# Presentation: 536477

## “...intellectual freedom is essential to human society -- freedom to obtain and distribute information, freedom for open-minded and unfearing debate and freedom from pressure by officialdom and prejudices.”Andre Sakharov, 1968, “Reflections on progress, coexistence and intellectual freedom”

***Irving A. Lerch***
***APS Forum on International Physics***
***lerch@aps.org***

## Overview of the Visa Regime

***of approximately 30 million foreign visitors who enter the US each year, roughly a half million come as students on F, M and J visas.  And approximately 175,000 of these come to study science***
***jointly directed by State and Homeland Security (visa authority is now shared between the departments)***
***"Patriot Law" has already authorized the implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) to monitor those who come to the US  under the Student Exchange and Visitor Program (SEVP).  The Patriot Act has also imposed a two-tier review system over consular officers***

**Notes:**
	The proposed Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Security seeks to impose a security regiment on the nation’s recruitment of S&T talent.  Making such a system work within the uncertainties of the day will pose a formidable task.  Already proposals for organizing the new Department of Homeland Security include provisions from removing authority over visas from the State Department.  With the reorganization of INS, the potential for confusion and increased viscosity in the system poses a real danger to the health of the nation’s S&T enterprise.

## 4.4m, 26% rej.

- 263k, 20% rej.

- 2.6m, 32% rej.

- 216k, 25% rej.

## 342,113

- 586,323

**Net Contribution to U.S. Economy by**
**Foreign Students and their Families: $12,851,000,000**
*Source: Open Doors 2003, Institute of International Education Online Survey*

## What do the personal tragedies portend for the international and domestic enterprises?

- Students prevented from returning from foreign meetings or after attending to urgent family business (many denied or delayed at the outset).
- Colleagues unable to pursue major long-term research owing to visa restrictions.
- Colleagues subjected to summary imprisonment for minor violations of immigration laws.
- Colleagues denied or delayed visas to attend meetings (often after giving up their passports for unconscionably long periods).
- Colleagues at risk in authoritarian states denied sanctuary.

## 74,603

***74,603***

***51,519***

***8,076***

***12,801***

***64,757***

***6,238***

***10,432***

***34,803***

***6,595***

***9,982***

## AAU Summarizes 2003 Visa Survey, November 14, 2003:

**49% reported research delays**
**67% reported lengthening time to degree**
**28% reported classes without instructors**
**44% reported lost fellowships for foreign students**
**13% reported students missing major conferences**
**74% reported institutional financial loss**
**44% reported foreign students choosing another country**

## NAFSA/AAU/NASULGC Survey

**64% report steady or declining enrollments**
**36% indicate an increase (usually smaller than decline)**
**Reasons for decline:**
**69% noted increase in visa denials**
**65% visa delays (interview delays)**
**59% decrease in applications**
**32% delays for security advisories**
**25% applicant went to another country**

## Graduate school applications from international students declined 32% over the last year ... according to a Council of Graduate Schools survey. ... This survey generated responses from 113 graduate schools [which]  enroll nearly one-half of all international graduate students in the U.S.

***Over 90% of U.S. graduate schools ... responding to the survey reported an overall decrease in international graduate student applications. ***
***Total international applications in the responding graduate schools for Fall 2004 declined 32% from Fall 2003.***
***76% reported declines from China and 58% reported declines from India, the two largest sending countries.***
***Forty-seven percent of responding institutions reported a decline from Korea, 33% a decline from Taiwan, 30% a decline from Western Europe, 31% a decline from the Middle East, and 36% from all other countries.***
***Thirty-two of the 50 research institutions with the largest international student ... reported particularly severe declines, with all but one reporting decreases in international graduate student applications. ***
***International applications declined across all major fields, but the most striking decreases came in engineering, physical sciences, and biological sciences. ***
***Among the top 50 research institutions, an even greater percentage reported declines in all major fields, compared to the full survey. Over 90% of these graduate schools reported decreases in international applications for engineering programs, and 80% for the physical sciences.***

## Before 9/11, 100,000 Chinese

***Before 9/11, 100,000 Chinese***
***Students took the TOEFL/year.***
***Since, the numbers dropped to***
***30,000 in 2002 and 10,000 this year.***

## Slide 11

## Slide 12

## Visa Problems for Delegates to the International Symposium in Lepton Photon InteractionsFermi Lab

- At LP-1999 held at Stanford, 12 of 16 invited Chinese citizens and 7 of 25 invited citizens of the former Soviet Union attended.  At LP-2003 only one of about 20 invited Chinese and 5 of 20 invited Russians attended.  Almost all of Russians who did attend traveled with multi-entry visa or were already in the US.

## Slide 14

## Conclusions/Inferences for BNL(Susan White-DePace, Brookhaven National Lab)

- Approximately 20% of users work at more than one facility
- The average percentage of non-US users is slightly less than 50%
- Approximately 13% of users come from sensitive countries
- Total number of users exceeds 10,000

## The International Connection: A Sketch

**The 3 weapons laboratories--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia--received some 6,398 foreign visitors or assignees (stays from 30 days to 2 years) in 1998 including 1,824 visitors from sensitive countries.**
**In addition, employees traveled to foreign laboratories or scientific conferences encompassing 5,799 trips to include 1,814 trips to sensitive countries.**
***Result:  enhanced access to the 70-75% unclassified work needed to progress in weapons-related research, open scientific research, and cooperative international programs.***

**Notes:**
	The importance of exchange programs to the work of the weapons labs is clear in this overhead which illustrates the size of both the travel and visitors programs.  Any abridgement of these programs cannot help but impose a deleterious burden on the productivity of the labs.  Yet abridgements there have been.

## The Introduction of More Restrictive Measures

**New classifications for material already in the public domain.**
**Special identity badges for foreign nationals.**
**New restrictions on access to unclassified facilities.**
**Attempts to place non-classified facilities under restrictive controls.**
**Increased dependence on procedures of doubtful value--ie, polygraph testing.**
**New and more draconian classification procedures that threaten to restrict the distribution of scientific information.**
**Complex management schemes that further dissipate lines of responsibility and authority.**
**Impose security regimens on non-weapons labs.  The “tier system” is now dead.**

**Notes:**
	And as security considerations become the preeminent political and administrative focus, steps are proposed and instituted which threaten to further denigrate the scientific enterprise.

## Slide 18

| Laws | Executive Orders/ Advisories/Directives | Consequences |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1994 Foreign Relations Security Act | 
 | Holds consular officials liable if terrorists slip in. |
| 
 | VISAS Mantis
 | Technology theft/WMD Proliferation |
| 1996 INA
 | 
 | Defines criminal penalties for consular misconduct |
| 
 | VISAS Condor
   -Country Groups | National Security/Extends watch to certain countries |
| 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act |  | Imposes border control (INS) on DHS |
| 

 | Terrorism List
Export Control Posts
Technology Alert List | 7 nations special scrutiny
Prevent proliferation
Military and Economic |
| 2002 Patriot Act
 | 

May 03 Memo Expanding personal interviews | SEVIS, Consular Authority split (State/DHS)
Everyone between 16 and 60
previous clearance irrelevant |

## LISTS

***State Sponsors of Terrorism list (Cuba, Libya, Iran, ******Iraq******, North Korea, Sudan and Syria)***
***Non-Proliferation Export Control Posts (China, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia***
***Visas Mantis (Technology, WMD)***
***Visas Condor List (classified countries list)***
***Technology Alert list contains 16 categories****** ******(munitions, warheads and projectiles, nuclear, missiles, aircraft and missile propulsion, navigation and guidance, chemical engineering and biotechnology, remote imaging and reconnaissance, advanced computers, materials, cryptography, lasers and directed energy systems, acoustic and sensors technologies, marine technology, robotics, ceramics, high performance metals and alloys)***

- Visas Mantis and Visas Condor
- Directives from the Secretary of State

**Notes:**
	Thus domestic and international science policy is held hostage by a security system designed to run on “remote control.”  Since the foreign service mechanisms are almost without S&T expertise, guidance is provided in the form of lists which vagaries and generalities can have devastating impact.

	Consular officials are guided by directives published by the State Department.  Visa Mantis, released during Secretary Albright’s tenure directed consular officials to seek guidance if applicants came from designated countries or sought to participate in exchanges on specific topics.  Visa Condor, released by Secretary Powell, enlarged the watch list to include applicants from other countries.

## GAO Analysis of Visa Delays for Security ReviewsElectronic Industries Alliance:“Unfortunately, the U.S.’s ability to adapt, compete and innovate alongside emerging workforces in countries such as China and India is threatened by a systematically weak education system, a dearth of R&D funding, visa policy that discourages the brightest foreign minds and a business climate heavy with regulatory and tax burdens. If the U.S. wants to remain the world’s innovation leader, we must adopt positive policy solutions, rather than isolationist or protectionist measures, to address these problems.”

**GAO Analysis of Visa Delays for Security Reviews**Electronic Industries Alliance:“***Unfortunately, the U.S.’s ability to adapt, compete and innovate alongside emerging workforces in countries such as China and India is threatened by a systematically weak education system, a dearth of R&D funding, visa policy that discourages the brightest foreign minds and a business climate heavy with regulatory and tax burdens. If the U.S. wants to remain the world’s innovation leader, we must adopt positive policy solutions, rather than isolationist or protectionist measures, to address these problems.”***

## Special Scrutiny

- The first group of individuals subject to Special Registration included:
**Iran, ****Iraq****, Libya, Sudan**, or **Syria**
- The second group of individuals subject to Special Registration included:
**Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates**, or **Yemen**
- The third group of individuals subject to Special Registration includes:
**Pakistan **or **Saudi Arabia**
- The fourth group of individuals subject to Special Registration includes:
**Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, **or **Kuwait**
***These in addition to the Technology Alert Post countries***

## May 3, 2003, State Department Memo to Embassies: BORDER SECURITY ‐ WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCEFOR NONIMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS ‐ REVISION TO THE  REGULATIONS

***the visa interview is a crucial tool—in many cases the key tool—in determining visa eligibility. ... we have revised substantially the Code of Federal Regulations and ... guidelines on when personal appearance and interview can be waived for nonimmigrant visa applicants. ******This is the next step in preparing for the eventual fingerprinting****** ...***
***the requirement for personal appearance for nonimmigrant visa applicants can in general be waived by a consular officer only for a person who the consular officer concludes presents no national security concerns requiring an interview and who: ******(5) Is an applicant who within twelve months of the expiration of the applicant's previously issued visa is seeking re‐issuance of a nonimmigrant visa in the same classification at the consular post of the alien's usual residence, and for whom the consular officer has no indication of visa ineligibility or noncompliance with U.S. immigration laws and regulations******. ... ******Let me emphasize strongly, however, that consular officers are not required to waive interview in such cases.***

## US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) Program

***automated entry/exit system to,***
- Collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers (fingerprints, photos), through a dynamic system, on foreign nationals ...
- Enhance traffic flow for individuals entering or exiting the U.S. for legitimate purpose ...

## US-VISIT Program

- The US-VISIT system ... information will be stored in databases maintained by DHS and the Department of State as part of an individual's travel record.
- The information in the US-VISIT system will be available to inspectors at ports of entry, special agents in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), adjudications staff at immigration services offices, U.S. consular offices, and other law enforcement agencies.

## Reaction of colleagues:

**“****This is an Orwellian nightmare. If a visit to Fermi Lab implies fingerprinting, I'll stay at home.”**
- 		*German colleague currently at FNAL*

## Slide 26

## Needed Changes

***Time limits for security reviews for visiting students and scholars (those subject to Visa Mantis and Visa Condor scrutiny).***
***Modify application of 214(b) for J-1, F-1 and B visa applications by scientific students and visitors.***
***Classify as "returning scholars" all employees, students and long-time visitors supported by government funds (DoE, NSF, NASA, etc).  ***
***Extend parole by Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security to students and scholars.***
***Consular officials should not be held liable for such post-hoc charges as “criminal negligence.”***
***Widen the visa waiver program to provide for extended visits for J-1 and H-1B scholars and their families.***

## Statement and Recommendations on Visa Problems: Harming America's Scientific, Economic, and Security Interests

-  ***Problem***: Inefficient visa renewal process that causes lengthy delays. ***Recommendation***: Establish a timely process by which exchange visitors holding F and J visas can revalidate their visas, or at least begin the visa renewal process, before they leave the United States to attend academic and scientific conferences, visit family, or attend to personal business. A visa renewal process that allows individuals to at least initiate the process before leaving the country would greatly diminish, and in many cases eliminate, lengthy visa delays, and it would allow them to continue their studies and work uninterrupted.
-   ***Problem****: *Lack of transparency and priority processing in the visa system. ***Recommendation****: *Create a mechanism by which visa applicants and their sponsors may inquire about the status of pending visa applications, and establish a process by which applications pending for more than 30 days are given priority processing. Implementing these measures would greatly add to the transparency of the visa process and would help to ensure that applications do not get buried at the bottom of the pile or lost.
-   ***Problem***: Inconsistent treatment of visa applications. ***Recommendation***: Provide updated training of consular staff, establish clear protocols for initiating a Visas Mantis review, and ensure that screening tools are being used in the most appropriate manner. We recognize that the government is pursuing efforts to enhance training, and we encourage this. Consular staff need the best available tools and training to perform their vital responsibilities. Additional training and guidance for consular staff could greatly enhance security while simultaneously reducing the number of applications submitted for Visas Mantis reviews, thereby alleviating potential delays.
-   ***Problem***: Repetitive processing of visa applications for those with a proven track record. ***Recommendation***: Revise visa reciprocity agreements between the United States and key sending countries, such as China and Russia, to extend the duration of visas each country grants citizens of the other, thereby reducing the number of times that visiting international students, scholars, and scientists must renew their visas. We recognize that renegotiating bilateral agreements is a time-consuming process, and we believe it should be pursued as a long-term measure that allows the government to focus its visa screening resources by reducing the number of visa renewals that must be processed.
-   ***Problem***: Potential new impediment to international students, scholars, and scientists entering the U.S. created by proposed SEVIS fee collection mechanism. ***Recommendation***: Implement a fee collection system for the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) that allows for a variety of simple fee payment methods that are quick, safe, and secure, including payment after the individual arrives in the United States.

**Notes:**
Statement published May 12 by a consortium of academic, scientific and engineering organizations.

## Why U.S. Leadership Will Be Challenged

***More nations are acquiring high-end innovation capabilities with concerted investment in research and development (R&D) and technical talent.****** Other nations are acquiring fast-follower capabilities to rapidly commercialize innovation originating elsewhere.***
***The supply of scientists, engineers and technicians is growing substantially faster abroad than in the United States.***
***The U.S. first-mover advantage in information technology (IT) is diminishing with aggressive IT investment and deployment overseas.***

**Notes:**
The challenge enunciated by the Council is clearly stated here.  The US is losing its competitive advantage as scholars seek European and even Asian venues.

## Natural sciences and engineering doctoral degrees 

***Europe Data not accurate before 1989***

**Notes:**
The U.S. is accounting for a declining share of all doctoral degrees awarded in natural science and engineering fields, as the numbers of such degrees awarded in other countries are growing more rapidly.  The U.S. grants roughly 35% of its Ph.D.s to foreign students in all of the natural sciences and engineering (this is approximately 50% in the physical sciences).  With the decline in foreign student recruitment, both European and Asian production of scientists is beginning to exceed production of such scholars in the U.S.

## Correlation between Federal R&D expenditures and bachelors’ student production in the physical sciences, math, and engineering 1953 to 2000

***Correlation between Federal R&D expenditures and bachelors’ student production in the physical sciences, math, and engineering 1953 to 2000***

## Growth trends in scientific and technical publications by region: 1986–99

**Notes:**
	In the last decade of the 90s, both sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe have declined as contributing sources to the scientific literature (and there has been a decline in US contributions as well).  This is coincident with real losses in research support in these regions.

## Scientific publications: regional share of world output

**Notes:**
	This figure demonstrates the overall status of the various regions as sources of intellectual publication.  Note that in 1986 the largest contributor to the intellectual literature was the U.S. with almost 40% of the world total.  By the end of the millennium, the U.S. contribution had declined with Europe occupying the dominant position.  Eastern Europe has declined in response to economic exigencies.  Very small contributions from developing regions have demonstrated little change with the exception of Latin America.

## The Dangers to the National Interest

**Stifle vital international exchange**
***non-defense research***
***defense-related research***
***visitors programs***
**Impair University and lab productivity and morale**
***create suspicion and resentment***
***institutionalize racism***
**Impose cosmetic solutions while ignoring the real threat**
***focus on ethnicity rather than deed***
***failure to implement meaningful reform***
**Denigrate standards of justice and equal protection**
**Sacrifice the future**
***recruitment***
***loss of experienced researchers***
***declines in appointments and visitors***

**Notes:**
	Weapons development, safeguards, weapons stewardship, test ban, non-weapons research are all dependent upon international exchange.  Unlike the immediate post-war period, a greater portion of work in the physical sciences is being accomplished outside the US.  In addition, US programs are dependent upon immigrant and non-immigrant scientists.

	Recruitment, retention and morale are becoming serious problems at all the labs--not simply the weapons labs.  Affiliated universities also suffer as access becomes restrained.

	And because of the growing suspicion that ethnicity is being used to prevent scholars from advancement, the numbers if Asian-American and naturalized US citizens applying for positions is declining.