who in turn reports to the Deputy Secretary of 
the DHS. See figure 1 for the organizational position of immigration 
programs in DHS.

Figure 1: Immigration Programs in DHS:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

CBP, CIS, and ICE each have a separate chain of command and field 
structure. Under former INS, there were 33 district offices, each 
headed by a district director, who had responsibility for 
adjudications, detention and removal, inspections, intelligence, and 
investigations. In DHS, the responsibilities of the 33 district offices 
under the former INS were distributed among 33 CIS district offices, 27 
Special Agent in Charge investigations field offices, 22 detention and 
removal field offices, 20 CBP offices for field operations (that 
oversee about 300 land, sea, and air ports of entry), and 6 field 
intelligence units. The former INS's 20 border patrol sectors remained 
intact.[Footnote 9]

CBP brought together INS and Customs inspections programs that, prior 
to the transition, largely worked side by side in many land ports of 
entry around the country and that shared similar missions. CIS was a 
direct transfer of the Immigration Services Division within INS, and 
the program remained largely intact. In contrast, ICE is a patchwork of 
agencies and programs that includes INS's investigations and 
intelligence programs, Customs' investigations and intelligence 
programs, Customs' air and marine interdiction division, the Federal 
Protective Service, and the Federal Air Marshals. In combining the 
investigations programs, ICE has been tasked with merging INS 
investigators who specialized in immigration enforcement (e.g., 
criminal aliens) with Customs investigators who specialized in customs 
enforcement (e.g., drug smuggling). The integration of INS and Customs 
investigators into a single investigative program has involved blending 
of two vastly different workforces, each with its own culture, 
policies, procedures, and mission priorities. Both programs were in 
agencies with dual missions that prior to the merger had differences in 
investigative priorities. For example, INS primarily looked for illegal 
aliens and Customs primarily looked for illegal drugs. In addition, INS 
investigators typically pursued administrative violations, while 
Customs investigators typically pursued criminal violations.

Communication and Coordination Generally Considered Good or Excellent 
by Program Officials, yet Some Cite a Need for Clearer Guidance on 
Roles and Responsibilities:

Most field officials with whom we spoke in CBP, CIS, and ICE 
characterized communication and coordination with their local 
counterparts as good or excellent. Officials also said that positive 
relationships were primarily based on previous working relationships 
built while the programs--particularly inspections, detention and 
removal, and adjudications--were all within one agency, INS or Customs. 
About a quarter of the officials we interviewed across the immigration 
programs in CBP, CIS, and ICE also said that they would like a clearer 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each program. Those 
ICE officials who characterized communication and coordination as fair 
to poor attributed the inability to resolve their problems to various 
reasons, depending on the program; these included a lack of 
communication or conflicts in roles with the Border Patrol and the 
intelligence program's distance from, and production of useful work 
for, the SAC offices. Near the end of our work, some headquarters and 
field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE told us efforts were under way, 
and agreed upon, to clarify issues related to roles and 
responsibilities that have arisen.

Most Officials Reported Positive Communication and Coordination among 
Programs:

Communication among CBP, CIS, and ICE occurs at the headquarters and 
field level in different ways. All three bureaus have liaisons at the 
headquarters level. For example, ICE has liaisons to CBP and CIS that 
serve as points of contact and facilitators in convening the 
appropriate officials for discussions on cross-cutting issues, and 
ICE's liaisons are to contact those agencies' liaisons should ICE 
initiate discussions. In the field, officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE said 
they typically used meetings to maintain contact with one another, 
although the frequency of meetings varied--from not at all to 
bimonthly--and there are no requirements for field officials to meet 
regularly. Officials who said that they met regularly also said that 
they found these meetings to be useful in sharing information and 
addressing issues that cut across programs.

Overall, most field officials we contacted who responded to this 
question in CBP, CIS, and ICE characterized communication and 
coordination among their programs as good or excellent. Most SACs and 
ASACs said that communication and coordination with CBP's inspections, 
CIS's adjudications, and ICE's detention and removal programs were good 
or excellent. On the other hand, about one-third of SACs and ASACs who 
responded to this question believed that communication and coordination 
with CBP's Border Patrol and ICE's intelligence programs were fair to 
poor. Some officials said they expressed this view concerning 
communication and coordination with the Border Patrol because there 
were conflicts or overlaps in roles and responsibilities or a lack of 
communication. SACs and ASACs who characterized communication and 
coordination with ICE's intelligence program as fair or poor said they 
did so for such reasons as the intelligence office was not in close 
proximity to the SAC office or they did not feel that intelligence 
analysts were producing analyses useful to the SAC office. Table 1 
presents the responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs regarding communication 
and coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE programs.

Table 1: Summary of Interview Responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs 
Regarding Communication and Coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE 
Programs:

(Continued From Previous Page)

Rating: Good or excellent; 
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Border Patrol: 21 
(70%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Inspections: 41 
(91%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and CIS: Adjudications: 36 
(88%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Detention and removal: 
35 (83%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Intelligence: 28 
(68%).

Rating: Fair or poor; 
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Border Patrol: 9 
(30%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Inspections: 4 
(9%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and CIS: Adjudications: 5 
(12%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Detention and removal: 
7 (17%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Intelligence: 13 
(32%).

Rating: Total; 
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Border Patrol: 30 
(100%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and CBP: Inspections: 45 
(100%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and CIS: Adjudications: 41 
(100%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Detention and removal: 
42 (100%); 
Communication between ICE field offices and ICE: Intelligence: 41 
(100%). 

Source: GAO survey.

Note: Data are based on 40 telephone interviews and 9 face-to-face 
interviews with SACs and ASACs. We did not include responses from the 2 
SACs and 2 ASACs in the Baltimore and Arlington SAC offices, as our 
interviews with them were preliminary and the questions were not close 
ended. The total number of SAC and ASAC interview responses varies for 
several reasons: (1) One SAC office had two ASACs; (2) we did not 
interview one SAC who was new to his position; and we did not interview 
an ASAC who was also new to his position. Additionally, the total 
responses for each category varied because not all SACs and ASACs 
responded to all of our questions.

[End of table]

Many SACs and ASACs indicated that their positive views of 
communication and coordination with staff from other programs were 
primarily based on previous working relationships built while the 
programs were all in INS or Customs. In addition, officials we 
contacted in CIS and CBP, and other officials in ICE, said that they 
also relied on working relationships that existed before the transfer 
to facilitate communication and coordination on cross-cutting issues. 
Those SACs and ASACs who responded that they relied to a little or no 
extent on pre-existing working relationships said that they provided 
such a response because they did not have a prior relationship to rely 
upon. In addition, such informal means of maintaining communication and 
coordination among program officials, while helpful, can be short-lived 
as personnel retire or resign. For the long term, processes that 
provide a systematic way of building and maintaining such relationships 
among program staff provide better assurance of effective communication 
and coordination.

Providing guidance that outlines roles and responsibilities among the 
programs is one way of helping to achieve systematic maintenance of 
such relationships. In this respect, the headquarters offices for CBP, 
CIS, and ICE have issued some guidance on roles and responsibilities of 
certain aspects of the immigration programs. For example,

* CBP and ICE issued general guidelines on each bureau's roles and 
responsibilities regarding how they would transfer the assets of 
antismuggling investigators from the Border Patrol to ICE, and how they 
would handle antismuggling investigations after the transfer of these 
investigators to ICE. A memorandum jointly issued by CBP and ICE in 
April 2004 for SACs and Border Patrol sector chiefs in field locations 
outlined each program's basic responsibilities. ICE would assume 
responsibility for administrative support; funding of the antismuggling 
investigators; and all investigations and complex cases such as 
international in nature or related to organizations or national 
security. The Border Patrol would have lead responsibility for cross-
border and border-related interdiction activities, such as surveillance 
to interdict illegal border crossings. According to CBP officials, the 
intent of the memorandum was in part to provide each program with a 
basic framework for working together.

* CBP and CIS convened a working group to decide who would correct 
mistakes on aliens' arrival and departure forms. Several advocacy 
groups argued in the months following the transfer that as a result of 
the dispersal of immigration programs across DHS agencies, aliens 
entering the country did not know who to go to if an error was made on 
their arrival/departure form. The two bureaus agreed that an alien must 
seek an official in CBP to correct a CBP mistake, and a CIS official to 
correct a CIS mistake. Additionally, CBP and CIS agreed that if an 
alien seeking a correction inquires at the wrong office, then that 
person is to be directed to the appropriate authorities for making the 
correction. CBP and CIS officials provided us with this policy in 
written memos dated March 31, 2004, and March 30, 2004, respectively, 
that they said each bureau provided to its staff.

* CIS issued guidance to its field offices in December 2003 stating 
that its Office of Fraud Detection and National Security is to serve as 
the focal point and clearinghouse for requests from law enforcement 
agencies for benefits or "cover" documents.[Footnote 10] The guidance 
outlined the procedures that CIS is to use in responding to law 
enforcement agencies outside DHS (for example, the FBI and Drug 
Enforcement Agency) that want to provide benefits for aliens they have 
brought into the country as witnesses in a criminal case or as 
informants.

Some Field Officials Expressed a Need for Additional Guidance on Roles 
and Responsibilities:

Notwithstanding the above guidance, some officials we contacted across 
CBP, CIS, and ICE said that they would like a clearer understanding of 
the roles and responsibilities of each program. In addition, some 
difficulties with coordination cannot be resolved locally or by pre-
existing working relationships because they reflect a lack of clarity 
in the programs' roles and responsibilities and impede communication 
and coordination between them. For example, four SAC officials were 
unsure how the role of the senior inspector, inherited from INS and now 
in CBP, would affect ICE investigators' roles in conducting 
investigations in the ports of entry. [Footnote 11]

CBP has stated that cases are not always referred to ICE by the senior 
inspectors, and there is no CBP policy to refer such cases to ICE. This 
is because some cases concern immigration violations related only to 
attempted illegal entry at a port of entry and as such are CBP matters 
regarding admissibility, not ICE interior enforcement matters. 
According to CBP headquarters officials responsible for inspections, 
the bureau is exploring the concept of expanding the senior inspector 
position to address broader types of investigations rather than only 
immigration matters, but the role of the senior inspector in relation 
to the role of ICE investigators has not yet been determined.

Additional examples included problems (1) between ICE investigations 
and CBP's Border Patrol in negotiating controlled deliveries, (2) 
between ICE investigations and CIS in the area of benefit fraud, and 
(3) among CBP, CIS, and ICE in the area of issuing paroles to 
aliens.[Footnote 12]

Controlled Deliveries Have Reportedly Been Hampered by Communication 
and Coordination between Border Patrol and ICE:

According to some of the field officials we contacted, how the Border 
Patrol and ICE should communicate and coordinate with each other on 
controlled deliveries had not been fully defined. An ICE official told 
us that prior to the transition, this technique was used by both INS 
and Customs agents and, while INS typically coordinated with the Border 
Patrol, Customs agents, because they were often dealing with narcotics, 
did not necessarily coordinate with INS unless the controlled delivery 
was going through Border Patrol checkpoints. Based on what we were 
told, since the transition, ICE and the Border Patrol have had 
conflicting positions that hamper communication and coordination about 
controlled deliveries. Border Patrol officials we contacted stated that 
their mission is to prevent and detect illegal entry of persons or 
contraband between ports of entry. Some ICE investigators we contacted 
said that they believe, on the other hand, that in order to dismantle 
smuggling organizations--one of ICE's priorities--they need to do more 
than arrest the individual drivers or couriers. We talked with ICE 
officials in one field office who told us that there have been 
occasions when the Border Patrol deployed additional agents to an area 
after learning that ICE intended to conduct a controlled delivery. ICE 
investigators stated that this not only can hinder the accomplishment 
of their mission but potentially puts ICE investigators at risk. This 
is because Border Patrol agents can unsuspectingly encounter an 
undercover ICE agent in the course of interdicting persons attempting 
to cross the border, and if a gunfight ensues, the undercover ICE agent 
risks revealing his or her identity to the smugglers, or the ICE and 
Border Patrol agents risk injuring each other. A Border Patrol chief 
and deputy chief we interviewed stated that if CBP headquarters issued 
a formal memorandum stating that controlled deliveries by ICE were 
allowed, they would be willing to coordinate with local ICE managers.

A Border Patrol official in headquarters told us that after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, former Customs investigators began 
to lead operations on the border and between ports of entry, and saw 
their program as having authority to conduct operations on the border. 
When these investigators transitioned to ICE in March 2003, both 
agencies eventually sought to clarify their roles and responsibilities 
concerning controlled deliveries. The two bureaus formed a working 
group to do this in April 2004.

An outcome of the working group discussions, according to CBP 
headquarters officials, is that Border Patrol and ICE plan to issue 
guidance in the form of a memorandum of understanding concerning the 
general roles and responsibilities of their respective staffs for 
controlled deliveries.[Footnote 13] This new guidance, according to the 
Border Patrol official in headquarters who chaired the working group, 
is to state that all controlled deliveries between ports of entry have 
to be approved by the local Border Patrol chief, who will make a 
decision based on guidance from headquarters. Additionally, according 
to this same official, the guidance will state that the Border Patrol 
will have the responsibility, during controlled deliveries, for 
inspections to ensure that there are no weapons of mass destruction, 
for example, in vehicles or on persons in addition to the known 
smuggled goods or persons. Officials told us the guidance will also 
outline a process for grievances when local managers cannot agree. 
Border Patrol officials said they did not have a date when the guidance 
would be finalized, but that as of August 2004, a final draft was sent 
to CBP's Commissioner to be signed, after which ICE's Assistant 
Secretary would be given the draft for signature.

Focus of Benefit Fraud Investigations Reported as a Source of 
Disagreement among CIS and ICE Field Officials:

At the time of our site visits, how ICE and CIS should communicate and 
coordinate with each other in cases of suspected benefit fraud has not 
been formally defined by either CIS or ICE headquarters, and the field 
officials we contacted said that this has caused disagreement among CIS 
and ICE field officials. The difficulty between CIS and ICE 
investigations regarding benefit fraud is not new. We have noted in a 
past report that INS had numerous problems related to its enforcement 
of benefit fraud, including a lack of protocols for adjudicators and 
others in coordinating benefit fraud and a lack of criteria for 
investigators in prioritizing benefit fraud cases.[Footnote 14] Prior 
to the transition, INS had begun to place a priority on investigating 
benefit fraud perpetrated by large-scale organizations or persons of 
special interest, and this priority has continued under ICE. As a 
result, some CIS field officials told us that ICE would not pursue 
single cases of benefit fraud. ICE field officials who spoke on this 
issue cited a lack of investigative resources as to why they could not 
respond in the manner CIS wanted. For example, one ASAC acknowledged 
that CIS depended on ICE to go forward with leads on benefit fraud but 
said that his office could not commit large numbers of investigators to 
benefit fraud until more investigators were cross-trained. An ASAC and 
group supervisor in another office also cited the lack of investigators 
to address benefit fraud and acknowledged that the vast majority of the 
CIS cases referred to that ICE office we not investigated because of 
this lack of resources.

According to CIS officials, adjudicators refer single cases of benefit 
fraud to ICE, in part because they rely on ICE to conduct database 
checks on systems CIS adjudicators cannot access. For example, ICE's 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) may have information 
on individuals that could help adjudicators determine whether to 
approve or deny an application for benefits.[Footnote 15] However, CIS 
officials in three cities we visited stated that the applicants' files 
they send over to ICE are sometimes kept without notification of 
whether an investigation was initiated or not by ICE investigators for 
long periods of time. An ICE official in headquarters responsible for 
managing benefit fraud explained that SAC offices may investigate 
single cases of alleged fraud but the extent to which that is done 
depends on the assessment of the SAC office's staff resources and the 
priorities of the local U.S. Attorney's Office.[Footnote 16] Without 
having information from ICE that might form the basis for denying an 
application, CIS still has the responsibility to adjudicate the 
application and instead may even approve applications or take other 
temporary action when fraud is suspected. For example, in one office we 
visited, CIS officials said that they had 154 cases of alleged benefit 
fraud that they had referred to ICE since June 2003. They said they had 
not received responses from ICE on the status of these cases or whether 
ICE intended to investigate them. In the interim, CIS officials said, 
their office could not close the cases and instead had been granting 
the suspect applicants temporary employment authorization or advance 
parole.[Footnote 17] One CIS manager and one ICE manager in the field 
indicated that while dismantling large-scale smuggling rings is 
important, single cases of benefit fraud can have national security 
implications. For example, a person who is allowed to remain in the 
country as a result of committing marriage fraud can become a 
naturalized citizen in 3 years and facilitate the entry of other 
persons into the United States who could possibly pose security risks. 
CIS and ICE officials in headquarters agreed that benefit fraud was 
important to national security as well as the integrity of the 
immigration process. CIS officials in three cities told us that ICE's 
lack of responsiveness to some CIS referrals for benefit fraud 
investigations hindered their ability to meet their district and bureau 
goals for reducing the backlog of applications.

While challenges were reported, there have been efforts by ICE and CIS 
to address benefit fraud. After the transition, CIS created a Fraud 
Detection and National Security office devoted to deterring fraud. ICE 
has established Benefit Fraud Units composed of investigative 
assistants and intelligence analysts who were working in CIS's three 
regional offices and in the three of the four CIS service centers (who 
were working in these offices prior to the transition).[Footnote 18] 
CIS has Fraud Detection Units composed of adjudications staff in its 
four service centers who process applications, analyze applications to 
identify trends in fraud, and refer potential benefit fraud cases to 
ICE. ICE investigative assistants and intelligence analysts, in turn, 
are to refer cases to the local SAC investigations offices. Two CIS 
offices we visited were referring potential benefit fraud cases through 
this new process. Alternatively, in the other four offices we visited, 
CIS adjudicators were directly referring benefit fraud cases to local 
ICE investigators, who must determine whether to reject, postpone, or 
pursue the cases.

Headquarters officials from CIS and ICE told us that the two bureaus 
were planning to do more to address benefit fraud. These officials told 
us that CIS and ICE are working on a memorandum of understanding that 
will document the creation of standard protocols for adjudicators to 
refer and investigators to accept, alleged cases of benefit fraud 
(including time frames for ICE in responding to CIS) and for CIS and 
ICE to communicate and coordinate in matters involving benefit fraud. 
Additionally, CIS created a new fraud position description to address 
single cases of fraud, and a CIS official told us that as of August 
2004, the agency has hired 95 of 100 newly funded staff positions to 
work on benefit fraud and some of these staff have completed one 
training course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC).[Footnote 19] In addition, while neither official knew when the 
memo of understanding would be final, in the interim, CIS and ICE have 
established time frames for SAC offices to review fraud referrals for 
criminal investigation.

CBP, CIS, and ICE Lack Formal Guidance for Addressing Overlapping 
Responsibilities for Parole:

CBP, CIS, and ICE have the authority to grant aliens parole--temporary 
admission into the United States for such reasons as humanitarian 
purposes, public benefit (e.g., participating in a legal proceeding for 
the U.S. government), or for further inspection. A CIS official told us 
that the authority to make decisions regarding parole, under former 
INS, rested with the district director, who had responsibility for all 
of the immigration programs. However, since the transition, CBP, CIS, 
and ICE had yet to make formal the roles and responsibilities for each 
program regarding who has authority to grant parole and when it is most 
appropriate for one agency rather than the other to make decisions 
about a parole application. Without this guidance on roles and 
responsibilities, CBP, CIS, and ICE officials in local areas were 
making determinations as to how the parole process will work. For 
example, in one city we visited, as a result of monthly meetings, ICE 
investigations, CBP inspections, and CIS coordinated a panel of 
representatives from their local offices to review the applications or 
requests for parole and, depending on the facts of each case, decided 
what program would make the decision for granting parole to aliens. By 
contrast, in another city we visited, CBP and CIS were unsure as to who 
had the authority to make decisions about parole. CBP officials in 
headquarters who are responsible for inspections told us that the 
current practice is that the bureau that has possession of the person 
makes the decision about parole, and while there are ongoing 
discussions among managers in the three bureaus regarding authority, 
there have not been final decisions. In August 2004, CBP and ICE 
headquarters told us that the two bureaus have now drafted protocols 
regarding parole and that the completion of the protocols is contingent 
upon a decision by DHS on the placement and funding of the Parole and 
Humanitarian Assistance Branch. In commenting on a draft of this 
report, DHS said that the issues regarding parole operations have now 
been resolved.

Some Steps Taken and Some Steps Remain to be Completed in Integrating 
Immigration and Customs Investigators into ICE:

SAC offices have taken initial steps toward integrating the former INS 
and Customs investigative workforces. However, most SAC officials and 
investigators we spoke with said that one or more steps that are 
important for full integration remain to be completed. While officials 
in some SAC offices said they have not received enough specific 
guidance, such as performance measures from ICE headquarters on how to 
gauge their progress in merging INS and Customs investigators, many of 
the ones we contacted said there are some common initial steps SAC 
offices have completed in integrating investigators.[Footnote 20] These 
include (1) assigning former INS and Customs investigators to work 
together in mixed investigative groups, (2) providing formal and on-
the-job cross-training to investigators so that former INS 
investigators can perform the functions of former Customs investigators 
and vice versa, and (3) establishing pay parity for all former INS 
investigators and supervising investigators. Many SAC officials with 
whom we spoke also noted that several important steps to fully 
integrate former INS and Customs investigators remain to be taken. 
These include (1) co-locating former INS and Customs investigators so 
their offices are in the same building, (2) establishing uniform ICE 
policies and procedures, and (3) issuing symbols for ICE's Office of 
Investigations that identify all ICE investigators as being part of one 
agency. ICE headquarters officials told us in August 2004 that efforts 
are under way to address all of these steps.

Mixing Investigative Groups, Classroom-Based Cross-Training, and Pay 
Parity Are among the Initial Steps Reported in Integrating INS and 
Customs Investigators:

Of the 49 SACs and ASACs who responded to our question, 27 stated that 
investigators in their offices had been integrated to a great or 
moderate extent; 15 said they had been integrated to some extent, and 3 
said they had been integrated to a little extent. SACs and ASACs who 
responded to our question indicated they had generally maintained the 
investigative focus that existed before the merger (e.g., groups 
continued focusing on money laundering, strategic investigations, and 
benefit fraud) but had mixed or intended to mix some of the former INS 
and Customs investigators into these investigative groups. An ICE 
official in headquarters said that the extent to which investigative 
groups would be integrated has been left up to individual SACs, and the 
characteristics of some geographic locations may make integration more 
difficult. Eleven SACs said they were working toward having former INS 
and Customs investigators work within mixed investigative groups. One 
SAC noted that he did not want to integrate investigators and group 
supervisors until they were formally cross-trained--training where 
former INS and Customs investigators learn the laws and regulations of 
each other's discipline from experienced lawyers and trainers.[Footnote 
21]

Ten of 49 SACs and ASACs we spoke with indicated that former INS and 
Customs investigators in their offices were being assigned to work with 
one another on a case-by-case basis, and two of these said mixing of 
investigators in this way provided the investigators with opportunities 
to learn each other's discipline through on-the-job-training. Such 
opportunities included having a joint duty roster where investigators 
from each former discipline responded to a call for an investigation 
together and having some investigators from former INS and Customs work 
in the same investigative groups.[Footnote 22] Eleven of 49 SACs and 
ASACs we contacted told us their offices had a joint duty roster such 
that investigators from different former agencies responded to cases 
together and learned from one another on the job. In one of the SAC 
offices, we were told that investigators from the former INS and 
Customs respond together to calls for investigations, but former 
Customs investigators process immigration-related cases and customs-
related cases are processed by former INS investigators so they can 
learn the policies and procedures of the other discipline in a real-
life setting.

SACs and ASACs we spoke with said that in addition to on-the-job 
training, formal cross-training is key to eventually creating a unified 
workforce. ICE headquarters issued a cross-training curriculum to all 
SAC offices in January 2004 with a deadline for all investigators to 
complete cross-training by September 30, 2004. ICE headquarters 
officials did not set a deadline for the completion of training for 
group supervisors or senior managers, although these persons could 
choose to participate in the investigator training.

ICE officials responsible for developing the cross-training curriculum 
indicated that the intent of the cross-training was to ensure that all 
investigators from the former agencies were prepared to address all 
components of ICE's mission. The investigators are to participate in 8 
days of classroom training, taught by investigators and attorneys, 
covering both legal and operational issues of the other discipline. For 
example, former INS investigators receive training in areas such as 
commercial fraud investigations, financial investigations, trade 
compliance, and drug smuggling, while former Customs investigators 
receive training in areas such as determining citizenship, benefit and 
document fraud, initiation of removals, and alien detention. 
Investigators must pass, with a score of 70 percent or higher, a series 
of nine written tests in order to be certified as cross-trained. As of 
late August 2004, ICE headquarters reported that 2,175 out of 
approximately 5,400 former INS and Customs investigators had taken and 
passed at least one of the nine exams, including 1,210 former INS and 
Customs investigators who had fully completed cross-training. In August 
2004, ICE headquarters said that they still expected most investigators 
to complete the cross-training and nine examinations by the September 
30, 2004, deadline.[Footnote 23]

ICE officials cited the achievement of pay parity between former INS 
and Customs investigators as one of the successes of the merger. Prior 
to the merger and for approximately a little more than a year after the 
transfer, former INS investigators and their supervisors were paid at a 
lower grade level than their counterparts from former Customs. 
Specifically, most former INS investigators were paid at the GS-12 pay 
grade and most former INS group supervisors were paid at the GS-13 
grade; most former Customs investigators were paid at the GS-13 grade 
and most former Customs group supervisors were paid at the GS-14 grade. 
In our site visits and during telephone interviews, many ICE officials, 
including most former INS investigators, said that the lack of pay 
parity had affected morale, made former INS investigators feel as if 
they were second class, and made integrating the investigative groups 
more difficult as the former INS investigators were doing the same work 
for less pay. In April 2004, DHS approved an upgrade from GS-12 to GS-
13 for the majority of former INS investigators, and in June 2004 
approved an upgrade from GS-13 to GS-14 for the majority of former INS 
group supervisors. Investigators and group supervisors we spoke with 
after pay parity went into effect said they believed morale had 
increased since pay parity was implemented, and former INS 
investigators felt they are now equal to their former Customs 
counterparts.

Many Officials Stated That Important Steps to Fully Integrate 
Investigators Remain to Be Completed:

Twenty-one SACs and ASACs we spoke with stated that other efforts 
important to integration --such as co-locating all ICE investigators in 
a given field location so they are in one building, establishing 
uniform operational policies and procedures, and "branding" ICE's 
Office of Investigations with symbols that identify investigators as 
belonging to one agency --have been delayed.

Complete Co-Location Has Not Yet Been Achieved:

According to 19 of 49 SACs and ASACs we contacted, one of the obstacles 
to integration has been the fact that numerous investigators from 
former INS and Customs have continued to work in separate locations. 
Although INS's and Customs' investigations programs were merged into 
ICE, former INS investigators generally continued to work in former INS 
buildings, and former Customs investigators generally continued to work 
in former Customs buildings. Eight SACs and ASACs with whom we spoke 
noted that the lack of co-location of former INS and Customs 
investigators perpetuated the view among investigators that ICE is not 
yet integrated. For example, 3 officials said that creating a unified 
organization is difficult when members of a work group--8 to 12 
investigators--are dispersed in different offices, sometimes miles 
apart. Some SAC officials reported they have moved some investigative 
groups, such as the benefit fraud and criminal aliens, to the same 
buildings in an effort to better co-mingle former INS and Customs 
investigators. Officials in some other locations told us this has not 
been possible because of lack of space. Fourteen of 20 SACs we spoke 
with by phone noted that their offices have been unable to co-locate 
former INS and Customs investigators because space in their current 
buildings was limited and building leases were signed before the 
transfer or because they could not secure additional funding from DHS 
to lease new buildings before existing leases expire. An ICE 
headquarters official said there are a few SAC offices that are 
completely co-located and there are additional SAC offices that have 
submitted co-location plans to ICE headquarters and requested 
additional space. This official also said that ICE will begin to co-
locate offices that have had Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration violations or where leases will soon expire, and the 
goal is to have all SAC offices co-located in the next 5 to 7 years. 
ICE headquarters officials recently estimated that complete co-location 
immediately would cost about $150 million.

Lack of Uniform Policies and Procedures for Some Operations Reportedly 
Causes Confusion and Hinders the Creation of a New Culture:

Some officials told us that ICE has been slow to establish uniform 
operational policies and procedures, causing confusion and some delay 
in the creation of a new unified ICE culture. Policies and procedures 
on such things as the use of firearms or the steps to take when 
investigators are involved in car accidents while working in an 
official capacity vary between former INS and Customs investigators. In 
the absence of uniform policies and procedures, ICE headquarters 
officials said they directed SAC offices to continue to use former 
policies from both INS and Customs, applying the policy from the former 
agency to the agent from that agency. SAC officials from some offices 
said they have created new local office policies for all ICE 
investigators.

One SAC official said that a lack of unified operational policies and 
procedures has in some cases resulted in confusion or the establishment 
of local policies. Other SAC officials told us this can be problematic 
if investigators working together are relying upon different policies 
and procedures to carry out their investigative work. In one city, we 
were told that two investigators--one from the former INS and one from 
the former Customs--were involved in an auto accident. The former 
agencies had different procedures for filing paperwork on an accident, 
and no one knew which policy to follow. The SAC made a local decision 
to use the policy of the driver's former agency. In another city, the 
SAC decided to adopt a former Customs policy concerning making an 
arrest at a residence. Customs policy had called for a minimum of four 
investigators in making an arrest, while INS did not have a policy on 
the minimum number of investigators required for an arrest. The former 
INS investigators and supervisors said they did not understand the 
rationale for this policy, given the volume of arrests they typically 
had in a day. Officials in ICE headquarters explained the rationale to 
us, stating that under INS investigators often engaged in 
administrative arrests of individuals for administrative crimes, such 
as visa overstays or document fraud. Under ICE, they said investigators 
are often engaging in criminal law enforcement arrests and possibly 
arresting more dangerous suspects. As a matter of officer safety, ICE 
requires that investigators work in groups of four when making an 
arrest. Knowing this rationale may have helped the former INS staff 
avoid confusion over this change. Additionally, ICE headquarters 
officials told us that the investigations program prioritized the 
establishment of uniform policies, for example, focusing on a unified 
policy for undercover operations. These headquarters officials also 
said that, in the interim, SAC offices were instructed by ICE 
headquarters to use the policy of the former agencies.

Pending Name Change Caused Delay in Creating a Unified ICE:

After more than a year as ICE, field officials said that investigators 
and managers were continuing to use their former agency badges and 
credentials, and ICE headquarters officials had spent months waiting on 
a request for a name change.[Footnote 24] Some SACs we spoke with said 
that at the time we contacted them, ICE still did not have the public 
identifiers that separate it from the former agencies of which it is 
composed. We were told that incomplete branding of the agency with a 
unique logo has at times contributed to frustration and 
embarrassment.[Footnote 25] Some of the former INS investigators and 
managers we spoke with said that the delay in branding ICE has held up 
the creation of a unified ICE agency.

According to officials at ICE headquarters, one element in the process 
of establishing ICE is to brand it with a unique identity by creating 
badges, raid jackets, business cards, and other identifying materials 
or symbols. When DHS was created, INS staff were directed to retire all 
emblems and paraphernalia. However, Customs was not given the same 
orders. In some ICE offices, we observed Customs emblems and 
paraphernalia on display. In another example of the divide between INS 
and Customs, in one city we visited, former Customs investigators had 
created a mock-up of the new ICE badge that they said was for former 
INS investigators, which referred to the INS investigators as "Junior 
Officers" of the U.S. Customs Service.

During one site visit, a group of former INS investigators we spoke 
with questioned why headquarters had been so slow to implement 
branding, and one investigators said the branding should have been 
completed prior to the transition or shortly thereafter. In another 
site visit, one investigator said this lack of an identity has proven 
to be frustrating and embarrassing when acting in an official capacity, 
such as testifying in court. One ASAC we spoke with said that he tried 
to board a plane with his weapon and was questioned by airline 
officials when he showed his INS badge to verify that he was law 
enforcement. Airline officials said that INS had been abolished, and 
the ASAC had to explain that ICE did not yet have its own badges. The 
ASAC was eventually allowed to proceed but said he knew this problem 
had plagued other investigators as well. In another example, an agent 
in one city said that he went out and purchased his own ICE raid jacket 
because he did not like having his authority questioned when he wore an 
INS raid jacket.

Most of the decisions about branding were made at the DHS level, and 
there are written guidelines for the use of the DHS seal and agency 
signatures for such things as business cards, letterhead, and 
flags.[Footnote 26] According to an official in ICE headquarters who is 
responsible for branding, certain branding activities that are 
particular to ICE are in the final stages. At the time of our interview 
in July 2004 and confirmed in August 2004, ICE headquarters officials 
acknowledged the delay and said that raid jackets were made available 
for purchase locally in January 2004, badges will be issued beginning 
in September 2004, and uniforms were in the final stages of production.

Many See Positive Aspects of the Transition:

Many of those we spoke with from both the former INS and Customs noted 
that there have been benefits to merging the INS and Customs 
investigations programs. They noted that combining the expertise of 
former INS and Customs investigators has provided expanded authority in 
conducting investigations and could contribute to more thorough 
investigations. Other SAC officials said that expanded authority has 
been beneficial in investigating money laundering in alien smuggling 
cases and going after the assets of foreign-born persons running 
prostitution rings as they can now prosecute someone for multiple 
offenses. Four SACs and ASACs said they expect the benefits to increase 
as cross-training is completed and investigators more fully learn the 
expertise of the other former agency.

Former INS investigators we spoke with also noted beneficial aspects of 
the merger. Many of the former INS investigators we spoke with in our 
site visits said they are now able to concentrate on investigative work 
rather than services and they have received a pay increase to bring 
them up to par with the former Customs investigators. In one location, 
former INS investigators said that prior to the merger, the District 
Director would task investigators to assist with naturalization exams 
or to fill guard duties at district offices or ports of entry. In 
another location, former INS investigators said they now have more 
employees to carry out missions.

Many Officials Expressed Difficulty Understanding Administrative 
Services:

Although DHS has issued guidance via Email on how administrative 
support shared services would function, several CBP, CIS, and ICE field 
officials told us that they were confused about what constitutes shared 
services, the processes for receiving services from a shared service 
provider, and how many of the administrative staff in their offices 
would be transferred to other offices. One official in headquarters 
told us in July 2004 that decisions about shared services were not 
completely resolved. Additionally, officials in all three agencies 
cited problems with administrative computer systems for travel, budget, 
and payroll--administrative functions that are handled by the 
individual bureaus and are not a part of shared services. As a result 
of several problems and changes that have occurred, according to 
officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE, some field offices have assigned 
administrative duties to inspectors, adjudicators or senior 
adjudications managers, or investigative staff because the office 
needed additional administrative support.

In an attempt to provide more efficient administrative mission support 
services, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing systems 
and processes called "shared services." DHS initiated the shared 
services system in December 2003, making determinations about the 
realignment of approximately 6,100 administrative positions. In January 
2004, the Undersecretaries for Management and Border and Transportation 
Security and the heads of CBP, CIS, and ICE signed an agreement 
finalizing the interbureau governance of shared services. In commenting 
on a draft of this report, DHS said that the Department encountered 
delays in the execution of service level agreement and resource 
allocation. Consequently, the implementation phase did not begin until 
late in the spring/summer of 2004. According a to DHS official, shared 
services is intended to represent a new model for government on 
delivering and managing administrative services.

DHS's shared services system utilizes four different approaches in 
providing and receiving services for CBP, CIS, and ICE staff. The 
shared services system's approaches are (1) each bureau provides its 
staff some of its own services itself, (2) one bureau provides a 
certain service to staff in all three bureaus, (3) one bureau provides 
a service to its own workforce and staff in one other agency while the 
third bureau provides that service for its own staff, and (4) each 
bureau provides selected services to its own workforce as well as to 
selected staff in other bureaus. For example, CBP is providing human 
resource management to its workforce, in addition to workforces in CIS 
and ICE~. ICE is providing training for supervisors in ICE, CIS, and 
CBP but handles equal employment opportunity issues for only its own 
workforce, and CIS. CBP, CIS, and ICE are each providing their own 
workforces with procurement, budget, labor and employment relations, 
and professional development training, among other services. According 
to DHS officials, the decisions about which bureau would provide a 
certain service were made on the basis of an assessment of such factors 
as each bureau's adaptability to an increased workload, level of 
modernization, and historical expertise with each shared service. See 
figure 2 for a description of the services each bureau is to provide 
under shared services.

Figure 2: Division of CBP, CIS, and ICE Roles Under DHS's Shared 
Services:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Despite Communication about Recently Implemented Shared Services 
System, Officials Say Confusion Persists:

A DHS briefing document and communication strategy indicated that 
through such means as the bureau's intranet, chain of command, 
memorandums, fact sheets, and video broadcasts, DHS would communicate 
the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE for providing 
shared services. DHS provided us evidence that it has used some of 
these communication methods. However, a senior official at DHS told us 
in June 2004 (6 months after the initiation of shared services) that 
although a communication strategy was in place, communicating about 
shared services to the field is a work in progress. This official also 
said that it is the responsibility of the bureaus both receiving and 
providing services to communicate information about shared services to 
the field offices and staff. DHS officials also stated that the 
responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE under shared services are still 
under development. One official who was involved in the formation of 
shared services told us that DHS would like to change some 
administrative functions that the bureaus currently handle for 
themselves--for example, procurement--into shared services. Further, 
even though CBP was designated as the provider of personnel services to 
CIS, the extent of that service is still in negotiation.[Footnote 27]

Field officials told us that numerous officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE 
were uncertain about what constitutes shared services, the process for 
receiving services from a shared service provider, and which 
administrative staff would be re-aligned from their positions in local 
offices to work for providers of shared services. In our telephone 
interviews with SACs and ASACs, 33 of 40 said that their offices were 
experiencing problems with shared services to a moderate or great 
extent.[Footnote 28] The 4 SACs and ASACs who said they were 
experiencing problems to little or no extent provided such reasons as 
not interacting with shared services providers or relying on the staff 
who assisted them prior to the initiation of shared services in 
December 2003.[Footnote 29]

Our meetings with field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE indicated that 
despite communication from DHS, field office officials varied in their 
understanding about what constitutes shared services. For example, one 
ASAC believed that shared services consisted of sharing resources, such 
as buildings and computer technology, rather than having one bureau 
provide a certain administrative service for the other two. 
Additionally, in April 2004, approximately 3 to 4 months after the 
initiation of shared services, four ICE officials and one CBP 
inspections official were not aware that this occurred.

Officials in four of the six sites we visited were unsure about who 
specifically to call or the process they were to use in obtaining a 
shared service from CBP, CIS, or ICE.[Footnote 30] For example, after 
the person responsible for facilities was transferred to ICE, an 
official in a CIS district office did not know who to call for 
assistance with setting up vacant office space for CIS staff who were 
being moved to that location. This official ultimately learned that the 
process was not a shared service but was instead handled within CIS. A 
SAC official in another office we visited said he and administrative 
staff did not know how to obtain an authorization to repair a vehicle 
that had been damaged in an accident in October 2003. The officials 
initiated a purchase order request in November 2003 for services to 
repair the vehicle and submitted it to ICE. However, under the shared 
services system, CBP was designated responsibility for authorizing 
fleet repairs for CBP, CIS, and ICE. The SAC official said that he and 
administrative staff spent several months contacting multiple officials 
at CBP offices and ICE headquarters about approval for the repair and 
how to pay for it. In March 2004 the car was scheduled to be sold at an 
auction.[Footnote 31] In late June 2004, CBP issued an informal policy, 
by Email to the SAC office, for receiving approval for repairs and 
invited the SAC office to resubmit a request (as it had been previously 
denied) if it had not already sold the car. Before SAC officials were 
informed of this process, we were told that the office paid 
approximately $1,000 for storage of the vehicle and stopped saving the 
funds initially set aside for the repair.

In five of the six sites we visited, officials expressed uncertainty 
and unmet expectations about which administrative staff in their 
offices would be reassigned to shared services positions and 
transferred to other programs or agencies. The decision about the 
reassignment of administrative staff for shared services was made at 
the headquarters level by a working group of CBP, CIS, and ICE 
officials and led by DHS. For example, in one SAC office that we 
visited, approximately 50 administrative staff from former INS had been 
supporting CBP and CIS in addition to ICE, and all but 1 were moved 
because of the realignment of staff for shared services. Because the 
SAC had expected to retain 3 rather than 1 of the 50 administrative 
staff, he assigned administrative work to several investigators as a 
collateral duty. Administrative staff in one CBP office for field 
operations that we visited had received e-mail messages from CBP 
headquarters notifying them that, within a few days, they would be 
transferred to another program or bureau. We were told that some 
reassignments came as a surprise and involved moving from one office 
building to another, but usually they were in the same general 
geographic location.

ICE provided us with a written statement explaining that it, along with 
CBP and CIS, could not begin delivering administrative services to one 
another under shared services until "reimbursable agreements"--the 
arrangement of costs and funding for a particular administrative 
service--were finalized. As such, this delayed notifications to 
administrative staff about reassignments and affected the agencies' 
ability to provide information to the field.

Travel, Budget, and Other Computer System Problems Seen as Significant:

Many officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said that problems 
with travel and budget, and computer systems have at times adversely 
affected office operations. For example, because of problems with 
travel computer systems, many officials in ICE's SAC offices said that 
staff are not receiving reimbursements. Thirty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs 
responding to our question about shared services cited Travel Manager-
-ICE's off-the-shelf computer system for processing travel requests and 
vouchers--and/or the Federal Financial Management System (FFMS)--the 
computer system ICE SAC offices use to track their budgets--as 
significant administrative problems. Additionally, CBP officials 
identified such problems as cumbersome procedures for accessing data 
systems and the lack of computer program updates to reflect changes on 
time and attendance cards. In August 2004, headquarters officials told 
us they were making efforts to resolve the problems by providing 
training, reducing funding strings for Travel Manager, and 
reprogramming FFMS.

Twenty-six of 49 SACs and ASACs responding to our question about shared 
services also discussed the problems they were having with Travel 
Manager. ICE headquarters officials told us that Travel Manager is a 
new system to the former Customs field staff in ICE's investigations 
program. It was used in the former INS's headquarters and in some field 
offices prior to the transfer. ICE headquarters officials told us that 
Travel Manager was chosen because it could interface with ICE's 
accounting system and automate the process for managing travel 
documents. ICE investigations officials in the field and headquarters 
told us that with Travel Manager, the funding strings (codes that tell 
the system what account to charge and to what program to attribute 
travel) have caused problems for staff in the field and headquarters. 
ICE headquarters investigations officials estimated that there are 
approximately 80,000 separate funding strings, each approximately 48 
characters long, from which field staff have to choose in carrying out 
a transaction such as completing a travel voucher. They explained that 
because the system is new to many staff and the funding strings are not 
labeled so that the user can select words rather than a string of 
numerical characters, some ICE staff may choose incorrect funding 
strings, causing their vouchers to "disappear" in the system or be 
routed to the wrong approving official. When this occurs, ICE 
headquarters officials for investigations told us, neither the traveler 
nor the approving official receives a notice that the voucher has 
failed to be processed. Additionally, because ICE's Travel Manager 
interfaces with its Federal Financial Management System, if staff 
choose the wrong funding string, the voucher may be routed to an 
account that does not have the funds. If this happens, ICE officials 
said the system would reject the voucher. As a result, they said that 
some ICE investigators and managers have not received timely or 
accurate reimbursements for their travel.

According to some ICE field officials we contacted, when staff 
inadvertently select the wrong funding string, it takes from several 
weeks to months to process the voucher. A few officials said that when 
staff do not receive timely reimbursements, they sometimes use their 
personal funds to pay their government credit card bills. For example, 
one SAC said that an agent in his office used personal funds to pay 
$15,000 for bills incurred from business travel. Another SAC official 
said that not all investigators are able to use their personal funds to 
pay for their business travel expenses. One SAC said that he was 
waiting to be reimbursed for $11,000 in travel bills that he had 
accrued on his government credit card. Because he had not been 
reimbursed, he felt he was in danger of having his government credit 
card revoked. These examples are to illustrate the types of concerns 
reported to us. We did not verify the facts reported to us or the 
circumstances surrounding these specific examples, e.g., whether the 
problems were caused by the travel system, the individual, or both.

ICE headquarters investigations officials responsible for Travel 
Manager said that they have made some changes to Travel Manager to aid 
ICE staff. For example, they reduced the number of funding strings from 
the initial 800,000 to about 80,000, and added alphabetical codes to 
help facilitate the use of the software. They also said they have 
suggested to an ICE group working on finance issues that either the 
system or a staff member should send notification to the approving 
official and traveler when vouchers cannot be successfully 
processed.[Footnote 32] Officials responsible for all of ICE's 
financial management told us that the office responsible for mission 
support for all of ICE had provided over 200 contacts in the field to 
assist with Travel Manager, held a training conference, and provided 
training opportunities in the field and in headquarters for staff 
regarding Travel Manager. However, they recognized that 48-character 
numerical funding strings are difficult to use. They also discussed 
additional reasons why staff in the field were having problems with 
Travel Manager. First, because ICE did not have a full accounting of 
its staff, [Footnote 33] Travel Manager did not recognize all of the 
staff and was unable to route all of the vouchers. Second, many staff 
were unfamiliar with Travel Manager, so they did not know how to 
determine whether their vouchers have been approved or rejected. Third, 
in situations where staff did not travel for their home program office, 
e.g., if an investigator was traveling on behalf of the Federal Air 
Marshals, the travel documents could not be managed through Travel 
Manager.

Twenty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs also discussed problems with FFMS, but 
the problems were not as numerous as those with Travel Manager. FFMS is 
a financial accounting system that allows the tracking of budget 
expenditures and balances. It was previously used by INS and ICE chose 
to adopt it, although DHS plans to transition to a new departmentwide 
financial system. The problems with FFMS are new to former Customs 
managers and administrative staff, but not necessarily new to former 
INS staff who began using the software shortly before the transition. 
The SACs and ASACs who stated that they had problems with FFMS said 
that it mostly affected their ability to manage the office budgets. In 
response to this problem, five SACs we contacted told us that they are 
tracking their budgets manually, with some using Excel spreadsheets so 
they can know how much they are spending from each budget area. One SAC 
said he is using over 20 Excel spreadsheets to track the office budget, 
and another bought an off-the-shelf budget software system to 
supplement FFMS. The officials in ICE headquarters responsible for 
finance told us that the limitations of FFMS were known, but FFMS was 
chosen after three studies were conducted by independent consultants 
approving its use by ICE and it was certified to meet auditing 
standards. Additionally, ICE officials in headquarters responsible for 
finance said in June 2004 that they have attempted to address field 
concerns by reprogramming FFMS to allow SAC offices to track their 
budgets in the manner they were used to doing in Customs and by 
providing weekly training to program officers in headquarters.

CBP officials in inspections and Border Patrol in four of the six sites 
we visited also told us they were having problems with administrative 
computer systems and applications, mostly in the area of time and 
attendance. Inspections officials cited problems with CBP's 
computerized time and attendance system, Customs Overtime Scheduling 
System (COSS), and in some cases, inspections officials said they were 
not accurately paid overtime. Officials we spoke with in CBP's Border 
Patrol also cited problems with COSS and overtime payments and added 
that in some cases, staff were maintaining a manual record of actual 
time and attendance but inputting into COSS only the 40 hours per week 
recognized by COSS. CBP officials in Border Patrol headquarters 
acknowledged the problems with COSS when we talked with them in June 
2004. However, in August 2004, CBP headquarters officials responsible 
for program management of COSS told us that there were initial problems 
with overtime payments for former INS staff that were attributed to 
errors in the calculation of pay after transmission from COSS to the 
Department of Agriculture for processing and the method the Border 
Patrol had used to schedule hours worked, while under former 
INS.[Footnote 34] They said that all problems with COSS had been 
resolved by January 1, 2004. We did not verify whether or when specific 
problems were addressed or the actual causes of the problems reported 
to us by Border Patrol and inspections officials but did note a 
difference in the causes field officials mentioned and the reasons 
provided by CBP headquarters officials.

Mission Staff Sometimes Assigned Administrative Work Full-Time or as 
Collateral Duty:

One criticism we had of the former INS was that because of staffing 
shortages, mission staff often had to assume administrative or other 
functions as a collateral duty. One effect of assigning mission staff 
to administrative work is that they are not spending all of their time 
on duties needed to accomplish the program's mission and thus are not 
reaching the full potential of the program position. In our site 
visits, we found that this continues to be a problem in some offices. 
Some officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said they had to use 
mission staff in this way because they did not have enough 
administrative support to compensate for the realignment of 
administrative staff to shared services, the addition of mission 
personnel that have come as a result of mergers of some programs in the 
transition, and hiring freezes. As a result, inspectors, adjudicators, 
and investigators in some field offices were taking on administrative 
work full-time or as a collateral duty:

* In three of the six sites we visited, we found examples where CBP 
inspectors were assigned to handle various administrative functions as 
a collateral duty. For example, an inspector in one city was detailed 
to resolving problems related to time and attendance and payroll for 
former INS inspectors. In another city, supervisory inspectors were 
detailed to perform scheduling duties normally performed by 
administrative staff.

* In three of the six CIS district offices we visited, we found 
examples of adjudicators or senior managers taking on administrative 
functions in addition to their work as a collateral duty. In two 
district offices, adjudicators were taking on such functions as 
managing office space and monitoring the budget. In another city, the 
third highest manager in a district office was assigned to handle 
personnel, procurement, and vacancies rather than duties related 
specifically to managing the adjudication of applications. Because 
these mission staff were spending time on administrative functions, 
they were spending less time addressing program missions such as 
reducing the backlog of applications.

* In two of our six site visits and in telephone interviews, we learned 
that ICE investigators are also taking on administrative functions as a 
collateral duty. In one SAC office we visited, the SAC assigned 10 
special investigators, including 1 associate special agent in charge, 1 
assistant special agent in charge, 2 group supervisors, and 6 junior 
investigators, to administrative duties. In our telephone interviews, 
we found examples consistent with our site visits. For example, we were 
told that special investigators in a subordinate office of one SAC 
office were assigned all of the clerical work in addition to their 
normal duties when the office lost its administrative support staff. 
Rather than assign administrative duties to investigators, other SAC 
offices said they are converting unfilled agent positions to 
administrative positions. For example, an official in one office said 
he would have to convert unfilled agent positions to administrative 
positions, and an official in another office gained an administrative 
staff member from CBP by transferring (through a personnel action) one 
of its staff vacancies to CBP.

Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Transformations:

The challenges we identify in this report highlight the importance of 
using the transition of immigration functions into DHS as an 
opportunity for further addressing long-standing and new challenges 
through positive transformation. We realize that carrying out this 
transformation will be no easy or quickly realized task. In this 
regard, we and others have studied the experiences of other public and 
private organizations that have undergone successful mergers and 
transformations. In a July 2003 report, we identified nine key 
practices that have consistently been found at the center of successful 
mergers and transformations, as shown in figure 3.[Footnote 35] This 
report was done to help federal agencies implement successful 
transformations of their cultures, as well as help the new DHS merge 
its various originating components into a unified department. 
Collectively, in our view, these key practices and related 
implementation steps discussed in our July 2003 report can help 
transform the sometimes diverse cultures of DHS legacy agencies into a 
cohesive unit that fulfills its new mission, meets current and emerging 
needs, maximizes performance, and ensures accountability.

Figure 3: Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Organizational 
Transformations:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

We did not perform an in-depth analysis comparing these key practices 
with the transfer of immigration functions into DHS. Nonetheless, we 
believe that all nine are important for DHS in its transformation of 
immigration programs and noted two key practices that we think would be 
particularly helpful as it addresses the challenges we identified in 
this report. We realize that DHS has started using many of these nine 
practices and, while we did not assess how well each of the practices 
has been followed, we did identify certain parts of the two practices 
that we believe would further assist DHS in its transformation efforts.

Establish a Communication Strategy to Create Shared Expectations and 
Report Related Progress:

Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to 
implementing a merger or transformation. Communication is most 
effective when done early, clearly, and often, and is downward, upward, 
and lateral. Organizations must develop a comprehensive communication 
strategy that reaches out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and 
seeks to genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation 
process. Implementation steps that accompany this key practice include 
communicating early and often to build trust and understanding, 
ensuring consistency of message, encouraging two-way communication, and 
providing information to meet specific needs of employees.

DHS's office responsible for shared services provided us with a 
communication strategy dated May 2004 and a briefing, dated February 
2004, outlining communication strategies, both with the objectives of 
raising awareness and promoting understanding of shared services within 
and outside of DHS. CBP told us that the agency has developed and 
implemented a communications strategy and provided us with examples of 
communications activities. Additionally, 22 of the 36 SACs and ASACs 
responding to our question by telephone told us that concerning 
communication, they received information from headquarters regarding 
transition goals and milestones.[Footnote 36] In addition, a few of the 
SACs and ASACs who responded that they had received transition 
information said that the information was received through such means 
as e-mail, broadcast messages, ICE's intranet, and SAC conferences. 
These efforts, however, do not appear to have been completely effective 
since, as previously discussed, about a quarter of the officials we 
contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE wanted a clearer understanding of their 
roles and responsibilities with other immigration programs.

Involve Employees to Obtain Their Ideas and Gain Their Ownership for 
the Transformation:

A successful merger and transformation must involve employees and their 
representatives from the beginning to gain their ownership of the 
changes that are occurring in the organization. Employee involvement 
strengthens the transformation process by including frontline 
perspectives and experiences. Further, employee involvement helps to 
create the opportunity to establish new networks and break down 
existing organizational silos, increase employees' understanding and 
acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and gain ownership 
of new policies and procedures. Implementation steps that accompany 
this key practice include using employee teams, involving employees in 
planning and sharing performance information, incorporating employee 
feedback into new policies and procedures, and delegating authority to 
appropriate organizational levels.

In conducting our field work and in meetings with headquarters 
officials, we did not identify any indication that the bureaus 
responsible for immigration programs had formal mechanisms for 
obtaining periodic feedback from field staff (other than the top 
manager in the office) about how well the transition was occurring or 
their concerns or ideas for improvement. In addition, several 
headquarters officials seemed somewhat surprised by the concerns 
reported to us by field officials when we discussed them in August 
2004. On the other hand, while we did not conduct an exhaustive search 
of employee involvement by all field staff, our work did identify 
examples of such involvement. For example, we found two instances where 
field officials had participated in working groups held at headquarters 
regarding issues related to roles and responsibilities. That is, the 
working group to outline roles and responsibilities between the Border 
Patrol and ICE investigations involved field managers, two of whom we 
interviewed. Additionally, we were told that a meeting held in July 
2004 involved CIS and ICE headquarters managers, field staff, 
investigators, and adjudicators in discussions about benefit fraud. 
Without a formal mechanism for obtaining employee feedback, however, 
the bureaus run the risk of missing opportunities for improvement and 
of allowing field-related problems to arise and continue without 
adequate responses.

Conclusions:

With its critical roles in helping protect national security and 
enforcing immigration laws, it is very important that INS's integration 
into DHS and its related transformation successfully address 
longstanding and new management challenges. To accomplish this, DHS's 
three immigration bureaus are tasked with establishing clear 
communication and coordination among one another and with the efficient 
and effective integration of the roles and responsibilities of the 
former immigration and customs investigative workforces, all while 
implementing a new system for providing administrative services. In 
managing this transformation, DHS is faced with not only the previous 
management challenges that beset INS for years, but with new challenges 
that come with creating a new department and managing diverse agencies. 
Notwithstanding this daunting endeavor, the transformation provides DHS 
with a unique opportunity to successfully address these inherited and 
new challenges and thus better accomplish its important mission.

While DHS has started addressing many of the challenges and has 
experienced some successes in its communication and coordination and 
other efforts, the challenges and uncertainties reported by field 
officials and discussed in this report show that these efforts have not 
been sufficient to fully realize the potential benefits of this 
transformation. The sentiment among the field officials within CBP, 
CIS, and ICE we contacted demonstrates the importance of them having 
additional explanation and guidance from DHS and the headquarters 
management of each of the respective bureaus that delineates the (1) 
specific roles and responsibilities for conducting uniform immigration 
program operations, such as benefit fraud investigations, parole 
decisions, and controlled deliveries and (2) processes and procedures 
for making the shared services system work more efficiently. Without 
clear guidance, conflicts that the programs have had prior to and after 
the transition will likely persist and staff in the field will lack a 
complete road map for addressing cross-cutting issues that may arise in 
the future, as well as the necessary information to efficiently utilize 
the administrative services they need to accomplish their mission.

Collectively, the nine key practices and related implementation steps 
that we identified in our 2003 report can help DHS transform the 
diverse cultures of former agencies into a cohesive unit that fulfills 
its new mission, meets current and emerging needs, maximizes 
performance, and ensures accountability. Specifically, while DHS 
efforts to incorporate the key practices and implementation steps we 
discuss in this report into its transformation plans should help 
address the challenges, in our view, a communication strategy that 
obtains and considers employee feedback to create shared expectations 
and gains their ownership in changes would improve the likelihood of 
success in addressing the integration challenges. We realize that 
carrying out a successful transformation is no easy or quickly realized 
task and believe that this makes having a strategy that fully 
incorporates these key practices all the more important.

Recommendations:

To assist DHS in successfully transforming its immigration related 
programs and address the challenges discussed in this report, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the heads of 
CBP, CIS, and ICE, as appropriate, in consultation with the 
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, to take the 
following three actions.

* First, the bureaus should create a mechanism for periodically 
obtaining employee feedback on their ideas and concerns and consider 
this feedback in its future transformation and communications 
strategies, including assessing the challenges reported to us.

* Second, the bureaus should provide additional specific guidance to 
field managers and staff that establishes uniform policies and 
procedures on all cross-cutting integration issues that affect 
operational effectiveness, including specific descriptions of the roles 
and responsibilities of each bureau and its staff in investigative 
techniques such as benefit fraud investigations, parole decisions, and 
controlled deliveries.

* Finally, the bureaus should provide additional detailed written 
guidance to field managers and staff on the processes and procedures to 
follow for the provision of shared administrative services.

Agency Comments:

DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, and these 
comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS said that, while there are 
instances where contextual clarification is needed, it generally agreed 
with our overall findings and recommendations and that our analysis 
would be beneficial to the department.

DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus-CBP, CIS, and ICE-
should create a mechanism for periodically obtaining employee feedback. 
DHS commented that there have been accomplishments in this area and 
provided examples for each of the three bureaus. The examples include 
both existing and new efforts started since our field work, including a 
contract by CBP in September 2004 for a professional services firm to 
take periodic surveys of randomly sampled employees to measure the 
effectiveness of communications. If effectively implemented, the new 
efforts should provide the bureaus with additional employee ideas and 
concerns to consider in its transformation and communication efforts.

Concerning our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional 
specific guidance to the field on cross-cutting issues, DHS said that 
it has provided clear and thorough guidance and uniform policies and 
procedures in critical cross-cutting integration issues. It also said 
that the transition challenges it faced were compounded because the 
overarching priority was to accomplish all of the department's 
missions. DHS said there has been progress related to the consistency 
and delivery of guidance on cross-cutting issues that should be 
acknowledged in the final report. While we have not assessed the 
results of some of these examples of progress, we considered them and 
added them to the report where needed to add context. Further, we note 
that many of the examples DHS provided of its progress were ongoing 
during our fieldwork and staff still raised the concerns we report and 
said that more guidance on cross-cutting immigration issues is needed. 
Although these recent efforts, if properly implemented could address 
some of the deficiencies we identified, we believe that this feedback 
from field officials shows that more attention is needed in this area 
to address uncertainties and confusion about cross-cutting issues.

DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional 
guidance on the processes and procedures in providing shared services 
but noted its concern about our discussion of communication problems 
during the transition to shared services. DHS said that it used best 
practices to develop a communication strategy and plan to realign 
various administrative or support services into a shared services 
environment. It said that it experienced delays in rolling out the 
shared services initiative, so it is understandable that field managers 
lacked familiarity with certain issues at the time of our interviews. 
However, DHS did not believe the field managers views expressed in this 
report accurately portray the initiative or the level of comprehension 
of the initiative. We commend DHS for developing a communication 
strategy and plan for this initiative but believe that the views 
expressed in this report do portray the level of comprehension of the 
initiative by those officials at the time of our interviews. The 
concerns they raised, along with additional feedback DHS obtains in 
future employee surveys, should assist DHS in accomplishing the goals 
of this initiative.

DHS also offered technical comments, which we considered and 
incorporated where appropriate.

We plan to provide copies of this report to other appropriate 
committees, the Secretary of DHS, and other interested parties. We will 
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov. If your or your staff have any questions, please call me 
at (202) 512-8777. Key contributors to this report are listed in 
appendix II.

Signed by: 

Richard M. Stana: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:

List of Congressional Committees:

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on The Judiciary: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable James Sensenbrenner, Jr.: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on The Judiciary: 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Harold Rodgers Chairman: 
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

The Homeland Security Act --(P.L. 107-296, Sec. 477(d)(1)--mandated us 
to review the transfer of functions from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and identify issues associated with the transition. Our overall 
objectives were to assess the status of (1) communication and 
coordination among immigration programs in DHS field offices, (2) 
integration of immigration and customs investigators in U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field offices, and (3) 
administrative services and systems used by DHS's immigration agencies' 
field offices. We did not assess program performance or DHS's overall 
response to long-standing problems in this review. Additionally, our 
analysis was based on a snapshot in time, primarily during fiscal year 
2004, and it is possible our results would have been different if our 
interviews had been conducted today.

To obtain information on our objectives, we reviewed laws; U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and ICE transition 
documents; DHS, CIS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and ICE 
memos on communicating and coordinating; DHS shared services 
implementation plans; our past reports; and other relevant documents. 
We also spoke with immigration experts in the public and private 
sectors, and with representatives of pro-and anti-immigration advocacy 
groups in the Washington, D.C., area. These included the American 
Immigration Lawyers' Association, the Arab-American Antidiscrimination 
Committee, the Center for Immigration Studies, Electronic Data Systems 
Corporation Inc., the Institute for the Study of International 
Migration, the Migration Policy Institute, the National Immigration 
Forum, and the National Council of La Raza.

We interviewed officials at DHS headquarters who were responsible for 
managing ICE's detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations 
programs; CIS's adjudications program; and CBP's inspections and the 
Border Patrol. We also interviewed ICE, CIS, and CBP officials 
responsible for developing plans for the transition and officials in 
the former INS Office of Statistics and Office for Policy and Planning.

We conducted structured interviews with officials in ICE's special 
agent in charge (SAC) offices, CIS's district offices, and CBP's 
offices for field operations in 6 of the 27 cities that have SAC 
offices and with U.S. Border Patrol sector headquarter offices in 3 of 
those 6 cities. The 6 cities we visited were Arlington, Virginia; 
Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New York; Miami, Florida; Detroit, 
Michigan; and San Diego, California. Our visits to Arlington and 
Baltimore were used as preliminary site visits to design our interview 
questions. We selected these locations because of their geographic 
dispersion; their proximity to ports of entry; and the relative 
proximity of ICE, CBP, and CIS offices to one another.

* In site visits to CBP's Offices for field operations, we met with 
directors for field operations, assistant directors for field 
operations, and, in some cases, inspectors. In these interviews, we 
collected information and documentation on (1) communication and 
coordination with ICE investigations and other DHS components, (2) the 
role of ICE investigators at the ports of entry, and (3) administrative 
services.

* In site visits to CBP Border Patrol offices, we met with Border 
Patrol sector chiefs, directors for administration, and administrative 
officers. In these interviews, we collected information and 
documentation on (1) communication and coordination with ICE 
investigations and other immigration components, (2) the Border 
Patrol's work on antismuggling, and (3) administrative services.

* In site visits to CIS offices, we met with district directors, 
assistant district directors, as well as section chiefs. In these 
interviews, we collected information and documentation on (1) 
communication and coordination with ICE investigations and other 
immigration components, (2) benefit fraud, and (3) administrative 
services.

* In site visits to four ICE field offices, we used a structured 
interview instrument to obtain information from the SAC and associate 
special agents in charge (ASAC). In one location, we spoke with the two 
ASACs. In all four visits, we also met with assistant special agents in 
charge and administrative staff. In some locations, SACs and ASACs were 
in interim positions until ICE made permanent appointments. In New 
York, Miami, Detroit, and San Diego, we also conducted individual and 
group interviews with investigators and supervising investigators from 
the former INS. In these interviews, we collected information and 
documentation on (1) ICE's investigative mission and performance 
measures for the program, (2), communication and coordination with 
other immigration components in DHS, (3) communication and coordination 
with other federal agencies, (4) integrating immigration and customs 
investigators, and (5) administrative services.

We used our structured interview instrument to obtain information from 
ICE's SAC offices with telephone interviews with the two most senior 
managers in the 21 ICE field offices we did not visit--20 SACs and 20 
ASACs. We conducted these interviews between March and April of 2004 
and made some follow-up calls in June 2004. In our telephone interviews 
we asked about (1) ICE's mission and performance measures; (2) 
communication and coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE programs; 
(3) communication and coordination with other federal agencies; (4) 
integrating immigration and customs investigators; and (5) 
administrative services. We did not speak with one SAC because he was 
new to the position and did not believe he could provide us with useful 
information. We had previously interviewed him as the ASAC in another 
city. We did not speak with one ASAC because he, too, was new to the 
position. In total, we spoke with 49 SACs and ASACs in person and by 
telephone.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528:

Homeland Security:

October 7, 2004:

Richard Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:

RE: Homeland Security: Better Strategic Framework Needed to Transform 
Immigration Programs, GAO-04-1067 (Job Code 440233):

Dear Mr. Stana:

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates this opportunity 
to submit agency comments on the above referenced draft report. The 
information gathered from your analysis and interviews with DHS field 
personnel will prove beneficial as we continue to strengthen and 
realign personnel and operations in the Department. While we generally 
concur in the overall findings and recommendations, there are instances 
that require contextual clarification; and, accordingly, we offer the 
following comments.

Recommendation: The bureaus should create a mechanism for periodically 
obtaining employee feedback on their ideas and concerns and consider 
this feedback in its future transformation and communications 
strategies, including assessing the challenges reported to us.

The Department wholeheartedly agrees with your recommendation, and we 
ask that this report list at least a few of our accomplishments.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE):

* ICE's Office of Investigations (OI) has implemented a direct 
communication mechanism to open two-way communications between the 
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) field office personnel and OI 
Headquarters management. To foster this two-way communication, senior 
level managers have been appointed as the OI Ombudsman. During their 
term as the OI Ombudsman, each senior level manager is physically 
detailed to OI/HQ for a 30-day period, during which time he or she 
serves as a liaison to the field. To ensure a spirit of inclusion, each 
of the 27 SAC offices will participate in this program by having an 
employee detailed into this rotating position. To further underscore 
the importance of this initiative, the SAC is the individual who 
occupies the Ombudsman position. By appointing the SAC, an individual 
who has the authority to propose and make final decisions, the 
initiative has increased and enhanced the field's ability to forward 
specific issues requiring a HQ remedy. It also provides a direct forum 
to the Director of OI for issues requiring immediate attention.

The results and feedback that have been gleaned from this initiative 
have been positive, and OI plans to continue the program.

* In contrast to the new initiative discussed above, the OI SAC 
Conferences is a decades-long established process. Two have been held 
thus far this calendar year (i.e., March and June). The conferences are 
attended by the SACS and the Attaches from the 35 foreign offices. 
Prior to each conference there is a formal submission to OI/HQ of areas 
of concern by each field office. The conference is designed so that HQ 
subject matter experts or program oversight staff can address specific 
issues, operations, and/or investigative concerns. Because the SAC 
Conferences pull information up from the field so that HQ staff can 
tailor guidance back to the field, it is a classic example of two-way 
interaction and teamwork. Consequently, it is understandable that there 
is extensive participation and interaction at these conferences. 
Therefore, OI intends to continue its regular schedule of bi-annual SAC 
Conferences throughout FY 2005.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP):

CBP employee feedback forums were established as early as July 2003. A 
sample of the opportunities that employees had to provide feedback to 
the agency includes, but is not limited to, the following:

* In July 2003, CBP contracted with a professional services firm to 
conduct a series of focus groups with CBP employees around the country 
to assess the effectiveness of internal communications in the newly 
created agency. Representatives from the Office of Field Operations, 
the Office of Border Patrol, and other mission support employees 
participated in these sessions conducted by a third party contractor. 
Results of the focus groups were presented to senior CBP leadership for 
action.

* In September 2003, senior CBP officials conducted more than 30 town 
hall meetings with CBP employees around the country to announce the 
"One Face at the Border" initiative. These town hall meetings were 
intended as opportunities for CBP leadership to share new information 
and receive feedback from employees.

* In March 2004, senior CBP officials conducted dozens of town hall 
meetings with employees around the country to commemorate the one-year 
anniversary of the creation of DHS. These town hall meetings provided 
CBP employees a forum for asking questions directly to the senior 
leadership.

* In July and August 2004, senior CBP officials conducted dozens of 
ceremonies around the country in which CBP frontline employees received 
the first DHS law enforcement badges. These ceremonies were accompanied 
by supervisory roundtable discussions with senior CBP officials and 
local managers/supervisors. These sessions provided CBP employees a 
forum for asking questions directly to senior leadership. Similar 
sessions were conducted with regional CBP leaders, at the Director of 
Field Operations and Port Director level, with additional field 
personnel.

* In September 2004 CBP contracted with another professional services 
firm to take frequent "pulse surveys" to measure the effectiveness of 
communications. CBP employees will be randomly sampled on a periodic 
basis and asked for their opinion of the effectiveness of 
communications at CBP. The contractor will analyze the data and provide 
specific recommendations for ways in which CBP can improve its employee 
communications.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS):

* USCIS has worked diligently since it was formed to enhance 
communication throughout the organization.

* USCIS sends out daily email broadcasts to USCIS staff providing them 
with news on developing issues in the organization.

* The USCIS Director has visited with over two-thirds of the USCIS 
workforce to get the staff's thoughts and ideas.

* USCIS launched Project Ingenuity in May 2004. Through Project 
Ingenuity, the Director has asked employees, supervisors and managers 
at every level to bring forth their good ideas on how USCIS can achieve 
its top three goals (i.e., backlog reduction, national security 
enhancement, and customer service improvement).

* Project Ingenuity provides a forum for suggestions ranging from 
changes in processes, procedures, and policy to regulations and law.	As 
of August USCIS had received more than 170 suggestions.

* USCIS keeps its staff informed on the initiatives undertaken by 
Project Ingenuity suggestions.

* USCIS created, as a component of Public Affairs, its INTERCOM office. 
This office is responsible for improving the internal communications of 
USCIS. For example, the office has a key role with the following by:

* Working on branding issues, employee surveys, and leading USCIS 
communications efforts with respect to shared services;

* Updating the Intranet web-site and publishing alerts for employees; 
and 

* Arranging quarterly electronic town hall meetings between top 
management and employees. These meetings allow employees to address 
questions and suggestions to top management directly.

Recommendation: The bureaus should provide additional specific guidance 
to field managers and staff that establish uniform policies and 
procedures on all cross-cutting integration issues that affect 
operational effectiveness, including specific descriptions of the 
roles and responsibilities of each bureau and its staff in 
investigative techniques such as benefit fraud investigations, paroled 
decisions, and controlled deliveries.

Due to safety and the criticality of the DHS law enforcement mission, 
the Department has provided clear and thorough guidance, even if this 
precludes an immediate response. Additionally, DHS has articulated 
uniform policies and procedures in critical crosscutting integration 
issues, and achieved significant law enforcement accomplishments that 
could not have been undertaken prior to the DHS integration. The 
transition of immigration functions, performed by legacy Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, (INS), to the DHS was part of the most 
significant reorganization the Government has undertaken in 50 years. 
The report acknowledges that such a transition will take years to 
implement fully and the GAO team's discussions with field and 
headquarters staff within the first 17 months of the transition 
demonstrates the challenges faced by all. Moreover, the challenges were 
compounded because the reorganization was done in an environment where 
the overarching priority was ensuring that no mission would fail.

We also offer the following for your consideration.

Adjudicator's Field Manual:

The report suggests there was confusion concerning which organization 
has authority to grant aliens parole. We do not believe the situation 
has been as confusing as stated. USCIS has authority for advance 
parole, which is documented in its Adjudicator's Field Manual, Chapter 
54. ICE has authority over parole of individuals outside of the U.S., 
except for those appearing at a port-of-entry. Individuals appearing at 
a port-of-entry come under the jurisdiction of CBP. We agree that 
international operations, including humanitarian parole, are one of the 
areas that took a long time to resolve. However, we also believe that 
the report should reflect the fact that those issues have been 
resolved. Moreover, USCIS and appropriate Organizational Elements (OEs) 
within DHS formally work together on a number of operational issues at 
the Headquarters level. For example, USCIS participates with BTS 
officials and its OEs on a number of crosscutting projects and 
programs. These include, shared services, U.S. Visit, biometrics, 
background checks, anti-fraud investigations, secure document 
development, intelligence, etc.

The GAO also recommends that each OE should provide additional guidance 
and establish uniform policies and procedures on all crosscutting 
integration issues that affect operational effectiveness, to include 
benefit fraud and parole decision. Given the progress that we have 
already made in this area, we request that the final report 
acknowledges some of the initiatives that have been implemented to 
improve consistency and the delivery of guidance. For example, USCIS 
has developed the Adjudicator's Field Manual that replaced the legacy 
INS Operating Instruction and placed it on the Intranet web site so 
that it is available to all employees. Similarly, policy memos (i.e., 
reporting and analysis of fraud indicators within the benefit process) 
are posted on the Intranet to ensure there is consistent and complete 
delivery of policy at all levels.

The Arizona Border Control (ABC):

The ABC Initiative was established in March 2004 as a vehicle to 
control the threat of illegal traffic across the southwest border. It 
is an outstanding example of a crosscutting DHS law enforcement 
operation. The USCIS and the BTS Directorate recognized the importance 
of integration and the definition of roles and responsibilities for the 
field officers and provided an innovative method to jump-start that 
integration. The ABC Initiative provided for an Integrator and Deputy 
Integrator, appointed by the Under Secretary for the BTS Directorate. 
The Integrators were top members of the BTS field management leadership 
within Arizona. The ABC Initiative Planning Cell was comprised of field 
managers who met regularly and developed operational plans for the 
"boots on the ground" day-to-day operations and coordination of 
resources.

This ABC Initiative combined assets of DHS OEs such as USCIS, CBP, ICE, 
and TSA along with various other Federal agencies. All of the BTS OEs 
worked at both the leadership and field levels to address the threat, 
and to provide support for controlling the flow of illegal activity 
along the Arizona Mexico border. Weekly reporting, intelligence 
analysis, and conference calls with DHS HQ provided direct 
communications to address the needs of both the initiative and the 
operational plans.

Since DHS kicked off the ABC initiative on March 16, 2004, agents have 
made more than 351,700 illegal immigrant apprehensions at the Arizona 
border --evidence of substantial progress at securing the border 
against illegal incursions. Prosecutions of human smuggling 
organizations, another key indicator, have increased by 68 percent. 
Migrant desert rescues have more than doubled, potentially saving 697 
lives. In addition, narcotics seizures have risen from 165,057 lbs. in 
2003 to 359,604 lbs. during the same period in 2004.

Asset Forfeiture:

Since the creation of ICE, the INS, and Customs Asset Forfeiture 
Programs have merged completely and are being funded by one asset 
forfeiture fund-the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. While originally a 
Customs concept, the Asset Identification and Removal Group (AIRG) 
concept has been expanded and enhanced to support the broadened 
authorities. The INS Vermont Asset Forfeiture Support Group has been 
integrated into the AIRG structure and continues to support a cross 
section of ICE investigations. Since the realignment, AIRGs provide 
investigative support to the entire area of responsibility covered by 
the SAC Office. The AIRG groups open second or collateral 
investigations in support of the substantive investigations being 
worked by other groups within the SAC. The support provided by the AIRG 
allows investigators conducting the substantive investigations to focus 
attention and resources on the principal violations, while the AIRG 
investigators are responsible for asset identification and removal.

Recommendation: The bureaus should provide additional detailed written 
guidance to field managers and staff on the processes and procedures to 
follow for the provision of shared administrative services.

The Department concurs and has addressed this issue, and we are 
particularly concerned regarding the report's frequent references to a 
failure of communications at particular stages during the transition. 
Shortly after the March 2003 formation of DHS, senior leadership 
recognized opportunities where we could realign various administrative 
or mission support services; and thereby leverage personnel and 
resources while at the same providing services more efficiently in a 
shared services environment. To accomplish this challenge, the Tri-
Bureaus (e.g., CBP, ICE, and USCIS) established a shared services 
internal communications team to develop and implement a Communication 
Strategy and Plan. The purpose of our efforts is to:

* generate a flow of timely, accessible, accurate, and consistent 
messages about the realignment/reorganization;

* manage stakeholder expectations, address concerns, ease anxiety, and 
reduce misconceptions; and:

* promote and facilitate stakeholders input into the decision-making 
process.

The Communications Plan defines the specific communication vehicles and 
sequence of the development and implementation of the communications. A 
separate Communication Strategy establishes a structured approach to 
communicating with Tri-Bureau stakeholders throughout the mission 
support/administrative realignment/reorganization. The strategy serves 
as a guide for developing future communications by targeting audiences 
and crafting messages to achieve specific goals within a given 
timeframe. Both documents establish the framework for implementing our 
shared services communications with stakeholders.

The internal communications team identified audiences and their 
particular concems/issues. Core messages have been identified for each 
audience. Depending on the target audience, our primary goals are to:

* raise awareness of the Tri-Bureau's mission support/administrative 
realignment/reorganization efforts and the proposed changes taking 
place;

* promote a clear understanding of the Tri-Bureau's mission support/
administrative realignment/reorganization decisions; and:

* build commitment to the Tri-Bureau's mission support/administrative 
realignment/reorganization among stakeholders, leading to buy-in on the 
decisions and the new organization.

Communication on shared services is ongoing in a coordinated manner 
both at the Departmental and OE levels. For example, upon establishment 
of USCIS, its Human Capital Management Office produced and disseminated 
brochures entitled Services at a Glance for all human resource 
functions, including issues dealing with workers compensation and 
safety and health. In the area of health and safety, USCIS also has 
worked collaboratively with CBP, the service provider, in conducting 
training sessions for field personnel with collateral duties. USCIS and 
other DHS OEs regularly use established internal communications 
vehicles such as the Leadership Alert and USCIS Daily News to provide 
current information to the workforce. Additionally, DHS and its OEs 
have established a Department-wide web site to disseminate and receive 
employee feedback on the new HR system. To foster this dialogue, we 
have posted and catalogued employees' questions and responses. In 
addition, there has been a plethora of televised HR Town Hall meetings, 
video teleconferencing, and presentations to Regional Directors and 
Service Center Directors providing service updates.

This is a long-term and complex process ranging from the identification 
and adoption of best practices to the complex execution of prerequisite 
service level agreements (to assure compliance with Federal 
accountability laws, and organizational/personnel issues). The draft 
report incorrectly states that this initiative was implemented in 
December 2003 when all that was approved at that time was the policy 
decision. There is a sharp distinction between the approval of a policy 
decision and the implementation or execution phase of that policy. 
Regrettably, the Department encountered delays in accomplishing the 
execution of service level agreements and resource allocation. In fact, 
the execution phase did not begin until late in the spring/summer 
timeframe of 2004. Consequently, we consider timing as a significant 
factor when reviewing the comments in this report, because the draft 
report cites field managers' lack of familiarity with such issues. This 
initiative was rolled out in the spring/summer of 2004, and it is 
entirely understandable that the field managers lacked familiarity with 
the issue because the draft report's fieldwork is based largely on 
information gained during the February/March 2004 timeframe. Even 
though the statements are understandable given the timing of events, it 
does not accurately portray the initiative or the level of 
comprehension of the initiative.

Again, we appreciate your analysis and thank you for providing us with 
the opportunity to comment. We consider your review thorough and the 
fieldwork findings have been helpful to us. We will continue to 
reevaluate our processes in light of this report, and we ask that you 
review the report in light of our comments.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Anna F. Dixon:

Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison: 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Evi Rezmovic (202) 512-2580 or rezmovice@gao.gov:

Staff Acknowledgments:

David Alexander, Gabrielle Anderson, Leo Barbour, Carole Cimitile, 
Randall Cole, Patricia Dalton, Katherine Davis, Nancy Finley, Larry 
Harrell, Tahra Nichols, Rachel Seid, and Sarah Veale made key 
contributions to this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] P.L. 107-296 (2002).

[2] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003).

[3] P.L. 107-296, Sec. 477(d)(1). 

[4] Special agents in charge (commonly referred to as SACs) are law 
enforcement officers responsible for directing ICE investigation 
operations and resources in a specific geographic area. SACs are the 
most senior managers in the field offices of ICE's investigations 
program. Associate special agents in charge (commonly referred to as 
ASACs) are the second most senior managers in the field offices of 
ICE's investigations program. During our review the title ASAC was 
changed to deputy special agent in charge.

[5] Controlled delivery is an ICE investigative method that involves 
allowing a known group of illegal aliens or contraband to enter the 
country so they can be followed to their destination and arrested by 
ICE investigators.

[6] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003).

[7] GAO, INS's Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues 
Remain after Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: August 2, 
2001); GAO, Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements 
Needed to Address Growing Problem, GAO/GGD-00-103 (Washington, D.C.: 
May 1, 2000); GAO; GAO, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is 
Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: January 31, 
2002); GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS 
Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-02-861T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 
2002); GAO, Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove 
Imprisoned Aliens Need to be Improved, GAO/T-GGD-97-154 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 15, 1997) and Criminal Aliens: INS's Efforts to Identify and 
Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement, GAO/T-GGD-99-47 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb., 25, 1999); GAO, Immigration Benefits: Several 
Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488 
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).

[8] P.L. 107-296, Sec. 471(a).

[9] In addition to the 33 district offices, CIS also runs four Service 
Centers, three regional offices, eight asylum offices, and a number of 
application support centers, and sub-offices. The SAC offices also have 
subordinate and smaller Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) offices that 
report to them. Each of the 20 Border Patrol sectors has subsector 
stations within its geographical area.

[10] "Cover" immigration documents are those used by law enforcement 
confidential informants or cooperating witnesses, for example, in 
furtherance of a particular investigation or intelligence collection 
effort. These documents are not actual benefits. 

[11] The senior inspectors, in addition to performing the duties of the 
CBP officer, present criminal cases to the United States Attorney 
regarding certain potential criminal immigration violations that occur 
at ports of entry. Such criminal violations are, for example, re-entry 
after removal and alien smuggling and involve an administrative removal 
action and a potential criminal case. 

[12] Benefit fraud includes the willful misrepresentation of a material 
fact to gain an immigration benefit in the absence of lawful 
entitlement. Benefit fraud includes such schemes as marriage fraud and 
non-immigrant visa fraud.

[13] The guidance is also to cover other issues, such as Title 21 
authority (covers the importation, distribution, manufacture, and 
possession of illegal narcotics), asset forfeiture, and sharing of 
intelligence and information. 

[14] Investigators in both INS's service centers and district offices 
investigated possible benefit fraud on the basis of information that 
they received from staff who processed benefit applications 
(adjudication officers), other INS investigative units, INS regional 
units, the public, and other federal and local law enforcement 
agencies. 

[15] TECS was developed and maintained by the Customs Service (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury), and is a mainframe-based enforcement and 
inspection support system that prior to the transition was used by 
Customs, INS inspectors and intelligence analysts, and other federal 
agencies. The system was developed to store information about people 
who are of interest to law enforcement agencies so that their entry 
into the United States may be monitored or, if necessary, prevented.

[16] We previously reported in GAO, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused 
Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66, (Washington, D.C., 
January 2002) that U.S. attorneys accept fraud cases under established 
prosecutorial priorities and resource availability and that the 
priority on fraud varies among the U.S. attorney's offices around the 
country. 

[17] Advance parole is a benefit that allows an alien residing in the 
United States (in other than lawful permanent resident status) to gain 
permission to travel out of and return into the United States when the 
conditions of the alien's stay do not otherwise allow for re-admission 
after departing the Untied States. 

[18] ICE has Benefit Fraud Units in the Texas, Vermont, and California 
Service Centers. Now under CIS, the former INS's four Service Centers-
-California, Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont--were created in 1990 to help 
reduce application backlogs in the district offices. Service Centers 
process 35 types of applications, including petitions for permanent and 
temporary workers, petitions for admission of spouses, and applications 
for employment-based adjustment of status to permanent resident. The 
Service centers also share responsibility with the District offices for 
processing naturalization applications. 

[19] According to a CIS official, every district office, service 
center, and asylum office will receive at least one of these positions, 
and large district offices will receive several positions. 

[20] In an interview with ICE headquarters officials in July 2004, we 
were told they are just starting to provide guidance to SAC offices on 
integration and only doing so on a case-by-case basis. 

[21] Group supervisors are senior special agents responsible for 
overseeing an investigative group of 8 to 12 special agents in a 
particular investigative field, such as benefit fraud, antismuggling, 
or money laundering. 

[22] Before the transfer, both INS and Customs investigations programs 
rotated agents on a roster to serve 24-hour shifts to respond to issues 
that arose, for example, at the ports of entry or after regular 
business hours.

[23] There are a limited number of agents who are unable to complete 
cross-training as they are on detail assisting the United States Secret 
Service in carrying out protective duties during this election year or 
are assisting in training the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

[24] For a number of months ICE delayed issuing new badges, 
credentials, name signs, business cards, and other printed material 
because of a pending request for a name change. ICE formally requested 
a name change--to Investigations and Criminal Enforcement--to more 
accurately reflect the work of all ICE divisions, as well as to further 
remove the agency from the legacy immigration and customs brands. In 
late June 2004, the Assistant Secretary for ICE announced that it was 
clear the name change would not be approved in the near future and ICE 
would go forward with the procurement of new badges and credentials. 

[25] DHS defines branding as all the things and symbols that create the 
recognition for an agency. Branding provides an organization with an 
identity and provides information to others about what that agency is. 

[26] All agencies, with the exception of the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
Secret Service, are required to use the DHS seal and the agency's name 
as their logos. 

[27] CBP stated in September 2004 that the two bureaus finalized the 
agreement for shared services on July 2, 2004.

[28] The 9 SACs and ASACs we visited face-to-face were not asked the 
same question. 

[29] Three SACs and ASACs said that they were experiencing problems 
with shared services to "some extent."

[30] We visited two sites before the official initiation of shared 
services in December 2003.

[31] The vehicle registered approximately 4,000 miles on the odometer 
at the time of the accident, and the repairs were valued at 
approximately $6,500.

[32] In August 2004, ICE provided a statement that indicated that if 
staff chose an incorrect accounting string, the system would indicate 
an error before routing the document to the approving official. 

[33] According to ICE officials responsible for finance, when the 
Office of Management and Budget allocated staffing and funding to the 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate and CIS, the funding for 
several programs such as general counsel and information technology 
went to CBP and CIS but the staff went to ICE. These ICE officials told 
us that because ICE was funding additional support staff, the agency 
did not have an accurate account of staff funded by ICE and staff in 
ICE whose funding was with CBP and CIS. 

[34] The National Finance Center, an office within the Department of 
Agriculture, handles payroll and other administrative services for some 
government agencies.

[35] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003).

[36] Four of the 40 we contacted did not respond to our question. 

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