# Presentation: 336175

## Advanced Sensors for SafeguardsInternational Workshop Santa Fe, NM, USA23 – 27 April 2007

**Sensor Information and IAEA Safeguards Conclusion**

**Advanced Sensors for Safeguards****International Workshop ****Santa Fe, NM, USA****23 – 27**** ****April 2007**

**T Ayers, M Lieskovsky**
**Department of Safeguards****IAEA**

**Notes:**
0 min
Greetings and thanks
General objectives as headlined

## Inspection Activities

**Inspection (under CSA)**
**Detection of diversion of declared NM**
**At Facilities and LOFs**
**‘****Defined’ verification activities**
**Complementary Access (under AP)**
**Correctness and completeness of State Declarations**
**To assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities**
**To resolve questions or inconsistencies with respect to declarations Art. 2**
**To confirm the decommissioned status of facilities and LOFs**
**At declared sites and locations or other places under special circumstances**

**Notes:**
1 min
General statement as above

## Preparation

**Inspection**
**Individually or teams **
**Using ‘standards’ tools, devices, techniques and may include design verification**
**Well defined activities**
**Continuous improvement in instruments and techniques**

**CA**
**Generally up to 2 inspectors**
**Part of country specific approach**
**Needs and objectives are derived from available information**
**HQ familiarization with the area, layout, building(s), processes, technology, equipment, staff, projects, scope, history, etc.**
**Special briefings**
**Indicators and other significant factors are identified and assessed**
**Prep of CA logistics, strategy, documents, equipment, ES, etc. are finalized**

## Preparation (CA for ‘Undeclared  NM & As’) 

**Identify inconsistencies in information and potential “indicators” of undeclared activities **
**Assess the safeguards significance of factors that might undermine the basis upon which SGs conclusions are drawn**
**Indicate areas of insufficiency: activities or analyses conducted, availability of information**
**Identify and prioritise follow-up actions in preparation for drawing safeguards conclusions**

**Notes:**
2 min
The conclusions of the SER (as updated at the end of each year) feed directly into the SG Department’s annual process of drawing Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) conclusions.
Overall the analytical process itself yields in providing information to support the Information Review Committee’s (IRC) considerations, (their conclusions and recommendations).

## In Field (in-situ) Activities

**Notifications**** ****(2 or 24 hrs)**
**Area/site/location appraisal**
**Briefing with State and Operator Representatives – purpose, planned activities, sfgs devices, ES, etc.**
**Collect specific info (floor plans, equipment, process and system, location of NM, other materials, etc.)**
**Review and describe ‘boundry’ of activities vis-a-vis ‘Managed Access’**** ****e.g., safety, security, ****dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, proprietary or commercially sensitive information**

**Activities under Art. 6:**
**Visual observation (digital photography)**
**Radiation detection and measurement devices**
**Environmental sampling**
**Other sampling**
**Examination of safeguards, shipping records **
**Seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices**
**Item counting**
**Origin or disposition of NM**
**Other objective measures (Board approved and following consultation between the Agency and State)**

**In Field (*****in-situ*****) Activities**

**Notes:**
When implementing Art 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities:a) for access in accordance to Art 5.a.(i) or (5.a.(iii):- VO, collect ES, use of rad detectors, application of seals, and other objective measures (Board approved and following consultations between the Agency and State)
b) For access in accordance of 5.a.(ii):- VO, Item counting of NM, NDA and sampling, use of rad detectors,examination of records relevant ot the quantities, origin or disposition of the material, and collect ES, other objective measures (Board approved and following consultations between the Agency and State 
c) For access in accordance with Art 5.b:-VO, collect of ES, use of rad detectors, examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records, and other objective measures (Board approved and following consultations between the Agency and State)
d) For access in accordance with Art 5.c: collect ES,  and in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency pursuant to Art 5.c, utilization at that location of VO, rad detection and, as sgreed by State and the Agency, other objective measures. 

## In Field (in-situ) Activities

**CA Kit**
**HM-5 – NaI based / ****γ****-****spectrometer / advance features **
**GPS/ Digital Camera / Voice recorder**
**Laser based distance measuring device**
**ES Kit**
**Pre-inspection kit (before) **
**Cotton swipes and packaging**
**NM and isotopics, enrichment, reprocessing, fission products, other elements upon special request**
**Indication/confirmation on use and nature of activities in the building(s)**

## Draw backs - CA KIT

**Kit is bulky and distinctive – they know why you’re there!**
**HM-5: **
**γ**** radiation only - no ****α****, ****β****, ****n or X-rays**
**low resolution**
**not shielded**
**Picture taking - often not permitted, ‘negotiated’**

## Weakness - ES

- Samples are prone to cross-contamination (due to movements of personnel, equipment, materials, etc.)
- Long wait for the results, usually  > 6 months
- Restrictions on shipment of radioactively contaminated samples

## Conclusions (?)

- Is all relevant information on the nuclear activities accurate, complete, and consistent?
- Is there sufficient information available on which to draw a conclusion? If not, what’s missing?
- Follow-up on issues of safeguards significance*	*

**Notes:**
1 min 
Present the next few overheads for examples... (depending on remaining time). 

## What’s needed?

_**CA Tools**_
**Reliable, real time, sensitive devices to indicate presence/absence of nuclear materials and NFC indicators in ‘minute amounts’**
**Faster alternatives to ES methods, i.e. capabilities to evaluate ‘trace amounts’**
_**CSA Tools**_
**(Re)verification methods for difficult-to-access material, e.g. spent fuel in welded storage containers**
**New tamper indicating systems with advanced features, e.g. location transmitter, state of health**