**[CHAPTER FIVE]{.underline}: ORGANIZED LABOR AT THE RICHMOND BRANCH**

Previous chapters have described some of the kinds of work performed by
shop-floor workers at the Richmond plant, both before and during the
war. Much of it was grueling and repetitive work. Moreover, Ford
management sometimes treated workers poorly. For these reasons, workers
at Richmond, as elsewhere in the U.S., sought to organize themselves
into unions so that they could collectively negotiate with their
employer concerning wages and working conditions. This chapter describes
those efforts by the Richmond workers in the context of union organizing
nationwide throughout the auto industry. Shortly after the Richmond
workers finally brought Ford to recognize their union in 1941, the U.S.
entered World War II, issuing in a new set of working-place issues,
which this chapter also describes. As in the rest of the country, the
war changed the employment landscape in Richmond, and many more women
joined the workforce. The chapter closes with an overview of the
experiences during the war of women workers at the Richmond plant.

**A. Organized Labor in the Auto Industry**

Ford workers at the Richmond branch formed union organizing committees
in January 1937. Their efforts to seek recognition of their union took
place in the context of a waves of labor organizing throughout
California and the nation in the 1930s. Much of this activity took place
because for the first time in U.S. history, with the passage of the
Wagner Act in 1935, workers who wanted to organize themselves for
purposes of collective bargaining with their employers had the explicit
protection of the U.S. government. The Wagner Act established the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), with which workers could register
their complaints and seek redress when employers engaged in unfair labor
practices. The NLRB defined as unfair such practices as union espionage,
supporting company-affiliated unions, imposing sanctions on union
members, and refusing to recognize and negotiate with workers\' unions.
Franklin Roosevelt\'s re-election in 1936 appeared to be an endorsement
of his New Deal programs, including the Wagner Act, which further
emboldened workers to organize themselves and the NLRB to protect them.
One union that took bold action after the 1936 election was the United
Auto Workers (UAW), formed only a year earlier. Early in 1937, 1500
workers in two General Motors plants in Flint, Michigan, enacted a
sit-down strike, borrowing a tactic that had worked successfully for
meatpackers in Austin, Minnesota, and rubber workers in Akron, Ohio,
earlier in the 1930s. The GM workers barricaded themselves in the
factories for more than six weeks before GM finally agreed in February
to recognize the workers\' UAW local and begin negotiations with the UAW
for contracts covering workers and locals at GM plants elsewhere in the
U.S. as well.[^1]

The GM workers, success had energized others in Detroit and industrial
workers elsewhere in the country to use the sit-down to gain recognition
of their unions. Within a week of the UAW victory in Flint, 5000 cigar
makers in Detroit occupied five plants. A few weeks later, 17,000
strikers occupied all nine of Chrysler\'s Detroit facilities. In 1937,
there were almost 500 strikes in the U.S. that featured sit-downs
lasting one day or more. That year, the nation saw a record 4,760
strikes, most of which were aimed at gaining union recognition. Some
large corporations recognized unions without a strike. For example, U.S.
Steel recognized the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in March 1937
without a strike, agreeing to establish a formal grievance procedure.
Later that year, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters gained
recognition from the Pullman company, becoming the first
African-American union to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement.[^2] California workers in many industries joined this upsurge
in efforts to gain recognition. In northern California, for example,
cannery workers continued to mount strikes at numerous facilities. It
was in this context that UAW Local No. 76, which had recently gained
recognition by GM in Oakland, turned its attention to assisting workers
at the Ford plant in Richmond to organize.[^3]

Another important facet of the context in which Richmond\'s UAW local
arose was the growing rift between the old American Federal of Labor
(AFL) and the new Committee for Industrial Organization (soon to become
the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or CIO). The unions that
comprised the AFL were old trade unions, each of which represented a
particular craft, skill, or trade, like carpenters, machinists, railway
conductors, and cigar makers. Each union prided itself in the skills its
members possessed, and they often demonstrated little concern for
workers who had other skills or for unskilled workers. Therefore, many
large industrial enterprises had several groups of workers represented
by different unions, often with competing interests, and those
enterprises often had another large group of unskilled workers who were
not represented by a union at all. Employers had long been able to
exploit this lack of unity in the American labor movement, so for
decades some labor organizers had advocated industrial unions, which
were labor organizations that represented all the workers at a
particular plant or in a particular industry regardless of craft, skill,
or trade. Early in the twentieth century, the radical Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW) had advocated such an approach to organizing workers,
gaining some local footholds among, for example, miners and seasonal
construction and agricultural workers. Although most American labor
organizations remained trade unions, some, such as the United Mine
Workers (UMW) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW) arose

as industrial unions, and locals within the industrial unions
represented all workers at facilities where they were organized.[^4]

By the early 1930s, many American industrial corporations had become
gigantic, employing tens or hundreds of thousands of workers. Despite
the hardships of the Great Depression, workers in some industries
refused to withstand the hardships placed on them by employers any
longer, staging industry-wide strikes to demand recognition of their
unions. In 1934, there were strikes among truckers in Minneapolis,
cannery workers in California, and dock workers on the San Francisco
Bay. The largest such strike involved 350,000 textile workers along the
Atlantic seaboard. President Roosevelt and his New Deal allies in
Congress, like Sen. Robert Wagner, for whom the Wagner Act was named,
recognized that workers had to be enabled to democratically create new
representative institutions to counter the power of the giant
corporations and thus achieve some balance, in keeping with the
republican ideals of the nation. At the same time, some union leaders
began to realize that the values of the old AFL were inhibiting the
formation of such institutions. Therefore, individuals like John L.
Lewis of the UMW and Sidney Hillman of the ACW formed the Committee for
Industrial Organization in 1935 to foster a mass organizing drive among
industrial workers. The CIO formally broke with the AFL in 1937.[^5]
With that break, CIO and AFL unions often competed with each other for
the loyalty of workers being organized at large industrial operations,
such as Ford\'s Richmond branch, as will be described below. In Contra
Costa County, the Central Trades Labor Council, affiliated with the AFL,
sought to force every union affiliated with both the AFL and the CIO to
withdraw from the CIO.[^6]

Meanwhile, Henry Ford and his top managers, like Harry Bennett and
Charles Sorensen, remained the most recalcitrant of the U.S. auto
makers. During the spring of 1937, after the UAW had won recognition by
GM and was pushing to gain recognition from Chrysler and Hudson, Homer
Martin, president of the UAW international, announced that the union
would launch a drive to get Ford\'s recognition as well. Ford\'s
lieutenant Harry Bennett responded that, \"Organized labor is not going
to run the Ford Motor Company.\" Bennett was so adamantly opposed to
dealing with unions that he sent orders to Richmond that Bulwinkel
should respond to the sit-down strike in April 1937 (described below) by
calling in the sheriff\'s department. Bulwinkel wanted to avoid the
bloodshed that had ensued at other auto industry strikes, so he
counselled against using the police. Despite Bennett\'s insistence,
Bulwinkel avoided the call to the sheriff.[^7] Meanwhile, rumors
circulated that Ford would close his plants for three years to prevent
their being organized. He denied the rumor, but he constantly harangued
his workers that they should stay out of unions. The rise in union
strength, however, brought dissension to the Ford family. Henry
continued to refuse to have anything to do with them, while his son
Edsel advocated that the company should try to negotiate an agreement
with the unions. Undaunted, the elder Ford vowed to do everything in his
power to resist the unions and even work to rescind the Wagner Act. And
his company began to employ strong-armed tactics in opposing organizing
efforts at its plants in Dearborn, Kansas City, and Dallas, leading to a
new term, \"the Ford Terror.\"[^8]

**B. Richmond Sit-Down Strike of 1937**

United Autoworkers of America Local 76 had formed in October 1935 at
Oakland. It represented workers at three General Motors plants there.
Frank Slaby had been one of the principal organizers, and the members of
the local elected him president. Local No. 76 began recruiting members
who worked in the automobile, aircraft, and farm implement industries in
the Bay Area. Organizers from the local began distributing union
literature outside the Ford Motor Company\'s Richmond branch in November
1936. By January 1937, enough Richmond employees had joined the union
that the local formed organizing committees for the Richmond plant. One
of the committees met with Ford managers of the Ford plant to register
complaints that two union members, A. Gonsolves and A.L. Gullickson, had
been fired for joining the union. Although those grievances were
resolved informally, conflict continued to simmer as union members began
to select shop stewards. Ford demoted some of the shop stewards when it
learned of their identities. When a committee of the local met with Ford
managers to complain of the demotions, the company responded that it
would recognize the union committee and try to resolve the grievances.
Meanwhile, however, foremen in the plant began to harass shop stewards,
accusing them of being radicals, \"Red,\" and communists. They referred
to the president of the local as \"Red\" Slaby. Foremen tried to
convince union members that their allegiance would hurt them, not
help.[^9]

In became clear to the union that Ford was not going to recognize the
shop stewards the workers at Richmond had selected. Meanwhile, working
conditions grew worse in April as Richmond managers rushed meet
deadlines in Ford\'s contract to produce trucks for the Japanese. Shop
stewards tried to file complaints with Ford management, but to no avail.
Similar tensions were brewing at Ford\'s Long Beach plant, where the
workers staged a sit-down strike in mid-April. A week later, at midday
on Friday, 23 April 1937, while plant manager Clarence Bulwinkel was at
a Rotary Club lunch and just after Richmond production workers had
returned to work from their lunch break, shop stewards, acting on behalf
of Local 76, called for a sit-down strike of workers at the Richmond
plant to gain Ford\'s formal recognition of the union. That afternoon,
Slaby drove from Oakland to Richmond to take charge of the strike. At
11:00 pm, he announced that Ford had promised to negotiate with union
officials. In celebration, workers organized an impromptu midnight
parade, said to be five miles long, that wove through the streets of
Richmond before processing through Berkeley to Local 76 headquarters in
Oakland. Believing they had an agreement in hand, union members agreed
to go back to work on Monday, which they did.[^10]

Two days after the April 1937 sit-down strike at Richmond, Ford
officials met with a committee representing the UAW local, including UAW
vice president Ed Hall from Detroit. The Ford officials introduced an
individual named John Adams, who, the Ford people said, would begin
representing the company in labor negotiations. Adams, whose real name
was John Gillespie, made certain assurances to the union members. In
response the workers ended the strike, believing the company had
recognized their union. By late May, however, it became apparent to the
workers that Ford had not recognized their union and was not trying to
attend to grievances, so the union called a walk-out. At subsequent
meetings, the UAW\'s negotiating committee proposed written agreements
under which Ford would recognize the union as the sole bargaining
representative of workers at the Richmond plant, but Ford officials
refused sign. During this second strike, the International Association
of Machinists also made a brief effort to organize workers at the
Richmond branch. At a June 4th meeting between the Local 560 and Ford
management, the union informed the company that of the total 1,316
production workers at the Richmond branch, 1,120 of them wanted Local 76
to represent them when bargaining such issues as wages and working
conditions. Adams, claiming to represent the Ford Motor Company, agreed
to certain of the union\'s demands concerning grievances and seniority,
but he said that Ford would not agree to formally recognize the union.
He called the other agreements he had made with the union a kind of
back-door recognition. With those assurances, the union ended the
strike.[^11]

Meanwhile, Ford continued its anti-union campaign. The company formed an
organization called the American Auto Workers Union and urged its
employees to join it rather than the UAW. Officials distributed
literature, including a booklet titled \"Ford Almanac for July 1937,\"
designed to discourage workers from joining the union. A Ford foremen
parked his car outside a union meeting and observed workers arriving and
leaving.[^12]

It had been Ford\'s practice to close the Richmond plant each year in
September to modify the assembly line for the coming year\'s model cars.
The company suspended the employment of most workers but retained others
to make the changes in the plant. Then, when the company was ready to
resume production it would call old workers back. In 1937, when the
Richmond plant closed for the season on September 3rd, there were about
1,260 employees, of whom the UAW 939 claimed as members. The 1937
closure lasted longer than usual, causing the Richmond City Council to
adopt a resolution urging Ford to open the plant as soon as possible. At
the end of the year, Ford shipped cars assembled elsewhere in
Richmond\'s territory, apparently to forestall the re-opening of the
Richmond branch. In early December, Adams met with laid-off employees
who were still members of the union. He informed them that Ford would
soon resume operations at Richmond and that all the previous employees
would be rehired, but that they would have to disband their grievance
committee, eliminate their shop stewards, and quit the union. He tried
to assure them that Ford\'s Long Beach branch was doing well without
shop stewards. The plant re-opened on December 9th, and the company
rehired about 680 workers. The union noticed that many shop stewards,
union officers, and members of committees had not been rehired. The UAW
therefore filed a formal complaint with the National Labor Relations
Board NLRB in May 1938, claiming that 150 former Ford employees at
Richmond had not been rehired because they had joined the union or had
helped in the union organizing.[^13]

As it turned out, John Gillespie, the individual who had introduced
himself as Adams, began appearing on Ford\'s behalf at other meetings in
the Bay Area, such as a meeting with the NLRB in San Francisco and with
officers of the union local in Oakland. At those meetings, however, he
used other names, like J.H. Peterson, who was a Ford official in
Detroit, and Moore. At the NLRB meeting in June 1937, for example, C.A.
Bulwinkel (Richmond plant manager), R.S. Harrison (Richmond plant
superintendent), and Pat Smith (Ford Motor Company personnel department,
Detroit) accompanied Adams as he impersonated Peterson, and they did not
reveal to the NLRB officials Adams\' true identify. In December 1937,
after Gillespie appeared as Adams at a meeting with the Richmond workers
to urge them to abandon the union so that they could be rehired, he met
in Oakland with UAW leaders, introducing himself as a man named Moore.
Some Richmond workers happened to be at the Oakland meeting, and they
recognized Moore as the man who had presented himself to them in
Richmond as Adams, a representative of Ford. After the December 1937
meeting with the union, at which he had said Ford would rehire all the
employees, \"Adams\" was not seen again representing Ford in labor
negotiations.[^14]

In the midst of Ford\'s anti-union campaign and the autumn 1937 shutdown
of the Richmond branch, the Richmond auto workers decided in early
November by a vote of 113 to 42 to leave Local No. 76 and form their own
local. This move was contrary to the advice of Local No. 76 president
Frank Slaby and of Harry Bridges, well-known leader of the
Longshoremen\'s union in San Francisco. On 18 November 1937, the UAW
issued a charter to Local 560 in Richmond. The initial officers of the
new local were: Robert Phillips, president; Harry Morrison, vice
president; Mike O\'Donnell, secretary-treasure; Palmer Myhre, Stanley
Schofield, and William Floor, trustees. Meanwhile, the new Richmond
local sent a delegate to Detroit to participate with representatives
from Long Beach and other Ford branch operations as well as from Ford\'s
Michigan plants in launching a nationwide effort to gain Henry Ford\'s
recognition of the union. The focus of the drive would be on organizing
Ford\'s Dearborn and Detroit operations, and the UAW chose 35 organizers
to work with employees there.[^15]

The law firm Williamson & Wallace of San Francisco represented Ford
during the NLRB investigation of the Richmond workers\' complaint. As
soon as management at Richmond learned that the union had filed the
complaint, W.F. Williamson met with NLRB regional director Alice M.
Rosseter in an effort to learn the nature of the union\'s grievance. In
addition to complaining that most of the strike committee and the
union\'s shop stewards had not been rehired, Local 560 asserted that
Adams had promised they would get their jobs back. But the union also
voiced suspicion, because they had begun to realize that Adams, whose
real identity was Gillespie, was operating under several identities. It
had led the workers to doubt that Ford was negotiating with them in good
faith. Not knowing how the firm should represent the company with regard
to this issue, Williamson & Wallace initially took the stance at
meetings with Rosseter that the various people Gillespie claimed to have
been were actually present at meetings. The firm, though, was in a
difficult position: should it assert to the NLRB that Ford had
negotiated with the union, even though the person representing the
company used a false identity? or should it assert to the NLRB that Ford
had not negotiated with the union because \"Adams\" was not a legitimate
representative of the company, even though other Ford officials had been
present at those meetings?[^16]

The firm also began investigating the current status of individuals who
were named in the complaint, hoping to find that they had quit
voluntarily or were working elsewhere. After a brief investigation, the
firm assured Ford headquarters in Dearborn that the workers\' complaints
about not being reinstated were groundless and that the present
condition among those employed at the Richmond branch was contentment.
After a more thorough investigation, however, Williamson & Wallace found
that several men with good work records and considerable seniority, some
of whose employment at Ford went back to 1922, had not been rehired. It
began to appear that the union had good grounds for its complaint. Yet,
the firm recommended to the Richmond management that the company should
try to avoid an NLRB-sanctioned election, because the workers would
undoubtedly vote to have the UAW represent them. The question facing top
management in Dearborn was whether to acknowledge that Ford, in the
person of \"John Adams,\" had recognized the union at 1937 meetings, or
to deny that Ford had recognized the union. In the case of the latter,
there almost certainly would be an NLRB-sanctioned election.[^17]

Ford\'s response notwithstanding, the UAW and workers at the Richmond
branch petitioned to have Ford officially recognize Local 560 as the
workers\' representative in June 1938. The union claimed that a majority
of the workers at Richmond had designated Local 560 as their
representative and that Ford was not recognizing the local. Meanwhile,
Williamson & Wallace had changed its opinion concerning the advisability
of an election. The firm had been interviewing foremen at the plant, and
they now believed that anti-union sentiment was quite high among the
current workers. The NLRB hearing began on 20 June 1938. The union
presented witnesses who testified that during all the recent periods
that the Richmond plant was operating, both before the September 1937
closer and after the December 1937 re-opening, a majority of the
production workers were either union members or had applied for
membership. They also testified that, regardless of Gillespie\'s actual
status as a representative of the company, Richmond managers like
Bulwinkel and Harrison had assented to agreements Gillespie had made
with the union. For these reasons, the union asserted that it should be
recognized as the workers\' bargaining agent.[^18]

The NLRB hearing in the Richmond matter began June 20th and ended after
three weeks of testimony on July 9th. NLRB examiner Thomas Kennedy heard
testimony from about half the individuals named in the complaint.
Kennedy issued his preliminary report on September 2nd. The NLRB
examiner determined from the hearings that the Ford Motor Company at
Richmond had engaged in unfair labor practices. Although Kennedy
dismissed a small number of the complaints, he found that the reason
most of the men were not rehired was clearly their union activities. The
examiner also made recommendations for men not interviewed during the
hearing, determining that they, too, had more seniority than many of the
men who had been rehired and that they would have been rehired had they
not participated in union activities. At the conclusion of his report,
Kennedy recommended that Ford reinstate the men who had been unfairly
not rehired. Moreover, he recommended that Ford not discourage its
employees from joining Local 560 and that Ford recognize Local 560 as
its production workers\' representative at the bargaining table. In
October, Williamson & Wallace filed an exception to the report on
Ford\'s behalf. The NLRB did not issue its final order in the case until
February 1941, essentially upholding Kennedy\'s recommendations. As part
of the ruling, the NLRB ordered that Ford rehire 143 men who had
wrongfully not been rehired and that Ford compensate them with back pay.
The NLRB, incidently, had ruled in the union\'s favor in the Long Beach
case as well.[^19]

At the national level, Ford management continued to refuse to recognize
UAW locals at its Detroit, Dearborn, and branch plants, and labor
continued to battle for recognition of its union. When organized labor
learned that Ford had been awarded a contract for the experimental jeeps
in late 1940, labor\'s voice on the National Defense Board, Sidney
Hillman, protested to no avail that the government should not contract
with Ford if the company refused to operate within the nation\'s labor
laws. In early 1941, Ford submitted the low bid to make nearly 12,000
trucks for the War Department, but this time the government insisted on
including a clause in the contract that Ford abide by the Wagner Act and
the Wages and Hours Law. When Ford refused, the War Department awarded
the contract to the next highest bidder. In Michigan\'s contentious
climate of red-baiting by Ford managers and Ford attorney I.A. Capizzi,
and with former UAW president Homer Martin having been recruited by Ford
to organize a competing auto workers union affiliated with the AFL,
called the Federal Labor Union, the UAW was nevertheless able to
implement a successful strike, when 85,000 workers in Detroit and
Dearborn walked off the job in April 1941. After ten days, the strike
finally induced Ford to meet the union\'s demands. Among them was an
NLRB-sanctioned election, held on May 21. Of some 80,000 workers from
Ford\'s River Rouge, Highland Park, and Lincoln plants casting ballots,
51,868 voted for the UAW and 26,132 voted for the AFL affiliate. Only
about 2,000 workers voted against union representation. In the wake of
the election, Ford agreed to sign a contract stating that the UAW would
represent Ford\'s 120,000 production workers, including the 1,300 men
working at Richmond.[^20]

Things were not quiet in Richmond as members of Local 560 watched events
unfold in Detroit. *The Labor Herald* reported that on the Friday in
February after the NLRB issued its order, the Ford service department at
the Richmond plant warned the paperboy, who sold newspapers at the plant
gate, not to shout any headlines about the decision. By 1941, operations
at the Richmond branch had greatly expanded, as described in previous
sections, and most of the union members against whom Ford had
discriminated in 1937 and 1938 were now reportedly back at work.
Therefore, when the NLRB issued its final order, Ford petitioned for a
rehearing, claiming that the rehiring of employees subsequent to the
controversy but prior to the NLRB order showed that Ford had not
discriminated against the union members. The NLRB dismissed the appeal.
Meanwhile, Ford tried to offer the aggrieved workers at the Richmond
plant a settlement independent of the NLRB order, offering to pay 31.5%
of the back pay and leave the other issues to litigation. Ford did not
authorize the Richmond branch managers to negotiate with the union how
the workers\' back pay would be calculated, however, nor were the
managers authorized to negotiate any other matters with the union.
Ford\'s refusal to meet with local union representatives led to brief
continuation of the controversy, but Ford eventually complied with the
order to the union\'s and the NLRB\'s satisfaction late in the
summer.[^21]

Although Ford reinstated workers following the NLRB\'s February order
and posted notices around the Richmond plant assuring workers of their
right to join unions, the company did not actually recognize the
Richmond local of the UAW. In April, Ford foremen at Richmond urged
their workers to join Local No. 22669 of the AFL entity, the Federal
Labor Union. Then in May, while workers in Detroit and Dearborn were
voting in the NLRB-sanctioned election, the AFL local in Richmond
suggested that the Richmond workers vote to elect officers of Local
22669. Local 560 of the UAW cautioned Richmond workers that this was
merely a ploy by the AFL to give Local 22669 some patina of official
standing. Recognition of Local 560 finally came in June, when Ford
signed contracts with the UAW nationally, but not before the union and
its members had exerted considerable energy in getting Ford to
negotiate. Although Local 560 had once boasted that a large percentage
of the Richmond workers had joined the UAW, membership had dwindled to a
small, active core after the initial organizing drive in 1937. Vince
McKenna, president of Local 560, reported in June 1941 that, following
the signing of the national contract between Ford and the UAW, there was
a healthy rush to join the union by workers at the Richmond plant, both
new members and former members who wished to re-establish their good
standing with the local. Ford put the last of the aggrieved workers back
on the payroll on July 21st.[^22]

**C. Labor During WWII**

The United States had the highest percentage of its population working
in the production of ordnance of all the nation\'s involved in World War
II, Allied or Axis. By the same token, other countries had higher
percentages of their male populations serving in the military than did
the U.S. While in the U.S. only 1 in 6 men served in the Armed Forces, 1
in 4.5 men in Germany and 1 in 5 men in Great Britain and Japan served
in those countries\' militaries. Even though the U.S. enlisted many of
its citizens in armaments production during the war years, the
government was nevertheless tolerant of labor strikes. Workers staged
work stoppages in 3,000 separate instances across the country in 1942
and 1943. Although workers could strike in Britain as well, Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union prevented such behavior.[^23] The situation at the
Richmond Tank Depot reflected overall national conditions in many ways,
as this section describes.

Labor was at least as scarce for Ford\'s Richmond plant during the war
as it was at other factories around the country trying to meet the
military\'s needs for weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Whereas many
plants had high turnover rates, however, the Richmond plant evidently
had a relatively stable workforce. In December 1942, A.B. Jewett of the
Richmond branch employment department reported to Dearborn that the
plant was experiencing a turnover rate of only 4% per month. This did
not include men who entered military service, because the company did
not classify them as having quit. Jewett reported that, in contrast, the
Kaiser shipyards in Richmond, where employment stood at 82,000. Kaiser
had a turnover of more than 14% each month. Jewett believed that two
factors helped the turnover rate at Ford\'s Richmond plant: 1) the
six-day week, and 2) women workers, who quit at a much lower rate than
men did.[^24]

Ford\'s lack of turnover was short-lived, however. For example, there
were about 1,500 workers on Ford\'s payroll at Richmond in 1944, with a
peak number of 2,111 in August (see table in the section above on
Ford\'s Production and Processing of Tanks). To maintain that level of
employment, Ford had hired 2,109 people during the course of the year,
most of whom had never worked for Ford before. During the same year,
2,071 people quit the Richmond plant, only 4.3% of whom left to enter
the military. Leading up to the August peak in employment, the Richmond
had hired at about 100 new people and sometimes as many as 150 each
week. Many of those summer employees were minors who returned to school
in the fall. Reportedly, another reason that many workers left work at
the Richmond Tank Depot in 1944 was because of rumors following the
D-Day invasion that the war was essentially over. Some workers left
Richmond

altogether, returning to their homes elsewhere in the country.[^25] The
following table shows the various durations of workers tenure at the
Richmond branch in 1944:

**Duration of Employment of Terminating Employees**[^26]

**July December**

30 days or less 49.2% 37.5%

60 days or less 13.4 8.6

90 days or less 9.7 3.8

120 days or less 8.2 3.8

150 days or less 5.2 5.8

180 days or less 5.9 10.6

200 days or more 8.2 29.8

At the beginning of 1944, the 284 women on the payroll comprised 19% of
the workforce. At the end of the year, the 341 women constituted 22% of
the payroll. The number of Negro workers also increased during 1944,
beginning with 103 black employees (6.4% of the workforce) in March,
when Ford began keeping the statistic, and ending the year with 160
blacks on the payroll (10.5%).[^27] That number jumped to 327 Negro
workers (18.2% of the Ford employees) by the end of January 1945.[^28]

Ford also recorded other demographic data about its employees at the
Richmond plant during various times. At the end of 1943, the company
found that 14 employees out of 1,310 claimed to have had no schooling
whatsoever, 95% of them had completed the 5th grade, 80% had completed
the 8th grade, and 30% had completed four years of high school. At the
end of 1944, Ford surveyed the birthplace of its employees, finding that
only 15% were natives of California. As with the employees of other
California companies producing in support of the war effort, many of
Ford\'s employees at Richmond (31%) hailed from Arkansas, Texas,
Oklahoma, and Missouri. A total of 40 states were represented on Ford\'s
payroll, along with Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine
Islands. People from China, India, Australia, and fifteen European
countries worked at Ford, and among the Latin American countries natives
of Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru were
represented on the payroll.[^29]

One of the Richmond Tank Depot\'s labor problems was absenteeism. Maj.
Ball reported in late 1944 that it averaged about 10%. It was especially
high during the Christmas season, especially among women. One of the
methods Ordnance used to try to inspire Ford workers to reduce
absenteeism was to have battlefront veterans describe their experiences.
One such event took place on 23 January 1945, the day George McFadden
received the second of his cash awards for his idea for saving costs in
transporting jeeps made at Richmond (see section above on jeeps).
Ordnance presented him the award during a program to which all depot
employees and their families were invited. During the program, seven
veterans of the European theatre (one officer and six enlisted men) gave
accounts of their experiences in battle. Introduced as \"personal
emissaries of Gen. Eisenhower,\" they recounted the terrible hardships
of war and appealed to the workers to continue Richmond\'s excellent
record of production to help speed the end of the war. Capt. Spiker
reported that the program had no noticeable effect on absenteeism. The
day of the program, 8.2% of the workers were absent; the following day,
7.2% were absent. That compared with an absenteeism rate of 7.2% and
6.8% for the same two days (Tuesday and Wednesday) the previous week.
Workers were especially likely to skip work on Sundays, with 18.9% and
23.5% missing on 14 and 21 January, respectively. Therefore, the
Richmond Tank Depot decided to discontinue Sunday work on 28
January.[^30]

A related problem concerned overtime. In October 1944, all workers at
the Richmond Tank Depot, both Ordnance and Ford employees, went from
three eight-hour shifts per day to two, with the day shift operating
from 6:30 am to 3:00 pm and the swing shift from 3:30 pm to midnight. In
January 1945, as shipping orders increased, production workers went on
an overtime schedule, working ten-hour shifts, with the day shift
running from 6:30 am to 5:00 pm and the night shift from 5:30 pm to 4:00
am. Workers on the night shift did not like that new schedule, so on
January 9th, 221 of 367 production workers walked off the job at
midnight. The next day, management and union leaders met with the shift.
Jewett appealed to the workers\' patriotism. Bill Williams, one of the
union leaders, reminded the workers that there was a grievance procedure
in the union contract for such complaints, and he asked them to follow
that procedure, rather than walking off the job. The appeals worked, and
night-shift production workers abided by the overtime schedule. By
March, however, a new problem arose affecting both shifts: workers who
didn\'t want the overtime hours left work after eight hours. By
mid-March, as many as 196 men were leaving work early. Capt. Spiker
appealed the workers, asking them to be conscientious about the need to
maintain production to supply soldiers fighting

overseas. The numbers of workers leaving early thereafter decline
markedly, but the problem persisted.[^31]

In February, the Army and Navy mounted a publicity campaign called \"Man
the Battle Stations\" and aimed at recruiting workers necessary to
maintain industrial production through the end of the war. Radio station
KSFO broadcast a special program, sponsored by Lucky Lager Beer, growing
out of the military\'s campaign. The program emphasized the work being
done at the Richmond Tank Depot. Capt. Spiker, commanding officer of the
Richmond Tank Depot, took part in a ten-minute interview on station KRE,
again stressing the importance of the work being done at Richmond and
saying the depot had an immediate need for 100 workers with training in
automobile manufacture.[^32]

During the course of the war, Ford maintained a permanent training
program at the Richmond branch to ensure that workers and supervisors
had the necessary skills. For example, during 1944 and 1945, Ford hired
a total of 4,958 new employees, both men and women, of whom 432 (9%)
received on-the-job-training in the skills necessary to become
electricians, carpenters, draftsmen, engine mechanics, machinists,
millwrights, painters, plumbers, radio technicians, steam fitters,
tinsmiths, and welders.[^33]

Ford was not willing to fill all of its openings, however, by training
individuals without the requisite skills. This was demonstrated in
February 1945, when Bay Area newspapers picked up on the above-described
\"Man the Battle Stations\" publicity campaign and published articles
suggesting that the Richmond Tank Depot was willing to hire untrained
women. Women applicants who flooded Ford\'s employment office were
turned away, leading Ford employment manager A.B. Jewett, UAW-CIO
representative Frank Slaby, and two representatives of Local 560 to call
a meeting with Capt. Spiker to register their complaints concerning the
publicity. Both Jewett and the union representatives told Spiker that
they needed male applicants, not female. The reason, however, was not
simple prejudice but rather the limits California law placed on the
kinds of work employers could ask women to do, such as lift heavy
weights. Spiker responded that the newspapers had run the articles
without his knowledge, and he promised ask the San Francisco Ordnance
District to try to get newspapers to check their facts before publishing
such articles.[^34]

Nevertheless, the Richmond Tank Depot continued to have difficulty
finding enough workers during the closing months of the war in 1945, as
many who had migrated to California for work in wartime industries
headed home to other parts of the country. Because of the labor
shortage, Ford hired ever greater percentages of blacks and women.
Observing the overall trend in July 1945, Capt. Spiker wrote:

Before the war, women and negro employees were no problem at the Ford
Motor Company for the reason that they were practically non-existent on
the employment records. While they present no problems of a serious
nature, it is expected that they will be released when the Contract
terminates.[^35]

The percentage of women working at the Richmond Tank Depot peaked in
October 1944, and the percentage of blacks peaked in February 1945.[^36]

During the ensuing months, demands on production at the Richmond plant
declined as did employment levels, but Ford still experienced a labor
shortage until June, when schools let out and the company was able to
hire boys aged 16 to 18 for the summer. Despite a slight increase in the
number of Ford employees at the plant during the summer, workers
processing combat vehicles nevertheless had to work considerable
overtime because of the orders for production the Army made during the
final push toward victory against Japan. In mid-July 1945, the depot
went on 12-hour shifts for five days and worked 10-hour shifts an
additional eight days. The governor of California even authorized the
depot to have women work 10-hour days and 60-hour weeks because of the
emergency. Despite the grueling schedule, absenteeism during the week of
12-hour shifts was the lowest of the month. Immediately after the
announcement of Japan\'s unconditional surrender, demand for production
declined, as the only Ordnance work remaining was to prepare vehicles
being stored at Richmond for shipment to storage facilities elsewhere.
When Richmond got the news of the Japanese surrender, Ford had 1,138
production workers processing combat vehicles; by the end of the month,
the number was down to 899. Ford dismissed all of the high-school boys
to assure work for men supporting families, the company transferred some
of the production workers to work on reconverting the plant to civilian
production, and more than 170 production workers quit, either to resume
peacetime jobs or to move back to their homes in other parts of the
country. Because of CIO seniority rules, the percentages of blacks and
women working on the Ordnance contract remained relatively high through
the end of October.[^37]

Some of the workers at the Richmond Tank Depot toward the end of the war
were men who had received medical discharges from the armed forces after
being wounded in battle.[^38]

**1. Unions**

In November 1943, two employees at Richmond and an organizer of the
United Office and Professional Workers of America tried to organize
clerical workers at the Richmond branch. They distributed literature to
workers outside the Richmond plant, and they scheduled a meeting between
clerical workers and the union at the UAW\'s Local 560 hall at El
Cerrito. The organizing effort continued through 1944. In April 1944,
the United Office Workers and the CIO filed a complaint with the NLRB on
behalf of an office worker whom Ford had discharged. In August, the Army
recommended the Richmond Tank Depot for its third Army-Navy \"E\" Award,
which would be the second star on the depot\'s flag. Because a complaint
was on file at the NLRB, however, the Army delayed notifying the depot
of the award. When Local 560 of the UAW heard of the delay, E.D. Fry,
secretary-treasurer of the local, wrote Maj. Ball a letter stating that
Local 560 was not associated with the complaint and that the complaint
had nothing to do with production workers in the plant. He said delaying
the award was unfair to the plant workers who had achieved the record
meriting the award, and he therefore asked Maj. Ball to lift the
objection that was delaying the process.[^39]

Another incident that aroused the anti-union concern of Ford management
occurred in the spring of 1945, when the plant foremen formed a social
group they called the Ford Foremen\'s Club. They held their first
meeting at the Richmond Golf Club, and they instituted a rule that
anyone talking about problems at work would be fined a dollar. At the
same time, organizers on the West Coast representing the Foremen\'s
Association of America (FAA) were trying to organize a union for foremen
at industrial plants. The FAA had been successful in organizing foremen
at some automotive plants in Michigan, including Ford\'s River Rouge
plant. To counter the union movement, a group called the California
Personnel Managers\' Association formed a subsidiary organization called
the California Industrial Management Association (CIMA) so that groups
like the Ford Foremen\'s Club could affiliate. The idea was that foremen
had a desire to belong to an organization, and by affiliating with the
CIMA they would be less susceptible to the possible attractions of
belong to a union for foremen. Richmond superintendent W.A. Abbott
approved of the steps the foremen had taken and was quick to assure the
Ford hierarchy in Dearborn that the Richmond foremen remained opposed to
unions. M.L. Wiesmyer wrote back to Abbott, saying the news made him
nervous: \"We don\'t think much of the idea of foremen forming any kind
of organization whatever.\" After the initial meeting of the Ford
Foremen\'s Club, however, interest in belonging to an organization began
to fade. The group voted not to affiliate with the CIMA, and Ford\'s
labor relations supervisor at Richmond predicted that the club would
soon dissolve.[^40]

Meanwhile, production workers at the Richmond branch continued to be
represented by the UAW, which maintained a closed shop. Once hired,
every production worker, whether man or woman, paid the UAW a
five-dollar initiation fee. Monthly dues were \$1.50. Workers\'
complaints were handled under the four-step grievance process
established between the UAW and Ford. In 1943, workers filed 69
grievances against the company, and in 1944 they filed 187. Half of the
grievances were settled at the first stage in the process in 1943 and
two-thirds were settled at the first stage in 1944. Only eight
grievances went beyond the second stage in 1943, and eleven went beyond
that stage in 1944. One grievance had to be settled by the Umpire (the
fourth stage in the process) in 1944. M.A. Williams headed the UAW
bargaining unit at the Richmond plant.[^41]

An important feature of the labor situation at the Richmond Tank Depot
during the war years is that instead of two classes of workers, labor
and management, there were four: Ford employees who were members of the
UAW, Ford officials, military officers of the Ordnance Department and
the Signal Corps, and civil service employees of those two branches of
the Army. Numerous reports by the commanding officer at the depot
describe the generally cooperative atmosphere that existed among the
various groups, but one report suggests that comity was not ubiquitous.
In his third quarter 1944 report, Maj. Ball wrote:

At the beginning of 1944 a study was made of the Ordnance plant
organization. Two decisions were reached: first, Ordnance personnel
would not be increased; and second, relationship with the Contractor
would have to be improved in order to meet requirements of both quality
and increasing quantities of vehicles for overseas shipment.

Everyone in the Ordnance organization was instructed to refrain from any
discussion with the Contractor\'s personnel involving controversial
subjects; all such cases were to be reported to the Commanding
Officer.[^42]

The report gave no hint of what such \"controversial subjects\" might
be. The following quarter, Ball wrote that attitude and cooperation
between Ordnance and Ford were excellent.[^43] He did, however, describe
details of a subject that could possible cause friction in a workplace:

The general attitude of the Ordnance personnel is excellent. All the
personnel take pride in working for the Government and feel that they
are a bit closer to the war effort. These factors offset the lower
differential in pay between that of Ordnance and the Contractor.
However, considering annual leave, sick leave and other privileges, the
conditions are fairly equal. There exists a very desirable attitude
between the Contractor\'s personnel and Ordnance personnel insofar as
there is close cooperation, geniality, thorough understanding of each
one\'s job and in general reflects mutual respect.[^44]

**2. Women**

The increase in the percentage of workers at the Richmond plant who were
women, noted above, mirrored a national trend brought about by the
mobilization of the population for the war effort. In July 1944, women
comprised 36.9% of workers in factories working under prime contracts
with the government. The segment of America\'s total work force that was
female rose from 25.8% before war to a high of 35.4% during the war.
Although this new demographic of America\'s industrial workforce
signaled a remarkable social change for the nation, it was by no means
extreme in comparison with other belligerents in the war. In Britain\'s
civilian labor force, 38% of workers were women at the height of the
war. In the Soviet Union, women were 38% of the work force in 1940 and
53% in 1942. German women already comprised 37% of the civilian work
force before Hitler invaded Poland in 1939; by 1944, 51% of German
civilian workers were women.[^45]

The mobilization of workers in America\'s industrial plants was not as
easy as simply hiring women to do jobs men had once done. Many women,
especially single women and poor women, already were self-employed or
had low-paying jobs in domestic service or the textile, clothing, and
shoe industries before the war. Some were quick to accept higher pay in
military production but circumstances for others precluded them from
taking the new employment opportunities. Women from rural areas were
generally not available, because their work-loads there had already
increased in making up for the men who had left farms and small-town
businesses for military service. Cities with ordnance manufacturing
plants could not stand to import large numbers of women from other
areas, even if available, because housing and transportation were
already stretched to the limit with the influx of male industrial
workers and their families. Federal manpower planners were loath to
recruit married women with children, because then the government would
need to develop child-care resources, a burden they hoped to avoid. They
focused their attention on a demographic they labeled the \"idle\"
reserve, who were recent high school graduates or unemployed, married
women without children and already living in crowded industrial
manufacturing centers. In some parts of the country, including at the
Richmond Tank Depot, women who worked in ordnance plants were dubbed
\"WOWs,\" for Women Ordnance Workers.[^46]

England had already established a national system by which women were
required to register for assignment to work either in manufacturing, the
military, or the civilian defense. Eleanor Roosevelt had advocated such
a system for mobilizing American women since 1941. Paul V. McNutt, chief
of the War Manpower Commission, had initially believed there would be
enough men workers available, but by autumn 1942 he, too, wanted a
National Service Act that would authorize him to register men and women
alike and then direct them to workplaces were they were needed.[^47]

Then there were the difficulties of putting women to work within the
existing legal framework intended to protect women. A 1939 California
law prohibited employers from making women work more than 8 hours per
day or more than 48 hours per week. In February 1943, the California
legislature passed the War Production Act, which authorized the Governor
to issue a permit to an employer that would allow that employer to have
women work more hours than normally allowed under the law, if the work
would further production in support of the war effort and if the work
would not increase the risk of harming the health and safety of the
women workers.[^48] On the other hand some of the difficulties in hiring
women appeared to be imaginary. The War Manpower Commission had a
program for training industrial workers for the war effort, and it
routinely received requests for literature aimed specifically at
training women. One of the program\'s managers responded:

We have so many requests from nervous employers for special material on
the training of women that I\'ve asked my secretary to go out and buy a
rubber stamp to use on every printed piece we send out, reading \"this
includes women, Negroes, handicapped, Chimamen, and Spaniards.\" The
only difference between training men and women in industry is in the
toilet facilities.[^49]

Such evidently was the attitude of the Ford management at the Richmond
branch, which was said to have been a \"house of men.\" Prior to the
war, only three women had worked at the Richmond branch, a daytime
telephone operator and two typists. The shortage of workers, however,
compelled the Richmond branch to hire women, and the managers quickly
learned that women could make excellent industrial workers. For some
tasks (work involving small details or tedium, said to require greater
patience) they even concluded that women were superior to men. But women
workers at Ford did not fall into their posts merely because of the
manpower shortage. They also had a strong advocate at the San Francisco
Ordnance District in the person of Rowenah M. Peters, Executive
Assistant to the District Chief. She had begun working for the Office of
the Chief of Ordnance in Washington, DC, in 1931. Peters transferred to
the San Francisco District in 1933, and by the time World War II started
she had the most seniority of the district\'s civilian staff. She had
gained a respected reputation among industrialists and military staff
alike for her understanding of ordnance production and for her expertise
in personnel matters, and she was said to have paid official visits to
more Army ordnance facilities that any other woman in the U.S. She
therefore took a lead role in convincing industrialists in the
jurisdiction of the San Francisco District that women should be among
the new recruits as companies mobilized to meet wartime demand.[^50]

Her first such visit in autumn 1940 was to the Norris Stamping and
Manufacturing Company, which had just received its second Ordnance
contract under the pre-war mobilization programs. The company\'s
president, K.T. Norris, also believed that women could make effective
industrial workers, and he enthusiastically worked with Peters to move
women into his production schemes. The Norris company is reported to
have had one of the best records during the war of employing women
toward a combination of effective production and of goodwill between
workers and management. Other companies were not so receptive to the
idea of employing women. The manager at Ford\'s Richmond plant was said
to have been disdainful of the suggestion, and the manager at the Yuba
Manufacturing Company in Benicia is said to have responded to Peters
that he would not even consider the idea of hiring women. The Yuba
company made gold dredges during peacetime, and the manager dismissed
the notion that women could help turn the plant\'s lathes,
drill-presses, and overhead cranes to the work of producing ordnance.
Three years later, however, virtually all the ordnance producers in the
San Francisco District were employing women, who had gained reputations,
among other things, as skilled machine-tool and crane operators.[^51]

Women worked in all the sections at the Richmond branch during World War
II. Of 332 women working there at the end of February 1945, 95 worked on
the jeep assembly line. Curiously, two other main jeep assembly plants
at Dallas and Louisville did not employ women. It was because of this
distinction that jeep chassis assembly foreman Fred Willmer was said to
have been especially proud that his plant routinely produced jeeps at
the least cost of the three Ford plants. Tasks involved in jeep
production that were filled by women included assembling and installing
light switches, driving jeeps off the assembly line and taking each for
a test drive, delivering jeeps to the Army\'s Ordnance Inspectors, and
draining gasoline from the tank in preparation for shipment. One of the
dirtiest jobs in the plant involved dipping 25-pound sacks of parts (the
heaviest load women were allowed to lift under California law) in a
thick, black anti-rust fluid prior to sorting them into boxes for use by
workers along the jeep assembly line. A woman named Bette Hargrave held
that job in 1945. Georgette Bittich was one of the women who gave jeeps
their five-mile test drive before delivering them to the Ordnance
Inspectors. The bodies of the twenty or so jeeps she tested daily were
said to be still so hot from the paint-curing oven that she had to sit
on a pillow to shield her from the radiant heat, which abated after
about a mile on the road.[^52]

In the Tank Depot, women worked at numerous jobs, including wrapping
machine gun parts for shipping. The parts were already coated with
grease. A woman would grab the necessary parts and wrap them in
grease-proof paper. After labeling the package, she would dip it in hot
wax. When the wax cooled, she would wrap the package again in paper and
label it, this time sealing the label with cellophane tape. Other women
wrapped radio parts for the tanks. Some of the tank radios were
manufactured to different specifications than those finally selected for
particular tanks. This meant personnel at the Ford plant, often women,
had to disassemble the radios and re-wire them according to the new
requirements. Reportedly, women were usually selected for the radio work
because it was highly repetitive but they could maintain the
attentiveness necessary to achieve quality work. Other women would wrap
radio parts in paper and wax, similar to the way other women wrapped gun
parts, and then they placed the wrapped radio parts in wooden boxes. As
a final sealant, they would paint tar along the edges of the boxes.
Often women would remark that they took great care with their jobs
because a vehicle they outfitted or a part they wrapped might be used by
a loved one, a son, grandson, or nephew, fighting in either the European
or the Pacific theatre.[^53]

As mentioned in an earlier section, the Carpentry Shop behind the
Richmond plant made all the wooden crates for shipping vehicles and
parts overseas. Skilled carpentry was another task that men at Ford had
once thought women could not master, but in 1945 the foreman of the
Carpentry Shop considered his women workers to be highly skilled and
faster than the men who used to work there. He had a couple of women on
his crew who were grandmothers.[^54]

Isla Buster worked in a department that packed lights and related
equipment. She and her husband had moved to Richmond from Lubbock,
Texas, when their son, Bob, enlisted in the Army Air Force to serve as a
gunnery sergeant. She said, \"Our pledge to Bob when he joined was that
we would work in defense \'till he comes home, and we\'re going to keep
it.\"[^55]

Another job in preparing vehicles for shipment was called \"blue
freeze.\" It derived its name from the tape, originally blue, that
workers used to seal all openings on tanks and other larger vehicles
that were not crated in wooden boxes. The work was conducted outdoors on
the pier adjacent to the Ford plant, and many of the workers were
women.[^56]

Women also worked for Ford in the Service Stock Department. Dealerships
and repair shops throughout Richmond\'s expanded service region sent
orders to the Richmond branch for parts, and workers in the Service
Stock Department filled the orders. Several women were pickers and
packers, meaning they picked the ordered parts of the shelves and packed
them for shipment. Eva Rost was a picker who started work at Ford in
July 1943. Her husband was a SeaBee in the Pacific theatre, and her two
step-sons were also in the military. In early 1945 she said, \"I\'d
rather work while they are gone, but when my husband comes home, any
soldier that wants it can have this job.\"[^57]

Some of the women working at the Richmond Tank Depot were not Ford
employees but rather worked for the Army, either the Ordnance Department
or the Signal Corps. The latter worked under the command of the Ordnance
Department but had sole responsibility for inspecting radios and other
communications equipment on the vehicles processed at the Richmond Tank
Depot. The Signal Corp detachment at Richmond had one military officer,
a lieutenant, and a civilian in charge. They were both men, as were the
civilian technicians who worked for the Signal Corps. All of the Signal
Corps inspectors were women. Women also worked as Ordnance Department
inspectors. When the U.S. had entered the war, Ordnance inspectors had
been men, and they were initially eligible for deferments from the
draft. By summer 1942, however, it was nearly impossible for men to
continue to receive draft deferments solely for being trained Ordnance
inspectors. In July 1942, the Ordnance Department began to explicitly
recruit and train women to serve as inspectors, training them along with
eligible men. Training of Ordnance inspectors had long been conducted at
Arsenals, but to meet the new demand the Ordnance Department established
special training programs at other institutions. For example, the Los
Angeles region of the San Francisco Ordnance District established a
special training school at the University of Southern California, which
enrolled its first class in February 1942. By the time the third class
enrolled in July 1942, two-thirds of the trainees were women.[^58] After
some experience with women inspectors, Ordnance concluded they often
made superior workers:

It was found that women inspectors were inclined to be more careful on
details, did not become dissatisfied with monotonous work and were not
continually asking for advancement. They were used more and more in
inspection work, even being placed on such work as tank assembly to
inspect welding procedure.[^59]

The Richmond plant had several employees whose specific jobs arose when
Ford began hiring women. Angela Zatta, a native of Italy, was custodian
of the women\'s rest rooms. Stella DeJarnett and her husband, a wounded
veteran of World War I, moved to Richmond from Fresno at the beginning
of WWII to work in war production. Her job at Ford\'s Richmond branch
was Matron of Women, a sort of in-plant police officer for women, who
could observe activities of workers throughout the facility, including
women\'s rest rooms. When the Richmond branch began employing women, it
established a separate first aid station for them. Molly Mansfield was
the registered nurse who staffed it. Edna Guyn served as the women\'s
counselor at the Richmond branch. She had an office, but conducted most
of her counselling as she walk about the plant. Women could raise any
issue with her, whether about family matters at home or troublesome
situations at work. She was able to help resolve some issues informally
that otherwise might have led to formal grievances.[^60]

Much of the above information on women workers at the Richmond Tank
Depot derives from a report called \"Women Man the Battle Stations\" and
prepared by Fern Hurley for inclusion in history of the San Francisco
Ordnance District. Hurley visited the Richmond plant on 28 February and
1 March 1945, interviewing foremen and women production workers.
Following is a list of women reported by Hurley to have been working at
the Richmond branch at the time of her visit in 1945:

Theodora Acredolo Edna Guyn Carrie E. McDonald

Sue Allen Bette Hargrave Dolores McDowell

Mary (Zatta) Baldwin Agnes Harrington Fay Moore

Aline Beaird Bessie Harris Lottie Mott

Georgette Bittich Edith Heller Valborg (Olsen) Ney

Blanche Bottini Flonnie Helm Arline Noyes

Ivadel Brown Lucille Helzer Emma Nuti

Mary Bruce Addie Henderson Bertha Parker

Isla Buster Virginia Hinman Elberta Peters

Betty Carder Jean Jackson Marie Phelan

Fannie Caswell Irene Jones Doris Phillips

Patricia Clifton Mary Jones Anita Pike

Jennie Darling Pearl Kallenberger Kathryn Ray

Stella DeJarnett Jessie Loera Eva L. Rost

Margaret Dennis Inez Lonnon Edith Sadie

Ruth Fisher Bertha Looney Eunice Smith

Trini Garcia Bertha King Ann Stiefel

Louise Gaylord Molly Mansfield Helen Taylor

Ada M. Gerken Bessie Martin Nadine West

Marie Grubes Ann McDonald Angela Zatta

Hurley described the work some of the women were doing, but she devoted
as much attention in her report to other aspects of the women\'s lives,
especially in three areas: 1) their background and what brought them to
work at Ford, 2) family members serving in the armed forces, and 3) how
other members of the family, especially children, help the women take
care of the work necessary to maintain a home.

[^1]: ^?^Nevins and Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth*, 47-50, 133-135;
    Milton Derber and Edwin Young, *Labor and the New Deal* (New York:
    Da Capo Press, 1972 reprint of 1957 edition by University of
    Wisconsin Press), 170-172; Steve Babson, *The Unfinished Struggle:
    Turning Points in American Labor, 1877-Present* (New York: Rowman &
    LIttlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 95-98.

[^2]: ^?^Babson, *The Unfinished Struggle*, 98-103.

[^3]: ^?^The weekly Contra Costa *Labor Journal*, affiliated with the
    American Federal of Labor (AFL) covered numerous strikes in Contra
    Costa and nearby counties. From its first issue in June 1937 onward,
    the San Francisco *Labor Herald*, affiliated with the Congress of
    Industrial Organizations (CIO), reported strikes throughout northern
    California. See also Albert Vetere Lannon, *Fight or Be Slaves: The
    History of the Oakland-East Bay Labor Movement* (Lanham, MD:
    University Press of America, 2000), 77-91; \"Truce Holds at Stockton
    As Canneries Idle after Rioting,\" *Richmond Independent* (24 April
    1937): 1, 6 (photos of Stockton labor violence).

[^4]: ^?^David Brody, *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the 20th
    Century Struggle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 3-81;
    Robert H. Zieger, *American Workers, American Unions*, Second
    Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3-25.

[^5]: ^?^Nevins and Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth*, 50-51; Zieger,
    *American Workers, American Unions*, 26-46; Jeremy Brecher, *Strike*
    (Boston: South End Press, 1972), 150-177; Nelson Lichtenstein,
    *State of the Union: A Century of American Labor* (Princeton:
    Princeton University Press), 21-48.

[^6]: ^?^Contra Costa *Labor Journal* (19 March 1937): 1. The split
    between the CIO and the AFL is evident in coverage given organizing
    activities at the Richmond plant. The AFL-affiliated *Labor Journal*
    covered the early UAW organizing efforts at the Richmond plant, and
    it covered the two strikes in 1937, but the *Labor Journal*
    virtually ignored the UAW\'s complaint against Ford, filed with the
    NLRB in early 1938, and it ignored the NLRB\'s rulings against Ford
    and in favor of the UAW at the Richmond plant. The CIO-affiliated
    *Labor Herald*, on the other hand, reported in detail on labor
    activities at the Richmond plant. In fact, Ford\'s apparent
    recognition of UAW Local No. 560 was one of the lead stories on the
    front page of the *Labor Herald\'s* inaugural issue of 8 June 1937.

[^7]: ^?^Bennett quoted in \"Ford Plants Next in Line for Auto Union
    Organizers,\" Contra Costa *Labor Journal* (16 April 1937): 3. See
    also \"The Reminiscences of Clarence Bulwinkel,\" 35; Nevins and
    Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth*, 47-54, 135.

[^8]: ^?^\"Ford Plants Next in Line for Auto Union Organizers,\" 3;
    Nevins and Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth*, 137-139, 150-151.
    \"The Ford Terror\" is described in the latter, p 150.

[^9]: ^?^Charges by UAW Local 76 against Ford Motor Company, Case No.
    XX-C-71 dated 5 January and 22 January 1937, NARA RG-25, Entry 155,
    box 130, Ford Motor Company, Richmond, CA; E.S. Neal, Progress
    Report No. 1 in Case No. XX-C-71 dated 9 March 1937, NARA RG-25,
    Entry 155, box 130, Ford Motor Company, Richmond, CA; Thomas H.
    Kennedy, \"Intermediate Report,\" unpublished National Labor
    Relations Board report dated 2 September 1938, HFM Acc. No. 51, box
    8, Richmond, CA, folder, p. 1-6; National Labor Relations Board,
    \"Decision and Order,\" 21 February 1941, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8,
    Richmond, CA, p. 4-6; W.F. Williamson to I.A. Capizzi, letter dated
    7 February 1941, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA,
    Correspondence folder; \"UAW Open Meet Swells Ranks of Local Union
    76,\" Contra Costa *Labor Journal* (16 April 1937): 1.

[^10]: ^?^\"Sit-Down Strike At Ford,\" *Richmond Independent* (23 April
    1937): 1, 3; \"Parley Ends Ford Strike,\" *Richmond Independent* (24
    April 1937): 1, 3; \"Ford Plant Work,\" *Richmond Independent* (26
    April 1937): 1; \"Ford Plant Schedule Is Resumed,\" *Richmond
    Independent* (27 April 1937): 1; \"The Reminiscences of Mr. Clarence
    Bulwinkel,\" 34. There are some excellent photos of the strikers on
    p. 3 of the 24 April issue.

[^11]: ^?^\"Ford Recognizes Auto Union After Sit-Down Strike,\" Contra
    Costa *Labor Journal* (30 April 1937): 1; \"Ford Plant to Stay Shut,
    Edict As Strike Is Called,\" *Richmond Independent* (26 May 1937):
    1, 8; \"Ford Strike Is Unbroken,\" *Richmond Independent* (27 May
    1937): 1, 4; \"Strike Action Disputed by Union Heads,\" *Richmond
    Independent* (27 May 1937): 1, 4; \"Ford Strike Siege Is Seen,\"
    *Richmond Independent* (28 May 1937): 1, 6; \"A.F.L. Organizes Ford
    Men,\" *Richmond Independent* (29 May 1937): 1, 3; \"Union Groups
    Contest Right to Represent Ford Men,\" *Richmond Independent* (31
    May 1937): 1, 2; \"Ford Strike Spread to Other Plants Threatened,\"
    *Richmond Independent* (1 June 1937): 1, 2; \"Slaby Files Charges in
    Ford Strike,\" *Richmond Independent* (1 June 1937): 1; \"Food Asked
    for Ford Strikers,\" *Richmond Independent* (2 June 1937): 1;
    \"Membership in Unions May Be Settled,\" *Richmond Independent* (2
    June 1937): 1, 3; \"Ford Strike End Forecast,\" *Richmond
    Independent* (3 June 1937): 1; \"Ford Peace Parley Is Held,\"
    *Richmond Independent* (4 June 1937): 1, 6; \"New Effort for Ford
    Peace,\" *Richmond Independent* (5 June 1937): 1; \"Charges Fly in
    U.A.W., Ford Row,\" *Richmond Independent* (5 June 1937): 1; \"Ford
    Plant Here Reopened,\" *Richmond Independent* (7 June 1937): 1, 3;
    Weekly Report on Case No. XX-C-71 for week ending 1 May 1937, NARA
    RG-25, Entry 155, box 130, Ford Motor Company, Richmond, CA;
    \"Amended and Supplemental Charge,\" charge filed by the NLRB and
    UAW against Ford Motor Company dated 19 January 1938, HFM Acc. No.
    51, box 8, Richmond, CA, Correspondence folder; Kennedy,
    \"Intermediate Report,\" 5-8, 39-41; NLRB, \"Decision and Order,\"
    1, 7-8; W.F. Williamson to F.A. Thomson, letter dated 21 June 1938,
    HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA, Correspondence folder; Press
    \"Release by committee of 12 employees of Ford Motor Company,
    Richmond, California, who are members of UAW,\" NARA RG-25, Entry
    155, box 130, Case No. XX-C-170, Ford Motor Company, Richmond, CA;
    \"Petition for Investigation and Certification of Representatives
    Pursuant to Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,\"
    petition dated 2 June 1937, NARA RG-25, Entry 155, box 130, Case No.
    XX-C-125, Ford Motor Company, Richmond, CA.

    In his Ford Motor Company oral history, M.L. Wiesmyer considered
    Gillespie a very untrustworthy character. Wiesmyer was also critical
    of Bennett\'s unsavory business methods regarding unions and other
    business matters; see \"The Reminiscences of Mr. M.L. Wiesmyer,\"
    104-105, 121-123, 142-143. Wiesmyer\'s reminiscences from within the
    Ford management structure reinforce a conclusion that Bennett\'s use
    of Gillespie in negotiations with the Richmond workers was an
    underhanded tactic.

[^12]: ^?^\"Amended and Supplemental Charge,\" 19 January 1938; NLRB,
    \"Decision and Order,\" 1, 7-8. The latter includes quotes from the
    Ford Motor Company\'s anti-union literature.

[^13]: ^?^Kennedy, \"Intermediate Report,\" 7-9; NLRB, \"Decision and
    Order,\" 2, 11, 25; W.F. Williamson to F.A. Thomson, letter dated 26
    May 1938, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA, Correspondence
    folder; \"Demand Reopening of Richmond Plant,\" *Labor Herald* (1
    December 1937): 1, 4.

[^14]: ^?^Kennedy, \"Intermediate Report,\" 6-7 NLRB, \"Decision and
    Order,\" 26-29; Williamson to Thomson, letter dated 26 May 1938;
    Memo for Files, NLRB memorandum describing meeting with Ford Motor
    Company representatives dated 4 June 1937, copy of memo in two
    locations, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA, Correspondence
    folder, and NARA RG-25, Entry 155, box 130, Case No. XX-C-170, Ford
    Motor Company, Richmond, CA. See also a summary of Gillispie\'s
    activities in the Bay Area in \"Take Ford Co\'s Word with a Grain of
    Salt,\" *The Labor Herald* (14 March 1941): 4. For an alternate view
    of Gillespie, see \"The Reminiscences of Clarence Bulwinkel,\" 36.
    Bulwinkel considered Gillespie to be a very capable and valuable
    labor negotiator.

[^15]: ^?^\"Desert Leaders,\" San Francisco *Voice of the Federation*
    (11 November 1937): 3; \"National Ford Drive Mapped,\" *Labor
    Herald* (17 November 1937): 6; NLRB, \"Decision and Order,\" 1;
    \"Local Unit of U.A.W. Formed,\" *Richmond Independent* (6 December
    1937): 4.

[^16]: ^?^W.F. Williamson to F.A. Thomson, letters dated 4, 11, 14, 17,
    and 20 May 1938, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA,
    Correspondence.

[^17]: ^?^Williamson to Thomson, letters dated 14, 17, 20, and 26 May
    1938.

[^18]: ^?^\"Petition for Investigation and Certification of
    Representatives Pursuant to Section 9(c) of the National Labor
    Relations Act,\" petition dated 7 June 1938, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8,
    Richmond, CA, Correspondence folder; Williamson to Thomson, letters
    dated 9, 11, and 23 June 1938, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA,
    Correspondence folder.

[^19]: ^?^\"7 Times for Ford: \'Guilt As Charged\',\" *The Labor Herald*
    (28 February 1941): 1; Kennedy, \"Intermediate Report,\" 9-38,
    44-46, schedules A, B, C, & D; NLRB, \"Decision and Order, 11-23,
    34-35; Williamson to Thomson, letter dated 30 July 1938, Williamson
    to Bulwinkel, letter dated 30 July 1938, Williamson to I.A. Capizzi,
    letter dated 7 February 1941, Williamson to B.J. Craig, letter dated
    11 August 1941, all in HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA,
    Correspondence folder. Pages 9-38 of the \"Intermediate Report\"
    summarize the information provided by individuals at their
    interviews. There are similar summaries of workers\' stories in
    NLRB, \"Decision and Order,\" 11-23. Schedule A lists the men not
    interviewed for whom the complaint was dismissed. Schedule B lists
    the men not interview for whom the complaint was upheld. Schedule C
    lists the men interviewed for whom the complaint was upheld.
    Schedule D lists the men interviewed for whom the complaint was
    dismissed.

[^20]: ^?^\"Henry Ford Gets Two Million Bucks,\" *The Labor Herald* (3
    January 1941): 1; \"Ford Gets a Taste of Justice,\" *The Labor
    Herald* (7 February 1941): 1; \"Ford Fascism Crumbles,\" *The Labor
    Herald* (18 April 1941): 1; \"Ford Election Set,\" *The Labor
    Herald* (18 April 1941): 1; \"Americanize Ford with Historic CIO
    Pact,\" *The Labor Herald* (18 April 1941): 1, 3; Sol Dollinger and
    Genora Johnson Dollinger, *Not Automatic: Women and the Left in the
    Forging of the Auto Workers\' Union* (New York: Monthly Review
    Press, 2000), 63-70; Nevins and Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth*,
    156-167.

[^21]: ^?^\"Ford\'s Weird Policies,\" *The Labor Herald* (28 February
    1941): 4; \"Ford Co. Renews Battle at Richmond Assembly Plant,\"
    *The Labor Herald* (11 April 1941): 1; Williamson to Capizzi,
    letters dated 7 February and 12 July 1941; Williamson to Craig,
    letter dated 11 August 1941; \"Supplemental Decision and Order,\"
    NLRB order dated 25 April 1941, HFM Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond,
    CA, Correspondence folder; Lannon, *Fight or Be Slaves*, 89. A copy
    of a subsequent agreement between Ford and the UAW is included as an
    exhibit in \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September
    1944,\" 41, exhibit 15.

[^22]: ^?^\"Ford Co. Renews Battle at Richmond Assembly Plant,\" *The
    Labor Herald* (11 April 1941): 1; \"Ford Election Set,\" *The Labor
    Herald* (16 May 1941): 1; \"Americanize Ford with Historic CIO
    Pact,\" *The Labor Herald* (27 June 1941): 1, 3.

[^23]: ^?^Alan S. Milward, *War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945*
    (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979):
    216-244, as summarized in Alan Gropman, \"Industrial Mobilization,\"
    in *The Big L: American Logistics in World War II*, Alan Gropman,
    ed. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997),
    76-77.

[^24]: ^?^A.B. Jewett to M.L. Wiesmyer, memorandum dated 15 December
    1942, HFM Acc. No. 371, box 16, folder 4.

[^25]: ^?^Ford Motor Company, Richmond Branch, Labor Relations
    Department, \"Labor Relations & Employment Records Survey,
    January-December 1944,\" unpublished report in HFM Acc. No. 371, box
    17, folder 4, pp. 1-3. Maj. Ball\'s report at the end of 1944,
    \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September 1944,\" 13,
    states that Ford\'s turnover was only 6% per month, which is a
    slightly lower figure than the approximately 8% turnover Ford\'s
    Survey showed.

[^26]: ^?^\"Labor Relations & Employment Records Survey,
    January-December 1944,\" 3.

[^27]: ^?^\"Labor Relations & Employment Records Survey,
    January-December 1944,\" 1, 4. The statistics on women workers are
    reiterated in Fern Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\"
    unpublished, undated (ca. March 1945) report in NARA RG-156, Entry
    646, box A578, San Francisco Ordnance District History, Vol. XII, p.
    37. Maj. Ball, \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30
    September 1944,\" 13, reported that 9.5% of Ford\'s production
    workers were black and 24% were women at the end of 1944.

[^28]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to 31 March 1945,\"
    18.

[^29]: ^?^\"Labor Relations & Employment Records Survey,
    January-December 1944,\" 5.

[^30]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 13, 114; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January
    to 31 March 1945,\" 10-11, 16.

[^31]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 56; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to
    31 March 1945,\" 18-19, 197-198.

[^32]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to 31 March 1945,\"
    67-68; a report and a script documenting the broadcasts are included
    as exhibits SS and TT on pp. 116-128.

[^33]: ^?^\"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676,\"
    3-4.

[^34]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to 31 March 1945,\"
    89-91; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\"
    188.

[^35]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\"
    187.

[^36]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\"
    187-188.

[^37]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\"
    187-190; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September
    1945,\" 23-25, 95, 157-158.

    There was a general decline in the percentage of women working in
    the automobile industry after the war; see Ruth Milkman, \"Rosie the
    Riveter Revisited: Management\'s Postwar Purge of Women Automobile
    Workers,\" in *On the Line: Essays in the History of Auto Work*,
    Nelson Lichtenstein and Stephen Meyer, eds. (Urbana and Chicago:
    University of Illinois Press, 1989), 129-152. The details of
    women\'s experiences at the Richmond Tank Depot have not been
    examined for this study.

[^38]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot,\" Vol. II, part 2, December 1944,
    photos.

[^39]: ^?^Robert Collins to I.A. Capizzi, letter dated 29 June 1944, HFM
    Acc. No. 51, box 8, Richmond, CA, Correspondence folder; \"Richmond
    Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September 1944,\" 13-14, 22-24;
    \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31 December
    1944,\" 13. The latter report (p. 37, exhibit no. 11) includes a
    copy of the literature the UOPWA-CIO distributed, in the form of a
    true-false test, to workers during the organizing drive.

[^40]: ^?^Abbott to Wiesmyer, memorandum dated 3 April 1945, Wiesmyer to
    Abbott, memorandum dated 9 April 1945, Jewett to Stewart Evans,
    letter dated 13 April 1945, HFM Acc. No. 371, box 17, folder 4;
    Nelson Lichtenstein, \"\'The Man in the Middle\': A Social History
    of Automobile Industry Foremen,\" in *On the Line: Essays in the
    History of Auto Work*, Nelson Lichtenstein and Stephen Meyer, eds.
    (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 169-177.

[^41]: ^?^\"Labor Relations & Employment Records Survey,
    January-December 1944,\"5-6; Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle
    Stations, \" 35, 38.

[^42]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September
    1944,\" 3.

[^43]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 3.

[^44]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 6.

[^45]: ^?^Donald M. Nelson, *Arsenal of Democracy, the Story of American
    War Production* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 237;
    Francis Walton, *Miracle of World War II: How American Industry Made
    Victory Possible* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 372, 382-383;
    Milward, *War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945*, 216-244; Leila J.
    Rupp, *Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda
    1939-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 185; Penny
    Summerfield, *Women Workers in the Second World War: Production and
    Patriarchy in Conflict* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 29; Harold G.
    Vatter, *U.S. Economy in World War II* (New York: Columbia
    University Press, 1985), 20; all summarized in Gropman, \"Industrial
    Mobilization,\" 78-80.

[^46]: ^?^\"The Margin Now Is Womanpower,\" *Fortune* 27 (February
    1943): 99-103, 222-224; Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time:
    Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II* (New
    York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 364. The article in *Fortune* has
    some stunning photos of women working in factories. It also has some
    interesting material on attitudes toward women workers. For example,
    there are some interesting stories about women wanting to wear
    stylish hair to work and refusing to take necessary safety
    precautions regarding their hair. There is also a description of the
    acronym, WOW, for Women Ordnance Workers that was promoted by
    Bridgeport Brass in Connecticut. It mirrored the names given women
    in the military (WAVEs, WAACs, WAFs). WOWs there even had a uniform
    of red bandannas and \"handsome\" blue coveralls (p. 223). Women
    workers at the Richmond Tank Depot were identified as WOWs in
    \"Richmond Tank Depot, Richmond, Calif., 1 October - 31 December
    1944,\" Vol. II, part 2, the section of photographs.

[^47]: ^?^\"The Margin Now Is Womanpower,\" 100; Goodwin, *No Ordinary
    Time*, 364-365.

[^48]: ^?^D.C. Moffitt to M.L. Wiesmyer, memorandum dated 22 February
    1943, and Wiesmyer to Abbott and Jewett, memorandum dated 1 March
    1943, HFM Acc. No. 371, box 16, folder 4.

[^49]: ^?^Channing Dooley, quoted in \"The Margin Now Is Womanpower,\"
    102.

[^50]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 2-4, 36.

[^51]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 2-5.

[^52]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 43-47, 58-61.

[^53]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 48-57.

[^54]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 69-71.

[^55]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 64.

[^56]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 64-69.

[^57]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 62-63.

[^58]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 54; \"Richmond Tank
    Depot, 1 January - 30 September 1944,\" unpublished historical
    report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A599, San Francisco Ordnance
    District, Vol XXIII, Part 1, p. 33, photograph of Signal Corps
    personnel; \"San Francisco Ordnance District History, 1939-1942,\"
    unpublished historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A576,
    San Francisco Ordnance District, Vol I, Part 4, pp. 38-42.

[^59]: ^?^\"San Francisco Ordnance District History, 1939-1942,\" 42.

[^60]: ^?^Hurley, \"Women Man the Battle Stations,\" 39-43.