# Presentation: 517932

## Presented by:

**Presented by:**
**Robert M. Szozda**

**Uranium – 233 Disposition Project**
**Design Integration**

**Work Performed**
**Under DOE **
**Contract No. **
**DE-AC05-04OR228600**

**Notes:**
Speaking on behalf of the Project Team, the U-233 project is the most interesting, challenging and rewarding project we have ever been involved in

I would like to provide you an overview of the U233 Disposition Project
	Reasons for Project
	Scope
	Issues
	A specific benefit – medical isotopes

## Isotek Systems, LLC Includes:

**Isotek Systems, LLC Includes:**

| Duratek | Nuclear Fuel Services | Burns and Roe |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DOE Project Management
Nuclear Facility Operations
Waste Management
Facility Shutdown | Uranium and Special Nuclear Materials Processing
Commercial Nuclear Facility Operations
Safeguards and Security | Facility and Equipment Design
Engineering, Procurement & Construction Management
 |

**Notes:**
Because of the complex scope of work one company could not do the whole scope - LLC was put together to provide expertise to DOE in: 

In addition DOE required commercialization of the medical isotopes which resulted in a Priv Sector  Beneficial Use  program
	Isotek – management of production, marketing and distribution
	PNNL – R&D for isotope generators, tech support to isotope producers
	Commercial production partners – turn isotope commodity into an FDA 	approvable pharmaceutical

## Problem

- Uranium, including highly** **enriched uranium and **233**U stored in a Manhattan Project vintage facility.

- Continued **233**U storage in Building 3019A at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory represents a significant liability to the Department of Energy

**Situation**

**Notes:**
Situation: an excess inventory of U-233 exists
Building 3019 is the oldest continuous operating Hazard Cat 2 nuclear facility in the DOE complex and contains 1.5 tons of U including U233

Some of the inventory has been in place since the 1960s

Problem: The inventory is a liability
Inventory was the subject of DNFSB Recommendation 97-1, Safe Storage of U-233
	DOE issued an Implementation Plan in 1997 which committed to perform a study of alternatives to the continued storage of 233U

The material may have to be repackaged to address safety concerns if storage continued indefinitely

Cost of security is increasing in response to potential threats
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ID Mtl: 350 kg U-233 dioxide mixed with 14 tons of thorium and other oxides within unirradiated fresh fuel
Other inventories at LANL and LLNL are proposed by DOE to be consolidated with the Oak Ridge inventory

## Solution:  Department of Energy Initiated the U-233 Project to:

**Solution:  Department of Energy Initiated the U-233 Project to:**

- Eliminate the costs associated with storage of fissile material, criticality controls, and security

- Reduce long-term facility operating cost and prepare the material for safe low-cost long-term storage

- Provide medical isotopes for cancer research and treatment

**Notes:**
2001 DOE issued Excess Material Disposition Decision Memorandum No. 2 that discussed potential use of the material 
Alternatives:  
	Source of Bi-213 for possible cancer treatment
	Tag for HEU to allow ID of the source of uranium
	Fissile mtl for developing an advanced Th fuel cycle
Determined there was no programmatic use other than as a source of medical isotopes
Solution:
DOE ONE conducted a competitive procurement and awarded a contract in October 2003

There are 3 principal objectives of the work
	downblend the inventory to eliminate security and nuclear safety cost
	Package and move the downblended oxide to a less expensive 	storage facility 
	provide medical isotopes that are in short supply

## U-233 Project Work Phases

**Work is divided Into three distinct phases**

**Design**

**AuthorizationBasis**

**Safeguards& Security**

**Operational Readiness Review**

**233****U Processing**

**Blenddown**

**Staging**

**Safe****Shutdown**

**Phase 1**

**Bldg 3019****Operations**

**Transition**

**Ongoing S&M**

**Building 3019 Modifications**

**Phase 2**

**Phase 3**

**3 yrs**

**5.5 yrs**

**6 mo**

**Disposition at WIPP/NTS**

**Notes:**
DOE planned the work around 3 distinct phases:
	Phase I - Oct 03 to July 05
		Process design
		Development of the auth basis
		Design of security – we are conducting a new VA using new threat 			guidance to design security measures
		NEPA assessment – DOE completed an EA and FONSI

	Phase II – if awarded will be after review of the design and congressional 	approval of the business case (6.5 years and 2.5 of that is operations)
		Turn-over of facility operations from the incumbent contractor to Isotek
		Construction of processing equipment
		Commissioning
		Readiness Assessment
		Processing operations

	Phase III 0.5 years of process cleanout and equipment stabilization

## A Short History of the Building 3019 Complex

**A Short History of the Building 3019 Complex**

- National Repository for **233**U since 1962

- Pilot plant for numerous chemical recovery processes

- Originally constructed to separate Plutonium from Graphite Reactor spent fuel

- Chemical explosion in 1950s spread Pu, some of which is now fixed in place by coating

**Notes:**
			May 1943		Nov 1943
A little history:
Complex was constructed in 1943 as the chemical separations plant for the graphite rector – these pictures show construction in progress

Between 1943 and 1976, Building 3019A functioned as a pilot plant for radiochemical reprocessing technology including Purex and Thorex 

Became a national repository for U-233 1962

The core of the complex is the original building structure, which consists of seven shielded processing cells. 

Complicated facility to conduct construction due to:
	equipment that shut down but remains in place
	contamination from a 1950s incident that spread Pu contamination
	Massive walls several feet thick concrete
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------		Design of processes and equip must fit the footprint – used LASER			mapping to get exact dimensions for the processing foot print

## A Short History of 233U

- Released from DOE Defense Programs inventory as excess

- Made by neutron irradiation of natural thorium (Th-232) – possible alternative to enrichment

**Notes:**
A little history of the material:
Made by irradiating natural thorium (Th-232) with neutrons in a reactor
	Natural Th is readily available in monazite sands in the US and Brazil
	Was believed to be easier to chemically separate 233U from Th than to use 	separate 235U from 238U 
	viewed as a strategic alternative to enrichment

Over 2000 kg produced between OR, HAN and SRS

Use of 233U in fuel cycle was ultimately abandoned in favor of lower cost low-enriched uranium 

## Characteristics of 233U Present Design Challenges

**Dose:**  1 ml sample is 2-4 R/hr at 1 cm, some canisters 300 R/hr due to 232U daughter 208Tl, that emits a 2.6 MeV gamma-ray

- Physical properties require heavily shielded hot cells with extensive contamination, radiation, criticality, and security controls

**Notes:**
The material presents special design challenges
Storage and handling requirements for fissile materials must take into consideration containment, criticality control, safeguards, and shielding 

233U has some similar properties to highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium 
	Specific activity is 3 orders of magnitude > U235
	Critical mass is 1/3 to 1⁄4 of that of U-235
	From a security perspective it is in the same category as Pu-239

The inventory is not uniform in isotopic composition and depends on the source and how it was used
Uranium-232 is present along with U-233 at concentrations ranging from 1 to about 220 parts per million (ppm) that results in a daughter Tl-208. 
	Lab samples are 2-4 R/hr requiring special handling
	Canisters can be up to 300 R/hr resulting in design of multi-layer 	several foot thick shielding in hot cells

## Characteristics of 233Uin Building 3019A

- The monolith represents more than 2/3 of the material and contains about 19% cadmium and 3% gadolinium.

- Organic materials are not expected; if present will be removed during pre-treatment.

- Current packaging: double containment, stainless steel, aluminum, welded/bolted, glass, plastic, vermiculite.

**Characteristics**** ****of ****233****U****in Building 3019A**

##  Some Representative Canister Types 

**Notes:**
These are representative pictures of the canisters

Typically 3 3/4 inch outside diameter and varying lengths

The top set of containers are those used for the U oxide monolith
	24-inch long 3 1⁄2 inch diameter welded steel inner container contained in an 	outer jacket for contamination control

The majority of the containers are can inside can inside a can as shown in the lower 2 examples

Retrieved from the tube vaults by magnetic or vacuum lifting device

## Summary of 233U Downblending         & Dispositioning

**In-process **
**Storage**

**Inner Container**

**Notes:**
This is representation of the process

Chemically simple  - U dissolves in nitric acid

The process is more lab scale than production plant scale with a thru-put of approximately 18 kg per week on the average – 7 batches of oxide monolith

The challenge is to handle the range of containers and forms of U, and provide >95% recovery of the 40g of Th-229

The process will start with sorting .......
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Down Blend tank will initially be filled to a specified level with DUN 
DUN will be re-circulated through an eductor, where it will be mixed with a small stream of HEUN coming from a predetermined volume held in the HEU Head Columns
The eductor is utilized so that a HEUN addition to an empty Blend Tank cannot occur
CEUSP 120:1  High Purity 200:1 => increase a factor of 300 (approx 450T)

## Controls are Part of theDesign Basis

- Shielding designed for < 0.5 mR/hr for occupied work areas

- Pipes and tanks limited to 4 inches in diameter

- Slab tanks or sumps  limited to 1 inch depth

**R/hr**

**mR/hr**

**Notes:**
Radiological control, nuclear criticality safety and contam control are essential components of design – guidance to designers developed early on
	Dose mapping established shielding requirements to ensure doses 	are less than 0.5 mR/hr

	Geometry (size, shape, volume) and interaction (spacing, separation, 	isolation) control design up to where downblending occurs

	Pipes and tanks are limited to 4 inch diameter. 

	The dissolvers exceed 4 inches to allow the U monolith canisters to be placed 	inside and are mass controlled

	Tanks and sumps are limited to 1 inch depth

## Major Capabilities Added toBuilding 3019A Include

**Major Capabilities Added to****Building 3019A Include**

- New shielded hot cell with manipulators for canister opening,  pretreatment, and dissolution
- Adding equipment to existing shielded cell for NMC&A measurement, and downblending

**Notes:**
Adding major capabilities to the facility because there is no current processing infrastructure for this material

New hot cell for inspection, canister opening, pretreatment, dissolution and waste packaging with 4 manipulator  stations 

Modifying an original cell for safe tank storage, NMC&A measurement and downblending activities. 

New hot cell for thorium extraction, purification, packaging and storage with 5 manipulator stations 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chloride elution – and use of IX to separate Pu and U 

## Major Capabilities Added toBuilding 3019A (cont.)

**Major Capabilities Added to****Building 3019A (cont.)**

- Adding equipment for denitration and product packaging
- Installing new analytical labs, shielded glove boxes and a process off-gas scrubber

**Notes:**
After downblending adding an area for 
	Uranyl nitrate concentration by an evaporator (1000gU/l)
	Denitration with 3 rotary trough denitrators to convert UN to UO3
	Oxide conversion furnace to convert the UO3 to a more stable 	U3O8
	Product packaging and container sealing

Also adding equipment 
	to existing labs for analysis 
	glove boxes for resin handling
	a NOx scrubber
	waste tanks
	NDA equipment for measuring waste containers 

## Key Technical Issues Addressedin Design Phase

**Key Technical Issues Addressed****in Design Phase**

-  Dissolution rate
-  Denitration technology
-  Radon hold-up in off-gas systems
-  Product packaging
-  Security prior to and during processing

**Notes:**
Key Technical issues
	Dissolution rate – process development to optimize dissolution 	parameters (molarity, temperature, pH, circulation rate) to dissolve quickly without 	foaming and overflow

	Th separation/purification – ORNL developed the process and Isotek did PD to 	ensure >95% recovery of 40g Th in the variety...

	Denitration – did PD for in-situ and rotary trough in parallel 
		Insitu – no powder handling, simpler – spattering, peak NOx emissions
		RT – proven at Y-12 and Hanford, lower peak NOx emissions, more 		moving parts, powder handling

	Isotope partitioning – looked at separation of daughters an daughter 	ingrowth and modeled shielding

	Rn Holdup – how much will be generated; how many HL delay necessary to meet 	discharge limit; how much hold up exists in vent system; method of providing 	additional hold up.

	Product packaging – type of container for Th inventory [100mCi batches for 	isotope producers]
	Security – most effective methods to address the new DBT

## Downblending Process

## Depleted Uranium  

- Approximately 210 MTU needed for testing and processing:
- 	  2 MTU in 2011
- 	26 MTU per quarter beginning in 2012

- The DU must meet transportation regulations.
- The DU must meet NFS license conditions relative to fission product and transuranic attributes in incoming material:
-  Less than 0.25 millicuries of fission products per gram of
-    uranium
-  Less than 10E-6 grams of plutonium per gram of uranium
-  Less than 1.5E-5 grams of transuranic materials (including
-    plutonium) per gram of uranium
- The DU must exhibit less than 0.1% insolubles when dissolved in nitric acid.

## ESH&Q Status

***ESH&Q Integrated fully into project design***

**ESH&Q Status**

***Safety Analysis***

***Nuclear Criticality ***
***Safety ***

***Training***

***Emergency Preparedness***

***Quality Assurance***

***Waste Management***

***Environmental Protection***

***Occupational Safety & Health***

***Radiological Control ***

##     Independent Assessment (IA)

**“****The IA Team concluded that Isotek is ready to assume operation and management activities for Building 3019 Complex contingent on completion of the M2 List of open items and resolution of the two IA pre-mobilization findings.”**

- Proficiencies included:
* “**it was obvious that integrated organization was working well”*
* “**Isotek management’s approach, communication, and attitude are exemplary”*

**    ****Independent Assessment (IA)**

*“**. . . I have reviewed the evidence of completion for these M2 items and found it complete. . . This concludes actions by the IA Team.”*
- 			Julie Wallen, IA Team Designee

##       Integrated Safety Design 

- Implemented the 10 CFR 830 requirements for integration of safety basis with the design and operation of the modifications to the existing facility following ISMS:
**First integrated design meeting in December 2003**
**Major integrated design meetings about every 60 days**
**UT-Battelle personnel for facility knowledge and experience**
**NFS personnel for process design and operations experience**
**BREI personnel for nuclear facility upgrade experience**
**Merrick personnel for hot cell design experience**
**Designated Operations Manager with nuclear facility upgrade experience**
**Supporting safety staff with DOE facility safety and operations experience**
- Design concepts reviewed for technical feasibility of meeting both defined DOE safety requirements and safety requirements resulting from safety analysis of the modifications following ISMS Core Functions.

##    Defined Design Requirements

**ESH Design Expectations** provided to all personnel from December 2003 to about August 2004
- Early definition of hazardous chemical design expectations including **Waste Acceptance Criteria**
- Established a** Work Smart Standards Set**
**10 CFR 830** requirements
**DOE O 420.1A** design for nuclear safety, fire protection, nuclear criticality prevention, and natural phenomena resistance
**DOE G 420.1-1** for nuclear safety defined design requirements
- Early definition of fire protection requirements from **DOE-STD-1066**
- Early independent review of **DOE O 420.1A** nuclear criticality design requirements with DOE criticality safety branch
- Integrated defined design requirements from **DOE G 420.1-2** for natural phenomena hazard mitigation, using **DOE-STD-1020**

## Operations Design Input

**Essential that Operations is Integrated Early in Design**
**System Owner and Operator**
**Ensures appropriate integration between various support organizations**
-  Safety Analysis
-  Nuclear Criticality Safety
-  Environmental Safety & Health
-  Radiation Protection

## Operations Design Input

- Essential For Design Team to Understand the Hazards and Required Controls
- High Rad Levels – Dose Mapping needs to be Completed at the Conceptual Stage
- Involve Operations and Maintenance Staff in the Design
- Hot Cell Technicians
- Manipulator Repair Personnel
- Single Point Failure
- Remote Work – Mock Up as Much as Possible even the Simple Activities

## Operations Design Input

**Experience Pays High Dividends**
- Site Specific Experience – ORNL, Y-12, LANL,....
- DOE Department Experience – EM, NE, NNSA, ..
- Isotope Specific Experience – U-233
- Chemical Processing Experience – Uranium Processing – NFS
- Remote Operations
**The more Unique the System, The Higher the Return on Experience**
**Complete Job Hazard Analysis as early as possible**

## Lessons Learned

**Communication, Communication, Communication**
- Site visits ~ 1 day of pay
**Integrate Design at the Conceptual Stage**
- Denitration
**Strong ES&H is necessary for Complex Systems**
**Establish Design Basis Early**
- Evolves with Design
**Establish Operations interface for all disciplines and systems**** **
- System Engineers
- Operations Supervisors
- Technical Support Personnel

## Lessons Learned

**Multiple Design Firms – Establish a Single Design Process**
**Work Closely with Your Customer**
- Early Design – Be Conservative
- Involve All Disciplines (Rad Protection, Crit. Safety, Env., ES&H, ...)
- Reveal All – All Things Are Discovered – Just a Matter of When
**Make Progress on Big Issues Early**
**Stay Informed – Rules, Expectation, Approach, Regulation Changes Daily**