# Presentation: 284404

## Bank stability, transparency and the safety net

- Erlend Nier
- Bank of England
- 15 September 2006

## Introduction

- Large number of banking crises throughout 1990s in countries as diverse as Japan, Turkey, Argentina, SE Asian countries.
- However, little agreement as regards the structural causes of instability.
- What is the role of
- Lack of transparency
- Safety nets
- Inadequate supervision and regulation?

## Introduction

- Suspicion among policymakers that
- ‘**recent crises** owe some of their intensity to a general **lack of transparency**’ and that ‘practices and policies responsible for the depth of recent crises **would not have been undertaken, had they been required to be made public**’ (Fischer, 1999, p. 563)

## Introduction

- Policy response: strengthen market discipline through more disclosure
- Stated aim of Basel 2, Pillar 3 disclosures is to provide ex ante incentives for banks to more prudently manage their risks.
- Important to know whether these measures are likely to have a beneficial effect on stability.

## Existing cross-country research (eg Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004)) has not been able to document an impact of bank transparency on incidence of crises.
small sample problem 
40 - 60 countries
banking crisis hard to define 
judgement (eg Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003)
large number of factors (eg macro, etc)
marginal impact of structural factors may be small.
transparency hard to measure

- small sample problem
- 40 - 60 countries
- banking crisis hard to define
- judgement (eg Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003)
- large number of factors (eg macro, etc)
- marginal impact of structural factors may be small.
- transparency hard to measure

## This study offers new approach by investigating banking problems at the individual bank level.
Large cross-country sample of > 500 banks from 32 countries, from 1994 - 2000 
Define crisis at the bank level, using a market indicator of crisis 
dramatic fall in stock price
Measure transparency at the bank level
>3000 observations on transparency

- Large cross-country sample of > 500 banks from 32 countries, from 1994 - 2000
- Define crisis at the bank level, using a market indicator of crisis
- dramatic fall in stock price
- Measure transparency at the bank level
- >3000 observations on transparency

## Bank transparency appears to reduce the incidence of banking problems.
These effects are stronger for countries in which financial and institutional development is weak.
Safety nets: effect of deposit insurance depends on design (explicit versus unlimited protection)
Explicit (in contrast to implicit) schemes appear to reduce the incidence of problems
Unlimited schemes appear to increase incidence of problems
Supervision and regulation: appear to have little effect on incidence of banking problems

- These effects are stronger for countries in which financial and institutional development is weak.
- Safety nets: effect of deposit insurance depends on design (explicit versus unlimited protection)
- Explicit (in contrast to implicit) schemes appear to _reduce_ the incidence of problems
- Unlimited schemes appear to _increase_ incidence of problems
- Supervision and regulation: appear to have little effect on incidence of banking problems

- Main Take-away

## Detail - Overview

- 1. Conceptual Background
- 2. Existing empirical research
- 3. Research design
- market indicator of crises
- measuring transparency
- 4. Main result and extensions
- 5. Conclusion

## 	Conceptual Background

- Ex ante: transparency can create market discipline and _reduce moral hazard_ eg Boot and Schmeits (2000)
- Ex post:
- Tansparency can destabilise (ex post) when banks suffer from recoverable weakness, eg Cordella and Yeyati (1998)
- Transparency can stabilise (ex post) since it reduces scope for informational contagion, eg Gorton and Huang (2002)

## Existing Empirical Research

- Transparency
- has no discernable effect on the likelihood of crises, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004)
- Deposit insurance
- Explicit insurance
- increases likelihood of crises, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
- decreases likelihood of crises, Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), Gropp and Vesala (2004)
- More generous protection (unlimited coverage) increases likelihood of crises, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
- Regulation and Supervision:
- Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005) do not find strong evidence for an effect on banking crises

## Research Design

- Use sample of > 500 listed banks from 32 different countries from 1994 – 2000
- Define _market indicator_ of crisis at bank level
- Define c(i, t) =1 if bank i experiences a crisis in year t
- if stock return falls into 5 per cent tail of unconditional distribution
- Cut-off equivalent to return of -50%  p.a.

## Frequency of crisis, c(i,t)=1

## Research Design - Probit

- Perform probit regressions

- M: Macroeconomic controls
- B: Bank-specific controls
- S: Structural variables

## Structural factors (S)
Transparency
disclosure index records for 17 items of possible disclosure whether or not bank provides information in its annual accounts as represented in BankScope database
is normalised to range between zero and 1
direct measure of the quantity of information provided

- _Transparency_
**disclosure** index records for 17 items of possible disclosure whether or not bank provides information in its annual accounts as represented in BankScope database
- is normalised to range between zero and 1
- direct measure of the quantity of information provided

## Disclosure sub-indices

## Structural factors (S)
Deposit insurance
explicit=1 if an explicit deposit insurance scheme exists
unlimited=1 if an explicit scheme exists and if it provides unlimited coverage
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000)

Financial Development
	Stock market capitalization, credit to GDP

Supervision and regulation
Various measures of capital, supervisory power, restrictions on activities, entry, obtained from Barth et al (2004) 

- _Deposit insurance_
**explicit**=1 if an explicit deposit insurance scheme exists
**unlimited**=1 if an explicit scheme exists and if it provides unlimited coverage
- Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000)
- _Financial Development_
- 	**Stock market capitalization**, **credit to GDP**
- _Supervision and regulation_
- Various measures of **capital, supervisory power**, **restrictions on activities**, **entry**, obtained from Barth et al (2004)

## Macroeconomic controls (M)
current account (-)
interest rate (+)
GDP growth (+)

Bankspecific controls (B)
risk (beta) (+)
profitability (-)
size (-)
NB: All variables enter with a one-year lag

- current account (-)
- interest rate (+)
- GDP growth (+)
**Bankspecific controls (B)**
- risk (beta) (+)
- profitability (-)
- size (-)
- NB: All variables enter with a one-year lag

## 	Main Results on Transparency

|   | (1) Probit |  |         (2) Probit |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dep. Variable | c(i, t) |  | c(i, t) |  |
| L1Disc | -0.5644 | ** | -0.5020 | *** |
| Year | 0.1710 | *** | 0.0902 | *** |
| Logsize | -0.0797 | ** | -0.0819 | *** |
| L1Beta | 0.2717 | * | 0.3442 | *** |
| L1Roa | -7.2689 | ** | -3.5110 | *** |
| L1Current | -0.0030 | * |   |   |
| L1Interest | 0.0001 |   |   |   |
| L1Gdp_g | 5.1397 | * |   |   |
| Constant | -341.9816 | *** | -180.4627 | *** |
| No. of obs. | 2531 |   | 3004 |   |
| No. of banks | 537 |   | 532 |   |

## 	Main Results on Transparency

**Disclosure** appears to _reduce_ incidence of banking problems
- All control variables have the expected sign and are significant in most regressions.
- Crises preceded by high Gdp growth
- Crises preceded by high deficits
- Crises preceded by high nominal rates
- Larger banks less crisis prone
- High correlation (beta) banks more crisis prone
- Profitable banks less crisis prone

## Transparency and Safety Nets

|   | (1) Probit |  | (2) Probit |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dep. Var. | c(i, t) |  | c(i, t) |  |
| L1Disc | -0.6173 | *** | -0.5683 | *** |
| Explicit | -0.5773 | *** | -0.5365 | *** |
| Unlimited | 0.3306 | *** | 0.0335 |   |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Controls  | ..... |  | .... |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -368.4068 | *** | -195.6069 | *** |
| No. of obs. | 2531 |  | 3004 |   |
| No. of banks | 537 |  | 562 |   |

## Transparency and Safety Nets

**Explicit** deposit insurance significantly reduces the likelihood of crises, in line with Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), Gropp and Vesala (2004).
**Unlimited** insurance significantly increases the likelihood of crises, in line with Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
- Effect of **Transparency **robust to inclusion of features of safety net.

## Transparency and Financial Development

|  | (1) Probit | (2) Probit |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dep. Variable | c(i, t) | c(i, t) |
| L1Disc
Explicit
Unlimited

Controls

Stmcap
Pcredit
L1Discstmcap
L1Discpcredit
Constant | -0.9100    ***
-0.5542    ***
0.2387    **

....

-0.4434    **

0.4857    *

-374.5178  *** | -1.5662     ***
-0.5572     ***
0.3188     **

....

-1.1291    **

1.9433      **
-334.0994  *** |
| No. of obs.
No. of banks | 2517
531 | 2449
510 |

## Transparency and Financial Development

**Financial development** appears to _reduce_ incidence of banking problems
- Effect of **transparency** **robust** to inclusion of measures of financial development
- Transparency has a **stronger effect** in countries in emerging economies, where financial development is still weak (independent of measurement), in line with Giannetti (2006)

## Transparency and Regulation (1)

|  | (1) Probit | (2) Probit | (3) Probit |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dep. Variable | c(i, t) | c(i, t) | C(I, t) |
| L1Disc
Explicit
Unlimited

Controls

L1Cap
Capstring
Suppower
Constant | -0.6184    ***
-0.5777    ***
0.3304     ***

....

-0.0034   

-368.4095  *** | -0.5917   ***
-0.5224   ***
0.3917   ***

....

-0.2166   ***

     -401.0170  *** | -0.6248     ***
-0.6964     ***
0.3159     **

....

            0.0281
       -373.7825    *** |
| No. of obs.
No. of banks | 2531
537 |              2446
               512 |                2504
                 523 |

## Transparency and Regulation (2)

|   | (4) Probit |  | (5) Probit |  | (6) Probit |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dep. Variable | c(i, t) |  | c(i, t) |  | c(i, t) |  |
| L1Disc | -0.6649 | *** | -0.6378 | *** | -0.6126 | *** |
| Explicit | -0.7040 | *** | -0.6620 | *** | -0.6138 | *** |
| Unlimited | 0.2985 | ** | 0.4023 | *** | 0.3284 | ** |
| Controls  | ..... |  | .... |  | .... |  |
| Activ | 0.0276 |   |  |   |  |   |
| Entry |  |   | 0.1176 | * |  |   |
| Bankconc |  |   |  |   | -0.0422 |   |
| Constant | -401.2400 | *** | -400.708 | *** | -366.718 | *** |
| No. of obs. | 2446 |   | 2446 |   | 2479 |   |
| No. of banks | 512 |   | 512 |   | 526 |   |

## Transparency and Regulation

- Results generally in line with Beck et al (2005) and Barth et al (2004).
- Capital stringency reduces banking problems, in line with  Barth et al (2004)
- Entry restrictions associated with increase in incidence of problems, in line with Beck et al (2005), and Schaeck et al (2006)
- However, overall evidence is weak.
- Effects of both transparency and safety net robust to inclusion of these variables.

## Conclusion

- More transparency may significantly reduce the likelihood of banking crises,
- Ex ante disciplining effect
- Reduction of contagion
- Effect is stronger for emerging markets,
- in line with theory (Giannetti, 2006)
- confirming anecdotal evidence on genesis of crises during1990s.
- Evidence lends support to initiatives to increase transparency by mandating more disclosure, eg through Pillar 3 of Basel 2

## Conclusion

- Safety nets also important:
- Explicit deposit insurance decrease the likelihood of crises
- Consistent with Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) and Gropp and Vesala (2004)
- Generous depositor protection may increase the likelihood of crises.
- Cosnsistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
- Other structural variables related to supervision and regulation appear to have little effect in our sample, in line with Beck et al (2005) and Barth et al (2004).