# Presentation: 225924

## Crisis Characteristics

**Threats to major values.**
**Time urgency.**
**Ambiguity or uncertainty.**
**Surprise or uniqueness.**

**Source: Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in *****Avoiding Inadvertent War,***** edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page 472.**

## CRISIS SITUATIONS AND 

**INFORMATION MANAGEMENT**

**Crisis situations are novel, unstructured and outside of an organization’s or individual’s typical operating framework**
**Crises require nonprogrammed decision responses**
**Crises are highly uncertain and complex situations**
**Crises are characterized by an overload of incomplete, conflicting information**
**The process of perceiving, selecting, and processing this information is critical to effective crisis management**

**Source:  Reilly, A.H. 1993. “Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis Management.” *****Industrial and Environmental Quarterly.***** Vol. 7, No. 2. Page 118.**

**CRISIS**
**    ****ATTRIBUTES**

**PROBLEM**
**SENSING**

**PROBLEM/THREAT  **
**DIAGNOSIS**

**DECISION**
**RESPONSE**
**EXTERNAL**
**INFORMATION**
**FLOW**

**RESOURCE**
**MOBILIZATION**
**RESPONSE ACTIONS**

**INTERNAL**
**INFORMATION**
**FLOW**

**CRISIS**
**OUTCOMES**

**DECISIONS**
**AND ACTIONS**

**EVENT**
**PERCEPTION**

***CRISIS MANAGEMENT***

- Environment

**THE ROLE OF INFORMATION**
**IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT**
*(Source: *Reilly, A.H. 1993. “Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis Management.” *Industrial and Environmental Quarterly.* Vol. 7, No. 2.)

**Overhead 19-**

## The Three Rights of Information to Support Crisis Decision Making

- Get the **right **information
- to the **right** people
- at the **right** time.

## Layered Functions

**5.  Organizational Memory  **
**6.  Group Processes**
**4.  Values**
**3.  Filtering**
**2.  Data Validation**
**1.  Connectivity**

**Source: Hale, Joanne. 1997. “A Layered Communication Architecture for the Support of Crisis Response.” *****Journal of Management Information Systems.***** Vol. 14, No. 1. **

## Tasks of the Crisis Decision Maker

**Define the main elements of the situation**
**Maintain receptivity to new information**
**Identify and adequately consider the major values, interests, and objectives to be fulfilled**
**Search for and evaluate alternative courses of action**
**Estimate probable costs and risks of alternatives**
**Search for new information relevant to assessment of options**
**Discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information**
**Consider problems that arise in implementing options**
**Assess the situation from the perspective of other parties**
**Resist both defensive procrastination and premature closure**
**Monitor feedback from the developing situation**
**Make adjustments to meet real changes in the environment**

## Characteristics of Defective Decision Making in Crisis

**A truncated time span, with major attention being devoted to the immediate and diminished attention to long-range consequences of the action;**
**A perceived requirement for decisional closure, which may in turn lead to premature action or, conversely;**
**In searching for certainty, a tendency to irrational procrastination;**
**Cognitive rigidity, a tendency to maintain a fixed mind-set and not be open to new information;**
**A tendency to reduce cognitive complexity and uncertainty;**
**A reduction of the range of options considered;**
**In considering options, a tendency to “bolster,” - that is to upgrade factors in favor of the favored action prescription and downgrade factors militating against;**

**Source : Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in *****Avoiding Inadvertent War,***** edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pages 475.**

## Characteristics of Defective Decision Making in Crisis (Cont’d)

**A tendency to view the present in terms of the past;**
**A tendency to seek familiar patterns, to relate the critical events to mental schemata or scripts;**
**Diminished creativity;**
**A tendency toward the fundamental attribution bias – to see the other’s actions as being precipitated by internal (psychological) causes rather than external circumstances (example: my adversary’s actions show he is malevolently out to destroy us, rather than that he is protecting himself from external threats); and**
**A corresponding tendency to fall into the actor-observer discrepancy – that is, to see the external situation as the cause of one’s own behavior without attending to one’s own internal psychological motivations.**

## The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Decision Makers

- Stimulus situation

- Perception of threat to values

- Anxiety or fear

- Coping Pattern

- Impact on information processing

- Choice of decision or policy

***Effects of stress on leadership decision-making***
**Source*****:****** *****Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in *****Avoiding Inadvertent War,***** edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page 475.**

*Stress*

## PERFORMANCE/STRESS CURVE

**Source*****:****** *****Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers.” in *****Avoiding Inadvertent War,***** edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page 474.**

- STRESS

**PERFORMANCE/STRESS CURVE**

**PERFORMANCE**

## The Compulsive Personality Under Crisis Induced Stress

**Folie du doute - paralyzed by indecision.**
**Tendency to irrational procrastination because of search for certainty; fear of making a mistake.**
**Once decisional closure, difficult to reopen.**
**Comfortable with applying set policies and procedures to solve problems.**
**Sensitive to position in hierarchy.**
**Overly responsive to superiors, competes with peers and dominates subordinates.**

**Source*****:****** *****Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in *****Avoiding Inadvertent War,***** edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pages 477-479.**

## The Narcissistic Personality Under Crisis Induced Stress

-  **Self centered, egocentric, and self-absorbed.**
** ****Seek constant reassurance of self-worth.**
** ****Primary loyalty to self; acts to promote own position.**
** ****Can shift positions easily.**
**Believe that they are principled and scrupulous individuals.**
**Seek advisors who prop up their self-esteem.**

**Source*****:****** *****Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in *****Avoiding Inadvertent War,***** edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pages 479-481.**

## The Paranoid Personality Under Crisis Induced Stress

**Surrounded by enemies - extreme suspiciousness.**
**Difficulty trusting own subordinates.**
**Fixed conclusion in search of evidence.**
**Do not accept information and advice that runs contrary to own conclusions.**

**Source*****:****** *****Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in *****Avoiding Inadvertent War,***** edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pages 481-483.**

## Unconflicted adherence
Unconflicted change
Defensive avoidance
Hypervigilance

Vigilance

- Unconflicted change
- Defensive avoidance
- Hypervigilance
- Vigilance

**Five Basic Patterns of Decision Making**

**Source: Fink, Steven. 1986. *****Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable.***** New York: Amacom. Pages 133–150.**

## Decision Making Patterns

**Vigilance – ****follows a methodical, high-quality process to objectively collect available information, thoroughly consider it, search for other possible options, and make a well reasoned decision.**
**Unconflicted adherence – continuing with the current situation.**
**Unconflicted change – following the last advice received.**
**Defensive avoidance – avoiding decision making.**
**Hypervigilant – vacillating approach.**

**Source: Fink, Steven. 1986. *****Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable.***** New York: Amacom. Pages 133–150.**

## A Definition of “Groupthink”

-     **“****a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group...members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternate courses of action... a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group pressures.”**

**Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” *****Human Relations.***** Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from *****Victims of Groupthink*****, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 9 in *****Groupthink.***

## Antecedent Conditions for “Groupthink”

**Primary: Moderately or highly cohesive group.**
**Structural or administrative faults in the organization in which the group exists including:**
**Insulation of the group.**
**The group leader’s preference for a certain decision.**
**A lack of norms requiring methodical procedures for the group.**
**Homogeneity of the group members’ social background and ideology.**
**High stress from external threats with low hope of a better solution than the leader’s.**
**Low group self-esteem induced by the group’s perception of recent failures, excessive difficulty on current decision-making tasks, and moral dilemmas (i.e., apparent lack of feasible alternatives except ones that violate ethical standards).**

**Source:**** ****Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” *****Human Relations.***** Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from *****Victims of Groupthink*****, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 2 and 3.**

## Symptoms of “Groupthink”

**Direct social pressure placed on a member who argues against the group’s shared beliefs.**
**Members’ self-censorship of their own thoughts or concerns that deviate from the group consensus.**
**An illusion of the group’s invulnerability to failure.**
**A shared illusion of unanimity.**
**The emergence of self-appointed mind guards that screen out information from outside the group.**
**Collective efforts to rationalize.**
**Stereotyped views of potential adversaries outside the group.**
**Unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality.**

**Source:**** ****Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” *****Human Relations.***** Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from *****Victims of Groupthink*****, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.**

## Symptoms of Defective Decision-Making

**Incomplete survey of alternatives.**
**Incomplete survey of objectives.**
**Failure to examine risks of preferred choices.**
**Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives.**
**Poor information search.**
**Selective bias in processing information at hand.**
**Failure to work out contingency plans.**

**Source:**** ****Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” *****Human Relations.***** Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from *****Victims of Groupthink*****, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.**

## Antecedent Conditions of “Teamthink”

**Team beliefs and assumptions emphasizing the positive.**
**Team self-talk - encouraging open discussion.**
**Team mental imagery - creating a common vision.**
**Thought patterns - optimism.**

**Source:**** ****Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” *****Human Relations.***** Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from *****Victims of Groupthink*****, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 5–7.**

## Symptoms of “Teamthink”

**Encouragement of divergent views.**
**Open expression of concerns and ideas.**
**Awareness of limitations and threats.**
**Recognition of members’ uniqueness.**
**Discussion of collective doubts. **

**Source:**** ****Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” *****Human Relations.***** Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from *****Victims of Groupthink*****, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 7.**