U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
Bureau of Justice Statistics
Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin
Capital Punishment 1993
NCJ-150042
This report is one in a series.  More recent editions
may available.  To view a list of all in the series go to
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#cp
Full text with tables available from:
Bureau of Justice Statistics Clearinghouse
800-732-3277
Box 179
Annapolis Junction, MD. 20701-0179
FAX Number (for report orders and mail list signup only): 410-792-4358
Capital Punishment 1993
By James Stephan
BJS Statistician
and Peter Brien
BJS Statistical Assistant
Ten States executed 38 prisoners during 1993. The number of persons
executed was seven more than in 1992 and was the largest annual number
since the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of revised State
capital punishment laws in 1976. The prisoners executed during 1993 had
been under sentence of death an average of 9 years and 5 months, about
1 month less than the average for inmates executed the previous year.
For the 2,716 prisoners under sentence of death at yearend, 55% were
held by States in the South. Western States had an additional 22%;
Midwestern States, 16%; and the Northeastern States of Connecticut, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 7%. California held the largest number of death
row inmates (363), followed by Texas (357), Florida (324), and
Pennsylvania (169).  Six prisoners were in Federal custody under a death
sentence on December 31, 1993.
Between January 1 and December 31, 1993, 30 State prison systems and
the Federal prison system received 282 prisoners under sentence of death.
California (33 admissions), Florida (32), North Carolina (32), and Texas
(27) accounted for 44% of the inmates entering prison under a death
sentence in 1993.
Ten States executed 38 persons in 1993--17 in Texas; 5 in Virginia; 4 in
Missouri; 3 in Florida; 2 each in Arizona, Delaware, and Georgia; and 1
each in California, Louisiana, and Washington. All were men.
Status of the death penalty, December 31, 1993
Executions     Number of prisoners        Jurisdictions
during 1993    under sentence of death    without a death penalty
____________________________________________________________
____
Texas     17    California     363        Alaska
Virginia   5    Texas          357        District of Columbia
Missouri   4    Florida        324        Hawaii
Florida    3    Pennsylvania  169        Iowa
Arizona    2    Illinois       152        Kansas
Delaware   2    Ohio           129        Maine
Georgia    2    Oklahoma       122        Massachusetts
California 1    Alabama        120        Michigan
Louisiana  1    Arizona        112        Minnesota
Washington 1    North Carolina  99        New York
                Tennessee       98        North Dakota
                Georgia         96        Rhode Island
                23 other                  Vermont
                jurisdictions  575        West Virginia
                                          Wisconsin
 Total  38       Total   2,716
*At yearend 1993, 34 States and the Federal prison system held 2,716
prisoners under sentence of death, 5.3% more than at yearend 1992. All
had committed murder.
*During 1993, 38 men were executed:
18  were non-Hispanic and white
13  were non-Hispanic and black
 1  was Native American
 4  were white and Hispanic
 2  had an unknown Hispanic origin (1 white and 1 black).
*The average time between sentencing and yearend 1993 for the 2,716
inmates was 6 years and 1 month.
*During 1993, 282 prisoners under a sentence of death were received by
State prison systems from the courts.
*Among inmates under sentence of death and with available criminal
histories, 2 in 3 had a prior felony conviction; nearly 1 in 10 had a prior
homicide conviction.
*About 2 in 5 inmates sentenced to death had a criminal justice status
when they committed their capital offense: About half of these were on
parole and half included persons with charges pending, on probation, in
prison or escaped from prison, and others.
*Almost 1 in 7 persons sentenced to death between 1988 and 1993 had
received two or more death sentences.
*Of persons under sentence of death--
1,566 (57.7%) were white
1,109 (40.8%) were black
   22 (0.8%) were Native American
   16 (0.6%) were Asian American
    3 were classified as "other race."
*The 206 Hispanic inmates under sentence of death accounted for 8.1%
of inmates with a known ethnicity.
*Thirty-five (1.3%) of the persons under a death sentence were women.
*Half of the inmates sentenced to death had been sentenced at age 29 or
older.
Eighteen of the executed prisoners were non-Hispanic whites; 13 were
non-Hispanic blacks; 4, white Hispanics; 1, white with unknown Hispanic
origin; 1, black with unknown Hispanic origin; and 1, Native American.
Twenty-six of the executions were carried out by lethal injection, 10 by
electrocution, 1 by lethal gas, and 1 by hanging.
From January 1, 1977, to December 31, 1993, a total of 226 executions
took place in 21 States. Of these 121 (53.5%) were white, 87 (38.5%)
were black, 16 (7.1%) were Hispanic, and 2 (0.9%) were Native
American. During 1977-93, a total of 4,259 persons entered State prisons
under sentences of death, among whom 2,468 (57.9%) were white, 1,724
(40.5%) were black, and 67 (1.6%) were of other races. Also during
1977-93, 1,789 removals from a death sentence occurred as a result of
dispositions other than execution (resentencing, retrial, commutation, or
death while awaiting execution). Of those removed from under a death
sentence, 937 (52.4%) were white, 747 (41.7%) were black, 17 (0.9%)
were Native American, 8 (0.5%) were Asian American, and 80 (4.5%)
were Hispanic.
Capital punishment in the courts
Dobbs v. Zant, January 19, 1993  Without dissent, the Supreme Court
held that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit erred in refusing
to consider a newly discovered transcript of the sentencing hearing which
was unavailable during the original sentencing proceeding. The defendant
sought habeas corpus relief, charging that he received ineffective
assistance from his court-appointed counsel at sentencing. The High Court
emphasized the importance of reviewing capital sentences on a complete
record and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Graham v. Collins, January 25, 1993  This case involved a petitioner who
claimed that Texas' sentencing instructions to the jury prevented the jury
from adequately considering certain mitigating evidence. When the Court
of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
Federal habeas corpus relief, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the
appeal. Because this case came before the Supreme Court on collateral
review, the Court, consistent with the principles established in Teague v.
Lane (1990), had first to determine whether the relief sought by the
petitioner would require the creation of a new rule of constitutional
law.The Court held that petitioner's claim would require a new rule;
therefore, his claim was barred.
After the petitioner was convicted of capital murder, a separate
punishment phase was conducted to determine the sentence.  For the death
sentence to be imposed according to Texas' capital-sentencing statute then
in effect, a jury had to answer affirmatively each of three questions: (1)
Was the conduct of the defendant committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that death would result? (2) Is there a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society? and (3) Was the conduct of the
defendant unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased?  After being instructed to consider all of the evidence, the jury
unanimously answered yes to all three special issues.
Upon appeal, the defendant claimed that the three special issues did not
allow the jury to consider fully the mitigating circumstances of his youth,
character, and otherwise crime-free background. The Supreme Court held
that the defendant's claim would require a fourth special issue that would
instruct the jury to consider any mitigating evidence, independent of its
relevance to the three special issues.  Because the ruling that the petitioner
sought would have constituted a new rule under Teague v. Lane, the
Court denied Federal habeas corpus relief.
Herrera v. Collins, January 25, 1993  This case dealt with the issue of
whether a capital defendant can seek Federal habeas
corpus relief by claiming that new evidence renders him actually innocent
of the murder for which he was sentenced to death.
In 1982 the defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of a police
officer. Following his conviction, he pleaded guilty to the murder of a
second police officer. Ten years after his conviction, the defendant filed
a second petition for Federal habeas corpus relief arguing that he was
innocent of the murders of the police officers and that the defendant's
now-dead brother had committed the murders. The defendant offered four
new affidavits in his defense. The district court dismissed most of the
claims but granted a request for a stay of execution so that another appeal
could be made.  The  Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found no
evidentiary basis for petitioner's claim and vacated the stay of execution.
Affirming the findings of the court of appeals in a five-to-three decision,
the Supreme Court held that a claim of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence is not ground for Federal habeas corpus relief. The
Court defended as consistent with due process the Texas statute which
requires that a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence be
made within 60 days of judgment.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, January 25, 1993  The defense counsel failed to
object during the sentencing phase on a matter in which the objection
would have been sustained. If the objection had been made, a sentence of
death would have been precluded. After the proceeding, a Supreme Court
decision in Strickland v. Washington (1984), removed the validity of such
an objection. In this case the Supreme Court decided whether the defense
counsel's failure to make an objection in a State criminal proceeding
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
The defendant was convicted of capital felony murder and sentenced to
death by an Arkansas jury after the jury found one aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances to exist. Defendant
petitioned for collateral relief to the Arkansas Supreme Court on the basis
that the death sentence was unconstitutional under the then-existing
precedent of Collins v. Lockhart (1985). The Arkansas Supreme Court
declined to consider whether to follow Collins because defense counsel
had failed to raise the issue during the sentencing phase; the court
affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence
The defendant appealed to the District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
Collins objection, and that this failure amounted to prejudice under
Strickland.  Under Strickland, a defendant demonstrates prejudice by
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to render an unfair or
unreliable result.
Unfairness or unreliability does not result unless counsel's ineffectiveness
deprives the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the
law entitles him. The district court, in a ruling affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, found prejudice, granted habeas corpus
relief, and conditionally vacated the death sentence.
By seven to two, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing proceeding
was neither unfair nor unreliable because the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit overruled Collins in 1989. Reversing the court of appeals'
decision to vacate the death sentence, the Court ruled that the defendant
suffered no prejudice from counsel's deficient performance.
Delo v. Lashley, March 8, 1993  In this case the Court examined the
adequacy  of the trial court's instruction during the punishment phase.
The defendant argued that the trial court: (1) violated the defendant's
eighth amendment due process rights by refusing to instruct the jury as to
the mitigating circumstance of "no significant history of prior criminal
activity," and (2) failed to automatically instruct the jury that the
defendant was  to be presumed innocent.
Without dissent, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on both counts.  On the first count, the
High Court held that no evidence was offered by defense counsel to
support the instruction of the mitigating circumstance.  Applying a
principle established in Lockett v. Ohio (1978), no eighth amendment
violation occurred because nothing in the Constitution obligates State
courts to give mitigating circumstance instructions when no evidence is
offered to support them.  On the second count, the Supreme Court ruled
that the defendant in this case was convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the
trial; therefore, the presumption of innocence disappears.  The defendant
was not automatically entitled to a "presumption  of innocence"
instruction.
Arave v. Creech, March 30, 1993  The Supreme Court considered
whether Idaho's aggravating circumstance, that the defendant exhibited
"utter disregard for human life," was unconstitutionally vague.
The petitioner in this case was an inmate serving life terms for several
first-degree murders.  He had admitted to killing or participating in the
killing of at least 26 people.  Bodies of 11 of his victims were recovered
in 7 States.  The defendant received the death penalty for the murder of
a physically handicapped fellow inmate, whose skull the defendant
smashed with a sock full of batteries and whom he repeatedly kicked
about the throat and head.
The petitioner was sentenced to death, in part because of the aggravating
circumstance that he exhibited "utter disregard for human life."  Affirming
the trial court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected petitioner's
argument that the aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague,
holding that the validity of the aggravating circumstance stemmed from
their finding that the petitioner was a "cold-blooded, pitiless" killer.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction in part
because the aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague.  In a
seven to two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and held that the aggravating circumstance provides clear
and objective standards and minimizes the risk of an arbitrary and
capricious application of the death penalty.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, June 1, 1993  The Supreme Court reviewed a jury
instruction that was essentially identical to an instruction held
unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana (1990) to determine whether it was
harmless error.
In the Louisiana trial of a defendant charged with first-degree murder in
the course of committing armed robbery, the judge gave instructions to the
jury that included a definition of reasonable doubt that was essentially
identical to a definition previously ruled to be unconstitutional. The
defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the conviction but remanded the case
for a new sentencing hearing on grounds other than the erroneous jury
instruction, which it ruled harmless.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana. The Supreme Court held that in a criminal
case, a jury instruction which is constitutionally deficient in the definition
of reasonable doubt would always invalidate a conviction. The Court
concluded that reliance on an unconstitutional definition of reasonable
doubt violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to jury trial.
Godinez v. Moran, June 24, 1993  The Supreme Court considered
whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right
to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial.
The petitioner was sentenced to death by a Nevada jury for using an
automatic pistol to fatally shoot a bartender and patron four times each
and his former wife five times.  Two psychiatrists examined the defendant
and concluded that he was competent to stand trial.  Approximately 10
weeks after the evaluations, the defendant decided to discharge his
attorneys and change his pleas to guilty.  After review of the defendant's
mental condition, the
trial court accepted the waiver of counsel and guilty pleas.  The defendant
was then sentenced to death. The defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that he had been mentally
incompetent to represent himself. The court of appeals reversed the
conviction, ruling that the conviction was based upon a legal standard for
competency that was too low.
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the court of appeals, holding that the decision to waive the right to counsel
does not require a higher level of mental functioning than the decision to
waive other constitutional rights. The Court held that the standard for
measuring a criminal defendant's competency to plead guilty or to waive
the right to counsel is not higher than the standard for standing trial.
Johnson v. Texas, June 24, 1993  In this case the High Court again
examined the death penalty as applied in Texas. The Court upheld Texas'
capital sentencing system as consistent with the 8th and 14th amendments.
Because this case came to the Supreme Court on direct review of the
petitioner's conviction and sentence, the restraints established in Teague
v. Lane did not apply.
The case involved a 19 year-old drug abuser who robbed and murdered
a convenience store clerk. After the jury determined that the defendant
was guilty of capital murder, the separate punishment phase was
conducted. Upon appeal, defense counsel argued that the special issues did
not specifically instruct the jury to consider the defendant's age as a
mitigating factor.  In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled that
there was no reason to believe that the jury was precluded from
considering the defendant's youth in its determinations.
Focusing on the special issue that the defendant would continue to threaten
the community, the High Court concluded that the jury was able to make
a determination on a defendant's future dangerousness by asking the extent
to which youth influenced the defendant's conduct.
Statutory changes
During 1993, 12 States revised statutory provisions relating to the death
penalty. Most of the changes involved additional aggravating
circumstances, additional categories of victims permitting the application
of the death penalty, and broadening of the law to allow a defendant to
choose between two methods of execution. By State, these statutory
changes were as follows:
Arizona--Added new sections to and revised an act relating to death
sentences. These revisions became effective 7/21/93.
In specifying conditions of a sentence to life in prison without
the possibility of release, the revision eliminates a previous stipulation of
release.  The stipulation was that the defendant could be released after 25
years if the victim was at least age 15 and after 35 years if the victim was
less than 15 (13-703).
Arizona lawmakers also provided that persons sentenced to death shall not
be executed if they are mentally ill or incompetent and cannot understand
the nature of the punishment or the reasons for the execution (13-4021).
Arkansas--Added teachers and other school employees to its capital
murder victims list that includes law enforcement officers, prison officials,
probation and parole officers, fire fighters and court officials (5-10-101),
effective 8/13/93
California--Revised its penal code to allow persons sentenced to death to
choose between lethal gas and lethal injection as the method of execution
(paragraph 3604), effective 1/1/93.
Colorado--Revised a statute to prohibit sentencing mentally retarded
persons to death (16- 9-403), effective 4/29/93.
Connecticut--Added to its penal code as an aggravating factor the
defendant's use of an assault weapon in a capital felony (53a-46a),
effective 10/1/93.
Illinois--Added paramedics, ambulance drivers, and other medical
assistance or first aid personnel killed in the course of duty to its capital
murder victims list (720-ILCS 5/9 1(b)(2)), effective 1/1/93.
Indiana--Added probation and parole officers, community corrections
officers, and home detention officers to its capital murder victims list, and
added carjacking murder as an aggravating circumstance (3-50-2-9),
effective 7/1/93.
Louisiana--Amended its code of criminal procedure to provide for a 12
hour delay between the verdict and the sentencing hearing in a capital case
(LA C. Cr. P. Art 905).
Nevada--Enacted a law expanding the number of aggravating
circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed to include
conviction of more than one offense of murder in the first or second
degree (AB-58), effective 10/1/93.
New Jersey--Added "leader of a narcotics-trafficking network" as an
aggravating circumstance (NJS.A.ZC:11- 3(:)), effective 5/5/93; and
amended the State's death penalty statute to state that the term "homicidal
act" means conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in
death (NJS.A.2C:11-3(c) and-3(c)(4)(i), effective 1/26/93.
Ohio--Amended its penal code to permit persons sentenced to death to
elect to be executed by means of a lethal injection instead of by
electrocution (O.R.C. 2949.22), effective 10/1/93.
Texas--Added to its list of capital offenses the following: murder of more
than one person during the same criminal transaction,  murder of more
than one during different criminal transactions but according to the same
scheme or course of conduct, and murder of an individual under age 6
(19.03 (a)(z)), effective 9/1/93.
Alabama. Murder during kidnaping, robbery, rape, sodomy, burglary,
sexual assault, or arson; murder of a peace officer, correctional officer,
or public official; murder while under a life sentence; murder for
pecuniary gain or contract; aircraft piracy; murder by a defendant with a
previous murder conviction; murder of a witness to a crime; murder when
a victim is subpoenaed in a criminal proceeding, when the murder is
related to the role of the victim as a witness; murder when a victim is less
than 14 years old; murder in which a victim is killed while in a dwelling
by a deadly weapon fired from outside the dwelling; murder in which a
victim is killed while in a motor vehicle by a deadly weapon fired from
outside that vehicle; murder in which a victim is killed by a deadly
weapon fired from a motor vehicle (13A-5-40).
Arizona. First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 10 aggravating
factors.
Arkansas. Capital murder as defined by Arkansas statute (5-10-101).
Felony murder; arson causing death; intentional murder of a law
enforcement officer, teacher or school employee; murder of prison, jail,
court, or correctional personnel or of military personnel acting in line of
duty; multiple murders; intentional murder of a public officeholder or
candidate; intentional murder while under life sentence; contract murder.
California. Treason; homicide by a prisoner serving a life term;
first-degree murder with special circumstances; train wrecking; perjury
causing execution.
Colorado. First-degree murder; kidnaping with death of victim; felony
murder. Capital sentencing excludes persons determined to be mentally
retarded.
Connecticut. Murder of a public safety or correctional officer; murder for
pecuniary gain; murder in the course of a felony; murder by a defendant
with a previous conviction for intentional murder; murder while under a
life sentence; murder during a kidnaping; illegal sale of cocaine,
methadone, or heroin to a person who dies from using these drugs;
murder during first-degree sexual assault; multiple murders; the defendant
committed the offense(s) with an assault weapon.
Delaware. First-degree murder with aggravating circumstances.
Federal prison system.  See Appendix  II.
Florida. First-degree murder; capital felonies (FS 921.141); capital drug
trafficking felonies
(FS 921.142).
Georgia. Murder; kidnaping with bodily injury when the victim dies;
aircraft hijacking; treason; kidnaping for ransom when the victim dies.
Idaho. First-degree murder; aggravated kidnaping.
Illinois. First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 12 aggravating
factors.
Indiana. Murder with 13 aggravating circumstances.
Kentucky. Aggravated murder; kidnaping when victim is killed.
Louisiana. First-degree murder; treason (La. R.S. 14:30 and 14:113).
Maryland. First-degree murder, either premeditated or during the
commission of a felony.
Mississippi. Capital murder includes murder of a peace officer or
correctional officer, murder while under a life sentence, murder by bomb
or explosive, contract murder, murder committed during specific felonies
(rape, burglary, kidnaping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural
intercourse with a child, nonconsensual unnatural intercourse), and murder
of an elected official. Capital rape is the forcible rape of a child under 14
years old by a person 18 years or older.  Aircraft piracy.
Missouri. First-degree murder (565.020 RSMO).
Montana. Deliberate homicide; aggravated kidnaping when victim or
rescuer dies; attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault, or
aggravated kidnaping by a State prison inmate who has a prior conviction
for deliberate homicide or who has been previously declared a persistent
felony offender  (46-18-303,MCA).
Nebraska. First-degree murder.
Nevada. First-degree murder with 9 aggravating circumstances.
New Hampshire. Contract murder; murder of a law enforcement officer;
murder of a kidnaping victim; killing another after being sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole.
New Jersey. Purposeful or knowing murder; contract murder.
New Mexico. First-degree murder; felony murder with aggravating
circumstances.
North Carolina. First-degree murder (N.C.G.S. 14-17).
Ohio. Assassination; contract murder; murder during escape; murder
while in a correctional facility; murder after conviction for a prior
purposeful killing or prior attempted murder; murder of a peace officer;
murder arising from specified felonies (rape, kidnaping, arson, robbery,
burglary); murder of a witness to prevent testimony in a criminal
proceeding or in retaliation (O.R.C. secs. 2929.02, 2903.01, 2929.04).
Oklahoma. Murder with malice aforethought; murder arising from
specified felonies (forcible rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon,
kidnaping, escape from lawful custody, first-degree burglary, arson);
murder when the victim is a child who has been injured, tortured, or
maimed.
Oregon. Aggravated murder.
Pennsylvania. First-degree murder.
South Carolina. Murder with statutory aggravating circumstances.
South Dakota. First-degree murder; kidnaping with gross permanent
physical injury inflicted on the victim; felony murder.
Tennessee. First-degree murder.
Texas. Murder of a public safety officer, fireman, or correctional
employee; murder during the commission of specified felonies (kidnaping,
burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, arson); murder for remuneration;
multiple murders; murder during prison escape; murder by a State prison
inmate; murder of an individual under 6 years of age.
Utah. Aggravated murder (76-5-202, Utah Code annotated).
Virginia. Murder during the commission or attempts to commit specified
felonies (abduction, armed robbery, rape, sodomy); contract murder;
murder by a prisoner while in custody; murder of a law enforcement
officer; multiple murders; murder of a child under 12 years during an
abduction; murder arising from drug violations (18.2-31, Virginia Code
as amended).
Washington. Aggravated first-degree premeditated murder.
Wyoming. First-degree murder, including both premeditated and felony
murder.
Method of execution
As of December 31, 1993, lethal injection was the predominant method
of execution (25 States). Twelve States authorized electrocution; 8 States,
lethal gas; 3 States, hanging; and 2 States, a firing squad.
Fourteen States authorized more than one method--lethal injection and an
alternative method--generally at the election of the condemned prisoner;
however, 3 of these 14 stipulated which method must be used, depending
on the date of sentencing; 1 authorized hanging only if lethal injection
could not be given; and 1 authorized lethal gas if lethal injection is ever
ruled unconstitutional.
Federal executions, effective February 18, 1993, are to be carried out by
lethal injection.
Automatic review
Of the 36 States with capital punishment statutes at yearend 1993, 35
provided for review of all death sentences regardless of the defendant's
wishes. Arkansas had no specific provisions for automatic review, and the
issue was in litigation in South Carolina. The Federal death penalty
procedures did not provide for automatic review after a sentence of death
had been imposed. While most of the 35 States authorized an automatic
review of both the conviction and sentence, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, and
Tennessee required review of the sentence only. In Idaho, review of the
conviction had to be appealed or forfeited. In Indiana, a defendant could
waive review of the conviction.
The review was usually conducted by the State's highest appellate court
regardless of the defendant's wishes. (In Maryland the question of whether
a defendant could waive the right to automatic review of the sentence had
not been addressed; and in Wyoming neither the statute nor case law
clearly precluded a waiver of an appeal.) If either the conviction or the
sentence was vacated, the case could be remanded to the trial court for
additional proceedings or for retrial. As a result of retrial or resentencing,
the death sentence could be reimposed.
Minimum age
According to State attorney general offices, in  1993 nine jurisdictions did
not specify a minimum age for which the death penalty could be imposed.
In some States the minimum age was set forth in the statutory provisions
that determine the age at which a juvenile may be transferred to criminal
court for trial as an adult. Eleven States and the Federal prison system
required a minimum age of 18. Sixteen States indicated an age of
eligibility between 14 and 17.
Characteristics of prisoners under sentence of death at yearend 1993
Thirty-four States and the Federal prison system held a total of 2,716
prisoners under sentence of death on December 31, 1993, a gain of 136
or 5.3% more than at the end of 1992). The Federal prison system count
rose from 1 inmate at yearend 1992 to 6 at yearend 1993. Three States,
which had 24% of the adult resident population reported 38% of the
Nation's death row population:  California (363), Texas (357), and Florida
(324). Of the 35 jurisdictions with statutes authorizing the death penalty,
New Hampshire and Wyoming had no one under a capital sentence and
South Dakota, New Mexico, and Colorado had 3 or fewer.
Fifty-five percent of all inmates under sentence of death were in Southern
States--a region that contained 35% of the Nation's adults. For the West
the percentages of all persons under sentence of death and of all adults in
the residential population were about the same, whereas for the Northeast
and Midwest the percentages of the population sentenced to execution
were smaller than the percentages of the total adult population.
                    U.S. resident      Population of
                    population         persons under
                    age 18 or older    death sentence
____________________________________________________________
_____
 U.S. total              100%               100%
Northeast*                20                  7
Midwest*                  24                 16
South                     35                 55
West                      21                 22
*Four of the nine States in the Northeast and 6 of the 12 States in the
Midwest do not authorize capital sentences.
In all four regions of the country the number of prisoners under sentence
of death increased during 1993. The number rose by 56, or 4.0%, in the
South; by 21, or 13.1%, in the Northeast; by 43 or 7.6%, in the West;
and by 11, or 2.7%, in the Midwest.
Among the 35 jurisdictions with prisoners under sentence of death at
yearend 1993, 22 had more inmates than a year earlier; 7 had fewer
inmates, and 6 had the same number. California had an increase of 30,
followed by North Carolina (23), Pennsylvania (16), and Florida (11).
Alabama had the largest decline (4).
During 1993 the number of blacks under sentence of death rose by 78
(7.6%); the number of whites rose by 55 (3.6%); and the number of
persons of other races (Native Americans and Asians or Pacific Islanders)
rose by 3 (7.9%).
The number of Hispanics sentenced to death rose from 199 to 206 during
1993.  Sixteen Hispanics were received under sentence of
death, 9 were removed from death row, and 4 were executed.
Three-fourths of the Hispanics were incarcerated in 4 States: Texas (54),
California (51), Florida (30), and Arizona (20).
During 1993 the number of women sentenced to be executed increased
from 34 to 35.  Six women were received under sentence of death, 5 were
removed from death row, and none was executed. Women were under
sentence of death  in 14 States, with Alabama, California, Florida,
Illinois, and Oklahoma together holding over 57%.
         Women under sentence of death 12/31/93
________________________________________________
State           Total    White      Black
________________________________________________
 Total           32        24        11
Alabama           4         2         2
California        4         3         1
Florida           4         3         1
Illinois          4         3         2
Oklahoma          4         3         1
Pennsylvania      3         1         2
Texas             3         2         1
Missouri          2         2         0
North Carolina    2         2         0
Arizona           1         1         0
Idaho             1         1         0
Mississippi       1         1         0
Nevada            1         0         1
Tennessee         1         1         0
Men were 98.7% (2,681) of all prisoners under sentence of death.  Whites
predominated (57.7%); blacks comprised 40.8%; and  other races (1.5%)
included 22 Native Americans, 16 Asian Americans, and 3 self-identified
Hispanics. Among those for whom ethnicity was known, 7.6% were
Hispanic. The race, sex, and Hispanic origin of those under sentence of
death at yearend 1993 were as follows:
                 White    Black    Other
__________________________________________
Male            1 ,542    1,098     41
 Hispanic          187       11      5
Female              24       11      0
 Hispanic            2        1      0
Among inmates under sentence of death on December 31, 1993, for whom
information on education was available, more than three-fourths had either
completed high school (38.1%) or finished 9th, 10th, or 11th grade
(38.1%).  The percentage who had not gone beyond eighth grade (15.8%)
was about twice as large as that of inmates who had attended some college
(8.0%). The median level of education was the 11th grade.
Of inmates under a capital sentence and with reported marital status,
nearly half had never married; somewhat more than a
fourth were married when they were sentenced; and a fourth were
divorced, separated, or widowed.
Among all inmates under sentence  of death, 45.0% were age 30 to 39 on
December 31, 1993, and 60.5% were age 25 to 39 . The median age was
35 years. Less than 1% were younger than 20 and about 3.5% were age
55 or older. The youngest offender under sentence of death was age 18
(born September 1975); the oldest was 78 (born September 1915). More
than half of all inmates under sentence of death at yearend 1993 were age
20 to 29 at the time of their sentencing; about 3.9% were age 19 or
younger; and  1.4% were age 55 or older.
Entries and removals of persons  under sentence of death
Between January 1 and December 31, 1993, 30 State prison systems and
the Federal prison system reported receiving 282 prisoners under sentence
of death. Forty-four percent of the inmates were received in 4 States:
California (33), Florida (32), North Carolina (32), and Texas (27).
All 282 prisoners who had been received under sentence of death had been
convicted of murder. By sex and race, 141 were white men, 129 were
black men, 2 were Native American men, 1 was an Asian man, 3 were
Hispanic men classified as "Other race" in Pennsylvania, 5 were white
women, and 1 was a black woman.
Of 282 new admissions, 15 were Hispanic men, and 1 was a Hispanic
woman.
Twenty-three States reported a total of 97 persons whose sentence of death
was overturned or removed.  Appeals courts vacated 50 sentences while
upholding the convictions and vacated 39 sentences while overturning the
convictions. Florida (12 exits) had the largest number of vacated capital
sentences. Indiana reported one removal by post-conviction relief. Ohio
reported two, and Missouri, Georgia, and Texas each reported one
commutation of a death sentence. Louisiana and Idaho each removed one
inmate from under sentence of death as the result of amendments to
capital statutes.
As of December 31, 1993, 49 of the 97 persons who were formerly under
sentence of death were serving a reduced sentence (36 to life
imprisonment, 12 to a sentence of more than 20 years, and 1 to 20 years
or less), 23 were awaiting a new trial, 23 were awaiting resentencing, 1
had further prosecution dropped, and 1 was removed by an unspecified
method.
In addition, 11 persons died while under sentence of death in 1993.  Eight
of these deaths were from natural causes--two in
Oklahoma, and one each in California, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, and Texas.  Three suicides occurred--one each in
California, Ohio, and Virginia.
From 1977, the year after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of revised State capital punishment laws, to 1993, a total of 4,259 persons
entered prison under sentence of death. During the 17 years, 226 persons
were executed, and 1,789 were removed from under a death sentence by
appellate court decisions  and reviews, commutations, or death.(The same
individual may have received and been relieved of the death penalty
several times.)
Among individuals who received a death sentence between 1977 and 1993,
2,468 (57.9%) were white, 1,724 (40.5%) were black, and 67 (1.6%)
were of other races. The distribution by race and Hispanic origin of the
1,789 inmates who were removed from death row between 1977 and 1993
was as follows:  whites 937 (52.3%), blacks 747 (41.7%), Native
Americans 17 (0.9%), Asians 8 (0.5%), and Hispanics 80 (4.5%). Of the
226 who were executed, 121 (53.5%) were white, 87 (38.5%) were black,
16 (7.1%) were Hispanic, and 2 (0.9%) were Native American.
Criminal history of inmates  under sentence of death in 1993
Among inmates under death sentences on December 31, 1993, for whom
criminal history information was available, 67.9% had a history of felony
convictions, including 9.1% with at least one previous homicide
conviction.
Among those for whom legal status at the time of the capital offense was
reported, 42.3% had an active criminal justice status. Nearly half of these
were on parole, while the others had charges pending, were on
probation,were in prison or escapees, or had some other criminal justice
status.
Excluding those who had charges pending, nearly 1 in 3 were already
under sentence for another crime when their capital offense occurred. In
a number of States, being under sentence for another crime is considered
an aggravating factor in capital sentencing.
Criminal history patterns varied slightly by race and Hispanic origin. For
example, 73.2% of blacks had prior felony conviction records compared
to 64.8% of whites, and 60.9% of Hispanics.  Relatively more blacks
(10.2%) than whites (8.4%) or Hispanics (9.0%) had a prior homicide
conviction; and a slightly higher proportion of whites (7.2%) and blacks
(6.3%) than Hispanics (5.5%) had a charge pending  at the time of their
capital offense.
The median time between the imposition  of a death sentence and yearend
1993 was 67 months, and the mean time was 73 months.
Overall, the average time for women was 4.3 years--about 70% as long
as for men (6.1 years). On average,  whites, blacks, and Hispanics had
spent about the same amount of time under a sentence of death.
             Elapsed time since sentencing
___________________________________________
                Mean        Median
     Total       73 mos      67 mos
Male             73          67
Female           51          37
White            74          68
Black            72          63
Hispanic         69          64
Since 1988 data have been collected on the number of death sentences
imposed on each person entering prison under sentence of death. Among
the 1,669 individuals received under sentence of death, about 1 in every
7 entered with 2 or more death sentences.  Whites, blacks, and Hispanics
had similar proportions of those with single or multiple death sentences.
Executions
According to data collected by the Federal Government since 1930, during
the 64 years ending in 1993, a total of 4,085 persons were executed under
civil authority. (Military authorities carried out an additional 160
executions between 1930 and 1993.)
After the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976, 21 States
executed 226 prisoners:
1977      1            1986       18
1979      2            1987       25
1981      1            1988       11
1982      2            1989       16
1983      5            1990       23
1984     21            1991       14
1985     18            1992       31
                       1993       38
During this 17-year period, 5 States executed 163 prisoners:  Texas (71),
Florida (32), Virginia (22), Louisiana (21), and Georgia (17). These
States acccounted for 72% of all executions.
Between 1977 and 1993, 106 white non-Hispanic men, 72 black
non-Hispanic men, 15 white Hispanic men, 1 black Hispanic man, 14
white men with Hispanic origin unknown, 15 black men with Hispanic
origin unknown, 2 Native American men, and 1 white non- Hispanic
woman were executed. During 1993 Texas carried out 17
executions; Virginia executed 5 persons; Missouri 4; Florida 3; Arizona,
Delaware, and Georgia, 2 each; and California, Louisiana, and
Washington State, 1 each. All persons executed in 1993 were male.
Eighteen were non-Hispanic whites; 13 were non-Hispanic blacks; 4 were
white Hispanics; 1 was white with
Hispanic origin unknown; 1 was black with Hispanic origin unknown; and
1 was Native American.
From 1977 to 1993 4,641 prisoners were under death sentences for
varying lengths of time. The 226 executions accounted for 4.9% of all
exits from sentences of death during the period. A total of 1,699
prisoners, or 36.6% of those at risk, received other dispositions.
Relatively more whites (5.1%) and Hispanics (5.3%) than blacks (4.6%)
were executed. However, a slightly larger proportion of blacks (37.4%)
and whites (37.2%) than Hispanics (26.5 were removed from under a
death sentence by means other than execution.
Among prisoners executed between 1977 and 1993, the average time spent
between the imposition of the most recent sentence received and execution
was 7 years and 10 months. White prisoners had spent an average of 7
years and 5 months, and black prisoners, 8 years and 6 months. The 38
prisoners executed in 1993 were under sentence of death an average of 9
years and 5 months.
For the 226 prisoners executed between 1977 and 1993, the most common
methods of execution were electrocution (108) and lethal injection (108).
Other methods were lethal gas (8), hanging (1), and a firing squad (1).
    Executions, 1977-93
____________________________________________________________
___
                                   His-     Native
                   White   Black   panic    American    Asian
____________________________________________________________
___
                    121      87      16        2          0
Lethal injection     57      34      15        2          0
Electrocution        57      50       1        0          0
Lethal gas            5       3       0        0          0
Hanging               1       0       0        0           0
Firing squad          1       0       0        0          0
Appendix I.  Current status of inmates under sentence of death, 1973-93
Between 1973 and 1993 a total of 4,984 persons were sentenced to death.
For inmates received in each year, the table shows what
occurred with respect to their sentence before December 31, 1993.
For example, of the 254 persons who were sentenced to death in 1983, 23
had been executed, 10 had died while in confinement, 1 had been relieved
of the death sentence because courts struck d
own wholly or in part the statutes under which they were sentenced, 20
had their conviction overturned on appeal, 48 had their sentence
overturned on appeal, 4 had their sentence commuted, 2 were removed
from under sentence of death for other reasons, and 146 were still under
a death sentence at yearend 1993.  Of the 2,716 persons under sentence
of death on December 31, 1993, 107 or 3.9% were sentenced prior to
1980.
Of the 2,716 prisoners under sentence of death at yearend 1993, Indiana,
Kentucky, Nebraska, and Tennessee had the inmates who had served the
longest among all condemned inmates.  By contrast, Oregon had no
inmates sentenced prior to 1989, the Federal prison system prior to 1991,
and South Dakota prior to 1992.  The average time from sentence to
December 31, 1993, for the 2,716 condemned inmates was 6 years and
1 month.
Appendix II.  Federal laws providing for the death penalty
Between 1972, when the Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia struck
down the death penalty as then applied, and yearend 1993, Congress
enacted four death penalty statutes:
*A) Any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing
criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable under
section 841(b)(1)(A) or section 960(b)(1) who intentionally kills or
counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing
of an individual and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of
imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be
up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death; and (B) any
person, during the commission of, in furtherance of, or while attempting
to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service of a prison sentence for, a
felony violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter who
intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the
intentional killing of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer
engaged in, or on account of, the performance of such officer's official
duties and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of
imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be
up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death (21 U.S.C. 848(e).
*Espionage by a member of the Armed Forces:  communication of
information to a foreign government relating to nuclear weaponry, military
spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, war plans, communications
intelligence or cryptographic information, or any other major weapons or
defense strategy (10 U.S.C. 906(a)).
*Witness tampering where death results (18 U.S.C. 1512).
*Death resulting from aircraft hijacking (49 U.S.C. 1472 and 1473).
The following capital punishment provisions, which were enacted prior to
the Furman decision, remain in the United States Code:
*Murder while a member of the Armed Forces (10 U.S.C. 918).
*Destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related facilities resulting in
death (18 U.S.C. 32-34).
*Retaliatory murder of a member of the immediate family of law
enforcement officials (18 U.S.C. 115(b)(3) [by cross-reference to 18
U.S.C. 1111]).
*Murder of a member of Congress, an important executive official, or a
Supreme Court Justice (18 U.S.C. 351 [by cross-reference to 18 U.S.C.
1111]).
*Espionage (18 U.S.C. 794).
*Destruction of government property resulting in death (18 U.S.C.
844(f)(d)(i)).
*First-degree murder (18 U.S.C. 1111).
*Mailing of injurious articles with the intent to kill or resulting in death
(18 U.S.C. 1716).
*Assassination or kidnaping resulting in the death of the President or Vice
President (18 U.S.C. 1751 [by cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 1111]).
*Willful wrecking of a train resulting in death (18 U.S.C. 1992).
*Bank-robbery-related murder or kidnaping (18 U.S.C. 2113).
* Treason (18 U.S.C. 2381).
* Murder of Federal judges and officers (18 U.S.C. 1114).
Methodological note
The statistics reported in this Bulletin may differ from data collected by
other organizations for a variety of reasons: (1) National Prisoner
Statistics (NPS) adds inmates to the number under sentence of death not
at sentencing but at the time they are admitted to a State or Federal
correctional facility. (2) If in one year inmates entered prison under a
death sentence or were reported as being relieved of a death sentence but
the court had
acted in the previous year, the counts are adjusted to reflect the dates of
court decisions. (See the note for the affected jurisdictions.) (3) NPS
counts for capital punishment are always for the last day of the calendar
year and will differ from counts for more recent periods.
1993 Supreme Court decisions cited
Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S.Ct. 835 (1993). Decided January 19, 1993.
Graham v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892 (1993). Decided January 25, 1993.
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993). Decided January 25, 1993.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S.Ct. 838 (1993). Decided January 25, 1993.
Delo v. Lashley, 113 S.Ct. 1222 (1993). Decided March 8, 1993.
Arave v. Creech, 113 S.Ct. 1534 (1993). Decided March 30, 1993.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993). Decided June 1, 1993.
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993). Decided June 24, 1993.
Johnson v. Texas, 113 S.Ct. 2658 (1993). Decided June 24, 1993.
Other cases cited
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990).
Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (CA8), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013,
106 S.Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
This BJS Bulletin was written by James Stephan, BJS Statistician, and
Peter Brien, Statistical Assistant, under the supervision of Allen J. Beck.
Tracy Snell gave computing assistance. Priscilla Middleton assisted with
graphs. Tom Hester edited the report.
Marilyn Marbrook supervised production, assisted by Jodi Brown, Yvonne
Boston, and Jayne Robinson. At the Bureau of the Census, Rhonda
Carney collected the data under the supervision of Gertrude Odom.
December 1994, NCJ-150042
Owning Topic : T= 202 E= 649 Type = d
              T=Corrections - 196 E= 649 Type = e