# Presentation: 466369

## Webbers Falls, Oklahoma Robert Y. Love Allision With the I-40 BridgeMay 26, 2002

## Slide 2

**Notes:**
Good Morning, 
About 7:45 a.m., on May 26, 2002, the towboat Robert Y. Love, pushing two, 297 feet long, and 54 feet wide, empty asphalt tank barges, was traveling northbound on the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River, near the town of Webbers Falls, Oklahoma. 

## Estimated track of the towboat Robert Y. Love and tow

- Estimated track of the towboat *Robert Y. Love* and tow

**Notes:**
As the towboat approached the Interstate 40 Highway Bridge, it veered leftward off course and rammed a bridge pier about 201 feet west of the navigation channel. 

## Slide 4

**Notes:**
The impact collapsed a 503-foot section of the bridge, which fell into the river and onto the barges below. According to witnesses, highway traffic continued to drive into the void in the bridge created by the collapsed spans. When traffic stopped, eight passenger vehicles and three truck tractor semi-trailer combinations had fallen into the river or onto the collapsed portions of the bridge. 

## Slide 5

**Notes:**
The accident resulted in an immediate response by 58 local, State, and Federal agencies.  The on-scene rescue and recovery operations lasted 5 days. The accident resulted in 14 fatalities, 5 injuries and caused an estimated $30.1 million in damage to the bridge, including the operation of detours, and $276,000 in damage to the barges. 
On July 29th 2002, 65 days after the accident, as a result of the joint cooperation between the State of Oklahoma and the Federal Highway Administration, the bridge was re-opened vehicular traffic. 

## Parties to the Investigation

- Federal Highway Administration
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Department of Justice
- State of  Oklahoma
- Magnolia Marine Transport Company

**Notes:**
Parties to the Investigation were : (CLICK)

The Federal Highway Administration (CLICK)
The U. S. Coast Guard (CLICK)
The U. S. Department of Justice (CLICK)
The State of Oklahoma(CLICK)
And Magnolia Marine Transport Company(NEXT)

## Issues

- The captain’s incapacitation and countermeasures for such an event
- Bridge protection, including risk  assessment
- Mitigation of loss of life, including motorist warning systems

**Notes:**
The safety issues identified in this accident include(CLICK)
The captain’s incapacitation and countermeasures for such an event; (CLICK)
Bridge protection, including risk assessment; and (CLICK)
Mitigation of loss of life, including motorist warning systems. (NEXT)

## On-Scene Investigative Staff

- George Black	     Member
- Bob Barlett		     On-Scene Coordination
- Michele Beckjord	     Survival Factors
- Chris Voeglie	     Vehicle Factors
- Dennis Collins	     Human Performance
- Robert Accetta	     Highway and Evidence 			     Documentation
- Mark Bagnard	     Evidence Documentation

**Notes:**
On-Scene Investigative Staff:
George Black		was the Member on-scene 
Bob Barlett			On-Scene Coordination
Michele Beckjord		Survival Factors		
Chris Voeglie		Vehicle Factors		
Dennis Collins		Human Performance		
Robert Accetta		Highway Factors and Evidence Documentation	
Mark Bagnard		Evidence Documentation Team	

## On-Scene Investigative Staff (cont)

- James Scheffer		Marine IIC and 					Operations
- Theodore White		Marine Survival 					Factors
- Tom Roth-Roffy		Marine Engineering
- Jamie Estock		Marine Human 					Performance
- Keith Holloway		Public Affairs
- Ken Suydam		Investigator-in-Charge

**Notes:**
James Scheffer		Marine IIC and Operations		
Theodore White		Marine Survival		
Thomas Roth-Roffy	Marine Engineering
Jamie Estock		Marine Human Performance		
Keith Holloway		Public Affairs
And I was the Investigator-in-Charge	 

## Report Development Staff

- Dr. Mitch Garber	Medical Officer
- Joe Gregor		GPS
- James Skeen		Meteorology
- Bill Woody		Marine Human 					Performance
- Leon Katcharian		Marine Report 					Writer
- Don Tyrrell		Marine Report 					Writer/Manager

**Notes:**
Dr. Mitch Garber 		Medical Officer		
Joe Gregor			GPS Research
James Skeen		Meteorology
Bill Woody			Marine Human Performance
Leon Katcharian		Marine Report Writer
Don Tyrrell			Maine report writer/Manger		

## Report Development Staff (Cont)

- Mike Brown		Recommendations
- Ed Pacchetti		Recommendations
- Debbie Taylor		Editor
- Michele McMurtry	Project Manager

**Notes:**

Mike Brown			Safety Recommendations		
Ed Pacchetti			Safety Recommendations		
Debbie Taylor		Editor				
And Michele McMurtry was the 	Project Manager

This concludes my presentation. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have at this time, or we can proceed with the individual presentations.

## Human Performance Issues

- Dennis Collins

**Notes:**
Good morning.  I will be discussing the human performance issues in this accident; Dr. Garber will examine the medical issues following this presentation.
[NEXT]

## Robert Y. Love Captain

- 60 year-old male
- 40 years on inland towing vessels
- 29 years licensed as operator
- With current company 11 years
- Captain of *Love* since February 2001
- Held a current license
- Normal vision, hearing

**Notes:**
At the time of the accident, [CLICK]
the Captain of the vessel was sixty years old. [CLICK]
He had approximately 40 years of experience working on inland towing vessels, [CLICK]
having been licensed as an operator of un-inspected towing vessels since 1973. [CLICK]
He had been with his current employer for 11 years [CLICK]
and had been the captain of the Robert Y. Love since February of 2001.[CLICK]
At the time of the accident, the Captain held a valid license, issued in 1997 and expiring in 2002. [CLICK]
The medical examination required for his license showed no indication of vision or hearing problems. [NEXT]

## Issues

- Several excluded
- Workload
- Training, experience, qualifications
- Alcohol / illicit / prescription drugs
- Two factors of interest
- Fatigue
- Medical condition

**Notes:**
During the investigation, staff examined many factors to determine their contribution, if any, to this accident. [CLICK]
As a result of the information gathered, staff excluded several factors, including [CLICK]
the Captain’s workload; [CLICK]
his training, experience, and qualifications; [CLICK]
and alcohol, illicit drugs, or prescription drugs. [CLICK]
Two factors of interest to staff were [CLICK] 
the Captain’s fatigue at the time of the accident, [CLICK]
and his medical condition.  I will discuss fatigue; Dr. Garber will discuss the Captain’s medical condition. [NEXT]

## Captain’s Work Schedule

- Normally 30 days on, 15 days off
- Stood “Captain’s watches”
- 0600 – 1200
- 1800 – 2400
- Normal industry schedule
- Schedule changed prior to the accident

**Notes:**
According to the Captain, [CLICK] his normal work schedule on the tow was 30 days on, 15 days off. [CLICK]
While on-board the tow, the Captain would stand the “Captain’s watches”, [CLICK] 
meaning he was scheduled to be on-duty from six AM until noon [CLICK]
and from six PM until midnight. [CLICK]
This “6 on, 6 off” schedule is a normal practice in the inland towing industry. [CLICK]
However, in the days prior to the accident, the Captain’s schedule was changed. [NEXT]

## Slide 16

**Notes:**
At 4 o’clock PM on May 24th, 2002, the Captain disembarked the M/V Jennie Dehmer in Herman, Missouri  [CLICK] and drove by car to the St. Louis airport, a distance of 78 miles.
 [CLICK] He continued traveling by car to Vicksburg, Mississippi, a distance of 484 miles.  In Vicksburg, he changed from a company car to his personal vehicle and
 [CLICK] traveled to his home in Florence, Mississippi, arriving at approximately 4 AM on May 25th. While at home, he slept for 3 and a half hours.
 [CLICK] He departed his home at approximately 10 AM on May 25th and drove back to Vicksburg, Mississippi.  
 [CLICK] After changing to a company vehicle in Vicksburg, the Captain drove to Van Buren, Arkansas, a distance of 368 miles.  The Captain boarded the M/V Robert Y. Love at approximately 6:40 PM, shortly after arriving in Van Buren.  After boarding, he stood a partial watch, went to bed at approximately 11:30 PM, and arose at 5 o’clock AM on May 26th.

## 23 May

**23 May**

**24 May**

**25 May**

**26 May**

**12**

**6**

**12**

**6**

**12**

**AM**

**PM**

**AM**

**Notes:**
Here is a graphical representation of the Captain’s approximate schedule.  [CLICK]
The grey areas represent the Captain’s off-duty periods when standing the 6-on, 6-off watch. [CLICK]
Here is the Captain’s schedule in the three days prior to the allision with the I-40 bridge.  Blue represents time asleep; green represents time awake. [CLICK]
This arrow shows the Captain shortening his afternoon sleep period; [CLICK]
The Captain remained awake through an off-duty period, as shown by the second arrow; [CLICK]
The third arrow highlights where the Captain went to bed at a time he would normally be waking up; [CLICK]
And the final arrow shows where the Captain remained awake through a off-duty sleep period. [NEXT]

## Sleep Deficit

- Captain had a sleep deficit
- Between *Jennie Dehmer* and *Robert Y. Love*
- 1038 miles
- 20.5 hours in a car
- Slept 3.5 hours
- Several disruptions to usual schedule

**Notes:**
[CLICK] 
As a result of the changes to his normal routine, the Captain had a sleep deficit at the time of the accident. [CLICK]
From the time he disembarked the Jennie Dehmer until the time he boarded the Robert Y. Love, the Captain [CLICK]
traveled 1038 miles, [CLICK]
spent approximately 20 and a half hours in a car as both the driver and a passenger, [CLICK]
and slept for 3 and a half hours.  [CLICK]
His schedule resulted in several disruptions, including a shortened sleep period, remaining awake through a normal sleep period, going to bed at his normal rising time, and remaining awake through a second sleep period. [NEXT]

## Other Information

- Sleep deficit may not have caused incapacitation
- Slept at least 5 hours
- Loss of consciousness “all at once”
- His position after the allision
- Visual problems, disorientation
- Loss of consciousness atypical of fatigue

**Notes:**
[CLICK] Despite the Captain’s sleep deficit, other information revealed in the course of the investigation suggests his sleep deficit may not have been the cause of his incapacitation. [CLICK] 
The Captain slept for at least 5 hours before going on duty; [CLICK] 
He described his loss of consciousness as occurring “all at once”, [CLICK] 
He described returning to consciousness and being crouched on the floor, below the level of the control console, and  [CLICK] 
He stated he was disoriented and had trouble with his vision problems upon his return to consciousness. [CLICK]
His description of his loss of consciousness to both investigators and his physicians is atypical of fatigue and suggests a possible medical problem. Therefore, based on this evidence, staff concludes the Captain’s loss of consciousness was probably not the result of fatigue.  This concludes my presentation; Dr. Garber will now cover the medical issues associated with the Captain of the Robert Y. Love [NEXT]

## Medical Issues

- Mitch Garber

**Notes:**
GOOD MORNING.  I WILL BRIEFLY PRESENT TODAY SOME INFORMATION REGARDING MEDICAL ISSUES EVALUATED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS ACCIDENT.  (NEXT)

## Captain’s Statements

- No recollection for last 1/3 mile           (4 minutes)
- No recollection of allision
- Found himself wedged in crouched position between console and chair
- Initially could not visually focus or get oriented

**Notes:**
(CLICK)The tugboat captain stated that he had no recollection beginning about 1/3 of a mile short of the i-40 bridge.   This translates roughly to the last 4 minutes prior to the allision. (CLICK)
He stated that he had no recollection of the allision itself, (CLICK)
And that his first recollection after the allision  was being in a crouched position between the operator’s chair and the vessel control console (CLICK)
He stated that he initially could not visually focus on anything or get oriented to his surroundings. (NEXT)

## Slide 22

**Notes:**
THIS IS A PHOTO OF THE AREA IN THE TUGBOAT BETWEEN THE CHAIR (CLICK) AND THE CONTROL CONSOLE.  NOTE THAT THERE IS VERY LIMITED SPACE IN WHICH TO FALL, AND INSUFFICIENT SPACE TO ALLOW THE CAPTAIN TO HAVE LAIN PRONE ON THE FLOOR. 

## Syncope (Faint)

- Loss of consciousness due to interruption of blood flow to brain
- Typically, consciousness is restored rapidly after individual falls
- Space did not allow complete fall

**Notes:**
The experience of the captain is consistent with a medical occurance known as syncope or fainting, (CLICK)
in which an individual loses consciousness due to an interruption of blood flow to the brain. (CLICK)
In a typical episode of syncope, consciousness is restored rapidly after an individual falls, as the heart is no longer required to oppose gravity in order to maintain blood flow to the brain (CLICK)
In this case however, the very limited space available did not permit the captain to fall completely to the floor, and he was likely maintained in a partially vertical position, significantly extending the period of time before he recovered from the syncopal episode. (NEXT)

## Syncope (Faint)

- Possible causes
- Certain heart conditions
- Dehydration
- Rising too quickly
- Certain types of migraines
- Not associated with fatigue

**Notes:**
 (CLICK) Such episodes can be caused by a variety of conditions, (CLICK)
 including certain heart conditions such as abnormal heart rhythms, (CLICK)
 by dehydration, (CLICK) 
orthostatic hypotension (when the blood pressure drops after a person rises too quickly), (CLICK) 
certain types of migraine headaches, and others. (CLICK)

 Fatigue from sleep loss is not known to cause or predispose to syncope. (NEXT)

## Preaccident Conditions

- No significant diagnoses
- Recent dizzy spells at home (attributed to overexertion from yard work)
- 4 days prior, dizzy spell with nausea while on another vessel
- No other symptoms

**Notes:**
(CLICK) The captain had no significant pre-accident diagnoses. (CLICK)
He had noted some recent dizzy spells at home, which he not unreasonably attributed to over-exertion from yard work, (CLICK)
And 4 days prior to the accident, had a dizzy spell with nausea while on another vessel.  In each case, these spells passed without incident, (CLICK)
He did not lose consciousness, and had no other symptoms prior to the date of the accident. (NEXT)

## Postaccident Testing

- Comprehensive evaluation at local regional medical center
- Results normal except blocked coronary artery with no effect on heart function
- Later electrophysiological study (EPS) generated serious abnormal rhythms
- Implanted defibrillator – no shocks, no symptoms

**Notes:**
(CLICK) The captain underwent a comprehensive evaluation at a local regional medical center with a wide variety of non-invasive and invasive evaluations. (CLICK)
All of his results were essentially normal with the exception of a single completely blocked coronary artery which had no effect on tests of heart function. (CLICK)
He later underwent an electrophysiology study which is an attempt to stimulate serious abnormal rhythms through electrical impulses applied to the interior of the heart.  Such rhythms were in fact generated, (CLICK)
Which led physicians to conclude that he would benefit from the implantation of a defibrillator designed to deliver shocks to the heart muscle if a sustained abnormal heart rhythm were to occur.  As of may 4th of this year, though the device had recorded several short episodes of rapid heart rate, no shocks had been delivered, and the captain had not experienced any episodes of syncope or near-syncope.  (NEXT)

## Postaccident Testing

- Cardiac catheterization, EPS done, despite negative noninvasive evaluation
- With normal nuclear medicine stress test, invasive testing not essential
- Without loss of consciousness, invasive testing would not have been pursued
- Preaccident evaluation would not have been abnormal

**Notes:**
(CLICK) It is notable, however, that invasive studies (cardiac catheterization, eps) were pursued in this case in spite of a negative noninvasive evaluation. (CLICK)
In particular, given the captain’s normal nuclear medicine stress test, it would not have been unusual to forego invasive cardiovascular testing in a typical clinical setting. (CLICK)
Had the captain had the non-invasive studies performed without a history of loss of consciousness, invasive testing almost certainly would not have been pursued. (CLICK)
Thus, even had the captain presented to medical attention prior to the accident (for instance as a result of the few dizzy spells he experienced), it is highly unlikely that any abnormalities would have been detected. (NEXT)

## Toxicology

- Diphenhydramine (Benadryl®) at low levels in captain’s blood and urine
- Consistent with reported ingestion of two tablets of Benadryl® the night before the accident
- Diphenhydramine is impairing and sedating, but substantial effects unlikely at low levels detected

**Notes:**
I would like to make a quick comment on the toxicology findings in this case (CLICK) 
diphenhydramine, an over-the-counter sedating antihistamine, often known by the trade name benadryl, was detected at low levels in the captain’s blood and urine. (CLICK)
The levels found are consistent with the captain’s reported ingestion of two tablets of benadryl the night before the accident. (CLICK)
Diphenhydramine is sedating and impairing, often without individual awareness of any symptoms of impairment.  However, substantial effects from the medication are unlikely at the low levels detected, and there is no evidence that the medication would have contributed to the incapacitation experienced by the captain.  

I am prepared to answer any questions at this time.

## Alerter Systems and Safe Transit Procedures

- James Scheffer

**Notes:**
Good morning, I will discuss wheelhouse alerter systems and safe transit procedures (NEXT)

## Slide 30

**Notes:**
In this accident the captain of the Robert Y. Love was most likely incapacitated as a result of an unforseen medical event. He was alone in the pilothouse which is a common condition aboard inland towing vessels. At the time of the allision three other crew members were awake aboard the vessel. Had a method been available to alert the crewmembers to the problem in the wheelhouse, they could have investigated and possibly taken action that might have prevented the accident.

## Wheelhouse Alerter Systems

- Two systems under evaluation by three inland towing companies
- Monitoring of rudder movement
- Monitoring of physical motion

**Notes:**
After the I-40 bridge accident, segments of the marine inland towing industry developed alerter systems for use on inland towing vessels. (CLICK) 
At this time two systems are being evaluated by the industry.(CLICK)
One system monitors steering rudder movements while the tow is underway.(CLICK)
The other system monitors physical movements of the operator in the wheelhouse.(NEXT)

## Rudder Controls

**Rudder Controls**

**Notes:**

In the rudder monitoring system,( note the rudder controls shown by the arrows). if the levers are not moved within given time frame (NEXT)

## Slide 33

**Notes:**
an alarm goes off in the wheelhouse. (CLICK). (The systems installed so far use a 2-minute period.) If the captain or pilot on duty does not answer the wheelhouse alarm within 30 seconds,(CLICK). Secondary alarms are activated in the captain’s and pilot’s cabins and in a centrally located crew area. 
One company has installed this system on all 60 of its boats. The company reports that the crews like the system and the wheelmen accept it.
MMT, the owner of the Robert Y. Love, initially installed the system on five of its towboats for evaluation, as of June 2004 this system has been installed on its entire fleet of 16 towboats.(NEXT)

## Wheelhouse Motion Detection

**Wheelhouse Motion Detection**

**Notes:**
The second alter system under evaluation detects the physical movements of the operator in the wheelhouse. If no movement is detected in the wheelhouse, the system sounds an alarm to alert the crew. At least one major inland towing company has installed this system on its towboats and has reported that the system has preformed satisfactorily. (NEXT) 

## Wheelhouse Alerter Systems

- Promising safety improvement
- Three companies independently evaluating these systems

**Notes:**
(CLICK) Staff considers alerter systems to be a promising safety improvement and concludes that wheelhouse alerter systems may provide effective means of preventing operator incapacitation and operator fatigue accidents in the future. (CLICK) Staff is aware of three companies that are, independently of one another, evaluating the effectiveness of these devices. Staff believes that the Coast Guard Research and Development Center should evaluate the utility and effectiveness of wheelhouse alerting systems on inland towing vessels for preventing accidents

## Safe Transit Procedures

- Identify bridges subject to allisions
- Develop best practices for transiting bridges
- Route familiarization
- Sharing of near-miss information
- Removal and alteration of bridges
- Crew Endurance Management Systems

**Notes:**
After this accident, the Coast Guard and American Waterways Operators (AWO) convened a working group to determine what could be done to correct problems related to bridge allisions. The working group recommended that the Coast Guard and AWO work jointly to: (CLICK)
Identify bridges subject to allisions (Click)
Develop best practices for transiting bridges (Click) 
Provide route familiarization for operators(Click)
Improve Coast Guard –Industry information sharing on near misses(Click)
Removal and alteration of “obstructive” bridges (Click)
Implement Crew Endurance Management Systems (NEXT)

## Crew Endurance Management Systems

- Develop a system to manage risk factors
- Ensure sufficient hours of uninterrupted sleep
- Demonstration project
- Eight companies
- 40 towing vessels
- 150 CEMS coaches

**Notes:**
The Coast Guard defines Crew Endurance Management as the ability to maintain performance within safety limits while enduring job-related physical, psychological, and environmental challenges. (CLICK)
This program aims to develop a system for managing risk factors that can lead to human error and performance degradation.(CLICK)
One goal of the project is to ensure sufficient hours of uninterrupted sleep for watchstanders. 
(CLICK)
Crew endurance management demonstration projects (CLICK) are underway in at least eight companies (CLICK) and on 40 towing vessels .(CLICK) and 150 CEM coaches have been trained.(NEXT)

## Crew Endurance Management Systems

- The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004
- The Secretary shall conduct and report to Congress on the results of a demonstration project involving the implementation of Crew Endurance Management Systems on towing vessels

**Notes:**
On August 9, (CLICK) the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 became public law, which amends section 409, “Hours of Service on Towing Vessels” .(Click)
And requires the Coast Guard to report to Congress on the results of their crew endurance management system demonstration project. Staff is encouraged by the efforts of the AWO and Coast Guard to improve operator performance and concludes that the recommendations of the Coast Guard-AWO Bridge Allision Work Group to improve operator performance, and lessons learned from the ongoing CEM demonstration projects, when implemented, should both enhance the safety of towing vessel operations and reduce bridge allision accidents. 
(Jims last slide)

## Bridge Protection

- Michele McMurtry

**Notes:**
Good morning. I will discuss bridge protection.

## Slide 40

**Notes:**
This picture was taken downstream of the 2,000 foot -long I-40 bridge. The bridge was a twin-girder, continuous-span bridge consisting of 13 concrete deck sections supported by steel girders and a steel superstructure which were supported by 12 reinforced concrete piers and 2 bridge abutments. 
(CLICK) Piers 1 through 4 were west of the main channel, and 
(CLICK) piers 5 through 12 were east of the main channel. 
(Click) Piers 4 and 5 were the concrete channel piers for the main spans and navigation channel. (NEXT) 

## N

**N**

**Source: ODOT**

**Notes:**
The north or upstream side of the bridge (CLICK) had protection cells for the channel piers. (NEXT)

## N

**N**

**Notes:**
This is a closer view of the (CLICK) upstream protection cell (CLICK) at pier 5. (NEXT)

## Pier Protection

- 1960s - Pier protection not required
- 1970 - Vessel traffic near bridge
- 1977 and 1980 - Damage on channel piers
- 1982 - Application to install protection cells
- No standards

**Notes:**
In the 1960s, (CLICK)
when the I-40 bridge was designed and built, pier protection was not required by State or Federal design standards or permit process.(CLICK)
Following completion of the waterway in 1970, commercial vessel traffic began operating near the bridge.(CLICK)
During subsequent bridge inspections in 1977 and 1980, ODOT found that the channel piers had experienced superficial collision damage, indicating that the piers were vulnerable to vessel collision. (CLICK)
Consequently, in 1982, the ODOT submitted an application to the Coast Guard requesting permission to install pier protection cells on the north side of the channel piers to address these problems, though no requirement existed to do so. (CLICK)
Although, the Coast Guard had completed a study[2] on bridge protection, and the 1980 Sunshine Skyway Bridge accident in Florida had heightened awareness of the vulnerability of bridge piers to vessel collision, the bridge community lacked standards or guidelines for bridge protection, . (NEXT)

United States Coast Guard, The State of the Art of Bridge Protective Systems and Devices, USCG Contract CG-71955-A (Washington, DC: USCG, November 1978).

## Accidents Outside of Navigation Channel

- Pier protection *inside* navigation channel
- Bridge struck *outside* navigation channel

**Notes:**
(CLICK) ODOT had installed pier protection cells inside the navigation channel,(CLICK)
the I-40 bridge accident occurred outside the navigation channel. The Safety Board has investigated several similar accidents. (NEXT)

## Benjamin Harrison BridgeJames River, Hopewell, Virginia (1977)

- Benjamin Harrison BridgeJames River, Hopewell, Virginia (1977)

**Source: Virginia DOT**

**Notes:**
In 1977, the span adjacent to the navigation channel was struck on the Benjamin Harris Bridge in Hopewell, Virginia. 

## Sunshine Skyway Bridge

**Sunshine Skyway Bridge**
**	****Tampa, Florida (1980)**

**Source: St. Petersburg Times**

**Notes:**
In 1980, the anchor pier of the cantilevered bridge structure of the Skyway Bridge in Tampa, Florida was struck 360 feet from the navigation channel.

## Judge William Seeber BridgeNew Orleans, Louisiana (1993)

- Judge William Seeber BridgeNew Orleans, Louisiana (1993)

**Notes:**
In 1993, the towboat CHRIS struck the pier adjacent to the main channel pier of the Judge William Seeber Bridge in  New Orleans, Louisiana.

## Bayou Canot RR BridgeMobile, Alabama (1993)

- Bayou Canot RR BridgeMobile, Alabama (1993)

**Notes:**
In 1993, the Bayou Canot Railroad Bridge near Mobile Alabama was struck by a barge tow far from the navigation channel.

## Queen Isabella Causeway

- South Padre Island, Texas (2001)

**Notes:**
In September 2001, the Queen Isabella Causeway was struck at an unprotected pier 175 west of the(CLICK) navigation channel. (NEXT)

## Accidents Outside of Navigation Channel

- Previous accidents demonstrate
- Most bridges can be struck *outside* navigation channel
- Increases complexity of bridge protection

**Notes:**
(CLICK) Such occurrences demonstrate (CLICK) that most bridges over navigable water can be struck either inside or outside the regular navigation channel by barge tows and individual commercial vessels, (CLICK)
thus increasing the complexity of bridge protection. (NEXT)

## Protecting All Bridge Piers

- Pier protection cells
- I-40 bridge would cost $6.8 million
- 2,844 highway bridges requiring permits
- Multiple piers vulnerable to vessel impact

**Notes:**
Protecting all bridge piers from vessel collision would be an enormous task. (CLICK)
One method is constructing pier protection cells. (CLICK) According to ODOT,  protection cells at all 12 piers of the I-40 bridge would cost approximately $6.8 million.(CLICK)
Nationwide, there are 2,844 highway bridges requiring a bridge permit. (CLICK) 
Many of these bridges have multiple piers that are vulnerable to vessel impact. Staff concludes that because of the cost, replacing or constructing pier protection for each existing bridge pier vulnerable to vessel impact nationwide may not be reasonable. (NEXT)

## AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications

- Bridge’s risk to collision and collapse
- Load and resistance factor design (LRFD)
- In 2007, LRFD will be the Federal-aid bridge standard
- Florida is using for *new* bridge design

**Notes:**
Bridge engineers have a tool to effectively assess a given bridge’s risk (and acceptable risk) for vessel collision. (CLICK) The AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications provide guidelines for determining a bridge’s risk to collision by assessing vessel and vehicle traffic characteristics and the ability of the bridge to withstand the collision. (CLICK)
These guidelines have been incorporated in the Load Resistance Factor Design  bridge standards, (CLICK)
which, after 2007, will become the mandatory standards for all new Federal-aid bridge construction.(CLICK)
 Florida, with many bridges over water, is already using the LRFD standards for new bridge design. (NEXT)

## AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications (cont)

- Louisiana using to evaluate *existing *bridges
- Oklahoma evaluating 12 *existing* river crossings
- Not mandatory to evaluate vulnerability of *existing* bridges

**Notes:**
 After the 1993 bridge accident in New Orleans , (CLICK)
 Louisiana embarked on a program using the AASHTO Vessel Guide to evaluate existing bridges over navigable water.(CLICK)
After the I-40 bridge collision, ODOT hired a consultant to evaluate bridges at 12 existing river crossings using the AASHTO Vessel Guide (CLICK)
Although these standards can and are being used to evaluate the vulnerability of existing bridges to vessel and vehicle collisions, they are not mandatory. Staff concludes that to adequately protect the motoring public, bridge owners should be required to evaluate an existing bridge’s vulnerability to vessel collision. (NEXT)

## Sufficiency Rating System

- Method of measuring one bridge’s needs against another
- Relative risk of a bridge to extreme events
- Vessel or vehicle collisions
- Flooding, including scour and debris loading
- Seismic events
- Terrorist attacks
- Not part of the sufficiency rating formula

**Notes:**
Demands on the limited funds in the bridge program are many. (CLICK) 
The sufficiency rating system is a method of measuring one bridge’s needs against another when qualifying for limited Federal-aid funds.(CLICK)
Currently, the relative risk of a bridge to extreme events CLICK)
such as vessel or vehicle collisions; (CLICK)
flooding, including scour and debris loading; (CLICK)
seismic events;(CLICK) 
and, more recently, terrorist attacks, (CLICK)
is not part of the sufficiency rating formula.(NEXT)

## Sufficiency Rating System (cont)

- Tools are available
- Risks to extreme events *can* be included in a bridge’s sufficiency rating
- Balance needs while not ignoring conditions that can lead to catastrophic events

**Notes:**
Tools to design new bridges(CLICK) and to evaluate existing bridges for protection against these events are available to bridge engineers via scour assessment methods, the debris loading specification, seismic risk methodology, and the Vessel Collision Guide Specifications. (CLICK)
Once the relative risks of extreme events are established, this information can be included in a bridge’s sufficiency rating and used to prioritize rehabilitation or replacement, balancing the many different needs of State bridge programs, while not ignoring conditions that can lead to catastrophic events. (CLICK)
Staff concludes that including the relative risk to extreme events in bridge sufficiency ratings and in priority for rehabilitation and replacement would help provide a more accurate assessment of a bridge’s risk to collapse and loss of life. and believes that the FHWA should revise the sufficiency rating system to include the probability of extreme events, such as vessel impact, in the prioritization of bridges for rehabilitation and replacement. 

That concludes my presentation on bridge protection. Staff is prepared to answer any questions.   

(NEXT)

## Motorist Warning Systems

- Robert Accetta

**Notes:**
Good morning, during this presentation I will be discussing the available sight distance for truck tractor semi-trailers and passenger cars on the east- and westbound approaches to the void in the bridge and Motorist Warning Systems.

In this accident, 11 vehicles either fell with the collapsed sections of the bridge or drove off the bridge into the void. The surviving drivers indicated that they could not see the void in the bridge in time to avoid driving into it.

Click (next slide)

## Available Sight Distance

- Passenger cars and truck tractor semi-trailers
- East and westbound directions
- Total stopping distances exceeded available sight distances

**Notes:**
Staff examined the available sight distance (Click)
for truck tractor semi-trailers and passenger cars (Click)
on the east- and westbound approaches to the void in the bridge (Click)
and determined that the total stopping distances for both types of vehicles was greater than the maximum estimated distance from the first point of possible perception. (NEXT)

## Westbound

**Notes:**
In a moment, staff will be showing a video depicting the available sight distances.  Staff determined that there was less sight distance available to the driver of a passenger car.  Therefore, the following videos represent the perspective from a passenger car.  This overhead diagram shows the post collision configuration of the bridge.
(Click)
This arrow shows the point at which the following video begins relative to the void in the bridge (Click)
and this arrow shows the direction of travel. 

 (Video)
At highway speeds the total stopping distances were greater than the maximum estimated distance to stop from the first point of possible perception.  Therefore, the drivers in this accident did not have adequate time to detect, identify, and respond to the hazard posed by the collapsed sections of the bridge.
Click (next slide)

## Eastbound

**Notes:**
Staff will be showing another video depicting the available sight distance also from a passenger car, but from the eastbound side of the bridge.  This overhead diagram also shows the post collision configuration on this side of the bridge. (Click)
This arrow shows the point at which the following video begins relative to the void in the bridge (Click)
and this arrow shows the direction of travel. 

 (Video)
As stated before, staff believes that the drivers in this accident did not have adequate time to respond to the hazard and that a motorist warning system would have mitigated the loss of life in this accident.
Click (next slide)

## Motorist Warning SystemsInstalled After Bridge Accidents

- Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in Louisiana
- Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Florida
- Queen Isabella Causeway in Texas

**Notes:**
Motorist Warning Systems were installed, after bridge accidents, on the following bridges :  (Click)
the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in Louisiana (Click)
the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Florida (Click)
And the Queen Isabella Causeway in Texas. (NEXT)

## Lake PontchartrainWarning System

- Marine radar system scans lake for vessels
- Hazard lighting system uses yellow flashing lights
- Police monitor marine frequencies and post messages on variable message signs
- Coast Guard is notified for enforcement action

**Notes:**
The Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in Louisiana, has a motorist information/warning system, (Click)
consisting of a marine radar system that scans the lake for vessels, (Click)
A hazard incident lighting system, consisting of yellow flashers located along the bridge. (Click)
In addition, police dispatch personnel, also monitor the marine frequencies and post warning messages on the variable message signs that are used to warn motorists and (Click)
The Coast Guard is notified, if necessary, for enforcement action. (NEXT)

## Sunshine Skyway BridgeWarning System

- Digital message signs
-  high winds
- Bridge span continuity warning system
- less than totally dependable

**Notes:**
The Sunshine Skyway Bridge has a motorist warning system that consists of: (Click)
digital message signs to warn motorists of high winds on the bridge (Click)
and a bridge span continuity warning system, that according to the Florida Department of Transportation, is less than totally dependable. (NEXT)

## Queen Isabella Causeway

**Notes:**
(Click)(arrows)
As a result of the 2001 Queen Isabella Causeway accident 10 cars either fell with the collapsing sections or drove off the end of the remaining roadway structure, resulting in 8 fatalities.
After the accident, the Texas Department of Transportation designed and installed an early warning collapse detection system that became operational in March 2004. (NEXT)

## Queen Isabella CausewayMotorist Warning System

- Fiber-optic cable
- “STOP WHEN FLASHING, DANGER” warning signs
- Gates at both ends of causeway
- Red flashing signals in both directions

**Notes:**
This motorist warning system consists of: (Click)
fiber-optic cable, (Click)
“STOP WHEN FLASHING, DANGER” warning signs, (Click)
gates at both ends of the causeway, (Click)
and red flashing signals are placed approximately every 500 feet along the bridge in both directions. (NEXT)

## Fiber-Optic Cable

- Source: TXDOT

**Notes:**
(Click) (arrows)
As you can see in this slide the fiber optic cable extends the entire length of the bridge.
(NEXT)

## Fiber Circuit Breaker and Fiber Optics

- Source: TXDOT

**Notes:**
The fiber optic circuit breaker (Click) (arrow) as shown by this arrow
is used to stabilize the glass fibers (Click) (arrows)
as shown by these arrows, within the cable at fixed points on the bridge to ensure that the fiber cables break as the bridge deflects. (NEXT)

## Queen Isabella Causeway

- Source: TXDOT

**Notes:**
This slide illustrates another part of the motorist warning system that is located at each end of the causeway.  This portion of the motorist warning system, (Click) (arrows)
as shown by these arrows consists of: Red flashing signals, stop when flashing warning signs, & and gates. (NEXT)

- Red Warning Signals

- Source: TXDOT

**Notes:**
This is an example of one of the red flashing signals affixed to a support.  Note that many of the components of the system were designed from standard traffic signal devices. (NEXT)

## Slide 69

**Notes:**
(Click) (for arrows)
In this view the arrows show the placement of the red flashing warning signals along the causeway while traveling toward South Padre Island. (NEXT)

## Slide 70

**Notes:**
(Click) (for arrows)
And in this particular view, the arrows show the placement of the red flashing warning signals along the causeway while traveling toward the mainland. (NEXT)

## Queen Isabella Causeway Motorist Warning System

- If the fiber-optic cable is severed
- 	– Signals before break flash red
- 	– Signals beyond break do not flash
- Automatically calls police and  Coast Guard

**Notes:**
(Click)
If the fiber optic cable is severed, (Click)
the signals located before the break are designed to flash red, (Click)
and the signals beyond the break are designed not to flash, allowing traffic to clear the bridge. (Click)
In addition, the system will automatically place calls to law enforcement agencies and the Coast Guard.
(NEXT)

- Motorist Warning Systems

- FHWA working to improve reliability of    long-term instrumentation
- March 2004 Structural Health Monitoring initiative
- Neither AASHTO nor the FHWA provide guidance on the use of these systems

**Notes:**
(Click)Staff believes that the FHWA should continue its efforts to provide and improve the reliability of such systems, through its(Click)
March 2004 Structural Health Monitoring initiative and through continuing intelligent transportation systems programs. Staff also believes that the FHWA should monitor existing systems and develop an effective motorist warning system to stop traffic in the event of a partial or total bridge collapse. (Click)
Although AASHTO and FHWA describe motorist warning systems, neither provide guidance on when and where to use these systems.  Therefore, staff  believes that once FHWA has developed an effective motorist warning system, AASHTO should provide guidance to the States on their use.
(The end of slide show)
This concludes my presentation on motorist warning systems and staff is prepared to answer any of your questions.