# Presentation: 846819

## Alpha Gamma Hot Cell FacilitySprinkler System Upgrade

*Presented by:  *
*	**Betsy Grom, Argonne National Laboratory*
*	**Don Mershon, Nexus Technical Services Corp.*

## Project Description

- The Alpha Gamma Hot Cell Facility (AGHCF) Sprinkler Upgrade corrected sprinkler and water supply system deficiencies, upgrading protection to comply with DOE requirements.

**Notes:**
Don

## 212 Reference Plan

## Building 212 Utility Plan

**N**

## Building 212 Layout

## AGHCF Operations

- AGHCF Mission:
- At project start: R&D for safe and reliable fuel systems for advanced commercial power reactors. (1964 – 2006)
- At project end: Radioactive and hazardous material handling, management & storage. (2006 – Present)
- AGHCF is located within Building 212, F-Wing, and runs from the basement through the second floor
- Covers approximately 20,000 square feet
- F-Wing includes the Alpha Gamma Hot Cell, support, maintenance, and office areas.
- Primary Constraint in AGHCF during installation was to maintain an hourly fire watch.

## Project Background

- Nuclear facility FHAs were updated
- The updated AGHCF FHA identified that:
- Past sprinkler modifications were inadequate
- The existing water supply was questionable
- Hydraulic calculations confirmed that the existing water supply was inadequate
- Temporary fix - operability determination
- Replaced sprinkler heads
- Restored compliance with SAR requirements
- A project plan for resolution was developed
- The project plan was implemented

**Notes:**
Don

## Fire Hazards Analysis

- Exposure Hazards
- Machine shop
- Offices
- Storage and support areas
- AGHCF Internal Hazards (water not welcome)
- Nuclear fuels
- Metals
- Swarf
- Cutting oils, lubricants
- Trash
- Seismic interaction was not considered in the existing sprinkler system design

## Service Level Trash was Cleared

## Sprinkler and Water Supply Analysis

- Existing design
- Occupancy classifications were unclear
- Design criteria were inadequate
- Areas beneath obstructions were unprotected
- Multiple phased sprinkler modifications were unfinished and inadequate for the hazards
- Flow tests were conducted
- Hydraulic calculations were performed
- Results – system could not function as designed, the water supply was inadequate due to undersized building supply feeder

## F-101 Hallway Obstructions

## Key Decisions

- Classification of:
- Nuclear Hazard Category (HC-2)
- Performance Category (PC-3)
- How to apply seismic requirements
- Detailed design or performance specification?
- First project under ISO 9001 - 65 step project management procedure

## Key Decisions

- Hazard and Performance Categories
- Defined in DOE 420.1B
- Further defined in:
*DOE-STD-1020-02, *Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities
*DOE-STD-1021-93, *Natural Phenomena Hazards Performance Categorization Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components

## Performance Category 3

- PC-3 SSCs are those for which failure to perform their safety function could pose a potential hazard to public health, safety, and the environment because radioactive or toxic materials are present and could be released from the facility as a result of that failure. PC-3 SSCs would prevent or mitigate criticality accidents, chemical explosions, and events with the potential to release hazardous materials outside the facility. **Design considerations for these categories are to limit facility damage as a result of design basis natural phenomena events** so that hazardous materials can be controlled and confined, occupants are protected, and the functioning of the facility is not interrupted. When safety analyses determine that local confinement of high-hazard materials is required for worker safety, PC-3 designation may be appropriate for the SSCs involved. PC-3 NPH provisions are consistent with those used for reevaluation of commercial plutonium facilities with conservatism in between that of model building code requirements for essential facilities and civilian nuclear power plant requirements.

## Where to Use Seismic BracingShades of Grey...

## Key Decisions

- Detailed design or performance specification?
- Why a detailed design?
- Intricate scope of work with operational sensitivities during installation
- Ensure the final installation meets _all_ design requirements
- More accurate cost estimates
- Control costs by:
*Limiting the number of contractor change orders*
*Encouraging an open relationship with contractors to alleviate their anxiety with respect to unknowns*

## Key Decisions

- First project under ISO 9001 – 65-step project management process
- Why use the 65-step process?
- Required by Argonne site engineering program
- Complicated scope of work requiring diligent coordination
- Control work to ensure appropriate outcomes
- Ensure design AND installation meet ALL requirements
- Predictable costs and results
- Features of project management process:
- Aggressive documentation and follow-up
- Checklists to ensure activities completed
- Milestones or deliverables tied to each step
- Traceable results

## Team Resources

## Procedures

## Issues

- Operations
- Work adjacent to hot cell to be performed within one week
- Hourly fire watch during construction
- Protection of Zinc Bromide(ZnBr2) filled windows

## Design Objectives

- Correct design criteria for occupancies
- Increase water supply
- Protect areas under obstructions
- Design for seismic interactions

## Design Requirements

- Water supply to remain operable during the day
- Work to be pre-planned and pre-fabricated to minimize exposures and speed installation
- ZnBr2 windows to be protected from mechanical damage during installation
- Work to be sequenced to allow testing and return to operability of AGHCF sprinklers immediately following installation

## 212 F-Wing Main Floor FHA Sketch

## 212 F-Wing Second Floor FHA Sketch

## 212 F-Wing Service Level FHA Sketch

## AGHCF Layout

## Sequencing required:
Water supply was shared between fire protection and domestic water distribution systems
Initial out-of-services rendered both water distribution systems inoperable during water supply upgrade
Operations required domestic water during the day, allowing shutdown on Saturdays only
After separation from domestic water, cross connections to the service tunnel feed main would leave multiple areas of 212 unprotected if not sequenced
Sequencing allowed the project to manage fire watch costs

- Water supply was shared between fire protection and domestic water distribution systems
- Initial out-of-services rendered both water distribution systems inoperable during water supply upgrade
- Operations required domestic water during the day, allowing shutdown on Saturdays only
- After separation from domestic water, cross connections to the service tunnel feed main would leave multiple areas of 212 unprotected if not sequenced
- Sequencing allowed the project to manage fire watch costs

***Sequencing Played a Key Role***

## North Water Supply EntranceShared Service with Domestic Water Supply

- Fire protection water

- Domestic water

- Shared water supply feeder

***North Water Supply Entrance******Shared Service with Domestic Water Supply***

## Sequencing Plan

## Seismic Bracing

- Required by DOE 420.1B and DOE-STD-1020
- Seismic bracing required to avoid interaction with AGHCF ZnBr2 filled windows
- Seismic bracing design details were developed and complied with NFPA 13 requirements
- Contractor decided to ignore and invent their own unsubstantiated restraints
- Contractor ultimately complied with the design details provided

## Pipe Support and Seismic Brace Details

## Correct Seismic Braces

- Seismic braces

## Incorrect Seismic Braces

- No stability in horizontal or longitudinal planes

## Can you spot the difference?

## Seismic Brace vs. “Seismic Brace”

## Interesting Pipe Supports

## Correct Pipe Support

## Incorrect Pipe Support

***Incorrect Pipe Support***

## Service Tunnel Swivel Seat

## Post Mortem

- Detailed design provided an accurate cost estimate with contractor costs coming in within 2% of cost estimate
- Contractor change orders were minimized and extras were held to less than 4%
- Complete documentation was received
- Lesson - involve construction and operation types in design phase to capture innovations to make the job go easier

## Post Mortem (cont.)

- Project management process
- Prepared management for complete cost estimate and alleviated the need for “value engineering”
- Original project scope estimate was for a different scope of work, it did not include upgrading the water supply, thus original cost estimate was low
- Original project scope would not have fixed the problem
- Lesson – make sure funding requests and GPP estimates match the scope required to fix the problem
- Lesson – well defined project made it easy to obtain management backing

## Post Mortem (cont.)

- Lesson – watch the contractor all the way to the end
- Pipe supports were fabricated from all thread rod rather than following design details for pipe saddles
- Seismic braces were homemade with no basis for design, nor installation, persistence forced them to follow the design and install qualified seismic braces

## AGHCF Sprinkler System Upgrade

- For more information contact:
- Betsy Grom (630) 252-8274 or;
- Don Mershon (630) 893-2277 x-14
- Questions ?