# Presentation: 208113

## Violations of Temporary Flight Restrictions and Air Defense Identification Zones

***Michael Zuschlag***
***Human Factors Division***

*An Analysis of Airspace Violations and Pilot Report Data*

## Protected Assets Flight System

| NASA Langley Research Ctr.
Susan Wilz, Eddie Norris | Volpe Center
Kevin Harnett |
| --- | --- |
| Prevent intentionally hostile activity  | Applicability of access control technologies 
CONOPs |
| Prevent unintentional incursions of temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) | Analysis of TFR incursions
Baseline TFR process 
Potential improvements |

**Notes:**
Project background. This research came out of the Protected Assets Flight System project conducted with NASA LaRC and headed on the Volpe side by Kevin Harnett.
NASA LaRC (Susan Wilz, project lead) was looking at technical means prevent a 9/11 style attack. Idea of PAFS is to give aircraft the intelligence to detect hostile takeover of the aircraft, and then, once triggered, prevent hostile activities, such as deliberately crashing the aircraft into something.
But in addition to keeping bad guys from causing trouble, NASA was also interested in keeping good guys from getting into trouble, and so were also interested in reducing accidental incursions of security zones place around potential targets. These zones collectively may be referred to as TFRs.
Our role in preventing TFR incursions included:
Analysis of TFR incursions: find out why there are incursions in order to prevent them.
Baseline current TFR process: know how it’s done now, so know where to improve it.
Assessment of Potential Improvements: Come up with recommendations.
This talk focuses on the analysis of the incursions, although I’ll touch on recommendations.

## Problem of TFR Incursions

*Risk to safety*
*Distraction to ATC *
*Potential shoot-down of non-hostile aircraft*
*Risk to security*
*False alarms may lead to complacency*
*May divert resources from real actual attack*

**Notes:**
The purpose of this study is to determine the apparent factors and causes of violations of restricted airspace, particularly temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) and air defense identification zones (ADIZs). 
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has greatly expanded the use of TFRs and ADIZs to more securely control the airspace around potential terrorist targets. Since then, there have been a substantial increase of accidental violations of restricted airspace. This frequency of violations incurs security and safety risks plus economic costs.
Safety Risks:
- Violators may distract ATC from main task of traffic separation
- Sequence of errors may result in shoot-down of non-terrorist-controlled aircraft
Security Risks
- Current high frequency of false alarms may lead to complacency, delaying effective response to an actual attack
- Resources used to track or intercept a false alarm may not be available for a co-occurring actual attack.
Also economic costs: Figure 10’s of 1000’s of $ per scramble
By illuminating the reasons for these violations, this study aims to take the first step towards reducing them.

## Research Overview

| Study Question | Data source |
| --- | --- |
| Where, when, who? | Flight Service Operations Support Center (FSOSC) database of all violations |
| Why? | Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports of TFR violations |

**Notes:**
To answer this questions, the study has two parts:
1. A statistical analysis of the general characteristics of violations using data collected by the FAA of all violations for two year period. This will answer what kind of pilot violates what kind of TFRs and when.
2. Analysis of narratives of TFR violations submitted to NASA’s ASRS to determine probable cause and reporter-identified contributing factors. This will answer the key question of why do pilots violate TFRs.

## FSOSC database

*Violations as detected by air traffic control (ATC)*
*June 2002 to June 2004*
*Basic attributes*
*Location and airspace, Date & time, *
*Aircraft type and tail number, *
*Military scramble (Y|N) *
*2910 violations*

**Notes:**
First Study: General characteristics of violations.
Flight Service Operations Support Center (FSOSC) established to create and publish graphic TFR Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), which announce and explain TFRs, and to assist FSSs with their interpretation of the NOTAMs.
Violations of TFR, ADIZ, and FRZ. Does not include other airspace violations (e.g., Class B).
Two years: 6/4/2002 to 6/9/2004. Note: data appears to be missing from 7/10 to 9/28 2002 (nearly 3 months)
Some inconsistencies in values for fields. Clean up.
Flat file with 2910 cases. 

## What? 2,910 Violations?

- Scrambles 15%

*What? 2,910 Violations?*

- Photo by Brendan Smialowski, Getty Images

- False Alarms 100%

**The May 11, 2005 DC ADIZ violation was only unusual because it forced an evacuation**

**Notes:**
Consider that alone: for those two years each day on average 4 aircraft violate a TFR (later, data may suggest frequency is dropping). The May 11th DC ADIZ violation by a Cessna 150 that got so much media attention was only unusual in that it provoke an evacuation. 
GAO reports there have been well over 3000 cases since 9/11/01. None so far with apparent terror intent. High noise for signal. High cost for GA pilots.
14.6% (424) Scrambles. ATC has rules to decide if violator is sufficient threat to call scramble. ATC most often just tracks aircraft until it appears to land, then calls to have pilot contact them. 
424 scrambles are a lot: averaging over 1 every other day. Costs millions per year. Consider increased chance of accidental shoot down.
Supplemental:
Photo from Washington Post web site of Capitol being evacuated due to TFR violation.
To right: pie chart showing proportion of actual terrorist attacks to false alarms since 9/11/01. More interesting pie charts to follow.
The GAO cannot rule out the possibility that some violations are in fact terrorist testing the system. Nonetheless, with over 3000 violations largely all by different individuals (as will be seen), it’s almost certain that the overwhelming majority are false alarms (accidental violations).

## Airspace Violated

*Airspace Violated*

- DC ADIZ 49.0%

- Presidential 22.0% 39 states

- NY ADIZ 8.0%

**Crawford 6.4%**

**Camp David 3.9%**

**Newport Depot 2.2%**

**Disney (both) 1.8% **

**Blue Grass 0.7%**

**Kennebunkport  0.7%**

**US ADIZ 1.0% 4 states**

**Other 5.4%, 20 states**

**9 locations account for 73% of all violations**

**ADIZ-like TFRs account for 80% of all violations**

**Notes:**
Over 97% of all violations associated with Security or VIP TFRs. Others (sports, airshow, space launches, rescue/natural disaster) are relatively rare.
Blue vs. Tan: About 3/4‘s of the violations are for a dozen places characterized by static or recurrent TFRs. NY ADIZ, Crawford, Camp David, Disney --all relatively frequent and well-publicized, yet still account for many cases. 
Green Hatchmarks: ADIZ-like TFRs account for at least 80% of all violations. 1/2 of all violations are for DC ADIZ alone. Over 80% of “pop-up” TFR violations are for Presidential 
ADIZ-like means pilots may enter the TFR, but they must:
- Activate a flight plan and be cleared by ATC into the TFR.
- Squawk a proper transponder code (typically assigned by ATC).
- Remain on flight plan or other required path.
- Maintain radio communications with ATC.
Supplemental: 
- DC ADIZ. Does *not* include 31 cases from the non-ADIZ-like FRZ and P56 (would push it just over 50%).
- 96% of Presidential TFR violations are 6/10/03 or later, when 30 nm ADIZ structure became “standard.”
- Crawford, Camp David, and Kennebunkport may also “expand” to be ADIZ-like on occasion. Crawford: includes 50 P49 and 135 in “Crawford”; Camp David: includes 99 in P40 vs. 40 in “Thurmont.” P-zones don’t change but TFR change by growing a shrinking around P-zone.
- US ADIZ, 85% in FL, rest in 3 other southeastern states 
- Disney: 21 Disneyland, 30 Disneyworld.

## Aircraft Characteristics

**Most violations are by the least well-equipped aircraft**

**Notes:**
Central tendency highlighted in blue. Generally low-end general aviation (GA) aircraft, namely piston-driven single-engine airplanes: 72% of all violations where aircraft is known. Such aircraft typically
- Operate under VFR (some pilots not certified for IFR). 
     - Solutions must work for VFR pilot.
- Have fewest resources --aircraft may not have advanced avionics
     - Solutions must address cost to pilot
Supplemental:
Data based on aircraft type, including inferred use (e.g, if MD-80, then transport), which has some ambiguity. 
Military assumed if military designation used (some military aircraft are in GA use, e.g., T-6 Texan, but then some civil aircraft are in military use, e.g,. King Air).
Experimental assumed if kitplane type (e.g., Van’s), but in principal, and GA aircraft type can be experimental).
Aircraft unknown for 1/3 of all violations. Usually ATC follows aircraft to ground then has pilot call in to get aircraft info. If aircraft disappears where there’s no place to call, may not get data. May underestimate rotorcraft and military.
There definitely some military, mostly rotorcraft. They are not immune.
Aircraft by FAA Category:
Airplane: Fixed wing with engine, other than experimental.
LTA: Lighter-than-air: In this case, a couple of Goodyear blimps around DC. No balloons.
No gliders. 
Scramble not related to aircraft type, except Unknown aircraft less likely to involve a scramble.

## Repeating Aircraft

- 2910 Records

- 2033 records among **1886 aircraft** with known tail number

**123 (6.5%) repeating aircraft**
- 7.2% of violations are with repeating aircraft

| Tail number appeared | Number of aircraft |
| --- | --- |
| Once before | 104 (5.5%) |
| Twice before | 14 (0.7%) |
| 3x before | 5 (0.3%) |

**Notes:**
Are there “repeat offenders”? Don’t have pilot ID in data, but do have plane ID Repeaters may occur, but are very rare. 
Violations seem to cut across a broad population of pilots. Targeting just violators for educational interventions unlikely to be effective.
Supplemental:
Not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between pilot and aircraft. Many pilots rent or share aircraft. A repeat offender may have repeated in a different aircraft. On the other hand, the same tail number appearing more than once may be violations by different pilots.

## Trends by Month

*Trends by Month*

**Are violations now on the decrease?**

- DC ADIZ Established

- Invasion of Iraq

- Missing Data

- 30nm ADIZ-like Presidential TFRs Common

- NY ADIZ Rescinded

- Improved FAA Graphical TFR Site Goes Live

- DC ADIZ Appears on Charts

- FAA Posts Graphical TFRs

**Large jumps correspond to ADIZ-like TFRs**

**Notes:**
Big jumps associated with establishment or removal of ADIZ-like TFRs. Increase in Spring 2003 may be associated with DC ADIZ, established February 2003, and general heightening of security in March 2003 with Iraq invasion, including 1 month of a NY ADIZ (associated alone with 232 violations in March and April; drop in May may due to it being rescinded). Increase in June ‘04 may be due to regular use of large ADIZ-like Presidential TFRs (75 Presidential violations in June, about equal to size of jump).
Perhaps some good news. Violation rate for 1st and 2nd quarters of ‘04 is about half as high as 1st and second quarter ‘03. Recent drop off may reflect ongoing efforts by FAA (and AOPA) to improve pilot awareness and understanding, such as:
- Improved graphical TFR website, 
- Representation of DC ADIZ and other recurrent/static TFRs (e.g., Crawford) on charts.
- Elimination of some smaller TFRs around certain military installations (6/03)
Supplemental:
DC ADIZ relatively violation frequencies higher compare to other locations in 1st 2003 (when first imposed) and 1st 2004 (about 60%). 
Relatively more scrambles before July 2003 than after (about 20%)
Total 2002 violations probably about twice as great due to missing months.
Few cases for DC Area  from 2002 presumably for for FRZ/SFRA and P-areas within. 

## Conclusions

*Interventions must*
*Address flight in or around ADIZ-like TFRs*
*Be applicable to low-end GA aircraft*
*Efforts to reduce incursions having an impact?*
*Cause of violations?*

**Notes:**
ADIZ-like TFRs consistently associated with bulk of violations. 
These TFRs are complex: Flight is allowed but pilots must follow unique rules. Also, DC ADIZ has complex shape: not a simple circle, nor fully conforming to existing airspace. 
But such TFRs tend to also be:
- Large: includes major metro areas (e.g., DC ADIZ includes 2 big cities).
- Long duration: DC ADIZ established 2/03. NY ADIZ was up for a month. 
This along with other high violation rates of certain “simple” TFRs such as Disney and Newport, suggest mere probability of exposure is very good predictor. Most violations in general occur in static or recurrent places. Most occur when and where the most GA planes are flying. 
Suggests issues other than simple ignorance of TFR may be playing a role. Suggests that barriers to complying with TFRs may be part of the system.
In any case, any solution to have a chance at substantially reducing violations must work for GA aircraft and in the ADIZ-like environment.
Possible decrease in violation frequencies suggest interventions are working. Most interventions focus on improving communication of TFRs (e.g., graphic TFR web site and charting of the ADIZ).
Next step: Understand human factors of these errors. Analyze cases in ASRS. 

## ASRS Reports: Reasons for Violations

*Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) queried for “TFR” or “temporary flight restrictions.”*
*Sub-sampled to represent population of violations*
*Narratives systematically categorized*
*Probable cause*
*Reporter-identified contributing factors*

**Notes:**
Second Study
Examined the narratives of 203 records from NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) queried for “TFR” or “temporary flight restrictions.” 
Honesty systematically encouraged: ASRS records are confidential and cannot be legally used against (or for) the pilot in disciplinary actions by the FAA. 
Submissions to ASRS are voluntary. To maximize the degree they represent violations in general, records were sampled to match FSOSC-observed proportions of airspace, aircraft type, and other variables.
93% of sampled records concerned a violation of restricted airspace.
Content of narratives these records systematically categorized on:
- Specific action constituting the  violation
- Probable cause based on a model of TFR compliance
- Factors identified by report submitter as contributing to the violation.
Categorization scheme tested for inter-rater reliability and variables reported here found to be acceptably reliable (80-100% agreement).

## Probable Cause:Other than DC Area

- Airspace Not Known or Recalled 30.1%

- Other 9.7%

- Misunderstood Distance to Airspace 41.8%

**Misunderstood Procedures for Penetration 8.7%**

**Misunderstood Time or Date of Effect 5.8%**

**Unspecific Details 2.9%**

**Control Setting Error 1.0%**

- Most common cause is pilot misunderstanding the details of the airspace

- Violators usually knew TFR existed

**Notes:**
Looking first at TFRs other than the DC area first. (DC ADIZ accounts for almost 1/2 of all violations).
Tan areas: Most violations (at least 59%; may include some of “Other”) due to pilot misunderstanding details about the TFR, primarily the location of its boundaries relative to oneself (42%). 
There were also misunderstandings of the procedures for penetration (applies only to ADIZ-like TFRs such as the NY ADIZ), and the time or date when the TFR goes into effect.
Most violations are not due to the pilot simply being unaware of the existence of the TFR (blue area). This cause can be positively ascribed to only 30% of the violations --not a trivial proportion but definitely not the typical case. Most violators knew the TFR existed but just didn’t understand it.
Supplemental:
Limitations of data do not allow reliable differentiation of pilots who knew own location but not TFR boundary location, and vice versa.
“Control setting error” includes “slips” --things like mis-setting the transponder for an ADIZ-like TFR (when the pilot knows the correct code).

## Probable Cause:DC Area

*Probable Cause:**DC Area*

**Airspace Not Known or Recalled 12.0%**

- Other 10.0%

- Misunderstood Distance to Airspace 40.0%

**Unspecific Details 3.0%**

**Control Setting Error 3.0%**

- Misunderstood Procedures for Penetration 31.0%

- Misunderstanding of procedures for authorized penetration plays larger role

**Notes:**
DC Area: Similar story but more so: 74% of the time the violation is due to the pilot getting the details wrong (tan versus blue).
Misunderstanding of relative distance to airspace is the same as for other airspace. DC ADIZ has unusually complex shape, but it has also been more widely publicized.
Many more violations probably due to misunderstanding of the procedures (31% vs. 9% for other than DC Area). More control-setting errors to (usually related to transponder use as required for authorized ADIZ penetration). This is consistent with the observation that 43% of DC violations due to error in procedure, esp., not getting clearance and error in transponder use.
Only 12% of cases associated lack of awareness of airspace (not surprising since DC ADIZ has long duration and was relatively well publicized).
Supplemental:
0 cases of not understanding time or date. The the time period sampled, the ADIZ was essentially always in effect.

## Misunderstood Distance:Case #575606

*Misunderstood Distance:**Case #575606*

- 1. Pilot departs Shannon for local VFR flight

- 2. Pilot thought *all* of ADIZ corresponded to Class B limits

- 3. Pilot decides to train on GPS 24 approach

- 4. Turn around initial approach fix places pilot in ADIZ

**Notes:**
Number 1 cause is misunderstanding one’s relative distance to the TFR boundary. The following are three cases where the pilot knew the TFR existed, but didn’t understand his/her relative distance to the boundaries of the airspace. Note how confusion often comes from attempting to map TFR boundaries to known references.
March 2003: pilot flies his Cherokee for the first time since ADIZ established. Looking to exercise engine and practice around aircraft’s home airport of Shannon VA.
Thought that DC ADIZ corresponded with outer Class B ring, but this is only true in the north, east, and west.
While airborne, spontaneously decides to practice GPS approach.
Flies runway reciprocal out to IAF which happens to be on edge of ADIZ. Turn to re-establish approach.
On second practice run intercepted by Customs Blackhawk.
Supplemental:
Professional bizjet pilot with almost 6000 hours.
In these graphics, airplane icon is not to scale and flight path is a rough representation base on text narrative. Fixed features are to scale.

## Misunderstood Distance:Case #595198

*Misunderstood Distance:**Case #595198*

- 1. FAA publications show old 5 nm TFR

- 2. Pilot briefed on current 10 nm expansion TFR

- 3. GPS shows FAA depiction without scale, leading to assumption it is 10 nm expansion

- 4. Pilot navigates around 5 nm ring, entering 10 nm expansion

**Notes:**
Official FAA charts show selected recurrent or static TFRs, including for Camp David. However, charts apparently show out-of-date representation of Camp David TFR, a 5 nm radius from a 2002 NOTAM.
In October 2003, a TFR “expands” Camp David P-zone, as is commonly done. However, expansion is to 10 nm radius, not 5 nm. 
Pilot’s IFR-rated GPS uses official sources for moving map display, so shows 5nm expansion. GPS display lacks adequate scale indication.
Pilot assumes depicted ring represents 10 nm expansion and uses display to navigate clear of it. This, however, puts pilot through 10 nm ring.
Supplemental:
Aircraft: Trinidad TB-20; Pilot: 920 hours. 
Above scan is an actual sectional from February 2004 --long after the 5nm TFR has expired and 10 nm expansions are common.
In another case in ASRS records, and pilot made the same mistake only using a paper chart from the FAA rather than a GPS.

## Misunderstood Distance:Case #599483

*Misunderstood Distance:**Case #599483*

- 1. Intended course to miss TFR by 5 nm

- 2. Unexpectedly strong westerly winds

- 3. Aircraft drifts into TFR

**Notes:**
Plain old navigation errors: Planned course around TFR would avoid it by at least 5 nm. 
However, aircraft drifts into Newport Chemical Depot TFR apparently due to stronger than anticipated winds. 
Pilot realizes he’s off course, gets orientation and corrects back to course
Pilot notified of incursion by Champaign/Urbana Approach.

Supplemental:
Often not possible to distinguish error in ownship position from error in TFR position --all reporter can say is s/he thought they were farther away than they were from the TFR.
Aircraft: Arrow IV; Pilot: 174 hours.
Pilot reports turning over VOR, so navigation may have been at least partially electronic.
Visibility was moderate: 6 nm & hazy.

## Misunderstood Procedures:Case #602933

- 2. FSS gives pilot frequency for Approach to get clearance and transponder code

- 1. Untowered airport in DC ADIZ

- 3. Transponder set for pattern work for airport next door

- 4. Pilot contacts Approach to request clearance

- 800 ft

**Notes:**
And now three examples of misunderstood procedures. Note that in all cases, error is associated with confusion between what is usually done with new post-9/11 requirements. 
First: Clearance/activation error.
Student pilot and instructor prepare to depart from airport inside ADIZ to airport outside ADIZ. 
Airport has no control tower, so clearances and discrete transponder codes must be gotten through Potomac Approach. During FSS briefing, briefer gives student pilot frequency to contact Approach.
At a nearby airport (also in ADIZ), planes may takeoff without an explicit clearance if they are squawking a transponder code for local pattern work (i.e., practice flights) Instructor believes that since departure airport was in the same Class D airspace as the other airport, they can use the same code for takeoff.
Immediately after airborne, instructor contacts Approach for a clearance to destination. Approach clears them, but they already violated the ADIZ by simply leaving the ground without a clearance or discrete transponder code.
It is often not possible to reach approach by radio when on the ground. The procedure they should have followed is to call Approach by phone to get the clearance and discrete transponder code. That procedure is unique to ADIZ-like TFRs.
Supplemental:
Aircraft: C172; Instructor: over 2000 hours. 
Departing from Essex (4 nm S of Martin State) for Martinsburg in WV.
Fairly frequent error. For IFR flights, its common to contact approach after airborne (if in VMC) and then activate flight plan and get transponder code.
Also cases where pilot claims FSS told him to contact Approach after airborne for clearance.

## Misunderstood Procedures:Case #579443

- 1. Flight into NY ADIZ from South under control of McGuire Approach

- 2. As aircraft leaves McGuire radar, pilot told to “squawk 1200”

- 3. Aircraft transponder set to 1200 while pilot raises NY approach

**Notes:**
Transponder usage error.
Pilot files and activates flight plan from S Jersey through NY ADIZ to New Hampshire.
McGuire Approach gives pilot transponder code and provides radio contact as aircraft enters ADIZ, as is necessary for allowed flight in ADIZ.
Less than 15 nm into ADIZ, McGuire says radar services are terminated (likely out of range), and tells pilot to set transponder to 1200, a standard non-discrete code used by all VFR traffic. There’s no handoff to NY Approach
Pilot questions losing contact with ATC while in an ADIZ, and McGuire gives pilot a frequency to try to reach NY.
Pilot reaches NY immediately but in the meantime, the transponder was apparently set to 1200.
Normally, controllers tell pilots to go to 1200 when radar contact cannot be maintain, but this does not apply in an ADIZ. NY ADIZ was only up for 4 weeks, allowing little time for controllers to experience.
Supplemental:
Aircraft C182; Pilot 2600 hours. 
Flight was VFR up the Hudson corridor below Class B airspace.
There are many other cases in ASRS records of pilots claiming a violation was due to ATC or FSS giving flat-out incorrect information or instructions.

## Misunderstood Procedures:Case #599020

- 1. Rules allow “direct” departures from fringe airports without explicit clearance

- 2. Pilot interprets this to mean “no turns”

- 3. Actual intention was to fly shortest route out of ADIZ

**Notes:**
Flight path error (a rare thing to get wrong).
Modification to DC ADIZ allows pilots to depart the ADIZ from airports around its fringe without getting a clearance from ATC. Pilots need only set their transponders to 1205 to indicate their intentions.
NOTAM explaining this says departure of the ADIZ must be “direct.” “Direct” to pilots usually means “no turns” (as in “cleared direct to DXR”). In this case, pilot leaves Martin State flying direct to Westminster VOR
However, NOTAM intention was that pilots leave the ADIZ by the shortest route after airborne. Given the runways at Martin State, this generally means flying direct to ADIZ edge to the north through southeast.
NOTAM was later re-issued substituting the word “shortest” for “direct.”
Supplemental:
Aircraft: C152; Pilot: 1300 hrs. Flight with student. 
“Acceptable region” in this illustration is an inference based on the instructions in the NOTAMs and the layout of Martin State. It has not been mapped or described by any authority.

## Getting NOTAMs/Briefing

- Probably most pilots reviewed NOTAMs or got a briefing before the alleged violation

**Notes:**
The narratives were categorized for statements indicating whether or not the pilot checked the NOTAMs or got an FSS briefing before flight. About half of the narratives were indeterminate: we couldn’t say for sure whether or not the pilot got the NOTAMs or briefing. Generally, this means the narrative didn’t mention NOTAMs or briefings at all.
Among the unambiguous cases, 84% of the time, the pilot said he got the NOTAMs or a briefing, and 16% of the time the pilot indicated s/he didn’t get NOTAMs or a briefing (latter includes recommendations like, “From now on, I will always check the NOTAMs”).
What does it mean? Well, at least 39% of pilots who allegedly violated a TFR had in fact been briefed or check NOTAMs. It could easily be more. If the same proportions apply to those that don’t mention NOTAMs or briefings as those t hat do, then 84% of alleged violators were briefed or check NOTAMs. Possibly nearly all pilots who didn’t mention it were in fact briefed or check NOTAMs --maybe pilots don’t mention it because it is just understood to be a standard preflight procedure. That would mean that upwards of 90% of all alleged violators were briefed or check NOTAMs. The truth is probably somewhere in between. It seems likely that most alleged violators were briefed or check NOTAMs before flight. 
Failure to check NOTAMs or get a briefing may  be a factor in violations, but it does not appear to be the primary factor. Rather, it suggests that more often the pilot incorrectly interprets the NOTAM or briefing s/he received. 
Supplemental
We used a very strict criteria for categorization --the reporter must explicitly  say they got NOTAMs or a briefing. They could quote the NOTAM verbatim, but unless they actually said they got the NOTAMs, we did not assume the pilot actually got the NOTAMs before flight.
We categorized narratives on whether the pilot got any NOTAMs or FSS briefing, not that they necessarily got the NOTAM or briefing on the specific TFR s/he allegedly violated. Indeed, there are cases where the pilot claims they got a briefing, but the briefer didn’t warn them of the TFR.
If in just 23 of the 109 ambiguous cases the pilot in fact was briefed or got NOTAMs, then most alleged violators were briefed or got NOTAMs.

## Reporter-identified Factors

- Problems in communications about the airspace seen as contributing to most violations

**Notes:**
These are things the ASRS report submitter (the pilot) say contributed to the violation. Includes factors implied by the mitigation recommendations the reporter included in the ASRS narrative (e.g., “I should’ve...”).
Consistent with misunderstanding of the details of the TFR being the most common probable cause, most narratives (51%) suggested their respective violations were at least partially caused by problems in communicating information about the TFR. In other words, if the TFR were better communicated, then there wouldn’t have been a violation. TFRs are communicated to pilots mostly through FSS briefings and NOTAMs. Much of the communication difficulties seems to be associated with using speech or text to communicate spatial information. Examples to follow.
Another factor: 17% of the narratives suggested better use of ATC services such as flight following could have avoided the violation.
Supplemental:
A single narrative can cite more than one factor, so the sum of the percents is over 100%.
“General Human Factors” include fatigue and distraction --factors not specific to TFR violations. Little there to suggest a solution.
“Violation Handling Error” includes problems in officials handling the violation that made matters worse. Includes pilots who think they are wrongly accused of violating the TFR. Limitations on ASRS narratives generally do not allow an objective assessment of this claim, but ambiguity of identifying violating aircraft make this a possibility. 
We also coded for things like deliberate violations and for suggestions to not have TFRs. These came up in only a miniscule number of cases.

## Airspace Communication:Flight Service Station Briefings

- 1. Flight Service Station briefer refers to fix at 37° and 5.7 nm from a navaid

- 2. Pilot thinks all TFRs centered on a navaid and fix is simply location of entity to protect

- 3. Pilot flies into TFR that was actually centered on fix

**Notes:**
Case: #590613
Transiting complex airspace around LA, pilot is briefed on 30 nm TFR centered on fix 37 degrees and 5.7 nm from Ventura VOR/DME. Pilot misunderstands description because he was under the mistaken assumption that TFRs are always centered on a navaid. He takes the briefer mentioning the fix to be mean “that the TFR was to protect something from that location.” Thus, he flies without giving the TFR sufficient berth.
Other cases:
- Omission of details: Case #602933 (earlier case where student and instructor who took off to get clearance after airborne). Briefer had asks strudent if he was familiar with ADIZ, and student replied “yes,” but didn’t know detail about squawking before being airborne.
- Case: Transcription error of coordinates for a TFR during in-flight briefing (switch two digits) leads to misunderstanding of boundaries.
- Claims of briefers giving flat-out wrong info on boundaries (unable to evaluated claim in this study since don’t have access to briefing tapes).
Supplemental:
Aircraft: Cessna Centurion; Pilot: 2200 hours.
Believing that a TFR this large would be centered on a navaid is not illogical from the pilot’s perspective because it makes it reasonably easy to avoid the TFR with typical aircraft navigation equipment. In this case, simply tune to the DME and make sure the displayed distance stays over 30 nm. The relatively large size of this TFR (10x size of a typical non-security TFR) would be seen as still providing sufficient protection to the off-centered entity.

## Airspace Communication:Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs)

- FDC 5/1953 ZJX PART 2 OF 4 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, MARCH 18, 2005 LOCAL. EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BELOW AND/OR UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY ATC: A. ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS WITHIN A 10 NMR AREA LISTED ABOVE ARE PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR: 1. LAW ENFORCEMENT, MILITARY AIRCRAFT DIRECTLY SUPPORTING THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE (USSS) AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EMERGENCY MEDICAL FLIGHTS, AND REGULARLY SCHEDULED COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AND ALL-CARGO CARRIERS OPERATING UNDER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING TSA-APPROVED STANDARD SECURITY PROGRAMS/PROCEDURES: AIRCRAFT OPERATOR STANDARD SECURITY PROGRAM (AOSSP), DOMESTIC SECURITY INTEGRATION PROGRAM (DSIP), TWELVE FIVE STANDARD SECURITY PROGRAM (TFSSP), OR ALL-CARGO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURE (ACISP) AND ARE ARRIVING INTO AND/OR DEPARTING FROM 14 CFR PART 139 AIRPORTS. 2. FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE TFR, ALL MEDICAL FLIGHT OPERATION COMPANIES SHALL COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN ADVANCE WITH THE END PART 2 OF 4
- FDC 5/1953 ZJX PART 3 OF 4 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, MARCH 18, 2005 LOCAL. USSS AT 850-444-5646 TO AVOID POTENTIAL DELAYS. B. WITHIN THE AIRSPACE BETWEEN 10 NMR AND 30 NMR LISTED ABOVE: 1. ALL AIRCRAFT ENTERING OR EXITING THE 30 NMR TFR SHALL BE ON AN ACTIVE IFR OR VFR FLIGHT PLAN WITH A DISCRETE CODE ASSIGNED BY AN ATC FACILITY. AIRCRAFT SHALL BE SQUAWKING THE DISCRETE CODE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE AND AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN THE TFR. 2. ALL AIRCRAFT ENTERING OR EXITING THE 30 NMR TFR MUST REMAIN IN TWO-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATC. 3. ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATING WITHIN THE 10 NMR TO 30 NMR TFR AND OPERATING AT ALTITUDES OF UP TO BUT NOT INCLUDING FL180 ARE LIMITED TO AIRCRAFT ARRIVING OR DEPARTING LOCAL AIRFIELDS AND ATC MAY AUTHORIZE TRANSIT OPERATIONS. AIRCRAFT MAY NOT LOITER. 4. FLIGHT TRAINING, PRACTICE INSTRUMENT APPROACHES, AEROBATIC END PART 3 OF 4
- FDC 5/1953 ZJX PART 4 OF 4 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, MARCH 18, 2005 LOCAL. FLIGHT, GLIDER OPERATIONS, PARACHUTE OPERATIONS, ULTRALIGHT, HANG GLIDING, BALLOON, AGRICULTURE/CROP DUSTING, ANIMAL POPULATION CONTROL FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AND BANNER TOWING OPERATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED. 5. ALL USSS CLEARED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS BASED IN THE AREA SHOULD NOTIFY THE USSS PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE. 6. FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE TFR, ALL MEDICAL FLIGHT OPERATION COMPANIES SHALL COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN ADVANCE WITH THE USSS AT 850-444-5646 TO AVOID POTENTIAL DELAYS. C. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATORS CHECK NOTAMS FREQUENTLY FOR POSSIBLE REQUIRED CHANGES TO THIS TFR PRIOR TO OPERATIONS WITHIN THIS REGION. END PART 4 OF 4

*Airspace Communication:**Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs)*

- NOTAMs hard to read or scan:
-  Format
-  Readability
-  Lack of graphics
-  Sheer number
-  Sort order

**Notes:**
NOTAM missed or misunderstood. Using text to describe spatial boundaries or complex procedures has inherent limitations.
Narratives complain about:
- Readability and format: Text hard to read (all capitals). Content hard to understand.
- Sheer number and sorting order: 35-page briefing on one flight with TFR NOTAM buried within. Case where pilot discovers NOTAM after flight.
Supplemental:
Pictured: NOTAM 5/1953, an example of Presidential TFR NOTAM from early 2005. While fairly typical for a Presidential TFR NOTAM, most non-TFR NOTAMs are considerably shorter, perhaps making them easier to read but harder to find. Use of all-capital letters and Courier font is from the original NOTAM as it appears in a DUATS output.

## Airspace Communication:FAA Graphic TFRs

- Often hard to interpret details on TFR maps, including maps posted by the FAA

**Notes:**
Pilots complained of inadequate TFR maps provided by the FAA on the web. Here’s an actual map for a presidential TFR in Indiana in early 2005. Note how sparse it is on details and labels. Other maps attempt to provide more detail, but are often difficult to read. For a TFR in Connecticut in 2003, the pilot misidentified the river on a map to use as a reference for the eastern most boundary of a TFR. On this map, it is easy to imagine an pilot confusing the top highway for the bottom and not staying adequately north of the TFR. 
The FAA has done much to improve TFR maps since 2003, but they still may not be adequate.
Supplemental:
If you’re thinking the coastline of Lake Michigan looks wrong for Indiana, it is. This map is rotated a good 15 degrees to the left from a North up orientation.

## Conclusions

*Improve communication and awareness of the ***details** *about the TFR*
*Boundaries of TFR*
*Procedures for allowed penetration*

**Notes:**
These results imply that the best means to reduce violations of restricted airspace is to improve the effectiveness of informing pilots of the details about the restricted airspace. Better pilot awareness of the existence of TFRs and ADIZs should prevent some violations but cannot eliminate most of them. While the FAA has made graphic representations of TFRs available to pilots, the implementation used at the time of this study does not appear to have solved the problem of conveying the boundaries of restricted airspace. Furthermore, knowing the boundaries of the airspace is only part of the problem. For ADIZs and ADIZ-like TFRs, where penetration is allowed, the detailed procedures to be followed while in the airspace do not appear to be making it to pilots in an effective manner.

## Improvements: NOTAMs

- Use of mixed case to improve readability

- Use of variable emphasis and breaks to bring out key information

**Notes:**
FAA has been incrementally improving system. Here’s a NOTAM from last month displayed on the FAA TFR web site.
Use mixed case and variable emphasis to improve reading and scanning for key words. Break text into blocks of meaning (currently breaks can occur mid-sentence). Critical information used to assess NOTAM relevance should be at the top and emphasize.
Would also like to see this:
- Applied to all NOTAMs when users get general briefing (DUATS)
- Use keywords to provide categorization of NOTAMs such ones relevant to VFR, IFR, or (as with most TFRs) all flight in order to support computer-based viewers that let the pilot sort or filter NOTAMs by their own criteria. This many include:
- Class and identity of object NOTAM relates to (e.g., runway, navaid, airspace).
- Class of action related to object (e.g., name change, frequency change, restriction).
- Type of flight or aircraft that the NOTAM is most relevant to.
- Dynamically generate content from NOTAMs and flight plan, such as indicating proximity of NOTAM-related subject to flight plan, or generating a summary map of flight, showing proximity to TFRs, weather, and other hazards.

## Improvements: FSS Briefings

- FSS systems being upgraded

## Improvements: FAA Maps

- Balanced level of detail

- Features relevant to VFR pilots

**Notes:**
TFR maps need to balance clutter and detail for the medium they use and the purpose they serve. The map should be sufficiently detailed to allow a pilot unfamiliar with the area to precisely identify the TFR boundaries and draw it on a sectional or other chart, but not so detailed that text or symbols are difficult to read when printed in black and white or viewed at the level of zoom necessary to show the entire TFR. 
Regular TFRs such as ADIZ also appear on charts, but would help to improve process and speed of updating.
Shown are things key for orienting the pilot and understanding the TFR location:
- Ground references such as those found on a sectional chart. 
- All fixes useful for locating the TFR boundaries. 
- Other airspace, especially Class B and C, and certain SUAs
Other things I’d like to see:
- Easier to read labels (e.g., interstates)
- Scale and latitude and longitude graticule. 
 State and national borders. 
 Compatibility with B&W printout
 Representation of type of restriction (total or ADIZ-like), its ceiling, and temporal boundaries. An airborne pilot need only glance at this map to fully review the TFR. 
 Avoidance of terrain elevation depiction. It provides too much clutter while providing little in orientation.

## Limits on Improving Maps and NOTAMs

*Pilot must “pull” information*
*Long lag between encountering TFR information and potential violation*
*No real-time feedback on pilot actions*
*Violations due to navigation errors not addressed*

**Notes:**
The short term interventions are expected to help, but it is not realistic to expect them to cut violations 90% on their own. They have inherent limitations:
- Requires pilot to actively seek TFR information through NOTAMs. Pilots may make errors in this search. It would be better to intelligently and selectively “push” the information  towards them
- Pilots encounter TFR information typically hours before having to deal with the TFR itself, allowing for recall or reference errors. It would be better if up-to-date information were encountered or re-encountered when near the TFR.
- There’s no means to provide feedback to the pilot if they make an error in understanding or using the TFR information, other than being caught making a violation but then it’s too late. It would be better if there were feedback before the violation occurs.
- An unknown proportion of violations are due to navigation errors, not errors understanding the TFR per se. Short term interventions do not address these. It would be better if the pilot could tell the relative distance to the TFR whether or not s/he know his/her correct location.

## Future: Cockpit Display

- Strategic planning map display

- Tactical moving map display

- Text information display

**Notes:**
Thinking as a human factors engineer, I can imagine what an ideal system would be like. For one thing, it would put real-time graphic TFR information in the cockpit.
Information display requirements:
- Include strategic display of TFR for flight planning.
- Include tactical display for use while flying in or near TFRs.
- Include text display of TFRs on demand.
Must include all TFRs including transitory
Note:Images shown here are intended to be notional only. Actual implementation requires research. Shown is 5/1953 as it might appear on a low-end hand-held moving map display (4-level gray scale, 240x160 pixels).

## Mechanized ADIZ Entry

- Access or create flight plan

- Electronically file flight plan

- Display or apply clearance info

- Display clearance status

- Support closing flight plan

- Activate flight plan and get ADIZ clearance

**Notes:**
Mechanized flight plan filing. ISARC should allow:
- Access to or pilot creation a flight plan.
- Presentation of TFR clearances (with text or graphics).
- Support pilot-initiated real-time flight plan filing and activation.
- Display of apply (if linked to transponder and radios) information received from the clearance.
- Close completed flight plans and allow pilots to cancel them as well.
This must be doable either in the air or on the ground.
Because the air traffic controller is not responsible for ensuring separation for an aircraft operating under VFR, such a clearance can be automated because the controller does not have to coordinate the aircraft's entry into the airspace with other traffic. 
This should include support of peculiar local flight plans such as for pattern work or flights into and out of “fringe” airports on the DC ADIZ.
Supplemental:
Ideally, should be capable and useful for filing any VFR flight plan, not just flight plans into ADIZ-like TFRs. This may encourage more frequent filing of flight plans, improving the safety of VFR flight, as well as getting pilots into the habit of filing flight plans, making if more likely they’ll follow the correct procedures for ADIZ-like TFRs.

## Future: Violation Alerting

- ADIZ-like TFR

- ADIZ-like TFR

- TFR

- Direct Conflict

- Imminent Activation

- Wrong Squawk

- Path Deviation

- TFR

**Notes:**
Alert the pilot of a likely TFR violation in time to take corrective action. 
The form of the alert should be proportional imminence of the violation (e.g., while flight planning versus while airborne near the TFR).
Example alerts include:
- Current flight plan, track, altitude or vertical speed will imminently bring the aircraft into a SSA. 
- Current speed, flight plan and/or track will cause the aircraft to become trapped in a SSA that is about to activate.
- Transponder is not squawking the appropriate code while approaching ADIZ-like TFR, or pilot attempts to change the transponder from the appropriate code.
- The aircraft is deviating from an activated flight plan in an ADIZ-like TFR.
Supplemental:
Alerts involving “approaching a TFR” should include preparing to takeoff at an airport in a TFR, but ISARC should also suppress annoying alerts when merely taxiing (e.g., from one hangar to another). There’s a number of ways this could be implemented. For example, an interface to the altimeter or a built-in WAAS receiver can be used to determine if the aircraft is on the ground. ISARC knowledge of runway end points can be used to determine if the aircraft is aligning itself on a runway for takeoff.

## Supporting Technologies

**Status**

**Technology**

- GPS moving maps continued
- Datalink
- Telecom Infrastructure
- Electronic Clearance

- TFR Information Display & Alerts
- Updates & Clearances
- Updates & Clearances
- Clearances

**TFR Application**

- Deployed continued
- Field testing
- Developing
- Recommended

**Notes:**
Currently, many technologies are being developed that can be used to make such implementation within 10 years.
Relatively affordable moving map devices are already common among GA pilots, supporting flight plan creation and editing, graphically depicting airspace, and even alerting the pilot of approaching airspace (e.g., Class B). Advanced versions include communications radios and control of the transponder.
Datalink is up and running to some degree, with full coverage of the East coast for UAT and FIS-B. These can be used to distribute TFR updates and handle clearances.
The FAA is proceeding with modernizing its telecommunications infrastructure with System Wide Information Management (SWIM) and the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI). This can also be used to distribute TFR updates and handle clearances.
As far as I know, no one is currently developing on electronic flight plan activation and TFR clearance delivery, but maybe someone investigating this in regards to Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS), where it may have uses there. TFRs may be excellent live pilot test for this technology.

## Notional System

- ADIZ-like TFR

- Flight Plan

**ATC**

- 2. Moving map displays TFR

- 3. Alert provided when necessary

- 4. Flight plan activation and Clearance

- 1. Latest TFR info sent

**Notes:**
How it could work:
- Latest TFR information is sent to a on-board (panel or hand-held) GSP unit by FIS-B over UAT.
- Moving map in cockpit shows TFR and any alerts.
- For an ADIZ-like TFR, pilot uses ISARC to file a flight plan with ATC and request a clearance.
- Flight plan is algorithmically  reviewed and clearance given, along with transponder code and ATC frequency.
- ISARC monitors transponder to verify code is set before TFR entry.
- ISARC automatically closes the flight plan the when aircraft arrives at is end outside the TFR.
Supplemental:
Flight plan may be automatically closed when aircraft stops at the entered destination, provided the stop is not particularly sudden (i.e., a crash).