# Presentation: 172060

## Core Reqs. Overview

- October 15-17, 2007
- David Flater
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- dflater@nist.gov

**Notes:**
Every slide has a header image containing a NIST logo and the words “Improving U.S. Voting Systems – NIST activities supporting the Help America Vote Act.”  All title slides include an additional NIST logo at the bottom.

## Strategy for this presentation

- Overall organization
- Prerequisites
- Part 1 Chapters 6-8, in order
- Related sections of Parts 2 and 3 introduced where relevant
- Goals
- Explain what the VVSG says
- More detail on things that changed significantly, with impact
- Answer questions
- Non-goals (unless someone asks)
- Explain what the VVSG used to say
- Technical details

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## What is a “core” requirement?

- The distinction is an artifact of the subcommittee structure of the TGDC (STS, HFP, CRT)
- All requirements that are not within the scope of work of security or human factors specialists
- Functional requirements of the form “All voting systems shall be able to count votes”
- Reliability and accuracy
- Workmanship

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## Strategy for revising core reqs.

- Global changes apply to everything
- Reorganized the document
- Identified the requirements
- Clarified language and used terms consistently
- Requirement changes satisfy three criteria:
- There is a problem
- There is a solution
- The solution is an improvement

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## Strategy for revising core reqs.

- Clarifications
- Reworded requirements that confused reviewers
- Where significant dialogue was needed to establish that certain requirements made sense, that dialogue is included as informative text
- Miscellaneous mandates
- Removed guidance for punchcard technology
- Process model
- Public Information Package

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## Big changes

- Defined voting variations
- Reliability and accuracy
- Benchmarks
- Test method
- Software workmanship
- Fewer prescribed programming rules
- Greater emphasis on integrity
- Electromagnetic compatibility
- Quality assurance and configuration management
- Test methods and related
- Logic verification
- Volume test
- Certain ground rules tightened

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## Small but important changes

- Clarified reporting requirements
- Optical scanning accuracy
- Defined categories of marks
- Support for early voting
- COTS-related definitions
- Operating test for humidity

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## Changes by STS

- POC:  John Wack
- Integratability and data export/interchange (a.k.a. common data formats, interoperability)
- Issuance of voting credentials and ballot activation (a.k.a. e-pollbooks)

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## Prerequisites

- Terms
- Voting system and voting device classes

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## System and device

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- Voting system

- Voting devices

- Documentation

**Notes:**
“Voting system” is illustrated as a big circle surrounding three DREs, an EMS, a central count optical scanner, a bar code reader, a ballot box, and some documentation.  “Voting device” is illustrated with arrows pointing to the constituent devices.  Additional clip-art representing people and processes is outside of the big circle.

##  Meaning in requirements

- “Voting systems SHALL...”
- Means:  The system *as a whole* shall do this
- The specific devices involved may vary
- “Voting devices SHALL...”
- Means:  *Each* and *every* voting device shall do this, individually

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## Voting process

- People and processes are
- Outside the scope of a product standard
- Not included in the definition of voting *system*
- Not assessed by test labs except indirectly, “as specified by the manufacturer”
- Where the requirement on the system is to “play nice” with a certain process, the VVSG refers to the voting process, but does not constrain the process

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**Notes:**
The clip-art representing people and processes on page 10 is repeated.

## Classes

**Class:**  Identified set of voting systems or voting devices sharing a specified characteristic
- Diagrams in Part 1, Section 2.5.2
- Classes are used to narrow the scope of requirements (Applies-to:)

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## Classes

- Classes form a generalization/specialization hierarchy (more formally, a *lattice*)
- The part/whole relationship between systems and devices is separate and different

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**Notes:**
A black arrow illustrates the relationship between two different kinds of trees.  Another black arrow illustrates an analogous relationship between two different kinds of forests.  A thicker red arrow represents the separate and different relationship between the forests and the trees.

## Voting system class breakdown

*Voting system*
- Supported voting variations
- E.g., *Straight party voting*:  voting systems that support straight party voting
*IVVR*

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## Voting device class breakdown

*Voting device*
- Supported voting variations
- E.g., *Straight party voting device*:  voting devices that support straight party voting
- Commonly understood device categories
*DRE*, *Optical scanner*, etc.
- Generalizations
*Vote-capture device*, *Tabulator*, *Paper-based device*, etc.
- Other important concepts
*IVVR vote-capture device*, *Acc-VS, VVPAT*

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## Do not assume that classes are mutually exclusive

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- DRE

- Acc-VS

**Notes:**
Graphics show two separate classes, Acc-VS and DRE.

## Do not assume that classes are mutually exclusive

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- DRE

- Acc-VS

- Acc-VS ⋀ DRE

- Accessible voting stations that happen to be DREs, or DREs that are also accessible voting stations

**Notes:**
Acc-VS and DRE are now both connected to a mutual subclass, Acc-VS ⋀ DRE.

## Why it makes sense

- Certain requirements apply to DREs
- Certain requirements apply to accessible voting stations
- A device that is both must satisfy *both* sets of requirements
- Inheritance minimizes repetition

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## Extra slides

- Concept analysis by example
- Semantics of classes (Part 1 Section 2.5.4)

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## Quiz time

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- Tabulator

- Paper-based
- device

- Paper-based device ⋀ Tabulator

- Is the subclass Paper-based device ⋀ Tabulator
- any different from Optical scanner?

**Notes:**
The classes Paper-based device and Tabulator are both connected to a mutual subclass, Paper-based device ⋀ Tabulator.

## Quiz time

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- Tabulator

- Paper-based
- device

- Paper-based device ⋀ Tabulator

- Not at the moment...  But the equivalence could be temporary.

- Optical
- scanner

- Punchcard
- reader

**Notes:**
The graphics from the previous slide are repeated and new elements are added.  Paper-based device ⋀ Tabulator now has two subclasses, Optical scanner and Punchcard reader.  Punchcard reader is highlighted.

## Terms

- General:*  Vote-capture device*,* Tabulator*,* Programmed device*, ...
- Specific:  *DRE*, *EBM*, *PCOS*, *EMS*, ...
- These all have definitions in Appendix A

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## Terms

- Tabulator:  Programmed device that counts votes
- There is a whole set of requirements that applies to any device that counts votes
- No hair-splitting between counting vs. aggregating
- DREs are tabulators
- EMSs are tabulators

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## Terms

- VEBD = voter-editable ballot device
- All vote-capture devices that let you back up and change your votes without starting over
- An abstraction that has relevant requirements to be inherited by many subclasses
- Comes in audio (VEBD-A) and video (VEBD-V) flavors
- An Acc-VS (accessible voting station) must satisfy both VEBD-A and VEBD-V

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## Terms

- EBM = electronically-assisted ballot marker
- VEBD
- When finished, print filled-in paper ballot
- Radically different implementations:  DRE-style vs. vote-by-phone
- EBP = electronic ballot printer
- Special case of EBM
- Does not require you to feed in a blank ballot
- Activates whichever ballot style is needed
- When finished, print that on blank ballot stock

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## Flavors of optical scanner

- PCOS:  precinct-count optical scanner
- Low volume
- Interacts directly with voters
- Opportunity to reject ambiguous ballots
- CCOS:  central-count optical scanner
- High volume
- Operated by central election officials
- Ambiguous ballots must be arbitrated somehow
- A given optical scanner might be configurable to support both sets of requirements

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## Flavors of optical scanner

- MCOS:  MMPB-capable optical scanner
- MMPB = manually-marked paper ballots
- ECOS:  EMPB-capable optical scanner
- EMPB = EBM-marked paper ballot
- Differences
- MCOS required to handle the range of manual marks
- ECOS must be able to raise alarm if marginal marks or overvotes are detected (equipment malfunction)
- Likely every optical scanner will support both

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## Next VVSG TrainingChapter 6:  General Core Reqs.

- October 15-17, 2007
- David Flater
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- dflater@nist.gov

## Chapter 6:  General Core Reqs.

- 6.1  General Design Requirements
- 6.2  Voting Variations
- 6.3  Hardware and Software Performance
- 6.4  Workmanship
- 6.5  Archival[ness] Requirements
- 6.6  Integratability and Data Export/Interchange
- 6.7  Procedures required for correct system functioning

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## Let’s get this out of the way

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- 6.7  Procedures required for correct system functioning
- The requirements for voting systems are written assuming that these procedures will be followed.
- Follow instructions:  The voting system must be deployed, calibrated, and tested in accordance with the voting equipment user documentation provided by the manufacturer.

## 6.1  General Design Requirements

- General principles
- No obvious fraud
- Verifiable vote recording and tabulation
- Minimum devices included
- Misc. design requirements carried over
- Paper ballots
- Card holders
- Ballot boxes
- Activity indicator
- Operable in a polling place

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## 6.2  Voting Variations

- If the manufacturer claims that the voting *system* supports feature *X*, then it must contain *devices* that support feature *X*
- Requirements in later sections specify what *X* means at the device level

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## Voting variations

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  guy giving lecture.

## Counting logic

- All voting systems must support
- 1-of-M voting (vote for [not more than] one)
- Yes/no questions
- Classes for optional features
- N-of-M voting
- Cumulative voting
- Ranked order voting
- Straight party voting
- Cross-party endorsement

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## Ballot handling

- In-person voting
- Absentee voting
- Provisional/challenged ballots
- Review-required ballots

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## Other features

- Write-ins
- Ballot rotation
- Primary elections
- Closed primaries
- Open primaries
- Split precincts

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## A careful distinction 

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- MICKEY MOUSE (write-in) ... 275
- ... other write-ins ...

*Write-ins*

*Review-required ballots*

**Notes:**
Clip-art of an explosive device idiomatically indicates a potential pitfall for the reader.  The top half of the slide shows a DRE with a report of 275 write-in votes for Mickey Mouse.  The bottom half of the slide shows a central count optical scanner that has outstacked (separated) ballots containing write-ins.  Its report simply shows 300 write-ins not ascribed to any particular contest choice.

## Impact of changes (voting variations)

- This was purely a matter of defining things that were left unspecified in the old Guidelines
- Manufacturer claims of support for feature *X* now invoke specific requirements
- All of these features are optional in the Guidelines
- States may opt to require certain ones in an RFP
- Manufacturers have a choice
- Satisfy the requirements
- Modify the claim

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## 6.3  Hardware and Software Performance

- “Benchmarks”
- 6.3.1  Reliability
- 6.3.2  Accuracy
- 6.3.3  Misfeed rate
- Electromagnetic compatibility
- 6.3.4  Electromagnetic immunity
- 6.3.5  Electromagnetic emission limits
- 6.3.6  Dielectric withstand

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## Benchmark terms

- Reliability → _failure_ rate
- There is a precise (but complex) definition of failure designed more for arbitration than readability
- In plain language, failures are equipment breakdowns, including software crashes, such that continued use without service or replacement is worrisome to impossible
- Normal, routine occurrences like running out of paper are not considered failures
- Misfeeds of ballots into optical scanners are handled by a separate benchmark, so these are not included as failures

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  DRE displaying a standard warning icon and bursting into flames.

## Another careful distinction 

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- _Failure_ as used for reliability benchmarking versus “failing” a conformance test or generic “failure” to meet expectations
- A system can “fail” a test even if there is no operational _failure_
- Operation completed without _failure_ but did the wrong thing
- Part 3 Req. 5.2.1.2-D:  A demonstrable violation of any applicable requirement of the VVSG during the execution of any test SHALL result in a test verdict of Fail.
- The reliability benchmark deals specifically with operational _failures_

**Notes:**
Clip-art of an explosive device idiomatically indicates a potential pitfall for the reader.

## Benchmark terms

- Accuracy → _error_ rate
- Specifically, the report total error rate defined by Part 3 Req. 5.3.4-B
- Plain language:  Observable discrepancy between the reported number and the correct result
- Not the human factors meaning of accuracy (usability testing)
- Strictly a measure of mechanical performance
- Bad inputs are thrown out

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  guy comparing two different reports and apparently finding a discrepancy.

## Misfeed rate = combined rate of bad things that scanners do to paper ballots
Multiple feed
Paper jam
Rejection of a ballot that has nothing wrong with it

- Multiple feed
- Paper jam
- Rejection of a ballot that has nothing wrong with it

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- Benchmark terms

**Notes:**
Clip art:  something went “bang” on the intake side of a central count optical scanner, ejecting several ballots and alarming an election official.

## Executive summary

- Both the old benchmarks and the old test method had issues
- New benchmarks based on estimates provided by NASED representative to TGDC
- All numbers old & new considered somewhat arbitrary
- There is no “typical” case
- Corrected mistakes
- Average case vs. worst case
- Observed vs. demonstrated
- New test method fixes problems and is simpler

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## Relevant procedural changes

- Part 3 Section 5.3:  Benchmarks are now evaluated over the course of the entire test campaign
- Part 3 Section 2.5.3:  Not permissible to bypass portions of the voting system that would be exercised in an actual election
- Part 3 Req. 5.2.3-D:  Volume test

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## Part 3 Req. 5.2.3-D:  Volume test

- “Large” test in conditions approximating normal use in an election
- More equipment
- More people
- Simulated election day
- This is a general functional test, not designed just for evaluating the benchmarks
- However, data collected during this test contribute substantially to the evaluation of the benchmarks

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## Impact of changes

- Benchmarks are more defensible
- Can no longer get a pass on reliability and accuracy just by “acing the exam” – must be consistently reliable and accurate throughout the entire test campaign
- More valid system test
- Simulated ballots forbidden, replaced by volume test

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## Impact of changes

- Test method improvements are free
- Making better use of data collected throughout testing campaign
- Volume test will add cost
- Limited cost by limiting size and scope
- Size and scope made to agree with California Volume Reliability Testing Protocol for DREs

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## Extra slides

- Old benchmarks
- New benchmarks
- Old test method
- Simulation vs. end-to-end testing
- New test method

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## POC:  Alan Goldfine

- Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and other requirements (Part 1 Section 6.3.4 *et seq*.)
- Come back to this at end of chapter to avoid changing speakers repeatedly

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## 6.4  Workmanship

- 6.4.1  Software engineering practices
- 6.4.2  Quality assurance and configuration management
- 6.4.3  General build quality
- 6.4.4  Durability
- 6.4.5  Maintainability
- 6.4.6  Temperature and humidity
- 6.4.7  Equipment transportation and storage

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## 6.4.1  Software engineering practices

- 6.4.1.1  Scope
- 6.4.1.2  Selection of programming languages
- 6.4.1.3  Selection of general coding conventions
- 6.4.1.4  Software modularity and programming
- 6.4.1.5  Structured programming
- 6.4.1.6  Comments
- 6.4.1.7  Executable code and data integrity
- 6.4.1.8  Error checking
- 6.4.1.9  Recovery

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## Executive summary

- Manufacturers are expected to use current best practices for software engineering
- “Published” and “credible” coding conventions
- Three year rule and reassessments
- Worst practices are prohibited
- I.e., practices that are known risk factors for latent software faults and unverifiable code
- Defensive programming is required
- Use of state-of-the-art programming languages and standards facilitates compliance

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## Impact of changes

- Resolved controversy over prescriptive requirements on programming style
- More flexibility for manufacturers
- Pressure to migrate to state-of-the-art programming languages and standards
- Should get more reliable, higher integrity software
- Costs
- Legacy code must be cleaned up and reinforced to meet the same requirements
- More experience and judgment required of test labs

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## Warning:  Programming jargon

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  guy looking confused and overwhelmed.

## Terms

- COTS:  includes shrink-wrapped commercial software and analogous open-source packages
- General-purpose
- Widely used
- Unmodified
- Application logic:  logic from any source that is specific to the voting system, with the exception of border logic
- Border logic:  “glue code”
- Third-party logic:  neither application logic nor COTS
- So-called “modified COTS”
- Source code generated by a COTS package

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## “COTS exemption” busted

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| Categories | Level of scrutiny | Tested? | Source code/data required? | Coding standards enforced? | Shown to be correct? |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| COTS | Black box | Yes | No | No | No |
| Third-party logic, border logic, configuration data | Clear box | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Application logic | Coding standards | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Core logic | Logic verification | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

## 6.4.1  Software engineering practices

- 6.4.1.1  Scope
- Application logic
- Not COTS, third-party logic, or border logic
- 6.4.1.2  Selection of programming languages
- High-level language with support for structured programming—which includes block-structured exception handling
- Compromise—C can be retrofit with extension package to add exceptions
- Interpreted languages like Java are allowed

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## 6.4.1  Software engineering practices

- 6.4.1.3  Selection of general coding conventions
- Workmanship, security, integrity, testability, maintainability
- “Published”
- “Credible”
- 6.4.1.4  Software modularity and programming
- Orthogonality of design
- Size limit

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## 6.4.1  Software engineering practices

- 6.4.1.5  Structured programming
- Unstructured programming is forbidden
- 6.4.1.6  Comments
- Optional; defer to coding conventions
- 6.4.1.7  Executable code and data integrity
- Risky practices forbidden
- Protect against tampering
- Monitor transfer quality of I/O operations (e.g., burning coasters)

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## 6.4.1  Software engineering practices

- 6.4.1.8  Error checking
- Defend against garbage input from outside
- Prevent buffer overflows, numeric overflows, stack overflows...
- Validate inputs to each unit
- Masking errors is prohibited
- Diagnostics and health monitoring
- Detect or prevent violations of election integrity (e.g., accumulation of negative votes)

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## 6.4.1  Software engineering practices

- 6.4.1.9  Recovery
- Protect integrity of all recorded votes and audit log information
- Controlled recovery to known good state
- Allows diagnostic state prior to recovery

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## POC:  Alan Goldfine

- Workmanship (Part 1 Section 6.4) other than software engineering practices
- Come back to this at end of chapter to avoid changing speakers repeatedly

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## 6.5  Archival[ness] requirements

- Records last at least 22 months in temperatures up to 40 °C and humidity up to 85 %

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**Notes:**
Clip art 1:  grim reaper next to a computer with a spider web across its screen suggests that the computer may have expired.  Clip art 2:  paper records are spilling out of a large box.  A guy reviewing them with a magnifying glass seems alarmed by what he found.

## Related requirements

- Part 2 Req. 4.4.8-C  Operations manual, procedures to ensure archivalness
- The manufacturer SHALL detail the care and handling precautions necessary for removable media and records to last 22 months etc.
- Part 3 Req. 4.1-B  Review of COTS suppliers’ specifications
- Test lab shall verify that the media are not being used out-of-spec

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## Impact of changes (archivalness)

- Responsive to complaints about thermal paper going off
- Ambient conditions specified
- End users should not have to resort to extreme measures to preserve records for the statutory period
- More test lab scrutiny of data sheets for media used
- Actually supposed to last 22 months in ambient conditions

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## Other speakers

- Alan Goldfine
- Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and other requirements (Part 1 Section 6.3.4 *et seq*.)
- Workmanship (Part 1 Section 6.4) other than software engineering practices
- John Wack
- Integratability and data export/interchange (Part 1 Section 6.6) – rewritten to satisfy security concerns and promote use of open standards
- Issuance of voting credentials and ballot activation (Part 1 Section 7.5.1) – rewritten to satisfy security concerns

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## Alan Goldfine

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**Notes:**
Clip art suggesting themes of electricity or lightning, radio frequency transmission, and shoddy equipment.

## Next VVSG TrainingChapter 7:  Reqs. by Voting Activity

- October 15-17, 2007
- David Flater
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- dflater@nist.gov

## 7  Requirements by Voting Activity

- 7.1  Election Programming
- 7.2  Ballot Preparation, Formatting, and Production
- 7.3  Equipment Setup for Security and Integrity [L&A testing]
- 7.4  Opening Polls
- 7.5  Casting
- 7.6  Closing Polls
- 7.7  Counting
- 7.8  Reporting

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## 7.1  Election Programming

- The EMS shall support election definition
- Definition of political and administrative subdivisions, a.k.a. reporting contexts, corresponding to precincts, districts, etc.
- Ballot definition (contests and candidates)
- The EMS shall support all of the claimed voting variations
- The EMS shall provide for the distribution of these definitions to the rest of the system as needed

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## 7.2  Ballot Preparation, Formatting, and Production

- The EMS shall support the definition of ballot configurations and ballot styles
- Subject to many subrequirements
- The EMS shall provide for the distribution of these definitions to the rest of the system as needed

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## Terms

**Ballot configuration:**  Set of contests in which voters of a particular group (e.g., political party and/or election district) are entitled to vote
**Ballot style:**  Concrete presentation of a particular ballot configuration
- A given ballot configuration may be realized by multiple ballot styles, which may differ in the language used, the ordering of contests and contest choices, etc.

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## Why this makes sense

- Most functional requirements on vote capture and tabulation are independent of style issues such as which ballot position a given contest choice appears in or which language it is written in
- Nevertheless, there are functional requirements on the capability of the voting system to produce and tabulate different ballot styles
- Auto-layout capability
- Association of ballot styles with political parties in primary elections
- Correct mapping from ballot positions back to contest choices
- So we need both terms

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## 7.3  Equipment Setup for Security and Integrity [L&A testing]

- “The purpose of logic and accuracy testing is to detect malfunctioning and misconfigured devices before polls are opened.  It is not a defense against fraud.”
- Built-in self-test and diagnostics
- Integrity checks on ballot styles and software
- Able to run test ballots
- Calibrations
- No side-effects
- Readiness reports (→ Part 1 Section 7.8.2)

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## 7.4  Opening Polls

- Designated functions to open polls
- Guard against accidental or unauthorized poll opening
- Guard against doing things in the wrong order
- Check that L&A testing was done
- Check that L&A test result was “OK”
- Leave no ambiguity whether polls are currently open

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## 7.5  Casting

- 7.5.1  Issuance of voting credentials and ballot activation
- 7.5.2  General voting functionality
- 7.5.3  Voting variations
- 7.5.4  Recording votes
- 7.5.5  Redundant records
- 7.5.6  Respecting limits
- 7.5.7  Procedures required for correct system functioning

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## POC:  John Wack

- 7.5.1  Issuance of voting credentials and ballot activation – rewritten to satisfy security concerns
- Presented earlier

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## 7.5  Casting

- 7.5.2  General voting functionality
- Capture votes
- No advertising
- 7.5.3  Voting variations
- Support all of the claimed voting variations
- 7.5.4  Recording votes
- Record them correctly
- All records shall be consistent with the feedback to the voter
- Cast is committed

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## 7.5  Casting

- 7.5.5  Redundant records
- DREs shall record and retain at least two machine-countable copies of each cast vote record on physically separate media
- 7.5.6  Respecting limits
- If the next ballot could overflow a counter, STOP
- 7.5.7  Procedures required for correct system functioning
- One voter, one ballot
- Assignment of the correct ballot style
- Prevent tampering
- Early voting considerations

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## 7.6  Closing Polls

- Designated functions to close polls
- No access to cast vote records before close of polls
- No voting after close of polls
- No reopening of polls
- Post-election reports (→ Part 1 Section 7.8.3)

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## 7.7  Counting

- 7.7.1  Integrity
- 7.7.2  Voting variations
- 7.7.3  Ballot separation
- 7.7.4  Misfed ballots
- 7.7.5  Accuracy
- 7.7.6  Consolidation
- 7.7.7  Procedures required for correct system functioning

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## 7.7  Counting

- 7.7.1  Integrity
- Detect and prevent ballot style mismatches
- Optical scanners must deal with ballots that are oriented incorrectly
- 7.7.2  Voting variations
- Support all of the claimed voting varations
- 7.7.3  Ballot separation
- For CCOS, outstacking of ballots on various conditions
- For PCOS, separation of ballots containing write-ins
- ECOS react to marginal marks and overvotes as equipment malfunctions

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## 7.7  Counting

- 7.7.4  Misfed ballots
- Ability to clear misfeed
**Indicate status of misfed ballot**
- 7.7.5  Accuracy
- Special cases for optical scanners
- General benchmark handles everything else

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## Categories of optical scan marks

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- Ideal mark (not marginal)

- Reliably detectable mark (not marginal)

- Standard, reliably detectable mark (not marginal)

**Marginal mark**

- .

- Hesitation mark (not marginal)

- No mark (not marginal)

- Extraneous mark (not marginal)

**Notes:**
Each category of mark is illustrated with an example.

Ideal mark:  oval completely filled in with a #2 pencil.
Reliably detectable mark:  oval mostly filled in, but not quite completely filled in, nor quite staying within the lines.
Standard, reliably detectable mark:  a 1 mm thick horizontal line crossing the entirety of the oval on its long axis (horizontally).
Marginal mark:  a thin check mark centered on the oval.
Hesitation mark:  a small dot inside the oval.
Extraneous mark:  somebody scrawled “NIXON” beside the oval but put nothing within it.
No mark:  an empty oval.

## 7.7  Counting

- 7.7.5  Accuracy
- SHALL count reliably detectable marks
- SHALL count standard mark (MCOS)
- SHALL reject marginal marks (PCOS) (→ Part 1 Req. 3.2.2.2-E)
- SHOULD ignore hesitation marks and imperfections
- SHALL ignore extraneous marks and non-marks
- C.f. Part 2 Req. 4.1.2-A.2  User documentation, reliably detectable marks

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## 7.7  Counting

- 7.7.6  Consolidation
- Single report for polling place
- 5-minute requirement for DREs
- 7.7.7  Procedures required for correct system functioning
- Clearing ballots that get stuck between the reader and the ballot box

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## 7.8  Reporting

- 7.8.1  General reporting functionality
- 7.8.2  Audit, status, and readiness reports
- 7.8.3  Vote data reports
- 7.8.4  Procedures required for correct system functioning

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## 7.8  Reporting

- 7.8.1  General reporting functionality
- Timestamps
- Reporting is non-destructive
- 7.8.2  Audit, status, and readiness reports
- Pre-election reports = record of the election definition
- Status and readiness reports = record of conditions at open of polls
- Able to turn event logs into reports

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## 7.8  Reporting

- 7.8.3  Vote data reports
- 7.8.3.1  General functionality
- Accurate, human-readable report of all votes cast
- Account for all cast ballots and all valid votes
- No discrepancies / detect, flag, and diagnose discrepancies
- No tallies before close of polls
- 7.8.3.2  Ballot counts
- 7.8.3.3  Vote totals (including overvotes and undervotes)

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## Changes

- Optical scanner requirements caught up to the state of the practice
- Clarified and disambiguated reporting requirements
- Guiding principle:  account for all cast ballots and all valid votes
- Cast vs. read vs. counted
- Vote counts vs. ballot counts

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## Impact

- Optical scanners
- Don’t expect any changes to products
- A greater range of marks should be tested by test labs
- Vendors must disclose what constitutes a reliably detectable mark vs. a marginal mark
- Reporting
- Expected impact:  localized software changes to report generator in some systems
- Worst case impact:  if system does not currently keep track of all of the needed data, may need to add some new counters

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## 7.8  Reporting

- 7.8.4  Procedures required for correct system functioning
- Ballot accounting
- Label unofficial reports as unofficial

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## Next VVSG TrainingChapter 8:  Reference Models

- October 15-17, 2007
- David Flater
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- dflater@nist.gov

## Process Model (Pt. 1 Sec. 8.1)

- Informative
- Provides context for product requirements
- Not directly used by any product requirements

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## Vote-Capture Device State Model (Pt. 1 Sec. 8.2)

- Informative, but important
- Clarifies concepts for early voting
- Overnight suspension of early voting is not the same as closing the polls
- Distinguishes “activated” (active period) from “in use” (voting session)
- Referenced by access control requirements

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## Logic Model (Pt. 1 Sec. 8.3)

- Normative
- Rigorously defines the correct results from counting votes
- Referenced by reporting requirements (shall report the following results)
- Used in logic verification
- Higher level of assurance than operational testing alone

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## Counting logic as modelled

- Cumulative voting
- N-of-M voting = special case with at most 1 vote per contest choice
- 1-of-M voting = special case with N = 1
- Yes/no question = special case with yes/no as the only choices
- Ranked order voting not handled; see Part 1 Section 7.7.2.5

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**Notes:**
Clip art beside the first set of bullets (under Cumulative voting):  Matryoshka doll, illustrating how each special case fits within a more general model.

## Related requirements

- Part 1 Req. 6.1-B  Verifiably correct vote recording and tabulation
- Part 1 Req. 6.3.2-A  Satisfy integrity constraints
- Documentation requirements
- Part 2 Req. 3.4.7.2-F  TDP, inductive assertions
- Part 2 Req. 3.4.7.2-G  TDP, high-level constraints
- Part 2 Req. 3.4.7.2-H  TDP, safety of concurrency
- Part 3 Section 4.6  Logic Verification

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## Logic verificationPart 3 Section 4.6

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  guy giving lecture.

## What is logic verification?

- Formal characterization of software behavior within a carefully restricted scope
- Proof that this behavior conforms to specified assertions (i.e., votes are reported correctly in all cases)
- Complements [falsification] testing
- C.f. “inductive assertions,” “Hoare logic,” “program proving”

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## Motivation

- TGDC Resolution #29-05, “Ensuring Correctness of Software Code”
- Higher level of assurance than operational testing alone
- Clarify objectives of source code review

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## How it works

- Vendor specifies pre- and post-conditions for each callable unit
- Vendor proves assertions regarding tabulation correctness
- Testing authority reviews, checks the math, and issues findings
- Pre- and post-conditions correctly characterize the software
- The assertions are satisfied

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## Compromise #1

- Scope of verification limited to core logic
**Core logic:**  Subset of application logic that is responsible for vote recording and tabulation
- Limited scope = limited assurance; unlimited scope = impracticable

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## Compromise #2

- Programming language does not have formally specified semantics
- A formal proof cannot be mandated
- Do what is feasible
- Formality where possible
- Informal arguments where not
- Limitations on complexity to make correctness intuitively obvious
- Still better than operational testing alone

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## Impact

- Another document for manufacturers to produce
- Skill level:  computer science undergraduate
- Higher level of assurance than operational testing alone
- Possible fear, loathing, claims of infeasibility
- This is not Common Criteria EAL 7
- This is not the general case (arbitrary software)
- Limited both in scope and in rigor

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## Extra slides

- Part 2 summary
- Part 3 summary
- Definition guidelines

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## End of presentation

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## Bonus Slides

- Deleted Segments
- Extras

**Notes:**
Clip art:  Free!

## Plain language vs. precision for intended use:an analogy

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- TITLE 47—TELECOMMUNICATION
-               CHAPTER I—FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
- PART 2—FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS—Table of Contents
-      Subpart B—Allocation, Assignment, and Use of Radio Frequencies
- Sec.  2.106  Table of Frequency Allocations.
- NG66  The band 470–512 MHz (TV channels 14–20) is allocated to the broadcasting service on an exclusive basis throughout the United States and its insular areas, except as described below:
- Blah blah blah, diddy blah de blah blah, screech yowl arrrr...

**Notes:**
Manufacturers of televisions and any regulators or test labs who evaluate those televisions need to know the frequencies corresponding to different channels.  The people who buy and use televisions neither need nor want to be exposed to those technical details and jargon.  It is quite a challenge to write a single document that satisfies both audiences.

## Concept analysis by example

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  guy giving lecture.

## Concept analysis by example

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- Critter

**Notes:**
This series of slides builds up a concept lattice one layer at a time.  Here we start with a single root concept, Critter.

## Concept analysis by example

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- 8-legged
- critter

- Hairy
- critter

- Critter

**Notes:**
Critter gets subclasses Hairy critter and 8-legged critter.

## Concept analysis by example

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- 8-legged
- critter

- Hairy
- critter

- Critter

- Rat

- Dingo

- Tarantula

- Black
- widow

- All rats are hairy critters.
- All dingos are hairy critters.

- All tarantulas are 8-legged critters.
- All black widows are 8-legged critters.

**Notes:**
Hairy critter gets subclasses Rat and Dingo.  8-legged critter gets subclasses Tarantula and Black widow.

## Concept analysis by example

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- 8-legged
- critter

- Hairy
- critter

- Critter

- Rat

- Dingo

- Tarantula

- Black
- widow

**Do not assume that classes are mutually exclusive**

- All tarantulas are hairy, 8-legged critters.

**Notes:**
A slantwise line is added to make Tarantula a subclass of Hairy critter.  It is now a subclass of both Hairy critter and 8-legged critter.

## Concept analysis by example

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- 8-legged
- critter

- Hairy
- critter

- Critter

- Rat

- Dingo

- Tarantula

- 8-legged
- dingo

- Black
- widow

**Notes:**
A clip-art guy scratches his head over a potential new subclass, 8-legged dingo.  The analysis of hypothetical concepts involves interesting branches of logic and philosophy, but that is another presentation.

## Concept analysis by example

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- 8-legged
- critter

- Hairy
- critter

- Critter

- Rat

- Dingo

- Tarantula

- Black
- widow

**Notes:**
An empty class that is a subclass of everything is added at the bottom to complete the formalism.

## Semantics of classesPart 1 Section 2.5.4

- Under attack due to mathematical language
- Section 2.5.4 just defines in mathematical language what is described in plain language in Section 2.5.2
- Technically oriented readers (“language lawyers”) want formality to resolve the ambiguities of plain language
- Removing the mathematical language would reduce the precision and completeness of the specification
- Not to be confused with Section 8.3 (Logic Model)

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## Old benchmarks

- Failure rate (reliability)
- 163 hours MTBF widely condemned
- Rationale supported neither the benchmark nor the test—confusion of non-comparable values
- Tested:  90 % > 45 hours
- Time-based benchmark considered less appropriate than a volume-based benchmark
- Misfeed rate
- Two different benchmarks, no specific test

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## Old benchmarks

- Error rate (accuracy)
- Untestable benchmarks on low-level operations
- Conflation of ballot positions with votes
- Model assumes maximum one error per ballot position
- Unclear how inaccuracies in ballot counts and totals of undervotes and overvotes factor in
- Upper benchmark (1 in 10 000 000) considered arbitrary, possibly unattainable by paper-based systems
- Tested:  95 % > 1 / 500 000

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## Old benchmarks

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| Benchmark | P(failure) in 15 hours | Min. test time
(if benchmark used as lower test MTBF) | w/ 7.1 days |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 45 hours
(VVSG’05 II.C.4) | 28 % | 169 hours
(7.04 days) | 1 device |
| 135 hours
(VVSG’05 II.C.4) | 11 % | 21.1 days | 3 devices |
| 163 hours
(VVSG’05 I.4.3.3) | 8.8 % | 25.5 days | 4 devices |

- p = 1−*e*−15/*θ*

*t* ≥ 3.75 × *θ*1

**Notes:**
Using MIL-HDBK-781A Test Plan V-D and Figure 13 in handbook.

## What happens if we just raise the number

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| Benchmark | From | P(failure) in 15 hours | Min. test | w/ 7 days | w/ 100 devices |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1500 hours | [1] | 1.0 % | 234 days | 34 devices | 2.34 days |
| 5000 hours | [2] | 0.30 % | 2.14 years | 112 devices | 7.82 days |
| 15000 hours | [3] | 0.10 % | 6.42 years | 335 devices | 23.4 days |

- [1]  IEEE Draft 5.3.1 ballot comment (later increased to 15000)
- [2]  VVSG’05 public comment #2056, lower bound
- [3]  VVSG’05 public comment #2056, upper bound

## Reliability benchmarks

- Part 1 Sections 6.3.1.2 and 3 describe the scenario and the estimates from which the reliability benchmarks are derived
- Different device classes have different reliability requirements depending on how they are used, how easily replaced, etc.
- Section 6.3.1.4:  Derivation of reliability benchmarks based on 1 % risk of exceeding tolerances
- Special case:  Benchmark for failures resulting in disenfranchisement set to zero
- Falsifiable but not demonstrable

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## Accuracy benchmark

- Part 1 Requirement 6.3.2-B
- 6.3.2-A has to do with logic verification (later)
- Benchmark derived from the "maximum acceptable error rate" used as the lower test benchmark in VVSG 2005 (ballot position error rate of 1 / 500 000)
- Conversion from old metric (ballot position error rate) to new metric (report total error rate) explained in the discussion field

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## Misfeed rate benchmark

- Part 1 Section 6.3.3
- Has ranged between 2 % (1 / 50) and 10−4 (1 / 10 000)
- Per input from NASED representative, now set at .002 (1 / 500)

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## Report total error rate

- Need a definition of error that allows them to be counted
- Errors must be _observable_
- Given test report, tell me _how many_ errors were made
- It’s not as simple as previously believed

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## Report total error ratePart 3 Req. 5.3.4-B (generalized from 1990 VSS F.6)

**Report item:  **Any one of the numeric values (totals or counts) that must appear in any of the vote data reports.  Each ballot count, each vote, overvote and undervote total for each contest, and each vote total for each contest choice in each contest is a separate report item.
**Report item error:**  Absolute value of the difference between the correct value and the reported value.
**Report total error:**  Sum of all of the report item errors.
**Report total volume:**  Sum of all of the *correct* values.
**Report total error rate** = report total error / report total volume

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## The old test method

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  guy giving lecture.

## Probability Ratio Sequential Test (PRST)

- A.k.a. Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
- VVSG follows recipes from MIL-HDBK-781A
- Originally designed for munitions testing
- Simultaneously
- Obtain statistically significant result
- Minimize the length of the test (number of bombs used)
- Avoid bias

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## Page <number>

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**Notes:**
Graphics illustrate how a PRST operates using a graph of the number of failures (vertical axis) versus time (horizontal axis).  The progress of a test is shown as a line that proceeds horizontally while time passes without failures but takes a step vertically when a failure occurs.  The field traversed by this line is divided into three zones delimited by two diagonal significance boundaries.  Above the upper significance boundary is an end zone labelled “Terminate and Reject.”  Too many failures in a relatively short period of time puts you there.  Below the lower significance boundary is an end zone labelled “Terminate and Accept.”  Sufficient time passed with relatively few failures puts you there.  In the middle is the region where the test continues.  Behavior that is not statistically significant keeps you going diagonally in the middle until a significance boundary is crossed or the point of truncation is reached.  Truncation is represented here by an arbitrary capping off of the middle region.

## 45 hours

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- 135 hours

**Notes:**
Graphics show the operating characteristic (OC) curve for a test with the following parameters:  α (producer’s risk) = 10 %, β (consumer’s risk) = 10 %, d (discrimination ratio) = 3:1, θ0 (upper test benchmark) = 135 hours and θ1 (lower test benchmark) = 45 hours.  The probability of acceptance begins near zero for MTBF near zero, rises to .1 if the true MTBF is 45 hours, goes up to .9 if the true MTBF is 135 hours, and rises asymptotically towards 1 as the true MTBF increases beyond 135 hours.

## Whither 163 hours?

- “The MTBF demonstrated during certification testing shall be at least 163 hours.”  (VVSG’05 I.4.3.3)
- In 1990 and 2002 VSS, minimum duration of Probability Ratio Sequential Test to demonstrate MTBF ≥ 45 hours with the given parameters was calculated to be 163 hours
- In VVSG’05, this was revised to 169 hours
- MTBF actually demonstrated is a different number, and it varies
- Ranges from 44 hours to 73 hours (at 90 % confidence)
- Confusion of non-comparable values

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## Whence 45 hours?

- “A typical system operations scenario consists of approximately 45 hours of equipment operation, consisting of 30 hours of equipment set-up and readiness testing and 15 hours of elections operations.”  (VVSG’05 I.4.3.3)
- With MTBF = 45 hours, 63 % of our machines die by the end of the election (after 45 hours)
- More confusion of non-comparable values

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## Issues applying PRST

- PRST assumes that we can adjust the length of the testing as it specifies
- Ignore failures occurring in other portions of the test campaign?
- Somehow make the length of the test campaign coincide with what PRST specifies?

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## Old test not end-to-end

- VVSG’05 permits test labs to bypass portions of the system that would be exercised during an actual election (VVSG’05 II.1.8.2.3)
- “May use a simulation device... provided that the simulation covers all voting data detection and control paths that are used in casting an actual ballot.”
- But... “In the event that only partial simulation is achieved, then an independent method and test procedure shall be used to validate the proper operation of those portions of the system not tested by the simulator.”
- Also:  “For systems that use a light source as a means of detecting voter selections, the generation of a suitable optical signal by an external device is acceptable.”
- If the test is compromised, the number of ballot positions tested is of little relevance
- “One flight test is worth a thousand simulations” – Henry Spencer

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## The new test methodPart 3 Section 5.3

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**Notes:**
Clip art:  guy giving lecture.

## Classical hypothesis testing

- Collect data throughout the entire test campaign
- At the end, analyze the data and determine what they demonstrate
- Length of testing is fixed in advance (the approved test plan)
- Specific length is not critical, but discretionary stopping introduces bias

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## “Event” = failure, error, or misfeed, as applicable
“Volume” = e.g., # ballots (defined by the benchmark)
Hypothesis H0:  The system is conforming
Critical value vc:  “Cutoff volume”
Calculated based on benchmark event rate rb and number of observed events no
vc is the minimum volume at which it would not be “unusual” for no or more events to occur in a marginally conforming system
“Unusual” = less than 10 % chance
If tested volume vo is at least vc, you pass
Critical value rd:  “Demonstrated rate”
rd may be greater or less than the benchmark event rate rb

- “Volume” = e.g., # ballots (defined by the benchmark)
- Hypothesis H0:  The system is conforming
- Critical value *v**c*:  “Cutoff volume”
- Calculated based on benchmark event rate *r**b* and number of observed events *n**o*
*v**c* is the minimum volume at which it would not be “unusual” for *n**o* or more events to occur in a marginally conforming system
- “Unusual” = less than 10 % chance
- If tested volume *v**o* is at least *v**c*, you pass
- Critical value *r**d*:  “Demonstrated rate”
*r**d* may be greater or less than the benchmark event rate *r**b*

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- Terms

## Possible outcomes

- Fail
- Demonstrated nonconformity with 90 % confidence (*v**o* < *v**c*)
- Pass
- Strong pass:  Demonstrated conformity with 90 % confidence (*r**d* ≤ *r**b*)
- Weak pass:  Inconclusive, pass by default (*r**d* > *r**b* and *v**o* ≥ *v**c*)
- Longer testing makes an inconclusive result less likely, but they can never be prevented entirely
- Impossible to demonstrate conformity to benchmark of zero

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## Example

- Benchmark event rate *r**b* = 10−2
- Observations
- Tested volume *v**o* = 600
- Observed events *n**o* = 3

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## How-to:  Part 3 Section 5.3.2

- Cutoff volume *v**c*
- P(2, *r**b **v**c*) = 0.9
*v**c* 	= 1.102065 / 10−2 		= 110.2065
- 600 > 110.2065
- Pass
- Demonstrated rate *r**d*
- P(3, *r**d **v**o*) = 0.1
*r**d*	= 6.680783 / 600		= 1.113464 × 10−2
- Not a strong pass ...

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| n | rv satisfying P(n,rv)=0.1 | rv satisfying P(n,rv)=0.9 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2 | 5.322320 | 1.102065 |
| 3 | 6.680783 | 1.744770 |

## Logic verification non-issue

- Rice’s theorem:  In the general case (arbitrary software), nontrivial properties are undecidable
*This is not the general case*
- Vote counting uses very simple math and logic
- All voting system designs must preserve the ability to demonstrate that votes will be counted correctly

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## Part 2  Documentation Requirements

- 1  Introduction
- 2  Quality Assurance & Configuration Management
- 3  Technical Data Package
- 4  Voting Equipment User Documentation
- 5  Test Plan
- 6  Test Report
- 7  Public Information Package

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## Part 3  Testing Requirements

- 1  Introduction
- 2  Conformity Assessment Process
- Informative description
- General requirements on test labs, ground rules
- COTS validation, initial and final builds
- 3  Introduction to General Testing Approaches
- 4  Documentation & Design Reviews
- Inspections
- 5  Test Methods
- Operational tests
- OEVT

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## Definition Guidelines (ISO 10241)

- A definition shall contain, or start with, the nearest superordinate term.
- A definition shall only contain delimiting characteristics.  Other information should be put in an informative note.
- Use already defined terms as components in the definitions.
- A definition shall not be too narrow or too broad.
- Avoid circular definitions.

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- Summarized from “Introduction to Terminology,” Bernd G. Wenzel, EuroSTEP GmbH, 1997.

## Definition Guidelines (ISO 10241)

- A definition shall not begin with an expression such as “term used to describe ....”
- Unless there is a specific reason, a definition shall not begin with an article.
- A definition shall have the same grammatical form (e.g., verb, adjective, or noun) as the term.  The grammatical form shall be indicated whenever there is a risk of misunderstanding.
- Unless there is a specific reason, a definition shall consist of a single phrase.

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