# Presentation: 477283

## Aircraft encounters from the 18th August 2000 eruption at Miyakejima, JapanAndrew Tupper, Bureau of Meteorology, Darwin, Northern Territory, AustraliaYasuhiro Kamada, Japan Meteorological Agency, Tokyo, JapanNoriyuki Todo, Japan Airlines, Tokyo, JapanEd Miller, Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, Virginia, USA

**Aircraft encounters from the**** 18****th**** August 2000 eruption at Miyakejima, Japan****Andrew Tupper,** Bureau of Meteorology, Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia**Yasuhiro Kamada**, Japan Meteorological Agency, Tokyo, Japan**Noriyuki Todo,** Japan Airlines, Tokyo, Japan**Ed Miller,** Air Line Pilots Association, Herndon, Virginia, USA

*2**nd** International Conference on Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety, June 2004*

## Miyakejima - initial information...

- 8 July 2000: Initial crater collapse – explosions and other activity continue through to 18 August, including a large eruption to 35000 ft 9/10 August.  High public awareness in Japan.  Local airlines were able to develop contingency plans based on the possibility of a larger explosion.

- Map courtesy
- Kagoshima University

## Radiosonde

## GMS-5 image

**Notes:**
This is the overall situation.  An ex-Typhoon lies to the North, and a stationary front near Japan.

## 08:02 – 08:26 UTC

- Time lapse video courtesy
- Dr. A. Terada, terada@eos.hokudai.ac.jp
- Tokyo Univ. / Hokkaido Univ.

- Map from Kinoshita et al, 2003

**Notes:**
On the 12th of August, the Earthquake Research Institute of Tokyo University had set up a camera at Tsubota, 3 km SE of the crater on the coast of the island.  If you watch this time lapse sequence very carefully, you can just see the eruption of the 18th...

## 18 Aug, 0812 UTC  Tokyo VAAC received observation from JMA Miyakejima observatory; eruption now > 5.8 km.
18 Aug, 0815 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 1: eruption > 19000 ft (5.8 km). Domestic chart for domestic area issued, forecasting ash movement to south, below 30000 ft (9 km). 
18 Aug , ???? UTC  NOTAM RJTD A3781/00 advises ash cloud tops to 5.8 km.
18 Aug, 0820 UTC  Radar shows cloud top 10-12 km.  JMA Haneda issues ARMAD 1 (area meteorological advisory) for domestic aircraft: Volcanic ash observed at 0802 UTC, tops to 5.8 km, movement unknown, intensity unknown.  
18 Aug, 0825 UTC:

- 18 Aug, 0812 UTC  Tokyo VAAC received observation from JMA Miyakejima observatory; eruption now > 5.8 km.
- 18 Aug, 0815 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 1: eruption > 19000 ft (5.8 km). Domestic chart for domestic area issued, forecasting ash movement to south, below 30000 ft (9 km).
- 18 Aug , ???? UTC  NOTAM RJTD A3781/00 advises ash cloud tops **to** 5.8 km.
- 18 Aug, 0820 UTC  Radar shows cloud top 10-12 km.  JMA Haneda issues ARMAD 1 (area meteorological advisory) for domestic aircraft: Volcanic ash observed at 0802 UTC, tops to 5.8 km, movement unknown, intensity unknown.
- 18 Aug, 0825 UTC:

**Notes:**
The GMS images shown here are a combination of the ‘split-window’ and infrared images.  Light green represents possible ash – GMS data was a bit noisy during this event, so there are also some false alarms.  Tokyo VAAC use a black/white colour scheme, which I’ll show later.

## 18 Aug, 0825 UTC  Pilot report received at Tokyo VAAC; eruption > 25000 ft (7.6 km) at 0810 UTC
18 Aug, 0830 UTC  Pilot report received at Tokyo VAAC; eruption 40000 ft (12 km) at 0829 UTC
18 Aug, 0833 UTC  Tokyo office of one foreign airline issues report of eruption to 5.8 km.
18 Aug, 0835 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 2; eruption 40000 ft (12 km) extending SE. No further details are given due to time constraints.

- 18 Aug, 0825 UTC  Pilot report received at Tokyo VAAC; eruption **>** 25000 ft (7.6 km) at 0810 UTC
- 18 Aug, 0830 UTC  Pilot report received at Tokyo VAAC; eruption 40000 ft (12 km) at 0829 UTC
- 18 Aug, 0833 UTC  Tokyo office of one foreign airline issues report of eruption **to** 5.8 km.
- 18 Aug, 0835 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 2; eruption 40000 ft (12 km) extending SE. No further details are given due to time constraints.

## 18 Aug, 0840 UTC  Tokyo radar shows height > 14 km.

- from Tokyo VAAC, 2004, ‘Case studies of volcanic ash clouds using satellite imagery’

## 18 Aug, 0846 UTC, SIGMET 2 issued. One airline reported that this was the only SIGMET received.  ARMAD 2 issued at the same time with same information.
18 Aug, 0846 UTC  Revised NOTAM RJTD A3782/00 advising ash to 40000 ft (12 km).

- 18 Aug, 0846 UTC, SIGMET 2 issued. One airline reported that this was the only SIGMET received.  ARMAD 2 issued at the same time with same information.
- 18 Aug, 0846 UTC  Revised NOTAM RJTD A3782/00 advising ash to 40000 ft (12 km).

## 18 Aug, 0855 UTC  SIGMET 3: Volcanic ash from Miyakejima observed by Boeing 747 at 0829 UTC, tops > 12 km, drifting ESE, intensifying.
18 Aug, 0900 UTC – Encounters 1 & 2 – DC 10 & 737-800 in train (assume 5 nm/9 km spacing).  DC 10 makes no report.  737-800 flies through cloud.  Electronic engine controls failed but engines still functioned.  Cockpit filled with haze and dust.  Flight management computer failed.  Emergency landing.  Engine damage, lost forward visibility on windscreen except for a small area under windshield wiper. Leading edges & tail abraded, radome, air data probes damaged. Both engines replaced. Cost > US $ 5 million.

- 18 Aug, 0855 UTC  SIGMET 3: Volcanic ash from Miyakejima observed by Boeing 747 at 0829 UTC, tops > 12 km, drifting ESE, intensifying.
- 18 Aug, 0900 UTC – Encounters 1 & 2 – DC 10 & 737-800 in train (assume 5 nm/9 km spacing).  DC 10 makes no report.  737-800 flies through cloud.  Electronic engine controls failed but engines still functioned.  Cockpit filled with haze and dust.  Flight management computer failed.  Emergency landing.  Engine damage, lost forward visibility on windscreen except for a small area under windshield wiper. Leading edges & tail abraded, radome, air data probes damaged. Both engines replaced. Cost > US $ 5 million.

## 18 Aug, 0925 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 3 (height of eruption 46000 ft (14 km), with 18 hour dispersion forecast.  Volcanic ash nephanalysis, forecast charts issued for domestic users.

- 18 Aug, 0925 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 3 (height of eruption 46000 ft (14 km), with 18 hour dispersion forecast.  Volcanic ash nephanalysis, forecast charts issued for domestic users.

- Visible image (right) from Tokyo VAAC, 2004, ‘Case studies of volcanic ash clouds using satellite imagery’

## Slide 12

**Notes:**
Standard volcanic ash graphic, issued 0913UTC

## 18 Aug, 0930 UTC.    747 encounters ash cloud to SE of eruption, after requesting diversion, which was only partially allowed.  Encountered ash cloud at 34000 ft (10.3 km), exited cloud at 30000 ft (9.1 km) 2 minutes later. Emergency landing.  3 engines, flight deck wind screen, some forward passenger windows replaced. Fourth engine to be replaced after 100 hours flying time.  Cost > US $5 million (~ 6 million?).

- 18 Aug, 0930 UTC.    747 encounters ash cloud to SE of eruption, after requesting diversion, which was only partially allowed.  Encountered ash cloud at 34000 ft (10.3 km), exited cloud at 30000 ft (9.1 km) 2 minutes later. Emergency landing.  3 engines, flight deck wind screen, some forward passenger windows replaced. Fourth engine to be replaced after 100 hours flying time.  Cost > US $5 million (~ 6 million?).

## Slide 14

## Slide 15

**Notes:**
Supplementary volcanic ash graphic, issued 1155UTC

## 18 Aug, 1155 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 4 (height of eruption 47000 ft (14.3 km), with 18 hour dispersion forecast.  Volcanic ash nephanalysis, forecast charts issued for domestic users only.
18 Aug, 1206 UTC  Aircraft associated with encounter (4) departs Narita with large eastward diversion to avoid eruption.
18 Aug, 1235 UTC Encounter 4. Aircraft had diverted east of normal track to attempt to evade ash cloud.  Strong sulphuric smells, ‘sparking’ on windshield. Aircraft removed from service and inspected for three days, but no ash found. Cost to airline of diversions/inspections > US $2 million.

- 18 Aug, 1155 UTC  Tokyo VAAC issues Volcanic Ash Advisory 4 (height of eruption 47000 ft (14.3 km), with 18 hour dispersion forecast.  Volcanic ash nephanalysis, forecast charts issued for domestic users only.
- 18 Aug, 1206 UTC  Aircraft associated with encounter (4) departs Narita with large eastward diversion to avoid eruption.
- 18 Aug, 1235 UTC Encounter 4. Aircraft had diverted east of normal track to attempt to evade ash cloud.  Strong sulphuric smells, ‘sparking’ on windshield. Aircraft removed from service and inspected for three days, but no ash found. Cost to airline of diversions/inspections > US $2 million.

## 18 Aug, 1920 UTC  Tokyo VAAC analysts note difficulty of tracking dispersing ash cloud because of cumulonimbus overlap.
18 Aug, 2010 UTC Encounter (5) Sulphuric smells but nothing else noticed.
18 Aug, 2015 UTC Volcanic Ash Advisory 7.  High level eruption cloud is no longer trackable and advisory focuses on lower level ash, max height 5.8 km.

- 18 Aug, 1920 UTC  Tokyo VAAC analysts note difficulty of tracking dispersing ash cloud because of cumulonimbus overlap.
- 18 Aug, 2010 UTC Encounter (5) Sulphuric smells but nothing else noticed.
- 18 Aug, 2015 UTC Volcanic Ash Advisory 7.  High level eruption cloud is no longer trackable and advisory focuses on lower level ash, max height 5.8 km.

## Slide 18

## Slide 19

## Slide 20

## Slide 21

**Notes:**
SeaWiFS image – pretty, but deceptive.  The ash that did the damage is within the cloud mass.

## GMS-5/VISSR and Terra/MODIS split window images, 0040 UTC & 0105 UTC.  After Tupper, A., S. Carn, J. Davey, Y. Kamada, R. Potts, F. Prata, and M. Tokuno (2004), An evaluation of volcanic cloud detection techniques during recent significant eruptions in the western 'Ring of Fire', Remote Sens. Environ., 91, 27-46 doi:10.1016/j.rse.2004.02.004. 

- GMS-5/VISSR and Terra/MODIS split window images, 0040 UTC & 0105 UTC.  After Tupper, A., S. Carn, J. Davey, Y. Kamada, R. Potts, F. Prata, and M. Tokuno (2004), An evaluation of volcanic cloud detection techniques during recent significant eruptions in the western 'Ring of Fire', *Remote Sens. Environ.*, *91*, 27-46 doi:10.1016/j.rse.2004.02.004.

## The (non-remote sensing) Issues

- In fact, the overall response time was very fast, compared to some other events in the world.  Despite the paucity of high resolution imagery and the effects of an eruption that occurred just before sunset, this was a well observed eruption, reflecting the high standard of technical expertise in Japan.  However....

## Domestic vs Foreign

- The separation of the information stream into domestic and foreign was an issue.  Foreign airlines generally had much less information to work with.  Our challenge here is to make sure domestic innovation is brought into the international warning system.

**Notes:**
Local airlines, such as JAL, have developed sophisticated procedures for ash avoidance, which bypass the IAVW system.  This certainly contributed to the relatively low damage from the eruption.  However, the expertise, and aircraft reports of Japanese airlines also need to be brought into the IAVW to improve the overall level of safety.  We don’t have the option of switching to a local carrier in the middle of a flight!

## High level / low level

- At that time, volcanic ash SIGMETS and Volcanic Ash Advisories from Japan were only issued for eruptions above 5000 m, severely limiting the flow of information in the initial stages.  This was changed in November 2003.

## “Height above...”

- “Height above...”

- The heights used in warnings were generally cautious.  In particular, the translation of 08:12 report from h > 5800 m in the advisory to h=5800 m in the SIGMET caused major problems.  **This is a common, worldwide issue.**

- 5800 m?

**Notes:**
A similar situation occurred at Rabaul in 1994, when the flight level of the aircraft (FL290) was mistakenly interpreted as the eruption height (FL600+) – fortunately the issue was quickly picked up by Port Moresby ACC.  One option for moist, low wind shear conditions is to assume that, where a major eruption is identified, the eruption will rise to the tropopause.  Warnings then reflect that until observations shows otherwise.

## Getting detail out quickly

- The first Volcanic Ash Advisory to contain a full dispersion forecast was issued at 09:25 UTC.  The dispersion forecast was never reflected in the SIGMET, which continued to have very simple (not useful) wording.

## Getting it all in the SIGMET?

- RJTG SIGMET 2 VALID 180845/181445 RJAA-
- TOKYO FIR VA ERUPTION MIYAKEJIMA LOC N31 E139 VA CLD OBS AT 0830Z SE OF MIYAKEJIMA SFC/FL460 N3415 E13925 - N3410 E13950 - N3345 E13955 - N3350 E13930 - N3415 E13925 MOV SE 40KT INTSF FCST 1445Z VA CLD APRX N3430 E13915 - N3420 E14105 - N3035 E14330 - N3155 E13850 - N3430 E13915 OTLK 012045Z VA CLD APRX N3435 E13905 - N3035 E13830 - N2855 E14505 - N3415 E14220 - N3435 E13905 020130Z VA CLD APRX N3440 E13905 - N2955 E13830 - N2730 E14700 - N3410 E14305 - N3440 E13905

- Time to write this: at least 30 minutes, just for one layer...

**Notes:**
The text below is a possible SIGMET for this situation based on the latest SIGMET template.  This level of detail can only be assimilated quickly with computer-aided processing, or in graphical form.

## Warning cessation

- When the high level ash became impossible to see, the advisories, and therefore warnings, were scaled back.  We still have no universal procedure to deal with this issue.

## Communication

- Japanese and foreign airlines, feeling the need for information, called the VAAC directly during the crisis, as did the Japanese media (NHK).

**Notes:**
Because they perceived that they weren’t getting enough information, airlines called the VAAC directly during the crisis, adding to the pressure.  Miscommunication was exacerbated because of the language barriers.  This is a very difficult issue.  An aircraft operator will do whatever it takes to get information if they feel that an aircraft is at risk – which was certainly the case. One operator complained afterwards that ‘Communications with Tokyo VAAC are extremely difficult’.  However, no VAAC will have the resources to talk to every airline during the critical first few hours of an eruption – the time spent talking, especially in an non-native language, will affect the overall quality of service.  Ill-feeling can be created on both sides.  To address this, VAACs need to a) ensure that the information flow from the office meets aviation operator expectations and is reflected in the official warnings, and b) develop a strategy to deal with incoming calls.  Aviation operators need to agree, through ICAO and the IAVW process, on what the expectations should be.

## Post-analysis

- At least two airlines visited the VAAC afterwards to discuss the event.
- No formal investigation of the performance of the IAVW or detailed damage analysis was made – no protocol exists to really do that.
- Cultural differences dictate that the response to such an event will vary from place to place unless international protocols are already in place.
- Events need to investigated promptly as elements of the aviation industry have a short attention span.
- Investigations ***must*** occur, in order to improve the International Airways Volcano Watch.

## Conclusions (1)

- The eruption was very well observed.
- Fast response time.
- No fatalities – it could have been much worse.

- Poor information flow, especially to official warnings (& foreigners).
- Decisions based on superseded and/or misleading warnings.
- Two life-threatening encounters, at least two other encounters.
- No follow-up

## Conclusions (2)

- We can get ‘best-practice’ contingency planning etc implemented worldwide under the International Airways Volcano Watch umbrella to reduce the load on individual airlines and increase safety for non-local carriers who will otherwise be more vulnerable.
- We can make sure that pre-eruption information is available through NOTAMs etc.
- We can improve the observation  warning processes.
- We can create protocols for prompt, non-partisan investigation of serious incidents.

- None of these issues are unique to Japan.  The same issues can, and will, recur anywhere.  How do we respond?

- Thank you