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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
February 2003:
Defense Management:
Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its 
Training and Doctrine Command:
GAO-03-214:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-214, a report to
Congressional Requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Armys Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) trains
soldiers and develops doctrine and future warfighting concepts to fight
the battles of today and tomorrow. As such, the Command has been
designated as the lead in the Armys transformation from a Cold
War-oriented force into a rapidly deployable and responsive force
better able to meet the diverse challenges of the future. Concerns
have been raised at congressional hearings about TRADOCs
readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the context of
Army transformation and associated funding priorities. GAO
assessed the impact of budget, workload, and personnel changes,
as well as ongoing transformation plans, on TRADOCs ability to
perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to the combat
forces.
What GAO Found:
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOCs workload has grown as a result 
of new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet
those requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the 
Commands operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC 
allocated these and other operations money to support its highest 
mission prioritytrainingwhile other areas received less emphasis. The 
table below depicts the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed 
to perform its workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number 
of personnel the Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved 
differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOCs 
personnel requirements.
Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel 
authorizations, TRADOC has met its training mission, but with 
difficulty. 
Moreover, the Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas, 
such 
as developing training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these 
backlogs is illustrated in TRADOCs monthly status reports, which show 
that the Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-
thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and 
attributed 
the low ratings primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two 
Army leadership panels concluded that TRADOCs training and development 
standards had deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and 
leader development programs were lacking.
Several ongoing and planned Army initiatives may affect TRADOCs 
ability to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to 
reassess TRADOCs process for determining personnel requirements and 
ongoing efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant 
commands to warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing 
flexibility to shift funds from one mission area to another because the 
Army established the Installation Management Agency to manage its 
facilities. TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan that Command 
officials believe will increase TRADOCs efficiency and improve its 
ability to meet mission requirements; however, the costs, benefits, 
performance measures, and human capital issues associated with the plan 
are not yet clear.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army validate TRADOCs workload and
personnel requirements before further reducing the Commands
personnel authorizations, and ensure that the Commands
reengineering plan adequately addresses efficiency, effectiveness,
and human capital issues. In commenting on the report, the
Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations related
to TRADOCs reengineering but expressed various concerns about
other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall
actions would be taken.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While Budget 
Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload:
TRADOCs Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership 
Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems:
Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Table 2: TRADOCs Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities 
(as of October 2002):
Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during 
Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002):
Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active 
Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001:
Figures:
Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations:
Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation:
Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area:
Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission 
Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a 
Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for 
Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal 
Years 1995-2001:
Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003:
Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002):
Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for 
the Period January 2001 - February 2002:
Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
Abbreviations:
AMC: Army Materiel Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FORSCOM: Army Forces Command:
IMA: Installation Management Agency:
O&M: Operations and Maintenance:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
POI: Programs of Instruction:
TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command:
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February 10, 2003:
The Honorable Joel Heffley
Chairman
The Honorable Soloman P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force 
into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet 
the diverse challenges of the future. The far-reaching organizational 
and operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every 
element of the Army. The Armys Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
has been designated the lead command for this transformation and, as 
the architect of the Armys future, TRADOC has a key role in the 
transformation process. TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that the 
Army remains a modern and capable fighting force by developing 
warfighting concepts and doctrine and by providing recruiting, 
training, and associated support for military personnel. Like the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and other Army commands, TRADOC incurred 
significant decreases in its resources--particularly its personnel 
resources--during the 1990s as the department took major steps to 
reshape and reduce the size of its forces. Between fiscal years 1991 
and 2001, Army active duty military personnel and civilian personnel 
were reduced by about 33 percent and 42 percent, respectively. TRADOC 
incurred similar reductions during this period.
Each year, senior Army officials must decide how to allocate resources 
among competing priorities and programs within and among the Armys 
operational and institutional forces. In recent years, the Army has 
chosen to give priority to its operational or warfighting units and 
accept a higher level of risk of mission failure in support 
organizations such as TRADOC. At the same time, at congressional 
hearings over the last few years, concerns have been raised about 
TRADOCs readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the 
context of Army transformation. At your request, we reviewed the 
resources and workload assigned to the Command and its readiness to 
carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to examine 
(1) the Training and Doctrine Commands personnel, workload, and budget 
trends since 1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on 
the Commands ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained 
soldiers to the combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned 
that could have an effect on the Commands ability to perform its 
mission.
In conducting this examination, we reviewed documents and interviewed 
officials at Army Headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and 
Forces Command. Our analysis of the trends in the Commands personnel 
and budgetary resources focused primarily on fiscal years 1995 through 
2001. A complete description of our methodology is shown in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOCs workload has grown due to new 
mission requirements and its budget has increased in selected areas, 
its authorized personnel gradually decreased about 13 percent. 
Specifically, the number of authorized personnel declined during this 
period from about 63,000 to 55,000. The current authorization 
represents about 70 percent of the personnel that the Command believes 
are needed to perform its work (otherwise known as requirements), which 
have ranged from about 75,000 to 79,000 personnel.[Footnote 1] The 
reductions in authorized personnel were caused by a number of DOD and 
Army decisions. Key among these were reductions mandated by force 
structure reshaping decisions that began in the early 1990s, such as 
Quicksilver,[Footnote 2] and other department initiatives that 
occurred since 1995, such as reductions recommended by the 1997 
Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote 3] While TRADOC officials believe 
that the Commands reported personnel requirements are accurate, 
unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters staff 
over the accuracy of these requirements, particularly as they relate to 
the use of contractors. Despite personnel reductions, the Commands 
primary funding source--operations and maintenance funding--increased 
about 23 percent (in constant dollars). However, at the Commands 
discretion, funding for all of TRADOCs programs did not increase--
funding devoted to training increased about 13 percent, while funding 
devoted to base operations decreased about 20 percent as the Command 
reallocated limited resources to higher-priority missions. Also, a 
large portion of the increased funding was directed to hiring contract 
personnel to support new mission requirements such as Army 
transformation to a lighter force. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, 
contractor support funding increased by about 38 percent, or about 
$317 million, but this increase did not fully offset the loss of 
personnel authorizations, according to Command officials.
Amid these reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC met its 
highest mission priority, training, although not without some concerns 
about quality from other Army organizations. The Command has had more 
difficulty fully meeting other mission requirements--such as those 
involving the development of training materials and doctrine--many of 
which have sizeable workload backlogs. The effect of these workload 
backlogs is illustrated in TRADOCs monthly status reports. Our 
analysis of these status reports showed that the Command assigned the 
lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during 
fiscal year 2001 and into 2002, and it attributed the low ratings 
primarily to the lack of personnel. The impact of these conditions has 
been observed by organizations outside TRADOC. Two Army leadership 
panels chartered by the Army Chief of Staff--one representing officers 
and one representing noncommissioned officers--concluded in 2001 and 
2002 that TRADOCs training and development standards had deteriorated 
and that mechanisms for evaluating training and leadership development 
programs were lacking. Officials with the Army Forces Command--a 
primary customer of TRADOC services--have also expressed concern about 
TRADOCs reduced capabilities, but the impact cannot be fully 
quantified due to a lack of Army empirical data and analysis. Although 
TRADOC does not have a formal process to obtain feedback on the quality 
and relevance of the products provided to its customers, Forces Command 
officials indicated that they believe the quality of TRADOCs 
individual training programs and doctrine products has declined. For 
example, they cite the lack of a training strategy to support 
operational units adoption of digital technology, as well as the 
outdated condition of some doctrine used to guide tactics and 
procedures in the field. On the other hand, Forces Command officials 
noted that TRADOCs support for an element of the Army transformation-
-the Interim Brigade Combat Teams--had been good. Continuing 
disconnects between mission requirements and resources could adversely 
affect TRADOCs ability to carry out its mission and improve its 
readiness posture in the future as it continues to address additional 
transformation requirements, while also training and supporting the 
current force.
Several ongoing and planned actions may affect the Commands ability to 
perform its mission in the future; however, the overall outcome is 
unclear at this time. In October 2002, a major Army Headquarters 
initiative, already underway, began shifting budgetary resources and 
about 10,000 personnel authorizations related to base operations away 
from the Command to the new Army Installation Management Agency. This 
reorganization will reduce TRADOCs mission requirements, but will also 
eliminate base operations funds that, in the past, were used by the 
Command as a source of training support; thus, in the future, the 
Command will have less flexibility to shift funding among its primary 
missions. Another Army Headquarters initiative is aimed at reassessing 
the process used to determine personnel requirements for TRADOC and 
other commands that support warfighting units, but the outcome is 
uncertain because differences of opinion exist over TRADOCs 
requirements and the extent to which its requirements have been offset 
by contractor support. Also, the Army is conducting commercial 
activities studies to identify opportunities to use in-house personnel 
more efficiently and to contract some activities to an outside vendor. 
Such studies are likely to lead to reduced personnel requirements in 
the activities studied but would not necessarily free personnel for 
assignment to other activities or mission areas where shortages exist. 
In addition, the Army has an initiative underway, known as Manning the 
Force, which is transferring military personnel from the noncombatant 
forces across the Army to warfighting forces to improve the Armys 
combat readiness. This initiative, which continues through fiscal year 
2003, is reducing the number of military personnel assigned to TRADOC; 
however, the Command has not fully quantified the impact of this 
specific initiative. Finally, TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan 
that is intended to create a more streamlined and efficient command 
structure, rely more heavily on technology, and better position the 
Command to support current and future mission requirements. Command 
officials believe the plan, once finalized and implemented, will 
increase TRADOCs efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission 
requirements. However, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and 
human capital issues associated with implementing the plan are not yet 
clear. Also, the extent to which this effort will lead to 
organizational consolidations and reductions in personnel requirements 
remains unclear. These issues could take on more importance as the Army 
continues its transformation efforts and, if not adequately addressed, 
could place the Command at increased risk in its role as the Armys 
architect of the future.
We are making recommendations for executive action to help the Command 
address workload backlogs; better measure the quality of its products 
and services; and ensure that its reengineering plan adequately 
addresses efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues and is 
properly resourced to support Army transformation. In commenting on a 
draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendations related to 
TRADOCs reengineering process but expressed various concerns about 
other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions 
would be taken.
Background:
The Army consists of both operational and institutional forces. The 
institutional forces support such activities as training, supply, and 
maintenance, and perform a broad range of noncombatant functions that 
enable operational forces--combat and support units--to deploy and 
fight in regional and theater wars. TRADOC is part of the Armys 
institutional forces. The Command is viewed as the Armys architect of 
the future because much of what it does is focused on identifying 
future warfighting requirements and developing organizations, training 
curriculum, doctrine, and people to fight the battles of tomorrow, as 
well as those of today.
TRADOCs Responsibilities:
TRADOC carries out its mission at 26 schools and several training 
centers located on 15 major installations throughout the continental 
United States. (See fig. 1.) The Command also has 11 battle 
laboratories, which support research and development activities 
associated with weapon systems and combat operations. The schools and 
battle laboratories specialize in developing and testing warfighting 
capabilities such as air defense, armor, artillery, aviation, infantry, 
and transportation. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was authorized 
about 36,500 military personnel and 18,700 civilian personnel.
Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In general, TRADOCs overall mission focuses on five primary areas:
* Combat Development. Through its combat development mission, TRADOC 
identifies needed capabilities and requirements for new and existing 
weapon and battlefield management systems to improve warfighting 
capabilities and responsiveness. The capabilities and requirements are 
designed and incorporated into current and new weapon systems to 
improve the Armys warfighting capabilities. As part of this effort, 
TRADOC provides an Armywide focus on research and development 
activities and conducts analysis and experimentation. The Commands 
battle laboratories are heavily involved in the combat development 
mission.
* Doctrine Development. TRADOC develops doctrine to address the 
complete range of potential tactical and operational missions and 
operating environments--from infantry operations to aviation--that 
combat units might encounter. Doctrine establishes the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures the combat units might use to carry out 
their warfighting missions; it is essential for conducting warfare. 
Much of the Armys doctrine is found in its field manuals, which number 
more than 600. Doctrine developers write and update the field manuals, 
as well as develop organizational structures for combat units.
* Training and Training Development. TRADOCs training and training 
development mission is directed at developing competent soldiers, 
capable leaders, and relevant training materials. TRADOC provides 
soldiers with initial individual entry-level training. The Command also 
provides advanced individual training, such as learning how to operate 
a tank. As the training developer, TRADOC develops course material for 
over 2,000 courses that support individual training. TRADOC also 
develops training material for unit training, which takes place in the 
combat units. In addition, through training development, TRADOC 
certifies staff and faculty associated with its schools, develops a 
distance-learning curriculum, and promotes continuing education for its 
military personnel. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC trained about 
323,000 military and civilian personnel at its schools.
* Accessions/Recruiting. TRADOC is responsible for recruiting soldiers 
for the Army. Recruiting activities are conducted throughout the United 
States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and at U.S. facilities 
in Germany and Asia. Recruiting is carried out by a TRADOC subcommand 
called the Accessions Command, which was established in February 2002. 
From the beginning of fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001, 
accessions activities were carried out by the Army Recruiting Command, 
the Cadet Command, and the Military Entrance Processing Command. These 
commands are now components of the Accessions Command.
* Base Operations. TRADOC has historically maintained the school 
buildings, barracks, roads, training ranges, and other structures used 
to carry out its mission. Base support activities have included 
facilities maintenance as well as equipment repair. However, in October 
2002, base operations support across the Army was consolidated and 
transitioning to a new Army agency called the Installation Management 
Agency was begun. Like other Army commands, TRADOC will no longer have 
direct responsibility for base operations. A large portion of the 
TRADOC personnel and funding resources associated with base operations 
is being transferred to the new agency.
TRADOC is also the lead command for Army transformation. This 
transformation, which was announced in October 1999, is a plan to move 
the Armys Cold War organization and equipment to a lighter, more 
strategically responsive force to fill what the Army sees as a 
strategic gap in its warfighting capabilities. The transformed force is 
expected to be capable of responding to a broad range of operations--
from peacekeeping to regional conflicts to major theater wars. To 
realize the transformation, the Army plans to develop new equipment, 
revise its operating concepts and doctrine, build unit-level 
organizations that can quickly adapt to changes in the intensity of a 
given military operation, and change how it trains its soldiers and 
leaders. Transformation will touch on all of TRADOCs mission areas 
because TRADOC is heavily involved in developing requirements for 
current and new equipment, revising doctrine, developing new 
organizations, and training soldiers and leaders. As part of its 
transformation responsibilities, TRADOC has already played a lead role 
in developing and fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams--commonly 
referred to as the Stryker brigades--which are being organized and 
equipped to deploy nearly as quickly as light infantry units but with 
more lethality and survivability.
Overview of TRADOC Funding:
In fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was provided a budget of about $3.2 billion 
to carry out its mission.[Footnote 4] This total, however, does not 
include funding to pay the Commands military personnel, who are paid 
from funds that are centrally managed at Army Headquarters. Figure 2 
depicts TRADOCs funding by appropriation.
Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The largest segment of the budget was comprised of Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) funding. It totaled approximately $2.9 billion, or 
about 91 percent of TRADOCs total budget. Figure 3 shows how O&M 
funding was allocated among TRADOC mission areas.
Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Training and base operations were allocated most of the O&M funding. 
Funding for doctrine development is included in both combat 
developments and training development.
TRADOCs O&M funding increased to about $3.5 billion for fiscal year 
2002--about $600 million more than fiscal year 2001. A large portion of 
the increase resulted from additional funding to support the global war 
on terrorism.
TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While Budget 
Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload:
Since at least fiscal year 1995, the number of personnel that TRADOC 
has been authorized to accomplish its mission has been less than the 
number of personnel that TRADOC officials believe are required. While 
personnel requirements remained relatively steady between fiscal years 
1995 and 2001, TRADOCs workload increased and its personnel 
authorizations decreased as a result of DOD and Army efforts to reshape 
and constrain the size of the in-house workforce. TRADOC and Army 
Headquarters officials do not agree on the accuracy of TRADOCs 
personnel requirements. As personnel authorizations decreased, 
TRADOCs budget increased; however, the increase was not applied 
uniformly across all of TRADOCs programs or mission areas. An 
increasing percentage of the budget was shifted to the Commands 
highest-priority mission area--training. In addition, a portion of the 
budget increase was directed to new mission requirements related to 
Army transformation. Because TRADOC did not have the in-house personnel 
to address the new requirements, the Command increased its use of 
contractors to satisfy some of the new mission requirements.
TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Are Down Despite Increasing Workload 
and Associated Personnel Requirements:
Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOCs personnel requirements, as identified 
by the Command, have remained somewhat steady. Yet, its personnel 
authorizations and the actual number of personnel on hand have 
gradually declined by nearly 13 percent--from about 63,000 to 55,000--
to where they represent about 71 percent and 65 percent, respectively, 
of the Commands personnel requirements. Table 1 details these 
personnel trends.
Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Requirements; 1995: 79,298; 1996: 77,069; 1997: 76,650; 1998[A]: 
75,613; 1999[A]: 76,139; 2000[A]: 76,409; 2001: 78,255.
Authorizations; 1995: 63,139; 1996: 57,814; 1997: 57,700; 1998[A]: 
56,814; 1999[A]: 55,852; 2000[A]: 54,659; 2001: 55,204.
Actual; 1995: 61,207; 1996: 57,036; 1997: 57,273; 1998[A]: 54,839; 
1999[A]: 53,699; 2000[A]: 51,993; 2001: 50,936.
Authorizations as a percent of requirements; 1995: 80%; 1996: 75%; 
1997: 75%; 1998[A]: 75%; 1999[A]: 73%; 2000[A]: 71%; 2001: 71%.
Actual as a percent of requirements; 1995: 77%; 1996: 74%; 1997: 75%; 
1998[A]: 72%; 1999[A]: 71%; 2000[A]: 68%; 2001: 65%.
Actual as a percent of authorizations; 1995: 97%; 1996: 99%; 1997: 98%; 
1998[A]: 97%; 1999[A]: 96%; 2000[A]: 95%; 2001: 92%.
Source: TRADOC.
[End of table]
[A] Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of 
personnel requirements and authorizations, and actual personnel that 
are associated with two TRADOC subcommands: the Recruiting Command and 
Military Entrance Processing Command. (For additional information, see 
app. I).
TRADOC also experienced a reduction in actual staffing levels between 
fiscal years 1995 and 2001. As shown in table 1, the Command was 
staffed at 77 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 1995 and at 
only 65 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 2001. The table also 
shows that the Command has experienced a decline in the number of 
actual personnel assigned to the Command. According to TRADOC 
officials, this shortfall in actual personnel provides an even clearer 
indication that the Commands full workload cannot be accomplished. The 
reductions in TRADOCs personnel authorizations were similar to those 
of the Army overall, as well as for selected commands. See appendix II 
for a comparison of TRADOCs personnel authorizations with those of 
other selected major Army commands.
Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOCs workload has grown due to the addition 
of several new mission requirements. A number of these are associated 
with supporting Army transformation requirements that began to emerge 
after transformation plans were announced in 1999. The Command acquired 
responsibility for conceptualizing and developing two new aspects of 
the Armys fighting forces--the interim and objective forces--while 
still retaining the responsibilities for supporting, modernizing, and 
transforming the current force. These new responsibilities include 
developing weapon systems requirements, combat and training doctrine, 
and training courses to facilitate the transformation.
In addition, a number of other DOD and Army decisions resulted in 
TRADOC gaining new mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995 
and 2001, the Command assumed responsibility for several smaller 
commands and agencies, including the Army Recruiting Command, the 
Military Entrance Processing Command, and the Army Management Staff 
College.[Footnote 5] Each of these commands and agencies brought new 
workload requirements with them. However, they also brought most of the 
personnel authorizations associated with that workload.
The personnel requirements associated with the Commands major mission 
areas, as identified by TRADOC, fluctuated only slightly between fiscal 
years 1995 and 2001, as depicted in figure 4.
Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission 
Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: The training component of TRADOCs training and training 
development mission area has the single most personnel requirements and 
is shown in the chart separately from the training development 
component. The doctrine development mission area is included in the 
figure, but TRADOC does not account for doctrine development personnel 
separately. Instead, doctrine development personnel are accounted for 
in the training development and combat developments mission areas.
As shown in figure 4, requirements in TRADOCs training mission area 
ranged from about 35,000 to 37,000, with slight reductions between 
fiscal years 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the personnel requirements for 
the training development, combat development, and base operations 
mission areas had some minor changes from year to year.
The reductions in personnel authorizations between fiscal years 1995 
and 2001 forced TRADOC to set priorities among its mission areas to 
ensure that it successfully performed its highest-priority function--
training. Figure 5 shows TRADOCs authorization allocations relative to 
personnel requirements during this period. In comparison to the other 
mission areas, training was authorized the highest percentage of 
personnel authorizations in each year. Furthermore, training 
authorization levels remained relatively steady, while those in the 
base operations mission area were steadily reduced.
Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a 
Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Several DOD and Army force structure decisions were responsible for a 
large portion of TRADOCs personnel authorization reductions. 
Throughout the 1990s, DOD implemented several force structure reshaping 
initiatives--including those resulting from the 1997 Quadrennial 
Defense Review--that were aimed at streamlining the military services. 
Most of these initiatives directed across-the-board cuts in personnel 
authorizations and often left the military services and their commands 
to determine how to allocate the reductions. For example, one such 
initiative--referred to as Quicksilver--was implemented between 
fiscal years 1991 and 1996 to reduce the Armys force structure to 
create a balanced, versatile, smaller, more lethal, and more ready 
force than existed in the late 1980s. As a result, the initiative 
eliminated 3,134 civilian positions and 6,224 military positions at 
TRADOC between fiscal years 1991 and 2001.
TRADOC officials expressed confidence in the accuracy of their reported 
personnel requirements. They cite the validation of their requirements 
determination process in 2001 by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency as 
proof that their process produces valid requirements.[Footnote 6] Also, 
representatives of the Manpower Analysis Agency stated that TRADOCs 
personnel requirements determination process was based on a sound 
methodology. However, unresolved differences remain between TRADOC and 
Army Headquarters officials regarding the accuracy of the Commands 
personnel requirements. Representatives of the Armys Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Operations and Plans question the methods and assumptions 
used by TRADOC to link workload and personnel. More specifically, these 
officials told us they believe that TRADOC does not accurately account 
for work being done by contract personnel, and thus the difference 
between the Commands requirements and authorizations is not as large 
as it appears. They believe that contractors are filling the gap 
between requirements and authorizations. However, these officials did 
not provide any objective analysis to document the extent to which this 
might be the case. Similarly, TRADOC officials did not have sufficient 
data to show the extent to which they were relying on 
contractors.[Footnote 7] However, according to TRADOC officials, the 
Commands personnel requirements determination process appropriately 
considers work being done by contractors. Although we did not 
independently validate TRADOCs personnel requirements processes, our 
discussions with knowledgeable officials and review of available 
documentation indicated that their requirements analysis was based on a 
rigorous multistep process and gave due consideration to the work being 
performed by contractors. Furthermore, as discussed later in this 
report, TRADOC frequently cited personnel shortfalls as a cause of low 
readiness ratings.
TRADOC Received Budget Increases, but Additional Funds Benefited 
Limited Areas:
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, TRADOCs O&M budget increased $544 
million, or about 23 percent (expressed in constant fiscal year 2001 
dollars). However, this increase in funding was not uniform across all 
of TRADOCs mission areas or budget categories. For example, funding 
for the base operations mission decreased by around $20 million, or 
about 2 percent, while training mission funds increased by around $326 
million, or about 36 percent. Over time, funding allocated to the 
recruiting or accessions mission area increased by about $200 million, 
or almost 100 percent. (See fig. 6.):
Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for 
Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Likewise, the increase in funding was not uniform across TRADOC budget 
categories. For example, between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, funding in 
the civilian personnel budget category decreased by $60 million, while 
contract funding increased by $317 million. The decrease in civilian 
personnel funding resulted from the loss of personnel authorizations.
During this period, an increasing percentage of the budget was shifted 
from base operations accounts to the Commands highest priority 
mission--training. This is shown in figure 7. This practice generally 
left TRADOC in a position to conduct only minimal repair and 
maintenance on its facilities.
Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal 
Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The largest increases in TRADOCs budget were directly related to 
contracting and added mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 
1995 and 2001, the amount of funding spent on contracting increased by 
38 percent, or about $317 million (in constant fiscal year 2001 
dollars). According to TRADOC budget officials, a large portion of this 
contract funding was used to support Army transformation initiatives. 
They noted that in several instances the Army provided funding for 
transformation-related activities but did not provide the associated 
personnel authorizations. TRADOC did not have available in-house 
personnel to address the new requirements, which effectively forced the 
Command to contract for those activities. In fiscal year 2001, the 
Command received $289 million related to new mission funding. Of that 
total, $150 million, or 52 percent of new mission funding, was directly 
associated with Army transformation and was used to acquire contractor 
support. For example, contractors were used to develop doctrine and 
training materials for the new Stryker brigades.
TRADOCs Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership 
Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems:
Reductions in personnel authorizations, coupled with unchanged 
personnel requirements, have affected TRADOCs ability to meet workload 
requirements in some mission areas. The Command has been able to 
perform its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, backlogs 
of work exist in the training development, doctrine development, combat 
development, and base operations mission areas. The Commands inability 
to address its personnel shortages and workload backlogs are reflected 
in its monthly readiness reports, which consistently show low readiness 
levels throughout the Command. At the same time, TRADOC lacks a formal 
process for obtaining customer feedback information to evaluate the 
effectiveness of its mission and alert Army leaders to potential 
problem areas. Two Army leadership panels completing their work in 2001 
and 2002 identified concerns about TRADOCs ability to effectively 
carry out its mission. Also, anecdotal evidence from U.S. Army Forces 
Command (FORSCOM)--a major TRADOC customer--indicates that the quality 
of TRADOC training provided to individuals has declined and confirms 
that some doctrine is not up to date. Army transformation and other 
potential future requirements will likely place new demands on TRADOC, 
making it even more challenging for the Command to perform its mission 
at its current resource levels.
TRADOC Performed Training Mission but Experienced Difficulty Meeting 
Other Mission Workload:
Over the past several years TRADOC has been able to perform its 
training mission, but officials noted some concerns about the quality 
of the training. As shown in figure 8, the number of full-time 
equivalent students per year--referred to as the training workload--
decreased significantly between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, primarily 
as a result of DOD downsizing. Since approximately 1994 the training 
workload has remained relatively steady, between 60,000 and 70,000 
full-time equivalent students annually. Due to the high priority placed 
on meeting the training workload, TRADOC ensures that the students 
arriving at its schools receive timely scheduled training.
Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
However, officials located at both TRADOC Headquarters and the TRADOC 
schools we visited expressed concern about a decline in quality in some 
aspects of the training provided by the Command. They believe that the 
Command does not have enough experienced training instructors to 
provide the quality of training they would like. They noted that 
personnel reductions have resulted in the loss of some of the corporate 
knowledge necessary to develop training courses and doctrine 
publications and that personnel who were once devoted solely to writing 
doctrine are now asked to conduct training first and to write doctrine 
as a secondary responsibility. Furthermore, they told us that the 
decreasing number of personnel, coupled with increasing class sizes, 
resulted in more students per instructor and less individual training 
time.
Workload Backlogs Exist in Some Mission Areas:
Workload backlogs are evident in some of TRADOCs primary mission 
areas. A training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout 
the Command. Moreover, the combat development backlog is growing. 
Finally, declining personnel and budgetary resources have affected the 
Commands ability to carry out base operations.
TRADOC Has Training and Doctrine Development Backlogs:
According to TRADOC workload data, a training and doctrine development 
backlog exists throughout the Command. Army training and doctrine 
materials must complement one another so that soldiers are trained 
according to current doctrine. However, as a result of an insufficient 
number of training development personnel, TRADOC has not been able to 
maintain the currency of its highest-priority training courses--
commonly referred to as programs of instruction (POI)--and associated 
doctrine. TRADOC officials stated that to compensate for the shortage 
of doctrine development personnel, the Command has used contractors in 
some instances to write and revise doctrine publications. Even with the 
use of contractors, backlogs continue.
TRADOC managers use a database to manage the Commands highest-priority 
training and doctrine development workload. TRADOC leadership uses the 
information contained in this database to make resource and workload 
allocation decisions. Table 2, which shows data extracted from the 
database, identifies the Armys top 13 training and doctrine 
development priorities as understood by TRADOC. However, these top 
priorities do not represent the entirety of the Commands training and 
doctrine development workload. The work associated with these 
priorities is expressed in terms of staff-years of work and staff-years 
available to perform the work. As the table shows, TRADOCs available 
personnel cannot complete the workload associated with these top 
priorities--only 45 percent of the staff-years required for the top 
priority training and doctrine development work were available, 
indicating a significant shortfall in personnel available to do this 
work.
Table 2: TRADOCs Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities 
(as of October 2002):
Priority ranking: 1; Workload categories: Contemporary operating 
environment/force protection; Staff-years: 717.98.
Priority ranking: 2; Workload categories: Unit set fielding - 1st 
Cavalry; Staff-years: 108.49.
Priority ranking: 3; Workload categories: Interim B\brigade combat 
teams (Stryker brigades); Staff-years: 850.22.
Priority ranking: 4; Workload categories: Distance learning courseware; 
Staff-years: 1,911.81.
Priority ranking: 5; Workload categories: Doctrine (field manuals, 
joint and NATO pubs); Staff-years: 306.82.
Priority ranking: 6; Workload categories: Mission training plans; 
Staff-years: 1,403.97.
Priority ranking: 7; Workload categories: Soldier training pubs; Staff-
years: 17.02.
Priority ranking: 8; Workload categories: TRADOC transformation; Staff-
years: 103.80.
Priority ranking: 9; Workload categories: Institutional digital 
education plan; Staff-years: 84.00.
Priority ranking: 10; Workload categories: Interim division; Staff-
years: 187.18.
Priority ranking: 11; Workload categories: Individual training 
requirements (POI, etc.); Staff-years: 1,326.19.
Priority ranking: 12; Workload categories: Total army training system 
courseware; Staff-years: 35.17.
Priority ranking: 13; Workload categories: Warrior training support 
packages; Staff-years: 265.43.
Priority ranking: Total staff-year requirements; Workload categories: 
[Empty]; Staff-years: 7,318.08.
Priority ranking: Total staff-years available; Workload categories: 
[Empty]; Staff-years: 3,294.00.
Priority ranking: Shortfall in 
staff-years; Workload categories: [Empty]; Staff-years: (4,024.08).
[End of table]
Source: TRADOC.
Most of the Commands training and doctrine developers are focusing on 
the top four priorities. TRADOC officials stated that the first and 
fourth priorities are both being filled at nearly 100 percent of the 
staff-years required, while attention given to other areas--such as 
Mission Training Plans and TRADOC Transformation--varies.[Footnote 8]
Although many of the areas represented in table 2 have a component of 
doctrine writing, priority number 5 is the area most directly related 
to TRADOCs doctrine mission. TRADOC doctrine development officials 
told us that the Command had enough personnel to complete about 40 
percent of its existing doctrine development workload. A large portion 
of this backlog involves field manuals, which have to be written, 
reviewed periodically, and revised.[Footnote 9] In total, TRADOC is 
responsible for more than 600 field manuals and publications, which 
include joint operations with other military services and U.S. allies.
We calculated that as of January 2002 only about 33 percent of the 
field manuals in the inventory were up to date. (See fig. 9.) The other 
67 percent of the manuals required work, including the development of 
at least 81 new publications, the review of 129 existing publications, 
and the revision of 205 outdated publications. Of the 81 new 
publications, 26 are directly related to the Stryker brigades and Army 
transformation. Without updated field manuals, the Armys combat units 
may not have the benefit of the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
needed to help them better perform their missions in future conflicts.
Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Doctrine writing is one mission area that relies on contractors to 
satisfy some workload requirements. For example, Fort Benning, which is 
responsible for supporting the development and fielding of the Stryker 
brigades, is using contractor personnel to develop doctrine for the new 
brigades. In this particular situation, Fort Benning officials told us 
that the contractor used retired military personnel with infantry 
experience to help write the field manuals. The officials noted that 
the retired military personnel being used by the contractor had 
relevant experience needed for writing doctrine; however, they also 
expressed concern that reduced personnel authorizations may eventually 
shrink the pool of available retired military personnel with the 
experience needed to fill the contract positions.
Combat Development Backlog Is Growing:
TRADOC is also experiencing growing workload backlogs in its combat 
developments mission area. The backlogs include tasks required to 
develop and analyze warfighting concepts and materiel requirements 
related to force modernization and transformation, among other things. 
According to TRADOC officials, the Command is responsible for about 
46,200 combat development tasks per year. Those same officials noted 
that the Commands workload backlog is growing at a rate of about 33 
percent per year because the mission area does not have enough 
personnel to address the large volume of tasks that needs to be 
completed.
Declining Resources Affect TRADOCs Ability to Provide Base Operations:
TRADOCs base operations mission area, which involves activities like 
logistics and the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of real 
property, has also been affected by declining resources. TRADOC 
officials told us that they frequently were able to provide only 
emergency or minimal real property maintenance at installations between 
fiscal years 1995 and 2001, due to insufficient personnel and funding. 
Moreover, during that time, TRADOC shifted O&M funding from base 
operations accounts to training accounts to ensure that the training 
mission could be accomplished. This explains, in part, the backlog of 
reported real property maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2001, 
the funding level for the Commands base operations was set at about 70 
percent of its workload requirements, thus TRADOC was able to make more 
funding available for higher-priority mission areas, such as training.
Various TRADOC officials have also expressed concern about the 
difficulty of staffing and maintaining training ranges. For example, 
officials from both TRADOC and FORSCOM noted that the National Training 
Center, which is used to conduct large-scale collective training 
exercises, has not been adequately staffed to observe the training and 
provide feedback to units involved in the exercises. As a result, 
FORSCOM units have had to use their own personnel to augment National 
Training Center personnel, particularly in the area of forward 
observers; consequently, some FORSCOM combat personnel were not able to 
participate fully in training exercises.
Readiness Reports Show Personnel Shortages and Effects:
TRADOC prepares a monthly status report that assesses the readiness of 
most of its organizational units. These monthly reports are provided to 
the Army Chief of Staff. Our review of these reports showed that a 
majority of the Commands organizations were assigned the lowest 
readiness rating throughout most of fiscal year 2001 and into fiscal 
year 2002 and that 17 of TRADOCs 30 reporting units identified 
personnel shortages as the primary reason for their lower readiness 
status.[Footnote 10] TRADOCs readiness rating criteria call for a unit 
to be rated low in the category of personnel if it has less than 70 
percent of the personnel it requires. Figure 10 shows how the 30 units 
included in the reports were rated.
Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for 
the Period January 2001 - February 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: GAO analysis of TRADOC monthly status reports.
A few units that did not report problems with personnel shortages had 
other problems that caused them to report low readiness ratings. For 
example, one reporting unit that was consistently at a C-4 rating 
identified the lack of equipment on hand rather than insufficient 
personnel as the reason for its low readiness ratings.
Unit commanders include written comments that accompany the readiness 
ratings they provide on monthly readiness reports. The comments 
highlight the types of problems being experienced and the effect those 
problems have on the units mission performance. We reviewed the 
comments for the period covered in figure 10, and the following quote 
is representative of many of the comments that appeared in the monthly 
reports:
[The] lack of personnel and funding, especially a very limited officer 
presence, has put Combat, Doctrine and Training Development at risk 
resulting in the use of outdated doctrine and training materials.The 
Operating Force has to compensate by developing what it needs on its 
own.
According to our analysis, commanders most often reported the shortage 
of doctrine, training, and combat developers as their top readiness 
concern. For example, one comment stated that TRADOC needs funding for 
400 permanent civilian training development positions to eliminate the 
Commands large training development backlog. Another comment noted 
that the 70 percent reduction in military and civilian training 
developers severely degraded the Commands capability to maintain 
current force training materials as well as support the evolving future 
forces requirements. Between January 2001 and January 2002, 28 units 
reported a shortage of developers as a major concern at least once.
Other comments regarding the lack of personnel referred to reductions 
in the required rank of soldiers that were filling supervisory/training 
positions, thus assigning training responsibilities to less experienced 
military personnel. Likewise, commanders noted that personnel 
reductions had placed civilian personnel in positions for which they 
were marginally qualified or not qualified at all.
DOD also reports on the readiness of the military services to perform 
their respective training functions. This readiness assessment is 
presented to Congress in the departments quarterly and annual 
Institutional Training Readiness reports. Although TRADOC has 
consistently reported a low overall readiness status, the quarterly 
reports DOD provided to Congress generally showed Army institutional 
training readiness at the C-1 and C-2 levels. The readiness reports 
provided to Congress, however, only reflect the training portion of 
TRADOCs mission and do not rate the Commands readiness to carry out 
training, doctrine, and combat development. For example, the 
departments annual Institutional Training Readiness Report for Fiscal 
Year 2001, issued January 2002, showed TRADOCs institutional training 
readiness to be either C-1 or C-2 for six of the seven training 
categories assessed.[Footnote 11] The report did note, however, that 
personnel and funding shortages caused some ratings to drop below C-1, 
particularly in the flight training area. The report also noted that 
TRADOC had to put other mission areas--combat, doctrine, and training 
developments--at risk to meet its primary mission of training. In 
addition, DODs Institutional Training Readiness reports compare the 
number of students projected to enter the training system and the 
number that actually receive training. For this reason, the reports do 
not provide a measure of training quality.
TRADOC Lacks Information to Evaluate Its Mission Effectiveness:
While TRADOC readiness reports show a significant degradation in 
readiness--often attributed to resource constraints--the impact on its 
ability to support operational forces is not well established and is 
often limited to anecdotal concerns voiced by operational leaders. 
TRADOC previously collected and evaluated such anecdotal information in 
the form of feedback from its customers, but it does not currently have 
the capability to do so. According to TRADOC officials, this capability 
was eliminated in the early 1990s as part of the Commands response to 
reduced personnel authorizations. Nevertheless, collecting feedback 
from customers is a good management practice. The Government 
Performance and Results Act[Footnote 12] as well as prior GAO reports 
reference the need to obtain and analyze data related to the quality of 
services provided by and to government organizations.[Footnote 13] 
Obtaining feedback from customers is an important aspect of assessing 
the quality of services. Without a systematic process to collect and 
evaluate customer feedback information, the ability to plan and 
prioritize workload based on customers needs is hindered.
The Command decided in fiscal year 2002 to reestablish a quality 
assurance program. According to TRADOC officials, the programs 
objectives would be to (1) establish and maintain an organizational 
structure within TRADOC to ensure the quality and standardization of 
education/training across components; (2) ensure that all components 
are trained to the same standard and trained to perform in a 
contemporary operating environment;[Footnote 14] (3) ensure that 
students can perform to training standards; and (4) ensure that 
education/training meets the needs of the legacy, interim, and 
objective forces. However, it is unclear how many resources TRADOC 
would be able to allocate to this program and whether the program would 
incorporate a customer feedback component.
Army Leadership Panels and FORSCOM Officials Believe the Quality of 
TRADOC Products Has Declined:
Two recent Army training and leader development panels and various 
FORSCOM officials indicate that the quality of TRADOCs products--such 
as well-trained soldiers and adequate field manuals and training 
materials--has declined. Also, officials at FORSCOM Headquarters and at 
one of its major installations, Fort Hood, Texas, provided us with 
anecdotal information about the quality of TRADOCs products that 
reinforced the panels observations.
During 2001 and 2002, two Army Training and Leader Development Panels-
-one representing officers and one representing noncommissioned 
officers--raised issues about the quality of TRADOCs products. The 
purpose of these panels, which were chartered by the Army Chief of 
Staff, was to assess the quality of the Armys training and leader 
development programs and identify areas needing improvement. In 
particular, the panels were to determine the relevancy of existing 
training and leader development programs to the needs of the future 
forces. The first panel focused on evaluating training and leader 
development efforts related to commissioned officers, and the second 
panel focused on noncommissioned officers.
* The officer panel concluded that (1) TRADOC was not providing the 
Army with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe 
lack of training development resources; (2) TRADOC was not updating or 
developing training and education products fast enough to support both 
the current and future forces; (3) many of the foundational 
publications and products related to standards-based training and 
leader development were obsolete; and (4) mechanisms for evaluating 
training and leader development programs were lacking. The panel made 
the general observation that the Armys combat forces were evolving at 
a pace that was not allowing the institutional training base to provide 
up-to-date training and educational products.
* The noncommissioned officer panel presented similar but more detailed 
conclusions than the officer panel. The panel noted, among other 
things, that (1) more than 40 percent of Army military occupational 
specialties did not have current manuals; (2) the Army training and 
development standards had deteriorated since the early 1990s; and (3) 
the Armys failure to keep its standards up to date since the Gulf War 
had created a generation of senior noncommissioned officers that do not 
know and are not executing the principles and processes of Army 
training doctrine.
FORSCOMs observations complement the findings of the two Training and 
Leader Development Panels. FORSCOM officials consistently noted that 
soldiers graduating from TRADOC schools are not as well trained as they 
once were because TRADOC no longer has the number of personnel it needs 
to ensure comprehensive, quality training. Nor did they feel that 
TRADOC had adequately developed or communicated a strategy for training 
personnel on digital equipment like the new Army Battle Command System. 
Moreover, they noted that some of the equipment being used for training 
was not current, and thus the training being provided on those systems 
was not properly preparing soldiers to operate the equipment that their 
operational units were using. For example, they said that armor 
officers were being trained on older versions of Abrams tanks at 
TRADOC, while several operational units were already using newer 
digitized versions. Several armor battalion commanders at Fort Hood 
said that they had to frequently provide individual training to armor 
officers coming from TRADOCs Armor School in order to familiarize the 
officers with the digital equipment being used in battalion tanks.
Some FORSCOM officials also expressed concerns about the age of Army 
doctrine publications, several of which are Cold War-era documents. 
They noted that the lack of current doctrinal publications causes units 
in FORSCOM to develop battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures 
based on doctrinal foundations that do not reflect the current 
operating environment. FORSCOM officials did note one exception to 
their general observations about doctrine: they believed TRADOC had 
provided both timely and quality doctrine development and related 
support for the new Stryker brigades.
TRADOC Likely to Face Additional Workload Challenges as the Armys 
Architect of the Future:
TRADOCs ability to meet its future responsibilities will likely be 
challenged because the Command continues to acquire new mission 
requirements that will continue to compound its already large workload 
backlogs. For example, Army transformation requirements will continue 
to place new demands on TRADOC over the next several years.[Footnote 
15] Transformation will bring changes in equipment as the Army 
modernizes existing equipment and transitions to the interim and 
objective forces. This, in turn, will necessitate changes in operating 
concepts, doctrine, and training.
The Armys plans, however, do not call for the total elimination of 
current capabilities. While it is developing the objective force and 
establishing the interim force, such as the Stryker brigades, the Army 
plans to sustain, recapitalize (upgrade and rebuild), and modernize 
many of the systems currently in use. For example, all of the Abrams 
tanks currently in the Armys arsenal will eventually be equipped with 
digital battlefield command systems as part of modernization and 
transformation efforts and will remain in the arsenal until about 2031. 
Maintaining and upgrading current capabilities will continue to place 
demands on TRADOCs combat, doctrine, and training developments mission 
areas.
Available budget data indicate that TRADOC could face increased funding 
challenges as the Army proceeds with its transformation efforts and 
continues to maintain its current weapon systems. We reported in May 
2001 that the modernization and transformation of the current force 
will require significantly more resources--current systems alone would 
require substantial investment to sustain and modernize.[Footnote 16] 
As we noted in the report, the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) said on September 6, 2000, 
that the Army would require 
$23 billion to modernize its current forces during fiscal years 2002 to 
2007, but projected that it would only have about $15.5 billion for 
that purpose, a $7.5 billion shortfall. Given this magnitude of budget 
shortfalls, without additional budgetary resources and improved 
operating efficiencies, the Army will have to make trade-offs between 
modernization initiatives and operational demands. Moreover, Army 
Headquarters has not been persuaded to provide TRADOC with 
significantly more resources, primarily because it does not have extra 
resources available. Officials involved in prioritizing Army budgetary 
resources stated that the Army simply had too many other, higher-
priority programs and requirements to satisfy before it could provide 
TRADOC with additional funding.
Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain:
Both Army Headquarters and TRADOC have actions or plans in process that 
could affect TRADOC, but it is unclear how these actions will affect 
the Commands resource posture or its ability to perform its mission. 
Armywide actions include the transfer of responsibility for base 
operations away from all of its commands to a new Armywide 
organization, a reassessment of the process used to determine personnel 
requirements for TRADOC and the other institutional forces, and ongoing 
commercial activities studies that may cause TRADOC to rely more on 
contractors to support future operations. The Command is also losing 
some military personnel to the combat forces as part of the Armys 
Manning the Force initiative. Finally, TRADOC is in the process of 
developing a commandwide reengineering plan, which is intended to 
streamline its organizational structure, make better use of information 
technology, and be more responsive to the Armys combat forces. Issues 
and questions related to these various initiatives remain unresolved or 
unanswered.
Base Operations Mission Transferred to New Organization:
As part of its effort to transform, streamline its headquarters, and 
improve resource management, the Army announced plans in October 2001 
to create a new agency for managing all of its base operations 
activities. The new agency, called the Installation Management Agency 
(IMA), was activated in October 2002 and assumed management 
responsibilities for base operations activities such as force 
protection, logistics, public works, facilities maintenance, and morale 
and welfare programs under one management organization.[Footnote 17] 
The Army hopes to achieve several goals with IMA, which include 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of installation management 
and allowing mission commanders to focus more on maintaining readiness. 
The Army expects to transfer about 35,000 personnel authorizations and 
about $8 billion in funding from various Army commands to IMA during 
fiscal year 2003.
For fiscal year 2001, TRADOC had about 18,100 personnel requirements 
and about 10,350 personnel authorizations for base operations. The Army 
began to transfer personnel authorizations and associated funding from 
TRADOC to IMA in October 2002. As many as 10,000 personnel may be 
transferred, although the number had not been finalized. The personnel 
authorizations to be transferred represent most of the authorizations 
allocated to TRADOCs base operations mission area.
The loss of the base operations mission will result in TRADOC having 
less flexibility to shift funding among its primary mission areas. In 
the past, TRADOC has been able provide additional funding to its 
higher-priority mission areas by taking some funds from base 
operations. For example, in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the 
Command moved $115 million, 
$98 million, and $145 million, respectively, from investment accounts-
-which were primarily base operations accounts--to training 
accounts.[Footnote 18] As a result, TRADOC was able to complete its 
primary mission--training--at the expense of some base operations 
activities, such as the maintenance and rehabilitation of facilities. 
TRADOC officials told us they will no longer have the flexibility to do 
this after base operations funding is reallocated to IMA.
Army Reassessing Process for Determining Institutional Force Personnel 
Requirements:
The Army is reassessing the process it uses to determine personnel 
requirements. Army regulations require that the institutional forces 
personnel requirements be based on workload. A sound workload analysis 
is needed to allocate personnel resources among institutional 
organizations throughout the Army and to ensure that the highest-
priority functions and missions are funded first. Moreover, current law 
specifies that civilian personnel are to be managed solely on the basis 
of the workload required to carry out the functions and activities of 
their respective military department and the funds made available to 
the department.[Footnote 19] The law also requires the military 
department secretaries to report annually on their compliance with the 
provisions of this law.
However, the Army has had longstanding issues with its institutional 
force personnel requirements, as documented in previously published GAO 
and Army Audit Agency reports.[Footnote 20] Since early 1995, the Army 
has developed plans and taken steps to improve the processes used to 
develop personnel requirements for the institutional forces. 
Nevertheless, we reported in May 2001 that the accuracy of the 
personnel requirements for the Armys institutional forces was 
questionable.[Footnote 21] We recommended that, among other things, the 
Army use the results of Army Manpower Analysis Agency reviews to 
improve the personnel requirements of the institutional forces.
While some progress to develop more accurate personnel requirements has 
been made, the Army is still concerned about two primary problems: (1) 
the validity of workload estimates and the resulting personnel 
requirements and (2) the extent to which contractors are satisfying 
workload requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Army did 
not have accurate information about the size and use of the contractor 
workforce. As a result, the Army was unable to report that it was 
managing its civilian personnel solely on the basis of the workload 
required to carry out the functions and activities of the department 
during fiscal year 2002. A major issue involved the extent to which 
contractors were meeting workload requirements. Although the Army 
expends about one-third of its total obligation authority for 
contractor support, its estimates of the number of contractor personnel 
supporting the Army ranges from about 125,000 to 600,000.[Footnote 22] 
Without accurate information about the contractor workforce, the Army 
was not confident that its civilian personnel requirements were valid. 
In 2002 the Army began an effort to identify the size of its contractor 
workforce; this effort is still underway.
In early 2002, concerned about the accuracy of its personnel 
requirements and the widening gap between personnel requirements and 
authorizations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 
within Army Headquarters initiated a study of the requirements 
determination process for all of the commands that comprise the 
institutional forces.[Footnote 23] The intent of the study was twofold-
-to arrive at a process that produces valid requirements and to 
strengthen the role of Army leadership components in the review and 
approval of the requirements. Among other things, the study team 
proposed in August 2002 that personnel requirements simply be adjusted 
downward so that they would equal personnel authorizations. This 
proposal applied to TRADOC even though its personnel requirements 
determination process had previously been certified as valid by the 
Armys Manpower Analysis Agency. The proposed change in the process was 
expected to pressure the commands that comprise the institutional force 
to rejustify their respective personnel requirements and give Army 
Headquarters more control over the process. However, the commands, as 
well as some Headquarters offices, opposed the proposal for several 
reasons. They believed that it did not (a) acknowledge valid 
requirements processes that were already in place; (b) acknowledge 
existing workload backlogs in excess of resource levels, which makes 
areas of risk more visible to senior managers; (c) acknowledge the role 
the commands play in validating requirements; and (d) comply with 
legislative requirements to manage personnel requirements solely on the 
basis of workload. As a result of the commands concerns, the proposal 
has been abandoned. However, the study team continues to seek out other 
options for strengthening senior Army managers control over the 
process and to identify potential new policy guidance related to the 
personnel requirements determination process for institutional forces. 
The follow-on study is not expected to be completed until sometime 
during fiscal year 2003.
Commercial Activity Studies Likely to Reduce Personnel Requirements and 
Authorizations:
Studies conducted as part of the Armys commercial activities program 
will likely lead to some reduction in personnel authorizations at 
TRADOC. To help meet DOD force reshaping and downsizing goals, the Army 
established a goal for TRADOC to study about 13,600 positions under 
Office of Management Budget Circular A-76. One goal of the A-76 studies 
is to identify commercial functions that could be performed more 
efficiently, either by a streamlined in-house workforce or a contract 
with the private sector. In either case, the required number of 
personnel authorizations would likely be reduced--either because the 
in-house workforce would become more efficient and would not require as 
many staff or because the function would no longer be performed by 
current federal employees. However, these studies by themselves will 
not free personnel for assignment to other mission areas where 
shortages exist.
Most of TRADOCs commercial activity studies were initiated in fiscal 
years 1997 and 1999. Because studies generally take from 2 to 4 years 
to complete, TRADOC did not begin to implement decisions until fiscal 
year 2001. As of November 2002, decisions on 39 of the 57 studies had 
been made. Decisions implemented thus far resulted in a majority of the 
activities under study going to private-sector contractors. Remaining 
decisions will not be made until sometime in fiscal year 2003. Table 3 
shows the status of the studies.
Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during 
Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002):
Studies announced; 1997: 13; 1999: 44; Total: 57.
Total positions to be studied; 1997: 4,833; 1999: 3,999; Total: 
8,832.
Civilian; 1997: 4,709; 1999: 2,043; Total: 6,752.
Military; 1997: 124; 1999: 1,956; Total: 2,080.
Studies completed; 1997: 13; 1999: 26; Total: 39.
Positions retained in-house; 1997: 935; 1999: 1,429; Total: 2,364.
Positions to contract; 1997: 3,898; 1999: 423; Total: 4,321.
Source: TRADOC.
[End of table]
The studies reviewed a number of commercial activities; however, most 
of the larger studies fell within the base operations mission area and 
involved the logistics and public works functions. Because TRADOCs 
base operations mission was transferred to IMA beginning in October 
2002, the Command will not be affected in the future by most of these 
studies. Of TRADOCs remaining primary mission areas, training and 
training support will be most affected by some of the smaller 
commercial activities studies that are currently underway.
In addition to the above studies that are nearing completion, the Army 
announced plans in October 2002 to further study all of its functions 
that do not necessarily require military personnel to perform. If these 
plans are carried out, Army officials estimate that as many as 150,000 
personnel authorizations Armywide could be eliminated as work shifts to 
the private sector. To what extent this will affect TRADOC remains to 
be seen.
Further, although commercial activity studies can reduce TRADOCs 
personnel requirements and improve operating efficiencies, they can 
increase the Commands budget requirements when their outcome results 
in military positions being replaced by civilian or contractor 
personnel. In these instances, the Army plans to reallocate the 
military positions to other needs. However, the increase in budgetary 
requirements occurs because the Command must budget for the cost of its 
civilian personnel and contractors, which are paid from O&M funds. They 
no longer have the benefit of the military personnel who were paid by 
Army Headquarters from centrally managed funds. These additional costs 
are referred to as military buy-back costs. In September 2001, TRADOC 
estimated that its military buy-back costs would be about $44 million, 
$90 million, and $92 million for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, 
respectively.
Manning the Force Initiative Is Reducing TRADOCs Military 
Authorizations:
The Armys Manning the Force initiative was announced in fiscal year 
2000 and is intended, in part, to transfer military personnel from the 
institutional to the operational forces to improve the readiness of 
combat forces. This initiative will continue at least through fiscal 
year 2003. Initially, TRADOC expected to lose about 1,400 military 
personnel to the combat units as a result of the Manning the Force 
initiative. Since a lack of military personnel is already contributing 
to workload backlogs and low readiness reports, the initiative is not 
likely to improve TRADOCs ability to reduce backlogs and improve 
readiness. Furthermore, the loss of authorized military personnel will 
not free funds for the Command because, as discussed above, military 
personnel are not paid from TRADOCs O&M funds.
However, TRADOC officials were not able to identify the number of 
military personnel that either have been or will be sent to the combat 
units as a result of the Manning the Force initiative. They explained 
that several initiatives affecting the number of military personnel 
assigned to TRADOC, such as Quicksilver, were already underway when 
the Manning the Force initiative began.
TRADOCs Plan to Reengineer the Command Is Still Evolving:
TRADOC has begun developing a plan to overhaul its structure and 
processes, and that plan is still evolving. TRADOC officials believe 
that the Command must reengineer or overhaul its structure and 
processes to ensure that it continues to support the combat forces 
readiness and Army transformation. They believe that an overhaul is 
needed because (1) the rapid pace of change related to transformation 
is stressing the systems and processes associated with combat, 
doctrine, and training development; 
(2) the current procedures are too resource-intensive; (3) the weapon 
systems requirements determination process does not respond to the 
needs of the combat forces in a timely manner; and (4) the cost of 
maintaining TRADOCs current organizational structure cannot be 
sustained.
In May 2002 the Command received approval from the Army Chief of Staff 
to develop a reengineering plan. Its draft plan, referred to as the 
TRADOC Transformation Operational and Organizational Plan, is linked to 
Armywide plans that provide overall strategic direction--the 2002 Army 
Modernization Plan and the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. The 
TRADOC plan is based on two primary goals: (1) streamline the Commands 
organization and processes and (2) make better and more extensive use 
of information technology. The Commands staff is also in the process 
of updating policies and regulations to support the reengineering 
effort.
Although TRADOCs draft plan has not been finalized, the Command is 
considering the following organizing concepts to help it achieve its 
goals:
* Implement new teaming and partnering arrangements. TRADOC is 
considering establishing new teaming and partnering arrangements across 
organizational boundaries to better focus its resources on key mission 
areas. Command officials believe that this approach will maximize 
personnel resources and expertise across the Command to produce better 
products and eventually result in more effective partnership 
arrangements. As part of this organizing concept, the role of TRADOC 
Headquarters will evolve from program management to the integration of 
functions and organizations within TRADOC.
* Establish a Combined Arms Command. TRADOC is considering establishing 
a subcommand, notionally being referred to as a Combined Arms Command. 
This command will focus on training and leader development. Most of 
TRADOCs educational institutions will be placed under this 
organization, which will oversee the activities of the schools.
* Centralize development for training materials, doctrine, and combat 
systems. TRADOC is considering centralizing development activities as a 
by-product of its adoption of a standard schoolhouse model (as 
discussed in the following point). Responsibility for training 
development, doctrine development, and combat development for the 
future force would be shifted from the current 26 schools to six 
primary battlefield mission areas associated with future combat 
operations--maneuver, maneuver support, maneuver sustainment, fires, 
command and control, and special purpose forces. Development of each of 
these primary battlefield mission areas would be under the command of a 
general officer. In addition, each primary battlefield mission area 
would be supported by a battle laboratory. The six battlefield areas 
would report to the Combined Arms Center, leaving the individual 
schools to become more focused on the primary mission of training 
soldiers. TRADOC believes doing this would help the command become more 
efficient and effective.
* Readopt the standard schoolhouse model. After TRADOC was established 
in the 1970s, it established school houses/training centers (infantry, 
armor, artillery, etc.) that followed a standard model in the way they 
were organized and staffed. As resources became more constrained, the 
schools were given more flexibility to organize in a manner that suited 
the commanders needs and, theoretically, would make the best use of 
TRADOC resources. Management became more decentralized. TRADOC is 
considering a move away from the decentralized management approach and 
back to a standard schoolhouse model. In addition, the schools would be 
clustered or organized under the primary battlefield mission areas 
associated with future combat operations.
* Refocus battle laboratories and centralize their management. The 
commands 11 battle laboratories are currently aligned with TRADOCs 
schools. For example, an armor battle laboratory is part of the armor 
school at Fort Knox, and the infantry battle laboratory is part of the 
infantry school at Fort Benning. TRADOC is considering centralizing the 
management of six laboratories and refocusing them on the six primary 
battlefield mission areas discussed above. TRADOC believes realigning 
the laboratories, along with creating new teaming and partnering 
arrangements, will better focus its resources on broader issues, such 
as Army transformation.
* Use distance learning more extensively. Distance learning is expected 
to become an integral part of the Commands training curriculum. 
Implementation of this concept has been underway for some time at 
TRADOC. In general, it allows soldiers to complete computer-based 
training courses or selected modules of a course at their permanent 
duty location rather than traveling to a TRADOC facility to complete 
the course. TRADOC expects to develop at least 525 distance learning 
courses by 2010.
TRADOC officials also believe that better and more extensive use of 
information technology is just as important as the organizational 
changes it is considering. These officials state that information 
technology will be the basic building block of the reengineering 
effort. TRADOC officials believe the Command has to address mission 
requirements more quickly with fewer resources. They also believe 
improved processes built on the latest technology will allow TRADOC and 
its customers to share data and develop products--such as doctrine, 
training materials, and operational requirements documents--in a timely 
manner.
At the time we completed our review of TRADOC, the Command had not yet 
developed costs and benefits associated with the reengineering plan, 
and it was not clear to what extent the reengineering effort would 
result in organizational realignments or consolidations that might 
reduce personnel requirements. TRADOC officials told us that an 
analysis of costs and benefits would take place and be incorporated 
into an implementation plan after the reengineering concepts and 
organizing principles were agreed to within the Army. The analysis is 
to be completed by mid-fiscal year 2003.
We also inquired about development of performance measures to gauge the 
progress of the reengineering effort and a human capital plan to 
support the effort. Ideally, a reengineering effort such as the one 
being undertaken by TRADOC is guided by an overall strategic framework, 
which sets out the strategic goals to be attained and performance 
measures to be used to measure and report progress toward reaching the 
goals. Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act requires 
DOD to develop a strategic framework to improve its performance. In 
addition, it is important for DOD and its components to align their 
human capital policies with their strategic goals.[Footnote 24] A human 
capital plan that supports or is integrated with an overall strategic 
plan can help align the policies and identify the necessary workforce 
size and skills mix and where those skills need to be deployed. When 
the right personnel are on board and provided the training, technology, 
structure, incentives, and accountability to work effectively, the 
likelihood of organizational success will be increased.
We found that TRADOC recognized the need for performance measures but 
had not yet developed them. We also found that the Command has not 
developed a human capital plan to support the reengineering effort; 
however, it has identified the elements needed for a human capital 
plan, which is to be completed during fiscal year 2003. Thus far, the 
effort addresses civilian personnel and how the Command can better cope 
with the civilian personnel reductions it has incurred; it does not 
address workforce issues associated with military personnel or 
contractors, which, in a broad sense, are also part of the Commands 
human capital. Given the personnel downsizing that TRADOC has 
experienced and its potentially increasing reliance on contractors to 
meet its workload, a human capital plan could help the Command 
thoroughly assess its personnel requirements and integrate them into 
the reengineering effort.
Conclusions:
Although TRADOCs budget has increased in recent years, the Command has 
experienced reductions in personnel authorizations that have challenged 
it to fully meet its workload in most mission areas. TRADOC data 
indicate that its primary problems relate to personnel shortages, and 
its readiness reports indicate that more than two-thirds of its units 
were not ready to perform their missions due primarily to a lack of 
personnel. Most of the training workload is getting done, but a 
significant amount of mission work associated with training material, 
doctrine, and combat developments is not. In addition, TRADOC does not 
know how well it is accomplishing its mission because it does not have 
a process in place to obtain systematic feedback from its customers on 
the quality and relevance of its training and doctrine. Without this 
type of information, the Army and TRADOC are not in a sound position to 
fully assess the Commands mission effectiveness, which could lead to 
inefficient allocation of resources and ranking of requirement 
priorities. Army Headquarters officials are aware of some of TRADOCs 
difficulties, but, operating within existing resource constraints, 
officials have had to make difficult choices and allocate resources to 
higher Army priorities.
However, issues related to TRADOCs personnel and workload could take 
on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts 
and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased 
risk in its role as the Armys architect of the future. TRADOC is 
currently developing a plan to reengineer its mission areas. The extent 
to which this effort could lead to organizational consolidations and 
reduced personnel requirements remains to be seen. A broad assessment 
of TRADOCs workload requirements and backlogs in conjunction with its 
reengineering plans would help it set its future direction. Because the 
Commands reengineering effort is still evolving, the Army and TRADOC 
have an opportunity to establish a plan based on a strategic framework 
for addressing resource and mission requirements, human capital, 
reengineering costs, and performance measures.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that TRADOC retains sufficient resources to carry out all of 
its missions in an effective and efficient manner--supporting current 
forces as well as the transformation effort--we recommend that the 
Secretary of the Army direct the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs) to work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans, as part of their personnel and force management 
oversight responsibilities, to examine TRADOCs workload requirements, 
the adequacy of TRADOCs resources, and TRADOCs mission performance as 
it finalizes plans for its reengineering efforts. In doing this, action 
is needed to:
* reassess TRADOCs backlog of current work and future work 
requirements across all mission areas to ensure that all personnel 
requirements are identified and validated before further reducing 
TRADOCs personnel authorizations;
* develop a human capital plan in conjunction with TRADOCs 
reengineering plan that addresses issues associated with the mix and 
skills of civilian, military, and contractor personnel;
* establish performance measures to gauge progress and identify the 
costs and benefits associated with the reengineering effort; and:
* develop a feedback system so TRADOC is acquiring the best information 
possible about the quality and relevance of the products and services 
it provides to its customers.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Program Integration) stated that the department agreed with 
the recommendations related to TRADOCs reengineering process without 
elaborating on planned actions, but expressed various concerns about 
the recommendations related to reassessing TRADOCs personnel 
requirements and developing a customer feedback system--leaving unclear 
what overall actions would be taken. The departments written comments 
are reprinted in Appendix III.
DOD interpreted our recommendation to reassess TRADOCs backlog of 
current workload and personnel requirements before further reducing 
TRADOCs personnel authorizations as a recommendation to fence TRADOCs 
current work force, and it cited resource constraints and competing 
demands as making it impractical to do so. Further, the departments 
response expressed concern that our report did not quantify the 
resources required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, 
and combat developments. Our recommendation was not intended to be 
taken in isolation or to suggest an absolute fencing of TRADOC 
personnel, but rather to encourage a reassessment of workload and 
personnel requirements as part of TRADOCs ongoing reengineering 
effort. Likewise, our intent was not to quantify the resources required 
to remedy the backlogs of work in the various areas noted. That effort 
can best be done by the Army in the context of a number of 
considerations. From our perspective, the Army and TRADOC have several 
options if they are to effectively deal with reported shortfalls in 
personnel related to workload requirements. The options include 
identifying functions and activities that may no longer be required, 
identifying opportunities to reduce personnel requirements or 
reallocate resources through its reengineering efforts, obtaining 
additional resources, or some combination of these. Given that TRADOCs 
reengineering effort is still underway, and we understand that TRADOCs 
new commander has recently directed his staff to focus on the potential 
for reducing workload requirements, it remains unclear what changes in 
resource requirements will ultimately be necessary. Given the resource 
constraints identified by TRADOC commanders in their monthly readiness 
reports, we continue to believe it appropriate that TRADOC reassess its 
work requirements as part of its reengineering efforts.
Concerning our recommendation for developing a customer feedback 
system, DOD commented that existing informal feedback mechanisms help 
evaluate TRADOCs support to its customers. It indicated they would 
evaluate our recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits, and 
likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes. DOD also noted that 
it would evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve 
product relevance and customer responsiveness as part of the TRADOC 
reengineering process. Separately, DOD expressed concern that our 
report did not quantify the impact of shortcomings noted in our report 
on operational force readiness. Our assessment of impact was, aside 
from information contained in TRADOCs readiness reports, more 
qualitative in nature based on the results of internal Army studies and 
our limited discussions with leaders in the Armys Forces Command. 
Given the nature of the concerns identified, we continue to believe 
that the Army could benefit from a more formal feedback system, one 
that, if appropriately designed, could be useful to the Army in better 
determining how well TRADOC supports the operational readiness of the 
combat forces. Absent such a system, it will be more difficult to fully 
assess the impact of the shortcomings noted in our report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 
and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please 
contact me on (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov. Other GAO contacts and 
staff acknowledgments are identified in appendix IV.
Signed by Barry W. Holman:
Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
As requested by the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on 
Readiness, we examined the workload, funding levels, and personnel 
resources at the Armys Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Our 
review was structured to determine if the Command was adequately 
resourced to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were 
to examine (1) TRADOCs personnel, budget, and workload trends since 
1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Commands 
ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to 
combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an 
effect on the Commands ability to perform its mission.
To determine the extent to which TRADOC has experienced budget, 
personnel, and workload changes over the past several years, we met 
with Army Headquarters and TRADOC budget, personnel, operations, and 
training officials. Pertinent budget, personnel, and workload 
documentation/data were obtained and analyzed to determine the 
magnitude of the changes. We focused our analyses primarily on 
documentation from fiscal years 1995 through 2001 because we were able 
to obtain more complete information for these years. Fiscal year 2002 
budget data had not been finalized at the time we completed our 
analysis. We also examined relevant DOD and Army senior leader 
guidance, including the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Army 
Transformation Campaign Plan, TRADOC mid-year budget reviews, and 
TRADOC command plans. We also discussed the allocation of Army 
personnel among its commands resulting from the Total Army Analysis 
process. We identified the primary TRADOC mission areas--combat 
development, doctrine development, training and training development, 
accessions (more commonly referred to as recruiting), and base 
operations--and structured our analysis of budget, personnel, and 
workload data around these mission areas. Our analysis of budget data 
was limited to budgetary obligations for the fiscal years we reviewed. 
Our analysis of personnel data compared the differences in required, 
authorized, and available personnel for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. 
We also discussed and reviewed available documentation pertinent to the 
process used by TRADOC to develop and validate its personnel 
requirements. We held discussions and reviewed documentation with 
TRADOC, Army Manpower Analysis Agency, and Army Force Management 
Support Agency representatives. The documentation included 
mathematical models and studies completed by TRADOC to develop manpower 
estimating criteria. We also compared the changes in TRADOCs civilian 
and military authorizations with those of the total active Army and two 
of the Armys largest commands--Army Materiel Command and Forces 
Command--to put the personnel changes into an overall Army context. We 
also identified the changes in budgetary resources allocated to 
TRADOCs mission areas for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. Because 
aspects of TRADOCs accessions mission were added to its 
responsibilities in fiscal year 1998 and subsequently eliminated from 
its responsibilities, we excluded the accessions mission when we 
analyzed the trends in personnel and workload. This included personnel 
requirements, which averaged about 12,400 for fiscal years 1998 through 
2000, and personnel authorizations, which averaged about 11,900 for 
this 3-year period. The analyses that excluded the accessions mission 
are noted, where appropriate, in the report.
To determine the effect of personnel and budget changes on the 
Commands ability to perform its mission, we met with officials from 
TRADOC and Forces Command Headquarters and several of their 
installations. At TRADOC Headquarters we discussed and obtained 
documentation related to the Commands ability to measure mission 
effectiveness. This included reviewing the Commands monthly readiness 
reports for the period November 2000 through April 2002 for all of its 
schools and training facilities; these reports are provided to the Army 
Chief of Staff each month. We also compared TRADOCs readiness reports 
with DODs Institutional Training Readiness reports issued during the 
same period to identify similarities and/or differences between the 
two; the Institutional Training Readiness reports are provided to 
Congress annually. At the TRADOC facilities we visited--the armor 
school, the air defense school, and the infantry school--we discussed 
the resources available to support the facilities workload. We also 
identified examples of impacts that resulted from resource shortages 
and obtained information about how the facilities were measuring their 
mission effectiveness. At Forces Command Headquarters and one of its 
heavy armor installations, Fort Hood, we discussed the quality of 
soldiers coming out of TRADOC schools and requested available data that 
measured the quality of TRADOC products--trained soldiers, doctrine, 
and training support materials. We also reviewed numerous reports and 
analyses of agencies and groups that have examined TRADOC--such as RAND 
Corporation, TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Defense Science Board--to 
obtain any additional observations and findings not revealed during our 
review of TRADOC.
To identify Army actions taken or planned that might have an effect on 
the Commands ability to perform its mission, we met with Army 
Headquarters officials and TRADOC officials to discuss past, current, 
or future initiatives that could affect the resources TRADOC will have 
available to carry out its mission. During these discussions, we 
obtained documentation and testimonial evidence regarding several 
initiatives. These included the Commands commercial activities 
program, the Armywide Transformation of Installation Management 
initiative, and the Commands plan to reengineer itself. We analyzed 
the impact of the commercial activities program, which is being carried 
out under OMBs Circular A-76 process, on TRADOCs budget and personnel 
since fiscal year 1995. We determined the number of positions announced 
for competition, the number of positions awarded to contractors, and 
the number of positions retained by TRADOCs in-house workforce. We 
also discussed the scope and implementation schedule for the Armys 
Transformation of Installation Management initiative, which is an 
Armywide program that is moving base operations and support from 
garrison commanders to a new agency called the Army Installation 
Management Agency. Finally, we discussed the status of plans to 
reengineer TRADOC, which involves organizational streamlining and 
better use of information technology.
We communicated regularly with Department of the Army and TRADOC 
officials during the analysis process to ensure that our analysis 
appropriately considered their views, and we conducted work at the 
following locations:
* Army Headquarters, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia;
* TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
* Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky;
* Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas;
* Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia;
* Forces Command Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Georgia;
* 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas;
* Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and:
* Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
We conducted our review from September 2001 through October 2002 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions:
Since the early 1990s, the Armys civilian and military personnel 
authorizations have been significantly reduced as DOD reshaped and 
reduced the size of its institutional and operational forces. Overall, 
the Armys authorizations for civilian and active duty military 
personnel have been reduced by about 41.5 percent and 33.8 percent, 
respectively, since fiscal year 1991.[Footnote 25] The following 
figures show the reductions for the Army and three of its largest 
commands: TRADOC; the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which provides 
unit training for combat forces; and the Army Materiel Command (AMC), 
which is responsible for acquiring and supporting weapon systems.
Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.
Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.
As shown by these figures, all three commands realized significant 
reductions in civilian personnel. Table 4 summarizes the reductions 
that occurred from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2001.
Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active 
Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001:
Active Army; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 153,200; 
Civilian personnel: Percent: -41.5; Military personnel: Number of 
reductions: 245,400; Military personnel: Percent: -33.8.
TRADOC; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 13,515; Civilian 
personnel: Percent: -41.9; Military personnel: Number of reductions: 
13,549; Military personnel: Percent: -27.1.
FORSCOM; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 10,056; Civilian 
personnel: Percent: -36.4; Military personnel: Number of reductions: 
28,694; Military personnel: Percent: -12.4.
AMC; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 41,561; Civilian 
personnel: Percent: -45.5; Military personnel: Number of reductions: 
5,915; Military personnel: Percent: -79.5.
Source: Army.
[End of table]
Note: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
Mr. Barry W. Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management United States General 
Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Holman:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO, draft 
report, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission 
Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command, dated 
December 13, 2002 (GAO Code 350113).
We support the recommendations that suggest improvements to the Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) re-engineering process, but take 
specific issue with the reports recommendation that no further 
reduction of TRADOCs military or civilian personnel occur until this 
review is completed. We do not believe it appropriate to fence TRADOCs 
current work force mix or resourcing based on the data supplied in the 
draft report alone. Further, resource constraints and competing 
demands, particularly the global war on terrorism, make it impractical 
for the Army to fence TRADOC authorization levels until process 
improvements have been implemented.
We are also concerned that the report does not quantify the resources 
required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, and combat 
developments, nor does it quantify the impact of those backlogs on 
operational force readiness. The report acknowledges that contractors 
may be mitigating some doctrine-writing workload, but forces Army G-3, 
rather than TRADOC as claimant for additional resources, to quantify 
the magnitude of that offset.
In addition, the report cites the absence of processes for systematic 
customer feedback on the quality and relevance of TRADOCs products. 
Although theres always room for improvement, existing informal 
feedback mechanisms help evaluate TRADOCs support to its customers. We 
plan to evaluate the GAO recommendations in terms of the costs, 
benefits and likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes. 
Further, we will evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further 
improve product relevance and customer responsiveness during the TRADOC 
business process re-engineering effort.
My point of contact is Colonel Sid Evans of the Requirements 
Directorate, (703) 695-0813, sidney.evans@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by Jeanne B. Fites:
Jeanne B. Fites Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 
Integration):
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
James E. Fuquay, (937) 258-7963:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, James Hatcher, Nancy Lively, 
Travis Masters, Debra McKinney, Robert Preston, and R.K. Wild made key 
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Throughout this report, we refer to personnel requirements and 
personnel authorizations. Personnel requirements refer to the number of 
personnel, both civilian and military, deemed necessary by TRADOC to 
support its workload. Personnel authorizations refer to the number of 
personnel an organization, in this case TRADOC, is allowed to hire. 
Personnel authorizations are often less than requirements because of 
budget constraints.
[2] Quicksilver was an Army initiative intended to reduce its force 
structure and create a more balanced, versatile, lethal, smaller, and 
ready force.
[3] The Quadrennial Defense Review analyzes military strategy for U.S. 
forces.
[4] We focused primarily on TRADOCs fiscal year 2001 budget because 
the Command had not yet received its final 2002 budget authorization at 
the time we conducted a significant portion of our analysis.
[5] TRADOC also assumed responsibility for the Army Civilian Training 
Education Development Student Detachment, the Army Aeronautical 
Services Agency, and the Army Nuclear Chemical Agency.
[6] The Army Manpower Analysis Agency is assigned responsibility for 
overseeing and certifying the Army requirements determination processes 
used by Army commands. The Manpower Analysis Agency reports to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).
[7] During fiscal year 2002, the Army began collecting information to 
identify the size of its contractor workforce.
[8] TRADOC does not track actual staff-year data. However, officials 
were confident that the Contemporary Operating Environment/Force 
Protection and the Distance Learning Courseware priorities were filled 
to 100 percent. They identified other areas that have received 
resources, but could not provide a measure of the level of resourcing 
for these areas.
[9] The Army doctrine development (field manual development) cycle has 
six phases: 
(1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5) 
print and dissemination, and (6) implementation and evaluation. This 
process may take from 18 to 24 months to complete. The length of time 
varies depending on whether a field manual is being newly written or 
revised, the scope and complexity of the material, the extent of the 
staffing/review required, and the level of approval authority required.
[10] Readiness ratings are based on specific criteria related to 
personnel levels, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and 
training. The ratings are measures of a unit/components ability to 
perform its mission. A C-1 rating represents the highest readiness 
position, denoting that the mission can be fully performed. Conversely, 
a C-4 rating represents the lowest readiness position, denoting that 
the mission cannot be accomplished.
[11] The seven categories of institutional training that were assessed 
were (1) recruiting, 
(2) one-station unit training, (3) officer acquisition, (4) initial 
skill training, (5) skill progression training, (6) functional 
training, and (7) flight training.
[12] The Government and Performance and Results Act requires federal 
agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the 
degree to which the goals are met. Its intent is to focus agencies more 
on results, service delivery, and program outcomes (P.L. 103-62, 1993).
[13] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Improving 
Customer Feedback Program Could Enhance DLAs Delivery of Services, 
GAO-02-776 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2002); Tax Administration: IRS 
Faces Challenges in Measuring Customer Service, GAO/GGD-98-59 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 1998); and Federal Prison Industries: 
Limited Data Available on Customer Satisfaction, GAO/GGD-98-50 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 1998).
[14] According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 02-
8, Operation Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, the 
contemporary operational environment is the overall operational 
environment that exists today and in the near future, out to the year 
2020. The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, 
lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to 
larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more 
conventional, symmetrical ways.
[15] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army 
Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces 
Major Challenges, 
GAO-02-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001).
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisition: Army 
Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311 
(Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001).
[17] IMA is comprised of a headquarters located in the Washington, D.C. 
area and seven regional offices--four located within the continental 
United States and one each in Hawaii, Germany, and Korea. 
[18] The investment accounts included funds for (a) infrastructure 
sustainment, rehabilitation, and modernization; (b) facility 
reduction; (c) integrated training management; and (d) combat 
developments.
[19] The legislative requirements are set out in 10 U.S.C. Section 129; 
the annual reports are to be completed by February 1 of each year.
[20] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Armys 
Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few 
Results, GAO/NSIAD-98-65 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998) and U.S. 
Army Audit Agency, Managing Workload, Organizations and Staffing, HQ 
94-751 (Alexandria, Va.: June 23, 1994). 
[21] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Projected 
Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established, GAO-01-485 
(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001).
[22] The estimate is based on a study sponsored by the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), which was completed 
in March 2002. The Assistant Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) is 
responsible for Army personnel policies. 
[23] The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for 
conducting the Total Army Analysis, which determines the allocation of 
personnel resources among the operational and institutional forces. 
Within Operations and Plans, the Force Management Division has had a 
long-standing role in determining personnel allocations for the Armys 
combat forces. The Force Management Division was the sponsor of this 
study and believes it needs to be more involved in allocating personnel 
authorizations to the institutional forces. The Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans also receives TRADOCs monthly status reports on 
readiness. 
[24] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-
Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, 
D.C.: September 2000, Version I); U.S. General Accounting Office, Human 
Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Departments of Defense 
and State, GAO-01-565T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2001); and U.S. 
General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed 
to Help Maintain Momentum of DODs Strategic Human Capital Planning, 
GAO-03-237 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002).
[25] The totals do not include members of the Army Reserve and National 
Guard.
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