63 FR 55578, October 16, 1998

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration
[A-549-502]

Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand: Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review; Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand.

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SUMMARY: In response to a request by Saha Thai Steel Pipe Company, Ltd.
(``Saha Thai''), and its affiliated exporter S.A.F. Pipe Export Co.,
Ltd., (``SAF''), and two importers, Ferro Union Inc. (``Ferro Union''),
and ASOMA Corp. (``ASOMA''), the Department of Commerce (``the
Department'') is conducting an administrative review of the antidumping
duty order on certain welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from
Thailand. This review covers the following manufacturer/exporter of the
subject merchandise to the United States: Saha Thai/SAF. The period of
review (POR) is March 1, 1996 through February 29, 1997. We received
comments on the preliminary results and rebuttal comments from the
petitioners and respondent.
    Based on our analysis of comments received, we have calculated a
margin for Saha Thai. The final weighted-average dumping margins are
listed below in the section entitled Final Results of Review.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 16, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Totaro or Dorothy Woster, AD/CVD
Enforcement Group III, Office 7, Import Administration, International
Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
1374 or (202) 482-3362, respectively.

Applicable Statute

    Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the statute are
references to the provisions effective January 1, 1995, the effective
date of the amendments made to the Tariff Act of 1930 (hereinafter,
``the Act'') by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). In addition,
unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Department's
regulations are to the regulations codified at 19 CFR Part 353 (April
1997). Although the Department's new regulations, codified at 19 CFR
351 (62 FR 27296, May 19,

[[Page 55579]]

1997) (``Final Regulations''), do not govern this administrative
review, citations to those regulations are provided, where appropriate,
as a statement of current Departmental practice.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On March 11, 1986, the Department published in the Federal Register
an antidumping duty order on welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from
Thailand (51 FR 8341). On March 7, 1997, the Department published a
notice of opportunity to request an administrative review of this order
covering the period March 1, 1996 through February 28, 1997 (62 FR
10521). A timely request for an administrative review of the
antidumping order with respect to sales by Saha Thai/SAF during the POR
was filed jointly by Saha Thai, SAF, Ferro Union, and ASOMA. The
Department published a notice of initiation of this antidumping duty
administrative review on April 24, 1997 (62 FR 19988). On May 14, 1997,
certain domestic producers of standard pipe products entered an
appearance in this review: Allied Tube & Conduit Corporation, Sawhill
Tubular Division--Armco, Inc., Wheatland Tube Company, and Laclede
Steel Company, (``petitioners'' or ``domestic interested parties'').
    Because the Department determined that it was not practicable to
complete this review within statutory time limits, on November 19,
1997, we published in the Federal Register our notice of extension of
time limits for this review (62 FR 61802) pursuant to section
751(a)(3)(A) of the Act. On April 7, 1998, the Department published in
the Federal Register (63 FR 16974) the preliminary results of its
administrative review of this antidumping order covering the period
March 1, 1996 through February 28, 1997. The Department has now
completed this review in accordance with section 751(a) of the Act.

Scope of the Review

    The products covered by this administrative review are certain
circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from Thailand. The subject
merchandise has an outside diameter of 0.375 inches or more, but not
exceeding 16 inches. These products, which are commonly referred to in
the industry as ``standard pipe'' or ``structural tubing,'' are
hereinafter designated as ``pipe and tube.'' The merchandise is
classifiable under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) item numbers
7306.30.1000, 7306.30.5025, 7306.30.5032, 7306.30.5040, 7306.30.5055,
7306.30.5085 and 7306.30.5090. Although the HTS subheadings are
provided for convenience and Customs purposes, our written description
of the scope of the order is dispositive. This review covers sales of
these products by Saha Thai/SAF during the period March 1, 1996 through
February 28, 1997.

Verification

    As provided in section 782(i) of the Act, we verified sales
information provided by the respondent Saha Thai from March 2-6, 1997,
using standard verification procedures, including examination of
relevant financial records and analysis of original documentation used
by Saha Thai to prepare responses to requests for information from the
Department. We also verified sales and level of trade issues at one of
Saha Thai's affiliated home market resellers. Our verification results
are outlined in the public version of the verification report
(Memorandum to Roland L. MacDonald from John B. Totaro and Dorothy A.
Woster, March 19, 1998 (``Saha Thai Verification Report'').

Analysis of Comments Received

    Saha Thai, SAF, Ferro Union, and ASOMA (collectively ``Saha Thai'')
and the petitioners submitted case briefs on May 22, 1998, and rebuttal
briefs on June 1, 1998.

Comment 1

    Saha Thai argues that the Department correctly found that Saha Thai
is jointly controlled by more than one person, but incorrectly found
that Somchai Lamatipanont individually controls Saha Thai. Saha Thai
states that in view of Mr. Lamatipanont's limited role in Saha Thai,
there is no basis upon which to find that he is either ``legally or
operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction'' over
Saha Thai. Citing to a commentator on Securities and Exchange
Commission rules, Saha Thai advocates a definition of control based on
identifying who ``calls the day-to-day shots'' in the company. A.A.
Sommer, Jr., ``Who's `In Control'--SEC,'' 21 Bus. Law 559, 582 (1966).
Saha Thai argues that the Department's discussions with Saha Thai's
officers at verification showed that Saha Thai, a closely held
corporation, operates through a consensus of its owners and operators.
Saha Thai claims that the company is controlled ``jointly'' by a
control group consisting of either the entire board acting together or
a majority of the board; thus, no single individual, particularly
Somchai Lamatipanont, can be said to control Saha Thai. Saha Thai
asserts that only the board can exercise restraint or direction over
the company.
    Petitioners respond that the opinions of a particular commentator
on the definition of control in the context of securities law are
irrelevant to the application of the antidumping statute. Petitioners
note that the statute requires that a person be ``legally or
operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction'' for
control to exist. Moreover, petitioners refer to the statement in the
Preamble to the Final Regulations that the analysis of whether a person
is in a position to exercise restraint or direction ``focuses on the
relationships that have the potential to impact decisions concerning
production, pricing or cost. . . . the ability to exercise `control'
rather than the actuality of control over specific decisions.'' 62 FR
at 27297-98. Petitioners contrast this definition of control with that
proffered by Saha Thai--whether a person ``calls the day-to-day
shots''--which focuses on the actuality of control instead of the
potential to impact decisions. Petitioners state that Saha Thai's
definition of control promotes the idea that only a person or persons
who can compel a vote of the majority of the stock or board seats can
exercise control, and that this idea is contrary to the statute, the
SAA, and the regulations. Petitioners conclude that all of Saha Thai's
arguments regarding control were considered and rejected by the
Department in the preliminary results.
    Petitioners also reject Saha Thai's argument that Somchai
Lamatipanont is not ``in control'' of Saha Thai. First, Petitioners
state that Somchai Lamatipanont's role in the company is substantial
and meets the statutory test for control. Second, petitioners argue
that the fact that the board of directors may be deemed to be in
control of Saha Thai does not preclude a finding that Somchai
Lamatipanont, or other individuals, may also be in a position to
exercise restraint and direction over Saha Thai. Petitioners state that
the Department correctly recognized in the preliminary results that
multiple persons of varying degrees of control may individually and
jointly control a company for purposes of the statute. Petitioners
claim that Saha Thai's own description of its corporate structure
supports this finding. Petitioners argue that within that type of
structure, the Deputy Managing Director, Somchai Lamatipanont, would
have the potential to impact decisions concerning production, pricing
or cost, which meets the Department's definition of control as

[[Page 55580]]

stated in the Preamble to the Final Regulations. Petitioners conclude
that the Department correctly determined that Somchai Lamatipanont
controls Saha Thai within the meaning of section 771(33).

Department's Position

    We find Saha Thai's concept of ``control'' inconsistent with the
statute. Section 771(33) of the Act states that ``control'' exists
where one person ``is legally or operationally in a position to
exercise restraint or direction'' over another person. This definition
is stated in terms of the ability to restrain or direct a company's
operations. As explained in the Preamble to the Proposed Regulations
and reiterated in the Final Regulations, the Department need not find
evidence of actual control to satisfy this statutory definition.
Proposed Rule, 61 FR at 7310, 7311; Final Regulations, 62 FR at 29298.
    The control test advocated by Saha Thai defines control in terms of
actual direction of a company's operations. However, this argument is
similar to several comments rejected by the Department in the Preamble
to the Final Regulations. For example, the Preamble states:

[i]n general we agree with the suggestion that we focus on
relationships that have the potential to impact decisions concerning
production, pricing or cost. This does not mean however, that proof
is required that a relationship in fact has had such an impact. In
this regard, section 771(33), which refers to a person being ``in a
position to exercise restraint or direction,'' properly focuses the
Department on the ability to exercise ``control'' rather than the
actuality of control over specific decisions. Therefore, we will
consider the full range of criteria identified in the SAA, at 838,
in determining whether ``control'' exists. (emphasis added).

62 FR 27297-98. The Department declined to adopt the suggestion that
the Department define ``legal or operational control'' under section
771(33)(F) of the Act as the ``enforceable ability to compel or
restrain commercial actions.'' Id. at 27298. Thus, we agree with
petitioners that the definition of control proposed by Saha Thai is
inconsistent with the antidumping statute and the Department's
regulations. Although this more narrow application may be appropriate
for the securities laws, the definition contained in the antidumping
statute is consistent with Congress' intent to expand the category of
business relationships examined for purposes of the Department's
antidumping analysis.
    We also disagree with Saha Thai's assertion that Somchai
Lamatipanont does not control Saha Thai within the meaning of section
771(33)(F). As discussed above, consistent with the statute and
regulations, the Department's control analysis properly examines the
ability or potential to restrain or direct a company's operations. As
we stated in the preliminary results, the facts on the record establish
that Somchai Lamatipanont is one of the nine members of Saha Thai's
board of directors, and has held this position for at least the last
ten years. July 30, 1997 QR at 2. Further, as Deputy Managing Director,
Mr. Lamatipanont (1) assists the Managing Director in ensuring that
decisions made are executed in accordance with the Managing Director's
instructions, (2) acts for the Managing Director with respect to
administrative matters when Managing Director is out of the office, and
(3) is responsible for significant issues involving day-to-day
operations and management decisions in consultation with the Managing
Director. October 31, 1997 QR at 2. These responsibilities place
Somchai Lamatipanont in a position to exercise restraint or direction
over Saha Thai's operations, particularly with respect to pricing and
production decisions.
    Our conclusion is not altered by Saha Thai's argument that, because
Saha Thai operates through a consensus of its owners and operators, no
individual can be said to control Saha Thai without a majority of the
remainder of the group. Neither the statute nor the legislative history
expressly limits the definition of control to a single person. The
definition of ``control'' is based solely on the ability to direct or
restrain operations. Therefore, multiple persons or groups may be in
control, individually and jointly, of a single entity, each having the
ability to direct or restrain the company's activities. Based on this
analysis, we confirm our preliminary finding that the Lamatipanont
family, through its equity interest and a family member's position as a
director and senior executive officer of Saha Thai, controls Saha Thai
within the meaning of section 771(33)(F).

Comment 2

    Saha Thai disputes the Department's finding under section
771(33)(F) of the Act that Saha Thai is affiliated with two Thai
producers of the subject merchandise, Thai Hong Steel Pipe Import
Export Co., Ltd. (``Thai Hong'') and Thai Tube Co., Ltd. (``Thai
Tube''). Saha Thai argues that the Department erred in finding common
control of these producers by the Lamatipanont family because,
according to Saha Thai, there is no such family group who possesses the
power of common control over these producers. Saha Thai argues that
besides Somchai Lamatipanont, the other Lamatipanont family members own
small percentages of Saha Thai stock and have no role in Saha Thai. In
addition, Saha Thai notes that Somchai Lamatipanont does not own any
shares in Thai Tube or Thai Hong and is not involved with either
company.
    Saha Thai argues that it had no commercial transactions with Thai
Hong or Thai Tube and does not share officers, directors, employees,
information, or facilities with these companies. Saha Thai states that
the three producers never supplied each other with production materials
or finished products, never provided loans or capital, and never
discussed their common industry and/or markets in spite of the
Lamatipanont family's involvement in each. Saha Thai adds that, based
on the supplier lists obtained at verification, the reseller identified
as Company B in the Federal Register notice of the preliminary results
(owned and controlled by Somchai Lamatipanont and his son, Worawut) did
not purchase pipe from either Thai Hong or Thai Tube.
    Saha Thai concludes that the Saha Thai stock owned by Somchai
Lamatipanont's brother, Samarn, and Samarn's family (shareholders,
officers and directors in Thai Tube and Thai Hong) is the only link
between Saha Thai and Thai Hong and Thai Tube, and that this connection
does not amount to evidence of a family group. Saha Thai asserts that
the Department based its preliminary finding of a family group on a
shared last name as opposed to record evidence. Saha Thai continues
that the Department's finding that a significant potential for
manipulation of price and production does not exist between these
companies casts doubt on the Department's conclusion that the
Lamatipanont family members constitute a family control group. Saha
Thai argues that the ``Somchai Lamatipanont branch'' of the family
should be recognized as operating distinctly from and without
involvement by the ``Samarn-Thai Hong/Thai Tube branch'' of the
Lamatipanont family.
    Saha Thai argues that by considering the Lamatipanonts a ``family
group,'' the Department has ``collapsed'' these individuals under
section 771(33)(A) of the Act. Saha Thai argues that this is incorrect
because nephews and in-laws are not affiliated under the section
771(33)(A) definition of the types of family members that can be
considered affiliates. Thus, according to Saha Thai, there is no
affiliation under section

[[Page 55581]]

771(33)(A) between Somchai Lamatipanont and his nephew and in-laws
involved in Thai Tube and Thai Hong. Even if the Department finds that
the members of the Lamatipanont family are affiliated under section
771(33)(A), Saha Thai argues that based on the record evidence the
Department should not collapse these individuals into a single family
control group for purposes of the antidumping law.
    Petitioners agree with the Department's preliminary determination
that the Lamatipanont family constitutes a family group who controls
Saha Thai, Thai Hong, and Thai Tube. To support their argument, the
petitioners refer to elements of the Department's preliminary results
collapsing analysis. The petitioners argue that, contrary to Saha
Thai's claim, the Department did not find that there was no potential
for manipulation, but that there was not a ``significant'' potential
for manipulation. Petitioners emphasize that the focus of the
Department's collapsing analysis is on the potential for sharing
information and cooperation, not on the structure of ownership
interest. Petitioners state that in the preliminary results, the
Department found every element for collapsing present other than
evidence of intertwined operations; petitioners note that actual
evidence of intertwined operations is not required to find significant
potential for manipulation. Petitioners continue that finding actual
evidence of cooperation between Saha Thai and Thai Hong and Thai Tube
would have been nearly impossible, and the Department was unable to
verify such cooperation, because (1) Saha Thai chose not to provide
relevant information, (2) Saha Thai's responses are not reliable, and
(3) Thai Hong and Thai Tube refused to participate in this review.
    Furthermore, petitioners argue that the record evidence does
support the conclusion that a significant potential for price and
production manipulation exists. Petitioners cite Collated Roofing Nails
from Taiwan, in which the Department found that persons in ``positions
of legal and operational control in their respective companies [can]
create a significant potential for price or production manipulation.''
62 FR 51427, 51436 (Oct. 1, 1997) (emphasis added). Petitioners assert
that family members can be expected to act in concert when doing so is
in their common interests. Petitioners add that the Department has not
improperly adopted a presumption that family members necessarily act in
concert because such cooperation between family members is not required
to find affiliation under the statute. Because the statute defines
family members as affiliated persons, it is reasonable to presume that
they will cooperate with one another. Petitioners continue that the
Department reasonably interpreted the statute to find that a person is
affiliated with the children of his brother. Petitioners conclude that
the Department correctly found that Saha Thai is affiliated with Thai
Hong and Thai Tube in the preliminary results, and should find the same
in the final results.

Department's Position

    We disagree with Saha Thai's argument that we improperly examined
the Lamatipanont family as a control group for purposes of our
affiliation analysis under section 771(33)(F) of the Act. Section
351.102(b) of the Final Regulations provides that, in determining
whether control exists for the purpose of finding affiliation, the
Department will consider, among other things, corporate or family
groupings, franchise or joint-venture agreements, debt financing, and
close supplier relationships. 62 FR at 27380. The directive in the
regulations that the Department consider family groupings in examining
affiliation recognizes that control may be exerted through familial
holdings and corporate positions. It is therefore reasonable to examine
familial control in the aggregate to ensure that prices and costs used
in the dumping calculation reflect market value, and are not influenced
by familial relationships, and that the appropriate methodology is
employed (e.g., affiliated producers are collapsed where warranted).
See e.g., Queen's Flowers de Colombia v. United States, F.Supp. 617,
626 (CIT 1997).
    The facts on the record demonstrate that several families are each
involved in the ownership and management of Saha Thai. Four of these
families also own and control at least one other Thai company that
produces and/or sells the subject merchandise. Throughout its
questionnaire responses, Saha Thai refers to ``six family groups with
ownership interests in Saha Thai.'' See, e.g., October 31, 1997 QR at
9. Each family owns a significant minority of Saha Thai's shares. Each
of these six stockholding families holds at least one seat on Saha
Thai's nine-member Board of Directors (together they hold all of the
nine board seats in Saha Thai), and members of the four families with
the largest equity interests also serve as the senior executive
officers in Saha Thai: Chairman of the Board (Ampapankit), Managing
Director (Karuchit/Kunanantakul), Deputy Managing Director
(Lamatipanont), and Financial Director (Sae Haeng/Ratanasirivilai). The
facts on the record demonstrate that Saha Thai's ownership and
management structure is family-oriented, and that within this
structure, these families are legally or operationally in a position,
jointly and severally, to control Saha Thai within the meaning of
section 771(33) of the Act.
    The Department's analysis in this case follows current practice by
evaluating all indicia of control by the family, not just stock
ownership. For instance, in an analysis of affiliation based on common
control by a family group, the Department explained:

The legislative history of the URAA makes it clear that the statute
does not require majority ownership for a finding of control. Even a
minority shareholder interest, examined within the context of the
totality of other evidence of control, can be a factor that we
consider in determining whether one party is operationally in a
position to control another.

Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Brazil: Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 18486, 18490 (April 15,
1997). In the most recently completed segment of this proceeding, the
Department noted the breadth of the term ``control'' under section
771(33) of the Act: ``the statutory definition of control encompasses
both legal and operational control. Multiple persons or groups may be
in control, individually and jointly, of a single entity, i.e., each
has the ability to direct or restrain the company's activities.''
Certain Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand;
Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review, 62 FR 53808 at
53815 (October 16, 1997).
    Our finding that Saha Thai is affiliated under section 771(33)(F)
of the Act with Thai Tube and Thai Hong by virtue of common control by
the Lamatipanont family is based on record evidence that this family is
one of the control groups within Saha Thai. Our analysis of the
Lamatipanont family's control is consistent with the statute,
regulations and current practice.
    We disagree with Saha Thai's assertion that we should consider the
Lamatipanonts as two separate branches of the same family who operate
independently of each other. In its questionnaire responses and case
briefs, Saha Thai does not deny that Somchai Lamatipanont, the center
of one alleged branch of the family, is the brother of Samarn
Lamatipanont, the center of the second alleged branch of the family.
These brothers, their wives, and their children are owners, directors
and managers of three producers of standard pipe: Saha Thai, Thai Hong
and Thai Tube. Where members of the same

[[Page 55582]]

family hold interests and management positions in several companies in
the same industry, it is reasonable to examine the interests of the
family as a whole for purposes of determining where common control
exists. See Queen's Flowers 981 F.Supp. at 626.
    Saha Thai misconstrues our analysis by claiming that we improperly
collapsed the Lamatipanont family members under section771(33)(A) of
the Act. We did not rely on this provision for purposes of aggregating
the interests of the Lamatipanont family members. Rather, we made
reference to this subsection merely as further support for considering
familial holdings in our affiliation analysis, i.e., the fact that
family members are affiliated, confirms the reasonableness of examining
control by family groups. We, therefore, find it reasonable to examine
the interests of the Lamatipanont family as a whole in steel pipe
businesses.
    Moreover, in determining the existence of a ``corporate or family
grouping'' for purposes of affiliation, the Department is not required
to find, as Saha Thai suggests, the existence of a ``control group
acting in concert.'' Drawing such a bright line test ignores the focus
of the statute and the regulations on the ability of a person to exert
restraint or direction over a company in determining ``control'' for
purposes of affiliation. The Department is equally concerned with a
control group which has the potential to act in concert or act out of
common interest.
    Finally, Saha Thai's arguments that it had no commercial
transactions and does not share officers, directors, employees,
information or facilities with Thai Hong or Thai Tube to support its
argument that the Lamatipanont family does not control these producers
is unpersuasive. These factors are relevant to a collapsing analysis
but are not determinative of control within the meaning of section
771(33) of the Act. (See Department's Position in response to Comment
3.) For the purpose of examining the existence of common control, we
examined indicia of control, such as the ownership interests, board of
directors seats and management positions held by members of the
Lamatipanont family in Saha Thai, Thai Hong, and Thai Tube. Analysis of
these facts led us to conclude that these three producers of the
subject merchandise are affiliated because they are under the common
control of the Lamatipanont family within the meaning of section
771(33)(F) of the Act. Our conclusion is unchanged for the final
results.

Comment 3

    Petitioners argue that the Department incorrectly found in the
preliminary results that Saha Thai and Thai Tube and Thai Hong should
not be collapsed because there is no evidence of intertwined
operations. Petitioners argue that while evidence of actual price and
production manipulation is not present on the record, the Department in
its regulations explicitly rejected the need for a showing of actual
manipulation in favor of finding a significant potential for
manipulation. Petitioners also argue that there is significant
potential for manipulation of price and production where affiliation is
based on control under section 771(33) of the Act. Petitioners contend
that whenever a person or group of people are legally or operationally
in a position to exercise restraint or direction over two entities,
there is a significant potential for manipulation of price and
production. Petitioners cite Certain Welded Carbon Standard Steel Pipes
and Tubes From India; Final Results of New Shippers Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 62 FR 51427, 51436 (Sept. 10, 1997), as a case
where the Department found that it was ``immaterial'' that two
collapsed entities were operated as separate entities, and that there
may be overlap between the evidence used to find affiliation based on
control and the evidence used to determine the appropriateness of
collapsing. Petitioners then cite Collated Roofing Nails From Taiwan;
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 62 FR 51427,
51436 (Oct. 1, 1997), as support for the proposition that significant
potential for manipulation of price or production can be created by a
person or a group of persons in positions of legal and operational
control in their respective companies.
    Petitioners argue that the Department's preliminary affiliation
analysis regarding the Lamatipanont family's ownership, management and
access to marketing, sales and production data support the existence of
a significant potential for price and production manipulation.
Petitioners note that the Department found that Saha Thai's competition
policy on its own does not rebut the potential for manipulation of
prices and production. Petitioners note that the focus of the
Department's regulations on this issue is the potential for
manipulation, and argue that requiring a showing of actual intertwined
operations undercuts this focus of the regulations.
    Petitioners also argue that Saha Thai has frustrated the
Department's attempts to gain information on Thai Tube and Thai Hong,
and that the record contains numerous instances where Saha Thai refused
to provide basic information. Petitioners continue that the Department
should hold Saha Thai responsible if the record contains inconclusive
evidence of intertwined operations between Saha Thai and Thai Tube and
Thai Hong. Petitioners conclude that the Department should collapse
these three companies for the final results.
    Saha Thai responds that there is no basis on which Thai Tube and
Thai Hong can be collapsed with Saha Thai, particularly because Saha
Thai had no commercial or other transactions with these companies, and
in fact had a twelve-year-old company policy prohibiting such
transactions. Saha Thai states that petitioners' arguments that these
companies should be collapsed are irrelevant and ludicrous. Saha Thai
concludes that the Department should affirm its decision not to
collapse Saha Thai and Thai Tube.

Department's Position

    A finding of affiliation has been and continues to be a necessary,
but not determinative, criterion in deciding whether to ``collapse''
two or more companies, i.e., treat them as a single entity for margin
calculation purposes. For example, the Department may find two
companies affiliated on the basis of an equity interest and then
consider the level of that interest in deciding whether to collapse the
affiliated parties. One producer's equity interest of ten percent of
another would result in treating two companies as affiliated, but
absent other factors may be insufficient to warrant collapsing them.
Similarly, a finding of control results in treating companies as
affiliated. However, it is appropriate to consider the level of control
in deciding whether to collapse those companies. The existence of some
degree of control alone is not necessarily determinative of the
collapsing question. In short, affiliation alone is not a sufficient
basis to collapse. See Preamble to the Final Regulations, 62 FR at
27345.
    In the preliminary results, we found Saha Thai affiliated with Thai
Tube and Thai Hong under section 771(33)(F) of the Act by virtue of
common control by the Lamatipanont family. We then applied our
collapsing analysis, using factors set forth in the Final Regulations
at Sec. 351.401(f), to determine whether these two producers should be
collapsed with Saha Thai for purposes of calculating dumping margins.
Although each producer is affiliated with Saha Thai and each company
produces subject merchandise, we

[[Page 55583]]

concluded that the record evidence did not support a finding of
significant potential for manipulation of pricing or production.
Therefore, we did not collapse Saha Thai with either Thai Tube or Thai
Hong. See Memo to File from John Totaro, March 30, 1998. We continue to
find that collapsing Saha Thai with these producers is inappropriate in
this review.
    Although we agree with the petitioners' assertion that evidence of
actual manipulation is not a prerequisite to finding a significant
potential for manipulation, the record evidence must demonstrate a
``significant potential'' for such manipulation to justify treating
affiliated producers as a single entity. We also agree that each factor
set forth as a relevant indicator to determine whether a significant
potential for manipulation exists need not be met in each case. Rather,
as explained in the Preamble to the Final Regulations, this is a non-
exhaustive list of factors which the Department considers in
determining whether to collapse affiliated producers. Id. In practice,
where factors such as substantial transactions, shared distributors, or
interlocking boards or management indicate a significant potential for
manipulation, the Department has treated separate entities as one. See
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia; Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews, 61 FR 42833, 42853 (Aug. 19, 1996); Cut to
Length Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil; Preliminary Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 47436, 47437 (Sept. 9,
1997) and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 12744, 12749
(March 16, 1998); Certain Welded Carbon Standard Steel Pipes and Tubes
from India; Final Results of New Shippers Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 62 FR 47632, 47638-39 (Sept. 10, 1997).
    In this instance, we found the factors indicating a potential for
manipulation insufficient to collapse Saha Thai and Thai Tube and Thai
Hong. While the Lamatipanont family exercises some control over each of
these entities, it is only one of several groups that jointly and
severally control Saha Thai. There is little overlap between the boards
and management of Saha Thai and the other two producers. While the
Lamatipanont family holds all the board seats and high management
positions in Thai Tube and Thai Hong, another member of the family
holds only one of nine board seats and the Deputy Managing Director
position in Saha Thai. Moreover, there are no commercial transactions
or other evidence of intertwined operations between Saha Thai and
either Thai Hong or Thai Tube. Petitioners claim that there is some
evidence on the record of intertwined operations, but we cannot
conclude from the evidence to which petitioners refer that Saha Thai's
operations are intertwined with Thai Hong or Thai Tube. (Due to the
proprietary nature of this information, details of our analysis are
contained in the proprietary version of the Memorandum to File from
John Totaro, dated October 5, 1998.) Thus, the facts presented in this
review are similar to those in Chilean salmon, where the Department did
not collapse two companies because it found no evidence to suggest a
significant possibility of price or production manipulation. See Notice
of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Fresh Atlantic
Salmon From Chile, 63 FR 31411, 31421 (June 9, 1998).
    We do not consider our finding of the Lamatipanont family's
ownership and control, by itself, as a sufficient basis to collapse
these affiliates. As discussed above, the Lamatipanont family is a
significant but minority owner of Saha Thai, and multiple entities are
in control of Saha Thai. In Standard Pipes from India, Commerce
recognized that there may be overlap in the evidence establishing
affiliation by control and our collapsing analysis, but the evidence
relied on in our collapsing analysis goes beyond that which is
necessary to find common control. For example, in Standard Pipes from
India, the two affiliated producers shared four members of their boards
of directors out of a total of seven directors for one company and nine
directors for the other. 62 FR at 51438. In addition, the same
individuals held the top management positions in both producers. Id.
Similarly, in Collated Roofing Nails from Taiwan, the family members
who owned and controlled the affiliated producers also had significant
ties to both companies. The chairman of one producer was the past
general manager and current advisor to the second producer, where his
son was the current general manager. Each family member had substantial
responsibility for the sales and production decisions of their
respective companies, which facilitated the sharing of employees and
the transferring of sales between the two. See Collated Roofing Nails
from Taiwan, 62 FR at 51436.
    In the present case, the level of control and the absence of
evidence of intertwined operations leads us to conclude the collapsing
is not warranted. This determination does not reflect a heightened
evidentiary standard, as petitioners suggest. Rather, it is consistent
with the Department's practice of not collapsing producers solely on
the basis of affiliation. See Preamble to the Final Regulations, 62 FR
at 27345.
    Saha Thai provided sufficient information for the Department to
make a collapsing information. Therefore, despite that fact that Thai
Tube and Thai Hong refused to provide information, the use of facts
available was unnecessary. We note, however, that we will continue to
examine the appropriateness of collapsing these affiliated producers in
future reviews. Therefore, continued lack of participation from these
companies may result in the application of facts available.

Comment 4

    Saha Thai argues that the Department failed to undertake the
requisite statutory and regulatory analysis of the Siam Steel Group
companies in reaching its conclusion that those companies are
affiliated on the basis of common control by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul
family. Saha Thai argues that because Saha Thai is controlled by a
group other than the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family, Saha Thai cannot be
affiliated with Siam Matsushita \1\ or any other Siam Steel Group
company by means of common control under section 771(33)(F) by the
Karuchit/Kunanantakul family. Saha Thai asserts that the Karuchit/
Kunanantakul family does not control Saha Thai and that major company
decisions require board approval. Further, Saha Thai argues that the
Karuchit/Kunanantakul family does not control Siam Matsushita because
(1) it held only 39% of Siam Matsushita's shares, (2) Karuchit/
Kunanantakul family members held only ceremonial titles in the company,
(3) the operational and management roles in Siam Matsushita are held by
Japanese individuals, and (4) a majority of the board members are
Japanese individuals. Saha Thai concludes that Japanese investors
control Siam Matsushita, while the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family is
merely the

[[Page 55584]]

company's local conduit into the Thai market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ In its case and rebuttal briefs, Saha Thai referred to Siam
Matsushita Steel Co., Ltd. as ``Company E,'' the name used by the
Department to refer to this company in the preliminary results
because Saha Thai requested for business proprietary treatment of
this company's name. However, Saha Thai has referred to this company
on the public record of this review, for example, at page 2 and
Exhibit A of its December 31, 1997 questionnaire response (public
version), Exhibit 2 of its October 31, 1997 questionnaire response
(public version). Therefore, the company's identity is no longer
proprietary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Saha Thai contends that the Department's conclusions in the
preliminary results regarding the influence of Siam Steel International
on the manufacturing policies and product selection of the Siam Steel
Group companies were not supported by the record. Saha Thai claims that
the reference to the Siam Steel Group name is for public relations
purposes only and there is no legal entity known as the Siam Steel
Group. Saha Thai contends that the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family holds
only minority interests in the Siam Steel Group companies and exerts no
managerial control in the series of joint ventures that comprise these
entities. Saha Thai asserts that the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family does
not have the ability to direct the production decisions of the Siam
Steel Group members because that control rests with Japanese investors.
    Second, Saha Thai argues that the Department correctly decided to
not collapse Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita for the preliminary results
because of the substantial retooling needed to shift production from
Saha Thai to Siam Matsushita. In addition, Saha Thai argues that the
record does not contain evidence of any potential for the manipulation
of price or production between these companies. Saha Thai references
the company policy adopted twelve years ago that prohibits certain
kinds of cooperation, and its statement in its October 31, 1997,
questionnaire response that none of the operations of Saha Thai and
Siam Matsushita were intertwined. Saha Thai asserts that neither
company was performing any part of the other's production processes,
nor were they sharing designs. Moreover, except for Siam Matsushita's
extremely small-quantity purchases from Saha Thai, Saha Thai claims
there were no commercial interactions between Saha Thai and Siam
Matsushita.
    Finally, Saha Thai states that it provided information concerning
Saha Thai's relationship to and interactions with many other companies
in response to the Department's questions. Saha Thai claims that it
made overtures to the Department concerning the need to include
meetings with Siam Matsushita or visits to the company as part of its
verification, but that the Department did not request any additional
information. Saha Thai urges the Department to affirm its preliminary
results decision to not collapse Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita.
    Petitioners agree with the Department's conclusion in the
preliminary results that the facts on the record establish that Saha
Thai is affiliated within the meaning of section 771(33)(F) with Siam
Matsushita. However, petitioners argue that the Department should
collapse Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita for the final results.
Petitioners disagree with the Department's preliminary analysis, in
which the Department concluded that the substantial retooling criterion
of the collapsing analysis is not satisfied.
    Petitioners argue that the record does not contain sufficient
information on Siam Matsushita's PVC-lined pipe production process to
determine whether it produces this pipe at full capacity or whether it
has excess capacity to devote to the production of the subject
merchandise. Also, petitioners contend that the record does not contain
information on the capacity of Siam Matsushita's pipe mill relative to
Saha Thai's, or its galvanizing facilities and PVC-coating equipment.
Petitioners argue that, absent this record evidence, the Department's
conclusion that Siam Matsushita would have to significantly alter its
manufacturing process is flawed.
    Petitioners also disagree with the Department's conclusion that
allowing a portion of production facilities to stand idle constitutes a
substantial retooling of Siam Matsushita's facility. Petitioners
contend that retooling requires the addition of new equipment or
modification of existing equipment, not merely the lack of use of
existing equipment. Petitioners contend that, unlike the circumstances
in Certain Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware From Mexico: Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 42496 (July 30, 1997), no
infrastructure changes would be necessary for Siam Matsushita to
produce the subject merchandise because Siam Matsushita produces
standard pipe as an intermediate product. Further, petitioners argue
that the record establishes that Siam Matsushita has break points in
its process after pipe production for galvanizing and PVC coating that
allow it to use portions of its facilities without engaging other
portions of its facilities. Petitioners conclude that the record
evidence supports the fact that Siam Matsushita could produce standard
pipe identical to that produced by Saha Thai without substantial
retooling of its production facilities.
    Furthermore, petitioners note that the Department's preliminary
analysis did not address the third collapsing criterion contained in
section 351.401(f)(1) of the Final Regulations, i.e., significant
potential for price or production manipulation. However, petitioners
argue that the facts which support the Department's preliminary finding
that Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita are affiliated by means of common
control by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family and membership in the Siam
Steel Group also support this collapsing factor. Petitioners argue that
family ownership and control under section 771(33) necessarily
constitutes a significant potential for manipulation, citing Collated
Roofing Nails from Taiwan, 62 FR at 51436. Petitioners also note that
the Department need not find that this factor exists, but must find
that, based on the totality of circumstances, the two companies are
sufficiently related to warrant treatment as a single entity, citing
Certain Welded Carbon Standard Steel Pipes and Tubes from India, 62 FR
at 47638.
    Petitioners claim the Department's preliminary findings regarding
the Siam Steel Group indicate at least some degree of common
involvement by the group in pricing decisions of the two companies.
However, petitioners state that additional information about the
intertwined nature of Saha Thai's and Siam Matsushita's operations is
not available because Saha Thai did not make such information
available. Petitioners claim these are essentially the same
circumstances that led the Department to apply adverse facts available
to Saha Thai in the last review.

Department's Position

    We disagree with Saha Thai's assertions that it is not affiliated
with Siam Matsushita under the Act. Section 351.102(b) of the Final
Regulations provides that, in determining whether control exists for
the purpose of finding affiliation, the Department will consider, among
other things, corporate or family groupings, franchise or joint-venture
agreements, debt financing, and close supplier relationships. The facts
on the record demonstrate that the Siam Steel Group is a grouping of
Thai entities involved in the steel industry which is owned and managed
by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family. Although these companies may
operate independently of each other, they are nonetheless subject to
direct or indirect control, within the meaning of section 771(33) of
the Act, by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family.
    The record indicates that one of the Siam Steel Group companies,
Siam Steel Group International Co., Ltd., (``SSGI''), is the primary
organizing body of the Siam Steel Group. SSGI is 98.88 percent owned by
members of the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family. October

[[Page 55585]]

31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 5. The Siam Steel Group brochure describes SSGI
as follows:

    Siam Steel Group International Co., Ltd. was established with an
intention to promote and support the operation of affiliated
companies in Siam Steel Group together with help in company's
expansion and development business of the group to proceed more
efficiently. . . .
    Apart from a strong purpose to develop technology and local
industry in order to compete with other countries, Siam Steel Group
have stable policy to continuously help preserving the environment
and conserving the nature directly by selection of products that do
not harm the nature and strictly control the manufacturing process
conformable to technical know-how basis.

June 2, 1997 QR at Exhibit 6. Thus, the Siam Steel Group holds itself
out to the public as an organization of affiliated companies, whose
expansion and development of business is promoted and supported by
SSGI, and who follow, to one degree or another, common policies on
manufacturing methods and selection of products to be produced. Further
evidence of SSGI's role in the Siam Steel Group companies is the fact
that SSGI funded the Siam Steel Group brochure. December 22, 1997 QR at
6. From this record evidence, we conclude that the Siam Steel Group is
the type of corporate grouping envisioned by the SAA and the
Department's regulations.
    The Karuchit/Kunanantakul family, together with Siam Steel
International Public Company Ltd.<SUP>2</SUP>, own between 8.17 percent
and 100 percent of each of the 26 Siam Steel Group companies, averaging
57.97 percent ownership of each company. The members of the Karuchit/
Kunanantakul family are in various positions of legal and/or
operational control in each member company through ownership and or
management in each company, and through ownership and management of
SSGI and Siam Steel International Public Company Ltd.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Siam Steel International Public Company, Ltd. is a Siam
Steel Group member, furniture manufacturer, Saha Thai shareholder
and Saha Thai customer. The Karuchit/Kunanantakul family owns a
controlling (65.33 percent) interest in this company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to Saha Thai in particular, the Karuchit/Kunanantakul
family directly or indirectly owns a significant percentage of Saha
Thai's stock. This family controls three of the nine seats on Saha
Thai's Board of Directors, as well as the Managing Director's position.
Saha Thai notes that ``[p]ricing decisions (either in the establishment
of a price list or changes to it) are not considered major decisions
requiring board approval.'' December 22, 1997 QR at 1. As stated above,
pricing decisions are made by the Managing Director, Somchai Karuchit.
The significant minority equity interest, seats on the Board of
Directors, and the Managing Director's position combine to place the
Karuchit/Kunanantakul family in a position of legal and/or operational
control of Saha Thai.
    Furthermore, the record evidence demonstrates that, of the seven
directors of Siam Matsushita, three are Karuchit/Kunanantakul family
members. October 31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 2. In addition, the record
demonstrates that Wanchai Kunanantakul is the President of Siam
Matsushita, Anantachai Kunanantakul is the Personnel and General
Affairs Director of Siam Matsushita, and another Karuchit/Kunanantakul
family member is the Chairman of Siam Matsushita. Id. Saha Thai Case
Brief at 29; October 31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 5; Memorandum to the File
from John Totaro, August 3, 1998.
    The record does not support Saha Thai's claim that the titles held
by these Karuchit/Kunanantakul family members are merely ceremonial.
There is evidence on the record that Siam Matsushita's President,
Wanchai Kunanantakul, is one of only two individuals, along with
Takashi Ozasa, Siam Matsushita's Vice President, with the power to bind
the company with his signature. October 31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 5 and
Exhibit 2. Anantachai Kunanantakul's position as Personnel and General
Affairs Director of Siam Matsushita suggests substantial involvement in
the operation of the company. Id. Moreover, given the Chairman's
responsibility in Saha Thai, we can infer that the Karuchit/
Kunanantakul family member's position as Chairman in Siam Matsushita is
equally substantive in nature. Saha Thai has offered no evidence to
demonstrate otherwise. Thus, the record evidence supports our
determination that the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family controls the
members of the Siam Steel Group, particularly Saha Thai and Siam
Matsushita. The fact that Japanese investors also have controlling
interests in certain Siam Steel Group companies does not detract from
this finding because, as discussed above, multiple persons or groups
may individually and jointly control the same companies under section
771(33) of the Act. On this basis, we continue to find that Saha Thai
and Siam Matsushita are affiliated under section 771(33)(F) of the Act.
    However, we do not find that the record evidence supports treating
these affiliated companies as a single entity under our collapsing
analysis. In the preliminary results, we stated that the record
evidence indicates that shifting production to subject merchandise
would require extensive and expensive infrastructure changes in Siam
Matsushita.
    The record establishes that Saha Thai's and Siam Matsushita's
production facilities are devoted to manufacturing very different
products: Saha Thai produces standard pipe and Siam Matsushita produces
PVC-lined pipe. The record demonstrates that Siam Matsushita produces
standard pipe as an intermediate product, but also that Siam
Matsushita's production process requires substantially more processing
to produce its final product, PVC-lined steel pipe. It is therefore
reasonable to infer that shifting production to standard pipe would
require Siam Matsushita to significantly alter its production process
and incur additional costs in shifting production. This determination
is consistent with prior cases where the Department did not collapse
affiliated producers who produced similar but not comparable products
which required different processes and equipment. See Certain
Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware From Mexico: Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 42496, 42497 (Aug. 7, 1997); Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-
Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada; Preliminary Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 60 FR 42511, 42512 (Aug. 16,
1995) and Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and
Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada; Preliminary
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 13815 (March
28, 1996).
    In reaching this conclusion, we have not adopted the petitioner's
view of ``substantial retooling,'' which advocates a finding of
substantial retooling only where new equipment is added to the existing
production facilities. This concept does not reflect commercial reality
because a company may substantially revise its production facilities
without adding new equipment. For example, we cannot conclude from the
facts on the record that it would not involve significant time and
expense for Siam Matsushita to restructure its continuous production
process to transform what is now an intermediate product into a
finished product. Thus, we do not consider Siam Matsushita's capacity
to produce standard pipe as an intermediate product as decisive on the
issue of whether substantial retooling would be necessary to shift
production to the lower-grade standard pipe produced by Saha Thai.

[[Page 55586]]

    Therefore, based on our analysis of the record evidence, we do not
find that the facts support collapsing Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita in
this review. Because we were able to reach this determination based on
the information provided by Saha Thai, application of the facts
available rule is unwarranted. We note, however, that we will continue
to examine any shift in production between these two affiliates in any
subsequent reviews.

Comment 5

    Saha Thai argues that it is not affiliated under section 771(33)(F)
with the three resellers, because none of the three Saha Thai directors
who, with their families, control the resellers also control Saha Thai.
    Petitioners reject this argument. Petitioners assert that Saha
Thai's interpretation of control is inconsistent with sections
771(33)(B) and 771(33)(E) of the statute and the Department's
statements in the Preamble to the Final Regulations that an enforceable
ability to compel or restrain certain actions is not a necessary
element for finding control under section 771(33) of the Act.
Petitioners conclude that the Department should continue to find Saha
Thai affiliated with Resellers A, B, and C for the final results.

Department's Position

    We disagree with Saha Thai's assertions that it is not affiliated
with these resellers identified in the preliminary results. As
discussed above in Comment 1, Saha Thai's argument is premised upon an
interpretation of ``control'' that is inconsistent with the statute and
the regulations. In the preliminary results, we found that Saha Thai
was affiliated under section 771(33)(F) of the Act with three home
market resellers of the subject merchandise, referred to in the notice
of preliminary results as Company A, Company B and Company C. Each of
these resellers is entirely owned by one of the six families that
jointly and severally control Saha Thai. Each of these families owns a
substantial minority interest in Saha Thai, has at least one family
member on Saha Thai's board of directors, and has a family member who
is an executive officer of Saha Thai. As we explained above, evidence
of actual control is not a prerequisite to finding ``control'' within
the meaning of section 771(33) of the Act, which defines control in
terms of the ability of one person to restrain or direct another
person. The statutory definition of control encompasses both legal and
operational control, and multiple persons or groups may be in control,
individually and jointly, of a single entity, each having the ability
to direct or restrain the company's activities. Furthermore, among
several individuals in a position to control an entity, one individual
may possess a greater degree of control than the others. For example,
the Managing Director of Saha Thai may have the greatest authority
among Saha Thai's executives. However, the Managing Director's superior
position would not eliminate the ability of the other officers--the
Financial Director, the Deputy Managing Director and the Chairman of
the Board--to direct or restrain the company's activities.
    We, therefore, conclude that the Sae Haeng/Ratanasirivilai family
controls both Saha Thai and Company A, the Lamatipanont family controls
both Saha Thai and Company B, and the Ampapankit family controls both
Saha Thai and Company C. Our position on this issue remains unchanged
for the final results.

Comment 6

    Petitioners argue that the Department has no choice but to apply
the facts available under 19 U.S.C. Secs. 1677e and 1677m (section
776(a) and (b) of the Act) because the record contains neither home
market and U.S. sales data nor information on cost of production for
Siam Matsushita, Thai Hong, and Thai Tube. Petitioners argue that this
information is necessary to perform the dumping analysis. Petitioners
state that the record is now so incomplete that it cannot serve as the
basis for the final results, and neither Saha Thai nor its affiliates
acted to the best of their ability to provide information requested by
the Department. Petitioners argue that an adverse inference under 19
U.S.C. 1677e(b) (section 776 (b) of the Act) is appropriate given the
outright refusal of Thai Tube and Thai Hong to cooperate. Furthermore,
argue petitioners, the record is replete with instances where either
Saha Thai did not provide information that was requested or the
Department found at verification that Saha Thai had not completely or
correctly answered the questionnaires. Petitioners argue that the
evidence on the record of this review should be viewed in light of Saha
Thai's ``dissembling and prevarication'' in the original investigation
and the most recently completed review. In this review, petitioners
argue that Saha Thai's submissions, particularly concerning the
affiliation and collapsing issues, contains enough unanswered
questions, inconsistencies, and proven errors to render the entire
response unreliable for the final results.
    Petitioners identify two issues in particular that demonstrate Saha
Thai's lack of cooperation in this review. First, petitioners cite Saha
Thai's alleged inability to produce documents at verification related
to its corporate governance, including its memorandum of association,
minutes of board meetings, or a record of a company policy decided at a
board meeting. Petitioners assert that Saha Thai cannot reasonably
claim that such documents do not exist. Second, petitioners note Saha
Thai's stated inability to substantiate its claim that major company
decisions are made by a 60% vote of the board. Petitioners identify
other instances where Saha Thai provided inadequate responses and
conclude that Saha Thai has provided less than full disclosure in this
case. Petitioners argue that to accept Saha Thai's responses as an
adequate basis for the final results would allow Saha Thai to ``control
the amount of antidumping duties by selectively providing [the
Department] information,'' citing Olympic Adhesives Inc., v. United
States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Petitioners contend that
the circumstances in this case require the use of adverse facts
available, and recommend the 37.55% rate applied to Thai Union in the
last review.
    Saha Thai responds that none of the alleged inconsistencies
identified by petitioners warrants serious consideration by the
Department as justification for total adverse facts available.
Specifically, Saha Thai addresses petitioners' focus on Saha Thai's
lack of ability to provide its memorandum of association and board of
directors meetings. Saha Thai argues that the memorandum of association
could not be located, and that board meeting minutes were not
maintained except in instances where important company policies were
established. Saha Thai argues that it has fully cooperated with the
Department and provided all requested information. With respect to the
requested corporate governance documents, Saha Thai notes that it
explained that such documentation does not exist, and therefore, it
should not be penalized for its informal governance structure. Saha
Thai argues that in circumstances where it is unable to provide
information or is never requested to provide information, the
application of facts available is inappropriate, citing Borden, Inc. v.
United States; Olympic Adhesives; Daewoo Elec. Co.

[[Page 55587]]

Department's Position

    Section 776(a) of the Act authorizes the resort to facts available
only where necessary information is not available on the record or an
interested party withholds information, fails to comply with the
Department's reporting requirements, significantly impedes the
proceeding, or submits unverifiable information. We have examined Saha
Thai's submissions in light of these factors and determine that resort
to facts available is inappropriate in this review. Saha Thai was
unable to produce certain corporate governance documents because such
documents do not exist. Further, the lack of this information did not
hinder our ability to reach the necessary determinations concerning its
affiliations with other entities.
    Further, as noted above, the information submitted by Saha Thai was
sufficient to make a determination that Saha Thai, Thai Tube and Thai
Hong should not be collapsed. Therefore, responses from Thai Hong and
Thai Tube were not necessary for calculating a dumping margin in this
review. This consideration applies equally to additional information
from Siam Matsushita. We note, however, as discussed in the relevant
collapsing analyses, that we will continue to examine these issues in
future reviews and the failure of these affiliates to respond may lead
to application of the facts available.
    In short, the record contains information necessary to complete the
review and Saha Thai: (1) Has not withheld information that has been
requested by the Department, (2) has submitted responses to the
Department's requests timely and in the form requested, (3) did not
significantly impede the review, and (4) provided information that was
largely verifiable.

Comment 7

    Petitioners claim that Saha Thai's questionnaire responses and
other data indicate that the contract date should be used as the date
of U.S. sales. Petitioners claim that Saha Thai did not provide any of
the requested factual information about changes in quantity after the
contract date. Instead, petitioners assert that Saha Thai insisted upon
using invoice date as the date of sale, claiming that the Department
requires invoice date in all or most instances, that the company
records sales based on invoice date, and that a change in date of sale
methodology from review to review would result in either the double-
reporting or omission of certain sales.
    Second, petitioners assert that the contract establishes the final
agreement of the parties to the sale. Petitioners cite the 1995-1996
review of Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from the Republic of
Korea, 62 FR 64559 (Dec. 8, 1997) (Pipe from Korea), where based on an
understanding of the U.S. sales process, in which price and quantity
are established at contract date, the Department instructed the
respondent to report contract date as the date of sale. Petitioners
contend that the Final Regulations allow flexibility in using a date
other than the invoice date as date of sale; the appropriate date of
sale occurs when the material terms of sale are set. Petitioners assert
that Saha Thai has offered both the wrong factual and legal arguments
for its choice in date of sale.
    According to the petitioners, as a consequence of an incorrect date
of sale, (1) a different set of sales will be evaluated, (2) in a
country subject to currency devaluation or inflation, the sale's value
may be distorted, and (3) incorrect dates lead to incorrect matching,
all of which ultimately distorts the antidumping duty margin. Thus,
petitioners argue that because Saha Thai did not provide the contract
dates as requested, the Department should find in its final results
that Saha Thai has significantly impeded the investigation and use the
facts available to determine Saha Thai's dumping margin. If the
Department does not use facts available, petitioners argue that the
U.S. date of sale should be corrected on the basis of non-adverse facts
available, i.e., based on the difference between reported contract and
invoice dates provided in Saha Thai's questionnaire responses.
Petitioners propose an additional method, calculating the interval
between the letter of credit date and the invoice date to derive a
weighted-average interval for the number of days between contract and
invoice.
    Saha Thai responds that the Department correctly used invoice date
as the date of sale. Saha Thai states that the Department's policy
clearly called for the use of invoice date as date of sale, since the
invoice date is the date on which the final quantity and price were
established. Saha Thai defends its reporting methodology, stating that
upon issuance of the questionnaire, Saha Thai contacted the official in
charge. Following the methodology set forth in the Final Regulations,
Saha Thai used invoice date as the date of sale. Saha Thai notes that
the Department's regulations, 351.401(i), express a preference for the
use of invoice date as the sale date based on commercial reality. Saha
Thai contends that there is no date which better reflects the final
terms of sale than the invoice date, the date which, as verified, is
recorded in Saha Thai's records maintained in the ordinary course of
business. Saha Thai states that only by reference to the invoice can
one see the quantities which were the subject of the sale.
    Saha Thai distinguishes this review from Pipe from Korea, where the
exporter's U.S. prices and quantities were seldom revised prior to
invoicing. Saha Thai further notes that the decision in the Korean case
did not depend on the existence of ``tolerance'' levels in the
contracts. Saha Thai also cites Certain Stainless Steel Wire Rod from
India, 62 FR 38976, 38979 (July 21, 1997), where the Department used
invoice date due to changes in quantity between the purchase order date
and shipment dates. Finally, Saha Thai argues that the Department uses
a date other than invoice date only when there are compelling reasons
to deviate from this practice, citing Cold Rolled and Corrosion
Resistant-Carbon Steel Flat Products from Korea, 63 FR 13170, 13194
(March 18, 1998). Saha Thai asserts that there is no compelling reason
in this review to deviate from the Department's standard practice of
using invoice date as date of sale.
    Moreover, Saha Thai claims that because it accurately reported
invoice date as the date of sale, application of facts available is
entirely unwarranted. Saha Thai notes that petitioners did not take
issue with Saha Thai's assertion that quantity was subject to change
from contract to invoice date until the end of this proceeding. Saha
Thai also claims that it never once refused to provide information
requested by the Department. Saha Thai notes that the Department did
not make an absolute and specific demand that Saha Thai report its
contract dates. Saha Thai further states that petitioners never
suggested that Saha Thai revise its sales listing. Saha Thai claims
that moving the sale date this late in the proceeding unfairly
penalizes Saha Thai by increasing the possibility that sales will be
matched to constructed value. Saha Thai claims that it was fully
cooperative with the Department and went to great lengths to provide
the information requested, and thus did not impede the Department's
investigation.

Department's Position

    The Department's current practice, as codified in the Final
Regulations at section 351.401(i), is to use invoice date as the date
of sale unless the record evidence demonstrates that the material terms
of sale, i.e., price and quantity, are

[[Page 55588]]

established on a different date. See 19 CFR 351.401(i), 62 FR at 27411;
Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe From the Republic of Korea; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 63 FR 32833, 32835-
36 (June 16, 1998). In this review, Saha Thai reported invoice date as
the date of sale in response to the Department's initial questionnaire.
June 2, 1997 QR at 3. To ascertain whether Saha Thai accurately
reported the date of sale, we requested additional information
concerning whether prices and quantities were fixed on a different
date. Saha Thai reported that it generally enters into short-term
contracts that establish price but quantities often change and are not
finally established in any written document prior to the issuance of
the invoice at the time shipment is arranged. July 30, 1997 QR at 18.
Saha Thai also stated that the invoice date is recorded in its records
kept in the ordinary course of business, whereas dates of contract and
related dates are not so maintained. Id. at 19.
    The Department verified that Saha Thai records sales in its
financial records by date of invoice. Verification Report at 17. We
also discussed Saha Thai's export sales process with the company's
export sales manager. As described in the Verification Report, Saha
Thai negotiates price and quantity, a contract is signed and a letter
of credit is arranged. At that point, a production order is issued to
the mill and delivery department, and the sales invoice is issued just
prior to shipping. Id. Based on verification and other information on
the record, the Department was satisfied that invoice date was the
appropriate date of sale for Saha Thai's U.S. sales, and we used this
date in the preliminary results.
    Petitioners' claim that the contract date fixes prices and
quantities is not supported by the record evidence. We examined the
sample contract and invoices supplied by Saha Thai, and this
information demonstrates that quantities were not fixed in the
contract. (Due to the proprietary nature of this information, details
of our analysis are contained in the proprietary version of the
Memorandum to File from John Totaro, dated October 5, 1998). While we
agree with petitioners that changes consistent with the tolerance level
established in the contract may establish a binding agreement on
quantity at the contract date, our analysis of the sample contract and
corresponding invoices reveals that changes frequently were made beyond
the agreed upon tolerance levels. Where such changes occur frequently
after the contract date, we have relied upon a later date. See Certain
Internal-Combustion Industrial Forklift Trucks from Japan; Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 34216, 34227
(June 25, 1997); Granular Polytetrafluoroethylene Resin from Italy;
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 48592,
48593 (Sept. 16, 1997). Consistent with this practice, we find that the
record evidence in this case supports using invoice date as the date of
sale.
    The facts in Pipe from Korea are distinguishable from those
presented in this review. In that case, the Department was satisfied
that invoice date was inappropriate because ``the material terms of
sale in the U.S. are set on the contract date and any subsequent
changes are usually immaterial in nature or, if material, rarely
occur.'' Pipe from Korea, 63 FR at 32836. However, as discussed above,
we have determined that the record evidence in this case supports Saha
Thai's assertions that its contracts do not fix quantity, and that
quantity is not established until invoice date. Therefore, given that
quantity can and regularly does change between contract date and
invoice date, we find that the invoice date better reflects the date on
which the essential terms of the sale are established. We also find
that Saha Thai accurately reported the appropriate date of sale;
therefore, application of facts available is unwarranted.

Comment 8

    Petitioners argue that the Department should reduce Saha Thai's
claimed duty drawback adjustment using the actual/ theoretical weight
conversion. Petitioners state that Saha Thai purchases hot-rolled sheet
in coils on an actual weight basis, and that customs duties on its
purchases are applied on the same basis. However, the sales of subject
merchandise on which duty drawback is granted are made on a theoretical
weight basis. Thus, claim petitioners, the drawback received per unit
of pipe exported exceeds the duties paid on the coil included in that
unit of pipe by the ratio of one minus the actual/ theoretical weight
conversion factor. Petitioners cite Certain Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe
from the Republic of Korea; Final Results of Administrative Review, 62
FR 55574, 55577 (Oct. 27, 1997) in support of their argument.
    Petitioners argue that as in the first administrative review on
standard pipe from Korea, the adjustment for duty drawback for Saha
Thai should be reduced by multiplying the drawback amount by the
actual/theoretical conversion factor whenever the conversion factor is
less than one. Petitioners claim that this will limit the drawback to
the duties paid on material actually incorporated into the exported
product as required by the statute and precedent.
    Saha Thai responds that petitioners' interpretation is incorrect
and based on a misrepresentation of the Department's determination in
Certain Welded Non-Alloy Steel pipe from the Republic of Korea. Saha
Thai claims that there is a direct correlation, transaction-by-
transaction, between the drawback received and the duties actually paid
on the inputs of the exported product. Saha Thai claims that
petitioners' reference to the Korean Pipe case is erroneous, because in
the Korean case respondents received drawback under a fixed rate
refund, whereas Saha Thai based drawback on a transaction-by-
transaction calculation of duties actually paid on the inputs exported
in the finished product. Saha Thai further states that the Department
verified that Saha Thai paid the duties for which it received drawback
and, with slight modification to certain clerical errors, accurately
quantified drawback in its response.

Department's Position

    The information on the record indicates that Saha Thai accurately
calculated duty drawback based on the amount of duties actually paid
and received by Saha Thai. The Department in Certain Welded Non-Alloy
Steel Pipe from the Republic of Korea examined two different types of
duty drawback calculations,

``fixed-rate'' duty drawback provision and . . . ``individual-
transaction'' duty-drawback provision. We found that, when
respondents received duty drawback under the individual-transaction
duty drawback provision, companies received duty drawback based on
the duties actually paid on the input of the exported product. . . .
We also found that companies receiving duty drawback under the
fixed-rate provision paid duties on the basis of the actual weight
of inputs imported but received drawback on the basis of the
theoretical weight of merchandise exported to the United States.
Because theoretical weight is generally greater than actual weight,
fixed-rate drawback calculated on a theoretical-weight basis is
greater than that calculated on an actual-weight basis. Therefore we
conclude that the reported duty drawback of respondents who received
the drawback under the fixed-rate provision exceeds the duties
actually paid.

62 FR 55574 at 55577 (Oct. 27, 1997).
    In the instant review, Saha Thai's duty drawback calculation does
not resemble the ``fixed-rate'' methodology alluded to by petitioners
in the Korean

[[Page 55589]]

Pipe case, wherein the duty paid on imported coil differed from the
duty drawback received on exports incorporating that coil due to
quantities calculated on actual versus theoretical weight. We examined
the record of this review and have determined that Saha Thai has
correctly calculated its duty drawback adjustment because the duty
drawback Saha Thai received from Thai customs authorities was equal to,
and not in excess of, the amount of duty paid. In its July 30, 1997
supplemental questionnaire response at Exhibit 11-2, Saha Thai
submitted the documentation generated by Thai customs which lists Saha
Thai's ``Duty Drawback classified by Export Entry,'' indicating the
amount of duty drawback paid to Saha Thai for a group of export sales,
as well as the ``Duty Drawback Classified by Import Entry,'' indicating
the actual duties Saha Thai paid on imports of coil. These documents
show that the amount of duties paid by Saha Thai on imported coil
equals the amount of duty drawback received by Saha Thai from Thai
customs on exports of pipe. Saha Thai allocated this drawback amount
over the total quantity of export sales. Thus, we find, based on the
facts on the record, that Saha Thai has not overstated its duty
drawback claims.
    In addition, the Department verified Saha Thai's duty drawback
calculation (see Saha Thai Verification Report at 28, and exhibit C6).
With the exception of several minor clerical errors noted at
verification, the Department was satisfied with Saha Thai's
calculations. Therefore for purposes of these final results, the
Department will continue to adjust U.S. price by the amount of duty
drawback calculated by Saha Thai.

Comment 9

    Petitioners claim that the Department made a ministerial error in
the preliminary results margin calculation by limiting the price-to-
price analysis to sales with entries during the POR. Petitioners argue
that while antidumping duties are assessed against entries that were
made during the POR, the Department bases margin calculations on sales
during the POR, citing Silicon Metal from Brazil, 61 FR 46763, 46765
(Sept. 5, 1996).
    Saha Thai responds that date filters should be tied to entry date
in accordance with standard Department practice. Saha Thai argues that
the cases cited by petitioners involve situations where sales in
addition to those entered during the POR are included in the database
because respondents were unable to tie sales to entries. Saha Thai
points out that it was able to tie all sales to entry dates, and
reported only sales entered during the POR, as instructed by the
Department.

Department's Position

    We agree with Saha Thai that the Department correctly calculated
the dumping margin using all sales of merchandise entered during the
POR. The Department's standard questionnaire instructed Saha Thai to
report U.S. sales based on entry date during the POR, and we verified
that Saha Thai accurately reported all sales with entry dates during
the POR. See Saha Thai Verification Report at 21. As the Department
stated in a recent case, the Department's preference is to base an
administrative review on entries during the period of review. Circular
Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from the Republic of Korea; Final Results
of Administrative Review, 63 FR 32833, 32836 (June 16, 1998). See also
Ferrosilicon from Brazil; Final Results of Antidumping Administrative
Review, 62 FR 43504, 43510 (Aug. 14, 1997). As the Department stated in
Korean Pipe, section 751(a)(2)(A) of the Act states that a dumping
calculation should be performed for each entry during the POR. Although
the Department's regulations at section 351.213(e) provide some
flexibility in this issue, the Department's preference is to review
sales based on entry dates unless there are compelling circumstances
that warrant a different approach to determining the universe of sales
to be examined during a particular review. See Korean Pipe, 63 FR at
32836. There is no record evidence of such compelling circumstances in
this review. Therefore, we have continued to use sales with entries
during the period of review, as reported by Saha Thai, for purposes of
these final results.

Comment 10

    Saha Thai argues that if the Department continues to include
reseller sales in the database, the Department should use the actual
reseller sales quantities to calculate normal value. Saha Thai states
that the resellers do not identify pipes held in inventory by producer,
and thus do not identify the producer of the pipes they sell. The
resellers' sales files include all sales of those products sold by Saha
Thai to each reseller. In addition, the resellers' monthly average
price for each product represents the monthly average price for all
producers, including Saha Thai. Saha Thai claims that the replacement
of the actual quantities of sales in each month made by each reseller
with the Department's calculated simple monthly average of quantities
sold by Saha Thai to the resellers has distorted the results of the
antidumping calculations. Saha Thai claims that this methodology
created the two highest dumping amounts for all U.S. transactions. Saha
Thai further claims that the use of actual reseller sales quantities
creates no distortion, as the resellers sold the pipe at the same
price, regardless of manufacturer.
    Petitioners argue that the Department appropriately used average
sales quantities sold by Saha Thai to the resellers. Petitioners
suggest that the Department's choice to use non-adverse facts available
was not arbitrary, as claimed by Saha Thai, but rather the only
accurate tabulation of Saha Thai's pipe sales quantities that the
Department could verify. Petitioners further state that the average
sales quantities chosen by the Department were more, not less,
probative of actual conditions, because the Department verified actual
sales quantities of Saha Thai pipe. Petitioners note that the
Department is accorded ``considerable deference'' in determining what
constitutes the appropriate facts available, referring to Allied-Signal
Aerospace Co. v. United States, 996 F 2d 1185 at 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Department's Position

    Because the resellers' sales data did not identify sales by
producer, we were unable to segregate the resellers' sales of Saha Thai
pipe. As a substitute, we determined a simple average by model of the
monthly quantities sold by Saha Thai to the resellers. These simple
average quantities were then used to weight average the reseller home
market normal value for all reseller sales with the Saha Thai home
market sales in order to calculate the normal value. See Memorandum to
File from Dorothy Woster, March 31, 1998 (preliminary results analysis
memorandum).
    Saha Thai proposes including the actual quantities of subject pipe
sold by the resellers to calculate the margin, but these sales include
pipe manufactured by other manufacturers. Using the resellers' complete
sales databases would be contrary to the statutory directive that the
Department calculate normal value based on sales of foreign like
product. See, section 773(B)(i) of the Act. The foreign like product is
merchandise manufactured by the same person that produced the subject
merchandise sold to the United States. See section 771(16) of the Act.
The statute indicates that, for the purposes of our antidumping
analysis, sales of merchandise produced by manufacturers other than the
manufacturer of the merchandise sold to the United States are not
appropriate

[[Page 55590]]

bases for the calculation of normal value.
    Therefore, in other cases where a reseller's sales database
contains sales of merchandise produced by other manufacturers, the
Department used a weighting methodology that permits us to use the
sales listing while neutralizing the effect of sales of other
producers' merchandise. See, e.g., Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel
Plate from Sweden: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 60 FR 18502, 18503 (Sept. 19, 1995), and Certain
Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Sweden: Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 15772 (April 9, 1996);
Stainless Steel Bar from Spain; Final Determination of Sales at Less
than Fair Value, 59 FR 66931, 66936 (Dec. 28, 1994).
    Under the circumstances presented in this review, using a weight
averaging methodology based on the facts on the record (Saha Thai's
verified sales quantities to the resellers, see Saha Thai Verification
Report at 15 and 16) is a reasonable approach that addresses the intent
of the statute that normal value be based on sales of subject
merchandise manufactured by the producer of subject merchandise sold to
the United States. Therefore, for purposes of these final results, we
have continued to use the simple average by model of the monthly
quantities sold by Saha Thai to the resellers.

Comment 11

    Petitioners argue that interest costs on coil inputs should be
treated as a cost of manufacturing, as opposed to G&A costs, in
accordance with Saha Thai's internal cost accounting procedures and
generally accepted accounting principles in Thailand. Petitioners note
that Saha Thai's practice of deducting these interest costs from the
cost of coil and transferring them to G&A is consistent with the
Department's treatment of these costs in the original investigation and
previous reviews. However, petitioners claim that in accordance with an
amendment to the statute at section 773(f)(1)(A) of the Act, these
interest costs must be treated in the same manner as Saha Thai treats
them internally. Petitioners argue that there is a presumption that the
Department shall use the respondent's normal cost allocations based on
how they are kept in its records, unless they are determined to be
unreasonable and distortive of the dumping margin. Moreover, argue
petitioners, these interest costs are directly attributable to the
acquisition of hot-rolled coil inventories. For these reasons,
petitioners contend that interest costs on coil inputs should be
treated as a cost of manufacturing.
    Saha Thai responds that interest costs on coil inputs should be
treated as they always have in this proceeding and according to
standard Department practice. Saha Thai claims that the Department
treats finance expenses as fungible business expenses, citing Silicon
Metal from Brazil, 61 FR 46,763, 46,773 (Sept. 5, 1996) and Tapered
Roller Bearings from China, 62 FR 6189, 6201 (Feb. 11, 1997). Saha Thai
contends that such expenses were treated as a general expense of
operating the company in previous reviews, and that nothing in the
revisions to the antidumping law requires a change. Saha Thai stated
that for purposes of the cost questionnaire response it transferred the
coil finance costs from the purchases account to its reported selling,
general (including financing expense) and administrative expense
calculations.

Department's Position

    We disagree with petitioners that interest costs on coil inputs
should be treated as a cost of manufacturing, as opposed to G&A costs.
As we explained in less than fair value determination, the Department
considers ``the financing expense of assets, long-term or short-term,
to be fungible and, therefore, a general expense of operating the
company.'' Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand;
Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, 51 FR 3384, 3386
(Jan. 27, 1986). See also Titanium Sponge from Japan; Final Results of
Antidumping Administrative Review, 55 FR 42227 (Oct. 18, 1990). In its
July 30, 1997 supplemental questionnaire response at 27, Saha Thai
stated that, ``the finance charge is based upon payment terms.'' Saha
Thai provided further detail in its October 31, 1997, second
supplemental questionnaire response: ``[t]he expense clearly is an
interest cost directly associated with Saha Thai's extended accounts
payable on purchases of coil. If Saha Thai did not receive financing
from its coil suppliers, it would have to borrow from banks to pay them
at an earlier date.'' Thus, by incurring these interest costs, Saha
Thai made a deliberate decision to delay payment of its payables (in
effect borrowing money from its suppliers). Section 773(f)(1)(A) states
that costs shall normally be calculated based on the records of the
respondent where those records are prepared in accordance with home
country GAAP and reasonably reflect the cost of producing the
merchandise. While Saha Thai records these types of expenses as cost of
manufacturing in its normal books and records which are prepared in
accordance with GAAP of Thailand, our longstanding practice has been to
treat these types of interest costs as general expenses and we find no
basis to alter this approach in these final results. Therefore, the
Department will continue to classify these interest costs on coil
inputs as a financing expense, and continue to include these costs in
our calculation as reported by Saha Thai.

Final Results of the Review

    As a result of this review, we have determined that the following
weighted-average dumping margin exists for the period March 1, 1996,
through February 28, 1997:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin
          Manufacturer/Exporter                 Period        (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saha Thai................................    3/1/96-2/28/97         1.92
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department shall determine, and the U.S. Customs Service shall
assess, antidumping duties on all appropriate entries. The Department
shall issue appraisement instructions directly to the Customs Service.
For assessment purposes, we have calculated importer-specific duty
assessment rates for the merchandise based on the ratio of the total
amount of antidumping duties calculated for the examined sales during
the POR to the total entered value of sales examined during the POR. As
a result of this review, we have determined that the importer-specific
duty assessments rates are necessary.
    Furthermore, the following deposit requirements shall be effective
upon publication of this notice of final results of review for all
shipments of certain welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from Thailand,
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the
publication date, as provided for by section 751(a)(1) of the Tariff
Act: (1) the cash deposit rate for the reviewed company will be the
rate stated above; (2) for previously investigated companies not listed
above, the cash deposit rate will continue to be the company-specific
rate published for the most recent period; (3) if the exporter is not a
firm covered in these reviews, or the original LTFV investigations, but
the manufacturer is, the cash deposit rate will be the rate established
for the most recent period for the manufacturer of the merchandise; and
(4) if neither the exporter nor the manufacturer is a firm covered in
these reviews, the cash

[[Page 55591]]

deposit rate for this case will continue to be 15.67 percent, the ``All
Others'' rate made effective by the LTFV investigation. These deposit
requirements shall remain in effect until publication of the final
results of the next administrative review.
    This notice serves as a final reminder to importers of their
responsibility under 19 CFR 353.26 to file a certificate regarding the
reimbursement of antidumping duties prior to liquidation of the
relevant entries during this review period. Failure to comply with this
requirement could result in the Secretary's presumption that
reimbursement of antidumping duties occurred and the subsequent
assessment of double antidumping duties.
    This notice also serves as a reminder to parties subject to
administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under
APO in accordance with section 353.34(d) of the Department's
regulations. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials
or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure
to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a
sanctionable violation.
    This administrative review and notice are in accordance with
section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and section 353.22
of the Department's regulations.

    Dated: October 5, 1998.
Robert S. LaRussa,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 98-27876 Filed 10-15-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P