# Presentation: 804900

## Nonproliferation &  Export Control 

**Update Briefing  **
**Steven Clagett**
**Director**
**Missile and Nuclear Technology **
**Control Divisions**

## Trends in Export Control and 

**	****Nonproliferation Policy after 9/11   **

- The Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes remain focused on the fundamental goal of preventing the spread of technologies that may contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG) recognize the increased need for effective multilateral export controls.
- Regime members continue to update and modify the lists of controlled commodities and implement “catch all” controls.

## U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls     

- Proposals to modify the Multilateral Export Control Regime Guidelines & Annexes (Control Lists)
- NSG proposal to notify Partners of approvals for controlled nuclear items to non-partners
- Support for multilateral initiatives, such as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
- Ensure effective implementation of “catch all controls” for all commodities to end users (countries, companies, or individuals) of concern
- Provide multilateral notifications of U.S. denials to utilize the “no undercut” policies

## U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls     

- Sanctions
- Consultations with foreign governments and commercial entities
- Outreach efforts with U.S. industry to stress the importance of export control compliance
- Strong enforcement of the law against violators
- International outreach programs to assist other nations implement a effective export controls

## MTCR Update

- Plenary: September 2002 Warsaw, Poland
- Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) to discuss changes to Annex controls
- Update on the new International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Missile proliferation
- Focus on regional nonproliferation issues.
- MTCR Plenary has added an Enforcement Experts component.

## NSG Update

- Enforcement experts meeting held in conjunction with the Plenary.
- Member States continued discussions on sharing NSG license approval data and proposed notification requirements.
- Regional nonproliferation issues.

**NSG Update**

## Missile Technology 

**Applications Processed ****(2001)**

- Received:  	 949
- Value:  	$154.3 million

- Received:  	 1036
- Value:  	$2.2 billion

**Nuclear Technology **
**Applications Processed ****(2001)**

## Distribution of Missile Technology 	Licenses by Country (2001)

**Distribution of Missile Technology ****	****Licenses by Country ****(2001)**

## Distribution of Nuclear Technology 	Licenses by Country (2001)

**Distribution of Nuclear Technology ****	****Licenses by Country ****(2001)**

## EPCI “Catch All” Controls

- The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) is designed to:
- Strengthen multilateral non-proliferation efforts;
- Prevent the export of technology that could contribute to missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear-weapons proliferation; and
- Minimize the impact on legitimate commerce.
- EPCI places export controls on end use and end users rather than a particular item.

## EPCI

- License may be denied if destined for missile, nuclear, or CBW activities or facilities.
- License must be obtained if the exporter **knows** the commodities will be used in CBW or missile activities or facilities.

- BIS may **inform** exporters at anytime that a license is required for a specific end-user if there is a possibility of nuclear, CBW, or missile activities.
- Any U.S. participation in nuclear, CBW, or missile activities or facilities requires a license.

## Evaluation Factors

- Country
- Commodity
- End-Use
- Significance for Missile/Nuclear Development
- Non-Proliferation Credentials
- Assurances and Guarantees
- Risk of diversion
- Sanctions

## Missile Technology Projects and 	Countries of Concern

**Programs in Countries:**
- China  --  M-series, CSS-2
- India   --  Prithvi, Agni, SLV-3, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite LV (PSLV), Geostationary Satellite LV (GSLV)
- Iran  --  Surface-to-surface, Scud
- No. Korea -- No Dong, Scud
- Pakistan  --  Hatf-series missiles
**Other Countries: (Mostly Middle East)**
- Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen

**Missile Technology Projects and ****	****Countries of Concern**

## Entities List

- The Entities List notifies exporters of a requirement for exports/reexports to specified end users.
- See Supplement Number 4 to part 744 of the EAR.

## India/Pakistan Sanctions

- On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted missile sanctions placed on India and Pakistan.
- On October 1, BIS reinstated a case-by-case license review policy for exports of MT and NP commodities to India and Pakistan and removed a significant number of entities from the Entity List.
- Entities affiliated with Indian and Pakistani missile development and their nuclear programs remain listed entities.
- The United States does not support Indian unsafeguarded nuclear power industry or the satellite launch vehicle development programs.

## PRC Issues

- Ongoing missile and nuclear proliferation concerns with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
- All commodities controlled for missile proliferation concerns - except inertial navigation systems for commercial aircraft - require presidential certification prior to export.
- The U.S. continues to conduct missile talks with the PRC in an effort to decrease Chinese proliferation activities.
- Success of these talks could affect U.S. export licensing in the future.

## Questions?

**Steve Clagett**
**Director, Missile and Nuclear Technology Divisions**
**202-482-4188**
**SClagett@bis.doc.gov**
**www.bis.doc.gov**