# Presentation: 310685

## OSMA Software Assurance Symposium

**OSMA Software Assurance Symposium**

- (1)

**Space Shuttle Return to Flight**
**(The Safety Guy’s View)**

**Bryan O’Connor**
**Associate Administrator**
**	****Office of Safety and **
**	****Mission Assurance**

***"Mission success stands on the foundation of our unwavering commitment to safety"***
**	****Administrator Sean O'Keefe  January 2003**

**30 July 2003 **

## Knowledge and High Risk Operations

***There are things we know that we know,***
***There are things we know we don’t know,***
***There are things we don’t know we don’t know.***

***Donald Rumsfeld, U. S. SecDef***
*** ******NATO HQ Press Conference, June ‘02***

***At NASA (and any other organization engaged in high risk activities)...***
***There are also things we don’t know we know!***

## The Risk Iceberg

**The Risk Iceberg**

***Known Knowns***

***Known Unknowns***
***    ***

***Unknown Unknowns***

***Unknown Knowns***

## The Four Levels of the Risk Iceberg

**Known Knowns**
**Flight Data and demonstrated performance**
**Flight or test-validated analysis, simulations and models**
**Operation within certification limits**
**Known Unknowns**
**Generic but undemonstrated failure modes and hazards**
**Risk analysis uncertainties**
**Acknowledged test and analysis limitations**
**Unverified modeling and simulation based predictions**
**Envelope expansion and operations within certification but out of family**
**Unknown Unknowns**
**Bad assumptions**
**Unfinished experimental research**
**Operation outside of certification limits (temperature, Q, tire speed, etc.)**
**Unknown Knowns**
**Miscommunicated test or analysis results**
**Uneven understanding of data or environment across the team**
**Poor documentation combined with loss of corporate memory**

## The Strategy for Safe Return to Flight

**Known Knowns: (Systems Engineering and Program Management)**
**High quality program and mission management processes and people**
**“****Listen to the hardware”**
**Known ****Un****knowns: (Risk Management)**
**Reduce uncertainties with analysis, test and attention to flight results**
**Recertify to the real environment (has it changed over the years?)**
**Treat residual risk (including uncertainty) with conservative ground and flight procedures, operating margins, contingency plans **
**Un****known Unknowns: (Continuous Research, Test and Evaluation)**
**Do what we can to better understand the limitations of the system in the real environment**
**Constantly challenge old assumptions, models and analyses**
**Un****known Knowns: (Continuous Process Improvement)**
**Continuously assess and improve program communications, documentation, workforce competence**
**Improve data analysis tools and techniques (e.g. trending)**

## Return to Flight: Near Term Activities

**Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations to date**
**Develop and implement comprehensive inspection plan for RCC**
**Modify NIMA memorandum of understanding**
**Develop in-flight TPS inspection and repair**
**Upgrade NASA imaging of shuttle launch and ascent**
**Other Activities focused on Return to Flight**
**External tank upgrades (foam shedding)**
**Improve FOD control at KSC**
**Improve on-vehicle video/digital film downlink capability**
**Assess KSC and MAF quality systems (including GMIPS)**
**Address public risk policy for shuttle over-flight**
**Improve mission management and Certification of Flight Readiness**
**Review shuttle requirements (waivers, deviations, exceptions)**
**Validate / improve safety and mission assurance structure (in-line and independent)...”no there there” ?**
**Improve problem tracking and anomaly resolution**

## Safety and Independence

## Typical Safety Program Interfaces (Example: Headquarters Directed Program)

**NASA **
**Administrator**

**OSMA AA**
**Code Q**

**Enterprise**
**AA**

**Center Director**

**Center SMA**

**Program**

**Functional Support**

**Independent**
**Communications Path**
**(re: Program)**

**Organizational Reporting**

***SMA support***

***Insight***
***Matrix  support***

***Policy***

**NESC**

## Typical Safety Project Interfaces(Example: Center Managed Projects)

**NASA **
**Administrator**

**OSMA AA**
**Code Q**

**Enterprise**
**AA**

**Center Director**

**Center SMA**

**Projects**

**Functional Support**

**Independent**
**Communications Path**
**(re: Program)**

**Organizational Reporting**

***SMA support***

***Policy***

**NESC**

**Projects**

**Projects**

**Projects**

## NASA Safety and Engineering Center

**Training and Development**

**Safety & Mission Assurance**

**Chief Engineer Office**

**Program Enterprises**

**LaRC**

**NESC**

**NASA Centers**

**Industry**

**Nat’l Facilities**

**Academia**

**Supplement to agency system safety and engineering activities**
**Independent engineering assessments and testing**
**Independent safety and mission assurance analysis, surveillance, audit**

**$**

**Training Tasks**

**Engineering/safety tasks**

## The Planned Result: Ex Scientia Salus                    (From Knowledge: Safety)

**The Planned Result: Ex Scientia Salus ****                   ****(From Knowledge: Safety)**

- CPI

- CRM

- R/T&E