# Presentation: 405827

## Grid West:Regional Proposal for an Independent Transmission Organization

**Montana Public Service Commission**
**February 4, 2005**
**Bud Krogh**
**Grid West Coordinating Team**
**ekrogh@serv.net**
**www.gridwest.org**

**Notes:**
The Grid West proposal would create a new, independent, non-profit corporation designed by regional grid users to manage the regional transmission grid and plan for its future.

## Presentation Overview

- Industry and Grid West History
- Grid West Regional Scope
- Grid West Stakeholders
- Regional Problems and Opportunities
- Recent Accomplishments
- Grid West Timelines and Work Plan
- Grid West Development Principles

## Historical BackgroundBuilding the Interconnection

**1941** – Northwest Power Pool (NWPP) formed to coordinate power system operations in support of wartime production
**1961** to **1970** – Today’s interconnected network takes shape.
- Columbia River Treaty, Pacific Intertie, connections from NWPP (Utah) to Arizona/New Mexico
**1970** to **1985** – Remote energy delivered by wires
- Southwest – Coal energy from NM, AZ to California
- Rockies – Coal energy to coastal PNW, Front Range and California
- BPA network expanded for hydro production and nuclear, 3rd AC intertie added to California
**Result is a single system covering the Western States where all parties are interdependent**.

**Notes:**
1941 – NWPP Formed
The Pool was originally formed in 1942, when the federal government directed utilities to coordinate operations in support of wartime production. 
Montana, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah and parts of Wyoming were already interconnected.  
The origin of those interconnections began with World War I and increased in during the two decades leading up to World War II.
1961-70 –Today’s Network Takes Shape
Columbia River Treaty – Canada agrees to build DAM (Duncan, Arrowhead and Mica) in exchange for 1⁄2 of downstream power benefits for treaty term of 60 plus $254.4 million through CSPE.
US agrees to build Libby Dam 
West Side – Pacific Intertie (2-AC and 1-DC) put in place a high-capacity link between Western Canada, the Pacific Northwest and California.
East Side – Interconnections between the NWPP (Utah) and Arizona/New Mexico established to enable economic exchanges.
1970-1985 – Remote Energy by Wire
Southwest – Network expanded to enable California to import coal (and later nuclear) energy from New Mexico and Arizona (Four Corners, San Juan, Navajo, Cholla, Springville and Palo Verde).
Rockies – Network expanded for: 
Delivery Montana coal energy to coastal Pacific Northwest.
Deliver Wyoming and Colorado coal energy to Front Range
Deliver Utah coal energy to Wasatch Front and California.
Northwest – BPA network expanded for:
Delivery of increased hydro production and nuclear energy to Pacific Coast
Third AC intertie between California and Norhtwest.
Result is a single system covering the Western States were no party’s actions are independent of each other.
West recognized this interdependence early and organized a single reliability entity (WECC nee WSCC) as opposed to separate reliability organizations in the East.
Tension from loop flow disputes festered from closing of the Pacific Intertie to present because of mismatch between the system physics and a commercial model that assumed parties’ actions were independently reconcilable. 

## Slide 4

**Notes:**
Orange lines are High Voltage DC: BPA (Cililo) to LADWP (Sylmar) and Utah (Intermountain) to LADWP
Stress the interconnectedness of this region (one of your 4 points of integrity.
Bud – FYI here are nominal capacity ratings for various voltage classes:
Line Voltage	Capacity (MW) per Circuit 
> 1000		3100 
> 500		1500
> 345		700
> 287		475 
> 230		300
> 161		150 
> 138		110 
> 115		75
> 100		60
> 69			30
> 60			20
> 50			15 
> 46			12 
> 34.5		7

## Historical BackgroundEnter Open Transmission Access

- Energy Policy Act of 1992 – amended the Federal Power Act
- Industry proposed implementations
- FERC Policy Statement on Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs)
- Western systems respond: WRTA, NRTA & SWRTA
- IndeGO (Aug 1995 – Dec 1997)
- Northwest and Rocky Mountain utilities, led by PNUCC, developed concept of an independent grid operator (IndeGO)
- A number of participants remained skeptical about benefits
- No regulatory mandate to proceed after Order 888 tariffs became effective and became standard practice
- Died as a result of perceived “cost shifts” caused by pricing scheme

**Notes:**
2.1  A debate nearly as old as the industry was resolved in Energy Policy Act of 1992.
   a.  Federal Power Act of 1935 amended to give FERC the authority to order provision of transmission service to Eligible Electric Utilities.
   b.  Interpretation uncertain at first.  Case by case?  Generic Orders? 
2.2  Industry responded to uncertainty by proposing methods of implementation:
   a.  Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs) – WRTA, NRTA, SWRTA
   b.  Parties begin to consider whether joint operations would be beneficial:
	i.  Meetings among the Northwest parties to discuss whether action should be taken lead to a joint study under the auspices of PNUCC, that defined governance and functional options for a regional transmission organization.
	ii.  The PNUCC study led the IndeGO initiative, with the participation of most parties in the Northwest Power Pool and the Rocky Mountain Power Pool.
	• Regionally responsive governance developed.
	• The need for a single system view of transmission use recognized in a congestion management system and new forms of transmission rights.
	• A tariff written and pricing proposal made for recovery of fixed costs.

## Historical BackgroundFERC Order 888/889

- FERC Order 888 and 889 (April 1996)
- Required utilities to offer an open-access transmission tariff and functionally separate transmission from wholesale merchant
- Introduced concept of Independent System Operator (ISO)
- FERC’s vision for the future of electric transmission service
- Compliance tariffs implemented in 1997
- Implementation of Order 888 Open Access tariffs
- lessened the urgency of IndeGO development
- Uncertainties about IndeGO raised concerns by some parties
- IndeGO effort archived for future use

**Notes:**
2.3  In the meantime, FERC considers its options for implementation of EPAct:
   a.  First, comparable transmission access for RTGs, mergers and requests for market-based pricing authority.  (Note:  These requests were driven by surplus generation across the country that occurred due to the generation construction programs that assumed a growing economy and high priced oil, when instead there was an economic downturn and oil prices dropped).
   b.  As applicants accepted these terms, FERC determined that it could issue a generic rulemaking for all jurisdictional utilities and that ultimately led to Order No. 888.
   c.  To meet Order No. 888, the tight power pools (New England, New York and PJM) had to convert into Independent System Operators in order to retain pooling benefits and provide open access.
2.4  The full implementation of Order No. 888 occurred before the IndeGO Proposal was completed.  (Note:  Although Order No. 888 was issued in 1996, 1997 was the first full year on the new tariffs with functional separation of transmission from other activities of the owners.)
   a.  With experience operating under Order No. 888, the “devil we know” replaced the “unknown threat” of the previous years.
   b.  This gave a level of comfort, that when added to apparent surpluses of energy supplies, reduced the urgency to act on the IndeGO plan. 
   c.  There were also unresolved concerns about the IndeGO proposal itself:
	i. The pricing proposal, which included a plan to levelize prices over ten years, met with stiff opposition from the transmission customers of lower priced system;
	ii. Continuing concerns were expressed about protection of existing transmission rights; and
	iii. No one wanted the be the first to jump without knowing what the others would do (especially BPA). 
2.5  Most parties felt that eventually such a regional solution would be needed so the IndeGO materials were completed and archived for future use.  

## Grid West’s HistoryRTO West

- FERC Order 2000 (December 1999)
- RTO West organized in Northwest to respond to FERC Order 2000
- July 2002 – FERC initiates rulemaking on Standard Market Design (SMD)
- Summer 2003 – Regional Representatives reconvened to identify regional problems and opportunities
- Active participation by state utility regulators is critical
- Fall 2003 – 3 organizational options developed to address problems and opportunities
- December 2003 – Regional “Platform” Proposal developed to respond to regional problems and opportunities and to serve as foundation for further developmental work

**Notes:**
Then in December 1999, FERC issued Order 2000. While voluntary for FERC jurisdictional utilities, it described 4 characteristics and 8 functions that needed to be addressed by transmission owning utilities.
Shortly thereafter an organization called RTO West was formed to respond to Order 2000.
By October 2000 RTO West had developed its Stage 1 Filing, describing governance and an approach to further development.
FERC accepted the Stage 1 Filing in April 2001 and provided guidance for future filings.
By March 2002, the RTO West Stage 2 Filing was completed. It included adjustments to governance and proposals for pricing, congestion management, and ancillary services.
While FERC accepted the Stage 2 Filing, its significance was largely overshadowed by FERC’s Standard Market Design (SMD) rulemaking in July 2002.
For the remainder of 2002 parties worked on responses to the SMD rulemaking.
In 2003, as political opposition to SMD reached a crescendo, regional resistance to the RTO West Stage 2 Proposal also grew.
Nevertheless, regional transmission problems did not subside.
The RTO West organization reconvened the Regional Representative Group in the Summer of 2003
State utility regulators were invited and have actively participated ever since.
In June 2003 – Developed an analysis of regional transmission problems and opportunities 
September – Began considering options for addressing problems. 3 groups formed
December – A Regional Proposal laid out a framework for staged implementation that was accepted by the RRG as basis for further work

## Activities in 2004

- Name changed from RTO West to Grid West
- Drafted and adopted Developmental and Operational Bylaws
- Membership and fee structure established
- Transmission Service Liaison Group (TSLG) developed transmission services market design
- Risk/Reward Group formed to begin evaluation of benefits, costs, risks and mitigation strategies
**Grid West became a membership organization on December 15, 2004**

**Notes:**
In 2003, Regional stakeholders – the RRG – identified regional transmission problems and opportunities and developed a proposal to address them.
In 2004, the Regional Proposal advanced through discussions of the Regional Representatives Group and a work plan was developed.
The name was changed to Grid West to reflect that the proposal was developed from the problems and opportunities identified by the region rather than a response to a FERC mandate.
A group was assigned to draft Developmental and Operational Bylaws
A Membership structure for developmental stage was proposed
A technical team called the Transmission Service Liaison Group initiated activities to develop a functional transmission services model for Grid West that is responsive to the regional problems and opportunities.
A Risk/Reward Group has been formed to evaluate potential costs, benefits, risks and cost control strategies. The group is currently compiling responses to a survey of transmission owners and customers assessing the nature of specific transmission problems.
Grid West officially became a membership organization on December 15, 2004.  Grid West is currently welcoming applications for membership from all eligible entities that are interested in joining. 

## Regional Scope

**Over 62,000 circuit miles of transmission lines**
**Includes most transmission facilities shown in this region owned by the following companies:**
- Avista Corporation (AVA)
- Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
- BC Hydro (BCH)
- Idaho Power Corporation (IPC)
- Nevada Power (NP)
- NorthWestern Energy (NWE)
- PacifiCorp (PAC)
- Portland General Electric (PGE)
- Puget Sound Energy (PSE)
- Sierra Pacific (SP)

- Note: The Grid West proposal is designed to accommodate participation by Canadian transmission owners and operators in British Columbia and Alberta.

**Notes:**
The current scope of Grid West facilities extends well beyond the Columbia River Power System as defined in the Northwest Power Act.
From British Columbia to Nevada, and east to Utah, Wyoming and Montana, the power system has become more highly integrated and interdependent for economy and reliability.
Some of the transmission owning utilities are considering control area consolidation to improve the efficiency of providing regulating reserves.
Note that Alberta has its own independent system operator and is a frequent participant in the Grid West RRG.
The group of utilities on this slide I will call the “Grid West Funding Utilities”

## Ownership of Regional Transmission Facilities

**Notes:**
The total scope of transmission facilities owned by the principal utilities is a little more than 62,000 circuit miles with a net plant investment of almost $7.5 billion.

## Grid West StakeholdersRegional Representatives Group (RRG)

- Transmission providers
- Power producers
- End users, including state consumer advocates
- Public power (municipals, coops, PUDs)
- Environmental and other public interest organizations
- State and provincial regulators and siting agencies, and tribal officials

**Notes:**
A major aspect of Grid West development has been to include broad representation by regional stakeholders.
I am particularly appreciative of the representative from Montana stakeholders.
The Regional Representatives Group, or RRG, participants encompass transmission providers, power producers, end users, public power, environmental and other public interest organizations, and state, provincial, and tribal officials within this region.
Identify leaders (refer to RRG roster in the Briefing Binder under the Bylaws and Membership tab).

## Problems

- Rules and practices that prevent full utilization of transmission infrastructure
- Impediments to region-wide transactions
- Congestion management by curtailment
- Absence of organized market structures for certain grid operations services

**Notes:**
Problems identified in 2003 include rules and practices that prevent full utilization of transmission infrastructure
The lack of a system wide analysis of combined schedules requires each transmission operator to hold back greater capacity margins.
A Balkanized reservation and scheduling process that leaves transmission unavailable on a region-wide basis.
Impediments to region-wide wholesale power transactions.  
Rate Pancaking (volumetric recovery of fixed costs) imposes barriers to efficient resource integration and dispatch.
Separate reservations required for each system make transactions contingent upon multiple, individual—and possibly competing—system operators.
Long queues for interconnection and service requests—that may be on separate utilities without coordinated analysis.
Congestion management is accomplished by curtailment of wholesale power transactions
Curtailments force load serving utilities to purchase replacement energy on spot markets.
The highly localized spot markets that result are less likely to be competitive and prices may reflect near-monopoly conditions.
And existing market structures are unable to fully accommodate the characteristics of all power generating resources
For example, ancillary services, like capacity reserves and balancing energy, are only traded bilaterally among a limited number of qualified market participants. Independent power producers, who represent the competitive margin in the region are virtually shut out of ancillary service markets. Grid West will develop capacity and energy markets for these services. Such markets will benefit wind integration efforts.
In such an environment, it is no wonder that investment capital is difficult to attract for new infrastructure and integrated resource planning efforts lack a consistent economic framework for making resource decisions.

## Opportunities

- Improvements possible in system planning and expansion procedures
- Identify strategies for addressing aging infrastructure
- Backstop mechanism for transmission construction
- Facilitate multi-party agreements
- Support for regional market monitoring
- Increased availability of operational data and analytical tools available to reliability coordinator/authorities

**Notes:**
In addition to the problems,, opportunities to improve certain transmission functions were identified, including, 
Improvements to System Planning and Expansion procedures
Grid West would be the central, independent authority that would make certain that transmission lines are used as efficiently as possible and also would be the backstop organization that would ensure new lines are built where they are needed to ensure future reliability.
Aging infrastructure is becoming a more urgent problem. Improved planning approaches will help identify the most efficient replacement strategies.
The existing transmission planning process does not support Integrated Resource Planning processes that balance competing generation and transmission options
All users of an interconnected network benefit from system enhancements, however, the proportional benefits vary depending on the specific project design. Reaching agreement on measuring project benefits and allocating project costs is very difficult using current transmission contract and service structures.
In the absence of clear understanding of, and agreement on benefits and costs, project financing is inhibited.
Grid West’s service and pricing structure will provide clear access and cost benchmarks that support transmission services and expansion decisions.
Grid West provides an important opportunity to support regional market monitoring
Complaints to FERC, such as the Net-Purchasers request for refunds, are mired in litigation involving huge amounts of transactional data. We have found that hindsight provides little in the way of regulatory relief.
Grid West would provide regional market monitoring, and if authorized, enforcement and mitigation.
And finally, there are opportunities to improve reliability management functions—an important consideration in the aftermath of the August 2003 Blackout.
Currently 15 autonomous control area operators within the region independently commit portions of the interconnected network without knowledge of each other’s actions. While the PNSC is able to detect system problems in real-time, this leaves little time to resolve operational problems. A better option for reliably committing additional system utilization is to have a single independent organization with grid-wide visibility that manages scheduled uses of the regional transmission system.

## Stated Purposes of Grid West

- ...to serve as an independent transmission entity that endeavors to:
**improve reliability** of the regional transmission grid,
**improve efficiency** in its use,
**provide nondiscriminatory access** to transmission services and related markets,
- provide cost-effective regional transmission **planning and expansion**,
- to **develop solutions** **to operational and commercial problems** resulting from limited transmission capacity,
**support effective monitoring** of wholesale power markets and transmission related services.

**Notes:**
From Grid West Operational Bylaws, November 24, 2004, pg. 8
The Operational Bylaws set clear objectives for Grid West.
It should endeavor to:
improve reliability of the regional transmission grid, 
improve efficiency in its use,
provide nondiscriminatory access to transmission services and related markets,
provide cost-effective regional transmission planning and expansion,
develop solutions to operational and commercial problems resulting from limited transmission capacity
Finally,
Grid West would support and establish effective monitoring and mitigation of market power abuses and market manipulation within the Geographic Area.

## Development Stages of Grid West

**Development Stages of Grid West**

**Bylaws Adopted**

**Corporation Activation**
**Membership Process**

**Should a 5-member Developmental Board be elected?**

**TA negotiations w/ independent board**

**Should Grid West offer Transmission Agreements (TA)?**

**Should Grid West become Operational?**

**TA Offer Evaluation**
**Risk/Reward Study **

**December 2004**

**Member        vote**

**BPA process**

**BPA process**
**Technical Development, Risk Reward Analysis**

**RRG consensus**

**Establish funding commitments**

**2006**

**2007**

**BPA ROD process on TA**

**Open TA negotiations**

**TA signed**

**Draft Articles and Bylaws**

**Fall 2005**

_**Decision Point 1**_

_**Decision Point 2**_

_**Decision Point 3**_

_**Decision Point 4**_

- Note: Dates shown are the best current estimates and subject to change .

**Notes:**
The proposal involves an extended transition period with a separate set of developmental bylaws governing a Developmental Board that is created to negotiate Transmission Agreements and form the operational nonprofit corporation and its Board.
The Developmental Board of Trustees will conduct a vote of the Grid West members before deciding whether to move forward into an operational stage.

## Timelines for Developmental Board Seating

***Timelines for Developmental Board Seating***

***2005***

***Jan***

***Feb***

***Mar***

***Apr***

***May***

***Jun***

***Jul***

***Aug***

***Sep***

***Oct***

***Nov***

***Dec***

***Information Production = 170 days***

***Review Period = 100 days***

***Bylaws Req. = 50 - 75 days***

***Work Groups***

*******

**Notes:**
The current Work Plan for 2005 shows the activities that must be accomplished in order to seat the Developmental Board.
The first membership window is open now through April 29th. A second window opens at the end of September. Members need to be in place if they would like to vote for Member Representative Committee delegates that are responsible for electing the Developmental Board.

## Product Flow for Decision Point 2

_***Product Flow for Decision Point 2***_

***Data on Cost ***
***& Benefits***

***Conceptual ***
***Design Papers***

***Seminars***

***Public ***
***Review***
***Period***

***Interim***
***Board***

***Development ***
*** ******Funding Plan***

***Business Protocols***
***(bridge from conceptual  framework to detailed design)***

***Search***
***Firm***

***Board Candidate List***

***Decision Point 2 Assessment***

***Decision Point 2 Implementation***

***Work Groups***

***Filing Utilities***

***RRG/Members***

***Filing ***
***Utilities***

***TSLG***

***CCA***

***Risk & ***
***Reward***

***Pricing***

***Legal ***

***RRG***

***RRG***

***RRG***

***RRG***

***RRG***

***RRG***

***RRG***

***Interim Board ***

***Organizational Startup Preparations***
***(staffing, location, etc.)***

***Developmental Board – Detailed Design Phase:***
***(TA & Tariff Development, etc.) ***

***RRG***
***Assessment***
***Meeting***

***Dev.***
***Funding***
***Decision***

***Grid West***
***Election***
***Process***

***GW Dev.***
***Board***
***Seated***

***Membership***
*** ******Enrollment***

***Developmental ***
***Reports & Feedback***

***Ongoing***
***Feedback***

## Operational Stage

**5-member Developmental Board continues as caretaker board**

**9-member independent Operational Board elected as soon as practical**

**Grid West preparations for offering service**

**Grid West offers transmission services**

**2007**

**         **_**Special Issues voting**_** **
**Expansion of backstop authority (chronic congestion)**
**Change from Company Rate **
**Authorization to issue financial transmission rights **
**Granting authority to market monitor to penalize/intervene**
**Authorization to change loss methodology**

- ?

- ?

- ?

- Note: Dates shown are the best current estimates and subject to change .

**Notes:**
When developmental activities have been completed, and the member vote has been tallied, the Developmental Board would oversee the election of an Operational Board.
The Operational Board would be responsible for staffing and commencing Grid West operations.
It would be governed by Bylaws that have been written to ensure adherence to principles developed over the last four years since RTO West began coordination efforts in the region.
A list of Special Issues for consideration by the operational organization will be addressed through detailed governance provisions included in the bylaws.

## Development Principles

**Accountability to the Region**
**Independent, Merit-based Decisions**
**Preservation of Existing Transmission Rights**
**Compatibility with Hydroelectric System Operations**
**Improve Transmission Service and Reliability**
**Facilitate Integrated Resource Planning, Provide Transmission Adequacy and Appropriate Congestion Backstop**
**Effective, Regional Market Monitoring**
**Avoiding Complex, Costly Structure**

**Notes:**
Grid West Principles that affect Adequacy:
Accountability – detailed in next slide
Existing Transmission Rights will be Preserved
Grid West Regional Representatives unanimously see the necessity of providing sufficient transmission rights to all utilities that are responsible for reliably serving load.
There will be no mandatory auctioning of existing transmission rights
Rights that exist today, will be preserved in accordance with existing contracts
Rights holders may voluntarily elect to release portions of their existing rights for resale.
Grid West Markets are designed to be compatible with the Hydro System
Existing hydroelectric plant owners and operators will continue to own, operate and control their hydroelectric assets.
They will be able to voluntarily offer energy and capacity products to the Grid West managed market
Grid West will provide them with dispatch instructions only to the extent that they have offered to provide service from their resources. 
Service and Reliability coordination can be improved
System wide visibility of conditions on regional power system will reinforce Grid West’s operating role, however, existing control area and distribution system operators will continue to perform most of their current operational functions.
Technologies for secure optimization of transmission system use, that cannot be implemented in today’s fragmented structure, could be implemented by Grid West.
The NAPA report concludes that Grid West has the authority to adopt and enforce reliability standards.
Grid West would direct resources to Planning, Adequacy and Congestion Relief
Grid West, as an independent organization with system-wide information and advanced analytical tools, would facilitate integrated resource planning by regional utilities by creating the analytical framework that is absent today.
Where transmission system does not meet minimum adequacy standards, Grid West would authority to enforce minimum transmission adequacy standards.
As a last resort, Grid West would require someone else to build transmission and allocate the associated costs.
Where the effects of chronic congestion create economic hardship, Grid West would provide a forum for those seeking relief.
Grid West would support and provide regional Market Monitoring
The region needs an organization that can mitigate the effects of, or prevent market dysfunction
Because power markets extend throughout the Western Interconnection, the organization has an important role and relationship with adjacent organizations in multiple states and provinces.
Cost Control
Complete market design and obtain regulatory approvals before investing in systems
Negotiate vendor contracts that include incentives and risk sharing provisions
Implement systems that have flexibility and support multi-vendor solutions
Perform benefit/cost analysis on all proposed system changes
Leverage functionality developed in other markets
Use vendors with experience—avoid paying for new vendor development.

## Member Classes

- Major Transmitting Utilities
- Transmission-Dependent Utilities
- Generators, Power Marketers, Large Generating End-Use Consumers, and Others
- End-Use Consumers
- State and Provincial Energy Authorities, Tribes, Certain Public Interest Groups
- In general, each member class has the same voting power

**Notes:**
The five member classes in Grid West are: 
(a) Major Transmitting Utilities, 
(b) Transmission-Dependent Utilities,
(c) Generators and Power Marketers, including Large Generating End-Use Consumers, 
(d) a class of End-Use Consumers, and 
(e) State and Provincial Energy agencies, Tribes and Public Interest Groups.
The voting power within Grid West is structured so that, in general, each of the five member classes in Grid West has the same voting power as the other member classes. 
The one exception to this general rule is for the fifth member class, which is provided seven votes’ worth of weighted voting power, rather than six vote weighting that all the other member classes have.  The states now have five members in this class.

## System Integrity

- The integrity of a system can be measured by the extent to which it satisfies four basic conditions:
- Wholeness
- Coherence
- Connectedness
- Adaptability
- When a system, an organization, an alliance, is internally connected, when one action bears a close and meaningful relationship to another, and where the system as a whole can respond vitally and creatively to any kind of stress or change, the system displays a high degree of integrity.
- Integrity is critical to a robust, resilient, and stable system
- Grid West can be evaluated in comparison with the status quo, by whether it better satisfies these four basic conditions.
*–** **Elements of Integrity by Julian Glasser, 2003*

**Notes:**
Vision without Action is empty
Action without Vision is blind

## Questions and Answers

**Notes:**
In conclusion, the RRG has worked diligently to create an organizational structure and governance approach that reflects the region’s priorities for the future.
The Grid West Bylaws provide for an organization that is flexible and focused on regional needs.
Grid West’s Board of Trustees will be independent of market participants, but accountable to the region.
And Grid West will provide new avenues to address today’s transmission problems while capitalizing on ways to increase operational efficiency.
The region’s utilities must take action to address the regions problems. Grid West is the forum for the regional stakeholders to set the future course of action.