> 
> >Dear Professor Schwartz,
> >
> >I have recently placed a review of the work of Henry Stapp on the
> >quantum physics archive.   As I don't suppose that you often browse
> >that archive, and as it was written in part in response to your use of
> >his work, I am taking the liberty of drawing it to your attention.
> >
> >The abstract on the archive is at
> >
> >http://arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0311158
> >
> >and the review is also available on my web site from
> >
> >http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/stappa.html
> >
> >You will see from the review that I too am interested in
> >mind-centered interpretations of quantum theory, but that I
> >believe Stapp's approach to be flawed.
> >
> >Although I agree with Dennett that free will is a ``user illusion'' and
> >believe that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics is irrelevant
> >to this,  I enjoyed your book on neuroplasticity.  It seems to me
> >that neither the evidence for plasticity, nor the validity of your
> >treatment methods, depends at all on the reality of free will.
> >
> >I would be interested in any comments you might have.
> >
> >Yours sincerely,
> >
> >Matthew Donald.
> >
> >
> >e-mail: matthew.donald@phy.cam.ac.uk
> >address: Dr. Matthew J. Donald,
> >         The Cavendish Laboratory,
> >         Madingley Road,
> >         Cambridge, CB3 0HE,
> >         Britain.
> >web site:  http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014
> > ``a many-minds interpretation of quantum theory''
> > ***************************************************
> 

Dear Jeff,

I think it will be useful to go over Donald's criticisms,
in order to make our contrary position clear. I assume
that you have a copy of "On the work of Henry P. Stapp",
and will label my replies by paragraph number [#], first
word of paragraph, and a key word or phrase to which I am 
responding.

[1]For, "inadequately developed."

The various specific points he raises will be addressed below.

[4]Beyond, "Stapp...proposes quantum events are physical and occur in
in inanimate objects as well as human brains."

The primary focus of the orthodox interpretations (Copenhagen and vN)
is on human beings. Our approach mainly follows that pragmatic tack.
But the issue of an imbedding ontology will also be discussed.

[5]Stapp, "writes that it is an absurdity to believe that the quantum choices
can appear 'out of the blue', an the basis of absolutely nothing at all."
"Stapp uses... [claim thatreality is not absurd]...to argue that conscious intervenes"
No!The intervention of conscious choice in orthodox QT comes via the dependence
of the  Process 1 choice upon a human chooser, who [freely] chooses what to measure. 

"Stapp's... even bolder third claim...is that the choice...is not controlled...
by any [known] rules...any known laws of [orthodox contemporary] physics."

This is not a bold claim: it is a simple fact.
Within orthodox QT the Process 1 choice is not specified by any known law. 
In that specific sense the observers' choices are "free choices."

[6]As   Donald: "it is hard to avoid the idea that in physics ultimately everything does
just appear 'out of the blue'. In classical mechanics ...the initial conditions
[are out of the blue]." 

In the mindless, choiceless, early classically conceived universe the initial conditions
do indeed come from "out of the blue". But the real world is a quantum world!

At the primary pragmatic level orthodox QT deals with the problem of causation by
using the facts that: (1) Process 1 choices are causally efficacious in the physical world independently of their causal roots and (2) those causal roots are, in principle, 
untracible solely in the physical world. Hence we are both entitled to, and required to, 
take these choices as primary variables, whose physical effects are specified, but whose origins must, to the extent that they can be traced, involve also non-physical variables

If we seek to imbed this pragmatic structure in an objective one-mind-per-person ontology 
then the rules must be specified that fix the particularness of each person's choices. 
The need for these rules would indeed be avoided by going to a many-minds-per-person formulation. But one would then need *other rules* for separating the continuously smeared out world of possibilities into individual streams of consciousness in ways that would yield the vN statistical rules of QT for the correlation among the increments of knowledge along the individual streams of consciousness.

This is technically a much more difficult task than the one-mind task, because in the latter case one has a two more physical processes, Processes 1 and 3, at one's disposal
and the *given* mathematical structure of the vN rules ensures the proper correspondence
to the data, *independently of the causal roots of the Process 1 choices*, whereas in the
many-minds case one has only one real process, Process 2, but must find rules that
will allow the events along the somehow-defined individual streams of consciousness to conform to the stringent mathematical demands of the von Neumann rules. This is difficult
technical task with stiff mathematical requirements, whereas the task of specifying the causal roots of the Process 1 choices has no stiff requirements: we can get quite far
with only loose ideas about the psychological/physical roots of these choices.

In any case, the vN three-process formulation is what is supported
empirically, and is thus the more secure foundation for scientific
development: the many-minds ontology is highly speculative, basically obscure,
anti-occam, and not yet developed to the point of being able to rigorously
produce the predictions of orthodox vN quantum theory.

This issue of causation is tied also to frequently posed ontological questions 
pertaining to the extrapolation of von Neumann QT back to times prior to human life, 
prior to all life, and eventually back to the birth of the universe. The form 
of orthodox von Neumannn QT demands choices not specified by the mechanical 
Process 2, but tracible in part by something that we call values.
The data cited in the BBS article argues for the conclusion that our 
known-to-be-real volitions, instigated by values, are actually causally efficacious. 
But what happens to this key process when we go back to very earlier times?
Are there values that instigate the promordial Process 1 choices?

Contemporary intellectual opinion, based ultimately on the basic valuelessness 
and pointlessness of everthing, from the mechanical perspective of
the classical world view, holds that value, "the good," is relative, 
and should be made concordant with one's political ambitions.
According to this perspective the early universe was devoid of values.

According to the Bible "good" was present already on the first day:
"and God saw...that it was good." I do not regard the Bible as the
arbitor of truth. Still, this account does raise the question of whether
the universe actually got going without values of any kind. 

The classical-physics-based view is that early universe is devoid of values. 
Then there could be no process besides Process 2.

A contrary consistently quantum point of view is that the full tripartite natural process
was there from the start. But then so was value. 

But if creation was instigated by values then "out of the blue" might not be desriptive.

The consistently quantum view point has as good a claim to be "science-based"
as the hybrid classical/quantum point of view. The valuelessness of the early universe
is not the unique scientific possibility.

[7]Stapp's "the lesson of modern neurophysiology"
"this neurophysiological hypothesis"

The basic issue is, precisely, the capacity of 
*that neurophysiological hypothesis* to adequately explain
the recent data of neuropsychology. We argue that 
*that hypothesis* is structurally and empirically inadequate, 
and that the classical-physics-based prejudice should therefore
be abandoned in favor of the quantum approach that bring
consciousness into brain dynamics in a managable pragmatic
and highly explanatory way. (See BBS)

"easy to understand" "evolved"
How can one understand evolution of consciousness if
Process 2 controls everything and proceeds without reference to
consciousness: How do the survival benefits of evolved consciousness
produce an effect if consciousness makes no difference? 

What is the rational basis of the insistence that the causal efficacy of our 
thoughts is a "user illusion" when neither physical theory nor empirical data
support this claim?

[8]Stapp "or whether some other type of process is... involved"
Yes, some other type of process, not Process 2, is involved.

One such "other type" of process is Process 1.
The state of the brain is a compendium of increments in 
information/knowledge of various kinds, instantiated in
a mathematical structure imbedded in a four-dimensional 
manifold of points with spacetime labels. This structure
specifies also a set of future possible increments in
information/knowledge. These increments will come in a sequence
of events, each consisting of a Process 1 choice made by
an agent, followed by a Process 3 choice made "by nature."

Process 1, unlike Process 2, is nonlocal, and it 
is not controlled by any law of contemporary orthodox
quantum theory. It can therefore be controlled in part by
psychologically described realities. Process 1 enters
orthodox theory as an effect of psychologically motivated
(and described) choices made by agents about how they will act.
The Process 1 action replaces S(t) by PS(t)P +P'S(t)P', with
P'=1-P. 

In order to causally relate Process 1 to effective intentional 
action the state PS(t)P should contains no aspect of S(t) 
that conflicts with a template for action that, if held in place,
will tend to make future experiences of the agent conform to
his intention. Then trial and error learning should allow effort 
to become bi-directionaslly causally linked, in the brain, via 
Process 1, to activation of the template of action that
tends to actualize the intended experience.

Every psychologically felt reality is a
a change in the state of knowledge/information instantiated
in the physically described brain, and the correlation that this
entails between the psychologically and physically described data
can be investigated. But the model differs from the classical-
physics-based model in that, because of the principled
insufficiency of knowable physical information, the scientist
is justified in taking conscious choices by human agents to
have the physical causal efficacy that flows specifically from their 
influence on Process 1. 

[9]The  "an entirely new kind of physics."
Neither Donald nor I assume macroscopic quantum coherence.
The state of the brain is assumed to be nearly a mixture 
of classically describable states. But the state of the
brain is described by a density matrix, S(t), and the dynamics
of Process 1 is controlled by that density matrix, as a whole.
In the simplest model one defines {P} be the set of P that
correspond to possible increments in knowledge, and defines
projection operator P(t) to be the P in {P} that maximizes 
Trace PS(t)/Trace S(t). This P(t) depends of course on the
entire mixture represented by S(t), and any dynamics involving
P(t) will likewise involve this entire mixture. This P(t) might
be expected to be pertinent because it is the P that is generated
with the greatest statistical weight by the brain in its search
for an appropriate action to take in the light of the situation
faced by the person. A simple model takes the P associated with
a Process 1 event at time t to necessarily be P(t). Then only a 
rule for a "consent" needs to be specified in order to 
complete the dynamics. Because the nature of the underlying
reality is essentially experiential, it would be natural for
the "consent" to be related to experientially felt values
associated with the experience specified by P(t).

"no conventional physical process within the brain will be able to
cause a ...'collapse'"

Process 1 is highly "nonconventional": it does something no conventional
process could ever do! That is why the founders had to make this radical
breakwith tradition! Process 1 picks out, from what is in principle a
continuously smeared out cloud of overlapping states of the "device" 
(in our case a brain), some discrete set of orthogonal subspaces of states
that correspond to distinct experiential reactions. No conventional physical
process starting from continuously smeared out states of all the relevant
elements can do such a thing in finite a time.[See my Can. J. Phys. article].

So when we consider Process 1 we are in a new ballpark, involving "a new kind 
of physics". Mind involves a new kind of process, within ontologically construed
von Neumann QT. 

[11]Johnjoe "no biological mechanism can [do the job]"

Precisely! The essentially different psychophysical Process 1 is needed!

[12]If "von Neumann's idea of 'measurement'"

Most discussion of "the measurement problem" completely miss the essential problem
by considering only "ideal measurements." von Neumann studied 'ideal measurements', 
but merely to SHIFT the problem, not to solve it. The central problem is that before
collapses the devices, and everything else, will be a smeared out cloud of overlapping
possibilities, not the neat little idealizations that occur in idealzed "idea measurements".  
The problem is to extract discrete streams on consciousness obeying von Neumann's rule from
a complelely smeared out continuum at all levels.

[13]von "I believe ... ordinary physical"
"In my opinion... neurophysiology is more
important that psychology"

Neuropsychology may indeed be "more important" than psychology,
but that does not mean that mind can be left out
We argue that important empirical data involving
protocols that specify how the subjects are to direct their conscious choices,
and that measure behavioural and neural responses to these specifications
require these choices to be included as pertinent variables of the theoretical
analysis. The vN theory is then the perfectly suited theoretical framework
because it puts these conscious choices in the central place, controlling, 
on the one hand, a very specific physical brain process that seems able to 
account nicely for the data, and, on the other hand, being contolled by psychological and physical factors, including an understanding of the words of the scientists who are conducting the experiments. 

A purely classical neurophysiological account does not really refer to the
pertinent psychologically described data, which is understood as arising from some very
mysterious kind of illusion. A quantum neurobiological explanation is even more complex, since it must involve an explanation of how the smeared out cloud of possible brain 
states manages to produce distinct classically understandable streams of consciousness,
that enjoy the correct statistical properties. 

[14]As "no longer possible to invoke the quantum Zeno effect..to attain desired outcome"

In our model "there will be specific circumstances in which
the (quantum Zeno) effect will as arise as a consequence
of specific collapses which actually occur" just as
Donald demands. 

But he seems to miss the main point, which is that what is controlling
the Process 1 involves psychological realities. So the collapse sequence
is indeed "well-defined". But it is controlled by psychological
factors. Through trial and error learning each subject builds a repetoire
of efforts that produce reliable feedbacks.

[15]Just "mental events are merely how physical events appear" 
"von Neumann's indeterministic events are merely how the continuous changes 
appear in specific circumstances".

Donald's starting point is to affirm these claims that mental events are
merely "appearances". 

The idea that there should be, in addition to the causally complete physical reality
also "appearances" is a baffling idea, unless one postulates some nonphysical observer 
with nonphysical thoughts, which is not what Donald does. But then what are these extra
nonphysical "mere appearances"? Why should they exist at all, if they have no real causal role?
 
Donald says that since I do not go along with his (weird?) idea that I owe you all an 
explanation of what quantum events are. The are, if we go to the ontological stance,
the changes in the states of systems that von Neumann's theory is all about. They are
abrupt change in these states. They are real events. Because these states are states of "knowledge" these events are increments of knowledge. This gives an isomorphism between
events in a psychological realm and events in a physical realm: the event is a change
in the physically/mathematically instantiated state of knowledge. It has a physical 
description and a psychological description. It is real, not mere appearance. 

Donald notes that I say that I have provided "A mechanical explanation of the efficacy of
conscious thoughts". He adds that he has "no idea of what this is supposed to mean". 

What this refers to is that a stream conscious thoughts can instigate a Process 1 event
that has a specific effect upon a brain. An effort can increase density of attention, which can activate the quantum Zeno effect, which can hold in place a template for action, which can cause that action to occur.

[16]In "conservation of energy"

I have discussed this in the Draft Target article
[/~stapp/BBSM4.doc] in the answer to question 4. 

[21]Relativity "no change...faster than light."

Relativity requires only that no "signal"
can be communicated faster than light.
The von Neumann collapses do not permit
"signals" (controllable effects) to be
communicated faster than light, and hence
do not violate the physical requirements of the theory
of relativity.

[22]Citing "Tomonaga and Schwinger"

These authors show that the constant-time surfaces upon which
the state S(t) is defined, can be replaced by an advancing
set of spacelike hypersurfaces. This alleviates a frame dependence
that is inimical to the theory of relativity.

[23]Apart "spacetime regions"

I assume that very high energy process cancel in such away
as to allow the state S(t) to be defined, and to make brain
dynamics well described by Quantum Electro Dynamics, with
the effects of the pertinent P(t)  implementable as actions
on S(t), as in von Neumann's nonrelativistic theory.
I suspect that the P(t) can be expressed in terms of the
coulomb field specified as in Schwinger's "Theory of
Quantized fields II" PR 82 pg. 727. (and also by S. Weinberg.)  
These quantities are expressed in terms of their sources by 
instantaneous action at a distance, and hence fit nicely into
the von Neumann formulas. 

[25, 26, 27]Without "should not have been observed."

The state S(t) of the brain is defined by tracing over
variables localized outside the brain. The predictions
of quantum theory associated with brain events, without
any kwowledge of (i.e., correlation with) events outside the
brain are independent of the effects of events occurring
spacelike to the brain. The fact that the prediction of QT
are valid means that there can be no observable effects
of the unknown faraway events.

[28]An "seasick man"

The same argument holds here.  

[29]It "is not straightforward to reconcile.."

I regard the demonstration as "straightforward."
Lorentz covariance pertains to measurable relationships, whereas
the "nonlocal" effects always involve unperformed experiments. 

[35]In "disappointing that Stapp fails to provide more"

Rome was not built in a day. The core issue is whether conscious
effort can make a difference: or whether physiology is the WHOLE STORY.
The important thing to do first is to see whether there are scientific
reason's, apart from the suggestive structure of orthodox contemporary
physics, for believing that, contrary to the classical-physics-based
prejudices of most scientists, our conscious choices can affect our
physical behavior in ways that go beyond what classic physics would
allow. Does the data fit well with the restrictive conditions imposed
by QT. More details can be filled in as the data accumulates.

From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Sun Dec 14 16:22:37 2003
Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2003 16:21:43 -0800 (PST)
From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov
Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov
To: Matthew Donald <mjd1014@phy.cam.ac.uk>
Cc: Jeffrey Schwartz <jmschwar@ucla.edu>
Subject: Re: Comments on your reply to my review

On Sun, 14 Dec 2003, Matthew Donald wrote:

> 
> Dear Professor Stapp,
> 
> On your web site, you have placed a reply to my review of your work. 
> Here are some comments.  
> 
> I wrote 
> > Stapp and I also disagree at a fundamental level about the
> > randomness of quantum events.  In Stapp (1993, \S 7.6), for
> > example, he writes that, ``it is an absurdity to believe that the
> > quantum choices can appear simply randomly `out of the blue', on
> > the basis of absolutely nothing at all.''  Presumably because he
> > believes that reality is not absurd, Stapp uses this first claim to
> > argue that consciousness intervenes in quantum events to influence
> > outcomes.
> 
> In reply, you wrote
> > No! The intervention of conscious choice in orthodox QT comes via
> > the dependence of the  Process 1 choice upon a human chooser, who
> > [freely] chooses what to measure. 
> 
> I'm not sure what you are objecting to here.  

I am objecting to the "because he believes that reality is not absurd."
That is not my line of argument, not my reason for saying the consciousness
intervenes. That conclusion comes not from the "absurdity" claim, but 
from the structure of orthodox QM. 

> In the introduction to
> the first chapter of your book, you say,  ``brain processes are
> causually influenced by subjective conscious experience'' and ``The
> theory fixes the place in brain processing where consciousness
> enters, and explains both the content of the conscious thought and
> its causal efficacy.''
> 
> Causal influence and causal efficacy would be empty without
> influence on outcomes.  In your later Zeno work, you explain how
> free process 1 choices can determine outcomes.
> 
> 
> 
> I think that our most significant differences are brought out by the
> section of your reply where you write
> 
> >    At the primary pragmatic level orthodox QT deals with the
> >    problem of causation by using the facts that: (1) Process 1
> >    choices are causally efficacious in the physical world
> >    independently of their causal roots and (2) those causal roots
> >    are, in principle,  untraceable solely in the physical world.
> >    Hence we are both entitled to, and required to, take these
> >    choices as primary variables, whose physical effects are
> >    specified, but whose origins must, to the extent that they can
> >    be traced, involve also non-physical variables
> 
> It is a mistake to confuse ``pragmatism'' and ``principle''.  As
> a theory, Process 1 is not only pragmatic but also incomplete, and
> because of that incompleteness, I believe that I am ``entitled'' to
> ask for a more complete theory (whether physical or non-physical). 
> I would expect such a theory to characterize the circumstances in
> which process 1 choices are made and the structure of the choice
> projections.
> 

I always emphasize "pragmatic" in order to point to the orientation of
orthodox QM toward practical use, not ontology. An ontological description
is required to be complete, but a pragmatic theory is only required to be
useful. William James in his defense of pragmatism emphasizes that 
pragmatism sees itself as on the path to better understandings---and so
ought science. We are not yet at the end of the road on these matters of 
the scientific understanding of mind. It is a grave mistake for science
to pretend that we now have all the answers, and can ponfificate
authoritively of every matter, including the basic nature of human
beings, and the relationship of mind to the rest of nature. I am activily
pursuing the problem of the origins of our thoughts with K. Laskey 
See reference in the newer version of the BBS paper on my website.

> >    If we seek to imbed this pragmatic structure in an objective
> >    one-mind-per-person ontology then the rules must be
> >    specified that fix the particularness of each person's choices. 
> 
> Exactly.  And I do not believe that you have specified such rules.
> 
Exactly.
> >    The need for these rules would indeed be avoided by going to a
> >    many-minds-per-person formulation. But one would then need
> >    *other rules* for separating the continuously smeared out
> >    world of possibilities into individual streams of
> >    consciousness in ways that would yield the vN statistical
> >    rules of QT for the correlation among the increments of
> >    knowledge along the individual streams of consciousness.
> 
> I agree.  And I *have* tried in my papers to specify these ``other
> rules''.
>    
> >    This is technically a much more difficult task than the
> >    one-mind task, because in the latter case one has two more
> >    physical processes, Processes 1 and 3, at one's disposal and
> >    the *given* mathematical structure of the vN rules ensures
> >    the proper correspondence to the data, *independently of the
> >    causal roots of the Process 1 choices*, 
> 
> It is not clear which task is more difficult.  The quantum Zeno
> effect is so powerful that, if process 1 choices were genuinely
> ``free'', any desired future result could be conjured up, at any time,
> by appropriate sequences of ``causal efficacious choices''.  So rules
> are needed to determine what choices subjects actually have in
> particular circumstances.  With my attachment to neurophysiology, I
> believe that these rules would have to produce a theory mapping
> brain states to sets of orthogonal projections.  Until this has been
> done, and the consequences shown to be compatible with
> observation, we cannot know how hard, or how implausible, or how
> complex, it is.
> 
The point I am making is the doing these things with three process ought
to be easier than doing it with just one of them, particularly, when one 
of the others can be so powerful, as you stress. With Process I at your 
disposal it is a matter of limiting its power, whereas without it 
the task could be strictly impossible.

> >   in the many-minds case one has only one real process, Process 2,
> >   but must find rules that will allow the events along the
> >   somehow-defined individual streams of consciousness to
> >   conform to the stringent mathematical demands of the von
> >   Neumann rules. This is difficult technical task with stiff
> >   mathematical requirements, whereas the task of specifying
> >   the causal roots of the Process 1 choices has no stiff
> >   requirements: we can get quite far with only loose ideas about
> >   the psychological/physical roots of these choices.
> 
> Everett got quite far in the many-minds case with only loose ideas.
> I have tried to go further.

In vN theory the loose idea is severely restricted. It is the causal roots
of the choices that is the big loose screw. 

Do you claim to have a complete MW theory?

> >    In any case, the vN three-process formulation is what is
> >    supported empirically, and is thus the more secure foundation
> >    for scientific development: the many-minds ontology is highly
> >    speculative, basically obscure, anti-occam, and not yet
> >    developed to the point of being able to rigorously produce the
> >    predictions of orthodox vN quantum theory.
> 
> It seems to me that much of the recent work in quantum mechanics,
> both experimental and theoretical, including work on decoherence, on
> the quantum Zeno effect, and on quantum computation, can be seen as
> indicating that there is no direct support for process 1; except as a
> heuristic first step towards explaining appearances.

The orthodox theory works. It seems reasonable to accept it, and see
what it says in neuroscience. It might possible be that the palpable
efficacy of conscious effort is merely an appearance, not the real
thing, but orthodox theory allows another, quite different, possibility,
which is interesting and worth explaining.

What one sees in the recent works that you mention seems to depend
on one's point of view. Carefully assessed, they do not show that
one can get along without Process I. A huge amount of effort has been
expended in the effort to get the observer back out, and those workers
are encouraged by seeing traces of classically describable features
here and there. Efforts to neutralize our role in nature will undoubtedly
persist for a while longer. But it is certainly worth emphasizing that QM
need not neutralize us, and that orthodox QM not only does not neutralize
us but incorporates us into the dynamics in a way that, although not in line
with nineteeth century ideals, seems to fit nicely the emerging data. And it
does not require us to turn our most deeply felt perception about ourselves, 
a primary life-spanning continually reaffirmed stream of intense data, 
into a deceptive illusion. James stressed that all observation is fallible,
and certainly we are often deceived about details, but to expand fallibility
about details into this wholesale rejection should not to be entered into
lightly when it goes against basic empirically supported orthodox physics,
when there is no evidence indicating the need for such a rejection of
comtemporary orthodox theory..

> 
> I have often admitted that aspects of my work are speculative.  It is
> certainly complex, but then I do not know how complex reality
> actually is.  I do not accept that my work is ``anti-occam''.   I only
> multiply entities under necessity; in particular, the necessities of
> avoiding solipsism, of theoretical consistency, and of compatibility
> with the empirical evidence for process 2, for (special) relativity
> theory, and for consciousness.
> 

I think the empirical evidence is for the triparite othodox process.
But, of course, evidence is theory-laden, so if you can devise another
theory that accounts for all the data that the orthodox theory does, then
your theory is equally well empirically supported. But it is probably more
in line with Occam to eliminate the many worlds we cannot experience, and
which cannot affect us, than to eliminate our palpable power to 
influence our own bodily behavior.

> I believe that my theory has been developed to the point where it
> reproduces the predictions of orthodox quantum theory (in the
> circumstances in which the orthodox theory makes confirmable
> predictions).  This is discussed at length in my paper
> ``Progress in a Many-Minds Interpretation of Quantum Theory'',
> quant-ph/9904001.
> 
> This paper, which contains the current definitive statement of my
> theory, is available both from quant-ph, and from the abstract on my
> web site at
> 
> http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/pimmia.html
> 

I shall make time to have a look at it: I base my assessment of
MW on the many papers on the subject that I have studied, and on
my own efforts in that direction, but I was unaware of your paper.

> On the subject of ``a theory mapping brain states to sets of
> orthogonal projections'', you write
> 
> >  The Process 1 action replaces S(t) by PS(t)P +P'S(t)P', with
> >  P'=1-P. 
> 
> >  In order to causally relate Process 1 to effective intentional 
> >  action the state PS(t)P should contains no aspect of S(t) 
> >  that conflicts with a template for action that, if held in place,
> >  will tend to make future experiences of the agent conform to
> >  his intention.
> 
> and then
> 
> >   The state of the brain is assumed to be nearly a mixture 
> >   of classically describable states. But the state of the
> >   brain is described by a density matrix, S(t), and the dynamics
> >   of Process 1 is controlled by that density matrix, as a whole.
> >   In the simplest model one defines {P} be the set of P that
> >   correspond to possible increments in knowledge, and defines
> >   projection operator P(t) to be the P in {P} that maximizes 
> >   Trace PS(t)/Trace S(t). This P(t) depends of course on the
> >   entire mixture represented by S(t), and any dynamics involving
> >   P(t) will likewise involve this entire mixture. This P(t) might
> >   be expected to be pertinent because it is the P that is generated
> >   with the greatest statistical weight by the brain in its search
> >   for an appropriate action to take in the light of the situation
> >   faced by the person. A simple model takes the P associated with
> >   a Process 1 event at time t to necessarily be P(t). Then only a 
> >   rule for a "consent" needs to be specified in order to 
> >   complete the dynamics. Because the nature of the underlying
> >   reality is essentially experiential, it would be natural for
> >   the "consent" to be related to experientially felt values
> >   associated with the experience specified by P(t).
> 
> I don't know how to define ``the set of P that correspond to possible
> increments in knowledge''.  

I believe that consciousness is associated with functional properties
of the brain, and that each possible conscious thought is associated
with the activation of a particular functional pattern of brain
activity, and that the action S-->PSP picks out the particular
functional activity by eliminating competitors.
> 
> If you take ``the P that is generated with the greatest statistical
> weight'' are you then ``able to rigorously produce the predictions of
> orthodox vN quantum theory''?  What happens if I'm listening to a
> Geiger counter with a very small chance of clicking in any given
> time interval and, as hard as I can, I ``choose'' not to hear it click?
> 

The key choice here in the choice to which is traced the existence of 
the classically describable set up. Process 2, alone, cannot give this.
Given that set-up, the Process 3 describes which of the discrete bins
specified by the set-up will be actualized. Whether someone is checking
the bins does not matter. 

I am concerned, however, more with the case in which
an agent must choose how to respond to challenging perceptual input. 

> You wrote
> >  [Donald] seems to miss the main point, which is that what is
> >  controlling the Process 1 involves psychological realities. So the
> >  collapse sequence is indeed "well-defined". But it is controlled by
> >  psychological factors.
> 
> ``Well-defined'' means defined in mathematical terms.  The point I
> miss is how you suppose psychology realities to be defined in
> mathematical terms.
> 

The "collapse sequence" is the sequence of physically/mathematically
described actions S->PSP. This description includes the times at which 
these events occur. But temporal density of these event is asserted
to be influenced by psy-factors.

> I wrote
> >  Just as one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy
> > of mind is whether mental events are merely how
> > neurophysiological events appear, so one of the most fundamental
> > questions in the philosophy of quantum theory is whether von
> > Neumann's indeterministic events are merely how the continuous
> > changes appear in specific circumstances.  My starting point is to
> > answer both questions affirmatively, and therefore I have tried to
> > develop a theory characterizing ``appearance''.
> 
> You replied
> >  The idea that there should be, in addition to the causally complete
> >  physical reality also "appearances" is a baffling idea, unless one
> >  postulates some nonphysical observer with nonphysical thoughts,
> >  which is not what Donald does. But then what are these extra
> >  nonphysical "mere appearances"? Why should they exist at all, if
> >  they have no real causal role?
> 
> In much of my writing, there is a tension between a final fully
> consistent but highly abstract analysis and a preliminary analysis
> posed in comprehensible terms.  My preliminary analysis may
> describe, for example, a quantum state for a physical brain in the
> sort of physical world that we see around us.  Ultimately, however,
> this is to be superseded by an understanding of such apparent
> worlds as mere appearance; merely a reflection of the abstract
> information-bearing structures which constitute our minds.
> 
> In a complete many-minds interpretation, physical reality is just a
> single, essentially contentless, quantum state, which, in the
> Heisenberg picture, is unchanging.  Everything of any interest lies in
> the ``appearances''.  That is why, increasingly, I describe myself as
> a philosophical idealist.   
> 

Everything interesting seems to have become shifted out of the
physical would, with all of its important mathematical properties,
into the world of appearances. But then all of the mathematics must be
shifted to that world. The world of appearances would then seem to be
essentually the same as the usual theory, which is based of potential 
increments of knowledge and their connection to experienced increments of 
knowledge, into one based on potential appearances and their connection to 
experienced appearances. At that point it just seems to be a change of words.
The nitty-gritty is the form of the extra rules that go beyond Process 1,
but which allow individual streams of consciousness to be set apart that
conform essentially to von Neumann's rules but which lack von Neumann's 
real Process 1, which is an essential component of his rules.

> I don't know why minds should exist at all. 

Is not that a bad thing?

> Here's what I wrote in a recent paper (``Finitary and infinitary
> mathematics, the possibility of possibilities and the definition of
> probabilities'', quant-ph/0306201, also available on my web site at
> 
> http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/fima.html
> 
> ) in which I was *really* being speculative:
> 
> >  My interpretation of quantum theory amounts to the definition of a
> >  stochastic process on abstract patterns of information.  Despite
> >  the complexity of this definition, it seems to me far from
> >  inconceivable that among all the possible ways in which
> >  stochastic processes can be defined on such patterns, the
> >  postulated definition is actually as simple as any comparable set
> >  of rules which make likely rich and meaningful patterns of
> >  information.
> 
> In the apparent physical world, brains evolve and consciousness is
> an epiphenomenon.  But from the point of view of a complete
> many-minds interpretation, consciousness is central, and brains
> appear to have evolved because the most likely sort of rich and
> meaningful pattern of information which can arise from simple
> rules and a simple contentless quantum state is the sort of pattern
> which will explain its own existence as the culmination of a long
> sequence of historical accidents with results selected by the
> survival of the fitest.
> 
> Idealists always require something additional to mind to explain
> why our world is not a freely-chosen dream world.  Bishop Berkeley
> thought that God was the answer.  I think that what must be added is
> probability.  I think that our worlds are typical, according to a
> well-defined probabilistic structure, of the worlds which can be
> experienced by minds of our complexity, supervening on
> stochastically-generated patterns of information obeying certain
> well-defined rules.  Our experience of evidence for our evolution is
> part of what makes us typical in this sense.
> 
> Finally, you wrote
> >  The fact that the predictions of QT are valid means that there can
> >  be no observable effects of the unknown faraway events.
> 
> This seems to me to be a circular argument.  Just as I am trying to
> go further than Everett, and therefore I meet new problems, so I
> think that, even leaving aside your proposals about the causal
> efficacy of minds, you are trying to go further than Heisenberg.  You
> are sufficiently explicit about the instantaneous occurrence of
> quantum events all across the universe that you are in a position to
> query whether, in the kind of formalism you are building, it is a fact
> that the (conventional, local, non-relativistic, small system)
> predictions of QT remain valid.  Addressing that query might
> conceivably allow you to place a bound on the rate at which process
> 1 can occur within a volume, or even allow you to argue that the
> universe is finite. 
> 

I am sufficiently explicit about my model to be able to say that the 
answers are "No". These instantanteous events associated with far-away
unknown Process 1 and 3 actions have no measuredable local effects. 
(To be sure, I do not go from denumerably infinite to more infinite than 
that, as regards to the number of events.) 

> In my opinion, satisfaction with ``loose ideas'' is the worst
> weakness in work on the interpretation of quantum theory.  What is
> most needed is explicit formalisms, which allow problems to be
> revealed and addressed.
> 

Yes indeed, and useful applications made to challenging real data. 

> 
> With best wishes,
>  
> yours sincerely,
>  
> Matthew Donald.
> 
>  
> e-mail: matthew.donald@phy.cam.ac.uk
> web site:  http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014 
> ``a many-minds interpretation of quantum theory''
>  ***************************************************
> 

Thank you for your reasonable comments, and your
sketch of your alternative many-minds approach. 

With best regards,

Henry P. Stapp

From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Wed Jan  7 16:40:21 2004
Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2004 16:39:26 -0800 (PST)
From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov
Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov
To: Matthew Donald <mjd1014@phy.cam.ac.uk>
Cc: Jeffrey M. Schwartz <jmschwar@ucla.edu>
Subject: Re: debate

On Tue, 23 Dec 2003, Matthew Donald wrote:

> 
> Dear Henry,
> 
> I wrote
> >  I have now worked your reply to my review together with my
> >  comments (those I sent you and some more) into an html page
> >  which is on my web site at
> 
> http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/stappr.html
> 
> You replied
> >  I have had prepared for some time a response to your
> >  reply, but had put off sending it 'til I had time to read
> >  it through carefully. But I'll send it off now. (attached)
> >  Please work it into your exposition. I will not be able
> >  to pursue this further until Jan '04.
> 
> I have now worked it in. 
> 
> Your reply was to my e-mail rather than the published html reply.
> In most cases, I hadn't made changes which were significant for
> the points to which you replied, but, in January, you might like to
> have a look at the points which weren't in the e-mail.
> 
> You might also like to consider a couple of points where I did make
> significant changes.
> 
> In my e-mail of 14th December, I wrote
> > If you take ``the P that is generated with the greatest statistical
> > weight'' are you then ``able to rigorously produce the predictions of
> > orthodox vN quantum theory''?  What happens if I'm listening to a
> > Geiger counter with a very small chance of clicking in any given
> > time interval and, as hard as I can, I ``choose'' not to hear it click?
> 
> You replied
> > The key choice here in the choice to which is traced the existence
> > of  the classically describable set up. Process 2, alone, cannot give
> > this. Given that set-up, the Process 3 describes which of the
> > discrete bins specified by the set-up will be actualized. Whether
> > someone is checking the bins does not matter. 
> 
> > I am concerned, however, more with the case in which an agent
> > must choose how to respond to challenging perceptual input. 
> 
> What actually went out on the html page on the 17th was
> > If you take ``the P that is generated with the greatest statistical
> > weight'' are you then ``able to rigorously produce the predictions of
> > orthodox vN quantum theory''? What happens if I'm listening to a
> > Geiger counter with a very small chance of clicking in any given
> > time interval? 
> 
> The reason I made the change is revealed in the answer I've given
> your reply.  (I won't repeat that answer here, to avoid starting
> another twin track conversation.)
> 
> Anyway, having my cake and eating it, I've changed the question
> posed to  
> >  If you take ``the P that is generated with the greatest statistical
> >  weight'' are you then ``able to rigorously produce the predictions
> >  of orthodox vN quantum theory''? What happens if I'm listening to a
> >  Geiger counter with a very small chance of clicking in any given
> >  time interval? What happens if, as hard as I can, I ``choose'' not to
> >  hear it click? 
> 
> This seems to fit your reply, and allows me to come back with a
> further question.
> 
> The significant second change was to the point where I discuss
> idealism.  You replied to the e-mailed
> > In a complete many-minds interpretation, physical reality is just a
> > single, essentially contentless, quantum state, which, in the
> > Heisenberg picture, is unchanging.  Everything of any interest lies
> > in the ``appearances''.  That is why, increasingly, I describe myself
> > as a philosophical idealist.   
> 
> rather than to my more considered
> > In a complete many-minds interpretation, the background physical
> > ``reality'' is just a single ``completely smeared out'' quantum state,
> > which, in the Heisenberg picture, is unchanging. All the real
> > interest lies with the minds; with their structures, with their
> > probabilities, and with their correlations. That is why,
> > increasingly, I describe myself as a philosophical idealist. 
> 
> This means that in your reply you talk about ``appearances'', rather
> than ``minds''.  Please let me know if you would like to revise this
> reply, because I want to come back on it.
> 
> Also, please let me know if you have any other comments to add.
> 
> Finally, you appear to refer to more than one version of your BBS
> paper.  I have included the link you originally gave to
> ~stapp/BBS7.doc in the discussion of energy conservation.  Is this
> link stable?  Should it be used at the other places where you
> mention this paper?
> 
> 
> With seasons greetings,
> 
> regards,
>  
> Matthew Donald.
> 
>  
> e-mail: matthew.donald@phy.cam.ac.uk
> web site:  http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014 
> ``a many-minds interpretation of quantum theory''
>  ***************************************************
> 

I have added a letter to the entries, with a new letter
at each Donald Review (0). Thus Stapp Reply (1)D begins
"In the mindless..." Numbers are added as needed, so that
Stapp (3)D1 is "Exactly"

Please add: (after DONALD(2)C, which is "So in what...using process 2."

STAPP (2)C

If the observers are free to choose, that sounds like Bohr, and the 
pragmatic approach, where observers are introduced and given powers
that are not specified by Process 2 (The Schr. Eqn.) alone.

In my parlance, the distinction between the pragmatic and many-worlds
(MW) approaches is that in the MW case the only rule is Process 2, and 
everything is required to be specified by that Process 2 alone, whereas
in the (orthodox) pragmatic approach the human agents are brought is
and allowed to make choices not deduced from Process 2. The effects of 
these choices on the physical universe are specified by Process 1.
If you allow the observers to freely choose how the physically described
system is to be probed, then in my parlance you are on the pragmatic side
of the Pragmatic versus MW divide. 
   
The problem with the MW approach that forced the founders of QM to the 
pragmatic alternative is the apparent impossibility of deducing Process 1, 
which is needed to link the QM mathematics to statistical predictions 
about experiences, from Process 2 alone. The problem is that it seems to 
be impossible to deduce from Process 2 alone the DISCRETE BASIS specified 
by Process I, from the continuous smear of overlapping possibilities 
produced by Process 2.
-------
I propose that we drop out my STAPP REPLY (1) D8 [This issue
of causation .... unique scientific possibility.] It is not in line
with the rest of the discussion.
-----

After DONALD (2) F2 [Debates...hidden variable theory.] insert:

"But is the "hidden" variable needed to complete the dynamics
psychic in character?"
-----

Following your DONALD (4)H3, which ends with "photograph is examined."

insert into Stapp(3)H3 before "I am concerned..."

According to the pragmatic approach, the main relevant Process 1 is the 
the choice made by the agent as to which experiment is to be set up.
In the cases you mention the choice is to put in place the particular
detection system, with a specified set of discrete bins. This is what
is difficult to achieve with Process 2 alone, because discrete bins
do not come out of the continuous smear of possible experimental
situations generated by Process 2 alone. Process 1 is 
a process of a very different kind. I believe it must be added as
a *supplement* to Process 2: it is not a *consequence* of Process 2.

But once the Process 1 action has occurred, then the various
orthogonal bins are specified and a statistical weight is assigned to
each bin, with the sum of these weights being unity. The quantum Zeno 
effect enters here first from the effort of the agent to decide which 
experiment to set up, and the effort of the agent to act in such a way
as to set this experiment up. If the experiment is a good experiment, then
the different bins will evolve into macroscopically distinguishable 
states, each with a statistical weight. An observer who opens his eyes
and gazes upon the "pointer" will evolve into a collection of orthogonal 
states. If the observer then attends to the position of the pointer in 
order to experience the outcome of the experiment then the probabilities
of the various possibilities will be specified by the statistical weights
of these possibilities. If the observer is attentive, and makes an effort
to remember, and perhaps mechanically record, the outcome then that 
initially oberved outcome will be held in place by the quantum Zeno
effect. 

It does not matter in  what order the possibilities are examined.
For example, of there are three possibiliies, outcome 1 with weight 90%,
outcome 2 with weight 9% and no experienced outcome with weight 1%, and 
the order of probing is by weight, then the first possibility will be 
experienced with probability 90%, the second with probability 9% and the 
third with probability 1%, according to von Neumann's rules, *sequentially 
applied*.  The order in which the questions are asked does not matter. The 
only reason that I imposed the special rule for the ordering was to make 
the process well defined, with just a sequence of Yes or No questions. 
   
It is important that the quantum zeno effect merely hangs onto
what has already been chosen: it does not affect the first choice.   
But by holding in place what has been randomly chosen, mental effort can
influence physical variables. It is this subtle effect that is
exploited in, for example, the BBS article on my website.
[http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html]

Although, everything works out OK for a standard measurement process, 
I am concerned more with the case ...to a challenging perceptual
input."
-------

After DONALD(4)H4 which ends with "sort of perceptual input." add:

STAPP (3) H4
I want to distinguish cases where the history of the person makes it
likely that he will be faced with a well defined choice between
distinct possibilities just on the basis of Process 2 alone from the cases
where Process 2 alone would produce a smear of *overlapping* (nearly 
classically defined) possibilities. These latter are the troublesome 
cases.

------

Please break DONALD REVIEW (0)L, which begins with "I believe that when.."
after "is more fundamental than psychology."

Then put my answer to *that* assertion, which begins with 
"Neurophysiology, and ends with "statistical properties."

Then comes your "My basic objection...measured."

Then insert my answer to *that* objection:

"Due to its discrete character the Process 1 choices cannot, I think,  be 
explained purely in mechanical/physiological terms: I believe that the choice
process involves the non-local psychic aspect of reality 
in a nonreducible way. Process 1 is not merely an aspect of 
Process 2. but is fundamentally psycho-physical. I go into this 
connection between the Process 1 projection operator P and brain 
in quite a lot of detail in the BBS article on my website. 

The projection operators P are operators that project onto 
patterns of neural excitations that constitute "templates for 
action". The relationship between these physical operators and
psychological intentions are "learned" by trial and error,
using the fact that an effortfully held in place P can have 
specific physical effects, via the quantum Zeno effect. Thus
the Process 1 actions, combined with effort, have causal effects
on the brain, and this allows a connection between psychological
experience and brain process to be established through learning,
even without having a detailed theory for the causal 
psycho-physical origins of the specific choice. A useful theory 
can be established without resolving this very deep question.

The key element of the pragmatic approach is that it 
allows the Process 1 choices to be introduced as basic empirically 
knowable variables, in place of the empirically inaccessible 
physically described local variables. Because of the "discreteness" 
character of this choice, Process 1 appears to be not reducible to 
Process 2. The difficult problem of specifying exactly how the 
psychological realities conspire with brain matter to produce a 
discrete choice is effectively evaded *at the practical level* 
by treating the choices as empirically specified input variables, 
just as in atomic physics. This gives a practically useful theory that 
covers a lot of data, and puts on the table, without immediately
answering, the deep question of the psycho-physical causal roots of 
the Process 1 choices."
-------
Please add onto STAPP (3)M, after "psy-factors." the paragraph:

  The Copenhagen way to make the psychological descriptions 
mathematical is to describe the intended empirical situation
in classical-physics terms. Using ideas from classical physics,
this classically described "idea" should be relatable to a
classically describable state of the EM field in the brain. 
There is a corresponding quantum coherent state and a projection
operator P onto that state. [See "Light as foundation of being."
in Quantum Implications, eds, Hiley & Peat, Routledge & Paul Kegan,
1987][Use the radiation gauge, Schwinger, Theory of Quantuzed 
Fields II, Phys.Rev. 91, 713-728 (1953) p.727]. Color and 
other psy-variables can probably also be represented in
a vector space. I see no reason in principle why the 
quantification of psy should be a problem.     
----

You noted that you altered DONALD (2) N [In much...idealist.]
Please replace my reply, Stapp(3)N, which reads "Everything... rules."
by 

"The idea that the only realities that we really know exist, 
namely our conscious experiences, are "mere appearances" in 
"apparent worlds" is exceedingly odd. To achieve this turning
of everything on it head, Donald needs to shift everything interesting 
out of the "physical world" into the world of "appearances". All the
mathematics that we need to use must somehow get shifted into the  
world of appearances. The rules pertaining to these apparent worlds must
somehow come out of Process 2, but yield at the practical level the 
qualitatively very different Process 1. Donald's world of appearances
must *effectively* go over to the very world described in the pragmatic
approach. 

The orthodox (pragmatic) approach deals *directly* with this
useful level of description, without entering into ontological 
speculations. It accepts our conscious experiences as the
foundation of science. The utility of trying to understand 
these primary scientific realities as "mere appearances" is 
not readily apparent.  In the von Neumann approach they are
primary variable that can actually have, within the formalism, 
the causal efficacy that they appear to have. 
-----
STAPP REPLY (1)P "I have discussed this in the (unabridged) BBS article
in the answer to question 4. 
[http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/BBSU1.doc  or ,pdf]
-----
After Donald (2)P [In this...temperature.] insert:
"I do very severely limit the effects of will to increasing
the density of attention to already actualized ideas."
-----

In STAPP REPLY (1)S [I assume...formulas.] please change
PR 82 to PR 91, and add after "formulas." The words:
"Also, the Schwinger-Tomonaga formalism allows S to be 
parameterized by S(sigma) not S(t), where sigma advances by
little local increments of the spacelike surface sigma.
The non intuitive spacelike action is easily
eliminated by imagining the spacetime future to be open, but 
the spacetime past (i.e., the part of spacetime behind the 
advancing (in process time) surface sigma, which creeps forward
by tiny local increments) to be existing and evolving 
in process time. The knowledge available on any portion of 
the spacetime surface sigma (the advancing NOW) is specified
by the actualizations in its backward light cone. But in a
Bell-type correlation measurement when the actualization
of an output occurs in a little advance of sigma on one leg, the
past evolves so as to implement the requisite correlated change
in the other leg. There is no action in a  space-like direction, but
correlations are implemented by actions in the V shaped region with
vertex at the creation of the singlet state. This is the natural way
to think about the "nonlocal" Bell-type "influences" in the relativistic
version of the von Neumann formalsm.
------

After DONALD (2)S [In Donald....per second.] Insert:

Stapp (2)S "I take the events in question to be macroscopic
[e.g., perhaps on the millimeter and the millisecond scales in a human
brain.] "

-----
After Donald (4) T ["The situations... conscious thought."]
insert:

STAPP (4) T " In all of my recent works I take the von Neumann
rules to hold strictly. That is a key requirement: stay
strictly within the framework devised by von Neumann."
----

Add to STAPP REPLY (1) V [Rome...accumulates]

Some key references to my works are missing from Donald's
list: 
Top-level code and selection: Stapp 1990 [Ch 6 of MM&QM, 1993/ 2003] 
"A quantum theory of the mind-brain interface."

Quantum Zeno Effect and Decoherence:
Website "Response to Tegmark" LBNL 46871 or  /~stapp/max.ps

-----

I hope these additions serve to clarify our points of agreement
and our differences. Thanks for your efforts in this direction.

Best regards,

Henry