# Presentation: 472164

## Air Traffic Control

- Hilton (Pete) W. Hall, Jr.
- ATC Group Chairman

**Notes:**
Good morning/afternoon

## Controller Responsibilities

- Provide to the flight crew
- NOTAM
- Taxi clearance
- Takeoff clearance
- Monitor aircraft

**Notes:**
My presentation discusses the air traffic controller’s responsibilities for providing NOTAM information; issuing taxi and takeoff clearances; and monitoring aircraft.  At the time of the accident, the Lexington tower was staffed with one controller, who was responsible for both tower and radar functions.

## NOTAM Information

- Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS)
- Current weather
- NOTAM information, such as taxiway closures
- NOTAM omitted from broadcast
- Controller did not provide information to the flight crew

**Notes:**
The controller is required to record the ATIS broadcast which contains the current weather and NOTAM information, such as the taxiway closure. During his shift, the controller did not include NOTAM information about the closure of taxiway Alpha north of runway 26 on the ATIS broadcasts, and he did not provide this information directly to the flight crew.  As previous stated, omission of the NOTAM information was not a factor because construction barricades for the closed taxiway were visible to the flight crew.

## Controller’s Taxi Clearance

- Instructed flight crew to runway 22
- Clearance to cross intermediate runways, such as runway 22, not required
- Pilot responded, “taxi two two”

**Notes:**
The controller instructed the flight crew to taxi to runway 22.  Federal regulations did not require the controller to issue a specific clearance for aircraft to cross intermediate runways, such as runway 26.  The pilot responded “taxi 22,” which was an appropriate acknowledgment of the taxi instruction.

## Safety Recommendations

- A-00-67 and A-00-68
- Require air traffic controllers to issue explicit runway crossing instructions
- Current status:  Open – Unacceptable Response
- No FAA action at the time of the accident

**Notes:**
In 2000, the Safety Board recommended that the FAA require that all runway crossings be authorized by a specific ATC clearance.  The current status of these recommendations is open – unacceptable.  At the time of the accident, the FAA had not taken action to implement the recommendations. Had these recommendations been in effect, the controller would have been required to issue a specific taxi clearance for the aircraft to cross runway 26 and then issue a specific taxi clearance for the aircraft to continue taxiing to runway 22.  As a result, the crew would have had better awareness of the aircraft’s position on the airport, which might have helped prevent the accident. 

## Controller’s Takeoff Clearance

- Controllers required to issue takeoff clearances and resolve potential conflicts
- No other aircraft were present
- Issued takeoff clearance
- Scanned runway 22
- Checked radar display for traffic

**Notes:**
Controllers are required to issue takeoff clearances and resolve potential conflicts on the airport surface or in the air.  When the first officer told the controller that the flight was ready to depart, there were no other aircraft taxiing, taking off, or landing.  The controller stated that he scanned runway 22, checked the final approach course, looked at the tower radar display for traffic  

## Takeoff Clearance

**ATC  “Comair 191, Lexington tower, fly**
**	****      ****runway heading, cleared for takeoff”    **
**F/O   “Runway heading, cleared for takeoff, 191”**

**Tower**

**Notes:**
issued a departure instruction and cleared the flight for takeoff.  As stated earlier, when the controller cleared the flight for takeoff, the aircraft was at the hold short line for runway 26. No FAA regulation, guidance, or procedure required the controller to determine that the aircraft had reached the departure runway before issuing the takeoff clearance.  Staff has proposed a recommendation to address this issue.

## Actions After Takeoff Clearance

- Performed radar function for previous flight
- Controller responsible for Comair flight radar services
- Began administrative task

**Notes:**
The controller had only the Comair aircraft under his control after he handed off the previous departure to the next ATC facility.  At that time, the controller chose to turn away from the tower windows to face the center console to perform an administrative task. However, the controller would have had to provide the Comair flight with radar services had it become airborne.  

## Tower Radar Display and Console

**Tower radar display**

**Center console**

## Actions After Takeoff Clearance

- FAA’s first priority:  separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
- Use good judgment in prioritizing other tasks
- Administrative task not critical to flight safety

**Notes:**
An FAA order requires that controllers give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts.  The order also states that controllers should use good judgment in prioritizing all other tasks based on the situation.  Because the administrative task was not critical to flight safety, the controller could have waited until Comair flight was out of his area of responsibility before accomplishing this task.  Staff has proposed a recommendation in this area.

## Tower and Radar Functions

- Controller responsible for both functions
- Contrary to FAA policy
- No radar functions interfered with tower tasks for Comair 5191

**Notes:**
As I previously stated, the controller was responsible for performing both tower and radar functions. This was contrary to the FAA’s policy that during the midnight shift 2 controllers should be on duty with the tower and radar functions split in combined radar/tower facilities such as the one at Lexington.  Although the controller was responsible for both functions, after transferring responsibility of the previous departure to the next ATC facility,  Comair 5191 was the only aircraft under his control. No radar duties were interfering with the controller’s tower responsibilities just before the accident. Thus, the midnight shift staffing with one controller did not contribute to the circumstances of this accident.

## Slide 12

**Notes:**
Thank you.