AMANDA REID, PETITIONER V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

   No. 86-1211

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1986

   On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

   Brief for the United States in Opposition

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Questions presented
   Opinion below
   Jurisdiction
   Statement
   Argument
   Conclusion

                             OPINION BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A33a) is reported
at 803 F.2d 714 (Table).

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on October 8,
1986, and a petition for rehearing was denied on November 21, 1986
(Pet. App. A41-A41a).  The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
on January 20, 1987.  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   1. Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), which prohibits the making of a
false statement of material fact in connection with the purchase of a
firearm, is unconstitutional as applied to petitioner.

   2. Whether evidence seized in a search of premises in New York
should have been suppressed in petitioner's trial.

                               STATEMENT

   Following a jury trial in the United States District for the Middle
District of North Carolina, petitioner was convicted of making a false
statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6).  She was sentenced to five years'
probation and a $2,500 fine.

   1. The evidence at trial, the sufficiency of which is not in
dispute, is set out in the opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.
A3-A6, A13-A14).  It showed that petitioner, an attorney, is a partner
in the California law firm of Decious, Reid and Associates and is
counsel to the New York City law firm of Daniel P. Foster, P.C.  In
May 1981, petitioner and her parents visited petitioner's aunt at the
latter's home in North Wilkesboro, North Carolina.  Petitioner had
never lived in North Wilkesboro and, with the exception of this brief
family visit, had never visited her aunt there.  On May 7, 1981,
petitioner purchased a handgun from a federally licensed firearms
dealer in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.  Federal law prohibits a
dealer from selling firearms to a person who is not a resident of the
state in which the dealer resides.  18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5).  On Form
4473, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms from that the
purchaser is required by law to fill out (Huddleston v. United States,
415 U.S. 814, 816 (1974)), petitioner listed as her address the
address of her aunt in North Wilkesboro.  For identification,
petitioner furnished a pistol permit, which is required by North
Carolina law for the purchase of a handgun, and an expired
international student identification card.  Petitioner had acquired
the pistol permit two days earlier from the County Sheriff's
Department in North Wilkesboro.  At that time, petitioner told the
Sheriff's Department that she was living with her aunt in North
Wilkesboro.  She explained her lack of any North Carolina
identification on the ground that she had not been in the State long
enough to acquire identification.  She stated, however, that she was
thinking of taking the bar examination and staying in North Carolina.

   Shortly after purchasing the handgun, petitioner returned to New
York.  In June 1981, she applied for admission to the New York bar.
On her bar application, petitioner stated that her address was
Brooklyn, New York, and that she had resided there since October 1978.
 Petitioner did not list the North Wilkesboro address in response to a
question asking for a list of every permanent and temporary residence
she had had since entering college.

   Petitioner testified at trial that in listing the North Wilkesboro
address on the ATF form, she considered that address to be a truthful
statement of her residence at that time.  Although she had only been
at the North Wilkesboro address on the one occasion, she stated that
she considered it to be her residence because "(I) could go there at
any time, I could go live with my aunt at any time, I am welcome there
at any time, her home is my home." Pet. App. A13-A14.

   2. Petitioner's sales receipt for the purchase of the handgun in
North Carolina was discovered during the search of an office of the
Foster law firm at Apartment 1A, 1107 Carroll Street, in Brooklyn, New
York.  That address was one of five locations searched by the FBI,
pursuant to warrants, on February 17, 1984.

   The warrants were issued on the basis of an affidavit prepared by
FBI Agent Neil Herman (App. 6-46).  /1/ Agent Herman's affidavit
recited that the Provisional Party of Communists (PPC) operated out of
three buildings located at 1107, 1111, and 1115 Carroll Street in
Brooklyn (App. 7, 9-11, 20).  The affidavit then set forth detailed
information about the premises and the PPC that was obtained from
several former members of the PPC, Carroll Street residents, and other
sources as a result of an extensive investigation by the Joint
Terrorist Task Force (App. 9, 19-20, 22, 25-27, 29, 33, 38).

   The affidavit stated that the PPC was a revolutionary communist
party founded in 1971 whose goal was the overthrow of the United
States government by military force (App. 10-11, 22, 25-26, 28-29,
33-34).  Numerous "front organizations," mostly unions, were run and
controlled from the PPC's national office, which was located in
Apartment 2A at 1107 Carroll Street (App. 12-13, 22).  Directly below
the national office, in Apartment 1A, was the law firm of Daniel
Foster, a PPC member (App. 13).  The law firm was controlled by the
PPC and staffed and run by PPC members (ibid.).  Apartment 1A also
housed the office of Gino Parenti, the leader of the PPC (App. 13-14).
 All PPC operations were conducted out of the national office and from
Foster's law firm (App. 13).  One of the front organizations used by
the PPC was "Foxfire Enterprises, Inc.," which owned and operated the
three buildings at 1107, 1111, and 1115 Carroll Street (App. 12-13).
One of the PPC's "safe houses" was a penthouse apartment located at
145 West 55th Street in Manhattan (App. 17).

   The affidavit recited that the scheduled date for the PPC's planned
coup was February 19, 1984 (App. 10, 20, 25).  The coup was to be
undertaken by the "military fraction" of the PPC and by means of a
general strike on the east and west coasts by unions under PPC control
(ibid.).  The PPC anticipated that it would take three days of
fighting to complete the coup (App. 19).  The "military fraction" of
the PPC conducted military drills, and its members received military
training (App. 11-12, 21-22).  The affidavit recited that within the
preceding 18 months, more than 100 firearms -- including submachine
guns, assault rifles, and military style M-1 carbines -- had been seen
in Apartment 2A at 1107 Carroll Street, and that within the preceding
five days, hand grenades and numerous other firearms and ammunition
has been seen in Parenti's apartment (App. 15, 18-19, 21, 27, 29).  A
PPC guard kept a 24-hour "lookout" from the PPC's second story window
at 1107 Carroll Street, and during "alerts," armed PPC members were
frequently seen at the Carroll Street location (App. 14-15, 28, 41).
The affidavit further recited that records and files of the "military
fraction" were maintained in Foster's law office at Apartment 1A, 1107
Carroll Street, and that other PPC files were to be found throughout
Apartment 2A (App. 13-14).

   Finally, the affidavit stated that on February 16, 1984, grand jury
subpoenas had been served on Daniel Foster and Kathryn Conelly Decious
to produce certain documents (App. 42).  Decious and Foster appeared
before Judge Eugene Nickerson of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York that same day to contest the validity
of the subpoenas.  They indicated at that time that they did not have
the requested records or any knowledge of them (App. 42-43).

   On the basis of Agent Herman's affidavit, Judge Henry Bramwell of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
issued warrants on the evening of February 16, 1984, authorizing the
search of the Carroll Street buildings and the penthouse apartment in
Manhattan (App. 1-5A).  The search warrant for Apartment 1A at 1107
Carroll Street authorized the officers to search for, inter alia,
"records relating to the purchase, storage and disposal of weapons,
ammunition and explosives" (App. 2).  /2/ During the search of
Apartment 1A, agents found the sales receipt for the firearm
petitioner had purchased in North Carolina (App. 88, 98, 164-168).
All the items seized during the several searches were taken to the FBI
office in the Southern District of New York, where they were
inventoried and stored under lock and key (App. 75, 107).  Thereafter,
pursuant to court order, the government made available to Daniel
Foster for inspection and copying all the material that had been
seized from his Carroll Street law office (App. 267-270).

   3. Following the searches, Foster filed motions in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to quash
the search warrants and for return of property (App. 258, 290-291).
Following a hearing on March 7, 1984 (App. 256-300), the district
court denied the motion to quash, ruling that it was moot because the
warrants had been executed and returned and noting that a motion to
suppress could be filed if criminal charges were brought (App. 258,
283, 286-288).  /3/

   Thereafter, Foster filed several motions in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, including a
motion to quash the search warrant executed at 145 West 55th Street
and a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) for suppression and
return of the items seized at that address.  The district court denied
the motions on April 23, 1984 (App. 254-255).  With respect to the
Rule 41(e) motion, the court ruled that given Foster's right of access
to the seized material, he had failed to show that he would be
irreparably harmed if the seized material was not returned (App. 255,
citing Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982)).

   In September 1984, Foster filed a further motion in the Southern
District of New York for return of the material seized from the
Carroll Street buildings and 145 West 55th Street.  At the November
16, 1984, hearing on that motion, the government informed the court
that it had returned to Foster all of the material seized from the
West 55th Street location (App. 238-242).  Because that was the only
material seized in the Southern District of New York (App. 241-242),
the court ruled that Foster had been granted full relief with respect
to documents seized in the Southern District (App. 242-243).  The
court further stated:  "(M)ydenial of further relief is explicitly
conditioned on the proposition that the plaintiff not be deemed to
have waived any rights which it would otherwise have under Rule 41 B
(sic), or any other rights, to move to suppress the use of any such
documents or copies of documents unless they are hereafter legally and
properly seized for law enforcement purposes" (ibid.).  In a
subsequent written order, the court ruled that insofar as Foster's
motion for return of property pertained to material seized in the
Eastern District of New York (that is, from the Carroll Street
buildings), Rule 41(e) required that the motion be filed in the
Eastern District (App. 233-234).

   Foster then filed a motion in the Eastern District for return of
the Carroll Street property and to quash the search warrants that had
been executed in the Eastern District.  The district court denied
those motions in an order dated June 7, 1985 (App. 229-232).  The
government represented to the court that it intended voluntarily to
return all the property seized in the Eastern District (App. 229,
230).  The government also informed the court that criminal charges
were pending against petitioner in federal district court in North
Carolina and that the government might seek to introduce at that trial
certain evidence that had been seized during the Carroll Street search
(App. 231).  The court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to pass
on the Rule 41(e) motion, noting that the Foster firm would suffer no
continuing injury because the government intended to return the
property (App. 230) and that it would be inappropriate for the court
to rule on the admissibility of any of the evidence that might be
offered at a future trial in another district (App. 230-231).

   4. Following her indictment on the instant charges, petitioner
moved to suppress the sales receipt on the grounds that the search
warrants were invalid as general warrants;  that the warrants were not
supported by probable cause;  that the seizure of the sales receipt
was outside the scope of the warrants;  and that the search was
conducted in an unlawful manner.  At the hearing on these claims (App.
47-200), the district court expressed the view that unless petitioner
met the test set out in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), by
establishing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally included in
the affidavit false statements that were necessary to the finding of
probable cause, he had no authority to invalidate a warrant issued by
another federal district judge (App. 53).  Petitioner argued that she
met the Franks standard because the source of the information recited
in paragraphs 18 and 25 of the search warrant affidavit was material
that had been suppressed during earlier state court proceedings (App.
54-55).  The district court found that even absent the information
recited in those paragraphs, there was an "abundance" of probable
cause (App. 57, 60-61).

   Petitioner also argued that the search warrants had been improperly
issued because, when it sought the warrants from Judge Bramwell, the
government did not advise him that a challenge to the validity of
grand jury subpoenas seeking the same material was pending before
Judge Nickerson (App. 50-51, 54).  Petitioner relied (App. 52) on
Judge Bramwell's statement that he doubted that he would have issued
the warrants had he known of the matter pending before Judge
Nickerson.  The district court noted that Judge Bramwell's statement
merely reflected a hesitancy to involve himself in a case being
handled by another judge, and it concluded that whether or not Judge
Bramwell would have issued the search warrants had he known that a
related matter was pending before Judge Nickerson had no bearing on
the validity of the search warrants (App. 61).

   Finally, petitioner argued that the sales receipt for petitioner's
firearm had been seized from the building located on West 55th Street
in the Southern District of New York and that District Judge Lasker on
November 16, 1984, had suppressed all the material that had been
seized in that district (App. 62-63).  The government responded that
Judge Lasker had issued no order suppressing evidence seized in the
Southern District of New York, and that in any event the receipt had
been seized from 1107 Carroll Street, which was located in the Eastern
District of New York (App. 63-64).  After a hearing on the latter
issue (App. 68-191), the court found that the receipt had been seized
at 1107 Carroll Street (App. 194-196).  The court then denied
petitioner's motion to suppress and to dismiss the indictment,
stating:  "I don't find anything wrong with the search, seizure, or
anything else pertaining to the warrant.  The preponderance of the
evidence leads me to the conclusion that it was proper in every
respect." App. 196.

   5. The court of appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction (Pet. App.
A1-A33).  The court found the evidence "quite sufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the critical issue of
(petitioner's) specific intent given the fleeting contact she had with
the North Carolina 'residence' she claimed, and her conflicting
statements of residence in other contexts" (id. at A33).  The court
also summarily rejected as "without merit" petitioner's claim that 18
U.S.C. 922(a)(6) was unconstitutional as applied to her (Pet. App.
A32).  Finally, the court of appeals sustained the district court's
refusal to suppress the sales receipt.  It found (1) "no error in (the
district court's) conclusion that a substantial basis supported the
Eastern District of New York Court's finding of probable cause for the
issuance of the warrants" (Pet. App. A28), and (2) that petitioner had
failed to show that Agent Hansen's affidavit contained knowingly false
statements that were necessary to the finding of probable cause (id.
at A27).  In this regard, the court of appeals found substantial
evidence to support the district court's finding that the seizure of
the receipt occurred in the Eastern District of New York, and it
therefore declined to consider the effect of any rulings by the
District Court for the Southern District of New York.  Id. at A23-A25.

                               ARGUMENT

   The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does not
conflict with any decision of this Court or of another court of
appeals.  Review by this Court therefore is not warranted.

   1. Petitioner first contends (Pet. 8-21) that 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6)
is unconstitutional as applied because her purchase of a firearm
represented a purely "local transaction" in which the federal
government had no legitimate interest.  This claim is without merit.

   a. The Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed by Congress in response
to concerns over the widespread traffic in firearms and their easy
availability to persons whose possession of firearms was contrary to
the public interest.  The primary purpose of the Act was "to curb
crime by keeping 'firearms out of the hands of those not legally
entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or
incompetency.'" Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974)
(quoting S. Rep. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968)).  Section
922(a)(6) was enacted as a means of documenting firearms transactions.
 As this Court explained in Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825:

      Information drawn from records kept by dealers was a prime
      guarantee of the Act's effectiveness in keeping "these lethal
      weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts, mentally
      disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose
      possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to
      allow." 114 Cong. Rec. 13219 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings).
      Thus, any false statement with respect to the eligibility of a
      person to obtain a firearm from a licensed dealer was made
      subject to a criminal penalty.

   Given Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to regulate sales
by firearms dealers, Congress plainly has the power to impose criminal
sanctions on a person who makes a false statement of material fact to
a firearms dealer.  Such regulation of private transactions affecting
commerce does not impermissibly interfere with the powers reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment.  Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 283-293 (1981).  /4/

   b. Petitioner contends (Pet. 10-11, 18-21) that the Gun Control Act
constitutes an impermissible intrusion into state police power in
another respect as well.  Her argument is as follows:  North Carolina
law provides that a county sheriff may issue a pistol permit to
residents of the county.  The Sheriff of Wilkes County issued her a
permit, thus determining that petitioner had sufficient local ties to
qualify as a resident of that county.  Accordingly, petitioner's
federal prosecution for making a false statement concerning her
residence in connection with the acquisition of a firearm interfered
with the State's right to define "residency." This claim is frivolous.

   Section 922(a)(6) makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to make any
false statement that is intended or likely to deceive a firearms
dealer with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale
of a firearm.  Section 922(b)(3) makes it unlawful for a dealer to
sell a firearm to any person who he believes or has reasonable cause
to believe does not reside in the state in which the dealer's business
is located.  The jury found that at the time petitioner purchased the
firearm in question, she falsely stated that she resided at her aunt's
address in North Wilkesboro, North Carolina.  Given the prohibition in
Section 922(b)(3) against sales to nonresidents, petitioner's false
statement was unquestionably material.

   Nothing in Section 922(a)(6) conflicts with North Carolina law on
the same subject.  The applicable state statutes make it unlawful for
a dealer to sell a pistol to a person without a permit and authorize
the county sheriff to issue a permit to a resident of the county.
N.C. Gen. Stat. Sections 14-402 to 14-404 (1986).  Thus, North
Carolina law, like federal law, requires that a permit for the sort of
firearm petitioner purchased be issued only to a resident of the
State.  That the Wilkes County Sheriff issued petitioner a permit upon
her representation that she intended to remain in that county in no
way established that petitioner in fact was a resident of North
Carolina;  if anything, it suggests that the Sheriff erroneously
issued petitioner a permit.  Indeed, petitioner fails to cite any
definition of "resident" under North Carolina law by which she could
conceivably qualify as a resident of North Carolina.  In any event,
Congress has full power to regulate matters affecting commerce in
firearms.  Under the Supremacy Clause, the laws Congress enacts on
that subject -- including those at issue in this case that prescribe
the definition of residence and establish procedures for ascertaining
residence -- are controlling, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI,
Cl. 2.  /5/

   2. Petitioner's various challenges to the district court's denial
of her motion to suppress the sales receipt (see Pet. 22-46) are also
without merit.

   a. Contrary to petitioner's contention (Pet. 23-24), the record
shows that the district court conducted an extensive hearing on
petitioner's motion to suppress (App. 47-200), after which it ruled
that the warrant and ensuing search were proper in every respect (App.
194-196).  Petitioner cites nothing to support her assertion that she
was foreclosed from introducing evidence bearing on her motion to
suppress.  To be sure, the district court expressed the erroneous view
that under Franks v. Delaware, it had no authority, in the absence of
a showing that the affidavit contained knowing misrepresentations
necessary to the finding of probably cause, to invalidate a warrant
issued by another federal district judge (App. 53).  However,
petitioner did not take issue with the court's statement to that
effect.  Instead, she maintained that she could make a showing that
satisfied the Franks v. Delaware standard that the district court
invoked (App. 53-62).  /6/

   In any event, the district court's misapprehension was of no
moment, because the court carefully scrutinized the warrant and the
ensuing search and found them to be proper in every respect.  The
record fully supports the district court's conclusion in that regard.
The detailed 40-page affidavit of FBI Agent Herman indisputably
provided the requisite probable cause for issuance of a warrant, even
without the two paragraphs that petitioner challenged as false.
Indeed, petitioner does not contend otherwise.  As the district court
observed at the suppression hearing, any judicial officer who did not
issue a warrant when presented such an affidavit "would be derelict in
(his) duty" (App. 61).  Moreover, because the executing officers were,
at the very least, entirely justified in relying on the warrant issued
by a federal district judge, petitioner would not be entitled to
suppression of the sales receipt even if the courts below had
concluded that the affidavit did not provide sufficient probable cause
to support the warrant.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984).

   b. Nor is there any merit to petitioner's argument (Pet. 37-43)
that the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad because it provided
no guidance to the agents as to what was to be seized and because the
agents had to examine the contents of every document in order to
determine whether it was within the scope of the warrant.  The warrant
made perfectly clear what items were subject to search and seizure.
It authorized the search for guns and ammunition;  records pertaining
to the purchase, storage, location, and disposal of those weapons;
records concerning PPC's terrorist activities and its plans for an
armed insurrection against the United States;  and the records of
Foxfire Enterprises.  The fact that the searching agents had to
examine numerous documents at 1107 Carroll Street in order to
determine which documents fell within the scope of the warrant does
not establish that the warrant was overbroad.  In document searches of
the nature involved here, a cursory examination of innocuous documents
is inevitable and entirely proper.  Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 482 n.11 (1976).

   c. Petitioner's related claim (Pet. 41) that the sales receipt was
outside the scope of the warrant because it "was not listed
individually or categorically as an item to be seized" is wholly
insubstantial.  The warrant authorized the search for "records
relating to the purchase, storage and disposal of weapons" (App. 2).
The fact that petitioner's name was not specifically mentioned in the
warrant is irrelevant.  /7/

   d. Finally, there is no merit to petitioner's contention (Pet.
33-35) that the district court should have suppressed the receipt and
dismissed the indictment on the basis of the November 16, 1984, order
by Judge Lasker in the Southern District of New York.  Petitioner
characterizes that order -- which is quoted in relevant part in the
court of appeals' opinion (Pet. App. A10) -- as one suppressing all
items seized in the Southern District.  That characterization is
simply erroneous.  In context, it is clear that Judge Lasker was not
ruling on the legality of the search or suppressing any evidence
seized in his district.  Indeed, Judge Lasker never considered any
evidence concerning the search.  And in the November 16 order, he in
fact denied Foster's Rule 41(e) motion for return of the property that
had been seized from 145 West 55th Street because the government had
returned that property to Foster (App. 233-234, 238-243).  In so
doing, Judge Lasker merely noted that his order did not foreclose
Foster (or, presumably, petitioner) from later challenging the
legality of the search in any subsequent criminal proceeding.
Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to do precisely that in her
prosecution below.

   Furthermore, as the district court found, the sales receipt was not
seized in the Southern District of New York, but from 1107 Carroll
Street in the Eastern District of New York (App. 194-196).  The court
of appeals held that the district court's finding on this point was
supported by substantial evidence, which it recited in considerable
detail (Pet. App. A23-A25).  That concurrent factual determination by
the courts below is not clearly erroneous and does not warrant review
by this Court.

                              CONCLUSION

   The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

   Respectfully submitted.

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   WILLIAM F. WELD

      Assistant Attorney General

   DEBORAH WATSON

      Attorney

   APRIL 1987

   /1/ "App." refers to the Supplemental Appendix filed by the
government in the court of appeals.

   /2/ The search warrant for Apartment 1A, 1107 Carroll Street,
authorized a search for (App. 2):

   1. Weapons (rifles, handguns and machineguns) and other military
equipment including uniforms;

   2. Explosives;

   3. All records of the Provisional Party of Communists (PPC)
relating to the purchase, storage, location and disposal of weapons,
ammunition and explosives;

   4. All books, documents and records outlining the PPC's plans for
an armed insurrection against the lawful authority of the United
States Government;

   5. All records relating to planned terrorist activities;

   6. All records of the "Military Fraction" of the PPC including, but
not limited to, records detailing planned military activities directed
against the lawful authority of the United States Government, records
detailing planned terrorist activities, records concerning the
location of "Military Fraction" headquarters, records relating to the
location of weapons, ammunition and explosives, records relating to
the purchase, storage and disposal of weapons, ammunition and
explosives, records relating to the identity of those individuals
making up the "Military Fraction" of the PPC and records relating to
the system of communications among and between the different locations
of the "Military Fraction" of the PPC;  and

   7. The books and records of Foxfire Enterprises, Inc.

   /3/ During the March 7 hearing before Judge Bramwell, Foster
complained that at the time the government sought the search warrants
from Judge Bramwell, the question of the validity of grand jury
subpeonas issued on February 16 for some of the same material was
pending before Judge Nickerson (App. 259-260, 264-265).  Judge
Bramwell commented that had he known that the matter was pending
before Judge Nickerson, he doubted that he would have signed the
search warrants (App. 260, 265).  The attorney for the government
informed Judge Bramwell that he had spoken to Judge Nickerson on the
evening of February 16 and advised him that the government was
applying for several search warrants for material that included some
of the subject matter of the subpoenas whose validity was to be
considered by Judge Nickerson.  The attorney for the government
further stated that Judge Nickerson had suggested that the government
apply to Judge Bramwell for the warrants because Judge Bramwell lived
closer to the courthouse (App. 265-266).

   /4/ Contrary to petitioner's contention (Pet. 16-18), application
of the federal Gun Control Act in these circumstances likewise does
not violate the Second Amendment.  It is settled that the Second
Amendment is not an absolute bar to congressional regulation of the
use and possession of firearms;  it protects use of possession that
"has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178
(1939);  see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
Petitioner can make no such claim here.  Moreover, petitioner was not
convicted of keeping and bearing arms.  She was convicted of making a
false statement in connection with her acquisition of a firearm --
activity that Congress has proscribed as an incidental part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme for curbing the illegal possession and
transfer of firearms.

   /5/ Petitioner's reliance (Pet. 15-16) on United States v. Behenna,
552 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977), is misplaced.  First, as the court of
appeals noted in the instant case (Pet. App. A20-A21), the defendant
in Behenna objected to the jury instructions regarding his intent with
respect to residence;  petitioner did not do so.  Second, as the court
below further noted (Pet. App. A21-A22), the decision in Behenna was
"highly fact-specific" and "focused upon ambiguity of particular
instructions in relation to particular evidence" regarding the
defendant's future residence.  In any event, the distinctions drawn by
the court below between this case and its prior decision in Behenna
present no issue warranting review by this Court.

   /6/ Petitioner likewise did not urge reversal on this particular
ground in the court of appeals (see Appellant's Br. 10-20), and she
mentions the point only in passing here (see Pet. 30).

   /7/ Petitioner's suggestion (Pet. 24-29) that the government acted
improperly or that the warrant was invalid because the grand jury one
day earlier had issued subpoenas for some of the same material also is
insubstantial.  Contrary to petitioner's intimation (Pet. 25-26), the
pendency before Judge Nickerson of a challenge to the subpoenas was
not hidden from Judge Bramwell, who issued the search warrant.  That
fact was recited in Agent Hansen's affidavit that was submitted to
Judge Bramwell in support of the warrant application (App. 42-43).
Furthermore, Judge Bramwell's comment that he might not have issued
the search warrant if he had known that the matter was pending before
Judge Nickerson merely reflected a reluctance to interfere;  it did
not imply that the search warrant should not have been issued or that
the government had acted improperly (App. 61, 265-266).  Finally, as
explained in the affidavit (App. 42-43) and by the government during
the March 7, 1984, hearing before Judge Bramwell (App. 260), there
were grounds to believe that Foster and Decious had made
misrepresentations to Judge Nickerson when they stated in contesting
the subpoenas that they did not have any of the records in question.
Because there was probable cause to believe that the PPC planned
violent activity on February 19, 1984 (App. 10, 20, 25), circumstances
plainly justified the government's seeking a search warrant to be
executed on February 17, 1984.