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Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy 
Needed' which was released on June 02, 2004.

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

June 2004: 

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION: 

Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; 
Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed: 

GAO-04-403: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-403, a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the House Committee on International Relations 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In October 2001, in response to the Taliban regimes protection of al 
Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States, coalition forces 
forcibly removed the regime from Afghanistan. In December 2002, 
Congress passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizing 
assistance funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic 
society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S. 
humanitarian and development assistance. This report analyzes, for 
fiscal years 2002-2003, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures in 
Afghanistan, (2) results of assistance projects, (3) the assistance 
coordination mechanisms and strategy, and (4) major obstacles that 
affected the achievement of U.S. goals.

What GAO Found: 

Of the $900 million that the U.S. government spent on nonsecurity-
related assistance in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, over 75 
percent supported humanitarian efforts, including emergency food and 
shelter, and over 20 percent supported longer-term reconstruction. 
USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense spent 
$508 million, $254 million, and $64 million, respectively, for 
humanitarian, quick-impact, and some longer-term projects. U.S. funding 
represented about 38 percent of the $3.7 billion the international 
community disbursed over the 2-year period. 

U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance benefited Afghanistan, but 
longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved limited results by the end 
of fiscal year 2003 due to late funding. By providing food and shelter 
to returning refugees and other vulnerable populations, early U.S. 
assistance helped avert a humanitarian crisis. USAIDs and Defenses 
quick-impact projects also helped rebuild small-scale infrastructure 
such as schools and bridges. USAID initiated several longer-term 
reconstruction activities, such as repairing the KabulKandahar road 
and starting a democracy program. However, because of delays in funding 
most major assistance contracts were not signed until summer 2003, 
limiting the results in fiscal years 2002-2003.

U.S. coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan assistance were generally 
effective, but international assistance was not well coordinated in 
fiscal years 2002-2003. In addition, the United States lacked a 
complete and integrated assistance strategy, which hampered the U.S. 
governments ability to focus available resources and hold itself 
accountable for measurable results. Further, U.S. officials responsible 
for coordinating efforts lacked complete financial data, which hindered 
their ability to oversee the assistance. 

In fiscal years 2002-2003, Afghanistan confronted many obstacles that 
other postconflict nations have faced, such as multiple competing 
parties. In addition, security deteriorated and opium production 
increased, thereby jeopardizing U.S. reconstruction efforts. Lack of 
staff, poor working conditions, and delayed reconstruction funding 
further impeded U.S. efforts. (See fig. 1.) In September 2003, to 
expedite progress, the U.S. government announced the Accelerating 
Success initiative, providing $1.76 billion for reconstruction in 
2004.

Obstacles to U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 
2002-2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

To improve oversight, GAO recommends that USAID revise its strategy to 
delineate goals, resource levels, and a schedule of program 
evaluations. GAO also recommends that State produce an annual 
consolidated budget report and semiannual reports on obligations and 
expenditures. In its comments, USAID committed to preparing a more 
detailed strategy. State commented that it considers its financial 
reporting sufficient. We continue to believe improvements are needed.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 
512-3149, or GootnickD@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

U.S. Funding Focused on Humanitarian Aid, Represented Sizable Portion 
of International Assistance: 

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Helped Avert Famine; Longer-term 
Reconstruction Efforts Had Limited Results: 

Coordination Mechanisms Established, but U.S. Strategy and Financial 
Data Were Incomplete; International Assistance Coordination Remained 
Weak: 

Achievement of U.S. Goals Uncertain Given Precedents, Obstacles: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Summary of the Key Provisions of the Bonn Agreement: 

Appendix III: Summary of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002: 

Appendix IV: Fiscal Years 2002-2003 Obligations and Expenditures for 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance by U.S. Agencies: 

Appendix V: Major Donors' Reported Pledges and Disbursements for 
Assistance to Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Development Indicators for Afghanistan versus the Average for 
Low-Income Countries and the United States: 

Table 2: Total assistance authorized: $3.3 billion between FY 2003 and 
2006: 

Table 3: Earmarks: $170 million development assistance of $425 million 
total between FY 2003 and 2006: 

Table 4: Required strategies and reports to be submitted to the House 
Committee on International Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, and both Appropriations committees: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including Provinces and Major Roads: 

Figure 2: Political History of Afghanistan, 1749-2004: 

Figure 3: Obligations and Expenditures, by Type, Fiscal Years 2002-2003 
 

Figure 4: Percentages of U.S. Reconstruction Assistance Expended by 
Agencies, Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

Figure 5: USAID and Defense (PRT) Obligations and Number of Projects, by 
Province: 

Figure 6: U.S. Assistance as a Percentage of International Assistance: 

Figure 7: WFP Distribution of U.S.-Provided Food in Afghanistan: 

Figure 8: Fatmasti Irrigation Canal outside Bamian, Afghanistan: 

Figure 9: PRT-Funded Construction of Provincial-level College in Bamian 
Province, Afghanistan: 

Figure 10: Infrastructure Rehabilitation: 

Figure 11: Economic Governance: 

Figure 12: Health Care: 

Figure 13: Education: 

Figure 14: Agriculture: 

Figure 15: Democracy Strengthening: 

Figure 16: Gender Equity: 

Figure 17: Major U.S. Interagency Afghan Assistance Coordination 
Mechanisms In Use During Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

Figure 18: International Afghan Assistance Coordination Mechanisms, 
Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

Figure 19: Postconflict Characteristics That Impeded Stability in Other 
Countries Versus Afghanistan: 

Figure 20: Time Line of USAID Funding for Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan: 

Figure 21: Division of Responsibility for Repairing the 482-kilometer 
Kabul-Kandahar Highway: 

Abbreviations: 

HHS: Health and Human Services: 

IOM: International Organization for Migration: 

OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance: 

OTI: Office of Transition Initiatives: 

PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team: 

RAMP: Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program: 

REACH: Rural Expansion of Afghanistan's Community-Based Health Care: 

REFS: Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services Program: 

U.N.: United Nations: 

UNDP: United Nations Development Program: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

WFP: U.N. World Food Program: 

Letter June 2, 2004: 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on International Relations: 
House of Representatives: 

Twenty-three years of war and destructive domestic policies and more 
than 5 years of drought destroyed Afghanistan's government, judicial, 
economic, and social institutions and its transportation, health, 
sanitation, and other infrastructure. In October 2001, responding to 
its protection of al Qaeda terrorists who had attacked the United 
States, Coalition forces forcibly removed the Taliban regime. With the 
passage of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act in December 2002, 
Congress authorized the use of federal funds for the delivery of 
humanitarian, development, and security assistance to 
Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] The act articulates U.S. policy goals in 
Afghanistan that include the creation of a stable Afghan society that 
is not a threat to itself or others and is not a base for terrorism.

Section 106 of the act directs the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
to monitor U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to 
Afghanistan. To meet this requirement and provide Congress with a 
comprehensive accounting of U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance to Afghanistan for the fiscal year 2002-2003 period, we (1) 
analyzed U.S. obligations and expenditures; (2) identified the results 
of assistance projects through September 30, 2003; (3) evaluated U.S. 
and international assistance coordination mechanisms and the U.S. 
assistance strategy; and (4) examined the major obstacles that affected 
the achievement of U.S. policy goals and the reconstruction 
effort.[Footnote 2]

To address these issues, we collected and analyzed information from the 
U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, 
Justice, State, and Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID); the United Nations (U.N.); the Afghan government; 
and nongovernmental organizations and private contractors responsible 
for implementing U.S. government-funded projects. This effort included 
analyzing data on obligations and expenditures by U.S. government 
agencies that provided assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002 
and 2003. We conducted reliability checks on the financial data 
provided by U.S. agencies and, based on these checks, concluded that 
the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes used. Because the 
U.S. assistance is provided as part of a larger international effort, 
we included information on the contributions provided by international 
donors. Finally, we traveled to Afghanistan in October 2003 to examine 
U.S. assistance-related operations in country. While in Afghanistan, we 
spoke with officials from U.S., U.N., and nongovernmental 
organizations; private contractors; and the Afghan government. However, 
the number and location of project sites we visited in Afghanistan was 
limited because of Department of State security restrictions. We 
conducted our review from August 2003 through April 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. (For further 
details of our scope and methodology, see app. I.): 

Results in Brief: 

In fiscal years 2002-2003, the U.S. obligated $1.4 billion and spent 
$900 million, or more than half its obligations for nonsecurity-related 
assistance to Afghanistan. Of the $900 million that the U.S. government 
spent, over 75 percent supported short-term, humanitarian assistance, 
including emergency food and shelter, and over 20 percent supported 
longer-term reconstruction needs. USAID, the largest provider of 
nonsecurity-related assistance, spent about $508 million on both 
humanitarian and reconstruction projects. During the same period, the 
Department of State spent $254 million, mainly on refugee and 
humanitarian assistance, and the Department of Defense spent $64 
million on food assistance and quick-impact projects. Most of the 
funding by USAID and Defense supported local projects in 31 of 
Afghanistan's 32 provinces, particularly in 4 of the most heavily 
populated. Overall, U.S. funding represented about 38 percent of the 
$3.7 billion disbursed by the international community for nonsecurity-
related assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003.

U.S. humanitarian and small-scale, quick-impact projects benefited 
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, but longer-term reconstruction 
efforts had achieved limited results by the end of fiscal year 2003 due 
to delayed funding. USAID and the Departments of Agriculture and State 
provided humanitarian assistance, including emergency food, health 
care, sanitation, and shelter, which helped avert a famine and 
reintegrate returning refugees. In addition, to assist Afghanistan in 
its transition from humanitarian relief to reconstruction of its 
infrastructure and civil society, USAID and Defense implemented small-
scale, quick-impact projects such as renovating or rebuilding schools, 
clinics, bridges, and irrigation canals. Further, under USAID's 
leadership, a number of longer-term reconstruction activities in a 
number of sectors achieved limited results. However, notable 
accomplishments include building a road from Kabul to Kandahar, 
establishing a democracy and governance program, and helping farmers 
reestablish farm production.

Although the U.S. government established coordination mechanisms for 
its assistance efforts in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, it 
lacked a complete operational strategy; in addition, coordination of 
international assistance was weak. A number of mechanisms to coordinate 
U.S. assistance were established and, in general, U.S. officials 
believed that U.S. assistance was well coordinated. The United States 
did not have a comprehensive strategy to direct its assistance efforts 
until June 2003. In addition, USAID's operational strategy did not 
clearly articulate measurable goals or other details. U.S. officials 
responsible for coordinating assistance efforts also lacked financial 
data necessary for program oversight and coordination. Without a 
comprehensive strategy or adequate financial data, the ability of the 
U.S. government to ensure progress toward development goals and make 
informed resource allocation decisions was impaired. Further, 
international assistance was not well coordinated in 2002, and efforts 
by the Afghan government to improve coordination in 2003 had not 
succeeded.

In fiscal years 2002-2003, the postconflict environment in Afghanistan 
threatened progress toward U.S. policy goals, and poor security, 
increasing opium cultivation, and inadequate resources impeded U.S. 
reconstruction efforts. Afghanistan faces many of the same obstacles 
that other nations have faced after civil conflict, such as multiple 
competing parties. Throughout fiscal years 2002-2003, terrorists 
attacked U.S., international, and Afghan government targets, and 
criminal activity by warlords and clashes between rival factions 
increased the overall climate of insecurity. In addition, record levels 
of opium production and associated revenues threatened Afghanistan's 
stability by funding the activities of terrorists and warlords. 
Further, small staff size, inadequate working conditions, and the 
timing of funding for reconstruction impeded U.S. efforts. To increase 
funding and expedite progress, in September 2003, the U.S. government 
announced an initiative called "Accelerating Success" that would 
provide an additional $1.76 billion for reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004.

We are recommending that USAID revise its operational strategy for its 
assistance program in Afghanistan. The revised strategy should 
delineate measurable goals, specific time frames, resource levels, 
external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of 
goals, and a schedule for program evaluations that assess progress 
against the strategy's goals. To improve management and oversight of 
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, we are also recommending that the 
Department of State produce an annual consolidated budget for all U.S. 
assistance to Afghanistan and report to Congress semiannually on 
obligations and expenditures for the assistance provided.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense and to USAID. State and USAID commented that they concurred 
with much of the information presented on the situation in Afghanistan 
for the period covered by our review. They also provided additional 
information on more recent activities taken and progress made. USAID 
and the Department of Defense also provided technical comments, which 
we incorporated where appropriate.

In response to our recommendation that USAID revise its operational 
strategy for Afghanistan to include details such as measurable goals, 
timeframes, and required resources, USAID said that its less 
comprehensive "interim" strategy was appropriate given the situation in 
Afghanistan during the early phases of the ongoing efforts. 
Nonetheless, USAID said that it was committed to developing a standard 
strategic plan for Afghanistan during 2004, which is consistent with 
our recommendation. The Department of State disagreed with our finding 
that the United States lacks a complete and integrated assistance 
strategy, citing its December 15, 2003, report to Congress "Fiscal Year 
2004 Strategic and Financial Plan for Reconstruction and Related 
Activities in Afghanistan" as meeting this need. We found that most of 
the strategies that were published during fiscal years 2002-2003 lacked 
details on funding and other resources, measurable goals, timeframes, 
as well as a means to measure progress. However, in the report, we cite 
the State Department's June 2003 Mission Performance Plan as meeting 
many of the requirements for a government-wide operational strategy. 
While the fiscal year 2004 plan cited by the State Department in its 
comments includes more details on the U.S. assistance budget for 
Afghanistan, it lacks operational details including time frames, 
measurable goals, and a means to measure progress towards those goals.

In response to our recommendation that State produce an annual 
consolidated budget for all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and report 
to Congress semiannually on obligations and expenditures, State 
emphasized that policy makers are provided with information on U.S. 
obligations weekly and that there is close interagency collaboration on 
all funding issues. We disagree. As we reported, complete and readily 
accessible obligation and expenditure data was not available and 
consequently, it is difficult to determine the extent to which U.S. 
assistance dollars are being used to achieve measurable results on the 
ground in Afghanistan. Specifically, we found that (1) governmentwide 
expenditure data on U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is not collected, 
(2) obligation data are collected on an ad hoc basis, and (3) the 
Coordinator's office experienced difficulty in consistently collecting 
complete and accurate obligation data from U.S. government agencies. 
Regular reporting of both obligations and expenditures for U.S. 
assistance to Afghanistan would provide the State Coordinator and 
Congress a more complete picture of what funds have been spent on the 
ground on visible projects.

Background: 

Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited 
natural resources, bordered by Pakistan to the east and south; 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran 
to the west (see fig. 1). At 647,500 square kilometers, Afghanistan is 
slightly smaller than the state of Texas; its population, estimated at 
27.8 million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and mostly 
uneducated. The country is divided into 32 provinces, over 300 
districts, and approximately 30,000 villages.

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including Provinces and Major Roads: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Afghanistan is an extremely poor country. As shown in table 1, 
development indicators published by the World Bank and the U.N. rank 
Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category, including 
malnutrition; infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy; 
and literacy.

Table 1: Development Indicators for Afghanistan versus the Average for 
Low-Income Countries and the United States: 

Indicator: Infant mortality; 
Afghanistan[A]: 165 per 1000 live births; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 80 per 1000 live births; 
United States: 7 per 1000 live births.

Indicator: Under 5 mortality; 
Afghanistan[A]: 257 per 1000 live births; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 121 per 1000 live births; 
United States: 8 per 1000 live births.

Indicator: Maternal mortality; 
Afghanistan[A]: 1600 per 100,000 live births; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 671 per 100,000 live births; 
United States: 17 per 100,000 live births.

Indicator: Life expectancy; 
Afghanistan[A]: 43 males/44 females; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 58 males/60 females; 
United States: 75 males/81 females.

Indicator: Percentage of children under 12 months immunized against 
diphtheria and measles; 
Afghanistan[A]: 45%; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 60%; 
United States: 93%.

Indicator: Percentage of population undernourished; 
Afghanistan[A]: 70%; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 25%; 
United States: N/A.

Indicator: Percentage of rural population with access to improved water 
source; 
Afghanistan[A]: 11%; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 69%; 
United States: 100%.

Indicator: Percentage of rural population with access to improved 
proper sanitation; 
Afghanistan[A]: 8%; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 31%; 
United States: 100%.

Indicator: Literacy--age 15 and over; 
Afghanistan[A]: 51% males/21% females; 
Average, low-income country[B]: 72% males/53% females; 
United States: 97% males/97% females. 

Sources: The World Bank and U.N.

[A] Data as of most recent year available.

[B] Low-income countries are defined as countries with an annual per 
capita gross national income of less than $735. (Afghanistan's 2002 per 
capita gross national income was $250).

[End of table]

Over the last 2 decades, political conflicts ravaged Afghanistan. The 
country was subject to ethnic rivalry led by provincial warlords, 
communist invasion, and fundamental Islamic control, all of which 
limited development (see fig. 2). Factional control of the country 
following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, coupled with the 
population's fatigue of fighting, allowed a fundamental Islamic group, 
the Taliban, to seize control of the country. Although the Taliban 
regime provided some political stability during the late 1990s, its 
destructive policies, highlighted in its repressive treatment of women, 
and its continuing war with the opposition Northern Alliance further 
impeded international aid and development.

Figure 2: Political History of Afghanistan, 1749-2004: 

[See PDF for image]

[A] The Durrani tribe ruled over most of what is present-day 
Afghanistan--despite domestic turmoil and foreign encroachment--from 
1749 through 1978.

[End of figure]

In December 2001, less than 2 months after U.S. and coalition forces 
forcibly removed the Taliban regime, an international summit in Bonn, 
Germany, established a framework for a new Afghan government,[Footnote 
3] which focused on an ambitious 30-month timeline for writing a new 
constitution by the end of October 2003 and holding democratic 
elections by June 2004.[Footnote 4] The framework, known as the Bonn 
Agreement, was endorsed by the U.N. Security Council on December 6, 
2001, through UN Resolution 1383. (See app. II for additional 
information on the Bonn Agreement.): 

In December 2002, the United States passed the Afghanistan Freedom 
Support Act of 2002 and increased its assistance to Afghanistan. (See 
app. III for details on the types and purposes of the assistance 
authorized by the act.) The goal of the U.S. government in Afghanistan 
is to firmly establish a democratic nation inhospitable to 
international terrorism, drug trafficking and cultivation; at peace 
with its neighbors; and able to provide its own internal and external 
security. U.S. efforts in support of this goal are intended to help 
create national security institutions, provide humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance, and reinforce the primacy of the central 
government over Afghanistan's provinces. Title I, Section 104(a) of the 
act states that in general, the President is strongly urged to 
designate, within the Department of State, a coordinator who shall 
among other things be responsible for: 

* designing an overall strategy to advance U.S. interests in 
Afghanistan;

* ensuring program and policy coordination among U.S. agencies carrying 
out the policies set forth in this title;

* pursuing Afghanistan assistance coordination with other countries and 
international organizations; and: 

* ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight by agencies 
responsible for Afghan assistance programs.

USAID[Footnote 5] provides U.S. assistance to underdeveloped countries 
through U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private 
contractors. The main organizational units responsible for managing 
USAID's reconstruction programs and operations in Afghanistan in fiscal 
years 2002-2003 were the agency's mission in Kabul, Afghanistan; the 
Bureau for Asia and the Near East; and the Bureau for Democracy, 
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance through the Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Food for Peace, Office of 
Transition Initiatives (OTI), and Office for Democracy and 
Governance.[Footnote 6] Other U.S. government agencies provided 
additional assistance, including the Department of Defense through its 
provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) located at sites throughout 
Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2002-2003, the PRTs ranged in size from 50 
to 100 civilian and military personnel, including civil affairs units, 
force protection soldiers, and representatives of the Departments of 
Agriculture and State and USAID. The teams are intended to deliver 
assistance that advances military goals and provide security in an 
effort to increase the reach of the Afghan central government in the 
provinces and allow assistance agencies to implement projects. By late 
2003, Defense established PRTs in Bamian, Kunduz, Gardez, and Mazar-I-
Sharif.

U.S. Funding Focused on Humanitarian Aid, Represented Sizable Portion 
of International Assistance: 

In fiscal years 2002-2003, the United States spent the majority of its 
nonsecurity-related funding to Afghanistan on humanitarian and quick-
impact projects, and it contributed approximately one-third of the 
international funding disbursed in Afghanistan.[Footnote 7] Of the 10 
U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan, USAID provided the 
largest amount, for both humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, 
and the Department of State provided the second largest amount, 
primarily for humanitarian assistance. USAID and the Department of 
Defense obligated[Footnote 8] a total of $283 million for nationwide 
programs and $564 million for localized program assistance in 31 
provinces. The United States accounted for 38 percent of the $3.7 
billion in nonsecurity-related international funding disbursed in 
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003.[Footnote 9]

U.S. Assistance Focused on Humanitarian and Quick-Impact Projects: 

The U.S. government obligated $1.4 billion for assistance to 
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, including $782 million for 
humanitarian and quick-impact projects and $647 million for strategic, 
longer-term reconstruction projects. U.S. agencies spent[Footnote 10] 
$900 million, of which $686 million, or over 75 percent, was spent on 
humanitarian and quick-impact projects and about $214 million, or over 
20 percent, was spent on longer-term reconstruction needs. (See fig. 
3.): 

Figure 3: Obligations and Expenditures, by Type, Fiscal Years 2002-
2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

USAID and State Provided Most U.S. Assistance: 

Of the 10 U.S. government departments and agencies involved in 
assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003,USAID provided the 
largest amount of assistance, for both humanitarian and reconstruction 
needs. USAID obligated $942 million, of which it spent about $508 
million by September 2003. It provided both short-term assistance--
emergency, humanitarian, and quick-impact projects--and longer-term 
reconstruction and development-oriented assistance, such as 
revitalizing infrastructure, improving health and education, 
strengthening the economy, and supporting democracy and governance. The 
Department of State provided the next largest amount, obligating $287 
million in fiscal years 2002-2003 and spending $254 million of that 
amount. State's programs were targeted mainly to refugee and 
humanitarian assistance, including demining, and also included funding 
for counterdrug programs and building a police force. The Department of 
Defense obligated $71 million and spent $64 million, primarily for 
provincial-level, short-term projects implemented through its PRTs and 
for humanitarian daily rations that it air-dropped early in fiscal year 
2002. In addition, seven other U.S. government agencies obligated $128 
million and spent $74 million for a variety of both humanitarian and 
reconstruction activities. (See fig. 4.): 

Figure 4: Percentages of U.S. Reconstruction Assistance Expended by 
Agencies, Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Most Funding Supported Provincial Projects: 

In an effort to expand the reach of the Afghan government--a major U.S. 
and Afghan government priority--most USAID and Defense assistance 
funding was spent on projects implemented at the provincial level. 
Specifically, USAID and Defense obligated $283 million for nationwide 
programs and $564 million for provincial-level assistance across 31 
provinces.[Footnote 11] Kabul received the most provincial-level 
assistance, $70.4 million for 148 projects, while Konar received the 
least, $121,350 for one project. Although assistance was provided in 
virtually all of Afghanistan's provinces,[Footnote 12] five provinces 
received approximately half of provincial-level program assistance. 
Four of these provinces--Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh, and Hirat--have major 
population centers, and the fifth, Badakshan, is increasingly important 
to the opium trade. (See fig. 5.): 

Figure 5: USAID and Defense (PRT) Obligations and Number of Projects, 
by Province: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: The figure above does not include the Department of Defense's 
humanitarian food drops conducted in fiscal year 2002.

[End of figure]

U.S. Was Largest International Donor: 

In fiscal years 2002-2003, international donors pledged $9.7 billion 
for assistance to Afghanistan. (See app. V for details.) International 
disbursements for the 2-year period totaled approximately $3.7 billion, 
of which U.S. obligations accounted for approximately 38 percent, or 
$1.4 billion--the largest amount donated (see fig. 6). Like U.S. 
funding, most international funding was directed to meet humanitarian 
needs rather than major reconstruction efforts. According to the Center 
on International Cooperation, as of May 2003, $947 million of the 
international disbursements had been used to begin reconstruction 
projects.[Footnote 13]

Figure 6: U.S. Assistance as a Percentage of International Assistance: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Helped Avert Famine; Longer-term 
Reconstruction Efforts Had Limited Results: 

In fiscal years 2002-2003, humanitarian and quick-impact assistance 
benefited Afghanistan, but longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved 
limited results. U.S. humanitarian aid helped overcome emergency 
conditions and jump-start the recovery effort. In addition, quick-
impact projects helped Afghanistan transition from the emergency to the 
reconstruction phase. However, because of delayed funding, most major 
contracts for reconstruction activities were not signed until summer 
2003, limiting the results achieved by the end of that fiscal year.

Humanitarian Assistance Helped Vulnerable Populations and Averted 
Famine: 

In fiscal years 2002-2003, to help redress the complex humanitarian 
crisis in Afghanistan, the U.S. government provided emergency 
assistance that helped avert a famine, significantly reduce the 
suffering of the most vulnerable Afghans, and assist the return of 
refugees. USAID's Office of Food for Peace provided Afghanistan with 
355,270 metric tons of wheat and other emergency food assistance 
(valued at $206.4 million) through P.L. 480, Title II, and the 
Department of Agriculture provided 79,600 metric tons of surplus wheat 
(valued at $38.7 million) through the 416(b) program.[Footnote 14] The 
United States provided most of its food assistance to Afghanistan 
through the U.N. World Food Program (WFP),[Footnote 15] as well as the 
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization and nongovernmental 
organizations. (See fig. 7.) Over the 2-year period, the United States 
provided over 60 percent of all international food assistance received 
by Afghanistan. According to the WFP, the food assistance provided by 
the United States and the international community helped avert famine 
in Afghanistan.[Footnote 16]

Figure 7: WFP Distribution of U.S.-Provided Food in Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

USAID also provided other emergency assistance in fiscal years 2002-
2003. According to USAID reports, the Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance provided $137.8 million to meet the basic needs of 
internally displaced people and other vulnerable Afghans. The funding 
supported health and nutrition programs, agricultural and other income-
generating rehabilitative work in rural areas, and logistics for 
coordinating humanitarian and food assistance countrywide. According to 
USAID, the office, through its cash-for-work programs, supported more 
than 4,000 small rehabilitation projects, including repairs to 
approximately 2,600 kilometers of roads, 1,500 wells and irrigation 
systems, and more than 100 schools and hospitals, benefiting selected 
communities throughout the country.

The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
provided $234 million to assist returning refugees. This assistance, 
disbursed primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
supported the voluntary return and reintegration of 2.2 million 
refugees and internally displaced people to their homes in Afghanistan. 
The U.S. assistance also provided shelter; water and sanitation; 
primary, reproductive, maternal, and child health care; food and 
nutrition; primary education; mine education and awareness; and 
economic assistance and training to refugees and internally displaced 
people.

Quick-Impact Projects Transitioned U.S. Assistance from Relief to 
Reconstruction: 

USAID's OTI[Footnote 17] and the Department of Defense's PRTs 
implemented small-scale, quick-impact projects. These projects aimed to 
extend the reach of the Afghan central government by providing benefits 
to rural communities and to facilitate the transition to longer-term 
reconstruction programs. Both OTI and the PRTs engaged in clinic and 
school reconstruction, bridge rehabilitation, irrigation construction, 
and other locally determined, small-scale projects.

In fiscal years 2002-2003, OTI expended $18 million for 435 projects. 
(On average, each project cost $42,465.) By October 2003, 66 percent of 
the projects had been completed. In a November 2003 assessment, OTI 
concluded that its efforts had increased the Afghan state's ability to 
function, enhanced the independent media's ability to promote public 
information, and facilitated infrastructure improvements in hundreds of 
communities. However, OTI also concluded that these gains had not yet 
achieved its objective of building citizen confidence in the ability of 
the central Afghan government. Few Afghans interviewed by OTI during 
the assessment were aware that the U.S. government or the Afghan 
central government had supported a specific project. (See fig. 8 for an 
example of an OTI project.): 

Figure 8: Fatmasti Irrigation Canal outside Bamian, Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: A USAID OTI grant of $25,139 funded the rehabilitation of the 2.5 
kilometer Fatmasti irrigation canal in Bamian province. The canal 
irrigates 60 hectares of land and benefits 600 families (or 
approximately 3,600 individuals).

[End of figure]

The Department of Defense's quick-impact projects were similar in size 
and scope to those implemented by USAID's OTI. In fiscal years 2002-
2003, Defense granted $20 million for 451 projects in Afghanistan 
through its PRTs.[Footnote 18] (On average, the projects cost $45,000 
each.) Sixty-four percent of them were completed by December 2003. The 
PRTs implemented projects designed to help (1) advance U.S. military 
goals, (2) build goodwill among the local population, (3) increase the 
visibility of U.S. support, and (4) extend the reach of the Afghan 
central government. Although no formal evaluation of the overall PRT 
effort had been completed as of October 2003, officials at the 
Departments of State and Defense said that the activities of civil 
affairs teams appeared to have a positive effect on security and were a 
useful tool for expanding local support for both the U.S. presence and 
the Afghan government. However, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan 
Relief reported that as currently structured, the PRTs lack the 
resources or mandate to either solve the security situation in 
Afghanistan or significantly contribute to reconstruction.[Footnote 
19] (Fig. 9 shows one example of a PRT project.): 

Figure 9: PRT-Funded Construction of Provincial-level College in Bamian 
Province, Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Nascent Longer-Term Reconstruction Efforts Achieved Limited Results: 

USAID's longer-term reconstruction efforts in fiscal years 2002-2003 
achieved limited results because of delays in funding. To help the 
Afghan government extend its influence throughout the country, USAID 
organized its longer-term assistance into six sectors: infrastructure 
rehabilitation, economic governance, democracy strengthening, 
education, health, and agriculture.[Footnote 20] The agency also 
integrated elements to promote gender equity into each sector. Most of 
the contracts for longer-term reconstruction assistance in each of the 
six sectors were not signed until summer 2003, due to delayed funding, 
limiting what USAID could achieve in that fiscal year.

The following presents U.S. efforts in each sector. The goals listed in 
figures 10-16 portray USAID's goals and objectives as stated in early 
planning and reporting documents. Since many of the projects created 
under the six sectors continued work begun through the quick-impact 
projects, USAID has not disaggregated their achievements. We include 
information on some quick-impact projects, as well as longer-term 
reconstruction projects. Also, since USAID does not track expenditures 
by the six sectors, we do not include information on total amounts 
spent by sector.

Figure 10: Infrastructure Rehabilitation: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Infrastructure rehabilitation. By the end of fiscal 2003, USAID had 
built or rehabilitated several physical infrastructure projects, most 
notably the Kabul-Kandahar road. Many of the early physical 
infrastructure projects handled through the quick-impact programs used 
local or low-technology procedures in order to speed implementation. 
For example, the OTI projects applied stone, gravel, and dirt to 
improve transport over secondary and tertiary roads. By contrast, a 
contract for the longer-term Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and 
Services infrastructure program (REFS), signed in September 2002, 
provided engineering and construction services for the production of 
paved roads and seismically sound buildings.

The Kabul-Kandahar road, a U.S. presidential priority, represents a 
significant political symbol within Afghanistan and is the main 
transport route for north-south trade from Central Asia to the Indian 
Ocean. In about 17 months, under the REFS contract, USAID contractors 
demined, graded, and installed the first layer[Footnote 21] of pavement 
on a segment of highway stretching 389 kilometers (approximately the 
distance from Washington, D.C., to New York, N.Y.).[Footnote 22] As a 
result, travel between the two cities was reduced from several days to 
about 6 hours. The road requires two more layers of asphalt and the 
construction of bridges and culverts; the estimated project completion 
date is October 2004. The prime contractor for the REFS program was 
also responsible for constructing schools and clinics listed as 
objectives under the education and health sectors. However, as of the 
end of fiscal 2003, although OTI and the PRTs built and rehabilitated 
schools and clinics, none of the more sophisticated buildings included 
in the infrastructure contract had been built.

In addition to the USAID infrastructure projects, State identified 
communications as an infrastructure element essential to meeting the 
long-term security needs of Afghanistan. USAID provided for voice and 
e-mail communication between the central government in Kabul and all 32 
provinces by installing a high-frequency radio communications network. 
The U.S. Trade and Development Agency provided short-term advisors to 
create a strategic plan for telecommunications development. By October 
2003, two telephone companies had established service in Afghanistan, 
but according to USAID and others, connectivity was still unreliable.

Figure 11: Economic Governance: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Economic governance. When the U.S. government began its reconstruction 
efforts in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank--
necessary to set fiscal policy and handle the country's reconstruction 
cash flow, respectively--were operating at an elementary level. USAID 
helped to reestablish the Ministry of Finance, create a central bank of 
Afghanistan and a new currency, and reform the customs process. To do 
this, USAID awarded a contract for its Sustainable Economic Policy and 
Institutional Reform Support program in November 2002. Under the 
program, USAID helped rehabilitate the ministry building and provided 
advisors to retrain the bank's staff. In addition, USAID helped the 
central bank establish and distribute a new national currency (the 
"afghani"). This involved collecting and destroying an estimated 13 
trillion of the greatly devalued, previously existing afghanis and the 
disparate currencies printed by warlords. USAID supported the 
commercial bank sector by assisting in legal and regulatory reform and 
training financial sector officials. As a result, international 
commercial banks began to receive licenses in the fall of 2003. 
Further, USAID helped to partially rehabilitate the Kabul customs house 
and airport customs facilities, streamline customs processes, and 
establish a tax identification number system for traders. Despite these 
and other efforts aimed at encouraging the provinces to remit revenue 
to the central government, according to the UN and others, warlords 
continued to keep large portions in their own regions, undermining the 
authority of the central government.

Figure 12: Health Care: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Health care. In November 2002, USAID, with assistance from the UN 
Population Fund, Japan's aid agency, and the European Commission, 
completed a comprehensive assessment of health facilities, services, 
personnel, and supplies available throughout the country. This effort 
helped Afghanistan's Ministry of Health to establish a national health 
strategy and national health priorities. All grants for health sector 
activities must address the priorities established in the ministry's 
strategy. The study found that Afghanistan has approximately one health 
facility per 27,000 inhabitants. It also established that nearly 40 
percent of existing basic care facilities employ no female health 
workers. (According to cultural norms, it is taboo for women to receive 
care from male health care workers.): 

Other health achievements included providing grants to NGOs to operate 
over 160 health facilities--covering an area where 3.9 million Afghans 
live--constructing or rehabilitating 140 health facilities, training 
over 1,700 health workers, participating in the campaign to immunize 90 
percent of the population against measles, and improving approximately 
3,600 rural potable waterworks. To expand U.S. support for 
Afghanistan's health sector goals, USAID established its Rural 
Expansion of Afghanistan's Community-Based Health Care program through 
a contract signed in May 2003, as a continuation of previously begun 
work.

Figure 13: Education: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Education. By the end of fiscal year 2003, USAID, through quick-impact 
projects, had repaired or constructed approximately 200 schools, 
provided more than 25 million textbooks, trained over 3,000 teachers, 
and supplemented approximately 50,000 teachers' salaries with vegetable 
oil. (The oil represented 26 percent of the teachers' monthly income.) 
To assist Afghanistan with longer-term education goals, USAID created 
the Afghanistan Primary Education Program through a contract signed in 
June 2003. Early efforts in this program included developing and 
beginning to disseminate an accelerated learning curriculum for girls, 
who were not educated under the Taliban.[Footnote 23] USAID plans to 
train 30,000 classroom teachers between fiscal years 2003 and 2006. The 
prime education contractor in charge of the training referred to the 
educators it will train as "mentors" because they will not have the 
same qualifications as formally trained teachers.

Figure 14: Agriculture: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Agriculture. Through quick-impact projects, USAID helped farmers 
reestablish agricultural production by distributing approximately 
9,300 metric tons of seed and 12,400 metric tons of 
fertilizer,[Footnote 24] and by rehabilitating more than 7,000 rural 
irrigation structures. USAID also helped improve the rural economy by 
repairing over 70 bridges and tunnels and more than 7,000 kilometers of 
secondary and tertiary roads and by employing the equivalent of 1 
million Afghans for 1 month. In July 2003, the agency awarded a 
contract for the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program, aimed at 
increasing the food security and incomes of the rural population. 
However, as of October 2003, work under this contract had not yet 
begun.

Figure 15: Democracy Strengthening: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Democracy strengthening. USAID established two democracy and governance 
programs, one to help implement the political goals set by the Bonn 
Agreement and the other to bolster the civil society, media, and 
political parties. Through the beginning efforts of these programs, in 
conjunction with the quick-impact activities, the United States 
provided key technical assistance, civic education, and logistics 
support for the emergency loya jirga (grand council) to establish the 
interim government, and for the second loya jirga to ratify a new 
constitution. USAID also provided over 130 advisers to the Afghan 
ministries and funded approximately 880 staff positions. In addition, 
USAID supported the creation of radio stations and trained over 320 
journalists to aid the development of a free and independent media. As 
of October 2003, USAID and the international community had helped the 
Afghan government establish judicial reform, human rights, and 
constitutional commissions. Further, USAID commissioned designs for a 
provincial courthouse and a judicial complex in Kabul. USAID's 
cooperative agreement with the Consortium for Elections and Political 
Process Strengthening, establishing the democracy strengthening 
program, was not signed until July 2003.[Footnote 25]

Figure 16: Gender Equity: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Gender equity. USAID did not create separate women's projects but 
rather included elements promoting gender equity in its 
programs.[Footnote 26] For example, some quick-impact infrastructure 
projects incorporated women's labor into the construction process. In 
Kunduz, where USAID helped a community build a retaining wall, women 
participated and earned income by making wire screens to contain rocks 
placed in the wall by the men. In addition, USAID facilitated the 
involvement of women in the loya jirgas (women accounted for 20 percent 
of the delegates at the December 2003 constitutional loya jirga) and in 
the Afghan government by rehabilitating 15 day care centers in ministry 
buildings to encourage Afghan women to return to work. USAID also 
encouraged the return of girls to the classroom by creating an 
accelerated education program.[Footnote 27] USAID also made maternal 
care one of its primary health goals. However, Afghan society still 
limits women's travel and work, which complicates attempts to educate, 
train, or provide medical care to them, and nearly 40 percent of 
existing health care facilities employ no female health workers. 
Further, several girls' schools have been set on fire to protest 
educating women, and a female loya jirga representative's life was 
threatened when she expressed her negative opinion about the 
government's collaboration with warlords.

Coordination Mechanisms Established, but U.S. Strategy and Financial 
Data Were Incomplete; International Assistance Coordination Remained 
Weak: 

In fiscal years 2002-2003, the U.S. government established several 
mechanisms to coordinate its assistance effort in Afghanistan, but it 
lacked a comprehensive reconstruction strategy. Although U.S. agency 
officials characterized coordination as effective overall, some 
problems occurred. In addition, key operational components of the 
strategies intended to guide the reconstruction effort were incomplete 
or were not drafted until the latter half of fiscal 2003. Further, 
coordination officials lacked complete and accurate financial data 
needed for effective program management. Meanwhile, international 
assistance coordination was weak in 2002, with limited improvements 
introduced through the consultative group mechanism in 2003.

U.S. Efforts Were Coordinated, but Minor Problems Occurred: 

U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003 was 
coordinated through a number of mechanisms; however, some problems 
occurred. U.S. efforts were coordinated in Washington through the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Office, the Policy Coordinating Committee, 
the Deputies' Committee, and the Principals' Committee, and in 
Afghanistan through the U.S. Embassy country team. (See fig. 17.) 
According to Department of State officials, interagency coordination 
among the Afghanistan Reconstruction Office, agencies delivering 
assistance, and the embassy country team was routine and daily. In 
addition, these officials stated that the formal, hierarchical, 
interagency committee structure provided a uniform process for making 
policy-level decisions and keeping the President informed.

Figure 17: Major U.S. Interagency Afghan Assistance Coordination 
Mechanisms In Use During Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[A] In October 2003, a national security decision directive eliminated 
the Policy Coordinating Committee and established the Afghanistan 
Interagency Operating Group in its place.

[B] In October 2003, the Afghanistan Reconstruction office became the 
Office for Afghanistan. The office's functions are codified in section 
104 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act. The office subsumed the 
Afghanistan Desk.

[C] In October, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group was established 
within the U.S. Embassy, Kabul.

[End of figure]

U.S. officials from several agencies we spoke to stated that, overall, 
the U.S. government's coordination of the Afghan assistance effort in 
fiscal years 2002-2003 was effective. According to officials from USAID 
and the Departments of Agriculture, State, and Commerce, coordination 
efforts were successful and the policy coordination committee succeeded 
in bringing all of the agencies together to discuss pertinent issues 
and make collective decisions. USAID's former mission director in 
Afghanistan emphasized that the daily meetings of the country team and 
other assistance sector-based teams ensured good coordination within 
the embassy.

Although U.S. officials stated that coordination among agencies was 
generally good, several cited examples of coordination problems. For 
example, USAID officials said that whereas USAID worked closely with 
Afghan government ministries on the selection and location of projects, 
the PRTs focused on projects chosen by local authorities. Consequently, 
the PRTs implemented projects that were not included in national plans 
developed by the central government.[Footnote 28] In addition, USAID 
officials and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials 
confirmed that coordination problems involving the two organizations' 
efforts in Afghanistan's health sector had occurred. Specifically, HHS 
rehabilitated the Rabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul, rather than focus 
efforts on rural health clinics where the Afghan Ministry of Health and 
USAID had determined the need for assistance was greater. In another 
example, Department of State staff stated that USAID did not share 
information on its demining activities and that staff turnover and 
inconsistent operating procedures within the Department of Defense made 
coordinating demining efforts difficult.

Strategic Guidance Was Incomplete, Financial Data Was Lacking: 

The U.S. government's strategies for directing its reconstruction 
efforts in Afghanistan evolved during fiscal years 2002-2003, and key 
operational components of the strategies were incomplete or not drafted 
until the latter half of fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 29] In addition, 
coordination officials lacked complete and accurate financial data 
needed for effective program management.

Strategic Guidance Evolved Over Time: 

Various strategies pertaining to U.S. assistance efforts were developed 
during the fiscal 2002-2003 period. Several levels of strategies, from 
the President's office down to the USAID mission, are designed to guide 
U.S. assistance efforts in Afghanistan, focus resources, and hold 
agencies accountable for their efforts.[Footnote 30] In February 2003, 
the President published a broad strategy for meeting the immediate and 
long-term security needs of Afghanistan in response to the Afghanistan 
Freedom Support Act requirements.[Footnote 31] The President's strategy 
is intentionally broad and, therefore, lacks operational details, such 
as time frames and measurable goals. In June 2003, 18 months after the 
signing of the Bonn Agreement, the Department of State published its 
first mission performance plan to guide U.S. efforts in Afghanistan for 
fiscal years 2003-2006.[Footnote 32] This plan is organized around five 
strategic goals for the reconstruction effort and one management goal 
pertaining to Department of State facilities in Afghanistan. The 
mission plan provides an estimate, by appropriation account, of the 
financial resources needed. Further, the plan (1) describes specific 
tactics and activities to be undertaken and assigns responsibility for 
each activity to USAID and other offices of the agencies housed within 
the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan and (2) defines baseline data, 
performance indicators, and targets for achieving each performance 
goal. As the key U.S. agency for reconstruction of Afghanistan, USAID 
is responsible for developing a more detailed strategy and subordinate 
plans and programs to carry out its responsibilities.

USAID Strategy Lacked Operational Details: 

The USAID mission in Afghanistan developed an interim strategy and 
action plan in August 2002. However, these documents did not clearly 
articulate measurable goals or provide details on time frames, 
resources, responsibilities, objective measures, or means to evaluate 
progress for each of the sectors targeted by the strategy.[Footnote 33] 
USAID directives require that interim strategies include a description 
of how or when the strategy would be replaced by a standard strategic 
plan. The interim strategy for Afghanistan does not contain the 
required description. USAID's guidelines and directives state that 
country-level strategies and plans should address, among other things, 
strategic objectives, key country-level problems, programmatic 
approaches, baseline data and targets, performance indicators and the 
means to measure progress, fundamental assumptions, and resources 
required to implement the plan. Although USAID developed a number of 
measurable goals for various sectors during fiscal years 2002-2003, 
these goals and the resources and methods designed to achieve them were 
included in numerous project documents and contracts rather than stated 
in a comprehensive strategy as called for by USAID guidelines.

Further, according to USAID officials, although USAID Washington 
reviewed the strategy and action plan, the documents were not vetted 
through USAID's standard strategy review process; instead an 
abbreviated process was used to assess clarity, feasibility, compliance 
with agency policies, delineation of expected results, and congruency 
with available resources. The former mission director in Afghanistan 
stated that the time and resources needed to develop and approve a 
strategy through the normal USAID operating procedures were not 
available when the strategy documents were developed and that a waiver 
for meeting standard strategy-related requirements was granted in 
February 2002.[Footnote 34]

In January 2003, USAID officials responsible for the agency's efforts 
in Afghanistan requested a second waiver and promised to draft a 
strategy according to USAID guidelines within 6 months of the waiver's 
approval. According to USAID documents, no strategy was drafted because 
the situation in Afghanistan was too dynamic, preventing USAID from 
taking a proactive approach to its efforts including the development of 
a strategy. A third waiver was approved in February 2004 that exempts 
USAID from developing the strategy until February 2005. As a result, 
more than 3 years will have passed between the time USAID began 
providing postconflict assistance to Afghanistan and the completion of 
a USAID assistance strategy for Afghanistan. The lack of a complete 
country strategy impedes USAID's ability to ensure progress toward 
development goals, make informed resource allocation decisions, and 
meet agency and congressional accountability reporting requirements on 
the effectiveness of agency programs.

Comprehensive Financial Data Was Not Readily Available: 

The coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, as well as others 
responsible for the coordination of U.S. assistance, lacked complete 
and accurate financial data in fiscal years 2002-2003. Program managers 
need financial data to, among other things, monitor performance, 
allocate resources, and determine whether strategic goals are being 
met. Further, relevant information needs to be identified, collected, 
and distributed in a form and time frame so that duties can be 
performed efficiently.[Footnote 35] Most of the agencies providing 
assistance to Afghanistan could not readily provide complete or 
accurate data on assistance obligations and expenditures, and some 
agencies were unable to disaggregate the information by fiscal year or 
province. Consequently, over the course of our review, we worked with 
the agencies to obtain reliable data. In fiscal years 2002-2003, the 
Coordinator's office did not require U.S. agencies to regularly report 
obligation and expenditure data.[Footnote 36] As a result, the 
Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan lacked information that 
could have helped decision-makers manage the overall assistance effort, 
including the targeting of resources to key efforts.

International Assistance Coordination Was Weak: 

Despite efforts to synchronize multiple donors' efforts, coordination 
of international assistance was weak in 2002 and problems remained in 
2003.[Footnote 37] The Bonn Agreement urged donors to defer 
responsibility for assistance coordination to the Afghan government. 
According to the UN, coordination is the responsibility of the Afghan 
government; efforts by the aid community should reinforce national 
authorities; and the international community should operate, and relate 
to the Afghan government, in a coherent manner rather than through a 
series of disparate relationships.[Footnote 38]

In April 2002, the Afghan government initiated efforts to exert 
leadership over the highly fragmented reconstruction process. To 
accomplish this task, the government published its National Development 
Framework, which provided a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and 
broadly established national goals and policy directions. In addition, 
the Afghan government established a government-led coordination 
mechanism, the implementation group, to bring coherence to the 
international community's independent efforts and broad political 
objectives. The mechanism's structure was based on the National 
Development Framework. Individual coordination groups, led by Afghan 
ministers and composed of assistance organizations, were established 
for each of the 12 programs in the framework.

The implementation group mechanism proved to be largely ineffective. In 
August 2002, officials from the Afghan government, the UN, the 
Department of State, and USAID, as well as a number of nongovernmental 
bodies, expressed concern over the lack of meaningful and effective 
coordination of assistance in Afghanistan. For example, the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Irrigation, 
and Agriculture stated that the donor community's effort to coordinate 
with the government was poor to nonexistent. The ineffectiveness of the 
implementation group mechanism resulted from its inability to overcome 
several impediments. First, each bilateral, multilateral, and 
nongovernmental assistance agency had its own mandate (established by 
implementing legislation or charter) and sources of funding, and each 
donor pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently. Second, 
the international community asserted that the Afghan government lacked 
the capacity and resources to effectively assume the role of 
coordinator and, that these responsibilities therefore could not be 
delegated to the government. Third, no single entity within the 
international community had the authority and mandate to direct the 
efforts of the myriad bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental 
organizations providing assistance.

In December 2002, the Afghan government replaced the implementation 
group with the consultative group mechanism to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of assistance coordination in support of 
the goals and objectives in the National Development 
Framework.[Footnote 39] The consultative group mechanism in Afghanistan 
is similar to the implementation group in (1) its National Development 
Framework-based hierarchical structure and stated goals, (2) the role 
of the Afghan government, and (3) the membership and leadership of 
sector-specific groups.[Footnote 40] (See fig. 18.): 

Figure 18: International Afghan Assistance Coordination Mechanisms, 
Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

By the end of fiscal year 2003, the consultative group had not 
surmounted the conditions that prevented the implementation group from 
effectively coordinating assistance. In an August 2003 review of the 
status of the consultative group process, the Afghan government stated 
that the terms of reference for the sectoral groups were unclear and 
too broad, the groups were too large and lacked strong leadership, 
member commitment was uneven, and the overall potential of the 
mechanism was not utilized. In October 2003, the Minister of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development stated that the consultative group 
process had not yet proven effective, that the consultative groups were 
too large to be effective decision-making bodies, and that assistance 
organizations continued to implement projects not included in the 
Afghan government's national budget and priorities. The Minister of 
Agriculture stated that despite the efforts of consultative groups to 
coordinate donor efforts, donor governments and assistance agencies 
continued to develop their own strategies and implement projects 
outside the Afghan government's national budget.

Achievement of U.S. Goals Uncertain Given Precedents, Obstacles: 

The attainment of the U.S. goal of a stable, democratic Afghanistan 
remained uncertain given the historical precedents and the current 
Afghan environment, where numerous obstacles threatened reconstruction 
efforts in fiscal years 2002-2003. Afghanistan exhibits many of the 
characteristics that other nations have faced in their efforts to 
transition from a postconflict environment to a stable democracy. In 
fiscal years 2002-2003, deteriorating security and increasing opium 
cultivation in particular jeopardized U.S. reconstruction efforts, and 
efforts to counter these obstacles have had little success. Other 
hindrances to U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan during this 
period included small staff size, inadequate working conditions and 
equipment, and the timing of funding for reconstruction activities. In 
September 2003, the U.S. government announced an initiative called 
"Accelerating Success" to increase funding and expedite projects.

Afghanistan Exhibits Characteristics That Threatened Success in Other 
Postconflict Nations: 

Afghanistan displays many of the characteristics that have obstructed 
transitions to peace and stability in other postconflict countries. 
Analyses conducted by various experts on postconflict reconstruction 
have identified a number of such characteristics, including multiple 
competing parties, valuable and disposable resources such as opium, and 
a weakened state.[Footnote 41] In addition, our past work has shown 
that despite variations in postconflict situations, efforts to rebuild 
require a secure environment, adequate resources, and the support of 
the host government and civil society.[Footnote 42] Figure 19 compares 
characteristics of Afghanistan that we--and experts from the World Bank 
and other nongovernmental institutions--found to have affected 
reconstruction in other postconflict countries.

Figure 19: Postconflict Characteristics That Impeded Stability in Other 
Countries Versus Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Pervasive Insecurity Threatened Reconstruction: 

Terrorist attacks by the Taliban and al Qaeda and the criminal activity 
of warlords contributed to the overall environment of insecurity 
throughout Afghanistan and threatened the U.S. reconstruction effort in 
fiscal years 2002-2003. In March 2002, in a report to the UN Security 
Council, the UN Secretary General stated that security will remain the 
essential requirement for protecting the peace process in Afghanistan. 
In a report to the council 1 year later, he identified security as the 
most serious challenge to the peace process. Others in the 
international community, including the United States, recognize 
security as a prerequisite for the implementation of reconstruction 
efforts.

According to UN, nongovernmental organization, and U.S. reports, the 
security situation deteriorated throughout 2003. Incidents over the 2-
year period included: 

* numerous skirmishes between coalition, al Qaeda, and Taliban troops 
in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan;

* the attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the 
President;

* the assassination of Vice President Qadir;

* the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker;

* attacks on contractors working on USAID's Kabul-Kandahar road project 
that resulted in 14 injuries and 9 deaths;

* rocket attacks on U.S. and international military installations;

* sniper fire and grenade attacks on UN and nongovernmental 
organization vehicles and offices; and: 

* bombings in the center of Kabul and Kandahar, at the International 
Security Assistance Force headquarters, and of UN compounds.[Footnote 
43]

The increase in violence against aid organizations forced suspensions 
of assistance activities. For example, attacks against deminers forced 
the UN to suspend all humanitarian demining activities in 10 provinces 
in May 2003 including demining activities along the Kabul-Kandahar 
road. Similarly, the killings of three nongovernmental organization 
staff in August 2003 and a UN High Commissioner for Refugees staff 
member in November 2003 resulted in, among other things, the agency's 
removing its international staff and its reduced ability to deliver 
assistance to refugees and internally displaced people.

Furthermore, the criminality of the warlords' private armies continued 
to destabilize the country and impede reconstruction, according to the 
Department of State, the UN, Human Rights Watch, and other 
international experts. The warlords foster an illegitimate economy 
fueled by the smuggling of arms, drugs, and other goods. They also, in 
violation of the Bonn Agreement, control private armies of tens of 
thousands of armed men and illegally withhold hundreds of millions of 
dollars in customs duties collected at border points in the regions 
they control, depriving the central government of revenues needed to 
fund the country's central government and reconstruction effort. 
Repeated violent clashes among the warlords continued throughout fiscal 
years 2002-2003, forcing USAID and other assistance agencies to 
periodically suspend their assistance activities in the affected areas. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the United States 
uses warlord-commanded militias in its continuing counterinsurgency 
effort against the Taliban. The militia forces also provide security 
for PRTs. For example, troops commanded by one of the warlords in 
control of Hirat and its adjoining provinces provide security to U.S. 
civil affairs units stationed in Hirat.

The United States and the international community have taken several 
steps to improve security in Afghanistan. First, beginning in 2002, the 
Department of Defense established PRTs in several locations in 
Afghanistan. These company-sized units of 50 to 100 soldiers were 
charged with enhancing security over immense geographical areas in an 
effort to create a safe environment for reconstruction activities. For 
example, the PRT in Gardez, with 77 security personnel and 52 other 
personnel, had an area of responsibility that covered five provinces 
with a total land area of 70,000 square kilometers--an area about the 
size of South Carolina. Nongovernmental organization officials, as well 
as others, have criticized the size of the PRTs, stating that the units 
were too small to provide security for their areas of responsibility or 
create a secure environment for reconstruction projects.

In 2002, Department of Defense began funding efforts to help establish 
a national army in Afghanistan. As of late fiscal 2003, its efforts to 
train the first corps of the new army had fallen behind schedule, due 
in part to higher than expected rates of attrition among Afghan 
recruits. As of September 2003, approximately 5,500 soldiers had been 
trained. In 2003, the Department of State and the German government 
(the designated lead nation for police training in Afghanistan) began 
implementing plans to train 20,000 Afghan police by June 2004 and 
50,000 by the end of 2005. By March 2004, 9,000 officers received 
training. Finally, the U.S. government considers the demobilization and 
reintegration of the warlords' forces a prerequisite for improving the 
country's security and succeeding in the international recovery 
effort.[Footnote 44] According to the Department of State, this program 
is critical to efforts to reduce the destabilizing presence of these 
militias. As of March 2004, 5,200 soldiers had been disarmed.

Opium Production Threatened Stability: 

The illicit international trade in Afghan opiates also threatened 
Afghanistan's stability during fiscal years 2002-2003. The drug trade 
provided income for terrorists and warlords, fueling the factions that 
worked against stability and national unity.[Footnote 45] According to 
UN and International Monetary Fund estimates, in 2002, Afghan farmers 
produced 3,422 metric tons of opium, providing $2.5 billion in 
trafficking revenue. This amount was equal to 68 percent of the total 
international assistance to Afghanistan disbursed for that year, or 
nearly 4.5 times the Afghan government's 2003 operating 
budget.[Footnote 46] In 2003, UN estimates indicated that opium 
production in the country increased to approximately 3,600 metric tons, 
the second largest harvest in the country's history. Further, heroin 
laboratories have proliferated in Afghanistan in recent years. As a 
result of the increased poppy production and in-country heroin 
production, greater resources were available to Afghan criminal 
networks and others at odds with the central government. According to 
the Department of State, at the provincial and district levels, drug-
related corruption is believed to be pervasive. Involvement ranges from 
direct participation in the criminal enterprise, to benefiting 
financially from taxation or other revenue streams generated by the 
narcotics trade.[Footnote 47] The International Monetary Fund and 
Afghanistan's Minister of Finance have stated that the potential exists 
for Afghanistan to become a "narcostate," in which all legitimate 
institutions are infiltrated by the power and wealth of drug 
traffickers.

The overall increase in opium production in 2002-2003 occurred despite 
the counternarcotics efforts implemented by the Afghan 
government[Footnote 48] and a number of international donors. During 
the 2-year period, the Afghan government and the international 
community, with funding from the United Kingdom and the United States, 
instituted alternative livelihood and poppy eradication programs in 
Afghanistan.[Footnote 49] Total U.S. funding dedicated to 
counternarcotics was $23.4 million in fiscal 2002. The Department of 
State did not request or receive funding for counternarcotics efforts 
in fiscal 2003. Although the programs failed to stem the increase in 
opium production, the long-term effects of these programs remain to be 
seen.

Inadequate U.S. Resources Hindered Reconstruction: 

During fiscal years 2002-2003, limited resources further obstructed 
U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The USAID mission in Kabul 
was insufficiently staffed to carry out its responsibilities. In 
addition, inadequate working conditions and equipment--including 
cramped workspace, limited mobility, and unreliable communications and 
transportation equipment--hindered the implementation of assistance 
activities. Further, most reconstruction funding was not available 
until mid-fiscal year 2003. To help expedite reconstruction efforts and 
create more visible results, the U.S. initiated an "Accelerating 
Success" program in fiscal year 2004.

Lack of Staff Prevented Management and Oversight of Assistance Efforts: 

The USAID mission in Kabul was inadequately staffed to accomplish its 
management and oversight responsibilities. In its August 2002 action 
plan for assistance to Afghanistan, USAID stated that the number of 
positions it was allotted (12 slots) through the embassy's staffing 
allocation process was clearly inadequate to design and implement the 
large program planned for Afghanistan. USAID's mission in Afghanistan 
managed a $505 million program in 2003, one of the largest in the 
world; however, its staff size is one of the smallest. On average, an 
overseas USAID mission has a staff of 73 and a budget of approximately 
$51 million, or one staff member per about $700,000. In Afghanistan, 
that ratio in fiscal year 2003 was approximately one staff member per 
about $13 million. Although USAID/ Kabul indicated in its 2003 staffing 
plan that it needed 113 staff, only 39 of these positions were filled 
during the year.

In its March 2003 risk assessment, USAID's Inspector General cited 
delays in the assignment and retention of qualified personnel as one of 
three material weaknesses in USAID's system of management controls in 
Afghanistan.[Footnote 50] It also reported that the risks associated 
with this material weakness were amplified by, among other things, the 
magnitude of the funding being provided to Afghanistan and the pressure 
to implement projects in extremely short time frames. In August 2003, 
we reported that as a result of the decreases in U.S. direct-hire 
foreign service staff levels, increasing program demands, and a mostly 
ad hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human 
capital vulnerabilities, including the lack of a "surge capacity" to 
respond to emergencies such as postconflict situations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.[Footnote 51]

Because of the small number of USAID staff in Afghanistan and the 
numerous vacancies, staff members were often required to work long 
hours and take on additional responsibilities. For example, from March 
2002 through June 2003, USAID's General Development Officer also 
periodically served as USAID's Acting Deputy Mission Director and 
Acting Mission Director and as the Department of State's Acting Deputy 
Chief of Mission and Charg d'Affaires. During our visit in October 
2003, USAID's mission had been without a Director for two months. At 
the time, the Acting Mission Director was also the Cognizant Technical 
Officer overseeing the largest USAID project in Afghanistan. USAID 
tried to compensate for the gaps by deploying staff to Kabul on 
temporary duty. However, this did not ensure the continuity needed to 
administer a program effectively and efficiently.

As a result of the small staff size, staff members were overworked and 
found it difficult to keep up with their myriad responsibilities, 
including monitoring and evaluating projects.[Footnote 52] The lack of 
monitoring was evidenced by the USAID staffs' inability to provide us 
with the exact location of the projects we asked to visit. In its 
December 2003 midterm program assessment of projects in Afghanistan, 
OTI noted that deficiencies in monitoring at construction sites 
contributed to a high rate of faulty construction, serious post-
construction problems, and added costs.

Inadequate Working Conditions and Equipment Constrained Assistance 
Efforts: 

Inadequate working conditions and equipment--such as cramped workspace, 
limited mobility, and unreliable communications and transportation 
equipment--also hindered the implementation of assistance activities. 
In its August 2002 action plan for Afghanistan, USAID stated that 
without adequate working and living space, it might not be able to 
achieve its goals. In its March 2003 risk assessment for USAID 
activities in Afghanistan, USAID's Inspector General cited unsuitable 
working and living conditions as material weaknesses, stating that 
existing conditions in Afghanistan were "unsuitable for carrying out 
program design and implementation in an effective and efficient 
manner." During our visit in October 2003, we found that staff at the 
USAID mission faced severe space constraints. For example, we observed 
as many as eight USAID staff, their files, and office furniture and 
equipment sharing one small office. USAID took steps to obtain 
additional space at the embassy and in other U.S. locations in Kabul, 
but it was not available during fiscal year 2003.

In addition, Department of State security restrictions, imposed due to 
increasing levels of insecurity, severely limited USAID staff's ability 
to travel to field sites and monitor ongoing reconstruction efforts. In 
its March 2003 assessment, USAID's Inspector General cited the security 
restrictions as another material weakness, stating that staff members 
are not able to travel to project sites and monitor project 
implementation in an adequate manner with the frequency required. To 
improve its ability to monitor field sites, USAID contracted for 
program managers through the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM).[Footnote 53] Although some IOM staff contracted by USAID are 
U.S. citizens, they are not bound by the same security rules as direct-
hire USAID staff and, therefore, can visit projects in the field. 
However, despite this action, we found that USAID was unable to 
adequately monitor projects.

The limitations on mobility made communications capability essential. 
However, according to U.S. and international officials in Afghanistan, 
e-mail and cellular phone service is intermittently reliable within 
Kabul and less reliable between provinces, making it difficult to 
contact staff and contractors in the field. PRT staff stated that they 
lacked adequate mobile secure communications equipment, and some had to 
purchase their own geographic positioning systems.

In addition, PRT staff in the field relied on old vehicles that the 
United States leased from local vendors. The frequent breakdown of the 
vehicles and the lack of replacement parts severely limited staff's 
ability to carry out their responsibilities. For example, according to 
PRT officials we spoke with, most of the vehicles used are 
approximately 10 years old--with some having logged more than 100,000 
miles--break down frequently, and are not designed for the rigorous 
terrain of Afghanistan. For example, senior PRT officials in Hirat told 
us that, in 2003, they made two unsuccessful attempts to reach 
Chaghcharan, the capital of Ghor, the province adjoining Hirat 
province. During a third attempt, one vehicle experienced 14 flat tires 
in 3 days.[Footnote 54] The PRT staff said that because the vehicles 
were in such poor condition, the staff spent much of their time on the 
road searching for spare parts and repairing vehicles instead of 
identifying assistance needs and implementing projects.

Funding Delays Slowed Reconstruction Efforts: 

Although the United States provided significant humanitarian assistance 
to Afghanistan in fiscal 2002, very little money was available to USAID 
for reconstruction until the second half of fiscal year 2003. USAID 
considers adequate funding a prerequisite for the success of the 
reconstruction effort. However, according to USAID officials, because 
they did not know when they would receive additional funding, they were 
unable to develop and plan for long-term resource-intensive 
reconstruction projects and instead focused on short-term projects that 
required less money; some of these served as pilots for the longer-term 
projects begun later in fiscal year 2003.

During fiscal years 2002-2003, funding for reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan was allocated to USAID programming offices in four 
increments. According to USAID, an initial allotment for $52 million 
for reconstruction was made in February 2002; at the time, the 
programming offices were assured that more funding was imminent. About 
8 months later, USAID obtained an additional $40 million; however, some 
of the money was used for emergency winterization measures, such as 
providing food and shelter, to stave off another humanitarian crisis. 
Since there was no Afghanistan--specific request for fiscal 2002, $80 
million was supplemental funding, while the remaining $12 million was 
reprogrammed funds from existing assistance accounts. As a result, 
USAID was able to initiate only two major reconstruction programs, 
infrastructure rehabilitation and the reform and development of 
economic governance, by the first anniversary of the Bonn Agreement in 
late 2002.[Footnote 55] In contrast, the rate of funding for rebuilding 
Iraq was much faster. Specifically, in less than 1 month after the U.S. 
announced an end to major hostilities in Iraq, USAID obligated $118 
million for reconstruction activities from the Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund account. By the end of December 2003, 7 months 
later, USAID obligated about $1.5 billion for Iraq reconstruction from 
this account.

Although there was no specific request for funding for Afghanistan 
included in the President's fiscal year 2003 budget, funding became 
available when Congress appropriated $295.5 million for Afghanistan in 
February 2003. USAID officials reported that the allotments from this 
appropriation began in April 2003, and USAID targeted about $265 
million toward longer-term reconstruction projects and $30 million for 
short-term projects. In April 2003, Congress passed the fiscal 2003 
supplemental appropriations bill that included $167 million for 
Afghanistan. The allotments from this appropriation began in June 2003. 
All of this funding was used for longer-term reconstruction. (See fig. 
20.): 

Figure 20: Time Line of USAID Funding for Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image]

[A] Public Law 107-38, 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United 
States: 

[B] Public Law 107-115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Act, 2002: 

[C] Public Law 107-117, Department of Defense and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist 
Attacks on the United States Act, 2002: 

[D] Public Law 107-206, 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United 
States: 

[E] Public Law 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, and 
for Other Purposes: 

[F] Public Law 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations 
Act 2003.

[End of figure]

Because of the delays in funding during the 17-month period following 
the signing of the Bonn Agreement, USAID had to cancel projects, 
reallocate funding from some projects in order to keep other projects 
operating, and delay the implementation of 5 of its 7 major 
reconstruction contracts until spring and summer of 2003. According to 
USAID officials responsible for the management of USAID's assistance to 
Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002-2003, if funding had been provided 
sooner and in greater amounts, major contracts could have been awarded 
sooner, a greater number of projects could have been implemented over 
the 2-year period, and more results could have been achieved.

Rate of International Donor Funding Was Also Slow: 

The funding provided by the United States in fiscal years 2002-2003 was 
part of the larger international reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. 
The Afghan government estimated that Afghanistan needs $30 billion over 
the 5-year period 2004-2008 for what it defines as high-priority 
reconstruction efforts. According to the Center on International 
Cooperation, as of May 2003, $947 million of the international 
disbursements had been used to begin reconstruction projects. Despite 
Afghanistan's stated need and the importance that the United States and 
the international community assigned to the reconstruction effort, 
Afghanistan received significantly less international assistance over 
fiscal years 2002-2003 than was provided during the first 2 years of 
other recent postconflict, complex emergencies over a similar time 
period. According to analyses by the International Monetary Fund, RAND 
Corporation, and others, Afghanistan received about $67 in annual per 
capita assistance in 2002 and 2003; by contrast, the annual per capita 
aid provided during the first 2 years in other recent postconflict 
settings was greater. For example, annual per capita assistance was 
$256 in East Timor (1999-2001) and $249 in Bosnia (1995-1997). At the 
October 19, 2003, meeting of the Consultative Group Standing Committee, 
the Afghan government warned the international community that the 
reconstruction effort might fail and that success would occur only if 
the rate of international obligations were increased and national 
reconstruction projects were fully funded.

Accelerating Success Initiative Designed to Increase Funding for 
Reconstruction: 

The U.S. government announced in September 2003 a new initiative called 
"Accelerating Success," to increase funding and expedite the 
reconstruction efforts, particularly regarding infrastructure, 
democratization and human rights, and security. The initiative was 
designed to be implemented in the 9-months leading up to the 
presidential elections planned for June 2004.[Footnote 56] The U.S. 
government plans to provide $1.76 billion[Footnote 57] for the 
acceleration effort. Approximately $1 billion of that amount would 
provide funding for elections, major and secondary road construction, 
health and education programs, economic and budget support to the 
Afghan government, senior advisers and technical experts, and private 
sector initiatives. The remaining $700 million would be targeted toward 
building the Afghan National Army, training and equipping the police 
force, expanding the counternarcotics program, and establishing rule of 
law.[Footnote 58] Funding for the initiative was appropriated in 
November 2003; however, USAID did not receive the money until January/
February 2004, leaving only 7 months to complete visible reconstruction 
projects before the September election. Moreover, the need to evaluate 
projects quickly will increase under the initiative, but no additional 
funds have been included for this purpose.

In April 2003, prior to the "Accelerating Success" initiative, at the 
request of President Karzai, the United States decided to complete the 
first layer of pavement of the Kabul-Kandahar road by December 2003 
instead of December 2005. Under the original plan, the estimated cost 
to bring the road up to international standards was $113 million; the 
United States pledged $80 million, while Saudi Arabia and Japan each 
pledged an additional $50 million. In shortening the timeline by 2 
years, the United States assumed responsibility for 389 kilometers of 
the 482-kilometer distance.[Footnote 59] (See fig. 21.) Consequently, 
the United States hired several more subcontractors, increased the 
labor and security forces, imported additional equipment, and tapped 
the world market of asphalt. The first layer of pavement was completed 
about 17 months after the contract was signed, and the road opened on 
December 16, 2003. By the time in 2004 that contractors lay the final 
layers of asphalt, repair the road's bridges, and construct the 
culverts, USAID projects that the road's total cost to the United 
States will be $270 million, more than double the original cost 
estimate, due to accelerating the project.

Figure 21: Division of Responsibility for Repairing the 482-kilometer 
Kabul-Kandahar Highway: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Conclusions: 

After 23 years of war, the reconstruction needs of Afghanistan are 
immense. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in October 2001, the 
United States has viewed the establishment of a stable, democratic 
Afghanistan as essential to U.S. national security. The United States, 
in cooperation with the international community, is attempting to 
rebuild Afghanistan and help the country become a stable and 
functioning democracy. U.S.-led efforts in fiscal years 2002-2003 
helped avert a humanitarian crisis; however, conditions in Afghanistan, 
such as the deteriorating security situation, the relative weakness of 
the central government, and the increase in opium production, 
complicate the longer-term reconstruction process and threaten its 
ultimate success. In addition, despite a consensus that reconstruction 
assistance is essential to achieving the U.S. goal in Afghanistan, most 
funding for reconstruction in fiscal years 2002-2003 was not allocated 
until 17 months after the signing of the Bonn Agreement. This delay, as 
well as a lack of staff and equipment, further hindered U.S. efforts. 
Consequently, overall progress towards Afghanistan's reconstruction 
goals by the end of fiscal year 2003 was limited.

The President's broad strategy published in February 2003 and reported 
on semiannually states that success in Afghanistan demands that the 
U.S. government follow a coherent, consistent, and closely coordinated 
strategy. However, for most of fiscal years 2002-2003, the United 
States lacked such a strategy. In addition, USAID, which provided the 
majority of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, lacked a complete 
operational strategy to guide its nonsecurity-related efforts, making 
it difficult for the agency to integrate projects, focus available 
resources, and be held accountable for achieving measurable results. 
The need for such a strategy has become more vital given that, between 
August 2002 and July 2003, USAID awarded seven major multiyear 
reconstruction contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Further, most of the U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan 
did not have readily available comprehensive financial data on their 
efforts, limiting the ability of individuals and institutions charged 
with coordinating and overseeing the assistance to execute these 
responsibilities.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Administrator of USAID revise its strategy for 
the agency's assistance program in Afghanistan. The revised strategy 
should, among other things, (1) contain measurable goals, specific time 
frames, and resource levels; (2) delineate responsibilities; (3) 
identify external factors that could significantly affect the 
achievement of its goals; and (4) include a schedule for program 
evaluations that assess progress against the strategy's goals.

In addition, to improve oversight of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, we 
are making two recommendations to the Secretary of State. We recommend 
that the Secretary of State direct the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance 
to Afghanistan to (1) produce an annual consolidated budget report for 
all assistance to Afghanistan and (2) semiannually report obligations 
and expenditures for the assistance provided, delineated by relevant 
U.S. agencies and the bureaus and offices within each agency 
semiannually.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense and to the U.S. Agency for International Development. State's 
and USAID's written comments are presented in appendixes VI and VII, 
respectively. State and USAID generally concurred with much of the 
information presented on the situation in Afghanistan for the period 
covered by our review. State emphasized that despite security and other 
challenges, significant progress had been made, not only with respect 
to humanitarian and short-term assistance, but also in advancing long-
term security, reconstruction, and governance objectives. USAID stated 
that the report presented a fair picture of the situation in 
Afghanistan at the end of fiscal year 2003, when USAID's large 
reconstruction efforts were just beginning. Both agencies included in 
their response additional information on more recent activities taken 
and progress made. The Department of Defense did not provide official 
written comments, but provided technical comments, as did USAID, that 
we have incorporated where appropriate.

In response to our recommendation that USAID revise its operational 
strategy for Afghanistan to include details such as measurable goals, 
timeframes, and required resources, USAID said that its less 
comprehensive interim strategy was appropriate given the situation in 
Afghanistan during the early phases of the ongoing efforts. While we 
recognize in the report that the strategy was an interim strategy, the 
need for a more complete strategy is vital due to the large increase in 
USAID assistance funding for Afghanistan. USAID said that it is 
committed to developing a standard strategic plan for Afghanistan 
during 2004, which would be consistent with our recommendation. The 
Department of State disagreed with our finding that the United States 
lacks a complete and integrated assistance strategy, citing its 
December 15, 2003 report to Congress, titled Fiscal Year 2004 Strategic 
and Financial Plan for Reconstruction and Related Activities in 
Afghanistan. In the plan, State noted that the United States is 
pursuing a three-fold strategy in Afghanistan, focusing on security, 
reconstruction, and governance. We found that most of the strategies 
that were published in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 lacked details on 
funding and other resources, measurable goals, timeframes, as well as a 
means to measure progress. However, in the report, we also cite State's 
June 2003 Mission Performance Plan as meeting many of the requirements 
for a government-wide operational strategy. Although the fiscal year 
2004 plan cited by State in its comments includes more details on the 
U.S. assistance budget for Afghanistan, like some of the previously 
published strategies, it lacks operational details, including time 
frames, measurable goals, and a means to measure progress toward those 
goals.

In response to our recommendation that State produce an annual 
consolidated budget for all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and report 
to Congress semiannually on obligations and expenditures, State 
emphasized that policymakers are provided with information on U.S. 
obligations weekly, and that close interagency collaboration occurs 
regarding all funding issues. In addition, State said that it already 
keeps Congress regularly informed through staff briefings, hearings, 
and mandated reports. We disagree. As we reported, complete and readily 
accessible obligation and expenditure data were not available, and 
consequently, it is difficult for the Coordinator to determine the 
extent to which U.S. assistance dollars are being used to achieve 
measurable results in Afghanistan. Moreover, we found that government-
wide expenditure data on U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is not 
collected, obligation data is collected on an ad hoc basis, and that 
the Coordinator's office experienced difficulty in consistently 
collecting complete and accurate obligation data from U.S. government 
agencies. Further reporting obligation data alone is insufficient. 
Obligation data measures the extent to which contracts have been 
awarded, orders placed, and similar transactions, not the extent to 
which money actually has been spent on the ground on visible projects. 
Consequently, reporting obligations alone does not provide an accurate 
portrayal of the progress of the assistance effort. For example, as our 
report shows, although $647 million was obligated for reconstruction 
projects in fiscal 2002 and 2003, less than a third of the total, or 
$214 million was actually spent. Regular reporting of both obligations 
and expenditures for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan would provide the 
Coordinator and Congress a more complete picture of what funds actually 
have been spent on visible projects.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 
committees. We are also sending copies to the Administrator of USAID, 
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. We also will make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3149. Other GAO contacts and staff 
acknowledgements are listed in appendix VIII.

Signed by: 

David Gootnick, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Section 106 of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 directs GAO 
to monitor U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to 
Afghanistan. To meet the requirements of the directive and provide 
Congress with a comprehensive accounting of U.S. assistance to 
Afghanistan for fiscal years 2002-2003, we (1) analyzed U.S. 
obligations and expenditures; (2) identified the results of assistance 
projects through September 30, 2003; (3) evaluated U.S. and 
international assistance coordination mechanisms and the U.S. 
assistance strategy; and (4) examined the major obstacles that affected 
the achievement of U.S. policy goals and the reconstruction effort.

We collected data on fiscal years 2002 and 2003 obligations and 
expenditures from the U.S. departments and agencies responsible for 
implementing U.S. government-funded projects in Afghanistan. These 
include U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human 
Services, State, and Treasury; the U.S. Trade and Development Agency; 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Because 
there is no single repository of financial information for all U.S. 
assistance in Afghanistan, we contacted each agency directly. In 
addition, because the Department of State does not have a consolidated 
financial reporting mechanism for programs in Afghanistan, we contacted 
each bureau and office separately--including the Bureaus of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration, and International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement; and the Offices of International Information Programs, 
Humanitarian Demining Programs, and Trafficking in Persons.

To determine which funds were applied to humanitarian and quick-impact 
projects and which were applied to longer-term reconstruction funding, 
we requested the agencies to designate their funding accordingly. In 
the case of USAID, we relied on the stated mission of the responsible 
funding bureau to make the determination. For example, the missions of 
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition 
Initiatives include addressing emergency situations and implementing 
quick-impact projects, respectively.

Since USAID did not provide separate financial management records for 
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we, in consultation with USAID, sorted the 
obligation and expenditure data by year to arrive at the fiscal year 
breakdowns that appear in this report. The Department of Defense was 
unable to disaggregate PRT project data by fiscal year. The fiscal 2002 
obligations and expenditures in the report include only funds spent on 
humanitarian daily rations, while the fiscal 2003 figures include all 
PRT funds in 2002 and 2003.

To delineate how funding and projects were distributed by province, we 
combined information from both USAID and the Department of Defense. 
USAID provided the information from a programmatic, rather than a 
financial database, as the financial database did not include data by 
location. Because the programmatic database had been updated only to 
September 17, 2003, the numbers used for figure 5 are less than the 
total obligations reported as of September 30, 2003. However, according 
to USAID, it can be assumed that the proportion of assistance by 
province did not change during that time lag. Also as a result of the 
data being drawn from a programmatic database, we are unable to show 
expenditures by province, because the database tracks only obligations.

To assess the reliability of the obligations and expenditures data from 
U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan, we (1) interviewed 
officials at the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID regarding 
their methods of gathering, managing, and using data; (2) reviewed 
USAID's financial audit statement; and (3) compared the data we 
gathered with USAID's Congressional Budget Justifications and the 
Department of State's 150 account documentation, as well as with the 
government-wide Afghanistan assistance compilation done by the 
Department of State's Resource Management bureau. A Department of State 
official stated that the data State compiled are not completely 
accurate, due in part to the lack of a requirement for all agencies to 
report to one central office on a regular basis, which results in 
variation in the frequency of reporting by individual agencies and 
differences in how agencies track data. However, the Department of 
State relies on these data for decision-making purposes and to track 
how quickly money for Afghanistan is being used. Based on our 
assessment, we conclude that the data are sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of showing, in gross numbers, the level of nonsecurity-related 
assistance that the U.S. government provided to Afghanistan in fiscal 
years 2002 and 2003.

To assess the reliability of the data on the pledges and disbursements 
made by international donors, we (1) interviewed the official at the 
Department of State who is responsible for compiling these data based 
on information provided by the Government of Afghanistan and (2) 
performed some basic reasonableness checks of the data against other 
sources of information. We determined that the data are sufficiently 
reliable for the purpose of making a broad comparison of the United 
States' contributions to those of other major donors and the combined 
total for all other donors. However, we also noted several limitations 
in the data, notably the fact that the data are largely self-reported 
by donor nations to the Afghan government and are affected by 
differences in exchange rates. In addition, donors both over-and under-
report due to varying definitions of disbursement. Furthermore, the 
data on larger donors are considered more reliable than the data on 
smaller donors, according to the Department of State. Due to these 
limitations, and the fact that we could not contact each of the donors, 
we were unable to determine the reliability of the precise dollars 
amounts pledged and disbursed by every donor. Nevertheless, because 
these are the only available data and are used by the Department of 
State, we present the dollar amounts reported to have been pledged and 
disbursed by each donor in appendix V.

To examine the results of assistance projects through September 30, 
2003, we collected and analyzed information from the Departments of 
State and Defense, and USAID in Washington, D.C., which outlined policy 
goals, basic strategies, program objectives, and monitoring efforts. We 
also collected and analyzed pertinent reports and testimony these 
agencies presented to Congress. In October 2003, we traveled to 
Afghanistan to examine the implementation of USAID and the Department 
of Defense's assistance-related operations. While in country, we spent 
13 days in the capital city, Kabul, interviewing officials from the 
Afghan Ministries of Finance, Health, Agriculture, and Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development; the Afghan commissions on Human Rights 
and the Judicial Reform; the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; the 
UN Development Program (UNDP); and the U.S. Departments of State and 
Defense and USAID. We also met with most of USAID's primary 
implementing partners (including the Louis Berger Group, Creative 
Associates, Management Sciences for Health, and Bearing Point) as well 
as nongovernmental organizations not funded by the United States, such 
as the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and the Danish 
Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees. In Kabul, we inspected 
Afghanistan's new banking system, customs house, and the rehabilitation 
of the Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital. We also spent a total of 7 days 
in the Bamian, Kunduz, and Hirat provinces, where we inspected U.S.-
funded projects, implemented primarily by either the OTI or the 
Department of Defense's PRTs. While in the provinces, we met with an 
Afghan shura (community council), teachers, and other community members 
involved in, or affected by, U.S. reconstruction projects. Constraints 
placed on our movement within Afghanistan by the U.S. Embassy due to 
security concerns limited the number of project sites we could visit.

To analyze the assistance coordination mechanisms developed by the U.S. 
government and the international community, we met with Department of 
State staff responsible for assistance coordination and staff from 
USAID, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health 
and Human Services, Labor, Treasury, and State involved in the 
provision of assistance, to obtain their views on coordination. In 
addition, we reviewed the U.S. National Security Strategy, the 
Department of State/USAID consolidated strategic plan for 2004-2009, 
the President's Security Strategy for Afghanistan, the U.S. Embassy 
Kabul Mission Performance Plan, and USAID's strategy and action plan 
for Afghanistan. Using the criteria contained in the U.S. Government 
Performance and Results Act and USAID Automated Directives System, we 
examined USAID strategies to determine whether they contained the basic 
elements of an operational strategy articulated in the act and in 
agency guidance. Our analysis of international coordination mechanisms 
included a review of UN and Afghan government documents, including the 
Afghan National Development Framework and Budget, pertaining to the 
international coordination mechanisms utilized in Afghanistan in fiscal 
years 2002-2003. In addition, we met with officials from the Afghan 
Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Health, and Rural Rehabilitation 
and Development to obtain their views on the evolution and status of 
the consultative group mechanism.

To analyze the obstacles that affected the implementation of U.S. 
reconstruction assistance, we examined analyses of common obstacles 
found in postconflict environments produced by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, the World Bank, Stanford University, and the RAND Corporation. 
We also reviewed as previous GAO work on the subject. We then compared 
those obstacles with the conditions present in Afghanistan in fiscal 
years 2002-2003. In addition, we reviewed reports produced by the 
Departments of Defense and State, the UN, the International Crisis 
Group, Human Rights Watch, the Bonn International Center for 
Conversion, as well as a U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime report on opium 
production in Afghanistan. To analyze other obstacles, including the 
lack of staff, equipment, and funding, we spoke with officials from the 
Department of Defense and USAID. In addition, we examined appropriation 
legislation, USAID's Congressional Budget Justifications, and the 
Inspector General's risk assessment of major activities managed by 
USAID/Afghanistan. Finally, we visited the USAID mission in Kabul, 
Afghanistan, and PRTs in Bamian, Kunduz, and Hirat, Afghanistan.

We conducted our review from August 2003-April 2004 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Summary of the Key Provisions of the Bonn Agreement: 

After coalition forces ousted the Taliban government, the United 
Nations (U.N.) convened four Afghan groups to establish a blueprint for 
a power-sharing, interim government;[Footnote 60] the Taliban were not 
included in these talks. The resulting document, officially entitled 
the "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the 
Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," commonly 
called the Bonn Agreement or the Bonn Accord, was signed in Bonn, 
Germany on December 5, 2001.

I. General provisions: 

* Establish an Interim Authority by December 22, 2001.

* Establish the composition, functions, and governing procedures for 
the interim administration.

* Convene an emergency loya jirga,[Footnote 61] or grand council, 
within 6 months of December 22, 2001 to decide on the Transitional 
Authority, which will govern until the Afghan population elects a 
representative government.

* Decide on a Transitional Authority by the emergency loya jirga until 
such time as a fully representative government can be elected through 
free and fair elections within 2 years of the convening of the 
emergency loya jirga.

* Hold constitutional loya jirga to establish a new constitution within 
18 months of December 22, 2001.

II. Legal framework and judicial system: 

* The 1964 constitution and existing laws and regulations should be 
applied until the new constitution is written, excepting: 

* where provisions of 1964 constitution are inconsistent with the Bonn 
Agreement, or relate to the monarchy or constitutional, executive, and 
legislative bodies: 

* where existing laws and regulations are inconsistent with the Bonn 
Agreement, Afghanistan's international legal obligations, or the 1964 
constitution.

* The interim authority shall have power to amend existing laws and 
regulations.

* Afghanistan shall have independent judicial power vested in a Supreme 
Court and other courts established by the Interim Administration. A 
Judicial Commission established by the Administration shall rebuild the 
justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international 
standards, the rule of law, and Afghan legal traditions.

III. Interim Administration: 

* Composition: A chairman will preside over the cabinet-style interim 
government, which includes five vice chairmen and 24 other members.

* Procedures: Decisions will be made by consensus, or by majority vote 
where necessary, as long as 22 members are present. If the vote is 
split equally, the chairman holds the deciding vote.

* Functions: The Interim Authority shall conduct the day-to-day affairs 
of state. Among other things, it may, with the assistance of the UN, 
establish a single national currency and a central bank, a Civil 
Service Commission, a Human Rights Commission, and any other commission 
to review matters not covered in the agreement.

IV. The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the 
Emergency Loya Jirga: 

* A 21-member, special, independent commission will be established to 
convene an emergency loya jirga within 6 months of the establishment of 
the Interim Authority. The emergency loya jirga will decide on a 
transitional authority to lead Afghanistan until a fully representative 
government is elected within 2 years of the convening of the loya 
jirga.

V. Final provisions: 

* Upon official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces, 
and armed groups shall come under the command and control of the 
Interim Authority.

* The Interim Authority and emergency Loya Jirga shall act in 
accordance with basic human rights and international humanitarian law.

* The Interim Authority shall cooperate in the fight against terrorism, 
drugs, and organized crime.

* The Interim Authority and Special Independent Commission for the 
convening of the emergency Loya Jirga shall ensure the participation of 
women and the equitable representation of all ethnic and religious 
communities in the Interim Authority and emergency Loya Jirga.

* The Interim Authority shall adhere to Security Council resolution 
1378.

* The Interim Authority shall elaborate on rules of procedure for the 
government as appropriate with UN guidance.

Annexes: I. International Security Force II. Role of the United Nations 
during the Interim Period III. Request to the United Nations by the 
Participants at the UN talks on Afghanistan IV. Composition of the 
Interim Administration: 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Summary of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002: 

Name: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, P.L. 107-327: 

Date: December 4, 2002: 

Major titles: 

I. Economic and Democratic Development Assistance for Afghanistan: 

II. Military Assistance for Afghanistan and Certain other Foreign 
 Countries and International Organizations: 

III. Miscellaneous provisions: 

Purposes: 

* Assure U.S. security.

* Address humanitarian crisis.

* Fight illicit narcotics.

* Promote a broad-based, multi-ethnic, gender-sensitive, and fully 
representative government.

* Support Afghan government's projects.

* Foster civil society.

* Support reconstruction (create jobs, clear landmines, rebuild the 
agriculture, health care and educational sectors).

* Provide resources to the Ministry for Women's Affairs.

* Foster a pluralistic society that respects religious freedom.

Major types of assistance authorized: 

* Urgent humanitarian needs: 

* Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDPs: 

* Counternarcotics efforts: 

* Reestablishment of food security, rehabilitation of the agriculture 
sector, improvement in health conditions and the reconstruction of 
basic infrastructure: 

* Reestablishment of Afghanistan as a viable nation-state: 

* Market economy: 

* Assistance to women and girls: 

Table 2: Total assistance authorized: $3.3 billion between FY 2003 and 
2006: 

Dollars in millions.

Development Assistance; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 425; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 425[A]; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 425; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 425; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 1,700.

Enterprise fund; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 300; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 0; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 0; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 300.

Security assistance; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 300[B]; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 0; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 0; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 300.

ISAF; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 500; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 500; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 0; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 1,000.

Total (per FY); 
Fiscal year: 2003: 1,525; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 925; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 425; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 425; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 3,300.

Source: GAO analysis of data contained in the Afghanistan Freedom 
Support Act of 2002.

Note: Rough Breakdown of Authorizations by Fiscal Year: 

[A] P.L. 108-106 Sec. 2214 increased the FY 04 allocation to $1.825 
billion.

[B] P.L. 108-106 Sec. 2206 amends this amount to $450 million.

Table 3: Earmarks: $170 million development assistance of $425 million 
total between FY 2003 and 2006: 

Dollars in millions.

UNDCP[A]; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 15; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 15; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 15; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 15; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 60.

Loya Jirga; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 0; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 30.

Women's Ministry; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 15; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 15; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 15; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 15; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 60.

NHRC[B]; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 5; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 5; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 5; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 5; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 20.

Total; 
Fiscal year: 2003: 45; 
Fiscal year: 2004: 45; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 45; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 35; 
Total over 4 fiscal years: 170.

Source: GAO analysis of data contained in the Afghanistan Freedom 
Support Act of 2002.

Note: Rough breakdown of earmarks for FY 2003-2006. Up to 7% of each 
earmark is allowed for federal agency administration costs. In this 
case, that would be $12 million.

[A] U.N. Drug Control Program.

[B] National Human Rights Commission (renamed Afghan Independent Human 
Rights Commission).

[End of table]
 
Coordination: 

Designate a coordinator within the Department of State to: 

* Design an overall strategy to advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan;

* Ensure coordination among U.S. agencies;

* Pursue coordination with other countries;

* Ensure proper management, implementation, and oversight of 
assistance; and,

* Resolve disputes among U.S. agencies with respect to Afghan 
assistance.

Strategies and Reports: 

Table 4: Required strategies and reports to be submitted to the House 
Committee on International Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, and both Appropriations committees: 

Section 206: Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other 
assistance in Afghanistan: c(1)(A) Security strategy, Immediate and 
long-term needs (updating strategies required by P.L. 107-206)[A]; 
Schedule: 60 days after enactment of act; 
Approximate deadlines: Section 206: Feb. 2003.

Section 206: Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other 
assistance in Afghanistan: c(1)(B) Description of progress towards 
poppy eradication; 
Schedule: 60 days after enactment of act; 
Approximate deadlines: Section 206: Feb. 2003.

Section 206: Promoting secure delivery of humanitarian and other 
assistance in Afghanistan: c(2) Security strategy implementation 
reports; 
Schedule: Every 6 months through 1/07; 
Approximate deadlines: June and Dec. 2003-2007.

Section 303: Donor contributions to Afghanistan: c(1) Initial report 
(strategy and progress); 
Schedule: 60 days after enactment; 
Approximate deadlines: Feb. 2003.

Section 303: Donor contributions to Afghanistan: Contributions status; 
Schedule: 90 days thereafter every 180 days through 12/31/04; 
Approximate deadlines: 4/03, 10/ 03, 4/04, 10/04.

Source: GAO analysis of data contained in the Afghanistan Freedom 
Support Act of 2002.

[A] P.L. 107-206 2002 (Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States 
(required separate strategies for immediate security needs and long-
term security needs.

[End of table]

Sunset: 

Authority expires after September 30, 2006.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Fiscal Years 2002-2003 Obligations and Expenditures for 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance by U.S. Agencies: 

Dollars in millions.

Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 436.34; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 379.59; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 505.64; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 128.31.

Agency: Department of State: Bureau for Population, Refugees, and 
Migration; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 145.85; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 142.33; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 87.70; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 72.79.

Agency: Department of State: International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 33.59; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 20.86; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 0[A]; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 0.

Agency: Department of State: Other State; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 11.00; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 11.00; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 8.68; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 6.66.

Agency: Department of Defense; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 50.90; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 50.90; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 20.27; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 13.58.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 2.74; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 2.74; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 5.61; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 5.61.

Agency: Department of Agriculture; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 40.31; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 27.67; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 29.36; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 10.85.

Agency: Department of Labor; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 6.30; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 0; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 0.57.

Agency: U.S. Trade and Development Agency; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 0.35; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0.35; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 3.17; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 1.59.

Agency: Department of Treasury; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 0.55; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0.46; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 1.12; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 0.64.

Agency: Broadcasting Board of Governors; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 28.51; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 14.09; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 7.40; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 6.67.

Agency: Overseas Private Investment Corporation; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 0; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 0; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 3.02; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 3.02.

Agency: Total; 
Fiscal year 2002: Obligations: 756.44; 
Fiscal year 2002: Expenditures: 649.99; 
Fiscal year 2003: Obligations: 671.97; 
Fiscal year 2003: Expenditures: 250.29.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. agency data.

[A] INL neither received nor requested funding for fiscal 2003.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Major Donors' Reported Pledges and Disbursements for 
Assistance to Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002-2003: 

Dollars in millions.

United States; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 3300; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 1428.

Japan; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 500; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 448.

European Commission; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 1245; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 386.

United Kingdom; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 331; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 190.

Germany; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 379; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 171.

Canada; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 273; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 129.

Netherlands; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 162; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 103.

World Bank; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 600; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 89.

Saudi Arabia; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 220; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 78.

Spain; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 148; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 77.

Italy; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 99; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 70.

United Arab Emirates; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 70; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 70.

India; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 310; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 69.

Norway; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 93; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 63.

Sweden; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 142; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 45.

Denmark; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 106; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 45.

Iran; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 500; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 33.

China; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 152; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 30.

France; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 62; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 30.

Kuwait; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 45; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 20.

Qatar; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 20; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 20.

Australia; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 20; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 20.

Pakistan; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 100; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 18.

Finland; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 32; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 13.

Belgium; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 34; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 12.

Asian Development Bank; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 610; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 11.

Austria; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 12; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 11.

South Korea; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 45; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 10.

Ireland; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 12; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 10.

Switzerland; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 25; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 9.

Luxembourg; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 5; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 4.

Turkey; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 15; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 3.

Greece; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 5; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 2.

Portugal; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 5; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 2.

Russia[B]; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 60; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 0.

Oman; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 6; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 0.

Total; 
Total pledges since 2001[A]: 9,743; 
Total disbursed since 2001: 3,719. 

Sources: Department of State, Asian Development Bank: 

Notes: Figures cited relate to humanitarian and reconstruction 
donations only; military donor contributions are not included.

GAO was not able to determine the reliability of the specific dollar 
figures in this table. While we determined that the data are 
sufficiently reliable for broadly comparing U.S. contributions to those 
of major donors, we noted several limitations, namely (a) that they are 
affected by differences in exchange rates, (b) donors both over-and 
under-report due to varying definitions of disbursement, and (c) the 
data on larger donors are considered more reliable than the data on 
smaller donors.

[A] Pledges are inclusive from 2001-2003 and have a disbursement range 
of 1-6 years depending on donor.

[B] Russian assistance has been primarily in-kind donations.: 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State:

Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:

Washington, D.C. 20520	
MAY 21 2004:

Ms. Jacqueline Williams-Bridgers 
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade 
General Accounting Office 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "AFGHANISTAN 
RECONSTRUCTION: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have 
Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed," GAO Job Code 
320210.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Tim 
Wilder, Deputy Director, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, at 
(202) 647-5267.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Christopher B. Burnham: 

cc:	GAO - Dave Bruno 
SA - William Taylor 
State/OIG - Mark Duda 
State/H - Paul Kelly:

Department of State Comments on the GAO Draft Report Afghanistan 
Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have 
Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed (GAO Job Code 
320210):

The Department has reviewed the draft report regarding obstacles to 
progress in Afghanistan. While we concur with much that is in the 
report, we would emphasize that despite security and other challenges, 
significant progress has been made not only with respect to 
humanitarian and short-term assistance but also in advancing long-term 
security, reconstruction and governance objectives. Notably, the Afghan 
National Army has reached an operational strength of over 8,000 
soldiers and continues to grow steadily in capacity, recently deploying 
to provincial centers. It is being joined by a rapidly growing police 
force that now numbers over 6,000 and will number 20,000 this summer. 
Reconstruction progress has not been limited to the Kabul-Kandahar-
Herat road, but -as the report acknowledges -includes the construction 
of over 200 schools, rehabilitation of over 163 health facilities and 
rehabilitation of over 7000 rural irrigation structures.	These are not 
minor achievements, and they are joined by many more (also referenced 
in the report). Most remarkable, given Afghanistan's tortured political 
history, has been the progress toward democratic governance --with a 
constitution ratified in January and over 2.3 million voters registered 
to participate, to date, in elections scheduled for September 2004.

The Department takes issue with the report's assertion that the United 
States lacks a complete and integrated assistance strategy. On December 
15, 2003 the Department submitted to Congress its report on the "FY 
2004 Strategic and Financial Plan for Reconstruction and Related 
Activities in Afghanistan." The Department's Report explains that:

"In concert with Afghan leaders and international partners, the United 
States is pursuing a three fold, integrated strategy in Afghanistan, 
focusing on security, reconstruction and governance. Pursued in 
parallel, these three elements are mutually reinforcing and promise to 
create a virtuous cycle as (1) improved security creates conditions for 
accelerated reconstruction and stronger government, (2) reconstruction 
boosts stability and confidence in the government by delivering 
benefits to citizens and (3) as the growth of constitutional, 
democratic and effective government discredits those who would return 
Afghanistan to the anarchy and violence of the past."

This three-fold strategy has long underpinned U.S. assistance to 
Afghanistan and is bearing fruit, as attested by progress already 
noted.

The GAO report recommends that the Department of State produce (1) an 
annual consolidated budget report and (2) semiannual reports to 
Congress on obligations and expenditures for U.S. Assistance to 
Afghanistan. These recommendations appear to be related to the judgment 
that the "U.S. coordinator for assistance to Afghanistan, as well as 
others responsible for the coordination of U.S. assistance, lacked 
complete and accurate financial data in fiscal years 2002-2003." If so, 
we would emphasize that there is close inter-agency collaboration on 
all funding issues and the Coordinator and other policy makers are 
provided with a chart that tracks all U.S. obligations and available 
resources on a week-to-week basis - a chart that is available to 
Congress on request. Progress toward specific sectoral objectives is 
also carefully tracked on a month-to-month basis. The report notes the 
weekly meetings of Department Deputies to review progress and set 
priorities relating to Afghanistan. It neglects to mention the daily 
meetings of the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG), which 
has led to virtually seamless working-level coordination among DoD, 
State, Treasury, USAID, the NSC, OMB and other agencies on the full 
range of policy and programming issues, including funding. Congress is 
also kept regularly informed, at the staff level, at hearings and 
through numerous congressionally mandated reports, including the report 
cited above.

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID:

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:

MAY 19 2004:

Mr. David Gootnick, Director 
International Affairs and Trade 
General Accounting Office 
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Gootnick:

USAID welcomes the opportunity to respond to the audit report on 
Afghanistan Reconstruction. On balance, we think the audit report 
presents a fair picture of the situation in Afghanistan at the end of 
fiscal year 2003 when 
USAID's large reconstruction efforts were just getting underway. This 
letter will bring you up to date on the progress made since then. My 
comments will follow the order of the presentation in the report.

To begin, USAID is very proud that its early humanitarian assistance 
averted a famine in Afghanistan in the winter of 2002-3. This enormous 
effort saved countless lives and earned the United States tremendous 
good will.

We have taken measures to address the shortcomings noted in the report. 
For example:

* USAID now requires standard signage on all our projects that gives 
credit to the Governments of the United States and Afghanistan. A 
reproduction of the standard signage is attached hereto.

* USAID has signed agreements with five additional implementing 
organizations to speed up progress constructing and rehabilitating 
schools and clinics.

* One hundred percent of FY 2003 funds and nearly 70% of FY 2004 funds 
are now obligated. Obligation figures are updated monthly for the 
Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group chaired by the State 
Department's Coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and the 
NSC in order to provide timely financial management information to aid 
interagency decision making.

* USAID staff in Afghanistan has grown from the 39 reported in the 
audit to 59 today (including six assigned to PRTs around the country). 
Office and living space also expanded when USAID was allotted space at 
Camp Phoenix, a U.S. military facility approximately 13 kilometers from 
the Embassy compound. Next month, USAID and other agencies are 
scheduled to move into new temporary facilities across the street from 
the Embassy compound. Between Camp Phoenix and the new compound across 
from the Embassy, office and living space no longer limit the size of 
our staff recruitment in Afghanistan.

We can also update you on the significant progress of the major 
projects identified in the report.

* The second layer of paving on the Kabul-Kandahar highway will be 
complete on schedule, in October 2004. On the Kandahar-Herat portion, 
the highway contractor is now working on 100 kilometers and several 
bridges in Farah and Herat provinces. USAID is on schedule to finish 
its portion of the Kandahar-Herat highway (approximately 329 kms) by 
the end of 2005. Contractors are also grading and paving almost 500 
kilometers of secondary roads, primarily in the south and southeast, to 
connect provincial capitals and large towns to the new highway.

* Our health contractor has made grants to NGOs to operate clinics that 
will provide service to 4.8 million Afghans; trained, since September 
2003, 1,384 health workers (including 578 community health workers and 
midwives-a key staffing constraint in addressing maternal mortality), 
and started construction on 72 health centers. Another program is now 
underway to train 5,500 women in literacy as a first step towards their 
training as Community Health Workers; a second program will more than 
double the number of trained midwives in Afghanistan.

* Our agricultural contractors have initiated irrigation projects to 
improve irrigation on 301,000 hectares-half of which are now complete. 
Approximately 350,000 livestock have been vaccinated or treated; a 
microfinance program has disbursed 675 loans and trained 850 loan 
officers; and 137,000 farmers are now served by 350 new extension 
agents. Three agricultural market centers have been constructed; work 
is underway on an additional 65, and a total of 100 will be complete 
this summer. Thanks to USAID's support in the customs sector, the 
Afghan government surpassed its target for domestic revenue collection 
for the Afghan fiscal:

* year ended March 20, 2004, collecting 10,090,500,000 Afghanis ($201M). 
Our education contractor has greatly expanded the Accelerated Learning 
program for the 2004 school year: over 137,000 students are enrolled in 
17 provinces now-67% of the last group of enrollees were girls. 4,800 
teachers were trained in the past year and thousands more are listening 
regularly to the radio-based teacher training program, now being 
broadcast in six provinces through local radio stations, and nationwide 
by way of a national broadcaster. Nearly 17 million textbooks are being 
provided in 2004.

* In the justice sector, USAID has renovated 2 courthouses and work is 
underway on 6 more. We have trained 120 potential judges and 183 court 
staff.

* USAID supports the UN effort for the September 2004 Presidential and 
parliamentary elections through civic education, political party 
development, and elections registration and operational support. In the 
last two weeks of April, 1,100 civic education workshops were held in 
five provinces, with nearly 30,000 participants (of whom 31 % were 
women). A second effort trained 43,000 people (36% women) to explain 
the upcoming elections to their neighbors.

Finally, the report faults USAID for not preparing a strategic plan for 
its program in Afghanistan. As the report notes, we did prepare a 
strategy for Afghanistan early on, in July 2002, and we supplement it 
with project planning documents that include interim goals, indicators 
and specific results. The results for the most visible projects are 
tracked biweekly by the Deputies' Committee meeting chaired by the 
Deputy National Security Advisor at the White House. We think this 
level of planning and oversight is appropriate for the situation in 
Afghanistan and complies with agency directives on strategic planning. 
(The agency directives distinguish between "standard" and "interim" 
strategic plans. Countries in transition or experiencing high 
uncertainty because of drastic political, military, and/or economic 
events-like Afghanistan-are to prepare less comprehensive "interim" 
strategies.) The time and resources it would take to prepare the 
analyses required for a standard strategic plan was better spent 
directing the multitude of ongoing projects, so there was no "back 
sliding" on Afghanistan's progress. We are committed to developing a 
standard strategic plan for Afghanistan during 2004 now that our 
staffing in-country has reached adequate levels and a more permanent 
government has been established in Afghanistan.

In summary, USAID has made great progress since the end of FY 2003. 
Long term projects are showing impressive results and in-country 
staffing is growing steadily. This summer will be the busiest yet, in 
the lead up to the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. We are 
very proud of our contributions to date and look forward to sharing 
many more accomplishments with you in the coming months.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

John Marshall: 
Assistant Administrator Bureau for Management:

Enclosure: Photo of standard USAID/Afghanistan project signage.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

[End of section]

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

David Gootnick (202) 512-3149 John Hutton (202) 512-7773 David Bruno 
(202) 512-7280: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those named above, Miriam A. Carroll, Martin de 
Alteriis, Ernie Jackson, Reid Lowe, and Christina Werth made key 
contributions to this report.

(320210): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] Title I of P.L. 107-327 pertains to humanitarian and development 
assistance; Title II, to security assistance; and Title III, to 
miscellaneous provisions. As mandated by the act, this report focuses 
on Title I-related assistance. For the purposes of this report, 
humanitarian assistance refers to the provision of emergency assistance 
that meets people's needs for adequate water, sanitation, nutrition, 
food, shelter, and health care. Quick impact projects refer to short-
term assistance that helps transition Afghanistan from the humanitarian 
to development assistance--longer-term reconstruction projects.

[2] The U.S. fiscal year covers the 12-month period October 1 through 
September 30. In this report, "international community" is defined as 
the collective grouping of bilateral, multilateral, and international 
assistance agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

[3] This report refers to the Afghan Interim Authority and the 
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as the government of 
Afghanistan.

[4] President Karzai announced in March 2004 that the elections would 
be postponed until September 2004.

[5] USAID is the principal U.S. agency that provides foreign assistance 
to countries recovering from disaster, escaping poverty, and engaging 
in democratic reforms.

[6] The Bureau for Asia and the Near East is one of four USAID 
geographic bureaus that are responsible for activities in the countries 
within the geographic region. The USAID mission in Kabul, Afghanistan, 
falls under the jurisdiction of the bureau. The Bureau for Democracy, 
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance's mission is to save lives, 
alleviate suffering, support democracy, and promote opportunities for 
people adversely affected by poverty, conflict, natural disasters, and 
a breakdown of good governance. OTI provides short-term assistance to 
pre-and posttransition countries experiencing significant political 
change or facing critical threats to stability and democratic reform. 

[7] See appendix IV for a list of the agencies and their assistance 
funding.

[8] For the purposes of this report, obligations are defined as amounts 
of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and similar 
transactions during a given period that will require payments during 
the same or a future period.

[9] According to State officials,the Department of State does not track 
international obligations and expenditures and defines disbursements as 
monies that have moved beyond pledges. In this report, we consider an 
international disbursement as including both obligations and 
expenditures. See appendix V for detailed information on international 
pledges and disbursements.

[10] For the purposes of this report, expenditures are defined as the 
issuance of checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of 
funds made to liquidate a federal obligation.

[11] USAID obligation data is from an agency database as of Sept. 17, 
2003. The agency's database does not include the additional $150 
million that were obligated in the last 13 days of fiscal year 2003. 
According to USAID, the share of funding per province would have 
remained relatively constant over the 13 days. The Department of 
Defense obligations are as of December 2003. Defense officials stated 
they could not break out the funds by fiscal year.

[12] Afghanistan has 32 provinces. Only 1 province, Nuristan, received 
no assistance at the provincial level, although it may have benefited 
from national programs.

[13] The Center on International Cooperation is a nongovernmental 
organization that seeks to inform public debate by examining 
international justice, humanitarian assistance, and postconflict 
peace-building.

[14] Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
of 1954 as amended (P.L. 480) authorizes USAID to donate agricultural 
commodities to meet international emergency relief requirements and 
carry out nonemergency feeding programs overseas. The U.S. Department 
of Agriculture provides surplus commodities to countries under section 
416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949. U.S. contributions consist of 
in-kind donations of commodities such as white wheat and cash donations 
to cover the cost of transporting the commodities from the United 
States to Afghanistan. 

[15] Between October and December 2001, the Department of Defense also 
dropped 2,489,880 humanitarian daily rations, each of which contained a 
complete set of meals for one day for one person, totaling 
approximately 2,200 calories. The Department of Defense stated the 
total cost of the ration effort to be $50,897,769.

[16] For additional information on U.S. food and agriculture assistance 
to Afghanistan in fiscal years 2002--2003, see U.S. General Accounting 
Office, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to 
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability, GAO-03-607 
(Washington, D.C.: June 2003).

[17] OTI works to strengthen the Afghan government's capacity to govern 
effectively and accountably; expand citizen and community participation 
in decision making; support voices of moderation and peace; and 
increase the availability and quality of public information. 

[18] In each PRT, a military civil affairs team is responsible for 
implementing aid projects.

[19] Policy Brief: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Security 
Situation in Afghanistan (Kabul: July 24, 2003.) Agency Coordinating 
Body for Afghan Relief is a nongovernmental organization coordinating 
body in Afghanistan with a membership of 68 international and Afghan 
nongovernmental organizations.

[20] Originally, USAID planned to conduct projects in four sectors: 
agriculture, education, health, and democracy. However, its priorities 
changed over time; the first long-term projects were implemented in the 
infrastructure and economic governance sectors.

[21] The first phase of the Kabul-Kandahar highway was inaugurated on 
Dec. 16, 2003.

[22] The total length of the highway is 482 kilometers. The Japanese 
aid agency repaired an additional 50 kilometers leading into Kandahar. 
The remaining 43 kilometers had been repaired under the Taliban.

[23] USAID's teacher training program has two facets: (1) a "master 
trainer" seminar for educators, who in turn are expected to educate 
other teachers in their vicinity with the new teaching methods, and (2) 
a distance-learning curriculum in which teacher classes are broadcast 
over the radio. The distance-learning radio shows began broadcasting in 
August 2003.

[24] Afghanistan's Minister of Agriculture estimated that the country 
needed about 500,000 metric tons of fertilizer for the 2002-2003 crop 
year.

[25] Italy is the lead nation for judicial sector reconstruction.

[26] The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 authorized $15 million 
to be appropriated for programs to assist Afghan women and girls.

[27] Under the Taliban regime, girls were not allowed to attend school. 
Consequently, many girls are older than the average age for their 
education level. The accelerated learning program attempts to bring 
them up to speed and reintegrate the girls into regular classroom 
settings.

[28] In 2003, USAID and the Department of State began placing staff in 
PRTs in part to improve coordination and assist in project selection.

[29] In previous analyses of postconflict assistance efforts, we found 
that a strategy that both looks beyond a country's immediate situation 
and operationalizes ongoing efforts is essential for effectively 
implementing an assistance program. From 1994 to 2004, We have done 
extensive work assessing postconflict assistance. Our report, Foreign 
Assistance: Observations on Postconflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Afghanistan, GAO-03-980T (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003), 
summarizes the broad issues identified and contains a bibliography of 
selected postconflict-related reports.

[30] The National Security Strategy, published in September 2002, 
broadly presents the United States' core national security objectives 
and includes foreign assistance as one of a wide range of initiatives 
to achieve these objectives. The latest consolidated Department of 
State/USAID strategic plan, published in August 2003, supports the 
National Security Strategy, presents worldwide priorities for both 
organizations, and includes four broad objectives for Afghanistan. 
Country-specific strategies are intended to support the broader goals 
contained in the National Security Strategy and Department of State/
USAID strategic plan.

[31] See Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, Title II, Section 
206(c)(1)(A). The act also requires that the President semiannually 
submit to the congressional committees cited in the act a status report 
on the implementation of the strategy.

[32] A mission performance plan is an authoritative, integrated 
interagency country strategy document, prepared by the U.S. embassy 
country team. Despite the agriculture sector's importance to 
Afghanistan's recovery and one of the major sectors targeted by USAID, 
the performance plan completed in June 2003 does not address 
rehabilitation of Afghanistan's agriculture sector.

[33] All of these components are required in USAID's standard strategic 
plans. USAID directives allow the use of interim strategic plans in 
countries experiencing high uncertainty because of drastic political, 
military, and/or economic events. According to USAID directives, a 
strategy should be developed prior to the implementation of assistance 
activities. Waivers are available for countries with special foreign 
policy interest, are valid for 1 year, and can be renewed annually. See 
USAID Guidelines for Strategic Plans (Washington, D.C.: February 1995); 
USAID Functional Series 200-Programming Policy Automated Directives 
System 201-Planning (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

[34] Section 201.3.4.5 of the USAID Automated Directives System 
provides that in special foreign policy situations where activities 
must be initiated prior to completion and approval of a strategic plan, 
a temporary 1-year exemption may be issued.

[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Internal Control: Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

[36] In December 2003, the Department of State began collecting 
obligation data from U.S. agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan. 
However, Department of State officials acknowledged that the obligation 
tracking efforts do not include all U.S. government agencies and are 
not updated on a regularly scheduled basis. In addition, the agency 
tracks only obligation, not expenditure, data.

[37] According to the UN, assistance coordination refers to a recipient 
government's integration of donor assistance into national development 
goals and strategies.

[38] United Nations, Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for 
the Afghan People (January 17, 2002).

[39] Consultative group is a World Bank term used to describe a process 
of consultations between the government of a recipient developing 
nation and the international community. Typically, the process involves 
monthly group meetings in country on sectoral or thematic issues. Such 
working groups bring together interested parties, including ministry 
representatives, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and UN 
agencies, to discuss strategic planning and improve coordination.

[40] Additional U.S. efforts to coordinate its assistance with that of 
the international community and the Afghan government included the 
biweekly humanitarian assistance conference call among relevant Afghan 
government, U.S., and international organizations providing 
humanitarian assistance and the Department of Defense's Civil Military 
Coordination cell located in Kabul. The cell's role is to coordinate 
PRT assistance efforts with the Afghan government.

[41] According to the World Bank, of the 52 countries that have 
experienced civil conflict since 1960, 44 percent relapsed into 
violence within 5 years.

[42] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Observations 
on Postconflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, GAO-03-
980T (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003).

[43] As of July 2003, the International Security Assistance Force 
reported having approximately 4,600 troops located in Kabul. These 
troops provide security only for the city of Kabul and the immediate 
vicinity. The bombing killed 4 soldiers and wounded 29 others.

[44] The Japanese government leads demobilization efforts.

[45] In 2001, the United States estimated that the Taliban collected at 
least $40 million in taxes on opium.

[46] Revenue to farmers was estimated at $1.2 billion, while revenue to 
traffickers was estimated to be $1.3 billion. Total income from opium 
cultivation and trafficking accounted for approximately 40-60 percent 
of Afghanistan's gross domestic product and is roughly equal to the 
value of Afghanistan's legitimate trade.

[47] Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report-2003 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).

[48] On January 17, 2002, the President of Afghanistan issued a decree 
stating that the existence of an opium-based economy was a matter of 
national security and should be fought by all means. In October 2002, 
the Afghan government instituted a Counter-Narcotics Directorate within 
its National Security Council to coordinate counternarcotics efforts. 
In May 2003, the President of Afghanistan signed a national 
counternarcotics strategy.

[49] The United Kingdom is the lead nation for counternarcotics efforts 
in Afghanistan. U.S. efforts included several alternative development/
crops projects, including a program intended to restore cotton 
production in Helmand province, the traditional center of opium 
production in Afghanistan.

[50] U.S. Agency for International Development, Risk Assessment of 
Major Activities Managed by USAID/Afghanistan, 5-306-03-001-S (Manila: 
USAID, 2003).

[51] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Strategic 
Workforce Planning Can Help Address Current and Future Challenges, GAO-
03-946 (Washington, D.C.; Aug. 22, 2003).

[52] USAID considers monitoring of its assistance effort critical for 
measuring the achievement of program outputs and results.

[53] IOM was established in 1951 as an intergovernmental organization 
to resettle European displaced persons, refugees, and migrants. Today 
it engages in a variety of migration management activities throughout 
the world.

[54] The distance between Hirat and Chaghcharan is approximately 200 
miles.

[55] To expedite its program in Afghanistan, USAID obtained waivers 
that authorized, among other things, other than fully competitive 
procedures for awarding grants and cooperative agreements, and for the 
procurement of goods and services. According to USAID documents, these 
waivers allowed USAID to award its contracts for infrastructure 
reconstruction and economic governance within 5 and 6 weeks, 
respectively. 

[56] In late March 2003, President Karzai announced that the election 
would be postponed until September 2004.

[57] The "Accelerating Success" program provides an extra $1.63 
billion, in addition to the regular fiscal 2004 request, and $135 
million in drawdown authority provided in the Afghanistan Freedom 
Support Act.

[58] The international community at a conference in Dubai pledged 
approximately $125 million in new money in late 2003. Consequently, the 
United States encouraged other donors to accelerate the rate at which 
they give their initial pledges so that the impact of reconstruction 
can be felt before Afghanistan's 2004 elections.

[59] Japan assumed responsibility for the remaining 50 kilometers 
leading into Kandahar. The remaining 43 kilometers had been repaired 
during the Taliban rule.

[60] Afghanistan comprises both settled and nomadic populations, 
multiple religious and ethnic groups, and refugees. A new 
representative government would need to incorporate all of these 
groups.

[61] A loya jirga is a traditional grand assembly of elders, which has 
been used in Afghanistan for centuries.

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