Exploratory Studies Facility Subsurface Fire Hazards Analysis   REV 03
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 
March 2002 



1. OBJECTIVE
The primary objective of this Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) is to confirm the requirements for a 
comprehensive fire and related hazards protection program for the Exploratory Studies Facility 
(ESF) are sufficient to minimize the potential for: 
 The occurrence of a fire or related event. 
 A fire that causes an unacceptable on-site or off-site release of hazardous or 
radiological material that will threaten the health and safety of employees, the public or 
the environment. 
 Vital U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) programs suffering unacceptable interruptions 
as a result of fire and related hazards. 
 Property losses from a fire and related events exceeding limits established by DOE. 
 Critical process controls and safety class systems being damaged as a result of a fire 
and related events. 
(DOE Order 420.1, Section 4.2(1)) 
2. SCOPE 
This FHA is revised to provide an up-to-date evaluation of hazards found in the current 
configuration and operation of the ESF. The FHA identifies deficiencies, and provides 
resolutions and mitigating measures for identified hazards. It specifically addresses the following 
items identified in the letter from Bechtel SAIC Company to the DOE (Williams 2001). 
 The intended use of refuge chambers in the Cross-Drift.
 The use of timber cribbing ground support above the steel sets in isolated areas of the
Main Drift. 
 The use of water as a backup system for incipient fire fighting needs to be re-evaluated. 
 The emergency lighting and exit lights have not been installed in the subsurface. 
 The visual warning system and the facility control and status indicators, located in the 
North Portal Lamp Building not being complete. 
 The smoke detector system, located in Alcove 5, while providing local alarm function, 
has not been connected to the control and status indicator panel. 
 The water supply piping supports need to be reworked. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 1 March 2002 

This analysis includes the Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block (ECRB) 
Cross-Drift, the Main Drift, Alcoves 1 through 10, and Niches 1 through 6. 
This analysis includes Alcove 5 only to the extent it affects the Main Drift. The Thermal Test 
Facility (TTF), located in Alcove 5, is described in detail in a separate document titled Thermal 
Test Facility Fire Hazards Analysis, (CRWMS M&O 1997c). The TTF FHA has been evaluated 
and has been determined to be current and adequate (Williams 2001). 
3. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
No quality assurance controls are applicable to the items or activities addressed in this fire 
hazards analysis. The items addressed in this technical report are temporary and are therefore 
not classified in accordance with QAP-2-3, Classification of Permanent Items, nor are any 
activities subject to the quality assurance requirements found in a Determination of Importance 
Evaluation. ESF subsurface fire protection has been examined in Determination of Importance 
Evaluation for the Subsurface Exploratory Studies Facility (CRWMS M&O 1999a Section 6.17) 
and Determination of Importance Evaluation for the ESF Enhanced Characterization of the 
Repository Block Cross Drift, (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 10.6.4) and the conclusions of 
these Determination of Importance Evaluations sufficiently bound this analysis. This report has 
been determined as not quality affecting (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Addendum A  Work Package 
6401226CN2) and is therefore not subject to the requirements of the Quality Assurance 
Requirements and Description (QARD) document. (DOE 2000b). 
This document was prepared in accordance with the Technical Work Plan for Test Facilities 
Design FY 01 Work Activities (CRWMS M&O 2000c), Attachment 4 of Hazards Analysis 
System, AP-ESH-008 and Technical Reports, AP-3.11Q. 
4. METHOD 
This analysis is based on an analytical method that incorporates a review of applicable 
documents, regulations, orders, codes, and practices. In addition to document reviews, site visits 
were conducted on May 16, and August 20, 2001. Specific items observed during the site visits 
are documented throughout this FHA. 
A search of off-project (non-CRWMS) literature (AP-3.11Q, Section 5.2f) was made but none 
are identified for review within this technical report. National Fire Protection Association codes 
and standards are considered off-project literature, but as these are the backbone of fire 
protection design bases, no special discussion is made. 
The Lessons Learned Database was reviewed (AP-ESH-008, Section 5.1.1.4.b) for relevant 
information that could be incorporated or addressed in this FHA. The Lessons Learned Database 
contains numerous examples for employees to use in their daily work but none appeared to be 
relevant to this FHA. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 2 March 2002 

This analysis was prepared and checked by fire protection engineers, (qualified per AP-2.2Q), as 
directed by the DOE Order 420.1, Section 4.2.1(6), and as defined in DOE Standard 
DOE-STD-1066-99, Section 4. 
5. FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS 
This FHA contains, but is not be limited to, a conservative assessment of the following fire 
safety issues: 
 Description of construction 
 Description of critical process equipment 
 Description of high-value property 
 Description of fire hazards 
 Description of operations 
 Potential for a toxic, biological and/or radiation incident due to a fire 
 Damage potential: Maximum Possible Fire Loss (MPFL) 
 Fire protection features 
 Protection of essential safety class systems 
 Life safety considerations 
 Exposure fire potential and the potential for a fire spread between two fire areas 
The fire safety items identified above are discussed in detail for the following: Mobile 
Equipment (Section 9.2), Main Drift (Section 9.3), ECRB Cross-Drift (Section 9.4), Alcoves 
(Section 9.5), and Niches (Section 9.6). 
The fire safety items below are generic and apply equally to those areas described. They include: 
 Natural hazards (earthquake, flood, wind) impact on fire safety (Section 10) 
 Emergency planning (Section 11) 
 Fire Department/Brigade response (Section 12) 
 Recovery potential (Section 13) 
 Security and Safeguards considerations related to fire protection (Section 14) 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 3 March 2002 

 Effect of significant fire safety deficiencies on fire risk (Section 15) 
(DOE G-420.1/B-0, Section IV, Paragraph 4.5). 
Section 16, Conclusions, discusses whether the fire protection program objectives described in 
Section 1 have been met for each area of the ESF Subsurface. 
6. DESIGN INPUTS 
6.1 DESIGN PARAMETERS 
The design of the Main Drift, ECRB Cross-Drift, Alcoves and Niches were developed in 
accordance with the design parameters identified in the applicable project procedures. 
6.2 CRITERIA 
The following design criteria, which are applicable to this analysis, were developed in response 
to requirements found in the Exploratory Studies Facility Design Requirements (ESFDR) (YMP 
1997), and the Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block Requirements Document 
(ECRB-RD) CRWMS M&O 1998a) 
 Alarm systems indicate monitored conditions. This item is inherent in the design of 
installed detection/alarm systems. (YMP 1997, 3.8.2.11.1.C) 
 A life safety system shall be provided between the underground and surface. (YMP 
1997, 3.8.2.11.1.D) 
 Fire protection systems have been designed to detect, warn, control, and limit the 
impact of credible fires in the ESF. (YMP 1997, 3.8.2.9.1.B) 
 Fire hose stations have been located to meet applicable safety requirements. (YMP 
1997, 3.8.2.9.1.D) 
 Subsurface fire protection system reliability is assured by mandatory use of 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) listed and/or Factory Mutual Research Corporation 
(FMRC) approved components. This item is inherent in the design of installed 
detection/alarm systems and is used throughout this analysis. (YMP 1997, 3.8.2.9.1.E) 
 Exit lighting, with battery backup, shall be provided to identify direction of evacuation 
to refuge chambers and/or shaft and ramp stations. Emergency lighting, with battery 
backup that is charged continuously by facility power, and actuates automatically, shall 
be provided in each shop, testing area, refuge chamber, and shaft and ramp station 
areas. (YMP 1997, 3.8.2.4.1.C & .D) 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 4 March 2002 

 The ESF fire protection systems will be installed to support scheduled testing programs 
as described in Appendix B to the ESFDR, and will not impair or preclude other 
associated testing and monitoring programs. (YMP 1997, 3.8.2.1.2.A) 
 The ESF fire protection systems will be installed to allow dismantling and removal 
upon completion of designated operational functions. (YMP 1997/CRWMS M&O 
1998a, 3.8.2.1.2.D) 
 The ESF fire protection systems will allow flexibility in the siting of final testing 
locations. (YMP 1997, 3.8.2.1.2.E) 
 The ESF fire protection systems will be installed to support the testing utility 
requirements for testing programs described in Appendix B to the ESFDR. (YMP 
1997/CRWMS M&O 1998a, 3.8.2.1.2.G) 
 The ESF fire protection systems will not require special facilities or equipment for 
service and maintenance. (YMP 1997, 3.8.1.2.C) 
 The Uniform Building Code has no requirements for fire protection systems installed in 
tunnels. (YMP 1997, 3.2.1.2.4.A) 
 The Occupational Safety and Health Program (AP-ESH-004) refers to DOE 
Order 420.1, Facility Safety, to establish facility safety requirements related to fire 
protection mitigation. (YMP 1997, 3.2.1.2.4C & D) 
 The impact on fire safety of natural hazards, such as, earthquakes, has been considered 
in the design of fire protection systems. (YMP 1997/CRWMS M&O 1998a, 
3.2.1.2.1.2.A) 
 OSHA 29 CFR 1926 regulations are used as minimum governing criteria throughout 
this analysis and the construction in the tunnel. MSHA standards are incorporated in the 
tunnel design and operation as referenced by OSHA Standards. (YMP 1997, 
3.2.1.1.2.4.H&I; CRWMS M&O 1998a, Derived 2) 
 The presence of combustible materials underground during construction and operation 
is controlled and limited by administrative procedures. (YMP 1997, 3.2.1.2.3.C) 
6.3 ASSUMPTIONS 
6.3.1 High-Value Property 
Assumption: High-Value property is assumed to be individual pieces of equipment and/or 
individual systems with a value exceeding $1 million (DOE-STD-1066-99, 
Section 5.3.1). Used in Section 9.2.4, 9.3.4, 9.4.4, 9.5.4, and 9.6.4. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 5 March 2002 

Justification: The values used were included in the previous revision of this document and are 
duplicated in this revision. The assigned values do not require verification 
because they represent costs to establish a rough order-of-magnitude dollar 
estimate for property loss and only approximate values are required. An order of 
magnitude change in these values will not impact the conclusions of this FHA. 
6.3.2 Limiting Fuel and Ignition Sources 
Assumption: Fuel sources and ignition sources in the construction and test areas may be 
minimized by removal of all construction debris and by enforced administrative 
procedures, i.e., effective good housekeeping. Used throughout. 
Justification: Section 3.2.1.2.3.C of the ESFDR limits and controls the presence of combustible 
materials underground during construction and operations. This is the most 
effective way of providing for hazard reduction. 
6.3.3 Water Supply 
Assumption: The 6-inch water distribution lines in the ESF Main Drift and the ECRB 
cross-drift, storage tank capacity, and pump size and head are sized to supply all 
anticipated fire protection water demand. Used throughout. 
Justification: The existing system was evaluated in the Title III Evaluation Report for the 
Subsurface Fire Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water 
System (CRWMS M&O 1998f, Table 6-1) and was determined to be adequate. 
The ECRB Cross-Drift system is installed in accordance with the sizing criteria 
established in the Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block, East-West 
Drift Utilities Design Analysis (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2) 
and was designed to include the fire protection water demand. 
6.3.4 Training 
Assumption: Underground personnel have been trained in the use of portable fire extinguishers 
for fighting incipient stage fires. Used throughout. 
Justification: BSC Training, in conjunction with Safety and Health, developed a training course 
for incipient stage fire fighting (CRWMS M&O 1997b, Lesson Plan). The 
training course is mandatory for all on-site personnel. Instructional films on the 
use of portable fire extinguishers are included in the General Employee Training 
(GET) and in the General Underground Training (GUT) Training. The film is also 
included in both the annual GET and GUT Refresher training sessions. Used 
throughout. 
6.3.5 Fire-fighting 
Assumption: Site personnel will not directly engage subsurface fires beyond the incipient stage. 
Used throughout. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 6 March 2002 

Justification: All Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project organizations fire fighting 
efforts are voluntary. These efforts are limited to a fires incipient stage, and 
conducted by employees who have been trained in the general working principles 
of portable fire extinguishers and standpipe hose system use, as appropriate, 
including the hazards involved in incipient stage fire fighting. Employees may 
voluntarily engage fires only in the incipient stage when they are reasonably 
certain they can control the fire, and only after appropriate training. Employees 
not directly engaged in fighting an incipient stage fire are required to evacuate the 
affected area/facility. All employees shall evacuate the affected area/facility when 
a fire is beyond the incipient stage. (Dyer 2000) 
6.3.6 MPFL Estimate 
Assumptions: The MPFL is the value of property, excluding land value, within a fire area, 
unless a fire hazards analysis demonstrates a lesser (or greater) loss potential. This 
assumes the failure of both automatic fire suppression systems and manual fire 
fighting efforts (DOE-STD-1066-99, Section 4). The loss determination includes 
direct and indirect costs associated with the fire and clean-up operations (DOE G-
420.1/B-0, Section IV, 4.7). The equipment lost is assumed to have no salvage 
value. The assumed values for equipment include: 
 $200,000 for a locomotive 
 $250,000 for a 2.7 m3 (3.5 yd3) load, haul, dump (LHD) 
 $75,000 for the maintenance railcar 
 $250 per lineal foot of conveyor belting 
 $10,000 for scientific equipment located in Alcoves 1  4, 6 and 7 
 $60,000 for scientific equipment located in Alcove 8 
 $25,000 for scientific equipment located in Niche 3 
 $20,000 for scientific equipment located in Niche 4 
 $40,000 for scientific equipment located in Niche 5 
Used in Tables 9.2-1, 9.3-1, 9.4-1, 9.5-1, and 9.6-1. 
Justification: These assumed values provide a rough order-of-magnitude estimate. A reasonable 
estimate of cleanup is 75 percent of equipment value, and equipment replacement 
cost is 115 percent of equipment cost. The assumed values do not require 
verification because they represent assumed costs to establish a rough 
order-of-magnitude dollar estimate for property loss and only approximate values 
are required. An order of magnitude change in these values will not impact the 
conclusions of this FHA. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 7 March 2002 

6.3.7 Impact on Site Characterization Study (Program Impacts) 
6.3.7.1 Water 
Assumption: Water is acceptable as a backup fire suppression agent. Used throughout. 
Justification: The Determination of Importance Evaluation for the Subsurface Exploratory 
Studies Facility states: The use of fire suppression agents (including water) 
should be treated as a spill and dealt with accordingly (CRWMS M&O 1999a, 
Section 10.6.4). Quantities of all materials used should be reported in accordance 
with the TFM Procedure. (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 10.6.1) 
6.3.7.2 Dry Chemicals 
Assumption: Multipurpose dry chemical is acceptable as a fire suppression agent. Used 
throughout. 
Justification: The Determination of Importance Evaluation for the Subsurface Exploratory 
Studies Facility states: . . . potential impacts were bounded by an analysis 
showing that retention of fire suppression materials within the North Ramp will 
not impact potential radionuclide release and transport over a 10,000 year time 
period . . . It was recommended, therefore, that water be used in conjunction 
with this fire-suppression material only if necessary for safety. (CRWMS M&O 
1999a, Section 11.3.3.3) (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 11.3.3). 
6.4 CODES AND STANDARDS 
6.4.1 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
29 CFR 1910 Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 1999 
29 CFR 1926 Safety and Health Regulations for Construction, 1999 
30 CFR Chapter 1 Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2000 
6.4.2 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
DOE Order 420.1 Facility Safety, 1995, Change 3, 11-22-2000 
DOE G-420.1/B-0 Implementation Guide, 1995 
DOE-STD-1066-99 Fire Protection Design Criteria, 1999 
6.4.3 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
NFPA 1 Fire Prevention Code, 2000 
NFPA 14 Standard for the Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems, 2000 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 8 March 2002 

NFPA 17 Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems, 1998 
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 2000 
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code, 1998 
NFPA 122 Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Underground Metal and Nonmetal 
Mines, 2000 
NFPA 385 Standard for Tank Vehicles for Flammable and Combustible Liquids, 2000 
7. REFERENCES AND PROCEDURES 
7.1 REFERENCES 
29 CFR 1910. 1999. Labor: Occupational Safety and Health Standards. Readily available. 
29 CFR 1926. 1999. Labor: Safety and Health Regulations for Construction. Readily available. 
30 CFR Chapter 1. 2000. Mineral Resources: Mine Safety and Health Administration. Readily 
available. 
Broom, J.L. 2001. Contract No. DE-AC08-01NV12101 - Submittal of Field Monthly 
Management Summary Status Report for the Month of March 2001. Letter from J.L. Broom 
(BSC) to S.P. Mellington (DOE/YMSCO), April 13, 2001, SSFS.04/01.006, with enclosure. 
ACC: MOL.20010529.0266. 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2001a. Calculation of ECRB Cross-Drift Worst-Case Fire and 
Effects. BAB000000-01717-0210-00001 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC 
Company. ACC: MOL.20011206.0227. 
BSC 2001b. ECRB Refuge Chamber. BABEAF000-01717-0210-00011 REV 00. Las Vegas, 
Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20020212.0259. 
BSC 2001c. Exploratory Studies Facility, ECRB Refuge Station General Arrangement and 
Details. BABEAF000-01717-2100-40361 REV 00 DCN 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel 
SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20020204.0010. 
CRWMS M&O 1995a. Exploratory Studies Facility Package 2C, TS North Ramp Contact RBT 
Test Alcove GA Plan and Sections. BABEAF000-01717-2100-40149 REV 01. Las Vegas, 
Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.20000308.0221. 
CRWMS M&O 1995b. Exploratory Studies Facility Package 2C, TS North Ramp, Bow Ridge 
Fault Test Alcove GA Plan. BABEAF000-01717-2100-40147 REV 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19960520.0175. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 9 March 2002 

CRWMS M&O 1996a. ESF Layout Calculation. BABEAD000-01717-0200-00003 REV 04. Las 
Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19960930.0095. 
CRWMS M&O 1996b. Exploratory Studies Facility TS Main Drift Southern Ghost Dance Fault 
Alcove Enlarged Plan. BABEAF000-01717-2100-40247 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS 
M&O. ACC: MOL.19970107.0057. 
CRWMS M&O 1997a. Exploratory Studies Facility TS Main Drift Northern Ghost Dance Fault 
Alcove Plan. BABEAF000-01717-2100-40232 REV 01. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. 
ACC: MOL.19970718.0132. 
CRWMS M&O 1997b. Incipient Stage Fire Fighting Training. Lesson Plan SH97011. Las 
Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.20010125.0038. 
CRWMS M&O 1997c. Thermal Test Facility Fire Hazards Analysis. BABFAH000-01717-
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CRWMS M&O 1997d. Exploratory Studies Facility, TS Main Drift, Drift Scale Flow Test 
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CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19971007.0346. 
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Document (ECRB-RD). BAB000000-01717-5705-00013 REV 01. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS 
M&O. ACC: MOL.19980417.0713. 
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MOL.19980216.0530. 
CRWMS M&O 1998c. Response to Design Input Request CMO-12, 1/22/97. Input Transmittal 
CMO-15. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19980311.0406. 
CRWMS M&O 1998d. Response to Design Input Request CMO-16, 2/23/98. Input Transmittal 
CMO-16. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19980710.0127. 
CRWMS M&O 1998e. Response to Design Input Request CMO-9, 11/19/97. Input Transmittal 
CMO-14. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19980311.0404. 
CRWMS M&O 1998f. Title III Evaluation Report for the Subsurface Fire Water System and 
Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System. BA0000000-01717-5705-00004 REV 0. 
Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19981007.0042. 
CRWMS M&O 1998g. Title III Evaluation Report for the Subsurface Lighting System. 
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MOL.19981120.0065. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 10 March 2002 

CRWMS M&O 1998h. Exploratory Studies Facility Cross Drift Alcoves/Niches Mechanical 
Utility Layout. BABFA0000-01717-2100-45318 REV 01. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. 
ACC: MOL.19990817.0248. 
CRWMS M&O 1999a. Determination of Importance Evaluation for the Subsurface Exploratory 
Studies Facility. BAB000000-01717-2200-00005 REV 07 ICN 03. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19990728.0282. 
CRWMS M&O 1999b. Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block, East-West Drift 
Utilities Design Analysis. BABFA0000-01717-0200-00002 REV 01. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19990817.0219. 
CRWMS M&O 1999c. Exploratory Studies Facility Ventilation System Plan Including the 
Repository Block Cross Drift. BABFAD000-01717-4600-00001 REV 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19990816.0220. 
CRWMS M&O 1999d. Transmittal of Shop Drawings, Equipment Data, Material Samples, or 
Manufacturers Certificates of Compliance (SDT) for Exploratory Study Facility, Area 25. 
Transmittal No. 01-C027-1. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.19990727.0233. 
CRWMS M&O 2000a. Determination of Importance Evaluation for the ESF Enhanced 
Characterization of the Repository Block Cross Drift. BABEAF000-01717-2200-00011 REV 04 
ICN 03. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.20000609.0264. 
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0200-00154 REV 00. Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: MOL.20000627.0253. 
CRWMS M&O 2000c. Technical Work Plan For Test Facilities Design FY01 Work Activities. 
TWP-MGR-MD-000012 REV 00, Las Vegas, Nevada: CRWMS M&O. ACC: 
MOL.20001108.0004. 
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 2000a. Emergency Management Plan. PLN-CRW-EM-
000001, Rev. 0. Las Vegas, Nevada: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive 
Waste Management. ACC: MOL.20000801.0003. 
DOE 2000b. Quality Assurance Requirements and Description. DOE/RW-0333P, Rev. 10. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management. ACC: MOL.20000427.0422. 
DOE G-420.1/B-0, G-440.1/E-0. 1995. Implementation Guide for Use with DOE Orders 420.1 
and 440.1 Fire Safety Program. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy. TIC: 242454. 
DOE Order 420.1, Change 3. 2000. Facility Safety. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Energy. Readily available. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 11 March 2002 

DOE-STD-1066-99. 1999. Fire Protection Design Criteria. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Energy. TIC: 249984. 
Dyer, J.R. 2000. Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) Fire Fighting Policy. Letter from J.R. 
Dyer (DOE/YMSCO) to G. E. Dials (CRWMS M&O), November 8, 2000, OPE:RBB-0104. 
ACC: MOL.20001204.0312. 
Factory Mutual Research. 2000. Belt Conveyors, Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 7-11. 
[Johnson, Rhode Island]: FM Global. TIC: 250023. 
Gwyn, D. W. 2001. System Safety Evaluation of Relative Risk Associated with the Ground 
Support System in the 3.01X Areas. Interoffice correspondence from D.W. Gwyn (M&O) to 
L.R. Morrison, January 24, 2001, LV.SA.RJG.01/01-001, with attachment. ACC: 
MOL.20010226.0188. 
McDonald, R.C. 1998a. "ECRB Cross Drift Railroad Ties." Letter from R.C. McDonald 
(CRWMS M&O) to K.L. Limon (Kiewit/PB), February 10, 1998, LV.CM.RRD.2/98-031, with 
enclosure. ACC: MOL.19980219.0724; MOL.19980219.0725. 
McDonald, R.C. 1998b. "Fire Suppression System for ECRB Conveyor." Letter from R.C. 
McDonald (CRWMS M&O) to K.L. Limon, (Kiewit/PB), January 29, 1998, LV.CM.RRD.1/98-
041. ACC: MOL.19980213.0462. 
McDonald, R.C. 1998c. "Requirements for Automatic Fire Suppression on U/G Heavy Diesel 
Equipment, Robbins TBM and Portable Diesel/Lube Car." Letter from R.C. McDonald 
(CRWMS M&O) to K.L. Limon (Kiewit/PB), March 13, 1998, LV.CM.TJR.3/98-093. ACC: 
MOL.19980417.0289. 
McDonald, R.C. 2001. "REVISED: Response to Opportunities for Improvement (OI)." 
Interoffice correspondence from R.C. McDonald (CRWMS M&O) to A.S. Dodd, III, January 9, 
2001, LV.SF.LCB.01/01-637. ACC: MOL.20010208.0064. 
NFPA 1. 2000. Fire Prevention Code. 2000 Edition. Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire 
Protection Association. TIC: 248642. 
NFPA 122. 2000. Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in Underground Metal and 
Nonmetal Mines. 2000 Edition. Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association. 
TIC: 249675. 
NFPA 14. 2000. Standard for the Installation of Standpipe, Private Hydrant, and Hose Systems. 
2000 Edition. Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association. TIC: 249673. 
NFPA 17. 1998. Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems. 1998 Edition. Quincy, 
Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association. TIC: 245935. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 12 March 2002 

NFPA 30. 2000. Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code. 2000 Edition. Quincy, 
Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association. TIC: 249674. 
NFPA 385. 2000. Standard for Tank Vehicles for Flammable and Combustible Liquids. 2000 
Edition. Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire Protection Association. TIC: 249663. 
NFPA 70. 1998. National Electrical Code. 1999 Edition. Quincy, Massachusetts: National Fire 
Protection Association. TIC: 240528. 
Williams, N.H. 2001. "Contract No. DE-AC08-01NV12101 - Fire Hazards Analysis Annual 
Review." Letter from N.H. Williams (BSC) to S.P. Mellington (DOE/YMSCO), March 27, 2001, 
PROJ.03/01.023. ACC: MOL.20010517.0264. 
YMP (Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project) 1997. Exploratory Studies Facility Design 
Requirements. YMP/CM-0019, Rev. 2, ICN 1. Las Vegas, Nevada: Yucca Mountain Site 
Characterization Office. ACC: MOL.19980219.0893; MOL.19960724.0138. 
YMP 2000. Exploratory Studies Facility Package 1A, Starter Tunnel General Arrangement Plan 
(Sht. 2). YMP-025-1-MING-MG121, Rev. 04. Las Vegas, Nevada: Yucca Mountain Site 
Characterization Office. ACC: MOL.20000615.0037. 
7.2 PROCEDURES 
AP-2.2Q, Rev. 1. Establishment and Verification of Required Education and Experience of 
Personnel. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management. ACC: MOL.20010724.0108. 
AP-3.11Q, Rev. 2, ICN 0. Technical Reports. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: MOL.20010405.0010. 
AP-SV.1Q, Rev. 0, ICN 2. Control of the Electronic Management of Information. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: 
MOL.20000831.0065. 
AP-ESH-004, Rev. 0, ICN 1, BSCN 001, ECN 001. Occupational Safety and Health Program. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management. ACC: MOL.20010709.0406. 
AP-ESH-008, Rev. 0, ICN 1. Hazards Analysis System. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: MOL.20010828.0001. 
AP-OM-010, Rev. 0, ICN 0. Abnormal Event Response. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: MOL.20020311.0151. 
LP-ESH-010-BSC, Rev. 1. Onsite Emergency Management, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: MOL.20010820.0147. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 13 March 2002 

SO-2000-08, Rev. 2. Underground Facility Entry Requirements. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel 
SAIC Company. ACC: MOL.20020327.0280. 
QAP-2-3, Rev. 10, ICN 0, BSCN 002. Classification of Permanent Items, Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: 
MOL.20010212.0283. 
8. COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
Only commercial off-the-shelf software was used in the preparation of this technical report. No 
software routines or models were used and no calculations were performed. 
No controls are required for the management of electronic data transfer, per AP-SV.1Q, Control 
of the Electronic Management of Information (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 10). 
9. ANALYSIS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This revised FHA technical report evaluates the fire hazards that may be encountered in the ESF 
and those fire protection features installed to mitigate those hazards. It includes the Topopah 
Spring Loop, referred to in this document as the Main Drift, (CRWMS M&O 1996a, Figure 3), 
the ECRB Cross-Drift, (CRWMS M&O 1998b, Figure 1), and Alcoves 1 through 10 and 
Niches 1 through 6, see Sections 9.5.2 and 9.6.2. 
Although all of the areas discussed in this FHA comprise the subsurface facilities, for ease of 
locating information for specific areas it is divided into the following sub-sections: 
Section 9.2 Mobile Equipment 
Section 9.3 Main Drift 
Section 9.4 ECRB Cross-Drift 
Section 9.5 Alcoves 
Section 9.6 Niches 
Each section is organized in the same order. If the reader wants information regarding what fire 
protection features are available for a specific area it is discussed in Sections 9.X.9, Fire 
Protection Features, in each sub-section. Sections 10 through 15 discuss topics common to all 
the sub-sections. These include natural hazards, emergency planning, fire department/brigade, 
recovery potential, security and safeguards, and significant deficiencies. 
The fire protection systems are designed to provide life safety to underground personnel 
(employees and the public), property protection, and to support scheduled scientific testing 
programs. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 14 March 2002 

Fire protection systems are designed to meet the criteria and assumptions defined in Section 6 of 
this analysis. To the extent practical, installation practices allow dismantling and salvage of the 
system components upon completion of their functional use in the ESF. 
9.2 MOBILE EQUIPMENT 
9.2.1 Introduction 
This section describes equipment and components that are mobile and could be located anywhere 
in the Main Drift, the ECRB or adjacent to the entrance to any Alcove or Niche. 
The mobile equipment includes the diesel locomotives and the maintenance railcar used to 
provide fuel and lubricants to the tunnel-boring machine and other equipment. This section 
describes each piece of equipment in sufficient detail to determine its impact as a fire hazard on 
the various areas of the sub-surface facilities. It also identifies the fire protection features, 
automatic, manual, and/or passive, to mitigate the identified hazards. 
9.2.2 Construction 
The construction of the mobile equipment is predominantly of steel and cast iron. There are 
minor quantities of exposed electrical wiring on each piece of equipment and some equipment 
utilizes rubber tires. All lubricants and fuels are contained within each piece of equipment. 
9.2.3 Critical Process Equipment 
None of the mobile equipment is considered critical process equipment. 
9.2.4 High-Value Property 
Mobile equipment does not meet the definition of high-value property (Assumption 6.3.1). For 
example, the estimated combined value of a locomotive and a maintenance railcar is 
approximately $275,000. (Assumption 6.3.6) 
9.2.5 Fire Hazards 
The Fire Prevention Code (NFPA 1) defines a fire hazard as  . . . any situation, process, 
material, or condition that, on the basis of applicable data, may cause a fire or explosion or 
provide a ready fuel supply to augment the spread of intensity of the fire or explosion and that 
poses a threat to life or property. Based on this definition the following fire hazards have been 
identified in the Main Drift. 
All of the elements necessary for a fire are found in the main drift. Construction and operation 
fuel sources include, the muck conveyor systems, combustible liquids, testing equipment, wiring 
insulation, rubber tires, and water and air hoses. Combustible liquids include diesel fuel, 
hydraulic fluid, grease and lubricating oil. Ignition sources may include faulting electrical 
equipment (motors, switches and transformers), welding and cutting operations, engine heat, and 
friction (brakes, bearings, gears and belting). Oxygen is supplied from ambient air. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 15 March 2002 

Scenario 1 - A locomotive fire has the potential to propagate rapidly beyond the incipient stage. 
An onboard fire, probably in the engine compartment, should be contained and damage 
minimized, if operators act promptly to extinguish the fire with their portable extinguishers. 
Scenario 2 -A fire resulting from an accident with the maintenance railcar, either during 
transportation in the drift or when transferring the combustible liquid contents of the onboard 
storage tanks to mobile equipment, has the potential to propagate rapidly beyond the incipient 
stage (BSC 2001a, Section 5). The ECRB Refuge Chamber calculation includes this fire scenario 
to determine the maximum duration of the worst-case design basis fire (DBF) and provides the 
technical design basis for the ERSs (BSC 2001b, Section 5.2.6.4). 
The diesel locomotives carry approximately 189.3 l (50 gal) of diesel fuel with lubricants in the 
wheel bearings and in other various components of the machine (site visit August 20, 2001). 
Heavy-duty diesel-powered mobile equipment, such as the 2.7 cu. m (3.5 cu. yd) LHD, carries 
235 l (62 gal) of diesel fuel, 227 l (60 gal) hydraulic oil, has rubber tires, and wheel bearing 
greases (site visit August 20, 2001). 
Quantities of combustible liquids such as, diesel fuel, lubricating oil and greases are limited, and 
any materials that might be stored underground are be kept in sealed containers, and separated 
from ignition sources (29 CFR 1926.800 (m) (NFPA 122). Containers are in accordance with 
NFPA 30 requirements. Sealed bearings are used, primarily for environmental containment, thus 
reducing exposure of greases. 
A dedicated maintenance railcar consists of five storage tanks and one barrel. It will deliver 
hydraulic oil 285.5-l (75.4 gal), lubricating oil 285.5-l (75.4 gal), and a barrel of grease 82.5-l 
(21.8 gal) to refurbish the tunnel-boring machine and other miscellaneous pieces of equipment. 
This railcar also carries diesel fuel 467.8-l (123.6 gal) for refueling mobile equipment. One tank 
is also provided for waste oil 285.5 l (75.4 gal capacity) and one containing compressor oil, 
285.5-l (75.4 gal). The railcar has secondary spill containment. During the site visit of August 
20, 2001 it was determined the railcar was constructed by the on-site contractor with no 
documentation stating it was constructed to comply with NFPA 385. 
Refueling and maintenance of rolling stock and mobile equipment is conducted primarily on the 
surface, with small quantities of refueling underground likely. 
9.2.6 Operations 
The mobile equipment operating in the ESF transports site personnel to their work areas and, on 
occasion, visitors to Alcoves 2 and 5. In addition, mobile equipment transports material, fuel 
and maintenance materials to service equipment located anywhere within the sub-surface. 
9.2.7 Potential for a Toxic, Biological and/or Radiation Incident Due to a Fire 
The potential for a toxic, biological and/or radiation incident due to a fire involving mobile 
equipment is not considered a major hazard for the following reasons: 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 16 March 2002 

 Burning electrical cables can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. 
The risk of combustion occurring is low, due to the use of cables consisting of fire-
resistant insulation of the self-extinguishing type and their small quantity. 
 Biological materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Radioactive materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Rubber tires can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. The risk of 
combustion occurring is low. 
9.2.8 Damage Potential Loss: Maximum Possible Fire Loss 
The MPFL for mobile equipment includes the replacement value of the LHD and a locomotive 
and the maintenance railcar and cleanup costs. This loss is described in Table 9.2-1. 
Table 9.2-1. Maximum Possible Fire Loss for Mobile Equipment 
EquipmentLost 
EquipmentValue 
CleanupCost 
Replacement 
Cost MPFL 
Locomotive $200,000 $150,000 $230,000 $380,000 
LHD (large) $250,000 $187,500 $287,500 $475,000 
Maintenance 
Railcar 
$75,000 $56,250 $86,250 $142,500 
Combined 
Loss 
N/A $393,750 $603,750 $997,500 
(Assumption 6.3.6) 
9.2.9 Fire Protections Features 
The fire protection features identified in this section are the installed mitigating features for the 
hazards identified in Section 9.2.5. 
9.2.9.1 Automatic 
The locomotive, maintenance railcar, and the LHD are protected by on-board, automatic fire 
detection systems and suppression systems (McDonald 1998c). It includes a pre-engineered, 
multipurpose dry chemical extinguishing system to protect the main hydraulic and lube oil 
systems. The system is designed to operate automatically or the operator can discharge the 
system manually (30 CFR 75.1911). 
The maintenance railcar and the diesel-powered mobile equipment has been fitted with a 
pre-engineered multipurpose dry chemical extinguishing systems, installed in accordance with 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/MSHA regulations (29 CFR 
1926.800(k)(10)(ii)/30 CFR 75.1911). The maintenance railcar is provided with an interlocked 
safety shut-off valve to shut-off the air supply to the fluid transfer pump(s). Even though the 
railcar storage tanks and transfer systems appear to be constructed by on-site personnel and there 
is no documentation that it complies with NFPA 385. The installation of the automatic 
suppression system, with interlock, makes the hazards manageable. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 17 March 2002 

9.2.9.2 Manual 
Each piece of mobile equipment carries a multipurpose, portable fire extinguisher. The minimum 
rating is 10A:60B:C. (30 CFR 75.1909(a)(2)). 
1-1/2 inch fire hose stations located at the entrance to each Alcove and at various locations 
throughout the Main Drift and ECRB Cross-Drift provide backup fire fighting capability. Hoses 
are also carried on the locomotives. Hoses are equipped with UL listed, electrically safe type 
nozzles. Each hose station installation has a pressure-reducing valve installed to ensure the 
nozzle pressure does not exceed 6.9 bar ga (100 psi) residual pressure (NFPA 14). Miners, 
locomotive operators and swampers who volunteer are trained in the use of fire hoses to fight 
incipient stage fires (McDonald 2001). 
Incipient fire fighting response is not considered viable, unless personnel are immediately
available at the time of ignition.
Section 15.7 discusses whether the fire hose stations should remain in service or be removed.
9.2.9.3 Passive 
The construction of the locomotives encloses the diesel engine with metal housings. The 
maintenance railcar is also constructed of noncombustible (steel and cast iron) materials. 
9.2.10 Protection of Essential Safety Class Systems 
The ESF is a non-nuclear facility. Radioactive materials are not present during construction and 
operation. Based on this, there is no essential safety class equipment, systems or components 
involved with the mobile equipment. 
9.2.11 Life Safety Considerations 
The mobile equipment does not have life safety considerations built into them to protect 
operating personnel and passengers from the effects of a fire. Personnel will follow exit signage 
directing them to the main drift, which will lead them to the surface. 
9.2.12 Exposure Potential and the Potential for a Fire to Spread 
Mobile equipment could be staged at any location in the Main Drift or in the ECRB Cross-Drift. 
It could also be adjacent to an Alcove or Niche when a fire occurs with the potential for a fire to 
spread to those areas. A fire in an Alcove or Niche has a low probability of spreading to the 
mobile equipment. The physical separation between the combustibles in these areas and the 
small quantity of in-situ and transient combustibles available minimizes the ability for a fire to 
spread. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 18 March 2002 

9.3 MAIN DRIFT 
9.3.1 Introduction 
The ESF consists of an underground U shaped configuration consisting of the North Ramp, the 
Main Tunnel and the South Ramp. The North Ramp and Main Tunnel contain a several alcoves 
and niches (CRWMS M&O 1996a, Figure 3). 
The length of the tunnel is approximately 7,877 m (25,837 ft) (CRWMS M&O 1996a, Section 
7.4.3) as measured from the north portal to the south portal. Tunnel excavation was performed 
using a 7.62 m (25 ft) diameter tunnel boring machine (TBM). Both the north and south ramps 
extend in a roughly westerly direction connecting to the Main Tunnel to define the eastern 
boundary of a potential repository. During construction of the Main Drift, excavated muck was 
removed from the ESF by a conveyor system for disposal at the surface. During the site visit it 
was observed that the conveyor system remains in the Main Drift, currently not being used, but is 
capable of restarting when the need is identified. Most of the construction materials, including 
ground support, are noncombustible. The exceptions are the muck conveyor belt and wiring 
insulation, which are of limited-combustible materials. 
The flow-through system provides ventilation of the ESF loop by use of two fans mounted on the 
portal side of the south ventilation bulkhead. The normal airflow direction is from the north 
portal to the south portal. The ventilation fans are reversible so the flow direction can be from the 
south portal to the north portal, if required under specific emergency conditions. Fan controls are 
located near the north portal and inside the south portal. Backup power is provided for the fans 
during utility power outages (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Section 3.7). 
9.3.2 Construction 
The Main Drift was bored with a TBM. All walls, floors, and ceilings consist of solid rock. In 
various locations steel bracing with wood cribbing is used where the rock is unstable. Locations 
where wood cribbing is used are shown on CRWMS M&O 2000b, Figure 1. 
9.3.3 Critical Process Equipment 
The Main Drift does not contain any critical process equipment. 
9.3.4 High-Value Property 
The high-value property includes the Main Drift subsurface muck conveyor. (Assumption 6.3.1) 
9.3.5 Fire Hazards 
The Fire Prevention Code (NFPA 1) defines a fire hazard as  . . . any situation, process, 
material, or condition that, on the basis of applicable data, may cause a fire or explosion or 
provide a ready fuel supply to augment the spread of intensity of the fire or explosion and that 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 19 March 2002 

poses a threat to life or property. Based on this definition the following fire hazards have been 
identified in the main drift. 
Transient combustible materials such as paper, cardboard boxes, excess wood cribbing, plastics, 
etc., are limited and controlled by administrative procedure (AP-ESH-004, Section 5.13.1.1.d). 
Strict enforcement of good housekeeping rules appear effective in limiting the presence of 
transient combustibles. 
All of the elements necessary for a fire are found in the main drift. Construction and operation 
fuel sources include, the muck conveyor systems, combustible liquids, plastics, PVC, rubber 
tires, testing equipment, excelsior (used behind cribbing in the 3.01X areas) wiring insulation, 
rubber tires, and water and air hoses. Combustible liquids include diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, 
grease and lubricating oil. Ignition sources may include faulting electrical equipment (motors, 
switches, transformers and mine power centers), welding and cutting operations, engine heat, 
and friction (brakes, bearings, gears and belting). Oxygen is supplied from ambient air. 
Scenario 1 - A locomotive fire has the potential to propagate rapidly beyond the incipient stage. 
An onboard fire, probably in the engine compartment, should be contained and damage 
minimized, if operators act promptly to extinguish the fire with their portable extinguishers. 
However, a diesel spill could release up to a tank full (189.3-l [50 gal]) (See Section 9.2.5) of 
fuel into the bottom of the drift and any subsequent fire would likely spread quickly and exceed 
the operators' ability to contain it. 
Scenario 2 -A fire resulting from an accident with the maintenance railcar, either during 
transportation in the drift or when transferring the combustible liquid contents of the onboard 
storage tanks to mobile equipment, has the potential to propagate rapidly beyond the incipient 
stage. Large quantities of fuel (See Section 9.2.5) could be released into the railcar's secondary 
containment or the bottom of the drift where any subsequent fire would spread quickly, involve 
adjacent equipment and exceed the operators' ability to contain it. 
Scenario 3 - A mobile equipment fire has the potential to propagate beyond the incipient stage. 
An onboard fire should be contained and damage minimized if the operator and other personnel, 
in the area, act promptly to extinguish the fire. A fire, resulting from an accident involving other 
combustible materials, may propagate beyond the operator's ability to control. 
Scenario 4 - A fire inside any power distribution equipment should be contained since the 
equipment is housed in a heavy steel cabinet. Large transformers are dry type and are enclosed 
in NEMA 12 (dust tight) cabinets. Over-current and multiple relay protection, and 
current-limiting fuses are provided. Cabling consists of fire-resistant coatings that are of the 
self-extinguishing type. 
Scenario 5  A conveyor fire has the potential to propagate rapidly beyond the incipient stage. 
Conveyor fires are generally caused by faulting electrical equipment or friction at drives or 
pulleys. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 20 March 2002 

9.3.6 Operations 
The Main Drift provides access to and egress from the ECRB, the alcoves and the niches. The 
primary work is supporting post characterization testing. 
All testing within the ESF is performed on the day shift. Occasionally, work may extend to or be 
scheduled on other shifts. 
9.3.7 Potential for a Toxic, Biological and/or Radiation Incident Due to a Fire 
The potential for a toxic, biological and/or radiation incident due to a fire is not considered a 
major threat for the following reasons: 
 Burning electrical cables can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. 
The risk of combustion occurring is low, due to the use of cables consisting of fire-
resistant insulation of the self-extinguishing type and by separating the power cables 
from the non fire-rated instrument cables. 
 Biological materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Radioactive materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Rubber tires can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. The risk of 
combustion occurring is low. 
9.3.8 Damage Potential Loss: Maximum Possible Fire Loss 
The MPFL in the Main Drift includes a partial loss of the subsurface muck conveyor 365.7 m 
(1,200 feet), two levels of belting 182.9 m (600 feet) in length), cleanup, and equipment 
replacement costs. If a locomotive and the maintenance railcar are engaged in refueling the LHD 
they could be included in the MPFL. This loss is described in Table 9.3-1. 
One of the largest area of the Main Drift with wood cribbing, installed to retain loose rocks 
(CRWMS M&O 2000b, Figure 1) is approximately 182.9 m (600 feet) long. A small portion of 
the cribbing could be lost if the fire occurs in this area. This potential loss, due to its complexity, 
is not included in the MPFL. 
Table 9.3-1. Maximum Possible Fire Loss for the Main Drift 
EquipmentLost 
EquipmentValue Cleanup Replacement Cost MPFL 
Muck Conveyor $300,000 $225,000 $345,000 $570,000 
Belting 365.7 m 
(1,200 ft) 
LHD $250,000 $187,500 $287,500 $475,000 
Locomotive $200,000 $150,000 $230,000 $380,000 
Maintenance Railcar $75,000 $56,250 $86,250 $142,500 
Combined Total Loss N/A $618,750 $948,750 $1,567,500 
(Assumption 6.3.6) 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 21 March 2002 

9.3.9 Fire Protections Features 
The fire protection features identified in this section are the installed mitigating features for the 
hazards identified in Section 9.3.5. 
9.3.9.1 Automatic 
Automatic fire detection, suppression and alarm systems are not installed in the Main Drift. 
Diesel-powered mobile equipment has been retrofitted with onboard automatic fire suppression 
systems. (McDonald 1998c) 
Automatic, pre-engineered multipurpose dry chemical suppression systems, which include 
manual actuating devices, are installed at all conveyor head, tail, drive and take-up pulleys 
(McDonald 1998b). 
The conveyor system in the Main Drift is provided with slippage and alignment switches to stop 
the conveyor automatically before friction can start a fire. The conveyor is also interlocked to 
stop both upstream and downstream transport equipment in case of such a problem. 
9.3.9.2 Manual 
Incipient fire fighting response is with portable fire extinguishers. 
The portable multipurpose dry chemical fire extinguishers installed use Ansul Foray agent and 
have a UL rating of 10A:60B:C. Spacing between extinguishers exceeds 60 m (200 ft) in specific 
locations. Additional extinguishers are being installed this fiscal year bringing the ESF back into 
compliance. 
To provide backup incipient fire fighting capability, 1-1/2 inch hose stations are installed in the 
Main Drift at the entrance to each alcove and at the entrance to the Cross-Drift. Locomotives 
also carry fire hoses that can be connected to the water line utility outlet. Each hose station 
includes a storage rack, a minimum of 150 feet of hose, with a UL listed, electrically safe 
shut-off type nozzle (NFPA 14). Each hose station installation has a pressure-reducing valve 
installed to ensure the nozzle pressure does not exceed 6.9 bar ga (100 psi) residual pressure 
(NFPA 14). Miners, locomotive operators, and swampers who volunteer are trained in the use of 
fire hoses to fight incipient stage fires (McDonald 2001). 
Incipient fire fighting response is not considered viable, unless personnel are immediately 
available at the time of ignition, as there are no automatic fire detection systems or suppression 
systems installed in the main drift. 
Section 15.7 discusses whether the fire hose stations should remain in service or be removed. 
9.3.9.3 Passive 
The walls, floor, and ceiling of the Main Drift are predominantly solid unsupported rock. In 
areas where the rock is unstable steel beams supporting wood cribbing is used to retain the rock. 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 22 March 2002 

At specific alcoves and niches steel bulkheads are installed. These bulkheads, although not fire 
rated, will hinder the spread of fire either into the alcoves or niches or into the Main Drift from a 
fire in an alcove or niche. 
9.3.10 Protection of Essential Safety Class Systems 
The ESF is a non-nuclear facility and radioactive materials are not present during construction 
and operation. Therefore, no essential safety class equipment, systems or components are 
installed in the main drift. 
9.3.11 Life Safety Considerations 
9.3.11.1 Ventilation 
The flow-through system will provide ventilation of the Main Drift by use of fans mounted on 
the portal side of the ventilation bulkhead. The bulkhead is at the South Portal so that normal 
airflow direction is from the North Portal to the South Portal. The ventilation fans are reversible 
so the flow direction can be from the south portal to the North Portal, if necessary for smoke 
removal. A backup generator is provided for the fan to maintain ventilation of the Main Drift 
loop during utility power outages (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Section 3.7). 
9.3.11.2 Egress 
The Main Drift is open at the north portal and is closed at the South Portal with dual, steel 
bulkheads. This provides two separate means of egress to escape a fire or other emergency. (LP-
ESH-010-BSC, Attachment 2, section B.7) 
9.3.11.3 Personal Respiratory Protection 
All subsurface personnel are required to be trained in the use of, and to carry personal 
self-rescuers. The standard unit carried is suitable for escape from fire where there is sufficient 
oxygen. These units remove carbon monoxide generated in a fire and are rated for 60 minutes. 
These units do not include eye protection. Consequently, activity in even moderate amounts of 
smoke will be extremely difficult. 
The walkout distance to the surface can be as great as 3,900 m, half the length of the tunnel. 
Significant life safety improvements are achieved by providing all subsurface personnel the 
capability to use self-contained, oxygen-generating, self-rescuers (SCSRs). These units are 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)/MSHA rated for 60 minutes of 
use in moderate to heavy working conditions but can be effective for up to 4 hours or longer 
when the wearer remains at rest or is breathing easily, as when awaiting rescue. They include 
eye goggles which makes escape in smoke possible. These SCSRs give personnel the means to 
walkout where travel times exceed 30 minutes, and protection against exposure to other harmful 
gases that may be present besides carbon monoxide. Currently a cache of SCSRs is located in 
Alcoves 5, 6,and 7 (LP-ESH-010-BSC, Attachment 2, Section B.9 second note) 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 23 March 2002 

9.3.11.4 Emergency Refuge Stations (ERS) 
There are no Emergency Refuge Stations, also referred to as Refuge Chambers or Refuge 
Areas, in the Main Drift. The project is committed to providing and maintaining a safe means of 
egress for all subsurface personnel. This commitment is met by providing SCSRs for all 
personnel. Combined with hazard mitigation by onboard, automatic, pre-engineered fire 
suppression systems, the ESF alarm/notification systems improvements (as yet uncompleted, see 
Section 9.3.11.5), this provides an acceptable level of personnel life safety. 
9.3.11.5 Alarm/Notification Systems 
Emergency communication is provided by an industrial paging/warning system. Emergency 
communication is provided by an industrial paging/warning system. To improve reliability, this 
system is connected to a separate dedicated cable system that is physically separated from the 
telephone cable system. It allows an individual to be paged, then respond and conduct a two-way 
conversation with the paging party. It has siren and flashing lights to provide audio and visual 
signaling (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Section 7.5.4). This system provides telephone locations every 
182.9 m (600 feet) (CRWMS M&O 1998g, Section 7.1.2) throughout the Main Drift. 
9.3.11.6 Exit and Emergency Lighting 
All subsurface personnel are required to carry miners' lights or flashlights that provide 
emergency lighting. Exit lighting and emergency lighting, with battery backup, are currently 
being installed to supplement the miners lights or flashlights (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Sections 
7.4.2.4 and 7.4.2.5) (CRWMS M&O 1998g, Tables 6.1-1 and 6.2-1; Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2). 
Completion is scheduled for June 2, 2002 (Broom 2001). 
9.3.12 Exposure Potential and the Potential for a Fire to Spread 
The probability of a fire igniting in the main drift, due to exposure from an ongoing fire outside 
of either portal entrance, is extremely low. Surface facilities are of noncombustible construction 
and are physically separated from both tunnel entrances. OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1926.800 
(m)(7)) also prohibit the storage of flammable and combustible materials close to the portals to 
reduce the possibility of a fire. 
Fire propagation is limited in the drifts by adherence to strict regulations controlling the storage 
of flammable and combustible liquids. (29 CFR 1926.800(m)(7) (NFPA 30). The occurrence or 
spread of fire is minimized by requirements for containers and safe separation distances from 
ignition sources and explosives. 
The most likely fire exposure potential to the Main Drift would be from an ECRB Cross-Drift 
fire. During the site visit it was noted there is a minimal quantity of combustibles located at the 
intersection of the two drifts. The fire exposure from the ECRB Cross-Drift is unlikely to be 
serious and would remain localized. 
A fire in an alcove is unlikely to spread to the Main Drift due to the physical separation of the 
areas where combustibles are located in the alcove and their relationship to the Main Drift. Fire 
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 24 March 2002 

byproducts from such a fire would be spread rapidly throughout the Main Drift and downstream 
of the fire location by the main ventilation system. 
9.4 ECRB CROSS-DRIFT 
9.4.1 Introduction 
The ECRB Cross-Drift consists of an S shaped drift (in plan view), connected to the Main 
Drift at approximately 1,990 m (6,527 ft) from the North Portal (CRWMS M&O 1998b, Figure 
1). 
The length of the drift is approximately 2,800 m (9,184 ft) (CRWMS M&O 1998b, Figure 1) as 
measured from the centerline of the Main Drift to the drift end. The ECRB Cross-Drift was 
excavated using a 5.0 m (16 ft 5 in) diameter TBM (CRWMS M&O 1998b, Section 7.2.4). 
9.4.2 Construction 
The ECRB Cross-Drift was bored with a TBM. The walls, floors and ceilings consist of solid 
rock. Excavated muck was removed from the ECRB Cross-Drift by a conveyor system that 
dumped muck onto the ESF muck conveyor for transport to the surface for disposal. The muck 
conveyor is mounted on the right rib of the drift. A steel, open-grid, safety grating was installed 
along the left rib of the drift to provide a safe walkway for the ECRB Cross-Drift personnel. 
During the site visit it was observed that the conveyor system remains but is currently not being 
used but is capable of restarting when the need is identified. Most of the construction materials, 
including ground support, are noncombustible. 
The exceptions are: 
 Timber (fir, pine, and/or oak) used for the rail supports (ties) throughout the length of 
the cross-drift. The 8-inch by 6-inch supports were installed on 30-inch centers. No 
ballast is used. The ties are coated with a fire-retardant material. (McDonald 1998a) 
 Certain materials, such as the muck conveyor belt and wiring insulation, are 
limited-combustible materials. 
9.4.3 Critical Process Equipment 
The ECRB Cross-Drift does not contain any critical process equipment. 
9.4.4 High-Value Property 
High-value property is defined as having a value in excess of $1 million (Assumption 6.3.1). 
This includes the ECRB TBM and its trailing gear having a value of $5.25 million (CRWMS 
M&O 1998c, Items 1 & 2). 
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9.4.5 Fire Hazards 
9.4.5.1 Combustible Liquid Fire 
The ECRB tunnel-boring machine, currently stored in the ECRB Cross-Drift, carries the 
following quantities of combustible fluids in onboard reservoirs (CRWMS M&O 1998c): 
Hydraulic Fluid: 
Main: 2,270 l (600 gal) 
Rock Drills: 570 l (150 gal) 
Clamshell: 76 l (20 gal) 
Conveyor Tailpiece: 38 l (10 gal) 
Lubrication Oil: 303 l (80 gal) 
In addition to the reservoirs, there are several gallons of fluid in the lines, pumps, cylinder 
accumulators, etc. The main hydraulic systems and the lube oil system are located at the front of 
the TBM. 
The Fire Prevention Code (NFPA 1), defines a fire hazard as  . . . any situation, process, 
material, or condition that, on the basis of applicable data, may cause a fire or explosion or 
provide a ready fuel supply to augment the spread of intensity of the fire or explosion and that 
poses a threat to life or property. Based on this definition the following fire hazards have been 
identified in the ECRB cross-drift. 
All of the elements necessary for a fire are found in Cross-Drift. Construction and operation fuel 
sources include, the muck conveyor systems, combustible liquids, plastics, PVC, rubber hoses, 
testing equipment, wiring insulation, rubber tires, and water and air hoses. Combustible liquids 
include diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, grease and lubricating oil. Ignition sources may include 
faulting electrical equipment (motors, switches, transformers and mine power centers), welding 
and cutting operations, engine heat, and friction (brakes, bearings, gears and belting). Oxygen is 
supplied from ambient air. 
The TBM has the capacity to carry approximately 2,950-l (780 gal) of AW46 hydraulic fluid (a 
high flash point, combustible liquid). 
Scenario 1 - A locomotive fire has the potential to propagate rapidly beyond the incipient stage. 
An onboard fire, probably in the engine compartment, should be contained and damage 
minimized, if operators act promptly to extinguish the fire with their portable extinguishers. 
However, a diesel spill could release up to a tank full (189.3-l [50 gal]), see Section 9.2.5, of fuel 
into the bottom of the drift and any subsequent fire would likely spread quickly and exceed the 
operators' ability to contain it. 
Scenario 2 -A fire resulting from an accident with the maintenance railcar, either during 
transportation in the drift or when transferring the combustible liquids from the onboard storage 
tanks to mobile equipment, has the potential to propagate rapidly beyond the incipient stage 
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(BSC 2001a, Section 5). Large quantities of fuel, see Section 9.2.5, could be released into the 
railcar's secondary containment or to the bottom of the drift where the subsequent fire would 
spread quickly, involve adjacent equipment and exceed the operators' ability to contain it. The 
ECRB Refuge Chamber calculation includes this fire scenario to determine the maximum 
duration of the worst-case design basis fire (DBF) and provides the technical design basis for the 
ERSs (BSC 2001b, Section 5.2.6.4). 
Scenario 3 - A mobile equipment fire has the potential to propagate beyond the incipient stage 
(BSC 2001a, Section 5.14). An onboard fire should be contained and damage minimized if the 
operator and other personnel in the area act promptly to extinguish the fire. A fire, resulting 
from an accident involving other combustible materials, may propagate beyond the operator's 
ability to control it. 
Scenario 4 - A fire inside any of the power distribution equipment should be contained since the 
equipment is housed in a heavy steel cabinet. Large transformers are dry type and are enclosed 
in dust free cabinets. Over-current and multiple relay protection, and current-limiting fuses are 
provided. Cabling consists of fire-resistant cable of the self-extinguishing type. 
Scenario 5 - A vehicle fuel tank, or maintenance railcar storage tank rupture causing fuel to pool 
in and around the wood ties, which catches fire in the ECRB Cross-Drift has the potential to 
propagate rapidly beyond the incipient stage (BSC 2001a, Section 5.14). Such a fire would 
likely rapidly consume the spilt fuel and cause some charring of ties in and immediately next to 
the fire. Since the ties are treated with a fire-retardant coating (a two-step process using a primer 
and final topcoat), it is unlikely that the fire would spread from tie to tie along the drift. 
However, energy re-radiation due to the confines of the small bore tunnel, and the high 
ventilation rate, could result in extension beyond the initial spill fire area. 
9.4.5.2 Muck Conveyors 
Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC) has conducted full-scale fire tests on designated 
fire-retardant belts on behalf of the United States Bureau Mines. All belts tested were ignitable 
and capable of propagating a fire when arranged in favorable burning configurations. Conveyor 
belts liberate dense, black, toxic smoke when ignited. FMRC cautions against ignoring belts 
because they are designated fire-retardant, when determining fire potential (FMRC 2000). 
9.4.6 Operations 
The primary work within the ECRB Cross-Drift consists of scientific investigation. In FY02 
Alcove 10 will be constructed. Testing is performed mostly on the day shift but may extend to or 
be scheduled on the back shifts. 
9.4.7 Potential for a Toxic, Biological and/or Radiation Incident Due to a Fire 
The potential for a toxic, biological and/or radiation incident due to a fire is not considered a 
major threat: 
 Most construction materials are essentially inert. 
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 Burning electrical cables can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. 
The risk of combustion occurring is low, due to the use of cables consisting of fire-
resistant insulation of the self-extinguishing type and by separating the power cables 
from the non fire-rated instrument cables. 
 Biological materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Radioactive materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Rubber tires can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. The risk of 
combustion occurring is low. 
9.4.8 Damage Potential Loss: Maximum Possible Fire Loss 
If a fire ignites while the TBM is being serviced from the maintenance rail car, which is moved 
with a locomotive, all could be lost. In other scenarios individual pieces of equipment could be 
lost. In addition to the equipment lost a portion [20 m (66 feet), two levels 10 m (33 feet) in 
length](BSC 2001a, Section 5.4.1) of the conveyor belting, would be damaged by the fire. The 
value of these losses is described in Table 9.4-1. 
Table 9.4-1. Maximum Possible Fire Loss for the ECRB Cross-Drift 
EquipmentLost 
EquipmentValue Cleanup 
EquipmentReplacement MPFL 
TBM 1 $5,250,000 $3,937,500 $6,037,500 $9,975,000 
Maintenance Railcar $75,000 $56,250 $86,250 $142,500 
Locomotive $200,000 $150,000 $230,000 $380,000 
LHD $250,000 $187,500 $287,500 $475,000 
Conveyor Belting 
(66 ft) 
$16,500 $12,375 $18,975 $47,850 
Total Loss N/A $4,368,750 $6,698,750 $11,020,350 
Source: (1) (CRWMS M&O 1998c) (Assumption 6.3.6) 
9.4.9 Fire Protections Features 
The fire protection features identified in this section are the installed mitigating features for the 
hazards identified in Section 9.4.5. 
9.4.9.1 Automatic 
The automatic, pre-engineered dry chemical suppression systems on the TBM (CRWMS M&O 
1998d), muck conveyors (McDonald 1998b), and locomotives (CRWMS M&O 1998e), and 
those installed on the diesel-powered mobile equipment and maintenance railcar (McDonald 
1998c) use a multipurpose dry chemical as the fire suppression agent. These systems are 
installed in compliance with 29 CFR 1926.800 and NFPA 17 requirements. 
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Automatic, pre-engineered multipurpose dry chemical suppression systems, which include 
manual triggering devices, are installed at the conveyor head, tail, drive and take-up pulleys 
(McDonald 1998b). 
9.4.9.2 Manual 
Incipient fire fighting response is with portable multipurpose dry chemical fire extinguishers. 
The portable multipurpose dry chemical extinguishers installed in the ESF at 60 m (200 ft) 
intervals along the length of the conveyors (29 CFR 1926.800). They use Ansul Foray agent 
and have a rating of 10A:60B:C. Spacing between extinguishers exceeds 60 m (200 ft) in 
specific locations. Additional extinguishers are being installed this fiscal year bringing the ESF 
back into compliance. 
To provide backup incipient fire fighting capability, 1-1/2 inch hose stations are installed. 
Locomotives also carry fire hoses that can be connected to a water line utility outlet. Each hose 
station installation includes a storage rack, a minimum of 150 ft of hose, with UL listed, 
electrically safe shut-off type nozzle. Each hose station has a pressure-reducing valve installed 
to ensure that the nozzle pressure does not exceed 6.9 bar ga (100 psi) residual pressure (NFPA 
14). Miners, locomotive operators, and swampers who volunteer are trained in the use of fire 
hoses to fight incipient stage fires (McDonald 2001). 
Incipient fire fighting response is not considered viable, unless personnel are immediately 
available at the time of ignition, as there is no automatic fire detection systems or suppression 
systems installed in the main drift. 
Section 15.7 discusses whether the fire hose stations should remain in service or removed. 
9.4.9.3 Passive 
The walls, floor and ceiling of the ECRB Cross-Drift are predominantly supported rock. Near the 
end of the ECRB Cross-Drift steel bulkheads are installed at Station 17+63 and Station 25+03 
(CRWMS M&O 1999d). These bulkheads, although not fire rated, will hinder the spread of fire. 
The wooden railroad ties are coated with fire-retardant material (CRWMS M&O 1998e). 
9.4.10 Protection of Essential Safety Class Systems 
The ESF is a non-nuclear facility and radioactive materials are not present during construction 
and operation. Therefore, no essential safety class equipment, systems or components are 
installed in the ECRB Cross-Drift. 
9.4.11 Life Safety Considerations 
9.4.11.1 Ventilation 
The ECRB Cross-Drift ventilation system is a semi-independent system. The ECRB Cross-Drift 
ventilation system draws in fresh air from the north portal and supplies it to the operating face of 
the bulkhead at Station 17+63 (CRWMS M&O 1999d). Exhaust air then returns to the north 
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portal through its 1.2 m (48-inch) diameter ducting. Exhaust fans #A, B, and C are operated to 
support the exhaust requirements of the cross-drift (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Figure 1 and Section 
3.5). 
The Cross-Drift ventilation system is an extension of the exhaust system in the ESF tunnel, 
which includes reversibility of airflow as an operating feature. Under normal circumstances, 
Fans 1, 2, and 3 in the Main Drift and Fans A, B, C, and D in the Cross-Drift operate 
continuously to satisfy the ventilation requirements of the Cross-Drift by exhausting about 37 
m3/s (77,000 cfm) from the Cross-Drift. A manual damper and pitot tubes installed near the 
entrance to the Cross-Drift facilitate air balancing. (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Section 3.5) 
In the event of an upset occurrence that warrants operating the ventilation system with airflow 
direction reversed, the 12.47 kV power supply to Fans 1 through 3 and Fans A through D will be 
momentarily interrupted, causing all of the fans to go off-line and become non-operative. Fan 
1 can then be restarted manually in the reverse direction, causing the 1.67 m (66) Main Drift 
header and the 1.2 m (48) Cross-Drift header to reverse their function and become supply air 
headers. Because the control damper located at the junction of the Cross-Drift is partially closed, 
this will cause air flow through the 1.2 m (48) header and into the Cross-Drift. The volume to 
the start of the ECRB Cross-Drift is about 40 percent of the fan capacity. (CRWMS M&O 
1999c, Section 3.5) 
The test of the reverse fan operations demonstrated that the system delivers about 6.6 m3/s 
(14,000 cfm) to the start of the Cross-Drift using only Fan 1 located at Sta. 00+10 in the Main 
Drift. The dampers in the ECRB duct reduce the volume available at the start of the Cross-Drift. 
Based on the computer models of the system, the air volume to the end of the drift at Sta. 25+50 
would be approximately 2.9 m3/s (6,200 cfm). (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Section 3.5) 
9.4.11.2 Egress 
If a fire occurs between the ERSs at Alcove 8 and Station 17+63m of the ECRB, personnel 
located upstream of the fire can evacuate out of the ECRB Cross-Drift toward the North Ramp 
safely, because the fire byproducts will be vented directly to the North Portal. Once in the North 
Ramp, the choice of direction for evacuation of personnel will be determined by the status of the 
ventilation system and construction activities. Personnel located downstream of the fire will 
assemble in the ERS behind the steel bulkhead at Station 17+63 and wait until rescued or until 
the fire is extinguished. 
If a fire occurs between Alcove 8 and the North Ramp, the egress of personnel in the ECRB will 
be prevented. Personnel will assemble in the ERS behind the steel bulkhead located at Station 
17+63 or in the Alcove 8 ERS. There is a cache of SCSRs in Alcove 8 and at the entrance to the 
Station 17+63m ERS (BSC 2001c, List E). Emergency response procedures for the ECRB are 
defined in AP-OM-010, Abnormal Event Response. 
9.4.11.3 Personal Respiratory Protection 
All subsurface personnel are required to be trained in the use of, and to carry personal 
self-rescuers. The standard unit carried is suitable for escape from fire where there is sufficient 
oxygen. These units remove carbon monoxide generated in a fire and are rated for about 
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60 minutes. These units do not include eye protection. Consequently, activity in even moderate 
amounts of smoke will be extremely difficult. 
The walkout distance from the end of the ECRB Cross-Drift to the surface can be as great as 
4,800 m. Significant life safety improvements have been achieved by providing all subsurface 
personnel the capability to use self-contained, oxygen-generating, self-rescuers (SCSRs). These 
units are NIOSH/MSHA rated for 60 minutes of use in moderate to heavy working conditions 
but can be effective for up to 4 hours or longer when the wearer remains at rest or is breathing 
easily, as when awaiting rescue. They include eye goggles which makes escape in smoke 
possible. These SCSRs give personnel the means to walkout where travel times exceed 
30 minutes, and protection against exposure to other harmful gases that may be present besides 
carbon monoxide (LP-ESH-010-BSC, Attachment 2, Section 9). 
9.4.11.4 Emergency Refuge Stations 
The project is committed to providing and maintaining a safe means of egress, or a safe refuge, 
for all subsurface personnel. This commitment is met in the ECRB by the installation of ERSs 
and by providing SCSRs for all personnel. This, combined with hazard mitigation by onboard, 
automatic, pre-engineered fire suppression systems, the ESF alarm/notification systems 
improvements (as yet uncompleted, see Section 9.3.11.5), provides an acceptable level of 
personnel life safety. 
In the ECRB Cross-Drift two ERSs have been designated. One in Alcove 8 at Station 07+98; 
with the second located behind the bulkhead at Station 17+63. Both have caches of SCSRs 
(BSC 2001c, List E). The ERSs are stocked with supplies (BSC 2001c, Lists A, B, C, D & E) 
sufficient for the duration of the calculated worst-case fire event plus contingency. 
9.4.11.5 Alarm/Notification Systems 
Emergency communication is provided by an industrial paging/warning system. To improve 
reliability, this system is connected to a separate dedicated cable system that is physically 
separated from the telephone cable system. It allows an individual to be paged, then respond and 
conduct a two-way conversation with the paging party. It has siren and flashing lights to provide 
audio and visual signaling (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Section 7.5.4). This system is installed so that 
it can be heard to warn and alert all personnel working in the alcoves or niches during an 
emergency (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Section 7.5.4). 
9.4.11.6 Exit and Emergency Lighting 
The exit and emergency lighting systems being installed in the ECRB Cross-Drift are described 
in the ECRB East-West Drift Utilities Design Analysis (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Sections 7.4.2.4 
and 7.4.2.5). Lighted exit signs are being installed at all intersections in the cross-drift. These 
inform personnel and visitors the direction to go to the ramp entrances/exits of the ESF 
(CRWMS M&O 1998g, Section 7.1.1). 
Emergency lighting with battery backup is being installed at each telephone station. Since 
telephones are installed at 180 m (600 ft) intervals this also illuminates the fire extinguisher at 
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each station (CRWMS M&O 1998g, Sections 7.1.2). It was observed during the site visit that the 
installation of these systems was incomplete. The installation of these systems is scheduled to be 
complete by June 3, 2002 (Broom 2001). 
9.4.12 Exposure Potential and the Potential for a Fire to Spread 
The probability of a fire igniting in the cross-drift, due to exposure from an ongoing fire outside 
the entrance to the drift is low. Combustible material in the drift opening is limited to the muck 
conveyor, wood railroad ties, electric cable, telephone wire and rubber hose connecting utility 
water from the Main Drift to the ECRB Cross-Drift piping. The ties are coated with 
fire-retardant material and it is unlikely that fire would spread from tie to tie along the 
cross-drift. However, due to energy re-radiation in the small tunnel there is a small risk that 
some fire spread along the ties could occur, if the adjacent fire energy and duration were high. 
The muck conveyor and electric cable are fire-resistant and there is only a small amount of 
telephone wire and rubber hose. The muck conveyor drive is protected by an automatic fire 
protection system. Other materials in the drift opening, such as compressed air and water piping, 
are of noncombustible construction. 
A fire in Alcove 8 is unlikely to spread into the ECRB Cross-Drift due to the physical separation 
(by distance) of the areas where combustibles may be located and their relationship to the 
cross-drift. 
9.5 ALCOVES 
9.5.1 Introduction 
The various alcoves described in this section were constructed to house a multitude of scientific 
experiments and data gathering. They vary from a visitors alcove to percolation tests. Each 
alcove has a different configuration. A roadheader or a combination of roadheader/drill and blast 
methods were used to excavate the natural materials for the alcoves. 
Alcove 5 is not discussed. For information regarding Alcove 5 see the Thermal Test Facility Fire 
Hazards Analysis (CRWMS M&O 1997c). 
9.5.2 Construction 
The Alcoves were excavated using a roadheader and are of various lengths. The walls, floors 
and ceilings consist of solid rock. Most of the construction, including ground support, is of 
noncombustible materials. 
9.5.2.1 Alcove 1 
Alcove 1 is on the right rib of the main ESF drift, approximately 43 m (141 ft) from the North 
Portal in the starter tunnel section. The total length of the Alcove is approximately 23 m (75 ft) 
from the centerline of the Main Drift to the end of the drift. The cross section is 5.5 m (18 ft) 
wide by 5.2 m (17 ft) high. A steel bulkhead is installed approximately 20 m (66 ft) from the 
Alcove entrance. (YMP 2000) 
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Ventilation air is blown into the Alcove from a duct connected to a dedicated fan/ducting system 
that supplies air to this alcove and to Alcove 2 (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Figure 3). 
9.5.2.2 Alcove 2 
Alcove 2 is on the right rib of the main ESF drift. The Alcove consists of a straight drift 
connected to the Main Drift at approximately 168 m (551 ft) from the north portal. The total 
length of the Alcove is 48 m (157 ft) from the centerline of the Main Drift to the end of the drift. 
The cross section varies from 3.7 m (12 ft) to 6.0 m (20 ft) wide by 3.7 m (12 ft) to 7.0 m (23 ft) 
high. A security fence and gate are installed at the entrance to the Alcove. (CRWMS M&O 
1995b) 
Ventilation air is supplied into the Alcove by a dedicated fan/ducting system. The fan is located 
upstream of Alcove 1 and also supplies Alcove 1. The fan intake extends to the portal entrance 
ensuring a fresh ventilation air supply to the Alcove, regardless of air quality in the Main Drift 
downstream of the north portal. The fan provides air supplied by ducting and to displace Alcove 
air back to the Main Drift (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Figure 3). 
9.5.2.3 Alcove 3 
Alcove 3 is on the right rib of the main drift. The Alcove consists of a straight drift connected to 
the Main Drift at approximately 754 m (2,473 ft) from the north portal. The total length of the 
Alcove is 36.5 m (120 ft) from the centerline of the Main Drift to the end of the drift. The cross 
section is 5.0 m (16 ft) wide by 5.0 m (16 ft) high. (CRWMS M&O 1995a) 
A tee off the main ventilation duct to the North Portal ventilates the alcove. A damper at the 
entrance to the alcove regulates the volume of air pulled from the alcove (CRWMS M&O 1999c, 
Figure 4, Section 3.9). 
9.5.2.4 Alcove 4 
Alcove 4 is on the right rib of the main drift. The Alcove consists of a straight drift connected to 
the Main Drift at approximately 1,028 m (3,372 ft) from the north portal. The total length of the 
Alcove is 52 m (170 ft) from the centerline of the Main Drift to the end of the drift. The cross 
section is 3.7 m (12 ft) wide by 3.7 m (12 ft) high. A steel bulkhead is installed at the Alcove 
entrance. (CRWMS M&O 1995a) 
A tee off the main ventilation duct to the North Portal ventilates the alcove. A damper at the 
entrance to the alcove regulates the volume of air pulled from the alcove (CRWMS M&O 1999c, 
Figure 5 and Section 3.10). 
9.5.2.5 Alcove 5 
The construction description for the TTF, Alcove 5 is included in the separate Thermal Test 
Facility Fire Hazards Analysis is essentially of the same type of construction as the other 
alcoves. (CRWMS M&O 1997c) 
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9.5.2.6 Alcove 6 
Alcove 6 is on the left rib of the main drift. The Alcove consists of an L shaped drift 
connected to the Main Drift at approximately 3,740 m (12,267 ft) from the north portal. The 
total length of the Alcove is 196 m (643 ft) from the centerline of the Main Drift to the end of the 
L. The cross section varies from 4.0 m (13 ft) to 6.0 m (20 ft) wide by 4.0 m (13 ft) to 4.5 m 
(15 ft) high (CRWMS M&O 1997a). 
The Alcove 6 ventilation fan and duct system provides air into the alcove, which is then 
exhausted back into the main ESF tunnel. A 90o elbow and a short length of duct were added to 
the exhaust end of this duct to avoid the possibility of recirculation of air from this alcove. The 
fan is on a timer and operates only during the day shift. The operation is controlled by an 
automatic timer. (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Figure 7, Section 3.12) 
9.5.2.7 Alcove 7 
Alcove 7 is on the left rib of the main ESF drift. The Alcove consists of a straight drift 
connected to the Main Drift at approximately 5,060 m (16,600 ft) from the north portal. The 
total length of the Alcove is 125 m (410 ft) from the centerline of the Main Drift to the end of the 
drift. The cross section varies from 4.0 m (13 ft) to 6.0 m (20 ft) wide by 4.0 m (13 ft) high. A 
7.0 m (23 ft) deep turnaround bay is on the right rib of the Alcove at 25.5 m (84 ft) from the 
main drift. Steel bulkheads are installed 32 m (105 ft) and 64 m (210 ft) from the centerline of 
the Main Drift (CRWMS M&O 1996b). 
Ventilation air is supplied from the Main Drift by a dedicated fan/ducting system. The 
fan/ducting system operates in exhaust mode, discharging directly into the Main Drift in the 
direction of the south portal (CRWMS M&O 1999c, Figure 8, Section 3.13). 
9.5.2.8 Alcove 8 
Alcove 8 is constructed in the ECRB Cross-Drift. Percolation tests are being conducted in the 
alcove. 
Ventilation air is supplied from the ECRB Cross-Drift with portable fans directing air into the 
alcove (site visit August 20, 2001). 
9.5.2.9 Alcove 9 
The Crest Alcove, Alcove 9, will conduct an unspecified scientific test when its completed. It 
will be located in the ECRB Cross-Drift. 
9.5.2.10 Alcove 10 
Alcove 10 will house a mini-heater test when its completed in FY02. It will be located in the 
ECRB Cross-Drift. 
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9.5.2.11 Alcove 11 
Alcove 11 is in the planning stages and will house an unspecified test when completed. 
9.5.3 Critical Process Equipment 
There are numerous pieces of scientific data gathering equipment located in the various alcoves. 
Data is collected on a frequent, sometimes daily basis. While this equipment is required to 
gather data it is not considered critical process equipment. 
9.5.4 High-Value Property 
Property having a value in excess of $1 million is considered high-value property (Assumption 
6.3.1). No individual piece of equipment, system or component meets this definition. 
9.5.5 Fire Hazards 
9.5.5.1 General 
The Fire Prevention Code (NFPA 1), defines a fire hazard as . . .any situation, process, 
material, or condition that, on the basis of applicable data, may cause a fire or explosion or 
provide a ready fuel supply to augment the spread of intensity of the fire or explosion and that 
poses a threat to life or property. Based on this definition the following fire hazards have been 
identified in the alcoves. 
All of the elements necessary for a fire are found in tunneling operations. ESF construction and 
operation fuel sources include, the muck conveyor systems, combustible liquids, plastics, PVC, 
rubber hoses, testing equipment, wiring insulation, rubber tires, and water and air hoses. 
Combustible liquids include diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, grease and lubricating oil. Ignition 
sources may include faulting electrical equipment (motors, switches and transformers), welding 
and cutting operations, engine heat, and friction (brakes, bearings, gears and belting). Oxygen is 
supplied from ambient air. 
9.5.5.2 Alcoves 1 and 3 
There are only small amounts of limited-combustible material in either of these Alcoves. 
Testing activity in the Alcoves consists of periodic entry to monitor and record instrument 
readings. 
9.5.5.3 Alcove 2 
Exhibits/displays are mounted in steel tubular frames with composite materials for the display 
areas. 
A section of the drift, approximately 8 m in length, has an area of steel sets with exposed timber 
ground support as part of the display. 
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9.5.5.4 Alcove 4 
During the site visit it was observed that the primary source of fuel in Alcove 4 is a wood table 
used to support data gathering equipment. 
9.5.5.5 Alcove 5 
See the Thermal Test Facility Fire Hazards Analysis for details of hazards within the TTF. 
(CRWMS M&O 1997c) 
9.5.5.6 Alcoves 6 and 7 
There are only small amounts of limited-combustible materials in either of these Alcoves. 
Testing activity in the Alcove consists of periodic entry to monitor and record instrument 
readings. 
9.5.5.7 Alcove 8 
Percolation tests are being conducted in the alcove. There is a small amount of 
limited-combustible materials in this Alcove. 
9.5.5.8 Alcoves 9 through 11 
Alcoves 9 through 11 have not completed construction as of the site visit. Therefore, no 
information is available to discuss the fire hazards located there. 
9.5.6 Operations 
9.5.6.1 Alcove 1 
Alcove 1 housed the United States Geological Survey (USGS) permeability test. All testing is 
complete and the alcove is idle. 
9.5.6.2 Alcove 2 
The USGS conducted test to determine hydrologic properties of the Bow Ridge Fault. All testing 
has been completed and the alcove is currently used as a visitor center. It has exhibits providing 
interactive presentations explaining why and how Yucca Mountain is being studied as a potential 
long-term repository for the storage of nuclear waste. No new construction or extensive testing 
is currently envisioned for this alcove. 
9.5.6.3 Alcove 3 
A radial borehole test is being conducted by the USGS in this alcove. Test monitoring activities 
continue. The alcove contains a small amount of scientific monitoring equipment, generally 
mounted in drill holes in the walls, with data recording equipment located on tables. The alcove 
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is ventilated and while there are no personnel assigned to this area, small numbers of scientists 
enter to record data. Access to the alcove is unrestricted. 
9.5.6.4 Alcove 4 
Radial borehole test is being conducted by the USGS in this alcove. Test monitoring activities 
continue. This alcove contains a small amount of scientific monitoring equipment, generally 
mounted in drill holes in the walls, and data recording equipment. The alcove is ventilated. 
Access to the alcove is unrestricted. 
9.5.6.5 Alcove 5 
The operations conducted in Alcove 5 are described in the separate Thermal Test Facility Fire 
Hazards Analysis. (CRWMS M&O 1997c) 
9.5.6.6 Alcove 6 
The USGS conducted tests to characterize the Ghost Dance Fault. The testing is complete and 
the alcove is idle. 
9.5.6.7 Alcove 7 
The USGS is now conducting tests to characterize the Ghost Dance Fault in this alcove. In-situ 
monitoring behind the alcove bulkhead continues. Two parallel bulkheads have been erected 
within the alcove, which restrict access to the rear portion of the alcove. Various scientific 
monitoring instruments have been mounted in the drift area between the bulkheads. Personnel 
access to this enclosed space is infrequent and required only if instruments fail or requires 
maintenance. The enclosed space is not ventilated and the only penetrations are for instrument 
cables. An attempt has been made to make the bulkheads airtight. Any entrance to the enclosed 
space requires re-establishment of ventilation prior to entry. The rest of the alcove houses a 
small amount of scientific monitoring and data collection equipment. The front portion of the 
alcove is ventilated and while there are no personnel assigned to this area, small numbers of 
scientists enter the alcove to record data for short periods of times. Access to the open portion of 
the alcove is unrestricted. 
9.5.6.8 Alcove 8 
The USGS/Berkeley are currently conducting water transport/permeability testing. Test 
monitoring activities continue. 
9.5.6.9 Alcove 9 
This alcove is to be constructed at a future date. When completed, scientists will conduct tests of 
an undetermined type. 
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9.5.6.10 Alcove 10 
This alcove is to be completed at a future date. Upon its completion, scientists will be 
conducting a mini-heater test. 
9.5.6.11 Alcove 11 
Alcove 11 is in the planning stages and will house an unspecified test when completed. 
9.5.7 Potential for a Toxic, biological and/or Radiation Incident Due to a Fire 
The potential for a toxic, biological and/or radiation incident due to a fire is not considered a 
major threat: 
 Most materials of construction are essentially inert. 
 Burning electrical cables can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. 
The risk of combustion occurring is low, due to the use of cables consisting of fire-
resistant insulation of the self-extinguishing type and by separating the power cables 
from the non fire-rated instrument cables. 
 Biological materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Radioactive materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Rubber tires can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. The risk of 
combustion occurring is low, due to the lack of an ignition source. 
9.5.8 Damage Potential Loss: Maximum Possible Fire Loss 
The value of scientific data lost due to a fire has not been determined for this analysis. All data 
is assumed collected and removed daily for storage outside the ESF. Therefore, the potential 
loss of scientific data will be minimal. In the event of a fire, the impact to the program would be 
evaluated. Since the nature and extent of such an interruption is difficult to predict, this has 
neither been calculated nor considered for this analysis. 
Rail mounted mobile equipment cannot enter an alcove; no rails have been installed. The 
roadheader could enter an alcove to perform excavation operations but in doing so, all scientific 
equipment would have been removed prior to the excavation. 
The MPFL for the alcoves is limited to scientific data collection equipment, miscellaneous 
support equipment, clean up and equipment replacement cost. The MPFL for each alcove is 
listed in Table 9.5-1. The values for equipment located in each alcove were obtained during the 
site visit and are rough order-of-magnitude estimates. A more refined estimate of this equipment 
will not impact the conclusions of this FHA. Alcoves are physically separated from each other a 
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distance where a fire in one alcove will not impact another alcove. Therefore, the MPFL will 
only include the losses in a given alcove. 
Table 9.5-1. Maximum Possible Fire Loss for the Alcoves 
Alcove No. 
EquipmentValue Cleanup 
EquipmentReplacemen 
t MPFL 
$10,000 $7,500 $11,500 $19,000 
$10,000 $7,500 $11,500 $19,000 
$10,000 $7,500 $11,500 $19,000 
$10,000 $7,500 $11,500 $19,000 
Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 
$10,000 $7,500 $11,500 $19,000 
$10,000 $7,500 $11,500 $19,000 
$60,000 $45,000 $69,000 $114,000 
(Assumption 6.3.6) Note 1  See CRWMS M&O 1997c. 
9.5.9 Fire Protections Features 
The fire protection features identified in this section are the installed mitigating features for the 
hazards identified in Section 9.5.5. 
9.5.9.1 Automatic 
No Alcoves have automatic fire detection or alarm capability other than Alcove 5. For a 
description of the automatic fire protection features of Alcove 5 refer to the Thermal Test 
Facility Fire Hazards Analysis (CRWMS M&O 1997c). 
9.5.9.2 Manual 
Incipient fire fighting response is with portable multipurpose dry chemical and clean-agent 
extinguishers. The portable multipurpose dry chemical extinguishers installed use Ansul Foray 
agent and have a UL rating of 10A:60B:C. Spacing between extinguishers does not exceed 60 m 
(200 ft). 
To provide backup incipient fire fighting capability, 1-1/2 inch hose stations are installed in the 
main drift, at the entrance to each Alcove. The same requirement is applicable in the cross-drift. 
Each installation includes a storage rack, a minimum of 150 feet of hose, with UL listed, 
electrically safe shut-off type nozzle. Each hose station has a pressure-reducing valve installed 
to ensure that the nozzle pressure does not exceed 6.9 bar ga (100 psi) residual pressure (NFPA 
14). Miners, locomotive operators, and swampers who volunteer are trained in the use of fire 
hoses to fight incipient stage fires (McDonald 2001). 
Section 15.7 discusses whether the fire hose stations should remain in service or be removed. 
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Incipient fire fighting response is not considered viable, unless personnel are immediately 
available at the time of ignition, as there is no automatic fire detection systems or suppression 
systems installed in any alcove other than Alcove 5. 
9.5.9.3 Passive 
In all alcoves the walls, floor and ceiling of the alcoves are predominantly supported rock. In 
Alcove 2 areas where the rock is unstable steel beams supporting wood cribbing is used to retain 
the rock. At specific alcoves steel bulkheads are installed. These bulkheads, although not fire 
rated, hinder the spread of fire either into the alcoves or into the drifts from a fire in an alcove. 
In Alcove 2, the visitors area, fire-resistant materials are used in the fabrication of the 
exhibits/displays. The frames are constructed of steel tubes. The cabinets are constructed of 
laminations of plywood and PVC covered by Acrovyn. Acrovyn is a trade name for an acrylic 
PVC alloy. It has a flame spread rating of 20. Fluorescent lights illuminate the displays. A 
small motor drives the rotating element. The interior of the cabinet is protected from fire by a 
coating of intumescent paint. Exhibit power requirement is 110 volts, at low wattage. 
Lighting and power distributions are installed in accordance with National Electrical Code 
(NFPA 70) requirements. Emergency lights, with battery backup, are provided for Alcove 2. 
9.5.10 Protection of Essential Safety Class Systems 
The ESF is a non-nuclear facility and radioactive materials are not present during construction 
and operation. Therefore no essential safety class equipment, systems or components are located 
in any alcove. 
9.5.11 Life Safety Considerations 
9.5.11.1 Ventilation 
With two exceptions, the alcoves' ventilation systems are extensions of the ESF ventilation 
system. Each Alcove has its own ventilation system to ensure airflow to support test personnel 
and continuing construction activities. Air is taken from the Main Drift and exhausted back to it. 
The exceptions are Alcoves 1 and 2, which have a common fan/ducting system supplying fresh 
air from the north portal and exhausts it back to the main drift. (CRWMS M&O 1999c, 
Section 3). 
9.5.11.2 Egress 
Each Alcove has a single means of egress available to escape a fire or other emergency (LP-
ESH-010-BSC, Attachment 2, Section B, and Attachment 3). All egress is to and through the 
Main Drift or into the ECRB Cross-Drift to the main drift. Once in the main drift, two means of 
egress are available, one to the north portal, the other to the south portal. 
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9.5.11.3 Personal Respiratory Protection 
All subsurface personnel are required to be trained in the use of, and to carry personal 
self-rescuers. The standard unit carried is suitable for escape from fire where there is sufficient 
oxygen. These units remove carbon monoxide generated in a fire and are rated for about 
60 minutes. These units do not include eye protection. Consequently, activity in even moderate 
amounts of smoke will be extremely difficult. 
The walkout distance to the surface can be as great as 3,900 m (12,795 feet), half the length of 
the tunnel. Significant life safety improvements are achieved by providing all subsurface 
personnel the capability to use self-contained, oxygen-generating, self-rescuers (SCSRs). These 
units are NIOSH/MSHA rated for 60 minutes of use in moderate to heavy working conditions 
but can be effective for up to 4 hours or longer when the wearer remains at rest or is breathing 
easily, as when awaiting rescue. They include eye goggles which makes escape in smoke 
possible. These SCSRs give personnel the means to walkout where travel times exceed 
30 minutes, and protection against exposure to other harmful gases that may be present besides 
carbon monoxide. 
A store of self-rescuers will be maintained in Alcove 2, in a sufficient quantity, to equip the 
maximum anticipated number of visitors. 
9.5.11.4 Emergency Refuge Stations 
The alcoves do not have ERSs. Alcove 8 in the ECRB Cross-Drift has been designated an ERS. 
9.5.11.5 Alarm/Notification Systems 
Emergency communication is provided by an industrial paging/warning system. To improve 
reliability, this system is connected to a separate dedicated cable system that is physically 
separated from the telephone cable system. It allows an individual to be paged, then respond and 
conduct a two-way conversation with the paging party. It has siren and flashing lights to provide 
audio and visual signaling (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Section 7.5.4). This system provides 
telephone locations every 182.9 m (600 feet) (CRWMS M&O 1998g, Section 7.1.2) throughout 
the ECRB Cross-Drift and the Main Drift and in each Alcove. 
9.5.11.6 Exit and Emergency Lighting 
Emergency lighting, with battery backup, is provided in Alcove 2, Visitor Center.
Exit and emergency lighting, similar in scope to that proposed for the ECRB Cross-Drift have
been installed in all other working Alcoves (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Sections 7.4.2.4 and 7.4.2.5)
(CRWMS M&O 1998g, Section 7.1.1).
9.5.12 Exposure Potential and the Potential for a Fire to Spread 
The probability of a fire igniting in any of the alcoves, due to exposure from an ongoing fire 
outside their entrance, is extremely low. Combustible material in the drift opening is limited to 
electric cable, telephone wire and rubber hoses connecting utility water from the Main Drift to 
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the alcove piping. The electric cable is fire-resistant and there is only a small amount of 
telephone wire and rubber hose. Other materials in the drift opening, such as compressed air and 
water piping, are noncombustible. The more likely event is a fire inside an alcove that vents fire 
byproducts into the Main Drift and to downstream alcoves. 
9.6 NICHES 
9.6.1 Introduction 
Niches are constructed by removing material from either the Main Drift or from the ECRB 
Cross-Drift. Drift scale flow tests are conducted in the niches (CRWMS M&O 1997d). 
9.6.2 Construction 
The Niches were excavated with a roadheader. The walls, floors and ceilings consist of solid 
rock with rock-bolts used to stabilize the rock. Two niches, numbers 5 and 6, will be installed in 
the ECRB Cross-Drift. 
Niches 1, 2, 3, and 4 are of similar configurations and are located on the right rib of the main 
ESF drift. Approximate distances from the north portal are: Niche 1 - 3,570 m (11,710 ft); 
Niche 2 - 3,650 m (11,972 ft); Niche 3 - 3,100 m (10,170 ft); and Niche 4 - 4,790 m (15,710 ft). 
Each is approximately 13.7 m (45 ft) long from the centerline of the Main Drift to its end. The 
cross section is 4.0 m (13 ft) wide by 4.0 m (13 ft) high. Each Niche is sealed off from the Main 
Drift by a steel bulkhead. (CRWMS M&O 1997d) 
Niche 5 is in the ECRB Cross-Drift at STA 16+20 m. Niche 6 is planned for the ECRB Cross-
Drift and will house an undetermined scientific test. 
9.6.3 Critical Process Equipment 
There are numerous pieces of scientific data gathering equipment located in the various niches. 
Data is collected on a frequent, sometimes daily basis. While this equipment is required to 
gather data it is not considered critical process equipment. 
9.6.4 High-Value Property 
Property having a value in excess of $1 million is considered high-value property (Assumption 
6.3.1). No individual piece of equipment, system or component meets this definition. 
9.6.5 Fire Hazards 
The Fire Prevention Code (NFPA 1) defines a fire hazard as . . . any situation, process, 
material, or condition that, on the basis of applicable data, may cause a fire or explosion or 
provide a ready fuel supply to augment the spread of intensity of the fire or explosion and that 
poses a threat to life or property. Based on this definition the following fire hazards have been 
identified in the niches. 
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All of the elements necessary for a fire are found in niches. Construction and operation fuel 
sources include, the muck conveyor systems, combustible liquids, plastics, PVC, rubber hoses, 
testing equipment, wiring insulation, rubber tires, and water and air hoses. Combustible liquids 
include diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, grease and lubricating oil. Ignition sources may include 
faulting electrical equipment (motors, switches and transformers), welding and cutting 
operations, engine heat, and friction (brakes, bearings, gears and belting). Oxygen is supplied 
from ambient air. 
There are only small amounts of limited-combustible materials in any of the niches. Testing 
activity in the niche consists of periodic entry to monitor and record instrument readings. 
9.6.6 Operations 
9.6.6.1 Niches 1 and 2 
Niches 1 and 2 are essentially identical. A bulkhead has been erected across the entrance to both 
niches. All testing activities in these niches are complete and the niches are idle. 
9.6.6.2 Niche 3 
The testing in this niche, by the USGS/Berkeley, is in conjunction with the water 
transport/permeability testing in Alcove 8. Test monitoring activities continue. 
9.6.6.3 Niche 4 
Air testing is performed in this niche. Test monitoring activities continue. 
9.6.6.4 Niche 5 
Air permeability testing and water transport tests of the lower lithophysal zone are performed in 
this niche. Test monitoring activities continue. 
9.6.6.5 Niche 6 
This planned niche has not been constructed. Upon completion it will house scientific testing. 
9.6.7 Potential for a Toxic, Biological and/or Radiation Incident Due to a Fire 
The potential for a toxic, biological and/or radiation incident due to a fire is not considered a 
major threat: 
 Most materials of construction are essentially inert. 
 Burning electrical cables can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. 
The risk of combustion occurring is low, due to the use of cables consisting of fire-
BABFAH000-01717-0200-00121 REV 03 43 March 2002 

resistant insulation of the self-extinguishing type and by separating the power cables 
from the non fire-rated instrument cables. 
 Biological materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Radioactive materials are not present during construction and operation of the ESF. 
 Rubber tires can emit potentially toxic gases as products of combustion. The risk of 
combustion occurring is low, due to the lack of an ignition source. 
9.6.8 Damage Potential Loss: Maximum Possible Fire Loss 
The value of scientific data lost due to a fire has not been determined for this analysis. All data 
is assumed collected and removed daily for storage outside the ESF. Therefore the potential loss 
of scientific data will be minimal. In the event of a fire, the impact to the program would be 
evaluated. Since the nature and extent of such an interruption is difficult to predict, this has 
neither been calculated nor considered for this analysis. 
The MPFL for the niches is limited to scientific data collection equipment, miscellaneous 
support equipment, clean up and equipment replacement cost. The MPFL for each niche is listed 
in Table 9.6-1. The values for the equipment located in each niche were obtained during the site 
visit and are rough order of magnitude estimates. A more refined estimate of this equipment will 
not impact the conclusions of this FHA. Niches are physically separated from each other a 
distance where a fire in one niche will not impact another niche. Therefore, the MPFL will only 
include the losses in a given niche. 
Table 9.6-1. Maximum Possible Fire Loss for the Niches 
Niche No. 
EquipmentValue Cleanup 
EquipmentReplacement MPFL 
1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 $25,000 $18,750 $28,750 $47,500 
4 $20,000 $15,000 $23,000 $38,000 
5 $40,000 $30,000 $46,000 $76,000 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(Assumption 6.3.6) 
9.6.9 Fire Protections Features 
The fire protection features identified in this section are the installed mitigating features for the 
hazards identified in Section 9.6.5. 
9.6.9.1 Automatic 
There is no automatic, fire suppression or fire detection system installed in any niche. 
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9.6.9.2 Manual 
Incipient fire fighting response is with portable multipurpose dry chemical extinguishers. 
The portable multipurpose dry chemical extinguishers installed in the ESF use Ansul Foray 
agent and have a UL rating of 10A:60B:C. Spacing between extinguishers does not exceed 60 m 
(200 ft). 
To provide backup incipient fire fighting capability, 1-1/2 inch hose stations are installed in the 
main drift, near each niche. Each installation includes a storage rack, a minimum of 45.7 m (150 
feet) of hose, with UL listed, electrically safe shut-off type nozzle. Each hose station is equipped 
with a pressure-reducing valve to ensure that the nozzle pressures does not exceed 6.9 bar Ga. 
(100 psi) residual pressure (NFPA 14). Miners, locomotive operators, and swampers who 
volunteer are trained in the use of fire hoses to fight incipient stage fires (McDonald 2001). 
Section 15.7 discusses whether the fire hose stations should remain in service or be removed. 
Incipient fire fighting response is not considered viable, unless personnel were immediately 
available at the time of ignition, as there is no automatic fire detection systems or suppression 
systems installed in any niche. 
9.6.9.3 Passive 
The walls, floor and ceiling of the alcoves are predominantly solid unsupported rock. In areas 
where the rock is unstable steel beams are used to retain the rock. 
Lighting and power distributions are installed in accordance with National Electrical Code 
(NFPA 70) requirements. 
9.6.10 Protection of Essential Safety Class Systems 
The ESF is a non-nuclear facility and radioactive materials are not present during construction 
and operation. Therefore, no essential safety class equipment, systems or components is located 
in any niche. 
9.6.11 Life Safety Considerations 
9.6.11.1 Ventilation 
No fixed ventilation system is required or provided for any niche. Temporary ventilation is 
provided, as needed, by a portable fan. 
9.6.11.2 Egress 
Each niche has a single means of egress available to escape a fire or other emergency (LP-ESH-
010-BSC, Attachment 2, Section B, and Attachment 3). All egress is to and through the Main 
Drift or into the ECRB Cross-Drift to the main drift. Once in the main drift, two means of egress 
are available, one to the north portal, the other to the south portal. 
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9.6.11.3 Personal Respiratory Protection 
All subsurface personnel are required to be trained in the use of, and to carry personal 
self-rescuers. 
The walkout distance to the surface can be as great as 3,900 m (12,795 feet), half the length of 
the tunnel. Significant life safety improvements are achieved by providing all subsurface 
personnel the capability to use self-contained, oxygen-generating, self-rescuers (SCSRs). These 
units are NIOSH/MSHA rated for 60 minutes of use in moderate to heavy working conditions 
but can be effective for up to 4 hours or longer when the wearer remains at rest or is breathing 
easily, as when awaiting rescue. They include eye goggles which makes escape in smoke 
possible. These SCSRs give personnel the means to walkout where travel times exceed 
30 minutes, and protection against exposure to other harmful gases that may be present besides 
carbon monoxide. 
9.6.11.4 Emergency Refuge Stations 
The niches do not have ERS. All designated ERS are located in the ECRB Cross-Drift. 
9.6.11.5 Alarm/Notification Systems 
Emergency communication is provided by an industrial paging/warning system. To improve 
reliability, this system is connected to a separate dedicated cable system that is physically 
separated from the telephone cable system. It allows an individual to be paged, then respond and 
conduct a two-way conversation with the paging party. It has siren and flashing lights to provide 
audio and visual signaling (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Section 7.5.4). This system provides 
telephone locations every 182.9 m (600 feet) (CRWMS M&O 1998g, Section 7.1.2) throughout 
the ECRB Cross-Drift and the Main Drift and in each Niche. 
9.6.11.6 Exit and Emergency Lighting 
The exit and emergency lighting for the Main Drift are utilized for the niches (CRWMS M&O 
1999b, Sections 7.4.2.4 and 7.4.2.5). 
9.6.12 Exposure Potential and the Potential for a Fire to Spread 
The probability of a fire igniting in any of the niches, due to exposure from an ongoing fire 
outside their entrance, is extremely low. There is only a small amount of limited-combustible 
material in the niches. 
10. NATURAL HAZARDS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The natural hazards described in the section are applicable to the Mobile Equipment, the Main 
Drift, ECRB Cross-Drift, the Alcoves and Niches described in Section 9. 
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10.2 EARTHQUAKE 
Concerns regarding whether the installed water distribution system meets seismic design 
requirements were addressed in the Title III Evaluation Report for the Subsurface Fire Water 
System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-potable Water Supply (CRWMS M&O 1998f). This 
report recommended the installation of seismic restraints to existing pipe support brackets to 
prevent detachment of the piping (CRWMS M&O 1998f, Section 7.4). 
10.3 FLOOD 
Floods caused by natural causes are highly unlikely because of the limited precipitation and 
because the portals are above the probable maximum flood level (CRWMS M&O 1998f, Table 
6.1, Requirement 3.2.1.2.1.1.I). 
10.4 WIND 
Wind forces presents no problem to underground structures. 
10.5 DUSTY ENVIRONMENT 
A dusty environment has no impact on the fire protection systems located in the subsurface 
areas. 
10.6 HIGH TEMPERATURE 
High temperatures have no impact on the fire protection systems located in the subsurface areas. 
10.7 HUMIDITY 
Humidity has no impact on the fire protection systems located in the subsurface areas. 
11. EMERGENCY PLANNING 
The operating contractor is currently responsible for developing and maintaining the emergency 
action plan in accordance with 29 CFR 1926, 29 CFR 1910.38 and the Emergency Management 
Plan (DOE 2000a). 
12. FIRE DEPARTMENT/BRIGADE 
During construction and operation, fire rescue duties are the responsibility of the operating 
contractor's mine rescue team. In accordance with YMP policy (Dyer 2000) no fire fighting will 
be conducted beyond an incipient stage. Therefore, manual fire fighting can not be used to 
mitigate MPFL determinations. Site personnel utilizing portable fire extinguishers may perform 
incipient level fire fighting. 
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13. RECOVERY POTENTIAL
The ability to recover from a credible subsurface fire is considered reasonably acceptable. 
Physical damage to the facility and its contents will be limited to the general location of the fires 
origin. The use of fire-resistant or noncombustible materials for construction and operation and 
the operation of the installed fire protection systems will ensure this. 
Program delays, due to lack of spare parts availability, are postulated only if the fire exceeds the 
presently defined credible subsurface fire. None of the equipment utilized in the subsurface 
areas is considered unique or of special design. All equipment is standard, off-the-shelf items 
modified for use on the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project. 
Unacceptable levels of environmental damage, caused by a credible fire, are postulated only if 
the fire protection systems fail to perform as designed. 
14. SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS 
The ESF is an unclassified facility. There are no security considerations related to fire 
protection. The only security consideration is related to life safety. Access to the underground 
facility is controlled through the portal access controller and is available only to personnel who 
have completed mandatory training in hazards awareness, use of lamps, and use of self-rescuers. 
15. EFFECT OF SIGNIFICANT FIRE SAFETY DEFICIENCIES ON FIRE RISK 
15.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following fire and life safety deficiencies were identified in the previous revision of this 
document. Sections 15.2 through 15.8 restate those deficiencies and provides an update on their 
status. 
15.2 EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM 
A manned surface facility is not presently designated for use as an emergency control room. 
Such a facility would act as the focal point and emergency coordination control center during 
any underground emergency. Control of the following systems should be in this control room: 
critical ventilation; communications; smoke detection/fire alarms; and utility and environmental 
monitoring. 
A manned control room will reduce the possibility for confusion during subsurface emergencies, 
by centralizing equipment trouble alarms and controls, and by having a designated person to 
provide prompt response and notification to appropriate parties of status of ventilation systems, 
etc. The implementation and manning of this control room should be made a priority to enhance 
life safety in the ESF. 
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15.2.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is open. A conceptual design for an integrated operations approach is in the 
planning stages. A design modification to the Change House to include an operational control 
room is contained within the current draft BSC budget. Design and construction of the 
operational control room is planned to be accomplished in the period from FY02 to FY04. 
Schedules for this work will vary depending upon funding levels and priority evaluations. 
There is an Operation Center where personnel have access to all flow diagrams and circuit 
drawings. During an emergency, personnel can review the appropriate documents and make 
decisions following the emergency plan to mitigate the emergency. If a base program operations 
emergency (a prolonged emergency) is determined then personnel from the operations center 
coordinate their activities with the emergency operations team from this location. Site personnel 
have no means to control any operations from this room. They can direct others to perform 
actions, i.e., reversing the fans, to mitigate the emergency. Currently there is no one place where 
the control of the critical ventilation systems; communications; smoke detection/fire alarms; and 
utility and environmental monitoring can be monitored, or controlled or where alarms are 
received. 
15.3 EXIT AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING 
Neither exit lighting nor emergency lighting is provided in the ESF Main Drift. Both are 
required by the ESFDR and for life safety. The current practice requiring all subsurface 
personnel to carry a miners light instead of emergency lighting is an acceptable interim 
measure. However, the installations of both exit and emergency lighting is still a necessary 
requirement for life safety. 
15.3.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is open. The Title III Evaluation Report for the Subsurface Lighting System 
recommended that exit lighting with battery backup be installed at intersections to identify the 
direction of evacuation within the tunnel and alcove (CRWMS M&O 1998g, Section 7.1.1). It 
also recommended that emergency lighting with battery backup be installed at 167 m (600 feet) 
intervals to light stations with telephones and fire extinguishers (CRWMS M&O 1998g, Section 
7.1.2). These systems are in the process of being installed with installation scheduled for 
completion June 3, 2002 (Broom 2001). 
15.4 FIRE ALARM, EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM 
Installation throughout the ESF, of an improved paging/warning system, is a requirement for 
life safety. 
15.4.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is closed for the subsurface ESF. The surface portions of this system are still 
being installed. Emergency communication is provided by an industrial paging/warning system. 
To improve reliability, this system is connected to a separate dedicated cable system that is 
physically separated from the telephone cable system. It allows an individual to be paged, then 
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respond and conduct a two-way conversation with the paging party. It has a siren and flashing 
lights to provide audio and visual signaling (CRWMS M&O 1999b, Section 7.5.4). This system 
is installed so that it can be heard to warn and alert all personnel working in the alcoves or niches 
during an emergency (CRWMS M&O 1998b, Section 7.5.4). 
15.5 PRE-ENGINEERED, ONBOARD, FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 
Diesel-powered mobile equipment (other than locomotives), and the maintenance railcar, 
currently used throughout the ESF for maintenance and construction, does not comply with 
MSHA 30 CFR 75.1911 requirements for onboard fire suppression systems. The retrofitting of 
all subsurface mobile equipment and the railcar with these systems, is a necessary requirement 
for life safety, and OSHA compliance. 
15.5.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is closed. Both the maintenance railcar and the TBM have had automatic fire 
suppression systems installed (CRWMS M&O 1999a, Section 6.17). These systems can be 
actuated automatically through the use of a detection system or can be manually discharged by 
the operator. 
15.6 BUILDING FIRE-RESISTANCE 
The office building located in alcove 4 does not comply with the OSHA 1926 requirement for 
one-hour fire-rated structures. 
15.6.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is closed. All components of this office building have been disassembled and 
removed. 
15.7 FIRE WATER SYSTEM 
The fire water system does not comply with the requirements of NFPA 14 and contains some
unlisted/non-approved components. Section 6.2 requirements are not met.
Noted deficiencies are:
 Flexible rubber hose is used to connect fire hose stations to the non-potable 
water supply line. 
 Non-listed water meters are proposed for installation in the supply line to each 
fire hose station. 
 The available system residual pressure exceeds allowed level in some areas, 
such as alcove 5. The system should be analyzed and pressure reducers 
installed at those locations where the nozzle residual pressure exceeds 6.9 bar 
ga (100 psi) when flowing 6.3 l/s (100 gpm). 
 The tunnel 6 water supply line is connected together in several locations with 
4 hard rubber hose. 
This system is being reviewed for adequacy in the Title III Evaluation Report. 
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15.7.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is open. The piping system supplying water to the individual fire hose stations 
does not comply with NFPA 14 requirements. This system was installed to provide construction 
personnel with a source of water for construction activities. This system was not designed as a 
fire water supply line. For convenience, and cost savings the existing water piping was modified 
to install fire hose stations to provide this backup capability. Each hose station has a pressure-
reducing valve installed to prevent hoses from seeing pressures in excess of 100 psig (NFPA 14). 
Although technically still a deficiency, it does not present a major life safety threat. The 
deficiency affects equipment reliability and subsequent availability. The fire hose stations are 
provided as backup mitigation for fighting incipient stage fires (primary mitigation is provided 
by portable fire extinguishers). Since it is not permitted to fight fires beyond the incipient stage, 
non-listed components should be adequate to support the intended use of these systems. 
This system was reviewed for adequacy in the Title III Evaluation Report for the Subsurface Fire 
Water System and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System and recommended the 
following: 
 Replace all the high pressure flexible hoses with carbon steel pipe,
 Leave as-constructed main tunnel piping and utility stations as is,
 Delete availability requirements for the SFWS/SNPWS because the system does not
impact personnel safety and the system is not required to function after an earthquake. 
(CRWMS M&O 1998f, Sections 7.2, 7.3, & 7.4) 
15.8 MAN-CAR NOISE ATTENUATION 
A need to attenuate noise levels presently incurred on the personnel transport man-cars has been 
identified. Since there is insufficient information available at this time to adequately review this 
potential hazard in this FHA, the materials ultimately selected should be reviewed for suitability 
for fire safety before any modifications are made. This analysis should be revised, if necessary. 
15.8.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is closed. The attenuation of noise from the mobile equipment was to be 
mitigated by the installation of sound absorbing materials in the personnel transport cars. The 
flammability and smoke generating properties of this material was in question. Subsequent to the 
planned installation of this material it was determined the sound attenuation properties of this 
material would not reduce noise levels to an acceptable level. Therefore the installation of the 
materials was dropped. 
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16. FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY DEFICIENCIES 
16.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following fire and life safety issues were identified in the Fire Hazards Analysis Annual 
Review (Williams 2001). Sections 16.2 through 16.8 restate those issues and provide an update 
on their status. 
16.2 EMERGENCY REFUGE STATIONS IN THE ECRB CROSS-DRIFT 
The revised FHA will address the intended use of refuge chambers in the Cross Drift. 
16.2.1 Current Status 
The area behind the bulkhead at Station 17+63 is designated as an ERS. Alcove 8 is also a 
designated as an ERS. The Abnormal Event Response procedure, AP-OM-010, provides 
instructions for response to abnormal events. Underground Personnel are to proceed to the 
bulkhead and associated refuge chamber at either Station 17+63 or Alcove 8 at Station 07+98 if 
exit from the ECRB is not possible. 
It is recommended Procedure LP-ESH-010-BSC be revised to reflect as-built conditions and to 
align with 30 CFR 57.11053, Escape and Evacuation Plans (See Section 18.1). 
Both ERSs have ceilings approximately 4.9 m (16 feet) above the floor. To aid in sealing leaks 
near the ceiling a ladder of sufficient height should be located in each ERS (See Section 18.2.1). 
To ensure all site personnel who work underground on a regular basis are aware of what to do in 
an emergency, mandatory training to the revised procedure should be provided including annual 
refresher training. 
16.3 TIMBER CRIBBING IN THE MAIN DRIFT 
. . . the use of timber cribbing ground support above steel sets in isolated areas of the Main 
Drift, which was not discussed in the original FHA, will be addressed in the revised FHA. 
Timber cribbing is used in various sections on the Main Drift to support loose rocks (CRWMS 
M&O 2000b, Figure 1). This wood cribbing is not treated with a fire retardant coating. The area 
where the largest portion of cribbing is used is approximately 183 m (600 feet) in length. 
16.3.1 Current Status 
Fire scenarios involving wood cribbing supporting loose rocks were evaluated in the System 
Safety Evaluation of Relative Risk Associated with the Ground Support System in the 3.01X 
Areas. The conclusions of this report state These fire scenarios all had a risk designation of 
Low to Extremely Low. To extend these fire scenarios to further include igniting the wood 
cribbing used in six of eight 3.01X areas would further decrease the frequency of such an event 
and push these risk designations to the Extremely Low direction. The conclusion also states 
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The 3.01X area design upgrades will encase the existing timber cribbing, thus eliminating the 
potential for a fire in the subsurface. Delaying this design upgrade until repository construction 
(prior to repository operation), however, will not prevent this requirement from being met. The 
risk of fire is with the existing design is Extremely Low to Low, as discussed previously 
(Gwyn 2001). 
16.4 WATER AS A BACKUP FOR INCIPIENT FIRE FIGHTING 
The use of water as a back-up system for incipient fire fighting also needs to be re-evaluated. 
Water distribution piping supplying water to fire hose stations is installed through the Main Drift 
and the ECRB Cross-Drift. This system was installed to support construction activities and does 
not meet fire code requirements. Mine Rescue personnel are trained in the proper use of fire 
hoses. Personnel who volunteer are trained in the use of the fire hoses and are the only site 
personnel allowed to use them but their use is restricted to fighting incipient stage fires. Do these 
limited uses of the fire hoses (low number of trained personnel and restrictions to fighting 
incipient stage fires) justify keeping the fire hose stations and the water distribution piping 
system? 
16.4.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is closed. If site personnel are in the local area when a fire occurs they can, if 
they feel they can extinguish the fire and escape the area in a safe manner, fight an incipient 
stage fire with a portable fire extinguisher (McDonald 2001). If an extinguisher cannot 
extinguish the incipient stage fire, personnel are to leave the immediate area and use the 
emergency communication system to announce a fire to all in the ESF. The fire hose stations 
located throughout the Main Drift and ECRB Cross-Drift are there to backup the fire 
extinguishers while fighting an incipient stage fire. Site personnel receive general fire hose 
training in Incipient Stage Fire Fighting Training (CRWMS M&O 1997b). They are not required 
to use fire hoses and do not receive hands-on training of fire hoses unless they volunteer for the 
additional training. The mine rescue teams are trained in the proper use of fire hoses and several 
locomotive operators have also volunteered for the training. The operators will be the first to 
respond whom are trained to use the fire hoses. The mine rescue team are located a distance from 
the ESF with a response time of 1-2 hours upon notification. 
As described in Section 15.7, the hose system does not meet code requirements, there is a small 
number of trained site personnel in the use of these fire hoses and the use of the fire hoses are 
restricted to incipient stage fires. If personnel are not in the area when the fire is in the incipient 
stages the fire extinguishers and fire hoses are of little value. If personnel are in the area of the 
fire they can use the fire extinguishers and they can, if trained, use the fire hoses to fight the fire. 
The water supply piping is there to support construction operations and will not be removed. If 
the fire hoses are removed then personnel in the area where a fire starts have no backup unless 
there is another fire extinguisher available (fire extinguishers are spaced approximately every 
200 feet). It is recommended that the water supply piping be upgraded (CRWMS M&O 1998f, 
Section 7.2) and site personnel be given mandatory hands-on training in the use of fire hoses. 
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16.5 EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND EXIT SIGNS 
The emergency lighting and exit lights have not been installed in the subsurface. This work is 
currently scheduled to begin in two months. 
The installation of the emergency lighting and exit sign systems, as required by Section 
3.8.2.4.1C&D of the ESFDR Criteria 6.2, have not been completed. 
16.5.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is open. See discussion in Section 15.3.1. 
16.6 VISUAL WARNING SYSTEM AND STATUS INDICATORS 
The visual warning system and the facility control and status indicators, located in the North 
Portal Lamp Building, have not been completed. 
The installation of the visual warning and status indicators, as required by Section 3.8.2.9.1B of 
the ESFDR (YMP 1997), have not been completed. 
16.6.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is open. Installation is scheduled for completion in FY02. 
16.7 SMOKE DETECTOR SYSTEM IN ALCOVE 5 
The smoke detector system, located in Alcove 5, while providing a local alarm function, has not 
been connected to the control and status indicator panel. This work would be completed during 
construction of the visual warning system. 
Upon detection of smoke the automatic detection system installed in Alcove 5, activates local 
audible and visual alarms so personnel can evacuate the area then it actuates the fire suppression 
system. Personnel on the surface are unaware of the emergency in Alcove 5 until someone uses 
the emergency communication system to make an announcement. A remote monitoring signal is 
required to be sent to an occupied location, such as an emergency control room. 
16.7.1 Current Status 
The status of this deficiency is open. It was noted during the site visit this remote signal has not 
been installed but will be installed in FY02. 
16.8 WATER SUPPLY PIPING SUPPORTS 
The water supply piping supports need to be reworked. 
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The water supply piping supports subsurface construction activities and supplies water to the fire 
hose stations. This systems, as installed, may not survive the design basis seismic event and 
should be upgraded with seismic restraints to meet those requirements. 
16.8.1 Current Status 
This deficiency is open. The Title III Evaluation Report for the Subsurface Fire Water System 
and Subsurface Portion of the Non-Potable Water System recommended the availability 
requirements for the SFWS/SNPWS be deleted because the system does not impact personnel 
safety. The system is not required to function after an earthquake (CRWMS M&O 1998f, 
Section 7.3). It also recommended that seismic restraints be installed to existing pipe support 
brackets to prevent detachment of the SFWS/SNPWS piping (CRWMS M&O 1998f, Section 
7.4). 
17. CONCLUSIONS 
17.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section discusses the conclusions reached by this FHA. The conclusions are separated into 
the same areas as discussed in Section 9. Based on this analysis and the site visit each area will 
be evaluated to determine if the program objectives, required by DOE Order 420.1, Section 
4.2(1), and described in Section 1, are met. These conclusions are: 
 An acceptable level of life safety is provided. 
 The risk of a damaging fire occurring is very low. 
 A fire will not cause an on-site or off-site release of hazardous or radiological material. 
 Unacceptable interruptions to vital DOE programs are unlikely. 
 Property damage from a fire will not exceed acceptable levels. 
 Critical process controls and safety class systems are not applicable to the ESF 
construction or operation. 
17.2 MOBILE EQUIPMENT 
The conclusion of this FHA is that the mitigating features installed on-board the mobile 
equipment provide an acceptable level of life safety. The risk of a damaging fire is low because 
of their on-board automatic fire suppression systems. Since the mobile equipment does not use 
hazardous or radioactive materials they will not cause either an on-site or off-site release of these 
materials. If a fire does occur that involves this equipment the property damage will not exceed 
acceptable levels. The mobile equipment does not have critical process controls and are not 
classified as safety class equipment. 
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17.3 MAIN DRIFT 
The conclusion of this FHA is that the installed features of the Main Drift provide an acceptable 
level of life safety. The risk of a damaging fire is low because of the low quantity of combustible 
loading. No hazardous or radioactive materials are stored in the Main Drift therefore there cannot 
be either an on-site or off-site release of these materials. If a fire does occur in the Main Drift 
property damage will not exceed acceptable levels. Additional study is required to identify the 
extent of the problem, develop mitigating features, and to determine the impact to the Main Drift 
and to the site characterization schedule. The Main Drift does not have critical process controls 
and do not contain safety class systems, structures or components. 
17.4 ECRB CROSS DRIFT 
The conclusion of this FHA is that the installed features of the ECRB Cross-Drift provide an 
acceptable level of life safety. The risk of a damaging fire is low due to the installed fire 
protection mitigating systems and implementation and operation of the ERSs. No hazardous or 
radioactive materials are stored in the ECRB Cross-Drift; therefore, there cannot be either an on-
site or off-site release of these materials. If a fire does occur in the ECRB Cross-Drift property 
damage will not exceed acceptable levels. The ECRB Cross-Drift does not have critical process 
controls and do not contain safety class systems, structures or components. 
17.5 ALCOVES 
The conclusion of this FHA is that the installed features of the alcoves provide an acceptable 
level of life safety. The risk of a damaging fire is low due to the low quantity of combustible 
loading. Since the alcoves do not use hazardous or radioactive materials they will not cause 
either an on-site or off-site release of these materials. If a fire does occur the property damage 
will not exceed acceptable levels. The alcoves do not have critical process controls and do not 
contain safety class systems, structures or components. 
17.6 NICHES 
The conclusion of this FHA is that the installed features of the niches provide an acceptable level 
of life safety. The risk of a damaging fire is low due to the low quantity of combustible loading. 
Since the niches does not use hazardous or radioactive materials they will not cause either an on-
site or off-site release of these materials. If a fire does occur the property damage will not exceed 
acceptable levels. The niches do not have critical process controls and do not contain safety class 
systems, structures or components. 
17.7 FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY DEFICIENCIES 
The following fire and life safety deficiencies were identified in the previous revision of this 
document and remain open. 
 Emergency Control Room. A conceptual design for an integrated operations approach 
is in the planning stages. A design modification to the Change House to include an 
Operational Control Room is contained within the current draft BSC budget. Design 
and construction of the Operational Control Room is planned to be accomplished in the 
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period from FY02 to FY04. Schedules for this work will vary depending upon funding 
levels and priority evaluations. (Section 15.2) 
 Fire Water System. The Title III Evaluation Report recommended the following: 
Replace all the high-pressure flexible hoses with carbon steel pipe, 
Leave as-constructed main tunnel piping and utility stations as is, 
Delete availability requirements for the SFWS/SNPWS because the system does not 
impact personnel safety and the system is not required to function after an earthquake. 
(Section 15.7) 
The following fire and life safety deficiencies were identified in this Fire Hazards Analysis 
Annual Report and remain open. 
 Emergency Lighting and Exit Signs. These systems are in the process of being installed 
with installation scheduled for completion June 3, 2002 (Section 16.5.1) 
 Visual Warning System and Status Indicators. Installation is scheduled for completion 
in FY02. (Section 16.6.1) 
 Smoke Detector System in Alcove 5. It was noted during the site visit this remote 
signal has not been installed but will be installed in FY02. (Section 16.7.1) 
 Water Supply Piping Supports. It is recommended that seismic restraints be installed to 
existing pipe support brackets to prevent detachment of the SFWS/SNPWS piping. 
(Section 16.8.1). 
18. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations were entered into the Condition/Issue Identification and 
Reporting/Resolution System (CIRS) database and are being tracked to closure. 
18.1 PROCEDURE REVISION 
Procedure LP-ESH-010-BSC should be revised to reflect as-built conditions and to align with 30 
CFR 57.11053, Escape and Evacuation Plans. 
CIRS Item 1964 is closed. 
BSC Safety and Health have reviewed the provisions of 30 CFR 57.11053 and has stated in the 
CIRS Record Report that it believes that the elements therein are sufficiently addressed by 
LP-ESH-010-BSC. 
Document Action Request DAR-D2342 has initiated an interim change notice to 
LP-ESH-010-BSC to delete Standing Order SO-200014, Abnormal Event Response and replace 
it with AP-OM-010. 
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18.2 ERS 
18.2.1 Ladder 
Both ERSs have ceilings approximately 4.9 m (16 feet) above the floor. To aid in sealing leaks
near the ceiling a ladder of sufficient height should be located in each ERS.
CIRS Item 1965 is closed.
A ladder is included in the equipment required to be supplied to each ERS (BSC 2001c, List B)
18.2.2 System Safety Analysis 
To ensure the ERSs provide a safe haven for personnel a System Safety Analysis should be 
performed on their design. 
CIRS Item 1966 is closed. 
The System Safety Analysis for Fire Events associated with the ECRB Cross-Drift has been 
completed. However, the SSA does not analyze the design of the ERSs, rather it analyzes the 
fire events that require the implementation of ERSs. To date, no safety analysis has been 
performed on the design of the ERSs. 
18.3 TRAINING 
18.3.1 Procedure 
To ensure all site personnel who work underground are aware of what to do in an emergency,
mandatory training to revised procedure LP-ESH-010-BSC should be provided and included in
annual refresher training.
CIRS Item 1967 is closed.
Revisions to Standing Orders (SO-2000-08, Underground Facility Entry Requirements);
Procedures (AP-OM-010, Abnormal Event Response has been added to complement
LP-ESH-010-BSC); and training programs have been made.
18.3.2 Lesson Plan 
Provide hands-on training for portable fire extinguishers and small fire hoses in accordance with
the Incipient Stage Fire Fighting Training lesson plan (CRWMS M&O 1997b).
CIRS Item 1968 is closed.
The Bechtel Nevada Fire Department has provided hands-on training in the use of portable fire
extinguishers. Only the mine rescue team has been trained in the hands-on use of fire hoses.
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18.4 MAINTENANCE AND TESTING 
18.4.1 Subsurface Fire Water System 
To ensure the adequacy and function of the Subsurface Fire Water System the maintenance and
testing procedures should be reviewed and evaluated.
CIRS Item 1969 is open.
Planned completion date is April 30, 2002.
18.4.2 Wood Rail Ties 
Due to daily wear on the wood rail ties in the ECRB Cross-Drift an evaluation should be
performed to verify the contractor applied fire-retardant coating is still within the manufacturers
recommendations and each exposed tie surface remains properly coated.
CIRS Item 1970 is closed.
The ties have been visually inspected by site personnel and the coating manufacturer contacted.
The coating effectiveness remains in question; the original coating materials are no longer
available; and re-application of a similar product would be costly and time-consuming.
Emergency refuge stations have been established for personnel in the ECRB. These are stocked
with the supplies necessary for the worst-case fire duration that was determined with the wood
ties in-place and assumed to be uncoated. Along with existing in-place fire protection mitigating
systems and Administrative Procedures/Standing Orders that control the most hazardous
operations, such as refueling, and maintaining a high level of housekeeping, the risk from fire is
low and acceptable.
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