# Presentation: 936703

## Mission Readiness Review

- GSFC/LaRC Integrated Program Management Council
- August 26, 2005

## Agenda

*Agenda*

- 12:30 PM	Welcome/Introduction			Presenter – Dale Schultz
- 12:35 PM	Mission Description				Presenters – Winker/ 								  Cramer/ Wells
- 1:05 PM	Flight System Readiness			Presenters -  Wells/ 								      Belon
- 2:50 PM	****Break****
- 3:00 PM	Mission Operations Readiness		Presenter - Cisewski
- 3:45 PM	Launch Vehicle Readiness			Presenters – Calvert/ 								     Goser
- 4:45 PM	Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)	Presenter - Goans
- 5:15 PM	Communications Plan			Presenter - Cagle
- 5:30 PM	Project Closing Statements			Presenter - Obenschain
- 5:40 PM	IPMC Discussion
- 6:00 PM	****END****

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## 
“The purpose of the CALIPSO Mission Readiness Review (MRR) is to provide GSFC/LaRC Management with an opportunity to assess the readiness of the CALIPSO mission for launch and on-orbit operations and to provide the documented basis for certifying to NASA Headquarters (HQ) that the mission is, in fact, ready for launch.”

	The CALIPSO MRR outcome will be documented via letter from the GSFC and LaRC Center Directors to the NASA HQ Science Directorate certifying that the mission is ready for launch.

*“**The purpose of the CALIPSO Mission Readiness Review (MRR) is to provide GSFC/LaRC Management with an opportunity to assess the readiness of the CALIPSO mission for launch and on-orbit operations and to provide the documented basis for certifying to NASA Headquarters (HQ) that the mission is, in fact, ready for launch.”*
- 	The CALIPSO MRR outcome will be documented via letter from the GSFC and LaRC Center Directors to the NASA HQ Science Directorate certifying that the mission is ready for launch.

*Statement of Purpose*

**NASA / SCHULZ**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## AGENDA- Mission Description -

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Mission science objectives and investigation strategy
- Science team preparations and readiness
- Full and minimum success criteria
- Residual risk summary
- Mission system design overview
- Mission operations and data distribution overview
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

**NASA / SCHULZ**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Readiness Review- MISSION DESCRIPTION -

- Dave Winker
- Bryant Cramer
- Jim Wells
- August 26, 2005

## Mission Objectives

*Mission Objectives*

-     Improve the representation of aerosols and clouds in models
- Improved predictions of climate and weather
- Improved models of atmospheric chemistry

- Improve understanding of the role of aerosols and clouds in the processes that govern climate responses and feedbacks
- – Direct and indirect aerosol effects
- – Cloud forcing and feedbacks

- CALIPSO will fly as part of the Aqua constellation (A-train) to provide observations needed to:

**NASA / WINKER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## 705 km, sun-synchronous orbit (1:30 PM)
Three co-aligned instruments:
CALIOP: Polarization LIDAR
532 nm || and  1064 nm
0 – 40 km altitude, 30 - 60 m
IIR: Imaging Infrared Radiometer
8.6 um, 10.5 um, 12 um
64 km swath, 1 km IFOV
WFC: Wide-Field Camera
645 nm
61 km swath, 125 m IFOV 

- 705 km, sun-synchronous orbit (1:30 PM)
- Three co-aligned instruments:
- CALIOP: Polarization LIDAR
- 532 nm || and  1064 nm
- 0 – 40 km altitude, 30 - 60 m
- IIR: Imaging Infrared Radiometer
- 8.6 um, 10.5 um, 12 um
- 64 km swath, 1 km IFOV
- WFC: Wide-Field Camera
- 645 nm
- 61 km swath, 125 m IFOV

**NASA / WINKER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Science Team Preparations and Readiness

- Production system “launch ready”
- Demonstrated fully automated end-end operations (June 2005)
- Data products are compliant with the CALIPSO Data Products Catalog
- Validation plans in place
- Development on track to support L+180 data release
_**Science Segment ready for Launch and Payload Checkout**_

**NASA / WINKER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Success

_**Level 1 Mission Requirements:**_
- Acquire 3-years of aerosol and cloud observations from CALIOP, IIR, and WFC in formation with Aqua
- Process data to produce aerosol and cloud data products
- Distribute calibrated Level 1 and 2a data products: L+180 days
- Distribute Cal/Val data: Spring 2007
_**Minimum Success:**_
- Acquire and process CALIPSO observations to produce:
-         The first high resolution (60 m) global profiles of clouds and aerosols with a backscatter sensitivity of at least 1 x 10-3 /km/sr at 532 nm.
-         The first global high resolution (60 m) profiles of cloud ice/water phase.
-         A comprehensive data set including seasonal cloud and aerosol properties to be acquired over periods including 3 months each during summer and winter (Jun-Aug and Dec-Feb), and 2 additional months (April, October) in the spring and the fall.
-       All measurements are expected to be coincident with other A-train satellite observations.
-         Success is defined as a significant improvement over our current knowledge of the global characteristics of multi-layer cloud structure and the vertical distribution of aerosols.

**NASA / WINKER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Description-RESIDUAL RISK SUMMARY-

- Bryant Cramer

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Residual Risk

- Definition: A Residual Risk is the risk that remains once all of the mitigations have been implemented
- A Residual Risk can have three components:
- Risk to personnel (pre-launch)
- Risk to flight hardware and/or facilities (pre-launch)
- Risk to mission success (post-launch)
- Residual Risks are scored on a 5x5 matrix

**NASA / CRAMER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background

**> 0.1**

**0.1**

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

*Residual Risk Scoring*

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /              no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss   $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss  $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss  >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation    Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy, Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

*Background*

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

**NASA / CRAMER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Residual Risk Summary

- Residual
- Risk
- List

- IPMC Actions

- RFAs

- NFRs

- MDRs

- Project Risk
- Database

- Safety

- Repairs

- Use-As-Is

- Cannot Duplicate

- Environmental

- External

- Sources of Residual Risks

- 4

- 1

- 0

- 5

- 0

- 0

- 16

- 16

- 0

- 4

- 9

- 13

- 0

- 0

- 3

- 3

- 0

- 0

- 3

- 3

- 0

- 1

- 1

- 2

**NASA / CRAMER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Residual Risks Statistics

- 42

- 5

- 37

- 2

- 3

- 12

- 25

- 1

- 2

- 0

- 2

- 23

- 2

- 2

- 0

- 8 Residual Risks to be Discussed

- “one”

- _>_ “two”

- 4 Yellow Risks

- Total

- Prelaunch

- Project Only

- 2nd Opinion

- Agree

- Disagree

- Project Only

- 2nd Opinion

- Agree

- Disagree

- “one”

- _>_ “two”

- Postlaunch

- Note:
- 1,1 vs 1,2 = “one”
- 1,1 vs 1,3 = “two”
- 1,1 vs 2,2 = “two”

**NASA / CRAMER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Description-Mission System Design Overview-

- NASA / Jim Wells

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## System Description

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Satellite Overview

*Satellite Overview*

**Payload (PL)**
**Built by Ball Aerospace & Technology Corporation (BATC) (LaRC Contract)**
**Science Instruments**
**LIDAR**
**WFC**
**IIR (contributed by CNES)**
**Payload Controller**
**Science Data Sub-System**
**Solid State Recorder**
**X-Band Transmitter (XBT)**
**X-Band Antenna**
**Platform (PF)**
**Contributed by CNES (Alcatel built)**
**Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) PROTEUS platform**
**Services:**
**Power Generation, Storage & Distribution**
**Attitude and Orbit Control**
**Command Control**
**S-Band Telemetry System**
**Thermal Control**
**Satellite Health Monitoring**

**Platform**

**Payload**

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Payload

**LIDAR Lasers**

**LIDAR Telescope**

**Wide Field Camera**

**Imaging Infrared**
**Radiator  **

**X-Band Antenna**

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Segment Summary

**Launch Site: Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), CA**
**Boeing Delta II 7420 Launch Vehicle (LV)**
**Delta II 10 foot (3 meter) composite fairing**
**Dual launch with Standard height Dual Payload Attach Fitting (DPAF)**
**CALIPSO upper berth**
**CloudSat lower berth**
**Instantaneous launch window 03:01:05 PDT (depending on launch day) **

- Simulated photo

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Description-Mission Operations and Data Distribution Overview-

- NASA / Jim Wells

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Operations Overview - Roles and Responsibilities -

*Mission Operations Overview **- Roles and Responsibilities -*

**Assessment Phase**

**Observational Phase**

**Mission Operations consists of an **_***integrated***_** NASA/CNES team.**

**Mission Management**
***CALIPSO Joint Steering Group***

**NASA / WELLS**

**LEAD**

**LEAD**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Command / Health and Status Data  (5 contacts per day nominal)
 S-band Network
Primary Sites:  Kiruna, Sweden;  Aussaguel France
Launch & Early Orbit Phase (LEOP) support provided using existing NASA JPL/Jason Mission Infrastructure and additional CNES 2 GHz ground stations
Jason Control Center, Poker Flats (AGS), and Wallops Flight Facility ( WFF)
Command transmission managed by Satellite Operations Control Center (SOCC)
CALIPSO Platform commands developed and uplinked from SOCC (once per day nominal)
CALIPSO Payload commands developed at Mission Operations Control Center (MOCC), encrypted, and transferred to SOCC for transmission (once per week nominal)
Housekeeping Telemetry (HKTM) stream real-time stream monitored at SOCC
Recorded Payload Telemetry (PLTM) data monitored at MOCC

Science Data (1 contact per day nominal)
Universal Space Networks (USN) stations in Alaska (prime) and Hawaii (backup)
 USN performs Level 0 processing / Delivery to LaRC Atmospheric Science Data Center (ASDC) 
 Science Team performs science data processing (SIPS model)
 NASA LaRC ASDC (i.e. DAAC) performs archival and distribution 

-  S-band Network
- Primary Sites:  Kiruna, Sweden;  Aussaguel France
- Launch & Early Orbit Phase (LEOP) support provided using existing NASA JPL/Jason Mission Infrastructure and additional CNES 2 GHz ground stations
- Jason Control Center, Poker Flats (AGS), and Wallops Flight Facility ( WFF)
- Command transmission managed by Satellite Operations Control Center (SOCC)
- CALIPSO Platform commands developed and uplinked from SOCC (once per day nominal)
- CALIPSO Payload commands developed at Mission Operations Control Center (MOCC), encrypted, and transferred to SOCC for transmission (once per week nominal)
- Housekeeping Telemetry (HKTM) stream real-time stream monitored at SOCC
- Recorded Payload Telemetry (PLTM) data monitored at MOCC
- Science Data (1 contact per day nominal)
- Universal Space Networks (USN) stations in Alaska (prime) and Hawaii (backup)
-  USN performs Level 0 processing / Delivery to LaRC Atmospheric Science Data Center (ASDC)
-  Science Team performs science data processing (SIPS model)
-  NASA LaRC ASDC (i.e. DAAC) performs archival and distribution

*Mission Operations Overview**- Operational Data Flow - *

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## AGENDA- Flight System Readiness -

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- Payload hardware/software status
- Satellite hardware/software status
- Satellite integration and test status
- Verification and validation results
- Software Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V)
- Orbitial debris analysis and disposal plan
- Anomalies and resolution
- Launch commit criteria
- Launch day management go/no-go decision flow
- Top Residual Risks
- Documentation status and open paperwork
- Open actions
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Readiness Review- FLIGHT SYSTEM READINESS -

- NASA / Jim Wells
- CNES / Bruno Belon
- NASA / Steve Pukanski
- August 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Flight System Hardware/Software Status -

- NASA / Jim Wells
- CNES / Bruno Belon

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## All Payload Re-Worked Items Have Been Successfully Re-Qualified and Re-Test Verified.
All Instruments Are Meeting Ground-Measurable Performance Requirements.
Lidar
IIR
WFC
All Payload “Infrastructure” Hardware Components Are Meeting Ground-Measurable Performance Requirements.
Payload Controller (PLC)
XBT and Antenna
Structure and Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI)

Payload Hardware Ready for Flight.

- All Instruments Are Meeting Ground-Measurable Performance Requirements.
- Lidar
- IIR
- WFC
- All Payload “Infrastructure” Hardware Components Are Meeting Ground-Measurable Performance Requirements.
- Payload Controller (PLC)
- XBT and Antenna
- Structure and Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI)
_**Payload Hardware Ready for Flight.**_

*Payload Hardware Status*

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## All Payload (PL) Software Testing Successfully Completed.
All PL Software Test Requests (STRs) / Software Change Requests (SCRs) Closed.
PL Controller Emulator System (PCES) Automated Colorado System Test & Operations Language (CSTOL) Procedure Continually Exercises the PL Flight Software as the PL is Operated on Orbit.
Available PL Flight Software Contingency Uploads:
CALIPSO-SCR-028, Single Event Latch-up (SEL) Induced Soft Reset Loop
PL Flight Software Configuration Control Board (CCB) Approved CALIPSO-SCR-028 for Implementation
Modification Verified On the PCES (Payload Verification Not Required)
PL Flight Software Nominal Operations Image (NOI) Tele-Command (TC) Groups Have Been Generated for Upload
CALIPSO-SCR-029, Single Event Upset (SEU) Memory Scrub Enhancements
PL Flight Software CCB Approved CALIPSO-SCR-029 for Implementation
Modification Verified On the PCES (Payload Verification Not Required)
PL Flight Software NOI TC Groups Have Been Generated for Upload

Payload Flight Software Ready for Flight.

- All PL Software Test Requests (STRs) / Software Change Requests (SCRs) Closed.
- PL Controller Emulator System (PCES) Automated Colorado System Test & Operations Language (CSTOL) Procedure Continually Exercises the PL Flight Software as the PL is Operated on Orbit.
- Available PL Flight Software Contingency Uploads:
- CALIPSO-SCR-028, Single Event Latch-up (SEL) Induced Soft Reset Loop
- PL Flight Software Configuration Control Board (CCB) Approved CALIPSO-SCR-028 for Implementation
- Modification Verified On the PCES (Payload Verification Not Required)
- PL Flight Software Nominal Operations Image (NOI) Tele-Command (TC) Groups Have Been Generated for Upload
- CALIPSO-SCR-029, Single Event Upset (SEU) Memory Scrub Enhancements
- PL Flight Software CCB Approved CALIPSO-SCR-029 for Implementation
- Modification Verified On the PCES (Payload Verification Not Required)
- PL Flight Software NOI TC Groups Have Been Generated for Upload
_**Payload Flight Software Ready for Flight.**_

*Payload Flight Software Status*

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## All Platform Re-Worked Items Have Been Successfully Re-Qualified and Re-Test Verified
All open issues at the Satellite Qualification Review (Mar 05) were closed and approved by a Delta Satellite Qualification Review (May 05) and the Satellite Readiness Briefing Status (Jun-Aug 05)
220V event 
Solar array drive mechanism life test and detection of canonical position
GPS receiver 
Computer mass memory
Remaining activities are nominally identified in launch campaign schedule
Fueling
Battery charging and current compensation

Platform Hardware Ready for Flight.

- All open issues at the Satellite Qualification Review (Mar 05) were closed and approved by a Delta Satellite Qualification Review (May 05) and the Satellite Readiness Briefing Status (Jun-Aug 05)
- 220V event
- Solar array drive mechanism life test and detection of canonical position
- GPS receiver
- Computer mass memory
- Remaining activities are nominally identified in launch campaign schedule
- Fueling
- Battery charging and current compensation
_**Platform Hardware Ready for Flight.**_

*Platform Hardware Status*

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Platform Flight Software Status

- All Platform Software Testing Completed.
- Since beginning of the project, performed more than 494 software dedicated tests by Alcatel software team
- Last issue 3.16 related to filtering of reed relays sensors information for SADM management
- 32 dedicated tests at software level were conducted to demonstrate evolution and regression of this last issue
- Final software review held on 25 May on issue 3.16 before upload (26 May) on Satellite at Vandenberg
- Review also checked software documentation, complementary analysis,  budgets, real time and anomaly (including for software benches).
- Software exercised during Satellite “Last Test” and Atmospheric Test.
_**Platform (PF) Flight Software Ready for Flight.**_

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Satellite-level Validationby Benches 

- Satellite validation including anomalous situations is performed on 3 main dedicated benches on which platform On-Board Software (OBSW) is implemented
- Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) numerical bench allowing closed loop with environment
- Power Hardware bench (for new battery management)
- Satellite system bench which includes hardware units forall critical equipment units including Data Handling Unit (DHU) and Payload High Fidelity Simulator (HFS)
- 7 system tests were conducted with last3.16 OBSW issue for regression purpose
- Finally, more than 60 tests were dedicated to CALIPSO configuration, to be added to 375 testscoming from Jason1 configuration for whichregression was analyzed
- Key Point on 26 May and last post test review on 28 Jun.
_**All Related Items Are Closed and Ready for Flight.**_

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Satellite Integration & Test -

- CNES / Bruno Belon

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## The Satellite passed all the environmental tests successfully:
Mechanical  (sine, acoustic, separation) : Results confirmed by Launch provider.  Acoustics tests were repeated following Payload re-mating.
Thermal
Electro magnetic compatibility (conducted, radiated)
The Satellite passed all the functional tests successfully:
Platform level health checks
Payload level health checks
Initial and final Performance Verification Tests (Platform and Payload)
Mission Profile Tests on nominal and redundant satellite configuration
“Last Test” at VAFB
Atmospheric Test at VAFB

- Mechanical  (sine, acoustic, separation) : Results confirmed by Launch provider.  Acoustics tests were repeated following Payload re-mating.
- Thermal
- Electro magnetic compatibility (conducted, radiated)
- The Satellite passed all the functional tests successfully:
- Platform level health checks
- Payload level health checks
- Initial and final Performance Verification Tests (Platform and Payload)
- Mission Profile Tests on nominal and redundant satellite configuration
- “Last Test” at VAFB
- Atmospheric Test at VAFB

*Satellite AIT Status**- Activities Completed - *

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Additional VAFB Payload Testing Successfully Completed
X-Band Transmitter RF Re-test
Worst Case Link Margin (10deg EL/10e-6 BER) : 5.07 dB Alaska, 3.8 dB Hawaii
Active Boresite Mechanism (ABM) Re-test
Solar Array/Integrated LIDAR Transmitter [ILT] Radiator MLI Interference check – Passed and Configuration approved by CNES/Alcatel
Satellite Cleanliness Verification Completed
Entire Payload Inspected and Cleaned as Necessary 11 Aug
All Instrument Optical Surfaces are Within Contamination Budgets
Entire Platform inspected and Cleaned as Necessary 16 Aug

- X-Band Transmitter RF Re-test
- Worst Case Link Margin (10deg EL/10e-6 BER) : 5.07 dB Alaska, 3.8 dB Hawaii
- Active Boresite Mechanism (ABM) Re-test
- Solar Array/Integrated LIDAR Transmitter [ILT] Radiator MLI Interference check – Passed and Configuration approved by CNES/Alcatel
- Satellite Cleanliness Verification Completed
- Entire Payload Inspected and Cleaned as Necessary 11 Aug
- All Instrument Optical Surfaces are Within Contamination Budgets
- Entire Platform inspected and Cleaned as Necessary 16 Aug

*Satellite AIT Status**- Activities Completed - *

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Remove Before Flight Items Will Be Removed During Final Satellite Closeouts as Defined in PC-SAT-666 Appendix H 
Hard/Soft Cover Removal & Beam Expander Optics (BEO)/WFC “Tear-Away” Covers Installed 26 Aug
Hard Covers: Telescope, BEOs, WFC, IIR
Soft Covers (for Nitrogen Purges): Telescope, BEOs
Telescope Hard Cover Attachment Points MLI Close Out 26 Aug
Prior to 29 Aug Boeing Handover 
Perform PL Spot Cleaning as Necessary per Procedure PC-PLD-628. 
Remove Temporary Telescope Drape & Install PL Bagging Prior to Boeing Handover
Platform Fueling
After Boeing Handover
Remove PL Bagging @ L-6 days
Remove BEO and WFC “Tear-Away” Covers @ L-19 hours
Platform Battery charging and current compensation, Dry Run @ L-19 days

- Hard/Soft Cover Removal & Beam Expander Optics (BEO)/WFC “Tear-Away” Covers Installed 26 Aug
- Hard Covers: Telescope, BEOs, WFC, IIR
- Soft Covers (for Nitrogen Purges): Telescope, BEOs
- Telescope Hard Cover Attachment Points MLI Close Out 26 Aug
- Prior to 29 Aug Boeing Handover
- Perform PL Spot Cleaning as Necessary per Procedure PC-PLD-628.
- Remove Temporary Telescope Drape & Install PL Bagging Prior to Boeing Handover
- Platform Fueling
- After Boeing Handover
- Remove PL Bagging @ L-6 days
- Remove BEO and WFC “Tear-Away” Covers @ L-19 hours
- Platform Battery charging and current compensation, Dry Run @ L-19 days

*Satellite AIT Status**- Remaining Work -*

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Verification and Validation -

- CNES / Bruno Belon
- NASA / Jim Wells

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Design Verification Matrix (DVM) to Satellite Specification:
 CNES compliance:
Total requirements for CNES:			48
Compliant:				44
Open:				4  (See Next Chart)
 	Alcatel compliance:
Total requirements for Alcatel: 		159
Compliant: 				150 
Compliant with approved Deviation request:	9
NASA compliance:
Total Requirements for NASA:  		61
Compliant :				30
Compliant with approved Deviation request:	31

All Satellite Deviation Requests are approved.

-  CNES compliance:
- Total requirements for CNES:			48
- Compliant:				44
- Open:				4  (See Next Chart)
-  	Alcatel compliance:
- Total requirements for Alcatel: 		159
- Compliant: 				150
- Compliant with approved Deviation request:	9
- NASA compliance:
- Total Requirements for NASA:  		61
- Compliant :				30
- Compliant with approved Deviation request:	31
_**All Satellite Deviation Requests are approved.**_

*Satellite Verification & Validation*

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Design Verification Matrix (DVM) to Satellite Specification:
  CNES compliance open points (4):
N2H4 weighing : Planned this week at Vandenberg
Final weighing at Vandenberg : scheduled for 27 Aug (weighing at Cannes compliant 584 kg < 635 kg)
Orbital pointing accuracy performance : Analysis performed, showing compliance, and will be formally closed on 9 Sep.
Potential backup orbit with Terra, in case Aqua fails on orbit prior to launch : Analysis delayed, and will be formally closed on 9 Sep.

-   CNES compliance open points (4):
**N****2****H****4**** weighing : Planned this week at Vandenberg**
**Final weighing at Vandenberg : scheduled for 27 Aug (weighing at Cannes compliant 584 kg < 635 kg)**
**Orbital pointing accuracy performance : Analysis performed, ****showing compliance,**** and ****will be formally closed on 9 Sep.**
**Potential backup orbit with Terra, in case Aqua fails on orbit prior to launch : Analysis delayed, and ****will be formally closed on 9 Sep.**

*Satellite DVM Open Points*

**CNES / BELON**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Payload Performance Tracked by Systems Engineering Report SER-SYS-2491 “BATC Statement Of Work (SOW) Design Verification Matrix (DVM)”
Payload Compliance with Platform Requirements Tracked by PC-SAT-101 “Payload Description Interface Specification (PDIS) Compliance Matrix”
Payload Compliance with Satellite Requirements Tracked by PC-SAT-102 “Satellite Specification Compliance Matrix”

All Requirements Closed Out.

- Payload Compliance with Platform Requirements Tracked by PC-SAT-101 “Payload Description Interface Specification (PDIS) Compliance Matrix”
- Payload Compliance with Satellite Requirements Tracked by PC-SAT-102 “Satellite Specification Compliance Matrix”
_**All Requirements Closed Out.**_

*PL Verification & Validation*

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## BATC SOW DVM Metrics

| SOW Section | Topic | Number | Complies | Complies with Waiver | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Main | General | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Appendix 1 | Payload | 238 | 228 | 10 | 0 |
| Appendix 2 | Lidar | 137 | 98 | 39 | 0 |
| Appendix 4 | WFC | 34 | 27 | 7 | 0 |
| Appendix 5 | IIR | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Appendix 6 | GSE | 43 | 40 | 3 | 0 |
| Subtotal |  | 468 | 409 | 59 | 0 |
| Appendix 7 | PA | 71 | 70 | 1 | 0 |
| Total |  | 539 | 479 | 60 | 0 |

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## PC-SAT-101 “PDIS Compliance Matrix”
Total Requirements:  			407
Complies with PDIS:			353
Complies with Approved Deviation Request:	54

- Total Requirements:  			407
- Complies with PDIS:			353
- Complies with Approved Deviation Request:	54

*PDIS DVM Metrics*

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Software Independent Verification & Validation -(IV&V)

- NASA / Steve Pukansky

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## IV&V Approach

- In FY’02, the IV&V Facility began performing IV&V on the CALIPSO Project
- A Criticality Analysis and Risk Assessment (CARA) was performed in order to determine the scope of IV&V Activities
- The objective is to optimize (or tailor) the IV&V approach to focus the analysis on the most critical areas to best utilize resources
- The CARA results in a Critical Functions List (CFL) that identifies and prioritizes critical software functions for application of IV&V activities

**NASA / PUKANSKY**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## IV&V Activities

- The IV&V Facility conducted an Independent Independent Verification and Validation of the Payload Flight Software (PFSW) and the Mission Operations Ground Software (MOGS) for the CALIPSO Payload Package
- Specific activities were performed to provide assurance with regard to the mission readiness of the software as follows:
- Requirements Analysis of the PFSW and MOGS
- Test Analysis of the PFSW and the MOGS
- Software Engineering and Integration analysis of the CALIPSO project as a whole
- Participated in CALIPSO Mission CDR and Ground Segment Review

**NASA / PUKANSKY**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## IV&V Analyses & Review

- Independent Verification and Validation performed as follows:
- Requirements Analysis performed on the following artifacts:
- DRD-12.5, PC-GND-101, PC-GND-102, PC-GND-103, and the Mission Requirements in the DOORS database supplied by the project
- Test Analysis performed on the following artifacts:
- Analyzed FSW-SER-1458, FSW-SER-1460, FSW-SER-1461, NOI FQT CSTOL Scripts, DRD-40, and SER-SYS-2460H
- Interface and Operations documentation reviewed:
- DRD-14, SER-FSW-1452, DRD-38, SER-FSW-1464, SER-FSW-1466, SER-LID-0557, DRD-10, and Test Report SQERs

**NASA / PUKANSKY**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## IV&V Results

- Independent Verification and Validation Findings:
- The IV&V team’s primary mandate was to ensure the payload package was sufficiently verified and validated prior to shipment to France to prevent integration problems due to Payload internal anomalies.
- IV&V provided issues in the form of document review records as well as delivering two reports which summarized IV&V Technical Issues
- Requirements Analysis Report (06/06/2003, updated 12/22/2003)
- Test Analysis Report (01/22/2004)

**NASA / PUKANSKY**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## IV&V Conclusions:
All issues identified by IV&V that would affect mission success or safety have been closed to the satisfaction of IV&V.
Some low severity issues remain open
Some issues are “closed with concerns”.

It is likely that mission success is not dependant on any of the issues which were closed with concerns because
The Payload is not responsible for safety of flight
The maintenance image is a separate S/W component, which is loaded under H/W control from the Platform
The maintenance image has limited interfaces to other payload systems
The maintenance image testing appears to have been sufficient to ensure it’s viability

From the artifacts reviewed, IV&V has no issues that would preclude the payload FSW from operating as specified or intended.

- All issues identified by IV&V that would affect mission success or safety have been closed to the satisfaction of IV&V.
- Some low severity issues remain open
- Some issues are “closed with concerns”.
- It is likely that mission success is not dependant on any of the issues which were closed with concerns because
- The Payload is not responsible for safety of flight
- The maintenance image is a separate S/W component, which is loaded under H/W control from the Platform
- The maintenance image has limited interfaces to other payload systems
- The maintenance image testing appears to have been sufficient to ensure it’s viability
- From the artifacts reviewed, IV&V has no issues that would preclude the payload FSW from operating as specified or intended.

*IV&V Conclusions*

**NASA / PUKANSKY**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Orbital Debris Analysis and Disposal Plan -

- NASA / Jim Wells

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Orbital Debris Assessment

- Final Orbital Debris Assessment (ODA) report submitted in May 2005
- ODA was reviewed and accepted by NASA JSC, LaRC, and GSFC on June 10th 2005, as complete while containing three non-compliances to the NSS1740.14 Guidelines in areas which have been documented and accepted on some previous spacecraft.
- Accidental Explosion
-  Propulsion System Reliability
- Post Mission Accidental Explosion
- Cannot fully deplete N2 pressure in Propulsion tank
- Post Mission Disposal
- Spacecraft Bus Reliability
- The ODA is currently at NASA HQ awaiting final signature by the Science Mission Directorate.

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Orbital Debris Assessment Results

| Guideline
Number | Description | Compliance | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3-1 | Debris Released During Staging, Payload Separation, or Payload Deployment | Compliant | DPAF renters < 25 years |
| 3-2 | Debris Released During Mission Operations | Compliant | None |
| 4-1 | Accidental Explosions from On-Board Energy Sources during Mission Ops | Non-Compliant | CALIPSO Propulsion System Reliability  is 0.9943      (Req’t = 0.9999) |
| 4-2 | Accidental Explosions from On-Board Energy Sources after End-of-Mission | Non-Compliant | Propulsion Tank N2 pressurant cannot  be completely released |
| 4-3 | Intentional Explosions – Short Term Risks | Compliant | None |
| 4-4 | Intentional Explosions – Long Term Risks | Compliant | None |
| 4-5 | Intentional Break-up for Renetry | Compliant | None |

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Orbital Debris Assessment Results

| Guideline
Number | Description | Compliance | Comments |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 5-1 | Collisions with Large Objects  | Compliant |  |
| 5-2 | Collisions with Small Debris  | Compliant |  |
| 6-1 | Disposal for final mission orbits passing through LEO | Compliant | Uncontrolled reentry within 25 years |
| 6-2 | Disposal for final mission orbits with perigee altitudes above LEO | Compliant | Not Applicable |
| 6-3 | Disposal for final mission orbits that are near-circular 12-hour orbits: | Compliant | Not Applicable |
| 6-4 | Reliability of postmission disposal operations: | Non-Compliant | Spacecraft bus reliability = 0.90 
(Req’t = 0.99) |
| 7-1 | Limit the risk of human casualty: | Compliant | Casualty Area = 3.3 m2 (Req’t <8m2) |

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO De-Orbit Plans

- Removal from Afternoon Constellation
- Lower CALIPSO a minimum of 15km below Constellation 705km altitude.
- Reentry within 25 years
- CALIPSO orbit lowered to an orbit lower than an apogee of 693km and perigee of 674km.
- Satellite passivation
- Hydrazine fuel depleted via orbit end-of-life maneuvers.
- Reaction wheels isolated by opening power supply relays.
- Batteries passivated by opening MOSFET’s on 15 of 16 solar array strings on each solar array wing and de-energizing the battery with remaining satellite power draw.

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Key Anomalies -

- NASA / Jim Wells
- CNES / Bruno Belon

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Key Payload NFRs (1 of 2)

| NFR
NUMBER | DATE
OPENED | DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM | DISPOSITION |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| COULD NOT DUPLICATE |  |  |  |
| 10137 | 3/24/2004 | Payload Controller Warm Reboot – Unplanned PLC warm reboot | Cause unknown; have monitored for hundreds of failure-free operating hours and have deemed the risk as acceptable |
| 10354 | 8/17/2004 | Lidar Data Error – Out of Sync error (incorrect buffer length) detected on Lidar FLX serial channels | Cause unknown; have studied all possible causes identified and have deemed the risk acceptable |
| USE AS IS |  |  |  |
| 10014 | 1/20/2005 | LRE Voltage Drop – LRE +15V power rail was pulled down to red limit due to Sample & Hold drift | Cause well understood. Analysis showed it to be a very low risk to use as is (and a lower risk than correcting the design flaw) |
| 10399 | 10/16/04 | DMA Channel Hang-Up – A DMA channel occasionally hangs, causing loss of a data packet before correction | Caused by a known driver software timing problem in the Single Board Computer; the error occurs very infrequently, involves minimal data loss, and is self-correcting |
| 10022 | 1/27/2005 | Mass Memory Overflow Flag – A false Mass Memory Module overflow event flag occurred | Analysis shows that it is safe to use as is; telemetry events will notify Payload operators of occurrence |
| 10402 | 3/7/05 | 220V Short – A Satellite ground braid was inadvertently shorted to a 220VA GSE transformer power strip | Detailed Payload and Platform analyses show there is no appreciable risk of latent damage; 250 failure-free hours since |
| 10414 | 3/31/05 | LEU Pass-Through Command – The pass-through command occasionally collects erroneous readings | Cause is well understood and poses no risk to proper operation of the LEU; command is not essential (designed for ground-use) and will be used only infrequently on orbit |
| 10508 | 6/29/05 | Cold APD Thermistor Readings – At Satellite TV cold plateaus, the APD temperature readings were not consistent with other optical bench readings | Cause is a well understood design flaw in signal loading; analysis and test show proper performance at flight operating temperatures |
| 10409 | 3/14/05 | LOM2 Pressure – Trending analysis of LOM2 pressure sensors shows a 20X faster-than-expected leak rate | Extrapolation to End-Of-Mission shows ample margin still exists on pressure; will begin flight ops with LOM2 as an additional precaution |

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Key Payload NFRs (2 of 2)

| NFR
NUMBER | DATE
OPENED | DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM | DISPOSITION |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| REPAIRS |  |  |  |
| 10386 | 9/5/04 | APD Failure – The APD detector failed in T/V testing | Cause found to be a failed reverse-biased capacitor; unit was reworked and re-qualified in Thermal/Vac, and now has over 350 failure-free operating hours since repair |
| 10139 | 4/14/04 | LEU LCB Boards – The LEU does not always communicate properly at power-up | Multiple design flaws were identified and corrected on the laser control boards; the boards were fully re-qualified now have over 250  failure-free operating hours since repair |
| 10366 | 8/25/04 | RPS Radiator – Satellite Thermal/Vac testing showed temperatures in the RPS have a lower margin than desired | The size of the radiator was increased and qualified through an acoustic test; multiple independent verifications of the modelling and analysis were performed to ensure the fidelity of the modification |
| 10378 | 9/1/04 | Laser Radiator – Attempts to correlate the flight thermal model with the T/V test data yields large discrepancies | The radiator was too large and was masked accordingly; multiple independent verifications of the modelling and analysis were performed to ensure the fidelity of the modification |
| 10406 | 3/09/05 | WFC FDIR – The WFC current draw increased and tripped an FDIR power-off of the WFC | Cause found to be a failed capacitor which was most likely mechanically stressed during original handling; camera was repaired and fully re-qualified, and now has over 500 failure-free operating hours since repair  |

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Open Payload NFRs

| NFR
NUMBER | DATE
OPENED | DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM | REMAINING WORK |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 10402 | 3/7/05 | 220V Short – A Satellite ground braid was inadvertently shorted to a 220VA GSE transformer power strip | Only paperwork closeout remains: report on stress analysis is being finalized.  Closed by 2 Sep. |
| 10507 | 6/22/05 | RF Transmitter Output Power – The output RF power appears to be lower than in previous measurements | No issue: once corrected for known offsets and other measurement uncertainties, the unit tracks well to the original vendor baseline data; only paperwork closeout remains.  Closed by 29 Aug. |

**NASA / WELLS**

- CLOSED

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Key Platform Anomalies

**CNES / BELON**

| CCA # | Date | Description | Status | Comment |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 108 | 29/03/2005 | MLI – Interface under ILT Radiator and Solar Array +Y | Closed | Solution implemented at Vandenburg.  MLI stability verified. |
| 119 | 29/03/2005 | AIT – 220V short | Closed | Closed at Key Point during ORR |
| 123 | 08/03/2005 | Payload Power Budgets | Closed | Closed at SRBS |
| 128 | 12/04/2005 | TSCV – Receiver humidity saturation | Open | Not critical unless launch mid 2006 wrt VAFB environment |
| 130 | 19/04/2005 | SADM collector | Closed | Closed at Key Point during ORR |
| 132 | 24/06/2005 | Pressure sensor grounding | Open | Under investigation. Not critical. |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Launch Commit Criteria –and- Launch Day Management Go/No-Go Decision Flow -

- NASA / Jim Wells

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Satellite Mandatory Launch Constraints

| Item | Mandatory Satellite Assets Required for Launch
(Go- No/Go) |
| --- | --- |
| CALIPSO configured in launch mode. | Confirmation that CALIPSO satellite flight software and electrical systems are configured for launch prior to count pickup at L-4 minutes |
|     CALIPSO BatteryState of Charge | Vaux_bat > 35.1 V  |
|     CALIPSO Battery Temperature | Temperature > 17deg Celsius |
| CALIPSO Battery Charge Termination  | Charge to the flight battery terminated and confirmed prior to count pickup at L-4 minutes.
         Iaux_bat < 10mamps |

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Ground Systems Mandatory Launch Constraints 

| Item | Mandatory Ground System Assets Required for Launch 
(Go - No/Go) |
| --- | --- |
| CALIPSO Control Centers | All CALIPSO Operation Centers (as listed) are required to be ready to support spacecraft for first on-orbit acquisition, by no later than L-8 minutes prior to launch.
Satellite Operations Control Center (SOCC), @ CNES, Toulouse, France
Jason Telemetry, Command & Communication Subsystem (JTCCS) @ JPL, Pasadena, California |
| CALIPSO Earth Terminals | All listed CALIPSO Earth Terminals and their connection from/to SOCC are required to be operational and ready to support launch, by no later than L-8 minutes prior to launch.
CNES TTCET Kiruna (KRN, Sweden)
CNES TTCET Hartebeeshtoek (HBK, South Africa) or Aussaguel (AUS, France) (one out of two)
2 GHz network KRN and (AUS and HBK)
NASA Earth Terminal- Poker Flat (NASAET-AGS), 5m (Alaska Ground Station) |
| CALIPSO Data Comm. Network | All CALIPSO Data Communication Networks (as listed) are required to be ready to support spacecraft for first on-orbit acquisition, by no later than L-8 minutes prior to launch.
JPL <--> NASAET-AGS
SOCC  <--> JPL
COO   (Orbit Computation Center) <--> KRN 2 GHz
COO    <--> AUS 2 GHz
COO    <--> HBK 2 GHz |

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Ground Systems Mandatory Launch Constraints (cont’d)

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Preliminary LaunchDecision Flow

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Team Organization

**CALIPSO Mission **
**Director**
- D. Schulz

**NASA Ground**
**Network Operations **
**Manager**
- Ed Dembowczyk

**CALIPSO Mission **
**Manager**
- M. Arnaud

**Launch Team Organization**

-   Alaska Ground Station (AGS)
-  Wallops Ground Station (WGS)
-  Voice & Data Networks

-  CNES S/C team
-  Alcatel S/C Team

-  CNES S/C team
-  PL team in France

-  CALIPSO SOCC
-  Kiruna (KRN)
-  Aussaguel (AUS)
-  Hartebeestoek  (HBK)
-  Voice & Data Networks

**CALIPSO**
**Principal Investigator**
- D. Winker

**CNES S/C **
**Operations **
**Manager**
- P. Crébassol

**CNES S/C Systems**
**Engineer**
- J. Blouvac

**CALIPSO NASA **
**Systems Engineer**
- J. Wells

-  PL team in US

**CALIPSO CNES **
**Systems Engineer**
- P Castillan

**CNES Ground**
**Network Operations **
**Manager**
- P. Gelie

**JPL JASON **
**Ground System **
**Manager **
- Don Royer

-   JASON MOCC

- VAFB
- France
- JPL
- GSFC

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Residual Risks -

- NASA / Bryant Cramer

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Top Residual Risks

- Hydrazine Leakage from AN Fittings (RR-01)
- Accidental Overcharging of the Battery During Current Compensation (RR-02)
- Slip Ring Wear Within the Solar Array Drive Mechanism (SADM) (RR-25)
- Reliability of the FPGA Controlling the Laser (RR-32)
- Likelihood of Experiencing a GLAS Type 1 Failure (RR-42)
- Sample/Hold Parts in Laser Receiver Electronics (RR-27)
- Improper Installation of Polarized Capacitors (RR-30)
- 220 VAC Short (RR-31)

**NASA / CRAMER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Hydrazine Leakage from AN Fittings (RR-01)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO Propulsion System

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Propulsion Waiver

- The propulsion system is an integral part of the PROTEUS spacecraft provided by CNES as a part of the CNES/NASA partnership used to implement the CALIPSO Mission
- NASA Safety Manual (NPR 8715.3) requires two-fault tolerance against catastrophic hazards such as the leakage of hydrazine during launch processing
- CNES has steadfastly refused to modify the propulsion system as it is identical to JASON that was accepted by JPL, KSC, and VAFB and launched successfully in December 2001
- Consequently a waiver was developed and it requests the approval of two variances:
- Propulsion system is zero-fault tolerant to hydrazine leakage through five AN fittings used in the propulsion plumbing
- Propulsion system is single-fault tolerant to hydrazine leakage through the four thruster valves
- Current status of waiver:
- Signed by GSFC and LaRC Center Directors
- Endorsed by JPL, KSC, and VAFB

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

##  Supplemental Safeguards

- Require all essential personnel complete PPF and/or SLC 2 evacuation rehearsal
- Project to conduct supplemental hydrazine familiarization training for all essential personnel in PPF/SLC 2
- In English and French
- Personnel must complete Hydrazine familiarization and evacuation rehearsals to have access to facilities after fueling
- Limitation of essential personnel at PPF/SLC 2 strictly enforced
- Establish Keep-Out area around base of S/C for non-essential personnel of at least one meter
- Use Zellweger Analytics CM4 Multi-Point Gas Monitor to sniff thrusters/fill and drain valves from fueling until fairing installation to the greatest extent possible
- After Fairing installation sniff checks to be performed through Fairing door openings with portable vapor detector
- Perform “sniff tests” around S/C after bagging and before DPAF canning
- Perform “sniff tests” around handling can after can is doubled bagged
- After DPAF stack is mated to the launch vehicle, perform “sniff tests” through a small hole in the spacecraft bag
- Perform “sniff tests” around S/C after de-canning and after bag removal on SLC 2
- Use portable vapor detector before personnel entry/access into fairing
- KSC assigned a GOSPL, Ground Operations Safety Propulsion Lead, who is responsible independent of the Project to insure the implementation of the supplemental safeguards

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## NESC Report

- NESC requested to assess the personnel risk of the CALIPSO Propulsion System prelaunch
- NESC did not address the risk to flight hardware or facilities
- NESC developed a long list of questions delivered to CNES/Alcatel followed by a trip to the Alcatel Facility at Cannes, France to inspect the propulsion system and the procedures used to install AN fittings
- NESC considers Alcatel procedures to be readily acceptable
- NESC acknowledges that welded joints are superior to threaded fittings in terms of preventing leakage
- Although the welded system may be safer, the threaded system can still be made acceptably safe to process
- NESC supported the use of the Supplemental Safeguards to reduce the likelihood of personnel injury to an acceptably low level

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Hydrazine Leakage from AN Fittings (RR-01)Personnel Risk (Prelaunch)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

- Pc

- Ps

- PN

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      N= NESC
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- NESC

- OSSMA

- PE

- PE

- Pc

- PN

- PI

- PI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- Ps

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Hydrazine Leakage from AN Fittings (RR-01)Flight Hardware & Facilities Risk (Prelaunch)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

- Fc

- FE

- Fs

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      N= NESC
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

- FI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Hydrazine Leakage from AN Fittings (RR-01)Mission Risk (Postlaunch)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

- Mc

- ME

- Ms

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      N= NESC
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- MI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Accidental Overcharging of the Battery During Current Compensation (RR-02)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background

- CALIPSO uses a lithium-ion battery for the first time on the PROTEUS spacecraft
- JASON and earlier PROTEUS spacecraft used a Ni-Cd battery
- Accidental overcharging of this battery is a catastrophic hazard:
- Operator errors in overcharging on other Li-ion batteries have resulted in several explosions
- The electrolyte is flammable
- Nominal charging of the battery is appropriately two-fault tolerant
- During the last 48 hours between fairing closure and launch, CALIPSO uses “current compensation” to prevent several unswitched spacecraft electrical consumers from discharging the battery below the launch minimum
- This process is only one-fault tolerant to accidental overcharging and therefore a waiver was prepared and is awaiting signature

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO Battery

- Known as a 953P VES 100 manufactured by SAFT
- Composed of 9 cell packages in series
- Each cell package is composed of 3VES 100 cells in parallel
- Total Capacity is 78 Ah
- Automatic bypass switches are parallel to each cell package – they activate at 4.30 V and 0.10 V
- Each cell package also has redundant 20 ohm shunt resistors to aid in balancing the cell packages during charging

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Current Compensation

- Defined as the external provision of current to several unswitched spacecraft electrical consumers while the spacecraft is OFF and awaiting launch
- The load represented by these unswitched consumers:
- Data Handling Unit 		= 280 mA
- Receiver I 			= 181 mA
- Receiver II 			= 181 mA
- Power Conditioning Equipment  =   _55 mA_							                                    697 mA
- The battery capacity is 78 Ah and 700 mA for the 48 hours between fairing closure and launch would reduce the capacity by 35 Ah and leave the battery at a 55% SOC
- The launch minimum SOC is 82% so, consequently, external current must be supplied during the last 48 hours before launch
- The objective of current compensation is NOT to charge the battery but to simply provide power to the unswitched spacecraft electrical consumers so that they will not significantly discharge the battery

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Safeguards to Overcharging

- The waiver identifies six safeguards to accidental overcharging during current compensation:
- Minimizing the use of single-fault tolerant current compensation
- Modification of High Red Limits to Automatically Interrupt the External Current
- Maintaining a log of current and voltage taken at hourly intervals
- Minimizing the number of people in the area during current compensation
- Limiting the current available for current compensation
- Limit the time that current compensation can be used

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Current Compensation Operating Limits

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Current Compensation Operating Zones

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Accidental Overcharging of the Battery (RR-02)Personnel / Flight Hardware Risk (Prelaunch)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

- Pc

- PE

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-       I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

- Pc

- PE

- PI

- PI

- IIRT

- P

- F

- =

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- Ps

- Ps

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Slip Ring Wear Within the Solar Array Drive Mechanism (SADM) (RR-25)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background

- CNES started an endurance test on a SADM known as “QM2” on 15 February 2005
- This was the last component of the SADM qualification program involving the requirements from SEVERAL missions
- Other aspects of the qualification program involved multiple functional tests, sine and random vibration, shock testing, and thermal/vacuum testing
- The endurance test was intended to represent five years and combined _+ _30° sweeps as used by JASON (like a windshield wiper) and complete rotations as used by CALIPSO
- The endurance test was suspended on 29 March due to an electrically open slip ring

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Anomaly on track 23

*Anomaly on track 23*

- Evidence of one 100° wide open circuit zone on track 23
- Test on 4 turns

- Voltage

- Normal

- Caused by eccentricity in ring; no preload

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Collector Wear

- Nickel particles collected on brushes and scratched the gold from the remaining slip ring surface

- In retrospect this represented an over test for CALIPSO due to mechanisms not previously encountered

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO Endurance Test

- CNES subsequently arranged a second endurance test to consist only of complete revolutions just as CALIPSO will use
- Employs new collector assembly identical to flight SADMs
- NASA concerned that testing a slip ring assembly is not representative of the entire SADM but a complete SADM is not available
- Run in vacuum with a DC motor running at approximately 1.4 rpm
- Completed 16,000 complete revolutions that corresponds to the CALIPSO three-year mission
- Test completed with no difficulty

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO Endurance Test Results

- Collector (slip rings):
- Wear evident but no significant differences between power (1.1A) and signal lines
- FOMBLIN present at bottom of tracks
- Brushes appear normal:
- No noticeable wear
- No thermal distortion
- Some gold particles on the brushes
- Voltage Measurements:
- Voltage stable throughout test – no glitches
- Stable at both 0.1 and 1.0 rpm
- Resistance Measurements:
- Limit of 80 mOhm per pair of lines was the objective
- Maximum measured was 30 mOhm
- Sixty sites from wear “tracks” selected for spectrographic analysis:
- Gold found everywhere
- No Nickel or Copper identified
- Fluorine frequently found (lubricant)
- Conclusion: Fly-As-Is

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Solar Array Drive Mechanism (RR-25)Mission Success Risk (Postlaunch)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

- ME

- Mc

- Ms

- MI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Reliability of the FPGAControlling the Laser (RR-32)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## There are two lasers and each is controlled by an identical Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
The FPGA provides logic control for the laser and its associated components
This FPGA has performed flawlessly (no anomalies) throughout the development of CALIPSO (each unit has ≈ 500 hours)
Fibertek has also used this FPGA in a terrestrial application wherein a dozen units were built. So far the time on each unit varies from a few hundred to over a thousand hours with no anomalies
However, this FPGA has never performed in space and there is concern that radiation and thermal cycling will lead to performance degradation that could jeopardize the mission

- The FPGA provides logic control for the laser and its associated components
- This FPGA has performed flawlessly (no anomalies) throughout the development of CALIPSO (each unit has ≈ 500 hours)
- Fibertek has also used this FPGA in a terrestrial application wherein a dozen units were built. So far the time on each unit varies from a few hundred to over a thousand hours with no anomalies
- However, this FPGA has never performed in space and there is concern that radiation and thermal cycling will lead to performance degradation that could jeopardize the mission

*Background*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## FPGA is an Actel RT54SX32-12Q208B
Built around the earlier 0.6 μ technology
Rated at a lifetime radiation dose of 100 Krad (CALIPSO requirement is 10 Krad)
Contains 32,000 programmable logic gates
Uses anti-fuse technology wherein a non-conducting link is transformed into a conducting link as the device is programmed
CALIPSO uses this FPGA for 15 specific functions related to the laser
Minimal timing interdependence between functions
Peak frequency is 11 MHz

- Built around the earlier 0.6 μ technology
- Rated at a lifetime radiation dose of 100 Krad (CALIPSO requirement is 10 Krad)
- Contains 32,000 programmable logic gates
- Uses anti-fuse technology wherein a non-conducting link is transformed into a conducting link as the device is programmed
- CALIPSO uses this FPGA for 15 specific functions related to the laser
- Minimal timing interdependence between functions
- Peak frequency is 11 MHz

*Laser Control Board (LCB)*

**CALIPSO LCB Block Diagram**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Analyses at Fibertek are completed 
FPGA White Paper was released on 15 August:
Lifetime radiation limit is 100 Krad and CALIPSO requirement is 10 Krad
FPGA tested over -30 to 65°C with no anomalies and is rated for -55 to 125°C
Orbital temperature excursion is 17 to 43°C
There are few timing interdependencies within the FPGA and the highest frequency is 11 MHz whereas the FPGA is rated at 100MHz
Timing skew analyses have yet to identify a critical situation affecting the mission
Glitching analyses identified a single function where glitches would minimally increase the count of laser firings – this has no consequence since this parameter controls nothing and is available from other sources
CALIPSO FPGA appears to be a highly de-rated application of the potential performance of this FPGA

- FPGA White Paper was released on 15 August:
- Lifetime radiation limit is 100 Krad and CALIPSO requirement is 10 Krad
- FPGA tested over -30 to 65°C with no anomalies and is rated for -55 to 125°C
- Orbital temperature excursion is 17 to 43°C
- There are few timing interdependencies within the FPGA and the highest frequency is 11 MHz whereas the FPGA is rated at 100MHz
- Timing skew analyses have yet to identify a critical situation affecting the mission
- Glitching analyses identified a single function where glitches would minimally increase the count of laser firings – this has no consequence since this parameter controls nothing and is available from other sources
- CALIPSO FPGA appears to be a highly de-rated application of the potential performance of this FPGA

*Current Status*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## FPGA Reliability

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

- MC

- MI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Likelihood of Experiencing a GLAS Type 1 Failure(RR-42)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Gold Indide AssessmentMechanical Thermal Fatigue Analysis

- The CALIPSO laser diode assemblies are stressed (thermally driven fatigue) far less than the GLAS laser diodes, and even less than the MOLA laser diode arrays due to the differences in drive current, repetition rate and pump pulse duration.
- The causal chain is as follows:
- Current pulse makes a thermal pulse in the wire,
- Thermal pulse makes a stress pulse, resulting in an increment of damage into the wire.
- The wire breaks when it accumulates sufficient damage.
- With the loss of each wire, the rate of damage accumulation of the remaining wires increases due to the greater current the remaining wires must carry.  This is an avalanche process, and runs away at the end, so that all the wires break, disabling the array

|  | MOLA | GLAS | CALIPSO |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Diode Array Drive Current | 65 A | 100 A | 50 A |
| Pulse Duration | 150 μs | 200 μs | 170 μs |
| Pulse Repetition Rate         | 10 Hz | 40 Hz | 20 Hz |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## DPA of Flight Spare D172

- SEM photo of Bar 13 showing four indium-affected gold wires.  The two center wires were broken during DPA disassembly

- Bar 10.  Typical Bar with some Indium contamination on the Gold wires.

- End-on view of a broken wire from Bar 13 shows a gold wire at center measuring 17 μm (original diameter 25 μm.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO operates its diodes at thermally induced stress levels similar to MOLA and significantly less than GLAS

Based on this analysis, the CALIPSO Laser will provide more than adequate lifetime to complete the mission

|  | MOLA | GLAS | CALIPSO |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Diode Array Drive Current | 65 A | 100 A | 50 A |
| Pulse Duration | 150 μs | 200 μs | 170 μs |
| Pulse Repetition Rate         | 10 Hz | 40 Hz | 20 Hz |
| Relative Thermal Stress | 1.4 | 96.0 | 1.0 |

- CALIPSO operates its diodes at thermally induced stress levels similar to MOLA and significantly less than GLAS
- Based on this analysis, the CALIPSO Laser will provide more than adequate lifetime to complete the mission

*Gold Indide Assessment**Mechanical Thermal Fatigue Analysis*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## GLAS Failure Type 1 (RR-42)Mission Success Risk

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- ME

- Mc

- Ms

- OSSMA

- MI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Sample/Hold Parts in Laser Receiver Electronics (RR-27)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## The two laser energy monitors provide the only direct measurement of laser energy
Laser health cannot be adequately monitored without the energy monitors:
Used to measure and trend total output energy
Used to measure and adjust the balance of 532/1064 output
Necessary to differentiate between boresight misalignment, wavelength shifts, changes in conversion efficiency, and laser degradation
Laser operations are impacted if energy monitor telemetry is not available
Energy readings are key to the implementation of contingency procedures
The Sample/Hold parts to be discussed are critical to the laser energy monitors

- Laser health cannot be adequately monitored without the energy monitors:
- Used to measure and trend total output energy
- Used to measure and adjust the balance of 532/1064 output
- Necessary to differentiate between boresight misalignment, wavelength shifts, changes in conversion efficiency, and laser degradation
- Laser operations are impacted if energy monitor telemetry is not available
- Energy readings are key to the implementation of contingency procedures
- The Sample/Hold parts to be discussed are critical to the laser energy monitors

*Background*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## When the laser is not firing, the Laser Receiver Electronics (LRE) Sample/Hold (S/H) amplifiers are not being sampled shortly after entering the HOLD mode
Consequently, they sit for many minutes in the HOLD mode 
While in HOLD, the output of this part will gradually drift up to either voltage rail at 0.008 V/second
This results in the S/H parts drawing extra current from the ±15 V power rails. This results in two effects:
Operating the HA-5320 Sample/Hold Amplifiers at higher than predicted temperatures
Junction Temperature 100°C/120°C BOL/EOL against 100°C derated requirement
Overtaxing the 5W DC/DC that provides the ±15 V
Enough so that the DC/DC internal current limiting circuit intervenes to create the voltage droop.

- Consequently, they sit for many minutes in the HOLD mode
- While in HOLD, the output of this part will gradually drift up to either voltage rail at 0.008 V/second
- This results in the S/H parts drawing extra current from the ±15 V power rails. This results in two effects:
- Operating the HA-5320 Sample/Hold Amplifiers at higher than predicted temperatures
- Junction Temperature 100°C/120°C BOL/EOL against 100°C derated requirement
- Overtaxing the 5W DC/DC that provides the ±15 V
- Enough so that the DC/DC internal current limiting circuit intervenes to create the voltage droop.

*Anomaly Description*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Driving issue is thermal management.
HA-5320 data sheet absolute maximum Junction Temperature specification is 175°C.
Junction Temperature will exceed the 100°C derated requirement up to perhaps 120°C but only for a fairly small amount of time.
Perform thermal/power measurements, thermal modeling, and reliability analyses to estimate/predict the additional hours of lifetime used.
Burn-In: 125°C Case Temperature for 168 hours under bias
Case-Junction Gradient = 20°C/W (S/H data sheet)
Power Consumption per nominal load = ~330mW
Burn-In Junction Temperature = 125°C + (20°C/W)(0.33W) = 131.6°C
Conclusion:
Operational temperatures haven’t exceeded and will never exceed Burn-In temperatures
We are a long way from the maximum temperature of 175°C
Negligible amount of additional lifetime has been & will be used

- HA-5320 data sheet absolute maximum Junction Temperature specification is 175°C.
- Junction Temperature will exceed the 100°C derated requirement up to perhaps 120°C but only for a fairly small amount of time.
- Perform thermal/power measurements, thermal modeling, and reliability analyses to estimate/predict the additional hours of lifetime used.
- Burn-In: 125°C Case Temperature for 168 hours under bias
- Case-Junction Gradient = 20°C/W (S/H data sheet)
- Power Consumption per nominal load = ~330mW
- Burn-In Junction Temperature = 125°C + (20°C/W)(0.33W) = 131.6°C
- Conclusion:
- Operational temperatures haven’t exceeded and will never exceed Burn-In temperatures
- We are a long way from the maximum temperature of 175°C
- Negligible amount of additional lifetime has been & will be used

*S/H Part Assessment*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## S/H Reliability Analyses Results

- Temperatures based on thermal images and power consumption measurements of non-flight LRE.
- Power Consumption measurements compare very favorably with Satellite and Breadboard power measurements.
- 26,280 hours in the 3-year mission. We assume 6,000 hours of ground test time.
- Test Case 4 is the extreme case of using as is and spending a year of the mission in Standby Mode.
- Ground Test Temperatures:
- 80C represents hours w/o the anomalous condition for laser energy monitors for the active laser.
- 95C represents hours w/ the anomalous condition at ambient (BOL, air) conditions. Note: BOL cold case temperature on orbit is same as ambient temperature.
- 120C represents hours w/ the anomalous condition at EOL (hot case, vacuum) conditions. This applies to TV test conditions and on orbit conditions.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## S/H Parts in LRE

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

- ME

- MC

- Ms

- MI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Improper Installation of Polarized Capacitors (RR-30)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Improper Installation of Polarized Capacitors

- On two occasions Ball installed polarized capacitors backwards.
- In one case the schematic was correct but the board design drawing was in error and in the other case the capacitor marking convention was the reverse of the common convention (band-on-positive)
- All schematics and circuit board designs were subsequently compared for consistency (SER-SYS-2513A)
- Available photographs were examined to confirm polarity
- All other boards were visually inspected whenever involved in repair
- There is good confidence that the other polarized capacitors are properly installed

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Improper Installation of Polarized Capacitors (RR-30) Mission Success Risk

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

- MC

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

- ME

- Ms

- MI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## 220 VAC Short (RR-31)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background

- On 27 March 2005 the Satellite ground inadvertently contacted the high side of the 220 VAC facility power through a grounded wrist strap
- Facility circuit breaker opened immediately
- The dolly holding the Satellite had multiple low resistance paths to the ground which conducted the surge current (>400 A)
- Platform was ON at the time and demonstrated no abnormalities
- Platform telemetry similarly revealed no abnormalities
- The Payload was entirely OFF
- A joint CNES/NASA team was formed to determine if the Satellite might have suffered latent damage

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CNES Investigation

- CNES focused on determining the magnitude of the voltage transient at the Satellite (platform) ground:
- A mathematical model was constructed of all of the ground paths.
- A mock-up was built using the same facility power and shorted to obtain good voltage and current traces.
- The model was then  adjusted (“anchored”) to be consistent with the voltage and current data from the experimental results.
- Examination of all telemetry data revealed no abnormalities whatsoever – the 220 VAC Short was invisible to the telemetry
- CNES concluded that the Satellite ground rose less than five volts for one-half cycle (50 Hz) and this was not harmful.
- The Satellite has subsequently been ON for over 300 hours and shown no abnormalities.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## NASA Model

- NASA determined that the payload was OFF and offered no paths to ground except through the protection diodes in the RS422 communication interface
- However the Payload experienced the failure of a tantalum surface mount capacitor in the Wide Field Camera (WFC) 29 hours after the 220V short
- The WFC anomaly forced NASA to look seriously at the possibility of latent component damage
- A NASA mathematical model was constructed incorporating the results of the CNES/Alcatel model and added representative circuitry from the Payload to explore voltage transients across various components
- The NASA model provided results similar to the CNES model except the following:
- The NASA model contains more source capacitance than the CNES model.
- Source capacitance is fully charged at the time of the short.
- At the onset of the short, the source capacitance discharges through the parasitic capacitance in the payload.
- This discharge produces a transient of about 80V lasting several microseconds

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## NASA Investigation

- The NASA model explored five aspects of the Payload circuitry potentially sensitive to the voltage transient:
- A capacitor  protected on one side by a large inductor (failed   capacitor C27)
- Common mode chokes
- Any response on the optical bench that might increase the transient
- “Sheet” current in the dolly coupling with inductors in the Payload
- X-band transmitter internal grounding
- Most Payload components see the transient as a common mode voltage and are unharmed
- The differential voltage produced in the above five instances was generally millivolts and very brief such that it was concluded that no harm was done
- The Payload has 250 hours of failure-free operation since the short occurred

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Wide Field Camera (WFC)

- The WFC failed during system level test, 29 hours after the 220 VAC Short.
- The instrument was shipped to Ball where the failure was attributed to the failure of a (reverse bias sensitive) tantalum capacitor (C27).
- Since the 220 VAC Short might reverse bias this circuit, the two events were investigated jointly.
- Analysis
- Modeling specific to C27 shows voltage level orders of magnitude less than stress level. (See plot page 8)
- DPA-C27
- C27 failure region not the same as the region associated with stress failure
- Found chipped corner that significantly reduced dielectric barrier
- Code 562 concludes that the C27 failure was not a result of reverse bias but instead from mechanical handling damage
- Conclusion – The WFC failure was unrelated to the 220 VAC Short
- WFC has over 500 failure free hours since the rework was completed.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Wide Field Camera Cont’d

- Sixteen other similar capacitors were removed for examination:
- Fifteen were well within specification
- One had an elevated leakage current but still within specification
- This capacitor failed almost immediately in a Weibull test
- DPA revealed tool marks in the solder and damaged dielectric in the middle on both sides
- Ball technician used tweezers to take the capacitor off of the board
- Focus was on sparing the board and not the capacitor
- Conclusion is that the capacitor was damaged in removal
- WFC failures had nothing to do with the 220V Short

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## 220 VAC Short (RR 31)Mission Success Risk (Postlaunch)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

- MC

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- OSSMA

- ME

- Ms

- MI

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Recent Results -

- NASA / Bryant Cramer

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## SDRAM Radiation Sensitivity within the Payload Controller Processor  (RR-41)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background (1 of 3)

- Payload Controller Processor is a General Dynamics 603 Power PC
- It is not radiation hard but “radiation tolerant”
- Early in 2005 there was uncertainty as to the frequency of Single Event Latch-ups (SEL) caused by both galactic and solar heavy ions
- An SEL causes an increased current of either 60-70 mA (small current SEL) or 200-350 mA (large current SEL)
- Causes no permanent damage but under certain circumstances a combination of SELs can produce an infinite soft resetting
- SELs are cleared with a power reset
- To gain confidence in estimating the frequency of SELs, radiation tests were carried out in March 2005 using identical parts

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background (2 of 3)

- In June 2005 it was determined that General Dynamics had extrapolated the Single Event Upset (SEU) frequency from the earlier heavy ion data
- This is acceptable but bears considerable uncertainty
- SEUs are more frequent and are normally corrected with memory Error Detection and Correction (EDAC) – also known as memory “scrubbing”
- Our technical objective is to prove that the EDAC, as presently implemented, is adequate to handle the SEU frequency
- Using the worst case of the extrapolated data it appeared that the memory EDAC would be saturated
- To eliminate this uncertainty, proton radiation tests were completed on July 29, 2005 using identical parts

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background (3 of 3)

- The FET switches that control the lasers are radiation sensitive
- Consequently the lasers are turned OFF during Solar Particle Events (SPE)
- During an SPE numerous SEUs can saturate the EDAC and flood the telemetry with error messages
- Current planning is to turn the Payload Controller OFF during SPE to offer greater protection against SELs and SEUs

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO Orbit-Specific SEL Rates(from CREME96 calculations – all are per SDRAM device)

- A few Small Current SELs are possible over the three-year mission
- A large current SEL is improbable

| Environment | Small Current SELs | Mean Time to SEL |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Solar Quiet | 1.8E-05 per day | 152 years |
| Worst Week | 4.1E-03 per day | 33 solar events |
| Worst Day | 3.9E-03 in 18hrs | 256 solar events |
| Peak 5 Minutes | 5.5E-02 in 5 minutes | 18 solar events |
| Environment | Large Current SELs | Mean Time to SEL |
| Solar Quiet | 7.8E-07 per day | 3653 years |
| Worst Week | 2.6E-04 per day | 513 solar events |
| Worst Day | 2.2E-04 in 18hrs | 4545 solar events |
| Peak 5 Minutes | 3.1E-03 in 5 minutes | 323 solar events |
|  |  |  |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO SEU Rate Predictions

**     ****SBC actively using 22 SDRAMS**
**-  20 System memory**
**-  2 Interface memory**

|  | Total SEUs in Time Interval |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 SDRAM | 2 SDRAMs | 20 SDRAMs | 22 SDRAMs |
| Worst (peak) minute | 0.057 | 0.11 | 1.14 | 1.254 |
| Worst hour | 0.95 | 1.89 | 18.94 | 20.834 |
| Worst 4.6 hours | 4.36 | 8.71 | 87.1 | 95.81 |
| Worst 24 hours | 22.7 | 45.5 | 454.6 | 500.06 |
| Quiet (peak) minute | 0.005 | 0.010 | 0.101 | 0.1111 |
| Quiet hour (no SAA) | 0.013 | 0.027 | 0.267 | 0.2937 |
| Quiet 4.6 hours (no SAA) | 0.06 | 0.123 | 1.227 | 1.35 |
| Quiet 24 hours (no SAA) | 0.26 | 0.520 | 5.200 | 5.72 |

**Rates as of 8/4/2005**
**Includes results from proton testing**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Latest Results

- Notes:
- Hours sum to total mission of 3 years = 26,280 hours
- SAA – South Atlantic Anomaly  - refers to the total time passing through the center of the anomaly. 4 orbits/day * 10 minutes/orbit*1095 days*1hour/60 minutes = 730 hours. The SAA does not contribute to an increase in SEL.
- Solar Storms (Large) –1 large CME providing 99% worst case fluxes for 8 days is assumed for CALIPSO
- Solar Storms (Small) – A total of 5 small CMEs providing 20% of the large CME fluxes (yielding 20% of worst case SEL/SEU rates) is estimated for CALIPSO
- This is for a total of 22 SDRAMs – 20 are used for System memory, 2 for interface memory
- SELs can be removed only by power cycling the Payload Controller (PLC).
- Large SELs draw up to 350 mA of current, small SELs draw 60-70 mA .
- It is recommended that the PLC be powered off during solar storms.
- The scrub rate is currently set to 1 per 10 minutes.

|  |  | Expected Number of Events during Duration |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Total Duration | SEL (Large) | SEL (Small) | SEU |
| Quiescent Solar | 24,758 hours | 0.017 | 0.41 | 7427 |
| SAA | 730 hours | See Quiescent or Storm Cases  | See Quiescent or Storm Cases  | 4862 |
| Solar Storms – Large | 192 hours | 0.039 | 0.69 | 4000 |
| Solar Storms- Small | 600 hours | 0.024 | 0.43 | 2500 |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Residual Risk

- Basic frequencies for SELs and SEUs are now based on recent radiation tests using identical parts
- By turning the payload controller OFF during Solar Particle Events:
- Several small current SELs are likely,
- A large current SEL will likely never be seen, and
- Frequency of SEUs lies within the present EDAC capability
- Software contingency plans are being developed to deal with small current SELs and SEUs should we need them later in Operations
- All of the documentation is completed and RFA DSQR-03 will be closed by 2 September

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## SDRAM (RR-41)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

- Mc

- MS

- ME

**0.01**

**0.001**

**0.000001**

**0.1**

**>0.1**

**I**

**II**

**III**

**IV**

**V**

_**Key**_
- Residual Risk:
-     P= Personnel Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     F= Flight Hardware &
-          Facilities Risk
-          (Prelaunch)
-     M=Mission Success Risk
-          (Postlaunch)
- Scoring Organization:
-      C=CALIPSO Project
-      E= GSFC AETD
-      S= GSFC OSSMA
-      I = IIRT
- Mitigated Risk:
-          = Unmitigated Risk
-             = Mitigated Risk
- Example:
-            = Unmitigated
-                  Residual Risk to
-                  Personnel as
-                  estimated by the
-                  CALIPSO Project

- PC

- CALIPSO

- AETD

- MI

- OSSMA

- IIRT

| Level | I | II | III | IV | V |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Safety &  Health | Minimal /                  no safety or health plan violations  | Injury or illness not resulting in lost work day | Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day  | Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness | Death or permanent disability |
| Flight H/W Facilities | Hardware loss     $200K - $1 M | Hardware loss       $1M - $10 M | Hardware loss       $10M - $100 M | Hardware loss    $100M - $250 M | Hardware loss       >$250 M |
| Mission Success | Component Degradation        Minor Impact | Functional Degradation, Loss of Redundancy,       Minor Impact | Subsystem Degradation, Workarounds, Moderate Impact | Multiple Subsystem Degradation, Jeopardize Full   Mission Success | Cannot meet minimum Success Criteria |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## X-Band Transmitter (XBT)Test Summary

**NASA / CRAMER**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background

- The CALIPSO X-Band Transmitter (XBT) was built by Cincinnati Electronics using an Aeroflex RF filter.
- The XBT Assembly (transmitter and filter) performance was “baselined” at the factory as part of flight qualification (at sea level & stable temperature).

- Internal (tlm) measurements of the unit were stable throughout functional, environmental, & integration testing.
- Telemetry of transmitter RF Power measured between the SSPA Gain Stage and the RF filter.  The power has been highly stable over the entire test program.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Background

- Health testing was conducted at the Payload (instrument) & Satellite levels at Ball, Alcatel & VAFB and passed the test criteria.
- The health test did _not_ have the accuracy or repeatability to clearly discern XBT performance trends, due to measurement errors as a result of:
- Eight different GSE configurations.
- Aging & handling effects on long cables & threaded connectors.
- Five different power meters with various dynamic range settings & calibrations.
- Varying thermal environments and initial conditions.
- A final XBT performance test (VAFB-2) was added to reduce measurement uncertainties (simplified configuration) & generate better comparisons to the initial factory baseline test.
- Once corrected for known offsets, the measurements track well to the original vendor baseline data.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## VAFB-2 Test

- Although it met the test procedure criteria; the VAFB-1 test looked to show a degradation in the output power (as measured by external EGSE).

- Data analysis of previous tests & the VAFB-2 test, indicates that the variation was due to differences in test set-up configurations, thermal effects, & measurement uncertainties.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Internal Voltage Telemetry

- The XBT internal voltages (5V, 10V & 12V), XBT telemetry measurements, have also been highly stable throughout the test program.

- Trending of voltages from the X-Band transmitter has continued throughout I & T
- All variation < 0.1 V

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Data Comparison

- The external EGSE data and internal telemetry (adjusted for filter loss) show good correlation, *except *during the VAFB-1 test.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Conclusion

- The XBT remains stable and is performing well within specification.
- There is a 5.1 dB link margin at Alaska.
- There is a 3.8 dB link margin at Hawaii.
- The results of the carefully conducted VAFB-2 retest are consistent with earlier data.
- The reasons for the 0.5 dB reduction in the VAFB-1 test results are likely due to a difference in transmitter temperature, meter calibration, GSE cable and connector  losses due to extended use and handling.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Open Documentation/Action Status -

- NASA / Jim Wells

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Four open Satellite NFRs/CCAs previously discussed
Satellite Request-For-Actions (RFAs) :
DSQR-03 (SDRAM tolerance)
Issue addressed. Only awaiting for remaining paperwork, BATC SER-SYS-2523.  
Closure expected by 2 Sep.
SQR-33 (Payload components sensitivities wrt unavailability)
Response provided by NASA.
In CNES approval process.
Closure expected by 2 Sep.

- Satellite Request-For-Actions (RFAs) :
- DSQR-03 (SDRAM tolerance)
- Issue addressed. Only awaiting for remaining paperwork, BATC SER-SYS-2523.
- Closure expected by 2 Sep.
- SQR-33 (Payload components sensitivities wrt unavailability)
- Response provided by NASA.
- In CNES approval process.
- Closure expected by 2 Sep.

*Open Documentation/Actions*

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight System Readiness- Summary -

- NASA / Jim Wells

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Summary

- All Satellite End-to-End Tests successful.
- No open technical issues.
- Remaining Satellite work includes:
- Minimal paperwork closure.
- Nominal launch processing.
_**CALIPSO Satellite Ready for Flight**_

**NASA / WELLS**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Agenda-Break-

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Agenda-Mission Operations Readiness-

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Status of all satellite and science operations centers and ground systems including hardware, software and procedures verification and validation
- Development team support for operations
- Operator training and certification
- Information Technology security including National Agency Checks
- Ground data handling verification
- Mission simulations and launch rehearsals
- Support to the mission (communications, tracking and operational support readiness)
- Anomalies and resolutions
- Contingency plans
- Status of radio frequency authorization application
- Documentation status and open paperwork
- Open actions
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Readiness Review- MISSION OPERATIONS READINESS -

- NASA / Mike Cisewski
- August 26, 2005

## System Overview

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Ground Segment Verification Status

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Ground Segment Verification

- All Launch Critical Requirements have been verified
- Outstanding requirements verification
- SOCC Telemetry Terminal (DRPPC) test at VAFB
- Scheduled to be tested during Dress Rehearsal #2:  August 30, 2005
- Backup Network (ISDN) Link between SOGS and MOGS (affects MOGS network and SOGS network)
- Pre-configured modem shipped from CNES to LaRC on August 24, 2005
- This requirement is for a backup in the event of a multiple day network loss at the SOCC

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

##  Ground Segment Readiness

- S-band Ground Station Tests Completed – Ready for Operations:
- Dedicated CNES Stations: AUS, KRN
- CNES network stations: HBK, KRN, AUS
- NASA Stations (Poker Flats (AGS) and Wallops Flight Facility (WFF))
- All stations verified using RF suitcase, Jason passes, and network exchanges
- S-band frequency authorization received on 5 November 1996.
- ITU reference AR11/A/1826

**KIRUNA Station**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

##  Ground Segment Readiness

- X-band Ground Station Tests Completed – Ready for Operations:
- Provided by Universal Space Networks under BATC subcontract
- Primary Location: Alaska
- Backup Location: Hawaii
- X-band frequency authorization received 25 July, 2003.
- RFA (Radio Frequency Authorization) #NASA010039
- Expires 31 Jan, 2010
- Key Tests Summary
- RF Compatibility Testing at BATC	Aug 2003
- RF Compatibility Testing at Alcatel	Mar 2005
- RF Compatibility Testing at VAFB	Jun 2005 / Aug 2005
- Final Worst Case Link Margin (10 degrees elevation / 10E-6 BER)
- Alaska:  +5.07 dB
- Hawaii:   +3.8 dB

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Ground Network Readiness

- NASA and CNES networks are ready to support operations
- CNES primary and backup networks between Ground Stations and the SOCC are ready to support operations
- NASA networks between all elements (MOCC, PDDS, ASDC, GSFC Constellation Coordination team, CloudSat) are ready to support operations
- International Networks between MOCC/SOCC and MOCC/IIR TEC are ready to support operations
- NASA LEOP network between AGS/WGS, JPL, LaRC MOCC, and CNES SOCC are ready to support operations
- Work Remaining
- Backup dial-up MOCC/SOCC ISDN modem is not operational yet
- CNES shipped  pre-configured ISDN modem on August 24 2005 to resolve problem
- Project confident of successful testing

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## SOGS is ready to support Operations
All SOGS components and system tests completed
Software under configuration control, last issue May 2005
Last issue of the satellite data base August 23, 2005

MOGS is ready to support operations
All MOGS components and system tests completed
Software under configuration control, Launch Build: May 13, 2005
Three software changes have been implemented since configuration freeze
Regression test completed August  3, 2005
Launch version of the payload data base August 22, 2005

- All SOGS components and system tests completed
- Software under configuration control, last issue May 2005
- Last issue of the satellite data base August 23, 2005
- MOGS is ready to support operations
- All MOGS components and system tests completed
- Software under configuration control, Launch Build: May 13, 2005
- Three software changes have been implemented since configuration freeze
- Regression test completed August  3, 2005
- Launch version of the payload data base August 22, 2005

*Operation Center Readiness*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## SOGS system maintenance and operations support:
Industrial ground system maintenance contracts are in place for JASON and will be extended to CALIPSO; they cover corrections and evolutions
The maintenance satellite operations contract is in place for PROTEUS  spacecraft (CALIPSO included); it covers general satellite expertise, support in case of abnormal situations, reviews, and monthly reporting

MOGS system maintenance and operations support
Payload simulator used to validate software changes is installed at LaRC and ready to support operations
Ball Aerospace sustaining engineering support included as part of existing BATC contract

- Industrial ground system maintenance contracts are in place for JASON and will be extended to CALIPSO; they cover corrections and evolutions
- The maintenance satellite operations contract is in place for PROTEUS  spacecraft (CALIPSO included); it covers general satellite expertise, support in case of abnormal situations, reviews, and monthly reporting
- MOGS system maintenance and operations support
- Payload simulator used to validate software changes is installed at LaRC and ready to support operations
- Ball Aerospace sustaining engineering support included as part of existing BATC contract

*Sustaining Support*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## NASA Ground Network supporting CALIPSO LEOP
JPL Jason Control Center (JTCC) 
Providing operational support of Jason Mission.  LEOP contingency command support
Alaska Ground Station (AGS)
Validated during RF suitcase testing in July 2004
Wallops Flight Facility
Validated during RF suitcase testing in March 2005
GSFC Flight Dynamics Facility
Backup LEOP orbit determination support using NORAD and NASA GN angle data
NASA Ground Network Readiness reviewed August 26, 2005

- JPL Jason Control Center (JTCC)
- Providing operational support of Jason Mission.  LEOP contingency command support
- Alaska Ground Station (AGS)
- Validated during RF suitcase testing in July 2004
- Wallops Flight Facility
- Validated during RF suitcase testing in March 2005
- GSFC Flight Dynamics Facility
- Backup LEOP orbit determination support using NORAD and NASA GN angle data
- NASA Ground Network Readiness reviewed August 26, 2005

*NASA LEOP Support*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## NASA GN Mission Support Readiness

| Integrated Networks Support Summary for Calipso |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 
Element | 
Security | Systems |  |  | Personnel |  | Documentation  NRD/NOSP | Significant  Changes |
|  |  | H/W | S/W | F/W | Staffing | Training |  |  |
| GN | G | G | G | G | G | G | G | NONE |
| NISN | G | G | G | G | G | G | G | NONE |
| GSFC NIC | G | G | G | G | G | G | G | NONE |
| FDF | G | G | G | G | G | G | G | NONE |

- The following elements are ready to support the CALIPSO mission
- Ground Network (GN)
- Ground Network Scheduling Office (GNSO)
- Network Integration Center (NIC)
- NASA Integrated Services Network (NISN)
- Flight Dynamics Facility (FDF)
- There are no unresolved issues or concerns

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Ground Segment VerificationScience Processing System

- Science Processing System Ready to support operations
- Launch Build of Science Code Complete
- All Interface Documentation and Testing Complete
- CALIPSO Automated Processing System and Data Management System are ready for operations

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Satellite Operations Team

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Satellite Operations Team

- Operations Team Training
- The ops team handles the SOCC to operate the satellite in all the system tests
- The operations  team supports other satellite projects including Jason1 and other CNES Micro-satellites using standard systems
- During operations, periodic training will be performed as done for Jason1
- Routine Operations Team Staffing

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Payload Operations Team

***Integrated payload operations team includes Management, Engineering, Science, and Operations***

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Payload Operations Team

- Operations Team Training
- The operations team has supported all phases of payload development, testing, and satellite integration and test (AIT).
- Formal Training program developed / Certification Complete
- Routine Operations Team Staffing
- Mission Operations Manager
- Command and Flight SW Specialist
- Payload Engineer
- Telemetry Specialist
- Data Administrator
- 5 additional staff available for LEOP support
-  Lights Out + Operations Paradigm
- 8 hours day / five days per week nominal
- Twice daily checks of key status parameters 7 days per week
- Autonomous software monitors payload status / pages operator 24/7

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## SOGS systems adhere to Internal CNES IT security requirements
CNES security regulations applied
Security acceptance tests fully completed except 2 routers configuration among 15 ; to be completed by early September
PRO-LS-CE-26-30-CNES: Compte-rendu de recette sécurité réseaux du RTD et du CCC du PGGS/Calipso

MOGS systems adhere to NASA 2810 IT security requirements 
PC-GND 404: CALIPSO Mission Operations Ground System Network Plan 
All National Agency Checks (NAC) are complete and current
IT security has been extensively reviewed and addressed by project 

- CNES security regulations applied
- Security acceptance tests fully completed except 2 routers configuration among 15 ; to be completed by early September
- PRO-LS-CE-26-30-CNES: Compte-rendu de recette sécurité réseaux du RTD et du CCC du PGGS/Calipso
- MOGS systems adhere to NASA 2810 IT security requirements
- PC-GND 404: CALIPSO Mission Operations Ground System Network Plan
- All National Agency Checks (NAC) are complete and current
- IT security has been extensively reviewed and addressed by project

*IT Security*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Objectives:
Verify all the nominal flight phases and satellite modes
Verify all PF failure procedures that necessitate immediate actions (“Immediate Failures”) 
Verify a comprehensive subset of PF failure procedures that don’t necessitate immediate actions (“Typical Failures”)
Verify payload assessment phase, routine operations phase, and immediate action procedures
Verify Constellation Coordination and Ascent procedures
Verify staff proficiency by introducing unexpected failures
Implementation:
End to End Testing
Long Term Routine Simulations
Launch Dress Rehearsals 
Network Dress Rehearsals
Coordinated Ascent Simulations

- Verify all the nominal flight phases and satellite modes
- Verify all PF failure procedures that necessitate immediate actions (“Immediate Failures”)
- Verify a comprehensive subset of PF failure procedures that don’t necessitate immediate actions (“Typical Failures”)
- Verify payload assessment phase, routine operations phase, and immediate action procedures
- Verify Constellation Coordination and Ascent procedures
- Verify staff proficiency by introducing unexpected failures
- Implementation:
- End to End Testing
- Long Term Routine Simulations
- Launch Dress Rehearsals
- Network Dress Rehearsals
- Coordinated Ascent Simulations

*Operations Verification Approach*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## End to End Test #1 (February 2005 / 2 days)
Validated flight control procedures and TM/TC in addition to PRESTO testing
Day one:  TMTC validation on PMA and Star tracker tests (ON/OFF and expertise) 
Day two:  TMTC validation on PMB, GPS antennas management, and Payload ON/ARM-RESET/OFF
End to End Test #2 (March 2005 / 3 days)
Day one: Executed payload assessment phase procedures 
Day two:  Executed flight software load and time tag command procedures
Day three: Executed laser transmitter, time correction, and payload mode procedures
Demonstrate standard contingency procedures (Safe / Standby)
End to End Test #3 (April 2005 / 1 day)
Executed Platform procedures for MCDP board management (OBDH TC validation), Star Tracker, and GPS 
Executed Payload procedures to Demonstrate Solar Flare and HST avoidance, recover from orbit maneuver, and integrated thermal management procedures

- Validated flight control procedures and TM/TC in addition to PRESTO testing
- Day one:  TMTC validation on PMA and Star tracker tests (ON/OFF and expertise)
- Day two:  TMTC validation on PMB, GPS antennas management, and Payload ON/ARM-RESET/OFF
- End to End Test #2 (March 2005 / 3 days)
- Day one: Executed payload assessment phase procedures
- Day two:  Executed flight software load and time tag command procedures
- Day three: Executed laser transmitter, time correction, and payload mode procedures
- Demonstrate standard contingency procedures (Safe / Standby)
- End to End Test #3 (April 2005 / 1 day)
- Executed Platform procedures for MCDP board management (OBDH TC validation), Star Tracker, and GPS
- Executed Payload procedures to Demonstrate Solar Flare and HST avoidance, recover from orbit maneuver, and integrated thermal management procedures

*End-to-End Testing*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## LTR#1 (June 2004)
Exercised 4 days of normal on-orbit operations with Platform to safe on day 4.

LTR #3 (Oct 2004)
Exercised 5 days of on-orbit operations with Payload FDIR and 1553 anomaly/recovery

LTR #2 (February 2005)
Exercised 5 days of normal on-orbit operations
Exercised normal OCG and three exceptional OCGs
Exercised normal ephemeris exchange with MOGS/AQUA train
Exercised Payload Flight Software upload

LTR #4 (May 2005)
Exercised 5 days of normal on-orbit operations with maneuver operations
Planned maneuver aborted and re-planned /  anomaly with CloudSat resulting in constellation red flag
Simulation of IIR-TEC and interfaces with MOCC and ASDC (Atmospheric Science Data Center)

- Exercised 4 days of normal on-orbit operations with Platform to safe on day 4.
- LTR #3 (Oct 2004)
- Exercised 5 days of on-orbit operations with Payload FDIR and 1553 anomaly/recovery
- LTR #2 (February 2005)
- Exercised 5 days of normal on-orbit operations
- Exercised normal OCG and three exceptional OCGs
- Exercised normal ephemeris exchange with MOGS/AQUA train
- Exercised Payload Flight Software upload
- LTR #4 (May 2005)
- Exercised 5 days of normal on-orbit operations with maneuver operations
- Planned maneuver aborted and re-planned /  anomaly with CloudSat resulting in constellation red flag
- Simulation of IIR-TEC and interfaces with MOCC and ASDC (Atmospheric Science Data Center)

*Long Term Routine (LTR) Simulations*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## RG#0 (April 2005 / 4 days)
Objective: To ensure the CNES CALIPSO teams and experts are ready to support the launch until NOM/nominal Satellite modes. Reduced staffing.
Utilized PRESTO, partial extended SOGS (Main Control Room, Orbit Computation Center, 2Ghz COR Network Center)
RG#1 (June 2005 / 4 days)
Objective: Same as RG0 extended to NASA, ALCATEL and JPL support (use of PFF and WFF) 
Utilized PRESTO, Extended SOGS (Main Control Room, Orbit Computation Center, Operational Network Center COR), NASA, Alcatel, JPL JTCCS (Jason JPL Control Center) CALIPSO support,  JTCCS connected to PRESTO
RG#2 (Scheduled August 2005)
Objective: Same as RG1 extended to all entities involved in CALIPSO LEOP: AQUA TRAIN, CLOUDSAT.  Test split in two parts as during real life:  3 days carried out until NOM/nominal modes, 3 days for maneuvers and start of assessment Payload
Utilize same components as RG1 extended to AQUA TRAIN and CloudSat coordination
RG#3 (Scheduled @ Launch – 3 days):
Objective: To ensure that CALIPSO Operations teams are ready to support the launch. Test is restricted to count down chronology, ground communications and Satellite simulation until BBQ mode. 
Utilize same components as RG2

- Objective: To ensure the CNES CALIPSO teams and experts are ready to support the launch until NOM/nominal Satellite modes. Reduced staffing.
- Utilized PRESTO, partial extended SOGS (Main Control Room, Orbit Computation Center, 2Ghz COR Network Center)
- RG#1 (June 2005 / 4 days)
- Objective: Same as RG0 extended to NASA, ALCATEL and JPL support (use of PFF and WFF)
- Utilized PRESTO, Extended SOGS (Main Control Room, Orbit Computation Center, Operational Network Center COR), NASA, Alcatel, JPL JTCCS (Jason JPL Control Center) CALIPSO support,  JTCCS connected to PRESTO
- RG#2 (Scheduled August 2005)
- Objective: Same as RG1 extended to all entities involved in CALIPSO LEOP: AQUA TRAIN, CLOUDSAT.  Test split in two parts as during real life:  3 days carried out until NOM/nominal modes, 3 days for maneuvers and start of assessment Payload
- Utilize same components as RG1 extended to AQUA TRAIN and CloudSat coordination
- RG#3 (Scheduled @ Launch – 3 days):
- Objective: To ensure that CALIPSO Operations teams are ready to support the launch. Test is restricted to count down chronology, ground communications and Satellite simulation until BBQ mode.
- Utilize same components as RG2

*Launch Dress Rehearsals (RG)*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## RGR#1  (June 2005 / 2 days)
Simulate all network flows associated with Launch & Orbit Phase 
SOCC, KRN, AUS, HBK, JTCCS, AGS, WFF

RGR#2 (Scheduled September 15,2005)
Repeat RGR2 based on September 29,2005 Launch
Include LEOP Flight Dynamics Facility Support
Utilize existing SPOT SCAMA voice circuit at CNES 

- Simulate all network flows associated with Launch & Orbit Phase
- SOCC, KRN, AUS, HBK, JTCCS, AGS, WFF
- RGR#2 (Scheduled September 15,2005)
- Repeat RGR2 based on September 29,2005 Launch
- Include LEOP Flight Dynamics Facility Support
- Utilize existing SPOT SCAMA voice circuit at CNES

*Network Dress Rehearsals (RGR)*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Procedures to support constellation operations complete
Afternoon Constellation Operations Coordination Plan
Contingency Operations Procedures
CALIPSO/CloudSat coordinated ascent plan 
CALIPSO Mission Analysis Document
CloudSat “Playbook”
Constellation Operations conducted in two phases
 Ascent Phase
 Operational Phase

- Afternoon Constellation Operations Coordination Plan
- Contingency Operations Procedures
- CALIPSO/CloudSat coordinated ascent plan** **
- CALIPSO Mission Analysis Document
- CloudSat “Playbook”
- Constellation Operations conducted in two phases
** **Ascent Phase
-  Operational Phase

*Constellation Operations*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Constellation OperationsAscent Phase

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Constellation OperationsOperational Phase

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Constellation Coordination rehearsed during LT2 and LTR4
Nominal file exchanges during LTR2
Re-planned orbit maneuver during LTR4 
 Nominal Ascent Ephemeris Exchanges 
July 22, 2005 LRD
August 22, 2005 LRD
September 29, 2005 LRD (part of coordinated ascent simulation) 
Successful Flight Dynamics Peer Review (July 21, 2005)
CALIPSO and CloudSat projects have addressed all panel findings (5)  
 Coordinated Ascent Simulation (scheduled September 12 – 16, 2005)
Two part simulation with emphasis on team coordination 
Develop ascent plan based on injection state provided by simulation team
Develop final trim maneuver based on post OR2 state provided by sim. team

- Nominal file exchanges during LTR2
- Re-planned orbit maneuver during LTR4
-  Nominal Ascent Ephemeris Exchanges
- July 22, 2005 LRD
- August 22, 2005 LRD
- September 29, 2005 LRD (part of coordinated ascent simulation)
- Successful Flight Dynamics Peer Review (July 21, 2005)
- CALIPSO and CloudSat projects have addressed all panel findings (5)
-  Coordinated Ascent Simulation (scheduled September 12 – 16, 2005)
- Two part simulation with emphasis on team coordination
- Develop ascent plan based on injection state provided by simulation team
- Develop final trim maneuver based on post OR2 state provided by sim. team

*Constellation Operations*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## SOGS anomaly synthesis

- Anomalies/nonconformance are managed according to the « CALIPSO anomaly management  plan » (CAL-P0-AQ-510-CN).
- For SOGS and satellite operations:
- Total: 110 anomalies
- Open: 17 anomalies
- Significant: 6 anomalies
- Impact on mission: 0 anomaly

- No impact
- To be closed

**N°**

**Component**

**Title**

**Status**

**Launch impact**

- 1050

- G1

- Exécution incorrecte de la FCP

- COP1S_AD_Service_S6_S1 : RC

- INITADUNL ne passe pas.

- Under observation.

- Workaround by restart G1

- 1084

- G1-Tools

- Exécution de la TC DISCARSTR 1 sec

- avant la due date.

- closed : fixed and validation

- completed in RG2

- 1093

- G2

- Mauvaise mise à jour de la

- BD_ENCODAGE_TC

- closed : fixed and validation

- completed in RG2

- No impact

- 1036

- SEBB

- Mauvaise gestion des RC par le SEBB

- (SCOE ET TTCET) (plantage station si

- réception d'une RC non adressée)

- DM in progress

- No impact

- (secured by GCP

- using)

- 1076

- G1-RT/ DRPPC / SCP

- Perte liaison (plus de TM) entre G1 et

- DRPPC ou entre G1 et G1-Routeur de la

- SCP.

- Not reproduced since RG0

- (not steady config.)

- 1085

- SOCC

- Configuration du CCC d'essai différente

- du CCC Nominal

- update in progress

- No impact

- (nominal CCC

- not concerned)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## MOGS anomaly synthesis

- Summary
- 24 Total
- 22 Closed
- 1 Cancelled
- 1 Open :  ISDN line :CALOPSOO08A

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## The SOCC operations team will react to Red Alarms generated from :
CNES SYGALE (system automatic monitoring of telemetry) system used to monitor both the satellite & CNES ground system
Phone call from LaRC  (Payload or external event- solar flares, collisions,..)
Red alarms defined for:
Reds preventing a recovery to safe mode (automatic TM monitoring : Sygale),
Ground red alarms (automatic ground monitoring : Sygale)
Satellite safe mode (automatic TM monitoring : Sygale)
Payload red alarm (payload state different from “operational” (automatic TM monitoring : Sygale)
Hubble telescope Laser avoidance (call from LARC)
Solar flares (call from LARC)
Collision risk (call from LARC, notified by CCS)

- CNES SYGALE (system automatic monitoring of telemetry) system used to monitor both the satellite & CNES ground system
- Phone call from LaRC  (Payload or external event- solar flares, collisions,..)
- Red alarms defined for:
- Reds preventing a recovery to safe mode (automatic TM monitoring : Sygale),
- Ground red alarms (automatic ground monitoring : Sygale)
- Satellite safe mode (automatic TM monitoring : Sygale)
- Payload red alarm (payload state different from “operational” (automatic TM monitoring : Sygale)
- Hubble telescope Laser avoidance (call from LARC)
- Solar flares (call from LARC)
- Collision risk (call from LARC, notified by CCS)

*Contingency Plans: Overview*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

##  Red Alarm support provided 24/7
CNES H24 operations hotline staffing  
1 spacecraft engineer (called H24 ops hotline), 
1 ground engineer,
 1 network engineer, 
1 TTCET support, 
1 ops coordination manager
The person on duty comes over at CCC in less than one hour and acts to secure the satellite accordingly to predefined plans
In case of Payload red alarm or Safe mode, the person on duty notifies LARC,
In case of ground alarm, the ground engineer on duty performs a first investigation. He can call the network/TTCET hotline
Further actions on the satellite are considered at the OCG (operations coordination group), ASAP on the next working day, with at least  two spacecraft engineers available

- CNES H24 operations hotline staffing
- 1 spacecraft engineer (called H24 ops hotline),
- 1 ground engineer,
-  1 network engineer,
- 1 TTCET support,
- 1 ops coordination manager
- The person on duty comes over at CCC in less than one hour and acts to secure the satellite accordingly to predefined plans
- In case of Payload red alarm or Safe mode, the person on duty notifies LARC,
- In case of ground alarm, the ground engineer on duty performs a first investigation. He can call the network/TTCET hotline
- Further actions on the satellite are considered at the OCG (operations coordination group), ASAP on the next working day, with at least  two spacecraft engineers available

*Contingency Plans: Overview*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Payload Contingency Procedures complete (PC-GND-602)
Defined response to payload telemetry limits 
Operations response to identified residual risks are defined and incorporated within operational plans to the extent possible
RR-16M:  Laser Radiator Sizing
RR-19M:  Payload Flight Software Latent Defects
RR-36M: Pedestal and SHG Temperature Telemetry
RR-41M: SDRAM Radiation Sensitivity
Incorporated lessons learned from GLAS
Emphasis on laser telemetry monitoring
Laser transmitter fault isolation flow charts complete

- Defined response to payload telemetry limits
- Operations response to identified residual risks are defined and incorporated within operational plans to the extent possible
- RR-16M:  Laser Radiator Sizing
- RR-19M:  Payload Flight Software Latent Defects
- RR-36M: Pedestal and SHG Temperature Telemetry
- RR-41M: SDRAM Radiation Sensitivity
- Incorporated lessons learned from GLAS
- Emphasis on laser telemetry monitoring
- Laser transmitter fault isolation flow charts complete

*Contingency Plans*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Documentation Status

- Documentation in excellent shape
- The following documents have changes pending:
-  CAL-LB/LS.3-SP-556-CNES: Payload Inputs for Operations
-  Update PF survival heater settings / timeline for PL mode transitions
- Finalized during RG2
-  PC-SAT-402: Payload Commissioning Plan
- Update timelines for September 29, 2005 LRD / Removal of bad days
- Finalized during RG2
-  PC-SAT-403: Joint Mission Management Plan
- In signature cycle

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Open Actions

- ORR 08 (ISDN link)** **
- Pre configured modem shipped 8/24/2005 from CNES
- Positive resolution expected
- Closure expected NLT Sep 2, 2005
- ORR 09 (integrated satellite pointing verification)
- End-to-End pointing verification approach defined at Payload CDR
- Closure expected NLT Sep 2, 2005
- MOR 13 (CNES lessons learned database)
- The RFA requests to verify that the lessons learned on previous projects, listed in the CNES dedicated data base, are consistent with CALIPSO design & operations
- The work is close to completion: full consistency of CALIPSO for 70% of the data base that was analyzed

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Dress Rehearsal #2 (RG 2)
Spacecraft LEOP phase:  August 30 to 31 and Sept 1, 2005
Maneuvers and Payload Assessment Phase Training:  Sept 6 – 8 2005
MOGS Proficiency Exercises
MOCC / USN / ASDC :  September 2, 2005 & September 19, 2005
Network Dress Rehearsal #2 (RGR 2)
CALIPSO ground network LEOP phase: September 13 to 14, 2005
ESMO / CALIPSO / CloudSat Ascent Simulation
Includes insertion and Orbit Raise #2:  September 12 - 16
Launch Dress Rehearsal #3 (RG 3):
Count down, ground communications and Satellite simulation until BBQ mode. 

- Spacecraft LEOP phase:  August 30 to 31 and Sept 1, 2005
- Maneuvers and Payload Assessment Phase Training:  Sept 6 – 8 2005
- MOGS Proficiency Exercises
- MOCC / USN / ASDC :  September 2, 2005 & September 19, 2005
- Network Dress Rehearsal #2 (RGR 2)
- CALIPSO ground network LEOP phase: September 13 to 14, 2005
- ESMO / CALIPSO / CloudSat Ascent Simulation
- Includes insertion and Orbit Raise #2:  September 12 - 16
- Launch Dress Rehearsal #3 (RG 3):
- Count down, ground communications and Satellite simulation until BBQ mode.

*Remaining Activities*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Summary

- CALIPSO Ground Segment ready to support operations
- CALIPSO Operations team ready to support operations
- Remaining work planned with no significant issues
- Joint team interaction is outstanding

- OPS IS READY

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## AGENDA- Launch Vehicle Readiness -

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Launch vehicle status (assembly and checkout)
- Launch constraints (windows, etc.)
- Range readiness and launch opportunities
- Anomalies from previous flights or vehicle processing and resolutions
- Launch Vehicle Integration
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Readiness Review- Launch Vehicle Readiness -

- NASA / John Calvert
- NASA / Mike Goeser
- August 26, 2005

## Launch Vehicle Overview

- Vehicle configuration: 7420-10C
- Launch site:  SLC-2 @ VAFB
- Launch date: 29 Sept 2005
- First launch of 7420 from VAFB
- Unique mission requirements
- Dual payload attach fitting (DPAF)
- DPAF contamination barrier
- Standard DPAF instrumentation
- CALIPSO requirements
- Mass: 584.3 kg (1288.1 lbs)
- Two 37-pin PAF umbilicals
- Two 24-in diameter doors
- PLF cleaning to VC-6
- CloudSat requirements
- Mass: 847.7 kg (1869.0 lbs)
- Two 61-pin PAF umbilicals
- DPAF access holes
- Two 24-in (upper DPAF)
- One 12-in (lower DPAF)
- T-0 A/C system
- Two 24-in diameter PLF doors

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## LV / SC Interface Configuration

- Mission Requirements
- Dual Payload Attach Fitting (DPAF)
- Standard Height Configuration
- CALIPSO Upper Payload
- CloudSat Lower Payload
- 10 foot Composite Fairing
- DPAF Contamination Barrier
- PLF cleaning to VC-6
- DPAF cleaning to VC-3
- Standard DPAF Instrumentation

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight Profile

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO/CloudSat Communications and Telemetry

_**Legend**_**    (time, sec)**
**1 = Main Engine Cutoff  (264)**
**2 = SECO-1  (670.3)**
_**WR Tracking Sites**_
**VTS -> AFSCN Vandenberg**
**TRS -> VAFB TM Receiving Station**
**SNI  -> NAWC San Nicolas Island **
_**SMC/VOD**_
**OTTR  -> Instrumented Ship**

*WR*

*OTTR*

***2***

***1***

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO/CloudSat Communications and Telemetry

*CALIPSO/CloudSat Communications and Telemetry*

_**Legend**_**    (time, sec)**
**3 = First Restart  (3596.1)**
**4 = SECO-2  (3607.8)**
**5 = CALIPSO Separation (3740.0)**
_**Downrange Tracking Sites**_
**MAL -> Malindi, Kenya**
**HBK -> Hartebeestoek, S. Africa**

*MAL*

***4***

***3***

***5***

***x***

***x***

***x***

*HBK*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO/CloudSat Communications and Telemetry

*CALIPSO/CloudSat Communications and Telemetry*

*30 W*

_**Legend**_**    (time, sec)**
** ****6 = DPAF Separation  (5736.0)**
** ****7 = CloudSat Separation  (5816.0)**
** ****8 = Evasive Burn (7700.0 – 7705.0)**
_**Downrange Tracking Sites**_
**VTS  -> Vandenberg Tracking Station**
**HTS  -> Hawaii Tracking Station**
**MGS  -> McMurdo Ground Station**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO/CloudSat Communications and Telemetry

*CALIPSO/CloudSat Communications and Telemetry*

_**Legend**_**    (time, sec)**
**9 = Depletion Restart (8900)**
**10 = Depletion Cutoff (8939.9)**
_**Downrange Tracking Sites**_
**HBK -> Hartebeestoek, S. Africa**

*0*

*HBK*

***9***

***10***

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Status/Launch Site Schedules

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Readiness Reviews

- Launch Vehicle Readiness Review		17 August 05	KSC
- CALIPSO Mission Readiness Review 		26 August 05	GSFC
- CloudSat Mission Readiness Review		1 September 05	JPL
- Launch Site Readiness Review		8 September 05	VAFB
- Safety & Mission Assurance 		10 September 05	HQ
- 	Readiness Review
- Flight Readiness Review		23 September 05	VAFB
- Launch Mgt. Coordination Meeting /		26 September 05	VAFB
- 	Mission Dress Rehearsal
- Launch Readiness Review 		27 September 05	VAFB

*Readiness Reviews*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO/CloudSat Integration & Test Schedule

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Conflict Calendar

***HOLIDAY***

**Mission Conflict Calendar**

**September/October 2005**

**Delta II**
**CALIPSO/CloudSat**
**03:01:05 PDT**

*ER-Delta II*
*GPS IIR-14*
*(NET)*

- Titan IV
- NROL-20

**Delta IV**
**NROL-22**
**(Planning)**

**Minotaur**
**STP-R1**

**WR Op**

**WR Op**

*Battery Probable Cause TIM*

_*Other Battery Events*_*:*
*08/24/05 - Battery Dissection Complete*
*09/02/05 - Battery Fishbone & Probable Cause Identification*

*Battery Range Safety Concurrence*

*Battery TIM / 30**th** & 45**th** Space Wing Approval*

***HOLIDAY***

*Delta IV*
*GOES-N*
*(NET)*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO Launch Site Documentation Status

- Requirements Documentation Status
- All CALIPSO requirements documentation is in place to support mission processing (LSSP, CCIP, NASA OR/OD)
- Final Boeing Range documentation is in work (OR/OD)
- CALIPSO Safety Documentation Status
- Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package (MSPSP) final version received 09 March 2005 and subsequently approved by all launch site parties, including 30th SW Range Safety and KSC Safety
- All standalone spacecraft procedures are being reviewed and approved by 30th SW Range Safety and KSC Safety in accordance with the schedule
- All supplemental safety documentation is approved and released (Integrated Operations Safety Plan, Operations Safety Plan,  Hydrazine training)
- Contingency Offload Plan will be addressed in the Special Attention Items section
- Boeing spacecraft-related procedures are being provided to CALIPSO/CloudSat personnel for review as they are made available

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO/CloudSat Launch Site Status

- CloudSat Launch Site Status:
- Standalone payload processing, test, and checkout is complete
- Fueling of spacecraft was performed on 14-15 August
- CloudSat has begun integrated operations, mated to their PAF, and installed in the lower cone
- Encapsulation in DPAF scheduled for Aug. 26.
- CALIPSO Launch Site Status:
- Initial operations, satellite checkout and atmospheric testing are complete
- Fueling was performed on 24-25 August
- Satellite is on schedule for weighing and integrated operations to commence on 29 August 2005

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Interface Control Documentation

- Mission ICD CALIPSO (ERB-04-214)
- Boeing document MDC 01H0074B, July 2005
- Specification Change Notice (SCNs)
- Three (3) In Review
- SCN 33 Electrical Connector Stayout Zone
- SCN 34 Spacecraft Access Requirement
- SCN 35 Payload to Blockhouse Wiring Diagram Resistance Value
- ICD Waivers
- None
- KSC Verification Status
- 95 requirements subject to verification process;  26 closed
- Remaining items are on normal closure schedule to support the launch schedule
- Closure process includes drawing review, analysis as well as inspection of “as built” hardware
- Final verification of remaining requirements will be complete during launch site operations

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Delta II Fleet Accepted/Open Risks

**2S**

**1S**

**3S**

| Item | Status | Risk ID | Risk Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | A | V0033 | Condition:  Cracks have occurred and been detected within electronics PackageE-Package Thick Film Assemblies (TFA’s)
Consequence:  Undetected cracks in other E-packages causing failure |
| 2 | A | V0034 | Condition:  Delaminations have occurred within the Graphite Epoxy Motor (GEM) nozzles' Exit Cone Liners (ECL) and Throat Support Insulators (TSI). 
Consequence:  Detrimental hot gas flow, adverse heating and eventual failure of the nozzle. |
| 3 | A | V0035 | Condition:  A photodiode failed within Redundant Inertial Flight Control Assembly (RIFCA) S/N 20093. 
Consequence:  Failure of photodiode in flight causing loss of one lane in another RIFCA  |

***The Launch Services Program understands the noted residual risks for the CALIPSO/Cloudsat mission, and the mitigations taken by the LSC and the Program engineering staff.   The Program recognizes the independent risk ratings provided by the Program Technical Team and SMA.  The efforts in mitigating the risk and the rationale for flight provide for the highest practical probability of mission success for the CALIPSO/Cloudsat mission.  The LSP Board process resulted in concurrence from all parties and documented the Program's acceptance rationale for the mission.   ***

**S = Safety & Mission Assurance Designation**
**P= Launch Services Program Designation**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Delta II Fleet Accepted/Open Risks

**4S 4P**
**5S**

| Item | Status | Risk ID | Risk Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 
4
 | A | V0015 | Condition:  Nine flight critical engine section components are unqualified for the RS-27A series 50 engine cutoff transient environment from MECO to vernier engine cutoff (six second period)
Consequence:  Failure of one or more of the nine flight critical engine section components during flight leading to a loss of vehicle |
| 5 | A | V0037 | Condition:  Power and Control (P&C) Box capacitors have become loose in S/N 20070 (not on C/C)
Consequence:  Undetected loose capacitors in other P&C Boxes.  |

**5P**

***The Launch Services Program understands the noted residual risks for the CALIPSO/Cloudsat mission, and the mitigations taken by the LSC and the Program engineering staff.   The Program recognizes the independent risk ratings provided by the Program Technical Team and SMA.  The efforts in mitigating the risk and the rationale for flight provide for the highest practical probability of mission success for the CALIPSO/Cloudsat mission.  The LSP Board process resulted in concurrence from all parties and documented the Program's acceptance rationale for the mission.   ***

**S = Safety & Mission Assurance Designation**
**P= Launch Services Program Designation**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Assurance Collision Avoidance

- LSP is planning to provide MA COLA support in response to GSFC center policy.
- Conjunctions (close approaches) are characterized by the associated probability of collision (POC).
- GSFC policy dictates that any POC higher than 1 in a million is unacceptable.
- CALIPSO/CloudSat mission represents a “worst case” with respect to MA COLA impact on launch operations.
- Due to instantaneous launch window, the only possible response to an unacceptable conjunction is to scrub the launch attempt for that day.
- Four bodies (2 spacecraft, separable DPAF, second stage) significantly increases the likelihood of conjunctions relative to a single payload mission.
- Relatively long mission duration (CloudSat separates ~40 minutes after SECO2)
- SSO is a relatively crowded orbit environment.
- Experience demonstrates that 1-in-a-million POCs are not uncommon for SSO missions.
- For Aura, an average of 28% of the 3 minute launch window was unacceptable.
- CALIPSO/CloudSat launch community should be prepared for the likelihood of standing down due to MA COLA.

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Special Attention Items

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## ERB/ERS Summary

- 6 ERB’s Remain Open, expected closure by 9/8/05.
- 6 ERS’s Remain Open, expected closure by 9/14/05.

|  | Number of OPEN ERBs | Number of OPEN ERSs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Mission | 1 | 1 |
| Core/Fleet | 5 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 6 | 6 |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Bracket Weld Drop-through ERS/ERB 05-290

- The presence of drop-through in second stage tank bracket welds was first discovered in Decatur on the forward skirt of tank FM-8 (NROL-21) during routine visual inspection.  X-ray inspection of FM-8 showed defects (porosity) in the fillet weld itself (not in the root side).  In-process dye penetrant inspection at Alenia of these fillet welds on FM-8 showed no presence of surface cracks.
- Subsequent inspection of other tanks at Alenia showed the presence of drop-through in the bracket welds of FM-15.  Investigation is ongoing as to the extent of these drop-through areas and/or the presence of defects (such as cracks or porosity) in the fillet weld areas.
- There are a total of 90 “details” attached by fillet welds on each Delta II 2nd stage tank
- X-ray inspection will be performed on 74 of 90 welds (shots thru multi-tank walls and thick flanges would yield inconclusive results - “zero value”)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Drop-through location

- Internal Surface of Skirt

- External Surface of Skirt

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## 2nd Stage Tank Resolution Plan

- Option 1 – Provide adequate rationale for acceptance of assigned/stacked C/C tank (FM5)
- X-ray 3 tanks (FM6, FM8, FM9) currently in Decatur and 3 tanks (QM, FM1, FM15) at Alenia				ECD 8/31
- Boeing (M&PE) review films			ECD 9/2
- Review weld history for trends (welders, timeframe, etc)  ECD 9/2
- Perform stress/strength analysis to determine maximum allowable defect size   					ECD 9/2
- Strength to compare max detected flaw size to max acceptable (analytical) flaw size				ECD 9/4
- Present findings/acceptance rationale at Engineering Review Board 						ECD 9/6
- Option 2 – Remove/Replace C/C 2nd Stage tank
- All variations of this option will require lengthy delay (~100 days) and would most likely not result in launch in 2005

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight Termination System (FTS) Batteries ERB #: 05-258

- In mid-June 2005, during dissection of the 2004 Production Lot FTS batteries following qualification testing at the vendor, numerous broken lead wires from plates to terminals were found
- 2005 FTS Battery Production Lot is considered susceptible to 2004 failure condition
- To mitigate fatigue failure, vibration levels have been lowered by Boeing and accepted by Range/NASA based on evaluation of ground test to flight data vibration levels
- Test batteries have been activated and undergone vibration testing 8/16.  Dissection scheduled for completion on 8/25
- The 2005 cell lots included the corrective actions required by the 2004 Production Lot Low Capacity Failure Analysis (ERS 03-339)
- May be causing less swelling inside the cell and therefore less friction between cell plates
- May make the 2005 Production Lot more susceptible to fatigue failure than previously qualified batteries

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Flight Termination System (FTS) Batteries ERB #: 05-258 continued

- Completion of fishbone analysis is required to identify and mitigate all potential failure modes
- NASA cog E has been fully involved with Boeing, Range and Aerospace technical evaluation
- Range has been requesting documented failure report before giving final approval
- LSP will conduct an ERB on 9/7 concurrent with Boeing TIM
- Final Range Approval expected no sooner than 9/15

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## GEM-40 Nozzle Delaminations

- Throat Support Insulator (TSI) ply separations exist on all four CALIPSO/CloudSat GEM-40 motor nozzles
- Separations meet the NASA acceptance criteria
- None of the four have separations in the Exit Cone Liner (ECL)
- CALIPSO/CloudSat GEM nozzle inspection points are the same as used during the previous nine NASA missions (starting with MER-A in 2003).
- Prior to GEM-40 transport to pad (completed 6/15/05).
- Prior to CALIPSO/CloudSat spacecraft mate to the Delta II (scheduled for 9/8/05.
- The CALIPSO/CloudSat GEM-40s are acceptable for flight

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## CALIPSO Supplemental Hydrazine Safeguards

**Supplemental document /**
**safeguard**

**Supplemental Requirements, Training, and Procedures**

**Standard document /**
**safeguard**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Spacecraft Emergency Offload Issue

- The current CALIPSO emergency offload plan has been  revised to improve the content and resolve any questions regarding the operational feasibility of the plan.
- Initial leak assessment, mitigation, and containment alternatives that exist after fairing installation were re-evaluated to add clarity and depth to contingency options available to the team.
- Potential for access to CALIPSO F&D valves thru fairing door has been reassessed and found feasible
- Fairing removal is considered a last resort, rather than an initial response
- Well thought, focused mitigation and containment steps have been added that precede fairing removal and s/c offloading.
- This issue is considered closed upon signature of all parties

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Summary

- NASA Launch Services Program is ready for continued CALIPSO/CloudSat launch vehicle processing.
- NASA Launch Services Program will complete all required open work prior to approval for start of spacecraft mate activities (LSRR 9/8), including:
- FTS Battery Assessment
- 2nd Stage Tank Bracket Weld Assessment

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Readiness Review

- Launch Vehicle Integration Status
- Mike Goeser
- August 26, 2005

## Launch Dates and Times
Schedule for Integrated Boeing/Spacecraft Operations
Documentation Status
Special Attention Items

- Schedule for Integrated Boeing/Spacecraft Operations
- Documentation Status
- Special Attention Items

*Key Topics*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Dates and Times

- CALIPSO/Cloudsat mission has instantaneous launch times for the period from 9/29/05 to 11/22/05 to launch both spacecraft into the       A-Train Constellation
- Launch time based on Mean Local Time for the Ascending Node
- A single inclination target of 98.204o based on Aqua ephemeris data to be used for entire launch period
- MLTs and corresponding launch times will vary slightly after Boeing completes the Best Estimate Trajectory (BET) analysis
- Final BET input to KSC on 22 August
- Launch time for 9/29/05 is 10:01:05 GMT (03:01:05 PDT)
- Launch times for all days of the launch period in following slide

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Dates and Times

| Launch Date | MLT of Ascending Node | Launch Time (GMT) | Launch Date | MLT of Ascending Node | Launch Time (GMT) | Launch Date | MLT of Ascending Node | Launch Time (GMT) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 29-Sep | 13:40:08 | 10:01:05 | 18-Oct | 13:39:47 | 10:00:44 | 6-Nov | 13:40:01 | 10:00:58 |
| 30-Sep | 13:39:46 | 10:00:43 | 19-Oct | 13:40:04 | 10:01:01 | 7-Nov | 13:40:18 | 10:01:15 |
| 1-Oct | 13:40:03 | 10:01:00 | 20-Oct | 13:40:20 | 10:01:17 | 8-Nov | 13:39:57 | 10:00:54 |
| 2-Oct | 13:39:41 | 10:00:38 | 21-Oct | 13:39:59 | 10:00:56 | 9-Nov | 13:40:14 | 10:01:11 |
| 3-Oct | 13:39:58 | 10:00:55 | 22-Oct | 13:40:16 | 10:01:13 | 10-Nov | 13:39:53 | 10:00:50 |
| 4-Oct | 13:40:14 | 10:01:11 | 23-Oct | 13:39:55 | 10:00:52 | 11-Nov | 13:40:10 | 10:01:07 |
| 5-Oct | 13:39:53 | 10:00:50 | 24-Oct | 13:40:12 | 10:01:09 | 12-Nov | 13:39:48 | 10:00:45 |
| 6-Oct | 13:40:10 | 10:01:07 | 25-Oct | 13:39:50 | 10:00:47 | 13-Nov | 13:40:05 | 10:01:02 |
| 7-Oct | 13:39:48 | 10:00:45 | 26-Oct | 13:40:07 | 10:01:04 | 14-Nov | 13:40:22 | 10:01:19 |
| 8-Oct | 13:40:05 | 10:01:02 | 27-Oct | 13:39:46 | 10:00:43 | 15-Nov | 13:40:01 | 10:00:58 |
| 9-Oct | 13:39:49 | 10:00:46 | 28-Oct | 13:40:03 | 10:01:00 | 16-Nov | 13:40:18 | 10:01:15 |
| 10-Oct | 13:40:06 | 10:01:03 | 29-Oct | 13:40:19 | 10:01:16 | 17-Nov | 13:39:56 | 10:00:53 |
| 11-Oct | 13:39:44 | 10:00:41 | 30-Oct | 13:39:58 | 10:00:55 | 18-Nov | 13:40:13 | 10:01:10 |
| 12-Oct | 13:40:01 | 10:00:58 | 31-Oct | 13:40:15 | 10:01:12 | 19-Nov | 13:39:52 | 10:00:49 |
| 13-Oct | 13:40:18 | 10:01:15 | 1-Nov | 13:39:53 | 10:00:50 | 20-Nov | 13:40:09 | 10:01:06 |
| 14-Oct | 13:39:56 | 10:00:53 | 2-Nov | 13:40:10 | 10:01:07 | 21-Nov | 13:40:26 | 10:01:23 |
| 15-Oct | 13:40:13 | 10:01:10 | 3-Nov | 13:39:49 | 10:00:46 | 22-Nov | 13:40:05 | 10:01:02 |
| 16-Oct | 13:39:52 | 10:00:49 | 4-Nov | 13:40:06 | 10:01:03 |   |   |   |
| 17-Oct | 13:40:08 | 10:01:05 | 5-Nov | 13:40:22 | 10:01:19 |   |   |   |

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Integrated Schedule Milestones

**CALIPSO Turnover to Boeing & Weighing****	****	****29 Aug****	****	****(L-31 Day)**
**Mate to Upper PAF****	****	****	****	****30 Aug****	****	****(L-30 Day)**
**Mate SC/Upper PAF to DPAF****	****	****	****1 Sept****	****	****(L-28 Day)**
**CALIPSO/Cloudsat/DPAF Canning ****	****	****	****8 Sept****	****	****(L-21 Day)**
**Transport to SLC 2 and Mate to LV****	****	****	****9 Sept****	****	****(L-20 Day)**
**Cloudsat Battery Conditioning****	****	****	****10 -15 Sept**
**CALIPSO Battery Charge****	****	****	****	****As Require****	**
**Flight Program Verification****	****	****	****16 Sept****	****	****(L-13 Day)**
**Fairing Installation****	****	****	****	****21 Sept****	****	****(L-8 Day)**
**Flight Readiness Review ****	****	****	****	****23 Sept****	****	****(L-6Day)**
**Second Stage Propellant Load****	****	****	****26 Sep****	****	****(L-3 Day)**
**Integrated Launch Rehearsal****	****	****	****26 Sept****	****	****(L-3 Day)**
**Launch Readiness Review ****	****	****	****27 Sept****	****	****(L-2 Day)**
**Current Compensation Begins****	****	****	****27 Sept ****	****	****(L-34 Hours)**
**RF Soft Cover Removal****	****	****	****	****28 Sept ****	****	****(L-19 Hours)**
**Launch****	****	****	****	****	****	****29 Sept****	****	****03:01:05 PDT**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Documentation Status

- Launch Vehicle ICD
- Revision B dated July 2005 with three outstanding SCNs (all approved by the project) – all planned to be signed off next week by all parties
- Clarification of electrical umbilical connection stay-out zone
- Change to SC access and GSE requirements on SLC 2
- Change to resistance values for SLC 2 wiring
- Launch Site Support Plan
- Baseline issue dated February 2005
- Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package
- MSPSP final version dated March 8, 2005 approved by Range & KSC Safety
- MSPSP Supplement signed May 9, 2005
- CALIPSO/Cloudsat MOU for Joint Launch Site Operations (11/22/04)
- Agreement on contamination plan after both SC are in the same high bay

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Special Topics

- Supplemental safeguards and KSC Ground Operations Safety Program Lead (GOSPL) in place to mitigate hydrazine propulsion system risk
- Supplemental safety documentation approved and special training is proceeding as required
- Propellant offloading plan on SLC 2 (following slide)
- Payload fairing air temperature (following slide)
- Risk mitigation for inadvertent CALIPSO RF transmission in the payload fairing (following slide)

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Propellant Offloading Plan on SLC 2

- Project is revising the offload plan with GOSPL support in response to direction from KSC
- Primary option for contingency offload of propellant with the fairing installed will now be to release GN2 pressure and connect offloading hose to SC through fairing door opening in SCAPE
- Allows for use of normal Boeing procedure for fairing removal
- This capability successfully demonstrated on 19 August at Astrotech
- 6’ tall United Paradyme technician in CAT I SCAPE using backpack breathing air through door opening of fairing simulation with SC mock-up
- Demonstrated reach to Fill/Drain Valve, clearance for offload hoses through opening, and simulated hose connection to FDV
- Demo was videotaped
- To be sent to signatories and planned for re-signing before transport to SLC 2
- No CNES/Alcatel concerns with updated plan

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Payload Fairing Air Temperature

- CALIPSO requires higher temperature for early orbit battery performance and solar array separation device (SC-LV I/F ring to be no lower than 62.6oF)
- Cloudsat requires lower temperature to maintain acceptable battery SOC (air temperature inside the DPAF no greater than 64oF)
- PLF A/C range of 66oF to 74oF and T-0 Battery Cooling A/C range of 46oF to 54oF shown to meet both SC requirements by Boeing CFD analysis
- Temperature measurements to be taken inside DPAF on the pad to verify CFD analysis
- Agreement between the two projects documented in KSC Memo dated 6/06/05 to define process in advance to adjust A/C systems if either SC requirements not being met

**RF Cover**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## RF Transmission in the Payload Fairing

- S-Band transmitters are automatically activated when the SC is powered on
- Poses risk to LV and both SC if fairing is on (especially Cloudsat)
- Alcatel designed, built, and tested soft RF covers to attenuate RF to allowable levels (Boeing analysis showed 20 dB required)
- Covers installed and tested at Astrotech June 20 – will remain on the SC until day before launch
- Cloudsat representative in attendance agreed that attenuation requirement met
- Telecommands to power on SC will be removed from MCDT before covers removed
- Covers removed hours before launch though fairing door opening and can be re-installed if required

**RF Soft Cover**

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Readiness Statement

_**CALIPSO is ready to proceed to launch with respect to Launch Vehicle integration.**_

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Agenda-Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)-

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Summary of critical milestone and peer review program
- Significant findings and recommendations from IIRT reviews
- Detailed discussion of all IIRT recommendations that are still open
- Mission readiness and residual risk assessment
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT) See Handout

- M. Goans
- August 26, 2005

## Agenda-Communications Plan-

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Education and Public Outreach Plan
- Public Affairs Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Mission Readiness Review- COMMUNICATIONS PLAN -

- Melinda Cagle
- August 26, 2005

## Plan approved June 28, 2005.
Science Mission Directorate (SMD)
Public Affairs (PA)
Living document
CloudSat – CALIPSO Communications Plan
Two missions   one plan
Outreach plan and Public Affairs plan  one plan
Lesson Learned Activity
New format created a lot of confusion during the SMD approval process.
We were the first and probably will be the last.

- Science Mission Directorate (SMD)
- Public Affairs (PA)
- Living document
- CloudSat – CALIPSO Communications Plan
- Two missions   one plan
- Outreach plan and Public Affairs plan  one plan
- Lesson Learned Activity
- New format created a lot of confusion during the SMD approval process.
- We were the first and probably will be the last.

*Communications Plan*

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Communications Plan

- Key elements of the plan
- Which mission first?  CloudSat - CALIPSO
- Mission objectives
- Mission themes or messages with accompanying supporting facts
- Mission tagline “*CloudSat-CALIPSO: Revealing the secrets of clouds and aerosols.*“
- Mission timeline – Project milestones
- Public Affairs timeline – Communications milestones
- Newsroom operations
- Contingency operations
- Public affairs products
- Public outreach plan
- List of responsible officials for NASA and partner agencies

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Communications Standards

- Issues with Aura outreach materials
- The look and feel was not consistent
- All new EPO products must adhere to communications guidelines
- Various levels of approval
- Content approval prior to production
- All new CALIPSO EPO products comply
- The Brochure
- Displays
- Banners
- Fact sheets
- http://www-calipso.larc.nasa.gov  or  http://www.nasa.gov/calipso

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Planning

- Guest Operations Status
- Administrator will not be attending
- Guest packets due to GSFC - 9/12
- Guest Ops center opens L-2
- Guest Briefing L-1 @ 2:30pm
- Coordination with partners for displays
- CNES
- Hampton University
- Transportation logistics
- Guest reception @ VAFB & LaRC
- Launch invitations
- Names can be added up to L-7

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Planning

- Public Affairs
- JPL, LaRC, KSC coordinating activities
- CNES Paris - Eliane Moreaux
- CNES French Embassy in DC - Jean-Jacques Tortora
- Press Kit
- Science Writer’s Guide

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Launch Planning

- Science Teams
- Joint CloudSat – CALIPSO Science Team Meeting
- Newly developed EPO products
- The Brochure
- Animations – CloudSat, CALIPSO, A-Train
- Fact sheets – Clouds, Aerosols, Energy Balance
- Rollup displays – CALIPSO only, CloudSat – CALIPSO
- Features for NASA portal – go live one month prior to launch
- Feature stories on CALIPSO team members

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## The Brochure

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Education

- Hampton University
- CloudSat – CALIPSO – Aura – GLOBE Teacher Workshops
- Teacher workshops 2004 & 2006
- Regional workshops follow each
- Involve students in reporting visual cloud observations and sun photometer data collection at the GLOBE program website.
- CALIPSO involvement added 2 French schools
- Video productions with WHRO
***“******How to use the sun photometer”***
***“******The A-Train Express” – ***grades 5-8
***“******What is lidar and how is CALIPSO using it?”***
- Live event
- CloudSat and CALIPSO scientists
- French and American students

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Education

- Hampton University
- http://calipsooutreach.hamptonu.edu
- Various web activities for students
- Contribute stories for the NASA Portal and Earth Observatory
- Lesson plans
- Using the sun photometer
- Sizing up clouds
- Maintain a relationship with GLOBE outreach activities in France
- Produce a DVD with videos and other features

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Points of Contact

- Science Manager - _[Melinda.F.Cagle@nasa.gov](mailto:Melinda.F.Cagle@nasa.gov)_
- Public Affairs Officer - _[Christopher.P.Rink@nasa.gov](mailto:Christopher.P.Rink@nasa.gov)_
- Guest Operations - _[D.Elaine.Gause@nasa.gov](mailto:D.Elaine.Gause@nasa.gov)_
- Science Writer – “Katie” _[k.e.lorentz@larc.nasa.gov](mailto:k.e.lorentz@larc.nasa.gov)_
- Education - _[Dianne.Robinson@hamptonu.edu](mailto:Dianne.Robinson@hamptonu.edu)_
- CNES Public Affairs, Paris - _[Eliane.Moreaux@cnes.fr](mailto:Eliane.Moreaux@cnes.fr)_
- CNES Public Affairs, DC – Jean Jacques Tortora _[FranceCnes@ambafrance-us.org](mailto:FranceCnes@ambafrance-us.org)_

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Agenda-Project Closing Statements-

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- Summary readiness statement for the mission
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Program Manager’s Assessment

- Is CALIPSO ready to Launch?
- Satellite Segment Status:
- Atmospheric Test at VAFB was a very successful end-to-end test
- Comprehensive Residual Risk Assessment completed
- Fueling successfully completed
- Five minor open issues - Technical work is all done and the paperwork will be completed by 9 September
- Mission Operations Segment is working well:
- CNES and NASA are working as a single team
- Operations Reviews have gone very well
- Multiple rehearsals have produced good momentum for the launch
- Science Segment is prepared:
- Team is in place – many come from LITE
- All production software is completed
- Launch Segment has a couple of issues:
- Welds in second stage need to be evaluated
- FTS batteries need to be resolved
- Launch date needs to be finalized
- These issues should be resolved next week
- Once Launch Vehicle issues are resolved,

- CALIPSO IS READY

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005

## Agenda-IPMC Discussion-

- Welcome/Introduction
- Mission Description
- Flight System Readiness
- ****Break****
- Mission Operations Readiness
- Launch Vehicle Readiness
- Integrated Independent Review Team (IIRT)
- Communications Plan
- Project Closing Statements
- IPMC Discussion

- MISSION READINESS REVIEW

- Aug 26, 2005