EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, PETITIONER V. COMMERCIAL
OFFICE PRODUCTS COMPANY

   No. 86-1696

   In The Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1987

   On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit

   Brief for the Petitioner

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Question Presented
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutory provisions involved
   Statement
   Summary of argument
      A state or local fair employment practice agency's
      decision to waive its right initially to process a
      charge of discrimination "terminates" its "proceedings,"
      within the meaning of Section 706(c)
      of Title VII, so as to allow the EEOC to assert
      immediate jurisdiction over the charge
      A. The language of Section 706(c) does not require
          that a state agency completely and forever
          surrender its jurisdiction over a charge to
          allow the charge immediately to be filed with
          the EEOC
       B. The legislative history supports the reasonableness
          of the EEOC'S view that a charge may be
          filed with the EEOC under Section 706(c) once
          a state agency waives its right initially to
          process a charge and seeks immediate EEOC
          jurisdiction
       C. Other provisions of Title VII support the
          EEOC'S view that the state agency's waiver of
          processing "terminates" its "proceedings"
          for purposes of Section 706(c)
   Conclusion

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-20a) is reported
at 803 F.2d 581.  The order of dismissal of the district court (Pet
App. 23a) is unreported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgement of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 21a) was entered
on October 15, 1986.  A petition for rehearing was denied on December
23, 1986 (Pet. App. 22a).  By order dated March 16, 1987, Justice
White extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari
to and including April 22, 1987.  The petition for a writ of
certiorari, which was filed on April 22, 1987, was granted on June 15,
1987 (J.A. 21).  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254 (1).

                     STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

   Section 706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(c), provides in pertinent part:

      In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring
      in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a
      State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice
      alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local
      authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to
      institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon
      receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under
      subsection (a) of this section by the person aggrieved before
      the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
      commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings
      have been earlier terminated * * *.

   Section 706(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), provides in pertinent part:

      A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred
      and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
      occurred * * * except that in a case of an unlawful employment
      practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has
      initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency
      with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to
      institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon
      receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on
      behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after
      the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within
      thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local
      agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local
      law, whichever is earlier * * * .

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether a state agency's routine decision to defer initial
processing of a discrimination charge to the Equal Eqployment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pursuant to a worksharing agreement,
constitutes a "terminat(ion)" of state proceedings within the meaning
of Section 706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(c), so that the EEOC may immediately deem the charge as
filed, rather than being required to wait until sixty days after the
commencement of state proceedings.

                               STATEMENT

   1. In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq., Congress attempted to coordinate federal and state efforts to
resolve charges of employment discrimination over which both the EEOC
(under Title VII) and a state or local fair employment practice agency
(under state or local law) have jurisdiction.  Under Section 706(e) of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), a complainant must file charges with
the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, except that if
a complainant has "initially instituted proceedings with a State or
local agency with authority to grant or seek relief," the complainant
may file charges within 300 days of the alleged discrimination, or
within 30 days after receiving notice of the termination of those
state or local proceedings, whichever is earlier.  When there exists
concurrent jurisdiction in a state or local agency and the EEOC,
moreover, Section 706(c), 42 U.S.C. 2000e5 (c), provides that a charge
is not deemed to be "filed" with the EEOC "before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or
local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." /1/
Hence, when there is a state or local agency with concurrent
jurisdiction, a charge is always timely filed with the EEOC if,
follwing its receipt by the EEOC, state or local proceedings are
commenced within 240 days of the discriminatory act, while a charge
received by the EEOC after 240 days will be timely filed only if the
state or local agency "terminate(s)" those proceedings by the 300th
day.  Mohasco Corp. v Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 817 (1980).

   Congress also authorized the EEOC to cooperate with state and local
agencies by entering into "written agreements" with those agencies in
order to promote "effective enforcement" of Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C.
2000e-8(b);  see also 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4 (g)(1).  Accordingly, the EEOC
has entered into "worksharing agreements" with approximately 81 of the
109 designated state and local fair employment practice deferral
agencies that enforce state and local employment discrimination laws.
These agreements typically provide that the stae agency will initally
process certain categories of charges and that the EEOC will initially
process others, with the state waiving its right to the 60-day
exclusive processing period in the latter instance.  See 29 C.F.R.
1601.13(c).  In either instance, the deferring agency normally
reserves the right to review the initial processing agency's findings
of fact, which the EEOC must accord "substantial weight" (see 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)), and if appropriate, also to investigate a charge
further after the initial processing agency has completed its
proceedings.

   2. On March 26, 1984, the complainant, Suanne Leerssen, submitted a
charge to the EEOC, alleging that on June 10, 1983 - 290 days earlier
- respondent, Commercial Office Products Company, had discharged her
because of her sex (Pet. App. 2a, 27a).  On March 30th, the EEOC
transmitted a copy to the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD), which
had concurrent jurisdiction over the charge (ibid).  Attached was a
transmittal form indicating that, pursuant to a worksharing agreemeet
between the EEOC and the CCRD, the charge was to be initially
processed by the EEOC (id. at 26a).  /2/ On April 4, 1984, the CCRD
indicated on the transmittal form, which it sent back to the EEOC, /3/
its "intention not to initially process the charge" (id. at 27a).  On
the same day, the CCRD sent a letter to the complainant, which advised
her that "(t)o avoid duplication of effort, the * * * Division will
take no action on your charge until the (EEOC) terminates its
proceedings" (id.at 2a, 28a-29a).

   The EEOC proceeded to investigate the complainant's charge.
Pursuant to its investigative authority, the EEOC issued a subpoena
for production of information that respondent had declined to provide
(Pet. App. 2a, 30a-32a).  Respondent refused to comply with the
subpoena, and the EEOC initiated this action for judicial enforcement
of the subpoena (id. at 2a, 33a-37a).

   3. The district court dismissed the EEOC's subpoena enforcement
action (Pet. App. 2a, 23a;  J.A. 12-20), holding that the EEOC lacked
authority over the charge, and, hence, could not subpoena respondent
for production of information.  The district court reasoned that under
Section 706(c) of Title VII the complainant's charge could not be
filed with the EEOC until 60 days after it was received by the CCRD,
which was beyond the 300-day limitations period established by Section
706(e).  Relying on Klausner v. Southern Oil Co., 533 F. Supp. 1335
(N.D.N.Y. 1982), the court held that a state agency's waiver of its
right to an exclusive period for initial processing of a charge did
not constitute a "terminat(ion)" of state proceedings, within the
meaning of Section 706(c), with the result that the charge could not
be deemed filed with the EEOC and processing by that agency could not
begin until expiration of the full 60-day statutory period.  /4/

   4. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 1a-20a).  The court
first held (id. at 5a-6a) that the 300-day limitations period was
applicable because proceedings before the CCRD had been "initially
instituted," within the meaning of Section 706(e).  The court of
appeals rejected (Pet. App. 6a) respondent's contention that the
extended 300-day period was inapplicable because the complainant had
filed her charge with the CCRD after the state's 180-day limitations
period had run.  The court of appeals, however, agreed with the
district court that the complainant's charge was not filed within 300
days and that the EEOC therefore lacked authority to issue the
subpoena (id. at 7a-16a).  /5/

   The court of appeals' decision rested on its conclusion (Pet. App.
9a) that a state agency "terminates" its "proceedings," within the
meaning of Section 706(c), only when it "completely surrenders its
jurisdiction over a charge." The court of appeals contended (Pet. App.
11a-12a (emphasis omitted)) that the EEOC's contrary construction of
Title VII is inconsistent with congressional intent "that the state
would act during its period of exclusive jurisdiction, and that the
federal authorities would begin proceedings only if state proceedings
failed to resolve the dispute." The court concluded (id. at 13a) that
the EEOC'S reliance on the terms of worksharing agreements entered
into by the EEOC and state or local agencies was misplaced because
"(w)orksharing agreements cannot serve as a substitute for deferral."

   Examining the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals
concluded (Pet. App. 12a-15a) that the CCRD had not "terminated" its
"proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c).  /6/ The court
stressed (Pet. App. 15a (footnote omitted)) that although the CCRD did
waive its right to process the charge initially, it also retained
jurisdiction-reserving the right to act after the EEOC terminated its
proceedings - and, hence, "did not finally and unequivocally terminate
its authority over (the) * * * charge." Accordingly, the court found
(id. at 16a), the complainant's charge was not formally filed with the
EEOC until 60 days after the charge was first filed with the CCRD
which was beyond the 300 - day limitations period (the charge was not
filed with the CCRD until at least 290 days after the alleged
discrimination (see id. at 2a)).  /7/ For this reason, the court ruled
(ibid.), the EEOC also lacked authority to issue the subpoena.

   Judge McKay dissented (Pet. App. 17a-20a).  He contended that the
meaning of "terminated" in Section 706(c) is ambiguous and that the
court should therefore defer to the EEOC's reasonable interpretation,
which is consistent with congressional intent to resolve doubts in
favor of claimants and which has been upheld by every other court
(except one district court) that has addressed the issue, including
the First Circuit.

   5. The EEOC filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc, which the court of appeals denied (Pet. App. 22a).
Judge McKay, Logan, and Seymour voted in favor of rehearing en banc.

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

   Section 706(c) provides that an employment discrimination charge
may not be "filed" with the EEOC before the expiration of 60 days
after commencement of any state or local proceedings under state or
local law concerning the same allegations, "unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (c).  Section 706(c)
therefore extends to states and localities that have enacted equal
employment legislation the right to attempt resolution of
discrimination claims arising within their boundaries for a period of
up to 60 days before the federal government intervenes.  Section
706(c), however, also explicitly contemplates that the state or local
agency may "terminate()" its "proceedings" prior to the expiration of
the sixty day period, and thereby allow the EEOC immediately to
process the charge (if timely).

   In this case, there is no dispute that the opportunity for an
initial exclusive period of processing was extended to the Colorado
Civil Rights Division (CCRD) and that the CCRD, with the expectation
that the EEOC would "immediate(ly)" process the charge (see Pet. App.
49a), voluntarily waived its right initially to process the
complainant's charge.  The question raised in this case is whether the
CCRD's waiver of initial processing fulfilled the deferral requirement
of Section 706(c) and - because it occurred within the 300-day charge
filing period provided in Section 706(e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) -
thereby permitted the EEOC to accept the charge as timely filed and,
hence, immediately to process the charge.

   It is our view - which is the interpretation of the agency (the
EEOC) primarily responsible for implementation and enforcement of
Title VII - that a charge may be deemed filed and, if timely, may be
processed by the EEOC, once the state agency notifies the EEOC that it
is declining to process the charge any further at present and wishes
the EEOC immediately to process the charge instead.  Contrary to the
view shared by both the court of appeals (Pet. App. 15a) and
respondent (Br. in Opp. 8-9), we do not believe that the EEOC was
barred from acting for 60 days by the mere fact that the state agency
in this case reserved the option to act after the EEOC processed the
charge.

   The language of Section 706(c) is ambiguous, and neither
contradicts our view nor compels the construction given by the court
of appeals.  At the very least, the EEOC's interpretation represents a
plausible reading of the statutory language.  Moreover, related
provisions of Title VII and the statute's legislative history refute
the court of appeals' view and fully support the EEOC's consistent
construction of the statute.  They demonstrate that Congress included
the state agency deferral requirement to provide state agencies with
the "opportunity" to have an exclusive period for processing an
employment discrimination charge.  They suggest, moreover, that
Congress did not intend to deprive a state agency of the option of
allowing the EEOC to process a charge immediately without the state
agency first formally relinquishing forever its jurisdiction over the
charge.  Finally, they show that Congress sought expeditious
processing of charges and the elimination of wasteful duplication of
federal and state efforts.  The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c)
is consistent with all of these expressions of congressional intent,
which provide no meaningful support for the claim that a state must
completely surrender its jurisdiction forever in order to
"terminate()" its "proceedings" within the meaning of that provision.
The court of appeals' reading of the law, on the other hand, is
inconsistent with congressional intent, in that it would disregard
state and local agency preferences, invite needless delay, and prevent
the consideration of numerous charges for no reason.  The decision of
that court therefore should be reversed.

                               ARGUMENT

 A STATE OR LOCAL FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE AGENCY'S DECISION TO WAIVE
ITS RIGHT INITIALLY TO PROCESS A CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION
"TERMINATE(S)" ITS "PROCEEDINGS," WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 706(c)
OF TITLE VII, SO AS TO ALLOW THE EEOC TO ASSERT IMMEDIATE JURISDICTION
OVER THE CHARGE

   The decision of the court of appeals misconstrues a statutory
provision intended to allow state and local agencies the opportunity
of an exclusive period for processing charges of unlawful employment
discrimination.  Under the court of appeals' (and respondent's) view,
the EEOC must defer processing a discrimination charge even when the
state or local agency has agreed that the EEOC agreed that the EEOC
should process immediately, and even when the charge will otherwise be
barred by the applicable federal statute of limitations.  /8/ That
decision frustrates Congress's clear intent "to encourage the prompt
processing of all charges of employment discrimination" (Mohasco Corp.
v Silver, 447 U.S. 807 825 (1980)), turns on its head congressional
intent to defer to state and local agency concerns, and needlessly
prevents consideration of some charges.  There is no meaningful
support in the legislative history for the court of appeals'
assumption that a state and local agency cannot "terminate()" its
"proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c), without
completely and forever reliquishing its jurisdiction over a charge.
/9/

 A. The Language Of Section 706(c) Does Not Require That A State
Agency Completely and Forever Surrender Its Jurisdiction Over A Charge
To Allow The Charge Immediately To Be Filed With The EEOC

   While a court must surely "give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress," Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)
(footnote omitted), in this case the language of Section 706(c) does
not "unambiguously express()" congressional intent.  Section 706(c)
provedes that "(i)n the case of an alleged unlawful employment
practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State
(with concurrent jurisdiction) * * *, no charge may be filed (with the
EEOC) * * * before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated * * *" (42 U.S.C. 200 e-5(c) (emphasis
added)).  Contrary to the decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
8a-9a, 13a n.13 (emphasis in original)) the statutory phrase "unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated" does not unambiguously
express congressional intent that a state agency must "completely
surrender its jurisdiction over such a charge" and thereby "completely
relinquish its authority to act on the charge at that point or in the
future."

   First, the plain meaning of "proceedings" in Section 706(c) is not
the legal equivalent of "jurisdiction" or "authority." The term
"proceedings" is ambiguous and its meaning, as this Court has noted in
other circumstances, depends upon its statutory context.  Compare
North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community
Council, Inc., No. 85-767 (Nov. 4, 1986), slip op. 5-9 with New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 60-66 (1980).  Congress's
use of the term "proceedings" in Section 706(c), moreover, is
consistent with the EEOC's reading of that provision.  "(P)roceedings"
may plausibly refer to only those initial proceedings commenced under
state or local law. Section 706(c) provides that the full 60-day
deferral period shall apply "unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated" (emphasis added).  The modifier "such" refers back to
those proceedings already "commenced" under state or local law.  The
statutory language makes no explicit reference to those proceedings
that the state agency might choose to intiiate following the EEOC's
determination.  Contrary to the reasoning of the court of appeals, the
language of Section 706(c) never specifically addresses the wholly
distinct issue whether a state or local agency may have any continuing
"jurisdiction" or "authority" over a charge once it has terminated its
initial "proceedings."

   The word "terminated" likewise does not unambiguously express
Congress's intent that state or local agency jurisdiction must be
forever abandoned.  "Terminated" may plausibly refer to a "cessation
in time";  it does not necessarily contemplate a cessation for all
time.  See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2359
(Merriam-Webster ed. 1976) ("to bring to an ending or cessation in
time, sequence, or continuity").  /10/ See also Isaac v. Harvard
University, 769 F.2d 817, 821 (1st Cir. 1985) (emphasis
omitted)("'Terminated' in section 706(c) could * * * mean a temporaty
cessation, or an ending of a defined segment of action.").

   The plain meaning of the relevant statutory language therefore does
not resolve this case.  The language of Section 706(c) neither plainly
and unmistakably endorses the EEOC's construction nor does it preclude
that construction.  At the very least, the statutory requirement that
state or local "proceedings" be "terminated" may plausibly be read as
being satisfied when, as in this case, the state agency has halted its
investigation of a charge, deferred the matter to the EEOC for
immediate processing, yet reserved the option of asserting its
jurisdiction following the EEOC's determination.  /11/

 B. The Legislative History Supports The Reasonableness Of The EEOC'S
View That A Charge May Be Filed With The EEOC Under Section 706(c)
Once A State Agency Waives Its Right Initially To Rocess A Charge And
Seeks Immediate EEOC Jurisdiction

   Because the meaning of Section 706(c) is not compelled by the plain
meaning of its language, examination of the relevant legislative
history is warranted.  That history may shed further light on "the
objects and policy of the law" and, accordingly, on the meaning of the
particular words chosen by Congress in the statute.  Kokoszka v.
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.
(19 How). 183, 194 (1857);  see United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985), slip op. 10;  Chemical
Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470
U.S. 116, 126 (1985);  Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981);
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1976).  In this case, examination of the legislative history
shows that the EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is reasonable
because it is true to the policy and objectives that prompted Congress
to adopt that provision's deferral requirement.

   1. The relationship between the EEOC and state and local fair
employment practice agencies under Title VII was an improtant topic of
discussion and compromise in the legislative enactment of Title VII.
The numerous civil rights bills initially proposed, including the
version that passed the House (H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110
Cong. Rec. 2511-2512, 12598 (1964)), did not include a state or local
agency deferral requirement.  The House-passed version instead
"contained a 6-month limitations provision for the filing of charges
with the EEOC, and directed the EEOC to enter into agreements with
state agencies providing for suspension of federal enforcement"
(Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 819 (footnote omitted)).  Under that proposal,
the EEOC was directed to "rescind any such agreement when it
determines (the state) agency no longer has (power to eliminate and
prohibit discrimination in employment), or is no longer effectively
exercising such power" (H.R. 7152, supra, 708(b), 110 Cong. Rec.
2511-2512 (1964).

   The House bill was criticized by Senator Dirksen, among others,
/12/ for allowing the exclusive jurisdiction of the state agency to
hinge on the EEOC's judgment whether the state agency's authority was
"effective()." 110 Cong. Rec. 6449 (1964).  According to Senator
Dirksen (ibid.), "such language (is not) appropriate.  The people of
the State should have the right to determine the effectiveness of
their agencies, consistent with the expressed purposes of this
section." See also id. at 7784 (remarks of Sen. Smathers) (criticizes
bill for its failure "to defer any Federal action until the State has
had an opportunity to apply its own laws").

   Proponents of the bill in the Senate at first opposed efforts to
amend Title VII to address this concern.  /13/ They later agreed,
however, to revise the language once it became apparent that some
compromise would be necessary to overcome a filibuster that was
jeopardizing the bill's passage.  See 110 Cong. Rec. 12593-12595
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark);  id at 12580 (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey);  Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. at 818-819.  The aim of
ensuing negotiations, which were led by Senators Mansfield and
Dirksen, was "a practical solution for the problem which is involved
where State and Federal jurisdictions are concerned" (110 Cong. Rec.
8192 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen)).  As described by Senator
Dirksen (id. at 8193), they sought, inter alia, to "develop language
which will assure the States on" the problem "of the steady and deeper
intrusion of the Federal power." The negotiations produced a
bipartisan compromise substitute, known as the "Dirksen-Mansfield
substitute," which ultimately became part of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.  See 110 Cong. Rec. 11926- 11935 (1964).  The substitute
proposed, among other things, adoption in Section 706(b) of the
relevant language at issue in this case, which is currently set forth
in Section 706(c).  /14/

   The debate surrounding the merits of this new language reveals the
legislative purpose and policy that lay behind it.  As described by
this Court, "(t)he history identifies only one reason for treating
workers in deferral States differently from workers in other States:
to give state agencies an opportunity to redress the evil at which the
federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal intervention
unless its need was demonstrated." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
at 821 (footnote omitted;  emphasis added).  /15/ See, e.g., 110 Cong.
Rec. 12688 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall) ("preserving the
opportunity and authority of the State and local governments to work
out their own problems if they are willing to do so");  id. at 12708
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("Provisions have been inserted in * * *
(T)itle()(VII) to give States which have * * *fair employment
practices laws * * * (the) reasonable opportunity to act under State
law before the commencement of any Federal proceedings * * * .");  id.
at 12721 (remarks of Sen Humphrey) ("(T)he individual complainant
cannot file his charge with the (EEOC) until the State or local agency
has been given an opportunity to handle the problem under State or
local law.");  id. at 13091 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("to give the
States the first opportunity");  id. at 14313 (remarks of Sen. Miller)
("(T)his bill gives the States the opportunity to carry out their
responsibilities first * * *");  see also id. at 12724-12725 (remarks
of Sen. Humphrey).

   Senator Humphrey accordingly explained that the deferral provisions
were added to make the substitute package a "States rights bill." 110
Cong. Rec. 12724-12725 (1964).  Senator Dirksen stated that "instead
of confusion and a waste of time, the result (of the substitute) would
be time economy and the expeditious handling of cases" (id. at 9790;
see id. at 8193 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen) ("assure individual
complainants that they will have fair and expeditious consideration of
their grievances")).  Deference to the states and expeditious,
nonwasteful processing of charges therefore were the principal
motivating factors behind Congress's adoption of Section 706(c)'s
deferral requirement.  /16/

   2. The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is consistent with
those expressions of congressional intent.  To permit the EEOC to
assert immediate jurisdiction when the state declines initially to
process a charge "serves the primary purpose of the statute - to give
states the chance to go first in processing employment discrimination
claims - while furthering the broad policy of Title VII to provide
relief from such discrimination as quickly as possible." Isaac v.
Harvard University, 769 F.2d at 826.  Cf. Love v. Pullamn Co., 404
U.S. at 526 ("The procedure complies with the purpose both of 706(c),
to give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination
complaints, and of 706((e)), to ensure expedition in the filing and
handling of those complaints.").  The state and local agencies are
provided with the "opportunity" to have a 60-day exclusive period for
processing the charge, yet they may choose to waive that right and not
act.  Deference to State and local agencies therefore is maintained
under the EEOC's reading of Section 706(c)'s deferral requirement.

   At the same time, Congress recognized that states would not always
"choose to exercise (the) opportunit(y)" to resolve discrimination
complaints and suggested that, in instances where the state is "unable
or unwilling" to provide relief, "the Federal Government must have the
authority to act." 110 Cong. Rec. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey).  Only "if there is possible reason to believe that a State
agency will deal with the matter, * * * will (it) have 60 days in
which to deal with it, before the Federal agency can be call in * * *"
(id. at 13090 (remarks of Sen. Case)).  This principle - that the
federal government has the authority to act when the state declines.
to exercise its deferral opportunity - is applicable regardless of the
reason for the state's inaction.  Cf. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. at 761 ("Individuals should not be penalized if States decline,
for whatever reason, to take advantage of the(ir) (deferral)
opportunities.")

   3. The legislative history also demonstrates the unreasonableness
of respondents' and the court of appeals' proffered construction of
Section 706(c).  Indeed, their construction turns on its head the very
purpose of Title VII'S deferral requirement:  deference to State fair
employment practice agencies.

   In this case, for instance, the Colorado Civil Rights Division
(CCRD) has affirmatively stated that it does not want to process the
complainant's charge initially and that it instead wants the EEOC to
process the charge immediately.  /17/ Respondent and the court of the
circumstances of this case to require either the EEOC to delay its own
action until 60-day period has run or for the State agency to
relinquish completely and forever its jurisdiction over the charge.
Either option frustrates important congressional policies expressed in
the legislative history.

   First, a 60-day delay /18/ before processing by the EEOC "would
serve no purpose." Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d at 825.
During that period, the state agency would be unwilling to act and the
EEOC would be unable to act.  /19/ Such a needless hiatus would thwart
Congress's clear intent "to encourage the prompt processing of all
charges of employment discrimination." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447
U.S. at 825 (footnote omitted);  see S. Rep. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1971);  110 Cong. Rec. 8193 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen)
("assure individual complainants that they will have fair and
expeditious consideration of their grievances");  see also Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. at 525-526.  /20/

   The harm caused by such a requirement is not confined, moreover, to
needless delay.  As illustrated by the circumstances of this case, the
position urged by respondent and accepted by the court below could
needlessly render untimely thousands of pending Title VII employment
discrimination charges that were received first by the EEOC more than
240 days after the alleged discriminatory act.  /21/ In such a
situation, a charge submitted to the EEOC is therefore too early until
it is too late, notwithstanding the state agency's desire for
immediate EEOC processing.

   The alternative option - for the state or local agency to
"completely surrender its jurisdiciton over a charge" (Pet. App. 9a)
likewise finds no support in the legislative history.  Congress was
concerned with safeguarding states' rights and providing states with a
limited prior "opportunity" to act.  The legislators evinced no intent
to require state and local agencies to relinquish their jurisdiction
forever in order to allow the EEOC immediately to process a charge.
Rather, the wording of the deferral requirement, which received
"meticulous attention" (110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Dirksen)), /22/ Suggests that whether a state or local agency retains
some modicum of jurisdiction was not a matter of concern to Congress.
In particular, Congress's choice of the term "proceedings" suggests
that Congress was concerned with simultaneous federal and state (or
local) agency investigations and hearings.  Most likely, Congress
hoped to render more meaningful any state or local proceedings
initially instituted by barring the instigation of any simultaneous
federal proceedings for at least 60 days.  The problem of this case,
the state agency allows the EEOC initially to process the charge and
the state agency merely retains jurisdiction over the charge so that
it might act following termination of the EEOC proceedings.

   There are also legitimate, noncontroversial reasons why a state
agency might prefer not to relinquish quthority over a charge for all
time.  The EEOC does not relinquish its authority under federal law
when a state agency is processing a charge and a state agency may
prefer to maintain an equivalent and symmetrical relationship with the
EEOC when, pursuant to a worksharing agreement with the state agency,
the EEOC is initially processing the charge.  The state may simply
prefer to avoid the appearance of state abdication of state authority
or there may be very concrete reasons why it is unwilling to
relinquish completely its jurisdiction.  Where, for example, the state
employment discrimination statute provides broader coverage than does
Title VII, the EEOC's initial investigation might subsequently reveal
that the Commission lacks jurisdiction under Title VII because the
employer does not have 15 employees or because the employer is a bona
fide private mebership club (see 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b)).  In such a case,
where state law applies to an employer with fewer than 15 employees or
to a bona fide private membership club, the complainant's sole
administrative remedy would be with the state agency under state law.
If the state or local agency had "completely surrendered its
jurisdiction," however, the individual complainant would be without a
remedy.  /23/

   Hence, the second option would flout the preferences of those very
state and local agencies to which Congress so plainly intended in
Title VII to defer.  The state and local agencies have registered in
their worksharing agreements with the EEOC their preference for
retaining some residual jurisdicition over a charge even while
allowing the EEOC initially to process the charge in their stead.
/24/ The legislative history nowhere suggests that Congress intended
to deny the agencies that option.  It instead expresses a general
intent to accommodate their desires.  Respondent's invitation to
restrict the ability of state and local agencies to terminate their
proceedings under Section 706(c) therefore should be declined.

 C. Other Provisions Of Title VII Support the EEOC's View That The
State Agency's Waiver Of Initial Processing "Terminates" Its
"Proceedings" For Purposes Of Section 706(c)

   The reasonableness of the EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is
also supported by expressions of congressional policy and purpose
manifested elsewhere in other, related, parts of Title VII.  See
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. at 650 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60
U.S. (19 How.) at 194) ("When 'interpreting a statute, the court will
not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be
used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute * * * and
the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various
provisions' * * * .").  These provisions reflect a congressional
commitment to respect a state or local agency request, not coupled
with a total relinquishment of its jurisdiction, that the EEOC
immediately assert jurisdiction over a charge.  They also show that
Congress favored the type of federal-state cooperative efforts
attacked by respondent in this case.

   1. Section 706(d) of Title VII provides that when a charge is filed
by a member of the EEOC alleging an unlawful employment practice
occurring in a state or locality with concurrent jurisdiction, "the
Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such
charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials and, upon
request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days *
* *, unless a shorter period is requested, to act" (42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(d) (emphasis added)).  Congress thus expressly provided that a
state agency could, for whatever reason, appropriately notify the EEOC
that it should proceed immediately to process a charge filed by a
member of the EEOC.  There is no requirement that the state agency
completely and forever surrender its jurisdiction over the charge.
Nor must the EEOC needlessly delay its efforts for the full 60-day
period once the state agency has notified the EEOC that it should
proceed without futher delay.

   It is reasonable to assume that Congress intended the same result
for those charges within the scope of Section 706(c).  The variation
in wording between Section 706(c) (60 days "unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated") and (d) (60 days "unless a shorter
period is requested") does not suggest otherwise.  As this Court has
previously remarked in a different context, the "difference in wording
between 706(b) (now (c)) and 706(c) (now(d)) seems to be only a
reflection of the different persons who initiate the charge." Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526-527 n.6 (1972) (citing Developments in
the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 Harv L. Rev. 1109, 1214 n.117 (1971)).  Moreover,
there are repeated statements in the legislative history that Congress
intended the "same" time limitations to apply in Section 706(c) and
(d).  See 110 Cong. Rec. 12690 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall);
id. at 15896 (remarks of Rep. Celler);  see also Staff of the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportuniity Act
of 1972, at 1771 (Comm. Print 1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams).

   2. The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is also supported by
those provisions of Title VII in which Congress sought to promote
federal-state cooperative efforts.  The prospect of federal-state
cooperative efforts in redressing employment discrimination was widely
applauded by all sides during the formulation of the equal employment
legislation and during the subsequent legislative debates on Title
VII, /25/ and Section 705(g)(1) of Title VII accordingly authorizes
the EEOC "to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional,
State, local, and other agencies * * *" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-4(g)(1)).
Section 709(b) more specifically provides that "(i)n furtherance of
such cooperative efforts, the Commission may enter into written
agreements with such State or local agencies * * *." 42 U.S.C. 200
e-8(b).

   Pursuant to those provisions, the EEOC has entered into worksharing
agreements with 43 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands, and approximately 35 local agencies.  These
worksharing agreements seek to maximize the efficiency of both state
and federal efforts and to minimize the burden on employers by
avoiding simultaneous state and federal proceedings.  They are
predicated upon a "division of labor" of charge processing;  under
these agreements, the state or local agency agrees to waive initial
processing rights over some charges to permit expeditious federal
processing and to allow the state or local agency to focus its
resources on cases that the EEOC is not simultaneously processing.
The EEOC is not simultaneously processing.  The EEOC's construction of
Section 706(c), which provides that such a waiver "terminate(s)" state
or local "proceedings" so as to permit the EEOC immediately to process
a charge (see 29 C.F.R. 1601.13(a)(5)(ii)(A);  52 Fed. Reg. 10224
(1987)), is therefore necessary to the present operation of these
worksharing agreements.  It allows the agencies and the EEOC to work
harmoniously towards and expeditious and fair resolution of
discrimination charges, without wasteful delay or duplication of
effort and also without requiring either sovereign to abdicate their
statutory responsibilities.  /26/

   Worksharing agreements therefore are not, as the court of appeals
claims (Pet. App. 13a), simply "a means of circumventing the clear
statutory framework and Congressional intent requiring deferral to
state agencies." Nor, contrary to respondent's suggestion (Br. in Opp.
12), do they constitute a "sleight-of-han, paper shuffling procedure"
to evade the requirements of Title VII.  Those agreements are a
"method of cooperation which has evolved as the practical solution to
the concurrent jurisdiction given by Title VII." Isaac v. Harvard
University, 769 F.2d at 824.  They represent precisely the the sort of
cooperative federalism Congress hoped to encourage in Title VII when
it included Section 706(c)'s deferral requirement.  Cf. New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. at 64 n.4 (approving
worksharing agreements as a means to "facilitate the processing of
complaints").  Respondent's proposed construction of Section 706(c)
would jeopardize the operation of these agreements.  /27/

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted,

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   DONALD B. AYER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   RICHARD F. LAZARUS

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   CHARLES A. SHANOR

      General Counsel

   GWENDOLYN YOUNGREAMS

      Associate General Counsel

   VELLA M. FINK

      Assistant General Counsel

   DONNA J. BRUSOSKI

      Attorney Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

   AUGUST 1987

   /1/ In order to ensure compliance with Section 706(c)'s deferral
requirement, the EEOC accepts charges of discrimination from
individuals who have not previously filed claims under state law, and
then transmits a copy of the charge to the appropriate state or local
agency.  See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1972).

   /2/ The worksharing agreement then in effect provided, inter alia,
that each agency would take "primary responsibility" for processing
the charges first submitted to it (see Pet. App. 48a).

   /3/ Respondent suggests (Br. in Opp. 3) that the EEOC never
received the charge transmittal form completed by the CCRD (see Pet.
App. 27a).  The EEOC disputed this same suggestion in the courts
below.  See Brief for Appellant EEOC 3.  According to the EEOC, the
CCRD maintains that it sent the form to the EEOC, as is contemplated
by 1 EEOC Compliance Manual Section 5.3 (1987), and additionally
contacted the EEOC by telephone to transmit the agency's waiver
orally.  See Pet. App. 38a-39a.  While the district court never made a
formal factual finding on the issue, the court of appeals stated that
the completed form had been sent back to the EEOC and the court no
doubt presumed that the completed form had been received by the EEOC.
See Pet App. 2a ("The CCRD returned the charge transmittal form to the
EEOC and indicated that the CCRD waived its right to initially process
the charge.").  In all events, neither court based its ruling on
respondent's suggestion.

   /4/ On June 14, 1985, following the district court's decision, the
CCRD wrote the complainant a leter stating that the Division had never
had jurisdiction over her charge because it had not been filed with
the Division within the limitations period provided by state law (180
days) (Pet. App. 55a-56a;  see Reply Memo 4 n.2).

   /5/ The court of appeals declined (Pet. App. 2a-3a) to rule on the
question whether a subpoena enforcement proceeding is the appropriate
stage at which to raise the timeliness of a Title VII charge as a
defense, because that argument was not raised in the district court
(ibid.).  The EEOC does not challenge that aspect of the court of
appeals' decision in this Court.

   /6/ The court expressly disagreed (Pet. App. 8a-9a & nn.6-7) with
the First Circuit's decision in Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d
817 (1985), which upheld the EEOC's view that a state agency's
decision to waive initial processing constitutes a "terminat(ion)" of
its "proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c).  The court of
appeals also distinguished (Pet. App. 13a n.13) its decision in this
case from its previous decision in Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462
F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972), where the court had upheld the timeliness
of an employment discrimination charge referred by a state agency to
the EEOC.  The court noted (Pet. App. 13a n.13 (emphasis in original))
that in Barela, unlike in this case, "the state agency * * * made a
decision to completely relinquish its authority to act on the charge
at that point or in the future."

   /7/ The court also rejected (Pet. App. 15a n.14) the suggestion
that the CCRD had terminated its proceedings prior to the 300th day
because, as stated in its June 14, 1985, leter to the complainant (see
note 4, supra), the charge was filed after the state limitations
period had run and therefore the agency "at no time had jurisdiction
over (the) charge." The court found that the state limitations period
was not self-executing and that therefore the Colorado agency did
possess jurisdiction at least until it wrote the letter to the
complainant on June 14th, which was after the federal limitations
period had run.

   /8/ The court of appeals agreed (Pet. App. 5a-6a) with the EEOC
that the 300-day limitations period provided for by Section 706(e) is
applicable in this case.  In Dixon v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 787
F.2d 943 (1986), petition for cert. pending, No. 86-181, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the 300-day charge filing period, made
available under Section 706(e) when the complainant "initially
institute(s) proceedings" with a state or local agency, does not apply
where (as in both Dixon and in this case) the state agency has entered
into a worksharing agreement determining that the EEOC rather than the
state will initially process the complainant's charge.

   /9/ The numerous lower courts which have addressed the issue
presented in this case are virtually unanimous in upholding the EEOC'S
construction of 'section 760(c).  See Isaac v. Harvard University,
supra;  Hamel v. Prudential Insurance Co., 640 F. Supp. 103, 107 n.2
(D. Mass. 1986);  Hatzopoulou v. American Steel Foundries, 39 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 372 (N.D. Ill. 1985);  EEOC v. Ocean City
Police Dep't, 617 F. Supp. 1133, 1140-1141 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd on
other grounds, 787 F.2d 955 (1986), rev'd on reh'g, 820 F.2d 1378 (4th
Cir. 1987) (en banc);  Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
580 F. Supp. 662, 665-667 (D.D.C. 1984);  Yeung v. Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co., 504 F. Supp. 422, 424 (N.D. Cal. 1980);  Cattell v. Bob
Frensley Ford, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 617, 618-619 (M.D. Tenn 1980);
Lombardi v. Margolis Wines & Spirits, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 99, 101-102
(E.D. Pa. 1979);  see also Steissberger v. Rockwell International
Corp., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1274 (E.D. Wash. 1982);
Morgan v. Sharon Pennsylvania Bd. of Education, 445 F. Supp. 142, 145
(W.D. Pa. 1978);  Greenlow v. California Dep't of Benefit Payments,
413 F. Supp. 420, 424 (E.D. Cal. 1976);  EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella,
401 F. Supp. 175, 184 (N.D.Ill. 1975);  but see Klausner v. Southern
Oil Co., 533 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).

   /10/ "Cessation" is defined as "a temporary or final ceasing or
discontinuance (as of action)" Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, supra, at 367.

   /11/ The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is entitled to
"great deference" and, if reasonable, should be upheld because the
EEOC is the agency primarily responsible for implementation and
enforcement of Title VII.  See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 761 (1979);  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434
(1971);  see also Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, No. 85-971
(Jan. 14, 1987), slip op 14-15;  Young v. Community Nutrition
Institute, No. 85-664 (June 17, 1986), slip op. 5-7;  Connecticut
Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985).

   /12/ See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5820 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Stennis)("T)he Federal Commission would be the sole judge of whether a
State agency is effective.  * * * (T)his Federal Commission may -
without consent or review from anyone - completely disregard the State
agency and assume full authority on equal employment matters in the
States.")

   /13/ See 110 Cong. Rec. 6550 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("It
has been suggested that this direction to the (EEOC to enter into
agreement with State agencies) is not enough, that there should be
some provision automatically providing for exclusive State
jurisdiction where adequate State remedies for discrimination in
employment exist.  Such a proposal is unworkable.  Congress cannot
determine nor can we devise a formula for determining which State laws
and procedures are adequate.  * * * The Commission must have authority
to determine in which States and in which classes of cases it will
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction.");  id. at 7214-7216
(Interpretative Memorandum submitted by floor managers Sens. Clark and
Case in response to Sen. Dirksen's criticisms) ("Title VII leaves
state and local (employment discrimination) laws untouched.  * * *
(I)t does not repeal nay consistent State or local laws.")

   /14/ A 1972 amendment to Title VII added a new subsection (a) to
Section 706.  Section 706(b) and (d) in the 1964 version accordingly
became Section 706(c) and (e) in the 1972 amended version.  See
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 820 n.31 (1980).  References to
those provisions in this brief are, unless otherwise indicated, based
on the current (post - 1972) version.  The 1972 enactment also
lengthened the limitations periods for the filing of charges with the
EEOC from 90 to 180 days in nondeferral states and from 210 to 300
days in deferral states.  See id. at 822.

   /15/ This Court has made this point repeatedly.  Se, e.g., Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972) (emphasis added) (Section 706(c)
(then Section 706(b)) "give(s) state agencies a prior opportunity to
consider discrimination complaints");  New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U.S. at 63 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 755 (1979) (emphasis added)) ("Title VII establishes a
comprehensive enforcement scheme in which state agencies are given 'a
limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination
and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal relief by victims
of the discrimination.'");  Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 810
(1980) (emphasis added) (Section 706(c) "prohibits the filing of a ()
* * * charge with * * * (EEOC) until after a state fair employment
practice agency has had an opportunity to consider it");  EEOC v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 63 n.12 (1984) (emphasis added) ("the
Commission may not initiate its own investigation until the
appropriate state agency has been afforded an opportunity to
investigate and resolve the matter").

   /16/ See 110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen) ("a
measure at once practical, workable, equitable, and fair, and one
which had a proper regard for what the States had done * * * ");  id.
at 13081 (remarks of Sen. Case) ("more concern or more deference could
not be given to the rights of the States");  id. at 14329 (remarks of
Sen. Brewster) ("The legislation that we are about to enact is
moderate, and defers to State action and local solution.").

   /17/ See Pet. App. 27a, 49a ("In order to avoid delay * * *, CCRC
hereby waives its exclusive right to process those charges for 60 days
* * * so that EEOC can take immediate action on such charges.")

   /18/ A delay of 120 days would be required in actions to enforce
state anti-discrimination laws which have been in effect for less than
one year.  See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c).

   /19/ The court of appeals suggested (Pet. App. 11a-12a (emphasis in
original)) that a state's decision to defer to the EEOC does not
terminate the state's proceedings for purposes of Section 706(c)
because such a construction conflicts with "the unmistakable intention
of Congress * * * that the state would act during its period of
exclusive jurisdiction and that the federal authorities would begin
proceedings only if state proceedings failed to resolve the dispute."
As explained by the First Circuit in Isaac v. Harvard University, 769
F.2d at 821, however, "the statute plainly allows the EEOC to proceed
in 60 days no matter what the state agency has done, so there is no
rigid requirement that the state complete all of its business before
the EEOC can act." Furthermore, the statute contains no requirement
that states with equal employment opportunity laws take action on
complaints within 60 days.  If Congress had intended to impose such a
requirement, it could have done so expressly.

   Finally, the court of appeals' reliance (Pet. App. 10a n.10) on two
comments by Senator Humphrey regarding the states' "responsibilities"
under the statute is misplaced.  As the court of appeals itself
recognized (id. at 10a), Congress sought only "to encourage the states
and the local communities to take a greater share of the
responsibility" in guaranteeing equal rights.  110 Cong. Rec. 11936
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);  see also Equal Employment
Opportunity:  Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2, at 960
(1962) (testimony of John B. Swainson, Governor of Michigan).
Congress sought to "give() the States an opportunity to carry out
their responsibilities first;  and then, if they do not do so, the
Federal Government steps in" (110 Cong. Rec. 14313 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Miller)).  There is no indication that Congress intended to
require the EEOC to refuse to honor a state agency's decision to place
initial responsibility for processing a charge in federal hands after
the state agency has expressly relinquished its opportunity to process
that particular charge further in the first instance.

   /20/ The 60-day delay would, of course, apply to all charges that
the state agency defers to the EEOC, and not only to those charges
filed more than 240 days after the alleged discriminatory event.
During the period of time covering fiscal year 1986 and 1987 (October
1, 1985 to June 30, 1987), the EEOC itself initially received
approximately 93,450 Title VII charges within 240 days of the alleged
violation.

   /21/ For example, between October 1, 1985 and June 30, 1987, the
EEOC received approximately 10,554 Title VII charges beyond 240 days.

   /22/ The drafters were "mindful of every word, of every comma, and
of the shading of every phrase" (110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks
of Sen. Dirksen);  see also 110 Cong. Rec. 12688 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Saltonstall)).

   /23/ There are also many sound reasons why a state may want to
waive initial investigation of a charge.  For example, it may have
insufficient resources to process all charges efficiently or
adequately, or it may believe that the EEOC will be better able to
investigate or conciliate certain charges.  As the First Circuit in
Isaac explained (769 F.2d at 825-826), "(a) state which seeks to waive
initial processing because of inadequate finances or heavy workload
would be unable to secure the quick attention to its citizens' claims
offered by the worksharing agreements * * *."

   /24/ With the possible exception of Oklahoma and Tennessee, none of
the numerous worksharing agreements entered into between the EEOC and
the various state and local fair employment practice agencies appears
to contemplate a complete relinquishment of agency jurisdiction upon
waiver of the right to a period of exclusive processing.

   /25/ See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1521 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler)
("Through cooperative efforts with State and local agencies, title VII
envisions an effective and harmonious mobilization of Federal, State,
and local authorities in attacking this national problem.");  Equal
Employment Opportunity:  Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt.
1, at 6 (1961) (testimony of Rep. Roosevelt) ("W)e want to be able to
put into any proposed legislation, the kind of language which would
assure full cooperation and preclude any possibility of
interference.").  See also 110 Cong. Rec. 2602 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Dent);  id. at 7205 (remarks of Sen. Clark);  id. at 8193 (remarks of
Sen. Dirksen);  id. at 11848, 13091 (remarks of Sen Dirksen);  id. at
11848, 13091 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);  id. at 12617 (remarks of
Sen. Muskie).

   /26/ Because the CCRD informed the EEOC within the 300-day
limitations period that it did not intend to process the charge
initially, this case does not raise the issue whether such formal
notice is necessary where, as in this case, the state agecny has
previously announced to the EEOC in a worksharing agreement the
agency's intention to waive its right initially to process a certain
type of charge.  Pursuant to its procedural regulations, the EEOC
forwards copies of charges to the state or local agency even where the
state agency has previously waived initial processing under a
worksharing agreement (29 C.F.R. 1601.13(a)(4)(iii);  see 52 Fed. Reg.
10224 (1987)).  For the purpose of meeting federal filing deadlines,
the EEOC's procedural regulations provide that "(w)here the document
on its face constitutes a charge within a category of charges over
which the (state) (a)gency has waived its rights to the period of
exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(4)(iii) of this
section, the charge is deemed to be filed with the Commission upon
receipt of the document.  Such filing is timely if the charge is
received within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation" (29
C.F.R. 1601.13(a)(5)(ii)(A);  see 52 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1987)).

   /27/ This Court's treatment of somewhat analogous issues lends
further support to the EEOC's position in this case.  In Idlewild
Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per curiam), this Court
considered the finality, for the purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C.
1291, of a district court decision not to convene a three-judge court
in a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
statute.  The district court had instead stayed the federal action
pending state court proceedings, pursuant to Pullman abstention
(Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).  This Court
held that the order was a final decision, within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. 1291, because the "'(a)ppellant was effectively out of court'"
(370 U.S. at 715 n.2 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v.
Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 428) (2d Cir. 1961)).  As more recently described
by this Court, that "(a) district court stay pursuant to Pullman
abstention is entered with the expectation that the federal litigation
will resume in the event that the plaintiff does not obtain relief in
state court on state-law grounds" does not negate the finality of that
district court stay and the appropriateness of immediate appea.  See
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
10 (1983) (footnote omitted).  Indeed, this Court characterized (id.
at 11 n.11, 12)the deferral in Idlewild as a "surrender (of)
jurisdiction," even though the district court retained jurisdiction
over the case.  The complainant in this case is similarly
"'effectively out of' (the state forum)" (460 U.S. at 11 n.11
(citation omitted)).  By analogy, therefore, that the state agency,
like the federal court in Idlewild, formally retained some residual
jurisdiction to act following the EEOC's determination should neither
negate the finality of the state agency's determination - for the
purpose of determining whether its "proceedings" are thereby
"terminated" - nor cast doubt on the appropriateness of the EEOC
immediately processing the charge.