SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


                                   ROY A. DAY
         92-8788                       v.
                                       __
                                  DONALD P. DAY

                                   ROY A. DAY
         92-8792                       v.
                                       __
                             VINCENT BEKIEMPIS, JR.

                                   ROY A. DAY
         92-8888                       v.
                                       __
                            WALTER C. HEINRICH ET AL.


                                   ROY A. DAY
         92-8905                       v.
                                       __
                          GAF BUILDING MATERIALS CORP.

                                   ROY A. DAY
         92-8906                       v.
                                       __
                        WILLIAM J. CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF
                            THE UNITED STATES ET AL.

                                   ROY A. DAY
         92-9018                       v.
                                       __
                             NORMAN W. BLACK ET AL.

                                   ROY A. DAY
         92-9101                       v.
                                       __
                             J. TERRY DEASON ET AL.

                                   ROY A. DAY
         93-5430                       v.
                                       __
                                  DONALD P. DAY

                ON MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
2                                  DAY v. DAY
                                       __

     Nos. 92-8788, 92-8792, 92-8888, 92-8905, 92-8906, 92-9018, 92-9101 AND
                       93-5430.  Decided October 12, 1993

  PER CURIAM.
  Pro se petitioner Roy A. Day requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under
  ______                                                 _________________
Rule 39 of this Court.  We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8.  Day is
allowed until November 2, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required
by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.
We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from
Day in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38
and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.
  Day is an abuser of this Court's certiorari process.  We first invoked Rule
39.8 to deny Day in forma pauperis status last June.  See In re Day, 509 U. S.
                 _________________                        _________
___ (1993).  At that time he had filed 27 petitions in the past nine years.
Although Day was granted in forma pauperis status to file these petitions, all
                         _________________
were denied without recorded dissent.  Since we first denied him in forma
                                                                 ________
pauperis status last June, he has filed eight more petitions for certiorari with
________
this Court - all of them demonstrably frivolous.
   As we have recognized, "[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no
matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's
limited resources.  A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these
resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice."  In re
                                                                           _____
McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam).  Consideration of Day's
________                            ____________
repetitious and frivolous petitions for certiorari does not promote this end.
  We have entered orders similar to the present one on previous occasions to
prevent pro se petitioners from filing repetitious and frivolous requests for
        ______
certiorari, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. ___
                ______    _____________________________________
(1992) (per curiam), and repetitious and frivolous requests for extraordinary
       _____________
relief.  See In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177
             _____________
                                   DAY v. DAY                                  3
                                       __

(1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, supra.
       ___________________________________
   Day's refusal to heed our earlier warning requires us to take this step.  His
abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit
our sanction accordingly.  The order therefore will not prevent Day from
petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him.  But
it will free this Court's limited resources to consider the claims of those
petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.

                                                               It is so ordered.
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