# Presentation: 247963

## FY’01

**(OEB)**

**FY’01**
**Safety & Health (S&H) Assessment**

**          ****Jon Mullin/HQ/QS**
**     ****Art Lee/HQ/QS**
**                 ****Dr. Bill Barry/KSC/QA**
**     ****March 7****, 2002**

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## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                      FY’01 Assessments

**OEB Activities for FY’01 **
**OEB Reviews Performed**
**Ames Research Center (March 6-8, 2001)**
**Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)**
**Langley Research Center (August 28-31, 2001)**
**National Transonic Facility (NTF)**
**OEB Participants**
**NASA Headquarters’**
**Safety & Mission Assurance Office**
**Chief Health & Medical Office**
**Facilities Engineering Division**
**Environmental Management Division**
**Institutional Program Offices**
**NASA Centers**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001**
**Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)**
**Areas of Concern Include: Safety; Fire Protection; Lifting Devices and Equipment; Emergency Preparedness & Security; Occupational Health; Operations & Maintenance**
**Safety**
**Conduct a complete “Safety Walk-down” of UPWT by experienced Safety, Fire, and Health Team**
**Include all Collateral Equipment (Drives, Auxiliaries, etc.) in required Facility Condition Assessment IAW NPD 8831.1B **
**Evaluate potential “risks” from a seismic event since unmodified portion of UPWT not meeting current seismic standard**
**Evaluate “risks” from potential Failure of Compressed Gas Containers in event of an Earthquake**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001**
**Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT) (Cont’d.)**
**Safety (Cont’d.)**
**Recommend ARC Code Q update Hazard Risk Identification Control Documentation to include System Safety Hazard Reports**
**What are the “Root Causes” from the extensive number of Contractor Failures during UPWT Project Upgrade**
**Evaluate Customer Requirements to insure against Facility Failure**
**Explain the Process assuring Document changes are flowed down to all related Documents **
**Lack of Knowledge Concerning Agency’s Lessons-Learned Information System (LLIS)**
**Implement the GIDEP process and provide user training**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001**
**Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT) (Cont’d.)**
**Safety (Cont’d.)**
**Review Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Configuration and consider tying in model homing system in case of Power loss**
**Confirm how Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) have been satisfied for UPWT**
**Confirm Risk Based Acquisition Management (RBAM) was conducted for UPWT contracts**
**Performance Evaluation Profile (PEP) results should be utilized to improve UPWT Safety & Health Program**
**Review Reliance on Unassisted Voice Communications in Test Environment and evaluate Recording of Voice Loops in UPWT Control Rooms, if Communication Systems installed **

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001**
**Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT) (Cont’d.)**
**Fire Protection **
**Improper Storage of Chemicals and Flammable Materials in violation of NFPA and NASA requirements**
**Lack of Fire Alarm Pull Stations at all Exits in violation of NFPA and NASA requirements **
**Placement of Fire Extinguishers is extremely dense potentially causing unnecessary costs (ref. NFPA 10) **
**Define and document Approval Process for transporting Hazardous Materials to UPWT in the “Test Planning Guide WT Operations Division H.S.T.P.”**
**Add Fire Safety Information to the “Test Planning Guide WT Operations Division H.S.T.P.”**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001**
**Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT) (Cont’d.)**
**Lifting Devices and Equipment (LDE)**
**Verify that Lifting Devices and Slings are properly tested IAW NSS/GO 1740.9B for LDE**
**Confirm that required Hazard Analyses and Failure Modes & Effects Analyses (FMEAs) were done prior to conducting “Critical Lifts”**
**Emergency Preparedness & Security**
**Evacuation Routes from the UPWT Control Rooms and Other Intensive Work Areas need to be clearly marked**
**All UPWT Workers need to be frequently trained and updated on the proper Emergency Egress with documentation of Training as required by OSHA  **
**Conduct Human Factors Study to Evaluate Standardized Emergency Shutdown Procedures for all WTs **

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001**
**Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT) (Cont’d.)**
**Emergency Preparedness & Security (Cont’d.) **
**Add Emergency Information to the “Test Planning Guide WT Operations Division H.S.T.P.”**
**Provide ARC Policy on Background Investigations for New Employees, especially unescorted access to Critical Facilities**
**Occupational Health**
**WT Guide for ARC requires an “Eye Exam” every 4 years, but Center Medical Office unaware of the requirement - need resolution**
**Concern with the “Noise-levels” in the UPWT Control Rooms **

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Ames Research Center Review, March 6-8, 2001**
**Reviewed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)**
**Observations **
**ARC should consider using SOLAR Web-based Training for improving Training opportunities Center-wide**
**Lessons-Learned for ARC Wind Tunnels should be better shared between Code R (Office of Aerospace Technology) Centers**
**Revisiting Hazard Risk Analysis on a Regular and Periodic Basis by UPWT is fundamental to a Good Risk Management Program**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                                        	     FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31, 2001**
**Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)**
**Areas of Concern Include: Safety; Emergency Preparedness; Fire Protection; Lifting Devices and Equipment; and Operations & Maintenance**
**Safety**
**Assure Operational Staffing Levels are maintained and Corporate Knowledge is being transferred and captured **
**Explain how the Center Director is made aware of the “Risk Acceptance” decisions made for the Center**
**Establish and communicate a strong and formal “Timeout” Policy Center-wide**
**NTF Management should become more familiar with Johnson Controls (JCI) Safety & Health Plan**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31, 2001**
**Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF) (Cont’d.)**
**Safety (Cont’d.)**
**Determine what Collateral Damage may occur should the NTF as a Pressure Vessel and System (PV/S) rupture during a Test and who updates the Hazard Analysis as part of the Facility System Safety Program **
**A complete Inventory of Flexible Hoses for PV/S is required IAW NPD 8710.5 **
**Evaluate a Facility Closed Circuit TV System to improve Safety and Security**
**Improve Confined Space Entry Management at the NTF**
**Management should advocate Funding to Upgrade Software/Hardware for Reliable WT Control & Data Acquisition System**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31, 2001**
**Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF) (Cont’d.)**
**Safety (Cont’d.)**
**Evaluate use of UPS in the NTF Control Room to protect Oxygen Monitoring Systems, Computers, & Data Acquisition Systems**
**Explain why the Oxygen Monitoring System is on a       12- month Calibration Cycle**
**Recognize LaRC’s VPP Star Status; however, “Lock-Out/ Tag-Out (LO/TO)” Program is less stringent than at many other Centers and should be re-evaluated independently  **
**Utilize the Agency’s Lessons-Learned Information System (LLIS) Database**
**Reconsider Philosophy on displaying NSRS & Agency Safety Initiative (ASI) Information (Displays currently limited), especially in High Traffic Areas Center-wide**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**	****Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31, 2001**
**Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF) (Cont’d.)**
**Safety (Cont’d.)**
**Project “INFUSE” should utilize the Agency’s “Risk Assessment” Training (sponsored by HQ/Code QE) **
**Confirm Data Retention (5 Years) complies with         NPG 1441**
**Review all Procedures or Actions to achieve orderly or Emergency Shut-down and generate or revise Procedures, where appropriate**
**As changes are made in Safety & Emergency Procedures, assure Personnel are properly trained and training is documented**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**	****Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31, 2001**
**Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF) (Cont’d.)**
**Fire Protection**
**Many Emergency Lights were either partially or totally burned out along with a need to improve Egress Identification**
**Evaluate Fire Extinguisher placement and Training in the NTF**
**Review Under-floor Wet Fire Sprinkler System to determine if Gaseous Suppression may be better  **
**Lifting Devices and Equipment (LDE)**
**Verify that LDE Program is consistent with NSS/GO 1740.9B **
**Ensure Compliance of Certifying and Tagging of Slings IAW NSS/GO 1740.9B**
**Develop Center-wide Policy defining “Critical**** Lifts”**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**	****Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31, 2001**
**Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF) (Cont’d.)**
**Operations & Maintenance**
**How is NTF Maintenance Data, including Roles & Responsibilities and reporting of Facility Health, communicated to Center Management**
**Explain “Value” to be derived from Third Party (Plexus Scientific) review of Maintenance Program**
**NTF Facility Safety Head should be included and utilized as “Critical” input to Project INFUSE Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Plan**
**Use Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) as a source of information for developing Project INFUSE RCM Plan**
**Include Construction of Facilities (CoF) in Backlog of Maintenance & Repairs (BMAR) reduction planning**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                FY’01 S&H Assessments

**Langley Research Center Review, August 28-31, 2001**
**Reviewed National Transonic Facility (NTF)**
**Observations**
**Suggest using Third Party to conduct Facility Condition Assessment rather than the current Maintenance Contractor**
**LaRC needs to continue their Program of replacing the recalled “Omega” Fire Sprinklers Heads and identifying recently recalled “Central” Sprinkler Heads   **
**Recommend installing Sound Discs for effective repeatable Vibration Analysis Data collection**
**Suggest linking Customer satisfaction feedback data to a set goal to trigger corrective/preventive action part of ISO Program**

## Operations & Engineering Board (OEB)                         Statistics