# Presentation: 865583

## Nevada BLM Fire & Aviation-Driver Training

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**Developed February 2007 - Updated April 2007**

## Preface

- 	**This Driver Training Course is a 16-hour course designed to ensure the student possesses the prerequisite knowledge and skills necessary to perform the task of vehicle operator for pickups, sports utility vehicles, and specialized equipment such as engines, water tenders, and crew carriers.  **
**	****The course is divided into 3 separate modules; Module 1 (4 hrs) covers BLM driving policy, attitudes and perceptions, and case studies utilizing select accident investigation reports from past seasons; Module 2 (4 hrs) includes training on completing periodic, pre-use, and post-use maintenance checks, utilization of the Fire Engine Maintenance and Procedure Record (FEMPR), and basic vehicle control exercises (cone course driving exercises); Module 3 (8 hrs) includes off road and on road driving exercises during which drivers will be evaluated by cadre.  **
**	**
**	****Over half of the course time is devoted to actual hands on driving exercises for the students. The students and local supervisors are encouraged to use these exercises on a periodic basis throughout the season to ensure currency, and build proficiency in the skills associated with the operation of motor vehicles in support of fire operations.**

## Preface

- 	**While many of the objectives and material for this training course were taken from the NWCG approved S-216 (Driving for the Fire Service) and PMS 419 (Engine Operator Training), the total required time and objectives of this Driver Training Course do not satisfy the requirements for either S-216 or PMS 419.  This course should not be considered as a substitute for either S-216 or PMS 419 and home units should still consider providing this suggested NWCG training. **
**	**
**	****In addition, it is Bureau policy that all drivers receive the National Safety Council Defensive Driver Training within 3 months of entering on duty, with refresher training every 3 years after the initial training.  Home units are still required to provide this training to their employees within the established time frames.  **
**	**
**	****This course was originally developed by the Nevada State Office Bureau of Land Management to meet agency training needs and requirements for vehicle operators.  It is the responsibility of the home unit to update changes in Bureau policy, or if home unit policy is more stringent, to amend the training to include this. **

## MODULE 1Unit 1- Introduction and Training Requirements

**OBJECTIVES:**
- 	1. Introduce the training cadre.
- 	2. Introduce the students.
- 	3. Identify and explain any administrative concerns.
- 	4. Explain course process, expectations, and requirements.
- 	5. Introduce the course to the students.

## INSTRUCTOR PREREQUISITES

- 	The cadre must be experienced vehicle operators to ensure proper demonstration of driving techniques.  The recommended ratio of students to instructors is 5 to 1.  The recommended ratio of students to vehicles is 3 to 1.  It is recommended that the maximum class size not exceed 25 students.

## TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 

- A.  Operators of Wildland Fire Engines, Water Tenders, and Crew Carriers (hereafter referred to as specialized fire equipment)
- 	1.  	Module 1 (4 hrs), Module 2 (4 hrs), and Module 3 (8 hrs) are 	required.
- B.  The initial year this training is implemented (2007) all operators of specialized fire equipment will be required to complete the full 16 hour training.  After meeting initial training requirements, an annual refresher will be required.

## TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

- 1.  After initial implementation in 2007, successful completion of S-216 (Driving for the Fire Service) or PMS-419 (Engine Operator Training) will satisfy training and refresher training requirements for the Driver Training Course.
- 	a. For example, in 2008, if an employee has successfully completed S-216 or ENOP training, they are not required to take the Driver Training Course.
- 	Or
- 	b. After initially receiving the Driver Training Course in 2007, if an employee successfully completes either S-216 or Engine Operator Academy in 2008 they have satisfied training requirements.

## TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

- 3.  Alternative courses such as National Safety Council sanctioned Emergency Vehicle Operator Course (EVOC) or other courses home units wish to utilize as driver refresher training must be approved by the Nevada State Office Deputy Fire Management Officer on a case by case basis.
- 	a. Defensive Driver Training remains a required training course for all BLM employees who operate any motor vehicle.

## STUDENT PREREQUISITES 

- A. The students must possess a current motor vehicle license, and possess the appropriate agency specific licensing for participation in the Module 3 driving exercises (ie. only students with Class B Commercial Driver’s Licenses or Instruction Permits will be allowed to drive vehicles with GVWR of 26,000 lbs or greater) .
- B.  Home units should also have a current DI-131 (Application for U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator’s Identification Card) and form OF-345 (Physical Fitness Inquiry for Motor Vehicle Operators - Appendix A) on file for all students prior to participation in training.  Similar forms are acceptable.

## Performance Objectives 

- The student will be able to:
- 1. Safely and efficiently operate a fire vehicle in the fire environment by applying the appropriate driving skills and techniques for the specific situation.
- 2. Apply basic maintenance procedures to ensure vehicle readiness.
- 3. Act in a professional manner when operating a vehicle, includes adhering to all Bureau policy related to motor vehicle operation.

## Evaluations

- 1.  Group exercises and discussions will be utilized to check the individual’s progress toward meeting the instructional objectives for each unit.
- 2. The field exercises will be evaluated by the use of a Driver’s Performance Evaluation Booklet (See Appendix B). The Performance Evaluation Booklet contains forms for evaluating each phase of the hands on driving exercises. The sum of these forms will form an overall assessment of the individual’s ability to perform the driving tasks. As training is an ongoing process, it is hoped that this information will help guide the local supervisor in identifying and planning additional opportunities to allow individuals to continue the development of their driving skills.

## Course Agenda

- Day One
- 0800-0830	Unit 1 - Introduction and Course Overview
- 0830-0915	Unit 2 – BLM Driving Policy
- 0915-0930	BREAK
- 0930-1130	Unit 3 – Case Study of 2006 Accident Reports
- 1130-1200	Unit 4 – Attitudes and Situational Awareness – STOP
- 1200-1300	LUNCH
- 1300-1330	Unit 5 – Understanding and Checking Your Vehicle
- 1330-1500	Unit 5 Exercise – Vehicle Check and Documentation
- 1500-1700	Unit 6 Exercise – Basic Vehicle Control
- Day Two
- 0800-1600	Unit 7 / Unit 8 Exercises – Vehicle Control Tasks 		(Urban, Suburban, Rural) and Off-Road Driving 			Exercises
- 1600-1700	Close Out and Review

## Unit 2- BLM Driving Policy

**OBJECTIVES:**
- 1.  Identify the 3 main publications that detail BLM emergency and non-emergency driving policy.
- 2.  Discuss driving duty limitations and requirements of vehicle operators.
- 3.  Engage in a discussion about Bureau policies and regulations.
**INTRODUCTION:**
- The purpose of this unit is to review all BLM driving and equipment operation policy.  All employees are required to follow this policy while operating BLM vehicles or equipment.  It is important to understand that driving duty day limitations change depending on whether or not you are working in support of an emergency incident or non-emergency incident.

## Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

**Driving Standard**
- 	All employees driving motor vehicles are responsible for the proper care, operation, maintenance and protection of the vehicle. The use of government owned, rented, or leased motor vehicles is for official business only. Unauthorized use is prohibited.

## General Driving Policy
• 	Employees must have a valid state driver’s license in their possession for the appropriate vehicle class before operating the vehicle. Operating a government-owned or rental vehicle without a valid state driver’s license could result in disciplinary action.
All drivers whose job duties require the use of a motor vehicle will receive initial defensive driver training within three months of entering on duty and refresher driver training every three years thereafter.
The operator and all passengers are required to wear seat belts and obey all federal and state laws.
All traffic violations or parking tickets will be the operator’s responsibility.
All driving requiring a CDL will be performed in accordance with applicable Department of Transportation regulations.

- • 	Employees must have a valid state driver’s license in their possession for the appropriate vehicle class before operating the vehicle. Operating a government-owned or rental vehicle without a valid state driver’s license could result in disciplinary action.
- All drivers whose job duties require the use of a motor vehicle will receive initial defensive driver training within three months of entering on duty and refresher driver training every three years thereafter.
- The operator and all passengers are required to wear seat belts and obey all federal and state laws.
- All traffic violations or parking tickets will be the operator’s responsibility.
- All driving requiring a CDL will be performed in accordance with applicable Department of Transportation regulations.

**Chapter 7 (Safety)**

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

- BLM - All employees operating a Government motor vehicle will be required to submit Form DI-131 (Application for U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator’s Identification Card) and OF-345 (Physical Fitness Inquiry for Motor Vehicle Operators). When the supervisor signs the DI-131, the employee is authorized to operate Government-owned or leased vehicles, or privately-owned vehicles on official business. Individual office forms equivalent to the OF-345 and DI-131 are acceptable.
- BLM - Employees operating any motor vehicle with a GVWR of 26,000 pounds or more, towing a vehicle 10,000 pounds GVWR or more, hauling hazardous material requiring the vehicle to be placarded, or transporting,16 or more persons, including the driver, must possess a valid Commercial Drivers License (CDL) with all applicable endorsements.

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

- BLM - Seat belts must be available and used in Bureau motor vehicles. Without exception, seat belts must be worn at all times by motor vehicle operators and passengers, regardless of the distance to be traveled or the time involved. If any employee fails to fasten their seat belt while riding in a vehicle on official business they are subject to disciplinary action as determined by local management.

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

- 	BLM/FWS/NPS - The DOI has granted wildland fire agencies a waiver to allow employees between the ages of 18 and 21 to operate agency commercial fire vehicles using a state issued CDL under the specific conditions as stated below:
- Drivers with a CDL may only drive within the state that has issued the CDL and must comply with the state’s special requirements and endorsements.

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

- These drivers must only drive vehicles that are equipped with visible and audible signals, and are easily recognized as fire fighting equipment. This excludes, but is not limited to, school buses used for crew transport and “low-boy” tractor trailers used for construction equipment transport.
- Supervisors must annually establish and document that these drivers have a valid license (i.e. that the license has not been suspended, revoked, canceled, or that the employee has not been otherwise unqualified from holding a license - 485 DM 16.3.B (1), ensure that the employee has the ability to operate the vehicle(s) safely in the operational environment assigned (485 DM 16.3.B (2), and review and validate the employee’s driving record (485 DM 16.3.B(4)).

**Notes:**
Left Out:
Wildland fire driving safety statistics from the Safety Management Information System (SMIS) will be reviewed at the end of the 2007 fire season to determine if there is any reason why the waiver should not become permanent policy.

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

**Incident Operations Driving**
- 	This policy addresses driving by personnel actively engaged in wildland fire suppression or all-risk activities; including driving while assigned to a specific incident (check-in to check-out) or during initial attack fire response (includes time required to control the fire and travel to a rest location).
- Agency resources assigned to an incident or engaged in initial attack fire response will adhere to the current agency work/rest policy for determining length of duty day.

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

- • 	No driver will drive more than 10 hours (behind the wheel) within any duty-day.
- Multiple drivers in a single vehicle may drive up to the duty-day limitation provided no driver exceeds the individual driving (behind the wheel) time limitation of 10 hours.
- A driver shall drive only if they 1 have had at least 8 consecutive hours off duty before beginning a shift. Exception to the minimum off-duty hour requirement is allowed when essential to:
- Accomplish immediate and critical suppression objectives.
- Address immediate and critical firefighter or public safety issues.

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

- As stated in the current agency work/rest policy, documentation of mitigation measures used to reduce fatigue is required for drivers who exceed 16 hour work shifts. This is required regardless of whether the driver was still compliant with the 10 hour individual (behind the wheel) driving time limitations.

## Fire Vehicle Operation Standards

Operators of all vehicles must abide by state traffic regulations. Operation of all vehicles will be conducted within the limits specified by the manufacturer.  Limitations based on tire maximum speed ratings and Gross Vehicle Weight restrictions must be followed. It is the vehicle operator’s responsibility to ensure vehicles abide by these and any other limitations specified by agency or state regulations.

- Operators of all vehicles must abide by state traffic regulations. Operation of all vehicles will be conducted within the limits specified by the manufacturer.  Limitations based on tire maximum speed ratings and Gross Vehicle Weight restrictions must be followed. It is the vehicle operator’s responsibility to ensure vehicles abide by these and any other limitations specified by agency or state regulations.

**Chapter 7 (Safety)**

## Chapter 7 (Safety)

- 	Headlights and taillights will be illuminated at all times while the vehicle is in motion. Emergency lighting will not be used except when performing suppression or prescribed fire operations, or to mitigate serious safety hazards. Overhead lighting and other emergency lighting must meet state code requirements, and will be illuminated whenever the visibility is reduced to less than 300 feet. Blue lights are not acceptable for wildland fire operations.

## Engine Water Reserve

Engine Operators will maintain at least 10 percent of the pumpable capacity of the water tank for emergency engine protection and drafting.

Chocks

At least one chock will be carried on each engine and will be properly utilized whenever the engine is parked or left unattended. This includes engine operation in a stationary mode without a driver “in place.”

- Engine Operators will maintain at least 10 percent of the pumpable capacity of the water tank for emergency engine protection and drafting.
**Chocks**
- At least one chock will be carried on each engine and will be properly utilized whenever the engine is parked or left unattended. This includes engine operation in a stationary mode without a driver “in place.”

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## Fire Extinguisher
All engines will have at least one 5 lb. ABC-rated (minimum) fire extinguisher, either in full view or in a clearly marked compartment.

Nonskid Surfaces
All surfaces will comply with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1906 Standards for Wildland Fire Apparatus (6.4.3.) guidelines.

- All engines will have at least one 5 lb. ABC-rated (minimum) fire extinguisher, either in full view or in a clearly marked compartment.
**Nonskid Surfaces**
- All surfaces will comply with National Fire Protection Association *(NFPA) 1906 Standards for Wildland Fire Apparatus *(6.4.3.) guidelines.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## First Aid Kit

Each engine shall carry, in a clearly marked compartment, a fully equipped 10-person first aid kit.

Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW)

Supervisors must ensure that the maximum allowable weight of the vehicle is not exceeded. 

- Each engine shall carry, in a clearly marked compartment, a fully equipped 10-person first aid kit.
**Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW)**
- Supervisors must ensure that the maximum allowable weight of the vehicle is not exceeded.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## Speed Limits
Posted speed limits will not be exceeded.

Lighting
All new orders for fire engine apparatus will include an overhead lighting package in accordance with statewide standards. It is recommended that the lighting package meet NFPA 1906 standards. Engines currently in service may be equipped with overhead lighting packages.

- Posted speed limits will not be exceeded.
**Lighting**
- All new orders for fire engine apparatus will include an overhead lighting package in accordance with statewide standards. It is recommended that the lighting package meet NFPA 1906 standards. Engines currently in service may be equipped with overhead lighting packages.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## Colors
Lighting packages containing blue lights are not allowed and must be replaced.  Blue lights have been reserved for law enforcement and must not be used on fire vehicles. A red, white, and amber combination is the accepted color scheme for fire.

Light Use
While off-road and/or during suppression, prescribed fire or other emergency activities, headlights and taillights shall remain illuminated at all times while the vehicle is in operation. Overhead lighting (or other appropriate emergency lights) shall be illuminated whenever visibility is reduced to less than 300 feet.

- Lighting packages containing blue lights are not allowed and must be replaced.  Blue lights have been reserved for law enforcement and must not be used on fire vehicles. A red, white, and amber combination is the accepted color scheme for fire.
**Light Use**
- While off-road and/or during suppression, prescribed fire or other emergency activities, headlights and taillights shall remain illuminated at all times while the vehicle is in operation. Overhead lighting (or other appropriate emergency lights) shall be illuminated whenever visibility is reduced to less than 300 feet.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## 
On-Board Flammable Liquid Storage

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations state, “only approved metal containers, of not more than 5 gallons capacity, having a spring-closing lid and spout cover and so designed that it will safely relieve internal pressure when subjected to  fire exposure, be used for storing or transporting flammable liquids” (29 CFR 1910.106). 

To comply with OSHA requirements and agency directives, only OSHA approved, type II metal safety cans should be used. Approved are the 2-in-1 polyethylene containers (Dolmars) used to fill chainsaws and steel Jerry cans that are used as a fuel tank for Mark III pumps. Cans must be clearly marked as to their content (e.g., gasoline, diesel, drip torch fuel). Dolmars must also be marked with the fuel oil ratio and the date of the saw gas mix so its suitability for use can be easily determined.

**On-Board Flammable Liquid Storage**
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations state, “*only* *approved metal containers, of not more than 5 gallons capacity, having a spring-closing lid and spout cover and so designed that it will safely relieve internal pressure when subjected to  fire exposure, be used for storing or transporting flammable liquids*” (29 CFR 1910.106).
- To comply with OSHA requirements and agency directives, only OSHA approved, type II metal safety cans should be used. Approved are the 2-in-1 polyethylene containers (Dolmars) used to fill chainsaws and steel Jerry cans that are used as a fuel tank for Mark III pumps. Cans must be clearly marked as to their content (e.g., gasoline, diesel, drip torch fuel). Dolmars must also be marked with the fuel oil ratio and the date of the saw gas mix so its suitability for use can be easily determined.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## BLM - Drip Torch Fuel Transportation and Dispensing

Reference Instruction Memorandum FA IM. 2005-030. This IM provides direction for drip torch fuel transportation and dispensing to bring BLM equipment and practices into compliance with applicable regulations and nationally recognized standards. It also provides direction on procurement of new equipment.

- Reference Instruction Memorandum FA IM. 2005-030. This IM provides direction for drip torch fuel transportation and dispensing to bring BLM equipment and practices into compliance with applicable regulations and nationally recognized standards. It also provides direction on procurement of new equipment.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## Fire Engine Maintenance Procedure and Record
Apparatus safety and operational inspections will be accomplished either on a post-fire or daily basis. Offices are required to document these inspections.  Periodic maintenance (as required by the manufacturer) shall be performed at the intervals recommended and properly documented. All annual inspections will include a pump gallon per minute (GPM) test to ensure the pump/plumbing system is operating at desired specifications.

- Apparatus safety and operational inspections will be accomplished either on a post-fire or daily basis. Offices are required to document these inspections.  Periodic maintenance (as required by the manufacturer) shall be performed at the intervals recommended and properly documented. All annual inspections will include a pump gallon per minute (GPM) test to ensure the pump/plumbing system is operating at desired specifications.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

## Engine Inventories

An inventory of supplies and equipment carried on each vehicle is required to maintain accountability and to obtain replacement items lost or damaged on incidents. The standard inventory for engines is found in Appendix R.

- An inventory of supplies and equipment carried on each vehicle is required to maintain accountability and to obtain replacement items lost or damaged on incidents. The standard inventory for engines is found in Appendix R.

**Chapter 15 (Firefighting Equipment)**

**Notes:**
Left Out:
NWCG Duty Day National Incident Operations Driving Standards Memo
Discuss that there is no 15 hour duty day for CDL Drivers, refer to memo

## Fireline Handbook Policy

## Chapter 1 – Firefighting Safety 

**Personnel Transportation Page 53**
- Overhead should have a driver whenever possible.
- All passengers in vehicles shall be seated and seat-belted with arms and legs inside vehicle.
- Personnel and unsecured tools will not be transported together.
- Driver must be qualified for the vehicle and operating conditions. If not, remove them from driving duties.
- When traveling to a fire, observe all traffic signals, safe speed limits, and safety rules.
- Driver should walk around vehicle to make sure all is clear before departure.
- Driver is responsible for arrangements to ensure that if chock blocks are provided, they are in place before loading, unloading, or when parked.
- When transporting personnel, the driver shall not leave his/her seat until the vehicle is securely chocked. NEVER load or unload personnel from an UNCHOCKED VEHICLE.
-  Driver shall conduct a daily mechanical check of vehicle before driving. Unsafe equipment should be removed from service and reported to the Ground Support Unit for repair.
- Driver should use spotter outside of vehicle when backing or turning around.
- Recommend that vehicles be operated with headlights on at all times.

## Engine Operations Page 60

All vehicles going to fires should stop for traffic lights and stop signs, even when using emergency warning lights, siren, and air horns.  Watch for oncoming traffic.
Mark vehicles parked on highway at fires by flags or warning lights in front and back to warn motorists of presence of equipment and personnel.
An engine operator, a hose puller, and a nozzle operator are desirable for effective use of engines in performing fire suppression operations.
Park engines on the side of road away from oncoming fire to reduce heat exposure on equipment and to allow other vehicles to pass. DO NOT BLOCK ROAD WITH YOUR ENGINE.
Engine will be positioned for a quick getaway.
Engines should be attended at all times.
Nozzle operators should wear eye protection.
When fires make hot runs upslope, it is safer to draw back to the flanks and let the fire cross the road than to attempt a frontal assault.
Adequate supervision and good communications, including hand signals, are necessary for safe, effective engine work.

- All vehicles going to fires should stop for traffic lights and stop signs, even when using emergency warning lights, siren, and air horns.  Watch for oncoming traffic.
- Mark vehicles parked on highway at fires by flags or warning lights in front and back to warn motorists of presence of equipment and personnel.
- An engine operator, a hose puller, and a nozzle operator are desirable for effective use of engines in performing fire suppression operations.
- Park engines on the side of road away from oncoming fire to reduce heat exposure on equipment and to allow other vehicles to pass. DO NOT BLOCK ROAD WITH YOUR ENGINE.
- Engine will be positioned for a quick getaway.
- Engines should be attended at all times.
- Nozzle operators should wear eye protection.
- When fires make hot runs upslope, it is safer to draw back to the flanks and let the fire cross the road than to attempt a frontal assault.
- Adequate supervision and good communications, including hand signals, are necessary for safe, effective engine work.

**Chapter 1 – Firefighting Safety**

## BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2 

## 4.2 Procedures

When an employee’s duties require operation of a motor vehicle for official business, whether BLM-owned, GSA Fleet, commercially leased, or privately owned, the employee will be required to submit a Form DI-131 (Application for U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operators Identification Card) and Form OF-345 (Physical Fitness Inquiry for Motor Vehicle Operators) or equivalent form, to obtain driving authorization. The employee must hold a valid state driver’s license in order to obtain and retain the authorization. Authorization to drive on official business must be renewed at the time the state driver’s license is renewed or a minimum of every 4 years.

- When an employee’s duties require operation of a motor vehicle for official business, whether BLM-owned, GSA Fleet, commercially leased, or privately owned, the employee will be required to submit a Form DI-131 (Application for U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operators Identification Card) and Form OF-345 (Physical Fitness Inquiry for Motor Vehicle Operators) or equivalent form, to obtain driving authorization. The employee must hold a valid state driver’s license in order to obtain and retain the authorization. Authorization to drive on official business must be renewed at the time the state driver’s license is renewed or a minimum of every 4 years.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## A. Driving Limitations

	1. Maximum Driving Time Restriction. Employees will not exceed 8 hours of driving time (behind the wheel) during a 16-hour duty period.  Breaks of 15 minutes are recommended every 2 hours when driving continuously.

	2. Rest Requirement. At least 8 consecutive hours of rest, without duty, are required prior to each duty period requiring driving.

	3. Other Limitations. Management/employees may place further limitations on the above hours of duty and/or driving time due to safety  factors, i.e., fatigue, weather, illness. Supervisor should be notified of changes and delays.

	4. Fire Emergency Driving. Refer to BLM Manual 9210.5.

- 	1. **Maximum Driving Time Restriction**. Employees will not exceed 8 hours of driving time (behind the wheel) during a 16-hour duty period.  Breaks of 15 minutes are recommended every 2 hours when driving continuously.
- 	2. **Rest Requirement**. At least 8 consecutive hours of rest, without duty, are required prior to each duty period requiring driving.
- 	3. **Other Limitations. **Management/employees may place further limitations on the above hours of duty and/or driving time due to safety  factors, i.e., fatigue, weather, illness. Supervisor should be notified of changes and delays.
- 	4. **Fire Emergency Driving. **Refer to BLM Manual 9210.5.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## B. Types of Operators
	1. Operators of Sedans and Light Trucks. The 5 CFR 930 requires the employee to have a valid state drivers License in his or her possession at all times while driving  on official business. An incidental operator is any employee who is required to operate a motor vehicle in order to properly carry out his/her assigned duties but whose principal duties are not operating a motor vehicle and his/her position is not classified as a motor vehicle operator.

	2. Full-Time Operators. Employees operating any motor vehicle with a GVWR of 26,000 pounds or more (BLM policy also includes fire pumpers of 15,000 GVWR), towing a vehicle 10,000 pounds GVWR or more, hauling hazardous material requiring the vehicle to be placarded, or transporting 16 or more persons, including the driver, must possess a valid Commercial Drivers License (CDL) with all applicable endorsements. Employee shall be at least 21 years of age and will comply with the necessary health monitoring requirements for a CDL. Authorization must be noted in the personnel file on Form DI-131 or equivalent.

- 	1. **Operators of Sedans and Light Trucks**. The 5 CFR 930 requires the employee to have a valid state drivers License in his or her possession at all times while driving  on official business. An incidental operator is any employee who is required to operate a motor vehicle in order to properly carry out his/her assigned duties but whose principal duties are not operating a motor vehicle and his/her position is not classified as a motor vehicle operator.
- 	2. **Full-Time Operators**. Employees operating any motor vehicle with a GVWR of 26,000 pounds or more (BLM policy also includes fire pumpers of 15,000 GVWR), towing a vehicle 10,000 pounds GVWR or more, hauling hazardous material requiring the vehicle to be placarded, or transporting 16 or more persons, including the driver, must possess a valid Commercial Drivers License (CDL) with all applicable endorsements. Employee shall be at least 21 years of age and will comply with the necessary health monitoring requirements for a CDL. Authorization must be noted in the personnel file on Form DI-131 or equivalent.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

**Notes:**
Left Off:
3. Operators of Specialized Equipment. Authorization to operate specialized equipment, e.g., 4x4 vehicles, dump trucks, front-end loaders, dozers, forklifts, backhoes, tracksters, skid-steer equipment, snowmobiles, all terrain vehicles (ATV), boats, etc., must be noted in the personnel file or maintained following local record keeping procedures.

## C. Supervisory Responsibility. Supervisors are responsible for ensuring that employees can satisfactorily operate the vehicle/equipment for which they are authorized. Supervisors have the authority to restrict or terminate authorizations of poor or unsafe drivers. Supervisors are responsible for educating the employee regarding BLM/Government policy on:
1. Mandatory seat belt use.
2. Alcohol/drugs prohibition.
3. Vehicle misuse.
4. Official passengers.
5. Accident reports.

- 1. Mandatory seat belt use.
- 2. Alcohol/drugs prohibition.
- 3. Vehicle misuse.
- 4. Official passengers.
- 5. Accident reports.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## D. Poor Drivers/Unsafe Drivers. A driver whose known deficiencies make his/her driving unsafe will not drive on official business until deficiencies are remedied, or his/her driving must be restricted to compensate for limiting factors. Any driver who has a poor accident record, is careless, uses poor judgment at the wheel, or has numerous driving violations may have their driving privileges suspended or revoked even though they possess a valid state drivers license. 

E. Drivers Training. All drivers whose job duties require the use of a motor vehicle will receive initial defensive driver training within 3 months of entering on duty and refresher driver training every 3 years thereafter.

- E. **Drivers Training**. All drivers whose job duties require the use of a motor vehicle will receive initial defensive driver training within 3 months of entering on duty and refresher driver training every 3 years thereafter.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## 4.3 Equipment
	Government-owned or Government-leased vehicles will be maintained in good mechanical condition.

	A. Defective Vehicle. Vehicle defects identified by the operator or during safety inspections shall be immediately reported to the supervisor and fleet manager. Defective vehicles shall be removed from service until repaired.

	B. Disabled Vehicle. Only authorized emergency repairs may be made to a government vehicle by the operator. If necessary, have it towed. (Refer to the vehicle book).

- 	Government-owned or Government-leased vehicles will be maintained in good mechanical condition.
- 	A. **Defective Vehicle**. Vehicle defects identified by the operator or during safety inspections shall be immediately reported to the supervisor and fleet manager. Defective vehicles shall be removed from service until repaired.
- 	B. **Disabled Vehicle**. Only authorized emergency repairs may be made to a government vehicle by the operator. If necessary, have it towed. (Refer to the vehicle book).

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## C. Vehicle Inspections. Monthly vehicle inspections shall be performed and documented by the vehicle operator or designated person. The inspection shall include checking vehicle lights (brake, tail, backup), mirrors, wipers, washers, defroster, gauges, brakes, fluids, and belts. Operators will ensure emergency equipment (first aid kit, reflectors, jack/lug wrench) is in the vehicle.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## D. Seat Belts. Seat belts must be available and used in Bureau motor vehicles. (Reference Executive Order 13043, April 16, 1997).

	1. Without exception, seat belts must be worn at all times by motor vehicle operators and passengers, regardless of the distance to be traveled or the time involved. If any employee fails to fasten his/her seat belt while riding in a vehicle on official business, he/she is subject to disciplinary action as determined by local management. (Reference 370 DM Appendix A).

	2. All heavy, self-propelled equipment fitted with rollover protective structures must have a seat belt for the operator. Seat belt use by the operator is mandatory.

- 	1. Without exception, seat belts must be worn at all times by motor vehicle operators and passengers, regardless of the distance to be traveled or the time involved. If any employee fails to fasten his/her seat belt while riding in a vehicle on official business, he/she is subject to disciplinary action as determined by local management. (Reference 370 DM Appendix A).
- 	2. All heavy, self-propelled equipment fitted with rollover protective structures must have a seat belt for the operator. Seat belt use by the operator is mandatory.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## E. Safety/Survival Equipment. Every field vehicle shall be equipped with warning flags or reflectors, a tool kit, and a first aid kit. Additional emergency equipment may be carried in each vehicle as determined by local need.

F. Fire Extinguishers. Approved fire extinguishers are required in buses, ambulances, fire engines, fire trucks, heavy motorized mobile equipment, special use vehicles, and as required by Department of Transportation (e.g., hauling of hazardous materials, such as gasoline, explosives, chemicals, etc.)(49 CFR 393.95). Fire extinguishers (ABC type) are not required in other vehicles, except by order of the State Director. If installed, they must always be properly maintained and inspected annually.

- F. **Fire Extinguishers**. Approved fire extinguishers are required in buses, ambulances, fire engines, fire trucks, heavy motorized mobile equipment, special use vehicles, and as required by Department of Transportation (e.g., hauling of hazardous materials, such as gasoline, explosives, chemicals, etc.)(49 CFR 393.95). Fire extinguishers (ABC type) are not required in other vehicles, except by order of the State Director. If installed, they must always be properly maintained and inspected annually.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## G. Accident Reporting Kit. All Bureau-owned or operated motor vehicles including off-road vehicles and special use equipment will carry a packet containing all accident report forms and other information needed by the driver in case of an accident or other emergency. These packets will be General Services Administration (GSA) or BLM Motor Vehicle Accident Reporting Kits.

	1. SF-91 Operator’s Report of Motor Vehicle Accident
	2. SF-94 Statement of Witness
	3. DI-134 Report of Accident/Incident, or similar
	4. CA-1 Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claim for Continuation of Pay/Compensation 

- 	1. SF-91 Operator’s Report of Motor Vehicle Accident
- 	2. SF-94 Statement of Witness
- 	3. DI-134 Report of Accident/Incident, or similar
- 	4. CA-1 Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claim for Continuation of Pay/Compensation

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## 4.4 Vehicle Servicing and Repairs

	Maintain and operate vehicles as recommended by the manufacturer. Comply with GSA and BLM requirements on use, care, maintenance, and inspections contained in the looseleaf vehicle book in each vehicle. In case of accident, be familiar with WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF ACCIDENT material.  Additionally all drivers should:

	A. Maintain records of all repairs and inspections.
	B. When the tread depth of any tire on the front steering wheels of any vehicle exceeding 10,000 GVWR falls below 4/32 inch, the tire will be replaced.
	C. Keep interior and exterior of vehicle clean at all times and free of trash and loose items.

- 	Maintain and operate vehicles as recommended by the manufacturer. Comply with GSA and BLM requirements on use, care, maintenance, and inspections contained in the looseleaf vehicle book in each vehicle. In case of accident, be familiar with *WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF ACCIDENT* material.  Additionally all drivers should:
- 	A. Maintain records of all repairs and inspections.
- 	B. When the tread depth of any tire on the front steering wheels of any vehicle exceeding 10,000 GVWR falls below 4/32 inch, the tire will be replaced.
- 	C. Keep interior and exterior of vehicle clean at all times and free of trash and loose items.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## 	D. Have maintenance done by a qualified mechanic. Always check items repaired before driving vehicle away from repair shop.

	E. Comply with local laws on studded tire use.

	F. Emergency equipment and tools carried inside of vehicles shall be secured.

	G. Securely anchor weight ballasts in pickup trucks, if needed. Do not use rocks or boulders.

- 	E. Comply with local laws on studded tire use.
- 	F. Emergency equipment and tools carried inside of vehicles shall be secured.
- 	G. Securely anchor weight ballasts in pickup trucks, if needed. Do not use rocks or boulders.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## 	H. If vehicles or equipment to be used or transported are equipped with hydraulic lifts, ensure that they are secured in place with safety locks or other devices to prevent accidental lowering.

	I. Before adjusting the chassis of a dump truck with the dump box in an elevated position, secure body with props to prevent accidental lowering.

	J. Use only approved-type safety cans for storage and transportation of gasoline and other flammable liquids. Approved metal cans carried in a pickup bed with a plastic liner can become highly charged with static electricity. Grounding is to be done by placing the safety can on the ground or by using grounding devices.

- 	I. Before adjusting the chassis of a dump truck with the dump box in an elevated position, secure body with props to prevent accidental lowering.
- 	J. Use only approved-type safety cans for storage and transportation of gasoline and other flammable liquids. Approved metal cans carried in a pickup bed with a plastic liner can become highly charged with static electricity. Grounding is to be done by placing the safety can on the ground or by using grounding devices.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## 4.5 Trailers Less Than 10,000 lbs GVW. All drivers towing trailers must be properly qualified and authorized.

	A. Vehicles towing trailers must comply with local, State, and Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations concerning size and weight of towing vehicle. Towing vehicles must have sufficient heavy brakes, and be heavy enough to ensure complete braking control in stopping and holding trailer.

- 	A. Vehicles towing trailers must comply with local, State, and Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations concerning size and weight of towing vehicle. Towing vehicles must have sufficient heavy brakes, and be heavy enough to ensure complete braking control in stopping and holding trailer.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## B. All trailers shall be equipped with suitable warning devices (i.e., reflective triangles) for use in emergency situations.
C. All trailers shall be equipped with standard workable trailer lights and stoplights.
D. All horse and similar trailers shall be equipped with trailer jacks or loading gear.
E. Use of a safety chain is mandatory.
F. Trailers, having 1,500 pounds gross trailer weight and over must be equipped with brakes adequate to stop and hold the trailer.
G. Electric breakaway switch to automatically apply trailer brakes is required. 

- C. All trailers shall be equipped with standard workable trailer lights and stoplights.
- D. All horse and similar trailers shall be equipped with trailer jacks or loading gear.
- E. Use of a safety chain is mandatory.
- F. Trailers, having 1,500 pounds gross trailer weight and over must be equipped with brakes adequate to stop and hold the trailer.
- G. Electric breakaway switch to automatically apply trailer brakes is required.

**BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2**

## Discussion Questions

**1)  What are the three main documents where BLM driving policy (emergency and non-emergency) can be found?**
**2)  How many hours is one driver allowed to drive in support of fire operations per day?**
**3)  How many hours in a single driver allowed to drive in a non-emergency situation per day?**
**4)  What is the length of a duty day, is there a difference for CDL and non-CDL licensed engine drivers?**
**5)  In relation to driving standards and training, what are supervisors responsible for ensuring and / or enforcing?**

## Unit 3- Case Studies of 2006 Vehicle Accident Reports 

**OBJECTIVES:**
- 	1.  Reference and apply BLM policies related to vehicle operations.
- 	2.  Apply lessons learned from accident investigation reports and develop recommendations to prevent similar incidents.

## INTRODUCTION:

	The accident reports represented in this unit should be updated annually to be used as Driver Refresher Training.  

	The topics covered in the accident reports should naturally lead to discussion and participation by the students. It is important that the discussion focuses on the vehicle operator’s role in the events. It is not the intent of these case studies to find fault or place blame on the individuals involved, but to introduce the students to “real” situations that they could find themselves in. Emphasis should be on what they would do if given the same situation, not what these individuals did wrong.

- 	The accident reports represented in this unit should be updated annually to be used as Driver Refresher Training.
- 	The topics covered in the accident reports should naturally lead to discussion and participation by the students. It is important that the discussion focuses on the vehicle operator’s role in the events. It is not the intent of these case studies to find fault or place blame on the individuals involved, but to introduce the students to “real” situations that they could find themselves in. Emphasis should be on what they would do if given the same situation, not what these individuals did wrong.

**Unit 3- Case Studies of 2006 Vehicle Accident Reports**

**Notes:**
The investigation reports will be presented by first allowing the student to read through the entire report.  After finishing with the reading, students should individually answer the discussion questions.  The instructor will then walk through the timeline, photographs, and findings of each report using with a Power Point presentation.  As a group, the class will discuss each of the reports and develop lessons learned from these incidents and recommendations for how to prevent similar incidents. 

## Engine 1949 Rollover

**Narrative: **
- 	8/14/06 18:45 - Engine 1949 departs Dixon Fire in route to the Gilmer Fire with approximately half a load of water on board.
- 	8/14/06 19:15 - Engine 1949 Operator Brock Uhlig fails to negotiate an approximately 45 degree curve to the right on the O’Neill Basin Access Road.  Engine 1949 rolled over 3⁄4 of a turn to the left coming to rest on the passenger side.

## Crew members on board were James Jund, front passenger seat; Chad Holbert, right rear seat; Justin Temoke, center rear seat; and Jeremiah Braun, left rear seat. Everyone was wearing their respective seat belt. The front passenger window was closed.  All of the other windows in the engine were open. 
Brock Uhlig stated that he had slowed to between 35 and 40 mph when he lost control of the vehicle. 
After the Engine came to rest on the passenger side, the four passengers were able to unlatch their seatbelts and exit the engine through the left rear (driver’s side) window.

- Brock Uhlig stated that he had slowed to between 35 and 40 mph when he lost control of the vehicle.
- After the Engine came to rest on the passenger side, the four passengers were able to unlatch their seatbelts and exit the engine through the left rear (driver’s side) window.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## The driver, Brock Uhlig, had trouble unlatching his safety belt because he was stuck between the driver’s seat and the steering wheel. Uhlig also sustained a broken upper left arm which further hampered his ability to release his seat belt.  Jeremiah Braun helped Uhlig by releasing the air control in the driver's seat.  Braun also shut off the master power switch which killed all electrical power to the vehicle. Once Uhlig released his seat belt he was still unable to exit the vehicle through a side window due to his broken arm. 
James Jund then climbed an adjacent hill and made radio contact with Dixon Fire IC, Ryan Romero.  Romero arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 20:04. 

- James Jund then climbed an adjacent hill and made radio contact with Dixon Fire IC, Ryan Romero.  Romero arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 20:04.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## 	8/14/06 20:01 – An ambulance and the Jaws of Life were ordered. 

	8/14/06 20:44 –Wells Ambulance arrived on scene.  The Jaw of Life was used to remove Engine 1949’s roof so that Uhlig could safely exit the vehicle. 

- 	8/14/06 20:44 –Wells Ambulance arrived on scene.  The Jaw of Life was used to remove Engine 1949’s roof so that Uhlig could safely exit the vehicle.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## 	8/14/06 22:12 – Wells Ambulance in route to Northeastern Nevada Regional Medical Center with Uhlig, Braun, and Jund on board. Temoke and Holbert transported in Engine 1903 by Fire Operations Supervisor Mike Pope. The Wells Ambulance and Engine 1903 were met about half­way to Elko by the Elko Ambulance.  All five Engine 1949 Crewmembers transferred to the Elko Ambulance and were taken the rest of the way to the Northeastern Nevada Regional Medical Center. 

	8/16/06 – The driver and four crew members were individually interviewed by the Fact Finding Team between 15:00 and 18:00 hours. 

- 	8/16/06 – The driver and four crew members were individually interviewed by the Fact Finding Team between 15:00 and 18:00 hours.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Investigative Process: 
	A three person Fact Finding Team (Team) appointed by the BLM State Fire Management Officer (see page 7) and assisted by an Elko BLM Law Enforcement Ranger conducted the investigation. In addition, an Accident Reconstruction Specialist was consulted to review the Team’s estimate of the vehicle speed at the time of the accident.  The investigation included an analysis of human, material, and environmental factors.  The process included interviews, a visit to the accident site, analysis of physical factors at the accident site, examination of Engine 1949, and a review of the timelines established by the Team. 

- 	A three person Fact Finding Team (Team) appointed by the BLM State Fire Management Officer (see page 7) and assisted by an Elko BLM Law Enforcement Ranger conducted the investigation. In addition, an Accident Reconstruction Specialist was consulted to review the Team’s estimate of the vehicle speed at the time of the accident.  The investigation included an analysis of human, material, and environmental factors.  The process included interviews, a visit to the accident site, analysis of physical factors at the accident site, examination of Engine 1949, and a review of the timelines established by the Team.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Engine 1949 Rollover

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

**Accident scene – Engine 1949 Rollover. Direction of travel was to left (NNE).   Note cattle guard on road.**

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

**Engine 1949 after rollover – Passenger compartment roof was **

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Engine 1949 Rollover

**Findings: **
- 1. 	BLM work/rest and incident operations driving duty day policies were adhered to.
- 	Discussion: The crew had worked a shift of approximately nine hours prior to the 	accident. The crew had taken a day off on Saturday, 8/5/06, nine days before the 	accident.  The crew had worked an average of ten hour shifts since the day off.  The crew was within policy guidelines.

## 
All crew members were current with required training. 

3.	All crew members were wearing their seat belts at the time of the incident. 

- All crew members were current with required training.
- 3.	All crew members were wearing their seat belts at the time of the incident.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Engine 1949 had a half tank of water. The center of gravity was a factor in this accident. Shifting water can change the center of gravity, affecting stability and the way the engine handles. 

Approximately half the water in the engine tank (approximately 400 gallons) was used on the Dixon Fire prior to departing for the Gilmer Fire.

- Approximately half the water in the engine tank (approximately 400 gallons) was used on the Dixon Fire prior to departing for the Gilmer Fire.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## 5. 	Road conditions: 
	There were active thunderstorms present and the accident scene had received some light spotty rain showers but not enough precipitation to affect the road surface.  

	There was a cattle guard approximately 175 feet before the curve.  The driver did not recall the cattle guard during the interview until he saw the photographs of the accident scene. 

Discussion:  The cattle guard was fairly level with the grade of the road.  The Team drove over the cattle guard a number of times at different speeds.  When crossing the cattle guard it could be felt but it did not affect the handling of the vehicle. (Ford Expedition). 

- 	There were active thunderstorms present and the accident scene had received some light spotty rain showers but not enough precipitation to affect the road surface.
- 	There was a cattle guard approximately 175 feet before the curve.  The driver did not recall the cattle guard during the interview until he saw the photographs of the accident scene.
- Discussion:  The cattle guard was fairly level with the grade of the road.  The Team drove over the cattle guard a number of times at different speeds.  When crossing the cattle guard it could be felt but it did not affect the handling of the vehicle. (Ford Expedition).

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## The surface of the gravel road prior to and at the curve where the rollover occurred was loose. The road has some light washboard going into the curve. 

The type of curve where the rollover occurred is referred to as a diminishing radius curve; i.e. the curve starts out relatively gradual and gets more severe as you continue around the curve. 

The bank of the road going into the curve was slightly positive.  Near the area where loss of control took place the bank of the road changed to slightly negative. 

- The type of curve where the rollover occurred is referred to as a diminishing radius curve; i.e. the curve starts out relatively gradual and gets more severe as you continue around the curve.
- The bank of the road going into the curve was slightly positive.  Near the area where loss of control took place the bank of the road changed to slightly negative.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## 	6.	The operator of Engine 1949 said he thought he was driving between 35 and 40 miles per hour as the Engine entered the right-hand curve.  All crew members were asked how fast they thought they were traveling. Their responses were:  
	25 to 30; 30 to 35; 20 to 25; and 25 to 30. 

- 	25 to 30; 30 to 35; 20 to 25; and 25 to 30.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## 	7.	An estimate of speed was calculated by the Team using Accident Reconstruction Analysis Techniques. Distance of skid and coefficient of friction estimated the speed to be between 42 and 44 miles per hour.  This calculation was corroborated by a professional Accident Reconstruction Specialist. 
	•	Discussion: Distance of skid was measured at 	between 153 and 163 feet with a 	coefficient of 	friction of .40 used – loose 	gravel (See diagram on 	Page 6). 

- 	•	Discussion: Distance of skid was measured at 	between 153 and 163 feet with a 	coefficient of 	friction of .40 used – loose 	gravel (See diagram on 	Page 6).

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Overall recommendation: 

Nevada Fire and Aviation should continue to stress the need for situational awareness as it relates to unusual vehicle and/or driving conditions.  In addition, refresher training on engine operation should be developed and provided to all existing Engine Operators.

- Nevada Fire and Aviation should continue to stress the need for situational awareness as it relates to unusual vehicle and/or driving conditions.  In addition, refresher training on engine operation should be developed and provided to all existing Engine Operators.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Conclusions and Observations: 

	It is the conclusion of the Team that Engine 1949 experienced a rollover due to a combination of the following factors: 

Poor road conditions (loose gravel and light wash board).
Diminishing radius curve.
Slight negative banking.
Shifting weight of half a load of water (approximately 400 gallons).
Driving too fast for conditions.

- 	It is the conclusion of the Team that Engine 1949 experienced a rollover due to a combination of the following factors:
- Poor road conditions (loose gravel and light wash board).
- Diminishing radius curve.
- Slight negative banking.
- Shifting weight of half a load of water (approximately 400 gallons).
- Driving too fast for conditions.

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Discussion Questions

Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if       so list them?

2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?

3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?

4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?

**Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if       so list them?**
**2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?**
**3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?**
**4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?**

**Engine 1949 Rollover**

## Balance Rock Rollover

- I. INTRODUCTION
- 	A. BLM Heavy Fire Engine, with a crew of three was returning from a routine re-supply run in Twin Falls, Idaho to the Juniper Butte guard station when the driver lost control of the vehicle, resulting in a roll-over accident.
- II. SUMMARY
- 	On August 14, 2006, at approximately 1830 hours an accident occurred resulting in injuries to three fire fighters. The front seat crew passenger was transported by air-evacuation to a local hospital in Twin Falls, Id. This individual was further evaluated, and then air-evacuated to a hospital in Boise, Id., with non-life threatening injuries to the back and pelvis. The driver and third crew member were transported by ground ambulance to a local hospital in near by Twin Falls, Id., where they were treated and released.

## III. Narrative

	Fire Engine E2421 was returning from Twin Falls to the Juniper Butte Guard Station, west bound on Balanced Rock Road, traveling approximately 35-40 mph.  Approximately 11 miles west of Castleford the engine came over a rise and the road turned slightly to the right.  Crew members reported that the vehicles rear-end started to slide to the outside of the curve.  The operator then attempted to correct the “fish tail” by slightly turning the steering wheel to the right.  The operator then over-corrected the vehicle causing the engine to head to the right side of the road; again the operator attempted to regain control of the engine, over-corrected and temporarily departed the road bed. 

- 	Fire Engine E2421 was returning from Twin Falls to the Juniper Butte Guard Station, west bound on Balanced Rock Road, traveling approximately 35-40 mph.  Approximately 11 miles west of Castleford the engine came over a rise and the road turned slightly to the right.  Crew members reported that the vehicles rear-end started to slide to the outside of the curve.  The operator then attempted to correct the “fish tail” by slightly turning the steering wheel to the right.  The operator then over-corrected the vehicle causing the engine to head to the right side of the road; again the operator attempted to regain control of the engine, over-corrected and temporarily departed the road bed.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## 	In an attempt to avoid impacting the rocks along the left side of the road, the operator then applied the brakes, and steered to the right, back towards the road. After impacting one large rock with the driver side rear tire, the engine began to lean to the driver side and then made a three-quarter roll. The engine then came to rest on the passenger side lying perpendicular in the road (See Sketch and Photo 1 below).

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Balance Rock Rollover

## Balance Rock Rollover

**Balance Rock Rollover**

**Photo taken by County Sheriff of E-2421, after accident.**
**Note a portion of the Cab has been cut open to extricate trapped occupants**

## 	
	E2420 and the Engine Module Leader’s (EML) chase vehicle were following E2421 on the gravel road, and arrived on the scene within minutes of the accident.  The EML then took charge of the situation by: assessing the scene, determining injuries, and contacting the South Central Idaho Dispatch center for emergency assistance from the Twin Falls Sheriff’s Department, as well as the ambulance and Life Flight Air Service.

	At approximately 1900 hours, the fire department, ambulance and Life Flight arrived on scene.  The driver of E2421 had already exited the vehicle and was being treated along side the road by the emergency medical service (EMS) team. The local fire department used the “Jaws of Life,” to extract the two remaining crew members from the wreckage.  All three crew members were stabilized at the scene. Two crew members were transported to the local hospital where they were treated and released with minor injuries. The other one was air- lifted to the local hospital, further evaluated, and then transported to St. Alphonsus Hospital in Boise, Id. for surgery.

- 	E2420 and the Engine Module Leader’s (EML) chase vehicle were following E2421 on the gravel road, and arrived on the scene within minutes of the accident.  The EML then took charge of the situation by: assessing the scene, determining injuries, and contacting the South Central Idaho Dispatch center for emergency assistance from the Twin Falls Sheriff’s Department, as well as the ambulance and Life Flight Air Service.
- 	At approximately 1900 hours, the fire department, ambulance and Life Flight arrived on scene.  The driver of E2421 had already exited the vehicle and was being treated along side the road by the emergency medical service (EMS) team. The local fire department used the “Jaws of Life,” to extract the two remaining crew members from the wreckage.  All three crew members were stabilized at the scene. Two crew members were transported to the local hospital where they were treated and released with minor injuries. The other one was air- lifted to the local hospital, further evaluated, and then transported to St. Alphonsus Hospital in Boise, Id. for surgery.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## V. Site Investigation
	The accident occurred on Balanced Rock/Crows Nest Road, approximately 11 miles West of Castleford. This is a BLM owned gravel road, which is maintained by cooperative agreement by Owyhee County, Idaho.

	For the area of the road where the accident occurred, the road conditions are characterized as moderately rough, with a slight decline and “wash board” type bumps and ruts. Two and three foot diameter rocks are present on both sides of the road. 

	Investigation of the accident site confirmed that the wheel tracks from E2421 are consistent with the engine operator’s statement on when the engine began to “fish tail,” and eventually left the road (see Photo 2 below).

- 	The accident occurred on Balanced Rock/Crows Nest Road, approximately 11 miles West of Castleford. This is a BLM owned gravel road, which is maintained by cooperative agreement by Owyhee County, Idaho.
- 	For the area of the road where the accident occurred, the road conditions are characterized as moderately rough, with a slight decline and “wash board” type bumps and ruts. Two and three foot diameter rocks are present on both sides of the road.
- 	Investigation of the accident site confirmed that the wheel tracks from E2421 are consistent with the engine operator’s statement on when the engine began to “fish tail,” and eventually left the road (see Photo 2 below).

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Balance Rock Rollover

**Balance Rock Rollover**

**Photo is looking west along the Balance Rock road;****note the “fish tail” tracks on the right side of the road left by E2421.**

## 	As the Engine “fish tailed” to the right the Operator overcorrected, and as the photo shows, the engine then departed the road bed on the left side of the road.

	When the Engine left the road bed, the operator attempted to regain control of the engine and avoid a group of rocks. Unable to avoid the largest, the rear of the engine impacted that rock, causing damage to the rear driver side tire rim. This impact also dislodged the rock from its location and caused it to roll approximately 20 feet away.

- 	When the Engine left the road bed, the operator attempted to regain control of the engine and avoid a group of rocks. Unable to avoid the largest, the rear of the engine impacted that rock, causing damage to the rear driver side tire rim. This impact also dislodged the rock from its location and caused it to roll approximately 20 feet away.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Balance Rock Rollover

**Balance Rock Rollover**

**Photo of the hole made when rock was hit and moved. ****The large rock is in the center of the photo, just to the left of the investigator.**

## Balance Rock Rollover

**Balance Rock Rollover**

**Photo of rear tire rim that impacted the rock.**

## VI. Work Rest History

	According to crew time reports on file at the Shoshone Fire Office both the Engine Module leader and the entire crew of engine E2421 were within the 2:1 work/rest ratio guidelines set forth in the Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations.

- 	According to crew time reports on file at the Shoshone Fire Office both the Engine Module leader and the entire crew of engine E2421 were within the 2:1 work/rest ratio guidelines set forth in the *Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations.*

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## VII. Qualifications

	The following personnel qualifications have been verified with documentation:

	Engine Boss
Fully Qualified Engine Boss and Engine Operator
Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 1 (FFT1)
Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2)
Fully Qualified Incident Commander Type 4
Current valid Idaho Commercial Drivers License (CDL) 
Has attended a Defensive Driving Training course within the last 3 years

- 	The following personnel qualifications have been verified with documentation:
- 	_Engine Boss_
- Fully Qualified Engine Boss and Engine Operator
- Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 1 (FFT1)
- Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2)
- Fully Qualified Incident Commander Type 4
- Current valid Idaho Commercial Drivers License (CDL)
- Has attended a Defensive Driving Training course within the last 3 years

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Engine Crew Member 1 (Operator at the time of the accident)
Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2)
Trainee Firefighter Type 1 (FFT1)
Current valid Idaho Driver’s License 
Has attended a Defensive Driving Training course within the last year.

Engine Crew Member 2
Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 2
Current valid Idaho Driver’s License 
Has attended a Defensive Driving Training course within the last year.

- Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2)
- Trainee Firefighter Type 1 (FFT1)
- Current valid Idaho Driver’s License
- Has attended a Defensive Driving Training course within the last year.
- _Engine Crew Member 2_
- Fully Qualified Firefighter Type 2
- Current valid Idaho Driver’s License
- Has attended a Defensive Driving Training course within the last year.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## VIII. Findings

	Direct Causes

E2421 was traveling too fast for the conditions of the road.  
In the initial accident report from the Twin Falls Deputy Sheriff, the official finding was that the vehicle was operating too fast for the road conditions. (See Attachment C).
In the findings of the Investigation Team, it was also determined that the road conditions and speed were a direct cause of the accident, based on the sheriff’s report, site inspection, and interviews conducted.

- 	_Direct Causes_
- E2421 was traveling too fast for the conditions of the road.
- In the initial accident report from the Twin Falls Deputy Sheriff, the official finding was that the vehicle was operating too fast for the road conditions. (See Attachment C).
- In the findings of the Investigation Team, it was also determined that the road conditions and speed were a direct cause of the accident, based on the sheriff’s report, site inspection, and interviews conducted.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Indirect Cause

Driver’s inexperience on handling the engine on this type of roadway was an indirect cause of the accident.
During the interview with the Investigation Team, the driver stated that she had turned the wheel of the vehicle towards the road (to keep the vehicle on the road), when she should have turned the vehicle into the direction of the fish tail to stabilize the vehicle.
The Driver stated to the Investigation Team, they were traveling in Drive (5th gear). Engine compression to slow the vehicle would not be sufficient once the fuel pedal was released considering the loose gravel, topography, wash board and rutted conditions on the road. The engine was not able to make the turn and maintain position on the road.

- Driver’s inexperience on handling the engine on this type of roadway was an indirect cause of the accident.
- During the interview with the Investigation Team, the driver stated that she had turned the wheel of the vehicle towards the road (to keep the vehicle on the road), when she should have turned the vehicle into the direction of the fish tail to stabilize the vehicle.
- The Driver stated to the Investigation Team, they were traveling in Drive (5th gear). Engine compression to slow the vehicle would not be sufficient once the fuel pedal was released considering the loose gravel, topography, wash board and rutted conditions on the road. The engine was not able to make the turn and maintain position on the road.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Other Findings:

BLM/State/CDL requirements and vehicle mechanical readiness:
According to the Statement given from the Engine Boss after the accident, the decision to allow the operator to drive at the time of the accident was based on his belief that the operator “does not need a Commercial Drivers License (CDL) to drive a heavy engine on a gravel road.” He also stated that the driver was “in training to become an engine operator.”

- BLM/State/CDL requirements and vehicle mechanical readiness:
- According to the Statement given from the Engine Boss after the accident, the decision to allow the operator to drive at the time of the accident was based on his belief that the operator “does not need a Commercial Drivers License (CDL) to drive a heavy engine on a gravel road.” He also stated that the driver was “in training to become an engine operator.”

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## The Balance Rock Road is a BLM owned gravel road, maintained by Owyhee County by agreement. The Investigation Team found no policy or waiver that exempts BLM from CDL requirements based on road jurisdiction or type of road. In order to be compliant with Idaho State Law, at minimum, the Operator “in training” needed to have a Class B restricted permit to drive E2421.

It is the finding of the Investigation Team that the mechanical condition of E2421 did not contribute to the accident.  Maintenance records were current, indicating no issues with drive train or chassis and repairs to deficiencies were performed.  According to interviews and statements, E2421 was one of their best engines and drove very well. It was also found that the engine was full of water at the time of the accident. General appearance of the other engines, both heavy and light within the fleet, is good to excellent.  Vehicles are clean, organized and a spot check showed that pumps start readily.

- It is the finding of the Investigation Team that the mechanical condition of E2421 did not contribute to the accident.  Maintenance records were current, indicating no issues with drive train or chassis and repairs to deficiencies were performed.  According to interviews and statements, E2421 was one of their best engines and drove very well. It was also found that the engine was full of water at the time of the accident. General appearance of the other engines, both heavy and light within the fleet, is good to excellent.  Vehicles are clean, organized and a spot check showed that pumps start readily.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## IX. Recommendations

	The Balanced Rock Accident Investigation Team recommends the following:

All drivers are required to follow BLM Manual Handbook 1112-2, Safety and Health for Field Operations and Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations (The Red Book), as stated in the citation page below.
All fire personnel who will be operating any fire vehicles need to successfully complete S216 Driving for Fire Service.
All fire personnel required to drive engines and 4x4 vehicles, need to complete the Agency’s 4x4 operation training course, as stated in the BLM Manual Handbook 1112-1, Safety and Health Management requirements as stated in the citation page below.

- 	The Balanced Rock Accident Investigation Team recommends the following:
- All drivers are required to follow *BLM Manual Handbook* *1112-2, Safety and Health for Field Operations and Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations (The Red Book), *as stated in the citation page below.
- All fire personnel who will be operating any fire vehicles need to successfully complete *S216 Driving for Fire Service.*
- All fire personnel required to drive engines and 4x4 vehicles, need to complete the Agency’s 4x4 operation training course, as stated in the *BLM Manual Handbook 1112-1, Safety and Health Management *requirements as stated in the citation page below.

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Balance Rock Rollover

- Fire Management for Twin Falls District should ensure that all Idaho CDL requirements are followed for any BLM vehicle exceeding 26,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight (GVW).
- Fire leadership at all levels should provide appropriate oversight and accountability to ensure that safety protocols are adhered to, such as, but not limited to the use of seatbelts.

## Discussion Questions

	1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?

	2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?

	3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?

	4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?

**	****1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?**
**	****2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?**
**	****3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?**
**	****4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?**

**Balance Rock Rollover**

## Inskip Fire Engine Rollover 

**Executive Summary**
- 	At approximately 22:20 on July 20, 2006, an engine rollover accident occurred in the BLM Winnemucca Field Office, Nevada. While returning home from the Inskip Fire, Engine 2946 (Winnemucca District engine) attempted to miss a black cow on State Highway 400, skidded for 196 feet, departed the roadway and rolled over onto its side. The three crewmembers, Joshua Henry (ENGB), Lindsey Swensen and Brady Charles were given first aid on scene by the crew of Engine 2943 which was following Engine 2946 at the time. All crewmembers were then transported to Humboldt General Hospital, treated and released with minor injuries.

## Narrative
7/20/06 22:03- Engine 2946 departs Inskip Fire returning Winnemucca.
7/20/06 22:24- 2902 (Mike Fettic) reports an engine accident, no injuries, requests accident investigator and tow truck. Will transport crew to hospital for check up.
7/20/06 22:39- 2902 states 2946 crew is being transporting to Humboldt General Hospital. 
7/20/06 23:03- Nevada Highway Patrol and A-1 Towing in route to accident scene.
7/21/06 00:58- Engine 2946 crew released from Hospital, everyone is OK.

- 7/20/06 22:03- Engine 2946 departs Inskip Fire returning Winnemucca.
- 7/20/06 22:24- 2902 (Mike Fettic) reports an engine accident, no injuries, requests accident investigator and tow truck. Will transport crew to hospital for check up.
- 7/20/06 22:39- 2902 states 2946 crew is being transporting to Humboldt General Hospital.
- 7/20/06 23:03- Nevada Highway Patrol and A-1 Towing in route to accident scene.
- 7/21/06 00:58- Engine 2946 crew released from Hospital, everyone is OK.

**Inskip Fire Engine Rollover**

## Findings

	Finding #1:  BLM work/rest and incident operations driving duty day policies were adhered to.

	Discussion:  The crew had worked a shift of approximately 14 hours when they were released from the incident and the drive home was about 1 hour. The crew had taken a day off 5 days prior to the accident and been working an average of 10 hour days since the day off. This is within policy limitations. 

**	****Finding #1:**  BLM work/rest and incident operations driving duty day policies were adhered to.
**	****Discussion:**  The crew had worked a shift of approximately 14 hours when they were released from the incident and the drive home was about 1 hour. The crew had taken a day off 5 days prior to the accident and been working an average of 10 hour days since the day off. This is within policy limitations.

**Inskip Fire Engine Rollover**

## 	Finding #2:  The State Trooper who investigated the accident stated he felt that Engine 2946 was traveling at speeds that were excessive for the conditions.

	Discussion:  Conditions at the time of the accident were very dark. The area adjacent to the accident scene is open range for free roaming cattle. The crew and driver had worked a long shift of over 14 hours. The crew had received a radio warning, from the lead vehicle in the convoy, concerning cows on the roadway. Based on evidence at the scene and interviews with personnel the investigation team was unable to conclude that excessive speed was a contributing factor. The team felt that the speed at the time of the accident was likely between 55-60mph. The posted speed limit is 70mph. 
	Recommendation:  FMO’s should ensure that all fire vehicle operators meet BLM drivers training requirements and that additional tailgate and 6-minute for safety training sessions are conducted regularly. These sessions should include identification of incident driving hazards and determination of safe driving speeds for commonly encountered road conditions. Safe driving speeds are sometimes significantly less than posted speed limits. 

**	**
**	****Discussion:**  Conditions at the time of the accident were very dark. The area adjacent to the accident scene is open range for free roaming cattle. The crew and driver had worked a long shift of over 14 hours. The crew had received a radio warning, from the lead vehicle in the convoy, concerning cows on the roadway. Based on evidence at the scene and interviews with personnel the investigation team was unable to conclude that excessive speed was a contributing factor. The team felt that the speed at the time of the accident was likely between 55-60mph. The posted speed limit is 70mph.
**	****Recommendation:**  FMO’s should ensure that all fire vehicle operators meet BLM drivers training requirements and that additional tailgate and 6-minute for safety training sessions are conducted regularly. These sessions should include identification of incident driving hazards and determination of safe driving speeds for commonly encountered road conditions. Safe driving speeds are sometimes significantly less than posted speed limits.

**Inskip Fire Engine Rollover**

## 	Finding #3:  None of the crewmembers on Engine 2946 were wearing seatbelts at the time of the accident.

	Discussion:  The State Trooper who investigated the accident stated he would have issued citations for lack of seatbelt use except for a Nevada law that does not require seatbelt use for occupants of vehicles in excess of 10,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight. 

	Recommendation:  All fire vehicle operators should ensure that every passenger in their vehicle is wearing a seatbelt at all times per the Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations page 06-5 and the Safety and Health for Field Operations Manual Handbook 1112-2 page 39. State and Field Office FMO’s and Field Office Managers should ensure that all employees are educated regarding BLM/Government policy on mandatory seatbelt use. 

**	****Discussion:**  The State Trooper who investigated the accident stated he would have issued citations for lack of seatbelt use except for a Nevada law that does not require seatbelt use for occupants of vehicles in excess of 10,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight.
**	**
**	****Recommendation:**  All fire vehicle operators should ensure that every passenger in their vehicle is wearing a seatbelt at all times per the *Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations *page 06-5 and the *Safety and Health for Field Operations Manual Handbook 1112-2 *page 39.* *State and Field Office FMO’s and Field Office Managers should ensure that all employees are educated regarding BLM/Government policy on mandatory seatbelt use.

**Inskip Fire Engine Rollover**

## Conclusions and Observations

	The crew of Engine 2946 was returning home from a routine Initial Attack fire and was within policy requirements for work/rest and driving duty day limitations. They unexpectedly encountered a black cow on the roadway in open range country at night.  They were extremely fortunate that the engine did not depart the roadway sooner than it did or at a higher rate of speed. Due to the fact that none of the crew were wearing seatbelts the potential for severe injury or death would have been high. Driving, and especially night driving, remains one of the highest risk activities firefighters undertake in the accomplishment of their jobs. This incident should serve as an important lesson learned to all personnel engaged in driving activities. 

- 	The crew of Engine 2946 was returning home from a routine Initial Attack fire and was within policy requirements for work/rest and driving duty day limitations. They unexpectedly encountered a black cow on the roadway in open range country at night.  They were extremely fortunate that the engine did not depart the roadway sooner than it did or at a higher rate of speed. Due to the fact that none of the crew were wearing seatbelts the potential for severe injury or death would have been high. Driving, and especially night driving, remains one of the highest risk activities firefighters undertake in the accomplishment of their jobs. This incident should serve as an important lesson learned to all personnel engaged in driving activities.

**Inskip Fire Engine Rollover**

## Discussion Questions

	1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?

	2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?

	3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?

	4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?

**	****1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?**
**	****2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?**
**	****3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?**
**	****4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?**

**Inskip Fire Engine Rollover**

## Raft River Accident 

**	****Executive Summary **
- 	At approximately 21:00 on August 4, 2006, an accident occurred on the Raft River fire on the Twin Falls District (BLM-ID), approximately 30 miles east of Burley, Idaho.  During initial attack of the fire, a firefighter was injured when a Type 6 fire engine backed into him while repositioning during mop-up operations.  The engine struck a firefighter, pushing her into the injured firefighter, knocking him to the ground, and continued to roll over the firefighter until the Engine Operator was able to stop and move the engine forward to free the firefighter.  A medical emergency was declared on the radio, and a Life Flight helicopter was immediately requested.  The injured firefighter was stabilized and transported to Magic Valley Regional Medical Center in Twin Falls, Idaho.  The fire engine was left in place and the Engine Operator and remaining engine crewmembers were released from the fire and transported to Twin Falls.

## 	Narrative 
	08/04/06 15:57- Engine 2692 responds to incident. 

	08/04/06 17:42- Engine 2692 arrives on scene at the Raft River fire and receives a briefing and assignment from IC Battalion 1 (Brian Bishop, ID-STF). 

	08/04/06 20:56- Engine Module Leader Sonner arrives near the accident location, and has a conversation regarding moving Engine 2692 to refill the water tank.  Engine 2692 Operator Cameron confirms that the engine will move to refill. 

**	****08/04/06 15:57**- Engine 2692 responds to incident.
**	**
**	****08/04/06 17:42**- Engine 2692 arrives on scene at the Raft River fire and receives a briefing and assignment from IC Battalion 1 (Brian Bishop, ID-STF).
**	**
**	****08/04/06 20:56**- Engine Module Leader Sonner arrives near the accident location, and has a conversation regarding moving Engine 2692 to refill the water tank.  Engine 2692 Operator Cameron confirms that the engine will move to refill.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	
	08/04/06 approximately 21:00- 
	Firefighter Burk is injured.  After hearing the radio conversation regarding moving the engine to refill, firefighter Shaw and firefighter Burk walk around the rear of the engine from the driver’s side toward the passenger’s side.  As they reach a point directly behind and a few feet from Engine 2692, both firefighters are distracted by a lizard.  The Engine Operator begins to move the engine in reverse.  Firefighter Shaw notices the engine moving toward them, and both firefighters attempt to avoid the engine.  The engine continues to move in reverse, striking firefighter Shaw and pushing her into firefighter Burk.  

**	****08/04/06 approximately 21:00**-
- 	Firefighter Burk is injured.  After hearing the radio conversation regarding moving the engine to refill, firefighter Shaw and firefighter Burk walk around the rear of the engine from the driver’s side toward the passenger’s side.  As they reach a point directly behind and a few feet from Engine 2692, both firefighters are distracted by a lizard.  The Engine Operator begins to move the engine in reverse.  Firefighter Shaw notices the engine moving toward them, and both firefighters attempt to avoid the engine.  The engine continues to move in reverse, striking firefighter Shaw and pushing her into firefighter Burk.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	08/04/06 approximately 21:00 (cont.)

	- Firefighter Burk falls to the ground facing up with his feet toward the engine.  Both firefighters attempt to move out of the path of the engine- only firefighter Shaw was successful when she moved toward the driver’s side of the engine out of its path.  As the engine continues to back up, firefighter Burk’s feet become entangled in the undercarriage, pushing his knees toward his chest, resulting in injuries to his back and spine.  Firefighter Shaw screams at Engine Operator Cameron to stop the engine.  Engine Operator Cameron does so, and then moves the engine forward to free firefighter Burk.  Engine Module Leader Sonners and Engine Module Leader Houser run to the site, and Houser begins first aid and stabilization. 

- 	- Firefighter Burk falls to the ground facing up with his feet toward the engine.  Both firefighters attempt to move out of the path of the engine- only firefighter Shaw was successful when she moved toward the driver’s side of the engine out of its path.  As the engine continues to back up, firefighter Burk’s feet become entangled in the undercarriage, pushing his knees toward his chest, resulting in injuries to his back and spine.  Firefighter Shaw screams at Engine Operator Cameron to stop the engine.  Engine Operator Cameron does so, and then moves the engine forward to free firefighter Burk.  Engine Module Leader Sonners and Engine Module Leader Houser run to the site, and Houser begins first aid and stabilization.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	08/04/06 21:02- Tony Davis (incoming ICT3) contacts SCIIDC and notifies them of a medical emergency and requests Life Flight respond immediately to the fire. 

	08/04/06 21:02-21:50- personnel on scene provided first aid to firefighter Burk, stabilized his condition, and prepared a landing site for the Life Flight helicopter. 

	08/04/06 21:50- Life Flight helicopter lands near accident site. 

	08/04/06 22:16- Life Flight helicopter leaves accident site with firefighter Burk, en route MVRMC.

	08/04/06 22:31- Remaining crewmembers of Engine 2692 leave the fire en route to Twin Falls, ID. 

**	**
**	****08/04/06 21:02-21:50**- personnel on scene provided first aid to firefighter Burk, stabilized his condition, and prepared a landing site for the Life Flight helicopter.
**	**
**	****08/04/06 21:50**- Life Flight helicopter lands near accident site.
**	**
**	****08/04/06 22:16**- Life Flight helicopter leaves accident site with firefighter Burk, en route MVRMC.
**	****08/04/06 22:31**- Remaining crewmembers of Engine 2692 leave the fire en route to Twin Falls, ID.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Finding #1:  BLM work/rest and incident operations driving duty day policies were adhered to.  In addition, all training and qualification records for the involved crew were in order and all individuals were current. 

	Discussion:  The crew had been positioned at Juniper Butte Guard Station and Rogerson Guard Station on the morning of the accident and had responded to a small fire while en route from Rogerson to Shoshone.  The crew then responded to the Raft River fire that afternoon.  The crew worked a 12-hour shift on August 3, and had a full day off on July 19, and were on workday #16 on the day of the accident.  This is within policy limitations.  The crew also was current with regards to Annual Fireline Safety Refresher training, Defensive Driving training, and first aid/CPR training.  Taskbook histories and qualification records were complete. 

**	**
**	****Discussion:**  The crew had been positioned at Juniper Butte Guard Station and Rogerson Guard Station on the morning of the accident and had responded to a small fire while en route from Rogerson to Shoshone.  The crew then responded to the Raft River fire that afternoon.  The crew worked a 12-hour shift on August 3, and had a full day off on July 19, and were on workday #16 on the day of the accident.  This is within policy limitations.  The crew also was current with regards to Annual Fireline Safety Refresher training, Defensive Driving training, and first aid/CPR training.  Taskbook histories and qualification records were complete.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Finding #2:  Emergency response procedures were in place and were followed.  All personnel involved performed well under duress. 

	Discussion:  When the accident occurred, personnel at the scene immediately reacted and notified SCIIDC of the need for medivac.  Personnel at the scene performed basic life support and prepared for the incoming helicopter.  Numerous personnel at the scene displayed effective leadership to control the situation and preserve the scene for investigation.  Employees at SCIIDC followed the emergency medical response plan, and provided the necessary support to the incident as well as make all required notifications. 

**	**
**	****Discussion:**  When the accident occurred, personnel at the scene immediately reacted and notified SCIIDC of the need for medivac.  Personnel at the scene performed basic life support and prepared for the incoming helicopter.  Numerous personnel at the scene displayed effective leadership to control the situation and preserve the scene for investigation.  Employees at SCIIDC followed the emergency medical response plan, and provided the necessary support to the incident as well as make all required notifications.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Finding #4:  Engine 2692 was not staffed with the appropriate supervision as per 2006 Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations (Red Book). 

	Discussion:  the Red Book states that a Type 6 engine will have a minimum staffing level of two individuals, including a Single Resource Boss for each engine (Page 15-1).  The Red Book also states that “if configured with more than one engine module for local assignments, engines may be staffed with one Engine Operator (ENOP) and one Engine Module Member, provided an Engine Module Leader is assigned to the group for operational supervision” (Page 15-1).  It is the opinion of this review team that this District intended to meet the Red Book policy; however, the assigned Engine Module Leader was physically removed from the location of Engine 2692 and was busy briefing other incoming resources, and Engine 2692 was operating as a single resource at the time of the accident.  Furthermore, the Engine Module Leader was supervising at least two engines and 10 people at the time of the accident as per District procedure, and the engines were geographically separated.  It is the opinion of this review team that the Engine Module Leader was actually performing the duties of Task Force Leader once the engines were separated, creating span of control and supervision issues that may have contributed to this accident. 

**	**
**	****Discussion:  **the Red Book states that a Type 6 engine will have a minimum staffing level of two individuals, including a Single Resource Boss for each engine (Page 15-1).  The Red Book also states that “*if configured with more than one engine module for local assignments, engines may be staffed with one Engine Operator (ENOP) and one Engine Module Member, provided an Engine Module Leader is assigned to the group for operational supervision*” (Page 15-1).  It is the opinion of this review team that this District intended to meet the Red Book policy; however, the assigned Engine Module Leader was physically removed from the location of Engine 2692 and was busy briefing other incoming resources, and Engine 2692 was operating as a single resource at the time of the accident.  Furthermore, the Engine Module Leader was supervising at least two engines and 10 people at the time of the accident as per District procedure, and the engines were geographically separated.  It is the opinion of this review team that the Engine Module Leader was actually performing the duties of Task Force Leader once the engines were separated, creating span of control and supervision issues that may have contributed to this accident.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Recommendation:  The BLM National Office of Fire Aviation issued FA-IM-2006-035 (Subject: BLM Engine Staffing Levels) on the same day the accident occurred.  This Instruction Memorandum establishes minimum and target staffing levels for BLM fire engines.  The Memorandum sets the minimum staffing level for Type 6 engines as one Single Resource Boss (ENGB) and one Firefighter Type 2 (FFT2).  State and Field Office FMO’s and Field Office Managers should ensure immediate compliance with this Instruction Memorandum. 

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Finding #5:  Initial witness statements, a roster of involved personnel, and other documentation were not gathered in a timely fashion. 

	Discussion:  Upon the arrival of this team, no witness statements had been solicited, and the team was unable to gather a complete list of involved personnel until almost 36 hours after the accident.  Upon formulation of this list, the team was finally able to solicit statements from involved personnel and begin interviews.  The 2006 Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations (Red Book) states that a roster of involved personnel should be developed and the involved personnel should be available for interviews by the investigation team (page 19-7).  The Red Book also states that statements from involved individuals should be gathered prior to a Critical Incident Stress Management session.  This presented a challenge to the team, as some involved individuals were on days off or on fire assignment immediately prior to the CISM session. 

**	**
**	****Discussion:  **Upon the arrival of this team, no witness statements had been solicited, and the team was unable to gather a complete list of involved personnel until almost 36 hours after the accident.  Upon formulation of this list, the team was finally able to solicit statements from involved personnel and begin interviews.  The *2006 Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations* (Red Book) states that a roster of involved personnel should be developed and the involved personnel should be available for interviews by the investigation team (page 19-7).  The Red Book also states that statements from involved individuals should be gathered prior to a Critical Incident Stress Management session.  This presented a challenge to the team, as some involved individuals were on days off or on fire assignment immediately prior to the CISM session.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Recommendation:  Implement a procedure to dispatch a Field Office Safety Officer or other available Safety Officer immediately to the scene to gather statements, secure the scene and any critical degradable evidence, and to ensure that the safety and well-being of all involved personnel is handled appropriately. 

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Conclusions and Observations 

	The crew of Engine 2692 responded to a routine Initial Attack fire and was within policy requirements for work/rest and driving duty day limitations.  The engine crew was performing routine mop-up operations when the incident occurred.  It is the opinion of this review team that the major causal factors of this accident were lack of situational awareness on the part of all crewmembers and lack of communication amongst the crew prior to moving the engine.  In addition, span of control and adequate supervision were stretched thin, and may have contributed to the accident.  The review team recommends that all employees engaged in any activities around vehicles and equipment need to follow guidelines and policies already in place to ensure the safety of employees and to reinforce the importance of situational awareness and communication between an operator and ground forces.  

- 	The crew of Engine 2692 responded to a routine Initial Attack fire and was within policy requirements for work/rest and driving duty day limitations.  The engine crew was performing routine mop-up operations when the incident occurred.  It is the opinion of this review team that the major causal factors of this accident were lack of situational awareness on the part of all crewmembers and lack of communication amongst the crew prior to moving the engine.  In addition, span of control and adequate supervision were stretched thin, and may have contributed to the accident.  The review team recommends that all employees engaged in any activities around vehicles and equipment need to follow guidelines and policies already in place to ensure the safety of employees and to reinforce the importance of situational awareness and communication between an operator and ground forces.

**Raft River Accident**

## 	Conclusions and Observations (cont.)

	The review team also recommends that the District ensures that all engines are staffed in compliance with national policy.  Additionally, the review team feels that the National Office of Fire and Aviation should evaluate the content of the Engine Operator (ENOP) Position Taskbook for the purpose of ensuring that Engine Operators, upon completing the taskbook, are adequately trained and prepared to safely operate fire engines in an actual fire environment. 

	This incident should serve as an important lesson learned to all personnel engaged in driving activities. 

- 	The review team also recommends that the District ensures that all engines are staffed in compliance with national policy.  Additionally, the review team feels that the National Office of Fire and Aviation should evaluate the content of the Engine Operator (ENOP) Position Taskbook for the purpose of ensuring that Engine Operators, upon completing the taskbook, are adequately trained and prepared to safely operate fire engines in an actual fire environment.
- 	This incident should serve as an important lesson learned to all personnel engaged in driving activities.

**Raft River Accident**

## Raft River Accident 

**Raft River Accident**

**Photo 1- Showing location of Engine 2692 on dozer line,**** taken from Sonner’s approximate location on two-track road.**

## Raft River Accident 

**Raft River Accident**

**Photo 2- Showing rear of engine where accident occurred.**

## Raft River Accident 

**Raft River Accident**

**Photo 3- Showing location of Engine 2692.  Location of Sonner, Houser, and Bryant and crews from this angle was on the two-track at bottom of draw behind and below the engine.**

## 	Discussion Questions

	1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?

	2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?

	3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?

	4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?

**	****1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?**
**	****2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?**
**	****3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?**
**	****4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?**

**Raft River Accident**

## Charleston Contract Engine Rollover 

**Executive Summary: **
- 	At approximately 21:00 on August 16, 2006 a contract Type VI Engine (AAA Forestry – call sign “AAA”) was returning to ICP from their assignment on the Charleston Fire.  The route of travel was through the Heguy Ranch Headquarters and along the entrance road to the ranch heading towards a County Road parallel to Mason Creek.  The engine drifted to the right side of the entrance road and then off an embankment into an irrigation ditch immediately adjacent to the road on the right side.  The vehicle came to rest on its right (passenger) side.  Occupants were the operator, Patrick Thiel, and crewmembers Jim Hart and Ramon Soto.  There were no injuries.  All occupants were employees of AAA Forestry (Outpost of Enterprise, Inc. 208/550-1785).  All occupants of the vehicle were wearing seatbelts. The occupants exited the vehicle after the accident and were able to push it to the left (drivers) side until it came to rest against the side of the irrigation ditch at an approximate angle of 45 degrees.  The vehicle remained in this position until the Fact Finding Team arrived at approximately 12:15 on August 17, 2006.

## Narrative:  
8/15/06 07:00 – Engine AAA went on shift in Klamath Falls, OR. 
8/15/06 – Later that morning (exact time unknown) Engine AAA dispatched to the Charleston Fire, Elko Field Office, NV 
8/16/06 0:100 – Pulled into Button Point Rest Area between Winnemucca, NV and Battle    Mountain, NV on I-80 to sleep. 
8/16/06 – Approximately 04:30 left Rest Area and proceeded to Elko Interagency Dispatch. 
8/16/06 – Approximately 06:00 arrived Elko Interagency Dispatch. 

- 8/15/06 07:00 – Engine AAA went on shift in Klamath Falls, OR.
- 8/15/06 – Later that morning (exact time unknown) Engine AAA dispatched to the Charleston Fire, Elko Field Office, NV
- 8/16/06 0:100 – Pulled into Button Point Rest Area between Winnemucca, NV and Battle    Mountain, NV on I-80 to sleep.
- 8/16/06 – Approximately 04:30 left Rest Area and proceeded to Elko Interagency Dispatch.
- 8/16/06 – Approximately 06:00 arrived Elko Interagency Dispatch.

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## 8/16/06 – Approximately 11:00 received assignment and proceeded to Charleston ICP. 
8/16/06 – Approximately 20:45 left Charleston Fire to return to ICP in order to meet work/rest guidelines. 
8/16/06 – Approximately 21:00 Engine AAA went off road into an irrigation ditch. 
8/17/06 – Approximately 12:15 Fact Finding Team arrived at ICP to investigate 
8/18/06 – Approximately 09:30 Fact Finding Team verified that Engine AAA had been retrieved and towed to the Elko BLM Fire Yard by Lostra Bros. Towing, Elko, NV. 

- 8/16/06 – Approximately 20:45 left Charleston Fire to return to ICP in order to meet work/rest guidelines.
- 8/16/06 – Approximately 21:00 Engine AAA went off road into an irrigation ditch.
- 8/17/06 – Approximately 12:15 Fact Finding Team arrived at ICP to investigate
- 8/18/06 – Approximately 09:30 Fact Finding Team verified that Engine AAA had been retrieved and towed to the Elko BLM Fire Yard by Lostra Bros. Towing, Elko, NV.

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## 	Finding #1:  From interviews conducted work/rest guidelines were exceeded by both the Engine Operator and crew of Engine AAA based on the timeline established during interviews with Engine Operator. 
	Discussion:  Engine AAA entered duty at 07:00 on August 15, 2006 and continued on duty until approximately 01:00 on August 16, 2006.  Following a rest period of approximately three and one-half hours Engine AAA continued to be on duty until approximately 21:00 on August 16, 2006.  This is not in accordance with established work/rest guidelines.  
	Recommendation:  (1) It must be made clear to contracted suppression resources that contracted resources are subject to the same work/rest guidelines as Agency personnel.  
	(2) Expanded Dispatch or any other entity performing the role of Check In should continue to verify hours of work/rest before assigning contract resources to an incident. 

**	****Discussion:**  Engine AAA entered duty at 07:00 on August 15, 2006 and continued on duty until approximately 01:00 on August 16, 2006.  Following a rest period of approximately three and one-half hours Engine AAA continued to be on duty until approximately 21:00 on August 16, 2006.  This is not in accordance with established work/rest guidelines.
**	****Recommendation:**  (1) It must be made clear to contracted suppression resources that contracted resources are subject to the same work/rest guidelines as Agency personnel.
- 	(2) Expanded Dispatch or any other entity performing the role of Check In should continue to verify hours of work/rest before assigning contract resources to an incident.

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## 	Finding #2:  The road being traveled at the time of the accident was narrow with a soft shoulder/embankment.
	Discussion: While the condition and width of the entrance road to the Heguy Ranch Headquarters did not meet County standards it could be safely traveled with appropriate care and attention.
	Recommendation:  When traveling on unimproved and/or private roads, an especially high degree of attention and situational awareness must be maintained at all times, especially during darkness. 

**	****Discussion: **While the condition and width of the entrance road to the Heguy Ranch Headquarters did not meet County standards it could be safely traveled with appropriate care and attention.
**	****Recommendation:**  When traveling on unimproved and/or private roads, an especially high degree of attention and situational awareness must be maintained at all times, especially during darkness.

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## 	Finding #3: Driver inattention contributed to this accident. 

	Discussion:  As stated by the Engine Operator (Operator), immediately prior to the accident a spotlight became dislodged in the passenger compartment and landed in the area of the Operator’s feet. While trying to retrieve the spotlight the vehicle drifted too close to the edge of the road. When the Operator realized what was happening it was too late to correct the vehicle’s travel direction and avoid running off the road. 

	Recommendations:  (1) All items in the passenger compartment should be secured to prevent movement during vehicle operation and (2) If an item becomes dislodged during vehicle operation, the operator should either stop the vehicle and secure the item or instruct a passenger to secure the loose item and not divert his/her attention from the primary duty (driving). 

**	**
**	****Discussion:**  As stated by the Engine Operator (Operator), immediately prior to the accident a spotlight became dislodged in the passenger compartment and landed in the area of the Operator’s feet. While trying to retrieve the spotlight the vehicle drifted too close to the edge of the road. When the Operator realized what was happening it was too late to correct the vehicle’s travel direction and avoid running off the road.
**	**
**	****Recommendations:**  (1) All items in the passenger compartment should be secured to prevent movement during vehicle operation and (2) If an item becomes dislodged during vehicle operation, the operator should either stop the vehicle and secure the item or instruct a passenger to secure the loose item and not divert his/her attention from the primary duty (driving).

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## 	Finding #4:  Driver fatigue may have contributed to this accident due to the number of hours the vehicle operator had been driving.
	Discussion:  Driving duty day limitations during any 16 hour duty day are 10 hours (whether consecutive or not) behind the wheel.  There is an additional requirement that at least an 8 hour period of rest occur before a new duty day begins.  Exigent circumstances allowing for a deviation from this requirement did not exist in this case. 
	Recommendation:  It must be made clear to contracted suppression resources that those resources are subject to the same driving duty day limitations as Agency personnel. 

**	****Discussion:**  Driving duty day limitations during any 16 hour duty day are 10 hours (whether consecutive or not) behind the wheel.  There is an additional requirement that at least an 8 hour period of rest occur before a new duty day begins.  Exigent circumstances allowing for a deviation from this requirement did not exist in this case.
**	****Recommendation:**  It must be made clear to contracted suppression resources that those resources are subject to the same driving duty day limitations as Agency personnel.

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## 	Conclusions and Observations 

	Contract Engine AAA was returning from a line assignment on the Charleston Fire to ICP when the Engine left a dirt roadway and slid into an irrigation ditch.  There were no injuries and minor, if any, damage to the Engine.  The driver and crew had exceeded work/rest requirements and the driver had also exceeded driving duty day limitations.  Causal factors in this accident were found to be driver inattention and possible fatigue. 

	A claim for damages is neither justified nor anticipated.  Consultation with the towing company indicated the retrieval was successful and the only minor damage was that the bead broke loose on the right front tire as it drug across the ditch bank.  The tire was successfully aired up on scene and the vehicle towed back to the Elko Fire Yard for re-inspection before being allowed to return to the Fire. 

- 	Contract Engine AAA was returning from a line assignment on the Charleston Fire to ICP when the Engine left a dirt roadway and slid into an irrigation ditch.  There were no injuries and minor, if any, damage to the Engine.  The driver and crew had exceeded work/rest requirements and the driver had also exceeded driving duty day limitations.  Causal factors in this accident were found to be driver inattention and possible fatigue.
- 	A claim for damages is neither justified nor anticipated.  Consultation with the towing company indicated the retrieval was successful and the only minor damage was that the bead broke loose on the right front tire as it drug across the ditch bank.  The tire was successfully aired up on scene and the vehicle towed back to the Elko Fire Yard for re-inspection before being allowed to return to the Fire.

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## Discussion Questions

	1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?

	2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?

	3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?

	4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?

**	****1)  Were there any violations of BLM driving policy, if so list them?**
**	****2)  What were the direct and indirect causes of the accident?**
**	****3)  What are the lessons learned from this accident?**
**	****4)  List any recommendations to prevent similar accidents?**

**Charleston Contract Engine Rollover**

## Unit 4 - Attitudes and Situational Awareness – STOP Sticker

**	****Objectives:**
- 	1. Describe the attributes of a professional vehicle operator in the wildland fire service.
- 	2. Define situational awareness as it applies to driving.
- 	3. List five distractions that affect your ability to safely operate the vehicle. Describe how to mitigate the effects of the distractions.
- 	4. Identify 3 physical factors and explain how they may affect your ability to do the job.
- 	5.  Introduce the STOP sticker and discuss how it is to be used.

## Attitudes and Situational Awareness 

**Introduction: **
- 	The purpose of this unit is to generate a discussion about the attributes of a professional driver and how that driver approaches the task of driving.  This includes gathering situational awareness (SA) before the vehicle starts and while driving, filtering out distractions that can influence their SA, and controlling the physical factors that influence their SA.  The STOP sticker is also introduced and explained in this unit.  While the distractions of driving continue to increase, it is imperative the drivers focus on the task at hand and filter out all other distractions while driving.

## I.  Attributes of a Professional Driver

	A. Safety First Attitude

		• As a public employee you have greater driving 	responsibility than the motoring public.
		• Use SOPs to ensure proper procedures.
		• Exercise restraint and good judgment to ensure the 	safe and efficient operation of your vehicle.
		• Check passengers and cargo.
		• Check vehicle readiness.
		• Inspect vehicle.
		• Safety circle (a quick walk around inspection).

- 	A. Safety First Attitude
- 		• As a public employee you have greater driving 	responsibility than the motoring public.
- 		• Use SOPs to ensure proper procedures.
- 		• Exercise restraint and good judgment to ensure the 	safe and efficient operation of your vehicle.
- 		• Check passengers and cargo.
- 		• Check vehicle readiness.
- 		• Inspect vehicle.
- 		• Safety circle (a quick walk around inspection).

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## B. Technically proficient in their job

	• Familiar with vehicle to be driven.
	• Responsibility to obtain needed training to maintain and improve skill level.
	• Who is responsible?
		- Agency
		- Individual

- 	• Familiar with vehicle to be driven.
- 	• Responsibility to obtain needed training to maintain and improve skill level.
- 	• Who is responsible?
- 		- Agency
- 		- Individual

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## C. Professionalism

		• Pride in self

		• Pride in equipment

			- Clean and well maintained

- 		• Pride in self
- 		• Pride in equipment
- 			- Clean and well maintained

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## II. Situational Awareness

	A. Situational Awareness in driving is your perception of the driving environment.  Regardless of your perception, reality may be different. The quality of your situational awareness (i.e., a closer match to reality) will result in better decision making. 

- 	A. Situational Awareness in driving is your perception of the driving environment.  Regardless of your perception, reality may be different. The quality of your situational awareness (i.e., a closer match to reality) will result in better decision making.

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## Attitudes and Situational Awareness 

- 	B. Drivers have a responsibility to be aware of their situation. They must do this to protect their crew and equipment. This is accomplished by input from observation and communication of all things around them.

## 1.  Some examples might include:
	a. Vehicle performance
	b. Vehicle capabilities
	c. Road conditions and type
	d. Radio traffic
	e. Past experience in area
	f. Observations from passengers
	g. Communications with supervisor, crew, adjoining forces
	h. Information concerning the current status of the incident, weather, terrain, etc.

- 	a. Vehicle performance
- 	b. Vehicle capabilities
- 	c. Road conditions and type
- 	d. Radio traffic
- 	e. Past experience in area
- 	f. Observations from passengers
- 	g. Communications with supervisor, crew, adjoining forces
- 	h. Information concerning the current status of the incident, weather, terrain, etc.

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## 	C. Filtering to improve situational awareness
		1.  Sometimes information concerning the fire 	environment and the driving environment may 	become overwhelming which in turn will make it 	difficult to process all the information needed to 	maintain good SA. In these cases you must decide 	what information is most important to attend to. This 	process is called filtering.

- 		1.  Sometimes information concerning the fire 	environment and the driving environment may 	become overwhelming which in turn will make it 	difficult to process all the information needed to 	maintain good SA. In these cases you must decide 	what information is most important to attend to. This 	process is called filtering.

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## 	D. External Factors That Cause Distractions

		1. Distractions shift focus from critical elements to 	something that is not as important.
			a. Radio
			b. Cellular phone
			c. Sirens
			d. Personal problems
			e. Beginning and end of assignment/going 		home
			f. Work loads
			g. Mission focused (tunnel vision)

		2.  How can these distractions be mitigated?

- 		1. Distractions shift focus from critical elements to 	something that is not as important.
- 			a. Radio
- 			b. Cellular phone
- 			c. Sirens
- 			d. Personal problems
- 			e. Beginning and end of assignment/going 		home
- 			f. Work loads
- 			g. Mission focused (tunnel vision)
- 		2.  How can these distractions be mitigated?

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## III. Physical Factors that Affect Driving

	A. The wildland firefighter’s physical and mental standards that are needed to accomplish the tasks required on an incident are extreme. Many different aspects of life are to be considered. It is the driver of a wildland fire vehicle that has the responsibility to make sure that they are in top mental and physical shape and are able toperform the duties required to be an operator.

- 	A. The wildland firefighter’s physical and mental standards that are needed to accomplish the tasks required on an incident are extreme. Many different aspects of life are to be considered. It is the driver of a wildland fire vehicle that has the responsibility to make sure that they are in top mental and physical shape and are able toperform the duties required to be an operator.

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## 1. Work and Non-Work Related Stress
		a. List Possible Causes

2. Physical fitness
		a. List Benefits of Good Physical Fitness

4. Mental Alertness 
		a. List Factors Affecting Mental Alertness

5. Effects of Drugs and Alcohol
		a. List Effects of Drugs and Alcohol Use on 	Driving Performance

- 		a. List Possible Causes
- 2. Physical fitness
- 		a. List Benefits of Good Physical Fitness
- 4. Mental Alertness
- 		a. List Factors Affecting Mental Alertness
- 5. Effects of Drugs and Alcohol
- 		a. List Effects of Drugs and Alcohol Use on 	Driving Performance

**Attitudes and Situational Awareness**

## STOP Sticker 

## STOP Sticker

**S**eat Belts On
- 	1.  The use of seat belts is mandatory and all operators are required to ensure that passengers are buckled in prior to moving the vehicle.
- 	2.  Even during suppression operations, operators should ensure that seatbelts are worn by all passengers.  Seatbelts should be equipped with locks that will prevent seat belts from cinching down during off road driving.
- 	3.  Seat belts save lives and prevent injuries, **BUCKLE UP!**

## STOP Sticker

## Tools and Equipment Stowed
	1. 	Get into a routine of doing this the same every time. 	Complete this while doing your “Safety Circle”:
		a. Look under vehicle for problems 
b. Cabinets / Equipment Secure 
Fuel cans
Boxes
Drip Torches
Hoses
Nozzles in Holders
No Loose Items 
c. Tires-look at tread and air pressure, check duals.
d. Check vehicle body for damage.
e. Windows and mirrors are clean and clear. 

- 	1. 	Get into a routine of doing this the same every time. 	Complete this while doing your “Safety Circle”:
- 		a. Look under vehicle for problems
- b. Cabinets / Equipment Secure
- Fuel cans
- Boxes
- Drip Torches
- Hoses
- Nozzles in Holders
- No Loose Items
- c. Tires-look at tread and air pressure, check duals.
- d. Check vehicle body for damage.
- e. Windows and mirrors are clean and clear.

**STOP Sticker**

## C. 	Operator and Crew Have Situational Awareness 

		1.  Account for all personnel
		2.  Vehicle clear of hazards 
		3.  Spotters being utilized
		4.  Crew communicates hazards / conditions to operator

- 		1.  Account for all personnel
- 		2.  Vehicle clear of hazards
- 		3.  Spotters being utilized
- 		4.  Crew communicates hazards / conditions to operator

**STOP Sticker**

## D.  Personnel Accounted For

1.  Account for all assigned personnel and others in the area.

2.  Never back without checking behind the vehicle (Safety Circle).

3.  Use spotters.

4.  Communicate intentions before moving vehicle.

- 1.  Account for all assigned personnel and others in the area.
- 2.  Never back without checking behind the vehicle (Safety Circle).
- 3.  Use spotters.
- 4.  Communicate intentions before moving vehicle.

**STOP Sticker**

## 	E.  Stickers should be placed on dash of vehicles and used as a checklist everytime you get behind the wheel.  Complete each step of the STOP Checklist before you start the vehicle. 

**STOP Sticker**

## MODULE 2Unit 5 - Understanding and Checking Your Vehicle

**Objectives:**
- 	1. Explain why it is important to perform a vehicle inspection.
- 	2. Explain why it is important to document any actions taken concerning the vehicle such as inspections, repairs, maintenance, or performance tests in the Fire Engine Maintenance Procedure and Record (FEMPR).
- 	3. Perform a vehicle inspection. Determine your vehicle’s readiness for daily operations in the field.

## Understanding and Checking Your Vehicle

## I.  Fire Engine Maintenance Procedure and Record

	A.  This book was developed for you to use as a guide to perform routine maintenance on a BLM fire engine. Duties described as “daily,” or “as needed” are recommendations by the development group. However, local protocol may dictate that some tasks are done more often, or less, then local standards should be followed. 

- 	A.  This book was developed for you to use as a guide to perform routine maintenance on a BLM fire engine. Duties described as “daily,” or “as needed” are recommendations by the development group. However, local protocol may dictate that some tasks are done more often, or less, then local standards should be followed.

**Understanding and ****Checking Your Vehicle**

## 	B.  This document is to be used for both the “Heavy” and “Light” engines; some instructions are specific to each type individually. Skip the task if it does not pertain to the engine you are using.

	C.  Although it was designed for engine use, it can be utilized for other vehicles or crew carriers by skipping sections specific to engines.

	D.  As an operator, you are required to ensure that the vehicle you are operating is safe to operate; this is done by completing and documenting pre-trip inspections.

- 	C.  Although it was designed for engine use, it can be utilized for other vehicles or crew carriers by skipping sections specific to engines.
- 	D.  As an operator, you are required to ensure that the vehicle you are operating is safe to operate; this is done by completing and documenting pre-trip inspections.

**Understanding and ****Checking Your Vehicle**

## Understanding and Checking Your Vehicle

- II. Reasons for Documenting
- 	A. Keep records of maintenance performed on 	incidents and those using 9310 money. Records will 	help to evaluate our equipment and make changes	as needed.
- 	B. Reasons for having records
- 		1. Liability reasons in case of a mechanical 			mishap that can cause damage or injury.
- 		2. To discover mechanical trends with vehicles, that 		can help with the future design of other fire engines.
- 		3. As a reminder when certain mechanical service was 		performed or needs to be performed.

## Understanding and Checking Your Vehicle

- 4. Information sharing
- 		a. Good record keeping is a great way to start 	newsletters, e-mail, face-to-face talk on the fireline, 	etc.
- 		b. Information sharing lets others know of safety 	problems found so that they can be corrected.
- 		c. Helps in the development of new and safer 	equipment.

## III. Field Exercise – Performing Daily Check

	A.  Each student will be required to perform and properly document a daily vehicle check.  The evaluation form used for this check is located in Appendix B.  At a minimum, the items listed on pages 67-69 should be checked on all types of vehicles and equipment.

- 	A.  Each student will be required to perform and properly document a daily vehicle check.  The evaluation form used for this check is located in Appendix B.  At a minimum, the items listed on pages 67-69 should be checked on all types of vehicles and equipment.

**Understanding and ****Checking Your Vehicle**

## Unit 6 - Basic Vehicle Control 

**Objectives:**
- 	1. Describe and demonstrate vehicle start-up procedures.
- 	2. Demonstrate the proper use of the spotter’s hand signals.
- 	3. On an established course, demonstrate the proper driving skills, an understanding of vehicle handling and maneuvering capabilities, and the application of appropriate cautions.

## Unit 6 - Basic Vehicle Control

**INTRODUCTION:**
- 	The following exercises will be conducted using the cone driving course.  The cadre will be evaluating drivers using the evaluation forms found in Appendix B.  Other evaluation criteria include:
- 	A. Driver’s foot will be off the accelerator and on the foot brake when shifting out of neutral/park.
- 	B. Vehicle will be completely stopped before shifting in or out of reverse.
- 	C. Transmission lever will be set back to the neutral/park position with parking brake set before driver leaves the seat.
- 	D. On steering wheel, place hands at the 9 and 3 o’clock position and thumbs on outside of wheel.

## MODULE 3 Unit 7 Vehicle Control Tasks(Urban, Suburban, or Rural)

**OBJECTIVES:**
- 1. Demonstrate the acceptable operation of a vehicle through a predetermined route or course representative of expected driving surfaces which incorporates the following maneuvers:
- 	-Enter and exit a limited access highway and execute lane changes.
- 	-On a rural road, drive through two kinds of curves.
- 	-The student’s performance will be evaluated in accordance with a performance checklist.
- 2. Explain the relationship of momentum and inertia to vehicle size and speed.
- 3. Explain how to mitigate centrifugal forces when negotiating curves.
- 4. Explain the purpose of the two second rule for determining following distance.

## 	 OBJECTIVES: 	

	1. List seven of the ten hazards encountered while driving off-road.
	2. Develop a Go/No-Go checklist for off-road driving.
	3. Demonstrate the proper driving techniques while negotiating selected poor traction conditions listed in this unit and explain precautions the operator needs to take.

- 	1. List seven of the ten hazards encountered while driving off-road.
- 	2. Develop a Go/No-Go checklist for off-road driving.
- 	3. Demonstrate the proper driving techniques while negotiating selected poor traction conditions listed in this unit and explain precautions the operator needs to take.

**Unit 8 - Off-road Driving Tasks**

## PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 

- 	Demonstrate the acceptable operation of a vehicle 	through a predetermined route or course 	representative of expected driving surfaces, which 	incorporates the following maneuvers. Enter and exit 	a limited access highway and execute lane changes.  	On a rural road, drive through two kinds of curves.
- 	Demonstrate the proper driving techniques while 	negotiating selected poor traction conditions listed in 	this chapter and explain precautions the operator 	needs to take.
- 	The student’s performance will be evaluated in 	accordance with a performance checklist.