Title: **NSF/Tokyo Report: Science in the Cold War:**

# [ The Legacy of the International Geophysical Year]{.underline}

Date: 4/23/98

Replaces: None

[The National Science Foundation\'s offices in Tokyo and in Paris
periodically report on developments abroad that are related to the
Foundation\'s mission. These documents present facts for the use of NSF
program managers and policy makers; they are not statements of NSF
policy.]{.underline}

[Special Scientific Report #98-07 (April 7, 1998)]{.underline}

[ \* \* \* \* \*]{.underline}

[The following was prepared by ]{.underline}***[Dr.
]{.underline}****[Fae L. Korsmo]{.underline}*[, Program Director for
Arctic Social Sciences in the Office of Polar Programs at the National
Science Foundation. ]{.underline}***[Dr. Korsmo]{.underline}***[ visited
Japan from March 15-23, 1998 in order to participate in, and present the
following paper at, the International Conference on Science, Technology,
and Society held in Makuhari.]{.underline}**[ ]{.underline}*[Dr.
Korsmo]{.underline}***[ may be reached via email at:
]{.underline}**[fkorsmo@nsf.gov.]{.underline}**

[ \* \* \* \* \*]{.underline}

**[Science in the Cold War:]{.underline}**

**[The Legacy of the International Geophysical Year]{.underline}**

[From the upper atmosphere to the ocean depths, the knowledge generated
during the International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-58) led to
important discoveries in the earth sciences. At the height of the Cold
War, the science programs of IGY engaged several thousand scientists
from 67 countries, including the United States and the former Soviet
Union, in one of the largest data collection and analysis efforts ever
to be undertaken (Sullivan, 1961; Wilson, 1961; Odishaw, 1968; Bullis,
1973; Doel, 1997). Many scientists who participated in IGY thought of
the earth in terms of system and process, while political leaders saw
the utility of IGY research for national security advantages.
]{.underline}

[IGY was shaped by the Cold War, yet its comprehensive earth science
programs involved multiple actors from East and West, North and South,
in both planning and implementation. The Soviet and U.S. space programs
emerged from the IGY, as did the Antarctic Treaty and other arrangements
for international scientific cooperation. U.S. military and national
security institutions played a vital role in shaping the research
agenda, mobilizing the resources, and using the results of IGY programs.
At the same time, the scientific organizers of IGY seized the
opportunity to extend our knowledge of the physical properties of the
earth, including its upper atmosphere and ionosphere, as well as the
solar system. What can we learn from this mixture of cooperation and
conflict, secrecy and sharing, Cold War tensions and universalist quests
for knowledge?]{.underline}

[IGY constitutes a transition between the mobilized science of World War
II and what might be called the entrepreneurial, pluralistic science of
the waning days of the Cold War. These brief remarks focus on the U.S.
perspective, but I hope to elicit discussion and further study to enrich
our knowledge of IGY as an international undertaking. Indeed, most
popular accounts of IGY as a positive scientific achievement emanate
from the U.S. and Western perspectives, while in-depth comparative work
has yet to be done. In the U.S. context, we know that despite
expressions of unease regarding military involvement, the interests of
scientists and national security coexisted in alignment and mutual
support. ]{.underline}

[Origins and Objectives of IGY]{.underline}

[Published sources on the IGY trace its establishment to a conversation
held in the home of James A. Van Allen in a suburb of Washington, D.C.,
April 5, 1950 (Sullivan, 1961, 20; Bullis, 1973, 6; Odishaw, 1968, 42;
McDougall, 1985, 118). Van Allen had invited a small group of scientists
concerned with atmospheric research, among them Lloyd Berkner, J.
Wallace Joyce, S. Fred Singer, and E. H. Vestine, to meet with renowned
geophysicist Sydney Chapman. It was Berkner who suggested that a third
polar year be held in 1957-58 to take advantage of the period of maximum
solar activities and several eclipses.]{.underline}

[During the same month Berkner shared the results of a report he had
completed for the U.S. State Department arguing for an enhanced role for
scientific expertise in U.S. foreign policy (Needell, 1993, 402, note
14). Specifically, the report recommended the establishment of a science
office in the State Department, the placement of scientific attachés at
embassies, and the creation of a National Academy of Sciences committee
to act as an advisory board to the State Department (Needell, 1992, 301;
Carnegie Commission, 1992, 32-33).]{.underline}

[At the same time, Berkner was planning a trip to Europe to attend a
meeting of the International Scientific Radio Union and the Mixed
Commission on the Ionosphere. Van Allen and his guests suggested that
Berkner present the idea of the third international polar year on his
European travels. He did so, and by January 1951 the above-named
organizations in addition to the International Union on Geodesy and
Geophysics, the International Astronomical Union, and the parent
International Council of Scientific Unions, had endorsed the plan. In
1952 ICSU established a committee on the polar year (Bullis, 1973,
6).]{.underline}

[Several scientific organizations, such as the World Meteorological
Organization and the International Association of Terrestrial Magnetism
and Electricity, suggested the program be expanded beyond the poles to
include other regions, and the ICSU general assembly approved Chapman's
suggestion to change the title of the program to the International
Geophysical Year.]{.underline}

[What would the program accomplish? What would be the U.S. role?
Berkner's post-war work for the military's Joint Research and
Development Board, the Department of Defense, and the State Department
indicated his belief that scientific competence was integral to a
successful U.S. foreign policy (Needell, 1987, 264-65). Examination of
the minutes and correspondence of the U.S. National and Executive
Committees for IGY show that other scientists joined Berkner in seeing
little contradiction between the international scientific exchange of
data and the close collaboration with the Department of Defense and
military branches. At the most basic level of cooperation, the
equipment, transportation, and research platforms provided by the
military allowed scientists working on IGY projects to reach new
frontiers, e.g., Antarctica and the upper atmosphere. At a deeper level,
the U.S. organizing scientists may have hoped that the involvement of
peers from other countries with diverse political systems and ideologies
would lead to a triumph of science over politics.]{.underline}[^1][ Such
a confluence of motivations (utilitarian and policy-related as well as
the interest in basic scientific research) behind the huge effort at
worldwide synoptic observation and measurement was indeed characteristic
of Cold War science in the United States. (Doel and Needell, 1997,
59-60).]{.underline}

[The late 1940s and early 1950s saw many developments in atmospheric and
rocket-related research (Devorkin, 1992), and the IGY program plans
capitalized on these developments. Initially the program called for
research in meteorology, latitude and longitude, geomagnetism, gravity
measurements, ionospheric physics, aurora and airglow, solar activity,
cosmic rays, glaciology, oceanography, and rocket exploration of the
upper atmosphere.]{.underline}[^2][. The emphasis on synchronous global
measurements to understand changes in sea levels, causes of magnetic
storms and ionospheric disturbances, the origins of cosmic rays, and
other processes required a large number of participants covering a vast
geographic space. The IGY programs extended nineteenth-century
exploration to the upper atmosphere and the ocean floor, using
satellites and submarines to capture complex interrelationships between
the atmosphere, earth, oceans, and ice (Pyne, 1979, 179). Joseph Kaplan,
Chairman of the U.S. National Committee for IGY, noted that it would be
"possible for the first time to triangulate the whole
earth."]{.underline}[^3][ The earth itself would become both field and
laboratory, with scientists and volunteers staffing the observation
posts and operating the instruments.]{.underline}

[The U.S. military interests ranged from preventing exclusive claims to
the Antarctic (especially on the part of the Soviet Union) to improving
military communications and electronic warfare. Walter A. McDougall
argues that the IGY provided the United States with a nonmilitary
justification for satellite surveillance of Soviet bases (i.e., in the
interest of global science, and under the legal cover of freedom of
space) (McDougall, 1985, 117-18). From the very origins of the IGY, the
military participated. A few scientists expressed disapproval of the
military's dominance.]{.underline}[^4][ For the most part, however, the
military had supported geophysical research both during and immediately
after the war, and participants in the U.S. National and Executive
Committees were already accustomed to a working
relationship.]{.underline}

[Plans for IGY, then, encompassed both international scientific
objectives and specific U.S. foreign policy and national security
concerns. Yet the implementation of the IGY program for the United
States could not proceed along the wartime model of mobilized research.
Instead, the fund raisers for the IGY had to balance an open, civilian
process of congressional appropriations to the newly constituted
National Science Foundation with a closed, secret intelligence gathering
effort by military and security agencies. Combined with the objectives
of worldwide data collection, the effort to prepare for and carry out
IGY research entailed the persuasion of multiple audiences and
participants within the United States, not to mention overseas,
including private foundations, congressional and White House staff,
federal agencies, universities, laboratories, amateurs, and the educated
public. ]{.underline}

[Selling Science]{.underline}

[On the eve of the official commencement of IGY, the U.S. National
Committee met in Washington, D.C. to consider, among other items, a
proposal (most likely raised by the Soviet delegate) to the Comité
Special de l'Année Géophysique Internationale (CSAGI) to hold a rocket
satellite conference in the United States no later than October 1, 1957.
Merle Tuve hesitated, noting that the "IGY as such does not have any
rocket information.Our military have a lot of rocket information." Hugh
Odishaw, on the other hand, spoke in favor of the conference to obtain
information on the Soviet satellite program.]{.underline}[^5][ In the
end, both the National Committee and CSAGI supported the conference, and
while the participants were gathered in Washington, D.C. in early
October, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik (Sullivan, 1961,
67-76).]{.underline}

[Students of the Cold War credit the Sputnik launching with catalyzing
the space, arms, and intelligence race.]{.underline}[^6][ Prior to
Sputnik, the U.S. military had reduced the number of planned satellites.
Sputnik presented an opportunity to argue for budgetary increases in
scientific research and education. Even before Sputnik, however, the
U.S. National Committee and Berkner, a leading figure within the
international committee, realized the need to capitalize on Cold War
tensions to sell IGY and to continue the interest in IGY's scientific
programs well after IGY officially ended December 1958.]{.underline}

[This marketing effort involved private corporations (including General
Electric and IBM), television stations, teacher education institutes,
curriculum developers, motion picture companies, and other
media.]{.underline}[^7][ The U.S. National Committee strove to represent
IGY as a civilian and international scientific program and resisted the
Pentagon's portrayal of the earth satellite program as a military
operation.]{.underline}[^8][ Posters, films, teaching kits, exhibits,
and brochures exclaimed the wonders of the earth and the benefits of
science to humanity. The linkages between research and education, public
and private support, nationalist pride and international knowledge
received explicit articulation during the IGY. These linkages continued
to characterize the U.S. space program, and today both NASA and NSF have
well developed educational and public relations components.
]{.underline}

[Science Policy and International Relations]{.underline}

[The National Science Foundation began its support of IGY with a grant
of \$5,000 in early 1953. By 1956, the budget request to Congress for
IGY activities had expanded to \$40 million (Bullis, 1973, 14). IGY
organizers went to work for NSF and helped to establish geophysics as a
broad area of institutional support (England, 1982, 307-10).
]{.underline}

[IGY also brought scientists into power through institutions such as the
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) (Wang, 1995, 330).
Berkner, ever alert to opportunities in international science, used the
IGY to lobby for reinstatement of the science attaché program in the
State Department.]{.underline}[^9][ Not only was the program revived,
but later the State Department established a Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
(1973-74).]{.underline}

[Another legacy of IGY was to lead the way for large, multidisciplinary
earth science endeavors such as the International Council of Scientific
Union's International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (1986) (Doel, 1997,
410). In the area of earth sciences, environmental sciences and global
change, the international legacy of IGY is ever present but unexplored.
As we move toward the fiftieth anniversary, it is time to explore the
lessons of IGY and their application to fundamental questions of
international relations in the post-Cold War era. What effects did IGY
have on recently decolonized states and remaining colonial outposts?
What perceptions of IGY colored science in other parts of the world,
including areas of Communist rule? How has the marketing aspect of
science, so evident during IGY, influenced science education and public
understanding of science across national boundaries? Finally, has IGY
proved a useful example of how international agreements can be made to
work smoothly, as Tuzo Wilson states (Wilson, 1961, 326)? ]{.underline}

[I hope this invitation to review the legacies of the IGY in a
comparative, international framework inspires you to reach into your
files, your memories, and your address books to reflect on the nature of
Cold War science in your home countries and the lessons we might bring
to bear on current efforts to address global environmental problems.
]{.underline}

[References]{.underline}

[Bullis, Harold. ]{.underline}*[The Political Legacy of the
International Geophysical Year]{.underline}*[. Prepared for the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.]{.underline}

[Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government.
]{.underline}*[Science and Technology in U.S. International
Affairs]{.underline}*[. New York, January 1992.]{.underline}

[Devorkin, David H. ]{.underline}*[Science with a Vengeance: How the
Military Created the U.S. Space Sciences After World War
II]{.underline}*[. New York, Berlin, Heidleberg: Springer-Verlag,
1992.]{.underline}

[Doel, Ronald E. "The Earth Sciences and Geophysics." In John Krige and
Dominique Pestre, eds. ]{.underline}*[Science in the Twentieth
Century]{.underline}*[. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997,
391-416.]{.underline}

[Doel, Ronald E. and Allan A. Needell. "Science, Scientists, and the
CIA: Balancing International Ideals, National Needs, and Professional
Opportunities." In Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew, eds.
]{.underline}*[Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA]{.underline}*[.
London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997, 59-81.]{.underline}

[England, J. Merton. ]{.underline}*[A Patron for Pure Science: The
National Science Foundation]{.underline}[']{.underline}[s Formative
Years, 1945-1957]{.underline}*[. Washington, DC: National Science
Foundation, 1982.]{.underline}

[McDougall, Walter A. ]{.underline}*[The Heavens and the Earth: A
Political History of the Space Age]{.underline}*[. Baltimore and London:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.]{.underline}

[Needell, Allan A. "Lloyd Berkner, Merle Tuve, and the Federal Role in
Radio Astronomy." ]{.underline}*[Osiris]{.underline}*[, 2d series, vol.
3 (1987), 261-88.]{.underline}

[Needell, Allan A. "From Military Research to Big Science: Lloyd Berkner
and Science-Statesmanship in the Postwar Era." In Peter Galison and
Bruce Hevly, eds. ]{.underline}*[Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale
Research]{.underline}*[. Stanford University Pres, 1992,
290-311.]{.underline}

[Needell, Allan A. "Truth Is Our Weapon: Project TROY, Political
Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security
State." ]{.underline}*[Diplomatic History]{.underline}*[ 17 (1993),
399-420.]{.underline}

[Odishaw, Hugh. "The International Geophysical Year," In Syun-Ichi
Akasofu, et al, eds. ]{.underline}*[Sydney Chapman,
Eighty]{.underline}*[. Fairbanks: University of Alaska, 1968,
42-43.]{.underline}

[Pielke, Roger A. and Michael H. Glantz. "Serving Science and Society:
Lessons from Large-Scale Atmospheric Science Programs."
]{.underline}*[Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society]{.underline}*[ 76, 12 (December 1995), 2445-58.]{.underline}

[Pyne, Steve. "From the Grand Canyon to the Marianas Trench: The Earth
Sciences After Darwin." In Nathan Reingold, ed. ]{.underline}*[The
Sciences in the American Context: New Perspectives]{.underline}*[.
Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979,
165-92.]{.underline}

[Sullivan, Walter. ]{.underline}*[Assault on the Unknown]{.underline}*[.
New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill, 1961]{.underline}

[Wilson, J. Tuzo. ]{.underline}*[IGY: The Year of the New
Moons]{.underline}*[. New York: Alfred. Knopf, 1961.]{.underline}

[Unpublished Manuscripts]{.underline}

[National Academy of Sciences, Archives of the International Geophysical
Year (IGY), Washington, DC. ]{.underline}

[^1]: [ The correspondence and minutes of the U.S. National Committee
    and Executive Committee for the IGY repeatedly reveal the members'
    concerns with establishing research ties with colleagues in Latin
    America, Asia, and Europe. J Tuzo Wilson reports that IGY was a
    success because the scientists agreed on a plan of action, left each
    nation-state to carry out its own part of the research task assigned
    to it, and delegated to a central committee the problems of
    coordination (Wilson, 1961, 326).]{.underline}

[^2]: [ See Joseph Kaplan's draft report, "The Scientific Program of the
    International Geophysical Year," Drawer 1, File "Organization USNC,"
    National Academy of Sciences, IGY Archives, Washington,
    DC.]{.underline}

[^3]: [Ibid., 10.]{.underline}

[^4]: [ For example, Donald B. Lawrence, Professor of Botany, University
    of Minnesota, wrote to Wallace Atwood, Director of the National
    Academy of Sciences, "It makes me very unhappy to see the military
    agencies taking such a prominent part in the sponsorship of the
    International Geophysical Year." Letter from Lawrence to Kaplan,
    copy to Atwood, 6 May 1953, Drawer 1, File "Program Proposals for
    IGY (1952-1953)," National Academy of Sciences, IGY
    Archives.]{.underline}

[^5]: [ "National Academy of Sciences, Special Meeting of the U.S.
    National Committee for the IGY, Thursday, June 27, 1957," pages
    23-25, Drawer 2, File "USNC -- Minutes,
    12]{.underline}^[th]{.underline}^[ Meeting," National Academy of
    Sciences, IGY Archives.]{.underline}

[^6]: [ The launch of Sputnik stimulated the creation of the National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration and justified huge increases in
    federal research and development spending. Kevles notes that between
    1957 and 1967 federal research and development expenditures nearly
    quadrupled, reaching almost \$15 billion. Daniel J. Kevles,
    "Principles and Politics in Federal R&D Policy, 1945-1990," preface
    to the 1990 edition of
    ]{.underline}*[Science]{.underline}[---]{.underline}[the Endless
    Frontier]{.underline}*[, by Vannevar Bush (Washington, D.C.,
    National Science Foundation, 1990), xviii.]{.underline}

[^7]: [ The problems of "marketing science" in the United States in the
    context of the end of the Cold War, federal budget deficits, and
    pressing policy problems, are taken up in Pielke and Glantz (1995).
    Prior to Sputnik, the marketing problems were of great concern to
    the U.S. organizers of IGY.]{.underline}

[^8]: [ "Minutes, Eighteenth Meeting, USNC-IGY Executive Committee," 5-6
    December 1956, Drawer 2, File "USNC Executive Committee Draft
    Minutes 1956," National Academy of Sciences, IGY
    Archives.]{.underline}

[^9]: [ Berkner wrote to members of Congress that "While such
    international sponsored activities as the IGY are progressing with
    extraordinary success, I feel that the representation of American
    science abroad is open to serious question. The program of the U.S.
    scientific attaches initiated in 1952 was most successful, but its
    recent abandonment has left very serious gaps in our international
    relations. This opinion is strongly reinforced by a recent trip to
    the Far East including Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, India, Malaya,
    Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand in which I had the opportunity
    to discuss the matter with many representatives of our foreign
    missions, as well as the scientists of these countries in my
    official capacity as President of the International Council of
    Scientific Unions." Letter from Berkner to Senator Paul H. Douglas,
    10 May 1957, Drawer 1, File "Congress (Senate) 1954-1960," National
    Academy of Sciences, IGY Archives.]{.underline}