# Presentation: 948949

## Facility Transition:Operations to DeactivationWilliam BellSavannah River Site

## Problem

- When a facility transitions from normal operations to deactivation, what are some of the  operational and safety issues, associated with the transition, that we need to be aware of as Facility Representatives?

**Notes:**
Will look primarily at the transition process, not the deactivation process. Not intended to be a “how to,” won’t be dealing with specifics of how to deactivate a facility.

Will consider some areas not always considered FR areas of responsibility.

Every facility is different with respect to specific physical hazards and the best methods for stabilizing the facility.

Based on lessons learned during deactivation of FB-Line and 235-F.

FB-Line: Hazard Category 2, Cat 1 Pu-239 production facility

235-F: Hazard Category 2, Cat 1 Pu storage and Pu-238 processing

## Deactivation

- Deactivation is the first post-operational stage for the facility, when the residual hazards are eliminated permanently, or reduced to a safe condition.

## Deactivation

- Deactivation is defined as “the last operational step in a facility’s life-cycle.
- Facility may remain in a deactivated condition for an extended period under a surveillance and maintenance program.
- Facility end state is “cold, dark, and dry.”

## Issues

- Operational Issues
- Documentation Issues
- Organizational Issues
- Personnel Issues

## Operational Issues

- Transition to deactivation may be more hazardous than normal operation
- Change from production environment to many one-of-a-kind tasks.
- Flushing and draining systems.
- Removal of selected equipment for re-use or disposal.

**Notes:**
Workers may be unfamiliar with obsolete systems no longer in use.
Operators may unknowingly depend on a system no longer in service.
Flushing and draining are typically not normal system operations.

## Operational Issues

- Rapidly changing facility conditions
- Changing radiological conditions
- Open systems
- Systems removed from service (steam, water, ventilation, electrical, security, fire protection, process systems)

**Notes:**
Deactivation of systems significantly changes facility access requirements and habitability.

Steam – loss of heat
Ventilation – reduction or loss of heating and cooling
Water – sanitary and decontamination facilities

Some areas may become inaccessible, either permanently or temporarily.

## Operational Issues

- Configuration Control
- Just as important during deactivation as when operating.
- As control rooms are deactivated status boards and other tracking mechanisms may be lost.
- Need to ensure configuration control is maintained.

## Operational Issues

- Legacy hazards from previous operations
- Radioactive contamination
- Old chemicals which may be unstable
- Entrance into normally inaccessible or unused areas which may not be well characterized.

**Notes:**
During HEPA filter removal, found ~3 kg of Pu oxide powder.

FB-Line had rooms that had not been entered for several years.  Loss of historical knowledge due to personnel leaving.

## Operational Issues

- Security Requirements
- Security category may be downgraded (Cat I to Cat IV).
- Security requirements for facility entry are decreased allowing easier access.
- New access controls may be required to prevent unescorted “tourists,” especially for facilities with high security.

**Notes:**
Tourists could include:

Previous workers at the facility (old home week)

Others not normally authorized access due to security requirements

Media personnel

## Operational Issues

- Emergency response changes
- Changing facility conditions may require notification to emergency responders of changes to response routes, facility access, fire pre-plans, evacuation routes, etc.
- Change to EALs to reflect reduction in hazards.

## Operational Issues

- Long Term Surveillance
- Unless the facility is immediately beginning D&D, a long term surveillance plan will be required.

## Operational Issues

- New hazards may develop during long term deactivation if end state is not adequate.
- Mold/Mildew
- Insects/Rodents
- Migration of radioactive material
- Water in-leakage

## Documentation Issues

- Changes to Documented Safety Analysis Technical Safety Requirements
- Need to establish step-out criteria.
- Revisions to DSA and TSRs to reflect new facility configuration.
- Revision to Authorization Agreement to preclude performing activities which are no longer authorized.

## Documentation Issues

- Changing procedures
- New hazards require new procedures and/or changes to existing procedures.
- New hazards analyses, RWPs, controls, etc.
- Cancellation of procedures as they become unnecessary or unworkable.

## Facility Organizational Issues

- Organization used for operations may not be appropriate for deactivation activities.
- Use of dedicated, multi-disciplinary teams to focus on deactivation of specific systems, areas, or processes for increased efficiency, decreased costs.

**Notes:**
During Operation:

Operators and mechanics often work separately.  RadCon supports both.

Work planning may be done independently for operations and maintenance.

During Deactivation:

Many activities require operators, and mechanics to work together with RadCon support (multi-disciplinary teams).

Work planning must include all aspects of job and may require more input from workers.

Reduced costs by about 30%.

## Site Organizational Issues

- Changes to emergency response organization.
- Organizational changes may require reassignment of emergency response functions.
- Emergency response may be coordinated from another location which may not be as familiar with another facility’s hazards.
- New organization may not be familiar with new responsibilities.

**Notes:**
At SRS several facilities co-exist in an area.

FEC directs action in the facility.

AEC directs actions for the area, supports FEC.

AEC/FEC functions may be in separate locations.

Deactivation of F-Canyon required reassignment of AEC duties to a different facility.

Personnel were not familiar with AEC duties.

Significant training for new AEC was required.

## Personnel Issues

- Workers may be distracted.
- Change in job location and duties.
- Reduction in pay (shift differential, etc).
- Organizational changes, new supervisors.
- Learning new skills.
- New co-workers.
- Separation from friends due to transfers or layoffs.

**Notes:**
Workers are putting themselves out of a job.

Reduction in pay could include:

Loss of shift differential

Demotion due to transfer to a different job

Loss of job; layoffs

## Personnel Issues

- New workers
- Unfamiliar with facility hazards
- Unaware of previous operations (legacy hazards)
- Unfamiliar with facility systems
- Unfamiliar with procedures

**Notes:**
New workers with specific expertise may be brought in to perform specific tasks.

May be unfamiliar with the facility and its hazards.

## Lessons Learned

- Keep up with the details but also step back and look at the “BIG PICTURE.”
- Look at organizational interfaces

**Notes:**
Attention to detail is important, but don’t lose sight of the big picture.

Consider all of the organizational interfaces that deal with the facility.

## Lessons Learned

- Transition from operation to deactivation does not necessarily result in an immediate or complete removal of the hazards in a facility.
- Significant hazards may remain in a deactivated facility
- Radioactive material holdup
- Chemical contamination

**Notes:**
Outside organizations may not be aware of the location or extent of any remaining hazards.

## Lessons Learned

- External support organizations may believe that because a facility is deactivated, there are no significant hazards remaining.
- Fire Department/HAZMAT
- Emergency Response Organization

**Notes:**
ERO assumed that security downgrade meant no radiological hazards remained.

FB-Line had significant holdup in some locations.

235-F had numerous radioactive sources and significant radioactive holdup after the security downgrade.  Significant holdup remained after deactivation.

## Lessons Learned

- Don’t underestimate the affects of organizational changes.
- Ensure an adequate number of personnel, with facility specific experience, are retained to safely complete the deactivation.
- Ensure that any new personnel receive adequate training prior working in the facility.

**Notes:**
Some personnel will be looking toward the future and trying to transfer as early as possible to get the most desirable jobs available.

## Lessons Learned

- Ensure contractor management addresses personnel related issues.
- Detailed de-staffing plan.
- Keep workers informed.

**Notes:**
Workers will develop their own information in the absence of information from management.

## Lessons Learned

- Make provisions for periodic inspections.
- Ventilation
- Temporary lighting
- Clearly mark surveillance routes

## Lessons Learned

- Ensure thorough documentation of the facility end state and remaining hazards.
- Photos / IPIX / Video
- Deactivation records
- Signs/postings

## Lessons Learned

## Lessons Learned

- Surveillance Route Marking

- Temporary Surveillance Lighting

## Slide 29