# Presentation: 024275

## Commission for the Guard and Reserve

- Battalion Commander Testimony
- 21 Sep 2006
- FASWCOM, Point Loma, CA
- LtCol Mark A. Smith
- CO, 2nd Bn, 24th Marines (former)
- OIF II-2, June 2004 – May 2005

## Introduction

- First, it is an honor to be here testifying to this Commission today.  Per my initial instructions received, I was asked to do a brief 5 minute introduction, and address several key issues for the commission.  That task, as with this war, does not lend itself to a 5 minute discussion, so I have defaulted to a power point presentation, trying to focus on ‘wave tops’ and making myself available for follow-on questioning or any requested or required subsequent actions.  With that said, by way of introduction, I felt it best for the commission to know who we were and what we did in the GWOT to better gauge our experiences and their play in your role as a commission.  That will come from my quick overview of slides 3, 4 and 5, which will end my introduction portion of this brief.  Caveat all remaining slides with my  position for this testimony and all future actions in the USMCR are based on the effects that policies and process have on the individual Marine.  For this ‘down with the blood and the guts and the mud and the beer’ level is the key to success against this vile enemy.  And, having lost (14) OUTSTANDING Marines during our tour, no amount of ‘big picture’ thinking carries sway with me when it has a direct effect on the training, readiness, lethality or survivabililty of these Magnificent Marines who, with a happy heart, ride into battle and willingly sacrifice all, while giving us their loyalty, even unto violent and early death.  So, with that, let me introduce the Mad Ghosts and our contribution to the GWOT!

## Overview

- 2nd Bn, 24th Mar (2/24) activated 01 Jun 2004
- Deployed to Camp Pendleton, CA for Intermediate Location Training (ILOC) which commenced in earnest on 10 Jun 2004 and lasted until mid-September 2004
- Deployed to Iraq mid-September 2004 and chopped OPCON to 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU): AO – S Baghdad/N Babil Provinces
- Mission: conduct full-spectrum Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) in order to set the conditions for free/fair Iraqi elections on 30 Jan 2005

## History/Metrics

- Utilized ‘zip code’ offense and occupied terrain in Mahmudiyah, Yusufiyah and Lutafiyah to conduct _**persistent **_and _**relentless**_ operations on 4th GW/ASW model of identification followed by neutralization of insurgency/terrorist network in zone, while reducing presence on ‘security’ missions/guarding ‘terrain’
- Upon arrival, MSR in our zone was highest IED MSR in theater, and our enemy activity exceeded any zone in theater
**By 30 Jan 2005 elections, we had reduced enemy violence by almost 80%, voter turnout was 71%, estimated enemy dead at over 300, and we had detained over 1,000 suspected insurgents and terrorists, over 80% of which had been processed on to Abu Ghraib prison for lengthy detention**

## Unique History

- 2/24 had a unique operational history that may be of particular interest to this panel in the number and types of HHQs that we served from an OPCON perspective
- 24th MEU, 1st Mar Div, I MEF: Sep – Dec 04
- 2nd BCT, 1st CAVDIV: Dec 04 – Feb 05
- 5th BCT, 1st CAVDIV: Feb 05 – Mar 05
- 256th BCT, 3rd ID: Mar 05 – Apr 05 (National Guard Brigade, Headquartered in Louisiana)

## Specific Issues from Commission #1:What was overall readiness picture prior to activation and what were significant impediments to improving readiness?

- _Overall Readiness_: prior to activation would grade as a C
- Bn was well manned, with exception of officers which was at just over 40% T/O at time of intent to activate message
- Marines of the Bn were highly motivated and as a result of a pre-mobilization Annual Training period (April 2004, Camp Atterbury, IN) focused on MOS skill mastery were ‘brilliant in the basics’ at the time of mobilization

## Specific Issues from Commission #1:What was overall readiness picture prior to activation and what were significant impediments to improving readiness?

- _Significant Impediments_: centered primarily around key personnel early activation/ACDU funding and equipment sourcing
- ABSOLUTE necessity of key personnel to activate early, 60-90 days prior to unit for mission analysis and Training Management to support post mobilization/ ILOC training plan (Cmdr/Staff, Co Cmdrs, etc.)
- Personal involvement and support of CG 4th MarDiv, MajGen McCarthy, was critical to extensive pre-mob ACDU of Bn Cmdr and S-3, which had enormous positive impact on AT and ILOC plan and management
- Inability to trigger equipment sourcing and updated repair priority status UNTIL mobilization created ‘lags’ in equipment availability and sourcing of equipment post commencement of training, and in some cases arrived just prior to deployment into theater
- Absolute WRONG way of conducting training management, particularly when one understands the concepts of neural network/ muscle memory training for high stress skillsets required of 4th GW/ ASW

## Specific Issues from Commission #2:Did the post mobilization process adequately address any deficiencies prior to deployment?

- NO
- Post mobilization ‘process’ further exacerbated pre-mobilization issues
**MCO for Cmd Relationships is the MAID-P**
- Upon mobilization it places units OPCON to COMMARFORCOM and essentially strips them of any form of HHQ for support normally associated with a Bn
- Essentially leaves Bn to ‘fend for themselves’ on matters of funding and support and leads to ‘disengagement’ of normal HHQs.  Constant friction between ACDU/RC as to whom supports what!
- Creates ENORMOUS amount of staff work/production on simple matters of ‘life support’ and ‘care and feeding’ that detract from staff/warfighting function readiness and mastery; in order to support procurement of copy machines, paper, credit cards, rental cars, etc!!!
**Again, had it not been for the personal involvement on several key issues by CG 4****th**** MarDiv, MGen McCarthy, I am convinced 2/24 would have been less prepared for combat and had been less successful than we were (NOTE: Bn’s do not normally, nor should they have to utilize Div Cmdr/GO assistance for issues of baseline support)**

## Specific Issues from Commission #3:Was this process efficient and effective?

- NO
- As mentioned in previous slide, this process essentially leaves the Bn ‘alone and unafraid’ to support themselves, devoid of normal chain of command and HHQ support
- The single biggest inefficiency in the process is the lack of understanding that once the Bn mobilizes and departs their HTC for ILOC training, THEY ARE DEPLOYED!
- They are deployed and have lost all primary mechanisms of funding and standard equipment NECESSARY to manage a Bn, but that on the surface seem transparent to those not involved as to how they effect ‘training’
- Need for rental cars for basic movement, need for copy machines/paper, postage machines, FedEx accounts, Govt Impact Card for purchases, phones, cell phones, etc., etc., etc.,
- The amount of time and effort that was exerted by my staff in these endeavors was ENORMOUS, and kept them from their primary duties.  This led to an average 18 hour workday/7 days a week throughout the ILOC period, and was further aggravated by the fact that HHQ contact was limited to the normal ‘workday’ with weekends and holidays off, and no 24hr/7 day OPS CENTER for immediate support

## Specific Issues from Commission #4:What factors had adverse impacts on morale and retention?

- Equipment availability/sourcing
- Marines of 2/24 were trained extensively on SASO skillset for 4th GW/ASW and understood both the physical and mental/ mindset aspects of hyper-realism and stimulus response training; neural network and muscle memory.  Accordingly, the lack of sufficient vehicles, radios, CSWs, ACOGs, OTV/Sapis, etc. during training as opposed to what would be available in theater, and forcing a constant ‘rotation of assets’ to train; they knew was a violation of hyper realism/neural network training principles, and led to morale issues
- ‘Life support’ and ‘care and feeding’
- As mentioned in previous slides, the enormous effort expended to procure the basics led to a belief among the Marines that the process was only concerned with saving money, was stupid, and did not serve them in _**their**_ only requirements: to be the best led, best equipped and best trained force on the battlefield, identical to their ACDU counterparts

## Specific Issues from Commission #5:How should policies or process be changed for the future, especially considering plans for cyclical rotation of reserve component units as part of rotational base in the U.S. Army?

- Policy
- _Volunteer Requirement_: Although it did not effect 2/24, as the OIC of 24th Mar FWD and OIC 24th Mar Combat Mentorship Program in support of 1/24’s pending deployment to Iraq, the volunteer requirement for subsequent mobilizations of units MUST be scratched, and ASAP.  Violates every principle of command, exponentially increases the complexity and challenges of RC mobilizations, and is universally rejected by the Marines and the Bn Leadership

## Specific Issues from Commission #5:How should policies or process be changed for the future, especially considering plans for cyclical rotation of reserve component units as part of rotational base in the U.S. Army?

- Policy
- Trigger point of mobilization date for equipment sourcing, maintenance priority increase, funding etc. should be changed to coincide with the Intent to Activate message, or a minimum of 90 days prior to mobilization.
- Post mobilization should be focused entirely on training the force to deploy
- The force to deploy should be set, both from a manning and equipment standpoint at mobilization date minus 90-120 days

## Specific Issues from Commission #5:How should policies or process be changed for the future, especially considering plans for cyclical rotation of reserve component units as part of rotational base in the U.S. Army?

- Policy
- Mobilization dates to coincide with college semesters; Jan 01 and Jun 01
- SCRATCH immediately.  Mobilization dates should be set based SOLELY on rotation date into theater, minus 120 days for ILOC training.
- Marines are the most staunch professionals I have ever had the honor of serving with, and will sacrifice semesters of school without hesitation or reservation in favor of training, readiness and warfighting mastery, period!  Anything less is a recipe for failure and casualties!

## Specific Issues from Commission #5:How should policies or process be changed for the future, especially considering plans for cyclical rotation of reserve component units as part of rotational base in the U.S. Army?

- Process
- Organic HHQ involvement in _**pre**_-mobilization process
- 24th Marines changed the paradigm by viewing 1/24 pending mobilization as a ‘Regiment Effort’ and was intimately involved as a HHQ, which was very successful
- Organic HHQ FWD element in _**post**_-mobilization process
- 24th Marines exploited their pre-mobilization concept and success by establishing a post-mobilization FWD element who via operational reporting and coordination was able to rapidly and efficiently address issues of support and training management for the Bn, allowing them to maintain focus on Warfighting
- NOTE 1: while the same challenges and lags were experienced as with 2/24, it is substantial to note that the Bn was far less effected due to 24th Marines assuming the Staff work.
- NOTE 2: it is _**NOT**_ insignificant to note, that having been forward deployed with 1/24 since 28 April 2006 as the _**24**__**th**__** Marines FWD OIC**_, I can testify without reservation that my duties and actions have been identical to what I was doing as the _**Bn Cmdr of 2/24**_ during our ILOC period in Jun – Sep 2004

## Specific Issues from Commission #6:How many training days, above the current 39 in a normal year, could you use and would your troops, families and employers support?

- This issue is not an issue of numbers per se, but how those numbers of days are utilized
- Current paradigm of 39 (24 Drill Days and 15 AT Days) is sufficient, just not on the 1 weekend a month, 2 weeks in the summer concept
- Complete/profound acceptance of 4th GW/ ASW is the fight we have, forces the realization that not only are the skillsets of success complex at the individual Marine level, but that it is also at the individual Marine and small team level that success or failure, victory or defeat will be realized
- Accordingly, I would argue for a paradigm change of the manner in which we execute a ‘normal year’ vice a change in number of days in a ‘normal year’

## Specific Issues from Commission #6:How many training days, above the current 39 in a normal year, could you use and would your troops, families and employers support?

- Quarterly drill periods, vice monthly, of (12) drill periods per, or 6 days
- Day 1: personnel, admin, medical, equipment, embarkation readiness, equipment draw/staging
- Day 2: orders issue, pre-combat checks/inspections, safety briefs, movement to training area
- Days 3,4 and 5: tactical execution of lane training and FEX, from team level up to Bn level (inclusive of digital domain C2 executing all battle drills: fire support, CASEVAC, operational reporting, battle rhythm, etc,), movement to HTC
- Day 6: AAR, equipment maintenance and turn-in, issue OpOrd for subsequent drill period, depart for HOR

## Specific Issues from Commission #6:How many training days, above the current 39 in a normal year, could you use and would your troops, families and employers support?

- Quarterly drill periods would be progressive in nature and coincide with the USMC Training Continuum for OIF-OEF deployments
- Fall Quarter: Main Effort - Block I skills
- Individual Mobilization Readiness and required skills
- Combat Marksmanship/Swim Qual, etc.
- Winter Quarter: Main Effort – Block II Skills
- Individual Skills, theater specific
- Spring Quarter: Maine Effort – Block II Skills, Block IV Skills Introduction
- Individual Skills, theater specific
- Unit Skills, theater specific (introduction and PME)
- Annual Training: Block IV Skills
- PME and mission rehearsal of Service Level Training

## Specific Issues from Commission #6:How many training days, above the current 39 in a normal year, could you use and would your troops, families and employers support?

- Summer Quarter: Main Effort – Remediation
- Cmdr determination of remediation effort
- Family Readiness/Employer Readiness updates
- Ensure familiarity with next FY training plan
- Coupled with this plan would be a recommendation for MARFORRES to establish a ‘Asymmetric Warfare Center of Excellence’ that units would rotate through for their AT, and would execute every other year, similar to the CAX program for 3rd GW excellence. AWCofE would also be available for Staff Training during Spring Quarter and prior to Bn execution of AT.  (6) of (9) Bn’s could execute the AWCofE during a FY, with the following year focused on a 3rd GW skillset and AT

## Specific Issues from Commission #6:How many training days, above the current 39 in a normal year, could you use and would your troops, families and employers support?

- Employer and Family Support for this training concept
- Employer support in my opinion hinges on tax breaks for sacrifice of employers serving in the Guard and Reserve
- Family support in my opinion hinges on stability of ‘knowing what is ahead’, which I think this concept supports, and in benefits; reduction of age of retirement pay, increased use of Tri-Care and timely pay and benefits will increase family support

## Questions

- Questions, concerns, comments, criticisms, $%^#&*, etc.???
- POC
- LtCol Mark A. Smith
- XO, 24th Marine Regiment
- _[mark.a.smith13@usmc.mil](mailto:mark.a.smith13@usmc.mil)_
- 504 235-6138 blackberry/cell