# Presentation: 116373

## Can the Spread of Nuclear Weapons be Stopped?

- ◘
- Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
- November 1, 2006
- ◘
- Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky

## During Cold War

- _Deter_ with nuclear Triad: ICBM’s, Strategic Bombers. SNBM’s
- Nuclear war fighting abandoned in plan
- MAD
- Mutual Assured Destruction

## The Cold War is over  -- but...

- Current Doctrine
- Deter, assure, dissuade, defeat
- Pre-empt, with nuclear weapons if necessary
- “all options” open
- “capabilities based,” not “threat based”
- Nuclear weapons play “smaller role”
- Adaptive planning
- NUTS
- Nuclear Use Target Selection

## Nuclear Weapons Risks Remain

- US – Russia  nuclear weapons release
- Regional Conflict (e.g. India and Pakistan)
- Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorists
- Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
- Risk = Probability x consequences

-    increased               decreased

- This
- Talk

- Not addressed in this talk

## Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation are not the same

- States can be deterred.
- Terrorists can not.
- No evidence that new proliferant states are greater or lesser risks  for transferring nuclear weapons or the tools to make them to terrorists.

## Nonproliferation – a nonpartisan goal

- Presidential Debate: September 30, 2004

- Mr. Lehrer: “...so it is correct to say that if somebody’s listening to this, that you agree...the single most  serious threat you believe –both of you believe is nuclear proliferation.”

- Mr. Bush: “I do –in the hands of a terrorist enemy.”

- Mr. Kerry:  “Weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation.”

- ...but...

## In the History of Mankind, all newly developed  technologies

- have been “dual purpose”
- have spread over entire globe
- This precedent _must_ be broken for nuclear weapons
- Knowledge is not a bar to proliferation today

## Cornerstone of Nonproliferation Regime is Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT)

- Came into force 1970
- Signed and Ratified by all Nations except
- Israel
- India
- Pakistan
- North Korea withdrew
- Review Conferences every 5 years
- Made a Treaty of Indefinite Duration at 1995 Review Conference

## The NPT Bargain

- Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-nuclear Weapons States (NNWS)
- US, Russia, UK, China and France are NWS
- NWS do not give NW or NW tools to NNWS
- NNWS do not receive such material

## The NPT Bargain(continued)

- NNWS have “inalienable right” to nuclear power.
- NWS work in good faith toward prohibition of NWs and General Disarmament (no specified timetable; implication is to deemphasize role of NW in international relations
- NNWS must negotiate Safeguards with IAEA

## Number of States with Nuclear Weapons

- United States

- Soviet Union

- United Kingdom

- France

- China

- Israel

- India

- South Africa

- Pakistan

- Belarus

- North Korea

- Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South Africa became NNWS

- Ukraine

- Kazakhstan

**NPT in force**

- 1970

- “I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20.”      John Kennedy, 1963

**Rate of 1 new NWS every 5 yrs**

## Historical Summary of MilitaryFissile Material & Nuclear Weapons Programs

- Nuclear Weapons Programs begun before 1970 when NPT came into force, succeeded and are still ongoing
- United States
- Russia
- United Kingdom
- France
- China
- Israel
- India

- Programs ended by 1970
- Programs ended after 1970

- Sweden
- Canada
- Australia
- Egypt

- Argentina	Brazil
- Romania	South Africa
- Spain		South Korea
- Spain		Switzerland
- Taiwan		Libya	Yugoslavia

## Historical Summary  (cont’d)

- Intentions suspected but no NW program identified
-      Algeria
- 	Syria

- Programs started after 1970
- 	Succeeded and ongoing
**	**Pakistan	 North Korea
- 	Are suspected to be actively seeking nuclear weapons
- 	Iran

- Factions within advocated for/sought NW, but ceased by 1970

- Inherited NW, but now non-NW State party to NPT
- Belarus
- Kazakhstan
- Ukraine

- Italy	   	Japan
- Germany	Norway

## The Bad News

- The Non-Parties to NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea)
- Latency: Capability of NNWS versus Intent
- NW policies of NWS
- U.S. redesign efforts
- Only China proclaims “No First Use.”
- U.S. pre-emptive policies
- The physical facts:
- Uranium Isotope enrichment  & Plutonium reprocessing can be part of peaceful power program --- but:
- Enrichment & Reprocessing can shorten lead time to acquire NW after withdrawal from NPT

## NWS

**NWS**

**NNWS**

- Conversion

- Nuclear Power

- Nuclear Weapons

- Nuclear Power

- Enrichment

- Spent Fuel

- LEU

- ?
- Reprocessing

- HEU

- LEU

- LEU

- Spent Fuel

- Pu

- ?
- Reprocessing

- HEU, PU

**Uranium Ore**

- The Fuel Cycle Under the NPT

- IAEA Safeguards

## INTENT

**INTENT**

**TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF  NNWS**

*IRAN*

*BRAZIL*

- “Latency” or likelihood of acquiring nuclear weapons

*JAPAN*

## Brazil

**1951 (Dual Purpose)**
- Brazil establishes National Research Council
- Swimming Pool Research Reactor fueled by HEU
- Brazil bought 625 MWe “turnkey” reactor

## Brazil (continued)

_**Military**_
**1970**
- Brazil military government
- Six 1.3 GWe  reactors by 1998
- Attempts to import European centrifuges
**1980**
- Three parallel military programs
- Air Force – laser enrichment
- Army – natural uranium graphite reactor     Pu
- Navy – centrifuge program

## Brazil (continued)

_**Peaceful Program**_
**1988 **
- Brazil approves new Constitution: no nuclear weapons
**~1990**
- Argentina and Brazil elected civilian Presidents
**1991**
- Argentina and** **Brazil terminate weapons programs and signed mutual “peaceful uses” treaty, establishing bilateral monitoring agency

## Brazil (continued)

**1994**
- Quadrilateral Agreement: Argentina, Brazil, bilateral agency, IAEA
- _But_ centrifuge program continues.  Domestic design more capable than P-1.
- Claimed purpose: Prestige, Independence;
- 	but large hydropower resources

## Iran

**1957 – 1979**
- 1957 US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation agreement
- 1968 Iran signs NPT; ratified in 1970
- Plans to construct 23 nuclear power plants by 2001!
- Starts Bushehr plant with German contractor
- Invests in European Nuclear Energy Consortium

## Iran (continued)

-                Iranian Revolution
- 1984 – 1988   Bushehr damaged by Iraqi 			bombardment
- 1985? or         Pakistan and China signed
- 2 yrs later       	nuclear cooperation agreements
- 			with Iran.  Tech transfers by 			Khan Organization.
- 1995		Iran contracts with Russia to 			finish Bushehr

## Iran (continued)

- 2002		Iranian dissidents reveal existence 		of Natanz enrichment facility and 			a heavy water production plant
- 2003		Iran suspends enrichment under 			pressure from EU
- 2004		Iran breaks centrifuge seals
- 2005		Iran resumes conversion
- April ‘06	Iran claims 3.5% enrichment; running 		164 centrifuges

## IRAN (continued)

- _Intent?_
- Iran not fully cooperative with IAEA Safeguards
- No evidence of NW program
- Fatwa by Supreme Leader forbidding NW
- Inalienable right to Fuel Cycle
- Need for Independence?

## Japan

- Owns about 45 tons of reactor-grade Plutonium
- Only about 10% of this is stored in Japan
- The designated purpose of this material is for use in Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) and breeder reactors.  These uses have been delayed or cancelled.
- Reactor-grade Plutonium is useable in NW

## North Korea (DPRK)

- 1985		DPRK joins NPT
- 1991		US withdraws NW from South Korea
- 1992		DPRK concludes Safeguards 			Agreement with IAEA *but  *IAEA
- 			detected 90g diversion of plutonium
- 1993		DPRK announces intent to withdraw 		from NPT.  IAEA 	demands more 			access to Yongbyon reactor.
- Many US – DPRK diplomatic contacts

## North Korea (DPRK) cont’d

- October, 1994:
- _US and DPRK sign “Agreed Framework”_
- DPRK stop reprocessing
- Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to build two LWR’s and to supply fuel oil
- Many follow-on diplomatic moves

## North Korea (DPRK) cont’d

- 1998		South Korea “Sunshine Policy”
- 1998- 2000	Extensive diplomatic bilateral 			contacts, including visit by 			Secretary of State Albright to 			Pyongyang

## North Korea (DPRK) cont’d

- 2001		Secretary of State Powell declares 		to “pick up where President 				Clinton left off,” but retracts and 			diplomacy turns hostile.
- 2002		President Bush includes DPRK in 			“axis of evil” in State of Union 			speech.
- 			Possible use of NW against DPRK 		included in Nuclear Posture Review.

## North Korea (DPRK) cont’d

- _August 2002_
- KEDO groundbreaking for reactors
- _October 2002_
- Asst. Secretary of State James Kelly visits Pyongyang.  US claims that DPRK  admitted to Kelly that it had  an HEU enrichment program.  DPRK denies this, stating they only claimed a right to enrichment.  Translation problem?
- DPRK enrichment program has disappeared from media.

## North Korea (DPRK) cont’d

- _November 2002_
- KEDO suspends fuel oil shipments in response to US enrichment claims. IAEA challenges enrichment.
- _December 2002_
- DPRK restarts reactor, removes IAEA seals, expels inspectors.

## North Korea (DPRK) cont’d

- _January 2003_
- DPRK withdraws from NPT
- _2003_
- DPRK tells US and China it has NW
- Six Nation Talks; US refuses bilateral talks
- _2006_
- DPRK tests NW

## The CTBT and Nonproliferation

- Long History: 1958 initiatives
- Partial Test ban: 1963 LTBT
- Reality versus Symbolism
- CTBT cited in all NPT Review Conferences
- Reality
- Cost to National Security low
- Technical benefit to Nonproliferation low
- Cost-Benefit Ratio is Quotient of two small quantities
- The CTBT has been signed by most nations but is not in force.  The US Administration opposes ratification.
- The CTBT Monitoring system is in place and is supported by the US.

## The CTBT Matrix

**Options**

**NNWS Countries**

- No CTBT

- CTBT Complied with by all countries

- CTBT all countries cheat to extent possible without detection

- Highly
- Developed

- Developing

- Least
- Developed

- What type of NW can each country build?
- Conclusion: US interest served better with CTBT, obeyed or not, than without CTBT.                                    (NAS, 2002)

## Remedies to Proliferation

- _What won’t work in the long run_
- Discriminatory “Coalition of the Willing”
- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
- Selective enforcement
- Divide world into fissile materials suppliers and receivers
- Military pre-emption of nascent nuclear facilities (Israel v. OSIRAK, 1981)

## Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d)

- _What may work_
- International fuel supply and return of spent fuel to international control
- Strengthen IAEA; make Additional Protocol mandatory
- Broaden negative and positive security assurances
- Make withdrawal from NPT subject to U.N. Security Council Action

## Positive & Negative Security Assurances

- NWS give assurances to
- +   Come to the assistance of a NNWS threatened or attacked with NW
- –    Not to attack a NNWS with NW unless the NNWS is allied with a NWS

## Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d)

- _What __*will*__ help_
- Universal *No First Use* acceptance by all NWS
- Drastic reduction of Nuclear Weapons stockpiles by formal Treaty by NWS
- Lessened reliance on military options in international relations
- US leadership in all of the above
*...**because...*

## US leadership

- US is strongest military power measured by conventional military strength and economic power
- and
- “You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool.”
- ...Rep. Ed Markey, 2006
- And
- “Never negotiate with the United States unless you have a nuclear weapon.”
- ...Indian Deputy Minister of Defense

## Ultimately

- Nuclear Nonproliferation Demands that _*every*_ Nation concludes that  its security and Well-Being are served better without nuclear weapons than with them.