# Presentation: 607380

## NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Mechanical Analysis SPRT Contributions to Return to Flight

**NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Mechanical Analysis SPRT Contributions to Return to Flight**

**Julie Kramer White**
**NESC Mechanical Analysis Lead**
**Johnson Space Center**
**FEMCI Workshop Keynote Address**
**Goddard Space Flight Center**
**May 2005**

## Outline

**NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Overview  **
**Purpose**
**Scope **
**Organization**
**Mechanical Analysis Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT)**
**Purpose**
**Scope**
**Organization**
**RTF Mechanical Analysis Efforts **
**Independent Technical Assessments **
**Consultations / Peer Review**
**Conclusion**

## NASA Engineering and Safety Center

**NESC was formed in direct response to the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)**
***“******The safety organization sits right beside the (shuttle) person making the decision, but behind the safety organization there is nothing there, no people, money, engineering, expertise, analysis.”***
***“ ... ******there is no ‘there’ there”***
**- Adm. Harold Gehman**

## NASA Engineering and Safety Center

**On July 15, 2003,  Administrator O’Keefe announced plans to create the NASA Engineering and Safety Center at Langley Research Center (LaRC)**
**Charter of NESC to provide “value added” independent assessment of technical issues within its programs and institutions. **
**Operational since Nov. 1, 2003**

## NASA Engineering and Safety Center

**NESC Philosophy & Culture:**
**Mission Success Starts with *****Safety***
**Safety Starts with *****Engineering Excellence***
** ****NESC fosters this culture by providing**
**Knowledgeable, technical senior leadership**
**Open environment**
**Emphasis on tenacity and rigor**
**	**

## NASA Engineering and Safety Center

**NESC is administered from LaRC, however, it is a decentralized organization which utilizes *****tiger team***** approach to problem solving**
**Representatives from all centers play key roles in the day to day management and technical assessment work of the NESC**
**Insight at center and program level into potential issues**
**Engineers need to be where the problems are to stay relevant**
**Model of One NASA**

**Notes:**
I don’t know how many of you were here last year for Ed Fasanella’s presentation on the RCC impact capability and the LS DYNA analysis team...but that effort was actually one of the MODELS for this concept.

It was a distributed team representing 3 NASA centers, industry, academia, and a DOE research lab...the BEST & BRIGHTEST in this area of technology

In three months they were able to make significant strides and technical contributions in the analysis of debris impact on RCC.  This work is the foundation of the work that is still going on today to prepare for return to flight.

## “One NASA” NESC Organization

- Earth
- Science

- Space
- Science

- Aerospace
- Technology

- Space Flight

- Chief Eng., AE

- NESC Office

- Administrator

- A

- M

- R

- Q

- S

- Y

- JSC

- KSC

- MSFC

- Stennis

- Ames

- Dryden

- Langley

- Glenn

- JPL

- Goddard

- Universities

- National
- Labs

- Government
- Organizations

- Industry

- Biological and
- Physical Research

- U

**NASA Engineering and Safety Center**

**Notes:**
Not “One NASA” like a public works program...

I mean one NASA like...the best from the centers brought together to solve a common agency problem.  Each center has it’s legacy, it’s strengths and the NESC capitalizes on these strengths.

REPORTING directly to the chief engineer – by passing the different mission directorates and center reporting structure - INDEPENDENT

## NASA Engineering and Safety Center

**NESC Organization**

**Notes:**
It is Mandatory that the first Technical Assistant is a Safety Professional
The other Technical Assistant(s) (TBD) would potentially be from
Program Management
Aviation Test Programs
Launch Vehicles
Spacecraft
Mishap Investigation

The personnel will be of National renown.  We will only hire if we can get the best otherwise we’ll use expert consultants.

## NASA Engineering and Safety Center

**Scope of NESC activities**
**Independent in-depth technical assessments**
**Independent trend analysis**
**Independent systems engineering analysis**
**Mishap Investigations**
**Technical support to Programs**
**Focus on High Risk Programs**

**Notes:**
High Risk does NOT mean Shuttle and Station...NESC has engaged many other programs...robotic, unmanned, aeronautic....Genesis MIB, Hubble life extension, SOFIA, X-43A, CALIPSO, Mars Exploration Rover (MER) operations, Cassini-Huygens ...

Mechanical analysis SPRT has been heavily involved in Shuttle RTF tasks...

## Super Problem Resolution Teams

**Super Problem Resolution Teams (SPRTs) are the backbone of the NESC**
**They have membership from multiple sources:**
**NASA**
**Industry**
**Academia**
**Other Government Agencies**
**They provide technical support of NESC activities with independent test, analysis and evaluation *****– ******not just technical opinions***
**Overcome negative connotation of “independent assessment” by offering our best technical personnel**
**Select recognized agency discipline experts to lead SPRTs**
**Utilize expertise at each center**

**Notes:**
Goals of the SPRT’s and particularly MA SPRT are not that different from FEMCI...

NETWORK of analysts

Innovative solutions to CHALLENGING structural analysis problems encountered in Hardware development, test and flight

## Super Problem Resolution Teams

**NESC goal is to establish an extension to the natural hierarchy of engineering progression**
**A true “technical ladder” **
**If successful, engineers will aspire to be in the NESC**
**Challenging work, visibility, *****pay and promotion***

## Mechanical Analysis SPRT

**Strength Analysis**
**Linear and non-linear structural behavior**
**Stress intensity factor**
**Margin of safety**
**Dynamic Analysis and Loads**
**Vibroaccoustics**
**Modal & frequency analysis**
**Coupled loads**
**Structural Testing**
**Model Correlation**
**Failure modes**

**Notes:**
Static Strength Analysis - Includes all aspects of strength and stiffness analysis, including, but not limited to:
Linear and non-linear structural behavior
Integrated thermal mechanical structural analysis
Optomechanical analysis
Tribology and nonlinear contacts mechanics
Joint analysis...Adhesive...Mechanical
Analytical determination of stress intensity factors
Calculations for factor and margin of safety
Review of hardware models, and development of independent models as necessary with emphasis on assumptions and boundary conditions
Dynamic Analysis and Loads - Analytical tasks and dynamic simulations may address, but are not limited to:
Vibroaccoustic...Random vibration...Accoustic
Modal analysis
Coupled loads
Frequency analysis
Vibration isolation and suppression
Shock
Aeroelastic effects
Dynamic Review of hardware models, and development of independent models as necessary with emphasis on assumptions and boundary conditions
Structural Testing: as it relates to model correlation; stress/strain, load and thermoelastic strain development; failure modes and resulting margin of safety for the element in test.

GRAY AREAs
Tribology and contact stress -> mechanical design
Fracture/Fatigue -> structures, materials
Composite structures -> structures

Somewhat dependant on workload, expertise of individual discipline leads...Mechanical analysis always works closely with structures, materials and mechanical design SPRTs

## Mechanical Analysis SPRT

**Core Mechanical Analysis SPRT represents 9 centers:**
**ARC: Ken Hamm**
**DFRC: Kajal Gupta**
**GRC: George Stefko & Mei-Hwa Liao**
**GSFC: Jim Loughlin & Dan Kaufman (deputy)**
**JPL: Frank Tillman & Paul Rapacz**
**JSC: Joe Rogers & Julie Kramer White (lead)**
**LaRC: Scott Hill**
**MSFC: Greg Frady**
**SSC: David Coote**

## Mechanical Analysis SPRT

**Core represents a broad spectrum of analysis experience**
**Identification of appropriate skills and resources for analytical tasks**
**Cognizant of structural analysis related task to ensure proper analysis expertise support (including peer review)**
**Proactively engage structural analysis related issues throughout the agency**
**Supplemented by additional resources from:**
**Center institutional engineering**
**Industry (Aerospace Corporation, ATA, Sverdrup-Jacobs, Swales)**
**Academia (Naval Post Graduate School, Georgia Tech)**

**Notes:**
So the NESC has...what was it admiral gehman said?  

PEOPLE – ~40 senior technical & management personnel, but several hundred EP charge to NESC task orders
MONEY – ~40M in FY04; ~ 65M in FY05
ENGINEERING – network of access to all the agencies institutional engineering and contracting infrastructure to bring on many contractors in 2-3 weeks...sometimes less.
EXPERTISE – access to best from inside and outside NASA
ANALYSIS – analytical and test capability to support their positions

## Assessments vs. Consultations

_**Assessments and Inspections**_**: **a _***request to independently conduct  an assessment or inspection***_ of a problem received from an individual, Programs/Projects, Centers, or an NESC member. Conduct an end-to-end technical assessment or inspection of the problem.  The assessment or inspection may only require an independent peer review or may require _***independent tests and analyses***_. The product of the assessment or inspection will be a _***comprehensive engineering report***_ which will  include findings, recommendations, and lessons learned.
_**Consultations**_**:  **a _***request to participate***_ in a problem resolution received from an individual, Programs/Projects, Centers, or an NESC member.  A consultation usually will not include extensive independent tests or analyses.
_**Program/Project Insight**_**:** _***routine interactions***_ with Programs/Projects and Centers.  Render advice and engineering judgment, issue technical position papers to address technical issues, and participate in boards and panels.

## Mechanical Analysis SPRT Tasks

**Independent Technical Assessments:**
**Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner cracks**
**Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity **
**Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools**
**Space Shuttle Return to Flight Rationale**
**Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Stud Hangup **
**SOFIA Acoustic Resonance**
**Consultations/Peer Review:**
**Shuttle External Tank Bellows Ice Liberation Testing**
**Shuttle T-O umbilical margin dissenting opinion**
**Shuttle Main Engine High Pressure Oxygen Turbo Pump (HPOTP) blade seal cracking**

**Mechanical Analysis SPRT RTF**

**Independent Technical Assessments:**
**Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner cracks**
**Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity**** **
**Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools**
**Space Shuttle Return to Flight Rationale**
**Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Stud Hangup **
**SOFIA Acoustic Resonance**
**Consultations/Peer Review:**
**Shuttle External Tank Bellows Ice Liberation Testing**
**Shuttle T-O umbilical margin dissenting opinion**
**Shuttle Main Engine High Pressure Oxygen Turbo Pump (HPOTP) blade seal cracking**

## Issue
In May of 2002, three cracks were found in the downstream flowliner at the gimbal joint in the LH2 feedline of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #1 of orbiter OV-104 (Atlantis)
Subsequently, all orbiters were found to have LH2 feedline flowliner cracks

Space Shuttle program had previously produced a flight rationale for STS-107; however, post 107 many fight rationale were carefully reevaluated, including flow liner

Due to the potentially catastrophic consequence of a flow liner failure and the complex nature of the problem, the Space Shuttle Program manager, asked the NESC to engage in an Independent technical assessment of this issue

**In May of 2002, three cracks were found in the downstream flowliner at the gimbal joint in the LH2 feedline of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) #1 of orbiter OV-104 (Atlantis)**
**Subsequently, all orbiters were found to have LH2 feedline flowliner cracks**
**Space Shuttle program had previously produced a flight rationale for STS-107; however, post 107 many fight rationale were carefully reevaluated, including flow liner**
**  **
**Due to the potentially catastrophic consequence of a flow liner failure and the complex nature of the problem, the Space Shuttle Program manager, asked the NESC to engage in an Independent technical assessment of this issue**

**Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks**

## Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks

**Scope of Assessment**
**Identify the primary contributors to the cracking in the flowliner**
**Implement a strategy to resolve the problem and/or mitigate risks to acceptable flight levels**

## Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks

**Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks**

**Challenges:**
**Characterizing dynamic environment with limited means of verification**
**Not readily accessible for R&R or instrumentation**
**Qualification and test facilities dismantled**
**Highly dynamic, cavitating, cryogenic flow environment**

## Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks

**Structural**
** ****Dynamics Role**

**Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks**

## Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks

**Structural Dynamics Tasks**
**Assess loads and environments on flowliner **
**Analyze hot fire tests data (flow induced environments)**
**Modal response identification of Shuttle flowliners **
**Assess strain transfer factors (test measured locations at mid ligament to crack initiation / field stress)**
**Identify relevant modes for each flight condition (single mode approach / multimode very complex and perhaps impractical)**
**Develop loading spectra for fracture analysis **
**Fill gaps in previous program approach and rationale**

## Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks

**Material:**
**Inconel 718**
**Thickness:**
**0.050 in**

**Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks**

## Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks

**Complex Mode Shapes**
**1000 to 4000 Hz**

**Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks**

## Orbiter Main Propulsion System Feedline Flowliner Cracks

**Results:**
**Validation of issue & program rationale through independent:**
**Test of flowliner dynamic response**
**Dynamic analysis and development of load spectra**
**Fracture analysis and computation of expected service life**
**Mitigation of risk through the development of alternate NDE techniques which significantly reduce initial flaw size in hardware and in analysis of service life **
**Significant decrease in defect size, reduces likelihood of crack re-initiation in future**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Issue**
**A member of the CAIB expressed concern to NESC about the hardware that attaches the carbon leading edge panels to the wing**
**Unusual failure features in the***** Columbia *****debris highlighted potential susceptibility to and degradation from:**
**oxygen embrittlement**
**corrosive environment **
**high temperature exposure during entry**
**stresses induced by installation**

**Debris **
**from **
**Panel 16 **
**of the **
**right WLE**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Scope**
**Assess the potential for aging-related degradation mechanisms to reduce the Design Allowables of the metallic components or result in failure mechanisms not originally accounted for in the orbiter certification**
**A****ssess the structural integrity of the Wing Leading Edge (WLE) spar and RCC panel attach hardware for debris impacts that may occur during ascent**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**“****Attach hardware” represents the metallic parts that connect the RCC panels to the wing spar**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Challenges:**
**Producing a relevant assessment of capability without running full certification rigor analysis**
**Wing leading edge design loads are determined by hundreds of load cases run through many global and local models**
**Detailed FEMs of attach hardware not available in many cases**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Analysis Approach**
**Analysis of critical panels for impact and heating effects (9 and 10 with associated T-seal)**
**Transient analysis with impact loads**
**LS/Dyna analysis used to obtain loads at lug points**
**impact analysis with foam impacting at apex on T-seal**
**Buckling analysis with loads at impact loading points**
**Lugs on clevises**
**Spar attach fitting on wing spar**
**Maximum stress from impact loads used to determine margin**
**Superimposed on margin from nominal cases with no factor of safety**
**Loads could not be obtained from orbiter**
**margins were used to superimpose impact event**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Model Generation**
**CATIA solid models of panel 9 hardware generated by Boeing**
**Translated into Pro/Engineer and defeatured as much as possible (non-parametric geometry required creating cuts and protrusions to remove fillets, holes, etc.)**
**Generated FEMs from this geometry**
**Model consists of clevises, spanner beams, spar attach fitting**
**Element types**
**Solid for clevises, spar attach fitting**
**Shell for spanner beams with spring elements**
**Beams/MPCs for pins**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

- Springs connect spanner beams and prevent in plane motion

- Pins modeled with beam elements and MPCs

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Typical results for evaluation**
**of fitting impact loads and spanner**
**Beam buckling **

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Updated Spar Left Wing Model**

-  Correct spar fitting attach locations
-  Corrugated spar panel updates
-  Improved local definition
-  Validate with spar panel tap test

- Subset of model used for transient analysis
- with refined mesh

- BCs added

**Typical results for evaluation**
**Spar buckling**

## Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Metallic Hardware Integrity

**Preliminary Results – ****CURRENTLY IN PEER REVIEW**
**No evidence of material degradation or applicable degradation mechanisms were found**
**The margins of safety on ascent for all attach hardware components and the wing leading edge spar are adequate to accommodate the increases in stress due to a foam impact on T-seal #9 (rib splice #10) of 1500 ft-lbs. **
**The spanner beams and spar web are not predicted to buckle due to a foam impact on T-seal #9 (rib splice #10) of 1500 ft-lbs.**

## Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools

**Issue**
**Since STS-107, the Shuttle Orbiter project has invested significant resources in the development of a suite of analytical tools to characterize damage due to debris impact and the resulting capability of the Thermal Protection System and primary structure to reenter with this damage**
**The NESC has been tasked with providing independent peer review of these tools, and is reporting out results to Stafford-Covey as a part of their RTF review**

## Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools

**Scope**
**The objectives of this review are to ensure sound methodologies have been applied in development of tools, limitations and assumptions have been properly identified and validated, and model performance has been sufficiently validated**
**There are 4 major tools assigned to mechanical analysis for review:**
**Rapid Response Foam on tile damage tool**
**Rapid Response Ice on tile damage tool**
**Bondline and tile stress tool**
**Structural stress assessment tool**

## Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools

**Challenge:**
**Provide a value added review of sophisticated analytical capability in a short time frame**
**  ****This suite of tools is intended to predict this...**
**  ****Then rapidly (10 sites in 24 hours) determine whether thermal and structural margin remains to reenter the orbiter in this configuration**

## Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools

## Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools

**Process – Near Term**
**Evaluation of tool datapacks which contain information on tool development and verification**
**Participation in table top review and Q&A with model developers**
**Provide official observer for mission simulation of on-orbit damage analysis**
**Provide feedback on legitimacy of model limitations, identify model shortcomings, potential improvements and recommendations for additional validation testing to improve analytical results**
**Ultimately, concur or non-concur on readiness of tools to support STS-114**

## Orbiter Tile and RCC Impact Damage Assessment Tools

**Process – Longer Term**
**Provide funding to bring tools in-house to NASA for parametric sensitivity studies (~$450K)**
**Develop capability to conduct damage assessment independent of program & prime contractor**
**Identify areas which merit additional test validation or other improvements**
**Assist in the development and incorporation of upgrades**

## Conclusion

**The NESC is a decentralized, technical organization, reporting directly to the agency chief engineer, whose goal is to provide “value added”, independent assessment**
**Mechanical Analysis SPRT supports the NESC by providing expertise from the centers, and outside NASA, in the solution of complex structural analysis problems**
**The NESC and the Mechanical SPRT, in particular, are heavily engaged in relevant return to flight issues**
**The continued success of NASA, the NESC and the mechanical analysis SPRT is dependant upon the continued support of engineers like you...**
**Safety Starts with Engineering Excellence**