# Presentation: 815428

##  Prevention of  Volcanic Ash Encounters in the Proximity Area  Between Active Volcanoes and  Heavy Air Traffic Routes

- Saburo  Onodera
- Flight Crew Training Dept., Japan Airlines

## Contents

- 1. Miyakejima Ash Encounter (Aug.18th,2000)
- 2. Indirect Factors of  Encounter
- 3. Lessons Learned and Proposal

## Miyakejima Ash Encounter        (Aug.18th, 2000) 

## Slide 4

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## Slide 5

##   Explosive Eruption on Aug.18th,2000

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**  ****Explosive Eruption on Aug.18****th****,****2000**

-         Cloud Top at  FL 460

## Miyakejima Volcanic Events

- 0802z            Explosive Eruption begins.
- 0930z             B747 encounters VA at  FL340
- 0932z      B737 encounters VA at  FL360

## Slide 8

## Significant Damage Found on B747    

-   1  3 engines were seriously damaged  and
-           replaced at Narita.
-   2 The remaining engine was also damaged
-           and replaced at the next scheduled  check.
-   3 The windshield was damaged and
-         replaced.

## Why Aircraft VA Encounter Could  Not be Prevented ?The Need to Review the Respective Actions / Information at the Actual Time of Encounter

## Actions 

-  - Pilot
-  - ATC (Air Traffic Control)  Controller
- _Available Information_
-  - VA Transport and Dispersion Forecast
-  - SIGMET,VAA, etc.,

## Pilot Action  (B747 Case) 

-   1 Requests ATC to deviate VA area.
-   2 Inadvertently encounters VA at FL340.
-       ★ St.Elmo’s Fire.
-       ★ Cockpit Smoke
-       ★ VHF Noise
-   3 Immediately reduces engine power.
-   4 Descends to FL310 to escape VA.
-   5 Lands safely at Narita Airport.

## MAIN POINT

_***WHY***_
-   did the pilot encounters VA despite ATC instructions?

##       ATC Controller Action   ATC Instructions

-            ATC vectored pilots to the furthest
-    easterly route, believing it was the  safest
-    course of action.
-        However, the route gradually became
-   invaded with volcanic ash, and ATC could
-    not provide effective radar vectoring.

##                    WHY ? 

##       - Congested Route Area       - Limited Options           - Timely Information 

## Slide 17

## Slide 18

## 3 Available Information         

-  (1) VA Transport and Dispersion Forecast
-  (2) SIGMET, VAA

## (1) VA Transport and Dispersion Forecast         

-     Forecasts were issued and updated  fre-
-   quently well before the eruption began.
-      However, the forecast was not accurate
-    enough to satisfy the needs for the area,
-    where options for route selection were very
-    limited.

##  1000UTC

-  1000UTC

- 0900UTC

- by Tokyo VAAC

- (by Tokyo VAAC)

-       VA Forecast Transport and Dispersion Model

**★  ****Encounter****  ****Point****  **

## Slide 22

## (2)  SIGMET and VAA        (An extract)

- 0802z Explosive Eruption begins.  (live broadcast)
- 0812z   **VA report**    “VA at or above 5000m,・・”
- 0818z  **VAA No1**  “Plume Top FL190”
- 0825z  **SIGMET 1** “Top FL190 MOV UNKNOWN”
- 0840z  **SIGMET 2** “Top more than FL400 Drifting
-                                 to E – SE, INTSF”         (Pirep)
- 0925z  **VAA No3**   “Top FL460. Outlook・・” (Sat Pic)
- 0930z   B747 encounters VA at FL340
- 0932z   B737 encounters VA at FL360

## (2) SIGMET, VAA Reports 

-   Timing of issue ・・・・・・・・・・swift and quick
-          ( issued more than 1 hour before encounter)
-   Contents of Information ・・・good as a whole
-          altitude of VA・・・・・ ・・・・・included
-          moving direction of VA ・・included
-          _moving speed of VA_ ・・・・ _not included  _at first
-          _area of contamination_・・・ _not included_  at first

##  Why was the VA Moving Speed  and  Area    of Contamination  Missing in SIGMET ? 

-   Satellite imagery was not made immediately available after observations. It takes time before the satellite data can be distributed to respective users.
-    Lack of timely critical information had a  great
-   impact on  ATC’s decision making process.

##  Similar Volcanic Ash Encounter Cases 

-  The Izu-Oshima Volcanic Encounter
-    on  21st  November,1986

##  Izu-Oshima Volcano Eruption at  0723z(Left) and  0743z(Right) 

** ****Izu-Oshima Volcano Eruption at  0723z**(Left**)**** ****and****  ****0743z**(Right**) **
**       ****on 21st Nov. 1986.  (Photo by H. Kamata)**** **

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## VA Encounter Could Not be Prevented

-  (1)  Even with much more available
-       information than 14 years ago.
-  (2)  Even with substantial lead time
-       before the encounter.

## 2.  Indirect Factors of Encounter 

## Slide 35

## Indirect Factors of  VA Encounter  at Miyakejima Volcano Eruption

- 1 Difficulty of Predicting  Explosive
-     Eruptions.
- 2 Long Lasting Nature of Volcanic Activity
-      leads to ⇒Decreased Sense of Danger
- 3 Complacency

## 3. Lessons Learned and Proposal 

##  “Why the Encounters Could Not Be Prevented?” 

-  Direct Causes
- 1 Lack of Timely Critical Information.
-       e.g.  The Moving Speed / Contaminated Area.
-             Accurate VA Forecast.
- 2 Delay of Positive Decision Making at ATC.
-        e.g.  Airspace was closed after encounter.

##  “Why the Encounters Could Not Be Prevented?” 

-  Indirect  Factors
- 1 Difficulty of predicting explosive eruptions.
- 2 Long Lasting Nature of Volcanic Activity.
- 3 Complacency.

## Lessons Learned 

-  Accurate and timely information on the area
-     of  volcanic ash is critical.
-  In an area where Air Traffic is congested near
-      Active  Volcanoes , ATC decision making on
-     “Volcanic Ash Avoidance” is crucial .
-   We do have lead time before Encounter.

##   (a) More ATC Initiatives and Reliable Forecast 

  (b) Education and Training
        (i)  Basic Knowledge of  VA Encounters
     (ii)  Practical Knowledge on  VA  Avoidance 

  (c) Simulated Volcanic Eruption drills

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-   (a) More ATC Initiatives and Reliable Forecast
-   (b) Education and Training
-         (i)  Basic Knowledge of  VA Encounters
-      (ii)  Practical Knowledge on  VA  Avoidance
-   (c) Simulated Volcanic Eruption drills

-   Proposed items to be studied

## I would like to conclude my talk by thanking thosepeople who are contributingto the prevention of volcanic ash encounter.Thank You.   

## Miyakejima Volcanic Eruptions in 2000

-        08 JUL.  (by NHK TV)                        14 JUL.  (by S. Nakada.)

## Miyakejima Volcanic Eruptions in 2000

-         10 AUG.  ( by S. Nakada.)                   14 AUG. ( by S. Nakada.)

## The Major Eruptions on 18 AUG., 2000

-      (by  Yomiuri Newspaper.)            (by  Nikkei Newspaper.)     (by  Asahi Newspaper.)

## The Major Eruptions on 29 AUG., 2000

-                ( by  T. Shimano.)                                  ( by  T. Shimano.)

## Eruptions on 09 and 10 SEP., 2000

-        09 SEP.  ( by O. Oshima.)                       10 SEP.  ( by  S. Nakada.)

## Volcanic Activities After One Year   (2001)

-   09 JUL. 2001 ( by  M. Tsukui.)                09 JUL. 2001 ( by  M. Tsukui.)

## Volcanic Activities After Two Years  (2002)

-  07 AUG. 2002  ( by  M. Tsukui.)      21 AUG. 2002 ( by  M. Yoshimoto.)

## Volcanic Activities After Three Years  (2003)

- 30 SEP. 2003  ( by  M. Yoshimoto)      30 SEP. 2003 ( by  M. Yoshimoto)

## Volcanic Activities After Three and a Half Years (2004)

- FEB. 2004  ( by  M. Ohno.)

## Slide 54

## Slide 55

## Volcanic Events since 2000 to Date at Miyakejima Volcano

- Jun., 2000.      Volcanic Activity increased.
- Jul. ~ Aug.     Repeated Small Eruptions.
- Aug.18th.         Explosive Eruption.
-               2 VA encounters.
- Sep.,2000       Volcanic Activity declines, but
-      ~        SO2 Emissions continues.
-    Jun.,2004     Residents are still evacuated.

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