# Presentation: 744825

## Georgia Voting System

- Security Features

## Brit Williams

- Bwilliam@kennesaw.edu
- 770-630-9433

- KSU Center for Election Systems

- Http://elections.kennesaw.edu
- elections@kennesaw.edu
- 1-866-KSU-VOTE
- 1-866-578-8683

## Principal Organizations

- Diebold Elections Systems Division
- NASED Independent Test Agencies (ITAs)
- KSU Center for Election Systems
- Local Election Jurisdictions

## Diebold Election Systems

- Prepares the Election System
- Mates the Election System with the Operating System
- Submits the combined Election System/Operating System (SYSTEM) to the ITA
- After ITA and State approval, installs the SYSTEM in the local jurisdictions
- Maintains the SYSTEM hardware

## NASED ITAs

- Reviews the SYSTEM for compliance with the FEC Voting System Standards
- Monitors the ‘Final Build’ of the SYSTEM object code
- Submits the Final Build, which includes the SYSTEM source code and object code, to the KSU Center for Election Systems

## KSU Center for Election Systems

- Reviews the SYSTEM for compliance with State of Georgia Election Code and Rules.
- Tests the SYSTEM for the presence of any unauthorized/fraudulant code.
- Develops a validation program to use to test the SYSTEM as installed in the Local Jurisdictions.
- Verifies that the SYSTEM installed by Diebold in the Local Jurisdiction is identical to the system received from the ITA and certified by the KSU Center.

## Local Election Jurisdictions

- Maintain and protect the SYSTEM
- Use the SYSTEM to program and conduct elections.

## Security Functions

- There are three distinct functions that must be performed to protect the integrity of the Voting System:

- Verify that the SYSTEM as delivered from the ITA is free of extraneous or fraudulent code.
- Verify that the SYSTEM as installed by Diebold in the Local Jurisdictions is *identical *to the SYSTEM received from the ITA and certified by the KSU Center.
- Verify at specified and random times that the SYSTEM has not been modified in any way.

## Security Function 1

- Verify that the SYSTEM as delivered from the ITA is free from extraneous or fraudulent code.

- Set up and conduct sample elections with known outcomes that are representative of Georgia general and primary elections.
- Conduct high-volume tests to determine capacity limits of the SYSTEM.
- Conduct tests to determine the SYSTEM’s ability to recover from various types of errors.

## Security Function 2

- Verify that the SYSTEM as installed in the Local Jurisdictions is *identical* to the SYSTEM received from the ITA and certified by the KSU Center.

- Prepare a verification program that will detect any changes to the SYSTEM installed in the Local Jurisdictions.
- Run the validation program against the SYSTEM installed in the Local Jurisdiction (after Diebold installation).
- Provide the Local Jurisdiction with a copy of the validation program.

## Security Function 3

- Verify at specific and random times that the SYSTEM has not been modified in any way.

- Run the verification program immediately before beginning to define an election.
- Run the verification program immediately upon the completion of an election.
- Run the verification program after any suspicious event.
- Run the verification program at random times as desired.

## Overview of Security Relationships

- Diebold Election
- Systems

- NASED Independent
- Test Agencies

- Local Election
- Jurisdictions

- KSU Election
- Center

- Function 1

- Function 2

- Function 3

- Trusted Organizations

- (Micro Soft)

## Validation Program (Hash)

- Based on NIST certified SHA-1 contained in FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
- Run ‘hash’ on the SYSTEM certified by the KSU Election Center.  This creates File 1.
- Run ‘hash-comp’ to compare File 1 with a new ‘hash’ on the SYSTEM in the Local Election Office.
- They should be identical.  Any differences are logged.

- The chance that a modification will not be detected is  less than 1 in 1,000,000,000.

## Hash Program

- Based on FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash Statement.
- Computes:
- 		32 bit CRC,
- 		128 bit MD5 Hash,
- 		160 bit SHA-1 Hash.
- _[www.dmares.com/mareswares/gk.htm](http://www.dmares.com/mareswares/gk.htm)_
- 			(See HASH and HASHCOMP)

## Procedural Security Features

- Procedures that control:
- 	who can access the system,
- 	when they can access the system,
- 	what components they can access,
- 	what functions they can perform.

## Physical Security Features

- Locked offices and warehouses
- No network connections
- No concealed voting booths
- Public posting of precinct results
- Open view of precincts and election offices on election day

## Specific Threats

- Trojan horse
- Counterfeit voter cards
- Altering GEMS or AVTS code
- Altering memory cards

## Future Considerations

- Download AVTS firmware during precinct setup.
- Implement SAIC high threat features:
- 		Dynamic passwords on voter card 	and Poll Manager’s card,
- 		Randomize records on one file,
- 		Encrypt modem transmission.

## Brit Williams

- Bwilliam@kennesaw.edu
- 770-630-9433

- KSU Center for Election Systems

- Http://elections.kennesaw.edu
- elections@kennesaw.edu
- 1-866-KSU-VOTE
- 1-866-578-8683