# Presentation: 109821

## OFCM Strategy for Providing Atmospheric Information WorkshopDecember 3-5, 2001

- OFCM *Strategy for Providing Atmospheric Information *WorkshopDecember 3-5, 2001

- Defense Environmental Data Control

- Col Michael Jamilkowski,
- Military Asst. for Environmental Monitoring
- Office of the Asst Secretary of Defense
- for Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence

**Notes:**
I’m standing in for Col Michael Jamilkowski, who is the Military Assistant for Environmental Monitoring in the Office of the Asst Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence.  He apologizes, but had to be in Europe this week.

I will briefly address the DoD’s required control of environmental data (Meteorological, Oceanographic and Space).  This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED.

## Background/Basic Principles
Age-Old Dilemma
History/Evolution
Law/Policy/Directives
Since September 11, 2001...
Summary and Way Ahead

- Age-Old Dilemma
- History/Evolution
- Law/Policy/Directives
- Since September 11, 2001...
- Summary and Way Ahead

- OVERVIEW

- UNCLASSIFIED

**Notes:**
These are the areas I will cover this morning:
- some background and history
- written guidance
- some perceived changes since Sept. 11th and
- a summary & outlook

## BACKGROUND/BASIC PRINCIPLES

-  Basic/Historical National Security Principles:
-  During times of war or other contingencies, National Security intelligence information must be:
-  -- Denied - Protected - Controlled
-  Intelligence Information control allows for:
-  -- Information Superiority & Battlefield Dominance
-  Intelligence Information Includes Environmental Data
-  US/Allied Warfighter’s must have Environmental Intelligence (data) to gain advantage over adversaries
-  Spectrum of Data Control:

- UNCLASSIFIED

**Notes:**
 These historic military intelligence principles are fairly straight-forward and logical:  
 there are times when we need to restrict the availability of US environmental data for National Security reasons

 Also, Data Control is not black and white, i.e completely restricted or free access
 there is a spectrum between the extremes
 examples of most probable forms of “Limited Denial”:
-- Delay access of highly perishable data to non-friendly or questionable users
-- Limit denial to a specific geographical area and/or time

##  Secure Info. Vs. Warfighter Access

-  How secure to make Information before Warfighter:
-  Access is effected?
-  Looses information advantage?
-  Utility is rendered ineffective?
-  Solutions
-  More secure communications options
-  More secure bandwidth
-  State-of-the-Art communications timeliness
-  Encryption technology breakthroughs
-  Avoid over-classification of data/products

- AGE-OLD MILITARY DILEMMA

- UNCLASSIFIED

**Notes:**
The age-old dilemma for the warfighter is that security classification sometimes limits access and ultimately makes the information useless!

And this is especially true for Environmental data & products, and perhaps more so in many cases...

There are solutions, largely in communications improvements, but most are expensive.  
- Avoiding over-classification can be pretty time-consuming.

## HISTORY/EVOLUTION

-  **Historically, many examples of environmental data control and denial exist**
** ****Over the last 60 years some examples are:**
-  World War II D-Day Invasion, 1945
- -- Allied Theatre-wide Weather Data & Forecasts tightly controlled
-  Falklands War, 1981
- -- Argentina denied Environmental Satellite Data
-  Persian Gulf War, 1991
- -- Iraq denied all US/Allied environmental & some commercial regional data
-  Operations Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom, 2001
- -- Normal control of US/Allied environmental & some regional commercial data
-  **Illustrates tendency towards regional/selective control/denial**

- UNCLASSIFIED

## HISTORY/EVOLUTION

- 1980

- 1970

- 1990

- 2000

- 2010

**A****C****C****E****S****S**

- Evolution of Access to DoD Polar-orbiting MetSat Data

- Early
- DMSP

- Shared
- DMSP

- 3-Hour
- DMSP

- 72-Hour
- DMSP

- Open*
- NPOESS

- UNCLASSIFIED

**Notes:**
 The history of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, or DMSP, plots out a fairly lengthy but positive progression towards (near*) open access in the NPOESS era.
 The asterisk indicates that there remains the possibility of times where selective denial will be necessary.
 This progression towards an NPOESS era of open access to US government polar-orbiting weather satellite data is embodied in the 1994 Clinton Presidential Decision Directive that created NPOESS (see next slide).
 It remains to be seen if current or future administrations will maintain or alter this...
 NOTES:
 - For Early DMSP, all data were encrypted & no non-DoD access allowed
 - Shared DMSP:  AF-Navy-NOAA shared processing agreement
 - 72-Hour DMSP: AF/XOW allowed release of data after 72 hours (from sensing)
 - 3-Hour DMSP: AF/XOW allowed release of data after 3 hours (from sensing)

## LAW/POLICY/DIRECTIVES

-  Public Law...
-  DoD & NATO Procedures...
-  DMSP Security Guide...
-  PDD/NSTC-2, May 1994, NPOESS...
-  DoD Space Policy, DoD Instructions...
-  US Shutter Control Policy...
-  Etc...

- UNCLASSIFIED

**Notes:**
Ample current written guidance exists directing data control:
- Public Law provides for control of all civil (DOC/NOAA) environmental data to “chop over” to the DoD during certain times of war and crisis
- US Policy,
- DoD & NATO procedures,
- Presidential decision,
- DoD Directives, Policy and Instructions

## SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001...

-  Since 9/11/01 the U.S. Government has been preparing for and engaging in a long-term "war on terrorism”
-  May involve covert and counter-insurgent military operations in various parts of the world.
-  Implication: Flexible "data denial" may be necessary
-  Accommodate periodic site-specific data denials
-  Associated with asymmetric war
-  Especially, w.r.t. International agreements

- UNCLASSIFIED

**Notes:**
 Although there have been no specific changes in written guidance since September 11th,  due to the US’s War on Terrorism, there are fairly strong implications with respect to US data denial flexibility:
- must be able to handle periodic or aperiodic data denial of a specific area,
- nature of asymmetric warfare demands increased flexibility,
- in current and future international negotiations, data denial clause is a must 
 Current example, although not necessarily environmental:
 NIMA’s “sole rights” contract for Ikonos imagery over Afghanistan

## SUMMARY & WAY AHEAD

-  **Data Denial for National Security purposes still necessary**
-  Perhaps more so since September 11th
-  **DoD will continue to maintain options for Data Denial**
-  While striving to ensure data access to US/Allied forces
-  **Long-Term US Environmental Data Control evolving to**:
-  Overall Greater Availability, esp. during peacetime
-  Selective Denial for limited/regional contingencies

- UNCLASSIFIED

**Notes:**
In summary:
- Data Denial will continue to be necessary to achieve US National Security objectives -- an increased imperative since September 11th
- The Dept of Defense will continue to maintain flexible options for Data Denial -- but also strive to ensure access to vital environmental data for our troops and our Allies
- Overall and in the Long Term, believe we will continue to see greater access to US environmental data (e.g., Internet), but
 -- we’ll always need to have the capability to selectively deny data and products 
 -- considering the outlook for continued limited regional conflicts (versus all-out world war)