# Presentation: 473345

## Homestead Park IIEscaped Prescribed BurnApril 4-10, 2006

- Shoshone National ForestWashakie Ranger DistrictLander, WY

## Project History

- Pass Creek Fire – 2002
- Public Scoping September, 2003
- Decision Memo – January 31, 2005
- Burn Plan signed April 4, 2006
- Burn Unit Implementation – April, 2006

**Notes:**
Project design was to achieve an overall fuel break strategy by treating the sage as well as using mechanical treatments to thin and clear cut existing lodgepole and aspen.

Project included:
Prescribed burn – 153 ac
Clear-cut stands to create fuel break – 6 units (188 ac)
Thinning – 28 ac
Aspen regeneration – 2 units (214 ac) 

## Pre-Burn Conditions

- The primary fuel model within the prescribed burn area was identified as a fuel model 2 (Grass/Sage)
- 20% of the remaining area was mixed between fuel model 6 (Limber Pine/Juniper and fuel model 8 (Short Needle Timber Understory)

**Notes:**
Fuel Moistures were taken by Wind River and Washakie District employees on March 31st in 3 places throughout the unit.

Northwest Corner:
100 hr Dead: 3 samples from this location: 15%, 17% and 20% average of 17.5%
Live Herbaceous: 30+ (taken with a moisture probe)

Bottom of the Slope, Middle of Unit:
100 hr Dead: 2 samples from this location: 13%, 17% average of 15.5%
Live Herbaceous: 30+ (taken with a moisture probe)
Dead 10 hr fuels: 2 samples from this location: 8% and 9%.

Eastern Boundary:
100 hr Dead:  2 samples from this location: 14% and 15%.
10 hr Dead: 1 sample from the location: 8%

Weather Parameters
Temp : 40 - 78 ̊
RH: 15 – 30% 
Winds: 0-12mph, @ eye level
Wind Direction: Any Direction
Transport Winds: Any Direction

Fuel Parameters
1 HR Fuels: 4-12%
10 HR Fuels: 4-14%
100 HR Fuels: 5-15%
1000 HR Fuels: 12-22%
Live Herbaceous: 30-120%

## Homestead Burn Unit

**Homestead Burn Unit**

**Notes:**
150 acre unit
Complexity = moderate
Risk assessment = moderate

## Slide 5

**Notes:**
Although taken a few days after the escape, snow under the lodgepole was present in the northern edge of the unit and is a typical practice to utilize as a secure line.

## The Timeline: April 4 – 7th

- Homeowners contacted
- April 4th:
- Test fire attempted, but deemed outside acceptable fire behavior characteristics outlined in the burn plan.
- The burn boss halted the burn, determined  sage brush along the eastern boundary needed to be reduced to hold the burn successfully along the eastern boundary.
- April 5th 6th and 7th:
- 30 foot wide saw line prior to black lining.

## SAW LINE

**SAW LINE**

**Notes:**
*) After the crews established the saw line the original hose lay was extended to cover the northeast corner to help with holding operations not only along the eastern boundary but along the ridge as well.
*) Personnel (27) from the Shoshone National Forest, Missoula and West Yellowstone Jumpers, Big Horn National Forest and Bureau of Indian Affairs.
*) Additional saw work along the Northeastern boundary was completed before the test fire was lit on the 8th

## The Timeline: April 8th

- The black line was tied in by 1900 on the 8th and crews monitored the line until approximately 1930.
- Humidity's in the 50s by 1930

**Notes:**
*) Black line carried down eastern flank anchored from initial test fire.
*) 60-100’, achieving 70 to 90% consumption

The North Zone Shoshone National Forest personnel  were released to return to Cody to assist with a burn on their zone the next day.
All other resources on Homestead Park II returned to the Northeast corner to continue black lining along the northern edge of the burn unit.

## Eastern Edge Black Line

**Eastern Edge Black Line**

**Continued Black Lining moving West**

**Test Fire Location**

**Structure**

**Notes:**
Burn organization:
firing and holding 14-29
Mop up 2-5
Patrol 1 - 5

## The Timeline: April 9th

- 0700: FMO received a call from the NWS to discuss the spot weather forecast for the 9th & 10th.
- 0800: personnel briefed at district office.
- 0930 personnel (24) arrived on the Homestead unit.
- 1000: test fire lit.
- Strip Head firing began at 1100 and by 1300 the final strip (of 3) was tied into the road on the southern boundary.

## Homestead Burn Unit

**Homestead Burn Unit**

**Notes:**
*) There was some concern with bringing fire through the stringer of trees through the western side of the burn unit due to fuel conditions in the stringer and where the timber sale boundary was marked.
*) They agreed to bring fire down the eastern edge of the stringer and begin strip head firing.
*) At 1100 the northern boundary of the burn unit was tied into the stringer of trees and the ignition crew began lining out for the strip head firing starting on the west side and bringing fire east to the black line created the previous day. 

## The Timeline: April 9th (cont.)

- 1330: ignition crew ties in with holding crews to monitor and mop-up.
- 1330 to 1700: mop-up (100 feet).
- 1700: Burn Boss feels mop-up standards met.
- 2100: Engine stays on burn to monitor.

**Notes:**
*) 5 igniters were used for the strip head ignition leaving 19 people for holding along the eastern and northern boundaries.

## April 10th

- The day of the ESCAPE

## The Timeline: April 10th

- 0900 - 1000: Personnel arrive to monitor and mop-up
- 1030: Winds begin to pick up
- 1130: Fire enters crowns, than drops back to ground.
- 1135: Resources from Fort Washakie notify of departure to area.
- 1140: NW corner crowns and makes run, priority change to structure protection.
- 1200 Additional resources from county are requested
- 1230: personnel retreat to safety zone.
- 1300: Wind gusts to 60-65 and move toward cabins.

**Notes:**
 Prescribed burn in mop-up status.
 Spot weather requested morning of 9th and had changed substantially over the afternoon – new spot weather was to be requested the morning of 10th but sustained winds of 30 mph increased fire behavior and spot weather not requested until closer to 1100.
3) Winds increased to over 60mph, interior ember or re-kindled heat along black line and saw line crossed onto private and made a run uphill and consumed 4 cabins before evening and winds died down and humidity's came up. 
4) 1140 – winds strong enough to knock over a firefighter on two separate occasions in exposed area.
5) Fire went onto private land sometime after 1230.

mop-up standards
100% slop-overs and spots
100% within 30 feet of north, west, south
100 feet from east

## The Timeline: April 10th

- 1300: Cabin closest to burn unit on fire.
- 1400: Fremont County resources arrive.
- 1445: Establish Unified Command
- 1600: Spot fire 1⁄2 mile ot the northeast identified and suppressed.
- 1900: Winds moderate and RH rises to 51%.

**Notes:**
??
 Spot weather requested morning of 9th and had changed substantially over the afternoon – new spot weather was to be requested the morning of 10th but sustained winds of 30 mph increased fire behavior and spot weather not requested until closer to 1100.
3) Winds increased to over 60mph, interior ember or re-kindled heat along black line and saw line crossed onto private and made a run uphill and consumed 4 cabins before evening and winds died down and humidity's came up. 
4) 1140 – winds strong enough to knock over a firefighter on two separate occasions in exposed area.
5) Fire went onto private land sometime after 1230.

*) Present of arch site adjacent to private property may have contributed – HOW WAS THIS TREATED IN OPERATION?

 mop-up standards
100% slop-overs and spots
100% within 30 feet of north, west, south
100 feet from east

## Slide 16

## April 10 - 14th

- The week of the ESCAPE

## The Timeline: April 10 – 15th

- Public meetings held April 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th
- Type II Team arrives evening of April 10th and morning of 11th.
- Fire contained on April 13th.
- Fire returned to Type 3 Organization on April 15th.

## Lessons Learned

- Pulled employees off the fire on the morning of day 2 and sequestered them off site to sit and document the series of events.
- Transition from Dubois (Wind River) District Ranger to Lander (Washakie) District Ranger occurred seamlessly between the first public meeting and the second meeting.
- First public meeting was held the evening of the escape, and for 4 straight evenings.
- Both rangers attended a field trip with property owners that lost cabins, the first they saw their losses.

**Notes:**
Ranger to Ranger transition was good.  Ranger not present due to training and the ranger that covered did a great job in staying stoic the first meeting and allowing transition the next and subsequent meetings.  My third month in the position and I felt any effort to work on community relations was set back by years.

## Lessons Learned (cont.)

- Internal communication
- Local and regional Media
- Ordered a critical incident debriefing, which took place the evening of day 2.
- Important to keep employees faceless and nameless as they work thru the event.

**Notes:**
Communication within the Forest, to the Regional Office in Denver to the WO in DC could have been much better organized.
 As managers we failed to get our heads up and see the importance of getting information to the public as quickly as possible.  Yet temper that with advice from the Ranger involved in 30-Mile – use caution as what is speculation can quickly become fact and you have very little ability to change that.
The public meetings were tough as you can imagine and although we made a concerted effort to keep all the fire people from these events, we should have been more forceful in keeping all district employees from attending any of the meetings.  

## The Review Team

- Review Team – Mark Stiles, Tim Sexton, Patty Koppenol, Gary Chancey – Forest Service, Dan Perko -  Wyoming State Forestry, and Pat Hickerson – Fremont County Commissioner.
- Review team spent April 17-21 interviewing and pulling together information for report.
- Media

**Notes:**
Personally struggle a little with perception becoming reality/facts.  But the lesson learned for us is that we did not follow through on the actions we were to implement, specifically handline or cold trailing.
 Requested a commissioner to sit on team, which helped to ease the government cover-up perception that holds strong in the county.  
 Coordinate closely with Review Team and resultant information provided to media.  Interviews with media became a pitting between local unit and review team leader.

## The Review

- Underestimated complexity of burning near private land.
- Did not get a second weather forecast on April 9th predicting high winds on April 10.
- Did not ensure burn perimeter of burn was out cold.

**Notes:**
 Two aspects of the burn plan were not followed: the positioning of engines near the private structures during ignition phases, and cold-trailing the black line relied on to prevent fire spread onto private land.

## The Review – Key Causal Factors

- Preparations were inadequate for protecting the adjacent private land and structures.
- There was insufficient attention to keeping current with weather forecast updates.
- Staffing for mop-up was no commensurate with the risk and complexity of conducting a prescribed burn next to private land and structures.
- Recon of the area immediately downwind, most of which was private land containing structures was insufficient to ensure that values at risk could be protected adequately.

**Notes:**
 Two engines and 5 personnel

## The Review – Key Causal Factors

- There was an over-reliance on the use of black line and wet line, and no use of hand line and cold-trialing.
- Mop-up resources arrived too late in the morning on Monday, April 10, 2006.
- Line officer did not review original Decision Memo and carry through to Burn Plan.
- Preparers and reviewers were unfamiliar with new FSM 5140.

**Notes:**
DM state” hand lines will be constructed along the Forest/Residence boundary and where needed on the burn boundary.”  In peer review the Forest FMO agreed that “wet line in combo with black line meets this and is a better option.  This change was not amended to NEPA nor shared with Agency Administrator.
 FSM 5142.6 required that burn plans specify the conditions under which prescribed fires may be left unattended before being declared out.

## Forest’s Action Plan

- Burn Plan Preparation
- Prescribed Burn Implementation
- Coordination and Communication with National Weather Service
- Other Forest Actions

**Notes:**
 See Forest Action Plan Document

## Regional Direction

- NEPA
- Complexity Analysis
- Holding and Mop-up Standards
- Contingency Plan
- Qualifications

**Notes:**
 See Regional Letter to all Forest Supervisors

## Lessons Learned (burn plan)

- Meeting with NWS
- Arch site
- NEPA – burn plan design/mitigation
- Organizational change
- Lack of follow through from NEPA to Burn Plan
- MMA – allow some room.
- FireWise community

**Notes:**
“An archeological site has been identified next to the forest boundary mid way up the slope.  This site has been approved for prescribed burning activities to occur over the area, however there will be no hand piling, digging hand line, scratch line or any vehicle travel within the site.”
Use caution in talking to the media – articles going back and worth
 Contingency plan – “In addition the structures located uphill from the unit are northeast of the unit are buffered by aspen and conifer timber stands that under the given prescription paramters fo rfuel conditions outside the burn unit are anticipated to produce low fire rates of spread and unlikely to carry fire.  Asa contingency, two Type 6 engines separate from and in addition to the two holding engines will be assigned to patrol the area and be on scene as contingency resources.”

large amount of change throughout the ranks between project inception and implementation
 Implementation mitigation was not carried through from decision to burn plan.  However discussion did occur related to black lining to replace handline that change was never documented.
 unclear access across public
 MMA – allow room for error.  Cerro Grande line was similar and burn line matched admin line.

## Today

- Claims
- Wyden Amendment
- Continual contact

## Slide 29

**Notes:**
April 10, 2003 – Sink’s Canyon prescribed fire experienced a wind shift that caused the fire to burn out of the MMA

Un-modeled inclusion of bitterbrush was outside of the acceptable range.
Complexity analysis: perform careful analysis of all urban interface burns and assign a complexity rating of high when the set of conditions defined in the handbook is met and cannot be mitigated.
Provide feedback to NWS to improve on spot weather forecasts.