Interwoven VisualPreview: //TEAMSITE/default/main/internet/fema/WORKAREA/workarea/txt/plan/mitplanning/howto7.txt
State and Local Mitigation Planning
HOW-TO GUIDE NUMBER SEVEN
INTEGRATING MANMADE HAZARDS INTO MITIGATION PLANNING
 
Prepared for
Federal Emergency Management Agency
500 C Street, SW
Washington, DC 20472

September 2003
Version 2.0


TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword	i
Introduction	iv
Phase One  Organize Resources 	1-1
Phase Two  Assess Risks 	2-1
Phase Three  Develop a Mitigation Plan	3-1
Phase Four  Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress 4-1
Afterword	AFT-1
Appendix A  Acronyms	a-1
Appendix B  Glossary	b-1
Appendix C  Library 	c-1
Appendix D  Worksheets d-1



FOREWORD

The Hazard Mitigation Planning Process

Hazard mitigation planning is the process of determining how to reduce or 
eliminate the loss of life and property damage resulting from natural and 
manmade hazards. This diagram shows the four basic phases of the hazard 
mitigation process.

For illustration purposes, this diagram portrays a process that appears to 
proceed sequentially. However, the mitigation planning process is rarely linear. 
It is not unusual that ideas developed while assessing risks should need 
revision and additional information while developing the mitigation plan, or 
that implementing the plan may result in new goals or additional risk 
assessment.

[DIAGRAM: displaying the Hazard Mitigation Planning Process: movement from 
Organize Resources to Assess Risk to Develop a Mitigation Plan to Implement the 
Plan and Monitor Progress.

Organize Resources: From the start, communities should focus on the resources 
needed for a successful mitigation planning process. Essential steps include 
identifying and organizing interested members of the community as well as the 
technical expertise required during the planning process.

Assess Risks: Next, communities need to identify the characteristics and 
potential consequences of hazards. It is important to understand how much of the 
community can be affected by specific hazards and what the impacts would be on 
important community assets.

Develop a Mitigation Plan: Armed with an understanding of the risks posed by 
hazards, 
communities need to determine what their priorities should be and then look at 
possible ways to avoid or minimize the undesired effects. The result is a hazard 
mitigation plan and strategy for implementation.

Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress: Communities can bring the plan to life 
in a variety of ways ranging from implementing specific mitigation projects to 
changes in the day-to-day operation of the local government. To ensure the 
success of an ongoing program, it is critical that the plan remains relevant. 
Thus, it is important to conduct periodic evaluations and make revisions as 
needed. 

END DIAGRAM]

[GLOSSARY SIDEBAR
mit-i-gate\ 1 : to cause to become less harsh or hostile; 2: to make less severe 
or painful.  
plan-ning\: the act or process of making or carrying out plans; specif: the 
establishment of goals, 
policies, and procedures for a social or economic unit. 
END GLOSSARY]

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed this series of 
mitigation 
planning "how-to" guides to assist states, communities, and tribes in enhancing 
their hazard 
mitigation planning capabilities.

These guides are designed to provide the type of information state and local 
governments need 
to initiate and maintain a planning process that will result in safer 
communities. These guides 
are applicable to states and communities of various sizes and varying ranges of 
financial and 
technical resources. 

This how-to series is not intended to be the last word on any of the subject 
matter covered; 
rather, it is meant to provide clear guidance for the field practitioner. In 
practice, these guides 
may be supplemented with more extensive technical resources and the use of 
experts when 
necessary.

The series consists of four guides covering the core aspects of the planning 
process, and 
additional guides addressing special topics in hazard mitigation. The "core 
four" guides cover:
-	Getting started with the mitigation planning process, including important 
considerations for 
how you can organize your efforts to develop an effective mitigation plan (FEMA 
386-1);
-	Identifying hazards and assessing losses to your community or state (FEMA 
386-2);
-	Setting mitigation priorities and goals for your community or state and 
writing the plan 
(FEMA 386-3); and
-	Implementing the mitigation plan, including project funding and 
maintaining a dynamic plan 
that changes to meet new developments (FEMA 386-4).

Special topics covered include:
-	Evaluating potential mitigation actions through the use of benefit-cost 
analysis and other 
techniques (FEMA 386-5);
-	Incorporating special considerations into hazard mitigation planning for 
historic properties 
and cultural resources (FEMA 386-6);
-	Incorporating mitigation considerations for manmade hazards into hazard 
mitigation 
planning, the topic of this how-to guide (FEMA 386-7);
-	Using multi-jurisdictional approaches to mitigation planning (FEMA 386-8); 
and 
-	Finding and securing technical and financial resources for mitigation 
planning (FEMA 386-9).

Why should you take the time to read these guides?
-	It simply costs too much to address the effects of disasters only after 
they happen;
-	State and federal aid is usually insufficient to cover the full extent of 
physical and economic 
damages resulting from disasters;
-	You can prevent a surprising amount of disaster damage if you understand 
where and how 
these phenomena occur;
-	You can lessen the impact of both natural and technological hazards and 
speed the 
response and recovery process; and 
-	The most meaningful steps in avoiding the impacts of hazards are taken at 
the state and 
local levels by officials and community members who have a personal stake in the 
outcome 
and/or the ability to follow through on a sustained program of planning and 
implementation.

The guides focus on showing how mitigation planning:
-	Can help your community become more sustainable and disaster-resistant 
through selecting 
the most appropriate mitigation actions, based on the knowledge you gain in the 
hazard 
identification and risk assessment process;
-	Allows you to focus your efforts on the hazard areas most important to you 
by determining 
and setting priorities for mitigation planning efforts; and
-	Can save you money by providing a forum for engaging in partnerships that 
could provide 
technical, financial, and/or staff resources in your effort to reduce the 
effects, and hence the 
costs, of natural and manmade hazards.

These guides provide a range of approaches to preparing a hazard mitigation 
plan. There is no 
one right planning process. However, there are several elements that are common 
to all 
successful planning endeavors, such as engaging citizens, developing goals and 
objectives, 
and monitoring progress. Select the approach that works best in your state or 
community.

[SIDE TIP: This special-topic guide, Integrating Manmade Hazards Into Mitigation 
Planning, is not 
designed to help you establish procedures to respond to disasters, write an 
emergency operations plan, 
or create a counterterrorism program for your community; rather, it assumes that 
your community is 
engaged in the mitigation planning process and serves as a resource to help you 
expand the scope of 
your plan to address terrorism and technological hazards. It provides 
information to supplement your 
community's hazard mitigation planning efforts. Because each of the four 
mitigation planning phases is 
covered comprehensively in its own how-to guide, references to other 
publications in the series are 
often used in lieu of full explanations of a process or activity. Furthermore, 
the guide is intended not as 
a highly technical manual but rather as a source of general guidance for the 
broad audiences that are 
likely to comprise state and local mitigation planning teams, including 
participants from government 
agencies, community interest groups, industrial partners, and others.
END SIDE TIP]

INTRODUCTION

Disasters are events that can cause loss of life and property, environmental 
damage, and 
disruption of governmental, social, and economic activities. They occur when 
hazards impact 
human settlements and the built environment. Throughout the Cold War, the focus 
of 
emergency management planning was on responding to and recovering from nuclear 
attack by 
foreign enemies. During the 1990s, this emphasis shifted to address natural 
disasters such as 
hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods. 

Yet again, the need to incorporate new threats into emergency management 
planningthis 
time, manmade hazards such as terrorism and technological disastershas become 
all too 
apparent, as demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and 
Washington, DC and the July 2001 hazardous material train derailment and fire in 
Baltimore, 
Maryland. Additionally, the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 1996 bombing at the summer 
Olympics in 
Atlanta, the 1995 destruction of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, and scores of smaller-scale incidents and accidents 
reinforce the need 
for communities to reduce their vulnerability to future terrorist acts and 
technological disasters.

[SIDE TIP: Manmade Hazards
For the purpose of this guide, "manmade hazards" are technological hazards and 
terrorism. These 
are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they originate from human 
activity. In contrast, while 
the risks presented by natural hazards may be increased or decreased as a result 
of human activity, 
they are not inherently human-induced.
The term "technological hazards" refers to the origins of incidents that can 
arise from human activities 
such as the manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous 
materials. For the sake of 
simplicity, this guide assumes that technological emergencies are accidental and 
that their 
consequences are unintended.
The term "terrorism" refers to intentional, criminal, malicious acts. There is 
no single, universally 
accepted definition of terrorism, and it can be interpreted in many ways. 
Officially, terrorism is defined in 
the Code of Federal Regulations as "...the unlawful use of force and violence 
against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives." (28 CFR, Section 0.85). The 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) further characterizes terrorism as either domestic or 
international, depending on the 
origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist organization; however, the origin 
of the terrorist or person 
causing the hazard is far less relevant to mitigation planning than the hazard 
itself and its 
consequences.
For the purposes of this guide, "terrorism" refers to the use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), 
including biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons; arson, 
incendiary, explosive, and 
armed attacks; industrial sabotage and intentional hazardous materials releases; 
and "cyber-terrorism." 
Within these general categories, however, there are many variations. 
Particularly in the area of 
biological and chemical weapons, there are a wide variety of agents and ways for 
them to be 
disseminated.END SIDE TIP]

Although this series of mitigation planning how-to guidesas well as mitigation 
planning 
mandates such as the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA)grew out of a focus 
on planning 
for natural hazards, recent events suggest that an all-hazard mitigation plan 
should also 
address hazards generated by human activities such as terrorism and hazardous 
material 
accidents. While the term "mitigation" refers generally to activities that 
reduce loss of life and 
property by eliminating or reducing the effects of disasters, in the terrorism 
context it is often 
interpreted to include a wide variety of preparedness and response actions. For 
the purposes 
of this how-to guide, the traditional meaning will be assumed; that is, 
"mitigation" refers to 
specific actions that can be taken to reduce loss of life and property from 
manmade hazards 
by modifying the built environment to reduce the risk and potential consequences 
of these 
hazards. 

To better structure the way in which we manage disasters, the concept of the 
"four phases of 
emergency management" was introduced in the early 1980s after the similarities 
between 
natural disaster preparedness and civil defense became clear. This approach can 
be applied to 
all disasters.

-	Mitigation is defined as any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate 
long-term risk to 
life and property from a hazard event. Mitigation, also known as prevention 
(when done 
before a disaster), encourages long-term reduction of hazard vulnerability. The 
goal of 
mitigation is to decrease the need for response as opposed to simply increasing 
the 
response capability. Mitigation can save lives and reduce property damage, and 
should be 
cost-effective and environmentally sound. This, in turn, can reduce the enormous 
cost of 
disasters to property owners and all levels of government. In addition, 
mitigation can protect 
critical community facilities, reduce exposure to liability, and minimize 
community disruption.
-	Preparedness includes plans and preparations made to save lives and 
property and to 
facilitate response operations. 
-	Response includes actions taken to provide emergency assistance, save 
lives, minimize 
property damage, and speed recovery immediately following a disaster.
-	Recovery includes actions taken to return to a normal or improved 
operating condition 
following a disaster.

FEMA developed the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) using an all-
hazards 
approach. While the IEMS was established as an "all-hazard" approach, responding 
to the 
threat of terrorism (referred to as counterterrorism) came to be viewed as the 
responsibility of 
law enforcement, defense, and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, defensive 
efforts to protect 
people and facilities from terrorism (referred to as antiterrorism) were 
generally limited to the 
government sector, the military, and some industrial interests. However, both 
technological 
disasters and incidents of domestic and international terrorism on United States 
soil during the 
past decade have made it clear that emergency managers, first responders, and 
planners must 
now work together to build better and safer communities in the 21st century.

[SIDE TIP: The terms counterterrorism and antiterrorism are often used 
interchangeably. When using these terms, you should be careful to distinguish 
their meaning. 
Counterterrorism deals with offensively managing the threat of terrorism, while 
antiterrorism 
refers to defensive efforts to protect people and property. END SIDE TIP]

[SIDEBAR: Hazard Mitigation Planning
The hazard mitigation planning process consists of four basic phases as shown 
below. The 
first phase, Organize Resources, addresses the creation of a planning team with 
representatives from the public and private sectors, citizen groups, higher 
education 
institutions, and non-profits. The second phase, Assess Risks, explains 
identifying hazards 
and assessing losses. The third and fourth phases, Develop a Mitigation Plan and 
Implement 
the Plan and Monitor Progress, discuss establishing goals and priorities and 
selecting 
mitigation projects, and writing, implementing, and revisiting the mitigation 
plan, respectively. 

[DIAGRAM: This diagram displays the Hazard Mitigation Planning Process: the name 
of each of the four 
planning phases appears in its own separate box.  An arrow leading from one box 
to the next shows 
movement from Organize Resources to Assess Risks to Develop a Mitigation Plan to 
Implement the Plan 
and Monitor Progress. Another set of arrows points from Implement the Plan and 
Monitor Progress to 
all three remaining phases, indicating that planning the process is not 
necessarily linear.
END DIAGRAM]
END SIDEBAR]

While you may not be able to prevent every accident or deliberate attack, it is 
well within your 
ability to reduce the likelihood and/or the potential effects of an incident 
through mitigation. The 
process of mitigating hazards before they become disasters is similar for both 
natural and 
manmade hazards. Whether you are dealing with natural disasters, threats of 
terrorism, or 
hazardous materials accidents, you will use a process of 1) identifying and 
organizing your 
resources; 2) conducting a risk or threat assessment and estimating potential 
losses; 3) 
identifying mitigation actions that will reduce the effects of the hazards and 
creating a 
strategy to place them in priority order; and 4) implementing the actions, 
evaluating the 
results, and keeping the plan up-to-date. This four-phase process is known as 
mitigation 
planning. 

In one form or another, planning is an element of almost everything that 
individuals, institutions, 
corporations, and governments do. Planning helps to coordinate actions, 
determine the order in 
which goals are accomplished, leverage opportunities, and identify priorities 
for allocating 
resources. Hazard mitigation planning is the integration of these activities 
into a community's 
emergency management programs in order to reduce or eliminate losses of life and 
property 
due to disasters. 

How do you use this and the other how-to guides?
Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning, the seventh guide in the 
how-to series, 
provides information that will help you incorporate manmade hazards into the 
four phases of the 
mitigation planning process in your community or state, from organizing your 
resources to 
updating your plan. This how-to guide follows the four-phase mitigation process. 
Each section 
corresponds to one of the phases.

The planning process is as individual as the jurisdiction that engages in it. 
Each community or 
state approaches growth and change in a unique way, and the process of planning 
for the future 
should fit your particular community's or state's "personality." As a result, 
you should not 
consider the step-by-step sequence included in this and other how-to guides to 
be the only way 
to pursue mitigation planning. However, the process illustrated here is based on 
certain steps 
common to successful planning. 

Types of Information Found in the How-to Series 
The how-to series contains several types of information. Some information is 
highlighted with 
icons. Additional information can be found in Appendix C, Library. 

Icons
The "States" icon identifies guidance focused solely on the role of the state. 
Although much of 
the information will be the same for local, tribal, and state governments, there 
are different 
requirements for state and local mitigation plans. Furthermore, states have 
additional 
responsibilities to assist local entities in their planning efforts. Guidance 
focusing on local 
governments applies to tribes as well. [STATE ICON]

The "Caution" icon alerts you to important information and ways to avoid sticky 
situations later 
in the planning process.  [CAUTION ICON]

The "DMA" icon provides information relating to the mitigation planning 
requirements outlined 
in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) regulations. [DMA ICON]

The "Glossary" icon identifies terms and concepts for which a detailed 
explanation is provided 
in Appendix B, Glossary. [GLOSSARY ICON]

The "Tips" icon identifies helpful hints and useful information that can be used 
in the planning 
process. [TIPS ICON]

Library
A mitigation planning "Library" has been included in Appendix C. The library has 
a wealth of 
information, including Web addresses, reference sources, and other information. 
All of the Web 
sites and references listed in the how-to guide are included in the Library.

Worksheets
Finally, to help track your progress, worksheets have been developed to 
correspond with the 
activities in this guide. These are included at the end of each section, where 
applicable, and in 
Appendix D, Worksheets. You can duplicate these forms and use them to organize 
your work as 
you implement the mitigation planning process.

PHASE 1: ORGANIZE RESOURCES

[DIAGRAM.  This diagram shows the four phases of the planning processorganize 
resources, 
assess risk, develop a mitigation plan, and implement the plan and monitor 
progressas a 
series of connected rectangles, just as in diagram found in the introduction.  
The first 
box, organize resources, is highlighted.  END DIAGRAM]

Overview

[DIAGRAM:
Mitigation Planning Process

1.	Organize Resources
>	Assess community support
>	Build the planning team
>	Engage the public
2.	Assess Risks
3.	Develop a Mitigation Plan
4.	Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress

This diagram starts with a smaller version of the diagram of the four-phase 
hazard 
mitigation planning process. Phase one of the planning process, Organize 
Resources, is 
highlighted. An arrow leads to the three sequential steps you need to take when 
organizing 
resources:  assess community support, build the planning team, and engage the 
public. 
END DIAGRAM]

Phase 1, Organize Resources, involves getting started in the hazard mitigation 
planning 
process by identifying and pulling together resources such as funding, staff, 
and political 
support. These resources will be necessary both to get the process off the 
ground and to 
achieve maximum effectiveness in the long term. 

This section supplements the guidance provided in the Getting Started: Building 
Support for 
Mitigation Planning how-to guide (FEMA 386-1). Step 1 involves establishing 
community 
support for integrating manmade hazards into the hazard mitigation planning 
process. Step 2 
includes developing a list of stakeholders with expertise in hazardous 
materials, security issues, 
and law enforcement, among other disciplines, that you may want to add to your 
planning team. 
Step 3 discusses special considerations relevant to public participation 
activities. 

Step 1  Assess Community Support
To be successful, a mitigation planning initiative requires the support of 
public officials, agency 
personnel, business owners and operators, citizens, and other community members. 
Getting 
Started discusses defining the planning area; gauging how much the community 
knows about 
mitigation planning; educating public officials on the hazards and risks in your 
community; using 
existing plans as a base from which to start; and organizing funding, technical, 
and human 
resources.

Inform the Public
One of the fundamental differences in planning for manmade disasters versus 
natural disasters 
is that most people have had little or no firsthand exposure to them. Even in 
light of the alarming 
increase in terrorist activity directed against the United States, the aging 
infrastructure, the 
persistence of security shortfalls in some sectors, and the proximity of 
industrial hazards to 
population centers, the public's perception of risk varies widely. This 
perception is influenced by 
many factors, such as media portrayal of events, the level of public education 
available, and an 
individual's experience with various hazards. Because the United States has a 
relatively short 
history of dealing with manmade hazards, discussions on this subject may be 
characterized by 
elements of uncertainty and even fear. Therefore, to gain public support, it is 
important to 
educate public officials, citizens, and the private sector about the manmade 
hazards that may 
affect the community and about the prevention and mitigation actions that can 
help address 
them. The planning team must present a realistic assessment of the potential 
consequences of 
such disasters while taking care to avoid overstating or inflating the risk.

[SIDE TIP: Planners should recognize that addressing manmade hazards may require 
that 
more attention be paid to dealing with a range of potentially strong personal 
responses, and they should 
be prepared to address potential concerns that may not have arisen during 
natural hazards planning 
such as security, unknown risks, and civil liberties. Thus, it is critical that 
planners develop a realistic, 
comprehensive picture of the hazards present in their communities to better 
educate the public and be 
prepared to respond to the their concerns. END SIDE TIP]

Promote the Benefits of Mitigation Planning
You can further educate people and build support by emphasizing the value added 
by mitigation 
planning and building on planning opportunities that already exist. Although 
manmade hazards 
may not be as easy to identify and predict as some natural hazards, the benefits 
of planning for 
such events are the same: improved disaster resistance, community involvement in 
the process, 
partnerships with sectors you may not have interacted with before, and more 
sustainable 
communities. Building on existing opportunities is a good way to create momentum 
for 
mitigation planning.

[SIDE TIP:
Summary of the benefits of mitigation planning
-	Reduces future losses from disasters
-	Builds partnerships
-	Facilitates funding priorities
-	Contributes to sustainable communities
END SIDE TIP]

Many people are concerned about manmade hazards since the attacks of 2001, and 
the media 
have focused intensely on these disasters. You can use this high visibility to 
show why your 
community should plan for such contingencies. Getting Started examines ways to 
implement 
natural hazard mitigation planning through existing plans; now you can reexamine 
those plans 
with a focus on how to integrate planning for manmade disasters into them.

You may want to point out the following benefits as you educate others:
1.	Mitigation helps local, tribal, and state governments fulfill their 
responsibility to protect their 
citizens, property, and environment by reducing the potential impacts of manmade 
disasters.
2.	Mitigation can enhance a community's ability to recover from the impacts 
of a manmade 
disaster. 

[SIDE TIP: Depending on the nature of the incident, the impacts of a manmade 
hazard can be 
localizedeven limited to a single buildingor they can be widespread, 
encompassing a metropolitan 
area, a watershed, or a transportation corridor. Additionally, the extent of the 
physical damages 
generated by an incident can be surpassed by its associated economic impacts, as 
demonstrated by 
the national-level economic effects of the September 11, 2001 attacks. END SIDE 
TIP]

3.	Mitigation can reduce exposure to civil or criminal liability in the event 
of a terrorist attack or 
technological accident. 
4.	Mitigation actions may help reduce insurance premiums.

[SIDE TIP:
At the time of this writing, the long-term consequences of the insurance 
industry's response to the events 
of September 11, 2001 are not clear. To date, the industry is having difficulty 
estimating the frequency 
and magnitude of future terrorism risks and is concerned about ensuring adequate 
capital to absorb the 
potential costs of another catastrophic attack. As a result, many insurers are 
establishing coverage 
limitations and raising premiums and deductibles for commercial customers. Risk 
is being shifted from 
insurers to property owners and business operators, and future attacks may lead 
to greater direct 
losses to those impactedfurther emphasizing the importance of taking actions to 
reduce vulnerability 
and minimize losses. 
(Source: General Accounting Office, Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured 
Exposure to Attacks 
Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities) END SIDE TIP]

Capitalize on Planning Opportunities
As mentioned previously, manmade hazards can be integrated into existing 
planning efforts. 
The following opportunities should be considered:
1.	Planning during post-disaster recovery. Following the September 2001 
attacks, the 
increased risk of manmade hazards became a topic of conversation in the 
mainstream 
media and across the nation. This widespread interest can serve as an impetus to 
enhance 
a mitigation plan with actions that can reduce the effects of future attacks.

[DMA SIDEBAR: The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 provides an impetus for state 
and local 
governments to undertake mitigation planning. The Act does not mandate that 
terrorism or 
technological disasters be addressed in hazard mitigation planning; however, it 
does encourage 
and reward state and local pre-disaster planning and promote sustainability as a 
strategy for 
reducing the effects of disasters. Naturally, this objective can only be fully 
achieved through 
incorporating not only natural hazards but also the full spectrum of manmade 
disasters. Interim final 
regulations on hazard mitigation planning were published in the Federal Register 
on February 26, 
2002 (see 44 CFR Parts 201 and 206). 
END DMA]

2.	Comprehensive and other community-oriented planning activities. If your 
community 
has begun developing or updating its comprehensive plan, capital improvement 
plan, urban 
design guidelines, land development regulations, growth management or 
sustainability 
plans, or other community-oriented guidance, this is a prime opportunity to 
incorporate 
planning for manmade disasters. For example, if your community is planning to 
build a new 
city hall or hospital, you can incorporate defensive architecture, site 
planning, and design 
approaches into the facility planning process to reduce the hazards to the 
facility from 
manmade events.

[STATES TIP: The results of the Institute for Business & Home Safety's 2001 
study, Are We 
Planning Safer Communities? Results of a National Survey of Community Planners 
and Natural 
Disasters show that the safest communities are located in states where hazards 
are a required 
consideration in comprehensive planning. In many states, however, this "best 
practice" is not followed. 
Ideally, hazard considerations are an integral part of state and local 
comprehensive planning; if they are 
not, state and local governments should consider requiring that comprehensive 
planning include all-
hazard considerations. 
END STATES TIP]

[SIDE TIP: Planners are encouraged to link together as many planning 
opportunities as 
possible to maximize coordination, thoroughness, information sharing, and cost-
effectiveness. Relevant 
planning actions may be ongoing or may already have been accomplished in your 
jurisdiction as part of 
other emergency management planning initiatives. For example, some jurisdictions 
completed a 
community vulnerability assessment as part of the Department of Justice's State 
Domestic 
Preparedness Support Program (equipment grant program - now within DHS); this 
information is directly transferable from 
first responder planning to mitigation planning.
END SIDE TIP]

3.	Update of existing mitigation plans or other emergency management plans. 
In order to 
keep plans up-to-date, state and local governments must perform periodic reviews 
of 
existing plans. During these reviews, planners should re-evaluate the hazards 
that can 
affect their communities and update their plans as appropriate to incorporate 
manmade 
hazards.

Step 2  Build the Planning Team
Assuming you have already set up your planning team, expanding its scope to 
incorporate 
terrorism and technological disasters will require enhancing the team's 
capabilities by acquiring 
expertise in a number of disciplines. To ensure that the composition of the 
mitigation planning 
team contains the right mix of members, the capabilities of the existing team 
should be 
assessed and any gaps filled. To prevent the team from becoming so large as to 
be unwieldy, a 
committee/subcommittee approach may be implemented. You may wish to use the 
categories 
listed below to define the various subgroup areas of the planning team.

[SIDE TIP: The size and composition of the planning team will depend on the 
community or 
state, size of the planning area, planning needs, and resources available. A 
team approach is optimal 
because: 
a.	It encourages participation and gets more people invested in the process
b.	It enhances the visibility and stature of the planning process
c.	It provides for a broad perspective on the issues
d.	It provides the widest possible range of expertise and experience
e.	It ensures the use of resources in a coordinated fashion to maximize 
benefits
END SIDE TIP]

[SIDE TIP: Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-
1), outlines 
methods for identifying stakeholders for a natural hazard mitigation planning 
process. Existing groups, 
such as natural hazard mitigation planning teams or emergency planning 
committees, can serve as 
ideal bases for manmade hazard mitigation efforts. Such teams should have a 
broad-based 
membership that includes, at a minimum, representatives of elected officials, 
emergency management, 
first responder agencies, healthcare, local environmental and transportation 
groups, the media, 
community groups, and representative owners and operators of private facilities. 
END SIDE TIP]

[SIDE TIP:  A community's hazard mitigation planners are its primary resource 
for leading and 
coordinating efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in the built environment. In any 
given community, however, 
there may be a variety of other entities operating to the same end, either in 
concert with mitigation 
planning or independently. These may comprise public, private, or partnered 
initiatives; they may cut 
across local, state, and/or federal jurisdictions; and they may address 
planning, security, safety, 
engineering, and other aspects of hazard reduction. While projects such as these 
are often undertaken 
in a vacuumthat is, without relation to the community as a wholetheir key 
personnel may possess 
or have access to expertise and resources that will enhance the ability of the 
hazard mitigation planning 
team to meet the state's or community's goals. The importance of thinking 
inclusively and holistically 
when recruiting team members becomes especially clear when planners are 
confronted with new and 
generally unfamiliar challenges such as integrating manmade hazards into 
mitigation planning. 
END SIDE TIP]

Expertise that will be helpful in addressing manmade hazards may be lacking from 
a purely 
natural-hazards oriented team. Such expertise includes the following:
-	Chemical emergency planning
-	Counter- and antiterrorism (law enforcement and military)
-	Crime prevention planning, including situational crime prevention and 
Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
-	Electrical engineering
-	Emergency management
-	Explosives/blast characteristics
-	Fire protection engineering
-	Force protection (protection of military personnel and facilities)
-	Industrial security
-	Mechanical engineering, including heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC)
-	Protective/defensive architecture
-	Site planning, urban design, and landscape design
-	Structural engineering, design, and construction

[GLOSSARY SIDEBAR:
Although situational crime prevention and Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design 
(CPTED) are closely related, the two are not synonymous. Situational crime 
prevention 
encompasses many CPTED principles, but focuses more on managerial and user 
behavior 
factors that affect opportunities for criminal behavior in the specific setting 
for the specific 
crime(s) being addressed. CPTED, on the other hand, focuses more on changing the 
physical 
design aspects of environments to deter criminal activity.
END GLOSSARY]

Specialized expertise in these fields can be found at a number of sources, even 
in communities 
with modest resources. Additionally, technical assistance from the federal 
government may be 
available to communities. Among the many federal organizations offering relevant 
support are 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). See Appendix C for Web links to 
these agencies' programs. 
See Worksheet #1: Build the Planning Team at the end of this section (also 
included in 
Appendix D) to help you identify additional team members.

[SIDE TIP: The planning team should work with elected officials to formalize the 
community's 
commitment to planning and to promote an atmosphere of cooperation by 
"authorizing" the planning 
team to take the steps necessary to develop a mitigation plan for terrorism and 
technological hazards. 
At a minimum, this authority can be established through a resolution or 
proclamation recognizing the 
team as an authorized agent of the community. 
END SIDE TIP]

Step 3  Engage the Public
Given the dramatic nature of terrorism and technological hazards, the community 
will expect to 
be involved in and informed about the mitigation planning process. Getting 
Started discusses 
developing a schedule or program for involving the public throughout the 
mitigation planning 
process. Adding a manmade hazard element to your public participation program 
will simply be 
another step. Keep in mind, however, that care must be taken when presenting 
certain types of 
information.

Because citizens may be fearful or upset about recent events and apprehensive 
about 
publicized threats, they may want to engage public officials in talking about 
such issues. The 
planning team should encourage the public to focus on what they can 
realistically do to protect 
their community and limit the time spent discussing issues that are outside the 
scope of their 
influence. For example, they may be concerned about travel safety and would like 
to see changes
in airport security, but federal government agencies control these issuesnot 
the local 
planning team. To alleviate concerns about issues the community has no authority 
over, the 
planning team should be informed enough to provide an overview of who the 
various authorities 
are and what their responsibilities are for addressing manmade hazards. 
Including as many 
stakeholders as possible in the planning process can help turn these concerns 
into productive 
considerations and enhance rather than hinder the process.

[SIDE TIP: Planners should note that some issues involved with technological 
hazards, such 
as industrial siting, hazardous materials transportation, or chemical storage 
and processing techniques, 
may be contentious and can cause friction among citizens, industry leaders, 
emergency planners, and 
other decision makers. Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) will likely 
already be involved 
with these issues and should be able to provide insight into how they can be 
addressed.
END SIDE TIP]

There are several stages in the mitigation planning process at which you can 
inform the public 
about your efforts to bring manmade hazards into your program. These stages are:

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. The planning team should inform the 
community 
of the complete spectrum of natural and manmade hazards it identifies and the 
risks they 
present, emphasizing that terrorism and technological disasters can strike not 
just in large cities, 
but in any community of any size. Although in some cases it will be necessary to 
limit the kinds 
of information shared, it is nevertheless important to provide the community 
with a realistic 
picture of the hazards and risks and to understand what the community considers 
to be an 
acceptable level of risk. It should be emphasized that while no amount of 
planning and 
mitigation can remove 100% of the risk from terrorism or technological 
emergencies, a thorough 
hazard identification process will help in prioritizing the community's needs 
and allocating its 
resources effectively.

Mitigation Strategy Development. When developing a strategy for the hazard 
mitigation 
process, you should hold public meetings or workshops to discuss mitigation 
actions. The 
planning team should obtain public input into non-sensitive mitigation 
decisions, especially if the 
actions will have a long-term effect, such as a change in traffic patterns or an 
increase in the 
surveillance of public places. The community should also have input into how to 
fund some 
mitigation actions, such as through taxes, bonds, loans, or grant programs. 
While citizens 
may be willing to pay for some actions, they may not be willing to support 
others.

Implementation and Monitoring of the Mitigation Plan. The planning team should 
keep the 
community informed of the implementation schedule and progress, although once 
again, it may 
be necessary to limit the kinds of information released to the public. The 
public should also be 
notified when the mitigation plan is reviewed and updated.

[CAUTION SIDEBAR: When addressing antiterrorism and other manmade hazard 
mitigation actions, you should recognize that many of these are sensitive and 
that 
information about them should be restricted to a very limited number of people. 
You must 
carefully consider whether each part of the process will be open to the public 
or whether for 
security reasons you will have only the planning team and perhaps a limited 
number of outside 
stakeholders (such as key public officials not on the planning team) discuss the 
best actions 
for certain critical facilities. See Phase 4 for sensitive information issues to 
consider. 
END CAUTION]

Once you have established community support, expanded the planning team to 
include 
manmade hazard experts, and engaged the public in the planning process, you will 
be ready to 
perform a hazard identification and risk assessment for your jurisdiction. Phase 
2 will guide you 
through this process.

	
Worksheet #1	Build the Planning Team	Phase 1, Step 2
Step 2 of "Getting Started" (FEMA 386-1) discusses establishing a planning team 
with a broad range of 
backgrounds and experiences represented. This worksheet suggests additional 
individuals, agencies, 
and organizations that should be included on a team to plan for manmade hazards. 
State organizations 
can be included on local teams when appropriate to serve as a source of 
information and to provide 
guidance and coordination.
You should use the checklist as a starting point for expanding your team. 

The worksheet has three columns. The first column has the titles of potential 
members of the planning 
team. The second column contains the heading of "on team." The third column 
contains the heading of 
"add to team." The second and third columns each have a blank check-off box that 
lines up to the right 
of each planning team member's title so that you can place a check mark in one 
box if the person is on 
the planning team or in the other box if that person should be added to the 
team. 

Under the general heading of Specialists for Manmade Hazards are the following 
job titles. To the right 
of each are the two empty check-off boxes
-	Bomb and Arson Squads
-	Community Emergency Response Teams
-	Hazardous Materials Experts
-	Infrastructure Owners/Operators
-	National Guard Units
-	Representatives from facilities identified in 
Worksheet #2:  Asset Identification Checklist
Under the general heading of Local/Tribal are the following job titles:
-	Administrator/Manager's Office
-	Board of Education 
-	Budget and Finance Office
-	Building Code Enforcement Office
-	City/County Attorney's Office
-	Economic Development Office
-	Emergency Preparedness Office
-	Fire and Rescue Department
-	Hospital Management
-	Local Emergency Planning Committee
-	Planning and Zoning Office
-	Police/Sheriff's Department
-	Public Works Office
-	Sanitation Department
-	Transportation Department
-	Tribal Leaders
Under the general heading of Special Districts and Authorities are the 
following job titles:
-	Airport/Seaport Authorities
-	Business Improvement District
-	Fire Control District
-	Flood Control District
-	Redevelopment Agencies
-	Regional/Metropolitan Planning 
Organization(s)
-	School Districts
-	Transit/Transportation Agencies
Under the general heading of Others are the following job titles:
-	Architectural/Engineering/Planning Firms
-	Citizen Corps
-	Colleges/Universities
-	Land Developers
-	Major Employers/Business Entities 
-	Professional Associations
-	Retired Professionals
Under the general heading of State are the following job titles:
-	Adjutant General's Office (National Guard)
-	Building Code Office
-	Climatologist
-	Earthquake Program Manager
-	Economic Development Office
-	Emergency Management Office/State 
Hazard Mitigation Officer
-	Environmental Protection Office
-	Fire Marshal's Office
-	Geologist
-	Homeland Security Coordinator's Office
-	Housing Office
-	Hurricane Program Manager
-	Insurance Commissioner's Office
-	National Flood Insurance Program 
Coordinator
-	Natural Resources Office
-	Planning Agencies
-	Police
-	Public Health Office
-	Public Information Office	
-	Tourism Department
Under the general heading of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are 
the following job titles:
-	American Red Cross
-	Chamber of Commerce
-	Community/Faith-Based Organizations
-	Environmental Organizations
-	Homeowners Associations
-	Neighborhood Organizations
-	Private Development Agencies
-	Utility Companies
-	Other Appropriate NGOs
END WORKSHEET #1]

PHASE 2: ASSESS RISKS
[DIAGRAM.  This diagram shows the four phases of the planning processorganize 
resources, assess risk, develop a mitigation plan, and implement the plan and 
monitor 
progressas a series of connected rectangles, just as in diagram found in the 
introduction.  
The second box, assess risks, is highlighted.  END DIAGRAM]


Overview

[DIAGRAM: Phase 2-1 (PROCESS)
Mitigation Planning Process
1.	Organize Resources
2.	Assess Risks
>	Identify hazards
>	Profile hazard events
>	Inventory assets
>	Estimate losses 
3.	Develop a Mitigation Plan
4.	Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress
This diagram starts with a smaller version of the diagram of the four-phase 
hazard mitigation planning 
process. Phase 2 of the planning process, Assess Risks, is highlighted. An arrow 
leads to the four 
sequential steps you need to take when assessing risks: identify hazards, 
profile hazard events, 
inventory assets, and estimate losses. An arrow leads from one step to the next, 
to show that they 
occur in sequence.
END DIAGRAM]



Phase 2 of the mitigation planning process, Assess Risks, involves identifying 
hazards and 
estimating potential losses. The results of these efforts will later be linked 
to estimates of the 
effectiveness of the mitigation projects you may be considering. There are some 
unique aspects 
to hazard characteristics, asset identification, and vulnerability assessment 
that will affect the 
way a risk assessment for terrorism and technological hazards is carried out. 
This how-to guide 
addresses these special considerations; please refer to Understanding Your 
Risks: Identifying 
Hazards and Estimating Losses (FEMA 386-2) for information on the more general 
aspects of 
the risk assessment process.

Step 1  Identify Hazards
The first step in any risk assessment is to identify the hazards that affect 
your community or 
state. Most manmade hazards fall into two general categories: terrorism 
(intentional acts) and 
technological hazards (accidental events). These two categories include the 
following hazards:

Terrorism
-	Conventional bomb/improvised explosive device
-	Biological agent
-	Chemical agent
-	Nuclear bomb
-	Radiological agent
-	Arson/incendiary attack
-	Armed attack
-	Cyberterrorism
-	Agriterrorism
-	Hazardous material release (intentional)

Technological Hazards
-	Industrial accident (fixed facility)
-	Industrial accident (transportation)
-	Failure of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system or 
other critical infrastructure component

Within these various types of incidents, there are many variations, which 
illustrates one of the 
fundamental differences between natural and manmade hazards. The types, 
frequencies, and 
locations of many natural hazards are identifiable and even, in some cases, 
predictable. They 
are governed by the laws of physics and nature. Malevolence, incompetence, 
carelessness, and 
other behaviors, on the other hand, are functions of the human mind and, while 
they can be 
assumed to exist, they cannot be forecast with any accuracy. There is, 
therefore, the potential 
for most, if not all, types of manmade hazards to occur anywhere. 
Your community or state's planning team should tap into available expertise in 
the areas listed 
earlier to develop a comprehensive list of the potential manmade hazards in your 
jurisdiction. 
You may also want to review reports and obtain briefings on the various plans 
government 
agencies and private companies have prepared in the event of an emergency. These 
may 
include radiological emergency plans, SARA Title III / hazardous material 
facility emergency 
plans, and chemical stockpile emergency plans, among others. 

[SIDE TIP: Research Existing Records, Plans, and Reports
Terrorist attacks and technological disasters occur infrequently enough in the 
United States that there 
may be few relevant records that can help determine what manmade hazards may 
affect the area being 
studied. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Department 
of State (DOS) issue 
annual reports on terrorist activities domestically and around the world, and 
Local Emergency Planning 
Committees, State Emergency Response Commissions, and the United States 
Environmental 
Protection Agency are sources for historical data on hazardous material 
incidents throughout the U.S. 
Also, in many communities, plans are in place to respond to numerous types of 
technological hazards, 
and these plansand the people who develop themmay be valuable sources of 
information about 
human-induced risks. In researching existing documentation, remember to consider 
information 
available from other levels of government whenever possible.
The following list identifies just a few of the documents that may be of use to 
the planning team:
-	Existing mitigation plans
-	Comprehensive plans
-	Emergency operations plans
-	Continuity of operations and other contingency plans
-	Radiological emergency plans (nuclear power plants)
-	Chemical stockpile emergency plans
-	SARA Title III / hazardous material facility emergency plans
-	Toxic Release Inventory Reports
-	Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy
END SIDE TIP]

[GLOSSARY SIDEBAR: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Like terrorism itself, the term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMD) has various 
definitions. 
Common to all of them is the assumption that WMDs comprise incendiary, 
explosive, 
chemical, biological, radioactive, and/or nuclear agents.

50 U.S.C., § 2302 defines WMD as follows:
"The term 'weapon of mass destruction' means any weapon or device that is 
intended, or has 
the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number 
of people 
through the release, dissemination, or impact of
(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;
(B) a disease organism; or
(C) radiation or radioactivity."

The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of 
Operations Plan 
(CONPLAN) considers a WMD to be "any device, material, or substance used in a 
manner, in 
a quantity or type, or under circumstances evidencing an intent to cause death 
or serious 
injury to persons or significant damage to property."
END GLOSSARY]

[SIDE TIP: One-Stop Shopping Resources for General Information on 
Manmade Hazards

http://www.fema.gov/hazards 
(FEMA: links to authoritative sources of hazard information) 

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/terrorismInfor/ctrt.asp
(FEMA: Antiterrorism training and resources)

While these information sources are primarily oriented toward emergency 
response, they can 
provide valuable insight to mitigation planners on how manmade hazards can 
impact 
communities.
END SIDE TIP]

Step 2  Profile Hazard Events
In the area of hazard profiling, there are significant differences between 
natural and manmade 
hazards, particularly those related to terrorism. Foremost among these is that 
terrorists have the 
ability to choose among targets and tactics, designing their attack to maximize 
the chances of 
achieving their objective. Similarly, accidents, system failures, and other 
mishaps are also 
largely unforeseeable. This makes it very difficult to identify how and where 
these hazards may 
occur. Notwithstanding the difficulty involved with predicting the occurrence of 
manmade 
disasters, the various consequences of these disasters are generally familiar to 
the sectors of 
the emergency planning and response community that already specialize in them: 
injuries and 
deaths, contamination of and/or damage to buildings and systems, and the like. 
Numerous 
authoritative sources exist that can provide detailed information on the nature 
of all of these 
hazards; however, more important for the purposes of hazard mitigation than 
details about the 
various agents' characteristics are the ways in which they can impact the built 
environment and 
what actions can be taken to reduce or eliminate the resulting damage. 

Whether intentional or accidental, manmade disastersas with natural disasters
involve the 
application of one or more modes of harmful force to the built environment. For 
the purposes of 
this how-to guide, these modes are defined as contamination (as in the case of 
chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards), energy (explosives, arson, and 
even 
electromagnetic waves), or failure or denial of service (sabotage, 
infrastructure breakdown, and 
transportation service disruption). The planning team should include expertise 
in these areas in 
order to develop a comprehensive list of the manmade hazards in your 
jurisdiction and identify 
the full spectrum of ways in which they might occur. 

The following table, Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards, is 
not intended to 
replace the expertise and knowledge of planning, security, or design 
professionals, but rather to 
help guide the planning team in understanding some of the ways in which these 
hazards can 
interact with the built environment. For each type of hazard, the following 
factors are addressed:
-	Application mode describes the human act(s) or unintended event(s) 
necessary to cause the 
hazard to occur.
-	Duration is the length of time the hazard is present on the target. For 
example, the duration 
of a tornado may be just minutes, but a chemical warfare agent such as mustard 
gas, if 
unremediated, can persist for days or weeks under the right conditions. 
-	The dynamic/static characteristic of a hazard describes its tendency, or 
that of its effects, to 
either expand, contract, or remain confined in time, magnitude, and space. For 
example, the 
physical destruction caused by an earthquake is generally confined to the place 
in which it 
occurs, and it does not usually get worse unless there are aftershocks or other 
cascading 
failures; in contrast, a cloud of chlorine gas leaking from a storage tank can 
change location 
by drifting with the wind and can diminish in danger by dissipating over time.
-	Mitigating conditions are characteristics of the target and its physical 
environment that can 
reduce the effects of a hazard. For example, earthen berms can provide 
protection from 
bombs; exposure to sunlight can render some biological agents ineffective; and 
effective 
perimeter lighting and surveillance can minimize the likelihood of someone 
approaching a 
target unseen. In contrast, exacerbating conditions are characteristics that can 
enhance or 
magnify the effects of a hazard. For example, depressions or low areas in 
terrain can trap 
heavy vapors, and a proliferation of street furniture (trash receptacles, 
newspaper vending 
machines, mail boxes, etc.) can provide concealment opportunities for explosive 
devices.

[SIDE TIP: The FBI's annual report Terrorism in the United States contains 
profiles and 
chronologies of terrorism incidents in America. The 1999 edition includes a 
comprehensive 
review of terrorist activities in the United States over the past three decades. 
This information 
is helpful to planners as data for hazard profiling; it also illustrates that 
manmade hazards 
impact not only large cities but commonly strike small to mid-sized communities 
as wellan 
important point when building public support for mitigating terrorism and 
technological 
hazards. The Terrorism in the United States reports can be downloaded from 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.htm.
END SIDE TIP]

[TABLE.  Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards
FIVE COLUMN TABLE
The first column is named "Hazards." The second column is named "Application 
Mode." The third 
column is named "Hazard Duration." The fourth column is named "Extent of 
Effects; Static/Dynamic." 
The fifth column is named "Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions."

Hazard: Conventional Bomb / improvised explosive device
Application Mode: Detonation of explosive device on or near target; delivery via 
person, 
vehicle, or projectile.
Hazard Duration: Instantaneous; additional "secondary devices" may be used, 
lengthening the 
time duration of the hazard until the attack site is determined to be clear.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Extent of damage is determined by type and 
quantity of 
explosive. Effects generally static other than cascading consequences, 
incremental structural 
failure, etc.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Overpressure at a given standoff is 
inversely 
proportional to the cube of the distance from the blast; thus, each additional 
increment 
of standoff provides progressively more protection. Terrain, forestation, 
structures, etc. 
can provide shielding by absorbing and/or deflecting energy and debris. 
Exacerbating conditions 
include ease of access to target; lack of barriers/shielding; poor construction; 
and ease of 
concealment of device.

Hazard: Chemical Agent*
Application Mode: Liquid/aerosol contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers or 
other aerosol 
generators; liquids vaporizing from puddles/ containers; or munitions.
Hazard Duration: Chemical agents may pose viable threats for hours to weeks 
depending on the 
agent and the conditions in which it exists.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Contamination can be carried out of the 
initial target 
area by persons, vehicles, water, and wind. Chemicals may be corrosive or 
otherwise damaging over time if not remediated.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Air temperature can affect 
evaporation of aerosols. 
Ground temperature affects evaporation of liquids. Humidity can enlarge aerosol 
particles, 
reducing inhalation hazard. Precipitation can dilute and disperse agents but can 
spread 
contamination. Wind can disperse vapors but also cause target area to be 
dynamic. The 
micro-meteorological effects of buildings and terrain can alter travel and 
duration of 
agents. Shielding in the form of sheltering in place can protect people and 
property from 
harmful effects.

Hazard: Arson/Incendiary Attack
Application Mode: Initiation of fire or explosion on or near target via direct 
contact or 
remotely via projectile.
Hazard Duration: Generally minutes to hours.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Extent of damage is determined by type and 
quantity of 
device, accelerant, and materials present at or near target. Effects generally 
static 
other than cascading consequences, incremental structural failure, etc.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Mitigation factors include built-in 
fire 
detection and protection systems and fire-resistive construction techniques. 
Inadequate security can allow easy access to target, easy concealment of an 
incendiary device, and undetected initiation of a fire. Non-compliance with fire 
and building codes, as well as failure to maintain existing fire protection 
systems, can substantially increase the effectiveness of a fire weapon.


Hazard: Armed Attack
Application Mode: Tactical assault or sniping from remote location.
Hazard Duration: Generally minutes to days.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Varies based upon the perpetrators' intent 
and capabilities.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Inadequate security can allow easy 
access to target, 
easy concealment of weapons, and undetected initiation of an attack.

Hazard: Biological Agent*
Application Mode: Liquid or solid contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers/ 
aerosol 
generators or by point or line sources such as munitions, covert deposits, and 
moving 
sprayers.
Hazard Duration: Biological agents may pose viable threats for hours to years 
depending 
on the agent and the conditions in which it exists.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Depending on the agent used and the 
effectiveness 
with which it is deployed, contamination can be spread via wind and water. 
Infection can 
spread via human or animal vectors.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Altitude of release above ground can 
affect 
dispersion; sunlight is destructive to many bacteria and viruses; light to 
moderate wind 
will disperse agents but higher winds can break up aerosol clouds; the micro-
meteorological 
effects of buildings and terrain can influence aerosolization and travel of 
agents. 

Hazard: Cyberterrorism
Application Mode: Electronic attack using one computer system against another.
Hazard Duration: Minutes to days.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Generally no direct effects on built 
environment.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Inadequate security can facilitate 
access to 
critical computer systems, allowing them to be used to conduct attacks.
Hazard: Agriterrorism
Application Mode: Direct, generally covert contamination of food supplies or 
introduction 
of pests and/or disease agents to crops and livestock.
Hazard Duration: Days to months.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Varies by type of incident. Food 
contamination events 
may be limited to specific distribution sites, whereas pests and diseases may 
spread widely. 
Generally no effects on built environment.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Inadequate security can facilitate 
adulteration of 
food and introduction of pests and disease agents to crops and livestock.

Hazard: Radiological Agent **
Application Mode: Radioactive contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers/ 
aerosol 
generators, or by point or line sources such as munitions, covert deposits, and 
moving 
sprayers.
Hazard Duration: Contaminants may remain hazardous for seconds to years 
depending on 
material used.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Initial effects will be localized to site of 
attack; 
depending on meteorological conditions, subsequent behavior of radioactive 
contaminants 
may be dynamic.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Duration of exposure, distance from 
source 
of radiation, and the amount of shielding between source and target determine 
exposure 
to radiation.

Hazard: Nuclear Bomb **
Application Mode: Detonation of nuclear device underground, at the surface, in 
the air, 
or at high altitude.
Hazard Duration: Light/heat flash and blast/shock wave last for seconds; nuclear 
radiation and fallout hazards can persist for years. Electromagnetic pulse from 
a 
high-altitude detonation lasts for seconds and affects only unprotected 
electronic systems.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Initial light, heat, and blast effects of a 
subsurface, 
ground, or air burst are static and determined by the device's characteristics 
and 
employment; fallout of radioactive contaminants may be dynamic, depending on 
meteorological 
conditions.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: Harmful effects of radiation can be 
reduced 
by minimizing the time of exposure. Light, heat, and blast energy decrease 
logarithmically 
as a function of distance from seat of blast. Terrain, forestation, structures, 
etc. can 
provide shielding by absorbing and/or deflecting radiation and radioactive 
contaminants.

Hazard: Hazardous Material Release (fixed facility or transportation)
Application Mode: Solid, liquid, and/or gaseous contaminants may be released 
from fixed or 
mobile containers.
Hazard Duration: Hours to days.
Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Chemicals may be corrosive or otherwise 
damaging over 
time. Explosion and/or fire may be subsequent. Contamination may be carried out 
of the 
incident area by persons, vehicles, water, and wind.
Mitigating or and Exacerbating Conditions: As with chemical weapons, weather 
conditions 
will directly affect how the hazard develops. The micro-meteorological effects 
of 
buildings and terrain can alter travel and duration of agents. Shielding in the 
form 
of sheltering in place can protect people and property from harmful effects. 
Non-compliance 
with fire and building codes, as well as failure to maintain existing fire 
protection and 
containment features, can substantially increase the damage from a hazardous 
materials 
release.
* Source: Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook
** Source: FEMA, Radiological Emergency Management, Independent Study Course
END TABLE]

Step 3  Inventory Assets

[SIDE TIP: As part of the hazard mitigation planning process, you should develop 
a base map showing 
the assets in your jurisdiction. You can overlay this map with information 
representing 
manmade hazards and their potential consequences. Maps may not be able to 
actually 
predict where manmade hazards are most likely to strike, but they can help 
planners 
understand the interrelationships between assets and hazards. Through functions 
like 
buffering and dispersion modeling, planners can identify how proximity and 
clustering of 
assets may exacerbate the impacts of a particular type of attack, and even 
evaluate the 
implications of multiple vulnerabilities.

The initial inventory can be done very quickly and easily using the baseline 
data contained in 
HAZUS ("Hazards US"), FEMA's hazard loss estimation software that uses building 
stock, 
economic, geologic, and other data to provide loss estimates for earthquakes. 
You can 
identify medical care facilities; emergency response facilities; schools; dams; 
hazardous 
material sites; roads, airports, and other transportation facilities; electric 
power, oil, and gas 
lines; and other infrastructure. Refer to page 2-3 of Understanding your Risks: 
Identifying 
Hazards and Estimating Losses (FEMA 386-2) for help in creating a base map.
END SIDE TIP]

As discussed in Step 1, the probability of manmade hazards occurring cannot be 
quantified with 
as great a level of accuracy as that of many natural hazards. Furthermore, these 
incidents 
generally occur at a specific location such as a building rather than 
encompassing a wide area 
such as a floodplain, and potential locations for terrorist attacks and 
technological disasters are 
likely to be distributed widely throughout your community. Thus, translating 
most manmade 
hazard profiles into meaningful geospatial information is difficult at best. 
Instead, the planning team should use an asset-specific approach, identifying 
potentially at-risk 
critical facilities and systems in the community. Once a comprehensive list of 
assets has been 
developed, it should be prioritized so that the community's efforts can be 
directed to protect the 
most important assets first. Then, beginning with the highest priority assets, 
the vulnerabilities of 
each facility or system to each type of hazard should be assessed. A discussion 
of each of 
these steps follows.

[SIDE TIP: The term "mitigation" in the context of this how-to guide refers to 
the physical aspects of 
vulnerability reduction. Thus, in identifying the areas of interest for the 
purposes of terrorism and 
technological hazards, planners should focus on specific places in their 
community where opportunities 
exist to reduce exposure to, and the potential consequences of, the various 
types of malevolent acts 
and accidental incidents that could occur. While this does require a highly 
facility-specific approach 
(e.g., the protection of a utility system, communications infrastructure, or 
government building), planners 
must be sure to consider the interconnectivity of all of the elements in the 
built environment such as 
buildings, infrastructures, and aggregations of human activity when determining 
the physical or 
geographic constraints of their planning activities.
END SIDE TIP]

Expand the Asset List
In expanding an existing asset list, the planning team should start by referring 
to the 
community's Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) to identify specific critical 
facilities, sites, 
systems, or other locations that could potentially be targeted for attack or 
that are at risk of 
being the site of an accident that could produce significant consequences. This 
process should 
take into account the dynamic nature of manmade events: while the physical 
consequences of 
some types of incidents generally remain localized (as with the bombing of a 
building), the 
impacts of others may spread well beyond the location of origin (as with a 
chlorine gas leak).
In addition to your EOP, Worksheet #2: Asset Identification Checklist at the end 
of this section 
(also included in Appendix D) is intended as an aid for identifying critical 
facilities, sites, 
systems, and other assets in your community or state. Step 3 provides some 
approaches for 
determining the importance of each asset to the community.

[SIDE TIP:
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Critical infrastructures are systems whose incapacity or destruction would have 
a debilitating effect on the 
defense or economic security of the nation. The critical infrastructure 
categories include:
-Agriculture & food
-Water
-Public Health
-Emergency services
-Defense industrial base
-Telecommunications 
-Energy
-Transportation
-Banking & finance
-Chemicals & hazardous materials
-Postal & shipping

The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) was 
established in July 1996 by 
Presidential Executive Order 13010 to formulate a comprehensive national 
strategy for protecting the 
infrastructures we all depend on from physical and "cyber" threats. The PCCIP 
included senior representatives 
from private industry, government, and academia, and was divided into five teams 
representing the critical 
infrastructures. Each team evaluated the growing risks, threats, and 
vulnerabilities within its sector. The sector 
teams and their industries included: 
-	Information and Communications - telecommunications, computers and 
software, Internet, satellites, fiber 
optics 
-	Physical Distribution - railroads, air traffic, maritime, intermodal, 
pipelines 
-	Energy - electrical power, natural gas, petroleum, production, 
distribution, and storage 
-	Banking and Finance - financial transactions, stock and bond markets, 
federal reserve 
-	Vital Human Services - water, emergency services, government services 

Threats to critical infrastructures can be posed by anyone with the capability, 
technology, opportunity, and intent 
to do harm. Potential threats can be foreign or domestic, internal or external, 
state-sponsored or a single rogue 
element. Terrorists, insiders, disgruntled employees, and hackers are included 
in this profile. The fact that most 
of the nation's vital services are delivered by private companies creates a 
significant challenge in determining 
where the responsibility for protecting our critical infrastructures falls; the 
PCCIP addressed this challenge by 
bringing the private and public sectors together to assess infrastructure 
vulnerabilities and develop assurance 
strategies for the future, consulting with industry executives, security 
experts, government agencies, and private 
citizens. State and local mitigation planning teams are encouraged to draw on 
this model as a basis for their own 
efforts to incorporate terrorism and technological hazard mitigation into their 
planning processes. 

Source: Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office at www.ciao.gov.

References and background information on critical infrastructure protection can 
be found on the Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office's Web site at 
http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/pccip_documents.htm.
END SIDE TIP]

Assess Vulnerabilities
The vulnerabilities of a given facility, site, system, or other asset can be 
identified based on two 
distinct but complementary approaches. First, any given place in the built 
environment has a 
certain level of inherent vulnerability that exists independent of any 
protective or mitigation 
actions that are applied to it. For example, a football stadium is a setting 
where thousands of 
people gather, and a terrorist may find such a target very attractive in that 
many people would 
be hurt in an attack. An assessment of such inherent vulnerabilities must be 
conducted for each 
asset to determine its weaknesses. Second, the security, design, and other 
mitigation tools 
used to protect a place determine its tactical vulnerability. For example, if an 
HVAC system is 
designed so that its components are not visible to the public and has security 
cameras aimed at 
it, a terrorist may be less likely to attempt to use the system as a weapon to 
release poisonous 
gas. A tactical vulnerability assessment should be completed for each asset to 
determine how 
well it is protected from an attack.

[CAUTION SIDEBAR: In conducting the vulnerability assessment, it is important to 
ensure that the 
focus is not only on hazard reduction but also includes preparedness, response, 
and recovery 
considerations. For example, allowing unrestricted vehicle access to a building 
may create some risk of a 
vehicle bomb attack, but it also helps ensure easy fire apparatus access for 
emergency response 
purposes. Thus, just as it is important to balance security and openness in 
planning and design, it is 
critical to consider the secondary hazards that could arise from well-intended 
efforts to reduce 
vulnerabilities. 
END CAUTION]

Inherent Vulnerability. Using the asset inventory you assembled in Step 3, the 
planning team 
can assess the inherent vulnerability of each asset based on:
-	Visibility: How aware is the public of the existence of the facility, 
site, system, or location?
-	Utility: How valuable might the place be in meeting the objective(s) of a 
potential terrorist or 
saboteur?
-	Accessibility: How accessible is the place to the public?
-	Asset Mobility: Is the asset's location fixed or mobile? If mobile, how 
often is it moved, 
relocated, or repositioned?
-	Presence of hazardous materials: Are flammable, explosive, biological, 
chemical, and/or 
radiological materials present on site? 
-	Potential for collateral damage: What are the potential consequences for 
the surrounding 
area if the asset is attacked or damaged?
-	Occupancy: What is the potential for mass casualties based on the maximum 
number of 
individuals on site at a given time? 

Completing Worksheet #3: Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix at 
the end of this 
section (also included in Appendix D) will help you determine how vulnerable 
each asset is and 
how vulnerable the assets are relative to each other. 

Tactical Vulnerability. The following list will help the planning team assess 
the tactical 
vulnerability of the assets in the community. The tactical vulnerability of each 
asset is based on:
Site Perimeter
-	Site Planning and Landscape Design: Is the facility designed with security 
in mindboth 
site-specific and with regard to adjacent land uses?
-	Parking Security: Are vehicle access and parking managed in a way that 
separates vehicles 
and structures?
Building Envelope
-	Structural Engineering: Is the facility designed to be blast-resistant? 
Does it provide 
collective protection against chemical, biological, and radiological 
contaminants?
Facility Interior
-	Architectural and Interior Space Planning: Does security screening cover 
all public and 
private areas? Are public and private activities separated? Are critical 
building systems and 
activities separated?
-	Mechanical Engineering: Are utilities and HVAC systems protected and/or 
backed up with 
redundant systems? 
-	Electrical Engineering: Are emergency power and telecommunications 
available? Are alarm 
systems operational? Is lighting sufficient?
-	Fire Protection Engineering: Are the building's water supply and fire 
suppression systems 
adequate, code-compliant, and protected? Are on-site personnel trained 
appropriately? Are 
local first responders aware of the nature of the operations at the facility?
-	Electronic and Organized Security: Are systems and personnel in place to 
monitor and 
protect the facility?

[DIAGRAM 
Tactical Vulnerability Considerations Side-view of the interior and envelope of 
a building. 
To the right, in sequence, are the lawn, sidewalk with pedestrian on it, tree, 
streetlight, curb, 
car at cub, empty travel land, then a truck in the far travel lane. The caption 
says "perimeter." 
END DIAGRAM]

A list of mitigation actions that correspond to the factors described above can 
be found in 
Phase 3, Develop a Mitigation Plan, in this guide.

Establish Mitigation Priorities
For the purpose of developing a realistic prioritization of manmade hazard 
mitigation projects, 
three elements should be considered in concert: the relative importance of the 
various facilities 
and systems in the asset inventory, the vulnerabilities of those facilities, and 
the threats that are 
known to exist. 

Asset Criticality. The first element, asset criticality, is a measure of the 
importance of the 
facility or system to the community. Considerations in determining asset 
criticality include: 
-	Is it an element of one of the community's critical infrastructures? 
-	Does it play a key role in your community's government, economy, or 
culture? 
-	What are the consequences of destruction, failure, or loss of function of 
the asset in terms of  fatalities and/or injuries, property losses, and economic 
impacts? 
-	What is the likelihood of cascading or subsequent consequences should the 
asset be destroyed or its function lost?

Vulnerability. The second factor was addressed in the previous section, Assess 
Vulnerabilities. 
By identifying the most exploitable weaknesses of each asset, the planning team 
can identify 
vulnerabilities in greatest need of attention. This, in effect, gives the 
planning team a criterion to 
use in establishing mitigation priorities so that the community can focus its 
efforts on addressing 
the most critical issues. 

[SIDE TIP: Prioritizing Mitigation Requirements: The General Services 
Administration Approach to Security Standards
The General Services Administration (GSA) is the United States government's 
landlord. As such, it is 
responsible for security at more than 1,000 federal facilities, both owned and 
leased. To meet this 
need, GSA uses a standards-based approach that involves assessing and 
categorizing facilities and 
assigning minimum security standards to each category.
Facility Security Levels
In order to determine the appropriate package of security measures for each 
facility, a five-level 
classification system is used to rate facilities based on occupancy, size, level 
of public contact, 
type of operations, and the nature of the agencies present in the facility. 
You can adapt this model to help prioritize mitigation projects by establishing 
criteria based on the 
assets present in your community. In a small town, for example, a three-level 
system may be 
adequate: the City Hall complex, containing the offices of elected and 
administrative officials as well 
as Police Headquarters, and an Emergency Operations Center, would qualify as a 
Level III facility; 
the city's maintenance yard might fall within Level II; and a remote sewage lift 
station would be 
assigned Level I status. 
Recommended Minimum Security Standards
The GSA list of security standards can serve simply as a list of recommended 
measures; however, to 
better allocate resources, measures can be linked to facility security levels. 
For example, the most 
basic measures may be mandated for all facilities, while the most stringent or 
sophisticated measures 
may be required only for the highest level facilities, recommended for middle-
level facilities, and 
unnecessary for the lowest-level facilities. The following criteria are among 
those considered for each 
category of security measures:
-	Perimeter security  parking, closed-circuit television, lighting, 
physical barriers
-	Entry security  receiving and shipping, access control, entrances and 
exits
-	Interior security  employee and visitor identification, utilities, 
occupant emergency plan, day care centers
-	Security planning  tenant assignment, construction, and renovation (this 
category also includes 
intelligence-sharing, training, and administrative procedures, which are outside 
the scope of this 
guidance) 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal 
Facilities
END SIDE TIP]

Threat. The last element, threat, is fundamental to the prioritization process 
but very difficult to 
quantify. It answers the question "what must we mitigate against?" The frequency 
of a hazard's 
occurrence is an important factor in establishing mitigation priorities, but 
unfortunately it is 
impossible to determine with any precision in the case of terrorism (for 
technological hazards, 
"threat" can be interpreted to mean the likelihood of some type of human-induced 
unintentional 
event). Instead of being influenced by predictable, quantifiable natural forces, 
terrorismand to 
some degree, other technological hazardsis the result of human behavior that 
often lies 
outside conventional ideals of appropriateness and rationality and is thus 
difficult to predict. 
In understanding the threat of terrorism, historical data can be of some value 
in that it illustrates 
the types of tactics that have been used previously (and thus may be used 
again); however, the 
historical approach is far from definitive because, in addition to the fact that 
threat information 
lacks the predictive accuracy needed for making decisions of this type, the 
origin and nature of 
the threats constantly change with technology, political issues, and other 
factors that compel 
and enable terrorist activity. Further complicating the use of threat 
information in determining 
relative risk, once a protective action is applied to an asset and its 
vulnerability reduced 
relative to that of a comparable target, the balance of target attractiveness
and thus the 
likelihood of attackmay be altered, displacing some risk onto another asset 
that has become 
relatively more vulnerable. 

The most useful application of threat information for mitigation planning 
purposes, then, will be 
as a guide to the types of incidents that are relatively most likely to occur. 
Clearly, the level of 
detail that can be provided to the planning team will be determined by the 
sensitivity of the 
threat information. The broadest threat estimates may be so vague as to be of 
little use, while 
the most current and specific information may be part of ongoing criminal and/or 
intelligence 
investigations and thus not available for mitigation planning purposes. However, 
it should be 
possible to obtain a useful level of understanding through consultation with 
local, state, and 
federal law enforcement agencies that can provide the planning team with a 
general 
characterization of terrorist and other such groups known to be active in your 
community, the 
tactics they may employ or have employed in the past, and projections of 
potential and 
emerging threats. 

In addition to asset criticality, vulnerability, and threat, the planning team 
may also take the 
following considerations into account when prioritizing projects:
-	What assets were of concern during your community's Y2K planning?
-	What assets support the continuity of your jurisdiction's governmental 
operations and 
essential functions?
-	What assets support the implementation of your jurisdiction's EOP, 
Emergency Support 
Functions (ESFs), and Incident Command/Unified Command systems?
-	What political priorities may be relevant?
-	To what extent will funding constraints limit mitigation options?

The following diagram illustrates the prioritizing process.

[DIAGRAM 
Prioritizing Mitigation Actions
Select the most appropriate actions to reduce the most exploitable 
vulnerabilities to the most 
realistic threats at the most critical facilities.
The diagram contains three boxes in a horizontal row. The boxes are labeled 
Asset 1, Asset 2, 
and Asset 3. Each box has three overlapping ovals in it. The ovals are labeled 
Criticality, 
Vulnerability, and Threats. An arrow from each box is pointing to a box below 
named Additional 
Considerations that has the following bulleted items in it: Planning and 
operational requirements,
 Funding limitations, Partnership opportunities, Political priorities, Community 
concerns. An arrow 
is pointing from the Additional Considerations box to a box beneath it labeled 
Mitigation Priorities.
END DIAGRAM]

The list you develop of the assets most important to protect will help you focus 
your loss 
estimation analysis in Step 4.

Step 4  Estimate Losses 
As with natural hazard risk assessment processes, the potential losses from 
manmade hazards 
are generally grouped into three categories: people (death and injury), assets 
(structures and 
their contents), and functions (provision of services and generation of 
revenue). However, 
terrorism and technological disasters present some unique implications for loss 
estimation. As 
previously discussed, for example, the key issue of frequency of occurrence 
(also called 
"recurrence interval") is elusive in the case of manmade hazards because of the 
difficulties 
associated with predicting human behavior and with acquiring and applying 
appropriate threat 
data.  

For some hazards, worst-case scenarios can be generated and losses estimated if 
the hazard 
can be characterized with some precision. CAMEO (Computer-Aided Management of 
Emergency Operations) software is one application that has been used extensively 
for 
preparedness and response activities relating to hazardous materials. For 
example, using the 
location of rail lines and the kinds and quantities of hazardous materials 
transported over them, 
models can be used to estimate the consequences of various chemical release 
scenarios. 
Particular attention can be paid to considerations such as evacuation of 
residential areas and 
critical facilities as well as mechanisms such as streams and winds that can 
disperse 
contaminants beyond the primary incident scene. Similarly, flood damage curves 
provide 
information about the extent of damage expected in a given flood event, and 
HAZUS provides 
loss estimates for earthquakes.

For other manmade hazards such as bombs, however, damage analysis capabilities 
are still 
evolving and are not yet widely available within state and local governments. 
Software can be 
used to model blast effects on structures, but tools that can easily translate 
this information into 
loss estimates for mitigation purposes are not yet available. When dealing with 
these difficult-to-
quantify risks, the planning team may wish to assume worst-case scenarios and 
estimate losses 
based on those scenarios using the techniques discussed in Step 3 of 
Understanding Your 
Risks (FEMA 386-2).

Using the results of your vulnerability analysis and your best estimates of 
potential losses, you 
can now formulate mitigation goals to drive the development of a mitigation 
strategy.


[Worksheet #2 			Asset Identification Checklist		
	Phase 2, Step 3
This worksheet is intended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, 
systems, and other assets in 
your community or state. Check all the boxes that apply to your jurisdiction.

-	Local, state, and federal government offices [list offices applicable to 
your jurisdiction]
The next four rows contain blank check-off boxes alongside blank lines. 	
-
-
-
-

-	Military installations, including Reserve and National Guard component 
facilities,  
(list offices applicable to your jurisdiction)
The next four rows contain blank check-off boxes alongside blank lines.
-
-
-
-

-	Emergency services 
-	Backup facilities
-	Communications centers
-	Emergency operations centers
-	Fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) facilities
-	Law enforcement facilities

-	Politically or symbolically significant sites
-	Embassies, consulates
-	Landmarks, monuments
-	Political party and special interest group offices
-	Religious sites

-	Transportation infrastructure components
-	Airports
-	Bus terminals
-	Ferries
-	Interstate highways
-	Oil/gas pipelines
-	Railheads/rail yards
-	Seaports/river ports
-	Subways
-	Truck terminals
-	Tunnels/bridges

-	Energy, water, and related utility systems
-	Electricity production, transmission, and distribution system components
-	Oil and gas storage/shipment facilities
-	Power plant fuel distribution, delivery, and storage
-	Telecommunications facilities
-	Wastewater treatment plants
-	Water supply/purification/distribution systems

-	Telecommunications and information systems
-	Cable TV facilities
-	Cellular network facilities
-	Critical cable routes
-	Major rights of way
-	Newspaper offices and production/distribution facilities
-	Radio stations
-	Satellite base stations 
-	Telephone trunking and switching stations
-	Television broadcast stations

-	Health care system components
-	Emergency medical centers
-	Family planning clinics
-	Health department offices
-	Hospitals
-	Radiological material and medical waste transportation, storage, and 
disposal
-	Research facilities, laboratories
-	Walk-in clinics

-	Financial services infrastructures and institutions
-	Armored car services
-	Banks and credit unions

-	Agricultural Facilities
-	Chemical distribution, storage, and application sites
-	Crop spraying services 
-	Farms and ranches
-	Food processing, storage, and distribution facilities

-	Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities
-	Apartment buildings
-	Business/corporate centers
-	Chemical plants (include facilities having Section 302 Extremely Hazardous 
Substances on-site)
-	Factories
-	Fuel production, distribution, and storage facilities
-	Hotels and convention centers
-	Industrial plants
-	Malls and shopping centers
-	Raw material production, distribution, and storage facilities
-	Research facilities, laboratories
-	Shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical centers

-	Mobile Assets
-	Aviation and marine units
-	Mobile emergency operations centers / command centers
-	Portable telecommunications equipment
-	Red Cross Emergency Response Vehicles, Salvation Army mobile canteens, 
etc.
-	Other (Bloodmobiles, mobile health clinics, etc.)

-	Recreational facilities
-	Auditoriums
-	Casinos
-	Concert halls and pavilions
-	Parks
-	Restaurants and clubs frequented by potential target populations
-	Sports arenas and stadiums
-	Theaters

-	Public/private institutions
-	Academic institutions
-	Cultural centers
-	Libraries
-	Museums
-	Research facilities, laboratories

-	Events and attractions
-	Festivals and celebrations
-	Open-air market
-	Parades
-	Rallies, demonstrations, and marches
-	Religious services
-	Scenic tours
-	Theme parks
END WORKSHEET #2]


Worksheet #3	Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix	Phase 2, 
Step 3

The Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix provides a way to record 
how vulnerable 
each asset is and enables the planning team to compare how vulnerable the assets 
are relative 
to each other. Make a copy for each asset and fill in the facility name or other 
identifier 
in the space provided. Select the appropriate point value for each criterion 
based on the 
description in each row. Then add the point values to get the total for each 
asset. When you 
have done this for each asset you identified, compare the total scores to see 
how the assets 
rank in relation to one another.
Facility, followed by a line on which to write the facility's name.	
EIGHT COLUMN TABLE
The first column is labeled "Criteria." Columns two through seven are labeled 0 
to 5. 
The entries in column two represent a low vulnerability score and entries in 
column seven 
represent a high vulnerability score. Columns three through five fall in the 
middle range 
of vulnerability scores. The eighth column is labeled "Score."
Criteria: Asset vulnerability
0: -
1: Existence not well known
2: -
3: Existence locally known
4: -
5: Existence widely known
Score:
Criteria: Target Utility
0: None
1: Very Low
2: Low
3: Medium
4: High
5: Very High
Score:
Criteria: Asset Accessibility
0: Remote location, secure perimeter, armed guards, tightly controlled access
1: Fenced, guarded, controlled access
2: Controlled access, protected entry
3: Controlled access, unprotected entry
4: Open access, restricted parking
5: Open access, unrestricted parking
Score:
Criteria: Asset mobility
0: -
1: Moves or is relocated frequently
2: -
3: Moves or is relocated occasionally
4: -
5: Permanent / fixed in place
Score:
Criteria: Presence of Hazardous Materials
0: No hazardous materials present
1: Limited quantities, materials in secure location
2: Moderate quantities, strict control features
3: Large quantities, some control features
4: Large quantities, minimal control features
5: Large quantities, accessible to non-staff persons
Score:
Criteria: Collateral Damage Potential
0: No risk
1: Low risk / limited to immediate area
2: Moderate risk / limited to immediate area
3: Moderate risk within 1-mile radius
4: High risk within 1-mile radius
5: High risk beyond 1-mile radius
Score:
Criteria: Site Population/ Capacity
0:  0
1: 1-250
2: 251-500
3:  501-1000
4:  1001-5000
5:  > 5000
Score:
Total:
Increments may be adjusted to better reflect your response capabilities or to be 
consistent 
with other guidance such as Mass Casualty Incident plans. Note that different 
risks may exist
at a facility depending on whether it is occupied or vacant.
Adapted from: FEMA Emergency Management Institute, Terrorism Planning Course
END WORKSHEET #3]


PHASE 3: DEVELOP A MITIGATION PLAN
[DIAGRAM.  This diagram shows the four phases of the planning processorganize 
resources, 
assess risk, develop a mitigation plan, and implement the plan and monitor 
progressas a 
series of connected rectangles, just as in diagram found in the introduction.  
The third box, 
develop a mitigation plan is highlighted.  END DIAGRAM]


Overview

[DIAGRAM: Phase 3-1 (Process)
 
Mitigation Planning Process
1.	Organize Resources
2.	Assess Risks
3.	Develop a Mitigation Plan
>	Develop mitigation goals and objectives
>	Identify and prioritize mitigation actions
>	Prepare an implementation strategy 
>	Document the mitigation planning process
4.	Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress
This diagram starts with a smaller version of the diagram of the four-phase 
hazard mitigation planning process. Phase 3 of the planning process, Develop a 
Mitigation 
Plan, is highlighted. An arrow leads to the four sequential steps you need to 
take when developing 
a mitigation plan: develop mitigation goals and objectives, identify and 
prioritize mitigation 
actions, prepare an implementation strategy; document the mitigation planning 
process. An arrow leads from 
one step to the next, to show that they occur in sequence. END DIAGRAM]

The hazard identification and risk assessment described in Phase 2 will 
determine what 
facilities and systems in your jurisdiction are at highest risk. In Step 1 of 
Phase 3, you will 
develop goals and objectives for the protection of these assets to prevent or 
avoid an attack or 
reduce losses in the event an attack occurs. Step 2 discusses the issues unique 
to identifying 
and prioritizing mitigation actions for terrorism and technological hazards. 
These actions 
primarily focus on creating a resilient, protective built environment. Step 3 
highlights special 
considerations in developing an implementation strategy. Step 4 summarizes the 
important 
components to include in your terrorism and technological hazard mitigation 
plan. Cross-
references are made to Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation 
Actions and 
Implementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3).

[GLOSSARY SIDEBAR:
Goals are general guidelines that identify what you want to achieve. They are 
usually long-term in 
nature. 

Objectives define measurable strategies or implementation steps to attain a 
goal. They are shorter in 
range and more specific than goals.
END GLOSSARY]

Step 1  Develop Mitigation Goals and Objectives 
The process for developing the mitigation goals and objectives that will shape 
your 
implementation strategy is the same whether you are addressing natural or 
manmade hazards. 
As discussed in Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions 
and 
Implementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3), you will review the risk assessment and 
loss 
estimation findings to identify assets at greatest risk. Manmade risk 
information should be 
combined with the findings for natural hazards to create a comprehensive picture 
of your 
community or state's vulnerabilities to both natural and manmade hazards. Your 
terrorism and 
technological disaster mitigation goals, as with those for natural disasters, 
should strive to 
protect lives and property, reduce the costs of disaster response, and minimize 
disruption to the 
community or state following a disaster. See Developing a Mitigation Plan for 
more details on 
formulating and prioritizing your goals. 

[SIDE TIP: Goals and objectives help determine where efforts and resources 
should be 
focused to maximize the effectiveness of mitigation-related activities. 
Mitigation goals and 
objectives should be multi-hazard in nature in order to provide the most 
comprehensive 
protection to your community or state. In addition to brainstorming, the 
planning team can 
identify additional goals and objectives in the following ways:
-	Review existing plans. Review existing mitigation, comprehensive, and 
emergency plans, building 
upon and/or modifying existing initiatives to maximize coordination between 
plans and minimize 
conflicts and duplication of effort. To the extent possible, existing plans 
should be used to address 
the special problems posed by technological and other manmade hazards rather 
than generating 
new, stand-alone documents. 
-	Solicit public opinions. Including the community in identifying goals and 
objectives will help 
ensure buy-in when mitigation actions are selected, and both the media and the 
Internet can be 
valuable communication tools. There are a number of methods for gauging public 
opinion:
-	Establish working groups or advisory committees
-	Hold town hall meetings
-	Administer surveys
-	Hold facilitated meetings with community representatives
While all of these methods can be effective on their own, it may be advantageous 
to combine multiple 
strategies, such as surveys and town hall meetings, in order to obtain the 
advantages of both a 
structured questionnaire as well as a free-flowing discussion.
END SIDE TIP]

[SIDE TIP: Sample Mitigation Goals and Objectives for Terrorism and 
Technological Hazard Mitigation

Goal 1:	Reduce the community's risk of exposure to hazardous materials.
Objective 1:	Install security measures at the anhydrous ammonia transfer 
and storage 
facility. 
Objective 2:	Increase the level of security of the facility using landscape 
design, lighting, 
and vehicle barriers.
Objective 3:	Assess the feasibility of hardening the facility's product 
storage and handling 
infrastructures.

Goal 2:	Protect the community's water supply. 
Objective 1:	Install security measures at the city water treatment plant.
Objective 2:	Secure all remote pump facilities.
Objective 3:	Monitor for radiological, biological, and chemical 
contaminants.

Goal 3:	Ensure that the city government has reliable communications systems. 
Objective 1:	Update the telecommunications capabilities of city government 
offices.
Objective 2:	Create redundant/backup capability for landline telephone 
system.
Objective 3:	Develop off-site backup of information technology systems.

Goal 4:	Reduce risk to critical government facilities.
Objective 1:	Increase vehicle standoff distance from the Emergency 
Operations Center.
Objective 2:	Restrict parking and vehicle access to the underground parking 
garage at City 
Hall.
END SIDE TIP]

Step 2  Identify and Prioritize Mitigation Actions
Once you have developed goals and objectives for mitigation, you should identify 
specific 
actions to help you achieve them. As you consider mitigation options, keep in 
mind that 
attacks and accidents are functions of human activity, and the risk of such 
events is a 
characteristic of the target itself rather than of its geographic location. 
Clearly, there are areas in 
most communities where the chances of an attack or accident are considerably 
different from 
other parts of the jurisdictionhigher at industrial parks and critical 
facilities than in suburban 
residential neighborhoods, for examplebut there is no such thing as a definable 
"terrorism 
zone" or "accident district" in the same sense as there are identifiable 
floodplains and seismic 
fault lines. Thus, it is not effective to protect people, buildings, and systems 
from manmade 
hazards by simply relocating them as one could for some natural disasters.

Rather than removing potential victims from the hazard, then, mitigation 
strategies for manmade 
hazards focus primarily on creating a built environment that is difficult to 
attack, resilient to the 
consequences of an attack or accident, and protective of its occupants should an 
incident occur. 
This can be accomplished through target hardening and other actions. Additional 
actions 
such as public awareness and education initiatives are not discussed in this 
guide but should be 
considered when formulating your mitigation strategy. 

Target hardening actions range from small-scale projects, such as installing 
security fencing 
around an HVAC system's air intake, to community-wide initiatives, such as 
altering land use 
patterns to require buffer zones around campuses of high-risk buildings. Also, 
while some 
actions are highly specific in nature and function, others can meet multiple 
goals. For 
example, designing a building to resist the force of a bomb blast will also 
offer protection from 
windstorms, and requiring buffer zones around critical facilities can help meet 
open space 
requirements and protect wetlands. The planning team is encouraged to take 
advantage of 
these complementary approaches whenever possible. 

[SIDE TIP: Taking Advantage of Existing Processes, Strategies, and Tools
Some actions and techniques used for mitigating natural hazards may also provide 
protection against 
manmade hazards, such as:
Earthquake mitigation techniques that provide structural strengthening of 
buildings may help resist 
impact/explosion effects of bombs. Examples of such techniques include adding 
steel moment frames, 
shear walls, cross bracing, stronger floor systems, walls reinforced with 
shotcrete/fiber materials, 
columns reinforced with fiber wraps/steel jackets, tension/shear anchors, 
vibration dampers, and 
strengthening or providing additional detailing of the building's connections.
Fire mitigation techniques may help protect facilities against the effects of 
bombs and incendiary 
attacks. Examples of such techniques include improved sprinkler systems, 
increased use of fireproofing 
and/or fire-resistant materials, redundant water supplies for fire protection 
(day-to-day and alternative), 
and site setbacks. 
High wind mitigation techniques that provide building envelope protection and 
structural 
strengthening may also help mitigate against impact/explosion effects of bombs. 
Examples of such 
techniques include openings using windows with impact-resistant laminated 
glazing, improving 
connections and the load path of the building, and adding/reinforcing shear 
walls.
Terrorism mitigation is becoming an integral part of multi-hazard mitigation, in 
process and often in 
practice. Additionally, a action that addresses the fullest possible spectrum of 
natural and manmade 
hazards will likely show the most cost-effectiveness.
END SIDE TIP]

Target hardening actions draw from a wide variety of disciplines, all of which, 
as discussed in 
Phase 1, should be represented on (or at least accessible to) the mitigation 
planning team. 
Potential hardening techniques and strategies are numerous, and a listing of 
every possible 
action lies beyond the scope of this guidance. The list of potential actions 
provided gives 
an overview of the techniques and strategies available. The Library in Appendix 
C contains 
references to many sources of information on these topics. The following section 
will discuss 
special considerations when evaluating actions to meet your goals and 
objectives.

[SIDE TIP: The planning team should draw on all available sources of expertise 
when selecting 
specific actions, keeping in mind the overall objectives of maximizing 
opportunities for multi-hazard 
mitigation; promoting sustainability through choosing socially, economically, 
and environmentally 
beneficial solutions; supporting preparedness, response, and recovery; and 
ensuring cost-
effectiveness.
END SIDE TIP]

[SIDE TIP:  Terrorism and Technological Hazard Mitigation actions
The list of actions below is by no means exhaustive or definitive; rather it is 
intended as a 
point of departure for identifying potential mitigation techniques and 
strategies in your 
community or state. 
 
Site Planning and Landscape Design
-	Implement Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
-	Minimize concealment opportunities in landscaping and street furniture, 
such as hedges, bus shelters, benches, and trash receptacles
-	Design grounds and parking facilities for natural surveillance by 
concentrating pedestrian activity, limiting entrances/exits, and eliminating 
concealment opportunities 
-	Separate vehicle and pedestrian traffic
-	Implement vehicle and pedestrian access control and inspection at 
perimeter (ensure ability to regulate flow of people and vehicles one at a time)
-	Design site circulation to minimize vehicle speeds and eliminate direct 
approaches to structures
-	Incorporate vehicle barriers such as walls, fences, trenches, 
ponds/basins, plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains into site planning and 
design
-	Ensure adequate site lighting
-	Design signage for simplicity and clarity 
-	Locate critical offices away from uncontrolled public areas
-	Separate delivery processing facilities from remaining buildings
-	Maintain access for emergency responders, including large fire apparatus
-	Identify and provide alternate water supplies for fire suppression
-	Eliminate potential site access through utility tunnels, corridors, 
manholes, etc.

Architectural and Interior Space Planning
-	Collocate/combine staff and visitor entrances; minimize queuing in 
unprotected areas
-	Incorporate employee and visitor screening areas into planning and design
-	Minimize device concealment opportunities such as mailboxes and trash 
receptacles outside screened areas 
-	Prohibit retail activities in non-secured areas 
-	Do not locate toilets and service spaces in non-secured areas 
-	Locate critical assets (people, activities, systems) away from entrances, 
vehicle circulation and parking, and loading and maintenance areas
-	Separate high-risk and low-risk activities
-	Separate high-risk activities from areas accessible to the public 
-	Separate visitor activities from daily activities
-	Separate building utilities from service docks, and harden utilities
-	Locate delivery and mail processing facilities remotely or at exterior of 
building; prevent vehicles from driving into or under building
-	Establish areas of refuge; ensure that egress pathways are hardened and 
discharge into safe areas
-	Locate emergency stairwells and systems away from high risk areas
-	Restrict roof access 
-	Ensure that walls, doors, windows, ceilings, and floors can resist forced 
entry
-	Provide fire- and blast-resistant separation for sprinkler/standpipe 
interior controls (risers) and key fire alarm system components
-	Use visually open (impact-resistant laminated glass) stair towers and 
elevators in parking facilities
-	Design finishes and signage for visual simplicity

Structural Engineering
-	Create blast-resistant exterior envelope
-	Ensure that structural elements can resist blast loads and progressive 
collapse
-	Install blast-resistant exterior window systems (frames, security films, 
and blast curtains)
-	Ensure that other openings (vents, etc.) are secure and blast-resistant
-	Ensure that mailrooms are secure and blast-resistant
-	Enclose critical building components within hardened walls, floors, and 
ceilings 

Mechanical Engineering
-	Locate utility and ventilation systems away from entrances, vehicle 
circulation and parking, and loading and maintenance areas
-	Protect utility lifelines (water, power, communications, etc.) by 
concealing, burying, or encasing 
-	Locate air intakes on roof or as high as possible; if not elevated, secure 
within CPTED-compliant fencing or enclosure
-	Use motorized dampers to close air intakes when not operational
-	Locate roof-mounted equipment away from building perimeter
-	Ensure that stairways maintain positive pressure
-	Provide redundant utility and ventilation systems
-	Provide filtration of intake air
-	Provide secure alternate drinking water supply

Electrical Engineering
-	Locate utility systems and lifelines away from entrances, vehicle 
circulation and parking, and loading and maintenance areas
-	Implement separate emergency and normal power systems; ensure that backup 
power systems are periodically tested under load
-	Locate primary and backup fuel supplies away from entrances, vehicle 
circulation and parking, and loading and maintenance areas
-	Secure primary and backup fuel supply areas
-	Install exterior connection for emergency power
-	Install adequate site lighting
-	Maintain stairway and exit sign lighting
-	Provide redundant telephone service
-	Ensure that critical systems are not collocated in conduits, panels, or 
risers
-	Use closed-circuit television (CCTV) security system

Fire Protection Engineering
-	Ensure compliance with codes and standards, including installation of up-
to-date fire alarm and suppression systems
-	Locate fire protection water supply system critical components away from 
entrances, vehicle circulation and parking, and loading and maintenance areas
-	Identify/establish secondary fire protection water supply
-	Install redundant fire water pumps (e.g., one electric, one diesel); 
locate apart from each other
-	Ensure adequate, redundant sprinkler and standpipe connections
-	Install fire hydrant and water supply connections near sprinkler/standpipe 
connections
-	Supervise or secure standpipes, water supply control valves, and other 
system components
-	Implement fire detection and communication systems
-	Implement redundant off-premises fire alarm reporting
-	Locate critical documents and control systems in a secure yet accessible 
place
-	Provide keybox near critical entrances for secure fire access
-	Provide fire- and blast-resistant fire command center
-	Locate hazardous materials storage, use, and handling away from other 
activities
-	Implement smoke control systems
-	Install fire dampers at fire barriers
-	Maintain access to fire hydrants
-	Maintain fire wall and fire door integrity 
-	Develop and maintain comprehensive pre-incident and recovery plans
-	Implement guard and employee training
-	Conduct regular evacuation and security drills
-	Regularly evaluate fire protection equipment readiness/adequacy 

Security
-	Develop backup control center capabilities
-	Secure electrical utility closets, mechanical rooms, and telephone closets
-	Do not collocate security system wiring with electrical and other service 
systems
-	Implement elevator recall capability and elevator emergency message 
capability
-	Implement intrusion detection systems; provide 24-hour off-site monitoring
-	Implement and monitor interior boundary penetration sensors
-	Implement color closed-circuit television (CCTV) security system with 
recording capability
-	Install call boxes and duress alarms
-	Install public and employee screening systems (metal detectors, x-ray 
machines, or search stations)

Parking
-	Minimize off-site parking on adjacent streets/lots and along perimeter
-	Control all on-site parking with ID checks, security personnel, and access 
systems
-	Separate employee and visitor parking
-	Eliminate internal building parking
-	Ensure natural surveillance by concentrating pedestrian activity, limiting 
entrances/exits, and eliminating concealment opportunities
-	Use transparent/non-opaque walls whenever possible
-	Prevent pedestrian access to parking areas other than via established 
entrances
END SIDE TIP]

Prioritize Mitigation Actions
When prioritizing natural hazard mitigation actions, a benefit-cost analysis is 
generally 
conducted for each proposed action. Several factors are considered, including: 
-	Cost(s) of the mitigation action;
-	Dollar value of risk reduction (i.e., loss of life, structure, content, 
and function) each time the 
hazard occurs (discussed in detail in Understanding Your Risks: Identifying 
Hazards and 
Estimating Losses [FEMA 386-2]);
-	Frequency with which the benefits of the action will be realized (i.e., 
frequency of hazard 
occurrence); and
-	Time value of money (i.e., the fact that benefits and costs in the future 
are worth less than 
benefits and costs today).

[CAUTION SIDEBAR: While many benefits can be achieved through implementing 
mitigation 
actions, planners should be sensitive to potential negative impacts as well. For 
example, altering 
traffic patterns may increase commute times and distances, and reducing on-
street parking may impact 
retail activity. Such considerations can be pivotal in determining the 
feasibility, viability, and potential for 
success of mitigation planning initiatives.
END CAUTION]

These factors are then combined by calculating the net present value of 
aggregate future 
benefits and costs over the life span of the action. For more details, see Using 
Benefit-Cost 
Analysis in Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-5).

Three challenges arise when applying this benefit-cost framework to terrorism 
and technological 
disaster mitigation actions: (1) the probability of an attack or frequency of 
the hazard 
occurrence is not known; (2) the deterrence rate may not be known; and (3) the 
lifespan of the 
action may be difficult to quantify. 

First, the frequency factor is much more complex in the case of manmade hazards 
than for 
natural hazards. While it is possible to estimate how often many natural 
disasters will occur (for 
example, a structure located in the 100-year floodplain is considered to have a 
1 percent 
chance of being flooded in any given year), it is very difficult to quantify the 
likelihood of a 
terrorist attack or technological disaster. Quantitative methods to estimate 
these probabilities 
are being developed but have not yet been refined to the point where they can be 
used to 
determine incident probability on a facility-by-facility basis. Therefore, the 
planning team must 
use a qualitative approach based on threat and vulnerability considerations to 
estimate the 
relative likelihood of an attack or accident rather than the precise frequency. 
Such an approach 
is necessarily subjective but can be combined with quantitative estimates of 
cost-effectiveness 
(the cost of a action compared to the value of the lives and property it saves 
in a worst-case 
scenario) to help illustrate the overall risk reduction achieved by a particular 
mitigation action. 

[SIDE TIP: It is possible to determine fairly accurately how effective 
mitigation efforts 
will be in preventing damages from a given type of attack. The performance of 
many security 
and mitigation actions can be modeled using established engineering techniques. 
For 
example, structural engineers can determine how a hardening action will protect 
a 
building's envelope. Naturally, the effectiveness of actions that rely on 
personnel and 
hardware can be more difficult to ascertain. For example, what is the 
probability that a 
security guard will fall asleep or that lightning will disable a perimeter 
sensor system?
END SIDE TIP]

Second, the deterrence or preventative value of a action cannot be calculated if 
the number 
of incidents it averts is not known. Deterrence in the case of terrorism may 
also have a 
secondary impact in that once a potential target is hardened, a terrorist may 
turn to a less 
protected facilitychanging the likelihood of an attack for both targets.
Third, the lifespan of a mitigation action presents another problem when 
carrying out a 
benefit-cost analysis for terrorism and technological hazards. Future benefits 
are generally 
calculated for a natural hazard mitigation action in part by estimating the 
number of times the 
action will perform successfully over the course of its useful life. However, 
some protective 
actions may be damaged or destroyed in a single manmade attack or accident. For 
example, 
blast-resistant window film may have performed to 100% effectiveness by 
preventing injuries 
from flying glass, but it may still need replacement after one "use." Other 
actions, such as a 
building setback, cannot be "destroyed" or "used up" per se. This is in contrast 
to many natural 
hazard mitigation actions, where the effectiveness and life span of a structural 
retrofit or land 
use policy are easily understood and their value over time is quantifiable.

Step 3  Prepare an Implementation Strategy 
As stated in the Foreword, this how-to guide assumes that your community or 
state is engaged 
in a natural hazards mitigation planning process and is intended to serve as a 
supplemental 
resource to help you address the unique risks associated with terrorism and 
technological 
hazards. If you have incorporated terrorism and technological hazards into a 
well-managed 
process, the implementation strategies and tools you use should enable you to 
effectively 
reduce your community or state's vulnerability to manmade disasters as well. 
Developing a 
Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-3) provides more details on preparing an 
implementation strategy.

Step 4  Document the Mitigation Planning Process
The mitigation plan for manmade hazards will be based on the risk assessment 
conducted in 
Phase 2 and will include a comprehensive strategy to address the mitigation 
priorities 
developed in Phase 3, Step 2. This information, which should be integrated into 
the natural 
hazard mitigation plan, should include:
-	A summary of the planning process itself, including the sequence of 
actions taken and a list 
of team members and stakeholders who participated; 
-	The results of the risk assessment and loss estimation; 
-	Mitigation goals and objectives aimed at reducing or avoiding the effects 
of manmade hazards;
-	Mitigation actions that will help the community or state accomplish the 
established goals 
and objectives; and
-	Implementation strategies that detail how the mitigation actions will be 
implemented and administered.

The hazard mitigation plan should serve as the focal point and basis for 
mitigation decisions for 
all hazardsnatural and manmade. As such, it should be written so that anyone 
who reads it 
can gain an understanding of current and future hazards and risks as well as the 
community's or 
state's intended solutions to those problems.

[CAUTION SIDEBAR: Ideally, terrorism and technological hazard mitigation will be 
incorporated with your existing mitigation plan; a single comprehensive plan is 
generally 
easier to manage and implement than a collection of stand-alone documents. 
However, some 
planning information may be of such high sensitivity that it should not be 
included in publicly 
available mitigation planning documents; examples of such information include 
vulnerability 
studies of critical infrastructure and data on security plans and systems. This 
material should 
be treated as an addendum to the mitigation plan so that it is still part of the 
plan, but access 
to it can be controlled. For guidance on protecting such sensitive information, 
see Phase 4, 
Consideration 1, Community Interest and Information Sensitivity.
END CAUTION]

PHASE 4: IMPLEMENT THE PLAN AND MONITOR PROGRESS
[DIAGRAM.  This diagram shows the four phases of the planning processorganize 
resources, 
assess risk, develop a mitigation plan, and implement the plan and monitor 
progressas a 
series of connected rectangles, just as in diagram found in the introduction.  
The fourth 
box, implement the plan and monitor progress, is highlighted.  END DIAGRAM]

Overview

[DIAGRAM: Mitigation Planning Process
1.	Organize Resources
2.	Assess Risks
3.	Develop a Mitigation Plan
4.	Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress
>	Community interest and information sensitivity
>	Project funding
>	Monitoring and evaluation
This diagram starts with a smaller version of the diagram of the four-phase 
hazard mitigation planning process. Phase 4 of the planning process, 
implement the plan and monitor progress, is highlighted. An arrow leads 
to the three sequential steps you need to take when implementing the plan 
and monitoring progress: community interest and information sensitivity, 
project funding, and monitoring and evaluation.  An arrow leads from one 
step to the next, to show that they occur in sequence. END DIAGRAM]

The fourth phase of the mitigation planning process, Implement the Plan and 
Monitor Progress, 
describes how to bring the mitigation plan to life. The implementation and 
monitoring phase is 
largely the same across the entire spectrum of hazards and is discussed in 
detail in Bringing the 
Plan to Life: Implementing the Hazard Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-4). This section 
will 
address special considerations for implementing mitigation actions unique to 
manmade 
hazards and should serve as a supplement to the process described in Bringing 
the Plan to Life. 

Consideration 1  Community Interest and Information Sensitivity
As a result of the heightened level of interest in the vulnerability of American 
communities to 
terrorism following the events of September 11, 2001, the public is likely to be 
keenly interested 
in efforts to protect people, buildings, and systems from terrorism and 
technological disasters. 
The planning team should understand that this presents both benefits and 
challenges, because 
much of the same information that can be used to rally public support for 
mitigation planning can 
also be of use to potential terrorists, saboteurs, or others with malevolent 
intent. For that reason, 
the planning team must carefully maintain the security of any information that 
pertains to 
vulnerabilities, security measures, and response plans. Jurisdictions' legal 
counsels should be 
able to provide guidance on how best to protect such sensitive information 
within the provisions 
of applicable freedom of information laws.

This constitutes a significant departure from the open and inclusive way in 
which mitigation 
planning has historically been conducted. However, new security realities demand 
that we re-
evaluate the way we think about information sensitivity, in particular how, 
where, when, and with 
whom we discuss risks, vulnerabilities, and protective (mitigation) actions. In 
addition to the 
overarching public safety rationale for protecting this information from those 
who would use it 
against us, the planning team should be sensitive to the fact that the owners 
and operators of 
many community assets may be reluctant to reveal their own security shortcomings 
due to 
concerns about liability, perception of vulnerability or weakness, and general 
security-
consciousness. For communities and states to work effectively with the people, 
facilities, and 
systems they are tasked with protecting, working relationships must be based on 
trust. All 
project partners should be committed to maintaining the integrity of the 
planning process as well 
as the principles and ultimate goal of the process: a more secure built 
environment.

Thus, managing sensitive information will be a new challenge for many 
communities and states. 
The federal government has the option to classify information when appropriate 
to protect the 
interest of national security, but most state and local governments currently 
lack adequate 
authorities and tools for preventing the inappropriate disclosure of every kind 
of sensitive data 
with any certainty. Communities and states should address this problem in two 
ways: first, they 
will need to ensure that sensitive information is handled in such a way as to 
maintain its 
security, and second, they will need to have adequate protections in place to 
ensure that 
sensitive information is not released when it is requested by members of the 
public who have no 
justifiable reason (or "need to know") for seeing the information. The following 
sections 
elaborate on these two ways to protect sensitive information while maintaining 
an appropriate 
level of public involvement in the planning process.

-	Internal handling procedures. State and local governments may have the 
ability to assign 
"For Official Use Only" (FOUO) status or a similar designation to information 
that is 
privileged, sensitive, or otherwise should be protected from circulation or 
disclosure to the 
public. However, such actions often lack formal information handling procedures 
and 
enforceability. Communities are encouraged to review their handling procedures 
to ensure 
that sensitive information in their possession can be authoritatively designated 
as such and 
protected appropriately, and once proper procedures are in place they should be 
applied 
and adhered to rigorously.
-	Withholding sensitive information. In keeping with the democratic 
tradition, federal and 
state laws generally require that government proceedings and documents be 
accessible to 
the public. These laws, often called "sunshine laws" or "freedom of information" 
laws, usually 
require public access to meetings whenever a commission, committee, board, task 
force or 
other official group meets to discuss public business. They also require that 
most 
government documents and records be made available to the public upon request. 

While these laws seek to keep governmental processes in the open, many of them 
establish 
disclosure exemptions for various types of sensitive information. Planners 
should work with their 
jurisdiction's legal staff to carefully review the applicable laws and to 
determine how these laws 
may impact their ability to protect sensitive planning information. Furthermore, 
they should also 
understand the specific procedures required to withhold documents and hold 
closed meetings 
as necessary to protect sensitive information from disclosure to anyone without 
a "need to 
know."

[SIDE TIP: Suggested Elements and Sample Language for a "For Official Use Only" 
(FOUO) 
Policy

-	Definition of FOUO  
The term 'For Official Use Only' should apply to information which is sensitive 
and requires 
protection from disclosure to the general public, and for which a significant 
reason, statutory 
requirement, or regulatory instruction exists to preclude general circulation. 
FOUO status is 
not a security classification level. 

-	Guidelines for determining sensitivity  
Information that may qualify for FOUO status includes the design, construction, 
security, and 
protection of government facilities and critical infrastructures; assessments of 
the 
vulnerabilities of facilities and systems; plans, procedures, and protocols for 
responding to 
terrorist attacks or other criminal events; or any other information that could 
be used for the 
purposes of damaging or destroying any facility or disrupting any operations.

-	Designation of authority  
Authority to assign and remove FOUO status should be granted to designated 
personnel 
based on position and/or responsibilities.

-	Document marking requirements 
Information that has been designated FOUO should be plainly marked as such for 
ease of 
recognition. To promote proper protection of information, markings should be 
applied at the 
time documents are drafted or as soon as FOUO information is added. Materials 
containing 
FOUO information should be marked 

'PROPERTY OF (JURISDICTION NAME)  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'

at the bottom of the front cover, title page, first page and outside of the back 
cover. Additionally, 
each page containing FOUO information should be similarly marked at the bottom. 
Material other 
than paper documents such as slides, computer media, films, etc., should also 
bear these 
markings. Electronically transmitted messages (e.g., e-mails) containing FOUO 
information 
should have the abbreviation 'FOUO' before the beginning of the text.

-	Handling instructions  
FOUO material should never be left unattended, and reasonable steps should be 
taken to 
minimize the risk of access by anyone without a "need to know." After working 
hours, FOUO 
information should be stored in a locked desk, file cabinet, bookcase, or 
similar location. 
Restrictions may also be placed on the duplication and transmission of FOUO 
information.
END SIDE TIP]

Consideration 2  Project Funding

[SIDE TIP: Federal Funding for Manmade Hazard Mitigation Projects

At the time of this writing, there is little federal funding specifically 
earmarked for state and local use in 
mitigating against manmade hazards. When dealing with multiple sources of 
funding, ensure that you 
seek funding from the most directly appropriate and relevant program before 
seeking assistance from 
other sources. That said, mitigation against terrorism and technological hazards 
will require creative 
funding strategies that incorporate a variety of non-traditional sources. Three 
reasons for this are:
1.	Terrorism can potentially occur almost anywhere and can affect a wide 
range of facilities and 
systems;
2.	As with natural hazard mitigation, the development and implementation of 
antiterrorism strategies 
can be complex and expensive; and 
3.	Comprehensive antiterrorism and technological hazard mitigation includes 
security measures and 
other techniques that may not be eligible for FEMA funding under current 
regulations.
END SIDE TIP]

Increasingly, communities are challenged by budget constraints that require 
"doing more with 
less." While many pre- and post-disaster funding sources exist that can help 
communities 
strengthen themselves against natural disasters, creativity will be the key to 
identifying how 
mitigation plans and actions for terrorism and technological hazards can be 
funded. 
-	Local governments have a good opportunity for incorporating mitigation 
funding into long-
range planning, especially in the capital improvement budget process. For 
example, 
planning for a new municipal building is an ideal opportunity to site a critical 
facility in a low 
hazard area, to ensure that it is built with seismic, high wind, or other 
appropriate hazard 
resistance as applicable, and to incorporate security systems and security-
oriented design 
principles into the facility's planning and design.

[SIDE TIP: Security considerations should be a priority in all capital 
improvement projects 
including both renovation and new development. 
END SIDE TIP]

-	State governments can implement incentive programs using tax rebates and 
budget 
surpluses to promote mitigation actions and strengthen building codes. They can 
also 
incorporate all-hazard mitigation considerations into the processes, guidance, 
and 
requirements that they develop for comprehensive planning, capital improvement 
planning, 
urban design, land development regulation, growth management, and 
sustainability.
-	Federal government funding for terrorism-related activities is rapidly 
expanding following 
the events of September 11, 2001. Many funding streams that may be of use to 
states and 
communities working to reduce their vulnerability to manmade hazards are not yet 
in place, 
but other established funding mechanisms not previously used for this purpose 
can be 
leveraged to provide assistance. Detailed information on available federal 
funding can be 
found in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance at www.cfda.gov. 
-	Private sector organizations, businesses, and individual homeowners have 
much to gain 
from reducing their own risk by implementing cost-effective actions to increase 
security 
and survivability. Industrial partners and other private interests may be 
willing to contribute 
time, labor, materials, or other support if they are convinced that the 
mitigation effort will 
benefit their organization as part of an overall community improvement.

Consideration 3  Monitoring and Evaluation 
There are significant challenges to monitoring and evaluating the implementation 
of mitigation 
strategies for terrorism and technological hazards. Given the relatively low 
likelihood of 
manmade disasters occurring in most communities (particularly in contrast to 
many naturally 
occurring events), the value and effectiveness of mitigation actions such as 
structural blast-
resistance retrofits and land use regulations may never be realized. Other 
actions such as 
the application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design techniques may 
indeed 
function to their full level of performance but their deterrent or preventative 
value may go 
unrecognized if they averted an incident that was, as a result, undetected. 
Still others such as 
guards and intrusion sensors may be put to the test regularly, either as part of 
a routine testing, 
training, and maintenance program or in "real world" events. Should an incident 
or accident 
occur, however, there will likely be significant interest on the part of the 
government, 
engineering, design, and standards communities in the performance of various 
actions, and 
the resulting inquiries and studies can provide valuable input into subsequent 
mitigation 
planning initiatives.

The monitoring and evaluation of the manmade hazards portion of the mitigation 
plan should 
correspond with the schedule established for the natural hazards portion of the 
plan. The plan 
should be revisited, and if necessary updated, on a regular basis to ensure that 
it is still relevant 
and accurate. If a disaster occurs, the plan should be revisited, and perhaps 
revised, then as 
well.

AFTERWORD

Afterword
[DIAGRAM. This diagram displays the Hazard Mitigation Planning Process: the name 
of each of 
the four planning phases appears in its own separate box.  An arrow leading from 
one box to 
the next shows movement from Organize Resources to Assess Risks to Develop a 
Mitigation Plan 
to Implement the Plan and Monitor Progress. Another set of arrows points from 
Implement the 
Plan and Monitor Progress to all three remaining phases, indicating that 
planning the process 
is not necessarily linear.
END DIAGRAM]


The basics of mitigating hazards before they become disasters are similar for 
both natural and 
manmade hazards. Whether you are confronting wind, water, seismicity, terrorism, 
hazardous 
materials, or sabotage, you can use the same four-phase mitigation planning 
process to reduce 
the consequences should these hazards impact the built environment. While 
communities of all 
sizes are increasingly aware of their vulnerability to manmade hazards, this 
awareness is of no 
value unless it is translated into action. 

You may not be able to prevent every accident or deliberate attack, but a well 
planned and 
effectively implemented mitigation program will help to reduce the consequences 
of such 
incidents. Of course, the reality is that natural hazards may indeed present a 
much greater risk 
than terrorism and technological disasters due to their higher frequency of 
occurrence. By using 
this guide and the other how-to guides in the series, you will be able to 
identify, prioritize, and 
implement mitigation actions across the full spectrum of hazards and maximize 
the efficient 
allocation of public resources.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

BCA	Benefit-Cost Analysis
CAMEO	Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
DMA	Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
DOS 	Department of State 
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOUO	For Official Use Only
GSA	General Services Administration
HAZUS	Hazards US
HIRA	Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IEMS	Integrated Emergency Management System
LEPC	Local Emergency Planning Committee
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
PCCIP	President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
SCADA	Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

Antiterrorism: Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of 
individuals, forces, and 
property to terrorist acts. (Source: US Department of Defense, Report of the 
Secretary of 
Defense to the President and the Congress, 2000.) 

Counterterrorism: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to 
terrorism. 
(Source: US Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the 
President and 
the Congress, 2000.) 

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED): A crime prevention 
strategy 
based on evidence that the design and form of the built environment can 
influence human 
behavior. Specifically, CPTED seeks to create a physical environment that 
discourages criminal 
activity. CPTED's basic principles are territoriality, access control, 
surveillance, activity support, 
and property maintenance.

Critical Infrastructure: System whose incapacity or destruction would have a 
debilitating 
impact on the defense or economic security of the nation. (Source: U.S. Critical 
Infrastructure 
Assurance Office at http://www.ciao.gov/resource/index.html.)

Domestic Terrorism: The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by 
a group or 
individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico 
without foreign 
direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or 
social objectives. 
(Source: FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1998.)

Goals: General guidelines that identify what you want to achieve. They are 
usually long-term in 
nature.

International Terrorism: Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal 
violation if committed 
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to 
be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government 
by intimidation or 
coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. 
International 
terrorist acts occur outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries 
in terms of the 
means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce 
or 
intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 
(Source: FBI, 
Terrorism in the United States 1998.)

Mitigation: To cause to become less harsh or hostile; to make less severe or 
painful.

Objectives: Measurable strategies or implementation steps to attain a goal. They 
are shorter in 
range and more specific than goals.

Planning: The act or process of making or carrying out plans; the establishment 
of goals, 
policies, and procedures for a social or economic unit.

Situational Crime Prevention: A crime prevention strategy based on reducing the 
opportunities for crime by increasing the effort required to commit a crime, 
increasing the risks 
associated with committing the crime, and reducing the target appeal or 
vulnerability (whether 
property or person). This opportunity reduction is achieved by management and 
use policies 
such as procedures and training, as well as physical approaches such as 
alteration of the built 
environment.

Terrorism: The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political 
or social objectives. (Source: 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85.)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Explosive, incendiary, nuclear, biological, 
and 
chemical weapons. As defined in 18 U.S.C., Section 2332a,  
 
  "the term 'weapon of mass destruction' means -

(A)	any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title;
(B)	any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury through the 
release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their 
precursors;
(C)	any weapon involving a disease organism; or
(D)	any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a 
level dangerous to 
human life."

Furthermore, a 'destructive device' is defined in 18 U.S.C., Section 921 as:
"any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas -
(i) bomb,
(ii) grenade,
(iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,
(iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter 
ounce,
(v) mine, or
(vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses."

APPENDIX C: LIBRARY

Research and Publications

American Planning Association. 1995. Integrating Emergency Management and the 
Planning 
Process. City Planning and Management News, Winter 1994-95: 3-4.

American Society of Civil Engineers. 1999. Structural Design for Physical 
Security: State of the 
Practice. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers.

Archibald, Rae W., et al. 2002. Security and Safety in Los Angeles High-Rise 
Buildings after 
9/11. Santa Monica, California: RAND. (Online) Available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB381.

Britton, Neil R. and John Lindsay. 1995. Demonstrating the Need to Integrate 
City Planning and 
Emergency Preparedness: Two Case Studies. International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and 
Disasters 13,2: 161-178.

Clarke, Ronald V., ed. 1997. Situational Crime Prevention : Successful Case 
Studies (2nd ed.). 
Guilderland, N.Y.: Harrow and Heston.

Coleman, Michael A. 1997. The Influence of Traffic Calming Devices upon Fire 
Vehicle Travel 
Times. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Transportation Engineers.

Crowe, Timothy D. 2000. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: 
Applications Of 
Architectural Design And Space Management Concepts (2nd ed.). Stoneham, MA: 
Butterworth-
Heinemann.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2002. World Trade Center Building 
Performance 
Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations (FEMA 
403). 
Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2001. Mitigation Resources for Success (CD-
ROM) 
(FEMA 372). Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2000. Planning for a Sustainable Future: 
The Link 
Between Hazard Mitigation and Livability (FEMA 364). Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Emergency 
Management Agency. (Online) Available at 
http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning_toc.shtm.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1997. Radiological Emergency Management 
Independent Study Course (IS-301). Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency 
Management 
Agency. (Online) Available at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is301.htm.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1996. The Oklahoma City Bombing: Improving 
Building Performance through Multi-Hazard Mitigation (FEMA 277). Washington, 
D.C.: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. 

Fehr, Stephen C. 1996. Parking Under Siege in D.C.: U.S. Anti-Terrorism Plan 
Threatens 360 
Spaces. The Washington Post, July 13, 1996.

Fleissner, Dan and Fred Heinzelmann. 1996. Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design 
and Community Policing. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice 
Programs, National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/crimepre.pdf.

Gordon, Corey L. and William Brill. 1996. The Expanding Role of Crime Prevention 
Through 
Environmental Design in Premises Liability. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department 
of Justice, 
Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedlia.pdf.

Hart, Sara. 2002. In the aftermath of September 11, the urban landscape appears 
vulnerable 
and random: Architects and consultants focus on risk assessment and security 
through design. 
Architectural Record, March 2002. 

Hinman, Eve E. and David J. Hammond. 1997. Lessons from the Oklahoma City 
Bombing: 
Defensive Design Techniques. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE Press).

Lasley, James. 1998. "Designing Out" Gang Homicides and Street Assaults. 
Washington,  
D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National 
Institute of Justice. 
(Online) Available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173398.pdf.

La Vigne, Nancy G. 1997. Visibility and Vigilance: Metro's Situational Approach 
to Preventing 
Subway Crime. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, 
National Institute of Justice. (Online) Available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/166372.pdf.

Mulder, Kathy. 1998. Split Speed Bump. Washington, D.C.: Institute of 
Transportation 
Engineers. 

National Capital Planning Commission. 2002. The National Capital Urban Design 
and Security 
Plan. (Online) Available at 
http://www.ncpc.gov/publications/UDSP/Final%20UDSP.pdf.

National Capital Planning Commission. 2001. Designing for Security in the 
Nation's Capital. 
(Online) Available at 
http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/security/DesigningSec.pdf.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 2002. Guidance for 
Protecting Building 
Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks (DHHS 
(NIOSH) 
Publication No. 2002-139). Cincinnati, Ohio: National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and 
Health. (Online) Available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/bldvent/2002-139.html.

National League of Cities. 2000. Domestic Terrorism:  Resources for Local 
Governments. 
Washington, DC.: National League of Cities.

National Research Council. 2001. Protecting Buildings and People from Terrorism: 
Technology 
Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Newman, Oscar. 1996. Creating Defensible Space. Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of 
Housing and Urban Development. (Online) Available at 
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/def.pdf.

Schneider, Richard H., and Ted Kitchen. 2002. Planning for Crime Prevention: A 
Transatlantic 
Perspective. New York, New York: Routledge.

Schwab, Jim, et al. 1998. Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction 
(Planning 
Advisory Service Report Number 483/484). Chicago, Illinois: American Planning 
Association.

Sidell, Frederick R., et al. 1998. Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook. Alexandria, 
Virginia: Jane's 
Information Group.

Smith, Keith. 1992. Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster. 
New York, 
New York: Routledge.

Smith, Mary S. 1996. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Parking 
Facilities. 
Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
National Institute of 
Justice. (Online) Available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedpkg.pdf.

Steinberg, Michele and Burby, Raymond J. 2002. Growing Safe. Planning 68,4: 22-
23.

Taylor, Ralph B. and Adele V. Harrell. 1996. Physical Environment and Crime. 
Washington, D. 
C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute 
of Justice. (Online) 
Available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/physenv.pdf.

U.S. Air Force. Installation Force Protection Guide. (Online) Available at 
http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/dcd/arch/force.pdf.

U.S. Army. 2001. Field Manual 3-19.30, Physical Security. Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, 
Department of the Army. (Online) Available at  
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-19.30/fm3-19.30.pdf.

U.S. Department of Justice. 1995. Vulnerability Assessment of Federal 
Facilities. (Online) 
Available at http://www.oca.gsa.gov.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 1999. 
Vehicle 
Bomb Explosion Hazard And Evacuation Distance Tables. This publication is no 
longer available online.  To request a copy, write to Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Arson and Explosives Programs Division, 800 K 
Street, NW, Tech World Suite 710, Washington, DC 20001.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2001. LEPCs and Deliberate Releases: 
Addressing 
Terrorist Activities in the Local Emergency Plan. (Online) Available at 
http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/factsheets/lepcct.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2002. Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured 
Exposure to 
Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities (GAO-02-472T). (Online) 
Available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02472t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2001. Homeland Security: A Risk Management 
Approach Can 
Guide Preparedness Efforts (GAO-02-208T). (Online) Available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02208t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2001. Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk 
Management Approach (GAO-02-150T). (Online) Available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02150t.pdf.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2000. Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to 
Strategies and 
Resources (T-NSIAD-00-218). (Online) Available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00218t.pdf.

U.S. General Services Administration. 2002. GSA Occupant Emergency Program (OEP) 
Guide. 
(Online) Available at 
http://www.gsa.gov/attachments/GSA_PUBLICATIONS/extpub/GSA_OEP_Guide_6.doc.

U.S. House of Representatives. 1996. Impacts of the closure of Pennsylvania 
Avenue on the 
District of Columbia. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the District of 
Columbia of the 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, One 
Hundred 
Fourth Congress, second session, June 7, 1996. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government 
Printing Office.


Web Sites

American Institute of Architects: Building Security Through Design 
http://www.aia.org/security/

American Lifelines Alliance 
http://www.americanlifelinesalliance.org

American Society for Industrial Security 
http://www.asisonline.org

Building Owners and Managers Association: BOMA International Emergency Resource 
Center 
http://www.boma.org/emergency

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance  
http://www.cfda.gov

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance: terrorism-related funding 
http://www.cfda.gov/911.htm

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
http://www.ciao.gov

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office: Critical Infrastructure Protection  
http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/pccip_documents.htm.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Emergency Management Institute, Terrorism 
Training and Resources 
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/terrorismInfor/ctrt.asp

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Information on Manmade Hazards 
http://www.fema.gov/hazards

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Mitigation Planning 
http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning.shtm

General Services Administration: Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings 
Service  
(note: certain information is excluded from public access for security reasons, 
but a vast amount 
of sound guidance remains) 
http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/facilitiesstandards/

General Services Administration: Office of the Chief Architect 
http://www.oca.gsa.gov

General Services Administration, Public Buildings Service: First Impressions  
Streamlining 
Security 
http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/firstimpressions/takingaction/streamline_security.html

International Facility Management Association 
http://www.ifma.org

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Advice for Safeguarding Buildings Against 
Chemical or Biological Attack 
http://securebuildings.lbl.gov

National Capital Planning Commission: Security and Urban Design 
http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/security/security.html

National Infrastructure Protection Center 
http://www.nipc.gov

National Institute of Building Sciences 
http://www.nibs.org

Penn State University, Protective Technology Center: Modern Protective 
Structures course 
http://www.cde.psu.edu/C&I/ProtectiveStructures/default.html

Public Entity Risk Institute  
http://www.riskinstitute.org

The Infrastructure Security Partnership 
http://www.tisp.org

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Center of Expertise for Protective Design: Blast 
Mitigation Action 
Group 
http://bmag.nwo.usace.army.mil

U.S. Army Soldiers' and Biological Chemical Command: Basic Information on 
Building 
Protection 
http://buildingprotection.sbccom.army.mil/basic

U.S. Department of Defense: Force Protection Equipment Demonstration IV 
http://www.fped4.org/

U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State: Technical Support 
Working Group 
http://www.tswg.gov

U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories: Architectural Surety 
Program 
http://www.sandia.gov/archsur

U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories: Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
initiative  
http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN02-11-00/steam_story.html 

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Terrorism in the 
United States 
reports 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.htm

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Chemical Emergency Preparedness and 
Prevention 
Office
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/ceppoweb.nsf/content/index.html

U.S. Fire Administration  
http://www.usfa.fema.gov

U.S. General Accounting Office: Special Collections  Terrorism 
http://www.gao.gov/terrorism.html

U.S. Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Security Engineering 
Division: 
Systematic Approach for Reviewing 
Projects for Protection Against Terrorism 3-day workshop 
http://atfp.nfesc.navy.mil/training.htm

Whole Building Design Guide: Provide Security to Assets 
http://www.wbdg.org (click "Design Guidance" then "Design Objectives" then 
"Secure/Safe")


APPENDIX D: WORKSHEETS	
WORKSHEET #1	Build the Planning Team
WORKSHEET #2	Asset Identification Checklist
WORKSHEET #3	Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix

Worksheet #1	Build the Planning Team	Phase 1, Step 2
Step 2 of "Getting Started" (FEMA 386-1) discusses establishing a planning team 
with a broad range of 
backgrounds and experiences represented. This worksheet suggests additional 
individuals, agencies, 
and organizations that should be included on a team to plan for manmade hazards. 
State organizations 
can be included on local teams when appropriate to serve as a source of 
information and to provide 
guidance and coordination.
You should use the checklist as a starting point for expanding your team. 

The worksheet has three columns. The first column has the titles of potential 
members of the planning 
team. The second column contains the heading of "on team." The third column 
contains the heading of 
"add to team." The second and third columns each have a blank check-off box that 
lines up to the right 
of each planning team member's title so that you can place a check mark in one 
box if the person is on 
the planning team or in the other box if that person should be added to the 
team. 

Under the general heading of Specialists for Manmade Hazards are the following 
job titles. To the right 
of each are the two empty check-off boxes
-	Bomb and Arson Squads
-	Community Emergency Response Teams
-	Hazardous Materials Experts
-	Infrastructure Owners/Operators
-	National Guard Units
-	Representatives from facilities identified in 
Worksheet #2:  Asset Identification Checklist
Under the general heading of Local/Tribal are the following job titles:
-	Administrator/Manager's Office
-	Board of Education 
-	Budget and Finance Office
-	Building Code Enforcement Office
-	City/County Attorney's Office
-	Economic Development Office
-	Emergency Preparedness Office
-	Fire and Rescue Department
-	Hospital Management
-	Local Emergency Planning Committee
-	Planning and Zoning Office
-	Police/Sheriff's Department
-	Public Works Office
-	Sanitation Department
-	Transportation Department
-	Tribal Leaders
Under the general heading of Special Districts and Authorities are the 
following job titles:
-	Airport/Seaport Authorities
-	Business Improvement District
-	Fire Control District
-	Flood Control District
-	Redevelopment Agencies
-	Regional/Metropolitan Planning 
Organization(s)
-	School Districts
-	Transit/Transportation Agencies
Under the general heading of Others are the following job titles:
-	Architectural/Engineering/Planning Firms
-	Citizen Corps
-	Colleges/Universities
-	Land Developers
-	Major Employers/Business Entities 
-	Professional Associations
-	Retired Professionals
Under the general heading of State are the following job titles:
-	Adjutant General's Office (National Guard)
-	Building Code Office
-	Climatologist
-	Earthquake Program Manager
-	Economic Development Office
-	Emergency Management Office/State 
Hazard Mitigation Officer
-	Environmental Protection Office
-	Fire Marshal's Office
-	Geologist
-	Homeland Security Coordinator's Office
-	Housing Office
-	Hurricane Program Manager
-	Insurance Commissioner's Office
-	National Flood Insurance Program 
Coordinator
-	Natural Resources Office
-	Planning Agencies
-	Police
-	Public Health Office
-	Public Information Office	
-	Tourism Department
Under the general heading of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are 
the following job titles:
-	American Red Cross
-	Chamber of Commerce
-	Community/Faith-Based Organizations
-	Environmental Organizations
-	Homeowners Associations
-	Neighborhood Organizations
-	Private Development Agencies
-	Utility Companies
-	Other Appropriate NGOs
END WORKSHEET #1]



Worksheet #2 			Asset Identification Checklist		
	Phase 2, Step 3
This worksheet is intended as an aid for identifying critical facilities, sites, 
systems, and other assets in 
your community or state. Check all the boxes that apply to your jurisdiction.

-	Local, state, and federal government offices [list offices applicable to 
your jurisdiction]
The next four rows contain blank check-off boxes alongside blank lines. 	

-
-
-
-

-	Military installations, including Reserve and National Guard component 
facilities,  
(list offices applicable to your jurisdiction)
The next four rows contain blank check-off boxes alongside blank lines. 	
-
-
-
-

-	Emergency services 
-	Backup facilities
-	Communications centers
-	Emergency operations centers
-	Fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) facilities
-	Law enforcement facilities

-	Politically or symbolically significant sites
-	Embassies, consulates
-	Landmarks, monuments
-	Political party and special interest group offices
-	Religious sites

-	Transportation infrastructure components
-	Airports
-	Bus terminals
-	Ferries
-	Interstate highways
-	Oil/gas pipelines
-	Railheads/rail yards
-	Seaports/river ports
-	Subways
-	Truck terminals
-	Tunnels/bridges

-	Energy, water, and related utility systems
-	Electricity production, transmission, and distribution system components
-	Oil and gas storage/shipment facilities
-	Power plant fuel distribution, delivery, and storage
-	Telecommunications facilities
-	Wastewater treatment plants
-	Water supply/purification/distribution systems

-	Telecommunications and information systems
-	Cable TV facilities
-	Cellular network facilities
-	Critical cable routes
-	Major rights of way
-	Newspaper offices and production/distribution facilities
-	Radio stations
-	Satellite base stations 
-	Telephone trunking and switching stations
-	Television broadcast stations

-	Health care system components
-	Emergency medical centers
-	Family planning clinics
-	Health department offices
-	Hospitals
-	Radiological material and medical waste transportation, storage, and 
disposal
-	Research facilities, laboratories
-	Walk-in clinics

-	Financial services infrastructures and institutions
-	Armored car services
-	Banks and credit unions

-	Agricultural Facilities
-	Chemical distribution, storage, and application sites
-	Crop spraying services 
-	Farms and ranches
-	Food processing, storage, and distribution facilities

-	Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities
-	Apartment buildings
-	Business/corporate centers
-	Chemical plants (include facilities having Section 302 Extremely Hazardous 
Substances on-site)
-	Factories
-	Fuel production, distribution, and storage facilities
-	Hotels and convention centers
-	Industrial plants
-	Malls and shopping centers
-	Raw material production, distribution, and storage facilities
-	Research facilities, laboratories
-	Shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical centers

-	Mobile Assets
-	Aviation and marine units
-	Mobile emergency operations centers / command centers
-	Portable telecommunications equipment
-	Red Cross Emergency Response Vehicles, Salvation Army mobile canteens, 
etc.
-	Other (Bloodmobiles, mobile health clinics, etc.)

-	Recreational facilities
-	Auditoriums
-	Casinos
-	Concert halls and pavilions
-	Parks
-	Restaurants and clubs frequented by potential target populations
-	Sports arenas and stadiums
-	Theaters

-	Public/private institutions
-	Academic institutions
-	Cultural centers
-	Libraries
-	Museums
-	Research facilities, laboratories

-	Events and attractions
-	Festivals and celebrations
-	Open-air market
-	Parades
-	Rallies, demonstrations, and marches
-	Religious services
-	Scenic tours
-	Theme parks
END WORKSHEET #2]



Worksheet #3	Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix	Phase 2, 
Step 3

The Facility Inherent Vulnerability Assessment Matrix provides a way to record 
how vulnerable each asset is and enables the planning team to compare how 
vulnerable the assets are relative to each other. Make a copy for each asset and 
fill in the facility name or other identifier in the space provided. Select the 
appropriate point value for each criterion based on the description in each row. 
Then add the point values to get the total for each asset. When you have done 
this for each asset you identified, compare the total scores to see how the 
assets rank in relation to one another.
Facility, followed by a line on which to write the facility's name.	
EIGHT COLUMN TABLE
The first column is labeled "Criteria." Columns two through seven are labeled 0 
to 5. The entries in column two represent a low vulnerability score and entries 
in column seven represent a high vulnerability score. Columns three through five 
fall in the middle range of vulnerability scores. The eighth column is labeled 
"Score."
Criteria: Asset vulnerability
0: -
1: Existence not well known
2: -
3: Existence locally known
4: -
5: Existence widely known
Score:
Criteria: Target Utility
0: None
1: Very Low
2: Low
3: Medium
4: High
5: Very High
Score:
Criteria: Asset Accessibility
0: Remote location, secure perimeter, armed guards, tightly controlled access
1: Fenced, guarded, controlled access
2: Controlled access, protected entry
3: Controlled access, unprotected entry
4: Open access, restricted parking
5: Open access, unrestricted parking
Score:
Criteria: Asset mobility
0: -
1: Moves or is relocated frequently
2: -
3: Moves or is relocated occasionally
4: -
5: Permanent / fixed in place
Score:
Criteria: Presence of Hazardous Materials
0: No hazardous materials present
1: Limited quantities, materials in secure location
2: Moderate quantities, strict control features
3: Large quantities, some control features
4: Large quantities, minimal control features
5: Large quantities, accessible to non-staff persons
Score:
Criteria: Collateral Damage Potential
0: No risk
1: Low risk / limited to immediate area
2: Moderate risk / limited to immediate area
3: Moderate risk within 1-mile radius
4: High risk within 1-mile radius
5: High risk beyond 1-mile radius
Score:
Criteria: Site Population/ Capacity
0:  0
1: 1-250
2: 251-500
3:  501-1000
4:  1001-5000
5:  > 5000
Score:
Total:
Increments may be adjusted to better reflect your response capabilities or to be 
consistent with other guidance such as Mass Casualty Incident plans. Note that 
different risks may exist at a facility depending on whether it is occupied or 
vacant.
Adapted from: FEMA Emergency Management Institute, Terrorism Planning Course
END WORKSHEET #3]

howto7.txt   


      Home New Form Import Edit More... 
      Browse Folders 
       
      Undo Changes 
      Review 
      Check Links 
      View Differences 
      Submit 
       
      Copy 
      Move 
      Delete 
      Rename 
      Convert 
       
      Tag 
      Versions 
      Properties 
       
      Assign Task 
      Add to My Favorites