U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

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A Closer Look 
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Street Gangs and 
Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving 
with Network Analysis 
 
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by: Jean M. McGloin 
University of Maryland


Street Gangs and 
Interventions: 

Innovative Problem Solving 
with Network Analysis 

by: 
Jean M. McGloin 
University of Maryland 

This project was supported by cooperative agreement #2003CKWX068 by the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. 
The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to 
specific companies, products, or services should not be considered an 
endorsement of the product by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues. 


Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
Acknowledgements 
The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and help offered by Dr. Scott Decker, 
Dr. George L. Kelling, Dr. Anthony A. Braga, and the anonymous peer reviewers. The 
research described here was completed as part of the North Jersey Gang Task Force 
under the direction of the Police Institute, at Rutgers University-Newark. The author 
also wishes to acknowledge the panelists and members at the National Gang Executive 
Session II, hosted by Chief William J. Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department and 
supported by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services. The National Gang Executive Session II focused on intervention and 
prevention programs designed to address gang crime through innovative partnerships 
with law enforcement. The influential dialogue among the participants was an 
essential component to the development of this publication. A special thank you to the 
planning committee members: Joan Brody, Jean Chan, Frank Hartmann, Dr. George 
Kelling, Sergeant Sean Malinowksi, and Michael Seelman. 
Abstract 
This paper briefly reviews the range of prevention, intervention, suppression, and 
comprehensive strategies, providing examples of each type. It then offers a case study 
of problem analysis in Newark, New Jersey. The Greater Newark Safer Cities Initiative 
(GNSCI) began in 1996 as a collaborative effort among law enforcement, community 
groups, social service agencies, clergy, and Rutgers University to address and temper 
the local violence problem. By 2003, the partners in GNSCI expressed concern over a 
perceived growth in street gangs and related crime. Accordingly, the North Jersey Gang 
Task Force emerged under the framework and from the existing partnerships of GNSCI. 
This paper discusses the unique utility of network analysis in the resultant problem 
analysis and underscores the important role of an academic research partner. Finally, 
the paper considers the importance of sustainability with regard to problem analysis. 
iii 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
1 
Introduction 
In light of the growing numbers, geographical spread, and demographic 
changes of street gangs in the 1990s, many consider them to be 
worthy of law enforcement attention, regardless of locale. Indeed, 
though most gangs exist in urban environments and are populated by 
minority males, they are not limited to such locations or such members.1 
The age range of gang members appears to be broadening, and many 
gangs seem to illustrate greater gender and ethnic diversity.2 In 
addition, as the number of gangs and gang members within urban 
environments has increased they have also spread across the country 
into rural areas.3 Finally, the line between prison and street gangs is 
becoming muddied as gang members flow in and out of the correctional 
system.4 Certainly, law enforcement has a difficult task in attempting to 
address this evolving and longstanding problem. This task is not 
necessarily more difficult than the new problems that are confronting 
local law enforcement, such as internet crime and terrorism. Still, the 
enduring nature of street gangs, as well as their diverse and dynamic 
nature, poses a unique challenge. 
Turning to the existing research only serves to underscore their 
complicated nature by highlighting variation in gang type, membership, 
and crime. Indeed, there are many gang varieties. Often, points of 
difference include size, longevity, level of organization, demographic 
characteristics, and favored criminal behavior (if any is discernable).5 
Other research has shed light on variation in the levels of gang 
membership.6 Consistent with the finding that full-fledged gang 
membership often is a gradual, social process,7 there are distinctions in 
the level to which individuals are affiliated with, or involved in, street 
gangs. These increasing levels of affiliation are positively related to 
increasing levels of criminal behavior, stressing the fact that even 
youths who are not members, but only associates of a gang, evidence 
more criminal behavior than those who are not involved. In short, the 
range of problems that may face law enforcement with street gangs is 
vast when considering the various gang types, levels of membership, 
and crimes that can emerge. 

COPS Innovations 
2 
Academics, law enforcement, and citizens agree that street gangs can have a 
significantly damaging impact on a community and its residents. Gangs 
play a role in firearm transactions and violence, drug sales and use, 
home invasions, car theft, homicide, and/or a general decline in the 
quality of life, along with a number of other crime problems. These issues 
are not necessarily new to law enforcementindeed, the relatively small 
number of the most problematic gang members who often underlie such 
issues are typically well-known among criminal justice agenciesbut 
the nature of gang involvement often requires a particular (i.e., "value-
added") understanding. Just as law enforcement engages in problem-
oriented policing for particular crime problems, they should likewise 
attempt a problem analysis of the involved street gangs. This is 
particularly important because gangs are unique phenomena, particular 
to time and place.8 Failing to undertake an appropriate problem analysis, 
not only of the specific crime problem at hand, whether car theft, 
firearm violence, or other crimes, but also of the gang landscape may 
result in a futile, even harmful, response strategy. For example, one 
strategy in Nevada relied on the incorrect notion that local gangs were 
similar to those in Los Angeles. It is no surprise, therefore, that it was 
ineffective.9 
Prevention, Intervention, Suppression, and Comprehensive Strategies 
The options before law enforcement when attempting to address a street 
gang problem(s) exist on a large spectrum, with regard to both goals and 
tactics. This is logical, given the previously mentioned variety of 
potential problems. As others have noted,10 programs may range from 
prevention, to intervention, to suppression, to comprehensive strategies. 
These different categories have the aim of reducing problems associated 
with street gangs, but the manner by which they do that, and the exact 
nature of the problems of interest, deserve brief elaboration. Figure 1 
illustrates this spectrum. In particular, this figure shows that prevention 
and intervention/suppression programs typically respond to different 
levels of risk and problems. It also details the different focus of these 
techniques and how comprehensive strategies rely on a combination of 
tactics. The forthcoming paragraphs explain this spectrum in more 
detail. 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
Figure 1. A Schematic of Prevention, Intervention, Suppression, and 
Comprehensive Programs. 
3 
Some risk (sometimes minimal) 
exists (e.g., local youth are at 
risk for joining street gangs; 
there is a risk for street gangs to 
emerge and/or grow in a 
particular geographic location) 
Risk has manifested into 
an actual problem (e.g., the 
emergence and continuation 
of local street gangs; increased 
gang membership and violence 
among local youth) 
Prevention Programs Intervention and Suppression 
Programs 
Attempt to prevent Tend to have a Tend to be law 
gang membership, gang social service enforcement-
crime, and/or gang orientation; focus based; focus on 
emergence/growth re-integrating suppressing 
gang members gangs and gang 
into the community activities 
Comprehensive Programs 
These programs combine intervention 
and suppression techniques, as well as 
(at times) prevention tactics; necessitate 
collaboration among numerous agencies 
and groups 

COPS Innovations 
First, prevention programs have the broadest audience of interest. Such 
strategies are typically aimed at groups that pose some risk, or more 
broadly, at general populations. For example, a prevention program may 
focus on preschool children who reside in gang neighborhoods before 
they show any symptoms of having joined the gang life. Such strategies 
rarely make divisions among the types of street gangs; the typical goal 
is to reduce gang membership regardless of category. Perhaps the best-
known gang prevention program is Gang Resistance Education And 
Training (G.R.E.A.T.), which has the aim of reducing the probability of 
youth joining a street gang. Evaluation results suggest that while 
G.R.E.A.T. has positive short term effects on gang-related behavior and 
attitudes, a four-year follow-up revealed no impact on gang membership 
or delinquent behavior.11 Still, G.R.E.A.T. was able to successfully 
change several risk factors (e.g., peer group associations and attitudes 
about gangs, law enforcement, and risk-seeking behaviors) associated 
with delinquency and gang membership."12 
Second, intervention strategies typically address individuals or places 
that have manifested some problem; that is, the situation has progressed 
past risk. In most cases, such programs attempt to persuade gang 
members or gang-affiliated youth to abandon their current lifestyle or to 
reduce gang-related crime. At this stage, defining the type of gang of 
interest, the level of individual involvement in the gang(s), as well as 
the specific problem of focus becomes extremely important and integral 
to any success. Intervention programs may include such tactics as a 
gang truce or the use of detached workers to persuade gang members to 
leave gang life and reintegrate into the community. One interesting 
intervention program moved the spotlight of the strategy away from the 
streets with the assumption that hospitals provided unique leverage to 
4 
The G.R.E.A.T. Program, administered by the Office of Justice Program's 
(OJP) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), is a school-based, law enforcement 
officer-instructed classroom curriculum. The program's primary objective is 
prevention and is intended as an immunization against delinquency, youth 
violence, and gang membership. G.R.E.A.T. lessons focus on providing life 
skills to students to help them avoid delinquent behavior and violence to solve 
problems. To learn more, go to http://www.great-online.org/. 
address gang problems. 


Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
In Oakland, California, a non-profit group helped to develop an 
emergency room-based intervention, entitled Caught in the Crossfire, 
aimed at reducing gang-related youth violence and death. The staff, 
which includes previous victims of violence, provides support and 
mentorship to victims of youth violence who are admitted to a local 
hospital. Beginning with bedside visits and extending into release, the 
staff works to identify the needs of the victim (e.g., employment, social 
services, mental health), prevent retaliation, and aid in his or her 
reintegration into the community. The staff also provides these services 
to local youth on probation for violent offenses. According to an 
evaluation, hospitalized youth who took part in the project were 70% 
less likely to be arrested and 60% less likely to evidence criminal 
involvement than hospitalized youth who did not partake in the 
program.13 
Third, suppression programs also have the aim of reducing gang 
activities, but they typically rely on the law as a guide and on criminal 
justice agencies as the primary, and often only, partners. These 
techniques characteristically depend on deterrence principles and often 
include law enforcement task forces or units, vertical prosecution, and 
sentencing enhancements. As with intervention programs, any success 
hinges on developing a plan based on a problem analysis to understand 
the gang problem in that jurisdiction. For example, in 1990, the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) launched Operation Cul-de-Sac 
(OCDS) in a community permeated by gangs and violent criminal 
activities. The strategy operated on the premise that gangs thrived on 
criminal opportunities and that if such opportunities could be "designed 
out", crime would decline. OCDS, therefore, erected traffic barriers to 
limit access to major roadways and the gang members' movement to hot 
spots of crime. By limiting direct access to such hot spots, the LAPD 
essentially created temporary cul-de-sacs, resulting in significantly 
fewer gang-related homicides and assaults. 
5 
Caught in the Crossfire is a program of Youth ALIVE!, a non-profit public 
health organization dedicated to reducing violent injuries and deaths among 
youth in California through education, prevention, and research. Youth ALIVE! 
works with communities most at risk for violence and seeks to empower 
residents to advocate for violence prevention, to address the social and 
emotional impact of violence in their communities, and make their 
communities safer places to live. To learn more, go to 
http://www.youthalive.org/caught.html. 

COPS Innovations 
In the summer of 2003, the city of Chicago began installing surveillance 
cameras as part of Operation Disruption, an aggressive use of 
surveillance to curb violent, often gang-related, crime. The cameras, 
which can swivel 360o and have the capacity to zoom in on objects of 
interest, can film in both day and night and serve to alert law enforcement 
to criminal activities. Like a somewhat similar strategy in Los Angeles, 
crime has declined since installation of the cameras, although it is 
unclear whether this is because of the program. To be sure, when 
operating alone, suppression techniques are rarely successful in the 
long term.14 Even if a program appears successful in the short term, 
gangs tend to endure because law enforcement can rarely eradicate them 
completely, nor do they have the resources to sustain such an intensive 
focus over time and across all gangs and gang members. In addition, 
crime may simply be displaced and there is the added risk of giving the 
gang a collective point of conflict, which may increase their cohesion 
and criminal activities. Suppression techniques certainly are important, 
but appear to provide the most benefit when part of a larger, 
comprehensive program that couples them with social intervention 
tactics.15 
6 
Operation Cul-De-Sac uses traffic barriers to block gang mobility, assuming 
that gang violence was partly the result of criminal opportunity. Law 
enforcement closed all major roads leading to and from the identified hotspots 
by placing freewaydividers at the end of the streets that led directly to the 
hotspots. This reconfiguration essentially created cul-de-sacs, which could 
hamper "hit-and-run" crimes such as drive-by shootings. For a detailed 
assessment of this and other youth gang prevention and suppression 
programs, go to the Office of Justice Program's (OJP) Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention's (OJJDP) Youth Gang Programs and 
Strategies (2000) at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/171154.pdf. 
Operation Disruption involves the use of portable units mounted on light poles 
and other fixtures in strategic locations. Each unit will be equipped with a 
variety of technologies, including cameras that have the ability to capture 
criminal activity blocks away. The goal of Operation Disruption is to create a 
visible crime deterrent in communities that have experienced a high incidence 
of violent crime. For more information, go to 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/police. 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
Finally, collaborative, comprehensive programs typically include 
prevention, intervention, and suppression techniques and hinge on the 
collective work of a variety of agencies, from criminal justice, to social 
service, to mental health, to faith-based groups. Though they often 
require intensive resources and time, such programs appear to be the 
most promising in areas that have an array of problems surrounding a 
gang problem and fit well within an existing community policing 
framework and philosophy. In addition, should a particular gang pose 
numerous problems, such as intense gang recruitment in schools, drug 
sales, and gang-related homicides, it may require a variety of techniques 
and partners to best address the issues at hand. Each agency has certain 
leverage and resources that can serve the problem and complement 
those of its partners. Perhaps the best-known comprehensive program is 
the Boston Gun Project, both for its innovation and success.16 
The Boston Gun Project and the consequent Operation Ceasefire began 
as an attempt to develop, initiate and evaluate an intervention aimed at 
addressing the dramatic increase in local youth violence. The 
partnerships that formed the base of this strategy (in both the analysis 
and implementation phases) included local, state, and federal criminal 
justice agencies (e.g., law enforcement, probation, prosecution, parole), 
social service agencies, academic researchers, as well as community and 
faith-based groups. After an in-depth analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data, the project selected a strategy of focused deterrence that 
combined suppressive and social intervention techniques. In combination 
with a focus on shutting down the city's illegal firearms trafficking, 
Operation Ceasefire relied on the tactic of "pulling levers." When a gang 
came into focus because of violent behavior, the relevant partners would 
pull every potential criminal justice sanction "lever" for that particular 
gang and/or gang member(s). At the same time, opportunities for, and 
access to, social services were made available to gang members to support 
an alternative to life in the gang. An evaluation found that Operation 
Ceasefire was associated with a decline in youth homicide, firearm 
assaults, and "shots-fired" calls for service.17 
7 
The Boston Gun Project was a problem-oriented policing initiative expressly aimed 
at taking on a serious, large-scale crime problem  homicide victimization among 
young people in Boston. Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and directed 
by David M. Kennedy, Anthony A. Braga, and Anne M. Piehl of Harvard University's 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Project began in early 1995 and 
implemented what is now known as the "Operation Ceasefire" intervention, which 
began in the late spring of 1996. Operation Ceasefire was an innovative partnership 
between researchers and practitioners brought together to assess the city's youth 
homicide problem and implement an intervention designed to have a substantial 
near-term impact on the problem. For more information, go to 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/research/bpg.htm. 

COPS Innovations 
This comprehensive framework, which is mirrored in Project Safe 
Neighborhoods and the Office of Justice Program's (OJP) Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's (OJJDP) Comprehensive 
Gang Model, has been replicated across many sites, including Indianapolis, 
Minneapolis, and Los Angeles.18 Also known as the Spergel Model of Gang 
Intervention and Suppression, the OJJDP model was named after Dr. Irving 
Spergel of the University of Chicago, who directed the initial phase of the 
project. The model calls for a team of community agencies and organizations 
to deliver five core strategies through an integrated approach: community 
mobilization; social intervention, including street outreach; provision of 
opportunities; suppression; and organizational change. 
The Need for Problem Analysis 
Many gang programs are interesting and hold promise, but this should 
not be taken as a signal for the immediate adoption of particular tactics 
or of their long-term effectiveness. Articles or reports rarely define the 
problem that a strategy is meant to address, seldom describe the 
program in full detail, and rarely contain an evaluation. As with any 
issue before law enforcement, an effective strategy must be rooted in a 
preceding problem analysis that takes the time and the care to define the 
various components of the situation.19 Gang problems in many locations 
are pressing and waiting to complete an analysis is difficult. Even so, 
the consequences of failing to engage in this step may be great. A 
misinformed strategy may possess ineffective tactics, making it 
impotent, or worse, leading to a further decline of the situation. 
The remainder of this publication focuses on a case study to describe 
an example of problem solving in Newark, New Jersey, which led to an 
innovative way to investigate a local gang landscape. The case study also 
highlights how one problem-solving effort may serve as the context and 
foundation for another. While the gang project is still in development, 
the process and the preliminary findings are nonetheless informative. 
In many instances, the problem analysis phase of a strategy may last 
longer than the intervention stage. At the same time, it must be on-
going. For example, Newark research partner Dr. George Kelling notes 
that it took a full year to understand the problems plaguing New York 
City's subways, yet only a few months to manage it effectively. This is 
often the most difficult portion of an intervention and requires careful 
attention because people tend to get distracted by other crises or 
problems. It is careful analysis, however, that will lead to long-term success. 
By detailing the Newark case study, this paper hopes to provide some 
examples of potential pathways for understanding local gang problems. 
8 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
This example also highlights the importance of an academic partner in 
such problem solving endeavors. It is unlikely that the analyses 
referenced here would have been generated by many law enforcement 
agencies. Indeed, some have noted that "most police officers are 
probably more prone to action than to research."20 While mapping 
techniques have permeated into many law enforcement departments, 
network analysis (the technique later described) has yet to emerge as a 
recognizably useful analytic tool in most law enforcement circles. 
Academic partners provide access to analytic expertise, as well as 
resources, which can provide unique insight to the problem solving 
process. Simply put, an academic-law enforcement partnership has the 
potential to be a particularly beneficial collaboration.21 
An Example of a Local Problem Analysis 
In 1996, the director of the Newark Police Department, Joseph 
Santiago, approached the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers 
University, Professor George Kelling in particular, and asked whether it 
could provide help addressing violence in Newark. While Newark had 
recently illustrated a fairly sharp decline in violence (murder, robbery, 
aggravated assault, and rape), its violent crime index still greatly surpassed 
those of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Despite the benefits of the 
newly instituted CompStat, Director Santiago was concerned that violence 
in Newark appeared immune to law enforcement tactics. Because the 
School of Criminal Justice has the goal of training researchers within this 
urban environment and Professor Kelling has a professional history with 
the Newark Police Department, 22 a relationship began based on a common 
goal: reduce violence in the city of Newark. This project came to be known 
as the Greater Newark Safer Cities Initiative (GNSCI). 
9 

COPS Innovations 
One of the benefits of the School of Criminal Justice serving as the 
organizer of a problem analysis is that it could serve as a "neutral 
convener." The neutral convener is critical because it has the capacity 
to raise questions, highlight problems, and corral attention around a 
particular issue since it is not perceived as having an allegiance to any 
one stakeholder at the table.23 We certainly found that this was the case 
with GNSCI. Simply, Rutgers existed outside the inter-organizational 
relationships, and, therefore, the provost of Rutgers-Newark, was able 
to gather various stakeholders for an initial meeting. This first meeting, 
hosted at Rutgers, included the Newark Police Department, the United 
States Attorney's Office for New Jersey, the New Jersey Attorney 
General's Office, and the School of Criminal Justice. 
During the next three years, the School of Criminal Justice attempted to 
build relationships with and across agencies. This was not always easy, 
often because of past problems and perceived conflicting interests. 
Forging successful partnerships is a difficult task and it is not uncommon 
for different orientations, perceptions of responsibilities, training, 
pressures, and priorities to act as significant hurdles.24 Still, if agencies and 
partners are able to agree on a common goal and are willing to 
communicate and work through such difficulties, forging such a 
collaborative relationship often is a linchpin of problem analysis and 
intervention success. By 1999, staff began collecting data on the nature of 
the violence problem in Newarkit took three years to convince people 
that it may be time to change the way of doing business to improve the 
quality of life and reduce violence in this city. 
The importance of collaboration in this project, and in problem-solving 
exercises in general, cannot be overstated. Forging these partnerships 
can be difficult, but often they are integral to understanding the problem 
at hand by combining information and perspectives. For example, in the 
Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative in St. Louis, the 
U.S. Attorney had the political power to push past roadblocks and 
ensure open access to data.25 In a similar manner, the Attorney General's 
Office of New Jersey served to convince certain partners, namely the 
local prosecutors, to participate in GNSCI during the early stages. At 
the same time, these partnerships also expand the utility and capabilities 
of the intervention itself. To be sure, various partners provide different 
resources and capabilities that complement and structure a 
comprehensive strategy. As an example, the Ten Point Coalition, as well 
as the Boston Streetworkers, provided a base of legitimacy for law 
10 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
enforcement action in the Boston Gun Project.26 In a similar fashion, the 
clergy of Newark opened the churches as locations for the notification 
sessions for the offenders of interest, which provided moral legitimacy 
to GNSCI in the community. 
Recent law enforcement programs have explicitly recognized the 
importance of forging and sustaining such partnerships. Indeed, the 
Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative has "partnership" as one of its 
five core elements. At a minimum, this framework recognizes 
that a truly comprehensive gun-violence intervention must include 
federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as prosecutors, as 
inherent stakeholders. In addition, collaboration was one of the primary 
pillars for two of the best-known gun violence programs, as well as 
their respective replications across the nation: Operation Ceasefire in 
Boston, Massachusetts and Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia. 
Partnerships and collaboration are moving past being considered 
advisable to being considered essential when addressing community 
problems.27 
By 2000, GNSCI had established what has become its cornerstone: 
biweekly meetings hosted by Rutgers University that included various law 
enforcement and prosecution agencies (local, state, and federal), parole and 
probation, social service providers, clergy, community groups, the 
public defender, and various mental health, substance abuse, and 
employment agencies. These partners had a stake in the violence 
problem in Newark, all had insight into the problem and all had 
unique resources that potentially could help address this problem. This 
working group had the task of addressing the primary finding of earlier 
data analysis. Like many cities, a small portion of people is responsible 
for the majority of the violence and the people who are killing and 
those being killed are remarkably similar. Whether individuals are killed 
or are the killers seemingly depends on chance. Similar to Boston, a 
large proportion of these problematic people in Newark are under probation 
or parole supervision; therefore, agencies have leverage over them. 
11 

COPS Innovations 
The working group became responsible for managing the most at-risk 
people with the goal of reducing their violent behavior and, in turn, the 
overall violence in Newark. The overarching goal was to deter them and 
others by example through the pulling-levers-strategy.28 Individuals on 
this caseload were notified that if they engage in violent behavior or are 
caught with a gun during their time on probation or parole, every 
potential resource will be brought to bear, including more stringent bail, 
vertical prosecution (and potential federal prosecution), and enhanced 
penalties. At the same time, if they needed services (e.g., employment, 
substance abuse counseling, mental health services, faith services), they 
could receive them. Clients (as those on the caseload came to be known) 
also had to attend accountability sessions to establish whether they, as 
well as partners in GNSCI, were meeting their obligations. It was 
important for the GNSCI group to follow through both sanctions and 
social services to gain and sustain credibility. 
Since the inception of GNSCI, of the 353 individuals in the at-risk 
group, only 7.9% have been arrested for violence and only 7.4% have 
been victims of violence. In addition, from 2001 to 2002, the homicide 
rate dropped by 28% (the adjoining towns of East Orange and Irvington 
had a 20% and 14% increase, respectively). By 2003, however, 
homicide in Newark jumped by 28%. The working group began to 
speculate about why this may be the case and one consistent answer 
emerged: gangs. 
Gangs in Newark 
During the GNSCI working group meetings of 2003, a new concern 
started to bubble to the surface. Community members and law 
enforcement were becoming increasingly concerned about what they 
perceived as a growing gang problem. They believed that the increased 
rate and changing nature of homicide in Newark was caused, in part, by 
the local gangs. Recent analyses in GNSCI had revealed an interesting 
trend: while homicides were increasing in Newark, shootings were 
decreasing. In the previous years of data analysis, homicides and 
shootings had a positive relationship with one another. The impression 
in the working group was that homicides were becoming more directed: 
victims were intended and sought out. While partners were unsure 
whether this reflected the actions of rival gangs or whether it was 
simply the fact that gang members were involved, they nonetheless 
12 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
perceived a connection. In short, the community believed that gangs 
posed a problem and the stakeholders saw GNSCI as a legitimate forum 
within which to voice their concerns and have them addressed. One 
problem analysis forum, therefore, served as the context within which to 
consider another issue. This is an important point to stress, if not for the 
partnerships and collaboration already in existence as a result of 
GNSCI, there would have been no forum for these various groups and 
agencies to discuss their concerns collectively. 
When pressed about their concerns, the stakeholders relayed the belief 
that local street gangs were involved in a plethora of criminal activities, 
from auto theft to drug sales to homicide to general community 
harassment. Given the broad nature of the problem, the nature of the 
gang landscape had to be defined, rather than defining only their role in 
a particular crime. In addition, the community and GNSCI stakeholders 
believed that this was part of a larger regional problem: that gangs in 
Newark had connections beyond the city's borders and to ignore 
adjacent municipalities would be ill-advised. This project, therefore, 
actually would expand geographically beyond its parent project, 
GNSCI. Accordingly, the North Jersey Gang Task Force was born in 
2003 and began a methodical process of defining the gang problem in 
various cities and towns in northern New Jersey. 
In a fashion similar to the Boston Gun Project, this project relied on the 
experiential knowledge of personnel from various criminal justice 
agencies (law enforcement, prosecution, probation, parole, juvenile justice 
commission, department of corrections, and so forth) when constructing 
a general, evolving picture of the gang landscape. The interview groups 
included different agencies as an attempt to get as complete a picture of 
the gang problem as possible from the law enforcement viewpoint. 
While many agencies have their own gang data, relying on intelligence 
files is problematic on several levels. First, university researchers do not 
have easy legal access to such files. Second, many agencies use 
different definitions and rules for their respective databases, which 
makes comparison and consolidation very difficult. Finally, such 
databases are not always updated or purged with regularity. Since the 
goal of the analysis is to construct a picture of the current gang 
landscape, the Boston Gun Project was used as a model and various 
criminal justice personnel who have an expertise about the gang 
problem were data sources. 
13 

COPS Innovations 
Again, the centrality of collaboration in GNSCI emerged as integral to 
the progress of the North Jersey Gang Task Force. Street gangs are a 
particularly political issue and law enforcement agencies can show 
strong reticence about sharing information. By 2003, the Newark Police 
Department had been sharing information and collaborating with other 
agencies through GNSCI for 4 years. The police department, therefore, 
had cultivated a trust of the other stakeholders and of Rutgers University 
as an analytic and research partner. At the start of the gang analysis, the 
department was willing and enthusiastic about sharing information 
because gangs were a problem worth solving. At the same time, the 
department vouched to other law enforcement agencies that this 
partnership was worthwhile given past experience. While some agencies 
declined to be part of this project either because of denial of a local 
gang problem or because of a lack of faith in the utility of this project, 
the majority agreed to participate. They simply realized they could not 
ignore the gang problem in their jurisdiction and were willing to be part 
of a problem solving initiative that may help. 
The interview groups began to provide data on such issues as gang 
territory, the role, nature, and extent of violence and crime, 
recruitment and initiation rituals, the extent of female membership, size, 
history, the role of families, and other topics of interest. In addition, 
researchers began to gather information on the criminal histories of all 
identified gang members. These data confirm the notion that such 
individuals do not specialize in particular forms of crime, but rather 
engage in an array of offending behavior.29 Given the fact that gangs are 
dynamic and that the project desires current data, the focus groups 
continued to meet over the course of one year. This not only allowed for 
the collection of recent data, but also for the formation of trusted 
relationships across agencies and with the researchers. 
The first analysis phase included GIS-mapping. Although the belief at the 
beginning stages of the project was that gangs were pervasive, 
identifying hot spots of gang territories was an appealing notion that 
could translate easily into intervention tactics. The sense was accurate: 
there were no clear hot spots of gang territory. Gangs seemed to be 
everywhere; the only area in Newark, for example, that did not have 
14 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
gang territory was the airport. This analysis also confirmed that a regional 
approach was appropriate because many gang territories overlap 
between cities. At this point, the partners asked whether there were 
residential hot spots and, if these emerged, perhaps that could inform an 
intervention in some manner. The analysis revealed that many gang 
members did not reside in their respective territories, which was consistent 
with some previous research.30 Moreover, a good number did not even 
reside in the city that contained their territory. 
Introduction to Network Analysis 
At this point in the problem analysis, it was clear that mapping could 
not be the sole analytic tool. Trying to be innovative and view the gang 
landscape from a unique perspective, this project recognized the 
usefulness that network analysis played in the Boston Gun Project. 
Network analysis is a technique that focuses on analyzing the pattern of 
social relationships among groups or individuals. By detailing the pattern 
of relationships (namely rivalries) among the street gangs in Boston, 
certain gangs nominated themselves for focus, and researchers were 
able to anticipate the potential consequences of an intervention strategy, 
such as particular gangs taking advantage of others' perceived 
weakness. The North Jersey Gang Task Force also detailed the 
relationships among the gangs and sets in the various neighborhoods 
under focus. Such an analysis provided insight into why particular 
geographic areas may experience violence caused by a contentious 
relationship among gangs or sets and the allegiances and rivalries that 
could influence the focus of an intervention or suppression program. To 
better define the street gang landscape in Newark, the project went one 
step further by defining the relationships among known gang members 
and their associates. To our knowledge, no other problem analysis 
preceding a gang intervention has done this. Doing so provided insight 
into law enforcement perceptions of the internal organizations of the 
street gangs under study.31 
15 

COPS Innovations 
Keeping track of the associations among gang members is relatively 
easy for law enforcement when dealing with small groups. For example, 
tracking the relationships and associations among a criminal group of 
10 individuals is reasonable. Many street gangs are quite large, 
however. Recognizing the web of relationships among hundreds of gang 
members and seeing the overall structure of this pattern is quite difficult 
under such circumstances. This is especially true when the knowledge 
that one person has about certain people and their associations overlaps 
with another's knowledge. Combining such information through data 
collection and analysis offers a more complete picture of how gang 
members are connected to each other. Not only does this information 
give a sense of how organized a particular street gang is, but it also 
provides insight into differential levels of individual entrenchment 
within a street gang. 
Information on gang organization often is integral to the proper 
selection of intervention tactics and programs; therefore, network 
analysis struck us as a useful, cutting-edge technique. In this setting, the 
fact that Rutgers University served as both neutral convener and 
research partner was invaluable. It is difficult for any law enforcement 
or criminal justice agency to invest the time and money necessary for 
this analysis. Partnering with a university, however, provides free access 
to the skills and labor of graduate students and researchers. 
Collaboration, therefore, is important not only for getting complete and 
consistent data about the gang problem, but also for having partners 
who are willing and able to analyze these data. Partnerships between 
local universities and communities are mutually beneficial because each 
side possesses unique but underutilized expertise and resources.32 
16 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
The interview groups provided information about the gang members' 
known associates in a variety of categories, including who hangs out 
and commits crime together ("runs together"), who has been 
incarcerated together, who is related to each other, who is a co-arrestee 
or co-defendant with whom, and other relationship dimensions. After 
these interviews, the data were coded and entered into statistical programs 
(the data were also updated after every interview). This information 
built up the street gang networks, providing insight into the structure 
of the gangs as well as into the various social positions that members 
occupy within the gangs. Such analysis was important because it 
provided knowledge about the structure of the gang in a manner 
different from most inquires, which tend to investigate gang rules, 
meetings, and loyalty, and it is important to the decision of how to have 
an impact on the gangs. Are the gangs organized enough to hold all 
members accountable for one member's actions (an Operation Ceasefire 
tactic called "collective accountability")? Do certain subgroups require 
focus? Do certain people nominate themselves for focus based on their 
social position in the gang? 
The first thing that the network analyses suggested is that the gangs in 
Newark are loosely organized. This finding was generally consistent with 
the research literature and with the perceptions of the partners in 
GNSCI. Even so, this analysis allowed the North Jersey Task Force 
partners to make this firm statement about the local gangs because it was 
grounded in a problem analysis. As such, collective accountability as a 
general tactic for gangs in Newark was unlikely to be a successful in this 
jurisdiction (see a more in-depth discussion in McGloin, 2005). Instead, 
smaller, well-connected groups may be better suited to an intervention 
focus. For example, Figure 2 illustrates cliques in the Almighty Latin 
King and Queen Nation in Newark. Cliques are intensely connected 
groupings within the overall network and may be vulnerable to a 
collective accountability strategy. This distinction between Newark and 
Boston gangs may be somewhat semantic. Gang definitions vary across 
location and Boston gangs may essentially be similar to the cliques in 
Newark, since they were small relatively well-connected groups. 
Without network analysis, however, these groups of well-connected 
people in Newark may have gone unnoticed since the "overall" nature 
of the gang may have clouded such groupings. 
17 

street gangs.33 

Image of The Identified Cliques for the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation in Newark, New Jersey
Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
Simply having information on gang members and their associates, even 
if one chooses not to analyze it in any complex way, is helpful. For 
example, Dr. Wayne Fisher, a researcher in this project, had the idea of 
putting together a book of the most problematic gang members. This 
book detailed the associates of those individuals in whom law 
enforcement is most interested. Any time police questioned a gang 
member, this book could be consulted to determine if he or she was an 
associate and, therefore, may have important information. As another 
example, when a homicide suspect who was a gang member was at 
large, Newark police consulted the association data of this project. By 
reviewing the information provided by law enforcement officers, the 
Newark Police Department was able to direct its search and find the 
suspect quickly. 
Continuing to rely on network analysis throughout the course of an 
intervention strategy helps to ensure that tactics continue to be 
appropriate and useful with a dynamic problem. For example, 
continuing to analyze the network of relationships will provide insight 
on whether an intervention strategy is further disorganizing the gang(s), 
or having the unintended consequence of increasing cohesion, and 
thereby raising the risk of more crime. At the same time, should 
positions in the gang shift, or new people move into structurally 
important positions within the gang, interventions may have to address 
new individuals or alter current strategies. 
This raises the important issue of sustainability, not only for problem 
analysis but also for collaboration and partnerships. Often, a crisis 
brings stakeholders to the table, perhaps because of a dramatic spike in 
youth homicide or a handful of particularly attention-grabbing gang 
crimes, for example. As the crisis subsides, however, it can be difficult 
to maintain the sense of urgency about the problem at hand. 
Accordingly, partners can become distracted and the collaboration and 
data analysis subside. This can be an unintended consequence of 
program success or simply a product of shifting attention and priorities. 
Whatever the cause, it can cease any benefit as the program loses 
treading and/or fails to match the problem at hand. For example, 
Operation Ceasefire ended in 2000 and the street gang problem of today 
is not the same as it was at the genesis of the project.34 Representatives 
from Boston at the National Gang Executive Session II, hosted by Chief 
William J. Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department and supported by 
the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, reflected on this issue and agreed that applying the same 
19 

COPS Innovations 
intervention framework within this city would be an ill-advised 
pathway. In short, an in-depth problem analysis must again inform any 
intervention strategy, despite early success. 
Most would agree that problem analysis must precede a gang 
intervention. A major theme, however, at the National Executive 
Session on Gangs II was the difficulty of sustaining such analysis as 
well as the resulting intervention. Two factors may improve the odds of 
sustainability. First, it is important for stakeholders to maintain a sense 
of urgency about the problem at hand. This is perhaps easier said than 
done, and relies on strong, committed leadership. This leadership is 
related to the second factor. Often, dynamic individuals form the core of 
these collaborative relationships. While this is beneficial with regard to 
leadership, it can be detrimental if and when such individuals inherit 
other professional responsibilities and leave the partnership. Under such 
circumstances, a problem-solving initiative and intervention can easily 
fall apart. If a project is to be sustained, the relationships must be 
among groups and agencies (i.e., organizational in nature) rather than 
based on individuals. In such a context, the relationships may become 
institutionalized and, therefore, remain despite individual-level turnover. 
GNSCI, for example, has continued despite witnessing four governors, 
three directors of the Newark Police Department, four State Attorneys 
General, and three U.S. Attorneys since its inception. This is possible 
only because of a focus on inter-organizational, rather than 
interpersonal, collaboration and partnership. 
Concluding Remarks 
While the exact nature of street gangs and the criminal problems in 
which they are involved often are unique to location and time, the 
commitment to engaging in a problem analysis should be pervasive. 
Some debates remain within the literature about many seminal street 
gang issues, suggesting that there can be no assumptions. Accordingly, 
generalizing themes and findings often is inappropriate. At the same 
time, law enforcement has a plethora of program types and tactics from 
which to choose, but that decision must be informed by the nature of the 
problem. Even if a program is a success in a particular domain, this is 
not a guarantee for repeat success elsewhere, particularly if the 
underlying problem is different. It is wise to attend to the principles of 
problem-oriented policing, taking the time and care to define a problem 
adequately before adopting a response strategy with an emphasis on 
collaboration, especially in the sphere of street gangs.35 
20 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
21 
About the Author 
Jean M. McGloin is an assistant professor in the Department of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland. 
She received her Ph.D. from the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers 
University-Newark in 2004. Her research interests include street 
gangs, policing and criminological theory. Her recent publications 
have appeared in Criminology and Public Policy, Justice Quarterly, 
and Journal of Criminal Justice. 

Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
23 
References 
1 See the National Youth Gang Surveys 
http://www.iir.com/nygc/PublicationLinks.htm#Surveys 
2 Esbensen, F.A., and Winfree, L.T. (1998). Race and gender differences between 
gang and non-gang youths: Results from a multisite survey. Justice Quarterly, 
15(3), 505-526. 
3 Crane, J., Boccara, N., & Higdon, K. (2000). The dynamics of street gang 
growth and policy response. Journal of Policy Modeling, 22(1), 1-25 
Miller, W.B. (2001). The growth of youth gang problems in the United States: 19701998. 
Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 
OJJDP. (1998). 1998 National Youth Gang Survey. Washington, DC: Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 
Spergel, I., Grossman, S.F., Wa, K.M., Choi, S., & Jacob, A. (1999). Evaluation of 
little village gang violence reduction project: The first three years. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago. 
4 Decker, S.H. (2001). From the streets to the prison: Understanding and 
responding to gangs. Indianapolis, IN: National Major Gang Task Force. 
Fleisher, M.S., & Decker, S.H. (2001). Going home, staying home: Integrating 
prison gang members into the community. Corrections Management Quarterly, 
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5 Fagan, J. 1989. The social organization of drug use and drug dealing among 
urban gangs. Criminology 27: 633-665. 
Klein, M.W. (1996). Gangs in the United States and Europe. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research 4: 63-80. 
6Curry, G.D, Decker, S.H. & Egley, A. (2002). Gang involvement and delinquency 
in a middle school population. Justice Quarterly, 19(2), 275-292. 
7 Decker, S.H., & Van Winkle, B. (1996). Life in the gang: Family, friends, and 
violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
8 Howell, J.C. (2000). Youth gang programs and strategies. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention. 

COPS Innovations 
24 
Klein, M.W. (1995). The American street gang. New York: Oxford University Press. 
9 Miethe, T.D., & McCorkle, R.C. (2002). Evaluating Nevada's anti-gang legislation 
and gang prosecution units. In W.L. Reed & S.H. Decker (Eds.), Responding to 
gangs: Evaluation and research, pp. 169-196. Washington, DC: National Institute 
of Justice. 
10 OJJDP. (2000). Youth gang programs and strategies: OJJDP summary. 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/summary_2000_8/intro.html 
11 Esbensen, F.A., Osgood, D.W., Taylor, T.J., Peterson, D, & Freng, A. (2001). 
How great is G.R.E.A.T.?: Results from a longitudinal, quasi-experimental design. 
Criminology and Public Policy, 1, 87-118. For more information on G.R.E.A.T., visit 
www.great-online.com or call 800-726-7070. 
12 Esbensen, F.A. (2004). Evaluating G.R.E.A.T.: A school-based gang prevention 
program. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. (Pages 1-3) 
13 For more information, see: http://www.youthalive.org/caught.html 
14 Klein, M.W. (1995). The American street gang. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
15 Decker, S.H., & Curry, G.D. (2003). Suppression without prevention, prevention 
without suppression: Gang intervention in St. Louis. In S.H. Decker (Ed.), Policing 
gangs and youth violence, pp. 191-213. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson 
Learning. 
16 For more information, see: Braga, A.A., Kennedy, D.M., Waring, E.J. and Piehl, 
A.M. (2001). Problem-oriented policing, deterrence, and youth violence: An 
evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire. Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 38: 195-225. 
17 Braga, A.A., Kennedy, D.M., Waring, E.J. and Piehl, A.M. (2001). Problem-
oriented policing, deterrence, and youth violence: An evaluation of Boston's 
Operation Ceasefire. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 38: 195225. 



Street Gangs and Interventions: 
Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis 
25 
18 Some cities have not exactly replicated the Boston Gun Project, per se, but 
the framework is nonetheless similar. For example, the Chicago Project for 
Violence Prevention runs a CeaseFire program that essentially treats gun 
violence (which often involves violent gang members) as a public health issue. 
This comprehensive program, which has indicators of success, relies heavily on 
mediating conflicts and responding rapidly to shootings with an array of 
stakeholders and services. 
19 Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem oriented approach. 
Crime and Delinquency, 25: 236-258. 
20 Cordner, G., & Biebel, E.P. (2005). Problem-oriented policing in practice. 
Criminology and Public Policy, 4(2), 155-180. (Page 159) 
21 Braga, A.A., McDevitt, J., & Pierce, G.L. (2005). Understanding and 
preventing gang violence: Problem analysis and response development in 
Lowell, Massachusetts. Forthcoming in Police Quarterly. 
22 Police Foundation. (1981). The Newark foot patrol experiment. Washington, 
DC: Police Foundation. 
23 For more discussion of the important role of a neutral convener, see 
Hartmann, F.X. (2002). Safety first: Partnership, the powerful neutral convener, 
and problem solving. In G.S. Katzman (Ed.), Securing our children's future: 
New approaches to juvenile justice and youth violence. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
24 Lane, J., Turner, S., & Flores, C. (2004). Researchers-practitioner 
collaboration in community corrections: Overcoming hurdles for successful 
partnerships. Criminal Justice Review, 29(1), 97-114. 
25 Decker, S.H., & Rosenfeld, R. (Forthcoming). Reducing gun violence: The St. 
Louis consent-to-search program, Research in brief. Washington, D.C.: National 
Institute of Justice. 
26 Braga, A.A., & Winship, C. (In press). Partnership, Accountability, and 
Innovation: Clarifying Boston's Experience with Pulling Levers. In D.L. Weisburd 
& A.A. Braga (Eds.), Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 

COPS Innovations 
26 
27 PEW Partnership for Civic Change. (2004). In it for the long haul: 
Community partnerships making a difference. Charlottesville, VA: Pew 
Partnership for Civic Change. 
28 Kennedy, D.M. (1998). Pulling levers: Getting deterrence right. National 
Institute of Justice Journal, No. 236. 
29 Klein, M.W. (1995). The American street gang. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
30 Meeker, J.W., Parsons, K.J.B., & Vila, B.J. (2002). Developing a GIS-based 
regional gang incident tracking system. In W.L. Reed & S.H. Decker (Eds.), 
Responding to gangs: Evaluation and research, pp. 289-329. Washington, DC: 
National Institute of Justice. 
31 For a more in-depth discussion of the data and the analyses, see McGloin, 
J.M. (2004). Associations among criminal gang members as a defining factor of 
organization and as a predictor of criminal behavior: The gang landscape of 
Newark, New Jersey. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI. 
32 PEW Partnership for Civic Change. (2003). University and community 
research partnerships: A new approach. Charlottesville, VA: Pew Partnership 
for Civic Change. 
33 McGloin, J.M. (2005). Policy and intervention considerations of a network 
analysis of street gangs. Criminology and Public Policy, 4(3), 607-636. 
34 McDevitt, J., Braga, A.A., Nurge, D., & Buerger, M. (2003). Boston's youth 
violence prevention program: A comprehensive community-wide approach. In 
S.H. Decker (Ed.), Policing gangs and youth violence, pp. 53-76. Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth Thomson Learning. 
35 The National Gang Center is an additional resource when dealing with a gang 
problem www.nationalgangcenter.org 


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