# Presentation: 050225

## Office of 
Export Control Policy and Cooperation
NA-242

- Export Control Policy and Cooperation
- NA-242

*ECCO Seminar*

*June 2002*

- Adam M. Scheinman
- Director
- (202) 586-2331

## OFFICE OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION (NA-20)

**Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation **
**Linton Brooks**
**Deputy Administrator**

**Nonproliferation **
**Research & Engineering**
**Robert Waldron**
**Assistant Deputy Administrator**
**NA-22**

**International Nuclear**
**Safety & Cooperation**
**James Turner**
**Assistant Deputy Administrator**
**NA-23**

**Nonproliferation & **
**International Security**
**Stephen Black, Acting**
**Assistant Deputy Administrator**
**NA-24**

**Nonproliferation Policy**
**Trisha Dedik, Director**
**NA-241**

**Export Control Policy**
** ****and Cooperation**
**Adam Scheinman, Director**
**NA-242**

**International Safeguards**
**Ron Cherry, Director**
**NA-243**

**Materials Protection &**
**Emergency Management**
**Jack Caravelli**
**Assistant Deputy Administrator**
**NA-25**

**Fissile Materials Disposition**
**Ed Siskin, Acting**
**Assistant Deputy Administrator**
**NA-26**

**Notes:**
Org chart updated 10/4/01.

We’ll hear from speakers from several of these organizations:  NA-25, NA-24, NA-26, all of NA-24’s organizations (241, 242, 243)

## NA-242: Technical Lead on Nuclear Technology for USG

- Functional Overview

- Domestic Controls

- International Controls

- Sensitive Subjects/
- Countries Lists
- Foreign Travel
- Foreign Visits &
- Assignments
- CRADAs
- NCI/IPP

- Part 810
- Authorizations
- Munitions
- Dual-Use
- Iraq - Oil-for-Food

- NSG
- Zangger Cmtee
- Wassenaar Arrgmt.
- Iraq Action Team
- Add’l Protocol
- MTCR/AG

- Russia/NIS
- Middle East/SAsia
- East Asia
- Latin America
- Southern Europe

- DOE Complex

- Industry

- Multilateral

- INECP

## OVERVIEW

- Licensing:
- DECATS
- Export Controlled Information
- Technology Transfer
- Surplus Material
- Industry Export Control
- Iraq – Oil for Food

- Multilateral:
- Purpose, Strategies & Mission
- Nuclear Supplies Group
- Non-Proliferation Treaty
- Technical Projects
- International NuclearExport Control Program (INECP)

## Licensing

## Licensing Team Areas of Responsibility

- Industry
- Part 810 authorizations
- Dual-use export licensing
- Nuclear-related munitions licensing
- Assurance requests for NRC exports
- Nuclear safety
- Export Controlled Information
- Iraq - Oil for Food
- Foreign national visas

- DOE Complex
- Sensitive Subjects/Countries Lists
- Foreign travel by DOE scientists and engineers
- Foreign national visits and assignments
- International agreements (IPP, NCI, MPC&A, etc.)
- Nuclear software
- Transfer of surplus property
- “Deemed exports”
- DOE publications
- “Pit-out” reviews

## Purpose: 
Counter spread of weapons of mass destruction 
Serve domestic and international export control and nonproliferation training needs
Provide an on-site awareness training of export control requirements
Test user’s knowledge of export control
Serve as early warning proliferation indicator

- Counter spread of weapons of mass destruction
- Serve domestic and international export control and nonproliferation training needs
- Provide an on-site awareness training of export control requirements
- Test user’s knowledge of export control
- Serve as early warning proliferation indicator

- DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System
- (Under Development)

## System Requirements:
Secure web-based client-server system
Online documentation and help
Usable at multiple DOE sites
Incorporate site-specific data into the system
contacts list
procedures
policies
test modules 
manuals on-line
Ability to edit core content without programming skills

- Secure web-based client-server system
- Online documentation and help
- Usable at multiple DOE sites
- Incorporate site-specific data into the system
- contacts list
- procedures
- policies
- test modules
- manuals on-line
- Ability to edit core content without programming skills

- DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System

## Reporting Requirements:
Individual user information
Site statistics:
Tool access and usage reports	
Training completion reports
Annual reminders for refresher training
Access to employee information for update of site training records
DOE compliance reports:
Number of sites participating in Awareness Training
Percent of employees who have completed training
Percent of employees who failed training

- Individual user information
- Site statistics:
- Tool access and usage reports
- Training completion reports
- Annual reminders for refresher training
- Access to employee information for update of site training records
- DOE compliance reports:
- Number of sites participating in Awareness Training
- Percent of employees who have completed training
- Percent of employees who failed training

- DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System

## Favorable Features:
Consistent information to all sites:
Eliminates duplication of effort
Allows easy dissemination of latest information and features
Enhances sites that lack own training capabilities
Compliance reporting capability
Training scheduled to user’s convenience reaches a wider audience
Documentation of material presented
Leverages infrastructure resources

- Consistent information to all sites:
- Eliminates duplication of effort
- Allows easy dissemination of latest information and features
- Enhances sites that lack own training capabilities
- Compliance reporting capability
- Training scheduled to user’s convenience reaches a wider audience
- Documentation of material presented
- Leverages infrastructure resources

- DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System

## Current Status:
Preparing for implementation
Pending cyber security approval 

*Current Status:*
- Preparing for implementation
- Pending cyber security approval

## Export Controlled Information (ECI)

*Export Controlled Information (ECI) -* Technical information whose export requires a license
- ECI should be protected if uncontrolled dissemination would adversely affect U.S. national security or nonproliferation objectives
- DOE policy on dissemination of ECI must balance commitments to:
- U.S. nonproliferation and national security goals
- Scientific and technological advance
- Benefit to U.S. industry
- Benefit to U.S. taxpayer
- Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements

## Export Controlled Information (ECI)

*ECI (continued):*
*DOE reviews technical documents to identify ECI whose release must be controlled*
*ECI review may require:*:
- For publications:
- Edit sensitive data
- Limit distribution
- For presentations:
- Edit sensitive data
- Limit audience

## Export Controlled Information (ECI)

*ECI (continued):*
- NA-242 initiatives to control release of ECI under FOIA:
- Proposed legislation similar to DOD’s enacted in 1984
- DOE would gain authority to withhold ECI
- But even now DOE may require FOIA requestor of ECI to disclose citizenship and, if foreign, to obtain export license
- And if FOIA requester is U.S. citizen, DOE should advise of  export licensing requirements for ECI transfer out of the country

## Technology Transfer Control

*Objectives:*
- To identify materials, equipment, and technology of proliferation concern
- To prevent transfers to proliferants
- To protect against inadvertent transfers
- To weigh proliferation and security concerns against value of scholarship, technology advance, and economic benefit
- To implement U.S. Government policy on transfers

## Technology Transfer Control

*Mechanisms of Transfer:*
- Sales, donations, loans, leases, exports
- Technical exchanges and communications
- Work-for-others, Cooperative Agreements, patent assignments
- Publications and presentations
- Visits and assignments to DOE sites
- Foreign travel by DOE personnel

## Technology Transfer Control

*Transfer Control Principle:*
- Whatever the transfer mechanism, export control review is a must
*Control Measures:*
- Export control review of all proposed transfers, exchanges, publications, presentations, visits and assignments, and foreign travel
- Export control requirements placed in all transfer agreements
- DOE/NNSA approval required for retransfers

## Technology Transfer Control

*Tools for Export Control Review:*
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) lists – Trigger and Dual-Use
- Export control regulations – Departments of Energy, Commerce, and State, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- DOE/NNSA
- Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation
- Sensitive Countries List
- Sensitive Subjects List
- Technology experts and export control personnel

## Surplus Property

*Transfer of Surplus Property:*
- Equipment and materials must be made useless for nuclear purposes
- Transfer agreement must include strict nonproliferation conditions
- There is a presumption of destruction for NSG Trigger list items and for weapons components
- For items deemed too valuable to destroy:
- Request exception from DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
- May require modifying equipment to render it useless for nuclear purposes
- Must get DOE/NNSA approval for retransfer or export

## Dual-Use Export Licensing:
Export Administration Act of 1979 gives Commerce the lead
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implement
EAR sections of note:
15 CFR Part 738, Special country policies
15 CFR Part 742, Control Policy – CCL-based controls
15 CFR Part 744, Control Policy – Catch-all controls based on end-user and end-use 
15 CFR Part 752, Special Comprehensive Licenses
15 CFR Part 774, Commerce Control List (includes Nuclear Referral List of items requiring DOE/NNSA review) 

- Export Administration Act of 1979 gives Commerce the lead
- Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implement
- EAR sections of note:
- 15 CFR Part 738, Special country policies
- 15 CFR Part 742, Control Policy – CCL-based controls
- 15 CFR Part 744, Control Policy – Catch-all controls based on end-user and end-use
- 15 CFR Part 752, Special Comprehensive Licenses
- 15 CFR Part 774, Commerce Control List (includes Nuclear Referral List of items requiring DOE/NNSA review)

- Industry Export Control

**Notes:**
First, I’m going to describe in more detail the role of the Department of Energy in the dual-use licensing process.

Within the Export Administration Regulations, specifically in Part 774, there is a list of controlled commodities.  As you have probably heard before, the commodities are controlled for varied reasons, including nuclear proliferation, regional stability, and anti-terrorism.  For each commodity, the reason or reasons for control is also stated on the list.

A number of commodities are controlled for nuclear proliferation reasons.  The list of those commodities is very similar to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Dual-Use Annex and is called the “Nuclear Referral List.”  The list contains all commodities on the Dual-Use Annex, but also contains some commodities unilaterally controlled by the U.S.

## Munitions Licensing:
Under jurisdiction of the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls
Authority
Arms Export Control Act 1976
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Part 121
DOE reviews nuclear-related cases
Category V - Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary Agents
Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment 
Review process similar to dual-use cases, except without time limits or escalation

- Under jurisdiction of the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls
- Authority
- Arms Export Control Act 1976
- International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Part 121
- DOE reviews nuclear-related cases
- Category V - Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary Agents
- Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment
- Review process similar to dual-use cases, except without time limits or escalation

- Industry Export Control

**Notes:**
Moving away from dual-use licensing, I am going to briefly mention the munitions licensing.  However, since you’ll be spending time tomorrow with State Department, I will not go into great detail.

Military equipment, materials, commodities and technologies that are not dual-use are under the jurisdiction of the Department of State.  These procedures for review and approval of this type of license are established by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

Energy reviews any munitions case that has a nuclear concern, such as high explosives.

DOE receives these cases from the State Department, but otherwise processes them similar to the Commerce Department dual-use cases.  We see about 25 cases a year.  One important difference from Commerce cases is that there is no time limit on these cases.  
Questions?

## NRC Exports:
Special or general licenses required for nuclear facilities, components, fuel, and source or byproduct materials 
Authority 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954
10 CFR Part 110 – implementing regulations
DOE/NNSA participates in Executive Branch review of NRC export licenses and obtains foreign government peaceful use assurances
DOE provides general license request confirmations

- Special or general licenses required for nuclear facilities, components, fuel, and source or byproduct materials
- Authority
- Atomic Energy Act of 1954
- 10 CFR Part 110 – implementing regulations
- DOE/NNSA participates in Executive Branch review of NRC export licenses and obtains foreign government peaceful use assurances
- DOE provides general license request confirmations

- Industry Export Control

**Notes:**
Nuclear exports under NRC jurisdiction include nuclear reactors, enrichment, reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants, and especially designed or prepared equipment and components there of.

Also includes special nuclear material, source and byproduct material, deuterium and nuclear grade graphite.

## NA-242 reviews about 4,000 applications annually for exports to Iraq from various countries under the UN Oil for Food program
Cases referred to DOE/NNSA from US UN Mission in New York
Review responsibility shifted to the IAEA Action Team as of June 1, 2002
LLNL performs reviews; NA-242 recommends to approve, deny, or hold

- Cases referred to DOE/NNSA from US UN Mission in New York
- Review responsibility shifted to the IAEA Action Team as of June 1, 2002
- LLNL performs reviews; NA-242 recommends to approve, deny, or hold

- Iraq - Oil for Food

## Maintain DOE/NNSA Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation
Export control training seminars for industry, academia, and federal government agencies
Maintenance of Proliferation Information Network System (PINS)
Review and approval of “deemed exports,” dual-use, and nuclear-related munitions cases
Individual validation licensing for overseas activities
DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System through NA-242 web site coming soon

- Export control training seminars for industry, academia, and federal government agencies
- Maintenance of Proliferation Information Network System (PINS)
- Review and approval of “deemed exports,” dual-use, and nuclear-related munitions cases
- Individual validation licensing for overseas activities
- DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System through NA-242 web site coming soon

- U.S. Export Controls Activities

## continued:
Review technology transfer cases referred to DOE/NNSA by the Departments of Commerce and State.
Participation in the DOC Bureau of Industrial Security Operating Committee on export policy and the Assistant Secretary-level Advisory Committee for Export Policy (ACEP)
Review of Foreign Access Tracking System database (foreign visitors to DOE/NNSA and contractors)
Review of Foreign Travel Management System (foreign travel by DOE and contractor personnel)
Participation in Export Control Coordinators Organization (ECCO) seminars

- Review technology transfer cases referred to DOE/NNSA by the Departments of Commerce and State.
- Participation in the DOC Bureau of Industrial Security Operating Committee on export policy and the Assistant Secretary-level Advisory Committee for Export Policy (ACEP)
- Review of Foreign Access Tracking System database (foreign visitors to DOE/NNSA and contractors)
- Review of Foreign Travel Management System (foreign travel by DOE and contractor personnel)
- Participation in Export Control Coordinators Organization (ECCO) seminars

- U.S. Export Controls Activities

## Continue to maintain existing and develop new expertise necessary to support NA-242 initiatives
Incorporate export licensing and nonproliferation awareness into security briefings for new personnel
In the interim, ensure that “deemed exports” and ECI applicability review are done for all foreign national visits and assignments and foreign travel by federal and contractor personnel
Target professional societies and groups of industry for nonproliferation awareness training
Actively participate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshops and Seminars

- Continue to maintain existing and develop new expertise necessary to support NA-242 initiatives
- Incorporate export licensing and nonproliferation awareness into security briefings for new personnel
- In the interim, ensure that “deemed exports” and ECI applicability review are done for all foreign national visits and assignments and foreign travel by federal and contractor personnel
- Target professional societies and groups of industry for nonproliferation awareness training
- Actively participate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshops and Seminars

## Multilateral

## Multilateral Team – Areas of Responsibility

- Multilateral Regime Support
- Nuclear Suppliers Group
- NPT Export Committee (Zangger)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in FY’03
- NPT Review Conference – 2005
- Working Groups
- Other Issues
- Export Control Workshops
- Bilaterals
- IAEA Action Team
- IAEA Additional Protocol

- Technical Projects
- Stockpile Stewardship
- Economic Globalization
- Characterization of DOE Complex
- Nuclear Propulsion
- Machine Tools
- SNET List Review
- Technical Review Group
- Commercialization of DOE lab technology (CRADAs)
- Plutonium Isotope Separation

## Purpose:
International export control regimes prevent nuclear proliferation by:
delaying a nuclear program and allowing other means, such as diplomacy, to help;
causing proliferants to accept less capable and more costly options; and
Establishing international guidelines and principles for nuclear suppliers with the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- International export control regimes prevent nuclear proliferation by:
- delaying a nuclear program and allowing other means, such as diplomacy, to help;
- causing proliferants to accept less capable and more costly options; and
- Establishing international guidelines and principles for nuclear suppliers with the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- Multilateral

## Strategies:

- Strengthen the multilateral supplier regimes through continued U.S. technical leadership

- Promote adherence to multilateral nuclear supplier arrangements in support of USG nonproliferation policy

- Cooperate with the U.S. interagency, DOE and NNSA offices, and like-minded multilateral partners to promote peaceful nuclear trade and nonproliferation objectives

- Ensure that DOE and NNSA program offices and contractors are fully apprised of all multilateral commitments and obligations

- _Strategies_

- Multilateral

## Mission:

- Initiate studies on rapidly developing technologies and initiatives before problems arise
- Technical studies: Accelerator Production of Tritium; Naval Reactor Technologies
- Multilateral negotiations: Conversion technologies; Plutonium Isotope Separation
- Policy studies: Globalization study
- Pursue an active role in preventing proliferation.
- Protect U.S. national security interests and peaceful nuclear trade.
- Conceptual change from “export control” to “supplier policy.”

- Multilateral

## Multilateral

*Role of NA-242:*
- Multilateral Regime Support
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
- NPT Export Committee (Zangger)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in FY’03
- Technical Team Projects
- Stockpile Stewardship, Globalization, Characterization of the Complex, etc.
- Other Issues
- Export Control Workshops
- Bilaterals
- IAEA Action Team

## Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

*NA-242 Participation:*
- Consultative Group *(working to revise the NSG Guidelines and improve the structure and effectiveness of the regime)*
- U.S. Chair (Richard Goorevich, NA-242) to chair the Consultative Group during the     2002-2003 term.

## Membership (40 countries):
Argentina		Germany 			Portugal 	
Australia			Greece			Romania
Austria			Hungary			Russia
Belarus		 	Ireland			Slovakia
Belgium			Italy 			Slovenia
Brazil 			Japan 			South Africa
Bulgaria			Kazakhstan (new)	Spain
Canada 			Korea, Republic of 		Sweden
Cyprus 		 	Latvia 			Switzerland
Czech Republic 	 	Luxembourg 		Turkey
Denmark 			Netherlands 		Ukraine
Finland 			New Zealand 	 	United Kingdom
France	 		Norway 			United States
				Poland 			

- Argentina		Germany 			Portugal
- Australia			Greece			Romania
- Austria			Hungary			Russia
- Belarus		 	Ireland			Slovakia
- Belgium			Italy 			Slovenia
- Brazil 			Japan 			South Africa
- Bulgaria			_**Kazakhstan (new)**_	Spain
- Canada 			Korea, Republic of 		Sweden
- Cyprus 		 	Latvia 			Switzerland
- Czech Republic 	 	Luxembourg 		Turkey
- Denmark 			Netherlands 		Ukraine
- Finland 			New Zealand 	 	United Kingdom
- France	 		Norway 			United States
- 				Poland

- INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

**Notes:**
Moving away from dual-use licensing, I am going to briefly mention the munitions licensing.  However, since you’ll be spending time tomorrow with State Department, I will not go into great detail.

Military equipment, materials, commodities and technologies that are not dual-use are under the jurisdiction of the Department of State.  These procedures for review and approval of this type of license are established by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

Energy reviews any munitions case that has a nuclear concern, such as high explosives.

DOE receives these cases from the State Department, but otherwise processes them similar to the Commerce Department dual-use cases.  We see about 25 cases a year.  One important difference from Commerce cases is that there is no time limit on these cases.  
Questions?

## Conversion Technology
successfully completed
led by NA-242
Plutonium Isotope Separation
on going
NA-242 provides technical lead
Full Scope Safeguards
U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine issue
Next NPT Revcon – 2005 & international outreach
U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine issue

- successfully completed
- led by NA-242
- Plutonium Isotope Separation
- on going
- NA-242 provides technical lead
- Full Scope Safeguards
- U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine issue
- Next NPT Revcon – 2005 & international outreach
- U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine issue

- NTP Exporters (Zangger) Committee

## Team Projects

*Examples of NA-242 / Multilateral Team Projects:*
- Technical Review Group (TRG) Phase II
- Stockpile Stewardship
- Collaboration with the UK on Machine Tools, Technical Review Group (TRG) Peer Review, and SNET List Review
- Economic Globalization and Nuclear Technology Supply
- Nuclear Propulsion
- Characterization of the DOE Complex

## Other
Hosted the 2001 NSG Plenary - Aspen, Colorado
Implementation of NSG Information Sharing System (NISS) upgrade.
Bilateral discussions on technical supplier issues and export controls (e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Baltic States)
Promote broader international adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol
Focus on export/import reporting requirements

- Hosted the 2001 NSG Plenary - Aspen, Colorado
- Implementation of NSG Information Sharing System (NISS) upgrade.
- Bilateral discussions on technical supplier issues and export controls (e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Baltic States)
- Promote broader international adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol
- Focus on export/import reporting requirements

- Team Projects

## International Nuclear Export Control Program (INECP)

## International Export Control Program      (INECP) Team – Areas of Responsibility

- Developing effective export control licensing processes
- Developing industry compliance by ensuring exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and technology are aware of national and international requirements

- Helping customs officials to recognize nuclear-related dual-use commodities
- Providing tools of export control
- Information technology
- Publications and handbooks
- Communication systems
- Dual-use material analyzers
- Remote inspection systems

- Provide training and assistance to Russia, FSU and others by:

## Mission:
Provide training and assistance to develop national systems of nuclear export control worldwide.
Approach:
Three tiered approach:
U.S. Interagency (State Department lead)
Government-to-Government
Technical interactions

- Provide training and assistance to develop national systems of nuclear export control worldwide.
*Approach:*
- Three tiered approach:
- U.S. Interagency (State Department lead)
- Government-to-Government
- Technical interactions

- International Nuclear Export Control
- Program (INECP)

## INECP: Promoting Effective Nuclear Export Controls Worldwide

**Transparent and standardized national licensing system**

**Industry awareness and outreach**

**Ability to detect and prevent illicit shipments**

- Maturing Cooperation

- Expanding Assistance

- Future Priorities

## Leverage off Department of Commerce Export Control Assistance Program
Assist with implementation of nuclear-related legal and parliamentary requirements
Provide training to government and industry in U.S. and international nuclear export control and nonproliferation processes and norms
Provide tools
Automated information systems for licensing and exports
Publications, handbooks, and technical guides
Communication systems

- Assist with implementation of nuclear-related legal and parliamentary requirements
- Provide training to government and industry in U.S. and international nuclear export control and nonproliferation processes and norms
- Provide tools
- Automated information systems for licensing and exports
- Publications, handbooks, and technical guides
- Communication systems

- INECP – Export Control Licensing Process

## (continued):
Assist in strengthening controls on transfer of:
Surplus/decommissioned equipment – especially NSG Trigger List and Dual-Use List items
Technology

- Assist in strengthening controls on transfer of:
- Surplus/decommissioned equipment – especially NSG Trigger List and Dual-Use List items
- Technology

- INECP – Export Control Licensing Process

## Industry Outreach
Partner with Department of Commerce
Assist in identifying potential exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and technology
Provide training to exporters in national and international export control laws, policies, regulations, norms
Internal Compliance
Encourage nuclear exporter compliance through training and assistance
Assist exporters in establishing internal compliance programs

- Partner with Department of Commerce
- Assist in identifying potential exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and technology
- Provide training to exporters in national and international export control laws, policies, regulations, norms
- Internal Compliance
- Encourage nuclear exporter compliance through training and assistance
- Assist exporters in establishing internal compliance programs

- INECP – Internal Compliance/Industry Outreach

## Partner with U.S. Customs international assistance programs and export control and border security program
Assist in the prevention of illicit exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology 
Provide and sponsor training to recognize nuclear-related dual-use commodities
Provide tools and equipment
Remote inspection systems, handbooks, and publications
Dual-use material analyzers
Communication systems and databases

- Assist in the prevention of illicit exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology
- Provide and sponsor training to recognize nuclear-related dual-use commodities
- Provide tools and equipment
- Remote inspection systems, handbooks, and publications
- Dual-use material analyzers
- Communication systems and databases

- INECP - Enforcement

## Looking Ahead 

## Following 9/11, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has moved to the fore of the U.S. national security agenda
NA-242 funding will rise in FY03
New program areas:
Add missile technology dual-use export reviews in FY03
Add CBW in FY04
Broaden reach of INECP – South Asia, Middle East, East and Central Asia, the Caucasus, major transshipment states
Proliferation Research and Analysis Project – anticipate emerging proliferation threats and identify chokepoints
Support U.S. Customs role in enforcing domestic export controls 

- Following 9/11, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has moved to the fore of the U.S. national security agenda
- NA-242 funding will rise in FY03
- New program areas:
- Add missile technology dual-use export reviews in FY03
- Add CBW in FY04
- Broaden reach of INECP – South Asia, Middle East, East and Central Asia, the Caucasus, major transshipment states
- Proliferation Research and Analysis Project – anticipate emerging proliferation threats and identify chokepoints
- Support U.S. Customs role in enforcing domestic export controls

## Continue to work toward ECI exemption from FOIA
Propose mandatory check-off block in FACTS to ensure that visited offices conduct “deemed export” review
Propose mandatory check-off block in FTMS to ensure DOE and contractor travelers conduct export control review
Develop an unclassified database of questions and responding NA-242 guidance
Develop introductory export licensing and nonproliferation awareness material for new DOE and contractor employees as part of security briefing
Expand outreach to scientific and technical communities to raise export licensing and nonproliferation awareness

- Continue to work toward ECI exemption from FOIA
- Propose mandatory check-off block in FACTS to ensure that visited offices conduct “deemed export” review
- Propose mandatory check-off block in FTMS to ensure DOE and contractor travelers conduct export control review
- Develop an unclassified database of questions and responding NA-242 guidance
- Develop introductory export licensing and nonproliferation awareness material for new DOE and contractor employees as part of security briefing
- Expand outreach to scientific and technical communities to raise export licensing and nonproliferation awareness

**Notes:**
FACTS - Foreign Access Control Tracking System
Currently the the deemed exports review check-off is not a mandatory field, reprogram to make it so. 
Same situation currently exists with FTMS (foreign travel management system) and warrants similar remedy