# Presentation: 326699

##  Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities David J. Seidel and Ray SartorLos Alamos National LaboratoryMay 4, 2005

##  Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities 

- Background
- DOE contractors conduct multiple hazard analysis activities in accordance with federal regulations, DOE orders and rules, and integrated safety management (ISM) requirements.
- Although each of these hazard analyses has a different focus such as emergency management, nuclear safety, chemical safety, or worker protection; they share the same basic purpose to identify and analyze potential dangers to workers, the public, or the environment, so that effective controls can be established to minimize or prevent adverse impacts.
- DOE is promoting integration of hazards analysis activities to:
-         help improve cost effectiveness, clarify organizational roles and responsibilities, and provide a basis for enhancing the technical quality of hazard analysis activities.

##  Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities 

- Drivers
- 2001 ‐ DOE/EFCOG Chemical Safety Topical Committee
- 2002 ‐ Integrating NEPA and AB Document Preparation
- 2003 ‐ DOE-HDBK-1163-2003
- 2003 ‐ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
- 2003 ‐ Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Review

**Notes:**

DOE recommendation document for analyzing accidents under the National Environmental Policy Act  states:
Integrating a NEPA accident analysis with the corresponding authorization basis document preparation process would be highly desirable, although it will not always be possible to do.

##  Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities 

- Purpose
- A LANL procedure was developed to provide guidance on integrating the hazard analysis activities associated with preparation or major revision of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), the Emergency Preparedness Hazard Assessment (EPHA), and the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a LANL nuclear facility.
- This procedure was written for nuclear facilities because the complexity of these analyses provides the most opportunity for process improvement.  However, the concepts of this procedure can be applied to non-nuclear facilities.

##  Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities 

- Team Selection
- An integrated hazard analysis project should be performed by a multi-disciplinary team, including:
- an analyst cognizant of DSA requirements, possibly from the Safety Basis Office (PS-4)
- an analyst cognizant of FHA requirements, possibly from the Fire Protection group (EOO-FIRE)
- an analyst cognizant of EPHA requirements, possibly from the Emergency Management & Response group (EOO-EM&R) and
- an analyst cognizant of NEPA requirements, possibly from the Ecology Group (ENV-ECO).
- Multi-disciplinary teams are discussed further in Section 4.1 of DOE Handbook 1163-2003

##  Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities 

- Project Plan** **
**     **
- Should delineate all of the required tasks
- Assign the resources
- Decide which activities are done by a team
- Decide which are done by an individual analyst

##  Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities 

- Hazard Analysis Integration
- It is presumed that the subject documents being written or revised for the facility are the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), the Emergency Preparedness Hazard Assessment (EPHA), and the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).  However, safety analysts can extend the concepts of this procedure to other documents.
- It is presumed that the hazard analysis team is familiar with hazard analysis procedures

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

- Baseline Information
- For any hazards analysis, the collection of the baseline information
- facility/design information,
- process/activity/operational information,
- materials & hazards information,
- existing safety documents,
- operations information,
- site and location characteristics, etc.)
-        is required

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

-      Site Characteristics and Facility Description
- All of the subject hazard analysis documents require that the site, facility, and operations & processes be described.  Some specific tasks that are common to the subject documents are:
- Establish the site boundary.
- Determine the site boundary distances (to be used in all analyses of public exposure).
- Write a description of the site characteristics that can be incorporated into all of the subject documents.
- Identify the facility segments that are independent of each other.
- Write a description of the facility that can be incorporated into all of the subject documents.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

-      Hazard Identification
- The identification of hazards is common to all of the hazard analyses  It is therefore beneficial to integrate this activity, i.e., performing the hazard identification once for all of the subject documents.  One way to perform an integrated hazard identification is:
- The team creates worksheets for hazard identification (and screening) that captures all parameters needed for the subject documents.
- For each independent facility segment, the team performs the hazard identification with the hazard identification worksheets.  Whenever possible, the team should walk down the facility.
- The cognizant analysts complete the hazard identification forms required for their specific document if the form is different from the completed worksheets.
- The team reviews all hazard identification forms to ensure consistency of the different documents.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

-      Hazard Screening
- The screening of the identified hazards is an activity common to all of the hazard analyses.
- DOE Handbook 1163-2003 identifies the hazard screening as a task that can be integrated and describes hazard screening as:
-         a useful process that can help pinpoint the presence of certain hazard types and does not require comprehensive or formalized analysis to develop a control strategy; and
-         identifying standard industrial hazards (SIH) that are routinely encountered, including hazards that (1) are well understood, (2) have adequate safety guidance relative to their use, and (3) may be adequately controlled by compliance with OSHA regulations or consensus standards.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

- Hazard Screening
**Despite differences in documentation, the concept and purpose of hazard screening is constant for all of the hazard analyses.  Therefore, the recommended approach is for the hazard analysis team to develop a single set of screening criteria that satisfies the requirements of all of the subject documents, i.e., the lowest common denominator.  For some of the hazard analysis documents, it may be possible that this set of screening criteria is more conservative than required by the specific requirements of the hazard analysis document.  However, the benefits are efficient use of the team’s time and consistency among the subject documents.**
**Once the screening criteria are developed, the team performs the hazard screening according to the screening criteria.  However, each of the DOE documents cautions that there are situations in which standard industrial hazards and common hazardous materials should not be screened out from further evaluation:**
**     ****DOE Handbook 1163-2003 states standard industrial hazards must still be considered as initiators for accidents involving other hazards.**
**      ****DOE Standard 3009-94 states standard industrial hazards are not screened out (identified) when they are initiators and contributors to accidents .**
**      ****DOE Guide 151.1‐1 states the possible effect of common hazardous materials as initiators or promoters of releases of other more hazardous materials should be considered**** .**

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

- Hazard Screening
- In summary, hazard screening requires the team to:
- Document the screening criteria.
- For each hazard identification, the team performs the hazard screening and completes the screening worksheet.
- The cognizant analysts complete the hazard screening forms required for their specific document if the form is different from the completed worksheets.
- The team reviews all hazard screening forms to ensure consistency of the different hazard analyses.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

**     **Facility Categorization
- After the hazard identification and screening is completed, it is possible to perform the facility hazard categorization.  The nuclear hazard category is determined per DOE Standard 1027  and LIR 300-00-05 LIR 300-00-05 also establishes the non‐nuclear hazard category.  If a facility contains hazardous chemicals, the release consequences at a distance of 100 meters and at the site boundary may be needed to determine the non-nuclear hazard category.
- While documentation of the facility categorization is required only in the DSA, the entire hazards analysis team needs to know the facility categorization.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

**   **Hazard Characterization
- After the facility hazards have been identified and screened, further characterization of hazards that exceed screening thresholds is necessary.  DOE Guide 151.1‐1 directs that the information that describes and quantifies the identified hazards should be assembled and documented to support the development of scenarios and analysis of possible releases.  For the DSA, FHA, and EIS, this task is implied by the requirement to develop the accident scenarios, rather than explicitly stated.
- For chemicals, the ERPG/TEEL-2 value (which is used as the Protective Action Criteria (PAC) value) and the ERPG/TEEL-3 value (which is used as the Threshold of Early Lethality (TEL) value) need to be determined and documented, if not previously collected with the baseline information.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

-       Hazard Evaluation – Scenario Development
**The requirement to develop accident scenarios is common to all of the hazard analyses, although there are differences in the accident types required to be considered, the differences in accident types are small, whereas the accident scenarios common to all or most of the subject documents are numerous.  Therefore, it is beneficial for the team to develop all of the accident scenarios that are needed by any of the subject documents.  Those accident scenarios not required or appropriate for a particular document can be omitted by the cognizant analyst.**
**It is recommended that a combination of **_**barrier**_** and **_**what-if**_** evaluation techniques be used to develop the accident scenarios.  For each identified hazard:**
**      ****Identify the primary barrier(s) **
**      ****Identify scenario-defining assumptions, e.g., inventory limits and       passive safety features.**

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

- 3. **Identify the failures and accidents that negate the primary barrier(s) (uncontrolled**** ****accident scenarios).  Although the airborne pathway is the most immediate and therefore of greatest concern, consider all possible release pathways, i.e., include possible scenarios with aquatic and ground pathways.  Consider the full spectrum of scenarios, including:**
**  ****a.****       ****Non-fire scenarios (drops, spills, leaks, container corrosion, etc.);**
**  ****b.****       ****Fire-initiated releases of hazardous material;**
**  ****c.****       ****Fire scenarios with only economic consequences;**
**  ****d.****       ****Run-off from fire fighting;**
**  ****e.****       ****Human or operator error;**
**  ****f.****        ****Failure of administrative controls;**
**  ****g.****       ****Criticality;**
**  ****h.****       ****Natural phenomena (seismic, lightning, etc.);**
**  ****i .****       ****External events (plane crash, motor vehicle collisions, adjacent facilities, etc.);**
**  ****j.****        ****Transportation events (vehicle collisions resulting in a spill or fire, explosions, etc.);**
**  ****k.****       ****Facility damage with possible compromise of classified material; and**
**  ****l.****         ****Malevolent acts and security contingencies (bomb threat/explosive device, sabotage, hostage situation/armed intruder, etc.)**
**·****          ****“Moderate” scenarios are those that could be initiated by a single individual using materials or tools readily available in the facility, or small quantities of flammables.**
**·****          ****“Extreme” scenarios, such as those used in vulnerability assessments and/or radiological and toxicological sabotage assessments, should provide the analyst with an upper bound on the severity of potential consequences.**

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

**    **
- Hazard Evaluation – Control Identification
- The requirement to identify controls is common to all of the hazard analyses
-  Once the accident scenario is defined, the team can identify and document any preventative and mitigative controls.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

- Hazard Evaluation Frequency Estimates
- A DSA requires the hazard evaluation to estimate the event frequency (both without and with the preventative controls),
- An EIS also considers the event frequency as an importance factor,
- The FHA and EPHA are not required to estimate the frequency of the postulated accidents,
- Therefore, the cognizant safety analysts for the DSA and EIS, if not the entire hazard analysis team, need to jointly perform the task of estimating the event frequency.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

**     **Hazard Evaluation – Consequence Analysis
**All of the subject hazard analysis documents require that the consequences of each accident scenario be determined. Significant differences exist among the subject documents on how to determine the accident consequences.  For example:**
**The FHA, EPHA, and EIS are required to evaluate the consequence to noninvolved workers, but the DSA is generally not concerned with noninvolved workers.**
**A DSA needs consequences for both with and **_**without the mitigative controls**_**, whereas, the EPHA and EIS are only concerned with consequences **_**with the controls credited**_**.**
**The EPHA needs the consequence analysis to determine the elapsed time to the consequence threshold.  The DSA, FHA, and EIS, do not require any time information.**
**For atmospheric dispersion, a DSA uses a statistical analysis method****[****, whereas, a EPHA will use a determinate (non-statistical) analysis method****[****.**
**For atmospheric dispersion, a EPHA needs to report both the 95% worst-case and the typical consequences, however, a DSA is only concerned with the 95% worst-case results.**
**The hazard analysis team shall decide whether to continue together to develop all of the information required in all of the hazard analyses, or to temporarily disperse (or divide into smaller groups) to develop their individual consequence analyses independently.**

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

**    **Review of Hazard Evaluation Documents
- The cognizant analysts complete the hazard evaluation forms required for their specific document.
- The team reviews all hazard evaluation forms to ensure consistency of the different hazard analyses.

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

**       **
**Other Exchanges of Information**
**DSA has responsibility ****which SSCs are Safety Class and Safety Significant **
**Once these safety SSC descriptions are developed, this information needs to be relayed to the cognizant analysts for the FHA and the EPHA, which must also describe and evaluate the Safety Class SSCs**
**DSA has the responsibility and authority to derive the administrative controls related to: TSRs, prevention of inadvertent criticality, radiation exposure control,  hazardous material exposure control and radioactive and hazardous waste management program **** **
**In the DSA, the results of the Fire Hazards Analyses should be summarized as appropriate to put fire interaction with material into a proper perspective (e.g., will material be within flame zone, heated indirectly, or largely unaffected)**
**The conclusions of the FHA shall be incorporated in the DSA Accident Analysis and shall be integrated into design basis and beyond design basis accident conditions **
**DSA Chapter 15, Emergency Preparedness Program,  needs to be based on, or at least consistent with, the EPHA.  The FHA must describe the emergency plans/fire response for the facility **** **

## Integration Of Hazard Analysis Activities

**   **References
**DOE-HDBK-1163-2003, Integration of Multiple Hazard Analysis Requirements and Activities, October 2003**
**UCRL-AR-200684, Integrated ES&H Analysis and Assessment Process – Evaluation and Recommendations, November 3, 2003**
**OST 300-00-06, Safety Basis Handbook; Section 1, LANL Hazard Analysis Technical Methodology Handbook, Rev. 1**
**DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, U.S. Department of Energy, April 2002**
**LIR 300-00-06.4, Nuclear Facility Safety Basis, July 26, 2004**
**DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23 Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Change Notice 1, September 1997**
**LIR 300-00-05.3, Facility Hazard Categorization, March 18, 2004**
**DOE G-420.1/B-0 and G-440.1/E-0, Implementation Guide for use with DOE Orders 420.1 and 440.1 Fire Safety Program, September 30, 1995 (on DOE’s directives website as DOE G-440.1-5)**