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entitled 'Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and 
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational 
Crewing' which was released on November 10, 2004.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2004:
Force Structure:
Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for 
Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing:
GAO-05-10:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-10, a report to congressional committees: 
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas presence by deploying 
ships for 6 months. Rotating crews aboard ships that remain deployed 
for longer periods is an alternative the Navy could pursue to increase 
the utilization of ships. Senior Navy officials have also cited crew 
rotations as a way to reduce part of the Navys plans for a larger 
force structure and reportedly free billions of dollars for other 
priorities. On its own initiative, GAO examined the Navys efforts to 
evaluate and implement several rotational crewing options and the 
impacts of ship maintenance on extended rotational crewing deployments.
What GAO Found:
The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews 
aboard surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible 
alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments. To effectively 
institutionalize and implement change, best practices show that a 
comprehensive analytical framework provides useful information to 
decision makers. However, the Navy has not established such an 
analytical frameworkconsisting of formal measurable goals, objectives, 
and metricsthat could be used to assess the feasibility of various 
rotational crewing options and determine their impact on operational 
requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. Further, the Navy has 
not systematically collected or developed accurate cost data to 
perform complete cost-effective analyses. Absent such information, the 
Navy may not know the full impact of rotating crews on surface ships, 
the extent to which the various options should be implemented, or 
whether it is getting maximum return on investment.
Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, 
the Navy has not provided effective guidance when implementing the 
practice and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned. 
Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to 
institutionalize change and facilitate efficient operations. While the 
Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for 
ballistic missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a 
ships condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not 
provided comparable guidance to surface ships. As a result, the Navy 
unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting 
effectiveness and crew morale.
Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of 
rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Effective maintenance 
strategies help ensure ships can perform their missions without adverse 
impacts on crew morale. It is a challenge to ensure the mission 
capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most 
maintenance and repair is usually completed between 6-month 
deployments. While rotating crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships 
deployed for up to 24 months, the service has not fully examined all 
issues related to the best maintenance strategies that could affect a 
ships condition and crews morale. Absent effective strategies, the 
Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition and discouraging crew 
support for rotational crewing.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of 
the Navy to systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of rotational crewing alternatives; specify standard 
policies and procedures to ensure consistent management and 
accountability for ships during crew rotations; collect, record, and 
disseminate lessons learned; and conduct a study of the maintenance 
process that includes all ships involved in rotating crews. The 
Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations and cited 
actions it will take to implement the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-10.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at 
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and 
Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships:
Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on Lessons 
Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences:
Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential Impacts 
Have Not Been Fully Assessed:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance 
Implementing 10 U.S.C. 7310:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the 
Persian Gulf:
Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material 
Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative:
Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships:
Table 4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer:
Figure 3: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile 
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground:
Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal:
Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift:
Figure 6: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation 
Destroyer, DD(X):
Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship:
Abbreviations:
DD: destroyer:
DD(X): next generation guided missile destroyer:
DDG: guided missile destroyer:
DOD: Department of Defense:
HSV: high speed vessel:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 10, 2004:
Congressional Committees:
The Navy's fleet of surface ships represents a significant capital 
investment to provide the forward presence desired. The Navy is also 
facing an affordability challenge as it invests in new ships, supports 
a high pace of operations, and manages rising personnel costs. The Navy 
has traditionally maintained overseas presence by using standard 
deployments whereby individual ships and their permanently assigned 
crews are deployed for approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle 
that includes time for training and ship maintenance. Rotating crews 
aboard ships so that the ships can remain deployed for a longer period 
is one of many alternatives the Navy could pursue to increase the 
utilization or the operational on-station days,[Footnote 1] or both, of 
Navy ships. Recently, senior Navy officials have also cited crew 
rotations as one of the ways to partially mitigate the need for a 
larger force structure and free billions of dollars for higher priority 
areas, such as the capabilities needed to operate from the sea when the 
United States is denied access to bases and ports abroad. As such, it 
is prudent for the Navy to employ its ships in a manner that maximizes 
its return on investment.
The Navy has rotated crews on ships in several ways, although its use 
of this practice is not widespread and is still evolving. On its Ohio-
class Trident ballistic missile submarines, the Navy has used a "Blue-
Gold" crew concept since the 1960s, whereby two complete crews are 
assigned to a single hull and rotate deployments. In the 1990s, the 
Navy's Mine Warfare Command[Footnote 2] used a concept whereby four 
crews rotated among three ships throughout the deployment cycle. More 
recently, the U.S. Pacific Fleet[Footnote 3] has been demonstrating the 
ability to rotate crews on some of its destroyers as part of a 
"Sea Swap" demonstration project. Under this concept, there are the 
same numbers of crews as ships, but the crews rotate for 6 months to 
those ships that are forward deployed for extended periods of 18 months 
or more. The Navy is also using this concept on its patrol coastal 
ships operating in the Persian Gulf and the Blue-Gold concept to 
support the high speed vessel experimental ship, the HSV-2 Swift.
We prepared this report under our oversight authority and are providing 
it to you because of your oversight on defense issues. Recognizing the 
Navy's need to explore ways for improving the use of its surface ships 
and its plan for employing rotational crews on several types of surface 
ships in the current and planned force (appendix I provides a 
description of all ships included in our evaluation), this report 
addresses the following questions: (1) Has the Navy systematically 
evaluated the feasibility, including the cost-effectiveness, of 
rotational crewing concepts for existing and future classes of surface 
ships? (2) Have the Navy's experiences with rotational crewing been 
effectively implemented? (3) How does ship maintenance affect 
implementation of rotational crewing?
To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility 
and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and 
future classes of surface ships, we reviewed rotational crewing studies 
performed by and for the Navy, including a recent study by the Center 
for Naval Analyses;[Footnote 4] compiled and analyzed sailor 
reenlistment data; interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy 
Headquarters and fleet officials; met with cost analysis experts in the 
government and the private sector; and reviewed key acquisition 
documents and crew employment plans. To assess whether the Navy has 
effectively implemented rotational crewing on surface ships and 
leveraged lessons learned, we conducted over 40 focus group meetings 
with rotational crews; interviewed Pacific and Atlantic Fleet[Footnote 
5] officials responsible for personnel, operations, maintenance, and 
training; and reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System instructions and 
queried the system to determine relevant lessons recorded. We used the 
strategic ballistic submarine community as a best practice based on its 
long-standing successful use of rotational crewing. To assess how 
maintenance on ships homeported in the United States might be affected 
by extended deployments, we reviewed ship maintenance directives and 
instructions, reviewed ship maintenance reports, and conducted focus 
group meetings with the three crews on the Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers involved with the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project 
and several crews that had rotated on patrol coastal ships.
While we did not validate the maintenance reports and sailor 
reenlistment data used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD 
officials to determine that the data were sufficiently reliable for our 
analysis. We did validate the Navy Lessons Learned System data and 
determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We 
conducted our review from July 2003 through July 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. The scope and 
methodology used in our review are described in further detail in 
appendix II.
Results in Brief:
The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews 
aboard surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible 
alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments. However, the 
service has not institutionalized this change by employing a 
comprehensive analytical framework that will systematically evaluate 
all rotational crewing options for current and future classes of 
surface ships. Best practices show that an analytic framework that 
includes measurable goals and objectives, performance metrics, and 
evaluation plans helps decision makers effectively implement change. 
The Navy has developed some data to demonstrate that rotational crewing 
aboard surface ships is feasible for increasing the forward presence. 
But, the Navy has not established formal measurable goals, objectives, 
and metrics that would be used to assess each of the rotational crewing 
options to determine their impact on operational requirements, ship 
condition, and crew morale. For example, one measure of crew morale is 
the reenlistment rate. While the Navy did not assess the rates for 
participants in rotational crewing, we found that reenlistments were 
generally lower on the Sea Swap guided missile destroyers compared to 
comparable Pacific Fleet ships. Further, the Navy has not 
systematically collected or developed accurate cost data in order to 
perform complete cost-effectiveness analyses. For example, cost 
assessments have been limited to identifying fuel savings resulting 
from fewer ship transits to and from homeports, costs for crew 
transportation and berthing, and some additional maintenance and 
training costs. A systematic cost-effectiveness assessment, according 
to cost analysis experts, should include all costs for each of the 
crewing alternatives, such as housing, training, maintenance, and ship 
acquisition costs. This capability and cost information is critical for 
comparing the different crewing options and evaluating which one most 
effectively meets specific operational requirements. In the absence of 
a systematic evaluation of the potential feasibility and 
cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing options for its current 
and future classes of surface ships, the Navy may make decisions 
without knowing the full impact of the practice on surface ships or the 
extent to which this practice should be implemented to meet operational 
requirements. Consequently, the Navy does not know that it is getting a 
maximum return on investment or the extent to which using rotational 
crewing can economically offset future ship total ownership 
costs.[Footnote 6]
The Navy's experiences with rotational crewing as an alternative to 
standard deployments are still evolving, and thus the Navy has not 
provided effective guidance for implementing the concept on surface 
ships and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned to support 
consistent management of the practice. Effective guidance and sharing 
of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and 
facilitate efficient operations. While the Navy has conducted some 
planning in support of rotational crewing on Sea Swap destroyers and 
has well-established crew rotation guidance for fleet ballistic missile 
submarines, it has not provided comparable guidance, including standard 
policies and procedures, to conduct rotational crewing on other surface 
ships. Consequently, management of rotational crewing on these ships 
has been left to ship commanders, resulting in inconsistent 
implementation and accountability. Further, the surface ship community 
has not capitalized on lessons learned from past and current crew 
rotation experiences. By not systematically recording and sharing 
lessons learned from its rotational crewing experiences aboard surface 
ships, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that could 
decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale. For example, 
experiences have shown the need to properly account for inventories of 
equipment and supplies during crew turnover that affect operations and 
general support of the crew, yet this inventory control problem during 
crew turnovers persists.
The Navy has not fully assessed the impact of ship maintenance on the 
implementation of rotational crewing because it has been focused on 
demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed different 
approaches to conducting maintenance without examining all related 
issues that could affect success. Effective maintenance strategies help 
to ensure that ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts 
on crew morale or incurring unintended consequences. It is a challenge 
to ensure the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer 
periods (up to 24 months) because they must maintain mission capability 
while deployed and forego standard maintenance periods that generally 
occur every 6 months. According to the Center for Naval Analyses, a 
more comprehensive Navy maintenance effort--including predeployment 
inspections and more overseas mission-essential repairs--was required 
to sustain the readiness of the two destroyers deployed in the Sea Swap 
demonstration project than is typical. Even with these extra efforts, 
the resulting impact on the condition of the ships was uncertain. 
Although the Center concluded that maintenance was adequate to sustain 
the ships at high readiness levels and that, upon return, the material 
condition of one of the demonstration ships was comparable to another 
recently deployed ship, Navy inspection data suggest otherwise. For 
example, we found that the Sea Swap ship had significantly more 
numerous deficiencies and lower inspection scores than the recently 
deployed ship. Because of the importance of maintenance, the Center 
concluded that if the demonstration project becomes a more standard 
practice, the Navy should review the maintenance process and assess 
maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. We found the 
need for such an analysis was further supported by the experiences of 
other deployed ships using rotational crews, such as the patrol coastal 
ships. These ships did not receive such focused maintenance, and Navy 
officials identified several maintenance problems that were not 
corrected while deployed that could have affected the ships' mission 
capability. Moreover, the Center and our focus groups reported concerns 
about the extra workload to maintain ships at a high level of 
readiness. In the absence of effective strategies, the Navy runs the 
risk that it will degrade the long-term condition of ships as well as 
discourage crew support for rotational crewing.
To ensure the Navy increases ship utilization in an effective and 
efficient manner, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to systematically evaluate the 
feasibility and cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing 
alternatives; develop a rotational crewing program with effective 
management oversight, standard procedures, and lessons learned; and 
fully assess the maintenance strategies. In commenting on a draft of 
this report, DOD concurred with the recommendations and cited actions 
it will take to implement the recommendations.
Background:
The Importance of Having a Forward Military Presence Overseas:
Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter 
threats and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national 
military strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military 
Strategy[Footnote 7] notes that an overseas presence supports the 
ability of the United States to project power against threats and 
support the establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions 
that foster extremist ideologies. The strategy also notes that keeping 
an overseas presence serves to assure U.S. allies; improves the ability 
to prosecute the global war on terrorism; deters, dissuades, and 
defeats other threats; and supports transformation. The Chief of Naval 
Operations earlier this year underscored the continuing importance of 
forward-deployed forces, noting "Our forward rotations remain 
critically important to our security, to strengthening alliances and 
coalitions, and to the global war on terrorism. But it is clear we must 
make these rotations with purpose, not just to fill the 
calendar."[Footnote 8]
Current Operational and Budgetary Pressures on Ship Procurement and 
Operational Accounts:
In early 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the challenge 
of accomplishing the Navy's missions within its budget. In 
February 2001, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations established a task 
force to explore force structure options facing the naval service, 
noting that in order for organizations to remain vital and competitive 
"they maintain their options and seek innovative developments that may 
provide simpler, more convenient, or less costly alternative solutions 
to their needs." One of the task force's primary assumptions was that 
the Navy leadership understands that there may be insufficient 
procurement funds available to maintain current fleet size. Another 
assumption was that the demand for naval forward presence would remain 
greater than the supply, regardless of fleet size. Within a year, an 
operational studies group within the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations noted that the need for alternative crewing approaches might 
be necessary to sustain the pace of global operations, especially in 
the global war on terrorism.
More recently, senior Navy officials have warned that budgets will 
remain tight. In June 2004, the Secretary of the Navy stated that DOD 
will have less money for recapitalization because the defense budget 
will not continue growing at the rates it has in recent years. The 
Navy's acquisition executive has also noted that the Navy is employing 
multiple strategies that eventually may reduce the number of ships, 
submarines, and aircraft it purchases, saving taxpayer dollars as it 
seeks more effective ways of employing its forces so that fewer of them 
can provide the capabilities needed to accomplish assigned missions.
Rotating Crews Is a Part of Force Structure Assessment:
One such effort that may enable the Navy to sustain a high pace of 
operations within expected budgets involves the rotation of crews on 
and off forward-deployed Navy surface ships. While the Chief of Naval 
Operations stated earlier this year that the ideal fleet size would be 
about 375 ships, he also said that he is no longer willing to commit to 
any specific number of ships until the Navy completes a new assessment 
of ship requirements. The assessment, which started this year, will 
evaluate the potential impact on force structure requirements from 
keeping ships at sea for longer than standard 6-month deployments by 
rotating the crews on and off. He noted the Navy's recent experience 
with keeping two destroyers on extended deployments, whereby these two 
ships provided the presence overseas that is the equivalent of 8 to 10 
ships on normal deployment schedules.
Traditional Ship Employment Cycle Provides Limited Time in Theater:
The amount of time a ship ultimately spends forward deployed in a 
theater of operations is affected by several factors in its employment 
cycle. These factors include length of a deployment, transit speeds and 
port calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance 
requirements, and maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces 
during nondeployed periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the 
United States and deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will 
normally spend less than 20 percent of its time in theater and that the 
Navy would need about 6 ships to maintain a continuous presence in the 
region over a 2-year period.
As part of the transformation efforts to increase the fleet's 
operational readiness and responsiveness, the Navy recently implemented 
a new operational strategy--called the Fleet Response Plan--that 
changes the manner in which it maintains, trains, mans, and deploys its 
ships. The overall objective of the plan is to create a more responsive 
force by sustaining a more level balance of training between 
deployments, instead of dropping to minimum rates of readiness upon 
return from deployment and then gradually rebuilding its state of 
readiness throughout a 12-month training cycle that follows major 
maintenance of the vessel. The plan also modifies long-standing forward 
presence policy of predictable, 6-month deployments to predetermined 
regions. This flexible deployment concept allows units that have 
attained high readiness to embark on deployments of varied duration--
but still generally no longer than 6 months--in support of specific 
national priorities, such as homeland defense, multinational exercises, 
security cooperation events, deterrent operations, or prosecution of 
the global war on terrorism. These deployments provide what the Chief 
of Naval Operations calls "presence with a purpose," and are intended 
to occur in less predictable patterns to keep potential adversaries off 
guard.
Ship Crewing Options:
In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range 
of Navy crewing options falls into four major categories: (1) Sea Swap, 
(2) Horizon, (3) Blue-Gold, and (4) partial or graduated crew 
swapping.[Footnote 9] Each of these options can be implemented in 
varying ways and may have different advantages and disadvantages, but 
the Navy's actual experience with nonstandard crewing concepts on 
surface ships is limited.
Standard Crew Deployments:
Standard crew deployments use one crew per ship. Most of the 
crewmembers are assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for 
crewmembers to deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. 
Standard ship deployments occur once every 27 months for a period of 
6 months of which the ship and the crew are on-station for 3 to 
4 months, depending upon whether the ship deploys from the east or west 
coast of the United States.[Footnote 10] Most Navy ships and their 
crews employ the standard crew deployment option.
Sea Swap:
The Sea Swap option uses the same number of crews as ships. Notionally 
under this option, one of the ships deploys two, three, or four times 
longer than the standard time by rotating crews every 6 months at an 
overseas location. Ideally, all of the Sea Swap ships share an 
identical configuration, so crew performance and capability are not 
degraded because of ship differences.[Footnote 11] Because crews do not 
return to the ships on which they trained, under a four-ship Sea Swap 
option, some crews could serve on three different ships in just over 
6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency on each one. 
A limited number of destroyers and patrol coastal ships have employed 
the Sea Swap option in recent years.
Horizon:
The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than hulls, such as 
four crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve 
for no more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or 
more. Under a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least 
two ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat 
proficiency on each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship 
for a period of time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training, 
center. This crewing option was employed on mine countermeasure ships 
during the 1990s.
Blue-Gold:
The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated "Blue" and 
"Gold," to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a 
ship for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on 
the same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed 
6 months and are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this 
option includes the crews' familiarity with the ship. However, a 
disadvantage is that the proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes 
do not have a ship on which to train and must rely on mock-ups and 
simulators. The Blue-Gold option has been employed by the strategic 
submarine force and the HSV-2 Swift.[Footnote 12]
Partial or Graduated Crew Swapping:
Partial crew swapping has been employed on a limited basis. The most 
notable use of this option involved the exchange of crewmembers between 
a ship based in Japan with a ship based in the United States in 1999. A 
variation on this theme is when portions of a ship's crew are swapped 
out at regular intervals, for example, one-quarter of the crew every 2 
or 3 months.
Rotational Crewing Believed to Provide Forward Presence Benefits:
The most significant advantage attributed to rotational crewing options 
is the more efficient use of a ship in an overseas operating area. This 
is accomplished by keeping the ship on extended deployments, ranging 
from 12 to 36 months or longer, while at the same time not increasing 
the crew's time away from home. Top Navy officials, including the Chief 
of Naval Operations, believe that increased efficiencies from rotating 
crews enable the Navy to perform the same number of missions with fewer 
ships or to increase the number of missions with the same force size. 
For example, the Navy's acquisition executive stated that if the 
Sea Swap option is employed on its next generation guided missile 
destroyer, the DD(X),[Footnote 13] the Navy might be able to reduce 
requirements from 24 to 16 ships and apply the savings toward the next 
generation cruiser.
Disadvantages often associated with rotational crewing include 
increased infrastructure costs; deteriorating ship material condition 
and lack of ready access to maintenance support while on extended 
deployment; decreased readiness due to differences between ships; and 
decreased quality of life and other sociological issues for 
crew members, including the sense of less "ship ownership," fewer port 
calls, and cultural changes.
Recent Sea Swap Destroyer Demonstration Project Assesses Feasibility:
The Navy recently conducted a 2-year demonstration to determine if two 
destroyers could (1) provide more deployment time on-station and 
(2) maintain sailor quality of life while rotating crews. The Navy 
declared the demonstration a success, stating that the ships operated 
well while increasing their operational capability. In its report on 
the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Center concluded that the 
feasibility of the concept clearly was a success.[Footnote 14] However, 
the Center noted that there were problems and limitations. While none 
of the problems was considered a showstopper, the Center stated that 
the Sea Swap demonstration afforded the opportunity to learn lessons in 
order to enhance the use of the practice in the future. Many of these, 
such as the need for improved accountability, oversight, and 
understanding of maintenance strategies, are discussed in this report.
Key Commands Responsible for Implementing Rotational Crewing on Surface 
Ships:
The Chief of Naval Operations has charged the Commander, Naval Surface 
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with being the primary proponent for 
demonstrating the feasibility of rotating crews on surface ships as 
well as assessing the cost of the various options and providing 
oversight and accountability. To date the Command's emphasis has been 
on using the Sea Swap demonstration as a "proof-of-concept" for 
rotational crewing. It provided the guidance implementing the concept, 
approved the assessment plan, and used Center support to collect and 
analyze some data. However, other commands are involved in implementing 
other rotational crewing options on surface ships; they include the 
Mine Warfare Command and the Amphibious Group Two Command. See appendix 
II for a more complete list of organizations involved.
The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and 
Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships:
Although the Navy's senior leadership has initiated a change in how the 
Navy can operate in the future by demonstrating that rotational crewing 
is a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments, the 
Navy has not systematically evaluated the feasibility and 
cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing options for its current 
and future classes of surface ships. The Navy has documented that 
rotational crewing helps to increase the forward presence of its ships 
beyond the traditional 6-month deployment periods, and officials have 
indicated that they want to make greater use of rotational crew 
options. While the Navy has conducted some limited assessments of the 
Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project, it has not developed a 
comprehensive common analytical framework to assess the potential 
impact of all rotational crewing options on the material condition of 
all of the ships, operational requirements, and the quality of life for 
crews.
In addition, the Navy has not collected complete and consistent 
information that is critical for comparing different crewing 
alternatives for such factors as evaluating which alternative most 
cost-effectively meets specific requirements and warfighting 
effectiveness. In the absence of a common analytical framework, Navy 
officials assigned to ships that have used or experimented with crew 
rotations have been left to develop their own goals, objectives, and 
metrics and the results have to date been uneven. As a result, the Navy 
does not have complete and accurate data, including cost data that 
reflect total ownership and operating and support costs, readiness, and 
crew quality of life, making success or failure of the individual 
options involving different types of ships difficult to determine. In 
the absence of a systematic evaluation, the Navy also does not know the 
extent to which rotational crewing options can provide maximum return 
on investment and economically offset future ship total ownership 
costs.
Navy Has Some Evidence to Show That Rotational Crewing Increases 
Forward Presence and Is Considering Greater Use:
The Navy has developed some data to demonstrate that rotational crewing 
helps to increase the forward presence of its ships beyond the 
traditional 6-month deployment periods. Table 1 shows the percentage of 
time a ship would be notionally forward deployed during the employment 
cycle for each type of crew deployment option and the number of ships 
that would be required to keep one vessel continuously operating in the 
Persian Gulf.
Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the 
Persian Gulf:
Crewing option: Standard; 
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 17%; 
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed: 6.
Crewing option: Sea Swap; 
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 24%; 
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed: 4.
Crewing option: Horizon; 
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 32%; 
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed: 3.
Crewing option: Blue-Gold; 
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 71%; 
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed: 
1.5. 
Source: GAO's analysis of Navy data.
[End of table]
Given such promise for improving deployment efficiencies, Surface Force 
Pacific Command[Footnote 15] officials have considered using rotational 
crewing options on other ships. For example, in July 2004, the 
Commander, Naval Surface Force, indicated plans to use the Sea Swap 
option on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer based in the Atlantic Fleet 
and an expeditionary strike group based in the Pacific Fleet, during 
the spring and summer of 2005, respectively. In addition, Mine Warfare 
Command officials informed us in July 2004 that it intends to rotate 
crews on mine warfare ships based in the Persian Gulf later in the 
year, but it had not yet determined which option it will use.
The Navy is also considering rotational crewing for operating future 
ships and, as a result, it could change the number of new ships that 
might be purchased. For example, the Navy is designing and procuring 
the littoral combat ship[Footnote 16] and the DD(X), which will 
cost billions of dollars. The Navy has suggested that if crew rotations 
with an expeditionary strike group are as successful as with the 
Sea Swap destroyers' demonstration, procurement plans for the number of 
the DD(X) destroyers can be reduced and the savings applied to other 
high priority ships.
No Established Framework and Limited Information for Comparing Crew 
Rotation Options:
While the Center and the Surface Force Pacific Command have conducted 
some assessments of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Navy did 
not have an analytical framework or collect the information that would 
be needed to assess and compare all crewing options. Lacking such a 
framework, the Navy has not systematically assessed the effect that 
rotational crewing has on such factors as the ships' material condition 
and readiness or crew quality of life and training. Additionally, the 
Navy has not systematically evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the 
various crewing options.
Analytic Framework Would Improve Ability to Evaluate Crewing Options:
Best practices show that an analytic framework that includes measurable 
goals and objectives, performance metrics, and evaluation 
plans[Footnote 17] would allow decision makers and others to receive 
consistent information needed to compare and assess different policy 
options, measure implementation progress, and determine whether the 
desired results were being achieved. Without such information for the 
various crewing options, Navy managers do not have a clear picture of 
the status of the crew rotation efforts, whether potential benefits 
from different crew rotations are being achieved, which option might be 
best in certain situations, and whether major issues need to be 
resolved.
The Navy has not established formal criteria for evaluating the 
implementation of the various rotational crewing options because its 
focus has been on demonstrating the feasibility of the concept rather 
than on assessing and formalizing the options. For example, the Navy 
did not establish evaluation criteria prior to implementing Sea Swap, 
and none was identified in the Center's Sea Swap assessment plan. As a 
result, the Center lacked criteria for judging ship condition and crew 
quality of life. According to the Center's September 2004 report, the 
Navy had no intent to control the operational activities in the sense 
of a scientific experiment, where one notionally scores a probability 
of success or other such measure of effectiveness. It said the intent 
was that general conclusions about the feasibility and difficulties of 
pursuing the Sea Swap concept for future force employment planning 
would be drawn from the experiment. Moreover, the Navy did not have 
comparable assessments for the options employed on other ships such as 
the patrol coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift.
More common data and analyses are not available for comparison because, 
in the absence of a common analytical framework, individual commands 
using crew rotations have been able to decide on their own what 
(1) goals, objectives, and metrics to establish; (2) data to collect; 
and (3) evaluations to do, if any. Such goals, objectives, and metrics 
on ship condition and quality of life, which could affect crew 
retention, were not established prior to deployment, and complete 
information on these factors was not systematically collected during 
and after deployments. As a result, while the Navy has reported that 
the Sea Swap demonstration project was a success for the destroyers 
involved, the Navy lacks clear criteria to objectively evaluate how 
well the project did and the project's potential against other 
rotational crewing options in two key areas we assessed--the condition 
of the ship and the crew's quality of life.
Material Condition of Ships Not Systematically Assessed:
The Sea Swap demonstration project collected data on ship condition 
that could be valuable. However, complete data were not systematically 
collected on the ships before deployment and there were no clear 
criteria for comparing the ships' condition upon return. For example, 
the Navy conducted a total ship readiness assessment of the 
U.S.S. Higgins, one of the two demonstration destroyers, in April 2004, 
shortly after the ship returned from its 18-month deployment. This 
post-deployment assessment of the combat, hull, mechanical, and 
electrical systems was used to compare the U.S.S. Higgins's material 
condition to the U.S.S. Decatur's. The U.S.S. Decatur, a guided missile 
destroyer, had recently completed a standard 6-month deployment. 
According to Surface Force officials, there was no significant 
difference between the two ships' material condition upon return. 
However, there is some disagreement about the criteria and 
interpretation of the data used in reaching this conclusion. This is 
discussed in more detail on pages 37-39. In its report, the Center 
cautioned that further analyses of ship material condition are needed. 
Comparable assessments of ship condition are not being performed on the 
U.S.S. Fletcher, the other Sea Swap destroyer on extended deployment.
The Navy is missing an opportunity to collect data and more objectively 
assess the impact of extended deployments on ship condition. A more 
stringent independent inspection[Footnote 18] for the U.S.S. Higgins is 
scheduled in January 2005, about 8 months after its return from 
deployment and likely after having received significant shipyard 
maintenance and modernization. Furthermore, Surface Force officials 
also told us that a comparable pre-inactivation inspection, which is 
normally performed, would not be done on the U.S.S. Fletcher because it 
is being decommissioned and they do not want to spend the 
money.[Footnote 19]
Quality-of-Life Issues Not Fully Assessed:
An objective of Sea Swap was to maintain the crews' quality of life. 
The Center's study plan stated the Center would examine how the project 
improved or degraded the quality of life and quality of work for Navy 
personnel through surveys and interviews with crewmembers. However, the 
Navy did not establish goals for determining the quality-of-life 
success of the Sea Swap program. As a result, even though the Center 
had collected data on morale, it could not conclude whether Sea Swap 
had succeeded or failed in this regard. Also, the Navy has no plans to 
monitor crews' quality of life for the patrol coastal ships and the 
HSV-2 Swift. The need for such an analysis is borne out by the impact 
of crew morale on reenlistment rates.
Quality of Life Is an Important Factor in Sailors' Career Choice:
Sailors' views of their quality of life is an important factor in 
determining whether they will choose to continue their military career. 
The Chief of Naval Operations has recognized the importance of people 
in making the Navy successful in performing its mission and has 
consistently made manpower and quality of service top priorities. 
According to the Chief, "Quality of work includes everything that makes 
your workplace a great place to be--from getting the spare parts you 
need in a timely manner to working spaces that are up to current 
standards."
Sea Swap's Implementation May Have Been Key to Quality-of-Life 
Concerns:
Information collected by the Center, and by us during our review, 
indicated that implementation of the Sea Swap demonstration project had 
a negative effect on crewmember quality of life. While noting that 
Sea Swap had been successful technically, the Center's pre-and post-
surveys of the crew showed that Sea Swap adversely affected morale 
because of the increased workload, fewer opportunities for liberty port 
calls, and crewmembers' general impression that the Sea Swap deployment 
was worse than their previous deployment. For example, the Center asked 
crews about their expectations for Sea Swap compared to previous 
deployments. The survey results showed that 65 percent of the arriving 
crews expected that Sea Swap would be a worse experience than their 
last deployment and of departing crews; 84 percent said participating 
in Sea Swap was worse.
Our focus groups with crews on the U.S.S. Higgins and the patrol 
coastal ships also revealed a negative quality of life. The Center and 
we both identified several factors that contributed to sailors' 
feelings, including workload, training and professional development 
opportunities, quantity and quality of port visits, and several 
sociological issues (e.g., culture, ship "ownership," sense of pride 
and recognition, predictability, or Navy tradition). The Center also 
noted that Navy leadership would need to understand which features of 
Sea Swap cause negative perceptions.
We addressed quality-of-life issues in each of our 43 focus group 
meetings. All 26 of our focus group meetings with Sea Swap destroyer 
crews that served on the U.S.S. Higgins and with crews on patrol 
coastal ships attested to a highly negative quality of life, a 
decreased morale, and a strong desire to not participate on any more 
crew rotations implemented like their most recent experience. Many 
crewmembers indicated that rotational crewing might have had a more 
positive effect if the following conditions were met:
* crew swapping had been better managed to ensure work accountability 
to reduce the workload,
* there had been time for individual training and professional 
development,
* promises had been kept on designated port calls,
* port calls had been phased throughout the deployment instead of at 
the end when sailors just wanted to return home,
* return flight schedules had been better coordinated, and:
* proper recognition had been given to each crew.
A small number of crewmembers indicated that their Sea Swap experience 
was positive in that they liked knowing they would be on a finite 
deployment period of 6 months.
In contrast, the 17 focus groups we conducted with Blue-Gold 
crewmembers from the HSV-2 Swift and the strategic submarine force 
found that these crewmembers had a generally positive crew rotation 
experience. They attributed their positive experiences to a level 
workload, management accountability, predictable schedules, individual 
training and professional development opportunities, and sufficient 
amounts of personal time during the interdeployment cycle, despite the 
ships' high operational tempo.
Negative Morale Impacted Reenlistment Rates:
Lower reenlistment rates for sailors with less than 6 years of 
service[Footnote 20] that served on Sea Swap guided missile destroyers 
and patrol coastal ships reinforced the Center's survey results and our 
focus group findings. Both Pacific Fleet and Surface Force Command 
officials identified reenlistment data as a key indicator of whether 
crews are satisfied with rotations. The Center's survey and our 
analysis showed that negative morale associated with participating in 
Sea Swap had an adverse impact on reenlistment rates. The Center's 
conclusion was based on a series of crew surveys. According to the 
Center,
* 55 percent of the crew said after the deployment that they thought 
that Sea Swap would make them less likely to stay in the Navy, versus 
39 percent before the deployment, and:
* 73 percent stated that if all deployments were like Sea Swap, they 
would be less likely to stay in the Navy.
Our analysis of overall reenlistment data for sailors with less than 6 
years of active service indicated that the crews on all three 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers involved in the Sea Swap demonstration 
experienced 50 percent reenlistment rates. These rates were below the 
Navy-wide reenlistment goal of 56 percent for this group and the actual 
64 percent reenlistment rate for non-Sea Swap Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers based in the Pacific Fleet.[Footnote 21] Because the first-
term reenlistment rates for the three Sea Swap destroyer crews were as 
low as 23 to 37 percent during their Sea Swap cycle, these ships were 
among the few that did not meet the Navy-wide reenlistment goal. If the 
Navy expands rotational crewing with out understanding its full impact 
on crews, the results could affect retention and crew support.
Cost-Effectiveness of Crew Rotation Options Not Systematically 
Evaluated:
The Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Navy commands using 
crew rotations have not systematically collected cost data for 
assessing the return on investment or cost-effectiveness of all surface 
ship rotational crewing options for current and future ships. The Navy 
testified to the Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2002 that 
it would determine the true cost and potential savings of one 
rotational crewing option, Sea Swap, to provide a firm analytical basis 
in order to decide whether to expand use of that option or look for 
other alternatives.[Footnote 22] Recently, the Commander, Naval Surface 
Force, initiated a limited effort to collect and model costs. However, 
to date, data collection and analyses comparing the cost of all the 
crew rotation options have not been completed. Cost-effectiveness is a 
method used by organizations seeking to gain the best value for their 
money and to achieve operational requirements while balancing costs, 
schedules, performance, and risks. The best value is often not readily 
apparent and requires an analysis to maximize value. 
A cost-effectiveness analysis is used where benefits cannot be 
expressed in monetary terms but, rather, in "units of benefit," for 
example, days of forward presence. Such an analysis would be of 
particular importance when making return on investment decisions about 
how many ships to buy and how to operate them.
Moreover, officials in DOD's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
told us that they have not conducted a basic cost-effectiveness 
analysis of rotational crewing alternatives. Nonetheless, they believe 
that rotational crewing is a good concept, that the Navy needs to 
perform these analyses, and that they were not aware of any such 
analyses having been conducted in the Navy. The Naval Cost Analysis 
Division cited DOD cost analysis guidance and procedures that would be 
applicable to a cost-effectiveness study of rotational crewing 
alternatives.[Footnote 23] According to Division officials, this 
guidance is to be used as the basis for preparing program life-cycle 
cost estimates, and provides information on the scope of the cost 
analysis, the procedures, and the presentation of the estimates. 
Division officials also told us they have not participated in any 
rotational crewing cost-effectiveness studies nor are they aware of 
any. Officials in both DOD and Navy offices indicated that the cost 
analyses for crew rotation alternatives should include the development 
of a cost structure for identifying all the relevant cost elements in 
the program, including depot level maintenance, fuel, training, 
infrastructure costs, and other costs unique to the program.
While Surface Force Pacific officials had developed limited information 
on costs and savings unique to the Sea Swap destroyers, it was not 
complete, and they have not developed comparable data for the patrol 
coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift. Examples of information collected 
included the estimated fuel savings from ship transits that were not 
needed; transportation, room and board for flying the crews to turnover 
cities; and special training. These officials told us that they plan to 
collect additional data to help evaluate Sea Swap costs, but that they 
are still determining what cost data should be collected and how to 
establish a baseline for control group comparison purposes. 
Furthermore, they told us that collection of the data will be 
challenging because there is no central database or automated system 
for coding rotational crewing-related expenses that could be used for 
documenting the unique costs associated with rotational crewing. The 
officials were also concerned that Navy management and accounting data 
systems are not integrated, making it difficult to collect complete and 
actual cost information that could be helpful in identifying the costs 
of the Sea Swap initiative.
Surface Force Pacific officials have also determined that they have 
responsibility for assessing the costs of crew rotation in the patrol 
coastal ships as well, but they had not been doing so. Amphibious Group 
Two[Footnote 24] officials told us in October 2003 that they have not 
systematically evaluated costs and are not aware of any 
cost-effectiveness analyses of rotational crewing being conducted. 
Surface Force officials said that more complete costs for patrol 
coastal ships have to be collected and analyzed to allow for cost-
effective comparisons.
Notwithstanding the limitations in the available cost data, Naval 
Surface Force Pacific officials told us they recently developed and are 
refining a model that presents information that is more comprehensive. 
For example, in a July 14, 2004, briefing, the Force's commanding 
officer presented costs of the Sea Swap demonstration, including a cost 
comparison for both the U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins to other 
ships in their respective classes, including the average costs per 
deployed day. Surface Force Pacific officials said that this model is 
also used to present similar data for the future littoral combat ship. 
However, we were informed that much of the data used in the model is 
based on estimates rather than actual costs and that some costs 
integral to evaluating rotational crewing options, such as maintenance 
and training infrastructure, were not included. Furthermore, the model 
has not been tested or validated by the Navy.
Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on Lessons 
Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences:
The Navy has done some planning in support of rotational crewing on 
surface ships, such as for the Sea Swap demonstration project, but 
because the concept is evolving as an alternative, the service has not 
provided effective guidance during implementation on all ships to 
ensure proper oversight and accountability. Furthermore, the Navy has 
not systematically leveraged lessons learned to effectively support 
rotational crewing. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned 
are key management tools to overcome challenges associated with 
institutionalizing change and facilitating efficient operations. The 
Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for 
ballistic missile submarines for use as best practices that include 
appropriately documenting the ship's condition and using advanced teams 
to help prepare for crew turnover and help ensure accountability. 
However, the Navy has not provided comparable guidance with policies 
and procedures to ensure proper crew turnover and accountability to all 
surface ships using rotational crewing. Consequently, the management of 
surface ship crew rotations has been informally delegated to each 
ship's incoming and outgoing commanding officers. This has resulted in 
inconsistent management of and accountability for operational factors, 
such as the ship's condition and ship inventories, when one crew 
replaces another. In addition, the surface ship community has not 
systematically collected, recorded, or disseminated lessons learned 
from all rotational crewing experiences. Although the Navy has a formal 
system to record lessons learned from fleet operations, experiences 
from crew rotations are not being recorded in the system so that they 
could be routinely shared among the surface ships and commands using 
rotational crewing. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating 
past mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew 
morale.
Navy Conducted Some Planning in Support of Rotational Crewing:
Because rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments 
differs from the traditional 6-month ship deployment, it is important 
that planning be effective to increase institutional knowledge and gain 
acceptance for implementing the change. The Navy has performed 
extensive planning in support of rotational crewing on ballistic 
missile submarines. However, crew rotation planning for the surface 
ship community has been limited and less formal.
Submarine Community Has Established Planning Elements:
The submarine community has a well-established concept for conducting 
Blue-Gold crew rotations, based on 40 years of experience on fleet 
ballistic missile submarines. As a result, we analyzed the community's 
concepts, procedures, and processes to identify "best practices." We 
found that three key elements of this concept are:
* formalized turnover policies and procedures;
* a training plan that maintains proficiency of crews that are in port; 
and:
* a maintenance plan that includes crew and incremental maintenance.
Formalized Crew Rotation Turnover Policies and Procedures Help Ensure 
Accountability:
The Navy's Submarine Forces Command developed formal policies and 
procedures for crew turnover in order to develop a comprehensive status 
of a ship's material condition and accountability of controlled 
material and documents, scheduled maintenance, and supply. The turnover 
process takes place over 2 to 3 days, during which the on-coming 
crewmembers from each department and division meet with their off-going 
counterparts to review detailed turnover checklists that cover issues 
such as personnel, training, administration, maintenance logs, 
classified material, ship operational funds, parts, and food supplies. 
For example, both crews review the status of preventative and 
corrective maintenance repairs that are recorded in equipment status 
logs, which help document the material condition of the ship. This 
information is passed from one crew to another during turnover to 
maintain continuity of maintenance. Both crews also review an inventory 
of provisions, medicines, hazardous material, and information 
technology equipment. Crewmembers from both crews are required to sign 
the checklists, and the two ship commanders are ultimately responsible 
for ensuring accountability of the material condition of the ship. By 
taking these steps, the on-coming ship command has the opportunity to 
note unsatisfactory conditions--including significant personnel, 
training, operational readiness, habitability, and material deficiency 
issues--on an exchange-of-command report. Turnovers can be delayed if 
both crews do not agree on the ship's material status. Members from one 
crew we met mentioned that they take pride in conducting the turnover 
because they want to set the standard for their partner crew.
Training Programs Maintain Proficiency of the Crew While Ashore:
Maintaining the operational proficiency of the crew that is in port 
without a submarine is the main challenge to the strategic submarine's 
Blue-Gold system. In response, the strategic submarine force has 
developed a training program to maintain crew proficiency in core 
competencies while ashore. This program is designed to update crews on 
recent procedural changes, allow crews to perform maintenance 
operations, and refresh personnel who have been away from their duties 
for several months. Crews receive classroom instruction and maintain 
their skills in simulators at the Trident Training Facility.[Footnote 
25] Crews are monitored and evaluated through graded individual and 
group exercises. Officers and crewmembers stated that they generally 
received adequate and sufficient training at the training facility to 
perform their mission. Nevertheless, they stated that simulated 
training is not the same as training on a ship and that crew readiness 
is lower during the first week of deployment as they try to 
refamiliarize themselves with the ship and their mission.
Crew and Incremental Maintenance Plan Designed for Rotational Crewing:
The ballistic missile submarine maintenance concept was specifically 
designed to accomplish incremental maintenance over a 42-year life 
cycle. The concept consists of crews working together to conduct 
maintenance repairs and incremental maintenance that is planned or 
unplanned corrective maintenance during an in-port maintenance period.
The submarine community has formal guidance for the in-port maintenance 
period during which both crews jointly conduct maintenance 
repairs.[Footnote 26] One main purpose is to enhance the efficiency and 
productivity of the maintenance period. During this time, both crews 
operate under one chain of command; the off-going crew reports directly 
to the on-coming ship commander. Once the submarine is at sea, the off-
crew works with the maintenance facility and the on-crew to develop a 
work package of needed preventive and corrective maintenance repairs. 
As a result, during the next in-port maintenance period the crew that 
has just taken command knows what to expect. Officers and crewmembers 
in our focus groups stated that this approach was key to completing 
required maintenance repairs in a short period. It also helps ensure 
that items that may not have been captured during turnover are 
identified according to officers on one submarine. In addition, crews 
stated that this concept decreases the incentives for pushing off work 
to the other crew because both crews conduct the needed maintenance 
repairs.
The incremental maintenance plan involves routine maintenance based on 
a set schedule common to all submarines and corrective repairs, which 
include those items that break or are in a degraded condition as a 
result of operations. The Trident Planned Equipment Replacement 
Program, another aspect of incremental maintenance, provides for 
repairs on hull, mechanical, electrical, or combat control system 
equipment that require maintenance beyond the ability of the ship's 
crew. The incremental overhaul relies on an extensive shore-based 
maintenance infrastructure, including dedicated full-time maintenance 
personnel, maintenance facilities that provide a full range of repair 
and maintenance services, and dry docks that provide the support 
necessary to conduct required equipment repairs and replacements.
Limited Planning for Surface Ship Crew Rotations:
Despite the challenges of implementing this change in crewing practice, 
the surface ship community's planning in support of crew rotations has 
been less formal and limited to several areas, including crew training 
on different systems used on participating ships, use of advanced crew 
turnover teams, and location and timing of port calls. Crews in our 
focus groups also identified some limitations to these planning 
efforts.
Planned Training for Different Equipment and Systems between Ships 
Had Limitations:
A Naval Warfare College study of several crew rotation options 
identified the crew's unfamiliarity with equipment and systems between 
different ships as a potential challenge for conducting the program. As 
part of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Commander, Naval 
Surface Force, sought to address differences in ship design, 
construction, and modernization between forward-deployed and 
nondeployed ships by providing crews with predeployment training 
specific to the forward-deployed ship they would join.[Footnote 27] The 
Command planned for the training to account for many of the differences 
between the destroyers, with emphasis on training systems and equipment 
on the forward-deployed ship, and set-up training classes in the United 
States and Sea Swap cities.[Footnote 28] For example, one on-coming 
crew received training to ensure its proficiency in areas such as 
critical weapons systems and engineering prior to the ship's turnover. 
Amphibious Group Two also provided training to patrol coastal ship 
crews to help them bridge the engineering differences they would face 
on the deployed ship.
However, in our focus group discussions, ship crews participating in 
Sea Swap and on the patrol coastal ships cited concerns about the 
adequacy of this training. The crewmembers indicated that proficiency 
improved with practice drills, but sufficient proficiency was not 
achieved prior to deploying, even though they had received their 
certifications. The delay in achieving proficiency was accentuated for 
the crew that swapped in the Persian Gulf because the crewmembers did 
not have the opportunity during a transit to become familiar with their 
new ship. For example, crewmembers for one ship stated that they only 
received partial training for operating a new radio that is necessary 
for conducting strike operations. This partial training degraded the 
crew's ability to shoot Tomahawk land attack missiles. Crewmembers also 
stated that they did not receive training to operate damage control 
radios, which meant the crew would have been unable to use the radios 
in an emergency.
Patrol coastal ship crewmembers also indicated that they faced 
challenges in training to operate the deployed ship's different 
equipment. For example, crewmembers stated they did not receive weapons 
training for Stinger missiles prior to overseas deployment because 
these weapons systems are not typically used while on deployment in the 
United States. Patrol coastal ship focus group comments revealed that 
the crews compensated for training deficiencies with self-initiated 
training during deployment. These crews also received some training 
from the Coast Guard while in theater. They felt the deficiencies in 
training on different systems compromised their ability to perform 
their respective mission.
Value of Some Advanced Turnover Teams Was Limited:
The Surface Force Pacific Command established advance turnover teams to 
assist ships participating in the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration 
project, but their assistance was sometimes constrained. These teams 
were comprised of approximately 15 to 20 members of the on-coming crew 
who were sent to the forward-deployed ship 2 weeks in advance of the 
turnover to conduct inventories and observe ship operations. The use of 
an advanced turnover team was an effort to expedite the turnover 
process from one crew to another. A Command official cited the work 
performed by these teams as instrumental in reducing the amount of time 
required for the turnover as well as for increasing their familiarity 
with the new ship. However, crewmembers in our focus groups stated that 
advance teams were not as effective as they could have been in some 
turnovers because they were denied access to areas and equipment in the 
ship at the time of turnovers. For example, a regional support office 
assumed control of a Sea Swap destroyer in the United States, locked up 
the workspaces, and did not grant the advance team access. In another 
instance, the advance team arriving on the ship overseas was not given 
access until the new crew assumed responsibility for the ship, which 
limited the team's time and ability to expedite an effective turnover.
Navy Crew Rotation Efforts Have Lacked Standard Guidance to Ensure 
Oversight and Accountability:
The Navy's implementation of surface ship crew rotation efforts lacked 
effective guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. Because the 
practice differs from the traditional crewing approach, such guidance 
is a key to ensuring successful implementation. In the absence of such 
guidance, including standard policies and procedures similar to those 
used in the ballistic missile submarine community, officers and crews 
on Sea Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and the HSV-2 Swift 
developed their own turnover procedures. This caused inconsistency 
between crews conducting the turnovers, which in turn, led to problems 
in documenting ship condition and accounting for ship inventories. As a 
result, surface ship crews cited the need to develop and implement 
standard turnover procedures, including checklists.
Crewmembers said there was no document to sign during the turnover to 
hold crews accountable for recording necessary maintenance repairs. For 
example, crews reported that Navy systems for tracking maintenance 
requirements and accomplishments were not systematically used to record 
maintenance repairs. Officers and enlisted crews on Sea Swap destroyers 
and patrol coastal ships indicated that, as a result, the ship 
maintenance logs did not accurately reflect the material status of the 
ships. One Sea Swap crew reported that the prior crew did not document 
that the forward-fueling station had a hole, which took the entire 
deployment to fix. In another instance, one crew stated that although 
three portable fire pumps were required to be on board the vessel, the 
crew only found two pumps, of which only one worked. Additionally, a 
patrol coastal ship crew indicated that the previous crew reported only 
a few needed maintenance repairs in the maintenance log. However, after 
turnover, the on-coming crew said that it noted about 50 repair items, 
including all 6 main engines that could not operate simultaneously. In 
another case, the electronic preventive maintenance log was not working 
during turnover, which the on-coming crew reportedly spent 3 weeks in 
repairs to make it function.
A ship commander mentioned that there is a challenge associated with 
properly tracking maintenance logs, which are not valued by all crews. 
Those logs can be valuable tools when used, but he stated that the 
maintenance logs did not reflect the material status of the ship. Some 
patrol coastal ship officers stated that every crew emphasizes 
different maintenance priorities, which can contribute to perceptions 
of inadequate material condition of the ship during and after turnover. 
Notwithstanding different perceptions of the material condition of the 
ship, Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crewmembers raised concerns 
about the lack of accountability, in particular oversight of 
documenting the material condition of the ship. Crewmembers from the 
Sea Swap destroyers and patrol coastal ships cited the need to 
establish turnover standards and checklists and to conduct an 
independent inspection to monitor the turnover and review the material 
condition of the ship.
Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crews also mentioned that 
accountability for ship inventories was inadequate. Naval supply 
guidance cites the need to conduct physical inventories of equipment 
and materials to the extent necessary to ensure effective control of 
those materials normally required for performing the mission or which 
require special management attention.[Footnote 29] Crewmembers told us 
that guidance on conducting inventories was not always followed in 
preparation for and during turnovers. Some crews mentioned that the 
time to review supply inventories, a time-consuming activity during 
turnover, was a problem. There were several instances on Sea Swap 
destroyers of missing equipment--maintenance assistance modules 
estimated at $90,000--and tools. One Sea Swap destroyer crew also 
reported that the crew discovered during an inventory a pair of missing 
night vision goggles. In another case, the on-coming crew lacked basic 
supplies, such as cleaning materials, light bulbs, and toilet paper. 
Crewmembers also reported items missing on their assigned ships upon 
return that were not identified during turnover. In another example, 
crewmembers of a patrol coastal ship crew stated that, upon return to 
the United States, they found that 10,000 rounds of ammunition were 
missing on their assigned ship. Sea Swap destroyer and patrol coastal 
ship crews cited the need for an independent authority to hold crews 
accountable for ship inventories.
Surface Ship Community Did Not Capitalize on Past and Current 
Lessons Learned:
The surface ship community also has not capitalized on existing and 
evolving lessons learned to more effectively plan and conduct crew 
rotations. Capturing and sharing such lessons serve to further 
institutionalize change by improving its implementation. While the Navy 
has a formal system to record lessons learned, experiences from current 
rotational crewing efforts are not being systematically collected and 
recorded in that system. As a result, the Navy is missing an 
opportunity to record lessons learned that could be leveraged by crews 
involved in current and future crew rotation experiences. Further, 
surface ships and commands have not capitalized on the lessons learned 
in the system to plan and conduct crew rotations. Consequently, crews 
experienced similar difficulties to those that the previously recorded 
lessons learned sought to correct.
Navy Lessons Learned System Created as a Central Repository to Preclude 
the Loss of Knowledge:
The Navy created a lessons learned database in 1991 to provide a system 
for units to benefit from collective Navy experiences, identify 
deficiencies, and take corrective measures in all aspects of fleet 
operations. A lesson learned is defined as information that increases 
the efficiency of Navy processes and improves the execution of future 
operations. According to the Navy, it should provide value to existing 
Navy policy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, organization, 
training, systems, or equipment.[Footnote 30]
The Navy Warfare Development Command is responsible for administering 
the system, and its officials indicated that information for current 
rotational crewing efforts should be submitted to the system, as it is 
the best way for lessons to be shared across the Navy community. Anyone 
in the Navy can submit a lessons learned report through the immediate 
chain of command. Fleet commands process and validate the proposed 
report, which is then forwarded to be officially entered into the 
system. Navy personnel ashore and at sea can access lessons learned 
contained in the system through a classified Internet site.[Footnote 
31] Use of this central repository would preclude the loss of lessons, 
such as those lost by the Mine Warfare Command in the late 1990s due to 
a computer failure.
Surface Ship Commands Have Not Made Systematic Efforts to Collect and 
Record Lessons Learned for the Navy's Central System:
The Naval Surface Force Command recognized the need for a comprehensive 
list of lessons learned in order to examine the Sea Swap initiative, 
but the Command has not made a systematic effort to collect or record 
lessons learned, nor did it task Sea Swap crews to identify and submit 
them. Aside from 78 lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations that 
took place in 1999 on Forward Deployed Naval Forces[Footnote 32] in the 
Seventh Fleet area of operations, no lessons learned directly related 
to crew rotations had been posted regarding the Sea Swap destroyers, 
patrol coastal ships, and HSV Swift experiences as of July 30, 2004. 
Absent guidance, Sea Swap crews' efforts to record lessons learned have 
been inconsistent. Some crews developed lists of lessons learned that 
were distributed to other rotational crews and the Command, including 
some that related to manning, personnel, supply, predeployment 
maintenance, training, turnover preparations and execution, turnover 
time, and advance parties. In one case, a Sea Swap ship undertook a 
concerted effort to document lessons learned prior to deployment, but a 
majority of those documents were later discarded because the crew 
wanted to create additional workspace. By not systematically recording 
and providing valuable experiences from crew rotations to the Navy 
Lessons Learned System, the Navy is missing an opportunity to more 
effectively plan and conduct current and future crew rotations.
In response to a Senate Armed Services Committee request on the status 
of one of the Sea Swap ships,[Footnote 33] the Command identified a 
preliminary set of lessons learned as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material 
Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative:
Topic: More efficient forward presence; 
Issue: A standard deployment of 
a ship from San Diego to the Central Command requires a 40-day period 
(30 days transiting and 10 days of quality-of-life port calls) at the 
start and end of a deployment. Given a normal, 180-day deployment, this 
provides 100 days of overseas presence in the Central Command per crew. 
The lesson learned was that by employing Sea Swap and conducting only 
one transit to the Central Command and one return to San Diego, the 
four crews rotating on the U.S.S. Fletcher will provide 518 days of 
forward presence. To achieve this number with standard deployments, 
five-plus ships would have had to deploy.
Topic: Crew training certifications; 
Issue: Sea Swap crews conducted their predeployment training and 
achieved their certifications on their own hulls, prior to turnover. 
These certifications remained with the crew. The lesson learned was 
that Sea Swap crews met all operational taskings; therefore, the 
certifications should remain with the crews, not tied to the hull.
Topic: Naval cultural issues; 
Issue: There is a sense of ownership that a crew feels for their ship. 
Sea Swap has personnel leaving their ship for another of the same 
class. The lesson learned was the need to fully educate the crew on 
the overall benefits of participating in an experiment such as Sea 
Swap and ensure a positive attitude of the crew.
Topic: Maintenance of the forward-deployed ship; 
Issue: Casualty reports are tracking on both classes of ships involved 
in Sea Swap and are compared to previous ships of both classes. The 
numbers of those reports have spiked each time a new crew embarks but 
have settled following a short period. The lesson learned was that the 
spikes that occur when a crew assumes the ship are somewhat expected 
due to new eyes reviewing the equipment.
Topic: Follow-on orders for Sea Swap crews; 
Issue: As Sea Swap crews would assume the hull of the crew who had just 
relieved them, it was necessary to change their code. Detailed 
coordination was required with the Bureau of Naval Personnel to ensure 
personnel with incoming orders went to the proper crew as they rotated 
ships. The lesson learned was that early and detailed coordination is 
mandatory.
Source: Naval Surface Force Pacific Command.
[End of table]
A final report will be provided to the Committee once the initiative is 
completed. None of these lessons learned from the Sea Swap initiative 
have been reported to the Navy Lessons Learned System.
Efforts to gather lessons learned in the patrol coastal community have 
been inconsistent. Amphibious Group Two similarly did not provide 
direction to collect and record lessons learned and stated that crews 
involved in rotations passed on lessons learned to one another. A 
patrol coastal ship commander stated that crew efforts to gather 
lessons learned were informal. We identified one lessons learned report 
sent by a ship commander to the ship's command, Amphibious Group Two, 
that contained lessons related to maintenance funding, ownership, and 
maintaining good ship inventories. However, none of these lessons 
learned had been recorded in the Navy Lessons Learned System as of 
July 30, 2004.
The Mine Warfare Command directed the HSV-2 Swift commanding officers 
to develop lessons learned reports on five issues. Only two of those 
lessons learned reports had been posted to the Navy Lessons Learned 
System as of July 30, 2004, and neither addressed ship crewing issues.
Many Past Lessons Learned Available in Formal System Are Not Being 
Systematically Leveraged:
The surface ship community has not capitalized on the Navy lessons 
learned database to plan and conduct crew rotations. A Naval Surface 
Force Pacific Command official told us that the Command did not 
systematically solicit available lessons learned from the Navy Lessons 
Learned System to help plan for crew rotations. We found that 
participants in our focus groups reported experiencing similar problems 
that several of the formal lessons learned reported by the Forward 
Deployed Naval Forces in 1999 had addressed. For example, two important 
lessons not leveraged were:
* reviewing the automated process for the transfer of crew 
identification codes when assigned to a new ship and:
* establishing and abiding by a written agreement between both ship 
commanders that clearly defines transfer and accountability procedures 
for equipment turnover.
When crews for Forward Deployed Naval Forces were rotated in 1999, 
the Navy recognized that the ships were not timely in properly updating 
crewmembers' records to show the ship to which crewmembers were 
assigned. This resulted in incorrect enlisted master files and the 
inability to process pay transactions. The lesson learned report stated 
that the Navy should instantly transfer personnel from one code to 
another automatically in a timely manner, which is crucial to avoid 
incorrect master files and the potential loss of certain pay and 
entitlements. Numerous Sea Swap destroyer, patrol coastal ship, and 
HSV-2 Swift officers and crews we met experienced similar difficulties. 
They reported that because their respective code was not changed to 
reflect they had changed ships, some crewmembers experienced problems 
receiving pay and others were ordered to the wrong ship. Officers and 
crew from a Sea Swap ship stated that creating codes for each crew 
would help alleviate similar problems. Assigning crews codes is a 
standard practice in the ballistic missile submarine community. This 
practice was also used by the mine warfare community during their crew 
rotations in the mid-1990s. The systematic use of an effective lessons 
learned system could have alerted the Navy to the need for a mechanism 
to ensure the effective transfer of crews and ships from one code to 
another in a timely and an accurate manner.
Establishing and abiding by written agreements between both ship 
commanders involved in a crew rotation enable both crews early in the 
planning phase to determine what equipment stays with the ship or the 
crew and improves accountability for tool equipment transfer. The 
Navy's lessons learned database identified the need for such 
agreements. However, despite both ship commanders agreeing during the 
planning phases of one of the turnovers that each ship's tools, parts, 
and material would remain with the respective ship and that both crews 
would review an inventory checklist during turnover, both crews did not 
follow the agreement. One crew removed many of the tools and other 
equipment before leaving the ship. As a result, the on-coming crew did 
not have the needed tools and other equipment to perform maintenance 
and repairs and had to spend $150,000 to buy the needed tools. Officers 
and crews from two patrol coastal ships also indicated that absent an 
agreed-upon written inventory identifying which items stay with the 
ship and what items stay with the crew, one of the crews took needed 
ship items back to the United States, in part, to ensure the crew had 
necessary items on the new ship. Officers from one patrol coastal ship 
stated that there is a need for a standard set of inventory items that 
should stay on a ship. Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship officers and 
crewmembers stated that an independent authority is needed to monitor 
the turnover process, including an inventory of tools, to hold both 
crews accountable.
Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential Impacts 
Have Not Been Fully Assessed:
The impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational 
crewing has not been fully assessed. This is because the Navy has been 
focused on demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed 
ships to use different approaches to conducting maintenance without 
capturing all needed information and examining all related issues that 
could impact success. A full assessment of maintenance issues on all 
ships employing this practice would be important in identifying and 
addressing possible impediments to effectively implementing rotational 
crewing. Navy destroyers and patrol coastal ships using rotational 
crews on extended deployments have faced maintenance challenges to 
ensure the mission capability of ships while overseas. To help minimize 
the adverse effects on the material condition of forward-deployed 
Sea Swap destroyers, the Navy expanded the scope of predeployment 
maintenance and sent maintenance support representatives in theater to 
provide additional technical support to crews. Despite concluding that 
the condition of the returning ship, U.S.S. Higgins, was comparable to 
that of another ship that had recently returned from a deployment, the 
results of such efforts on maintaining ship material condition are 
uncertain. The Center recommended that a review of maintenance support 
might be necessary prior to expanding Sea Swap to other ships. We found 
the need for such an analysis was further supported by the experience 
of patrol coastal ships, which did not receive such focused maintenance 
and identified several maintenance problems that were not corrected 
while deployed that could have affected their mission capability. 
Moreover, both the Center and our focus groups with rotational crews 
found that increased maintenance tasks contributed to diminished crew 
morale. Therefore, while the Navy used rotational crews to keep ships 
on station for up to 24 months, in the absence of a careful analysis of 
alternative maintenance strategies, the Navy runs the risk that some 
maintenance approaches will degrade the long-term condition of ships, 
diminish crew morale, and discourage crew support for using the 
practice.
Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Is a Challenge:
Navy vessels using rotational crews on extended deployments have faced 
maintenance challenges to ensure the vessels' mission capability while 
overseas. Normally, most ship maintenance and repair is completed 
between 6-month deployments. For instance, Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers normally receive continuous maintenance[Footnote 34] 
annually and 2-month Selected Restricted Availabilities[Footnote 35] 
every 22 months. However, ships employing rotational crews on extended 
deployments do not return to the United States for periods of 12 or 
more months, so crews must maintain ship capability while deployed in 
compliance with law[Footnote 36] and Navy guidance on overseas 
maintenance (see appendix III for details on Navy guidance).
According to the Center, each Sea Swap destroyer received more 
maintenance support and more intensive support than typically received 
by ships on routine deployments. This support included numerous 
predeployment inspections and maintenance on their power, electrical, 
steering, combat, and other systems to eliminate many potential 
required maintenance activities during deployment. For example, the 
predeployment maintenance on one of the Sea Swap ships, the 
U.S.S. Fletcher, began with the identification of all time-driven 
maintenance requirements that were scheduled during the extended 
deployment. Examples included calibration, assessments, and 
inspections of equipment to renew time-driven certifications. (Such 
actions are comparable to checking a car's timing belt or inspecting 
brakes and tires before taking a long trip.) Numerous other inspections 
were also conducted prior to deployment on selected ship systems and 
equipment to identify and repair problems and ensure the good working 
order of the ship. The U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins each 
received inspections for hull, mechanical, and electrical systems, as 
well as combat systems. The U.S.S. Higgins also received inspections of 
its Aegis radar system.
Sea Swap destroyers also received overseas maintenance support beyond 
that available to ships on a typical deployment. The Surface Force 
Pacific Command sent U.S.-based ship engineering material assessment 
teams, ranging from 3 to 11 members, to perform maintenance on the 
Sea Swap destroyers while the ships transited from their operational 
area of responsibility to overseas locations where crew turnovers 
occurred. The teams also assisted the crews while the destroyers were 
in port at the crew turnover city and were comprised of senior-level 
maintainers capable of performing a variety of maintenance jobs at the 
ship's organizational[Footnote 37] and intermediate levels.[Footnote 
38] According to Navy maintenance officials, the team's presence during 
transit from the theater of operations to the Sea Swap city and in port 
facilitated the completion of preventative maintenance, particularly 
repairs associated with ship habitability. Surface Force Pacific 
Command also assigned a Sea Swap destroyer port engineer to help ship 
officials develop maintenance plans during port visits, which is not 
typical for ships on normal deployments.
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command[Footnote 39] officials also noted 
that Sea Swap destroyers experienced material degradation over time. As 
a result, both destroyers required maintenance that was not readily 
supportable during operations. Navy officials said that Sea Swap 
destroyers were given preference for port visits in support of crew 
turnovers and maintenance as compared to other ships. They also said 
that maintaining ships deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of 
responsibility for long periods would continue to be a challenge.
During our review, we found that patrol coastal ship rotational crews 
also faced challenges in maintaining ship material condition. Like the 
Sea Swap destroyers, the patrol coastal ships received system 
inspections prior to deployment. Patrol coastal port engineers and 
maintenance support teams checked key systems--such as engines, weapons 
packages, and the bridge--to hedge against wear and tear the ship would 
experience on an extended deployment. However, unlike the Sea Swap 
destroyers, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command officials indicated that 
patrol coastal ships were not given preferential treatment to support 
maintenance. The patrol coastal ship community deployed a maintenance 
support team with the crews in an effort to address overseas 
maintenance needs, however, these teams are not unique to rotational 
crewing and typically support any patrol coastal ship deployment. The 
team consisted of five members located in theater who performed limited 
maintenance, ordered and stored parts, and provided administrative 
support. The scope of the maintenance performed by the teams was 
limited to organizational, intermediate, and select depot-level 
maintenance.[Footnote 40]
According to focus groups with patrol coastal ship crews, the 
maintenance support teams were usually the only personnel in theater 
capable of rectifying frequently occurring maintenance problems. If a 
maintenance support team was not available, the crew had to contact a 
technical support representative in the United States for assistance or 
try to conduct the maintenance itself. Some patrol coastal ship 
crewmembers indicated that the size of the maintenance support teams 
was insufficient to support both patrol coastal ships on extended 
deployments and suggested expanding the maintenance support teams to be 
comparable to the system used by the Coast Guard. According to patrol 
coastal ship crews, the Coast Guard had four ships similar to the 
patrol coastal ships in theater and provided approximately 50 
maintenance personnel to perform the same function as the patrol 
coastal maintenance support team. The increased size of the Coast 
Guard's maintenance support allowed its crews to stand down and live in 
barracks during maintenance periods. By contrast, a patrol coastal 
officer noted that, during maintenance availabilities, maintenance 
support teams only assisted the crew and did not take over the work 
effort and the crews remained on board throughout the repair process 
and performed maintenance.
Full Impact of Navy Maintenance Strategy for Destroyers and Other Ships 
Using Crew Rotations Is Not Clear:
The results of the different maintenance strategies used to sustain the 
two destroyers that were apart of the Sea Swap demonstration project 
and other ships using rotational crewing are uncertain. While the 
Center judged that the condition of the U.S.S. Higgins was comparable 
to another ship that had recently returned from a routine 6-month 
deployment, others in the Navy disagreed based on inspection results. 
We did not identify any similar effort to determine the impact on the 
patrol coastal or other ships that would provide the Navy with 
additional insights into the impact of the extended deployment on their 
condition.
The Center's judgment was based in part on a total ship readiness 
assessment conducted by Pacific Fleet maintenance personnel, in which 
Surface Force Pacific officials judged the U.S.S. Higgins' ship 
material condition after a 17-month deployment to be comparable to the 
U.S.S. Decatur's. However, officials from the Fleet Technical Support 
Center Pacific that performed the assessment thought there were some 
significant differences in the condition between the two ships. These 
officials found that the U.S.S. Higgins had 697 noted deficiencies out 
of 3,370 items tested (21 percent), whereas the U.S.S. Decatur had 465 
out of 3,231 items tested (14 percent). While the number of 
deficiencies alone does not necessarily indicate the significant 
material differences between the ships, some of the items deficient on 
the U.S.S. Higgins included data links for controlling operations 
between a ship and an aircraft and another was the nonoperational extra 
high frequency communication system[Footnote 41] on the U.S.S. Higgins 
that was operational on the U.S.S. Decatur.
Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific officials also assessed the 
operational functionality of each ship's equipment and found that the 
U.S.S. Higgins was not as capable. This assessment measured the 
equipment operational capability[Footnote 42] of each ship in order to 
quantitatively determine whether the ship's systems were performing in 
accordance with Navy requirements. The assessment results showed that 
the U.S.S. Higgins received an overall score of .70, while the 
U.S.S. Decatur received a score of .85. According to the Navy handbook, 
an equipment operational capability score of 1.0 indicates the 
equipment is fully capable of performing its function as designed, 
while a score of 0 indicates the equipment is totally unable to perform 
its function as designed. The handbook provides that any score between 
.70 and .80 indicates ship equipment is unable to obtain optimum 
operational standards, while scores above .80 indicate ship equipment 
passes all operational tests.
A further breakdown of the scores indicates the U.S.S. Higgins may have 
had problems that were more serious. The .70 score for the 
U.S.S. Higgins was arrived at by assessing two categories of equipment: 
the combat system-related equipment[Footnote 43] and the hull, 
mechanical, and electrical systems-related equipment.[Footnote 44] The 
combat system-related equipment score for the U.S.S. Higgins was .77, 
while the U.S.S. Decatur received a score of .83. Since the combat 
system portion of the score was higher than the total for the 
U.S.S. Higgins, the hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment score 
was at a minimum below .70.[Footnote 45] According to the handbook, 
scores above .50 and below .70 indicate that equipment has 
significantly reduced output or restricted operability. By contrast, we 
found that the hull mechanical and electrical equipment score for the 
U.S.S. Decatur was at least .85, given an overall score of .85 and a 
combat system score of .83, which indicated that equipment was fully 
operable.
Even though it concluded that the U.S.S. Higgins' condition was 
comparable, the Center recognized the importance of maintenance to the 
success of rotational crewing and proposed the Navy further assess 
maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. Specifically, 
the Center suggested that if Sea Swap becomes a more standard practice, 
"it will be necessary to conduct a holistic review of the overall 
maintenance process, including technical services and training." This 
review would assess the responsibilities and interrelationships among 
the many players, such as the ship's force, ship repair units, port 
engineers, and ship engineering maintenance teams. In addition, the 
Center added that the Navy should conduct a careful assessment to 
determine which maintenance support aspects are essential costs and 
which are dispensable. As of July 2004, the Navy had not started such 
an assessment.
We found that the experience of other ships on extended deployments, 
such as patrol coastal ships, bore out the need for such an analysis. 
Patrol coastal ships did not receive focused maintenance comparable to 
Sea Swap destroyers, and ship officials identified several maintenance 
problems aboard one or more ships (see table 3) that were not corrected 
while deployed that could have affected their mission capability.
Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships:
Repair needed: Severe hull cracks identified on ships; 
Action needed and effect of not receiving repair: Hull needed 
reinforcement. This class of ships is prone to hull cracking in heavy 
seas. If cracks are repaired quickly, the damage can be mitigated; if 
not, more severe cracking can cause the ship to break into pieces and 
sink. Installation of hull strengthening alteration eliminates the 
cracking problem but requires drydocking.
Repair needed: Ship service diesel generator fuel system clogged; 
Action needed and effect of not receiving repair: The fuel system, 
including fuel lines, pumps, and filters, needed industrial cleaning. 
Excessive biological growth in the fuel tanks due to the environment in 
which the ships are operating causes the system to clog. The potential 
impact is the loss of ship service diesel generator control and 
electrical power.
Repair needed: Rotating crane leaked and operated erratically; 
Action needed and effect of not receiving repair: The rotating crane 
needed repairs. A rotating crane is required to launch and recover a 
ship's rubber hull inflatable boat. Continued loss of the crane's 
operational capabilities will result in a major degradation to the 
primary mission area.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of table]
Patrol coastal ships on extended deployments did not have extra 
in-theater maintenance support comparable to Sea Swap destroyers. For 
instance, patrol coastal ships did not have ship engineering 
maintenance teams to aid the crew in achieving maintenance. As a 
result, according to the maintenance support team coordinator for 
patrol coastal ships, routine continuous maintenance often could not be 
accomplished and, subsequently, the overall material condition of 
patrol coastal ships deployed overseas slowly degraded. The official 
explained that repairs authorized overseas are very narrow in scope and 
only cover maintenance absolutely necessary for the ship to conduct its 
mission. As a result, the official commented that organizational-and 
intermediate-level planned maintenance and preservation work are left 
to the crew and deployed maintenance support teams to take on over 
short periods in port, typically 5 days or less. In addition, according 
to a patrol coastal ship port engineer, each forward-deployed patrol 
coastal ship had received about 4 weeks of maintenance in port over the 
last 18 months and added that this level of maintenance does not equal 
what a traditionally deployed patrol coastal would receive. Port 
engineers and other maintenance staff noted challenges in keeping the 
patrol coastal ships operationally ready. For instance, in our focus 
group discussions with patrol coastal ship crews, they explained that 
the ship's rotating crane that launches and retrieves the ship's rigid 
inflatable boats broke down during a patrol and the ship had to rely 
upon the Coast Guard to help with its repair. A Navy official also 
explained that the extendedly deployed patrol coastal ships have a very 
high operational tempo, which also impacts the ability of the ship's 
force to conduct organizational maintenance and increases the overall 
degradation of the ship over time. The official stated that onboard 
maintenance efforts have been able to keep the patrol coastal ships 
running, but that the Navy will pay a heavy price once the ships return 
to homeport for extensive overhauls, since repairs that are more 
serious will be necessary.
The Challenge of Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Contributed 
to Crew Morale and Quality-of-Life Problems:
The Center and we found that crews expressed concern about the extra 
workload they endured to maintain high ship readiness. Specifically, 
the Center concluded that while the Sea Swap demonstration showed a 
benefit for the Navy--saving dollars and increasing forward presence--
many sailors spoke of the burdens and loss of traditions. According to 
the Center, Sea Swap crews performed more work and experienced fewer 
benefits and traditions than what may have originally drawn them to the 
Navy. For instance, the Center's report noted that some Sea Swap 
crewmembers found that the maintenance workload was high throughout the 
entire deployment. Other complaints were that whenever the Sea Swap 
ships pulled into an Arabian Gulf port, other ships' sailors left on 
liberty while the Sea Swap crews remained on board doing maintenance. 
This intense maintenance schedule was a morale problem and a frequent 
topic that arose during the Center's crew interviews.
Our focus groups with Sea Swap destroyer crews identified similar 
concerns. For instance, extra maintenance work related to painting and 
preserving the ship was left to the ship's crew to accomplish. In 
addition, Sea Swap officers in our focus groups indicated that 
unreported work and high workloads disrupted sailor quality of life and 
that there was no increase in time or resources to get maintenance 
done. They also told us that more equipment inspections by in-theater 
support teams were needed while in port. The officers explained that 
the ship's crew had to inspect and fix different equipment throughout 
the ship because in-theater support teams were not available. According 
to the Sea Swap officers and crew, this affected their quality of life 
since liberty time was reduced to accommodate ship maintenance needs.
Our focus groups with patrol coastal ship rotational crews also 
indicated that increased maintenance tasks and workloads adversely 
affected crew morale and quality of life. Patrol coastal ship senior 
chiefs told us that rotational crews had difficulty meeting ship 
preservation requirements, loading supplies, and documenting ship 
maintenance logs for non-working items during port visits of 5 days or 
less. In addition, crewmembers on each rotational patrol coastal ship 
complained that they received no liberty ports; that all port visits 
became working ports due to the ship's maintenance needs; and that, 
given the small size of the ships, they needed time away from other 
crewmembers to decompress. Furthermore, a patrol coastal ship 
commanding officer said that his deployed patrol coastal ship required 
too many maintenance demands and noted that the ship was maintenance-
intensive from the day his crew took over.
Conclusions:
Rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments appears to 
be a feasible alternative to the traditional way the Navy operates that 
could enhance its effectiveness. Successfully overcoming issues that 
could impede using this alternative and to gain support for 
implementing this change require knowledge of the various rotational 
options and their impact on operational requirements, ship condition, 
and crew morale. However, the Navy has not taken several key steps that 
could help it better plan, manage, and monitor the implementation of 
this crewing approach and therefore may not realize its full potential. 
For example, the Navy has not established the analytical framework to 
evaluate all rotational crewing options and related costs. In the 
absence of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for 
assessing feasibility, cost, and other factors, including crew quality 
of life, the Navy does not have clear criteria for deciding when to use 
rotational crewing and which option best fits the situation. 
Furthermore, until the Navy more systematically collects data on 
current and potential surface ship rotational crewing options, 
including complete and accurate cost data for cost-effectiveness 
analyses, it will lack valuable information for making informed 
decisions about the potential for applying rotational crewing to 
current and future ships as well as whether it can get maximum return 
on investment and offset billions of dollars in future total ownership 
costs.
The Navy's implementation of crew rotations also lacks effective 
guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. For example, the Navy 
does not provide guidance that specifies standard policies and 
procedures for rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and 
accountability for ship operations during crew rotations. Until it 
does, crews may continue to have problems consistently documenting ship 
condition and accounting for ship inventories during ship turnover, 
which could lead to additional work burdens on the on-coming crew and 
potentially affect readiness. Furthermore, without more formal guidance 
built on systematically collected, recorded, and disseminated lessons 
learned from all rotational experiences that specify standard policies 
and procedures, the Navy may repeat mistakes.
Finally, the Navy does not know enough about the implications of 
maintenance on ships using rotational crews as a means to extend their 
deployments. The Center for Naval Analyses noted in its report on the 
Sea Swap demonstration that if that option is to become a more standard 
practice, the Navy needs to further review the overall maintenance 
process. However, until the Navy fully assesses the additional 
maintenance demands and related crew quality-of-life issues experienced 
by all ships implementing this crewing approach, and evaluates 
alternative maintenance strategies, it runs the risk that it will 
degrade the long-term condition of ships and discourage crew support 
for rotational crewing.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that the nation's multibillion-dollar investment in Navy 
ships yields the greatest possible benefits at the lowest possible 
total cost, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretary of the Navy to take the following four actions:
* Systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost-effectiveness for 
current and potential application of several rotational crewing 
alternatives for its surface forces by:
* establishing formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for 
assessing feasibility, costs, and other factors, including crew quality 
of life, and:
* systematically collecting and developing complete and accurate cost 
data, including ship total ownership costs, in order to perform 
accurate cost-effectiveness analyses.
* Provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for 
rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability 
for ship operations during the rotation.
* Systematically collect, record, and disseminate lessons learned 
pertaining to rotational crewing in the Navy Lessons Learned System to 
enhance knowledge sharing.
* Conduct a study of the maintenance processes used for all ships 
involved in rotating crews and examine, as part of the study, 
opportunities to mitigate the crews' concerns about maintenance 
workload to improve their quality of life.
Agency Comments:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the 
recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the 
recommendations.
DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and 
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call 
me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Key 
staff members that contributed to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by: 
Janet St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable James L. Talent: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Seapower: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joel Hefley: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John M. McHugh: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Vic Snyder: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Total Force: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Gene Taylor: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Projection Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 
[End of section]
Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, also known as 
Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of the triad of 
U.S. strategic deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike 
capability. There are 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines in the 
fleet, homeported in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. Each 
submarine has about 15 officers and 140 enlisted personnel. The average 
procurement unit cost for each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine 
is $2 billion (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing 
concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a "Blue" Crew 
and a "Gold" Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship 
deploys with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2-to 3-day 
crew turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a 
Blue Crew deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat after a 
3-day turnover process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in 
conducting maintenance repairs. During the Gold Crew's patrol, the Blue 
Crew stands down and enters a training cycle in its homeport.
Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Spruance-Class Destroyer:
The DD-963 Spruance-class destroyer has multimission offensive and 
defensive capabilities, and it can operate independently or as part of 
other naval formations. These ships were developed for the primary 
mission of antisubmarine warfare. Many of these ships were subsequently 
modernized with a vertical launch system[Footnote 46] and a Tomahawk 
cruise missile capability that greatly expanded the role of the 
destroyer in strike warfare.[Footnote 47] The crew consists of 30 
officers and 352 enlisted personnel. The average procurement unit cost 
is $489.6 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
The Pacific Fleet conducted Sea Swap rotational crewing with four ships 
of this class, with the U.S.S. Fletcher being the forward-deployed 
unit. The three other destroyers were decommissioned coincident with 
the crew exchange. That is, each on-coming crew decommissioned its ship 
prior to swapping with the off-going crew of the U.S.S. Fletcher. As a 
result, after their 6-month deployment, the off-going crewmembers 
dispersed to a variety of new assignments, just as if their own ship 
were being decommissioned. Further, the Spruance-class destroyer swap 
rotation was initially planned on three ships but was extended by 
adding a fourth destroyer. As a result, the U.S.S. Fletcher remained 
deployed for over 22 months. All of the Spruance-class destroyers will 
be decommissioned by the end of fiscal year 2006.
Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile Destroyer:
The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers--first 
commissioned in July 1991, with primary homeports in San Diego and 
Norfolk--provide multimission offensive and defensive capabilities, 
operating independently or as part of other naval formations. The 
DDG-51 is equipped with the Aegis combat system, a vertical launching 
system for launching antiaircraft and Tomahawk missiles, and an 
advanced antisubmarine warfare system. Each destroyer crews 23 officers 
and 300 enlisted personnel, and has a procurement average unit cost of 
$976 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
Navy plans call for a force of 62 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile 
destroyers. At the end of fiscal year 2004, this force will total 43 
ships. The Navy is conducting a Sea Swap rotational crewing system to 
rotate entire crews from one hull to another on selected ships in the 
Naval Surface Force Pacific Command's fleet of Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers.
Figure 3: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile 
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal:
The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to 
conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in 
support of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of 
foreign shores. The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ship first entered 
into service in 1993. The patrol coastal force consists of 13 ships--4 
stationed in San Diego, California, and 9 in Little Creek, Virginia. 
The crew consists of 4 officers and 24 enlisted personnel. The 
procurement average unit cost is $19.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 
dollars).
The Navy is using a crew swap model in which the entire crew of 
28 crewmembers rotates from one hull to another. The rotations are 
occurring between patrol coastal ships in the United States and those 
deployed in the Arabian Gulf to increase operation days and reduce 
transit times. Operational requirements have delayed the 
decommissioning of 8 ships and the transfer of 5 ships equipped with 
loading ramps to the Coast Guard.
Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
High Speed Vessel Two (HSV-2) Swift:
The HSV-2 Swift is a high speed (almost 50 knots), wave-piercing 
aluminum-hulled catamaran that was acquired as an interim mine 
warfare command and support ship and a platform for conducting joint 
experimentation, including Marine Corps sea basing.[Footnote 48] The 
Navy leased and accepted delivery of the catamaran from the builder, 
Incat Australia, in Australia, in August 2003. The Swift was leased for 
1 year at a cost of $27 million, with a 4-year option ($58 million).
The Swift employs two crews of 41 members each and uses the Blue-Gold 
crewing option. The Gold Crew is based out of the Naval Amphibious Base 
Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia. It operates the ship as a joint 
experimental platform with Marine Corps troops embarked, testing 
experimental and near-shore combat ship concepts. It also conducts 
special operations warfare.[Footnote 49] The Blue Crew is based out of 
Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas. This crew operates the ship as a mine 
warfare command and control ship. The Mine Warfare Command is in charge 
of coordinating overall mission scheduling for the ship and crews. The 
crews are responsible for the ship, but not its mission equipment. Each 
command that brings modules aboard ship must supply personnel to 
operate the modules. The Swift operates on a nominal 117-day cycle 
(plus or minus 10 days), including a 3-to-4 day turnover between crews, 
with a 4-month on/4-month off cycle. Crew exchanges take place in the 
crews' respective homeports or at overseas locations.
Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Next Generation Guided Missile Destroyer, the DD(X):
The DD(X) is a next generation, multimission surface combatant ship 
tailored for land attack that has not been built. The Navy intends to 
operate the DD(X) independently or as part of other naval formations. 
The DD(X) is expected to provide precision firepower at long ranges in 
support of forces ashore using two 155-mm advanced gun systems and 
80 vertical-launch system tubes for the Tomahawk cruise missiles and 
other weapons.
For fiscal year 2005, the Navy is requesting $221 million to begin 
building the first DD(X) and $1.2 billion for research and development 
for the program. The first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in 
2012. The Navy estimates that the first DD(X) will cost about 
$2.8 billion, including about $1.0 billion in detailed design and 
nonrecurring engineering costs for the class. The Navy earlier 
indicated it was planning to procure 24 DD(X) vessels through fiscal 
year 2017, before shifting to procurement of the next generation 
cruiser in fiscal year 2018. Recently, however, the Navy indicated it 
might accelerate the start of the cruiser procurement to sometime 
between fiscal year 2011 and 2014 and reduce the number of DD(X) 
destroyers it intends to buy to between 10 to 16.
Current DD(X) design planning anticipates a crew size of 125 to 
175 persons. The procurement contract establishes the requirement to 
consider deploying ships up to 3 years and requires the design agent to 
conduct and complete an analysis of crewing options that would support 
extended forward deployments, including standard, Sea Swap, Horizon, 
and Blue-Gold crewing options. The contract also requires the design 
agent to ensure that the DD(X) system can be effectively operated with 
an optimized crew and provide the crew with the highest quality of 
life, while minimizing total ownership cost.
Figure 6: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation 
Destroyer, DD(X):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Littoral Combat Ship:
The littoral combat ship--a new class of Navy surface combatants and 
the smallest member in the DD(X) family of next generation surface 
combatant ships--is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, 
and tailored for specific missions, such as antisubmarine, antisurface, 
or mine warfare in heavily contested littoral, or near-shore, waters, 
and it will use interchangeable mission modules[Footnote 50] tailored 
for specific missions. The Navy's goal is to develop a platform that 
can be fielded in relatively large numbers to support a wide range of 
joint missions, with reconfigurable mission modules to assure access to 
the littorals for the Navy forces in the face of threats from surface 
craft, submarines, and mines. It is also expected to have the 
capability to deploy independently to overseas littoral regions and 
remain on station for extended periods either with a battle group or 
through at-sea replenishment. Baseline ship planning is for a single 
crew; rotational crewing concepts are being explored as a secondary 
option. Crew size is expected to range between 15 to 50 core 
crewmembers, which do not include the crew for the mission package.
The Navy has plans to build 56 ships, with the first to be delivered in 
fiscal year 2007 for an estimated cost of $20 billion. Each sea frame 
hull has an average unit cost of $147.5 million to $216.4 million (in 
fiscal year 2004 dollars). The mission modules' average procurement 
cost is $177 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars) per ship set. The 
resulting average cost for a littoral combat ship platform is 
$324.6 million to $393.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility 
and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and 
future classes of surface ships, we interviewed Department of Defense 
(DOD) and Navy Headquarters and fleet officials, met with cost analysis 
experts in the government and the private sector, reviewed key 
acquisition documents and crew employment plans, and reviewed 
rotational crewing studies performed for and by the Navy. Studies we 
reviewed included:
* "Future Force Operational Plan," Executive Summary of the Horizon 
Concept Generation Team, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies 
Group XVI (June 1997);
* "Crew Rotation: The MCM-1 Experience," Center for Naval Analyses (May 
1998);
* "Alternative Naval Crew Rotation Operations," Center for Naval 
Analyses (October 2001):
* "Task Force Sierra Force Structure For The Future Phase One," Naval 
War College (undated);
* "Alternative Approaches to Meet New Operational Commitments," 
Briefing by the Deep Blue Team, Chief of Naval Operations (undated);
* "Sea Swap," Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Naval War College 
(June 2003); and:
* "Sea Swap Assessment," Center for Naval Analyses (September 2004).
We also conducted meetings with several of the commanding and executive 
officers of the Sea Swap destroyers, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected 
patrol coastal ships and strategic ballistic missile submarines.
To assess whether the Navy has effectively managed rotational crewing 
on surface ships and leveraged lessons learned, we visited Naval 
Surface Force Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California; 
Submarine Group Nine Command, Bangor, Washington; Mine Warfare Command, 
Corpus Christi, Texas; and Amphibious Group Two Command, Norfolk, 
Virginia. We also met with officials from the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Naval Warfare (Plans, Policies, and Operations; Surface 
Warfare; and Submarine Warfare) to review Navy guidance and plans for 
conducting crew rotations. We also conducted over 40 focus group 
meetings with Navy officers and crews involved in crew rotations on the 
guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins, selected ballistic missile 
submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected patrol coastal ships 
(see page 58 for more information on the objective, scope, and 
methodology of the focus groups). Further, we reviewed Navy Lessons 
Learned System instructions and visited the Navy Warfare Development 
Command, Newport, Rhode Island, to query the Navy Lessons Learned 
System to determine recorded lessons learned pertaining to crew 
rotations.
To assess how ship maintenance may impact implementation of rotational 
crewing, we reviewed relevant laws and Navy regulations pertaining to 
maintenance of U.S. Navy ships. We discussed ship material condition 
and associated sailor workload in over 25 focus groups with crews from 
the Sea Swap guided missile destroyers and from selected patrol coastal 
ships that had participated in crew rotations. We also obtained ship 
material condition assessments, called Total Ship Readiness 
Assessments, for the U.S.S. Higgins and the U.S.S. Decatur. We 
discussed the methodology and results of the assessments with officials 
from the Fleet Technical Support Center, San Diego, California; the 
Southwest Regional Maintenance Center, Commander Pacific Fleet, San 
Diego, California; the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division, 
Corona, California; and the Naval Surface Force Pacific, San Diego, 
California. We met with and obtained maintenance guidance and reports 
from Navy officials at Combined Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, 
Virginia; Surface Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Surface Force 
Pacific, San Diego, California; Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, 
Hawaii; Amphibious Group Two Command, Little Creek, Virginia; and 
maintenance experts in the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Washington, D.C. We also obtained written responses to our 
questions from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. In addition, we 
reviewed the Center for Naval Analyses's Sea Swap Assessment report and 
discussed the report's findings with officials from the Center.
To compare reenlistment rates for crews on Sea Swap guided missile 
destroyers and non-Sea Swap guided missile destroyers in the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, we obtained Unit Honor Roll reports, derived from the 
Enlisted Master File, from the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, 
Hawaii. We did not analyze Spruance-class destroyer data for two 
reasons: (1) we did not conduct focus groups with these crews and (2) 
the rotational crewing experience was not as complete or complicated as 
that experienced by crews on Arleigh Burke-class guided missile 
destroyers. Based upon discussions with Pacific Fleet officials we also 
excluded selected ship crews from our non-Sea Swap guided missile ship 
analysis because we wanted the ships we analyzed to reflect the 
standard ship and crew option as closely as possible. The ships and 
crews we excluded were: (1) precommissioning crews because of their 
small sample sizes and nondeployed status, (2) the U.S. Milius and its 
crew because it was an optimal manning experiment ship, and (3) the 
U.S. Paul Hamilton because this crew was on an extended, 10-month 
deployment. We compiled reenlistment averages for the ships we analyzed 
in 6-month blocks that roughly corresponded with Sea Swap guided 
missile destroyer program and crew deployments, beginning November 1, 
2001, and ending on April 30, 2004, and that included pre-deployment, 
deployment and post-deployment data for these crews.
While we did not validate the casualty report and sailor reenlistment 
data used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD officials to 
determine that the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We 
did validate the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the 
data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our 
review from July 2003 through July 2004 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards.
Focus Groups with Crews on Rotational Crewing Ships:
We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship officers 
and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations. Focus 
groups involve structured small group discussions designed to gain more 
in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be 
obtained from single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group 
methodologies, our design included multiple groups with varying group 
characteristics but some homogeneity--such as rank and responsibility-
-within groups. Each group involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions 
were held in a structured manner, guided by a moderator who used a 
standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their 
thoughts and experiences. Our overall objective in using a focus group 
approach was to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine 
and ship officers and enlisted personnel involved in crew rotations.
Scope of Our Focus Groups:
To gain broad perspectives, we conducted over 40 separate focus group 
sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted 
personnel involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer 
U.S.S. Higgins, selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, 
and selected patrol coastal ships. Table 4 identifies the composition 
of the focus groups on each of the vessels. Across focus groups, 
participants were selected to ensure a wide distribution of officers, 
enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship departments. GAO analysts 
traveled to each naval station to conduct the majority of the focus 
groups. Six of the focus groups were conducted on board the 
U.S.S. Higgins while it transited to its homeport after its extended 
deployment.
Table 4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform:
Personnel groups: Junior enlisted personnel; 
Strategic submarines: 3; 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 6; 
Patrol coastal ships: 3; 
HSV-2 Swift: 2; 
Total groups: 14.
Personnel groups: Lead petty officers; 
Strategic submarines: 4; 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 3; 
Patrol coastal ships: -; 
HSV-2 Swift: 1; 
Total groups: 8.
Personnel groups: Chief petty officers; 
Strategic submarines: 1; 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 3; 
Patrol coastal ships: -; 
HSV-2 Swift: 1; 
Total groups: 5.
Personnel groups: Senior enlisted personnel; 
Strategic submarines: 1; 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: -; 
Patrol coastal ships: 2; 
HSV-2 Swift: 1; 
Total groups: 4.
Personnel groups: Officers; 
Strategic submarines: 2; 
Arleigh Burke- class destroyers: 3; 
Patrol coastal ships: 3; 
HSV-2 Swift: 1; 
Total groups: 9.
Personnel groups: Advanced party; 
Strategic submarines: -; 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 3; 
Patrol coastal ships: -; 
HSV-2 Swift: -; 
Total groups: 3.
Personnel groups: Total; 
Strategic submarines: 11; 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 18; 
Patrol coastal ships: 8; 
HSV-2 Swift: 6; 
Total groups: 43. 
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Methodology for Our Focus Groups:
A guide was developed to assist the moderator in leading the 
discussions. The guide helped the moderator address several topics 
related to crew rotations: training, maintenance, infrastructure and 
operations, management and oversight, readiness, crew characteristics, 
quality of life, lessons learned, and overall satisfaction with the 
rotational crewing experience. Each focus group discussion began with 
the moderator describing the purpose of our study and explaining how 
focus groups work. Participants were assured anonymity of their 
responses, in that names would not be directly linked to their 
responses in write-ups of the sessions and that all of the responses 
for the session would be summarized. The participants were then asked 
open-ended questions about the impact of crew rotations on each of the 
topics. All focus group questions were moderated by a GAO analyst who 
was assisted by a GAO subject matter expert, while two assistants took 
notes.
Content Analysis:
We performed a systematic content analysis of the open-ended responses 
in order to categorize and summarize participants' experiences with 
crew rotations. Based on the primary topics developed in the focus 
group guide, individual GAO analysts reviewed the responses from one of 
the crews and created their own respective lists of subcategories 
within each of the primary focus group topics. The analysts then met 
collectively to generate a proposed list of topic primary categories 
and subcategories.
To ensure inter-rater reliability, one of our analysts reviewed the 
responses from each vessel type and assigned each comment to a 
corresponding category. Another analyst also reviewed each response and 
independently assigned the same comment to a corresponding category. 
Any comments that were not assigned to the same category were then 
reconciled and adjudicated by the two analysts, which led to the 
comments being placed into one or more of the resulting categories. 
Agreement regarding each placement was reached between at least two 
analysts. All initial disagreements regarding placement into categories 
were discussed and reconciled. The responses in each category were then 
used in our evaluation of how the Navy's experiences with rotational 
crewing have been effectively managed and the effect of maintenance 
overseas on ships homeported in the United States during extended 
deployments.
Limitations of Focus Groups:
Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the 
extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population, 
(2) develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make 
decisions about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically 
representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, 
they are intended to generate in-depth information about the focus 
group participants' reasons for the attitudes held toward specific 
topics and to offer insights into the range of concerns and support for 
an issue.
The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is 
limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of 
Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel from more than 40 selected 
groups. Second, while the composition of the groups was designed to 
assure a distribution of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, 
and ship departments, the groups were not randomly sampled. Third, 
participants were asked questions about their specific experiences with 
crew rotations. The experiences of other Navy ship officers and 
personnel involved in crew rotations, who did not participate in our 
focus group, may have varied.
Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups, 
but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and 
support our conclusions to objectives two and three.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance 
Implementing 10 U.S.C. 7310:
Department of the Navy guidance related to the implementation of 
Title 10, United States Code, section 7310(a) restrictions on overseas 
maintenance, or that define terms used in the law, is noted below.
Chief of Naval Operations:
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4700.7K (July 2003), "Maintenance 
Policy for U.S. Navy Ships," defines voyage repairs as "corrective 
maintenance of mission-or safety-essential items necessary for a ship 
to deploy or to continue on its deployment."
Naval Sea Systems Command:
Naval Sea Systems Command Fleet Modernization Program Management and 
Operations Manual (June 2002, Rev. 2), SL720-AA-MAN-010, Glossary, 
defines voyage repairs as "emergency work necessary to repair damage 
sustained by a ship to enable the ship to continue on its mission and 
which can be accomplished without requiring a change in the ship's 
operating schedule or the general streaming notice in effect."
Military Sealift Command:
Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 4700.15A 
(February 2, 2000), "Accomplishing Ship Repair in Foreign Shipyards," 
states that voyage repairs include:
* corrective maintenance on mission or safety essential items necessary 
for a ship to deploy, to continue on its deployment, or comply with 
regulatory requirements;
* scheduled maintenance, only to the extent that said maintenance is 
absolutely necessary to ensure machinery and equipment operational 
reliability or comply with regulatory requirements; and:
* voyage repairs do not include corrective maintenance actions that may 
be deferred until the next scheduled regular overhaul and drydocking 
availability in the United States or Guam without degrading operational 
readiness, habitability standards, or personnel safety, or adversely 
impacting regulatory compliance.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix.
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this 
report.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
OCT 25 2004:
Ms. Janet Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and 
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational 
Crewing, "dated September 23, 2004 (GAO Code 350383/GAO-05-10).
DoD concurs with the draft report. Responses to the four GAO 
recommendations and additional comments to the draft report are 
contained in Enclosure (1).
Sincerely,
Signed by: 
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosure:
1. Department of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 GAO CODE 350383/GAO-05-10:
"FORCE STRUCTURE: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide 
Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to systematically evaluate the 
feasibility and cost-effectiveness for current and potential 
application of several rotational crewing alternatives for it surface 
forces by:
* Establishing formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for 
assessing feasibility, costs and other factors, including crew quality 
of life;
* Systematically collecting and developing complete and accurate cost 
data, including ship total ownership costs, in order to perform 
accurate cost-effectiveness analysis. (Page 41/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Navy should 
systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost effectiveness of 
various alternative crewing schemes prior to making decisions that will 
impact force structure. Established metrics, along with a systematic 
process to collect and assess program objectives, will allow for the 
accurate analysis of alternative rotational crewing options.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to provide guidance that specifies 
standard policies and procedures for rotating crews to ensure 
consistent management of and accountability for ship operations during 
the rotation. (Page 41 /GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. Standard policies 
and procedures are required to ensure consistent management and 
accountability for ships during crew rotations. The Sea Swap Experiment 
facilitated the collection of data and lessons learned to develop and 
validate the policies and procedures to be used in rotational crewing. 
It also demonstrated the ability to conduct Sea Swap over a long period 
in an operational environment. Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic 
is in the process of developing these for the ongoing Patrol Craft (PC) 
Sea Swap program as well as the upcoming Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) 
Sea Swap.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to systematically collect, record, and 
disseminate lessons learned pertaining to rotational crewing in the 
Navy Lesson Learned System in order to enhance knowledge sharing. (Page 
41/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs that capturing Lessons Learned is an 
important process for any new initiative. Commander, Naval Surface 
Force has collected Lessons Learned and is in the process of collating 
them into the Navy Lessons Learned Data Base. These Lessons Learned 
have been "pushed" to ships involved in future Sea Swaps.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a study of the maintenance 
processes used for all ships involved in rotating crews, and examine as 
part of the study opportunities to mitigate the crews' concerns about 
maintenance workload to improve their quality of life. (Page 41/GAO 
Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Navy is 
continuing its review of ship rotational crewing, to include all 
maintenance processes used to support deployed Surface Force units in 
support of voyage repairs, requirements to comply with Title 10 USC and 
other governing directives and maintenance workload. To-date, 
Commander, Naval Surface Force experience with Sea Swap hulls has 
proven implemented maintenance processes were and are sufficient to 
support the continuance of a successful Sea Swap program.
DoD Additional RESPONSES:
Pages 8/20: The statement "while the Navy did not assess the rates for 
participants in rotational crewing, we found that reenlistments were 
generally lower on the Sea Swap destroyers compared to comparable 
Pacific Fleet ships" and the reenlistment data collected by Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA) is only for the period of deployment and does not 
tell the whole story. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has 
not seen the reenlistment data collected by GAO and would welcome its 
delivery for comparative review. This data is significantly different 
from that analyzed by Commander, Naval Surface Force for retention on 
Sea Swap ships. Commander, Naval Surface Force did collect Zone A 
reenlistment data from all seven destroyer Sea Swap crews as well as 
all Pacific Fleet destroyers that deployed during the same time as the 
Sea Swap. This data covered the entire deployment period, as well as 
six months immediately following deployment. The results were: 
Destroyer Sea Swap Crews: 124 sailors reenlisted out 199 sailors 
eligible for a total Zone A reenlistment rate of 62.3%. Pacific Fleet 
destroyers deploying during the Destroyer Sea Swap period (USS DECATUR, 
USS MILIUS, USS LASSEN, USS OKANE, USS HOPPER, and USS FITZGERALD) had 
129 sailors reenlist out of 212 eligible for a total Zone A 
reenlistment rate of 60.8%. This data is per the Navy Enlisted Master 
File. Also of note is that the CNA study found the retention statistics 
inconclusive and struck it from its final report.
Page 17: With regards to the returning material condition between USS 
HIGGINS and USS DECATUR, concur that this data must be further examined 
to see what lessons learned are available to improve maintenance 
strategies. This study should be conducted in close coordination with 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).
Page 18: With regards to the upcoming January 2005 Board of Inspection 
and Survey (INSURV) inspection of USS HIGGINS, when compared to other 
Sea Swap ships, particular attention must be focused on when the 
inspection is conducted, and results weighed accordingly. The process 
of reviewing the material condition of Sea Swap ships must be 
standardized, ensuring that same type equipment are inspected to obtain 
better comparisons between ships of the same class.
Page 33: The increased maintenance received by Sea Swap ships prior to 
deployment is not unreasonable, however, a clearly defined process must 
be established to delineate those increased requirements above what a 
normal deployer receives and not an adhoc process. Additionally, the 
increased maintenance requirement must be properly identified and 
budgeted for.
Nonconcur with the statement "Moreover, both the Center and our focus 
groups with rotational crews found that increased maintenance tasks 
contributed to diminished crew morale." There are many other factors 
beside organizational level maintenance workload which contribute to a 
decline in Sailors' morale. The connection between increased workload 
and crew morale do not justify the overall conclusion drawn in the 
draft report.
Page 34: There is no reason to revise Title 10 requirements to restrict 
repairs for naval vessels outside the United States based on where the 
ship is home ported and the nature of the repairs to be performed. 
Current and evolving maintenance strategies are adequate to meet 
operational commitments.
Page 39: Crew's concerns over quality of life impacts due to Sea Swap 
driven maintenance workload are not well quantified but are a continued 
area of interest for the Commander, Naval Surface Force Maintenance 
community. As a mitigating factor during the FLETCHER and HIGGINS Sea 
Swap experiments, Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific opted to 
"push" limited equipment grooming and assessment CONUS teams in-
theater to assist ship's force. The tasks of these teams were to assist 
in both identifying maintenance issues and accomplishing ship's force 
maintenance actions. (Hence, improve the quality of life of ship's 
force personnel from the perspective of maintenance workload.) During 
the evolution of this experiment, select commanding officers elected to 
cancel these support visits due to confidence in their crews to be 
self-sufficient in these matters. Both approaches achieved satisfactory 
results in meeting operational requirements. Due to this lesson 
learned, Commander, Naval Surface Force approach to future Sea Swap 
events will be to shift from a "push" to a "pull" process and allow 
the respective crew to take the lead in identifying the requirement for 
such assistance.
Page 44: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates the "average 
unit procurement cost for each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine 
is $2 Billion (in Fiscal Year 2004 dollars)." The report does not state 
that the average unit procurement cost for the each Ohio-class SSBN is 
based on the initial acquisition cost inflated to FY2004 dollars. In 
the data submission for the report, NAVSEA SEA017 indicated, "The 
inflated initial acquisition cost is not to be interpreted as a 
replacement cost. A replacement value for the specific ship would have 
to take into account changes in productivity, specifications, 
legislative, and contracting environment."
Page 45: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates that the 
"average unit procurement cost for a Spruance-class destroyer is $489.6 
million (in Fiscal Year 2004 dollars)." The report does not state that 
the average unit procurement cost for a Spruance-class destroyer is 
based on the initial acquisition cost inflated to FY2004 dollars. In 
the data submission for the report NAVSEA SEA017 indicated that "The 
inflated initial acquisition cost is not to be interpreted as a 
replacement cost. A replacement value for the specific ship would have 
to take into account changes in productivity, specifications, 
legislative, and contracting environment."
Page 46: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates that the Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyer"has a procurement average unit cost of $976 
million (in Fiscal Year 2004 dollars)." In the data submission for the 
report, NAVSEA SEA017 indicated that the DDG 51 Program Office required 
the $976M DDG Program AUC be implied with the statement "Program 
Average Unit Costs estimates have been base-lined in FY04 dollars for 
comparison purposes."
Page 47: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates that the 
"procurement average unit cost is $19.4 million (in Fiscal Year 2004 
dollars)" for a Cyclone-class patrol coastal ship. The report does not 
state that the average unit procurement cost for a Cyclone-class PC is 
based on the initial acquisition cost inflated to FY2004 dollars. In 
the data submission for the report, NAVSEA SEA017 indicated, "The 
inflated initial acquisition cost is not to be interpreted as a 
replacement cost. A replacement value for the specific ship would have 
to take into account changes in productivity, specifications, 
legislative, and contracting environment." 
GAO's Comments:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter 
dated October 25, 2004.
1. We have added a discussion of the methodology we used in our Sea 
Swap destroyer reenlistment analysis. See appendix II.
2. No change needed in report.
3. No change needed in report.
4. We agree that expanded scope predeployment inspections and 
maintenance for ships scheduled for extended deployments are prudent. 
We also agree that ships scheduled for extended deployments would 
benefit from a clearly defined process to delineate those increased 
requirements.
5. Our report noted that increased maintenance tasks contributed to 
diminished crew morale. We agree with DOD's comment that many other 
factors also contributed to the diminished morale for sailors crewing 
on rotational crewing ships.
6. Our report did not recommend revising Title 10 requirements.
7. No change needed in report.
8. No change needed in report.
9. No change needed in report.
10. No change needed in report.
11. No change needed in report.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
Jim Bancroft, Kelly Baumgartner, Larry Bridges, Lee Cooper, Corrie 
Dodd-Burtch, Joseph Kirschbaum, Kate Lenane, Elizabeth Morris, Richard 
Payne, Charles Perdue, Terry Richardson, Roderick Rodgers, Bill 
Russell, Rebecca Shea, Jennifer Thomas, Julie Tremper, John Van Schaik, 
and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Operational on-station days are defined as those days a ship spends 
forwardly deployed in the designated theater of operations.
[2] The Navy's Mine Warfare Command is responsible for developing and 
evaluating mine warfare doctrine, tactics, and equipment. The Command 
also ensures readiness of mine warfare forces to conduct offensive and 
defensive mine warfare operations through training and operational 
experience.
[3] The U.S. Pacific Fleet provides trained and combat-ready naval 
forces to combatant commanders. Pacific Fleet ships are at sea in the 
Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans, from the west coast of the United 
States to the Arabian Gulf. The Pacific Fleet encompasses approximately 
200 ships, 2,000 aircraft, and over 239,000 sailors, Marines, and 
civilians.
[4] The Center for Naval Analyses is the Department of the Navy's 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center. The Center's analysts 
provide direct support to operating forces and senior staffs across the 
spectrum of Navy and Marine Corps activities.
[5] The mission of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet is to provide combat-ready 
naval forces and to ensure that those forces are supplied the 
leadership, manpower, equipment, maintenance, training, and material 
needed to perform their assigned missions. The Fleet commander 
determines readiness and training requirements for assigned forces and 
ensures that deploying units meet prescribed readiness standards.
[6] Total ownership costs include the costs to research, develop, 
acquire, own, operate, maintain, and dispose of weapon and support 
systems; the costs of other equipment and real property; the costs to 
recruit, retrain, separate, and otherwise support military and civilian 
personnel; and all other costs of DOD's business operations.
[7] "National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 - 
A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow," The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.
[8] Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval 
Operations, before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 10, 
2004.
[9] For the purposes of this report, we are not including Navy ships 
operated by the Military Sealift Command and crewed by civilian 
mariners. The Command provides sea transportation of equipment, fuel, 
supplies and ammunition to sustain U.S. forces worldwide during 
peacetime and in war.
[10] A ship based in San Diego, California, would spend a greater 
portion of its deployment in-transit to the Persian Gulf-operating area 
than a ship based in Norfolk, Virginia, because of the distance. As a 
result, a ship based in San Diego may spend about 14 percent of its 
time in the Persian Gulf area whereas a ship based in Norfolk would 
spend closer to 20 percent of its time in the Persian Gulf area.
[11] Surface ships are continuously having their combat and other 
systems upgraded or replaced so maintaining "identical" configurations 
is a challenge. Also, despite surface ships with the same "design" 
being built within years of each other, no two ships are exactly alike 
and even more differences are likely when these ships are built in 
different shipyards.
[12] The HSV-2 Swift is a high-speed aluminum-hulled catamaran acquired 
as an interim mine warfare command and control ship. For a picture and 
details on the ship, see appendix I.
[13] The DD(X) is the Navy's next generation, multimission destroyer, 
tailored for land attack missions.
[14] Center for Naval Analyses, Sea Swap Assessment (Alexandria, 
Virginia: September 2004).
[15] Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, located in San 
Diego, California, ensures surface ships of the Pacific Fleet are 
properly trained, maintained, and crewed to support military 
operations. The Command is responsible for the readiness of 81 ships, 
including cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships, 
logistics, and fleet support ships.
[16] The littoral combat ship will be a new class of Navy surface 
combatants. It is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and 
tailored for specific missions such as antisubmarine, antisurface, or 
mine warfare in heavily contested coastal area waters, and will use 
interchangeable mission modules tailored for specific missions.
[17] The Government Performance and Results Act offers a model for 
developing an effective management framework to improve the likelihood 
of implementing initiatives and assessing results.
[18] Known as a trials and material inspection, this more stringent 
inspection is conducted by an independent Navy organization whose 
responsibilities include conducting material inspections of all naval 
ships at least once every 3 years, if practicable, for the purpose of 
determining and reporting upon a ship's fitness for further service and 
material conditions that limit her capability to carry out assigned 
missions and periodically ascertaining and reporting on the material 
condition and performance capabilities or limitations of Navy ships.
[19] Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4770.5F, May 29, 1991, 
"General Instructions for Inactive Ships and Craft," states that a 
Board of Inspection and Survey will inspect a ship to determine and 
document the material condition of the ship prior to inactivation.
[20] These sailors are commonly called first termers. These enlisted 
personnel eligible for reenlistment are from what DOD calls "Zone A" 
and cover reenlistments falling between 17 months and 6 years of active 
service. This group was selected as a proxy for crew morale because the 
personnel are less likely to reenlist if their experience is not good 
since they have little investment in a career at this point. Sailors 
with more than 6 years of experience are more likely to remain in the 
Navy.
[21] Based on our request, the Navy provided reenlistment data for all 
DDG-51 class ships by 6-month increments from 11/1/01 through 4/30/04. 
We excluded from our analysis two ships that experienced low 
reenlistment rates, the U.S.S. Milius, a ship experimenting with 
reduced manning, and the U.S.S. Paul Hamilton, a ship that was on an 
extended 10-month deployment, because we wanted to compare destroyers 
on normal deployments with destroyers in the Sea Swap initiative.
[22] "Navy On-Station Enhancement Options," Statement of Rear Admiral 
(Lower Half) Miles B. Wachendorf, U.S. Navy, Director, Strategy & 
Policy Division, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sea Power 
Subcommittee (March 19, 2002).
[23] Department of Defense Manual 5000.4-M, "Cost Analysis Guidance and 
Procedures," December 1992.
[24] Amphibious Group Two provides squadrons, ships, and supporting 
elements that are manned, trained, and materially and operationally 
ready to deploy. The Group, part of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, is located 
in Norfolk, Virginia. The Group has responsibility for the patrol 
coastal ships.
[25] The Trident Training Facility provides basic, advanced, 
functional, refresher, and team training to ballistic missile submarine 
officers and crews in order to build competence and proficiency in 
operating and maintaining these submarines.
[26] This concept is generally referred to as an "integrated crew 
refit."
[27] This type of training is commonly called difference training.
[28] Sea Swap cities are the cities where destroyer crew rotations took 
place.
[29] Examples include classified and hazardous items, security type 
medical supplies such as narcotics, laptop computers, depot level 
repairables, and maintenance assistance modules.
[30] Criteria for submitting a lesson learned include one or more of 
the following: (1) identify problem areas, issues, or requirements, and 
if known, recommend solutions; (2) contribute new information on 
existing or experimental tactics, techniques, procedures, policy, or 
doctrine; (3) provide an innovative technique or a procedure that 
successfully accomplishes the task; and/or (4) provide information of 
interest in planning, execution, application, or employment of an 
organization, system, process, or procedure.
[31] The site can be accessed from the Command Web page at 
www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil.
[32] Ships homeported overseas are considered part of the Forward 
Deployed Naval Forces. This force structure is negotiated with each 
respective host nation, with each host nation having ultimate decision 
authority regarding U.S. vessels assigned to their port. Therefore, if 
ships on extended deployment were considered homeported overseas, 
negotiations with the pertinent host nation would be required prior to 
starting each deployment.
[33] S. Rept. No. 108-46, at 309 (2003).
[34] Continuous maintenance is surface ship depot level work performed 
while in port to keep ship systems fully operational between scheduled 
shipyard maintenance periods.
[35] Selected Restricted Availability is defined as a short, labor-
intensive industrial period for the accomplishment of maintenance and 
selected modernization.
[36] Title 10, United States Code, section 7310(a) restricts repairs of 
naval vessels outside the United States based on where the ship is 
homeported and the nature of the repairs to be performed. Specifically, 
any naval vessel or any other vessel under the jurisdiction of the 
Secretary of the Navy with its homeport in the United States may not be 
overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a shipyard outside the United 
States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs. Under Navy 
guidance, voyage repairs generally consist of emergency work that is 
necessary to enable a ship to continue its mission and that can be 
accomplished without a change to the ship's deployment schedule.
[37] Organizational (shipboard) maintenance consists of corrective and 
preventive maintenance, which is performed by the ship's crew on its 
assigned equipment. Repairs normally consist of inspecting, servicing, 
lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and 
subassemblies.
[38] Intermediate maintenance consists of preventive and corrective 
maintenance, which is the responsibility of and performed by qualified 
personnel with specialized facilities such as fleet support activities. 
Repairs normally consist of calibration, repair or replacement of 
damaged or unserviceable parts or assemblies, and emergency manufacture 
of nonavailable parts.
[39] U.S. Naval Forces Central Command supports all naval operations in 
the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. This area includes the 
Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean.
[40] Depot-level maintenance consists of maintenance performed by 
designated maintenance activities to support organizational-and 
intermediate-level maintenance activities by the use of more extensive 
ship facilities, equipment, and personnel of higher technical skill. 
Repairs may consist of inspection, test, repair, modification, 
alteration, modernization, conversion, overhaul, and rebuild of parts, 
assemblies, subassemblies, equipment end items, and weapon systems. 
Depot-level maintenance is normally accomplished in fixed shops, 
shipyards, and other shore-based facilities, or by depot field teams.
[41] This communications system connects ships, submarines, and shore 
facilities. The system enables survivable, worldwide command and 
control communications to strategic and tactical naval forces through 
all levels of conflict.
[42] The readiness of ship equipment is quantified with a value called 
an Equipment Operational Capability score. The score is a number 
between 0 and 1, which is assigned to the lowest level of equipment 
being tested and reflects its ability to pass selected planned 
maintenance system tests and provide functional capability, as 
perceived by the assessing technician.
[43] Combat system-related equipment consists of command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence systems, detection 
systems, electromagnetic compatibility systems, guns, launchers, and 
other fire control systems as well as supporting equipment.
[44] Hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment examples include items 
related to a ship's engine and propulsion systems, safety equipment, 
and habitability systems such as air conditioners.
[45] We were able to obtain the combat system-related equipment scores 
for both ships, however, the Navy did not report a total hull, 
mechanical, and electrical system score.
[46] A vertical launch system is a missile storage and firing system 
aboard a ship that enables the vessel to perform multiple warfighting 
capabilities, including antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, ship 
self-defense, strike warfare, and antisurface warfare.
[47] Strike warfare is the use of tactical aircraft and/or cruise 
missile strikes against land targets in an offensive power projection 
role.
[48] Sea basing is the concept of placing capabilities critical to 
joint and coalition operational success, such as offensive and 
defensive firepower, maneuver forces, command and control, and 
logistics, at sea.
[49] The five principal mission areas of special operations are 
unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign 
internal defense, and combating terrorism.
[50] Mission packages would provide the main warfighting capability and 
functionality for specific missions and would consist of a combination 
of manned and unmanned off-board vehicles, deployable sensors, and 
mission manning detachments. A mission module would be used in multiple 
mission packages and, conversely, several mission modules would 
constitute a mission package. Mission modules are typically used to 
transport, support and house mission components (sensors or weapons), 
which would, in turn, be deployable or stationary aboard the ship.
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