# Presentation: 540954

## Control Systems Security Educationfor the Federal Information Systems Security Professional

**Why are they of concern:**
**Generally?**
**To me as a Educator?**
**How can we help our agencies in this arena?**

**Control Systems Security Education**for the Federal Information Systems Security Professional

- The views expressed herein are personal ones and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, The Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

- Dr. John Saunders
- National Defense University

**Notes:**
Tired of the rhetoric about. 
Q: What can YOU as a government employee do about Critical Infrastructure Protection, or Critical Information Infrastructure Protection this? 
A: The basic answer is nothing. Because:
Q: Who owns the Critical Infrastructure?
A: The private sector: Utility companies, large transportation companies, large telecomm providers, Banks, health care providers, etc
Q: Is there anything I can do?
A: You can pay attention to the protection of your own infrastructure
Q What is your infrastructure?
A: Often that infrastructure is land and buildings in campus like environments with its own streets, utilities, and communications infrastructure. Essential to the smooth operation of these services are Control Systems

DCS Security now largely under the radar. Significance will surface in 5-10 years as older technology is swapped out.

## Slide 2

## Simplified Control System (CS)

- Courtesy NIST Manufacturing Engineering Lab, Intelligent Systems

- - Control System
- - Sensors, Switches
-  Valves, Pumps, Transformers
-  Resource

- 1

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 1

- 2

- 3

- 4

- _Control System _– brains of a electronic and/or electro-mechanical system with sensors used to monitor & change levels or direct: air, water/fluid, electricity, traffic, fuel, etc.

**Notes:**
PLC
RTU
OPC
Modbus

This is from an exhibit at NIST, but portrays well the interconnected components in a system like this. These systems use slower bandwidth, e.g. 9600 bps, tentacles for data collection, “real time” sampling, firmware types of logic circuits, and electromechanical connections to effect valves, gates, throw switches, etc.

Control system are ften thought as that equipment used soley by large utilities, e.g. power, gas, water. In fact these systems exist in every modern building. The larger and newer the building and or building complex, the greater the liklihood that one of these systems is resident..

## U.S. Government Facility

- Other frequently used terms for this arena include **Distributed Control Systems** or **Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)**

- SOURCE: Vendor Site

- What is a CS?

**Notes:**
First I don’t mean to be a fear monger. Compared to your computer networks the number of incidents of malfeasance of control systems is miniscule. Also Safety is a built in feature in these systems. On the other hand the consequences of failure in this area are more serious. Some of the better publicized past incidents include:
Siberia, Russia, Summer 1982. The most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space occurred after the control system of a natural gas pipeline was modified to “reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable for pipeline joints and welds.” SOURCE: Thomas Reed former secretary of the Air Force in At the Abyss: An Insiders History of the Cold War, March 2004.
Salt River, Arizona, 1994. A 27 year old successfully gained access to control systems for the Roosevelt Dam flood gate. 
Bellingham Washington, June 1999. Three people died and eight were seriously injured after a gasoline pipeline burst. Malfunctions in the SCADA system prevented operators from noticing the problem until 237,000 gallons had leaked.
San Diego, CA, Nov 1999 Navy AN/SPS 49 Radar operating off the coast jammed the wireless system used to control natural gas valves of the San Diego gas & Electric, and the San Diego County Water Authority
Queensland Australia April 2000. A disgruntled employee successfully cracked into a sewage treatment SCADA system and released hundreds of thousand of gallons of raw sewage into parks, rivers and onto a Hyatt Regency’s grounds
Oak Harbor, Ohio August 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed that in January 2003, the Microsoft SQL Server worm—otherwise known as Slammer—infected a private computer network at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a safety monitoring system for nearly 5 hours. In addition, the plant’s process computer failed, and it took about 6 hours for it to become available again. Slammer reportedly also affected communications on the control networks of other electricity sector organizations by propagating so quickly that control system traffic was blocked. 

## Local Infrastructure possibly using CSs

- Electrical distribution, & UPS
- Natural gas distribution
- Fuel Oil storage & flow
- Water storage & flow
- Lighting
- Heating, cooling, ventilation

- Fire alarms & suppression
- Elevators & escalators
- Gates & doors, alarms
- Video security cameras
- Traffic signals
- Process Line Control

- What is a CS?

## Who Controls the Controls?

- What is a CS?

**Who educates the controllers? especially about security?**

**& Contractors?**

**Notes:**
Which group do you educate?

## The Cultures

- Focus
- Safety
- 100% Availability
- Electro-mechanical
- No updating, Aged equipment
- The Language
- RTUs, PLCs, IEDs
-  DNP, Modbus
-  Low Bandwidth
-  Analog & Digital
- The Vendors
- Allen Bradley(AB)/Rockwell, Honeywell, Siemens, Johnson Controls

- Focus
- Security
- 99.5% Availability
- Electronic
- Continuous Updating, New
- The Language
- Routers, Switches, Servers
-  IP, Ethernet
-  High Bandwidth
-  All Digital
- The Vendors
- IBM, Microsoft, CISCO, Dell

**Physical Plant**

**Network Operations**

- What are the concerns?

## So what? ...the Changing Landscape

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
This is one vendor’s web site advertisement for their product. These “open architecture” approaches may be found in every other manufacturer’s products as well.

## The Changing Landscape

**Remote connectivity/control of CS devices**
**Standardization of CS Protocols **
**Connection of CS & Business LANs**
**“****Windowing” of CS & SCADA Control**

- IP

- 1.

- 3.

- 2.

- 4.

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
Many of these are moving toward not being “trends” but rather the way systems are delivered “out of the box.”

The saving grace security wise for most of these systems has been 1. Vendor specific / proprietary protocols and 2. The Large # of distributed and un-connected systems. But this is changing. Many of the older systems lack even the most basic security measures such as passwords and messages sent in the clear.

“Based on my experience, there are only two sources of control system (SCADA, RTU, IED, DCS, and PLC) vulnerabilities.  Both are informal.  The first is Eric Byers' database at the British Columbia Institute of Technology which covers predominantly the process control industry.  The other is a database I started while at EPRI and is the most comprehensive one for electric power.  Our databases contain more than 30 cases of electronic impacts on control systems.  The vast majority are unintentional.” Joe Weiss, Kema Consulting

Most of these issues, while applied here on a “local “ level also apply to larger critical infrastructure systems. For example A regional power distribution company such as Consolidated Edison is attempting to improve the flow of power throughout the region it serves and therefore is adopting the use of digital control systems to assist in this tasking.

- SOURCE: GAO Report 04-140T Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing Control Systems. October 2003.

- What are the concerns?

**REMOTE**
**ACCESS**

## Access Airport Lighting ControlsFrom your PDA

- Access Airport Lighting ControlsFrom your PDA

- SOURCE: Vendor’s web site

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
Found on the web – Vendors pride themselves on the capability that they can supply to their customers. The issues here are self evident. Turn off the lighting, jump the fence & climb aboard the aircraft

## Facility Electrical Grid Accessvia your cell phone

- Facility Electrical Grid Accessvia your cell phone

- SOURCE: Vendor’s web site

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
How long would it take somebody to figure out that this was a hacker & not some other problem that may seem to be taking place, especially if well timed or random – enough to affect production, or perhaps to get some negative press about the unreliable nature of this production line

## Natural Gas Well Accessvia your browser

- SOURCE: Vendor’s web site

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
How easy would it be to close off a valve, rig switches to read normal pressure & as a result blow up and entire natural gas feed line.

## Cost Justification

- WAYNE, Pa., Oct. 24, 2002 -- Energy information systems and wind-powered generation will emerge as the two most critical energy technologies in the next five years, according to a majority of energy entrepreneurs and investors surveyed at the EnerTech Forum in Phoenix last week. Scott Ungerer, Managing Director of EnerTech Capital, said respondents believed energy information systems, which allow companies to better manage their energy use, would continue to grow, particularly given the current economic climate. "With corporate America's increased focus on the bottom line, monitoring and managing energy use is receiving more attention than ever by corporate users." On the telecommunications front, respondents predicted the following communications technologies would be in widespread use in the next five years: broadband wireless (named by 68 percent) and optical networks (named by 51 percent). When asked why utilities have been so slow to adopt energy management solutions like sophisticated monitoring, data collection, and equipment control and dispatch, 49 percent said the economics of the technology is not yet compelling enough for utilities. The same percentage predicted that the energy management market sector would remain fragmented for many years, with no clear and pronounced trend.

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
SCADA ScareSupervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to manage the flow of the nation’s electricity.

Misperceptions
 SCADA systems reside on physically separate networks.
  Connections between SCADA systems and other corporate networks are protected by strong access controls.
  SCADA systems require specialized knowledge, making them difficult for network intruders to access and control.
Vulnerabilities  
The information on SCADA systems is publically available.
  Domain name servers permit “zone transfers,” revealing IP addresses and server names.
  Maintenance dial-ups often fail to implement access policies.
  There’s no internal firewall or intrusion-detection system in use.
Source: Riptech Inc., Alexandria, Va. Jan 2002

Vulnerability Assessment Triggers AlarmsBy DAN VERTON JANUARY 21, 2002Computerworld
Data collected on cyberattacks during the past six months by a security firm that monitors corporate networks throughout the world shows that companies in the energy industry suffer attacks at twice the rate of other industries. And many of those attacks appear to be sponsored by governments or organizations in the Middle East. A recent threat assessment conducted by security firm Riptech studied more than 5.5 billion firewall logs and intrusion-detection system alerts. Of the approximately 129,000 validated cyberattacks uncovered, power and energy companies averaged 12.5 severe or critical attacks requiring immediate intervention per company. That rate is more than twice the average rate of attacks for all 300 companies surveyed, according to Tim Belcher, Riptech's CTO. 
In addition, Belcher said he has uncovered evidence that the average number of attacks originating from the Middle East is nearly twice as high per utility company as for companies in the high-tech, media and financial services industries. 
"For the first time, this provides empirical evidence that critical infrastructures do have profiles of attacks that appear to be sponsored by governments or other organizations in what we would consider to be threat countries," said Belcher. 
Belcher's statements come on the heels of an internal law-enforcement warning issued Jan. 16 by the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center about potential Internet-based attacks targeting utilities and municipal and state government information systems. 

Utility Companies Face Barrage of CyberattacksOutsourcing program offers a potential means of developing better tactical defenses By DAN VERTON JANUARY 21, 2002
Many of the nation's utility companies are finding it increasingly difficult to keep up with the number of cybersecurity incidents involving their control systems. Determining what to do about that problem was a key topic addressed at a utilities conference last week in New Orleans. The conference, sponsored by the American Gas Association (AGA) and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), included a panel of experts who discussed the security challenges utility companies face as they deploy greater numbers of commercial IT systems throughout what is arguably one of the most critical sectors of the U.S. infrastructure. 
Information Overload 
Companies that belong to the AGA or the EEI, both of which are based in Washington, account for all of the natural gas used by businesses in every state and 75% of all the electricity generated in the U.S. 
A large utility "could have a million [intrusion] events that need to be analyzed," said Will Evans, vice president of IT services at People's Energy Corp., a Chicago-based AGA member company that serves about 1 million customers in Chicago and northeastern Illinois. "I don't think anybody has the capability to do that in-house. It's practically impossible." 
According to Alexandria, Va.-based security firm Riptech Inc., the large number of intrusions is particularly disturbing given the nature of the nation's Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are used to manage the flow of electricity. 
In a white paper prepared by Riptech in January 2001, the company detailed how the power industry's demand for remote access has encouraged many utility firms to establish connections to SCADA systems. In addition, some utilities have added connections between corporate networks and SCADA networks in order to allow executives to obtain instant access to data about the status of their operational systems, according to Riptech. 
"The security strategy for utility corporate network infrastructures rarely accounts for the fact that access to these systems might allow unauthorized access and control of SCADA systems," the white paper concluded. 
Outsourcing Option 
To address the problem, Riptech developed a four-pronged outsourcing program. 
The company announced last week that it will offer preferential pricing treatment to all AGA and EEI member companies that require round-the-clock network monitoring, security assessments focused on the unique industrial control systems used by the industry, and secure architecture design, in addition to a secure gateway through which utilities can feed tactical intrusion information into the energy sector's Information Sharing and Analysis Center. 
The services are based on requirements spelled out by a council of utility company CIOs, said Tim Belcher, Riptech's chief technology officer. 
Evans characterized the program, particularly the secure tactical information sharing effort, as an important step for the utility industry. Executives from the AGA and EEI have been evaluating vendors for such services since before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, which highlighted the vulnerability and importance of the nation's critical infrastructure, Evans said. 
Joe Weiss, technical manager of the Enterprise Infrastructure Security Program at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, Calif., said he's encouraged by the Riptech offer. But he added that he remains concerned that the industrial sector as a whole hasn't yet addressed the fundamental cybersecurity challenges stemming from its use of legacy control systems. 
"Firewalls and intrusion-detection systems have been designed to protect against known IT exploits," said Weiss. "That has nothing to do with industrial control systems." 

## Operational Security

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
These are photos taken in public buildings around the DC area. They show open and unattended infrastructure closets. Contained in these closets are the keys They highlight an issue with plant/building engineering. The instruction sheet found with the cable system states “Information below is for qualified installation personnel only.” It explains how to 

“Information Below is for Qualified Installation Personnel Only.” Yet it was posted plainly on a wall for all to digest

Although physical plant/building engineers do not ignore security, their concern tends to be more on safety. 

Most problems in DCS come from inadvertent errors, 2nd from insiders, 3rd from outsiders

These are photos that I took in public buildings of wiring closets where no one was around. The top cable access system had a booklet labeled “Information below is for qualified installation personnel only.”

## Operational SecurityPartial List – Online Federal Government Installation DCS Network descriptions 

- SOURCE: Vendor’s web site

- What are the concerns?

**Notes:**
Here is another page from the web identifying the SCADA architectures and other juicy detail about where on the facilities the equipment is being used

## As Educators what can we do?

- Raise Awareness
- Of your building engineers in Computer Networks
- Of your IT security engineers in Building Engineering
- Encourage Inventory, Audit, Assessment of CS
- Encourage application of easy, yet high payoff, countermeasures
- Publicize the DOE 21 steps
- Follow along with Process Control Security Requirements Forum & ISA’s SP99 progress
- Learn the terminology

- What can we do?

## Raise AwarenessImprove Understanding & Connections between Computer/IT & Building  Engineers

**IT Security Worker**
- Electronic
- Equipment settings
- Switch settings
- Access Control
- Computer Programming & Data
- Creation
- Execution
- Storage

**Building/Campus Engineer**
- Supply & Discharge
- Electricity
- Water
- Fuel
- Circuit Settings
- Valve Settings
- Electro-Mechanical Equipment
- Physical Plant Safety

**Educate**

- What can we do?

**Notes:**
Turf battles
Very different backgrounds, education
Resistance

Building engineering
	long term employee
	resistant to change
	trade schools
	hourly 
Computer engineering
	short term employee
	4 year degree
	salary

What is the knowledge level of IT workers about circuits, valves, mechanical equipment?
What is the knowledge level of Building Engineers about 

## Education Opportunities

- SANDIA National Labs
- Assessment of SCADA systems; 2.5 days
- Best Practices for SCADA Security & Design; 2 days http://www.sandia.gov/scada/training_courses.htm
- NIST IEL Lab, Gaithersburg
- Instrumentation Systems & Automation Society (ISA)
- IC32C - Cyber Security for Automation, Control, and SCADA Systems
- _[http://www.isa.org](http://www.isa.org/)_
- AIChE
- Cybersecurity for Process Control Systems in Chemical Plants and Refineries
- _[http://www.aiche.org/education/cecrsdtl.asp?Number=553](http://www.aiche.org/education/cecrsdtl.asp?Number=553)_
- KEMA
- Annual SCADA Cyber Security Conference
- _[http://www.](http://www.kemaseminars.com/)__[kemaseminars](http://www.kemaseminars.com/)__[.com](http://www.kemaseminars.com/)_/
- Infosec Institute
- SCADA Security: Protecting our Homeland Security
- _[http://www.infosecinstitute.com/courses/scada_security_training.html](http://www.infosecinstitute.com/courses/scada_security_training.html)_

## Encourage CS Inventory, Audit, & Vulnerability Assessment

| System | CS Vendor | Operational Software / Firmware & Versions / Dates | Communications Protocols & Versions | Connection(s) | Contact |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Campus Security Cameras | APC Cam System  | Control Workstation W2K SP 2.3 | SNMPv 2.0; IPv4 | Ethernet / IP 
122.23.34.1-5; 122.23.35.1-5; 122.22.6.1-10 | Mary O’Connor
(301) 555-3276 |
| Campus Electric Power | Schneider PowerLogic |  | Modbus | Remote Dial-in
(301) 555-2525 | Harry McDuff
(301) 555-3244 |
| Bldg 12 Elevator Bank | Allen-Bradley (Rockwell)  |  |  | none | Bldg Ops
(301) 555-2300 |
| Campus Water Tower A |  |  |  | Wireless RM9600Meets ETS 300 220-3  400 - 470MHz operating frequency 25KHz channel spacing16Kbaud over air | Harry McGullicuty
(202) 555-2304 |
| Bldg B
HVAC | Honeywell Excel 500 Controller | LonWorks | FT 3120 and FT 3150 Free Topology Smart Transceivers; EIA-709.1  | Ethernet / IP
122.22.16.11 | Joe Horvath
(301) 555-1244 |
| Bldg 4-6 HVAC | 
Honeywell EXCEL 5000®  |  |  | RAS Dial-in
(301)555-2536 | Joe Horvath
(301) 555-1244 |
| Bldg 12 Fire Alarm | Allen Bradley  | RSLinxTM OPC Data Access 2.0 | DH-485; IPv4 | RSLinx Gateway to 122.22.16.64
 | Mary O’Connor
(301) 555-3276 |
| Bldg 5 Fire Suppression System | Johnson Controls Metasys ® Intelligent Fire Network
410-584-1160 |  | Modbus | HADAX Serial Communications controller; 12 RTUs | Mary O’Connor
(301) 555-3276
 |

- What can we do?

**Notes:**
May Use a Protocol Analyzer to analyze the processing, similar to a sniffer in a computer network

## Assessment Methodologies

- Sandia National Labs
- RAM-T;RAM-D;RAM-W
- http://www.sandia.gov/media/NewsRel/NR2001/ramdramt.htm
- ISS X-Force
- http://documents.iss.net/whitepapers/SCADA.pdf
- Asset Based Vulnerability Checklist for Waste Water Utilities, AMSA, 2002.
- http://www.vsatusers.net/pubs.html
- FERC Cyber Security Guidelines
- http://www.nerc.com/~filez/cipfiles.html
- Energy Infrastructure Vulnerability Survey Checklists. Office of Energy Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy
- http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/assessment_methods/VS_Checklist_Attachment.pdf
- http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/assessment_methods/Risk_Management_Checklist_Small_Facilities.pdf

## Promote High Profile CS Protection Measures

- Authentication - 2 factor preferred
- Tokens
- Dial Back
- Telephony Firewalls (see securelogix.com)
- Operations Security
- Physical Security
- Failure Mode
- Redundancy – dual, triple
- Disconnect with
- Ability to Bypass / Backup / Manually Operate
- Penetration Testing

- What can we do?

**Notes:**
Tokens, Dial back, encryption (?)

## 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks

- Identify all connections to SCADA networks.
- Disconnect unnecessary connections to the SCADA network.
- Evaluate and strengthen the security of any remaining connections to the SCADA network.
- Harden SCADA networks by removing or disabling unnecessary services.
- Do not rely on proprietary protocols to protect your system.
- Implement the security features provided by device and system vendors.
- Establish strong controls over any medium that is used as a backdoor into the SCADA network.
- Implement internal and external intrusion detection systems and establish 24-hour-a-day incident monitoring.
- Perform technical audits of SCADA devices and networks, and any other connected networks, to identify security concerns.
- Conduct physical security surveys and assess all remote sites connected to the SCADA network to evaluate their security.
- Establish SCADA “Red Teams” to identify and evaluate possible attack scenarios.
- Clearly define cyber security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for managers, system administrators, and users.
- Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical functions or contain sensitive information that require additional levels of protection.
- Establish a rigorous, ongoing risk management process.
- Establish a network protection strategy based on the principle of defense-in-depth.
- Clearly identify cyber security requirements.
- Establish effective configuration management processes.
- Conduct routine self-assessments.
- Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans.
- Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber security performance and hold individuals accountable for their performance.
- Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that organizational personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive information regarding SCADA system design, operations, or security controls.

- SOURCE: Office of Energy Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy.

- What can we do?

**Notes:**
These suggestions are excellent. But it is one thing to suggest a measure, it is another to implement it. Any one of these suggestions could cost an infrastructure organization hundreds of thousands of dollars. Which are the more important? Which provide the greatest bang for the buck? Which require more time to implement? Which do you do first? How often should these be redone?

What should our priority be? How effective will this be toward reducing the gap between where we are and where we “should be?”

## CS/SCADA Security Guidance

- Security Standards Efforts
- ISA’s SP99 Committee
- _[http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Site=SP99,_Manufacturing_and_Control_Systems_Security1](http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?Site=SP99,_Manufacturing_and_Control_Systems_Security1)_
- NIST’s Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF) & IEL Lab
- _[http://www.](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[isd](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[.](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[mel](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[.](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[nist](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[.](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[gov](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[/projects/](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[processcontrol](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)__[/](http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/projects/processcontrol/)_
- SCADA Security Test Beds
- Sandia http://www.sandia.gov/
- INEEL _[http://www.](http://www.inel.gov/)__[inel](http://www.inel.gov/)__[.](http://www.inel.gov/)__[gov](http://www.inel.gov/)_
- Industry Specific Guidance NERC, EPRI, AGA, CIDX
- Matthew Franz’s links: _[http://scadasec.net/](http://scadasec.net/)_
- _Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing Control Systems_. GAO Report 04-140T. October 2003.
- _IT Security for Industrial Control Systems_** **Joe Falco, Keith Stouffer, Albert Wavering, Frederick Proctor, NIST. 2003.
- Other Documents/Guidance from Sandia 	http://www.sandia.gov/scada/documents.htm

## Quiz Answers

- Programmable Logic Controller
- Terminal or Telemetry
- d. Treasury Building, 15th & Penn Ave
- a. Army
- c. Three
- d. All the Above
- c. Protocol Analyzer
- d. All the above
- b. PCSRF
- T, True

## Naval Sub Base, Kings Bay

**Utility Plant Remote Operation and Boiler Fuel**
**Conversion - **In 1997, SUBASE began installing a
- Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
- system for remote monitoring and operation of
- utility plant equipment. In conjunction with this,
**three of four central thermal plant boilers were**
**converted from coal to fuel oil and natural gas**
- (the fourth is currently being converted). The use of
- SCADA and fuel conversion have resulted in a net
- savings of $400,000 per year. Also as a result,
- nitrogen oxide emissions have been reduced by 74
- percent, particulate matter by 82 percent, and carbon
- monoxide by 85 percent.

- SOURCE: http://web.dandp.com/enviroweb/asn/awards/secnav/kings.pdf

## Structure of the Process Control Security Requirements Forum

- (NSA)

- National Institute for Standards and Technology
- (NIST)

- National Information Assurance Partnership
- (NIAP)

- Process Control Security Requirements Forum
- (PCSRF)

- Vendors

- Users

- Government