# Presentation: 469004

## An Approach To Improving ThePhysical And Cyber Security Of ABulk Power System With FACTS

**An Approach To Improving The****Physical And Cyber Security Of A****Bulk Power System With FACTS**

- Mariesa Crow & Bruce McMillin
- School of Materials, Energy & Earth Resources
- Department of Computer Science
- University of Missouri-Rolla****
- Stan Atcitty
- Power Sources Development Department
- Sandia National Laboratories****

- FACTS

- Physical Attack

- Natural
- Faults

- Sandia is a multi-program laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States
- Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.****

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

**Funded in part by the Energy Storage Systems Program of the U.S. Department Of Energy  (DOE/ESS) through Sandia National Laboratories (SNL).**

## Problem Motivation

**Problem Motivation**

**Prevent Cascading failures:**
**2003 Blackout**
**Causes**
**Physical & Cyber contingencies**
**Deliberate disruption**
- Hackers
- Terrorist Activity
**	**

## Proposed Solution

**Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS)**
**Power Electronic Controllers**
**Means to modify the power flow through a particular transmission corridor**
**Integration with energy storage systems**

## US FACTS Installations

**San Diego G&E/**
**STATCOM/100 MVA**
**Mitsubishi**

**Eagle Pass (Texas)**
**Back-to-back HVDC**
**37 MVA/ ABB**

**CSWS (Texas)**
**STATCOM/ 150 MVA / W-Siemens**

**Austin Energy**
**STATCOM/ 100MVA**
**ABB**

**AEP/ Unified Power Flow Controller /100 MVA/ EPRI**

**TVA**
**STATCOM/ 100MVA**
**EPRI**

**Northeast Utilities/ STATCOM/ 150 MVA/ Areva (Alstom)**

**NYPA/ Convertible Static Compensator/ 200 MVA**

**Vermont Electric/ STATCOM/ 130 MVA/ Mitsubishi**

## Communication and coordination
Scheduling - Distributed Long-Term control
Interaction – Local Dynamic control
Vulnerabilities of the combined physical/ cyber system
Recovery and protection from physical faults and/or cyber attacks and/or human error 

- Communication and coordination
- Scheduling - Distributed Long-Term control
- Interaction – Local Dynamic control
- Vulnerabilities of the combined physical/ cyber system
- Recovery and protection from physical faults and/or cyber attacks and/or human error

**Decentralized Infrastructures**

## Identify cascading failure scenarios for test systems

## Cascading Scenario

**Cascading Scenario**
**Outage 48-49**

- 45

- 46

- W.Lancst

- Crooksvl

- 47

- 69

- 68

- 49

- 66

- 65

- Zanesvll

- 48

- 50

- Philo

- MuskngumN

- MuskngumS

- 67

- Natrium

- Kammer

- 44

- WMVernon

- N.Newark

- SpornW

- Summerfl

- 62

- 64

- 37

- 34

- 36

- NwLibrty

- 39

- 40

- 41

- 42

- 43

- S.Kenton

- 38

- S.Tiffin

- West End

- Howard

- Rockhill

- EastLima

- Sterling

- Portsmth

- Bellefnt

- 74

- 75

- SthPoint

- CollCrnr

- 23

- TannrsCk

- Trenton

- 24

- Portsmth

- Hillsbro

- 72

- 70

- 71

- Sargents

- 73

- NPortsmt

- WLima

- 35

- 54

- 51

## Cascading Scenario

**Cascading Scenario**
**Outage 48-49**

- 45

- 46

- W.Lancst

- Crooksvl

- 47

- 69

- 68

- 49

- 66

- 65

- Zanesvll

- 48

- 50

- Philo

- MuskngumN

- MuskngumS

- 67

- Natrium

- Kammer

- 44

- WMVernon

- N.Newark

- SpornW

- Summerfl

- 62

- 64

- 37

- 34

- 36

- NwLibrty

- 39

- 40

- 41

- 42

- 43

- S.Kenton

- 38

- S.Tiffin

- West End

- Howard

- Rockhill

- EastLima

- Sterling

- Portsmth

- Bellefnt

- 74

- 75

- SthPoint

- CollCrnr

- 23

- TannrsCk

- Trenton

- 24

- Portsmth

- Hillsbro

- 72

- 70

- 71

- Sargents

- 73

- NPortsmt

- WLima

- 35

- 54

- 51

## Cascading Scenario

**Cascading Scenario**
**Outage 48-49**

- 45

- 46

- W.Lancst

- Crooksvl

- 47

- 69

- 68

- 49

- 66

- 65

- Zanesvll

- 48

- 50

- Philo

- MuskngumN

- MuskngumS

- 67

- Natrium

- Kammer

- 44

- WMVernon

- N.Newark

- SpornW

- Summerfl

- 62

- 64

- 37

- 34

- 36

- NwLibrty

- 39

- 40

- 41

- 42

- 43

- S.Kenton

- 38

- S.Tiffin

- West End

- Howard

- Rockhill

- EastLima

- Sterling

- Portsmth

- Bellefnt

- 74

- 75

- SthPoint

- CollCrnr

- 23

- TannrsCk

- Trenton

- 24

- Portsmth

- Hillsbro

- 72

- 70

- 71

- Sargents

- 73

- NPortsmt

- WLima

- 35

- 54

- 51

## Cascading Scenario

**Cascading Scenario**
**Outage 48-49**

- 45

- 46

- W.Lancst

- Crooksvl

- 47

- 69

- 68

- 49

- 66

- 65

- Zanesvll

- 48

- 50

- Philo

- MuskngumN

- MuskngumS

- 67

- Natrium

- Kammer

- 44

- WMVernon

- N.Newark

- SpornW

- Summerfl

- 62

- 64

- 37

- 34

- 36

- NwLibrty

- 39

- 40

- 41

- 42

- 43

- S.Kenton

- 38

- S.Tiffin

- West End

- Howard

- Rockhill

- EastLima

- Sterling

- Portsmth

- Bellefnt

- 74

- 75

- SthPoint

- CollCrnr

- 23

- TannrsCk

- Trenton

- 24

- Portsmth

- Hillsbro

- 72

- 70

- 71

- Sargents

- 73

- NPortsmt

- WLima

- 35

- 54

- 51

## FACTS Placement and Control

## FACTS Control

**Distributed Long-Term control algorithms for FACTS settings **
**Run by each processor in each FACTS**
**Alternatives**
- Max-flow algorithms
- Local optimizations
- Agent-based framework
**Assessment**
- Reduction of Overloads
- Computability

## FACTS Placement

**Placement**
**Place few FACTS in a large network for maximum benefit**

**Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) will be used to place FACTS devices in the network**

## Performance Index Metric

**Performance Index Metric**

**Gradient Descent on PI Metric****	****vs.****	****Maximum Flow **

## FACTS Interaction Laboratory (FIL)

## FIL Overview

- Construct a Laboratory System to Study and Mitigate
- Cascading Failures
- Deleterious effects of interacting power control devices
- Cyber Vulnerabilities
- Hardware in the Loop (HIL)
- Real-time Simulation Engine
- Simulate Existing Power Systems
- Inject Simulated Faults** **
- Interconnected laboratory-scale UPFC FACTS Device
- Measure actual device interaction

## FACTS Interaction LaboratoryArchitecture

- 10 KVA

- Simulation Engine (multiprocessor)

- FACTS/ESS

- FACTS/ESS

- FACTS/ESS

- A/D D/A

- A/D D/A

- A/D D/A

**Network**

## HIL Laboratory Interface

**HIL Laboratory Interface**

- Machine 1

- D/A output

- A/D input

- FACTS1

- Controllable
- Load

- Machine 2

- Machine 3

- Power System
- Simulation Engine

- Controllable
- Load

- Controllable
- Load

- FACTS2

- FACTS3

- D/A output

- A/D input

- D/A output

- A/D input

## FACTS – Flexible AC Transmission System Prototype Device

## FACTS Interaction Laboratory

**HIL Line**

**UPFC**

**Simulation**
**Engine**

## Cyber Fault Detection

## Fault Tolerance

**Define correct operation of the power system with FACTS/ESS**
**Embed as executable constraints into each FACTS/ESS computer**
**FACTS/ESS check each other during operation of distributed control algorithms**

## Cyber Fault Injection

**Attempt to confuse the FACTS embedded computers**
**Attempt to disrupt the communication between FACTS embedded computers**
**Confuse the power system’s operation**

## Error Coverage of Distributed Executable Correctness Constraints(Maximum Flow Algorithm)

## System Dynamic Control

## Power Network Embedded With FACTS Devices

- Tie-line flow

- CONTROL
- AREA A

- CONTROL
- AREA B

- A decentralized power network embedded with FACTS devices can be viewed as a
- hybrid dynamical system (Differential-algebraic-discrete-event).
- While the FACTS devices offer improved controllability, their actions in a
- decentralized power network can cause deleterious interactions among them.

## Performance of FACTS controllers

**Performance of FACTS controllers**
** ****with ideal observability **

**Uncontrollable modes in generator **
**speeds due to device interactions **

## Project Benchmarks

**Construction of HIL**
**Demonstration of Cascading Failures**
**Placement and Control**
**Hardware/Software Architecture**
**Cyber Fault Detection**
**Dynamic Control**
**Visualization**

## Special Thanks

**Imre Gyuk – DOE Energy Storage**
**Stan Atcitty – Sandia National Lab**
**John Boyes – Sandia National Lab**