# Presentation: 162979

## Section 10

***Red Team Report***

*** ******. . . Ronald L. Thomas***
*EO-1 Red Team Review Chairman*

## EO-1 RED TEAM REVIEW  

***. . .  Ronald L. Thomas***
*EO-1 Red Team Review Chairman*

***EO-1 RED TEAM REVIEW  ***
***MRR Report to***
***GSFC Program  Management Council***

## Background

***EO-1 Project approved March 1996***
***EIRR formed to review EO-1 Project in June 1999***
***Participated in Orientation, Pre-Environmental, SAC-C, Hyperion Pre-ship, and EO-1 Pre-ship Reviews***
***Red Team formed to review the EO-1 Project in March 2000***
***Initial Review held March 28-31, 2000***
***Red-Team met on April 11 to review findings***
***Red Team Summary Report presented to Bill Townsend on May 9, 2000***
***Thermal Vacuum II Readiness Review held on June 11, 2000***
***Red Team meeting held on June 13, 2000 to review:******	***
***Probabilistic Risk Management***
***Failure Mode & Effects Analysis***
***Fault Tree Analysis***
***Delta Pre-ship Review held August 9-10, 2000***
***Co-chaired by C. Vanek and R. Thomas***

***Background***

## Team Membership

***Team Membership***

## Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks

_***Technical Performance Reviews***_*** – the level, competence, and independence***
_***System Level Reviews***_*** – the performance, level, and independence ***
_***Test and Verification Program***_*** – the level and thoroughness implemented include V&V and IV & V used on software ***
_***Product Assurance***_*** – level imposed on each project element.  Includes parts usage, workmanship standards imposed, and software assurance processes used***
_***Systems Management***_*** – level imposed on project. Includes the performance and thoroughness of analyses, requirements management, documentation and technical-record keeping and workmanship and test process management.***
_***Verification Matrix***_*** – that shows the verification of the pre-launch requirements, and addresses the fidelity and type of verification.***

***The Red Team evaluated the 13 Project Specific Areas below (as contained in the Charter) on a scale of 1-10 (with 7 being nominal) for each of the Major Project Elements:***

***Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks***

## Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks (continued)

***13 Project Specific Areas (continued) ***
_***Staffing***_*** – the experience of the implementing organizations***
_***Test and Integration***_*** –  all hardware and software element results.  Include information on review and assessment of all failures and anomalies, and their resolution***
_***Failure-free and Total Operating Time***_*** – consider for all mission critical hardware and software***
_***Technical Review Process***_*** – consider the results, and an assessment of all significant RFAs. Also consider the Project’s responses to these RFAs***
_***Mission Simulations and Launch/Operations***_*** – consider the amount, level, and fidelity that has been done, or planned to be done ***
_***FMEAs, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment***_*** – Consider the use of these tools in quantifying the residual risk of EO-1, focusing on the Minimal Mission (as defined in the EO-1Mission Success Criteria).***
_***Single-point Failures***_*** – consider all, and provide a subjective assessment of the probability of each such failure mode causing a mission failure.***

***Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks ****(continued)*

## Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks (continued)

***In evaluating these 13 items, the Red Team was asked to do the following:***
***Evaluate EO-1 in terms of the likelihood of it completing the validation requirements for the Minimal Mission***
***Document the 13 evaluation items for each Mission Element on a score of 1-10 with 7 being nominal***
***Ascertain and document all residual risks, and provide recommendations for mitigation***
***Assess all single-point failure mechanisms, and provide recommendations on their acceptability or non-acceptability, and the rationale for each conclusion. The WARP is to be specifically considered***
***Assess the FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis, and the Probabilistic Risk Assessments***
***Provide a full Report of the above to the GSFC PMC at the EO-1 MRR***
***Provide an overall mission risk statement, along with justification for the statement.***
***Each member is to provide a written report to the Chairman within 6 days after each review.***
***The Chairman is to provide a verbal report to the GSFC Dep. Center Director within 10 days after each review.***

***Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks ****(continued)*

## Red Team Findings for theEO-1 Project Specific Assessments

_***GENERAL OBSERVATIONS***_
***EO-1 Team is to be commended for excellent Red Team Reviews***
***All information very well presented in the required Red Team format***
***All speakers knew their subjects and were very open and responsive to detailed questions***
***All Red Team RFAs were very well addressed and documented;  Web-based responses were very helpful.  ***
***EO-1 was implemented as a NMP “Faster, Better, Cheaper” Technology Program***
***Few NASA standards imposed on the program***
***Primary focus to deliver the technology for the cost and schedule proposed***
***Project not required to have an FMEA or Risk Management***
***To reduce cost, S/C is single-string design and has inherent risk.***
***EO-1 Project has had numerous Technical Peer Reviews and Systems Level Reviews***

***Red Team Findings for the******EO-1 Project Specific Assessments***

## Red Team Findings for theEO-1 Project Specific Assessments

_***GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ***__*(continued)*_
***Accelerated Minimal Mission has been baselined and increases opportunity for mission success (can be achieved in 120 days)***
***Combining high technology in the S/C subsystem (WARP) to get large amounts of data  from the instruments, adds risk (WARP must work to get data from instruments)***
***WARP has worked very well throughout all testing with exception of a low-voltage power supply failure (heritage hardware)***
***WARP operated flawlessly during the second T/V observatory test.***
***MAP heritage was to be flowed into EO-1, but EO-1 overtook MAP***
***There appears to be an imbalance between the completeness of the environmental test program for the various components.  ***
***The 3 instruments, 2 of which are not mission critical, were subjected to a more complete environmental test program which included T/V and sine vibration.***
***WARP, ACDS, and PSE (which are single-string, and are critical to the success of the program) were subjected to ONLY random vibration and thermal cycling (but not T/V).  These operated flawlessly during a second T/V test.***

***Red Team Findings for the******EO-1 Project Specific Assessments***

## This is Swales’ first time as a S/C integrator
They have experienced staff
They appear to have done a good job.
Some of the GSFC supplied GFE (WARP) received minimum QA processes
Resulted initially in a low program specific assessment rating of 6 that the team believed could not be rectified.  (However, very few failures occurred during subsequent observatory level testing)
As the Red Team investigated the GSFC hardware, particularly the WARP, it was found that the QA was better than initially believed to be.
Note, the Red Team did not reach consensus on a rating of 7, but most of the team believed a 7 more accurately represented the QA then the 6.
Although the FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis and Probabilistic Analysis was done after S/C development, they were done well and added value
Appropriate staffing of the EO-1 Project Office (number and experience base) came on late in the program. 
No Chief Engineer function assigned continuously.
Continuity of personnel was an issue (Minimal Mission helps this)

***This is Swales’ first time as a S/C integrator***
***They have experienced staff***
***They appear to have done a good job.***
***Some of the GSFC supplied GFE (WARP) received minimum QA processes***
***Resulted initially in a low program specific assessment rating of 6 that the team believed could not be rectified.  (However, very few failures occurred during subsequent observatory level testing)***
***As the Red Team investigated the GSFC hardware, particularly the WARP, it was found that the QA was better than initially believed to be.***
_***Note, the Red Team did not reach consensus on a rating of 7, but most of the team believed a 7 more accurately represented the QA then the 6.***_
***Although the FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis and Probabilistic Analysis was done after S/C development, they were done well and added value***
***Appropriate staffing of the EO-1 Project Office (number and experience base) came on late in the program. ***
***No Chief Engineer function assigned continuously.***
***Continuity of personnel was an issue (Minimal Mission helps this)***

***General Observations***

## Red Team Rollup of Project Specific Assessments for Each Element

## Red Team Findings for the EO-1 Project Specific AssessmentsS/C Subsystems - WARP

***WARP is required for mission success***
***Combining high technology in the WARP to obtain large amounts of data from the instruments, introduces risk.***
***WARP technology functions: high data rate,  high density storage, working well***
***Only failure has been the 5-volt power supply (random failure of a diode)***
***Lack of an ETU for WARP made troubleshooting very difficult***
***Boards required much re-work, jumpers, etc.***
***Data Interface Board had to be replaced; parts unavailable to replace Data Boards***
***Red Team conducted an independent assessment of the quality and analyses of the WARP Boards***
***The boards had been re-worked, but were found to be in satisfactory condition***
***Parts Level Stress Analysis was assessed by Red Team and found to be satisfactory.***
***Red Team requested Project provide thermal analysis of the WARP hardware configuration to determine thermal stresses of parts at their maximum power operating mode. (Analysis was found to be satisfactory).***
***Red Team endorsed Project’s plan for proceeding with a design for using empty board slot in WARP to provide a backup WARP function for meeting the minimal mission requirements. ***
***With the additional T/V testing successfully completed, Red Team agrees that project should proceed with WARP as originally designed.***

***Red Team Findings for the EO-1 Project Specific Assessments****S/C Subsystems - WARP*

## Red Team Findings for the EO-1 Project Specific AssessmentsSummary Findings for Operations

***Since Preliminary Red Team Report in May 2000, the following work has been completed:***
***All operations training***
***Technical Peer Review of safe mode on-orbit test***
***Security Review***
***Close out of critical and urgent discrepancy reports***
***End-to-end test of flight S/W load /dump and compare S/W***
***Installation of launch version of ground software***
***Spacecraft users guide and constraints and restrictions document***
***All contingency procedures***
***Remaining work to be completed by launch simulation on        10/11-12/00***
***Installation and verification of launch database 2.1***
***Final testing of launch version of ground S/W***
***Verification of all constraints and alerts***
***Completion of all end-to-end tests and simulations***
***With successful completion of launch simulation on 10/12/00 and planned  freeze of software and database, Red Team believes that  operations is ready to support  launch.***

***Red Team Findings for the EO-1 Project ******Specific Assessments****Summary Findings for Operations*

## Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors
The launch vehicle was evaluated in the context of a commercial launch services contract
Emphasis was placed on evaluating mission unique and L/V to S/C interfaces; the core vehicle was reviewed to a lesser degree
Major mission-unique item (Dual Payload Attach Fitting (DPAF)) was reviewed in detail
The Red Team assessment was based on a presentation and action items answered by KSC; no contractor presentations were made
Observations
There is no integrated mission document signed by the two flight projects attesting to their concurrence that their respective interface requirements have been met and verified
KSC signs Boeing Mission Specification for NASA
Although EO-1 depends on KSC to ensure correct integration of all interface requirements with other primary and secondary spacecraft, no signed documentation exists which assigns clear accountability for potential incompatibilities between the two primary spacecraft 
EO-1 dependent on KSC for updates
Compliance is heavily dependent on MIWG process

***Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors***
***The launch vehicle was evaluated in the context of a commercial launch services contract***
***Emphasis was placed on evaluating mission unique and L/V to S/C interfaces; the core vehicle was reviewed to a lesser degree***
***Major mission-unique item (Dual Payload Attach Fitting (DPAF)) was reviewed in detail***
***The Red Team assessment was based on a presentation and action items answered by KSC; no contractor presentations were made***
***Observations***
***There is no integrated mission document signed by the two flight projects attesting to their concurrence that their respective interface requirements have been met and verified***
*KSC signs Boeing Mission Specification for NASA*
***Although EO-1 depends on KSC to ensure correct integration of all interface requirements with other primary and secondary spacecraft, no signed documentation exists which assigns clear accountability for potential incompatibilities between the two primary spacecraft ***
*EO-1 dependent on KSC for updates*
***Compliance is heavily dependent on MIWG process***

***Red Team Findings for the******EO-1 Project Specific Assessments***

## Concern
The absence of S/C project signature gives the impression of a lack of accountability by GSFC in the verification of their payload requirement interfaces
Recommendation
Require that the two spacecraft projects clearly document their accountability for all interface requirement verifications	
KSC continues to authorize Mission Specification with current signature process

***Concern***
***The absence of S/C project signature gives the impression of a lack of accountability by GSFC in the verification of their payload requirement interfaces***
***Recommendation***
***Require that the two spacecraft projects clearly document their accountability for all interface requirement verifications******	***
*KSC continues to authorize Mission Specification with current signature process*

***Red Team Findings for the******EO-1 Project Specific Assessments***

## Payload Fairing

***Payload Fairing***

***Fairing collision with overpass ***
***During transportation of the payload fairing from Pueblo to VAFB, the fairing shipping container was driven into an overpass, resulting in minor damage to fairing***
***Fairing has been repaired***
***Fairing contamination concern***
***Review of Globalstars 5 and 7 post-flight video indicated that some particulate debris had been generated, most likely originating from the Fluoroglide  lubricant applied to the fairing separation rail bellows ***
***The EO-1 Project determined that this risk was not acceptable because some spacecraft instruments were located near the fairing split line and were, therefore, potentially susceptible to this contamination***
***The fairing contractor, Boeing, disassembled the fairing and cleaned all the lubricate.  GSFC personnel inspected the cleaned parts and confirmed that they satisfactorily met the EO-1 project requirements.***
***The fairing is being reassembled and will be shipped to the launch site.***
***The Red Team will review the KSC ERB actions concerning the laminate repairs, the disassembly, cleaning, testing, and re-assembly of the fairing in the very near future.***

## Launch Vehicle Residual Risk for EO-1 Mission Is Low

***Launch Vehicle Residual Risk for EO-1 Mission Is Low***

***Red Team Findings for the******EO-1 Launch Vehicle Risk ***

## Red Team EO-1 Residual Risks &Recommendations for Mitigation

***RESIDUAL RISK ORIGINALLY ***
***REPORTED BY RED TEAM***

***RISK MITIGATION***

***S/C is a single-string design***
***WARP is an advanced technology data processor and storage device that is necessary for Minimal Mission success ***

***Obtain at least 300 hours of system failure-free T/V operation ***
_***Successfully completed except for S-band transponder***_
***Implement around the clock, 3 shifts per day, on-orbit operations; this allows Minimal Mission to be completed in about 120 days***
_***Minimal mission has been base-lined***_
_***Probabilistic Risk Assessment shows probability of success for the Minimal mission to be 0.9***_
***Obtain at least 300 hours of WARP failure-free operation***
_***Successfully achieved in T/V II***_
***Need Stress Analysis that shows acceptable parts de-rating.***
_***Stress Analysis completed; acceptable parts de-rating***_
***Define backup solution that utilizes the empty slot in the WARP, or a new box that matches the baseplate footprint, to meet the requirements of the ALI only***
***Design successfully completed, but not implemented because of successful operation in T/V II.***

## Red Team EO-1 Residual Risks &Recommendations for Mitigation

***Flight software still undergoing change and has minimal failure-free operation time***
***High fidelity hardware / software test bed does not exist for supporting on-orbit operations***
***The QA process as chosen by the Project for the Goddard GFE has resulted in a level of program risk that cannot be quantified.***

***Conduct walk-throughs of all mission critical ground and flight software, and freeze software no later than start of baseline functional testing for T/V; exercise this software during T/V***
_***This was successfully implemented***_
***Project should assess how they will conduct EO-1 operations utilizing the existing test bed with an acceptable level of risk to the mission***
_***Project successfully addressed this in the Pre-ship Review Presentation.***_
***Requires failure-free operating time on S/C and accelerated operations plan***
_***Failure-free operating time achieved (except for S-band transponder), and Minimal-mission base-lined.***_
_***Red Team members did review some GSFC supplied hardware and QA paper work and found that they were better than the Red Team originally thought they were.***_

## Red Team EO-1 Residual Risks &Recommendations for Mitigation

***The amount of He required to use up the Gyro margin is unknown. The concern is that the Gyro margin may be exceeded before launch.***
***Critical S/C hardware, WARP, PSE & ACDS, received only thermal cycling (not T/V).***
***S-band transponder suffered an intermittent failure during S/C TV II Testing***

***Require that a worst case analysis be done that quantifies the amount of margin that may be used before launch***
_***Project determined margin and has taken steps to insure that margin does not erode.***_
***Perform thermal analyses of hardware to determine thermal stresses at maximum power operating mode.  Evaluate performance in upcoming S/C T/V testing.***
_***Successfully completed***_
_***Problem could not be determined, but identical unit from the TRIANA Mission is being substituted.  These transponders have a good history and the TRIANA unit has completed acceptance testing.  Additional failure-free hours will be put on the unit to achieve a total 500 hours  of operation in TV and an additional 300 hours in ambient integrated with the S/C.***_

## Red Team Assessment ofEO-1 Single-Point Failures, FMEA, FTA, & PRA

***Red Team Assessment of******EO-1 Single-Point Failures, FMEA, FTA, & PRA***

***Red Team Charter focuses on single-point failure mechanisms as a major source of residual risk.***
***Three system engineering tools have been used (at the NASA Administrator’s request) to estimate the likelihood of occurrence and overall mission risk associated with the predominate failure modes:***
***Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA)***
***Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)***
***Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA)***
***These tools were not used to develop the EO-1 design, but were performed as part of the Red Team process after the design was completed***
***Single string design by policy (redundancy was largely out-of-bounds)***
***Selective redundancy utilized where possible***
***These tools have been used in a complementary way to evaluate the likelihood of successfully completing the EO-1 Minimal Mission***
***Included the Flight, Ground System and Launch (mission unique)***
***Utilizing these tools, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment yielded a mission success probability of 0.90 for the Minimal Mission (120 days)***

## EO-1 S/C does have selected redundancy and not all hardware is required to meet the Minimal Mission
Solar Array:  Loss of a string can be tolerated
Solar Array Drive:  Not required for Minimum Mission
PSE:  some internal work-arounds available
1773 Data Bus:  Redundant fibers, Star Couplers, and Transceivers
Propulsion:  Not required for Minimum Mission
WARP:  Some internal partial redundancies
X-Band Transmit:  Not required for Minimum Mission
ALI:  Some internal partial redundancies
Not all instruments/hardware are required to meet the Minimal Mission
Hyperion, LAC
X-Band Phased Array Antenna, Lightweight Flexible SA, Pulse Plasma Thruster, GPS, Warp X-Band Exciter
Launch Vehicle Mission-Unique FMEA
EO-1 Separation from DPAF:  Bolt Cutters and Wiring are redundant
Ground System FMEA
Spares and alternative data paths
Safe Hold will keep EO-1 unharmed during Ground System outages

***EO-1 S/C does have selected redundancy and not all hardware is required to meet the Minimal Mission***
***Solar Array:  Loss of a string can be tolerated***
***Solar Array Drive:  Not required for Minimum Mission***
***PSE:  some internal work-arounds available***
***1773 Data Bus:  Redundant fibers, Star Couplers, and Transceivers***
***Propulsion:  Not required for Minimum Mission***
***WARP:  Some internal partial redundancies***
***X-Band Transmit:  Not required for Minimum Mission***
***ALI:  Some internal partial redundancies***
***Not all instruments/hardware are required to meet the Minimal Mission***
***Hyperion, LAC***
***X-Band Phased Array Antenna, Lightweight Flexible SA, Pulse Plasma Thruster, GPS, Warp X-Band Exciter***
***Launch Vehicle Mission-Unique FMEA***
***EO-1 Separation from DPAF:  Bolt Cutters and Wiring are redundant***
***Ground System FMEA***
***Spares and alternative data paths***
***Safe Hold will keep EO-1 unharmed during Ground System outages***

***Red Team Assessment of******EO-1 Single-Point Failures, FMEA, FTA, & PRA***

## WARP as a Single-Point Failure
Is a single string component
Has an S-Band back-up to the X-Band Channel
Memory chips can fail without any impact to the WARP’s operation
Can map around large areas of failed memory
Entire memory board can fail without impact to the other memory board
WARP reliability prediction is 0.896 for one year and 0.950 for 120 days
Red Team believes the WARP represents an acceptable risk for EO-1
Received in-depth assessment from Red Team (examination of boards, stress and thermal analyses reviewed)
Red Team concerned there was no breadboard or engineering model, but examination of boards showed all re-work done well.  (Memory Interface Board was replaced)
Has never had a design failure and only one hardware fix (defective part in LVPC)
Has had no software modifications
Over 2000 hours of operation, over 750 hours of T/V operation, and over 500 hours since the replacement of the LVPC regulator board

***WARP as a Single-Point Failure***
***Is a single string component***
***Has an S-Band back-up to the X-Band Channel***
***Memory chips can fail without any impact to the WARP’s operation***
***Can map around large areas of failed memory***
***Entire memory board can fail without impact to the other memory board***
***WARP reliability prediction is 0.896 for one year and 0.950 for 120 days***
***Red Team believes the WARP represents an acceptable risk for EO-1***
***Received in-depth assessment from Red Team (examination of boards, stress and thermal analyses reviewed)***
***Red Team concerned there was no breadboard or engineering model, but examination of boards showed all re-work done well.  (Memory Interface Board was replaced)***
***Has never had a design failure and only one hardware fix (defective part in LVPC)***
***Has had no software modifications***
***Over 2000 hours of operation, over 750 hours of T/V operation, and over 500 hours since the replacement of the LVPC regulator board***

***Red Team Assessment of******EO-1 Single-Point Failures, FMEA, FTA, & PRA***

## The Red Team assessment is that EO-1 is a low risk for achieving success for the Minimum Mission
Major risk is the single string design
Power System, ACS, WARP, and ALI must operate properly or mission is a complete loss
S/C systems and ALI instrument do have selected redundancies
Mitigation:
Selected redundancy and  many operational work-arounds do exist
Loss of Star Tracker can be mitigated by use of three-axis magnetometer (TAM)
Loss of IRU can be mitigated by use of the Star Tracker
S-Band transmitter can backup the X-Band capability (not vice-versa)
Housekeeping RSN essential only through Solar Array deployment
WARP can lose a whole memory board (or parts of both boards) and still meet mission requirements.
Failure of one of the ALI SCA channels can be tolerated.
The ALI and S/C systems have a high number of operating hours
The Flight Operations Team participated fully in all S/C testing
The Delta is a proven LV
Minimal Mission Success can be achieved in only 120 days at a probability of success of 0.90 (0.75 if spread over  one year)

***The Red Team assessment is that EO-1 is a low risk for achieving success for the Minimum Mission***
***Major risk is the single string design***
***Power System, ACS, WARP, and ALI must operate properly or mission is a complete loss***
***S/C systems and ALI instrument do have selected redundancies***
***Mitigation:***
***Selected redundancy and  many operational work-arounds do exist***
*Loss of Star Tracker can be mitigated by use of three-axis magnetometer (TAM)*
*Loss of IRU can be mitigated by use of the Star Tracker*
*S-Band transmitter can backup the X-Band capability (not vice-versa)*
*Housekeeping RSN essential only through Solar Array deployment*
*WARP can lose a whole memory board (or parts of both boards) and still meet mission requirements.*
*Failure of one of the ALI SCA channels can be tolerated.*
***The ALI and S/C systems have a high number of operating hours***
***The Flight Operations Team participated fully in all S/C testing***
***The Delta is a proven LV***
***Minimal Mission Success can be achieved in only 120 days at a probability of success of 0.90 (0.75 if spread over  one year)***

***Red Team EO-1 Overall Mission Risk Statement (with Justification)***

## Back-Up Charts

## Instruments:  ALI (Rating 7)

***Instruments:  ALI (Rating 7)***

***The ALI is necessary to meet the Minimal Mission ***
***Lincoln Lab developed the instrument***
***Lincoln Lab had good management involvement and a long history of building this type of hardware. ***
***They also had good peer reviews. ***
***They had a good test program with good factors of safety. ***
***The ALI has selective redundancies in the mechanisms to reduce the possibility of failure***
***Red Team found all processes for the ALI to be a 7 (nominal) or above. However, the re-occurring contamination that occurs in the focal plane needed to be addressed. (***_***Addressed at the Delta Pre-Ship Review***_***)***
***On-board reference lamp tracks contamination***
***Heating of focal plane drives off contamination***
***On-orbit decontamination process included in mission planning***
***Failures in the ALI occurred early, were successfully repaired, and were well documented.***

## Instruments:  Hyperion (Rating 7)

***Instruments:  Hyperion (Rating 7)***

***This is a TRW developed instrument***
***Not required to meet the Minimal Mission***
***Based on existing designs, good technical reviews, and test and excellent calibration processes.***
***Implemented excellent risk management and product assurance program.***
***Built on schedule within 12 months and quality was not cut or reduced. ***
***Selected redundancies to increase probability of success.***

## Instruments:  LAC (Rating 7)

***Instruments:  LAC (Rating 7)***

***This is a Goddard developed instrument which implemented Goddard workmanship and quality control standards.***
***They conducted all the appropriate environmental testing, including T/V at the box level***
***LAC is not required for the Minimal Mission***
***There have been no residual problems noted on this hardware***

## Spacecraft Subsystems

***Spacecraft Subsystems***

***1.  Technical Peer Reviews (Rating: 7)***
***Hardware ***
* **All S/C Subsystems have documented peer reviews *
***Software ***
*Some software was peer reviewed by the MAP Project*
*RFAs submitted to identify all mission critical software, and formal code walk-throughs have been conducted for all critical software*
*Code walk-throughs completed for all critical software*

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***2.******	******System Level Reviews (Rating: 8)***
***Total of 32 Reviews completed between EO-1 Primary Configuration Review in May 1997 and Red Team Preliminary Report in May 2000***
*403 RFAs assigned*
*6 Reviews to launch (including Red Team Reviews)*
***Review Sponsorship:***
*20 Reviews for Office of Flight Assurance (code 300) conducted *
*17 External Reviews (EIRR, Little’s Committee, Senior Manager’s Review, Red Team) *
* **2 Engineering Directorate Reviews (AETD, Code 500)*
* **5 NMP/EO-1 Project Office Reviews*
*Cross-involvement of all review teams in many reviews*
***Additional GSFC and Red Team Reviews held since May 2000 include:***
*Thermal Vacuum II Readiness Review*
*Red Team Review of RFAs and EO-1 Risk Analyses*
*Delta Pre-Ship Review*

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***3.******	******Test and Verification Program (Rating: 7)***
***The observatory functional and environmental test program was complete and included all the appropriate testing required***
***The philosophy of the Project was to defer testing (in some cases) to observatory level by limiting the box level testing -- Red Team believes that this has resulted in additional risk***
***Lack of Engineering test units is a residual risk to program, trouble shooting difficult on ground and on orbit***
***Red Team recommended a min. of 300 hours of failure-free operating hours be obtained in T/V on all hardware to obtain sufficient hardware confidence.  ***
*This was successfully achieved except for a failure of the S-band transponder (heritage hardware). *
*Project obtained a replacement transponder from the Triana Program and will achieve sufficient hours of operation on it and in the system prior to launch.*
***Software – project utilizes 7 RSNs and 2 Mongoose –V Processors***
***Software has some heritage from SAMPEX, XTE, TRMM and MAP.***
***Part of the software had formal IV&V ***
***Software operated successfully during final 300 hour T/V testing of the observatory***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***4.  Product Assurance (Rating: 7)***
***The contractor elements: ALI, Hyperion, etc., seemed to have a more rigorous quality process than the GSFC elements.***
***Inconsistent across all of the hardware by the Project / Institution.  A serious consequence is that it is difficult if not impossible to put Product Assurance back into the hardware***
***Red Team initially concerned that a minimal effort was performed on the GSFC hardware regarding Product Assurance***
***Independent assessments of the GSFC hardware, particularly the WARP, showed that the PA was better then initially believed.***
***Successful completion of the 300 hour T/V testing at the observatory level (except for the transponder) adds confidence that the PA is adequate***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***5.  Systems Management (Swales)  (Rating: 8)***
***The Swales Systems Manager provided a good review of their Systems management of the S/C***
***Good traceability of lowest level requirements back to Level 1 (EO-1 Project Plan)***
***Each of the lowest level requirements, for a given function, was verified by Analysis, or Test and Evaluation***
***Critical S/C resources were well managed: Mass, Telemetry, Power, etc.***
***Configuration Management processes in place for drawings and  I&T Procedures***
***Excellent work order process utilized***
***Excellent I&T Management***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***6.  Verification Matrix  (Rating: 7)***
***The Project provided a complete verification matrix for all the elements/subsystems.***
***The Verification Matrix was reviewed by each presenter for his particular subsystem/area during all subsequent reviews and was found to be adequate***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***7.******	******Staffing (Rating: 7)***
***Project staff which presented to the Red Team were knowledgeable and competent.***
***Swales provided names/experience of their project personnel ***
*Swales has excellent subsystems experience, but this was their first S/C integration*
*Swales key personnel had extensive S/C integration experience*
***The present GSFC staff has extensive experience in their respective areas. We were informed that the project staffing did get off to a very slow start and had a high turnover rate.  In fact, B. Cramer and D. Schulz are the only two remaining from the original EO-1 Team.***
*The project manager has extensive S/C experience.*
*The current software manager has excellent experience, but has only been on board since late 1999.*
***The GSFC supplied WARP, LAC, and Formation Flying teams all appear to have well-qualified staff.***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***8.******	******Integration and Test  (Rating: 8)***
***Technically sound Integration and Test program ***
***CPT to test every function and to measure performance of every subsystem.***
* **Contains about 100 individual tests*
* **All nominal and critical commands tested (about 500).*
***Performed non-CPT Performance Tests***
* **End-to-End optical for instruments, X-Band pointing tests, GPS Constellation Tests, Solar Array mechanical deployment, Heater tests, etc.*
* **MOC simulation tests*
***Thermal Vacuum Tests of complete S/C***
* **Conducted CPT at both hot and cold plateaus*
* **Functional tests conducted during pump-down and at end before chamber break.*
***Conducted post-environmental CPT in Dec. 1999***
***Good procedures for checking out all systems and for reporting problems (RFA submitted).***
***300 hour T/V test successfully completed at observatory level prior to Delta Pre-Ship Review (except for transponder)***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***9.******	******Operating Time  (Rating: 7)***
***Red Team initially concerned that there was not enough failure-free hours in T/V at the observatory level due to: ***
*disassembly of S/C, *
*software not completed or frozen,*
*WARP power supply board had been changed, and *
*many mission critical boxes did not undergo T/V after re-work*
***Project alleviated this concern by successfully completing a 300 hr. T/V test (except for the transponder) prior to the delta pre-ship review. ***
* **During these tests the observatory was exercised through its thermal, power, and data handling extremes. *
***New Transponder will have sufficient operating time at the box level and system level prior to launch.***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***10.******	******Technical Review Process  (Rating: 7)***
***Project has initiated actions to close RFAs generated by Red Team.***
***The project has addressed RFAs from all the reviews and is close to having them all closed out.***
*Web-based system for reviewing and closing out RFAs worked well*
***Project presented many of the critical Subsystem RFAs and how they were closed during the Red Team Review.***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***11.******	******Mission Simulations and Launch*/Operations  (Rating: 8*)***
***Red Team has found the mission simulations plans and implementation to be good. ***
***Project has accomplished flight operations team training using classroom techniques, the actual vehicle, and training simulators. This training plan is very thorough and complete.***
****ORR scheduled for October 3, 2000 and there are still a number of actions that are not complete.  It is expected that the open actions will be closed, but if not the rating of 8 will be reduced.***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***12. FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment***
***The FME, FTA and PRA were completed after the design and development of EO-1 was nearly complete.***
***Project conducted a special review for the Red Team to review these Risk Analyses***
***The  Risk Analyses appear to have been done well and have added confidence that EO-1 is a low risk for meeting the minimal mission of 120 days.***

## Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)

***Spacecraft Subsystems ****(continued)*

***13.  Single-Point Failures  (Rating:  7)***
***Single string systems have a long successful history at Goddard, but hardware must have a robust design and good quality.  ***
***Red Team recommended a minimum of 300 failure-free operation hours in T/V to mitigate the S/C changes and the single-string risk.***
***Red Team supports the Project recommendation to accelerate Operations so the Minimal Mission can be verified as quickly as possible (120 days).***
***EO-1 is single-string, but some hardware has selected redundancies:***
*Mechanisms for the solar array deployment, *
*ALI and Hyperion Instrument cover actuators*
*Solar array parallel strings*
*X-band antenna can fail gracefully due to multiple SSPAs*
*X-band and S-band  communication modes.*
*WARP has redundant memory boards, each of which can fail gracefully*
*1773 data bus, and  power harness*
*ACS Separate safehold processor, main computer memory, and propulsion heater.*
***All non-essential loads have fuse protection***

## Spacecraft Technologies

***Spacecraft Technologies***

***The S/C technologies are all rated 7 or above in all the specific assessment areas; they are:***
***Enhanced Formation Flying, EFF***
***Light-weight Flexible Solar Array, LFSA***
***Carbon-Carbon Radiator, CCR***
***X-band Phased Array Antenna, XPAA***
***Global Position System, GPS***
***Pulsed Plasma Thruster, PPT***
***The above technologies with the exception of EFF, XPAA and PPT can not  jeopardize the Minimum Mission.***
***PPT will not be activated until after the Minimal Mission requirements are satisfied. ***
***EFF software can be changed from the ground if problems arise.***
***XPAA has many redundant SSPAs, and is backed up by S-band. ***

## Spacecraft Technologies (continued)

***Spacecraft Technologies ****(continued)*

***XPAA is rated 7 or above in all the specific assessment areas.***
***XPAA is not necessary to meet the Minimal Mission (ALI data only and using the S-Band), but is to communicate the large amount of data from the three instruments.***
***The Red Team believes the XPAA has a low risk of failure***
***Designed and built by Boeing under fixed-price contract with GSFC***
***NASA GRC provided independent evaluation of RF Modules, packaging and array communications performance using Boeing EM hardware.***
***Three formal contract reviews conducted.***
***Experienced design / development team***
***Has more than 350 hrs. on-time since integrated on S/C***
***No open items***
***Very redundant design except for the RSN***

## Operations

***Operations***

***1.******	******Technical Peer Reviews    (Rating: 7)***
***2.******	******System Level Reviews (Rating: 7)***
***Operations included in the Project system reviews. ***
***3.******	******Test and Verification (Rating: 7)***
***Test and Verification approach is sound.***
***Verification of the flight and ground database expected before ORR***
***Implementation and verification of constraints and restrictions (C&R) are nearly complete ( Review at ORR on 10/3/00)***
***Project has limited test bed for on-orbit anomaly investigation and for trouble- shooting problems but by combining MAP and EO-1 hardware all the software can be tested on the ground***
***4.******	******Product Assurance (Rating: 7)***
***Operations products (procedures, database, C&R) are now under CM***

## Operations (continued)

***Operations ****(continued)*

***5.******	******Systems Management  (Rating: 7)***
***Systems management approach and plans are sound***
***Team has done a good job of documenting problem reports***
***Operations documentation is Web-based***
***6.******	******Verification Matrix (Rating:8)***
***Project provided an Operations testing matrix showing status/plans for all operations tests.***
***7.******	******Staffing and Experience (Rating: 8)***
***Operations Team appears to be adequately staffed with experienced personnel.***
***Team presented detail plans on how it would implement 24 hour, 120 day Minimal Mission ***

## 8.	Test and Integration (Rating: 8)
Project uses same ground system for operations training and I&T
By launch, the operations ground software will have 600 hours with the S/C
9.	Failure Free and Total Operating Time (Rating: 7)
Red Team recommended and EO-1 achieved a minimum of 300 hrs. of failure-free S/C operation for T/V tests prior to delta pre-ship review.
10.	Technical Review Process (Rating: 7)
Project  has some open Operations RFAs assigned by the Red Team (ORR item)
11.	Mission Simulations & Launch/Operations  (Rating: 8)
Project has conducted many mission simulations to date, final plans TBD for ORR
Most of the operations staff have participated in I&T
Contingency planning was well done and nearly complete (ORR Review)

***8.******	******Test and Integration (Rating: 8)***
***Project uses same ground system for operations training and I&T***
***By launch, the operations ground software will have 600 hours with the S/C***
***9.******	******Failure Free and Total Operating Time (Rating: 7)***
***Red Team recommended and EO-1 achieved a minimum of 300 hrs. of failure-free S/C operation for T/V tests prior to delta pre-ship review.***
***10.******	******Technical Review Process (Rating: 7)***
***Project  has some open Operations RFAs assigned by the Red Team (ORR item)***
***11.******	******Mission Simulations & Launch/Operations  (Rating: 8)***
***Project has conducted many mission simulations to date, final plans TBD for ORR***
***Most of the operations staff have participated in I&T***
***Contingency planning was well done and nearly complete (ORR Review)***

***Operations ****(continued)*

## 12.	FMEA, FTA, & PRA (Rating: 7)
Appropriate documents were supplied to Red Team for review
13.	Single-Point Failures (Rating: 7)
Both S-Band and X-Band communication available from S/C to ground.
Ground can communicate through at least two ground stations and through the TDRSS System

***12.******	******FMEA, FTA, & PRA (Rating: 7)***
***Appropriate documents were supplied to Red Team for review***
***13.******	******Single-Point Failures (Rating: 7)***
***Both S-Band and X-Band communication available from S/C to ground.***
***Ground can communicate through at least two ground stations and through the TDRSS System***

***Operations ****(continued)*

## Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors

***Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors***

***Dual Payload Attach Fitting (DPAF)***
***DPAF comments based on review of documentation and splinter meeting with DPAF program office management team***
***DPAF documents reviewed:***
***Design Certification Review (9/28/99)***
***Design Certification Review Update (3/7/00)***
***Delta L/V Design Certification Review (9/29/99)***
***Requirements Verification Matrix***
***Failure Modes and Effects Analysis***
***Specification Control Drawing (1D89290)***

## Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors (continued)

***Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors ****(continued)*

***Overall DPAF Observations***
***DPAF program was well planned and executed***
***Mission Success was top priority throughout program (no cut corners)***
***DPAF design was heavily based on Ariane 4/MMS/SPELDA design and process heritage***
***Critical flight items were fully redundant and thoroughly tested***
***Matra Marconi Space (MMS) and Boeing have significant relevant flight experience***
***Very Low Residual Risk***
***Lack of modal survey prevents reduction of small uncertainties in predicted loads ***
***Load/deflection was used to verify structure and interface stiffness***
***Modal survey is more rigorous***

## Launch Vehicle

***Launch Vehicle***

***1.******	******Technical Peer Reviews - 8 ***
***DPAF (Dual Payload Attach Fitting)***
*DPAF major new development item*
*DPAF reviewed more extensively than the few other mission unique elements*
*Several independent peer reviews held for DPAF*
*Independent reviews attended by relevant subsystem experts (considerable breadth)*
***Other Mission Elements***
*Level, competence and independence of KSC resident teams very good*
*Continuity of KSC review function stable throughout transition of mission*
*KSC Delta specific depth limited *

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***2.******	******System Level Reviews - 7 ***
***DPAF***
*Standard set of system level reviews*
*Additional Design Certification Review held*
*Many different organizations involved in reviews *
*NASA KSC, NASA OLS, Boeing,etc*
*Vested interest in mission success by all parties (potential future capability)*
***Other Mission Elements***
*Standard set of system level reviews *
*Experienced background for MIT (mission integration team)*
* **limited experience in current roles*
*above average experience in other aspects or other launch vehicles*
*For mission unique items, KSC conducts some independent reviews*
*KSC has contractual right to approve/disapprove or right to review all mission unique or mission specific analyses, testing and reports*
*Heavy dependence, with KSC participation, on Boeing review process for core vehicle items;  Aerospace under contract for pedigree reviews*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***3.******	******Test and Verification Program (for mission uniques) - 9 ***
***DPAF***
*DPAF Test and Verification very complete and detailed; very high standard*
*Although subcontractor had exceptional heritage on SPELDA program, DPAF still re-tested as a new design*
*LCCD systems subjected to both SPELDA and US conventional Lot Acceptance Testing*
*DPAF LCCD gets the benefit of MMS standard practices and US testing philosophy*
*LCCD Lot Acceptance Testing and Margin testing performed *
*Second Proof Test after pathfinder activity eliminates risks*
*Small residual risk due to lack of Modal Survey*
***Other Mission Elements***
*PAF Fit check and shock testing with flight PAF*
*GN2  purge standard mission specific item; numerous flights; standard design*
*Independent KSC review of standard Boeing vehicle testing*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***4.******	******Level of Mission Assurance - 8  ***
***DPAF***
*GSFC Code 300 performed DCR’s and provided important continuity*
*Experienced NASA FA individual continuous on DPAF throughout program*
*Transitioned with program to KSC*
*Additional KSC mission assurance capability still developing*
*Consistent NASA Project Office involvement throughout DPAF program*
*Boeing and NASA mission assurance present throughout development of  DPAF*
*DPAF  received greater scrutiny as a development program*
*MMS quality control processes appear to be quite thorough*
***Other Mission Elements***
*Boeing mission assurance processes above average for DPAF, average in general*
*KSC mission assurance limited but growing*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***5.******	******Systems Management for Mission Uniques - 7 ***
***DPAF***
*NASA DPAF team constant throughout life of system*
*Minimum Boeing Personnel turnover*
*Minimal Boeing subcontractor personnel turnover (MMS)*
*Detailed configuration control implemented by Boeing through Specification Control Drawing Process*
***Other Mission Elements***
*KSC focus on mission unique and integration items*
*Mission Specification (a.k.a. Interface Control) Document not formally signed by spacecraft projects (see special topic)*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***6.******	******Staffing - 8  ***
***DPAF***
*Experienced NASA project office personnel*
*Boeing and MMS team have considerable previous experience*
***Other Mission Elements***
*Experienced KSC resident team at Boeing*
*Stable Boeing workforce reported by KSC*
*Limited Delta-specific contractor and civil servant experience at KSC *
*Technical depth improving with experience*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***7.******	******Integration and Test - 9 ***
***DPAF***
*Thorough integration and test program for DPAF *
*Good waiver/nonconformance process*
*Rigorous tracking of non-conformances*
*Most waivers issued against documentation corrections*
***Other Mission Elements***
*Strong ERB System review by KSC Systems Engineering and Flight Assurance*
*Well defined system tests *
*Well defined PAF Fit and Shock Tests*
*NASA telemetry lab participates in Delta testing, allowing detailed analysis*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***8.******	******Operating Time - 7 ***
***DPAF***
*DPAF does not contain any active electronic items (i.e.. black boxes)*
***Other Mission Elements***
*No mission unique electronic configurations required for mission..*
***9.******	******Technical Review Process - RFAs - 8 (Above Standard) ***
***DPAF***
*All RFAs tracked and answered*
*All DPAF independent review team RFAs were implemented*
***Other Mission Elements***
*RFA’s tracked and answered*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***10.******	******Mission Simulations/Testing - 7 ***
***DPAF***
*S/C PAF Fit checks & shock testing performed *
*Pathfinder activity performed*
*Prepared launch site personnel for DPAF processing*
*Validated facility capabilities and accommodations*
***Other Mission Elements***
*KSC Delta experience recently exercised on Image launch campaign*
*Other recent: DS-1,  Landsat-7*
*Detailed mission dress rehearsal*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***11.******	******Assess FMEA, FTA and PRA for Completeness - 7 ***
***DPAF***
*FMECA and Separation Reliability Analysis completed*
***Other Mission Elements***
*FMECA, FTA, PRA tools not formally used for launch vehicle *
*FTA used for post-failure analysis*
*KSC active participant, with approval authority, in all phases of mission unique development and implementation*
*FMEA, PRA, FTA not required for vehicle mission uniques*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***12.******	******Mission Requirements Verification Matrix - 8 ***
***DPAF***
*DPAF detailed verification matrix completed*
*Launch Vehicle specific requirements for DPAF also tracked and documented*
***Other Mission Elements***
*Heritage GSFC and Boeing verification processes*
*The Boeing Mission Specification (nominal interface control document) not signed by spacecraft projects (see special topics)*
*Boeing’s formal verification process for their mission specifications occurs very late in the integration process*
*Not an early program process or document (end-game process)*
*KSC developing independent verification database; EO-1/SAC-C first use*
*KSC process improvement*

## Launch Vehicle (continued)

***Launch Vehicle ****(continued)*

***13.******	****** Single Point Failures - 7    ***
***DPAF***
*Single point failures limited to high reliability item (i.e. structures)*
*DPAF is quite simple (mostly structure), and robust*
*LCCD fully redundant*
***Other Mission Elements***
*Core vehicle not reviewed*
*No Single point failures identified for EO-1 interface*
*standard Delta 37” Clampband with dual 37 pin connectors*