# Presentation: 941064

## GOES-N SMSR04/18/06

- GOES-N SMSR 04/18/06 page

**Mike Kelly****Office of Systems Safety ****and Mission Assurance****GSFC Code 303**
**Ken Yienger**
**Missions Systems Engineer**
**AETD Code 599**

## Agenda for the GOES-N SMSR

- Current Environment for GOES-N Launch (04/05/06)
- Major GOES-N Spacecraft Events
- Imager and Sounder Readiness
- SXI Readiness
- Space Environment Monitor (SEM) Instrument Descriptions
- GOES-N Spacecraft Peer Review
- GIDEP Alerts
- Mission Ops/Ground System
- Operational Acceptance
- Launch Vehicle Activities
- Assurance Activities (Safety/Reliability)
- GOES-N Spacecraft Reviews
- NSRS Issues
- Closed GOES-N delta SMARR action
- Spacecraft and Launch Vehicle Issues
- Risk Definitions
- GOES-N Residual Risks 5x5 Chart
- GOES-N Residual Risks Summary Table
- GOES-N Residual Risks One-Pagers
- Backup Charts
- Aerospace Launch Vehicle MRR Charts
- Code 301 MRR Charts
- COPV Agreed-to Inspection Criteria

## Current Environment for GOES-N Launch(as of 04/14/06)

**Spacecraft is on hold at Astrotech and under purge as required.  **
**Encapsulation and preparation for launch is planned to begin approximately 04/22/06.**
**Mission Readiness Review at GSFC occurred on 04/07/06.**
**Action 1 - Open GIDEPS:  Clarify RAD 6000/Landing Gear (GSFC)**
**Action 2 - What is next Atlas launch after April 20 Atlas V? (GSFC)**
**Action 3 - Launch vehicle moisture absorption weight impact on trajectory analysis (BELS)**
**Action 4 - Crew experience and when last exercised all critical operations leading to launch (BELS)**
**Key milestones that would support a May 18 launch Date. **
**April 09/10     SC      Battery Letdown**
**April 20          SC      Mate to PAF and IVT-1**
**April 22           LV      Encapsulate**
**April 27           LV      Transport, Hoist, and Mate to Booster**
**May 11            FRR**
**May 14            SC      Battery Charge - Full Rate**
**May 17             LV      Launch Readiness Review (LRR)**
**May 18             Launch - 18:14 EDT**

## Major GOES-N Spacecraft Events

| 05/04/05 | Delayed due to Launch Vehicle COPV replacement |
| --- | --- |
| 06/23/05 | Delayed due to FTS batteries |
| 07/29/05 | Delayed due to Communication Isolator Qual. |
| 08/15/05 | Delayed due to COPV Pressure Drop |
| 08/16/05 | Delayed due to LV Batt. TLM Limit violation |
| 10/24/05 | Hurricane Wilma storm at KSC during the week of 10/24/05. There were no power, environmental control system (ECS), or HIRU purge outages.  There was no apparent damage or water intrusion to the launch vehicle according to reports from the crew at the launch pad. Pad power was not interrupted. |

** ****(cont.) **

## Major GOES-N Spacecraft Events   (cont.) 

| 11/02/05 -  02/01/06 | Boeing Union Strike Stand Down |
| --- | --- |
| 02/05/06 | Processing the spacecraft was begun at CCAF Pad 37. |
| 02/05/06 - 02/09/06 | Limited performance testing on Pad 37 prior to de-stacking was successfully completed. |
| 02/21/06 | Spacecraft was de-stacked and returned to Astrotech where it was de-encapsulated. |
| 02/28/06 | Spacecraft and Instrument functional testing were completed. |
| 03/03/06 | Testing after de-encapsulation was completed.  Data was nominal.  (Thruster leak check verification, AFT Omni first motion deployment, AFT thruster alignment check) |

## Imager and Sounder Readiness

- Imager and Sounder launch base processing and testing complete:
- Electrical Performance test results nominal
- Final closure and loading of the cooler doors for launch
- Optics and thermal control surface cleaning/inspections previously completed
- Retesting at the Astrotech Facility successfully completed
- No open issues or concerns

## SXI and SEM Instruments Readiness

- SXI Instrument level and spacecraft level testing and calibration successfully completed.
- All SXI test anomalies and discrepancy reports are closed.
- Re-testing at the Cape successfully completed
- No SXI open issues or concerns
- SEM Re-testing at the Cape successfully completed
- No SEM open issues or concerns

## GOES-N Spacecraft Peer Review

- GOES-N Spacecraft Peer Review Held 02/24/06 with Code 300 and Members of Independent Review Team
- Reviewed Spacecraft testing and Plans at the Cape:
- De-Stack Sequence and Spacecraft inspection Plans
- Planned Re-Testing sequences at the Astrotech Facility
- Revisited the Launch Flow
- Reviewed and closed technical issues for GOES N
- COMM Processed Data Relay (PDR) Isolator Reflected Power
- GOES N Fuse Size
- GOES N Solar Array Drive Silver Ring Oxidation (when un-purged)
- GOES N Reaction Wheel Ground Storage Life Extension

## GIDEP Alerts(As of April 17, 2006)

| Document Identifier | Issue Date | Manufacturer | Part Type | Status |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| J5-P-06-01 | 11/10/05 | Various | Semiconductors with UB Package | Surface mount packages have an extra ground connection.  Users must verify that this connection does not contact any stripes on a PC Board.
Open at BSS. |
| AAN-U-06-029 | 3/6/06 | TMW Corp. | Plating procedures | Company is cited for numerous improper procedures connected to their Chrome plating operations.
Open at ITT. |
| D7-P-06-01 | 3/27/06 | Deutsch ECD | Connector | Bayonet Connectors show improper placement of insert retainers.
Open at BSS and ITT. |
| H9-P-06-01 | 4/3/06 | Avibank Mfg. Inc. | Pip Pin Handle | Insufficient crimps holding the handle to the pin.
Open at ITT and LM. |
| QL-A-06-01 | 4/11/06 | Scientific Sales Inc. | Hygrothermograph Chart Paper | Paper is used in humidity and temperature recorders.  The discrepant paper has an improper temperature scale with a 4-degree offset in the temperature readings.
Open at BSS, ITT, and LM. |

**GIDEPS and Alerts Summary:**
**Boeing****	****	****3 open GIDEPs**
**ITT****	****	****4 open GIDEPs**
**LM****	****	****2 open GIDEPs**

## Mission Ops/Ground System

- Maintained Team and System Readiness:
- Continued with PLT updates and console manual training
- Executed lessons learned training from August attempts
- Continued monthly proficiency tests with ground network elements
- Continued Major PLT simulations and nominal health and safety operations including contingency operations
- Certified SSGS Build 10B for PLT Operations in January 2006
- Post Launch Test Procedure Development:
- All Priority 1 Post Launch Test Plans Completed
- Currently in a Ground System Freeze

## Operational Acceptance

- GOES-N System Operational Acceptance:
- Demonstrate compliance of Observatory to mission design/performance requirements
- Verify Successful completion of System Verification Plan
- Verify Successful completion of On-Orbit Commissioning Activities
- Demonstrate compliance of Ground System (SSGS) with mission operations design and performance requirements
- Verify Successful completion of System Verification Plan
- Verify Successful completion of Commissioning Activities
- Status operational impact of any remaining open Incident Reports
- Provide closure plan for any open liens
- Demonstrate readiness for transfer of operations from NASA to NOAA
- Successful as run, PLT timeline
- Resolution of major anomalies
- Document spacecraft/instrument configuration
- Status handover items (documentation, tools, configured items...)
- Status operational impact of any remaining open Incident Reports
- Provide closure plan for any open liens

## Launch Vehicle Activities

- De-stacked the encapsulated spacecraft on February 20, 2006
- Completed Thermal Shield Rework
- Activated FTS at LM on April 20, 2006 (pending Atlas V launch)
- Launch Site Readiness Review April 25, 2006
- Transport Spacecraft to Pad April 27, 2006
- Launch Vehicle FTS Battery integration modifications are near complete
- Flight Readiness Review May 12, 2006
- Mission Dress Rehearsal May 16, 2006
- Launch Readiness Review May 17, 2006
- Launch May 18, 2006

## Assurance Activities (Safety/Reliability)

| Assurance Verification Area | Status | Issues/
Concerns | Organization |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety |  |  |  |
| Safety Data Package (MSPSP) | Complete | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |
| Contingency Planning | Complete 1 | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |
| Range Safety/Documentation | Complete | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |
| NASA Safety Reporting System | Complete | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |
| Orbital Debris Analysis | Complete
 | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |
| Reliability |  |  |  |
| FMEA/CIL | Complete | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |
| Reliability | Complete | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |
| Limited Life Items | Complete / Updated as of March, 2006 | None | Proj. SMA (Code 302) |

- 1   Steve Nichols Addendum to identify new personnel at Headquarters

## GOES-N Spacecraft Reviews

_**REVIEWS**_**	**_**DATE**_
- GOES-N-Q SCR	5/4-6, 1998
- GOES-N-Q PDR	9/14-17,1998
- GOES-N-Q CDR	10/25-28,1999
- Interim Review  (IIRT)	2/27-28, 2001
- GOES-N-Q MOR  (IIRT)	1/16-17,2002
- GOES-N PER (IIRT)	2/4-6, 2003
- GOES-N Delta PER (IIRT)	2/29, 2003
- GOES-N Operations EIRR 	8/3-4, 2004
- GOES-N PSR (IIRT)	1/5-7, 2005
- GOES-N Delta PSR (IIRT)	3/1;3/7, 2005
- GOES-N FOR  (IIRT)	2/23-25, 2005
- MISSION READINESS REVIEW	5/27/2005
- SMARR	06/07/05
- GOES-N FRR	07/22/05
- LAUNCH READINESS REVIEW	08/14/05
- LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW	09/29/05

_**RFAs**_**	****	**_**STATUS**_
- 33		Closed
- 48		Closed
- 28		Closed
- 2		Closed
- 7		Closed
- 17		Closed
- 0		Closed
- 47		Closed
- 16		Closed
- 0		Closed
- 24		Closed
- 5		Closed
**	****	**
- 12		Closed
- 7		Closed
- 0		Closed
- 28		Closed

-  (cont.)

## GOES-N Spacecraft Reviews  (cont.) 

_**REVIEWS**_**	**_**DATE**_**	**_**RFAs**_**	**_**STATUS**_
- DELTA SMARR	10/17/05	**1****	****Closed**
**Independent Review Team (Code 301 chaired)****	****02/24/06****	****3****	****1 Open (as of 03/21/06)**
**Delta Mission Readiness Review at GSFC****	****04/07/06****	****4****	****Open**
**Mission Readiness Brief at HQ****	****05/05/06 (Planned)**
**DELTA FRR****	****05/12/06 (Planned) ****	**
**DELTA LRR****	****05/17/06 (Planned) **

## NASA SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM (NSRS) ISSUES

- Reconfirmed with Headquarters (Pat Martin) that there are no active NSRS items for the upcoming GOES-N spacecraft.

## CLOSED GOES-N DELTA SMARR ACTION

**Action Item #  101705-1**
**Action:**
- Keep Mr. O’Connor apprised of any further or increased risk with regard to the Star Trackers’ conformal coating and staking issue.  (Note acceptance criteria.)
**Status:**
- Risk of this issue never increased since the Delta SMARR per the SAM.  GOES star tracker units were reviewed by Ball and found acceptable for flight.  The investigation/review centered on the Calipso/Cloudsat Star Trackers which are very similar in design to the GOES units.
- Scott Gordon, Chief Engineer, Mechanical Systems Analysis & Simulations Branch,
- Code 542/GSFC, the GOES project engineers and the SAM reviewed/ concurred with the Ball conclusion.
*Action closed for GOES.*
**Objective Quality Evidence:**
- Report from Code 542/Scott Gordon and Ball Systems Engineering Report Rev C

## Spacecraft and Launch Vehicle Issues

| On-Orbit S-Band Communications LNA Anomaly Investigation (New) |
| --- |
| Reaction Wheel Low Speed Operation Issue |
| Extended Time on Pad – GOES-N spacecraft limited life issues analysis  |
| GOES-N Solar Array Drive (SAD) Motor Case Temperature Requirements |
| GOES-N Battery Cell Pressure Divergence |
| GOES-N Spacecraft Fuse Design Issue |
| Fuse Redundancy Status is Not Known |
| Yardney FTS Battery System Incorporation |
| GOES-N Launch Vehicle Dapco Joint |
| Pure Tin on Launch Vehicle Parts (GIDEP Advisory FV5-P-05-01) |

## Risk Definitions

- IMPACT

- 1

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 5

- L

- •

- I

- K

- E

- L

- I

- H

- O

- O

- D

- L

- I

- K

- E

- L

- I

- H

- O

- O

- D

- 5

- 4

- 3

- 2

- 1

| Probability Level | Probability of Risk Occurrence |
| --- | --- |
| 0 | Non-Existent (Eliminated) |
| 1 | Very Low |
| 2 | Low |
| 3 | Moderate |
| 4 | High |
| 5 | Very High |

- * Impact level 0 is used only after the chance of risk impact has been eliminated.

## GOES-N Residual Risks - 5 X 5 Chart(stripes: horizontal=green, vertical=-yellow, dots=red)

## GOES-N Residual Risks - Summary Table(stripes: horizontal=green, vertical=-yellow, dots=red)

## On-Orbit S-Band Communications LNA Anomaly Investigation (New)

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N,O,P**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
- Anomaly on a recently launched spacecraft's S-band communications link, has been tentatively traced to the failure of an input LNA that is very similar in construction to the GOES units design.
**RISK EFFECTS:**
- Similar failure could occur on GOES if failure is due to a cause not related to the tentative assessment above.

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

-  (cont.)

## On-Orbit S-Band Communications LNA Anomaly Investigation (New)   (cont.) 

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N,O,P   (cont.) **
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
- Failure investigation and recovery efforts are on-going, but a leading theory, supported by spacecraft telemetry, analyses and EM unit testing, is that the event was most likely caused by ESD build-up on the coaxial cables at the input of the units whose discharge upon switching to unit caused the failure of the input LNA.
- Unlike the anomaly program's units, the GOES S-band units have been specifically modified, in response to a past PA investigation (PA#90/#97) on a similar ESD concern, to incorporate bleed isolators to preclude the very ESD build-up currently attributed as the most probable cause of the on-orbit anomaly.
- Only three areas, specifically the SAR/DCPR, T&C slice-to-slice connections, and cables in the omni/T&C triplexer path, were not modified due to results of survivability analyses performed in the January 2005 time-frame.
- Since the briefing the ESD/survivability analyses have been revisited and reconfirmed as valid for the SAR/DCPR and T&C slice-to-slice connections.
- Resolution Efforts:
- Revisit/update the ESD/Survivability analyses on the cables in the omni/T&C triplexer path to confirm no additional susceptibility risk or that there is a path to ground.
- Continue monitoring "Program-2" failure investigation as additional developments warrant.
- Pending developments to the contrary, BSS/GOES PMO and the GOES Project feels issue has been adequately addressed to continue with processing of GOES-N for launch.
- A summary of investigation to date, is available for review at the GOES Project Office.  Not circulated due to sensitivity of on-going investigation

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

## Reaction Wheel Low Speed Operation Issue

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N,O,P**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
- Boeing enterprise issue documented as their PA Alert #138.
- Operation of Reaction Wheels during testing and on orbit running below 350 rpm increases the risk of bearing wear due to reduced lubrication thickness.
- If 1 reaction wheel fails, the spacecraft can operate with 3 reaction wheels.  However the current operation plan would have the 3 wheels operating for significant periods of time in the non-optimal region (less than 350 rpm).
**RISK EFFECTS:**
- Due to accelerated bearing wear at speeds below 350 rpm, reaction wheel bearing life may reduce the spacecraft functional life.
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
- Boeing is investigating operational changes to the 3 wheel contingency.
**Boeing investigation showed that no Boeing (Honeywell) RWAs have failed on orbit. **
- There are 5 satellites on orbit that have been continuously operating below 350 rpm.
- Three of these use the same lubricant as GOES.
- Honeywell reviewed Boeing’s criteria for operation and has indicated approval.  Honeywell will provide rationale to Boeing.  Honeywell was requested to provide their durations and constraints on low speed operation.
- Honeywell concurred that Boeing ground testing did not impact system performance.
- Honeywell is reviewing life test data on their other programs to determine whether they envelope the GOES application.
- GSFC Code 596 experts concurred that similar wheel designs have no issue with low speed operation.
- The investigation is continuing.  An update is expected.

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

**P**

**S**

## Spacecraft Extended Time on Pad

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
- The duration on the launch pad exceeds previous Boeing experience.
- During this 9 month period, there was a lack of access for inspections and spacecraft/instrument health and aliveness testing while on the pad.
**RISK EFFECTS:**
- In-orbit Spacecraft Anomaly due to extended duration on pad.
- Could not test deployables or perform thermal or vacuum testing on instrument detectors and could not access internal test ports.  Precision sun sensor and valve drivers could not be tested.
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
- Limited Performance Testing (LPTs) for instruments and spacecraft were performed on the pad prior to de-stacking.
- Six areas of risk were identified and were targeted for test or inspection after the spacecraft was returned to the Astrotech Facility:
- Propulsion Line Inspection & Functional
- Reaction Wheel Re-evacuation
- Deployments and Mechanical Inspections
- Separation System Evaluation
- Battery Discharge / Flatten
- Bus, Comm & GFE Testing
- Limitations were due to the fact that the spacecraft was fueled.

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

**I**

**S**

***P***

-  (cont.)

## Spacecraft Extended Time on Pad   (cont.) 

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N    (cont.) **
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:   (cont.) **
- Life Limit study was conducted to assess the health of the spacecraft and its mission critical components.
**All identified risks have been addressed and mitigated.**
- In the event the launch is postponed beyond August 2006, the following components will require further attention:
- Imager & Sounder Radiant Cooler Cover (RCC) Pyrotechnic Devices:
- Qualified and certified the pyrotechnics through September 2006.
- NASA/JSC lot testing will extend NSI’s for another year if necessary.
- Propulsion Sub-system:
- Fueled propulsion system approved until October 2006.
- If launch is delayed beyond this period the re-inspection and leak checks will be necessary.

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

## GOES-N Solar Array Drive Motor CaseTemperature Requirements

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
**Investigation of SAD demonstrated that Motor Case temperatures during qualification, acceptance, and life testing exceed the  Motor Design Specification Limits of 105C (units sees ~150C).**
**Motor Specifications cites a Winding Temperature Limit of 177C.**
**All Winding temps (Predicted & Measured) are below 177C Spec.**
**RISK EFFECTS:**
**Concern has been raised about over heating the motors during acceptance and qualification tests.**
**GOES-O motor cases saw acceptance temperatures of 140C**
**GOES-N/O motor cases saw qualification and acceptance temps of 150C and 140C respectively.**

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**S,P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

-  (cont.)

## GOES-N Solar Array Drive Motor CaseTemperature Requirements

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
**No deterioration of performance was seen in any of the testing and no significant findings were found in post-life test inspections.**
**Qualification/Life Test Motor retested to confirm performance then disassembled/inspected**
**Performance consistent with specification and post-life test results**
**Inspection found no obvious indications of temperature over-stress**
**Boeing Materials investigation showed only 4 materials rated below the winding specification limit of 177 degrees C.  **
**Three of the 4 do not actually experience temperatures above their own spec limits.  **
**The fourth is an epoxy that contacts magnet wire and therefore may see 177C which is above its continuous service temperature of 149C.  **
**It is used to fill the slots in the stator and is not used as a structural adhesive.**
**Boeing is investigating whether it can be used up to 177C in their application.**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

-  (cont.)

## GOES-N Battery Cell Pressure Divergence

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****379 ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
**As the GOES-N spacecraft flight batteries were self-discharged from the August launch attempt, a pressure differential (of up to 450 kPa) developed between the battery packs most likely due to individual cell self-discharge characteristics.  **
**Other potential causes such as a soft short or slow terminal leak may be indications of a more troubling battery capacity fade.  **
**RISK EFFECTS:**
**If current pressure divergence of GOES-N battery is present after pre-launch charging then flight battery may have reduced capacity.**
**May lead to mission lifetime reductions and power utilization constraints post-launch**
**Possible decreased power margin during the launch and orbit raising phase.  **
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
**Continued battery maintenance activities (recharging) has re-converged the pressure differential to less than 175 kPa, the approximate levels observed prior to the August 2006 launch attempt.   **
**The battery charge "flattening" procedure was completed on 04/10/06.  The cell pressures re-converged after the recharging procedure.**
**The GOES Power System Engineer stated that the Risk is mitigated and will continue to be monitored during the maintenance charges until launch.**

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

**P,S**

**I**

## GOES-N Battery Cell Pressure Divergence   (cont.) 

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****379 ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK LEVELS RATIONALE:**
- Prior to the procedure, the Project had rated the risk as likelihood,impact = 1,4.
- The (very) low likelihood rating was due to the fact that the cell pressures had re-converged to nearly the same values as observed after the August 2005 launch attempt.
- The higher impact rating was due to the possibility of reduced capacity at the end of the (15 year) life and the fact of limited margins at the outset.
- The Code 301 rating for this risk is likelihood,impact = 2,2.
- The low (2) likelihood rating is due to the fact that the pressure divergence level returned to the initial launch site charge level and all indications are that the battery condition has not degraded substantially.
- Each day on the ground however can be considered taking a day of on orbit life. Since the current predicted on orbit battery life has substantial margin over the ten year life, the consequence is (2).

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

## GOES-N Spacecraft Fuse Design Issue

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****382 ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
**A Boeing internal product assurance alert (#129) identified an issue with 601 bus fuse sizing.**
**The problem is related to harness wire resistance, which may be higher than expected.**
**RISK EFFECTS:**
**If the current is insufficient to blow fuses for all credible hard shorts, then harness temperatures will exceed acceptable limits and lead to harness failure.**
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
**Laboratory tests to characterize the harness wire behavior and/or fuse blow performance under controlled conditions were performed to clear some areas of concern.  **
**Boeing provided information to GSFC on 02/15/06, which indicated that there are no credible (single failure) failure modes that could cause sustained high current that would damage harness wires.  **
**The information was based on the results of the wire harness thermal testing, the fuse blow testing, the fuse/harness power analysis, the vendor lot data for the GOES-N parts and a circuit analysis.**
**All but three circuits (RWA, SXI,& ACE Motor Driver) have sufficient current to meet specification limits to blow fuses for all credible high current hard shorts.**
**Risk of credible short has been determined to be very low for each of the components identified. (Previously documented in CDR component FMEA’s.) Probability of occurrence, as well as the risk of collateral damage during rework, does not justify reworking harnesses for additional current capacity. **

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

**S,I**

**P**

## Fuse Redundancy Status is Not Known

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****361 ****	****closed for GOES-N**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
**Redundant fuses are installed in all critical areas.**
**Fuse redundancy was last tested during subsystem and early system build.**
**Fuse redundancy cannot be tested at the S/C level.  This is Boeing’s baseline design.**
**State of the redundant fuses is not known.  There is no way to know if circuit is operating on the primary fuse or the redundant fuse.**
**RISK EFFECTS:**
**Loss of redundancy if circuit is operating on the redundant fuse.  Some boxes have  a redundant counterpart.**
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
**None – this is the baseline design.  **

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

**P**

**I**

**S**

## Conclusion

**GOES N Spacecraft is Ready to Proceed with Launch processing.  Launch Readiness is pending the closure of the following three Spacecraft issues:**
**Solar Array Drive Thermal Specification**
**Reaction Wheel Low Speed Operation**
**On-Orbit S-Band Communications LNA Anomaly Investigation**

## Aerospace GOES-N Launch Vehicle SupportOverall Risk Assessment for Launch

- Overall Launch Risk is:
- 	 _5x2 (Low-Medium)_
- Level not unusual for launch vehicle with this level of maturity

**X**

- Key Watch Items that Could Impact Schedule:
- RL-10 Fuel Impeller Crack
- Yardney Battery (Range Approval)
- RL-10 Igniter Low Temperature
- Dapco Joints
- Composite Moisture Absorption

- Most Significant Technical Risks:
- 1st and 2nd Stage COPV
- RL-10 Second Restart
- Dapco Joints
- RL-10 Late Onset Harmonics
- DC-DC Converter – ECU
- Hydraulic Turbo Pump Assembly
- Aggressive, Success-Oriented Schedule

- Aerospace Recommendation: Proceed with Launch Processing

## BACKUP CHARTS

- Yardney FTS Battery System Incorporation
- GOES-N Launch Vehicle Dapco Joint
- Pure Tin on Launch Vehicle Parts (GIDEP Advisory FV5-P-05-01)
- Aerospace Launch Vehicle MRR Charts
- Code 301 MRR Charts
- COPV Agreed-to Inspection Criteria

## Yardney FTS Battery System Incorporation

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
**Original FTS Battery (BST) Re-Qualification does not support GOES N launch.  Incorporation of different battery by Yardney has issues.**
**Range must approve. **
**First Flight Item.**
**RISK EFFECTS:**
**Concern is potential for collateral damage.**

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

**A**

- NOTE:  A = Aerospace Launch Vehicle Review.

-  (cont.)

## Yardney FTS Battery System Incorporation   (cont.) 

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:   (cont.) **
**A comparison between the Yardney and BST (current) batteries was made and included characteristics such as capacity, dimensions, no. of cells, weight, wet stand life, mounting requirements, . . . etc.**
**A Yardney battery and CRD power requirements compatibility was made and included characteristics such as voltage, open circuit voltage, voltage drop under load, operating current and destruct pulse current.**
**Packaging constraints required relocation of Battery #1.**
**The added mass effects on ES modes, LO2 slosh and Controls interactions evaluated as negligible**
**EWR-127 tailoring to accommodate Yardney FTS battery**
**Wire harness design, fabrication and installation conform to Boeing standard practices and materials related to wire type, power harness overbraid, and harness clamping or support.**
**Qualification by Similarity submitted to Range on 3/29. Low Temperature Capacity Confidence Test successfully completed on 4/5.  Final Range approval expected on 4/7.**

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

## GOES-N Launch Vehicle Dapco Joint

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****I036 ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
**Foam core joints in composite sandwich structures filled with Dapco material have reduced shear strength capability**
**3 composite sandwich test coupons with Dapco joints failed at less than half typical Rohacell shear stress capability (274 psi average, 207 psi allowable)**
**RISK EFFECTS:**
**Launch vehicle failure**
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
**Tests/Analysis to generate Margins of Safety:**
**Performing tests to generate Dapco joint allowables including effect of voids and Dapco/foam debonds **
**Most critical Dapco joints being identified on all shells**
**Production NDI scans are being re-evaluated to identify voids/cracks in Dapco joints at critical locations**
**Review Qualification tests and perform new subcomponent tests to verify Dapco joint integrity**
**Qual test hardware being reviewed for Dapco joint quality in critical locations**
**Flight hardware being evaluated based on flight-hardware vs. test hardware joint quality **
**Subcomponent tests to be employed where full-scale qual test data not applicable**
**Repairs to improve Dapco joint capability are being developed and will be tested**

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

**A**

- NOTE:  A = Aerospace Launch Vehicle Review.

-  (cont.)

## GOES-N Launch Vehicle Dapco Joint   (cont.) 

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****I036 ****	****open for GOES-N**
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:   (cont.) **
**Review Qualification tests and perform new subcomponent tests to verify Dapco joint integrity   (cont.) **
**Vehicle Investigation (M+4-2) for CBC, mission specific for PAF/PLF**
**Load (pressure) reduction incorporated into PAF analysis**
**Umbilical load reduction under investigation for Thermal Shield**
**Positive Margin of Safety**
**Implement repairs as needed**
**Existing shells will be analyzed using new tested allowables, and will be repaired if required.**
**Future shells will avoid Dapco in critical locations, use foam core strips to fill joints.**
**Thermal Shield repairs in work**
**No repair is planned for the PAF.**
**Final clearance ECD 4/24/06**

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

## Pure Tin on Launch Vehicle Parts  (GIDEP Advisory FV5-P-05-01) 

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none****	****GOES-N Launch Vehicle**
**RISK DESCRIPTION:**
- DC/DC converters in the Delta IV launch vehicle contain capacitors which have pure tin leads.  The converters are used in the motor controller.  Affected lot date codes of the capacitors are used.
**RISK EFFECTS:**
- Launch vehicle failure
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:**
- Thermal cycle testing is planned to determine the extent of growth of the whiskers.  Based on these results, the risk will be evaluated.
- SAM has asked the Parts Group to review this issue.  Boeing wants to pursue a "use-as-is" disposition.  However, since the launch vehicle is available for rework, the SAM is inquiring about the risk of replacing these DC/DC Converters.
- Jay Brusse/GSFC/Code 562 stated that the thermal cycle testing performed by Pratt and Whitney does not give confidence that tin whisker growth has not occurred or will not occur.  There is no correlation between whisker growth and the number of thermal cycles.  Many whiskers seem to grow without any applied stimuli.  Although some industry standard methods have been adopted that use thermal cycling as a test, no one has figured out why tin whiskers grow.  This information was provided to both the project and Boeing to review and comment.

***S:   SMA Risk Assessment***
***P:   Project ***
***I:    Code 301 Review Team ***

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

- NOTE:  A = Aerospace Launch Vehicle Review..

**A**

-  (cont.)

## Pure Tin on Launch Vehicle Parts  (GIDEP Advisory FV5-P-05-01)   (cont.)  

**RISK ID:  ****	****	****none****	****GOES-N Launch Vehicle**
**RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS:    (cont.) **
**Boeing reported that an intermittent short or overvoltage will cause Nozzle Extension Deployment System (NEDS) to latch at high speed, which is outside qualification experience of the (NEDS).  **
**Aerospace opinion is that redundancy does not mitigate these situations. NEDS is a redundant system and requires only one system to deploy. **
**A shorted +15V (+15V converter) will result in a nominal single system deploy.  **
**A shorted +5V or +15V (+5,+/-15V converter) will result in a nominal single system deploy. **
**An intermittent shorted +5V or shorted –15V will cause NEDS to latch at high speed, which is outside qual experience of NEDS and Engine **
**Overvoltage on +5V, +15V, or –15V will allow NEDS to deploy but may latch at high speed, which is outside qual experience of NEDS and Engine **
**Boeing plans further investigation.**
**ERB will be conducted in near future.**

**P**

**I**

**S**

**S,P**

## Aerospace GOES-N Launch Vehicle Support

- Edward Ruth
- Systems Director, Commercial Launch Systems
- 7 APR 06

## Agenda

- Task Description
- Aerospace Review
- Significant Risk Items
- Overall Risk Assessment for Launch
- Aerospace Recommendation

## Aerospace GOES-N Task Description

- Aerospace to provide technical consultation and evaluation support to the NASA/GSFC Program Manager with respect to launch vehicle hardware systems status for flight for the launch of the GOES-N spacecraft on a Delta IV rocket.
- Follow all Boeing-identified technical risks to resolution
- Review all mission unique and first time flight items for technical acceptability
- Review Mission Constants
- Review and/or verify key Boeing analyses
- Review and close all significant LV related action items from major LV reviews
- Identify and review any additional technical concerns not covered by Contractor
- Track processing of launch vehicle at Cape
- Provide day of launch support at Cape and Aerospace General Offices
- Aerospace’s Review does not include:
- Complete Vehicle Pedigree
- Launch Certification

## Newly Identified Significant Risk Items

| Risk Item | Status/Mitigation Action | Residual Risk Assessment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dapco Joint | Test coupons with DAPCO joints failed at less than 1⁄2 typical shear stress. In work. May require repair of Thermal Shield. | 5 x 2
(Low-Med) |
| NEDS DC-DC Converter Tin Whiskers GIDEP Advisory | Capacitor supplier switched to 100% tin terminations without notifying their customers. Thermal cycling tests to bound whisker growth for mission risk assessment. | 5 x 2
(Low-Med) |
| Atlas Centaur RL-10 Development Engine XR405 Fuel Impeller Crack | Crack believed to have initiated from pre-existing notch in impeller blade. Lack of confidence in screen to catch similar notch. XR405 experienced higher environments than flight engine. PWR working on crack grown analysis for mitigation. | 5 x TBD
(TBD) |
| Composite Moisture Absorption | Moisture absorption weakens composite structures. Moisture predictions provide margin until APR 06. Extension will use actual T & RH. | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| NEDS DC-DC Converter Low Output ATP Failure | DC-DC converter output was low during acceptance test.  Incorrect inductor windings are screened by GOES-N DC-DC converter testing. | 5 x 1
(Low) |

## Newly Identified Significant Risk Items (cont.)

| Risk Item | Status/Mitigation Action | Residual Risk Assessment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| NEA Strut rod end bearings – Galling and Corrosion Incidents | Some rod ends in inventory have exhibited impeded movement. GOES-N NEDS has performed nominally in all testing. Aft struts will be inspected. Forward struts cleared by inspection and/or analysis. | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| Yardney Battery – First Flight for Delta IV | BST FTS battery being replaced with Yardney product. Range must approve. First Flight Item. Concern is potential for collateral damage. | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| RL-10 Low Igniter Box Temperature | Uncertainty exists in minimum temp. at 3rd burn ignition. Same ignition system flown successfully on Titan-Centaur. Boeing, Aerospace, and PWR working on analysis with updated models anchored to test data. Additional testing to be performed if predicted temperature is below current qualification temperature of 180oF. | 5 x 1
(Low) |

## Newly Identified Significant Risk Items (cont.)

| Risk Item | Status/Mitigation Action | Residual Risk Assessment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| PAF low temperature concern and repair | Evaluation of contractor analysis, hardware modification, NCRs, and in-house analysis | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| Alarm Race Condition | DLPS parameter trigger race condition led to parameter limit checking using non-current limits on last launch attempt. Mitigation includes database change (low hanging fruit), “use-as-is” justification, or combination of database change with use-as-is justification.  Aerospace reviewed alarm list, and it is shorter than Heavy Demo’s.  Further review included events before T-5 and counting and did not add to expected alarm list.  Even though 300 race conditions have been upgraded to meet the golden rule, they remain in expected alarm list (truly unexpected). | 3x3
(Low) |
| 2nd Stage Slosh Analysis | Boeing believes potential for excessive slosh on 2nd stage LH2 tank. Mitigated by reducing turn rates and pulse propellant settling. Aerospace is in concurrence that these changes are being properly implemented and that there is no issue with slosh for the GOES-N vehicle. | 3x3
(Low) |

## Previously Identified Significant Risk Items

| Risk Item | Status/Mitigation Action | Residual Risk Assessment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV) Failure | Reviewed contractor failure analysis, conducted in-house investigation, some independent analysis. Aerospace recommends cycle restrictions to maintain current risk level. | 5 x 2
(Low-Med) |
| RL-10 Engine Risk Assessment for Late Onset Harmonics and other performance risks | Reviewed hot fire and vibrational test data;  conducted focused pedigree review and TIM performed in-house analyses | 5 x 2
(Low-Med) |
| RL-10 second restart; V&R valve, LOX temp – low margin, single point of failure | Evaluation of contractor analysis, conducted  in-house analysis | 5 x 2
(Low-Med) |
| DC-DC Converter - Missing X-rays for ECU installed on GOES-N | RS-68 Engine Control Unit is not PIND tested and does not have getter; Capacitors manually installed and not adequately screened by ATP | 5 x 2
(Low-Med) |
| Hydraulic Turbo Pump Assembly Failure during ATP wear-in and speed control tests | Reviewed contractor failure analysis, conducted in-house investigation; FOD and / or internal component (e.g. bearing, gear) defect  | 5 x 2
(Low-Med) |
| Delta Cryogenic Second Stage (DCSS) – LH2 forward skirt components exceeded qualification | Aerospace reviewed thermal modeling, is reviewing qualification test reports for three way solenoid valve, and concurs with re-torque of manual valve as mitigation against leaks. | 5 x 2
(Low – Med) |

## Previously Identified Significant Risk Items (Cont.)

| Risk Item | Mitigation Action | Residual Risk Assessment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| RS-68 MCC Liner Cracks – Number of adjacent cracks out of family | HAR data package review, focused pedigree review, TIM, Aerospace in-house analyses | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| Ordnance Interrupter and Ordnance Umbilical Disconnect propagation concerns | Aerospace reviewed test plans and reports. Concurs with recommended replacement of ordnance interrupter with manifold.  Ordnance Umbilical Disconnect testing supports function with reduced but still positive margin. | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| Delta Cryogenic Second Stage (DCSS) Thermal Modeling | Aerospace performed IV&V of Boeing thermal models.  | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| HLVD Early MECO | Evaluation of contractor analysis, conducted  in-house analysis | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| RS-68 TVC Actuator High Torque Motor Coil Resistance | Aerospace concurs with proposed mitigation: 1) verified coil resistance and 2) perform dry slews to confirm proper function. | 5 x 1
(Low) |
| HDLV RS-68 MCC Nozzle Joint G9 Leak Indication | Participated in contractor investigation, conducted in-house analyses. | 5 x 1
(Low) |

## Previously Identified Significant Risk Items (Cont.)

| Risk Item | Status/Mitigation Action | Residual Risk Assessment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| CBC LO2 Dome Vibration Environment – HLVD levels exceeded predictions | Reviewed dynamic environments and concurred with Boeing’s recommended proto-flight test levels for control pressure transducer (CPT) and engine cut-off (ECO) sensor. | (5 x 1)
Low |
| GEM-60 Nozzle  – 082 NBR Dome Insulation cracks | Participated in contractor  investigation, including analyses,  subscale and full scale testing; evaluated GOES-N motors against findings | (5 x 1)
Low |
| GEM-60 Nozzle Composite overwrap debond/leak | Participated in contractor investigation, and evaluated GOES-N motors against findings | (5 x 1)
Low |
| Guidance, Navigation, and Control Algorithm Assessment | Validating using independent Aerospace simulation
 | (5 x 1)
Low |
| Flight Software – Mission Constants Assessment | Validating using independent Aerospace simulation | (5 x 1)
Low |
| HLVD Payload Fairing Separation Observation | Evaluation of contractor analysis, conducted  in-house analysis | 3 x 3
(Low) |

## Overall Risk Assessment for Launch

- Overall Launch Risk is:
- 	 _5x2 (Low-Medium)_
- Level not unusal for launch vehicle with this level of maturity

**X**

- Key Watch Items that Could Impact Schedule:
- RL-10 Fuel Impeller Crack
- Yardney Battery (Range Approval)
- RL-10 Igniter Low Temperature
- Dapco Joints
- Composite Moisture Absorption

- Most Significant Technical Risks:
- 1st and 2nd Stage COPV
- RL-10 Second Restart
- Dapco Joints
- RL-10 Late Onset Harmonics
- DC-DC Converter – ECU
- Hydraulic Turbo Pump Assembly
- Aggressive, Success-Oriented Schedule

## Aerospace Recommendation

- Aerospace Recommendation: Proceed with Launch Processing

## GOES-N MISSION READINESS REVIEW

**Integrated Independent Review Team ****Assessment**
**            ****    ****Richard Ho****	****                     Gary Ewell**
**            ****GSFC/Code 301           The Aerospace Corporation **
**April 7, 2006 **

## GOES-N IIRT Members

_**GSFC TEAM**_
**Richard Ho         Co-Chair****	**
**Steve Scott         Systems**
**Minh Phan          Mechanical**
**Marlon Enciso    Power**
**Wes Ousley        Thermal**
**Landis Markley   Guidance/Control**
**Dennis Asato      Propulsion**
**Fritz Hasler         Science**
**Tom Wrublewski NOAA**

_**AEROSPACE TEAM**_
**Gary Ewell              Co-Chair****	**
**Allen Goldstein      Systems**
**Kent Jackson          Electrical**
**Ed Serhal****	**** Mission Assurance**
**Jim Gin                    Flight Operations**
**Randy Villahermosa    Contamination****	**
**Richard Schoolar****	**** Detectors**
**Don Nelson****	**** Communications**
**Nikki Ogamba****	**** Reliability **

## Outline

**Items Reviewed Since May 05**
**Open Issues**
**Residual Risks**
**Summary and Recommendation**

## IIRT GOES N Reviews Since May 05

**Launch Lien Review****	****	****	****Aug 05**
**Delta Mission Review     ****	****	****	****Sept 05**
**Peer Review****	****	****      ****	****	****	****Feb 06**
**Launch Vehicle Status Review*  ****	****Feb 06**
**Telecons on Issues****	****	****	****Periodically**
*** Members of IIRT attended; not chaired**

## Major Areas/Items Reviewed

- Disposition of problems/anomalies on GOES O and P
- Resolution of Enterprise issues/alerts
- Launch during eclipse season
- Power margins
- Battery cell pressure divergence
- PDR Isolator multipaction
- Imager/Sounder E-box foot gap
- MMIC bromine contamination
- Fusing and wire harness sizing
- Solar array drive stepper motor temperature
- Reaction Wheel Operation at Low Speed
- Failure of Similar Angular Displacement Sensor
- Destacking and planned launch site testing

## Outline

- Items Reviewed Since May 05
- Open Issues
- Residual Risks
- Summary and Recommendation

## Solar Array Drive (SAD) Stepper Motor Thermal Qual

- Original SAD analysis and testing assumed 5% duty cycle operation which bounds sun-tracking mode but not 100% DC stepper motor operation for contingency safehold sun acquisition.
- On orbit operational and contingency temperatures and durations are enveloped by the protoflight and life tests.
- Maximum motor winding temperatures not measured in qual test. GOES N flight units tested to protoflight temperatures. Maximum winding temperatures could have approached the motor vendor specified limit of 177°C.
- Residual concern that the flight units may have been overstressed due to temperature gradients and hot spots.
- Boeing performing tear down and inspection of life test motor and documenting temperature limits for all non-metallic components.
- Project and IIRT will review GOES N stepper motor build/test data.
- Risk mitigated by redundancy, low operating temps in normal ops mode, and life test operating time.

## Reaction Wheel (RW) Operation at Low Speed

- Enterprise issue on RW bearing life at speeds below 350 rpm due to reduced oil film thickness.
- GOES RWs operate at this speed during ground testing and on-orbit with one wheel failed.
- Early on-orbit failure could result in several years of low speed operation
- Low speed operation not adequately covered in GOES RW qual and life tests or in heritage bearing/lube system qualification.
- RW qualification and life test data being collected/evaluated for similar bearing/lube systems operated for extended periods at low speeds.
- Vendor (Honeywell) requested to provide criteria/constraints on GOES RW low speed operation.
- Boeing assessing options to reduce low speed operating time in 3-wheel configuration.

## Failure of Similar Angular Displacement Sensor (ADS)

- ADS similar to GOES design failed by leaking mercury (Hg) past epoxy seals in thermal cycling (TC) test between –40 to +85 deg C
- GOES unit has lower qual temperature range (-18 to +55 C) but higher thermal stress due to epoxy application at both ends of sensor cavity vs. only at one end in failed unit
- Vendor performed proto-qual and accelerated life test on 10 sense units built to GOES design and assembly procedures
- One unit exhibited Hg leak from case after initial 8 proto-qual thermal cycles and would normally have been rejected
- All 10 units performed nominally before and after TC and vibe testing, and after accelerated life test of 48 thermal cycles from –20 to +60 C
- X-ray examination revealed minor Hg leaks past 1st seal in 3 units
- None of the mercury leaks affected performance and would not be a contamination risk to GOES instruments or sensitive surfaces
- Open for review of build records for qualification and flight units

## Outline

- Items Reviewed Since May 05
- Open Issues
- Residual Risks
- Summary and Recommendation

## GOES N Residual Risks

|  | IMPACT |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  |  |
| Very High |  |  |  |  |  | 5 | 
L
I
K
ELIHOOD |
| High | MDL Performance | SEM Detector |  |  |  | 4 |  |
| Moderate | SXI Wedgelock |  |  |  |  | 3 |  |
| Low |  | Battery Cell Press. Divergence
 | Magnetometer Anomaly
Bromine Contamination | Fuse Redundancy | Propulsion Anomaly | 2 |  |
| Very Low |  | E-Box Foot Gapping | PDR Isolator
Fuse Sizing | Post TV Rework | LOR Power /Comm
Extended Time on Pad | 1 |  |
| Science Mission Impact | Minimal or no impact. | Minor impact, full mission science still valid with some margin loss.           | Moderate impact, full mission science still valid with significant margin loss. | Major impact to full mission science; still meets minimum science.  Little or no margin remaining. | Loss of spacecraft or minimum science not met. |  |  |

## Consequence 5;  Likelihood 1

- Time on launch pad exceeds previous Boeing/SDC experience
- Concern over life limited items and inability to perform adequate inspections and spacecraft/instrument health and aliveness tests
- S/C destacked and returned to Astrotech for inspection and testing to mitigate risk
- Limited by fueled S/C configuration and ordnance
- Residual risk due to inability to test all components and functions
- Deployables, RCS valve drivers, solar array, star trackers, imager and sounder detectors, etc.

**Consequence 5;  Likelihood 1**

## Consequence 3;  Likelihood 2

- Bromine contamination suspected on GOES Communication Subsystem board MMICs. GOES-P units most vulnerable but possible on GOES - N & O MMICs.
- Damage mechanism identified. Time dependent corrosion progresses through 4 stages, accelerated by presence of oxygen.
- No on orbit failures to date.  25 (out of 19,600) ground failures identified, 7 failures occurred after 1500 hours of operating time.  One as late as 2580 hours.
- A MMIC failure due to bromine contamination was identified on GOES-P Weather Facsimile (WEFAX) SSPA S/N09. No impact on unit performance.
- GOES-N MMICs have substantially less exposure to bromine than the GOES-P units due to less time in the contaminating burn-in chamber.
- GOES-N units have undergone over 2000 hours of operating time with exception of the primary CDA SSPA (1886 hours), redundant SD/MDL Modulator (1856 hours), and the redundant Master Oscillator (1981 hours).

**Consequence 3;  Likelihood 2**

## Consequence 2;  Likelihood 2

- Large divergence in battery pack pressure noted during self-discharge from launch SOC to 25%
- Worst case divergence ~650 kPa (pack 3A to 3B)
- Concern over Battery age, health of cells and possible capacity loss
- Continued battery maintenance activities (recharging) has reduced the pressure divergence to less than 175 kPa, the approximate levels observed following the August launch attempt.
- Pressure measurement in less than 10% of cells
- Limited “reconditioning” of the battery performed at Astrotech
- Flattened to realign battery cells/pressures
- Recharged to 35% SOC within 24 hrs of flattening
- No pre-charge test will be conducted; however batteries are being treated as if they are hydrogen pre-charged

**Consequence 2;  Likelihood 2**

## Consequence 3;  Likelihood 1

- Recent enterprise issue on insufficient harness wires for parallel 10A or 15A fuses to power users resulting in longer fuse blowing durations and overheating of harnesses
- GOES N units with parallel fuses cleared by analysis of credible power short to ground failure modes, and reliability assessment
- Boeing planning test on ACE motor driver PWB to confirm analytical trace burn-through time

**Consequence 3;  Likelihood 1**

## PDR Isolator    

- Potential of multipaction and loss of Processed Data Relay (PDR) Service RF link due to reflected power from rogue carrier or off-frequency uplink
- Isolator tested to 144 watts voltage equivalent power; new predicted max power level 143 watts average and 164 watts peak for very short durations
- Low probability of occurrence; ground action possible to mitigate damage
- Redundant side available.

**Consequence 3;  Likelihood 1**

## Imager/Sounder E-Box Foot Gap

- Excessive mounting foot gaps found during reinstallation of Imager and Sounder electronic boxes on GOES P due to improper shimming
- Excessive gap found on one foot during re-inspection of GOES O
- Re-inspection not performed on GOES N
- Strength, thermal and other effects were assessed by analysis for worst case gaps
- High margins in connectors and mounting bolts for box bending
- Bonded panel inserts are weak link in mounting—No strength measurements
- Thermal performance not impacted due to presence of conductive RTV
- Vibration test data reexamined for frequency shifts or significant change in initial and final test responses
- None found

**Consequence 2;  Likelihood 1**

## Outline

- Items Reviewed Since May 05
- Open Issues
- Residual Risks
- Summary and Recommendation

## GOES N IIRT Summary

- GOES-N S/C state of readiness since May 05 MRR has been assessed via periodic meetings, telecons and Feb 06 Peer Review
- All problems encountered since last launch attempt were minor and have been adequately resolved or have acceptable closure plans
- All problems/anomalies on GOES O & P hardware and testing, and all enterprise issues were thoroughly reviewed and found to be of low additional risk to GOES N
- Some open issues still under review
- Tests and inspections performed to mitigate risks of extended time on pad were prudent
- No problems or issues
- Residual risk items have been identified and assessed

## GOES N IIRT Conclusions

- Pending successful closure of open issues, GOES-N S/C state of readiness and risk level is judged to be essentially same as for last launch attempt
- Overall mission risk still judged to be low-medium due to
- First flight
- Residual risks
- New launch vehicle and ascent profile

**      ****Recommend continuing processing for launch**

- BACK-UP

## Propulsion System

- On-orbit propulsion system leak in nearly identical 601 bus
- Insufficient telemetry to determine root cause; however mission had anomalously low perigee
- No suspect items during build or test of its components or propulsion system
- Most components and verification testing are same as on   GOES N
- No propulsion system leaks detected in recent GOES N inspection and sniff testing

**Consequence 5;  Likelihood 2**

## LOR Power Margin

- Battery state of charge at liftoff limited to 45-50% by ground temperature constraint.  S/C out of ground contact for 2-4 hrs after deployment
- Latest load and solar array analysis indicates sufficient power margin to sustain S/C during communications blackout after 3 sigma separation
- Approximately 50 watts margin under worst case conditions.
- Project independently verified the BSS power margin modeling and analysis associated with the final LOR strategy.
- Contingency simulations and rehearsal conducted for comm blackout situation. Will deploy Omni ant. only under contingency conditions.

**Consequence 5;  Likelihood 1**

## Fuse Redundancy

- Redundant fuses installed in all critical areas
- Fuse redundancy last tested during subsystem and early system build
- Cannot be tested at the S/C level
- State of redundant fuses unknown

**Consequence 4;  Likelihood 2**

## Consequence 2;  Likelihood 4

- Historic problem of noisy detectors and high failure rate
- Improvements in testing and purging made after Tiger Team investigation
- Thirty day screening requirement not met by all GOES N detectors
- Dome 5 detectors replaced shortly before shipping
- Burn-in/failure-free time not being met to reduce risk of detector failure
- Ground environment more severe than on-orbit ops
- Approaching 2 years since detectors last tested

**Consequence 2;  Likelihood 4**

## Residual Risks

| RISK | PROB-ABILITY | IMPACT |
| --- | --- | --- |
| MULTIUSE DATA LINK PERFORMANCE
MDL Bit Error Rate (BER) performance characterization were done using conventional PN test sequences.  However, using the Error Vector Magnitude (EVM) test method with actual instrument data spectrum, MDL performance show degradation on both primary and redundant links. Further investigation did not produce any definitive characterization of the impact and its sources.  The MDL link will likely experience performance degradation due to data pattern sensitivity.  However current end-of-life margin estimate is still positive.  | 4 | 1 |
| SXI WEDGELOCK 
Possible loose wedgelock connection on Camera Electronics Board may compromise thermal, mechanical, and electrical integrity.  Worst case analyses and testing indicate that even if the wedgelock is loose, no adverse thermal, mechanical, or EMI/EMC impact is expected.  Slight residual risk of EMI/EMC exceedances. | 3 | 1 |
| POST LAUNCH TEST (PLT) “LONG FORM” COMPLETION
PLT activity development effort has made progress since the FOR but will not be completed prior to launch. Not considered a lien to launch.  Residual risk assessed to be:  1) possibly will take longer than originally planned to complete PLT, and 2) Flight Team management will need to ensure strict compliance with the pre-execution verification process prior to the execution of any PLT activity.    | Closed |  |

## Residual Risks 

| RISK | PROB-ABILITY | IMPACT |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GOES-O MAGNETOMETER ELECTRONICS FAILURE		
Magnetometer #2 electronics box on GOES-O failed in SCTV cycle 4.  Electronics was 
removed from spacecraft and returned to vendor to isolate root cause. Vendor was 
unable to duplicate failure.  Probable cause likely to be debris in harness/connector. 
 | 2 | 3 |
| POST THERMAL VACUUM REWORK
Several flight components were removed and replaced post environments.  Rigorous mission assurance processes and regression testing were followed. Residual risk of “test as you fly” deviation is judged to be low. | 1 | 4 |

## COPV Agreed-to Inspection Criteria

- 						October14, 2005
- To:		416/GOES Deputy Project Manager, Andre Dress
- From:		543/Mechanical Engineering Branch, Associate Branch Head
- Subject:  	GOES-N Delta IV COPV Launch Pressure Cycle Limits and Inspection Criteria, Revision A; Updated per Lesson Learned from the USAF NROL-22 Launch Attempt Campaign
- The attached table at the end of this memorandum is the Revision A of the NASA/GSFC COPV Team recommendations on the COPV Launch Pressure Cycle Limits and Inspection Criteria.
- These updated recommendations are results of the lessons learned from the USAF NROL-22 Mission Launch Attempt Campaign.  All Pressure Cycle Limits and Inspection Criteria are supported by the COPV Pressure Cycle Test data and Boeing analyses.  The new COPV Launch Pressure Cycle Criteria will increase the mission residual risk.  However, the test data would still support the Medium Risk Category.
- Any deviations from these COPV Launch Pressure Cycle Criteria or any new COPV data will be assessed case by case.
- Please, contact me by phone at 301-286-8325, or by email at Minh.C.Phan@NASA.GOV if you have any questions pertaining to these COPV Launch and Inspection Criteria.
- Original Copy Signed by:
- Minh C. Phan

## COPV Agreed-to Inspection Criteria   (cont.) 

## COPV Agreed-to Inspection Criteria   (cont.) 

## COPV Agreed-to Inspection Criteria   (cont.)