# Presentation: 740256

## Model Predicted Low-Level Moisture and Winds Prior to the New Year’s Day 2006 Wildfire Outbreak in the Southern Plains  

**12-14 June 2007**

**Todd Lindley & Mark Conder**

**NWS Lubbock, Texas**

**Model Predicted Low-Level Moisture and Winds Prior to the New Year’s Day 2006 Wildfire Outbreak in the Southern Plains**** **

**Greg Murdoch**

**NWS Midland, Texas**

## Impacts of the New Year’s Day 2006 Wildfire Outbreak 

**73 new starts of varying     size/severity in**** ****Texas**** **

**30+ major wildfires that threatened life and property in Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico**

**400,000+ acres burned**

**125 structures destroyed**

**2 deaths and 20 injuries**

**2 rural Texas towns destroyed**

## Meteorological Synopsis 

**Extreme drought evolved in the Southern Plains winter through spring 2006 **

**545 dam closed cyclone and 130 kt upper jet ejected over the plains on 1 January**

**Damaging surface winds with  gusts over 50 kt mid afternoon**** **

**Minimum relative humidities of 3% to 6% **

**Unseasonably warm west of dryline and south of cold front**

## Model Evaluation Methodology 

**The Lubbock, Texas, ASOS (KLBB) was centrally located in the outbreak area of west Texas**

**KLBB observations of 10 m wind speed and 2 m relative humidity compared to forecasts of the same parameters for 5 model runs**

**GFS and NAM (Eta) solutions within 72 hours of event**

## Model Evaluation Methodology 

**Absolute Error**

**RH = 25% Wind = 15 kt **

**RH = 22% Wind = 12 kt **

**RH = 22% Wind = 15 kt **

**RH = 17% Wind = 15 kt **

**RH = 13% Wind = 11 kt **

## January 01  -  00 UTC 40NAM  -  12 to 24 Hours 

**24 UTC LAPs Analysis**

**January 01  -  00 UTC 40NAM  -  12 to 24 Hours**

## Model Failure to Resolve Frontal Passage 

**Model Failure to Resolve Frontal Passage**

**None of the 5 model runs depicted FROPA**

**1 firefighter injured, 1 truck cutoff, 70 homes and businesses threatened,  100 citizens evacuated at 2 burn sites**

**40NAM – 21h   21 UTC**

**21 UTC Surface Observations**

## In Summary: 

**For more info and analysis:**

- T. Todd Lindley et. al 2006:  Operational implications of model predicted low-level moisture and winds prior to the New Year’s Day 2006 wildfire outbreak in the Southern Plains. *NWA E-Journal of Oper. Meteor*. 2006-EJ7.

*Correspondence:* _[Gregory.Murdoch@noaa.gov](mailto:Gregory.Murdoch@noaa.gov)_
- NWS Midland, Texas

**Forecasters used local knowledge and common sense Meteorology and recent events to trend forecasts toward dangerous conditions**

**The New Year’s Day event was first of several historic wildfire outbreaks in 2005/06**

**Model guidance was misleading and unrepresentative of a high-impact fire weather event – W TX offices did a good job**

## Another thought

- In TX Red Flag Warnings have huge impact

-  Rewind back to 1997/1998
-  NWS spins-up Fire Wx Programs at new
-    WFOs
-  Including RFWs
- 	Initially intended for Fed/State   	land management officials

##    Continued	

-  Back to 2005/07 - almost 10 years later
-  The knowledge of/about RFWs has
-     proliferated
- Read over public radio
- On TV stations...like svr tstm watches
- TFS issues a public “News Release”
- During extended periods TFS will strategically place PIOs in the warned area
- Distribute fliers and give radio interviews

## Continued

- RFWs have morphed into an information “juggernaut” with two aspects
- First of course and the primary intended purpose...to forecast weather conditions that could lead to extreme fire behavior...primarily for land management officials
-  2nd is the Prevention Message

## To Illustrate

- Last dispatch in Granbury, TX
- 7 fires for 7000 ac in one day across N and C TX
- Was not RFW conditions but hot/dry
- Next day the wx was going to be worse
- None of the WFOs in TX had any Fire Wx highlights out
- Called and coordinated with 5 WFOs
-    and they issued products ranging from an RFW...
-    HWOs...to SPSs...Strongly worded FWFs...AFDs
- TFS issued a public release about RFW in N TX

## Illustration continued

- Team was briefed on worse wx conditions for next day
- Results
- 1 Fire in N TX for 25 acres
- At next state briefing a comment was made that not as many fires occurred as was expected
- 1st thought that came to mind was....we got the word out and people changed their behavior...a prevention message
- Later discussed with TFS PIO which confirmed my idea of the prevention message.
- TFS sees the public respond to this info...a huge compliment to the NWS RFWs

## Continued

-  I continue to think through this
-  Next arriving at the idea that why should
-     this prevention message in the RFWs be
-     hidden (subliminal)
-  Why not be more specific in RFWs by utilizing
-     CTA statement or Impact Statements
-  So I (we) talked to local users and TFS about
-     this idea and they agreed
-  We then developed statements and incorporated
-     them into the GFE formatter and now with the
-     click of a button we can add specific information
-     about a particular circumstance to the RFWs

## Continued

- Currently 10-401 does not specifically address this
- Goal...is to have this idea of CTA or Impact Statements referenced in 401 as at least an option in RFWs

## All WFOs Impacted

- A great thing to share our experiences
- “Real“ Fire Wx Forecasting in Tx is still less than 10 yrs old
- Great room for improvement
- Digital Services – PFW, web graphics, Wx planner
- More case studies, best practices, worst practices
- Improve RFWs...CTA statement need much work
- Gained better understanding of more than CWFA
- Occasional opportunity for fcstrs to go incidents

## Learning thru experience

- Granbury safety officer
- Great messages...like following Chuck Berry
- Favorite...Lessons Repeated Until Learned
- Said...many times it takes a “Significant Emotional Event” to learn the lesson
- In TX Late 05’/early 06’ has been our “Significant Emotional Event”
- Let’s use that season to further grow our Fire Wx Programs

## Midland’s Airborne Unit