# Presentation: 583046

## A 21st CENTURY NAVY

- A 21st CENTURY NAVY

**Notes:**
I’d like to thank you for the opportunity to be with you here today to talk about the Navy’s role in our nation’s security in the 21st Century. 
When I speak about the Navy’s role in defense strategy, questions are often asked about investment priorities and fiscal trade-offs; moreover, these questions are usually asked in the context of whether the Two-MTW construct is the correct one for our defense establishment; or whether our military is properly sized and shaped for the Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs) we are involved in today. 
These are important questions for our military as a whole.  But for Navy, they are perhaps less relevant...for the Navy has always been sized and shaped to provide this nation with credible combat forces forces forward overseas ... around the globe, safeguarding our interests in peacetime, responding quickly in crisis and sustaining combat power in war...far from our shores. 
For Navy, therefore, the question of trade-offs is relatively simple.  As long as our nation remains committed to sustaining its position as a world power -- remaining engaged throughout the world partly by the presence of U.S. combat power -- then it is clear that we must sustain a certain level of investment in our Navy.  

## RETURN ON OUR NATION’S INVESTMENT

- COMMAND OF THE SEAS
- For A Maritime Nation
- U.S. SOVEREIGN POWER FORWARD
- Timely Crisis Response
- Power to Shape
- ASSURED ACCESS
- ENABLE THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE TO FIGHT AND WIN

**R****ETURN ON ****O****UR ****N****ATION’S ****I****NVESTMENT**

**Notes:**
And there are four key returns that need to be assessed in determining that level of investment:  
First, the value of our nation’s investment to command the seas...the global commons on which we depend not only to project national power and influence beyond our shores, but for our country’s economic well being;  
Second, the additional benefits that stem from that same, initial investment...in maintaining U.S. sovereign power, forward...providing timely -- often decisive -- crisis response.  And with this demonstrated ability to respond -- across the entire spectrum of operations -- comes the power to shape regions of interest...to deter potential adversaries,  and to reassure allies and friends of our commitment to shared interests;  
Third, the access provided by having U.S. combat power already deployed forward if crisis does become war ... a  critical contribution to future joint warfighting by the Navy.  
And finally, the additional benefit -- “compounded interest”, if you will --  that accrues from this investment in having forces forward to assure access in order to enable the transformation of the joint forces to fight and win in any future conflict.  

## RETURN ON OUR NATION’S INVESTMENT

- COMMAND OF THE SEAS
- For A Maritime Nation
- U.S. SOVEREIGN POWER FORWARD
- Timely Crisis Response
- Power to Shape
- ASSURED ACCESS
- ENABLE THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE TO FIGHT AND WIN

**R****ETURN ON ****O****UR ****N****ATION’S ****I****NVESTMENT**

**Notes:**
With regard to the first return -- the value of our nation’s investment to command the seas ...

## Slide 4

**Notes:**
What you’re viewing is not a chart, but a recording of electronic emissions  across the globe over a 24 hour period.  The areas in green represent those of the heaviest concentration of electronic activity. 
Two things are evident by looking at this graphic:
Outside North America, the vast majority of electronic activity -- and therefore, commerce and population -- occurs within an arc that stretches from Western Europe, through the Persian Gulf, and into the Western Pacific rim.
And because the outlines of the continents are easily discernable, it is also clear that most of the world’s commerce occurs along the coasts.   
The purple lines are the major trade routes of the world. Note that, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, these trade routes tend to begin and end in these three vital areas.  
The black lines are the principal fiber-optic and telecommunications cables laid throughout the world. Notice again that these tend to begin or end in within that arc of interest. 
And these blue dots are the 16 superports of the world...those ports with the sophisticated infrastructure and depth of water necessary to handle the world’s largest commercial container ships. 
From the perspective of the United States alone, the free flow of commerce across the globe has direct economic benefits...sustaining the growth of our economy for much of the last decade.  

## COMMAND OF THE SEAS

**C****OMMAND**** ****OF THE**** S****EAS**

**99% of Intercontinental Trade Volume**
**80% of Intercontinental Trade Value**

**“****The ship is the inventory...”**
**                    ****The New Yorker**

**C****OMMAND**** ****OF THE**** S****EAS**

**99% of Intercontinental Trade Volume**
**80% of Intercontinental Trade Value**

**Notes:**
 While 80% of the value and 99% of the volume of all intercontinental trade travels across the global commons of the seas, the era of globalization has increased the importance of those 16 superports that are often astride or near these chokepoints.
Let me give you just one example:  Singapore.
This single port handles more than 300 million tons of cargo annually...or  one-fifth of the value of daily maritime trade.  
Nearly half of U.S. imports of ADP equipment travel though Singapore, as does more than a third of all the global trans-shipment activity that feeds the global ‘just in time’ supply chains....or those “heel-to-toe”  economic relationships that allow merchandise to move more efficiently, without the overhead costs of warehouses and storage facilities.
While the catalysts for these “heel-to-toe” relationships are information and communications technology, the transport that makes “just-in-time” work is the container ship...carrying approximately 64% of the value of world trade today, and projected to carry nearly 80% by 2020.
 In referring to the growth of container ship traffic in relation to the “just-in-time” supply chains, the New Yorker said it best in a recent article (December 2000) regarding “globalization”  and the reliance upon the container shipping industry to provide the “just-in-time” inventory.  Their words:  “The ship is the inventory.”  

## COMMAND OF THE SEAS

**C****OMMAND**** ****OF THE**** S****EAS**

**99% of Intercontinental Trade Volume**
**80% of Intercontinental Trade Value**

**C****OMMAND**** ****OF THE**** S****EAS**

**99% of Intercontinental Trade Volume**
**80% of Intercontinental Trade Value**

**Notes:**
 Therefore, it is at the confluence of these vital routes and services that we find  the three areas of the world where the Navy has traditionally been deployed in peacetime to support our global interests...at the intersections of the global economy.

We maintain that freedom of the seas with our forward-deployed Navy.  It is worth some amount of the nation’s treasure to maintain freedom of the seas.  But how much?

## RETURN ON OUR NATION’S INVESTMENT

- COMMAND OF THE SEAS
- For A Maritime Nation
- U.S. SOVEREIGN POWER FORWARD
- Timely Crisis Response
- Power to Shape
- ASSURED ACCESS
- ENABLE THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE TO FIGHT AND WIN

**R****ETURN ON ****O****UR ****N****ATION’S ****I****NVESTMENT**

**Notes:**
To answer that, the nation should consider the full return on its investment in a naval force that can master the seas...taking me to the second issue... ...the additional benefits of those same naval forces that maintain freedom of the seas:  timely crisis response, and the resultant capability to shape regions of U.S. interest. 

## Slide 8

**Notes:**
These forward-deployed combat forces provide this nation with speed of response...to an emerging crisis...from forces that can be immediately employed from within a region, without restrictions...even as we might begin to deploy other toward it.
For example, from the positions of these major combat elements on 15 December 2000, naval forces can respond within  24 hours, 48 hours, and 96 hours of ambiguous warning to crises anywhere within these range arcs.  Naval forces have done just that 144 times in the last decade alone.  

## Slide 9

**Notes:**
These responses have included 11 different combat operations.  In fact, the last 11 battlegroups to deploy  since 1998  have engaged in combat in Southeastern Europe and Southwest Asia.
In addition to these combat operations, in the last 10 years, naval forces have conducted 19 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations......four ongoing Maritime Intercept Operations [including more than five thousand boardings] in support of U.S. drug policy and United Nations sanctions...and 32 humanitarian assistance operations. 
And, often overlooked, 20 shows of force...conducted at the right time and place...have sent powerful messages to friends and potential foes alike. The Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996 is a good illustration.

##    Two CVBGs Respond

**   ****Two CVBGs Respond**

** ****SECDEF Perry: “*****The movement of U.S. warships is a prudent, cautionary measure.”***

**12 Mar 1996**

**  ****Taiwanese Conduct Elections**

**Independence**
**(CVBG)**

**Nimitz (CVBG****)**

**  ****Asian Markets Rebound**

**  ****Chinese Cease Missile Exercises**

**Notes:**
Most of you are familiar with this chain of events.  Chinese military actions in anticipation of Taiwanese elections had grave political, economic and military consequences.  
However, the movement of USS NIMITZ, deployed to the Persian Gulf, toward the area of crisis to join the already present INDEPENDENCE battlegroup in the vicinity of Taiwan sent a powerful message.  
In this case, having rapidly employable combat power in theater...and having rapidly deployable combat power readily available from outside of theater...secured three U.S. interests:  
Security interests, as Chinese missile exercises ceased the very next day.  
Economic interests, as Asian markets rebounded shortly thereafter, and... 
Political interests, as Taiwanese elections were ultimately held later that year.
It is, however, more than sending signals that counts...it is the credibility and timeliness of this responsive combat power...in overseas regions...that provides another daily return on the nation’s investment... the power to shape.  

## With a Full Spectrum of Effects to Assure Access

**With a Full Spectrum of Effects to Assure Access**
**...****Economically, Politically, **_***and Militarily***_

**Notes:**
These examples of the employment of forward deployed naval forces help to demonstrate why the demand for naval forces remains high. Our sovereign naval forces provide timely, decisive response in crisis and demonstrate U.S. commitment to defending our national interests overseas.
That’s the power of being there -- a timely application of the full spectrum of effects that provides the power to shape regions of interest, securing access for our economic, political and military interests overseas.   

## RETURN ON OUR NATION’S INVESTMENT

- COMMAND OF THE SEAS
- For A Maritime Nation
- U.S. SOVEREIGN POWER FORWARD
- Timely Crisis Response
- Power to Shape
- ASSURED ACCESS
- ENABLE THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE TO FIGHT AND WIN

**R****ETURN ON ****O****UR ****N****ATION’S ****I****NVESTMENT**

**Notes:**
Command of the seas...with U.S. sovereign power forward ... therefore provides timely response capability with the resultant power to shape the international security environment in ways favorable to our nation.
Moreover, if crisis does become war...naval forces already forward also provide the critical, early combat power...from the sea...assuring access to the battlespace for the joint force...and then becoming part of the larger joint warfighting effort. 
Assured access is an issue for the entire joint force...no one owns the whole pie.  But, naval forces will be the critical enabler by dint of their already “being there” for their daily business...creating the conditions that ease the access for follow-on forces.  

## Slide 13

**Notes:**
To discuss the concept of the Navy’s role in assured access, I’ll use an operational example.
We’ll go to the Persian Gulf – a place that we tend to be, day in and day out, going about our daily business of securing our economic interests with the sovereign power to respond to crises and shape the region.
The Persian Gulf is a place that we will continue to operate ... in defense of our nation’s vital interests overseas.

## Slide 14

**Notes:**
Let me advance to the end of this decade, to the year 2009.
As we enter the Gulf, one thing is clear – this is a dense, complex environment, an environment we get to know because we operate there on a daily basis...overseas, where our nation wants to fight and win its wars.
In 2009, we see a wide array of challenges to access for the entire Joint force.  Entering the Gulf for the first time -- without the benefit of an existing knowledge network that supports “plug and play” -- any force would quickly be overwhelmed.
We will assemble those elements of information into a comprehensive regional database that is updated continuously and shared throughout the force.  With knowledge of the adversary’s centers of gravity, we are ready for the transition to offensive operations -- effects-based attacks rather than attrition warfare – while maintaining command of the seas.
And we will distribute and display that database for the warfighter not as “information” -- but as “knowledge” -- augmenting our command of the seas with speed of command.

## Slide 15

**Notes:**
Those forward-deployed, immediately employable  naval forces are available to the Joint Force Commander to project not only offensive power ashore, but defensive power as well. 
The immediately employable protective umbrella afforded by on-station Theater Ballistic Missile Defense not only lends reassurance to our allies and friends, but also provides immediate protection to our forces deploying from the United States and those present in theater, particularly in cases where land-based defenses are not present before the initiation of crisis or conflict.  
The Navy’s ability to provide that protective umbrella is critical to the Air Force’s effort to transform itself to a more expeditionary, more deployable force.

## Slide 16

**Notes:**
Those same units that project defense ashore can immediately project offense ashore in the critical, early days of conflict.  We will extend our control of the battlespace by simultaneously attacking through it.
Surface ships and submarines firing Tomahawk and other land attack munitions (e.g., LASM, ALAM, ERGM), in conjunction with strikes from the carrier air wing and early-arriving elements of the Air Force, enhance our ability to control the battlespace.
And by simultaneously controlling and attacking, we sustain access through the early phases of conflict.
Why is that important?  Because it takes us beyond sequential concepts of operations to the simultaneity that will be required to prosecute modern conflict.
We attack to control – and control by attacking.

## Slide 17

**Notes:**
It is most obvious that if the Navy is not there, we cannot maintain a knowledge base of the undersea battlespace.  The seas may be “transparent” at some point in the distant future ... but to “see” this battlespace in 2009 we will still require sensors and platforms in situ.
Here, our submarines -- deploying unmanned underwater vehicles -- are complemented by the Advanced Deployable System...a deployable hydrophone array that provides fire control quality data on nuclear and conventionally-powered submarines in  or around geographically limited areas like choke points, ports or carrier/amphibious operating locations.
The unmanned underwater vehicles will map the sea bottom on a periodic basis -- locating those “mine-like” objects so that if crisis does become war, a re-survey of the bottom will help us to expeditiously identify any “change” to the sea floor.  
The result is another example of “change management”...we need to build our understanding of the area to be able to recognize when a change has occurred and take the right action.

## Slide 18

**Notes:**
The ultimate power  projection is putting “boots on the ground.” Striking targets from the sea or from the air is not the 100% solution to every problem. The Navy will therefore remain in stride with the Marine Corps’ Ship-to-Objective Maneuver by providing lift and  supporting fires from the sea as the Marines move over and around obstacles to push the point of entry further inland.  
Here, we watch the Marines -- supported by artillery and precision strikes from the sea and a protective Theater Missile Defense umbrella -- quickly create the conditions to establish land dominance -- conducting Ship to Objective Maneuver to wrest control from the adversary of a key port and airfield.  

## Slide 19

**Notes:**
The Army’s Brigade Combat Team arrives shortly thereafter to expand that region of control -- flying in under the same protective “umbrella” of Navy Theater Missile Defense...from the sea.  In addition, the Navy’s “artillery from the sea” -- including deep land attack, as needed -- provides these Army forces with early firepower until they are established ashore.  This permits the Army’s early flow into theater to be “lighter” and more oriented to offensive operations, as less critical early lift is required to be dedicated to “defensive” systems (e.g., THAAD and heavy artillery).
And ensuring continued freedom of the seas allows the sustainment required to support those ground-based forces.  The importance of sustainment from the sea cannot be overlooked ... even those forces whose initial stocks arrive by air will ultimately be sustained from the sea in an extended operation.

## RETURN ON OUR NATION’S INVESTMENT

- COMMAND OF THE SEAS
- For A Maritime Nation
- U.S. SOVEREIGN POWER FORWARD
- Timely Crisis Response
- Power to Shape
- ASSURED ACCESS
- ENABLE THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE TO FIGHT AND WIN

**R****ETURN ON ****O****UR ****N****ATION’S ****I****NVESTMENT**

**Notes:**
That’s a quick overview of how the Navy sees the concept of assured access for the future.
But, no one owns the whole assured access pie.  It will be a joint force that will eventually fight and win our nation’s wars...which leads to my final point...how the Navy helps enable the transformation of the Joint Force to meet the challenges that lie ahead...and operationalize Joint Vision 2020.  

## ENABLING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE

**USMC:  Ship-to-Objective-Maneuver:  200nm**

**In-stride with Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare****        **

**USA:****	****	****Brigade in 96 hours**
**     ****	****	****	****	****Division in 120 hours**
**	****	****	****	****	****	****5 Divisions in 30 days**

**Project Defense, “Artillery From the Sea”, Sea Control for Army and Aerospace Expeditionary Forces**

**USAF:****	****	****1 Aerospace Expeditionary Force in 48 hours**
**         ****	****	****	****5 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces in 15 days**

**ENABLING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE**

**Notes:**
  One of the lessons from the history of warfare is that, no matter how much more sophisticated we are than our adversary, there are times when there is no substitute for the combat power that can only be brought by troops on the ground. That’s the unique capability of the Navy-Marine Corps team...mobile, flexible combat power -- operating from the high seas -- where you need it, when you need it – to put combat troops ashore.
As the Army and the Air Force pursue their transformation initiatives, the Navy’s capabilities for projecting defense ashore...from the sea...will play a critical role.  Because the Navy will provide a protective umbrella for the Aerospace Expedtionary Force and the Brigade Combat Teams as they move more quickly into theater, tying up less critical early lift with requirements for defensive systems ... while supporting an earlier transition to offensive operations as the focus for lift is more or requirements for offense.  Likewise, Navy’s “artillery from the sea”  will support early offensive operations by ground-based forces until they are established ashore and secure their initial objectives. 
 Again, Navy capabilities will play a critical role in the transformation of the U.S. military into a more responsive, more rapidly deployable Joint force for the 21st Century.   

## 60% of the Ships at Sea or Under

**60% of the Ships at Sea or Under**
**Construction Today Will Be in the Fleet in 2020**

**Notes:**
 These Services are making force structure changes and implementing new force management tools to become more expeditionary (i.e., their transformation), but the naval services have always been an expeditionary force.   
 Navy’s transformation, then, is about force posture – not just force structure.  In addition, the Navy’s focus is necessarily oriented toward force posture because our platforms, themselves, are long-term capital investments.  Nearly two-thirds of the ships sailing the seas or under construction today will still be with us in the year 2020.
  Therefore, to understand Navy’s transformation, you must look at the force posture inside our platforms, and how increasing lethality will be the result of networking these improved platforms. 

## Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)

**Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)**

**Advanced Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA)**

**Multi-functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) / LINK-16**

**Sense**

**Decide**

**Engage**

**Connect**

**Knowledge**

**Lethality**

**Remote**

**Notes:**
To illustrate the impact of this “transformation”, of how networking improved sensors with advanced weapons is improving the lethality of our forces, let me take one example.  Look inside the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.  With the small, phased-array radar (AESA), the E/F represents the distribution of powerful sensors throughout the battlespace.  It can see farther, with greater precision, and with less emitted energy -- making it less vulnerable to attack and allowing it to stand-off to engage targets in the air and on the ground.  
The pilot’s extended view of the battlespace will be linked back to the operational commander with the Multi-functional Display System and LINK-16, which will also allow him to tie into the networked information from other  sensors to provide him with an unprecedented view of the entire battlespace in near real-time.
 And with precision munitions, the F/A-18E/F’s weapon’s capacity will allow the pilot to engage more targets, find targets before they can find him, both in the air and on the ground, and engage at greater ranges. 
Looking “inside” this platform, you can see that we have significantly increased it’s lethality by improving it’s ability to sense, decide, and engage with a greater number of munitions.
 In short, improvements to weapons and sensors have directly resulted in improved lethality -- a nearly seven-fold increase in the daily aimpoint capacity of a single carrier airwing since Desert Storm.

## NUMBERS MATTER

**N****UMBERS ****M****ATTER**

**C****apability **_**and**_** ****C****apacity**

**Notes:**
 Clearly, new capabilities are required.  But to have those capabilities on hand when and where they are needed, numbers still matter.
 As you can see from this example, in the current budgetary environment, fewer ships are likely to be available to execute the national strategy by the next decade.  Those forces will be stretched thin, particularly as the Navy absorbs new missions in deep land attack and Theater Missile Defense.
 Our platforms can perform multiple missions, but fewer platforms means that we can be fewer places in support of U.S. interests overseas. 

## NUMBERS MATTER

**N****UMBERS ****M****ATTER**

**C****apability **_**and**_** ****C****apacity**

**Notes:**
As we have been required to draw down force structure over the last decade, control measures have been introduced to help allocate the risk associated with “gaps” in naval presence overseas because of already fewer numbers.  
 Previously, the Navy had the force structure to maintain a “1.0” presence (i.e., 365 days a year) with its major force elements in each of the three deployment hubs I mentioned earlier.  However, as our force structure declined ... for example, when 15 carriers (enough for 1.0 presence in each CINC AOR) declined to 13 and then 12, the Global Naval Force Presence Policy was instituted.  Each year, the CINCS – the military “customer” for naval presence – come together and apportion the risk by allocating these limited assets.  The same is true for the reduction from 14 to 12 ARGs and...

## NUMBERS MATTER

**N****UMBERS ****M****ATTER**

**C****apability **_**and**_** ****C****apacity**

**Notes:**
  ...197 to 127 surface combatants. [Note:  surface combatants and TLAM were added to GNFPP in 1995.]

## RETURN ON OUR NATION’S INVESTMENT

- COMMAND OF THE SEAS
- The “Global Commons”
- U.S. SOVEREIGN POWER FORWARD
- Demonstrated Ability to Respond
- Power to Shape
- SUSTAINED ASSURED ACCESS
- ENABLE THE
-   TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE TO FIGHT AND WIN

**R****ETURN ON ****O****UR ****N****ATION’S ****I****NVESTMENT**

**Notes:**
In summary... by being forward daily – with U.S. warfighting power – the Navy maintains the mastery of the seas that is critical to our national interests.
  Those same forces also provide the National Command Authority timely, often decisive response to crises, and support a full range of operations...from shows of force to strikes ashore.
   That same combat power is the instrument to shape regions of interest – reassuring allies while deterring potential adversaries.
And if crisis becomes war, the cost of our entry will be less if the forces that assure access are already present forward in peacetime...enabling the transformation of the joint force...ready to fight and win as part of the joint team.

## MARITIME CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- COMMAND OF THE SEAS
- The “Global Commons”
- U.S. SOVEREIGN POWER FORWARD
- Demonstrated Ability to Respond
- Power to Shape
- SUSTAINED ASSURED ACCESS
- ENABLE THE
-   TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOINT FORCE TO FIGHT AND WIN

**M****ARITIME**** C****ONCEPT**** ****OF ****O****PERATIONS**

**Notes:**
This is the return on the nation’s investment in naval forces operating under a new Maritime Concept of Operations that allows naval forces to simultaneously control and attack – commanding the seas and projecting offense and defense ashore to assure access for the Joint Force.

## Summary

**Summary**

**America has the technology to sustain access from the sea**
**Our economic, political and Joint military success require it**
**Focused investments can ensure it remains decisive**

**Notes:**
   As the President has said, a networked Navy will assure access for all our forces -- projecting power over land and sea.  We have the technology to do so...our economic, political and military success depends upon it...and with the right investments, we can ensure that it remains the decisive strategic advantage for this great nation.