# Presentation: 110479

## End State Options Synthesis 1 OutbriefNASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Benchmarking Workshop:  End State Options and Acquisition Strategies for the NASA Exploration System of Systems IntegratorDoug Cooke, FacilitatorDecember 15, 2004

## Session Charter:  End State Options Synthesis 1

- This team will synthesize one or more end state SoSE&I org options, taking into account all the read ahead data and the morning’s presentations, as well as additional viewpoints from the session participants. Key aspects of the synthesis challenge to be considered are:
- What are the strengths of the various SoSE&I organizational models/approaches that were presented in the invited lectures, and/or which the participants can identify based on their extensive expertise and experience?
- How can these features be combined into a new organizational design?
- Is there a group consensus around separate govt-contractor vs. integrated govt-contractor organization?

## Process Comment

- This presentation does not have conclusions.
- These are “brainstorming items” of importance that should be considered in determining the integration approach to be used, but do not define that approach.
- The complexity of the issues involved suggest that more time for this discussion is indicated.

## Summary Thoughts

- Enterprise Differences
- Many major elements to be competed over time
- All have to work well
- All have to be amenable to Extension/transition to commercial industry/economic activity
- SoSE&I Role will change over time
- There won’t be a single, fixed “end state” that remains in effect for 30 years; instead, think of end-state1, end-state2...
- Need to take a life-cycle view
- SoSE&I has to start “before day 1” to be successful
- SoSE&I must bring in operations activity from the start, rather than do a “handover”
- Major Partnership Required
- There’s plenty of work for everyone in government and industry
- While there will be competition, it’s doubtful that anyone will be left out
- This should encourage more partnering and cooperation between otherwise competing organizations

## Summary Thoughts, continued

- NASA HQ (Admiral Steidle) is the SoSE&I Customer
- SoSE&I needs to become his “deputy”
- Cost, Schedule and Performance across Enterprise
- Manage Enterprise Architecture
- Cooperation across HQ Directorates
- Specific expertise of each NASA Center will be required
- SoSE&I needs to add value to industry/hardware contractors
- Help solve problems
- SoSE&I is a very large task
- Too big of job for one entity (i.e., a single contractor)
- Everyone involved needs to be part of the team; nobody should be excluded, but...
- Don’t “Disintegrate the Integrator.”  The multiple players have to be able to function together
- There are many organizational and process options for SoSE&I
- Domain Knowledge – National Assets

## Summary Thoughts, continued

- HW Exclusions
- Independence/impartiality is very important to customers
- Can be partial or full
- Regardless of how this is handled, we still need to pass the “Washington Post Test”
- Full exclusion of an organization from h/w development has potential problems
- The organization would either not have, or lose, h/w development experience
- Technical personnel might be disinclined to join an organization if they can’t ever develop something
- Personnel:
- High quality of personnel in the SoSE&I organization is the key to its success.
- These personnel will change over time, either by “natural forces” or deliberate rotation
- Post-employment restrictions preventing personnel from crossing “firewalls” as they rotate might need to be re-examined
- Even with personnel changes, a strong core needs to be preserved

## Summary Thoughts, continued

- Potential Organizations:
- FFRDC
- Major Aerospace Industry
- HW Exclusion
- Someone who builds things, has experience “getting their hands dirty”
- Center Lead
- Individual Segment Leads
- Compete for entire SE&I Role
- Centers are generally stronger in integration than in systems engineering
- National Team
- Can bring the best resources to bear
- Distinction between using an “existing” or “new” organization is not as large as it seems
- The job is so large that even an aerospace mega-contractor (or agency) would need to form a new sub-organization to do work
- Such a new sub-organization will need the flexibility to vary from existing policies

## Summary Thoughts, continued

- This is a Tough Problem!
- Needs to be a mature organizational construct
- Technical Capability
- Programmatics
- Partnerships
- Evolving
- Collaborative

## Overall Organization

**ESMD**

**Enterprise SE&I**

**SE&I**

**FFRDC**

- and/or

**Other agencies, internationals, etc.**

**NASA **
**Centers**

**CEV**

**CTS**

**GSS**

**SE&I**
**Development**

**SE&I**
**Development**

**Subsystems**

**Interface control by SE&I**

**Developers**

## End State Options Synthesis 2 OutbriefNASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Benchmarking Workshop:  End State Options and Acquisition Strategies for the NASA Exploration System of Systems IntegratorBetsy Park, FacilitatorDecember 15, 2004

## Session Charter:  End State Options Synthesis 2

- This team will synthesize one or more end state SoSE&I org options, taking into account all the read ahead data and the morning’s presentations, as well as additional viewpoints from the session participants. Key aspects of the synthesis challenge to be considered are:
- What are the strengths of the various SoSE&I organizational models/approaches that were presented in the invited lectures, and/or which the participants can identify based on their extensive expertise and experience?
- How can these features be combined into a new organizational design?
- Is there a group consensus around separate govt-contractor vs. integrated govt-contractor organization?

## Brainstorming Items

- Organizational Models:
**Nested IPT** – Broad membership incl. Product Primes (developers, operators, centers, etc.)
- SE&I org/contract at the top level
- Strong Prime empowered to make cost, performance trades, hold margins
- Hierarchical tiered structure
- Role is integrator of integrators
- Hardware exclusion necessary ?
- Yes, because possible conflict of interest between gov’t & SI
- No, firewalls are supported by individual ethics
**Multiple SIs** – Different SI solns are likely, desirable for different categories of work. Possible major segments:
- Major HW components – **HW Prime**
- Individual mission (defined by particular exploration goal) – **Prime oversight w gov’t**.
- Upper tier structure & planning (should be gov’t/ non profit) – **Gov’t / Non-profit**
- Cross-cutting segments (e.g. comm) – **No solution identified; potentially multiple.**

## Brainstorming Items

- Organizational Models:
**NASA Integrated Program Office with Single SE&I Contractor**
- Establishes centers of excellence for integration, responsibilities at centers (Tier D)
- NASA owns cost, schedule, performance, award fees
- Centralized control direct to members, not through center mgmt.
**LSI Contract with Hardware Exclusion**
- Gov’t led with non-profit support (FFRDC ?) in Tier A/B/C
- LSI Prime with HW exclusion in Tier D
**Integrator of Integrators**:
- Series of SE&I contractors over time working as the integrator of integrators
- Near-term spiral vs. long-term spiral are different challenges
- Contracts managed, led by centers
**NASA Does the Whole Job**
**LSI-led (Future Combat System -like Model) **
- NASA strongly integrated with the LSI, the glue
- Clear roles, responsibilities, controls & processes; use competition
- LSI selects the HW contractors, recommends fees
- Co-location irrelevant due to tech. Distributed workforce & centralized mgmt.

## Brainstorming Items

- Organizational Models:
**NASA Institute Alternative Model to FFRDC**
- Acknowledging need for system integration techniques for different tech-level developments
- Fed. employees formed into institute with authority to lead tech. development

## Brainstorming Items

- Brainstorming: SE&I End State Options
- Desired Characteristics:
- Proposed objective criteria:
- maximize exploration unit / $.
- programmatic survival – political, by building constituency that lasts
- Widely distributed functions (geographically, organizationally, functionally) to support interoperability
- Responsibility is verification of correct, feasible reqmts/ and validation that they were met
- Objective Management: Must be keeper of figures of merit --- sustainability, supportability, interoperability. And then relate the mission objectives to the FOM, ensure they can/will be met
- Structure must allow feedback in measuring and controlling Cost, Schedule, Performance
- Trust of System Integrator vs. Prime
- $ [full disclosure ?]. Must set up rules for EVM from Day 1
- Proprietary data. The decision of partial (?) HW exclusion has bearing on this. Make a good, early decision.
- The SI must understand HW development. Is HW expertise necessary?
- No, not organizationally, just staffed appropriately
- Yes, b/c most mistakes made in design, discovered in I&T.
- S&I structure must be spiral-developed: Open-ended and tailorable to evolving exploration goals.

## Brainstorming Items

- Brainstorming: SE&I End State Options
- Desired Characteristics (con’t)
- Integrator of integrator: Service to new project/integrators
- How do new developments tap into the existing development structure ?
- Not so driven to consensus that continually forced to compromise
- How much control will the gov’t give up ?
- Physical presence vs. virtual co-location ?
- Flexible on distributed vs. centralized, evolutionary over the life of exploration
- Basic structure with different players over time
- Clear centralized leadership
- SI 100% accountable to centralized leadership
- FFRDC risk is that they a) are immune from responsibility, b) tend to exist for themselves, not responsive to leadership
- Hardware exclusion ? At the basic level, ethics is the responsibility of the individual, but should take away the incentive to cheat

## Brainstorming Items

- Brainstorming: SE&I End State Options
- Options to Add to the Trade Space
- Consider SE & SI separately
- SI in A/B/C
- SE in D
- Other consortia options (NGO), Non-profit/FFRDC grown from other orgs

## Brainstorming Items

- Organizational Models:
**System Integration Teams**
- LSI Integrates by mission phase separate from developers
- HW exclusion not necessary
- NASA manages trade space across missions (Tier A-C)
- Tier E has own SI
- 1 SI team for dev, 1 for ops, 1 for pgm integration

## Session 1 “Four Models” OutbriefNASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Benchmarking Workshop:  End State Options and Acquisition Strategies for the NASA Exploration System of Systems IntegratorBetsy Park, FacilitatorDecember 16, 2004

## Session Charter

- Session objectives:  This team will evaluate strengths/weaknesses of Options 1-4, and will propose actions that can be taken to ensure that these options are enabled.
- Option 1: Apollo Model – Tier A-C SETA, “Prime of Primes”
- Option 2: Tier A-D SETA with HW Partial Exclusion
- Option 3: Tier A-D Independent Organization SETA
- Option 4: NAVSEA “Nested” MAIT Model
- Process note from the splinter session:
- These options differ from those in the NRC report distributed prior to the workshop and that were reviewed by most (if not all) participants.
- Session members had only a brief introduction to these four options, and then a short time to evaluate them.
- Greater understanding of the options, coupled with more time to study them, would likely lead to different—and more mature—results

## Two Common Themes:

- For any model, the people doing the SOSI task are the key element...as important as the structure.
- A “perfect” structure without great people will fail.
- An “imperfect” structure with great people could succeed.
- The term “end state” is problematic
- Constellation, NASA, public policy, and other key factors will evolve over time, very likely in ways not foreseeable today
- The SoSE&I organization must be adaptable to these changes
- While an “end state” SoSE&I structure could be defined in the near term based on current conditions, it should not be seen as permanently defined and inflexible

## Option Comparison:  Pros

- This splinter considered three potential variations of Option 3, which likely have different advantages and disadvantages.

## Option Comparison:  Cons

## Option Comparison:  Cons, continued

## Option Comparison:  Notes

## Potential Hybrid Structure

- Use Option 1 (Apollo) for Tiers A-C
- Use Option 4 (NAVSEA-Virginia) for Tier D and below

## Evaluation Criteria Outbrief(reflecting post-workshop integration)NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Benchmarking Workshop:  End State Options and Acquisition Strategies for the NASA Exploration System of Systems IntegratorVincent Bilardo, FacilitatorDecember 15, 2004

## 1. Affordability Criterion

**This criterion is defined to include the following factors:**
- _Cost of acquiring and maintaining SoSEI capability_, consisting of:
**Transition:** The SoSEI End State transition plan mitigates risks to NASA and the Exploration program, is logical and timely, minimizes impacts to ongoing operations and existing contracts, and contains minimal disruption to existing interfaces and agreements.
**Establishment:** The establishment of the option considers the complexity of the implementation, the requirement for approval/legislation outside of NASA, the predictability of the outcome, the time needed for establishment, the longevity of the arrangement, and the ability to re-compete or sever arrangements.
**Facilities:** The option enables the ability to obtain the necessary facility resources to perform SoSEI functions and maximize the accessibility, availability, and overall cost effectiveness in the use of the required facility resources - including those that are owned and/or operated by the government.
**Control:** The organization has an appropriate level of control for managing the SoSEI functions and external  organizations will respond to NASA direction as required to carry out their responsibilities.
**Competencies:** The competency strategy achieves a balanced result between staffing critical SoSEI competencies from NASA, industry, and academia.
- Ability to _manage life cycle cost_ and _achieve Spiral affordability_.
- Ability to achieve _long-term public funding stability_.

## 2. Organizational and Cultural Effectiveness Criterion

**This criterion is defined to include the following factors:**
- Ability to r_apidly startup_ and achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
- Ability to _transition seamlessly_ from Near/Mid-Term SoSEI solution to the End State solution, maintaining SoSEI integrity through each phase.
- _Adaptability, flexibility, responsiveness and evolvability_: The SoSEI option is capable of being responsive to the requirements of the directorate and the program with flexibility to adapt to requirement changes in a timely manner.  Risks introduced to the program due to the evolution are well-characterized and can be mitigated to an acceptable level. The option organizational design is robust and flexible enough to allow additional evolution as program requirements evolve.
- Ability to establish and maintain _clear lines of communication, authority, responsibility, and accountability_ across all interfaces between organizations and within each organization.
- _Staffing & retention ability_: The new SoSEI organization enables a full suite of human capital strategies and necessary to acquire and retain the skilled workforce and levels of expertise required to perform SoSEI functions, and to address potential adverse impacts on transitioning NASA employees.  The degree of complexity of the strategies and tools, and the effort necessary for this implementation is considered to be reasonable for NASA to undertake.
- _Minimum organizational complexity_, *i.e.*, a minimum number of distinct organizational units and/or interfaces between organizational units. Are the government and contractor components of the SoSEI organization separately badged, or are they integrated into a joint, "badge-less" organization?
- Ability to a_void/manage conflicts of interest_, including maintaining a clear understanding of Government vs. Contractor Roles & Responsibilities, while promoting and rewarding constructive internal competition.
- Ability to _promote innovation, measure and reward performance, and ensure process excellence_ (6-sigma, CMMI, etc.).
- Maintenance of _independent thinking, conclusions & recommendations_ and Ability to i_nfluence strategic goals_.
- Ability to _secure and maintain credibility_ with Internal Stakeholders.
- _Attract sufficient staff_ with the necessary skill mix.

## 3. Political and External Environments Effectiveness Criterion

**This criterion is defined to include the following factors:**
- _Credibility with external stakeholders_:  The SoSEI organization has credibility in the technical, political, and public communities. The option provides the capability to effectively advocate and acquire viable and sustainable funding resources and to clearly communicate the relevance of the program.
- _Sustainability_:  The SoSEI option enhances the long term sustainability of the program, including the following subfactors:
- Ability to Promote Commercial Ventures;
- Ability to Rebuild and Sustain the Space Industrial Base;
- Ability to Engage Public and Maintain Enthusiasm/Support;
- Ability to Secure Military Buy-In;
- Achieve Security Objectives;
- Ability to Leverage Non-Exploration Capabilities.
- _Ability to manage and integrate international partners_. The SoSEI option provides the authority, resources, and international credibility to establish and maintain international relationships, including partnerships, barter agreements, and other contract arrangements. The SoSEI option enables the seamless integration of international partners and their contributions. Relevant organizations within the option have recent, demonstrated experience with international collaborations.

## 4. Expertise and Experience Criterion 

**This criterion is defined to include the following factors:**
- _Space domain expertise_: One or more of the organizations in the SoSEI option has recent, relevant , and demonstrated experience with large, complex, high visibility, and high cost system of systems. The  role of the experienced organization(s) enables it to translate that expertise throughout the option and train other organizations/personnel as necessary.
- _Past performance during transition_: The SoSEI team members have demonstrated recent excellent performance in executing SoSEI functions, including for non-ESMD customers.
- Ability to _foster technology development_ and _infuse new technology_: The SoSEI option enables the seamless integration of new technology into future missions/spirals. Relevant organizations within the option have recent, demonstrated experience in technology development and integration.

## This criterion is defined to include the following factors:
Data rights security & management: The SoSEI option has appropriate authorities and safeguards to allow the system integrator to handle, manage, and safeguard proprietary data of multiple hardware system/element corporate providers.  The organizations have demonstrated performance in maintaining the security of sensitive data from government and contractor sources.
Ability to enable government corporate knowledge retention. The SoSEI option provides processes and information systems to enable enduring corporate knowledge retention over the life of the program. The processes and systems must be able to evolve over the long program duration without loss of knowledge.
Ability to enable a government smart buyer role.  The SoSEI option enables NASA to obtain and retain corporate programmatic and technical knowledge across successive spirals. The option enables NASA to maintain its internal expertise in system engineering and integration at a sufficient level for the government smart buyer role. NASA has clear visibility into the contractor(s), sufficient to provide technical and managerial insight into all aspects of the system of systems engineering and integration and to provide oversight of the contractor's performance. 
Knowledge acquisition management: The SoSEI option employs information systems and technologies to increase systems integration efficiency through knowledge sharing and accessibility. Advances in knowledge management are regularly infused into the SoSEI processes and tools.

- _Data rights security & management_: The SoSEI option has appropriate authorities and safeguards to allow the system integrator to handle, manage, and safeguard proprietary data of multiple hardware system/element corporate providers.  The organizations have demonstrated performance in maintaining the security of sensitive data from government and contractor sources.
- _Ability to enable government corporate knowledge retention_. The SoSEI option provides processes and information systems to enable enduring corporate knowledge retention over the life of the program. The processes and systems must be able to evolve over the long program duration without loss of knowledge.
- _Ability to enable a government smart buyer role_.  The SoSEI option enables NASA to obtain and retain corporate programmatic and technical knowledge across successive spirals. The option enables NASA to maintain its internal expertise in system engineering and integration at a sufficient level for the government smart buyer role. NASA has clear visibility into the contractor(s), sufficient to provide technical and managerial insight into all aspects of the system of systems engineering and integration and to provide oversight of the contractor's performance.
- _Knowledge acquisition management_: The SoSEI option employs information systems and technologies to increase systems integration efficiency through knowledge sharing and accessibility. Advances in knowledge management are regularly infused into the SoSEI processes and tools.

- 5. Knowledge Management Effectiveness Criterion

## 6.  SoSE&I Effectiveness Criterion

**This criterion is defined to include the following factors:**
- _Efficiency_:  The SoSEI option is able to deliver products within available resources on schedule. The option minimizes non-productive use of resources that negatively affect the implementation of the program. Organizations within the option perform regular self-analysis and analysis of each program to ensure sustained performance.
- Ability to _access full-range of SoSEI skills & capabilities_ (including Teaming).
- Ability to _work across multiple organization types_ (Government, Industry, Academia).
- Ability to _institutionalize SoSEI decisions_.
- Ability of SoSEI to _make acquisitions_ (*e.g.*, team and hire subcontractors, acquire facilities, etc.).
- _Lack of monolithic structure/distributed approach_ (*i.e.*, ability of the SoSEI option to located resources wherever needed across the ESMD enterprise so as to effectively execute SoSEI functions and responsibilities).
- Ability to develop a _balanced view and implementation of commonality_ (i.e., the full SoS-level impacts of commonality must be analyzed to determine the optimum level of its required application).

## 7. Program Management and SE&I Effectiveness Criterion

**This criterion is defined to include the following factors:**
- Ability to _manage system integration_:  The SoSEI option performs the full spectrum of system of systems engineering and integration function including requirements decomposition, flow, and traceability, functional allocation, systems design, modeling and simulation capability, verification and validation, trade assessments, strategy to task to technology, risk management, etc. All elements are given sufficient resources to enable the smooth, successful operation of the whole.
- Ability to _manage complex technical, organizational & process interfaces_: The SoSEI option provides clear, direct management of the system of systems interfaces with a clean delineation of responsibilities across the interfaces.
- Ability to _perform SOS program control_ (cost, schedule, CM/DM, risk, etc.).
- Ability to _promote commonality_ (H/W, S/W, processes).
- Ability to _manage IT, SBA, S/W development_.
- Ability to _manage geographically distributed complex interfaces_ (organization, system, software, etc.)
- Ability to _ensure system safety and execute all the “-ilities”_:  integrated logistics, reliability, supportability and maintainability analysis, etc.
- Ability to _ensure compliance with environmental, safety and health regulations_.
- Ability to _incorporate science community requirements_.
- Ability to _achieve mission success_.

## Acquisition Strategy OutbriefNASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Benchmarking Workshop:  End State Options and Acquisition Strategies for the NASA Exploration System of Systems IntegratorDale Thomas, FacilitatorDecember 16, 2004

## Splinter Session: Acquisition Strategy Splinter The Plaza Room

- Session objectives: this team will identify key aspects of the acquisition strategy NASA should pursue to implement the End State Option(s).  These aspects should include, at a minimum:
- Recommended contract and solicitation type;
- Desirable industry partnering/teaming arrangements;
- Contractor hardware exclusions (full, partial, none), and specific features or such exclusions (the more detail here the better!);
- Arrangements for SoSE&I organization/contractor handling of Exploration system/element hardware prime contractor proprietary/sensitive data;
- Design of incentives.
- Transition strategy.
- Session leadership:
- Dale Thomas (facilitator)
- Louise Hamlin (recorder)

## Pros
Standard process organization
Good lines of communication
Pushes decision authority lower
Takes advantage of center expertise
HQ can concentrate on up, freeing project to build product
Negs:
Tiered integration function not specified
Conflict of interest – integrator also builds HW
HQ SETA contractor weak
Promotes center rivalry
Model originates from non spiral development
Commercial IP issues not addressed
Prime-of-primes has no $ control on other contracts
Co-location at HQ from centers may not bring best-of-best
HQ SETA contractor may devolve to information gathering mode only, may be viewed as HQ spies

- Standard process organization
- Good lines of communication
- Pushes decision authority lower
- Takes advantage of center expertise
- HQ can concentrate on up, freeing project to build product
_**Negs:**_
- Tiered integration function not specified
- Conflict of interest – integrator also builds HW
- HQ SETA contractor weak
- Promotes center rivalry
- Model originates from non spiral development
- Commercial IP issues not addressed
- Prime-of-primes has no $ control on other contracts
- Co-location at HQ from centers may not bring best-of-best
- HQ SETA contractor may devolve to information gathering mode only, may be viewed as HQ spies

_**Actions/ Additional Concerns**_
- Requires very strong constellation pgm to balance arguments & ensure pgm-wide standards & policies
- Clarify interfaces to intnl partners
- Clarify technology infusion & mgmt
- Add HW exclusion capability

- Option 1: Apollo Model – Tier A-C SETA, “Prime of Primes”

## Option 2: Tier A-D SETA with HW Partial Exclusion

_**Pros**_
- Contractor represents a strong tech. partner
- Also outreach capability: educational, political, etc.
- Span of control – responsibility, authority enables clear decision-making
- SE&I Prime has advantage in attracting talent to team (hiring and teaming)
- Added stability through spiral
- Responsive to Congr. funding
_**Negs:**_
- Primes might resist decision-making control of SE&I Prime
- Partial HW exclusion invites possible Credibility/ Conflict of Interest
- Proprietary data (gov’t, Prime) management a challenge when SE&I Prime so involved
- Prime SE&I Role (dual leadership+ HW role) may attract Congressional fire
- Clear lines of control might be difficult to define

**Strong SE&I contractor role in Tier A-D with no contract letting responsibilities**

_**Actions/ Additional Concerns**_
- Partial HW excl.: How do you keep key expertise ?
- Firewalls: (separate SE&I org from HW providing org)
- Importance : SE&I expertise or HW expertise ?
- Importance: Acquisition support from SE&I Prime ?
- Fee-on-fee

## Negs
Large/ early investment required
Requires Congr. act to create (headcount limits)
Credibility of new organization 
Do they have experience on this scale ?
“One Client” service Org.
No “Reach back”, no “bench” 
DC location
Limited career paths for high performers
Slow “spin up” time
No Hardware experience

Mitigators
Use an existing org (Aerospace, Mitre, etc)
Modify charter
Limits (head count)
Resolve Regulatory Issues
Do not mandate “DC based” Structure
Push contracting responsibility to the centers

- Large/ early investment required
- Requires Congr. act to create (headcount limits)
- Credibility of new organization
- Do they have experience on this scale ?
- “One Client” service Org.
- No “Reach back”, no “bench”
- DC location
- Limited career paths for high performers
- Slow “spin up” time
- No Hardware experience
_**Mitigators**_
- Use an existing org (Aerospace, Mitre, etc)
- Modify charter
- Limits (head count)
- Resolve Regulatory Issues
- Do not mandate “DC based” Structure
- Push contracting responsibility to the centers

**Conclusion: Can’t get there from here**

**“****One Client” Service Organization**

_**Pros**_
- Independent agency/org (No OCI)
- Pockets of strong engineering talent

- Option 3: Tier A-D Independent Organization

## Negs
Very staffing intensive
Comm intensive (lots of mtgs !)
Cross-element modeling & analysis must be planned & structured
Risk of participants driving decisions to their advantage 
Integrators must have independent authority
Past success were at “lower levels” of integration

Implementation Actions
Define structure up front – scale-up/tailor Navy model ?
Decide how authority is delegated
Is there a Prime-of-Primes ?
Gov’t/Contractor mix

- Very staffing intensive
- Comm intensive (lots of mtgs !)
- Cross-element modeling & analysis must be planned & structured
- Risk of participants driving decisions to their advantage
- Integrators must have independent authority
- Past success were at “lower levels” of integration
_**Implementation Actions**_
- Define structure up front – scale-up/tailor Navy model ?
- Decide how authority is delegated
- Is there a Prime-of-Primes ?
- Gov’t/Contractor mix

_**Pros**_
- Flexible, incremental, “buy by the yard”, tailorable to spiral dev.
- Maximizes comm. & insight, no 3rd party integr.
- Doesn’t require lrg SoSEI at start; could begin implementation at Spiral 1
- Ownership/accountability at the lowest lvl
- Easy to balance NASA/Contactor mix

- Option 4: NAVSEA “Nested” MAIT Model

## Splinter Session: Acquisition Strategy Splinter The Plaza Room

- Session objectives: this team will identify key aspects of the acquisition strategy NASA should pursue to implement the End State Option(s).  These aspects should include, at a minimum:
- Recommended contract and solicitation type;
- Desirable industry partnering/teaming arrangements;
- Contractor hardware exclusions (full, partial, none), and specific features or such exclusions (the more detail here the better!);
- Arrangements for SoSE&I organization/contractor handling of Exploration system/element hardware prime contractor proprietary/sensitive data;
- Design of incentives.
- Transition strategy.
- Session leadership:
- Dale Thomas (facilitator)
- Louise Hamlin (recorder)

## Acquisition Strategies: Option 1

**Q: Teaming Arrangements**
- SETA A:  Flexibility to Sub based on needs , Teaming with GWT LABs
- PoP A:  Standard Gov’t procurement ACAs
**Q: Contractor HW exclusions **
- SETA A:  100% HW exclusion or Firewall SOSI Div.
- PoP A:  do pre-decisional analysis prior to HW award
**Q: Arrangements for proprietary/sensitive data**
- A: No unusual concerns, standard model
- PoP gets no special position post-decisional
**Q: Design of incentives**
- SETA A: Shared-savings
- PoP A: Incentive fee
**Q: Transition strategy**
- SETA A: Could do today
- PopA: Could work as near-term and end state option

**Q: Contract Solicitation**
- SETA A: Cost+ fee
- PoP A: Cost+ fee, separate integration contract

## Acquisition Strategies: Option 2

**Q: Contract Solicitation**
- A: Cost+ (fixed fee) or incentive
- Length of contract: 5-10yr for base period
**Q: Teaming Arrangements**
- A: Suggest no restrictions, could take advantage of specific skills of everyone, effective partnering will mitigate conflict & COI
**Q: Contractor HW exclusions **
- A: Partial, bidding of team at least 2 levels lower (no Prime)
- Firewalls for external credibility, COI
**Q: Arrangements for proprietary/sensitive data**
- A: Protect data b/t Primes, 100% access to Prime data
- Export-controlled (intn’l) non-disciminator
**Q: Design of incentives**
- A: Long term contract is incentive, prestige of program also
**Q: Transition strategy**
- A: Could implement immediately, evolution and stability are prime issues, Legislation to allow exclusion from FAR SOO, flexible long-term acquisition

## Q: Contract Solicitation
A: Team Selection, not competition

Q: Teaming Arrangements
A: Not applicable

Q: Contractor HW exclusions 
A: 100% exclusion

Q: Arrangements for proprietary/sensitive data
A:N/A – Quasi-Gov’t
Export-controlled (intn’l) non-disciminator

Q: Design of incentives
A: No contractual fee
Performance-based bonus

Q: Transition strategy
A: Post-Spiral 1 SRR to End State, start-state dependent, 
Transition team (CEV, SE&I Core)
Transfer CSs to SE&I Team

- A: Team Selection, not competition
**Q: Teaming Arrangements**
- A: Not applicable
**Q: Contractor HW exclusions **
- A: 100% exclusion
**Q: Arrangements for proprietary/sensitive data**
- A:N/A – Quasi-Gov’t
- Export-controlled (intn’l) non-disciminator
**Q: Design of incentives**
- A: No contractual fee
- Performance-based bonus
**Q: Transition strategy**
- A: Post-Spiral 1 SRR to End State, start-state dependent,
- Transition team (CEV, SE&I Core)
- Transfer CSs to SE&I Team

**“****One Client” Service Organization**

- Acquisition Strategies: Option 3

## Q: Contract Solicitation
A:  Cost+ award fee, full-and-open competition
Linkage to prime contracts for integration tasks, products, 5 yr + options, covers all spirals

Q: Teaming Arrangements
A:  not a sig. factor – neither precluded or req’d 
Another view: Boeing, LM, NG = directed subs

Q: Contractor HW exclusions 
A:  100% 

Q: Arrangements for proprietary/sensitive data
A:  Gov’t purpose data only, not prop. data from Day 1

Q: Design of incentives
A:  Fee structure must incentive SoS-level performance (e.g. 1% in all contracts for major MSs)

Q: Transition strategy
A:  No issues, this structure should enable a smooth transition

- Acquisition Strategies: Option 4

**Q: Contract Solicitation**
- A:  Cost+ award fee, full-and-open competition
- Linkage to prime contracts for integration tasks, products, 5 yr + options, covers all spirals
**Q: Teaming Arrangements**
- A:  not a sig. factor – neither precluded or req’d
- Another view: Boeing, LM, NG = directed subs
**Q: Contractor HW exclusions **
- A:  100%
**Q: Arrangements for proprietary/sensitive data**
- A:  Gov’t purpose data only, not prop. data from Day 1
**Q: Design of incentives**
- A:  Fee structure must incentive SoS-level performance (e.g. 1% in all contracts for major MSs)
**Q: Transition strategy**
- A:  No issues, this structure should enable a smooth transition

## Policy OutbriefNASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Benchmarking Workshop:  End State Options and Acquisition Strategies for the NASA Exploration System of Systems IntegratorBetsy Park, FacilitatorDecember 16, 2004

## Session Charter:  Policy

- Session objectives: this team will identify policy, regulatory, and statutory issues associated with the target End State Option(s) identified during the orientation.
- What are the obstacles that lie in the path to standing up the End State organization?
- What new authorities, if any, will NASA require in order to establish the End State SoSE&I organization?  The more specific, the better!
- Are there other organizations that have executed a similar transition, or which have obtained and implemented such policies/authorities?  What successes and problems were encountered?

## Brainstorming Items:  Creating a New Organization

- Creating an FFRDC requires
- Congressional buy-in; this can be difficult to get.
- Unique purpose, not presently available in industry
- Alternative options:
- Similar to a public utility:  For profit but regulated
- Not-for-profit organization (e.g., original MITRE)
- Danger of “going native”
- UARC (University Affiliated Research Center)
- Joint Sponsored Research Agreement
- A contract, but exempted from FAR provisions, falls under Space Act
- Justification required
- Not clear that this is applicable
- Creating an Institute (e.g., National Aerospace Institute at LaRC)

## Policy Issues to be Explored

- Easing Civil Service rules for NASA personnel to facilitate mobility
- Use incentives that are permissible, e.g., relocation
- Look at statutory restrictions—see what else is possible
- Non-traditional use of IPA’s to bring civil servants into a new organization
- Consider personnel ceilings—can you backfill people who leave a Center?
- Consider “governance:”
- Must understand organizational constraints of workforce outside of NASA, e.g., other agencies, internationals, FFRDC’s, industry
- Reach mutual understanding on operating principles
- ITAR
- Intellectual property
- Defining and enforcing common standards (international)
- Multi-year funding authority
- Establishing regulatory policies for commercial participation

## Policy Issues to be Explored, continued

- Environmental protection (including planetary protection)
- Division of labor between NASA and the SOSI
- Other organizations for benchmarking:
- Look at NPOESS—tri-agency steering group