# Presentation: 679409

## Mind the Gap: Updating FIPS 140

- Steve Weingart
- Futurex
- 864 Old Boerne Rd.
- Bulverde, TX 78163
- _[weingart@futurex.com](mailto:weingart@futurex.com)_
- Steve R. White
- IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
- P.O. Box 704
- Yorktown Heights, NY  10598
- srwhite@watson.ibm.com

## Outline

- History
-  FED Standard 1027
-  FIPS 140 – 1
-  Levels
-  Changes in Technology
-  Changes in Standards and the Environment
- Proposal: Level 3.5
- Discussion/Questions

## History

- Federal Standard 1027 was primarily a hardware standard for line encryption devices using single DES
- NIST developed FIPS 140 as a replacement
- It is more generalized.
- It accepts both hardware and software implementations
- It has the 11 criteria that cover the complete design
- During the development of FIPS 140 a level based system was proposed and accepted
- FIPS 140-1 was made official in 1994
- It became widely accepted
- FIPS 140-2, the first update, was made official in 2001

**Notes:**
Brett Smith, President and CEO
25+ years experience in the financial services industry
Accountant by education - began his career at KPGM (formerly Peat, Marwick & Mitchell)
Moved into banking, first as correspondent banker, then as V.P. of a U.S. corporate division. 
At age of 28 became one of youngest bank CEO/owners in state of Texas and over next several years turned around several undervalued banks.
Since 1992, investments and acquisitions centered in technology providers to financial services and electronic payment industry.
In 2001, acquired Futurex > investment strategy > assembled a team of experts to introduce new line of "best-in-class" products in encryption. 
High energy and leadership turned 20 year old company into energetic, fast-pasted, result oriented, solution provider.

From 2001 to 2003, Brett brought in the needed players to develop the best crypto engine in the industry.   They achieved this goal by comparing our products against all those in the market, and then they designed a product with more speed, security and functions while still having the lowest price.

Steve Weingart, CTO and Sr. Engineer
25+ years experience in hardware design and computer security 
Over 20 years at IBM > many at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center > worked on tamper resistant and tamper responding security packaging, cryptographic and secure processor hardware design, and cryptographic protocols
Invited member of NIST panel > wrote FIPS 140 standard
Authored/co-authored nine published academic papers 
Invited speaker on security subjects at many professional venues including Cambridge University, and nCipher and FISERV sponsored conferences.

Jason Anderson, Excrypt Product Development Manager
10+ yrs experience - financial payment industry > from transaction origination at ATM/POS devices to acceptance at the issuing financial institution
 5+ yrs experience > financial transaction security industry
 Member of ANSI X9F workgroups - financial transaction security
 Recognized as industry expert in financial transaction security:
 Encryption security - HSMs for card management, key management, and payment processing
 Financial transaction processing
 InterfnCipherng protocols to ATM and POS devices
 Major network/host interfaces
 Intercept and network processing development and design
 Development > Fed-Line Federal Reserve transfers system 

## Things have changed
Both attack and defense technologies have improved
Industry needs & requirements have changed
The standard, and its applicability, evolves

- Both attack and defense technologies have improved
- Industry needs & requirements have changed
- The standard, and its applicability, evolves

- History (cont)

**Notes:**
Best in Class designs and result oriented engineering developed a complete range of cryptographic security solutions that resulted in a new standard of excellence in the marketplace

## Original proposed six level system

| Level | Name | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | None | The attack can succeed “by accident” without the attacker necessarily being aware that a defense was intended to exist. No tools or skills are needed. |
| 2 | Intent | The attacker must have a clear intent in order to succeed. Universally available tools (e.g. screwdriver, nail file) and minimal skills may be used. |
| 3 | Common Tools | Commonly-available tools and skills may be used (e.g. those tools available from retail department or computer stores). |
| 4 | Unusual Tools | Uncommon tools and skills may be used, but they must be available to a substantial population (e.g. lock pick, logic analyzer; hardware and software debugging skills, electronic design and construction skills). Typical engineers will have access to these tools and skills. |
| 5 | Special Tools | Highly specialized tools and expertise may be used, as might be found in the laboratories of universities, private companies, or governmental facilities. The attack requires a significant expenditure of time and effort. |
| 6 | In Laboratory | A successful attack would require a major expenditure of time and effort on the part of a number of highly qualified experts, and the resources available only in a few facilities in the world. |

## FIPS 140, 4 level system

| Level | Physical Security | Design Assurance |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Production grade equipment. | Configuration management (CM). Secure installation and generation. Design and policy correspondence. Guidance documents. |
| 2 | Locks or tamper evidence. | CM system. Secure distribution. Functional specification. |
| 3 | Tamper detection and response for covers and doors, epoxy potting | High-level language implementation. |
| 4 | Tamper detection response envelope. EFP or EFT. | Formal model. Detailed explanations (informal proofs). Preconditions and postconditions. |

## Changes

- Attack Technologies have developed
- The Internet has become a forum for development
- Script Kiddies can obtain and try many software attacks beyond their skill level
- Expensive tools that were difficult to obtain are now available
- SEM
- FIB
- NC Machining
- Defense technologies have held up, mostly
- Not a great deal of new development
- That is mostly OK, since the higher levels have held

## Changes (cont)

- The customer population has become larger and more sophisticated
- Banking and Financial
- USPS
- In General FIPS 140 has become accepted ‘Due Diligence’ for commercial cryptographic devices
- This has spotlighted some need for change in the standard

## The Gap

- FIPS 140 has 4 levels
- These 4 levels correspond roughly to levels 1, 2, 3 & 6 from the originally proposed system
- So, there is a large gap between level 3 and level 4
- A typical level 3 device can cracked in a few hours by anyone with reasonable skills
- No level 4 device has been cracked publicly
- But, the level 4 requirements are so difficult that there are almost no level 4 devices

## The Gap

## There are 179 level 1 validations, 247 level 2 validations, 120 level 3 validations & 11 level 4 validations (557 total)
Of the level 4 devices, about half are unique, the rest are delta/re-validations.
Level 4 is too difficult develop, and too expensive to manufacture for most vendors
But industry requirements need more than level 3  
USPS and ANSI both require tamper detection, UPSP requires EFT/EFP
We need something new

- There are 179 level 1 validations, 247 level 2 validations, 120 level 3 validations & 11 level 4 validations (557 total)
- Of the level 4 devices, about half are unique, the rest are delta/re-validations.
- Level 4 is too difficult develop, and too expensive to manufacture for most vendors
- But industry requirements need more than level 3
- USPS and ANSI both require tamper detection, UPSP requires EFT/EFP
- We need something new

## The Proposal

- Level 3.5
- Essentially level 3 plus:
- Tamper detection required
- 1 – 1.25 mm max undetected hole
- Same as level 4 for single chip
- EFT/EFP
- Informal modeling

## The Advantages

- Avoid the most difficult requirements of level 4:
-  Formal modeling
- Any/All tamper detection envelope
- This level of security is reasonable to develop and manufacture

## Questions?

## Thank You!

- Steve Weingart
- w_[eingart@futurex.com](mailto:Weingart@futurex.com)_

- Steve R. White
- srwhite@watson.ibm.com