# Presentation: 475490

## United States                  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

**United States                  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program**

**Iran**

**Afghanistan**

**Pakistan**

**India**

**FIRST SHIPS ON STATION:**
**CVN 65, CVN 70, SSN 719, SSN 722**

- 9/12/2001

## NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM

**FOCUSED MISSION ****	**
**  ****Provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and ensure their safe, reliable, and    ****	****long-lived operation**
**CLEAR, TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL ASPECTS**
**  ****Research, development, design, construction**
**  ****Maintenance, repair, overhaul, disposal**
**  ****Radiological controls, environment, safety, and health matters**
**  ****Officer operator selection, operator training **
**  ****Administration (security, nuclear safeguards, transportation, public information,         **
**    ****procurement and fiscal management)**
**  ****Centralized control of Program’s Industrial Base/Vendors**
**  ****Spent fuel custody**
**SIMPLE, ENDURING, LEAN STRUCTURE**
-   **Director tenure 8 years, 4-Star Admiral/Deputy Administrator in NNSA**
**  ****Dual agency structure with direct access to Secretaries of Energy and Navy**
**  ****Small headquarters, field activities**

**  ****EXECUTIVE ORDER 12344 SET FORTH IN PUBLIC LAW 98-525 AND 106-65**

** **

## NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM

***NUCLEAR POWERED FLEET***                               -  82 ships                                                                    -  Over 40% of major combatants

***DEDICATED LABORATORIES***                                                           -  Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory  -  Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory -  GOCOs

***R&D/TRAINING REACTORS*** -  Train 2500 students/year

***REPORT TO DIRECTOR***
- - Ensures focus on mission
- - Immediate identification of concerns

***SPECIALIZED INDUSTRIAL BASE***
- -  1  dedicated equipment prime contractor                -   Hundreds of suppliers

-               ***SCHOOLS***                           -  Nuclear Power School       -  Nuclear Field “A” School

-     ***SHIPYARDS ***        4 Public / 2 Private

**LEAN, CENTRALLY CONTROLLED, DEDICATED, SUCCESSFUL**

**103 reactors operating worldwide**

## MASTERING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 

**Defense in Depth**
- 	•	Design:  simple, rugged, redundant, fail-safe, conservative
- 	•	Rigorous quality control:  on-site reps, detailed specs, HQ approval for deviations, separate logistics/supply, documentation (quality evidence)
- 	•	Comprehensive procedures and procedural compliance
- 	•	Oversight:  NPEB, squadron, type commander, field office
- 	•	People:  carefully selected; rigorous and continuous training

**THE KEY IS PEOPLE**
** ****CAREFULLY SELECTED, HIGHLY TRAINED, MOTIVATED**

## Engineered systems are used by people
Engineering analysis is done by people
Engineered equipment is maintained by people

- Engineering analysis is done by people
- Engineered equipment is maintained by people

**YOU CAN’T ENGINEER PEOPLE OUT OF THE EQUATION**

***ENGINEERING = c******1******[PEOPLE]******3****** ***

## NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANTPressurized Water Reactor

***NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT******Pressurized Water Reactor***

## Multiple Safety Drivers...which can be in tension.

** **

-  Reactor Safety
-  Ship Safety
-  Crew [Worker] Safety
-  Public Safety
-  Environmental Safety

**The tyranny of the “OR”**
** ****- *****Built to Last***** by James Collins & Jerry Porras**

## Most technical requirements and administrative processes developed under ADM Rickover.
His experience included time aboard ship (pre-WWII) and as head of Electrical Division of BUSHIPS.

- His experience included time aboard ship (pre-WWII) and as head of Electrical Division of BUSHIPS.

***TRUE TO OUR ROOTS***

- “One must create the ability in his staff to generate clear, forceful arguments for opposing view points as well as their own.  Open discussions and disagreements must be encouraged, so that all sides of an issue will be fully explored.  Further, important issues should be presented in writing.  Nothing so sharpens the thought process as writing down one’s arguments.  Weaknesses overlooked in oral discussion rapidly become painfully obvious on the written page.”
*- H. G. Rickover*

## Self-regulating
Multiple safety barriers
Large margins to core damage
Long time for response for many casualties
Operator back-up
Thoroughly and continuously trained operators
Multiple systems

- Multiple safety barriers
- Large margins to core damage
- Long time for response for many casualties
- Operator back-up
- Thoroughly and continuously trained operators
- Multiple systems

***KEY SAFETY ATTRIBUTES***

- “Since engineering is a profession which affects the material basis of everyone’s life, there is almost always an unconsulted third party involved in any contract between the engineer and those who employ him – that is the country, the people as a whole... Knowing more than the public about the effects his work will have, the engineer ought to consider himself an ‘officer of the court’ and keep the general interest always in mind.”
*- H. G. Rickover*

## Engineering modeling
Reactor safety and ship reliability for casualties
Public safety

- Reactor safety and ship reliability for casualties
- Public safety

***DEFENSE IN DEPTH IN ANALYSES***

- “...the NRC staff comments positively on the conservative design philosophy, the stringent standards for construction and materials, the incorporation of past operating experience, and the consideration of human performance in the VIRGINIA Class Submarine’s nuclear propulsion plant.  The VIRGINIA Class Submarine’s nuclear propulsion plant represents an advancement in safety over previous submarine classes that the RNC has reviewed.”
*- NRC letter of October 15, 2002*

## IAEA definition:  The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.
Another definition:  “a work environment where a safety ethic permeates the organization and people’s behavior focuses on accident prevention through critical self-assessment, pro-active identification of management and technical problems, and appropriate, timely, and effective resolution of the problems before they become crises.”  (Jonathan Wert, 1986)

*Another definition*:  “a work environment where a safety ethic permeates the organization and people’s behavior focuses on accident prevention through critical self-assessment, pro-active identification of management and technical problems, and appropriate, timely, and effective resolution of the problems before they become crises.”  (Jonathan Wert, 1986)

***SAFETY CULTURE***

- Culture – “the quality in a person or society that arises from an interest in ... excellence .... development or improvement of the mind by education or training.”
- - *The Random House College Dictionary (1980)*

## Ingredients
Assembly – the whole must net out as viewing safety as important; saying it is someone else’s job does not suffice
Characteristics – organizational structure and rules must support
Attitudes – people have to believe, and show they believe, that safety is important
Overriding – if cost and schedule keep taking precedence, people get the message and the culture suffers
Attention – problems must be communicated to appropriate personnel
Significance – cognizant personnel must be capable of assessing impact on safety; to do so, they must be trained, given authority, given complete information.
Accident prevention before they become crises – fix problems while they are still minor
Self-assessment – know how well you are doing the job
Management AND technical – problems are not limited just to hardware
Summary:  Identify, communicate, resolve, self-assess, train.

- Assembly – the whole must net out as viewing safety as important; saying it is someone else’s job does not suffice
- Characteristics – organizational structure and rules must support
- Attitudes – people have to believe, and show they believe, that safety is important
- Overriding – if cost and schedule keep taking precedence, people get the message and the culture suffers
- Attention – problems must be communicated to appropriate personnel
- Significance – cognizant personnel must be capable of assessing impact on safety; to do so, they must be trained, given authority, given complete information.
- Accident prevention before they become crises – fix problems while they are still minor
- Self-assessment – know how well you are doing the job
- Management AND technical – problems are not limited just to hardware
*Summary*:  Identify, communicate, resolve, self-assess, train.

***MAKING A SAFETY CULTURE***

**SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT**

## Centralized technical control of all aspects
Personal responsibility for technical, safety, radcon, environmental
In-depth technical understanding of all aspects of work at all levels
HQ involvement in all aspects (design, procedures, operations)
Organization with internal checks to ensure thorough review
Prompt reporting, evaluation, and correction of problems
Rigorous theoretical and practical training; continuing training at all levels
Conservative designs with ample safety margins; prevention first
Rigorous quality assurance of all aspects
Thorough testing of equipment prior to fleet application
Formality, discipline, and precision
Emphasis on close, frequent technical oversight
Skepticism, frankness, self-criticism, integrity, & attention to detail.

**Personal responsibility for technical, safety, radcon, environmental**
**In-depth technical understanding of all aspects of work at all levels**
**HQ involvement in all aspects (design, procedures, operations)**
- Organization with internal checks to ensure thorough review
**Prompt reporting, evaluation, and correction of problems**
- Rigorous theoretical and practical training; continuing training at all levels
- Conservative designs with ample safety margins; prevention first
- Rigorous quality assurance of all aspects
- Thorough testing of equipment prior to fleet application
- Formality, discipline, and precision
**Emphasis on close, frequent technical oversight**
- Skepticism, frankness, self-criticism, integrity, & attention to detail.

**PREVENT BIG PROBLEMS BY WORKING HARD ON THE SMALL ONES **

***PROGRAM PHILOSOPHY***

## NNPP TRIANGLE VIEW OF PROBLEMS

***NNPP TRIANGLE VIEW OF PROBLEMS***

## Director responsible for all aspects of work
Frequent oral & written reports from all Program activities
HQ
Outstanding personnel; management technically trained
Directly oversees adequacy of all technical requirements
Exercises technical approval over contractors, SYs, & vendors
Multiple reporting chains ensure problems promptly brought to attention of cognizant personnel
Oversees all personnel actions related to the Program
Directs and oversees all logistic support functions
Controls special nuclear material, including shipment
Responsible from R&D throughout life to final disposal
Periodic audits by cognizant technical personnel

- Frequent oral & written reports from all Program activities
- HQ
- Outstanding personnel; management technically trained
- Directly oversees adequacy of all technical requirements
- Exercises technical approval over contractors, SYs, & vendors
- Multiple reporting chains ensure problems promptly brought to attention of cognizant personnel
- Oversees all personnel actions related to the Program
- Directs and oversees all logistic support functions
- Controls special nuclear material, including shipment
- Responsible from R&D throughout life to final disposal
- Periodic audits by cognizant technical personnel

***CENTRALIZED TECHNICAL CONTROL***

**KNOWLEDGEABLE****  AND ****DEMANDING CUSTOMER **** **

## On-site field offices do surveillance, auditing
Activity self-assessment capability reviewed
Periodic HQ reviews (DOE labs) and audits (shipyards) by cognizant technical leads
Regular letters to Admiral & top HQ staff on issues
Reporting deviations from normal operation
HQ technical approval for almost every design detail and procedure 

- Activity self-assessment capability reviewed
- Periodic HQ reviews (DOE labs) and audits (shipyards) by cognizant technical leads
- Regular letters to Admiral & top HQ staff on issues
- Reporting deviations from normal operation
- HQ technical approval for almost every design detail and procedure

***CLOSE, FREQUENT TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT***

**ASSURING PERFORMANCE TO HIGH STANDARDS**

## Compliance with technical requirements
Detailed procedures and description
Analyses for casualty conditions
Operation only by highly trained, qualified operators
Rapidly reporting deviations from normal operation via multiple paths
Strong, continuing maintenance

- Detailed procedures and description
- Analyses for casualty conditions
- Operation only by highly trained, qualified operators
- Rapidly reporting deviations from normal operation via multiple paths
- Strong, continuing maintenance

***ASSURE PLANTS OPERATE WITHIN SAFE LIMITS***

**QUESTIONING ATTITUDE**

## Naval nuclear shipyard organization set
Nuclear work groups
Test and refueling organization
Maintenance controlled by NR documents
General process specified in NR manual
Detailed testing prior to unrestricted operations
Multiple oversight:  internal shipyard organization, ship’s crew, NR field office.

- Nuclear work groups
- Test and refueling organization
- Maintenance controlled by NR documents
- General process specified in NR manual
- Detailed testing prior to unrestricted operations
- Multiple oversight:  internal shipyard organization, ship’s crew, NR field office.

***CONTROL OF WORK***

**YOU GET WHAT YOU INSPECT, NOT WHAT YOU EXPECT**

## Cognizant technical organization submittal
NR HQ review
Lead engineer
Internal section agreement
Concurrence of other sections
Copy to ADM
Resolution of any dissent
Additional iterations may be required

- NR HQ review
- Lead engineer
- Internal section agreement
- Concurrence of other sections
- Copy to ADM
- Resolution of any dissent
- Additional iterations may be required

***NR HQ TECHNICAL APPROVAL PROCESS***

- “You must tell me the technically correct answer.  Once we decide that a way forward is technically acceptable, we should ***then*** consider the schedule and cost implications of these solutions.”
*- ADM Bowman*

## Learn from your mistakes.
Even better, learn from other people’s mistakes.

When the unexpected happens, investigate.
Understand the consequences had it happened under less fortuitous circumstances...what if?
Don’t assume it won’t happen again.
Evaluate need for corrective action.
May need preliminary action (e.g., procedure or training change) while waiting for longer term (hardware modification)

- Even better, learn from other people’s mistakes.
- When the unexpected happens, investigate.
- Understand the consequences had it happened under less fortuitous circumstances...*what if?*
- Don’t assume it won’t happen again.
- Evaluate need for corrective action.
- May need preliminary action (e.g., procedure or training change) while waiting for longer term (hardware modification)

***LESSONS LEARNED***

- “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”
**- George Santayana**

## Reactors and nuclear facilities are designed, constructed, maintained, and operated in accordance with applicable requirements and in a manner that protects people, the environment, and property.
Every employee is personally responsible for performing their duties in a manner that preserved the nuclear safety values...
Line organizations have the primary responsibility for reactor and nuclear safety.  This responsibility is not diminished by reviews external to the line organizations.
Reactor and nuclear safety-related activities are formally reviewed by an organization of knowledge experts independent of the line organizations.

- Every employee is personally responsible for performing their duties in a manner that preserved the nuclear safety values...
- Line organizations have the primary responsibility for reactor and nuclear safety.  This responsibility is not diminished by reviews external to the line organizations.
- Reactor and nuclear safety-related activities are formally reviewed by an organization of knowledge experts independent of the line organizations.

***EXAMPLES FROM PRIME CONTRACTOR***

**“**Line organizations have the primary responsibility for reactor and nuclear safety...”

## What are the acceptance criteria (i.e. , what is the basis for accepting this recommendation)?
What is the consequence of failure that this recommendation is designed to prevent?
What are the areas and levels of uncertainty (has there been an uncertainty analysis performed)?
What is the level of conservatism or margin to failure?
What change in the margin to failure will result from accepting the recommendation?
Is there a precedent for the recommendation?
How does this recommendation affect other design areas and/or how does it interact with other historical design changes and safety requirements?
Why should this recommendation be accepted (i.e., what is the benefit)?

- What is the consequence of failure that this recommendation is designed to prevent?
- What are the areas and levels of uncertainty (has there been an uncertainty analysis performed)?
- What is the level of conservatism or margin to failure?
- What change in the margin to failure will result from accepting the recommendation?
- Is there a precedent for the recommendation?
- How does this recommendation affect other design areas and/or how does it interact with other historical* *design changes and safety requirements?
- Why should this recommendation be accepted (i.e., what is the benefit)?

***QUESTIONS THAT SHOULD BE ASKED***

**QUESTIONING ATTITUDE**

## Technical Excellence - technically correct solution identified, technically expert decision makers, minority opinions, appropriate conservatism, simple/robust designs, cautiously challenge status quo
Responsibility - own your job, face facts & tell the truth, mainstream safety, overlapping responsibilities
People - selectivity, continuing training, professional competence, personal responsibility, dedication, long-term perspective, decisive
Formality and Discipline - decisions and their basis are documented, written procedures, procedural compliance, don’t live with deficiencies, don’t normalize deviance, effective communications

**Responsibility** - own your job, face facts & tell the truth, mainstream safety, overlapping responsibilities
**People** - selectivity, continuing training, professional competence, personal responsibility, dedication, long-term perspective, decisive
**Formality and Discipline** - decisions and their basis are documented, written procedures, procedural compliance, don’t live with deficiencies, don’t normalize deviance, effective communications

***ADM Bowman’s Core Values - “The Culture”***

**CONSTRUCTIVE DISSATISFACTION**

## Mainstreamed ... carried out day-to-day as a normal way of doing work by all personnel.  
An enduring deep fundamental core value of the organization, not a short term program or add-on.

- An enduring deep fundamental core value of the organization, not a short term program or add-on.

***COMMITMENT TO SAFETY***

**“**In a submarine environment, with these constraints, there is only one way to ensure safety:  it must be embedded from the start in the equipment, the procedures, and, most importantly, the people associated with the work.”
*- ADM F. Bowman (as quoted in NNBE Progress Report of July 15, 2003; p 16)*