# Presentation: 452918

## Financial Management (MW)

- Office of the Chief Financial Officer
- Gwen Sykes
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- This management control issue was introduced in 2001 as a significant area of concern because the core accounting system was not operational and it remained open until May 2003 when it was designated as an “Other Weakness” based on the new Internal Control rating schema.
- In October 2003, the OCFO had made significant progress toward improving the Agency’s financial statements, budget and execution documents, and other accounting reports.  At that time, the deficiency was reduced to a Management Challenge.
- In May 2004, it was elevated to a Material Weakness because the scope of the Core Financial Management System had the potential to impact the entire Agency.

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## Issue

- Since implementation of the Core Financial Management System, challenges in system processing, configuration, and capabilities have surfaced that have resulted in data anomalies (data integrity) and instances of non-compliance with prescribed federal accounting policies and procedures.  OCFO was a decentralized organization that lacked sufficient numbers of adequately trained staff guided by one set of NASA-wide policies and procedures.
- Root cause –
- Conversion from 10 disparate legacy financial systems supported by over 120 subsidiary systems, along with over a decade of historical data, to a single integrated financial management system highlighted long-standing data and process issues
- System processing issues in early stages of production operation resulted in data integrity problems, impacting external financial reporting
- Introduction of new system and processes has presented a tremendous learning curve for users which pre-implementation training did not fully address
- Migration to a single agency-wide core financial management system requires a single set of financial management policies and procedures
- Reduced staffing levels has deteriorated ability to maintain sufficient numbers of adequately trained resources to address post implementation challenges from the new financial system implementation and other systemic financial management challenges

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## Issue (continued)

- Corrective action taken to date
- Reconciled our differences with FBWT to within $22 million as of 8/30/2005.
- Developed a uniform automated tool to assist all Centers in reconciling FBWT that will be operational to start FY 2006.
- Significant progress made on hiring OCFO staff.
- Issued Monitoring Controls document for Center’s compliance on a monthly basis.

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## Recommendation

- Recommend that the current deficiency (MW-2004-1) be closed and a new Material Weakness be opened with the following description:
- 	The implementation of the IFMP Core Financial system during FY 2003 represented a major transformation in NASA’s financial management systems and processes. Challenges from this major change were anticipated, however, it has taken much longer than expected to stabilize our overall financial management environment.  Since the completion of the rollout of the new system, challenges in system processing, configuration, and capabilities have surfaced that have resulted in data anomalies (data integrity) and instances of non-compliance with prescribed federal accounting policies and procedures.  Further, the OCFO was a decentralized organization that lacked sufficient numbers of adequately trained staff guided by one set of NASA-wide policies and procedures.

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## Contractor-Held Property (MW)

- Office of the Chief Financial Officer
- Gwen Sykes
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- This deficiency was introduced in February 2003 as a “Material Weakness” with planned actions to include monthly reporting by contractors; publication of a Federal Management Regulation for Property, Plant, and Equipment; and initiation of contractor and accountant training.
- In October of 2003, the deficiency was reduced to an “Other Weakness”  when the OCFO completed the tasks of defining assets in space and issuing revised policy.
- In October 2004, the deficiency was re-designated as a Material Weakness when the IG questioned the accuracy and reliability of property related accounting data.

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## Issue

- NASA needs to improve its management controls for the financial reporting of property, plant and equipment, and materials including Theme Assets (formerly Assets-in-Space), contractor-held property, spare parts and assets under construction.  Lack of proper management controls can result in inconsistent financial recording practices that can misstate asset values and period expenses.
- Root cause
- 1) NASA’s policies and procedures not fully in conformance with federal requirements
- 2) Inconsistent application of existing policies and procedures
- Corrective action taken to date
- Establishment of Financial Integration Team, subgroup on PP&E composed of the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Administration, and Director of Procurement.
- Presentation to and support received from the Senior Advisory Group on the overall plan to improve NASA's PP&E internal controls and financial reporting.
- Established PP&E Compensating Controls Group comprised of HQs and Center representatives.
- Prepared draft Theme Assets capitalization policy paper and submitted to OIG and external auditors for review and comment.

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## Recommendation

- Recommend closing the current Material Weakness (MW-2004-02 - Contractor-Held Property) and replacing it with a deficiency that captures the overall scope of property related challenges.
- Recommend responsibility for this Material Weakness be shared by the OCFO and Institutions and Management.

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## Full Cost Integration (OW)

- Office of the Chief Financial Officer
- Gwen Sykes
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- In February 2003, the Associate Administrator for Earth Science pointed out that full cost accounting is a major Agency undertaking that should be monitored and placed on the agenda as a “Management Challenge.”
- In February 2005, the OCFO recommended the initial Full Cost Accounting MC be closed based on actions taken by the FC Steering Committee.  The committee chair ordered that MC-03-03 be removed as an exception, and instructed that Full Cost Integration be created as the new MC.
- In May 2005, the significance level was elevated from a “Management Challenge” to an “Other Weakness,” due to a perceived lack of understanding of full cost policies and procedures.

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## Issue

- Full Cost concepts need to be better integrated into NASA operations. Despite implementing a Full Cost accounting system and many Full Cost processes, NASA still lacks the level of cultural change needed to fully transition to Full Cost management.
- Root cause –
- Insufficient stakeholder training
- Unintended consequences and behaviors realized from initial full cost approaches
- Some policies and planned processes were based on insufficient experience and need to be refined to reflect lessons learned
- Corrective action taken to date
- Completed Full Cost Assessment
- Delivered recommendations to the Financial Integration Team on improving full cost implementation
- Continuing to improve policy to resolve operational issues
- Developing requirements for multiyear long-term plan to institutionalize full cost in NASA's operational culture.

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## Recommendation

- Recommend this issue remain as currently assigned (Other Weakness).

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## Space Shuttle

- Space Operations Mission Directorate
- William H. Gerstenmaier
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- 	Following loss of *Columbia *and her crew, the Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station and Space Shuttle Programs established a formal "Return-to-Flight Planning Team", and provided direction for the team to address actions required before a safe return to flight could be assured, and other actions determined necessary to comply with the formal recommendations of the CAIB.  Options and recommendations from the Return-to-Flight Planning Team were assessed by the Space Flight Leadership Council, which was established for this purpose and was co-chaired by the Associate Administrator for Space Operations and the Deputy Chief Engineer for Independent Technical Authority.  Return-to-flight actions were implemented through the normal Space Shuttle Program management.  The Council abolished on June 28, 2005, and all actions are now conducted through the Space Shuttle Program management.
- 	Progress on implementation of Return to Flight actions is documented in the "Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond" issued periodically.

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## Issue

- Technical Deficiencies:
- Modeling was not as accurate when the Shuttle system was originally certified in the late 1970’s; Debris Transport Analysis was more art than science (point to point transport); and the analyses that was done was rarely supported with rigorous testing (e.g.,  wind tunnel testing, impact testing).
- All pre-STS-107 flight history seemed to support the initial certification analyses.
- Foam damage to the Orbiter failed to show positive correlation between liberated debris mass and TPS (tile) damage.
- Post-STS-107 modeling told us where debris might strike the Orbiter, however, it was impact testing that defined critical debris (mass) thresholds for return to flight.  This testing showed us how fragile the Orbiter was to different materials and masses.  At that point, we knew we would have to eliminate all the critical debris sources, provide much improved debris impact monitoring, and determine to what extent we needed to harden the Orbiter before we could Return to Flight.
- While STS-114 proved we had done a very credible job of eliminating critical debris, five In Flight Anomaly foam loss events made it clear additional work is required before the second RTF mission to increase our understanding of the cause of these foam debris events and taking the appropriate corrective actions.  This work is currently on-going.
- Other Deficiencies:
- The Final Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) identified a number of systemic cultural, organizational, and managerial issues within both the Space Shuttle Program and NASA as a whole that contributed to the loss of Columbia on February 1, 2003.

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## Issue (continued)

- Root cause:
- The physical cause of the loss of *Columbia* and her crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel number 8.
- The Final Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) identified a number of systemic cultural, organizational, and managerial issues within both the Space Shuttle Program and NASA as a whole that contributed to the loss of Columbia on February 1, 2003.
- Fifteen Return-to-Flight and fourteen continuing to fly recommendations are in the CAIB Report.  Four dealt explicitly with management issues, and many of the other recommendations have important organizational as well as technical implications.
- The CAIB Report also calls on NASA to prepare a detailed plan for defining, establishing, transitioning, and implementing these recommendations prior to Return to Flight, with the understanding that the implementation of the fundamental management changes will continue beyond the first Shuttle flight after Columbia.

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## Issue (continued)

- Corrective action taken to date:
- In response to the CAIB report, NASA developed the Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond. The Implementation Plan is an evolving blueprint for safely and reliably returning to flight.  It explains how NASA is complying with the recommendations of the CAIB and other corrective actions.  These additional corrective actions may include other CAIB observations, self-imposed Shuttle program initiatives or input from other sources.
- On August 17, 2005, the Return to Flight Task Group released its Final Report.  In it, the Task Group unanimously closed out all but three of the Board's Return to Flight recommendations.  The Task group noted NASA had made substantial progress relative to these recommendations, and emphasized that, "The ability to fully comply with all of the [Board's] recommendations does not imply that the Space Shuttle is unsafe."  The first two Return to Flight missions, STS-114 and STS-121, will provide the data and flight experience needed to address the remaining open issues in these recommendations.  This work will be documented in future updates to the Implementation Plan.

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## Issue (continued)

- NASA made the decision to proceed with the launch of STS-114 on July 26, 2005 based on Return to Flight Task Group's assessment, the totality of improvements made to the Space Shuttle system during Return to Flight, and the vetting of all these improvements through a rigorous and multilayered engineering review process, culminating in the approved Certificate of Flight Readiness.
- Post-flight analysis of STS-114 indicated that, except for one event, the thermal protection system on the External Tank performed within expected parameters.  Most of the small foam shedding events that were observed with the newly upgraded imagery and sensor capabilities posed little or no threat to the Orbiter.  The one event of concern was the loss of an approximately one pound piece of foam from the area of the External Tank's liquid hydrogen protuberance air load (PAL) ramp.  NASA commissioned two teams (one lead by the Space Shuttle propulsion manager, the other an independent "Tiger Team" reporting directly to the Associate Administrator for Space Operations) to analyze these foam loss events and recommend any forward work that would have to be done prior to the launch of the next mission, STS-121.

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## Recommendation

- Until successful completion of STS-121, this item should remain a material weakness.

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## Shuttle Impact on ISS Operations

- Space Operations Mission Directorate
- William H. Gerstenmaier
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- Following the Shuttle Columbia accident, February 2003, the ISS Partnership agreed to an interim operational plan that would allow continued crewed operation.  The plan called for a reduction of the crew size to two, with the crew exchanges to be conducted on the scheduled semi-annual Soyuz flights.  Cargo re-supply would be provided by Russian Progress vehicles.  This is an interim measure until the Space Shuttle returns to flight.
- The first of two Shuttle Return to Flight missions has been completed, STS-114, launched on July 26, 2005 and landed on August 9, 2005.
**	**

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## Issue

- Description of deficiency:
- 	The International Space Station (ISS) was designed with the Space Shuttle as its prime support for crew transport, assembly of on-orbit elements, utilization and operations.  Additional crew and cargo transport is provided by Russia.  Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the Shuttle fleet was grounded. This has impacted the number of crew that can be supported onboard the ISS, temporarily halted assembly of the Station, and significantly reduced the available up and down mass support for Station operations and utilization.
- Root cause: The grounding of the STS fleet resulted in this impact on ISS operations.

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## Issue

- Corrective action taken to date:
- Established an understanding with the ISS partnership to (1) rely on Russian vehicles for crew and cargo support until Shuttle returns to flight and (2)  reduce the crew size from 3 to 2 to reduce the logistics burden, given the reduced capability of the Russian vehicles compared to the Space Shuttle.
- Successfully completed the ISS objectives for the STS-114 mission:
- Flew the combined Space Shuttle/ISS stack in a new configuration designed to minimize the threat of orbital debris and micrometeorite impact damage.
- Transferred more than 15,000 pounds worth of supplies and hardware to the ISS, including food, water, nitrogen, lithium hydroxide canisters, and scientific equipment.
- Returned more than 7,200 pounds worth of expended hardware and unneeded supplies from the ISS back to Earth.  Returning this hardware allows for failure analysis and possible reuse of Russian Elektron (oxygen generation) and Kurs (for docking of Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles) hardware, as well as U.S. components like a Control Moment Gyroscope (CMG), Global Positioning System sensor, and spacesuit.

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## Issue

- Repaired and/or replaced two of the ISS’s four CMG’s (which provide attitude control for ISS), restoring the Station to its full capability.
- Installed the External Stowage Platform-2, an external platform for storing components and assisting astronauts in conducting EVAs from the ISS, transferred the Human Research Facility-2 rack to the U.S. Destiny module on the ISS (increasing the scientific capabilities of the Station), and deployed and retrieved the Materials International Space Station Experiment Passive Experiment Containers from the outside of the ISS.
- Reboosted the orbit of the ISS and conducted a fly-around and completed photographic survey of the ISS prior to reentry.
- Between STS-114 and STS-121, we will continue to rely on Russian crew and cargo services.  ISS assembly will resume with STS-115.

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## Recommendation

- Until successful completion of STS-121, this item should remain a management challenge.

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## Information Technology Security

- Office of the Chief Information Officer
- Scott Santiago
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- The NASA OIG, through their audits of NASA’s IT Security Program, had identified a large number of findings over the years that led them to recommend that IT Security be declared a “Material Weakness.”
- NASA has been working since FY 2003 to correct the findings of those audits and to correct systemic problems with:
- ITS Policy and Procedural Requirements
- ITS Compliance Execution
- Because of the work in progress, NASA management has determined that IT Security be an “Other Weakness.”

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## Issue

- Root Cause:
- NASA IT Security, while improving, needs more effective implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. In addition, NASA’s policy and procedures have not kept up with OMB direction regarding implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA).
- OMB continues to focus attention on  IT Security, which requires NASA to make significant changes in how IT Security is managed.

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## Issue

- Corrective action taken to date
- Rewrote NASA IT Security policy and requirements documents to reflect NIST Guidance as directed by OMB, pending approval.
- Establishing a central database of all NASA systems and IT Security plans status and added a module to CATS for tracking all IT Security weaknesses according to FISMA.
- Established a certification and accreditation (C&A) program as Directed by OMB NIST SP 800-37 “Guide for the Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal Information Systems.
- Expanded the NASA ITS training program.

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## Issue

- Corrective action taken to date
- Improved Incident reporting and tracking
- Establishing centrally-managed monitoring of the NASA network
- Establishing centrally managed security services to correct known security weaknesses in managing sensitive information and to meet HSPD-12 requirements
- Established Agency metrics (ITS Scorecard) based on internal and external ITS performance requirements

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## Recommendation

- Continue to categorize NASA’s IT Security Program as an “Other Weakness” (OW) until changes are implemented and they begin to demonstrate the required results.

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## Competition in Contracting

- Institutions and Management
- Office of Procurement
- Tom Luedtke
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- In FY ’04, the OIG issued a report stating “NASA continues to be challenged in promoting competition in contracting”
- Audits and reviews performed over a 24 month period found several instances where “competition was not pursued and the lack of competition was not adequately justified”
- OIG stated “basic management controls are needed to provide reasonable assurance that competition is maximized where practical”

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## Issue

- Description of deficiency
- Per the OIG, “NASA continues to be challenged in promoting competition in contracting”, and
- “Basic management controls are needed to provide reasonable assurance that competition is maximized where practical and justifications for noncompetitive procurements meet regulatory requirements.”
- Root cause
- Federal and NASA procurement policies require the use of competition to the fullest extent possible
- Audit and reviews performed found several instances where competition was not pursued and lack of competition was not adequately justified

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## Issue (con’t)

- Corrective action taken to date
- All previously opened recommendations have been closed
- Office of Procurement has issued new guidance for establishing reasonable response time in synopses for commercial procurements
- Survey teams have focused on the documentation of efforts made to remove or overcome any barriers to competition
- Centers utilize Resource Consultants, Inc. for the purpose of providing Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) certification training and refresher training.  COTR certification class includes a section on competition in contracting

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## Recommendation

- Competition in contracting should be removed from the list.

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## Access to NASA Facilities & Technology

- Office of Security and Program Protection
- Clint Herbert, Deputy Assistant Administrator
- November 9, 2005

## Background

**	**NASA's previous photo-ID issuing policy and procedures had numerous shortcomings that needed to be revamped in order to ensure that only authorized persons gain access to NASA facilities. Each Center’s photo-ID producing equipment produced a differing photo-ID then that established under the previous NASA standards. To compound the issue, some former employees have been non-compliant in returning their badges, and continue to gain access to NASA facilities uninhibited.  Current NPR establishes new standards for both equipment and photo-ID topology.

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## Issue

- Description of deficiency:
- NASA's current photo-ID issuing policy and procedures have numerous shortcomings that must be revamped in order to ensure that only authorized persons gain access to NASA facilities. To compound the issue, some former employees have been non-compliant in returning their badges, and continue to gain access to NASA facilities uninhibited.  This leaves NASA extremely vulnerable to security breaches by individuals who no longer have a need to access NASA facilities and by adversaries who could easily produce a counterfeit NASA photo-ID. NASA also recognizes its vulnerabilities relating to issuing NASA photo-IDs, accessing, and accounting for foreign national (FN) (non-U.S. citizens) visitors, contractor employees, and other FN assignees.
- Root Cause:
- While NPR 1600.1 sets specific standards for photo-IDs, non-standardized equipment causes the appearance of photo-IDs (e.g., color, font, topography) to vary from Center to Center, making it impossible for any one Center to positively identify another Center's badge as being authentic. Multiple badge types at the agency have led to problems with managing access to NASA facilities & technology.
- Corrective Action Plan (CAP):
- Standardize the NASA photo-ID generating, issuing, and accountability technology to ensure consistency and uniformity. The ultimate goal of the OneNASA - photo-ID system is to upgrade the system to current technologies, establish an enterprise architecture deter counterfeiting, and prohibit unauthorized individuals (anyone other than current NASA employees/contractors) from freely accessing NASA facilities. STATUS: Systems procured and deployed at all Centers, IATO issued, generation and issuance of CS photo-IDs to has begun at NASA Centers and is scheduled to begin at HQs mid/end November.  Issuance of contractor photo-IDs to commence shortly thereafter.

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## Recommendation

- Remove from issues list and closeout.
- Rationale:  New NPR issued, new OneNASA Photo-ID’s being issued at all Centers.

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## Declassification Review ProcessManagement Challenge (MC)

- Office of Security and Program Protection
- Clint Herbert, Deputy Assistant Administrator
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- NASA had a significant backlog of permanent records containing classified national security information (CNSI) that needed to be reviewed for continued classification pursuant to EO 12958 amended.  NASA faces a December 2006 deadline to insure that all permanent records containing CNSI that are 25-years old or older are subjected to classification review. Poor records management practices prevented the identification of records subject to Section 3.3 of EO 12958 amended; resulting in NASA’s inability to identify its total universe to be considered for declassification. The identified root causes had significantly impeded the classification review program’s efforts.  EO 12958 as amended contains a sliding-window requirement for NASA to conduct yearly classification reviews of permanent records containing CNSI.

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## Issue

- Deficiency Description:
- NASA has a significant backlog of permanent records containing classified national security information (CNSI) that must be reviewed for continued classification pursuant to EO 12958 amended.  NASA faces a December 2006 deadline to insure that all permanent records containing CNSI that are 25-years old or older are subjected to classification review. Poor records management practices prevents the identification of records subject to Section 3.3 of EO 12958 amended; resulting in NASA’s inability to identify its total universe to be considered for declassification. The identified root causes have significantly impeded the classification review program’s efforts.  EO 12958 as amended contains a sliding-window requirement for NASA to conduct yearly classification reviews of permanent records containing CNSI.
- Root Causes:
- Insufficient staffing;
- Historically poor records management;
- Insufficient funding;
- Lack of Declassification Guides;
- Insufficient resident expertise to perform classification reviews for older programs;
- Insufficient support from senior management (commitment of resources)
- Corrective Action Plan (CAP):
- A comprehensive CAP has been developed and has been distributed to the OC, all Mission Directorates, and Center Security Offices on 2 November 2005.

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## Recommendation

- Closeout. NASA has made significant progress in declassification efforts and is now positioned to meet the December 31, 2006 deadline.

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## Staffing at NASA Headquarters

- Institutions and Management
- Jeffrey E. Sutton
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- NASA Headquarters managers have reported difficulty in recruiting and hiring personnel with the experience needed to address key areas.  During a pre-audit review, the NASA HQ policy staff found errors in the delegated examining (DE) activities that were significant enough to warrant withdrawing the DE authority from the HQ Human Resources Office.  An OPM audit substantiated NASA's initial findings and identified additional errors and deficiencies in the DE actions.  OPM also found deficiencies in competitive promotion actions in instances when the vacancy was announced under both DE and merit promotion procedures.  As a result, the absence of an effective recruitment capability at HQ has led to significant important vacancies in the Office of the CFO and other HQ organizations.  Delays in staffing the CFO Office stymies progress in mitigating the declared material weaknesses in financial management and contractor held property.

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## Issue

**Deficiency Description**
- The absence of an effective recruitment capability at HQ has led to significant important vacancies in the Office of the CFO and other HQ organizations. Delays in staffing the CFO Office stymies progress in mitigating the declared material weaknesses in financial management and contractor held property.
**Root Cause **
- Withdrawal of DE authority was caused by inadequate staffing and training of staff, leadership and organizational inefficiencies, and poor or non-existent operational procedures.  These root causes led to improper personnel processing, poor customer service and violation of OPM regulations.
**Corrective Action Plan (CAP)**
- The CAP focuses on establishing proper operating procedures; creating oversight of operations staff; creating new customer service standards; hiring additional staff & contractors; provision of basic HR training in NASA STARS & recruiting & staffing procedures & regulations; reorganization of the HQ HR office to a consulting model; & providing more effective & efficient management & leadership.

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## Recommendation

- Close this Management Challenge

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## Open OIG Audit Recommendations

- Institutions and Management
- Jeffrey E. Sutton
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- By early 2000, the number of open OIG recommendations had become unmanageable.  In December 1998 there were approximately 76; in October 2001 there were 523 open and 40 unresolved  recommendations.
- The Operations Council placed this item on the list to bring visibility.
- Significant work by both the new NASA OIG and management has resulted in a steady downward trend.
- By October 31, 2005 there were 37 open and no unresolved recommendations.

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## 3

## Recommendation

- Continue to give this appropriate management attention, but no longer report it as a Management Challenge

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## Open GAO Audit Recommendations

- Institutions and Management
- Jeffrey E. Sutton
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- As a result of an increase in GAO audit activity specific to NASA, highly visible and politically sensitive GAO audits (e.g., Mission Management Aircraft), and continued Congressional interest in the health of NASA’s financial management, the Operations Council agreed to add the status of GAO audit recommendations as a Management Challenge in order to keep senior management appraised of GAO audit activity.

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## 3

## Recommendation

- Continue to carry this as a Management Challenge
- Work with the appropriate offices and management to address the open and unresolved recommendations
- Re-institute regular meetings with the Administrator’s office to provide status of GAO recommendations

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## Mission Management Aircraft (OW)

- Infrastructure and Administration
- Jeffrey Sutton
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- GAO audit of Agency’s FY03 and FY04 Mission Management Aircraft (MMA) operations highlighted control deficiencies with respect to management of NASA’s MMA.
- MMA operations were also questioned in several prior GAO and NASA IG audit reports.

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## Issue

- Inadequate documentation and periodic review of MMA mission requirements
- Issued NPR 7900 Interim Change for HQ approval of all “mission required” flight designations
- Supporting PA&E review of MMA requirements
- Insufficient HQ oversight
- Augmenting HQ AMD staff for MMA
- Instituted annual HQ review of Center MMA operations
- Lack of integrated IT system to capture and report aircraft cost & utilization
- Funding NASA Aircraft Information System (NAMIS)
- Facilitating Aircraft Cost Accounting PAT

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## Recommendation

- Continue to carry this as an Other Weakness

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## NASA Rules Review

- Institutions and Management
- Jeffrey E. Sutton
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- Each OIC at Headquarters was tasked to review all their rules and regulations, to cancel any documents that were no longer required, and to strip the remaining documents of any and all instructions that are advisory, ambiguous, or just guidance.

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## Issue

**Deficiency Description:**
- Agency and Headquarters directives that are merely advisory in nature cause uncertainty about their application to the workforce.  Any documents that are no longer required are to be cancelled or stripped of any instructions that are advisory, ambiguous, or just guidance.
**Root Cause:**
- Decision-making processes that operate outside the organization's rules (from p. 177 of CAIB Report)
**Corrective Action Plan (CAP):**
- Phase 1:  Complete document inventories to show which directives to retain and which to cancel.  Completed 2/15/04.
- Phase 2:  Edit the retained directives as follows (Completed 3/12/04):
- 	(1) delete requirements and supporting information that are no longer needed;
- 	(2) delete references that are not specific to the content of the document;
- 	(3) boldface requirements to clearly distinguish them from explanatory material or supporting text;
- 	(4) correct administrative errors.
- Phase 3:  Establish a clear document hierarchy; apply a holistic
- 	approach to NASA rules; define and establish criteria for documenting requirements; and define and establish processes for review and enforcement.  Completed 3/1/05

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## Recommendation

- Close this Management Challenge

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## Space Exploration and the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000  (INA) 

- Office of Strategic Communications
- Joe Davis
- November 9, 2005

## Background

- The INA was signed into law by President Clinton in 2000.
- The International Space Station (ISS) and human space flight activities were singled out as the only cooperative program and used as leverage because in 2000 Russia was highly dependent on US funding—that is no longer the case.
- INA Section 6 restricts USG payments, in cash or in kind, to certain Russian entities for work related to human space flight, including the ISS.
- NASA, as part of an interagency effort, engaged Congress to develop a legislative solution to INA that would allow the Agency to purchase of goods and services from Russia, including essential Soyuz crew rescue services, to continue U.S. permanent presence aboard the International Space Station (ISS).

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## Working Towards a Solution 

- On July 12, 2005, the Administration submitted to Congress a proposed amendment to the INA and recommended that the amendment be added to NASA authorization legislation or another appropriate legislative vehicle.
- On September 19, 2005, the Senate, by Unanimous Consent, passed S. 1713, allowing NASA to procure required goods and services from Russia to ensure the continued safe operation of the ISS until January 1, 2012.
- On October 26, 2005, the House of Representatives, by voice vote, passed an amended version of S. 1713 which added sanctions language related to Syria and Iran.  However, the measure still allows NASA to procure Russian space goods and services to support the assembly and operation of the ISS between now and January 1, 2012.
- The House-amended S. 1713 was received in the Senate on October 27, 2005. Unanimous Consent clearance is in process and we are awaiting final passage.

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## Recommendation

- Recommend removal of INA action from the *internal deficiencies* list, as passage of an amendment securing relief is imminent.

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## Internal Controls on Releasing Program/Project Cost Estimates 

**Office of the Chief Engineer***
**Keith Hudkins**
**November 9, 2005**

** In coordination with OCFO, PA&E, Legislative Affairs & Mission Directorates*

## Action

**Responsible Office:** Office of the Chief Engineer
**Description***: Clarify/establish the internal controls for releasing estimated Cat 1 Program and Project life cycle cost from pre-formulation through the life of the program.
**Objective Today:** Approve concept

- * Different than action in the last meeting minutes

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## Concept for a Solution

- A controlled process for releasing cost estimates
- Add requirement for PA&E and the Mission Directorate to agree with Program Assumptions for the cost estimate
- Add requirement for a Council (SMC or PMC) to reconcile any differences
- Add requirement for all Cat 1 New Starts (i.e., JWST, Constellation, Shuttle Upgrade) to be communicated using PA&E cost estimates in terms of *assumptions*, *cost ****ranges**** and schedules for a firm commitment*
- Add requirement to keep these cost estimates and assumptions under configuration control

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## Lifecycle and Cost Estimates

- Pre Formulation

- CADRe
- (lite)

- CADRe
- (full up)

- SRR P-NAR
- Cost Est Update

- PDR NAR
- Firm Cost Commitment

- FAD

***PA&E***
***Cost Est*****.**

***PA&E &***
***Mission Dir***
***Assumptions***

*Note: Proposed addition listed in red italics*

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## Recommendation

**Agree to concept**

**Forward Action**

**Work with OCFO, PA&E, Mission Directorates**
**to implement concept in Agency Policy**

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## Back Up Slides

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## Action Plan

- We collaborated with OCFO, PA&E, Legislative Affairs, and Mission Directorates to draft a process to control and communicate early program/project cost estimates
- Plan to update NPR 7120.5, NASA Cost Estimation Handbook, and NASA Strategic Management and Governance Handbook as required
- Plan to implement and monitor the process for early cost estimates

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## Background

**Following GAO Report #GAO-04-642, May 2004 NASA has increase improved it’s guidance and controls for cost estimates**
- Release of NASA Cost Estimation Handbook, December 2004
- Inclusion of Cost Estimate requirements in updated NPR 7120.5C, NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements
- Cost Analysis Data Requirement (CADRe)
**Concern over the cost growth for the James Webb Space Telescope from Pre-Phase A through mid-Phase B raised this issue to an ICC Action Item ($1,072M growth)**
- Both Program and Independent Cost Estimates were conducted in FY04  & FY05

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## Background

**Key Reference Material:**
- 1. NASA - Lack of Disciplined Cost-Estimating Processes Hinders Effective Program Management, GAO-04-642, Report to the Committee on Science, House of Representatives, May 2004.
- 2. NASA Cost Estimation Handbook, December 2004 (available at _[http://www.ceh.nasa.gov/](http://www.ceh.nasa.gov/)__)_
- 3. Letter, “Implementation of Cost Management Initiatives”, Fred Gregory, December 23, 2004
- 4. NPR 7120.5C, NASA Program and Project Management Process and Requirements, March 22, 2005
- 5. NASA Special Review of the James Webb Space Telescope, July 28, 2005

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## Partial List of Participants

- Mary Kerwin
- David Graham
- Arlene Moore
- Joe Hammaker
- John Kelly
- Mike Blythe
- Keith Hudkins
- Margaret Kieffer
- Jo Gunderson
- Stan Fishkind
- Lisa Guerra
- Rob Anderson
- Ken Ledbetter

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