# Presentation: 360583

## Press Briefing:  Draft Report on

- Dr. William Grosshandler
** ****National Institute of Standards and Technology**** **
**Technology Administration**
**U.S. Department of Commerce**

_**National Construction Safety Team Investigation**_
**Press Briefing:  Draft Report on**
**The Station Nightclub Fire**

- Providence, Rhode Island
- March 3, 2005

**Notes:**
Good morning.  My name is Jim Hill.  I direct the Building and Fire Research Laboratory at the National Institute of Standards and Technology in Gaithersburg, MD.  My colleagues from NIST and I are here today to provide a briefing and announce the release of the draft report of our technical investigation of the Station nightclub fire.  The fire occurred in West Warwick, Rhode Island, on the night of February 20, 2003, and resulted in the deaths of 100 citizens of that and surrounding communities.
The President signed the National Construction Safety Team Act into Law on October 1, 2002.  It is very similar in purpose to the Act that created the National Transportation Safety Board.  It gives NIST the authority and responsibility to investigate major building failures where there has been substantial loss of life or the potential for substantial loss of life.  Since its enactment, we have launched two investigations; one on the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and a second one on the Station nightclub fire.  We are releasing the draft report on the Station nightclub fire today for a 4-week public comment period.  We encourage everyone to review our report and give us comments that could make our recommendations as effective as possible. 

## Duties of National Construction Safety Teams

- To evaluate technical aspects of evacuation and emergency response procedures;
- To recommend specific improvements to model building standards, codes, and practices based on findings; and
- To recommend research and other appropriate actions needed to improve structural safety of buildings, evacuation and emergency response procedures, based upon findings of this investigation.

**Duties of National Construction Safety Teams**

**Notes:**
This slide shows our responsibilities under the Act.  We are to determine the technical causes for the building failure and evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and emergency preparedness.

More importantly, we are to recommend specific improvements to model building standards, codes, and practices.  Like the NTSB, we have no regulatory authority and can’t require the changes.  However, we are committed to and will work diligently with the standards bodies, model code bodies, and professional societies to encourage the adoption of our recommendations.  We will also work for their adoption by state and local agencies that have the ultimate authority to implement the changes for the safety and benefit of the American people.

We know this community has suffered a terrible tragedy.  We trust our work will be an important step to avoid such tragedies in other communities across this country.

Bill Grosshandler, who led this investigation and is Chief of our Fire Research Division, will now give you a summary of our investigation and its recommendations. 

## Conduct of Investigation into The Station Fire

- Collected data from the site, local authorities, contractors, building design documents, video/photographic data, telephone/radio transmissions, oral and written accounts.
- Compared model building and fire codes and practices, and reviewed practices used in operation of building.
- Simulated and analyzed fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, evacuation, and operation of fire protection systems.
- Conducted tests to support analysis and simulation predictions.

**Conduct of Investigation into The Station Fire**

**Notes:**
Thank you Dr. Hill.  I will briefly describe how the technical investigation was conducted, show key results of our analysis, and walk you through the recommendations that we are making.  At the end I will tell you how to get copies of the report and how to send us your comments on it.
Shortly after the tragedy in February, 2003, the NIST Director assembled an investigative team.  The members included three senior technical staff from NIST and a technical representative from the US Fire Administration.  The team received valuable assistance from other NIST staff, other federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and local authorities in Rhode Island.  NIST would like to acknowledge the contributions of  Koffel Associates, Inc. of Maryland and Ove Arup and Partners Massachusetts, who assisted NIST with the review of model building and fire codes and the analysis of the evacuation process.  WPRI-TV in Providence provided key information to the Team in the form of a high resolution digital version of the video taken that night, and the Providence Journal shared information from their own investigation into the tragedy with NIST.  One goal we had was to take advantage of and build on information gathered by others, and these two media outlets deserve special recognition.
During the investigation, NIST:
identified the technical issues through consultations with experts in fire protection engineering, emergency evacuation, and members of other investigative teams;
collected data from the site, local authorities, contractors, building design documents, video/photographic data, telephone/radio transmissions, oral and written accounts;
compared model building and fire codes and practices, and reviewed practices used in operation of the building;
simulated and analyzed fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, evacuation, and operation of fire protection systems; and
conducted tests to support the analysis and simulation predictions. 

## Views of Building

**Views of Building**

- courtesy of Anthony Baldino III

- Platform

- Dance floor

***N***

- (main entrance)

**DART ROOM**

**Notes:**
The Station nightclub was a single-story wood frame building with a footprint of about 4500 ft2 and a small basement under the main bar room.   The north side faced Cowesett Avenue, which was where the main entrance was located.  To the right of the main entrance was a sunroom, and to the left was the main (or horseshoe) bar.  Four exits were provided for staff and patrons.  The main entrance had a double door (door 1) which led to a small vestibule and a single door (door 5) which controlled the inward flow to the ticket booth.  Door 2 on the east side of the building provided an exit from the main bar.  Door 4 on the west side of the building provided an exit from the dance floor and performance platform (commonly referred to as a stage).  The kitchen had its own exit to the outside, which would not have been considered accessible to patrons.

## Overall Timeline

- 	      -  band stops playing, crowd begins to evacuate
- 11:09	      -  cell phone callers report fire to 911
-  	      -  fire alarm sounds and strobes begin to flash
- 	      -  report received of fire at Station nightclub; off-duty police 	         on scene
- 	      -  people caught in doorway, smoke pouring out above
- 11:10	      -  4 fire engines, a ladder truck and battalion chief assigned 	         and dispatched
- 11:13	      -  Engine 4 on scene; running first hose line (1 3/4")
- 11:20	      -  master stream off Engine 2 operational
- 11:23	      -  Fire Chief 1: implement mass casualty plan
- 11:32	      -  roof over main bar appears down
- 12:15 am    -  partial collapse of pool room area begins
- ~ 12:45	      -  State Fire Marshal on scene
- ~1:00	      -  all patients transported

- _Time_			_Event_

**Overall Timeline**

**Notes:**
The NIST technical investigation focused on the two hour period beginning at 11:08 on the night of Feb. 20, 2003, with the ignition by a pyrotechnic device of foam material on the walls around the performance platform, and ending a little after 1:00 am, on Feb. 21, when it was reported that all patients had been transported to hospitals.  A few key events during the two hour period are shown here.  The band stopped playing and the crowd began to evacuate within 30 seconds of the start of the fire.  Ten seconds later the fire alarm sounded.  Cell phone calls from patrons to 9-1-1 and from police officers who were on the scene led to the dispatch of four fire engines, a ladder truck, and a battalion chief.  About 1-1/2 minutes after the fire started (between the call-in and the arrival of the fire department) people became caught in the front entrance, and smoke could be seen in the WPRI video to be pouring out the doorway at 1 minute 42 seconds.  The first firefighters and equipment were on-scene within five minutes of the first 9-1-1 call.  When the firefighters arrived, they found the main entrance blocked by the crush of the crowd and the fire grown to the point that flames were visible through doors, windows and a portion of the roof in the back.  Engine 4 established a 1 3/4", hand-held hose line within 6 1/2 minutes of the start of the fire, directed toward the main entrance. The Fire Chief on the scene implemented the mass casualty plan about 10 minutes after the first units arrived.  A master hose stream (Engine 2) was operational at 11:20 directed toward the front and west side of the building.  The roof collapsed over the main bar about 12 minutes later.  The roof over the dance floor and pool room began to collapse around 12:15 a.m.  A State Fire Marshal was on-scene by 12:45 a.m., and shortly after 1:00 a.m. the scene had been cleared of all victims needing medical attention.

## West Warwick Fire Department (WWFD)

**West Warwick Fire Department (WWFD)**
**Warwick Fire Department (WFD)**

**(BC)**
**(SH)**
**(L)**
**(E)**

**Notes:**
A schematic of the placement of the primary firefighting apparatus deployed is shown here.  WWFD engine 4 is applying water to the building from the front parking lot, along with Warwick FD engine 1 from the east.  The battalion chief is located on Cowesett Avenue with a good view of the overall scene.  An indoor triage area was established across the street in the Cowesett Inn.

## Computer Simulation of The Station Fire 

- View of fire from far side of main bar (head height)

- View of fire from near entrance to front vestibule (near floor)

**Notes:**
The first minute of the fire was captured in the WPRI-TV video taken inside The Station.  The fire was simulated on the computer by NIST to compare to the video and to have an idea of the conditions that may have existed within the nightclub once the WPRI videographer had exited.  Two views of the inside of the nightclub are shown here, playing in real time.  The upper left  view shows what one would have seen had they been near the doorway leading to the ticket booth and looking back toward the performance platform. The view on the lower right shows what one would have seen had they been on the east side of the main (horseshoe) bar, looking toward the performance platform.  The red spots on either side of the drummer's alcove represent the points of ignition of the foam material (shown in gray).  The large black objects are speakers and surfaces in brown are wooden structures.  The fire can be seen to be spreading up the wall and into the drummer's alcove, but it does not appear menacing at 30 seconds (when the band stopped playing and the door by the platform is opened) or even at 41 seconds (when the fire alarm was activated).  The reason is that the ceiling over the platform and dance floor was raised above the rest of the nightclub, and acted as reservoir for the rising hot gases and smoke.  Only when the smoke begins to spill under the lower ceiling and the fire flashes over around the platform does the seriousness of the incident become obvious.  Between 60 seconds and 80 seconds, the fire spreads very rapidly, seeming to "turn out the lights." By 90 seconds after the fire starts, the computer simulation predicts that conditions as far away from the point of ignition as the east side of the main bar are uninhabitable.

## Temperatures in The Station at 90 seconds

**Temperatures in The Station at 90 seconds**
- (from computer simulation)

**2 ft above floor**

**5 ft above floor**

- Peak temperatures in red exceed 1000 oC (1832 oF)
- Light blue indicates temperatures around the boiling point of water  (100 oC, or 212 oF)

- temperature oC

- temperature oC

**Notes:**
The environment within the nightclub 90 seconds after ignition is quantified by the computer simulation.  These diagrams are maps of the temperature at two different horizontal slices, the upper showing the temperatures at head height (5 ft above the floor), and the lower the temperatures at crawling height (2 ft above the floor). 
The performance platform is at the right side of the figures, the sunroom at the lower right, the main entrance at the middle of the bottom, and the main bar at the lower left.  Red regions represent temperatures greater than 1000 C (1832 F).  Colors approaching light blue are hot enough to boil water (100 C, or 212 F).  The upper figure shows that other than the kitchen and the back rooms that were separated by doors from the fire zone, temperatures at head height greatly exceeded values that would have been habitable for even momentary exposure.  Near the floor, shown in the lower diagram (note that the black regions are below the height of the platform), the temperatures at a few regions remained below 100 C (212 F), most notably near the windows in the front of the main bar area, a route that numerous people took to safety.  

## Direct contributors to substantial loss of life in The Station fire

-   Hazardous mix of building contents
-   Inadequate capability to suppress fire during
-    its early stage of growth
-   Inability of exits to handle all of the occupants
-    in the short time available for such a fast
-    growing fire

**Notes:**
The NIST team concluded that there were three major contributors to the building failure that resulted in the deaths of 100 people in The Station fire:
 a hazardous mix of building contents;
 an inadequate capability to suppress the fire during its early stage of growth; and
 the inability of the exits to handle all of the occupants in the short time available for such a fast growing fire.

## Key Findings Regarding Building Contents

**Key Findings Regarding Building Contents**
-  Non-fire retarded foam sample purchased by NIST ignited
-   within 10 seconds when exposed to a pyrotechnic device;
-   under similar condition, fire retarded foam sample did not ignite.
-  Computer simulation of the nightclub fire shows that flames
-   spread rapidly over foam finish material, igniting the wood paneling
-   adjacent to the foam and generating
-   intense heat in the first 90 seconds.
-  Fire transitioned to more traditional,
-   ventilation-limited wood frame
-   building fire in about 2 minutes.

- 90 seconds

**Notes:**
Regarding the hazardous mix of building contents, the key findings of the investigation can be summarized as follows:
 A non-fire retarded foam sample purchased by NIST ignited within 10 seconds when exposed to a pyrotechnic device; under similar conditions, a fire retarded foam sample did not ignite.
 The computer simulation of the nightclub fire shows that flames spread rapidly over the foam finish materials, igniting the wood paneling underneath and adjacent to the foam. The very rapid growth observed in the animation is quantified by the exponential increase in the heat release rate between 50 and 90 seconds.
 The fire transitioned to a more traditional, ventilation-limited wood frame building fire about a 1/2 minute later.

## Key Findings Regarding Fire Protection Systems

-  Experiments conducted at NIST demonstrated that a
-   sprinkler system installed in test room in accordance with
-   NFPA 13 was able to control a fire initiated in non-fire
-   retarded polyurethane foam panels.
-  Sprinklers were not installed in The Station, nor would they
-   have been required for such existing structures under
-   2003 editions of the model codes
-  A heat detection/fire alarm system was installed in the
-   building and was activated (sound and strobe) by the fire
-   41 seconds after the fire started.

**Notes:**
In the area of fire protection systems: 
 Experiments conducted at NIST demonstrated that a sprinkler system installed in a test room in accordance with the current model code was able to control a fire initiated in non-fire retarded polyurethane foam panels.
 Sprinklers were not installed in The Station, nor would they have been required for such existing structures under the 2003 editions of the model codes. 
 A heat detection/fire alarm system was installed in the building and was activated (sound and strobe) by fire 41 seconds after the fire started.

## Computer simulation of platform area mock-up with sprinklers

**Computer simulation of platform area mock-up with sprinklers**

**Notes:**
To investigate the impact that sprinklers may have had on the outcome, NIST conducted tests in a real-scale mock-up of the platform and a portion of the dance floor.  The tests were run with and without sprinklers.  The video at the lower left shows how the fire spreads without sprinklers present.  The foam-covered platform can be seen at the far end of the room.  The foam extends part way along the left wall which has been paneled with plywood.  Ignition occurs at the corners of the alcove at a position that matches what was seen in the WPRI-TV video.
We simulated the two test conditions on our computers to demonstrate that the sprinkler computer model could capture the critical aspects of the suppression process.  The simulation is shown at the upper right of this slide, and can be compared directly to the full-scale test shown below.  All videos are playing in real time.   

## Key findings regarding emergency egress

-  First patrons recognized danger 24 seconds after ignition
-   of foam; bulk of crowd began to evacuate around time
-   band stopped playing (30 seconds).
-  2/3 of occupants attempted to leave through main
-   entrance; many were unsuccessful.
-  Prior to 90 seconds, a crowd-crush occurred at main
-   entrance which disrupted flow through front exit.
-  Event precipitating crowd crush likely related to
-   arrangement of single interior door with merging streams
-   of traffic and pressure to escape rapidly deteriorating
-   conditions in nightclub.

**Notes:**
We examined the evacuation process, the details of the building design, and the location of the victims -- and much could be said about emergency egress from this building, as shown on this and the next slide:
 The first patrons, as seen on the WPRI-TV video, recognized danger 24 s after ignition of the foam; the bulk of the crowd began to evacuate  around time band stopped playing (30 s).
 2/3 of the occupants attempted to leave through the main entrance; many were unsuccessful. 
 Prior to 90 seconds, a crowd-crush occurred at the main entrance which entirely disrupted the flow through the front exit.  
 The event precipitating the crowd crush was likely related to the arrangement of the single interior door at the entrance to the vestibule with merging streams of traffic and pressure to escape the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the nightclub.  The single interior door could have triggered tripping and a second blockage of the double doors that was visible from outside the building.

## Key findings regarding emergency egress (cont.)

-  Measurements in a fire test of a reconstructed portion of the
-   platform and dance floor produced, within 90 seconds,
-   conditions well in excess of accepted survivability limits.
-  Computer simulation of the full nightclub fire suggested that
-   conditions around the dance floor, sunroom, and assembly
-   area behind kitchen would have led to severe incapacitation
-   or death within about 90 seconds after ignition of the foam.

**Notes:**
Additional findings regarding emergency egress:
 In a NIST fire test of a reconstruction of a portion of the platform and dance floor, within 90 seconds conditions were well in excess of accepted survivability limits.  
 Computer simulation of the full nightclub fire suggests that conditions around the dance floor, sunroom, and dart room would have led to severe incapacitation or death within about 90 seconds after ignition of the foam, especially for anyone remaining standing.

## Areas of recommendations for improvements to model building & fire codes, standards and practices in nightclubs

-  Strengthen requirements for installation of sprinklers*
-  Tighten restrictions on flammable materials as finish
-    products, and further limit use of  pyrotechnics*
-  Increase factor of safety on time to egress*
-  Other areas referred to in draft report*
- *And that state and local authorities adopt these provisions.

**Notes:**
Twelve specific recommendations are presented in the draft report on a wide range of topics for improving model building and fire codes, as well as standards and practices.  I would like to focus on three:
strengthening requirements for installation of sprinklers; 
tightening restrictions on flammable materials used as finish products and further limiting the use of pyrotechnics; and
increasing the factor of safety on the time needed to egress.

For the recommended improvements to have an effect, state and local authorities will need to adopt the revised provisions.

## Recommendation 1:  That model codes require sprinkler systems for all new and existing nightclubs regardless of size.

- Computer simulation of The Station fire had sprinklers been installed

**Reco****mmendation 1:  **That model codes require sprinkler systems for all new and existing nightclubs regardless of size.

**Notes:**
This brings us to our first (of twelve) recommendations. 
Recommendation 1:  NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems for all new and existing nightclubs regardless of size -- and that state and local authorities adopt this provision. 
To visualize the effect this may have had on Feb. 20, 2003, we applied the computer model to the full nightclub. The simulation is of the same fire scenario that led to uninhabitable conditions almost everywhere throughout the building in less than 90 seconds.  What is different here is that virtual sprinklers have been added. Two sprinkler heads can be seen as the red dots in the ceiling of the nightclub.  A virtual sprinkler was also installed in the drummers alcove.  Following ignition, the fire spreads exactly as before for up to 16 seconds, when the sprinkler on the right can be seen to activate.  The water spray immediately entrains the hot gases and smoke in the upper layer and forces them toward the floor.  A second sprinkler activates at 23 seconds (note the change in color of the sprinkler from red to green).  In stark contrast to the unsprinklered simulation, the peak temperature in the nightclub at 90 seconds was predicted to be only 25 C (77 F) when sprinklers were included in the simulation.

## Recommendation 2:  Regarding building contents and finish materials, that the model codes:

- (a) specifically forbid (with no exceptions) certain classes of materials (including non-fire retarded flexible polyurethane foam) that are known to easily ignite and rapidly propagate flames from all new and existing nightclubs;
- (b) provide greater guidance for when large-scale tests are required to demonstrate that materials pose no undue hazard for the use intended, and establish pass/fail criteria using best measurement and prediction practices; and
- (c) strengthen provisions in NFPA 1126 regarding use of pyrotechnics.

**Notes:**
While current model codes have provisions to prevent the use of materials that readily spread flames on floors, walls and ceilings, The Station incident and numerous other tragedies suggest that we need to rethink how this can be done better.
Recommendation 2:  Regarding building contents and finish materials, NIST recommends that the model codes
(a) specifically forbid (with no exceptions) certain classes of materials (including non-fire retarded flexible polyurethane foam) that are known to easily ignite and rapidly propagate flames from all new and existing nightclubs;
(b) provide greater guidance for when large-scale tests are required to demonstrate that materials pose no undue hazard for the use intended, and establish pass/fail criteria using best measurement and prediction practices; and
(c) strengthen provisions in NFPA 1126, the model standard dealing with the use of pyrotechnic devices. 

## Recommendation 3:  That the factor of safety on the time to egress be increased in the model codes by 

- (a) computing the number of required exits and permitted occupant loads assuming at least one exit will be inaccessible in an emergency;
- (b) increasing the capacity of the main entrance to accommodate, at a minimum, 2/3 of the maximum permitted occupant level during an emergency; and
- (c) eliminating trade-offs between sprinkler installation and factors that impact the time to evacuate buildings.

**Notes:**
The third recommendation will improve the safety of occupants in the event of a fire as well as in other circumstances requiring uninhibited egress in which sprinklers have no role, such as the case in the E2 Nightclub tragedy that occurred less than a week prior to The Station fire.

Recommendation 3:  NIST recommends that the factor of safety on the time to egress be increased in the model codes by 
(a) computing the number of required exits and permitted occupant loads assuming at least one exit will be inaccessible in an emergency; 
(b) increasing the capacity of the main entrance to accommodate, at a minimum, 2/3 of the maximum permitted occupant level during an emergency; and 
(c) eliminating trade-offs between sprinkler installation and factors that impact the time to evacuate buildings.

## Recommendation 4:

- That new life-safety provisions apply to existing as well as new nightclubs, and that the practice of  grandfathering older structures be eliminated....

**Reco****mmendation 5:**
- That model codes and standards require redundancy in passive and active fire protection systems....

**Reco****mmendation 6:**
- That proper account should be taken of the soundness of and safety factor provided by the existing provisions in light of the history of similar building failures....

**Notes:**
Recommendations 4, 5 and 6 are aimed at improving design practices and implementation of model codes.
Recommendation 4:  NIST recommends that new life-safety provisions should apply to existing as well as new nightclubs, and that the practice of  grandfathering older structures be eliminated.  Exemptions from the new provisions should be on a case-by-case basis and justified by a comprehensive fire safety analysis using best practices.
Recommendation 5:  NIST recommends that model codes and standards require redundancy in passive and active fire protection systems to ensure adequate performance of the structure when one or more of the protective systems is compromised by uncertain behaviors of the building owner or occupants. 
Recommendation 6:  NIST recommends that when performing an analysis of  proposed changes to model codes, proper account should be taken of the soundness of and safety factor provided by the existing provisions in light of the history of similar building failures.

## Recommendation 7:  

- That the model codes increase the number of portable fire extinguishers required....
**Reco****mmendation 8:  **
- That the model codes provide specific guidance on how to implement an effective fire inspection program....
**Reco****mmendation 9:  **
- That fire departments comply with minimum apparatus staffing, that emergency services maintain robust, interoperable communications to support major incident operations, and that mass casualty operations be conducted utilizing appropriate command structures and practices....

**Notes:**
Recommendation 7 is very specific.
Recommendation 7:  NIST recommends that the model codes increase the number of portable fire extinguishers required, with their number and placement based upon a minimum time for access and application in a fully occupied building, and that staff be properly trained in their use.
Recommendations 8 and 9 are aimed at improving model standards, codes and practices for the fire service.
Recommendation 8:  NIST recommends that the model codes provide specific guidance on how to implement an effective fire inspection program, including the training necessary to implement it.
Recommendation 9: NIST recommends 
 that fire departments comply with minimum apparatus staffing guidance; 
 that public safety agencies at all levels give greater attention to the difficulty of communication systems interoperability; 
 that emergency services develop/maintain robust, interoperable communications to support major incident operations, including those requiring substantial mutual aid augmentations; and
 that major incident/mass casualty operations be conducted utilizing appropriate Incident /Unified Command structures, policies and practices.

## Recommendation 10:

- That research be conducted to better understand human behavior in emergency situations, and to predict impact of building design on safe egress in emergencies.
**Reco****mmendation 11:**
- That research be conducted to understand fire spread and suppression better in order to provide the tools needed by the design profession to address above recommendations.
**Reco****mmendation 12:**
- That research be conducted to refine computer-aided decision tools for determining costs/benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies, and  to develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources.

**Notes:**
Recommendations 10 through12 apply to research that NIST has identified as necessary to support the implementation of many of the other recommendations. 
Recommendation 10:  NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand human behavior in emergency situations, and to predict impact of building design on safe egress in emergencies.
Recommendation 11:  NIST recommends that research be conducted to understand fire spread and suppression better in order to provide the tools needed by the design profession to address the above recommendations. 
Recommendation 12:  NIST recommends that research be conducted to refine computer-aided decision tools for determining costs/benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies, and  to develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources.

These are the recommendations contained in the draft report.  Now I will turn the floor back to Dr. Hill, who will explain how you can get copies of the report and how you can send us your comments on it.

## NIST welcomes comments on Draft Report 

- Web site to view draft final report: http://www.nist.gov/ncst
- (All comments received by April 4 will be considered prior to issuing the NIST Final Report)
- Submit comments to:
- 	E-mail:	NCST@nist.gov
- 	FAX: ** **(301) 975-4052
- 	Mail address:
- 		NIST  Investigation:  The Station
- 		National Institute of Standards and Technology
- 		100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8660
- 		Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660