# Presentation: 508929

## TRB 2005 Annual Meeting
Eisenhower Transportation Fellowship Showcase
January 11, 2003
Camille N.Y. Fink
UCLA Department of Urban Planning

- Eisenhower Transportation Fellowship Showcase
- January 11, 2003
**Camille N.Y. Fink**
**UCLA Department of Urban Planning**

**Anti-Terrorism Security and Transit: Some Findings from a Survey of Domestic Transit Operators**

**Notes:**
NO NOTES

## Presentation Objectives

- Overview of transit security trends and tactics
- Review of recent survey findings of domestic transit operators
- Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies

**Notes:**
NO NOTES

## What is Terrorism?

- Terrorism
- “The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group(s) of two or more individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI)
- Definition identifies motivation, perpetrators, and means
-  Quasi-terrorism
- Those acts incidental to the commission of crimes of violence that are similar in form and method to terrorism, but lack an organized social, political, religious, or economic dimension

**Notes:**
Terrorism definition used by the FBI
Quasi-terrorism used as broadened definition
Although terrorist acts are clearly outlined as those involving specific perpetrators, targets, and motives, the definition of quasi-terrorism is more vague and ambiguous.  The notion of quasi-terrorism may perhaps reflect the somewhat uncertain boundary and relationship between terrorism and more general crime and safety issues.

## Targets of Attacks on Public Transportation Systems1920 - 2000

- Buses = 40%
- Subways, trains, and rail = 34%
- Stations and terminals = 19%

**Notes:**
Analyses of trends of all terrorist attacks in recent years indicate that while the number of acts of terrorism has decreased, their lethality has increased.  In addition, the number of attacks against transportation systems increased in the 1990s. In 1991, transportation systems were the target of 20 percent of all violent attacks.  This rose to almost 40 percent in 1998.
Jenkins finds that from 1920 to 2000 about two-thirds of attacks were intended to kill with 37 percent involving fatalities.  Of these incidents, about three-fourths involved more than one fatality and 23 percent involved ten or more fatalities.
Results show that over half of attacks happen on subways, trains, rail, and stations and terminals (53%).

## Tactics Used Against Surface Transportation Systems1920 - 2000

**Notes:**
Use of bombs was overwhelmingly the most common tactic (60 percent of all attacks).
Chemical, biological, and radiological attacks made up a very small percentage of all tactics used (about 1 percent), but have been of particular concern to transit operators.

## Vulnerability of Surface Transportation Systems

- Very public, convenient, and accessible
- Carry large numbers of people through extensive networks
- Impossible to use security tactics employed in commercial aviation (screening of passengers, profiling, explosives sniffers, etc.)
- 	As a result, more focus on mitigation, quick response, and rapid restoration of services

**Notes:**
Carry large numbers of people daily through extensive networks of stations, stops, and facilities.
Volume of passengers and, in particular, the very high number of system access points, make it impossible for transit operators to employ many of the security tactics used in commercial aviation.  Preventive security measures such as the screening of passengers and luggage with X-ray machines and metal detectors, hand searches, passenger profiling, explosives sniffers, and armed guards would lead to intolerable public transit delays and costs.
As a result, surface transportation security tends to focus more on mitigation, quick response, and the rapid restoration of services after an incident.

## Survey of Domestic Transit Operators

- Team from UCLA, UC Berkeley, and San Jose State University recently completed international comparative study of transit security
- Interviews with transit officials in London, Paris, Tokyo, and Madrid
- Survey of domestic transit operators
- Two previous surveys of operators in the US
- Boyd and Sullivan (1997), 42 respondents
- General Accounting Office (2002), 155 responded
- Both surveys provide useful information about bureaucratic, policing, and emergency response issues
- Current study (1) looks at perceptions and experiences three years after September 11th, 2001 attacks and (2) looks at four distinct areas of transit security planning
- Policing
- Security hardware and technology
- Public education/user outreach
- Environmental design strategies

**Notes:**
NO NOTES

## Survey Sample Description

- 113 transit agencies responded (44% of agencies contacted)
- 108 cities in 40 different states
- 80% operate more than one transit mode
- 52% operate bus and paratransit only
- 24% operate rail service
- 88% of non-rail respondents operate service out of at least one enclosed bus terminal or multi-modal transfer facility

**Notes:**
Enclosed bus terminals and multi-modal facilities have a lot in common with subway systems, so high percentage of non-rail respondents operating rail systems have similar security concerns.

## Most Recent Incidents Experienced By Systems

**Notes:**
Respondents with rail systems or who operate out of an enclosed bus terminal or multi-modal facilities were asked about the most recent incident occurring on their system.  N=68.
Arson/incendiary devices most common type of incident recorded.
“Other” category included reports by two systems where suspicious packages were identified but turned out to be false alarms, a bomb threat, two knife attacks, a shooting with no victims, theft of a radio system, hazardous materials contamination on a bus, and a case of rail track tampering.
Sixteen agencies indicated they had received one or more credible threats – e.g., bomb, chemical, biological, fire attacks – in the last year.
14 of 16 agencies had received from one to four threats.
Two very large operators reported large numbers of threats – one cited 31 credible threats and the other 12.

## Vulnerability of System Modes to Attack

**Notes:**
Respondents asked about perceptions of vulnerabilities.
Rail modes perceived to be most vulnerable.
For all modes except paratransit, over 80% of respondents perceive mode to be very vulnerable or somewhat vulnerable.

## Importance of Strategies in Security Planning

**Notes:**
Percentage of respondents who believe that all four strategies are central to security planning more than doubled after September 11th.
Both before and after 9-11, however, policing was considered the most central strategy, followed by security hardware and technology.  Neither public education and user outreach nor environmental design strategies were given much importance before 9-11.
After 9-11, respondents from over half the agencies said that these factors had become significant and even central parts of security planning.
Respondents reported greater awareness of and attention to CPTED strategies after 9-11.  But, fewer agencies reported actually implementing CPTED strategies post 9-11.

## Anti-Terrorism Versus Anti-Crime Strategies

**Notes:**
Most respondents reported viewing the strategies as either hand-in-hand (46%) or partly overlapping (41%).
Only a few respondents reported that anti-crime and anti-terrorism strategies are largely separate from one another.

## CPTED Strategies and Transit Security

- More than two-thirds (69%) of respondents familiar with crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)
- 58% of respondents’ systems employ CPTED strategies
- Familiarity and use of CPTED higher among system with rail

**Notes:**
NO NOTES

## CPTED Strategies

**Notes:**
Comparing rail and non-rail familiarity with CPTED.
Familiarity and employment of CPTED higher at agencies with rail – not surprising because rail transit systems tend to have many enclosed stations and miles of exclusive rights-of-way.
88% of agencies with rail are familiar with CPTED; 88% use extensively or moderately.
63% of non-rail agencies familiar with CPTED; 49% use extensively or moderately.

## CPTED Definitions

- Definitions were reasonably consistent across respondents
- Some more broad
- “The proper design and effective use of the built environment that leads to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in a community’s quality of life” (Manager of Special Projects, systems with bus and paratransit only)
- Others more specific and include particular design ideas
- “CPTED is a proactive strategy that builds security into the design with a focus on prevention through solid security design (e.g., adequate lighting, ease of patrol, perimeter protection and access control, minimizing landscaping and hiding places, etc.” (Manager of Public Safety, regional system with light rail and bus)

**Notes:**
NO NOTES

## Components Where CPTED Strategies Are Used

**Notes:**
CPTED strategies are most likely to apply them to entrances and exits (82%), parking lots (75%), and gates (61%).
By contrast, CPTED strategies are least likely to be applied to elevators, escalators, and vending machines.
Comments listed under the “Other” category included landscaping and physical barriers around facilities.
When asked to rank CPTED strategies that provide the most “bang for the buck,” improved lighting and the addition of security cameras and/or closed circuit TV were the most commonly mentioned.
Other strategies mentioned by multiple respondents were access control, open facility design with clear lines of sign, and landscaping.

## Components of Rail Systems Where CPTED Strategies Are Used

**Notes:**
When asked specially about the application of CPTED concepts to rail systems, about half of the agencies with rail use CPTED in the design of maintenance facilities and station tunnels
Other components listed (control centers, traction power stations and distribution, and tracks) mentioned by between 20 and 40 percent of rail agency respondents
Just 23 agencies reported having CPTED guidelines in place (10 with rail and 13 without).
Most (61%) of these guidelines were developed by an in-house team (14 of the 23 agencies with guidelines), 5 agencies reported contracting with consultants to prepare their CPTED guidelines, two agencies used the sheriff’s or police department, one adopted FTA guidelines, and one developed guidelines through CPTED training at local technical college.
The lead department for developing guidelines was most often associated with safety and security or operations.

## Conclusions

- Significant attacks are rare and reported threats are asymmetric (only 16 of 68 respondents with rail and/or enclosed bus/ferry terminals reported credible threats)
- Attention to transit security increased significantly after 9-11; CPTED and information and outreach given much more attention after 9-11
- Survey findings reflect fundamental dilemmas of transit security planning – systems inherently open and vulnerable, but security has increased dramatically in the past decade

## Credits

- Survey written by Camille Fink (UCLA)
- Survey compilation by Robin Liggett (UCLA)
- Analysis and write-up by Robin Liggett and Brian Taylor (UCLA)