*Pages 1--24 from  O:\Slip\WP\2005-06\05-1237.wpd*
 United  States  Court  of  Appeals  FOR  THE  DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA  CIRCUIT 
 Argued  May  11,  2006  Decided  August  18,  2006 
 No.  05-  1237 
 CHARTER  COMMUNICATIONS,  INC.  AND  ADVANCE/  NEWHOUSE  COMMUNICATIONS, 
 PETITIONERS 
 v. 
 FEDERAL  COMMUNICATIONS  COMMISSION  AND  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA, 
 RESPONDENTS 
 CONSUMER  ELECTRONICS  ASSOCIATION  AND  NATIONAL  CABLE  &  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  ASSOCIATION, 
 INTERVENORS 

 On  Petition  for  Review  of  an  Order  of  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 

 John  D.  Seiver  argued  the  cause  for  petitioners  and  intervenor  National  Cable  and  Telecommunications  Association. 
 With  him  on  the  briefs  were  Paul  Glist,  Paul  B.  Hudson,  Christopher  A.  Fedeli,  Daniel  L.  Brenner,  and  Neal  M. 
 Goldberg. 
 Joseph  R.  Palmore,  Counsel,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  argued  the  cause  for  respondent.  With  him  on  the 
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 brief  were  Thomas  O.  Barnett,  Assistant  Attorney  General,  U.  S.  Department  of  Justice,  Catherine  G.  O'Sullivan  and  Andrea 

 Limmer,  Attorneys,  Samuel  L.  Feder,  General  Counsel,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  Richard  K.  Welch,  Associate 
 General  Counsel,  John  E.  Ingle,  Deputy  Associate  General  Counsel,  and  Laurence  N.  Bourne,  Counsel. 

 Robert  S.  Schwartz  was  on  the  brief  for  intervenor  Consumer  Electronics  Association. 
 Before:  GINSBURG,  Chief  Judge,  and  TATEL  and  GARLAND,  Circuit  Judges. 
 Opinion  for  the  Court  filed  by  Circuit  Judge  GARLAND. 
 GARLAND,  Circuit  Judge:  Cable  television  operators  petition  for  review  of  an  order  of  the  Federal  Communications 
 Commission  (FCC).  In  that  order,  the  FCC  declined  to  rescind  a  rule  that  will  preclude  cable  operators  from  offering  set-  top 
 converter  boxes  that  bundle  both  security  (descrambling)  and  non-  security  (e.  g.,  channel  selection)  functions  in  a  single 
 device.  For  the  reasons  explained  below,  we  deny  the  petition  for  review. 

 I 
 In  the  communications  context,  navigation  devices  are  equipment  used  by  consumers  .  .  .  to  access  multichannel  video 
 programming  and  other  services  from  multichannel  video  programming  distributors  (MVPDs),  such  as  cable  operators  and 
 direct  broadcast  satellite  services.  47  C.  F.  R.    76.1200(  c);  see  id.    76.1200(  b)  (defining  MVPDs).  The  most  common  such 
 device  is  the  set-  top  converter  box.  Cable  television  subscribers  typically  lease  converter  boxes  from  their  cable  operators  as  part 
 of  their  overall  service  packages.  As  currently  configured,  these 
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 devices  integrate  security  and  non-  security  functions.  The  security  function  contain[  s]  embedded  technology  that  decodes 

 or  descrambles  a  cable  signal,  and  it  is  this  function  that  precludes  a  consumer  from  accessing  tiers  of  cable 
 programming  not  part  of  his  subscription  package.  General  Instrument  Corp.  v.  FCC,  213  F.  3d  724,  726  (D.  C.  Cir.  2000) 
 (footnote  omitted).  Converter  boxes  also  perform  other  tasks  unrelated  to  security.  Id.  For  example,  converter  boxes 
 commonly  include  channel  tuners  and  provide  access  to  video  programming  guides.  Id.  Historically,  because  only  the  cable 
 system  operator  could  provide  the  conditional  access  (security)  technology,  suppliers  unaffiliated  with  the  cable  operator  were 
 not  able  to  offer  consumers  comparable  navigation  devices.  Hence,  such  devices  were  not  available  at  retail. 

 In  1996,  Congress  amended  the  Communications  Act  to  add  a  new  section  629,  entitled  Competitive  Availability  of 
 Navigation  Devices.  47  U.  S.  C.    549.  The  first  sentence  of  section  629(  a)  directs  the  FCC  to  adopt  regulations  to  assure 
 the  commercial  availability,  to  consumers  of  multichannel  video  programming[,]  .  .  .  of  converter  boxes,  interactive 
 communications  equipment,  and  other  equipment  used  by  consumers  to  access  multichannel  video  programming[,]  .  .  . 
 from  manufacturers,  retailers,  and  other  vendors  not  affiliated  with  any  [MVPD].  Id.    549(  a).  Section  629(  a)  s  second 
 sentence  further  provides  that  [  s]  uch  regulations  shall  not  prohibit  any  [MVPD]  from  also  offering  converter  boxes, 
 interactive  communications  equipment,  and  other  equipment  used  by  consumers  to  access  multichannel  video  programming 
 .  .  .  .  Id. 
 In  1998,  pursuant  to  section  629(  a)  s  directive  to  assure  the  commercial  availability  of  navigation  devices,  the  FCC  adopted 
 regulations  that  required  MVPDs,  by  July  1,  2000,  to  make  the  security  element  available  separately  from  the  basic  navigation 
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 1  See  47  C.  F.  R.    76.1204(  a)(  1)  (  A[  n]  [MVPD]  that  utilizes 
 navigation  devices  to  perform  conditional  access  functions  shall  make  available  equipment  that  incorporates  only  the  conditional  access 

 functions  of  such  devices.). 
 2  See  47  C.  F.  R.    76.1204(  a)(  1)  (1998)  (  Commencing  on  January 
 1,  2005,  no  multichannel  video  programming  distributor  subject  to  this  section  shall  place  in  service  new  navigation  devices  for  sale,  lease,  or 

 use  that  perform  both  conditional  access  and  other  functions  in  a  single  integrated  device.). 

 device.  See  Implementation  of  Section  304  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996:  Commercial  Availability  of 
 Navigation  Devices,  13  FCC  Rcd  14775,  14806,    76  (1998)  (  1998  Order).  1  The  FCCs  1998  Order  concluded  that 
 requiring  MVPDs  to  make  the  security  element  separately  available  would  permit  independent  manufacturers  and  retailers 
 to  market  navigation  devices  while  allowing  MVPDs  to  retain  control  over  their  system  security.  See  13  FCC  Rcd  at  14793- 
 94,    49.  Thereafter,  MVPDs  began  developing  a  separate  security  module  --  now  commonly  referred  to  as  a  CableCARD 
 --  that  plugs  into  a  slot  in  a  host  navigation  device,  permitting  the  device  to  perform  both  the  security  and  non-  security 
 functions. 
 The  1998  Order  further  required  MVPDs,  as  of  January  1,  2005,  to  stop  selling  or  leasing  new  integrated  navigation 
 devices  that  perform  both  security  and  non-  security  functions.  2  After  the  effective  date,  the  rule  would  preclude  cable  operators 
 from  offering  subscribers  the  integrated  set-  top  converter  boxes  that  had  previously  been  standard.  Should  MVPDs  wish  to 
 continue  selling  or  leasing  converter  boxes  to  subscribers  after  the  effective  date,  the  FCC  required  that  those  boxes  be  non-integrated 
 and  rely  on  the  same  technology  --  the  CableCARD  --  available  to  independent  manufacturers  and  retailers.  The 
 Commission  determined  that,  even  with  an  unbundled  security 
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 3  See  Implementation  of  Section  304  of  the  Telecommunications 
 Act  of  1996:  Commercial  Availability  of  Navigation  Devices,  14  FCC  Rcd  7596  (1999)  (  1999  Reconsideration  Order). 

 4  NCTA  intervened  on  behalf  of  petitioner  General  Instrument 
 Corp.  in  the  2000  challenge  and  intervenes  on  behalf  of  petitioners  Charter  Communications  and  Advance/  Newhouse  Communications 

 here. 

 element  available  from  MVPDs,  the  continued  availability  of  integrated  devices  --  devices  that  only  MVPDs  could  provide  -- 
 would  impede  competition.  See  id.  at  14803,    69. 
 Finally,  the  1998  Order  provided  that  an  MVPD  could  qualify  for  an  exemption  from  the  regulations  if  it  supports  the 
 active  use  by  subscribers  of  navigation  devices  that:  (i)  operate  throughout  the  continental  United  States,  and  (ii)  are  available 
 from  retail  outlets  .  .  .  throughout  the  United  States  that  are  not  affiliated  with  the  [MVPD].  47  C.  F.  R.    76.1204(  a)(  2).  In 
 1998,  the  only  MVPDs  that  qualified  for  this  exemption  were  direct  broadcast  satellite  (DBS)  systems.  By  contrast  to  the 
 cable  market,  where  navigation  devices  were  unavailable  except  through  cable  operators,  in  the  DBS  market  integrated 
 navigation  devices  were  already  available  at  retail.  In  addition,  although  the  DBS  devices  were  not  interchangeable  among  DBS 
 providers,  each  DBS  provider  had  a  nationwide  service  footprint.  Thus,  unlike  cable  subscribers,  DBS  subscribers 
 could  continue  using  their  equipment  if  they  moved  across  the  country,  as  long  as  they  used  the  same  DBS  service  provider. 
 See  1998  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  14800-  02,    64-  66. 
 The  cable  industrys  trade  association,  the  National  Cable  Television  Association,  Inc.  (NCTA),  challenged  the  1998 
 Order  as  well  as  a  1999  Reconsideration  Order  3  in  General  Instrument  Corp.  v.  FCC,  213  F.  3d  724  (D.  C.  Cir.  2000).  4 
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 NCTA  argued  that  the  plain  language  of  section  629(  a)  precludes  the  FCC  from  adopting  the  ban  on  integrated 

 equipment.  As  NCTA  noted,  although  the  sections  first  sentence  directs  the  FCC  to  adopt  regulations  to  assure  the 
 commercial  availability  of  converter  boxes,  interactive  communications  equipment,  and  other  equipment  from 
 unaffiliated  manufacturers  and  retailers,  its  second  sentence  directs  that  the  regulations  shall  not  prohibit  any  [MVPD]  from 
 also  offering  converter  boxes,  interactive  communications  equipment,  and  other  equipment.  47  U.  S.  C.    549(  a).  NCTA 
 maintained  that  the  FCC  had  contravened  the  plain  text  of  the  second  sentence  by  prohibiting  cable  operators  from  offering 
 integrated  converter  boxes. 
 The  General  Instrument  court  rejected  NCTAs  statutory  challenge,  noting  that  the  term  converter  boxes  must  be  read 
 consistently  in  both  sentences.  See  213  F.  3d  at  730.  If  we  accepted  NCTAs  reading,  we  said,  the  FCC  would  be  equally 
 compelled  by  the  plain  language  of  the  statute  to  permit  retailers  to  provide  integrated  converter  boxes.  That,  we  noted,  would 
 certainly  [be]  an  unacceptable  result  from  [the  cable  industrys]  point  of  view,  because  it  would  give  unaffiliated  companies 
 access  to  cable  operators  proprietary  security  technology.  Id.  Instead,  we  accepted  as  reasonable  the  FCCs  interpretation, 
 which  construed  the  term  converter  boxes  as  not  including  integrated  converter  boxes.  See  id. 

 In  September  2000,  with  its  statutory  authority  confirmed,  the  FCC  issued  a  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  to 
 review  the  effectiveness  of  its  navigation  device  rules.  Implementation  of  Section  304  of  the  Telecommunications  Act 
 of  1996:  Commercial  Availability  of  Navigation  Devices,  15  FCC  Rcd  18199,  18199,    1  (2000)  (  Further  Notice).  The 
 Further  Notice  sought  comment  on  the  existence  of  obstacles  or  barriers  preventing  or  deterring  the  development  of  a  retail 
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 5  The  FCC  subsequently  adopted  rules  implementing  the  plug  and 
 play  memorandum.  See  Implementation  of  Section  304  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996:  Commercial  Availability  of 

 Navigation  Devices  and  Compatibility  Between  Cable  Systems  and  Consumer  Electronics  Equipment,  18  FCC  Rcd  20885  (2003). 

 market  for  navigation  devices,  on  the  effect  operator  provision  of  integrated  equipment  has  had  on  achieving  a  competitive 
 market  for  commercially  available  navigation  devices,  and  on  whether  the  2005  date  for  the  phase-  out  of  integrated  boxes 
 remains  appropriate.  Id.  at  18203,    11.  Before  the  FCC  could  act  on  the  Further  Notice,  however,  the  cable  and  consumer 
 electronics  industries  adopted  a  memorandum  of  understanding  to  integrate  the  non-  security  navigation  functionality  of  set-  top 
 boxes  directly  into  digital  television  sets.  This  innovation  made  it  possible  for  customers  simply  to  plug  and  play  by  inserting 
 a  CableCARD  directly  into  a  digital  cable-  ready  television  with  no  need  for  an  external  navigation  device.  5  In  April  2003,  in 
 part  because  of  this  development,  the  FCC  extended  the  implementation  date  for  the  ban  on  new  integrated  boxes  from 
 January  1,  2005,  to  July  1,  2006.  See  Implementation  of  Section  304  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996:  Commercial 
 Availability  of  Navigation  Devices,  18  FCC  Rcd  7924,  7925-  26,    4  (2003)  (  Extension  Order).  The  Extension  Order  sought 
 additional  comments  from  industry  and  promised  that,  by  2005,  the  FCC  would  complete  a  reassessment  of  the  state  of  the 
 navigation  device  market  and  determine  whether  the  designated  time  frame  remains  appropriate  or  whether  the  ban  on  integrated 
 devices  will  no  longer  be  necessary.  Id.  at  7926,    5. 
 Both  the  cable  and  the  consumer  electronics  industries  filed  voluminous  comments  in  response  to  the  Further  Notice  and  the 
 Extension  Order.  Cable  commenters  argued  that  changes  in  market  conditions  since  the  FCC  adopted  the  integration  ban 
 warranted  its  repeal.  By  contrast,  the  consumer  electronics 
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 industry  denied  that  conditions  had  materially  changed  and  opposed  both  repeal  of  the  pending  ban  and  any  further 

 extensions  of  the  implementation  deadline. 
 On  March  17,  2005,  the  FCC  issued  its  Second  Report  and  Order.  See  Implementation  of  Section  304  of  the 
 Telecommunications  Act  of  1996:  Commercial  Availability  of  Navigation  Devices,  20  FCC  Rcd  6794  (2005)  (  Second  Report 
 and  Order).  While  acknowledging  some  market  progress,  the  FCC  was  not  persuaded  that  the  current  level  of  competition  in 
 the  navigation  device  market  is  sufficient  to  assure  the  commercial  availability  of  navigation  devices  to  consumers 
 from  sources  other  than  MVPDs.  Id.  at  6794,    2.  It  concluded  that  the  ban  on  integrated  devices  should  be  retained  because 
 common  reliance  by  cable  operators  on  the  same  security  technology  and  conditional  access  interface  that  consumer 
 electronics  manufacturers  must  employ  in  developing  competitive  navigation  devices  was  necessary  to  assure 
 development  of  the  statutorily  required  competitive  market  for  navigation  devices.  Id. 

 The  FCC  did,  however,  extend  the  implementation  date  for  the  ban  yet  again,  this  time  until  July  1,  2007.  See  id.  at  6811, 
   33.  That  extension,  the  FCC  said,  would  provide  the  industry  time  in  which  to  determine  whether  it  was  possible  to  implement 
 a  downloadable  software  security  solution  that  would  obviate  the  need  for  the  physical  integration  ban.  See  id.  at  6794-  95,   
 3.  The  FCC  further  stated  that,  if  the  parties  demonstrated  that  downloadable  security  was  feasible  but  could  not  be 
 implemented  by  July  1,  2007,  it  would  consider  granting  still  another  extension.  See  id.  at  6812-  13,    36.  The  FCC  instructed 
 the  cable  industry  to  report  on  the  feasibility  of  this  solution  by  December  1,  2005,  and  instructed  the  trade  associations  for  both 
 the  cable  and  consumer  electronics  industries  to  file  joint  status  reports  regarding  their  progress.  See  id.  at  6795,    3. 
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 Cable  operators  Charter  Communications,  Inc.  and  Advance/  Newhouse  Communications,  joined  by  intervenor 

 NCTA,  now  petition  for  review  of  the  Second  Report  and  Order.  They  argue  that:  (1)  the  integration  ban  violates  the  plain 
 language  of  section  629(  a);  and  (2)  the  FCC  unreasonably  declined  to  rescind  the  ban  notwithstanding  changed  market 
 conditions.  We  consider  these  arguments  below. 
 II 
 We  begin  with  the  petitioners  statutory  argument,  which  is  essentially  a  spin-  off  of  the  argument  addressed  by  this  court  in 
 General  Instrument.  There,  we  rejected  NCTAs  contention  that  the  FCC  was  precluded  from  banning  integrated  converter  boxes 
 by  the  second  sentence  of  section  629(  a),  which  states  that  the  FCC  shall  not  prohibit  any  [MVPD]  from  also  offering 
 converter  boxes,  interactive  communications  equipment,  and  other  equipment  used  by  consumers  to  access  multichannel 
 video  programming  .  .  .  .  47  U.  S.  C.    549(  a).  As  discussed  in  Part  I  above,  in  order  to  reconcile  the  use  of  the  term  converter 
 boxes  in  both  the  first  and  the  second  sentences  of  the  section,  we  accepted  as  permissible  the  FCCs  view  that  the  term  did  not 
 extend  to  integrated  converter  boxes.  General  Instrument,  213  F.  3d  at  730. 

 The  petitioners  now  ask  us  to  focus  our  attention  not  on  the  term  converter  boxes,  but  on  the  term  other  equipment.  The 
 petitioners  argue  that  if  integrated  set-  top  boxes  are  not  converter  boxes,  as  we  held  in  General  Instrument,  then  they 
 must  be  other  equipment,  a  possibility  we  did  not  address  there.  And  if  integrated  boxes  are  other  equipment,  then 
 section  629(  a)  s  second  sentence  prevents  the  FCC  from  barring  cable  operators  from  offering  them.  In  response,  the  FCCs 
 brief  in  this  court  points  out  that,  like  the  term  converter  boxes,  the  term  other  equipment  appears  in  both  sentences  of 
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 section  629(  a).  And  just  as  General  Instrument  held  that    converter  boxes  does  not  have  to  mean  all  converter  boxes, 

 other  equipment  used  by  consumers  does  not  need  to  mean  all  other  equipment  used  by  consumers.  FCC  Br.  22. 

 Before  we  may  address  the  merits  of  the  petitioners  statutory  argument,  we  must  first  consider  a  potential  show-stopper 
 offered  by  the  FCC.  According  to  the  Commission,  two  considerations  bar  us  from  even  reaching  the  petitioners 
 statutory  argument. 
 First,  the  Commission  argues  that  the  petitioners  statutory  challenge  is  time-  barred.  According  to  the  FCC,  the  integration 
 ban  was  based  on  an  interpretation  of  section  629(  a)  that  was  adopted  in  the  1998  Order  and  1999  Reconsideration  Order. 
 Congress  has  required  that  petitions  for  review  of  such  orders  be  filed  within  60  days,  28  U.  S.  C.    2344;  see  47  U.  S.  C.    402(  a), 
 and  a  petitioners  failure  to  file  within  that  window  constitutes  a  bar  to  our  review.  See  Natural  Res.  Def.  Council  v.  Nuclear 
 Regulatory  Commn,  666  F.  2d  595,  602  (D.  C.  Cir.  1981).  There  is  an  exception  to  that  bar  for  cases  in  which  the  FCC  has 
 reopened  its  original  rulemaking,  see  Kennecott  Utah  Copper  Corp.  v.  United  States  Dept  of  Interior,  88  F.  3d  1191,  1214 
 (D.  C.  Cir.  1996),  and  the  petitioners  claim  that  this  case  falls  within  that  exception.  They  contend  that,  when  the  FCC  issued 
 its  Further  Notice  to  review  the  effectiveness  of  the  rules,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18199,    1,  and  subsequently  said  that  it  would 
 complete  a  reassessment  of  the  state  of  the  navigation  devices  market  and  determine  whether  .  .  .  the  ban  on  integrated  devices 
 will  no  longer  be  necessary,  Extension  Order,  18  FCC  Rcd  7926,    5,  it  reopened  the  question  of  its  statutory  authority  to 
 adopt  the  rules  in  the  first  place. 
 But  nothing  in  those  notices  suggested  that,  in  reviewing  the  effectiveness  of  the  rules,  the  FCC  intended  to  review  their 
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 6  In  Public  Citizen,  we  said  that,  [  i]  f  in  proposing  a  rule  the 
 agency  uses  language  that  can  reasonably  be  read  as  an  invitation  to  comment  on  portions  the  agency  does  not  explicitly  propose  to 

 change,  or  if  in  responding  to  comments  the  agency  uses  language  that  shows  that  it  did  in  fact  reconsider  an  issue,  a  renewed  challenge  to  the 
 underlying  rule  or  policy  will  be  allowed.  901  F.  2d  at  150.  Here,  the 

 statutory  basis  as  well.  There  was  not  one  word  about  the  proper  interpretation  of  section  629(  a)  in  the  notices.  And  there 
 is  not  one  word  about  the  proper  interpretation  --  let  alone  the  construction  the  petitioners  suggest  here  --  in  the  Second  Report 
 and  Order  that  is  the  subject  of  this  case.  Although  the  petitioners  cite  our  decision  in  Public  Citizen  v.  Nuclear 
 Regulatory  Commn,  901  F.  2d  147  (D.  C.  Cir.  1990),  in  support  of  their  reopening  argument,  the  petitioners  misread  Public 
 Citizen  to  stand  for  the  proposition  that  the  substantive  invalidity  of  a  previously  adopted  regulation  can  always  be  asserted  upon 
 review  of  a  later  rulemaking  on  the  same  general  subject  even  though  the  statutory  time  period  for  review  has  expired. 
 Kennecott,  88  F.  3d  at  1214.  To  the  contrary,  we  expressly  stated  in  [Public  Citizen]  that  the  appropriate  way  in  which  to 
 challenge  a  longstanding  regulation  on  the  ground  that  it  is  violative  of  statute  is  ordinarily  by  filing  a  petition  for 
 amendment  or  rescission  of  the  agencys  regulations,  and  challenging  the  denial  of  that  petition.    Id.  (quoting  Public 
 Citizen,  901  F.  2d  at  152).  Indeed,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  every  time  an  agency  requests  parties  to  compare  the  regulatory 
 status  quo  with  specific  proposed  alternatives,  all  facets  of  the  status  quo  become  fair  game  for  new  challenges.  Safe  Food 
 and  Fertilizer  v.  EPA,  350  F.  3d  1263,  1267  (D.  C.  Cir.  2003);  see  Cellular  Telecomms.  &  Internet  Assn  v.  FCC,  330  F.  3d  502, 
 508  (D.  C.  Cir.  2003)  (holding  that  the  60-  day  window  barred  the  petitioners  from  challenging  the  statutory  authority  underlying 
 the  FCCs  1996  decision  to  impose  wireless  number  portability  in  a  2001  forbearance  petition).  6 
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 FCC  neither  invited  comment  on  the  statutory  authority  supporting  the  integration  ban,  nor  did  it  respond  to  comments  in  a  way  that 
 suggested  it  did  in  fact  reconsider  the  issue.  Indeed,  as  noted  below,  there  were  no  comments  on  the  statutory  issue. 

 7  See,  e.  g.,  American  Family  Assn,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  365  F.  3d  1156, 
 1166  (D.  C.  Cir.  2004);  Sioux  Valley  Rural  Television,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  349  F.  3d  667,  676  (D.  C.  Cir.  2003);  New  England  Pub.  Commcns 

 Council,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  334  F.  3d  69,  79  (D.  C.  Cir.  2003);  Time  Warner  Entmt  Co.  v.  FCC,  144  F.  3d  75,  81  (D.  C.  Cir.  1998). 

 Moreover,  even  if  our  review  were  not  barred  by  the  limited  statutory  window  for  filing  petitions  for  review,  it  is  certainly 
 barred  --  as  the  FCC  also  points  out  --  by  47  U.  S.  C.    405,  which  requires  that  the  Commission  be  afforded  an  opportunity 
 to  pass  on  an  issue  as  a  condition  precedent  to  judicial  review.  47  U.  S.  C.    405(  a).  This  circuit  has  strictly  applied 
 that  section,  holding  that  we  may  not  consider  arguments  that  have  not  first  been  presented  to  the  Commission.  BDPCS,  Inc. 
 v.  FCC,  351  F.  3d  1177,  1182  (D.  C.  Cir.  2003).  7  As  the  petitioners  concede,  there  is  not  a  single  page  in  the  voluminous 
 record  below  in  which  they  made  the  other  equipment  argument  that  they  now  press  before  this  court.  See  Oral  Arg. 
 Tr.  6. 
 Notwithstanding  their  failure  to  raise  this  argument  below,  the  petitioners  urge  us  to  reach  it  because  they  raised  it  in  their 
 original  attack  on  the  FCCs  1999  Reconsideration  Order  --  an  order  that  we  upheld  in  General  Instrument.  According  to  the 
 petitioners,  the  General  Instrument  court  misunderstood  the  nature  of  their  statutory  argument,  and  thus  addressed  only  the 
 converter  box  language  in  that  opinion.  This,  they  say,  left  the  other  equipment  language  fair  game  for  this  appeal. 

 But  even  if  the  petitioners  did  raise  this  issue  in  the  1999  proceedings  --  an  assertion  for  which  they  provide  no  citation  -- 
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 13 
 we  see  no  reason  the  Commission  should  be  required  to  sift  through  pleadings  in  other  proceedings  in  search  of  issues  that 

 a  petitioner  raised  elsewhere  and  might  have  raised  here  had  it  thought  to  do  so.  Beehive  Tel.  Co.,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  179  F.  3d  941, 
 945  (D.  C.  Cir.  1999).  [  I]  ndeed,  such  a  duty  would  be  inconsistent  with  our  adversarial  system,  in  which  the  petitioner 
 has  the  burden  of  clarifying  its  position  before  the  agency.    Id.  (quoting  Bartholdi  Cable  Co.  v.  FCC,  114  F.  3d  274,  280  (D.  C. 
 Cir.  1997)).  Nor  would  a  reasonable  Commission  necessarily  .  .  .  have  seen  the  question  raised  before  us  as  part  of  the  case 
 presented  to  it.  Time  Warner  Entmt  Co.  v.  FCC,  144  F.  3d  75,  81  (D.  C.  Cir.  1998).  To  the  contrary,  our  affirmation  of  the 
 FCCs  statutory  authority  in  General  Instrument,  as  well  as  the  FCCs  understanding  that  it  had  not  reopened  the  issue,  surely 
 gave  the  Commission  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  petitioners  meant  to  reassert  a  statutory  argument  on  this  go-  round.  And 
 that  --  together  with  the  petitioners  failure  to  mention  the  point  at  all  --  certainly  explains  why  the  FCC  did  not  address  the 
 question  in  the  Second  Report  and  Order.  Accordingly,  we  are  barred  from  considering  the  petitioners  statutory  argument. 

 III 
 The  petitioners  also  contend  that  the  FCC  unreasonably  refused  to  rescind  the  integration  ban  in  light  of  changed 
 circumstances.  This  contention  was  raised  below,  and  it  is  therefore  properly  before  us.  The  petitioners  regard  the  ban  as 
 unreasonable  for  an  array  of  interrelated  reasons.  In  considering  those  arguments,  we  apply  the  deferential  standard  of  the 
 Administrative  Procedure  Act  (APA),  and  will  uphold  the  Commissions  policy  judgments  as  long  as  they  are  not 
 arbitrary,  capricious,  an  abuse  of  discretion,  or  otherwise  not  in  accordance  with  law.    Global  Crossing  Telecomms.,  Inc.  v. 
 FCC,  259  F.  3d  740,  745  (D.  C.  Cir.  2001)  (quoting  5  U.  S.  C.    706(  2)(  A)).  Under  that  standard,  the  scope  of  review    is 
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 14 
 narrow  and  a  court  is  not  to  substitute  its  judgment  for  that  of  the  agency.    Cellular  Telecomms.,  330  F.  3d  at  507  (quoting 

 Motor  Vehicle  Mfrs.  Assn  v.  State  Farm  Mutual  Auto.  Ins.  Co.,  463  U.  S.  29,  43  (1983)).  The  agency  must,  however,  examine 
 the  relevant  data  and  articulate  a  satisfactory  explanation  for  its  action  including  a  rational  connection  between  the  facts  found 
 and  the  choice  made.  Motor  Vehicle  Mfrs.  Assn,  463  U.  S.  at  43  (internal  quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted). 

 A 
 The  petitioners  first  argument  is  that  the  integration  ban  is  no  longer  needed  to  comply  with  the  statutory  directive  of 
 section  629(  a)  because  navigation  devices  are  already  available  to  consumers  in  the  retail  market.  According  to  the  petitioners, 
 in  the  period  since  the  rule  was  promulgated,  the  cable  and  [consumer  electronics]  industries  engaged  in  an  extraordinary 
 collaborative  undertaking  to  bring  CableCARD-  equipped  navigation  devices  to  the  retail  market,  and  to  implement  the 
 separate  security  requirement  of  the  1998  Order.  Petitioners  Br.  21.  In  addition,  the  FCCs  plug  and  play  rules  legally 
 bound  the  cable  industry  to  specific  technical  and  operational  commitments  to  facilitate  the  commercial  availability  of  digital 
 cable-  ready  equipment.  Id.;  see  supra  note  5.  As  a  result,  by  mid-  2004,  the  record  showed  the  commercial  availability  of 
 more  than  140  models  of  CableCARD-  compatible  navigation  devices  from  11  different  manufacturers.  Id.  The  momentum 
 and  trajectory,  the  petitioners  assure  us,  is  inexorably  toward  such  availability  regardless  of  any  integration  ban.  Petitioners 
 Reply  Br.  18. 
 The  FCC  did  not  ignore  the  developments  cited  by  the  petitioners,  but  its  assessment  both  of  the  current  state  of  the 
 market  and  of  its  trajectory  differed  from  that  of  the  cable  industry.  Although  the  FCC  agreed  that  there  had  been 
14
 15 
 8  Citing,  inter  alia,  the  cable  industrys  own  comments,  the  FCC 
 also  found  that  an  industry  initiative  to  support  the  retail  availability  of  integrated  converter  boxes  has  not  been  successful.  Second 

 Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6799,    14;  see  id.  at  n.  42  (citing  NCTA  comments  acknowledging  that  the  results  of  the  initiative  have 
 been  disappointing). 
 9  See  Letter  from  Julie  M.  Kearney,  Consumer  Electronics  Assn, 
 to  FCC  Secretary  (March  14,  2005)  (stating  that  CableCARDs  have  been  installed  in  no  more  than  2.7%  of  the  devices  capable  of 

 receiving  them)  (J.  A.  420);  Comments  of  the  Consumer  Electronics  Assn  on  NCTA  Downloadable  Security  Report,  CS  Docket  97-  80,  at 
 3  (January  20,  2006)  (noting  that  80,000  CableCARDs  have  been  provided  for  a  total  of  3.8  million  TV  receivers  capable  of  relying  on 
 the  CableCARDs  --  barely  2  percent)  (J.  A.  313). 
 10  See  Letter  from  Lawrence  Sidman  to  FCC  Secretary  (October 
 28,  2004)  (detailing  reports  from  consumer  electronics  manufacturers  that  consumers  were  experiencing  numerous  technical 

 implementation  problems  including  persistent  problems  with  CableCARDs  or  their  headend  support,  erroneous  software  or 
 firmware  fixes,  [and]  inability  of  authorized  subscribers  to  acquire  some  channels  that  offer  encrypted  content)  (J.  A.  534). 

 progress,  it  was  clear  from  the  record  that  the  market  for  equipment  used  in  conjunction  with  the  distribution  of  digital 
 cable  video  programming  presently  remains  a  nascent  market.  Second  Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  6808,    28.  8  And 
 whatever  number  of  CableCARD-  compatible  television  models  might  be  available,  the  record  reflected  that  less  than  three 
 percent  of  the  compatible  televisions  sold  to  consumers  were  actually  being  used  with  CableCARDs.  9  Citing  submissions 
 from  the  consumer  electronics  industry,  the  FCC  also  expressed  concern[]  about  evidence  that  cable  operators  are  not 
 adequately  supporting  CableCARDS.  Id.  at    27.  10  Given  this  record,  there  was  nothing  unreasonable  about  the  FCCs 
 conclusion  that  the  competitive  reasons  that  led  the 
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 16 
 Commission  to  impose  the  integration  ban  have  not  been  eliminated  by  the  developments  in  the  market.  Second  Report 

 and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6809,    28. 
 Moreover,  this  court  is  bound  to  defer  to  the  FCCs  predictive  judgment  that,  [  a]  bsent  common  reliance  on  an 
 identical  security  function,  we  do  not  foresee  the  market  developing  in  a  manner  consistent  with  our  statutory 
 obligation.  Id.  at  6813,    36;  see  Melcher  v.  FCC,  134  F.  3d  1143,  1151-  52  (D.  C.  Cir.  1998)  (noting  that  this  circuits  review 
 has  been  particularly  deferential  where  the  FCC  must  make  judgments  about  future  market  behavior  with  respect  to  a 
 brand-  new  technology).  As  the  FCC  explained:  At  the  heart  of  a  robust  retail  market  for  navigation  devices  is  the  reliance  of 
 cable  operators  on  the  same  security  technology  and  conditional  access  interface  that  consumer  electronics  manufacturers  must 
 rely  on  in  developing  competitive  navigation  devices.  Second  Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6807,    27.  If  cable  operators 
 must  take  steps  to  support  their  own  compliant  equipment,  it  seems  far  more  likely  that  they  will  continue  to  support  and  take 
 into  account  the  need  to  support  services  that  will  work  with  independently  supplied  and  purchased  equipment.  Id.  at  6809, 
   30.  This  explains  the  FCCs  prohibition  on  integrated  devices,  as  it  assur[  es]  that  MVPDs  devote  both  their  technical 
 and  business  energies  towards  creation  of  an  environment  in  which  competitive  markets  will  develop.  Id.  It  is  an 
 explanation  that  is  neither  arbitrary  nor  capricious. 
 B 
 The  petitioners  second  contention  is  that  the  FCC  failed  to  explain  adequately  why  the  costs  of  the  integration  ban  were 
 justified.  The  cable  industry  maintains  that  the  costs  of  re-engineering  converter  boxes  will  be  enormous,  and  that  these 
 costs  will  be  passed  on  to  subscribers  who  will  obtain 
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 11  Cf.  Consumer  Elec.  Assn  v.  FCC,  347  F.  3d  291,  303  (D.  C.  Cir. 
 2003)  (holding  that  it  was  not  unreasonable  for  the  FCC  to  conclude,  on  the  basis  of  admittedly  imperfect  evidence  and  inherent 

 uncertainty,  that  the  cost  of  a  new  consumer  electronics  device  would  likely  fall  over  time). 

 absolutely  no  benefit.  Petitioners  Br.  27-  28.  Quoting  a  line  from  General  Instrument,  the  petitioners  declare  that  [  p]  erhaps 
 there  are  benefits  that  will  flow  to  consumers  from  the  integration  ban,  but  the  Commission  did  not  clearly  spell  them 
 out.  213  F.  3d  at  732. 
 The  quotation  from  General  Instrument  provides  no  succor  for  the  petitioners.  Our  reference  there  was  to  the  1998  Order, 
 not  to  the  one  we  consider  here,  and  we  find  the  explanation  offered  in  the  Second  Report  and  Order  satisfactory.  On  the 
 cost  side,  the  agency  noted  that  there  was  considerable  dispute  between  the  cable  and  consumer  electronics  industries  regarding 
 what  those  costs  would  actually  be.  See  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6809,    29.  While  the  FCC  did  not  dispute  that  consumers  will  face 
 additional  costs  in  the  short  term,  it  agree[  d]  with  the  [consumer  electronics]  parties  and  other  commenters  that  the 
 cost[  s]  .  .  .  likely  will  decrease  over  time  as  volume  usage  increases.  Id.;  see  id.  at  6805,    24  (citing  comments  arguing 
 that  advances  in  technology,  as  well  as  volume  production,  will  bring  costs  down,  and  that  the  costs  described  by  NCTA  are  for 
 first-  generation  products).  11  The  Commission  also  took  steps  to  minimize  industry  costs,  both  by  extending  the  implementation 
 deadline  from  2006  to  2007,  and  by  promising  to  reconsider  eliminating  the  ban  altogether  should  the  cable  and  consumer 
 electronics  industries  achieve  a  downloadable  security  solution  capable  of  providing  common  reliance  without  requiring  the 
 physical  separation  of  security  and  non-  security  functions.  See  id.  at  6812-  13,    36. 
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 18 
 The  FCC  further  concluded  that  the  costs  of  the  integration  ban  should  be  counterbalanced  to  a  significant  extent  by  the 

 benefits  likely  to  flow  from  a  more  competitive  and  open  supply  market.  Id.  at  6809,    29.  Those  benefits  included  the 
 potential  savings  to  consumers  from  greater  choice  among  navigation  devices,  as  well  as  the  spurring  of  technological 
 innovations.  Id.  And,  of  course,  there  was  the  fact  that  Congress  regarded  the  commercial  availability  of  navigation 
 devices  from  independent  sources  as  a  benefit  in  and  of  itself.  See  Consumer  Elec.  Assn  v.  FCC,  347  F.  3d  291,  303  (D.  C.  Cir. 
 2003)  (indicating  that  the  FCC  had  appropriately  assessed,  as  a  benefit  of  a  regulatory  requirement,  the  regulations  contribution 
 toward  speeding  achievement  of  a  congressional  mandate).  Given  the  congressional  command  to  assure  such  availability, 
 47  U.  S.  C.    549(  a),  and  the  FCCs  determination  that  the  integration  ban  was  necessary  to  do  so,  we  cannot  regard  the 
 agencys  cost-  benefit  balance  as  arbitrary.  See  generally  Consumer  Elec.  Assn,  347  F.  3d  at  304  (noting  that 
   cost-  benefit  analyses  epitomize  the  types  of  decisions  that  are  most  appropriately  entrusted  to  the  expertise  of  an  agency 
 (quoting  Office  of  Commcn  of  United  Church  of  Christ  v.  FCC,  707  F.  2d  1413,  1440  (D.  C.  Cir.  1983))). 

 C 
 Third,  the  petitioners  object  that  the  FCC  arbitrarily  applied  different  decisional  criteria  in  imposing  the  integration 
 ban  on  cable  but  not  DBS.  Petitioners  Br.  29  (emphasis  omitted).  As  we  noted  in  Part  I,  the  1998  Order  provided  that 
 an  MVPD  could  qualify  for  an  exemption  from  the  integration  ban  if  it  supports  the  active  use  by  its  subscribers  of  navigation 
 devices  that:  (i)  operate  throughout  the  continental  United  States,  and  (ii)  are  available  from  retail  outlets  .  .  .  throughout 
 the  United  States  that  are  not  affiliated  with  the  [MVPD].  47  C.  F.  R.    76.1204(  a)(  2).  At  the  time  of  the  1998  Order,  the  FCC 
18
 19 
 concluded  that  only  DBS  systems  qualified  for  the  exemption.  The  petitioners  contend  that,  by  the  time  of  the  Second  Report 

 and  Order,  the  cable  industry  had  met  the  exemption  requirements  while  DBS  service  was  backsliding.  Yet,  they 
 claim,  the  FCC  refused  to  even  consider  an  exemption  of  cable  --  whatever  the  evidence  --  on  the  same  grounds  that  the  FCC 
 relied  on  to  exempt  DBS.  Petitioners  Br.  30.  This,  they  declare,  was  unfair  to  cable  operators  and  put  them  at  a 
 competitive  disadvantage. 
 It  is  simply  not  true  that  the  FCC  refused  to  even  consider  the  petitioners  arguments,  particularly  as  to  disparate  treatment. 
 To  the  contrary,  the  Commission  noted  the  petitioners  concerns  regarding  the  lack  of  parity  in  treatment  between  DBS 
 operators  and  other  MVPDs.  Second  Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6814,    38.  But  it  also  determined  that  DBS 
 equipment  remains  widely  available  at  retail  outlets  from  various  DBS  service  providers  and  a  number  of  different 
 equipment  manufacturers,  on  a  geographically  portable  basis,  and  that  the  distinctions  that  led  the  Commission  to 
 differentiate  between  DBS  and  other  MVPDs  in  1998  remain  valid.  Id. 

 Although  the  petitioners  insist  that  more  than  140  models  of  CableCARD-  compatible  navigation  devices  are  commercially 
 available,  and  that  all  CableCARD-  enabled  devices  are  portable  geographically  and  interoperable  among  cable 
 systems,  they  concede  that  the  integrated  set-  top  boxes  cable  operators  lease  to  consumers  are  not  geographically  portable. 
 Petitioners  Br.  36.  And  that  is  the  rub,  since  the  record  reflects  that  less  than  three  percent  of  CableCARD-  compatible 
 television  sets  are  actually  being  used  with  CableCARDs.  This  means  that  the  vast  majority  of  cable  subscribers  remain 
 dependent  upon  non-  portable  converter  boxes  available  only  from  their  cable  companies.  On  these  facts,  it  was  not 
19
 20 
 unreasonable  to  doubt  that  the  cable  industry  supports  the  active  use  by  its  subscribers  of  navigation  devices  that  satisfy 

 the  two  criteria  required  for  exemption  from  the  integration  ban.  47  C.  F.  R.    76.1204(  a)(  2). 

 The  FCC  also  recognized  the  petitioners  point  that  [  a]  voiding  rule  based  market  distortions  with  respect  to  DBS  as 
 a  competitor  to  cable  .  .  .  is  an  important  consideration.  Second  Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6814,    38.  It  did  not, 
 however,  regard  the  present  proceeding  as  providing  a  record  on  which  the  Commission  can  resolve  these  issues.  Id.  The 
 FCCs  assessment  of  the  state  of  the  record  appears  correct.  Indeed,  while  the  petitioners  claim  that  the  ban  places  them  at  a 
 serious  competitive  disadvantage  vis-  a-  vis  DBS,  they  concede  that  there  is  no  quantitative  evidence  of  such  a  disadvantage  in 
 the  record.  See  Oral  Arg.  Tr.  8.  The  absence  of  a  sufficient  record  is  hardly  surprising,  since  neither  the  Further  Notice  nor 
 the  Extension  Order  sought  comment  on  the  DBS  exemption  or  on  the  relationship  between  developments  in  the  DBS  and  cable 
 markets.  See  Further  Notice,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18199,    1;  Extension  Order,  18  FCC  Rcd  at  7924,    3. 

 Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  not  unreasonable  for  the  FCC  to  decline  to  resolve  the  DBS-  related  issues.  As  FCC 
 counsel  said  at  oral  argument,  the  cable  industry  is  perfectly  capable  of  filing  a  petition  tomorrow  with  the  Commission  that 
 will  generate  a  record  appropriate  for  consideration  of  those  issues.  Oral  Arg.  Tr.  24.  The  FCC  has  discretion  to  defer 
 consideration  of  particular  issues  to  future  proceedings  when  it  thinks  that  doing  so  would  be  conducive  to  the  efficient  dispatch 
 of  business  and  the  ends  of  justice.  United  States  Telecom  Assn  v.  FCC,  359  F.  3d  554,  588  (D.  C.  Cir.  2004).  We  perceive 
 no  abuse  of  that  discretion  here. 
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 21 
 D 

 Fourth,  the  petitioners  contend  that  the  Second  Report  and  Order  failed  to  address  the  cable  industrys  argument  that 
 vibrant  intermodal  competition  has  displaced  any  remaining  justification  for  the  integration  ban.  Petitioners  Br.  43.  The 
 intermodal  competition  they  have  in  mind  includes  not  only  DBS  services,  but  also  incumbent  local  telephone  companies 
 [that]  are  now  entering  the  video  market  through  multi-  billion  dollar  construction  of  new  fiber  networks.  Id.  at  42.  The 
 petitioners  contention  is  that  intense  competition  from  DBS  [and  others]  in  the  marketing  of  video  services  to  both  current 
 and  potential  cable  customers  .  .  .  gives  cable  operators  every  incentive  to  maximize,  rather  than  limit,  the  range  of  .  .  . 
 equipment  options  and  distribution  outlets  for  equipment  that  enables  consumers  to  access  their  services.  Id.  at  43  (internal 
 quotation  marks  omitted). 
 The  petitioners  do  not  cite  record  evidence  to  support  their  depiction  of  the  current  state  of  intermodal  competition  as 
 vibrant  and  intense.  But  their  larger  problem  is  that,  whatever  the  theoretical  incentives,  the  FCC  found  that  the  real-world 
 result  that  section  629(  a)  commanded  it  to  assure  --  the  commercial  availability  of  navigation  devices  from  vendors 
 unaffiliated  with  MVPDs  --  has  not  arrived.  The  Commission  determined  that  only  common  reliance  .  .  .  on  an  identical 
 security  function  [that]  will  align  MVPDs  incentives  with  those  of  other  industry  participants  will  achieve  that  result.  Second 
 Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6809,    30.  As  an  example  of  the  need  for  aligned  incentives,  the  Second  Report  and  Order 
 recounted  the  cable  industrys  reluctance  to  provide  TiVo  --  an  intermodal  competitor  --  with  a  multistream  CableCARD:  a 
 device  that  TiVo  needed  to  allow  its  customers  to  receive  two  streams  of  programming,  but  that  cable  did  not  need  to  provide 
 the  same  service.  Id.  at  6803-  04,    21  &  n.  88;  see  Oral  Arg  Tr. 
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 22 
 12  TiVo  is  an  independently  manufactured  digital  video  recorder 
 that  is  a  direct  competitor  with  digital  video  recorders  that  are  supplied  and  now  sold  by  the  cable  companies.  Oral  Arg.  Tr.  26-  27 

 (FCC  counsel).  TiVo  needed  a  multistream  CableCARD  to  allow  a  customer  to  receive  two  streams  of  programming  so  that  one  could  be 
 recorded  and  the  other  watched.  Id. 

 at  26-  27.  12  Nothing  about  the  petitioners  intermodal  variant  on  the  argument  we  considered  in  Part  III.  A  calls  into  question 
 the  reasonableness  of  the  FCCs  conclusion  that  an  integration  ban  remains  necessary  to  achieve  the  statutory  objective. 

 E 
 We  next  address  the  petitioners  charge  that  the  Commission  said  it  would  insist,  now  and  in  the  future,  upon 
 an  integration  ban  regardless  of  the  extent  of  commercial  availability  of  cable-  ready  navigation  devices.  Petitioners  Br. 
 41  (citing  Second  Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6812-  13,    36).  That  charge  is  simply  not  true.  The  paragraph  that  the 
 petitioners  cite  states  that,  [  a]  lthough  we  agree  with  NCTA  that  the  significant  efforts  by  the  cable  and  consumer  electronics 
 industries  since  1998  indicate  that  a  competitive  environment  sufficient  to  relax  the  prohibition  on  integrated  equipment  may 
 develop,  that  day  has  not  yet  come.  Second  Report  and  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6812,    36  (emphasis  added).  Far  from  saying 
 it  would  never  consider  progress  in  commercial  availability,  the  FCC  said  that,  [  a]  s  part  of  the  Commissions  consideration  of 
 any  further  extensions,  we  will  consider  the  extent  to  which  there  has  been  progress  towards  making  navigation  devices 
 commercially  available.  Id.  at  6813,    36  (emphasis  added). 
 What  apparently  disturbs  the  petitioners  is  the  paragraphs  next  sentence,  in  which  the  FCC  advises  that  it  is  not  inclined 
 to  grant  any  further  extensions  on  the  basis  of  the  level  of 
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 13  Section  629s  sunset  provision  states  that  FCC  regulations 
 adopted  under  this  section  shall  cease  to  apply  when: 

 the  Commission  determines  that  --  (1)  the  market  for  multichannel  video  distributors  is  fully  competitive;  (2)  the 
 market  for  converter  boxes,  and  interactive  communications  equipment,  used  in  conjunction  with  that  service  is  fully 
 competitive;  and  (3)  elimination  of  the  regulations  would  promote  competition  and  the  public  interest. 

 47  U.  S.  C.    549(  e);  see  47  C.  F.  R.    76.1208. 

 competition  in  the  navigation  device  market  because,  [  a]  bsent  common  reliance  on  an  identical  security  function,  we  do  not 
 foresee  the  market  developing  in  a  manner  consistent  with  our  statutory  obligation.  Id.  (emphasis  added).  That  is  a 
 predictive  judgment  that  the  FCC  is  entitled  to  make  and  to  which  we  defer.  See  Consumer  Elec.  Assn,  347  F.  3d  at  303-  04. 
 Moreover,  notwithstanding  its  doubts,  the  Commission  note[  d]  that  Section  629  contains  a  sunset  provision  triggered  by  fully 
 competitive  markets  for  video  programming  and  navigation  devices,  and  that  FCC  rules  provide[]  that  any  interested  party 
 may  petition  the  Commission  for  a  determination  that  the  sunset  provision  has  been  satisfied.  Second  Report  and  Order, 
 20  FCC  Rcd  at  6813,    36.  13 
 At  oral  argument,  the  petitioners  pointed  to  another  place  in  the  Second  Report  and  Order  --  footnote  142  --  that  they  also 
 insist  shows  the  FCC  has  plugged  its  ears  against  the  cable  industrys  arguments.  Oral  Arg.  Tr.  12-  13.  The  second 
 sentence  of  that  footnote  reads:  The  Commission  will  not  entertain  arguments  regarding  the  need  for  the  cable  industry  to 
 rely  on  the  same  security  function  as  their  consumer  electronics  competitors.  20  FCC  Rcd  at  6811  n.  142.  But  while  that 
 sentence  did  foreclose  the  specified  arguments,  it  did  so  only  in  a  single  forum.  As  the  footnotes  preceding  sentence  makes 
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 clear,  the  edict  of  the  sentence  in  question  applied  only  to  the  December  1,  2005  report  by  the  cable  industry  and  the 

 comments  in  response  thereto.  Id.  Because  the  December  2005  report  was  limited  to  .  .  .  issues  [relating  to]  the  feasibility 
 of  a  downloadable  security  function,  id.,  it  was  perfectly  appropriate  for  the  Commission  to  restrict  that  filing  to  those 
 issues. 
 F 
 Finally,  we  note  that  the  FCCs  Second  Report  and  Order  extended  the  deadline  for  implementation  of  the  integration  ban 
 in  order  to  provide  the  cable  and  consumer  electronics  industries  with  more  time  to  work  toward  the  implementation  of  a  new 
 technology  that  may  moot  this  entire  controversy.  The  industries  are  currently  developing  the  downloadable  security 
 system  referenced  above,  which  would  allow  cable  operators  and  consumer  electronics  manufacturers  to  rely  on  an  identical 
 security  function,  but  would  not  require  the  potentially  costly  complete  separation  of  the  physical  security  element.  20  FCC 
 Rcd  at  6810,    31.  In  light  of  the  evolving  nature  of  that  technology,  it  was  hardly  unreasonable  for  the  FCC  to  delay,  but 
 not  to  delete,  the  integration  ban.  Although  the  enforcement  regime  chosen  by  the  Commission  may  not  be  the  only  one 
 possible,  we  must  uphold  it  as  long  as  it  is  a  reasonable  means  of  implementing  the  statutory  requirements.  Global  Crossing 
 Telecomms.,  Inc.,  259  F.  3d  at  745.  It  is  and  we  do. 
 IV 
 For  the  foregoing  reasons,  the  petition  for  review  is 
 Denied. 
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