SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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                                    No. A-851
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                         JAMES BLODGETT, SUPERINTENDENT,
                    WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, APPLICANT
                                       v.
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                                CHARLES CAMPBELL

                         ON APPLICATION TO VACATE ORDER
                                 [May 14, 1993]

  JUSTICE O'CONNOR, Circuit Justice.

  I have before me an application requesting that I vacate a remand order issued
by an en banc panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
This is not the first time that applicant James Blodgett, who is Superintendent
of the Washington State Penitentiary, has sought relief here with respect to
Charles Campbell's second petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Last Term
applicant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to issue a decision in Campbell's appeal from a District
Court decision denying the petition.  In re Blodgett, 502 U. S. ___ (1992). 
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Campbell's appeal, which had been argued and submitted on June 27, 1989, still
had not been resolved in January 1992, a delay of well over two years.  Id., at
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___ (slip op., at 1).  Although we declined to issue a writ of mandamus -
applicant had failed to seek appropriate relief from the Court of Appeals before
seeking extraordinary relief here, id., at 4-5 - we expressed concern about the
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delay and noted that applicant was free to seek mandamus relief again if the
panel did not handle the case expeditiously.  Id., at 5.  In fact, we cautioned
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that "[i]n view of the delay that has already occurred any further postponements
or extensions

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2                             BLODGETT v. CAMPBELL
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of time will be subject to a most rigorous scrutiny in this Court if [applicant]
files a further and meritorious petition for relief."  Ibid.  Approximately
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three months later, the Ninth Circuit panel issued an opinion in applicant's
favor.
  That, however, did not end the matter.  If applicant's account is correct, the
Ninth Circuit since then has extended the time for filing a petition for
rehearing in Campbell's case, granted rehearing en banc, and denied applicant's
motion for expedited review.  After vacating submission of the case so it could
receive and review supplemental briefs, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel issued
an order remanding the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on
whether hanging is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  The
court, however, did not indicate that the hearings the District Court already
had held were inadequate.  Nor did it conclude that the District Court would
have erred had it denied Campbell a hearing altogether.  Instead, the en banc
court stated that, because it had "chosen to address whether hanging is cruel
and unusual punishment," it would be helpful to have "the benefit of an
evidentiary hearing, with findings and conclusions by the district court." 
Campbell v. Blodgett, No. 89-35210 (Apr. 28, 1993), p. 1.  Applicant moved for
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reconsideration of that order, and the en banc court denied the motion.  Judges
O'Scannlain and Kleinfeld dissented:

     "Over a year ago, the Supreme Court reminded us that the State of
   Washington has sustained `severe prejudice' by the stay of execution in this
   case, which is now over four years old.  In re Blodgett, [502 U. S. ___
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   (1992)].  While the further delay to be caused by this remand order may not
   be egregious, it is symptomatic of this court's handling of this case. . . .
   Absent any indication by this court that the district court erred - by
   holding that Campbell was [wrongfully] denied a hearing on this issue
   altogether or that the hearing given was somehow inadequate as a

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                              BLODGETT v. CAMPBELL                             3
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   matter of law - I can see no basis to remand for a new evidentiary hearing." 
   Campbell v. Blodgett, No. 89-35210 (May 7, 1993), pp. 2-3.
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  Frustrated with the slow rate of progress and the additional delay occasioned
by the en banc court's April 26 remand order, Blodgett has submitted an
application that asks me to vacate that order.  Although I am concerned about
the glacial progress in this case, I have grave doubts about my authority to
offer such relief by way of application.  After all, most applications seek
temporary relief, such as a stay of judgment, vacation of a stay, or a temporary
injunction, and only where necessary or appropriate in aid of this Court's
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Drummond v. Acree, 409 U. S. 1228 (1972) (Powell, J.,
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in chambers) (application for stay); O'Brien v. Skinner, 409 U. S. 1240 (1972)
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(Marshall, J., in chambers) (application for stay); see also Coleman v. Paccar
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Inc., 424 U. S. 1301 (1976) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers) (application to vacate
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lower court stay); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Gray, 483 U. S. 1306 (1987)
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(BLACKMUN, J., in chambers) (application for injunction requiring that funds be
escrowed pending outcome of case).  Applicant, however, does not seek interim
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relief.  Nor has he filed with this Court a petition for either a writ of
certiorari or an extraordinary writ.  Rather, he requests that I act alone to
vacate the remand order of the en banc court, thereby barring the case's return
to district court and prohibiting the taking of more evidence.  I have not
located a single published order in which a Circuit Justice has vacated or
reversed a court of appeals' order, other than an order providing interim
relief; indeed, it appears that such an action would exceed my authority, which
is limited to providing or vacating stays and other temporary relief where
necessary or appropriate in aid of this Court's jurisdiction.  See Kimble v.
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Swackhamer, 439 U. S. 1385, 1385 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers) ("It
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scarcely requires reference to authority to conclude that a single

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4                             BLODGETT v. CAMPBELL
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Circuit Justice has no authority to `summarily reverse' a judgment of the
highest court of a State; a single Justice has authority only to grant interim
relief in order to preserve the jurisdiction of the full Court to consider an
applicant's claim on the merits").  Because I do not believe I have the
authority to vacate the Court of Appeals' remand order unilaterally in my
capacity as Circuit Justice, the application is dismissed without prejudice.