# Presentation: 476699

## Angling Management Organizations:  An Option for Cooperative, Rights-Based Management of Recreational Fisheries

**Robert J. Johnston**
**Agricultural and Resource Economics**
**University of Connecticut**
**Jon G. Sutinen**
**Environmental and Natural Resource Economics**
**University of Rhode Island**

*2005 Economics & Social Research Brown Bag Series.  *
*National Marine Fisheries Service.  *
*Silver Spring, MD.  April 21.  *

## Why revisit recreational fisheries management?  (What is wrong with the status quo?)

- In many recreational fisheries:
- Trends in the wrong direction—decreasing bag limits,  shorter seasons, increasing minimum sizes, etc.
- Weak control of recreational harvest, combined with incidental and commercial harvest, threatens sustainability.
- Management often occurs over broad geographical regions; interests of anglers may be heterogeneous within these regions.

## Why revisit recreational fisheries management?  (What is wrong with the status quo?)

- In many recreational fisheries:
- Regulations do not serve all anglers equally well.
- Compliance with fishery regulations can be weak—particularly if anglers have little input in management.
- Quotas difficult to track.  Harvests may exceed “soft” TACs.
- Recreational sector under increasing pressure given increasing rights-based commercial management.
- New ideas for managing recreational fisheries could reduce recreational/commercial conflicts.

## Example:  Gulf of Mexico Red SnapperHarvest and Quota

- Example:  Gulf of Mexico Red SnapperHarvest and Quota

## Example:  Gulf of Mexico Red SnapperDays Open

- Example:  Gulf of Mexico Red SnapperDays Open

## Example:  Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper

- Species overfished and subject to overfishing.
- Conflict between recreational sector, commercial sector, incidental harvest.
- Recreational management does not serve Eastern (FL, AL) and Western Gulf (TX) regions equally well.
- IFQs proposed for commercial sector.
- Recent emphasis on MRFSS data concerns may obscur more fundamental problems.
- Is there a good solution?

## Promising trends elsewhere...

- Rights-based management highly successful in many commercial fisheries.
- Co-management can increase voluntary compliance, decrease enforcement costs, and increase angler satisfaction.
- Community-based management experiments (e.g., the Pollock Conservation Cooperative) have met with success in commercial fisheries.

## Angling Management Organizations (AMOs)

- Novel approach to reduce conflicts and improve sustainability and value of recreational fisheries.
- Combines three promising trends in fishery management:
- Devolution of management
- Strengthened harvest rights
- Co-management
- First proposed in Sutinen and Johnston, *Marine Policy* 27 (2003).

## Angling Management Organizations (AMOs)

- Conceived as a large, locally organized group of recreational anglers who would jointly manage a recreational fishery in a specific area.
- Established in coordination with regional Fishery Management Councils.
- Provide anglers the ability to cooperatively manage their own fisheries, within limits set by regulators.

## More Specifically, AMOs Would Be...

- Private sector entities
- Comprised of recreational fishermen and others who elect a governing board
- Assigned a fixed share of the recreational quota
- Given responsibility to manage quota share
- Region and species specific
- Subject to oversight by fishery managers

## How Would AMOs Function?

- Most management authority would be provisionally granted to AMOs.
- AMOs given renewable right to a portion of TAC.
- Governing board chooses management mechanisms best suited to regional anglers, subject to compliance with TAC.
- Open / Closed Seasons
- Required “Fish Stamps/Tags”
- Other Input / Output Controls

## How Would AMOs Function?

- AMOs would ideally be self-financing.  Mechanisms might include:
- Sale of required fishing “tags” or “stamps”.
- License sales.
- Tournaments.
- Auctioning of fishing or charter rights.
- Membership fees.
- However, AMOs would be required to provide equal access to fishery participation (fees or restrictions could not be used to disenfranchise certain groups).

## How Would AMOs Function?

- AMOs could be region specific—to respond to heterogeneous attributes of anglers in different regions (e.g. Eastern vs. Western Gulf Red Snapper)
- Initially, AMO shares would be distributed through an equitable process to current anglers.  Once established, any person could become a shareholder by purchasing shares from existing shareholders.
- TAC granted to an AMO would be renewed each year, as long as AMO followed established rules.

## How Would AMOs Function?

- An AMO violating rules (repeatedly exceeding TAC, failing to provide equal access) could have charter revoked or TAC reduced/revoked.
- If stock grows or recovers, AMOs might be rewarded with a greater TAC.
- Provides incentives for stewardship.
- Anglers would establish their own rules—strengthening voluntary compliance.

## Expected Outcomes

- Management authority shared with anglers.
- Strengthen resource stewardship.
- Management better suited to needs of regional stakeholders.
- Reduce enforcement & monitoring costs.
- Alleviate management conflicts.
- Greater long-term economic benefits.

## Coordination Details

- Many details of AMO/Council coordination and activities would have to be agreed upon prior to establishing AMOs.
- Cooperative process between Councils, angler representatives, other stakeholders.
- AMO concept provides a simple and compelling framework.
- Many challenging questions and issues remain.

## Questions / Issues

- How would scientific research and data collection be funded and coordinated between AMOs and Councils?
- What if AMOs unable to raise sufficient funds for required management activities?
- Potentially high set-up and initial transactions costs.
- How would enforcement activities be coordinated between AMOs and Councils?  What authority might be provided to AMOs to allow enforcement?

## Questions / Issues

- Should AMOs have authority over larger or smaller geographical regions? (Perhaps start larger, and allow AMOs to subdivide if desired?)
- How to avoid simply adding “another layer of bureaucracy” to fishery management?  Councils would have to give up provisional authority.
- Do recreational anglers really *want* to exercise management control over their own fisheries?

## Conclusions

- AMOs offer one idea for introducing rights-based, region specific, co-management to recreational fisheries.
- Practical application of such ideas requires the answering of many difficult questions.
- But, current trends suggest clear costs/risks of maintaining the management status quo.
- If not AMOs—what?