U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Department of Justice Logo

311: Building a System for Police Non-Emergency Calls

A Case Study of the Orange County, Florida,
Government Service Center

Image of woman responding to call
Map of Florida with Orange County highlighted

Prepared by

Stephen T. Holmes
University of Central Florida
May 2007

This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement 2000-CK-WX-K115, 
awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. 
Department of Justice.  The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of 
Justice.  References to specific companies, products, or services should not be 
considered an endorsement of a product by the author(s) or the U.S. Department 
of Justice.  Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of 
the issues.

Any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation are those of the author and are not 
the responsibility of the Orange County Sheriffs Office or the COPS Office.

Acknowledgments

Special recognition is bestowed on Orange County Mayor Richard Crotty and the 
Orange County Commissioners for their understanding of the issues; County 
Administrator Ajit Lalchandani; and the many other county staff who provided a 
great deal of support, time, energy, and direction throughout this process.  

Thanks to Orange County Sheriff Kevin Beary.  Without his vision recognizing the 
need for a 311 Center in Orange County, none of this would have been possible.  

Our sincere appreciation goes to Debra Cohen, Ph.D., with the U.S. Department 
of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), for her 
guidance and advice during the entire process.   

Special thanks go to Marilyn Ward.  As the manager of the Public Safety 
Communications Division, Marilyn Ward was consistently the driving factor and 
visionary behind this project.  She worked long hours, and her incessant energy 
helped get this project off the ground.

Lorenzo Williams, Vicki Pegram, and all employees of the Government Service 
Center also deserve special recognition. These individuals were part of the 
project from its very inception and were primarily responsible for the centers 
implementation.  Without the dedication and belief in this project by the staff of 
the Government Service Center, it is questionable whether this project would 
ever have become a reality.

Jeffery Templeton of the Orange County Sheriffs Office also deserves credit for 
his efforts in facilitating the work of this project.  He was responsible for its 
implementation and making sure all timelines were met.  These efforts included 
editing the various drafts and prodding the chief author to make sure that the 
document was completed in a timely manner.  Very few people saw or could 
really appreciate all of his work behind the scenes to keep the project moving 
forward.  He was truly one of this projects unsung heroes.  

Finally, this report could not have been completed without the full cooperation of 
the men and women of the Orange County Public Safety Communications 
Division who helped lead and guide this project since its inception.  This program 
began almost 7 years ago and finally became a reality in 2006.  In that time, the 
leadership of this division changed hands; however, none of the managers of this 
division ever wavered in their support of the Government Service Center.  For 
that, kudos go again to Marilyn Ward, Carol Burkett (interim manager), and Tom 
Sorley.

Stephen T. Holmes, Ph.D.
University of Central Florida
Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies
sholmes@mail.ucf.edu 
407.823.2603

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Chapter I: Need for 311..........................................................i

Chapter II: Choosing the Model...................................................1

Chapter III: Partnerships
Political and Financial Fallout..................................................3

Chapter IV: Developing the Government Service Center Model.......................13
Rapid Consolidation of the Pilot ProjectTasks and Administrative 
Planning for ConversionA Series of Unfortunate Events: Hurricane 
Season 2004 Public EducationRefocusing the Efforts of the GSC

Chapter V: The Government Service Center.........................................21
Time-and-Effort Study of the Government Service CenterCall Processing and 
the Communications Loop...Alternative Forms of Communication from Citizens: 
Web/E-Mail InquiriesThe Current Focus of the Government Service Center

Chapter VI: Equipment and Technology: Call Routing and Call Tracking.............25
Growing Pains: Hardware and Software RequirementsThe Call Routing 
Process During Normal Operations The Call Routing Process During 
Emergency OperationsThe Knowledge BaseINFOMAPGeo 911 Mapping

Chapter VII: Staffing the Government Service Center..............................31
The Hurricanes and Additional PersonnelThe Staffing ScheduleStaff 
Development and Personnel Policies

Chapter VIII: Staff Training and Continuing Education............................35

Chapter IX: Lessons Learned......................................................37

Introduction
In almost every major metropolitan area, city planners and police personnel have 
witnessed times when citizens calls for service exceed the resources of police 
agencies and emergency communications centers. Whether it is a storm, natural 
disaster, terror plot, or simply an active weekend evening, citizens expect a 
timely response when they call 911.  Citizens themselves are not to blame for 
their high expectations.  They often pay special assessments to police agencies 
or are levied a special fee for these services.  Regardless of the nature of the 
calls, citizens expect answers and want services from their government in times 
of crisis.

The native population of Orange County, located in east central Florida, is an 
estimated 1.23 million citizens within the 907 square mile jurisdictional limits.  
The population fluctuates tremendously depending on the season and the 
number of tourists vacationing in the area.  During peak season, for example, the 
population in the region can reach as many as 3 million people.  While many 
other cities also have large numbers of tourists visiting their area, Orlando is said 
to be the number one tourist destination in the United States and one of the top 
three in the world.  Common vacation destinations include Disney World, Sea 
World, and Universal Studios. 

The size of the population, including its visitors, compounds even further the 
Orange County governments ability to respond to calls for service.   When a 
thunder storm hits, residents routinely lose power and many traffic signals 
malfunction.  Since many people staying in the area are unfamiliar with the 
contact numbers of the local power, telephone, or other utility companies, they 
often call 911 out of convenience.  These calls place an unnecessary burden on 
Orange Countys Emergency Communications Center and many callers wait 
minutes before their concerns can be addressed.    

Inevitably, situations arise when a citizen calls 911 in a true emergency and he or 
she is not able to receive the anticipated service.  Such was the case in August 
1999 when 911 lag time was blamed for the death of citizen in Orange County. 
When the local news media caught wind of the story, there was much public 
outcry.  The 911 tapes were played on the evening news and a series of stories 
appeared in the Orlando Sentinel concerning the lag time between when calls to 
911 were placed and answered.  The article stated that on a given day, as many 
as 50 calls to 911 rang for more than 10 seconds, and many remained 
unanswered for as long as a minute.

In response, Sheriff Kevin Beary proposed three solutions.  First, he said he 
would raise the salaries of 911 operators by 5 percent, then 3 percent the 
following year.  This would ensure that more qualified staff would be attracted to 
the profession.  Second, he stated that he would hire additional call takers.  This 
solution would alleviate the burden within the agency.  And third, he would 
implement a non-emergency 311 system to eliminate some of the pressure on 
the overburdened 911 system.

Cases like this illustrate the need for an alternative to the 911 system that 
citizens can call to receive service from their local government in non-emergency 
situations.  

The goal of the police and any emergency communications center is to provide 
timely and prompt service to citizens in times of need.  Coupled with that is the 
goal of county governments to provide seamless service to its citizens 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week.  For these reasons, the Orange County Board of 
Commissioners and the Orange County Sheriffs Office decided that 
implementing a 311 system was the only way to provide the level of service that 
its citizens expected.

Chapter I: Need for 311

Goals of the Government Service Center/311 System
-Improve operational efficiency of 911
-Provide seamless government service
-Provide a low-cost alternative to increasing the capacity of the 911 center
-Limit liability from not meeting mandatory performance minimums
-Decrease the cost of providing the existing level of service to county 
residents through call center consolidation.

Improving the operating efficiency of the 911 system was the major impetus for 
developing the 311 system in Orange County;  however, that was not the only 
reason.  Many other objectives were considered, including providing seamless 
service and information to county residents, delaying the need to add additional 
expensive capacity to the Emergency Communications Center, limiting the 
liability of county government when citizens could not get through to 911, and to 
save money through the consolidation of many of the 52 county-operated call 
centers.  It is difficult to assess the order in which these goals were considered 
because each was viewed as critical.  Chief in the minds of the 311 Centers  
planners was to improve operational efficiency and provide better customer 
service to county residents.1 

It is important to note that before the 311 Center was established, the 911 
Centers were having difficulty meeting their mandatory performance standard of 
answering 90 percent of all calls within 10 seconds.  There appeared to be two 
primary reasons for the problem.  First was the number of calls to the 911 Center 
that were of a non-emergency nature.  Many of these calls were unintentional 
phantom wireless 911 calls.  Such calls occur when a cell phone user 
inadvertently presses the 9 or 1 key on a telephone preprogrammed to dial 911, 
or, after completing a 911 call, the user accidentally presses the redial or send 
key.   The National Emergency Number Association reported that phantom 
wireless calls accounted for between 25 and 70 percent of all 911 calls in some 
communities in the United States.2   

The second issue dealt with how Orange Countys Emergency Operations 
Center counted its calls.  Many of the calls placed to the system were counted 
multiple times through a coding error; hence, the statistics reported to the state 
were often based on misleading and inaccurate information.  The coding problem 
was eliminated in 2003 when the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system was 
upgraded.

1. In this report, the 311 Center is often referred to by two different names.  
To be consistent with the organizational goals of the agency, 311 Center refers to 
the original model that the agency was to assume.  After the project shifted direction, 
the name was changed to the Government Service Center (GSC). 
2. Sampson, Rana, Misuse and Abuse of 911.  Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Problem-
Specific Guides Series No. 19, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2004.

The goals that led to the development of the 311 Center (which eventually 
became the Government Service Center [GSC]) in Orange County made it clear 
that adopting a 311 model seemed to be the only option that was both politically 
and financially feasible.   With the population explosion that was taking place in 
Orange County, the call centers were going to reach capacity within a few years.  
Coupled with the population growth was the increasing use of, and dependence 
on, cell phones. 
 
In 1997 the U.S. Department of Justices COPS Office made a concerted effort to 
assist agencies with problems associated with non-emergency phone calls being 
made to 911 lines by requesting that the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) reserve the 311 number for non-emergency calls.  At the time, it was 
believed that given the growing volume of 911 calls, nearly all call centers in the 
United States would be overloaded within the next 10 years.  

In 1998, the National Institute of Justice, with funding from the COPS Office, 
sponsored an evaluation of four non-emergency call management systems in 
Dallas, Texas; Baltimore, Maryland; Phoenix, Arizona; and Buffalo, New York.  
Conducted by the University of Cincinnati, the study compared and contrasted 
four approaches to handling non-emergency calls for police services. The 
resulting report made clear that each city had adapted different approaches for 
different reasons.  For example, the city of Dallas used a full-service 311 model 
where citizens could call for any service that the city offered, while Baltimores 
311 service was primarily for public safety non-emergencies.3 

In Fiscal Year 2000, the Orange County Sheriffs Office applied for and received 
funding from the COPS Office under the 311 Technical Assistance for Start-Ups 
program.4  This funding provided capital to purchase hardware and software for a 
311 system, as well as to support an evaluation of the system and develop a 
guidebook or case study of lessons learned.  

The 311 model deemed the most appropriate for Orange County was intended to 
be a low-cost solution to expanding the operations of the 911 Center and to keep 
the county in compliance with state-mandated operational measures.  The 
model, with its easy-to-recall number, allowed citizens and visiting vacationers to 
access one centralized center where they could receive information about 
government services.

3. Mazerolle, Loraine, Dennis Rogan, James Frank, Christine Famega, and John E. Eck, 
Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: An Assessment of Non-Emergency Call Systems. 
Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 2003. 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199060.pdf

4. 311 for Non-Emergencies: Helping Communities One Call at a Time.  COPS Fact Sheet. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, 2006. http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=314 

Many of the calls to 911 were not emergencies.  The policy of the 911 Center 
was to assist each caller within the time constraints and workload of the center.  
Before the activation of the 311 number, 911 operators had no place to route 
these callers so that they could be given the information or assistance requested.  
The operators making a good faith effort to assist the citizens often missed the 
mandatory minimums when other callers were placed in the queue or were 
dismissed tactfully.  

Figure 1: Inbound Non-Emergency Calls from Orange County 911 to Government Service Center.

To relieve the 911 Center of the non-emergency calls, today, callers are greeted 
on a special administrative line by a voice prompt informing them that if the call is 
not an emergency, they should instead call the Government Service Center 
(GSC) at 311.  Figure 1 shows the call volume to the GSC from the 911 line.   
From July 2005 through June 2006, the average time it took for the GSC to 
answer these calls was 17 seconds.  

While needed, the GSC typically does not handle that many calls from the 911 
Center.  As shown in Figure 2, on a typical day, only 11 or 12 calls are 
transferred from the Orange County 911 Center.  While this may not seem like a 
lot, it is important to remember that many of the routine calls that were previously 
placed to the center (after-hours Animal Control and Code Enforcement calls) 
were already offloaded when the GSC was formed.  So these data constitute the 
bulk of the calls the 911 Center previously fielded on its own.

Figure 2: Average Non-Emergency Calls Per Day from Orange County 911 to Government Service Center.

Chapter II: Choosing the Model 
Goals of the Orange County Government Service Center
	Alleviate the burden on the county's 911 emergency response resources. 
	Offload calls to cost-effective self-service options such as Interactive Voice Response. (IVR), e-mail, and web access 
	Implement system components that will be cost-effective to install, integrate, use, and maintain. 

Recognizing the need for an alternative model to handle public safety non-
emergency calls and to provide a more cost-efficient alternative to handling the 
variety of calls that were coming into the 911 Center, members of the Orange 
County Sheriffs Office and the Emergency Operations Center looked at the 
variety of 311 models in operation.  Initially, the project and future center was to 
proceed in two stages.  Stage One would encompass building a 311 Center to 
handle public safety non-emergency calls.  Once the 311 Center was firmly 
established, it would be reassessed to determine if it was feasible to move to 
Stage Two: a full-service model.  In this second stage, the project would handle 
all calls for service and information for the county and would serve as a 
consolidated call center much like the one in Dallas, Texas.  

Operating under the principle that a 311 Center in Orange County would be 
formed initially as a clearinghouse for public safety non-emergency calls, the first 
challenge was to obtain input from the various municipal police agencies within 
the county .  Some of these law enforcement agencies were experiencing a 
similar problem with their 911 centers being overburdened at high peak hours or 
in times of crisis and their buy-in and organizational support seemed plausible.  

The project planners envisioned a strategy in which the participants from each 
agency would meet once a month to develop a model whereby the non-
emergency calls could be offloaded into a new consolidated 311 call center.  At 
first, it was thought the best way this could be accomplished was to assemble 
representatives from the different Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP) in 
Orange County because it would be those individuals who would recognize the 
true need for the system and could provide the best input so that all participating 
agencies concerns could be addressed.  These representatives, therefore, 
would become the logical ones to carry the information back to the city 
managers, mayors, and other political sovereigns in the municipalities they 
represented.  

The initial meetings with representatives from the PSAPs and members of the 
project planning staff took place in the fall of 2000.  During the first discussions in 
this 311 PSAP Steering Committee, the representatives became very concerned 
about the model that Orange Countys 311 Center would eventually become.  
They determined that the county planned to use Stage One to assess the value 
of the concept; then, after the 311 Center was firmly established, there would be 
a discussion about moving to a full-service model that included all county 
services. 

To alleviate any concerns, all members of the 311 PSAP Steering Committee 
visited agencies that had developed or were in the process of developing 311 
centers: Austin and Dallas, Texas; and Chicago, Illinois.  

The visits enabled the project staff to see firsthand the range of duties that each 
agency was performing and the level of financial and political support that would 
be necessary to make each a reality.  For example, at the time, the 311 Center in 
Dallas was stationed next to the 911 Center and fielded calls from each of the 
citys divisions and provided performance statistics to the city manager. The 
model used by Austin focused exclusively on public safety non-emergency calls.  
The representatives from Austin claimed they had met absolutely no resistance 
to this model and that it was heralded by all in the jurisdiction as a model 
program.  

The project team members reported their findings to the 311 PSAP Steering 
Committee.  It was clear that very few of the participants envisioned the 311 
Center becoming a full-service center.  Some felt that if Orange County moved to 
a full-service model it would have a negative effect on their interaction with 
residents.  Others felt it would indeed alleviate a lot of the routine calls, but they 
still had staffing and fiscal concerns. 

Based on the initial reaction of many of the PSAPs, it was clear that at least in 
the beginning the project would focus solely on implementing a 311 Center that 
would respond to public safety non-emergency calls.  Further, all discussions 
concerning a move to a full-service model would be postponed until the 311 
Center was operational and there was full agreement among all members of the 
311 PSAP Steering Committee.
The situation changed dramatically in the coming months and years as the 
project began to take shape.  The efforts of the project staff to develop this new 
center are detailed in the following chapters. 

Chapter III: Partnerships

The strength of any cooperative agreement between federal, state, county, or 
municipal agencies depends heavily on the level of trust between each entity. In 
Orange County, the level of trust and the strength of the bond between the 
original municipalities and county participants significantly diminished as the 
project moved from planning to implementation because of several unfortunate 
circumstances.
Political and Financial Fallout	

Whenever a law enforcement officer issues a moving traffic violation in Orange 
County, a $12.50 surcharge is added to the fine.  The surcharge is designated for 
the development, maintenance, and improvement of radio systems throughout 
the county.  In the fall of 2002 it was brought to the attention of county officials 
that Orange County had been reimbursing traffic surcharge funds to the smaller 
municipalities that maintained their own communication/radio systems. The 
Orange County Attorneys Office informed the head of the 311 project (who also 
was the manager of the countys Public Safety Communications Division), that 
traffic reimbursements to these cities had to stop.  This news was not well-
received by many of the municipalities and many felt that this, like the proposed 
311 Center (even if it focused only on public safety non-emergency calls), was 
simply another step to diminish the authority and autonomy of the small 
municipalities located within the county and at the same time broaden Orange 
Countys jurisdiction over these small cities.  Others felt that Orange County was 
retaliating for the jurisdictions unwillingness to wholeheartedly endorse the 311 
project.  And still others felt that the motives of the county for repealing their 
funding were more sinister.  

In any event, this external mandate handed down from the county appeared to 
be the straw that broke the camels back. It resulted in the unwillingness of 
many of the 311 PSAP Steering Committee members to continue to work on 
planning the center, and many jurisdictions decided that they would no longer be 
a part of this group and pulled back.  Others said that they would continue to 
come to the meetings to protect what autonomy they had, but would not 
participate in any appreciable terms.  While a few jurisdictions stood by and 
supported the project, they were clearly in the minority. 

At this point the project was for all purposes stalled.  The research team 
interviewed each member of the committee to see exactly what the issues were 
and gave the information to the project staff.  One of the major concerns that 
many of the jurisdictions had was that participation in the 311 project would cost 
them financially because the county funds a majority of the 911 Centers needs 
based on call volume.  Thus, if calls, even non-emergency calls, are routed to a 
central location maintained by the county, then routed back to the individual 
jurisdiction, revenue for each municipality would be reduced.  Further, the capital 
needed to run their 911 system was so tight that any drawback of funds would be 
devastating because they did not have any way to make up for this loss of 
revenue.  

Realizing that the project was going nowhere with the current 311 PSAP Steering 
Committee, the project staff adopted a new strategy.  Instead of working with the 
PSAPs and trying to build the center from the ground up, the project leaders met 
with each city manager or mayor to try to gain their support.  During the fall of 
2002, each was briefed on the goals of the project and how the 311 center was 
to be founded to increase the quality of service to the residents of their 
jurisdictions.  Most were supportive of the concept but were reluctant or refused 
full cooperation at least until the City of Orlando pledged support.  This never 
happened partially because Orlando had just built a new state-of-the-art 
communications facility and was not experiencing capacity problems.  If Orlando 
signed on and its non-emergency calls were routed to 311, the city would also 
lose part of its valuable revenue stream.  Perhaps one city manager said it best 
when he said, Supporting the system right now is akin to the city taking a 50 
percent pay cut, and doubling its workload. To complicate the matter, even the 
employees of the Orange County Sheriffs Office were reluctant to participate 
because it diminished their contact with residents and they could not control the 
level and type of interaction once these calls were offloaded to a third party.  

To address this issue, the Orange County Public Safety Communications 
Division and the project team contracted with several legal consultants in 
Tallahassee, the state capital, to draft model legislation that would govern, fund, 
and set legislative parameters for the establishment of 311 systems in Florida.  
The language of this Florida Non-Emergency Telephone Act included 
provisions that allowed cities and other municipal areas to tax services provided 
by the county to fund 311 centers up to 2 years before implementation.  It was 
envisioned that if the project staff could create its own revenue stream, the 
concerns of more agencies and original partners would be alleviated and they 
might rejoin the partnership if the legislation passed.  The original 311 PSAP 
Steering Committee and everyone agreed.   To move forward, the project board 
asked for and received the support of the Florida Association of Counties 
Working Group on 911as long as the language in the bill contained a provision 
that allowed funding for 911 systems in the state to increase.  With this change in 
language, the group also gained support from the Florida Chapter of the 
Association of Public-Safety Communications OfficialsInternational, Inc. 
(APCO). 

Despite reaching an agreement with the 911 Working Group of the Florida 
Association of Counties and the Florida Chapter of APCO, the bill was not 
supported by the wireless carriers powerful lobbyists.  While members of the 
wireless industry had no issue with the concept of 311, they were concerned 
about three specific issues.  First, they feared a loss of revenue if cell phone bills 
were increased by the addition of another government tax.  Second, they were 
concerned about the public perception of another increase in fees.  The wireless 
carriers stated that it would be hard to explain to their customers that it was not a 
rate hike but rather an additional government fee.  And finally, they said it may be 
likely that if the bill passed, there was is a potential for reduced funding of 911 
systems by individual jurisdictions because the broad language in the bill allowed 
local jurisdictions to adjust the prescribed rates for both 911 and 311.  

Concurrent with the effort to acquire a dedicated funding mechanism for 311 to 
keep the concept alive in Orange County, the project planners also helped form a 
statewide coalition of agencies and personnel engaged in the 311 process to 
work on the model legislation and talk to their local representatives to try to 
convince them to support the bill.  Unfortunately, the bill did not pass.

Chapter IV: Developing the Government Service Center 
Model

Realizing that the county and project staff was not going to be able to overcome 
the political considerations and obtain passage of enabling legislation to fund 
311, the executive committee was left with three options.  First, adopt a radically 
different approach and centralize a select number of county services under one 
roof, with the hope that as the project moved forward, other county entities would 
join.  Second, continue with a small but devout group of supporters.  Third, 
discontinue efforts to implement 311 in the county.

The first option was more salient for three reasons: 1. It prevented other 
interested parties from independently using the concept;  2. The countys Code 
Enforcement and Animal Services Divisions were looking for help with their call 
centers; and 3. This option kept the promise of providing the citizens of Orange 
County with better government service. 

In September 2002, the executive committee began to develop the new 
countywide Government Service Center (GSC) under the premise that if we 
build it, they will come.       

The Orange County Mayors Office approved the proposed center and the project 
staff received permission to relocate agents and personnel to the vacant 
Cassady Building   The GSC officially began operations in July 2003, using the 
10-digit telephone number 407.836.3111.  

As originally envisioned, the GSC  served as a pilot project to see if call center 
centralization would improve the overall efficiency of the countys former contact 
points, and save money by maintaining one database and technological resource 
instead of the many that were needed before.  

After naming Animal Services, Code Enforcement, and the Citizens Action Link 
(a clearinghouse of information for county residents) as partners, the planners of 
the Orange County 311 project chose Lorenzo Williams as the new Public Safety 
Communications Division Assistant Manager because of his experience in 
running the Citizens Action Link.  Vicki Pegram, who had been one of the 
founding members of the 311 PSAP Steering Committee as a representative 
from the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority 911 Communications Center and 
had managed the call center at the Orlando International Airport, came out of 
retirement to manage the new call center.    

Williams, Pegram, and key project staff were given the better part of 6 months to 
set up the center, train the operators, and draft and implement policies and 
procedures.  They held biweekly meetings with representatives from the three 
partners to learn their business processes as well as to see how the GSCs 
different management information systems could be integrated into one.  In July 
2003, the GSC began answering calls for Code Enforcement and the Citizens 
Action Link. In August, calls for Animal Services began to be routed to the center. 

The GSC began with a bare-bones budget.  Staff who had occupied positions in 
the other agencies were transferred into the GSC. The move was not easy.  
Many of the call takers who had answered calls for only one unit had to learn the 
goals, missions, and practices of not only the other two partners but also learn 
where to find information related to countywide operations, such as when is 
garbage picked up, who is the county commissioner, and where public utility 
meetings take place.  This was challenging for some of the call takers because 
many of these positions were not considered skilled.  

While the call takers had to overcome a learning curve, many reported to be 
happy with the center because it was a more professional arrangement 
conducive to a true call center environment.  In the old Animal Services Call 
Center, for example, each operator worked in a space approximately 4 feet in 
width and under excessive office noise.  
Rapid Consolidation of the Pilot Project 
In January 2004, the county commissioned Technology Research & Consulting 
Inc., to study potential cost savings of a further consolidation. The firms final 
report recommended that the county move forward, and listed 46 departments 
and units that should be considered for consolidation. 

Seven agencies with 33 subunits, each with its own set of operating principles, 
policies and tasking requirements, required study. 
Table 1: The Original Consolidation Plan.
County Agency
Subunit
Public Works

Roads and Drainage

Traffic Engineering

Storm Water Management
Growth Management

Zoning

Housing and Community Development

Building

Planning
Health and Family Services

Health Services Division

Head Start

Youth and Family Services

Cooperative Extension

Citizens Commission for Children

Mosquito Control

Community Action

Regional History Center
Community and Environmental Services

Environmental Protection

Neighborhood Services
The original schedule called for the consolidation of 17 of the 33 subunits by 
June 1, 2004 (see Table 1).

GSC staff met with agency heads to incorporate the missions, goals, and policies 
of each subunit and discovered that certain subunits within agencies would not 
generate the financial or operational benefit on which the consolidation plan was 
based.  Division staff, therefore, analyzed the tasks performed by the 
departments and their divisions to determine how the inclusion of an agency 
would benefit the citizens, the county, or both.  Other considerations included 
workload, cost of conversion, and training requirements, as well as the space 
required in the existing GSC.   
Benefit to the Citizens
To benefit citizens, an agency had to perform some kind of useful service that a 
citizen could access by calling an easily remembered 3-digit telephone number  
without having to consult a telephone book.  If, for example, someone wanted to 
report a dangerous animal in a residential area or a dead animal on the road, he 
or she should be able to call the GSC and talk to a call taker who is 
knowledgeable about the policies and procedures of Animal Control and is able 
to complete the service request while on the phone with the citizen.  These 
services are a clear benefit to the citizens.
Benefit to the County
The second primary consideration was whether the consolidation of each division 
or subunit would benefit Orange County as a whole.  Initially this consideration 
was what sparked the interest of the county when Mayor Richard Crotty 
commissioned the GSC. Building on and solidifying the concepts of political trust, 
accountability, and open accessa key theme of the mayor and his government 
agendawould be of benefit to the county.  
Other considerations were analyzed before subunits were selected for 
consolidation including workload, human capital, cost of conversion, and space 
requirements.
Workload. The program planners were concerned about excessive call volume. 
Their research revealed, for example, that the previous Animal Services call 
takers were able to respond to only approximately 75 percent of their calls.  It 
was feared that once GSC took over this function, the volume of calls would 
overtax the staff and facility resources.  Converting a call center that has a highly 
technical call volume, therefore, required due consideration.

Human Capital.  Also important regarding workload was that the volume of calls 
that a division or subunit received determined the number of operators that the 
GSC had to employ to fulfill call volume requests adequately.  When the first few 
divisions were consolidated, host divisions transferred their existing call takers to 
the GSC.  This seemingly reasonable approach proved to be problematic.  Some 
of the transferred personnel clearly were not good matches for handling both the 
volume of calls and the variety.  
Even experienced call takers who are outstanding performers in their current 
positions can have problems when placed in an environment where their scope 
of responsibility is as large as that required by GSC operators.  For this reason, 
there was considerable turnover among the call takers who were transferred.  
The lesson learned from the first consolidation (Animal Services, Code 
Enforcement, and Citizens Action Link) indicated that it was not wise to simply 
transfer existing personnel.  Instead, the strategy in the future would be to hire 
personnel for existing or vacated positions.  
Cost of Conversion.  Here, we are referring to writing a conversion algorithm (or 
script) for an existing software system so that the front end can be handled by 
the GSCs management information system. In most cases, the GSC software 
appeared to exist on the front end where all calls began.  Some agencies, 
however, had an existing database that the software could pull from to check for 
existing work orders and/or calls from a specific address.  This script between the 
GSC software and the database application of choice was often a customized 
application written by the countys IT staff or purchased from an outside vendor.  
The time, effort, and financial cost of writing such scripts, as well as the existing 
practices of an agency, should be considered before consolidation is 
recommended or completed.  
Space Needed.  Space was also another consideration.  While the project 
planners projected that the Cassady Building was large enough to accommodate 
the agencies slated for consolidation, the current space would be filled to 
capacity.  To accommodate the new agencies within the existing infrastructure of 
the GSC, a capital improvement proposal was submitted to the County 
Commission to expand the current buildings usable workspace, but the proposal 
was not funded.  The County Commission, however, decided to reconsider the 
rapid expansion plans. Details of this process will be examined later.  
    
Tasks and Administrative Planning for Conversion
Once an agency was selected for consolidation, the real work began for the 
project staff.  The considerations mentioned earlier in this chapter set the 
priorities for inclusion in the GSC but did not include the volume of work that 
followed to make sure there was an orderly transition into the Center.  Most of 
the work of integrating the agencies into the GSC was spent working with the 
agencies staffs designing the work orders, processes, policies, and screens 
used in the software.
The Frequently Asked Questions Database
GSC staff also completed a set of frequently asked questions (FAQ) that would 
serve as a critical tool for educating the new call takers about the functions of the 
particular divisions, and streamlining the learning process so they could focus on 
the unique and infrequent calls that all too often take up so much of their time.  

To assist the GSC staff in this process, the GSC purchased a knowledge-base 
module to be part of the existing software application used to maintain the FAQs 
for all potential partnering agencies.
Design Process of Work Orders and Interface between IT Products
Another important step in the consolidation process was completing the design 
requirements for service requests.  This was critical because many of the 
targeted agencies call centers completed internal service requests while a call 
taker was on the telephone with a citizen.  In the past, these service requests 
had been native to the host agencys database application.  This process had to 
be replicated in the GSC software to allow agencies and their callers to track 
service requests. To achieve this, scripts between the GSC software and the 
host agencies database packages had to be generated, integrated, and 
synchronized.  
IT Needs and Assessment
The project groups plans were driven by the technology available in the county 
at the time. When the project first started, key personnel visited other sites with 
311 systems that used Motorolas Suncoast software.  This Windows-based 
software allowed the call centers to customize their application to each 
departments specific IT needs.  While impressed with the system, 
representatives from the countys IT staff were reluctant to spend the amount 
quoted by Motorola. Further, the county was already using Magic, a help desk 
application that could be modified to fit current needs. It was also operational in 
some existing county agencies, including the Citizens Action Link, which had 
become a part of the GSC.  

Anticipating future demand, project staff commissioned a study to determine if 
Magic could meet both current and future demands of the Center. The consultant 
expressed reservations about whether the Magic system was the best possible 
solution for the future of the GSC. 
The Front End of the GSCs Operations
Also considered in this early stage of consolidation was an interactive voice 
recognition (IVR) system that would provide automated options to the caller prior 
to reaching a call taker. While the county had several IVRs in place, none 
actively made use of natural voice recognition to expedite and triage the calls. 
The Avaya IVR system uses a persons natural voice and asks for prompts 
instead of using electronic digit signatures to route calls to specific boxes.  These 
prompts could be set up in different languages to cater to the countys large 
ethnic populations.  Similar systems are used by large corporations to increase 
the efficiency of their operations. The proposed and preferred Avaya system was 
estimated to cost a little more than $800,000.  The project staff submitted another 
capital improvement request to cover these costs but the proposal was not 
funded because of the countys other urgent prioritiesalthough the county 
continually showed its support for the venture.  

A Series of Unfortunate Events: Hurricane Season 2004

The three major hurricanes that battered Orange County and other parts of 
Florida in August and September 2004Hurricane Charley, August 13;  
Hurricane Frances, September 5; and Hurricane Jeanne, September 26
reemphasized the importance of providing citizens with timely and accurate 
information in times of crisis.  While the aftermath of the hurricanes was not as 
devastating as when Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005, 
three storms within 30 days challenged the county government to find more 
innovative ways to provide key information to its constituents.  It could be said 
that the three storms gave the GSC the notoriety it needed and its place in 
Orange County government.  

The Impact of the these Storms on the Government Service Center

Just prior to hurricane Charley, there was relative calm in Orange County. Few 
ever expected to see a storm of that size and magnitude come through Central 
Florida.  While everyone realized it was a possibility, no storm had ever hit low on 
the west coast of Florida and traveled up through the center of the state without 
losing a considerable amount of energy.  Even up to 15 minutes before people in 
Orlando started feeling the effects of Charley, there was a pleasant calm enjoyed 
by many residents.  That changed rapidly as the storm passed through. 

With wind speeds exceeding 120 miles an hour, the residents in Orange County 
fled to what shelter they had.  As the winds circulated, residents began hearing 
the shingles being ripped off their homes, and many feared that the storm would 
tear their roofs off. 

Despite the fact that emergency personnel were put on alert and additional 
personnel in the communication division were called in hours before, the 
telephone banks to 911 were flooded with calls from frantic citizens.  As shown in 
Figure 3, the volume of calls that the GSC received in the days immediately 
following the hurricanes was tremendous.  While not all of these calls may have 
gone to 911, it is conceivable that many would have.

Even when the winds subsided, many citizens were left without power, shelter, 
and anywhere to go for help or assistance.  These citizens without knowing 
anywhere else to call, dialed 911.  As a result, the 911 system was severely 
affected. 

 . 

Public Education

Before, during, and after the storms, county government officials used television 
and radio broadcasts continually to provide vital information to the citizens on 
where to go for assistance.  Taking a proactive stance, the county mayor 
conducted a series of press conferences advertising the GSC as a place where 
citizens could call to get the latest information on locating tarps, ice, roofing 
supplies, shelter availability, and details on curfews.
During the next 6 weeks in daily updates, the GSCs number was advertised in 
the news and on local television and radio.  Citizens began to rely on this number 
as the primary conduit for supplies and critical information. 

Because of this valuable service the GSC performed, it is now one of the chief 
agencies that county government relies on, particularly during hurricanes and 
other natural disasters.  The county sees the GSC as an essential part of the 
operations of local government that should be maintained. 

One of the critical elements in making the Government Service Center (GSC) in 
Orange County a success is making sure that citizens are aware of its service 
and use it more as a community resource instead of placing calls to 911.  While 
GSC staff are invited to community events, neighborhood association meetings, 
and schools, the center has deferred implementing a direct and focused 
community education effort.  

During the GSCs period of introspection, efforts were focused on call volume 
and on developing internal policies and procedures to assist in the organizations 
efficiency.  This focus will inevitably change as the center solidifies its direction.  
More than likely, that will come with the assimilation of new partners and 
challenges.
  
Refocusing the Efforts of the GSC
After seeing what a valuable service the GSC could perform in times of crisis, the 
county refocused the consolidation strategies. When the county administrator 
presented the consolidation plan to members of the countywide users group, 
representatives of each agency expressed serious concerns about the level and 
quality of customer service that would result from a fast and potentially ill-
conceived consolidation plan.  It became clear after a series of discussions that it 
was in the best interest of the county to scale back the plan and allow the GSC to 
mature gradually. It did not mean that other agencies were not being considered 
for consolidation; they were.  It meant only that the rush to add them to the GSC 
was placed in the proper context.  
Organizational Change 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the GSC has had a rich history in its 
development as a full service contact center.  During this time, the center 
experienced several managerial changes including the appointment of Carol 
Burkett, to serve as interim director of the Public Safety Communications 
Division.  It was during her tenure that the official turning on of the 311 number 
in Orange County took place and was formally announced at a press conference 
at the Orange County Board of Commissioners meeting in June of 2005.  This 
event was a major victory for those that had worked on this project for the 
previous 5 years. 

Chapter V: The Government Service Center

Both the operation and mission of the Government Service Center (GSC) have 
changed since the GSCs inception.  Originally envisioned as a public safety, 
non-emergency center designed to off-load calls from the overloaded 911 
system, plans were redirected because of functional and financial considerations.  

Today, the GSC is a full-service county clearinghouse for government 
information available to the public 7 days a week from 7:00 a.m. until 11:00 p.m.  
It houses six divisions: Animal Services, Citizens Action Link, Code 
Enforcement, Road and Drainage, Traffic Engineering, and Zoning. Each partner 
is an active participant in the GSC and representatives sit on its advisory board.  
The business processes of these agencies have been assimilated into the GSC 
and each partner is satisfied with the level of service it is receiving. 

As of this writing, project staff is examining GSC business practices to determine 
what they can improve before receiving permission to move ahead with further 
expansion.   One primary activity is an examination of the training curriculum for 
the call takers and other staff.  The training coordinator and GSC administrative 
staff have been studying ways to improve customer service, including how calls 
are processed.  These efforts center on providing data to the sponsoring 
agencies in a timely and efficient manner, ensuring that work orders do not fall 
between the cracks, and developing ways to improve the efficiency of, and 
decrease the time that, a call taker spends on completing a work order while the 
citizen is on the phone.

 As part of the process, the call taker advises the citizen of the operational 
parameters of the agency and of anticipated response time.  Through effective 
training, the GSC call takers have continually decreased the amount of time that 
it takes to answer calls.  Although GSC staff have been working on these issues 
since the GSCs foundation, the task is becoming more challenging and complex 
as more agencies are being considered for consolidation.  

 

Time-and-Effort Study of the Government Service Center
As with other 311 centers across the United States, the project in Orange County 
placed a priority on the time that staff dedicated to calls; specifically, the effort 
and level of support to field calls for Animal Services.  Currently, only 12.5 
percent of all calls to the GSC deal with issues related to animal services.  
Handling these calls and recording all the necessary information needed by the 
agency comprises approximately 55.9 percent of the call takers time and effort.  

Table 2: Orange County Government Service Center Time and Call Processing Report March 2006.

Research
Time 
on Call
After Call 
Processing
Total Time 
on Call
Percent of 
Activities
Percent 
of Calls
Animal Services

Bite Calls
1:41
5:51
5:05
12:37
0.6%
0.2%

All Others
1:35
1:54
1:38
5:07
55.3%
12.3%
Code Enforcement
0:34
1:06
0:42
2:21
23.0%
5.1%
Roads and Drainage
2:08
2:03
2:21
6:32
12.9%
2.9%
Traffic Engineering
2:56
1:35
1:49
6:20
4.0%
0.9%
Zoning

0:03
0:46
0:00
0:49
0.7%
0.1%
Other

0:00
1:29
0:00
1:29
3.5%
78.5%

When the development of the GSC was first discussed, it was understood that 
the calls to Animal Services were a significant concern to the operators of the 
911 centers.  Citizens were often confused about whom to call when they saw a 
stray, wild, rabid, or aggressive animal roaming the streets. Often, citizens called 
911.  While some of these calls still come into the 911 Center, they are now 
screened and transferred to the GSC.   As shown in Table 2, these calls 
constitute only a relatively small portion of citizen contacts, but the time and effort 
spent on the calls can be nearly double the amount of time an operator spends 
on any other kind of call. 

The time spent to process calls to other partners within the GSC varies 
depending on the type of call.  For instance, calls for Code Enforcement issues 
take on average 1.5 minutes to process while calls for Roads and Drainage or 
Traffic Engineering take, on average, 6.5 minutes to clear.  The reason for these 
differences is the level of detailed information that each agency needs to 
generate a work ticket.  This is not the only problem.  Agency staff also report 
that because the software was not a true call center application, the series of 
screens that the call taker must process through is overly cumbersome.  Further, 
there are some limitations within the product to query previous calls and self-
populate the existing fields from the originating phone number.  These and other 
problems with the current software are addressed in the next chapter. 
 
Call Processing and the Communications Loop 
Aside from general information requests, any work order created within the GSC 
is transferred to the agency of choice by direct transfer through the software 
(Roads and Drainage and Traffic Engineering) or is electronically converted to a 
medium that can be picked up by the host agencys system (Animal Services and 
Code Enforcement).  The agency marks the orders as received, updates the 
status, and provides a resolution.  Should a citizen call the center again to get an 
update on the status of his or her work order; the call taker can provide the 
information.   
Alternative Forms of Communication from Citizens: Web/E-Mail 
Inquiries

Inquiries also come into the GSC by e-mail through the countys central web site.  
To facilitate this process, county government has provided access on its central 
web site for citizens to email general inquiries to the center.    Most inquires are 
for general government information; however, many citizens use this format to 
generate work order tickets.  In cases such as this, a citizen may report seeing a 
wild animal on the street or a notice possible code violation.  While not all of 
these reports constitute enough information to generate a work order, the citizen 
inquiries are responded to and, when applicable, the notice is sent electronically 
to the host agency in question.  The official policy of the GSC is to respond to 
electronic inquiries within 24 hours.  
The Current Focus of the Government Service Center
In summary, when the county officially opened the GSC, it was conceptualized 
as a pilot project to provide seamless government service to its citizens as well 
as a test site to see if the county could save money through the consolidation of 
its more than 50 call centers.  With the focus on consolidation, the county set 
forth a plan of rapid consolidation that was later reconsidered.  As of this writing, 
the GSC is reviewing and revising its current policies and procedures, as well as 
ways to upgrade its existing facilities and hardware and software needs so that 
when called on it can assimilate additional partners readily.  Further, the center 
has been given the task of updating its emergency operations procedures to 
better serve the citizens of Orange County in times of crisis.  

Chapter VI: Equipment/Technology: Call Routing and 
Call Tracking

Since the initial discussions regarding the potential establishment of a 311 center 
in Orange County began, a great deal of attention was paid to how calls would be 
routed to the different agencies within the county.  In lieu of developing a 
countywide system to handle public safety non-emergency calls for the countys 
13 Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP), the Government Service Center 
(GSC) assumed an alternative mission and goal: to consolidate the agencies 
within the county that welcomed their services, but also whose calls were 
affecting the 911 centers after hours.  

Realizing the benefits that the GSC could provide, the Orange County Sheriffs 
Office spearheaded efforts to obtain funding from the Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) to obtain 
hardware, software, equipment, and the necessary infrastructure for a 311 
center. 
Growing Pains: Hardware and Software Requirements
The current software application, Magic, is widely used throughout Orange 
County. It is a Windows-based client care system that is easy to customize with 
existing applications and can track clients on many different levels.  It is used in 
many justice agencies across the United States.  It is, for example, the client care 
software of choice for the Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department and the United 
Nations.  When it comes to handling the variety of calls and customer requests of 
a 311 center, however, the applications utility presents some challenges. 
Throughout the development of the center, the project staff and the 311 PSAP 
Steering Committee had been concerned with the softwares ability to handle the 
volume of calls and future needs. 

In visits to 311 centers across the country, committee members learned that 
many were using Motorolas Suncoast system, and that it worked extremely well.  
In 2003, representatives from Motorola demonstrated their software to the 
partners of the GSC project who recognized it as the software of choice when 
compared with similar systems.  Two primary issues, however, prohibited its 
adoption.  1. During the initial meetings, the quote for the purchase of this system 
was a little more than $1 million.  The county, the original partners, and the funds 
provided by the COPS Office funding could not cover the costs.  2. There was 
limited support from members of the original steering committee to buy into the 
concept of 311 and adopt a new management information system. This would 
mean a radical change to their existing business practices and result in a net 
increase in their IT support costs.  Based on these considerations, everyone 
involved decided that the move to a true 311 management information system 
was not feasible.  

When the team changed the focus of the project and decided to rely solely on 
agencies within the county, Orange Countys IT staff concluded that since the 
client care software was used by two of the original partners it would be best to 
stay with this software solution. Further, they concluded that it could be 
customized enough to make it work in this call center environment.  They 
pledged the resources, adding that the new upgrades would allow them to 
provide additional capacity to the system to accommodate future partners.  

Still concerned about the softwares capacity, the project team hired an 
independent consultant, Technology Research & Consulting, Inc., to study the 
issue.  The consultants report claimed that, while the software was adequate for 
the duties of the GSC at the time, there was no assurance that it would be able to 
handle the sheer volume of calls as the center matured and more county agency 
call centers were assimilated.  Further, the report stated that while the software 
may be the current logical solution because the county already had the adequate 
number of licenses and in-house technical expertise to customize the application, 
new software solutions had to be considered.

Although the Magic software has continued to be the solution of choice for the 
GSC, there has been some dissatisfaction with its capabilities. The GSCs 
administrative core began to assess and evaluate the time it takes to handle calls 
and evaluate individual call taker performance.  When the center staff completed 
the first time and motion study, call takers and the administrative staff openly 
acknowledged that to complete any call, the number of screens that operators 
must process to clear each call were difficult to navigate through and not in any 
logical order.  

According to agency staff, it simply takes too long to fill out basic demographic 
and call information.  In this regard, opening screens do not auto populate with 
information from previous calls from the same phone number or address.  Hence, 
operators must search the database to see if a previous call has come from this 
location, check on the status (if any), confirm that the call is located in the county 
by jumping to an external mapping solution, then record the address location 
before recording the type of call and generate a service request.  

The GSC staff proposed a number of modifications to the system to make it work 
for the time being (see Table 3).  

Table 3: Suggested Magic 311 Application Modifications.
Notification when a 
duplicate record is made.
Default city and state fields 
set to Orlando, Florida.
If a query on a name, phone 
number, or subject is conducted, let 
the user select the record instead of 
autopopulating fields.
Search records in 
chronological order.
Update date and times of 
calls automatically.
Hide company name.
Create and print letters on 
behalf of department or 
county officials.
Creation of templates for 
county agencies.
Ability to view previous records on 
the same work order ticket.
Ability to query fields in 
plain English instead of 
subject codes.
Ability to automap address 
of current and new tickets 
to obtain jurisdiction.
Ability to identify maintenance 
facility by incident address for 
Roads and Drainage.
Quick and easy procedure 
to validate addresses for 
addressed not in the 
system.
Ability to enter and retrieve 
reports by intersections.
Ability to view property records 
without leaving the main screen.
Ability to query by more 
than one phone number at 
a time.
Ability to send and receive 
e-mail attachments through 
Magic from customers.
Data exchanged via the agencies 
should share same data structure 
as the customer database in Magic.
Ability to send and receive 
faxes from workstations.
User-friendly system that 
provides standardized and 
ad hoc reports.
Customer/client database should 
accept both real time and batch 
updates.

The Call Routing Process During Normal Operations 

Despite the problems associated with using software not originally designed as a 
311 call center application, the GSC staff continue to operate and field calls  in 
the most cost effective and timely manner possible.  Currently, the centers 
average call handling time is approximately 3 minutes; however, the goal of the 
GSC is to conform to industry standards recognized by the Statewide 311 
Coalition which states that 90 percent of all calls should be closed out in less 
than 2 minutes.  

Callers of the GSC are greeted by an automated voice system that announces 
Orange County 311and prompts the caller to select a language (currently, 
English or Spanish.)  The caller is notified of the hours of operation (7 a.m. to 
11p.m., 7 days a week) and advised to dial 911 if the call is an emergency.  Once 
the caller completes this common cycle, the call is routed to the GSCs 
automated call distribution system where an operator asks the caller for the 
jurisdiction in which he or she resides.  The operator uses an external mapping 
solution to validate the jurisdiction, the jurisdictional boundary of the incident, as 
well as the callers address or the location of the incident.  The operator prompts 
the caller for his or her name, and asks how the GSC can be of assistance.  

If the call is from one of the cities not participating in the GSC, the call taker 
searches the knowledge base to see if he or she can be of assistance and 
attempts to answer the residents question.  If the call taker is unable to help, he 
or she refers the citizen to the general help line of the jurisdiction in question or 
the specific agency that can provide assistance.

If the caller is a resident of unincorporated Orange County, the call taker obtains 
the demographic information of the caller and places it in the Government 
Contact Tracking System (GCTS).  If the call is for information only, the call taker 
search the knowledge base and tries to answer the citizens question. However, 
if the caller needs service from one of the partnership agencies, another 
application within GCTS is opened where the specific fields required by that 
agency are completed.  Once the call ticket is completed, the citizen is given a 
work order number and the work order is sent electronically to the host agency 
for resolution.  The host agency is responsible for updating the status of the work 
order so that if the citizen calls to check on the status of the request, the call 
taker can provide timely and accurate information. 

The flow of calls within the GSC is displayed in Figure 5.    

The Call Routing Process During Emergency Operations
Should the GSC be called into emergency operations status, the call routing 
process follows a similar procedure with a few minor differences. For instance, as 
was done successfully in the aftermath of Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, and 
Jeanne, citizens are greeted with a choice of selecting informational message 
boxes on where to get generators, ice, sandbags, tarps, batteries, or receive 
other information such as details of the curfew.  

Other changes to the call routing process include bringing voluntary staff into the 
center to assist callers with public safety and heath needs.  If a caller needs 
assistance in these areas, professionals are stationed on location to assist 
residents with their questions.  For instance, a nurse is available to talk to 
residents and allay their public health concerns; or if a resident is in need of 
mental health counseling, a certified mental health counselor in the GSC will 
provide the assistance necessary until the crisis has passed. Figure 6 illustrates 
call flow within the GSC during an emergency. 

The Knowledge Base
One of the essential elements in the GSC environment is the reliance on
staff to have the most up-to-date information on all county-run agencies.  
Because Orange County is so large and provides such a variety of services to its 
citizens, there is no way that the call takers can be relied on to have all of this 
information at their fingertips.  To expedite this process, the county bought the 
Knowledge Base to assist operators with information.  The module is essentially 
a query-based application where call takers can search the software memory 
banks for answers to preprogrammed questions.  
INFOMAP

Orange County's Growth Management department has a mapping solution called 
INFOMAP.   Widely used, it is available to citizens through the countys web site 
and is tied to the county's Geographic Information System.  The map not only 
validates jurisdictions but provides information related to Code Enforcement 
officer assignments and Roads and Drainage Maintenance facilities.  During 
emergencies, this mapping is used exclusively because it provides up-to-date 
information about county services and identifies the areas affected by the 
emergency.   
GEO 911 Mapping
Another resource available to call takers in the GSC is the Geo 911 Mapping 
database.  This new software application was delivered to the GSC in 2005 as 
part of the new Emergency Preparedness Plan.  It allows call takers to map calls 
to the proper jurisdiction using address information.  It is important to note that 
this is the same application that the 911 center uses to validate addresses. What 
makes this application so unique is that it is a stand-alone system that receives 
daily updates from Orange County but can run on its own in an emergency or 
during a computer power outage.  

Chapter VII: Staffing the Government Service Center

Close attention was paid to staffing the Government Service Center (GSC) 
throughout its development.  The participants who devised the center were 
former communications employees; therefore, they recognized early on that staff 
in the GSC had to be proficient in their knowledge of Orange County services 
and capable of handling a variety of calls. 
 
When the GSC was originally conceived, it was envisioned that its development 
would proceed through a two-step process.  The first step would encompass its 
opening as a public safety non-emergency center.  With this in mind, the project 
team envisioned that the call takers would hold qualifications similar to those of 
911 operators.  Further, the original plan called for the GSC to serve as a backup 
should Orange Countys 911 Center cease operations. That plan fell through. 

To implement a viable 311 center and as a cost-saving measure, Orange County 
consolidated a select group of agencies whose calls are now fielded by the GSC.  
Discussions among GSC staff, the County Commission, and the participating 
agencies determined how best to consolidate existing personnel and services 
and dictated that no existing county employee would lose his or her job.  Further, 
the positions of existing call takers from Animal Services, Code Enforcement, 
and the Citizens Action Link were transferred into the newly formed center.

While the staff was pleased to have the center founded and officially recognized 
by the county government, there was the realization that personnel transferred 
from these existing agencies would need additional training.  Quite often, 
personnel transferring from one occupation to another had limited abilities 
because of their previous work requirements.  When acquiring staff from other 
areas, it is important to ascertain that they are flexible and can demonstrate the 
basic knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the newly required duties.
The Hurricanes and Additional Personnel
When the three hurricanes hit Florida in the summer of 2004, personnel from the 
GSC were called on to help staff and distribute critical information to the countys 
million plus residents.  At the daily press conferences held by the Mayor of 
Orange County and the City of Orlando, the GSCs telephone number was 
displayed in the center of the picture.  Because the center did such an 
outstanding job of providing timely and relevant information to the citizens, the 
mayor of Orange County in February of 2005 agreed to transfer 13 vacant 
positions to the GSC.  In addition, the county approved the funding for three new 
positions: training coordinator, customer service liaison, and administrative 
specialist.  

The training coordinators primary responsibilities are to develop training 
programs for the call takers and monitor the learning objectives and outcomes. 
The customer service liaison serves as the liaison between citizens, the county 
commissioners office, the GSC, and the participating agencies.  He or she 
monitors the quality of calls and the information provided to citizens and conducts 
routine audits to make sure that the information provided is both timely and 
accurate.  If problems arise or complaints are received from either the GSC or 
the host agencies, the liaison provides reports to all interested parties on what 
went wrong and how these problems can be avoided in the future.  The 
administrative specialist supports and provides assistance to the assistant 
manager of the GSC.  
The Staffing Schedule
The current staffing model calls for the center to be staffed from 7:00 a.m. until 
11:00 p.m., 7 days a week, with 26 call takers and 5 additional positions 
occupying the administrative cadre.  Staffing is based on a modified, rotating 
schedule for employees.  Four overlapping shifts cover calls during peak periods.  
As of this writing, 22 call takers and four leads (floor supervisors) are on staff. 
Staff Development and Personnel Policies
A critical component of any organization is retaining the staff it has trained and 
finding ways in which personnel can advance in the organization.  In a call center 
environment, many of these opportunities are limited.  The GSC, however, 
devised a unique way to compensate its exceptional employees both internally 
and financially: the Lead system.  
The Lead System
In the Lead system approach, call takers who exhibit exceptional knowledge and 
skills may have the opportunity to be promoted to vacant lead positions.  These 
positions carry with it institutional prestige as well as a minimal increase in pay.  
The leads work with teams of call takers and monitor the workload and accuracy 
of those within their team through the use of software which allows them to 
perform quality checks by passively listening to calls and monitoring the active 
personal computers of call takers under their supervision.  

The leads are also responsible for providing a weekly report to the administration 
of the activities on the floor.  One of the major pushes under this system is the 
development of benchmarks.  In this endeavor, these individuals are the key 
players in the organizations time and motion study.  The idea is to calculate 
within broad parameters how much time call takers should spend on specific 
calls and evaluate the staff according to these benchmarks.  

The leads also respond to e-mail inquiries and develop standard responses to 
the routine questions that are often asked.  While it is too early to assess the 
effectiveness of this system, it is clear that the GSC has vastly improved one of 
its primary performance measures by answering 90 percent of calls within 45 
seconds.  Figure 8 denotes the variance from that goal.  In Fiscal Year 200304, 
only 45 percent of calls met this goal.  In Fiscal Year 200405, 74 percent were 
answered in 45 seconds.  And in Fiscal Year 200506, more than 90 percent of 
calls have been answered in this time frame.
Tardiness and Absenteeism
The GSC call takers prompt arrival at their work stations each day is similar to 
those standards set for 911 operators.  In a call center environment, one cannot 
afford to be lenient when it comes to tardiness and absenteeism.  Citizens 
expectation that they will receive an answer to their call during advertised 
business hours demands a more aggressive policy.   It became evident that the 
GSC was going to be evaluated by the quality of its engagement with the public. 
The center had to revise its personnel standards in excess of what was typically 
expected because of the variety of calls where some required immediate 
response, such as animal bites or traffic signal malfunctions. Higher expectations 
of these and other agents of the public trust were not only required, but essential.  
Progressive Discipline
The GSC administration understands and recognizes the importance of the talent 
contained within the organization.  And as such, it has implemented the doctrine 
of progressive discipline with its employees.  Under this method, violators of the 
policy are first given a verbal warning.   If the behavior continues after additional 
documented verbal warnings, a written reprimand is delivered along with a 
developmental action plan, notifying the call taker of the possible consequences 
of his or her behavior as well as a plan to rectify the situation.  While it is 
impossible to completely eradicate the problems of tardiness and absenteeism,, 
the problem has diminished significantly since this policy was put into place.  
Employee Awards Program
As with any agency in the private or government sector, an employee recognition 
plan for denoting outstanding performance is an integral part of not only building, 
but sustaining employee morale.  The GSC is no different.  In the fall of 2005, the 
GSC staff implemented a three-tier program to recognize the best performers 
and has dedicated the buildings front hall to those individuals. The program 
includes three distinct awards: the MVP, Employee of the Year, and Employee of 
the Quarter.

Each award carries the distinction of some type of tangible reward along with the 
honor of having ones name and picture hung in  the 311 Star Hall of Fame.  The 
MVP is awarded quarterly through a peer vote and the call taker given this honor 
is given a trophy to place in his or her cubicle.  The employee of the quarter is 
given lunch with the manager, a parking space, gift certificates for dinner, and a 
trophy.  The employee of the year receives a similar distinction.   

It is important to note that each award is paid for with donations collected from 
the administrative staff, and not taken from agency funds.  Agency personnel 
report intense competition for these awards and a collective desire for the 
bragging rights associated with winning this small, but meaningful competition 
over their peers.
Uniforms
Another one of the changes that was proposed to increase staff morale and build 
a common culture of those employed within the GSC was the adoption of 
uniforms.  Similar arguments have been made with other labor-intensive 
agencies, but the work in a call center is unique.  To perform at peak levels, 
employees must be comfortable in their attire.  To this end, some of the call 
takers suggested the adoption of a uniform so that call takers could be 
comfortable, not worry about spending too much money on their work attire, and 
could be easily recognizable in the community.  To this end, the administration 
approved this request and ordered polo shirts with each employees name and 
the GSC logo imprinted on the shirts.  This appears to have pleased all and may 
make a large difference in building the culture of GSC employees.  

Each of these small but critical policy changes has been essential in building and 
creating the synergy necessary to run and staff this extremely diverse and 
complicated call center.  

Chapter VIII: Staff Training and Continuing Education 
Perhaps nothing that the Government Service Center (GSC) has done has 
exceeded the importance of the training and continuing education of the call 
takers. These needs were always understood but after the 2004 hurricanes, it 
was clear that the center needed a full-time training coordinator, a position that 
was subsequently created in 2005.

One of the first things the GSC did was to work with representatives from 
Valencia Community College to develop an in-house training module for all new 
employees.  This 4-day training class orients new employees in the basic tenets 
of the call center environment, covers quality control and assurance, and tests 
their knowledge and skills to ensure that they can handle the job.

In addition, new employees are required to complete 2 weeks of orientation at 
the center relating to the goals, mission, and tasks of the five entities for which 
the GSC is the primary conduit.  Here, representatives from Animal Control, 
Traffic Engineering, Code Enforcement, Zoning, and Roads and Drainage 
departments take the new employees through every step of their operations.  
Further, the GSC implemented a policy of employee ride-alongs with each 
partner in a code enforcement vehicle (Figure 10) so that call takers can begin to 
understand the complexity of their jobs. 

Next, each new call taker spends anywhere from 4 to 6 weeks working one-on-
one with a trainer, while the leads monitor performance, before the employee is 
approved and released to work alone on the floor.

This rigorous training and orientation schedule does not conclude the training 
initiative.  The staff at the GSC has also introduced a series of continuing 
education refresher courses for existing employees because policies of the 
respective host agencies can change and the volume of information the 
employees are required to assimilate is large.  The program also provides time 
for the call takers to get out into the field with the host agents just as a new hire 
would.  Those participating in these special programs have found this exercise 
invaluable.  

Call center operators who have taken part in this program stated that, while they 
knew the policies and procedures of many of the host agencies, they did not truly 
appreciate the complexity of many of the agents jobs.  They report that seeing 
the problems first hand and getting to know the agents responsible for resolving 
these issues has greatly increased their awareness of the various duties in the 
county.

Chapter IX: Lessons Learned

Since the inception of Orange Countys 311 project, the Government Service 
Center (GSC) staff have seen their fair share of events over which they had little 
control. Originally conceived as a traditional 311 center focusing on public safety 
non-emergencies, the GSC operations, as of this writing, only marginally reflects 
the original plan.  This report has detailed the many forces that have shaped the 
center as it is today. Chief among them, however, was the challenging political 
relationships between county and local municipal operations.  

While no one in the beginning debated the fact that it was going to be difficult to 
consolidate non-emergency calls that previously were routed to each of the 13 
jurisdictions in the county into one center, few realized the dynamic climate and 
educational demands involved.  The most common disagreements that the cities 
had against consolidation was that it would cost money and force them to loose 
touch with residents.
 
Orange County continued to move forward with the adoption of the GSC and 
officially launched 311 in June 2005.  Working on a shoestring budget, the GSC 
accepted three original partners: Animal Control, Code Enforcement, and 
Citizens Action Link. Animal Control and Code Enforcement lacked sufficient 
staff to satisfy the publics expectations and the Citizens Action Link was chosen 
because it currently served as the countys central information clearinghouse.

When the initial meetings took place to plan the GSC, the project staff went out of 
their way to accommodate the needs of each partner.  Tasks were assigned and 
existing personnel positions were transferred. As mentioned previously, this 
probably was not the best staffing model; however, it was deemed a politically 
prudent move at the time. 

Further, to establish a viable service and gain more visibility as a county entity, 
concessions were made to standardized procedures with the existing partners.  
In this regard, members of the GSC and the administrative cadre report that in 
hindsight it would have been beneficial to establish service level agreements with 
the various departments before consolidation.  Based on this reflection, the GSC 
staff have begun new talks with their current partners to draft and execute these 
agreements.

Without these agreements in place, misunderstandings and communications 
between the GSC and the host agency could falter.   While not debating the 
communication breakdown, service level agreements clearly define each others 
roles.  In the future, the formal drafting and signing of the service level 
agreements will be an integral part of the organization's practices and 
implemented before adopting any new partner.   

Another major lesson learned in this project deals with the level of support 
needed to implement a consolidated call center in a large county or municipal 
agency.  As dictated by the history of the project and the iterations that the GSC 
took on before implementation, the absolute and unwavering support of upper 
county administration is needed before a project of this size and scope can 
begin.  The mayor and county administrator held several meetings with their 
directors outlining 311 objectives and goals for the future.  It was emphasized 
that cooperation and support of the 311 system was vital. Their support has been 
constant and unwavering throughout the development.  

The final point to be made is that while the staff and administration of the GSC 
proceeded to get the center operational, the available system technology to 
handle the volume and variety of calls continued to evolve. This was especially 
true of the software used to run the call center.  While the Government Contact 
Tracking System software was a robust system that was fully customizable to 
many agencies needs, it still fell short of a true call center software application.  
However, the county's IT staff went above and beyond dedicating numerous 
hours trying to accommodate and meet the call centers needs.    

Despite the number of obstacles that have faced the GSC since its inception, the 
future of Orange Countys GSC is extremely bright.  As of this writing, 
consolidation discussions are underway with several other county departments.  
At the same time, the GSC is in the process of refining its operational procedures 
and streamlining its administrative processes and is able to answer its existing 
calls within 21 seconds.  

  In this report, the 311 Center is often referred to by two different names.  To be consistent with the 
organizational goals of the agency, 311 Center refers to the original model that the agency was to assume.  
After the project shifted direction, the name was changed to the Government Service Center (GSC). 
  Sampson, Rana, Misuse and Abuse of 911.  Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Problem-Specific Guides 
Series No. 19, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, 2004.
  Mazerolle, Loraine, Dennis Rogan, James Frank, Christine Famega, and John E. Eck, Managing Citizen 
Calls to the Police: An Assessment of Non-Emergency Call Systems. Washington, D.C.: National Institute 
of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 2003. 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199060.pdf

  311 for Non-Emergencies: Helping Communities One Call at a Time.  COPS Fact Sheet. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2006. 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=314 
  
  http://www.orangecountyfl.net/cms/default.htm

 
 
 
 

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