Pat Hayes posted the following note (26 Aug 1996 11:03:28):
*******
Subject:      Re: QM in Stapp&Sarfatti vs Hameroff and Penrose
To: Multiple recipients of list PSYCHE-D <PSYCHE-D@rfmh.org>

..... the argument that somehow it follows
>> from classical physics that there can be no functional role for
>> consciousness.

Could anyone articulate this argument carefully, or give a reference to
such an articulation? (Eg from which part exactly of classical physics is
this remarkably unphysical-seeming result derived? Is it something to do
with thermodynamics, or is it best understood in terms of electromagnetism?
Etc...)

Why would any such argument not also apply to almost anything with a
functional role describable at a large enough scale that quantum effects
could usefully be ignored, eg (say) a leaf, a carburettor or a brick wall?
None of these structures can be predicted within classical physics (ie they
cannot be derived from Newton's laws of gravitation, Maxwell's equations,
etc.).

Analogous arguments to Chalmer's dancing qualia can be given for anything
that can be progressively dismantled (eg consider replacing each brick by a
metal block and ask when exactly it ceases to be a brick wall), and
analogous arguments to the zombie nonsense can be given for anything (eg
consider something which is constituted exactly like a brick wall but is
not, in fact, a brick wall: suppose for example it simply appears,
spontaneously, in a long elliptical orbit around Jupiter. This is
*logically* possible. It must follow then that the essence of
brickwall-ness is somehow separate from the physical nature of the wall
itself.)

Pat Hayes
*******

By classical physics is meant here the premise that: 1), there is a description
of the physical world in terms of  localizable quantities, namely the locations
of all the particles in the world, and the values at all points in the world of
all the local fields, such as the electromagnetic and gravitational fields; and
2),  there are  some laws  of  motion that  are  local in  the sense  that they
determine the rates of change of any  quantity localized at some point in terms
of quantities   localized  in a open   neighborhood of  that   point,  where this
neighborhood   can be  taken to be  as  small as  desired;  and 3),  these laws
determine in  principle all the values  of all these  localizable quantities at
all times, given the values of all  these quantities at times earlier than some
early specified initial time T_0.

These localizable quantities are called the basic physical variables. Any
quantity defined unambiguously in terms of these basic variables can be called
a physical variable, and various mathematical properties of these physical
properties can  be deduced from such definitions and the laws of motion.

For example, a  thundercloud can be  defined to be `angry'  when its electrical
potential relative to the earth or  nearby clouds is higher than some specified
amount,  and the   behaviour  appropriate  to an  angry   thundercloud, such as
releasing  thunderbolts, can be  predicted on the basis of  the definitions and
the laws of motion. But can one deduce  from these laws and definitions whether
or not the cloud feels like you feel when you are angry?

The answer is no!  There is a logical  disjunction between  (1), the set of all
assertions  about  physical  behaviours that  are  strictly  deducible from the
mathematical  laws of  motion  plus the  mathematical  definitions  of physical
properties  (in terms of  the basic  physical  quantities) and  (2), the set of
empirical facts about our  experiences. The former  set of assertions live in a
world of  mathematical  abstractions:  what lies in  this set is  determined by
mathematical and logical principles  alone. There is no logical principle there
that entails  anything about  what the  actually  experientially felt realities
are. These realities could be totally  nonexistent without violating any of the
mathematical properties.

But if the empirical/experiential realities could be totally absent, without
affecting the classical mathematical/physical/causal structure, then the 
former realities are not causally efficacious: they are epiphenomal. Nothing
physical changes if they are left out.

[On  the other  hand,  quantum  mechanics, adequately  formulated, is  based on
experiential realities, which therefore cannot be simply left out without doing
violence to the basic logical structure.]

Hayes asks: 
*****
Why would any such argument not also apply to almost anything with a
functional role describable at a large enough scale that quantum effects
could usefully be ignored, eg (say) a leaf, a carburettor or a brick wall?
None of these structures can be predicted within classical physics (ie they
cannot be derived from Newton's laws of gravitation, Maxwell's equations,
etc.).
*****

Yes, it would apply:  What the leaf and the  carburettor and the brick wall are
experiencing  or  feeling plays  no causal  role within  the  classical physics
description of  nature: the  *physical*  properties of these  things completely
determine   their   behaviour,  with  no  effects  from  the  analog,  from the
perspective of those  items, of our empirically  experienced reality. According
to the principles of classical  mechanics we can, in principle, deduce from the
physical  properties and laws how the  carburettor will  behave without knowing
anything at all about how it is feeling.

Henry P. Stapp       [http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html]