# MIDDLESEX COMMUNITY COLLEGE

# The Program On Homeland Security

# Terrence B. Downes, Esq., Executive Director

# 33 Kearney Square -- 5^th^ Floor

# Lowell, MA 01852 

# <downest@middlesex.mass.edu>

#  

# 

# Avian Influenza Pandemic Conference

# Tuesday, December 6, 2005

**Conference Notes**

**Reporter:**

**Edwin Jewett**

**11 Franzone Drive**

**Haverhill, MA 01835**

[**edjewett@comcast.net**](mailto:edjewett@comcast.net)

***Note: The Program on Homeland Security at Middlesex Community College
thanks Mr. Jewett for his work in compiling these Conference Notes, and
for his willingness to share them publicly for educational purposes.***

A conference for emergency response & health planners on the possibility
of an Avian Influenza Pandemic was conducted on December 6, 2005, at
Middlesex Community College in Lowell, MA. The presenters were all
top-flight, well-recognized, well-credentialed Centers for Disease
Control, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and local public health, medical
and emergency services experts.

The presenters included (inter alia):

DAVID G. SIDEBOTTOM, M.D.

*Infectious Diseases Consultant at both the Lowell General Hospital and
the Saints Memorial Medical Center, Lowell, MA*

HOWARD K. KOH, M.D., M.P.H.

*Associate Dean for Public Health Practice, Harvard School of Public
Health, Boston*

PASCALE M. WORTLEY, M.D., M.P.H.

*National Immunization Program, Centers for Disease Prevention and
Control (CDC), Atlanta*

ALFRED DeMARIA, Jr., M.D.

*Chief Medical Officer, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, and
Director, Massachusetts Bureau of Communicable Disease Control*

The following Conference Notes taken and reported by Edwin Jewett:

**"Everyone is a public health practitioner."**

*pandemos* -- of all the people

50-100 million died in the 1918 pandemic (called the "Spanish Flu"
because Spain was a neutral country during World War I and thus had the
only uncensored news, and was responsible for the early reports of the
outbreak).

*influenza* \-- medieval Italian for "influence of the stars"

The world suffers from "cultural amnesia" (Mike Davis, 2005) about the
1918 pandemic because there are few alive today who were alive then.
This is also relevant in terms of immunity.

In addition to death and disability, pandemic flu shortens life spans
among survivors by as much as 10 years.

The H5N1 virus will impact young and middle-aged healthy individuals far
more

than normal seasonal flu due to the severity of the inflammation or
**cytokine storm** it induces in healthy lungs. (See below for more on
cytokine storms.)

Because of this abnormal and obverse peak of mortality across the
demographic curve, the pandemic threatens social paralysis and
disruption, will have a severe impact on familial and daily care (esp.
for toddlers and the elderly), have a severe impact on the functionality
of industry, government, health care et al, and will generate
significant issues surrounding burial practices, social gatherings, and
more.

**[The Top Ten Things You Need to Know]{.underline}**...

1)  Avian flu is not necessarily pandemic flu. The development of a
    pandemic is dependent on the degree of pathogenicity in the virus.

2)  We are globally interdependent.

3)  Flu pandemics are recurring events; we are on the brink of one now.

4)  When a pandemic arrives, there will be widespread illness and death,

5)  Current medical supplies are inadequate or insufficient.

6)  Economic and social disruption will occur.

7)  We need to build "surge capacity" into our health care systems.

8)  Education is critical and will generate trust and confidence in
    government, planners, medical care providers, etc. Such trust and
    confidence will emerge and sustain itself only if there is
    "transparency in communications".

9)  All planning must be local.

10) A rejuvenation of the public health system is required.

The H5N1 virus is highly pathogenic and has the potential to create a
pandemic ***if***:

-   A new sub-type will emerge (this has occurred);

-   It will infect humans (133 documented human deaths thus far as of
    12/5/05);

-   It spreads easily and sustainably (this has not yet been confirmed)
    as a result of viral reassortment, adaptiveness and mutation.

The current situation is **the most severe poultry outbreak on record**,
already resulting in the deaths of 150 million birds (directly or
through preventive culling) in five Asian countries. Vietnam is the
epicenter, where probable human-to-human transmission has been reported.

**The 1918 pandemic killed approximately 25-30% of the population.**

Mortality occurs in about 25-55% of those infected.

\[Note: to place this into perspective, take a moment to mentally walk
through your locale or community and see one out of every four
individuals falling sick with 48 hours of onset, and one-quarter to
one-half of those dying over the course of a week. In a city of 100,000
people, 25,000 will likely not report to work, and 6-12,000 will die.\]

The World Health Organization is conservatively estimating that 2.0-7.5
million will die worldwide. In the US, the worst-case scenario is that
1.9 million will die, and that 8.5 million will require hospitalization.

There will be high rates of absenteeism, and the disruption of essential
services.

Businesses are urged to undertake immediate continuity of operations
planning.

**There is a need to build strong social capital.**

Planning must proceed on the basis of "space, staffing and supplies".

Every home should develop an emergency plan.

Education about cough etiquette, the necessity for respiratory and hand
hygiene, and the use of "increased social distance" must be undertaken.

**Infection occurs before symptoms present themselves.**

**Infected individuals remain contagious for 2-7 days (longer in
children!).**

There is scientific unanimity about the fact that we are overdue for
such a pandemic.

The disease will spread rapidly and affect an entire nation pretty much
at the same time. Thus the ability to call on outlying regions for
support, supplies, manpower, etc. will not exist. We live in a
Just-in-Time distribution economy, and this distribution chain will be
affected by absenteeism etc.

Urban crowding drives up the attack rate of the disease.

Low socio-economic status also drives up the attack rate of the disease.

The disease has been shown to infect European cats.

The SARS virus, a relative slow-mover, moved from Honk Kong to Vancouver
in one month.

# 

# Preparedness

1)  Get the right people involved.

2)  Define how coordination among entities will occur.

3)  Move beyond "planning to plan".

4)  Define who is in charge.

5)  Review legal authority as pertinent.

6)  Think through whether the plan addresses the entire population.

7)  Consider special ways to deal with the isolated, chronically
    ill-at-home, mass child care needs, and more.

There are **a large number of unknowns** with regard to this disease:

-   Epidemiology;

-   Demographics;

-   Severity;

-   Absenteeism rates across demographics;

-   The effectiveness of vaccines and anti-virals;

-   The production/supply/distribution of vaccines and anti-virals;

-   The possible effect of the use of adjuvant extenders in vaccines.

# Prioritization for the Use of Vaccines and Anti-Virals

(current draft working plan in the US):

**1A** Manufacturers and Distributors of Vaccines and Anti-Virals

**1B** Highest Risk 16 million

(age 65+ with chronic disease, \< age 65 with two or more chronic
diseases)

**1C** Pregnant Women and their Household Contacts

**1D** Public Health Emergency Responders

Key Government Officials

**2A** High Risk 58 Million

**2B** Personnel from Public Safety and Critical Infrastructure

**3** Other Key Decision-Makers; Funeral Officers

**4** Healthy Children and Adults

This is a critical and difficult **social triage** question, given the
unknowns, given the debatable effectiveness of vaccines and anti-virals,
given the expected high fatal impact on young health adults due to
cytokine storms, and given the lack of supplies and resources to handle
intensive health care needs (esp. acute respiratory issues). Many "first
responders" and health care personnel feel that they and their families
must be far higher on the prioritization list.

If the pandemic is of a moderate to severe nature, our response to it
will be "qualitatively different".

**The challenges**:

-   The magnitude;

-   The severity;

-   Staff shortages;

-   Limited ability to call in extra-regional resources;

-   Other services will be disrupted.

**The disease features**:

-   a short incubation period (1-4 days, 2 on average),

-   abrupt onset, with peak infection curve arriving early, and

-   the clinical illness from flu infection is non-specific.

There is a great deal of attention and energy being focused on the
ability of the world to **contain or slow down the spread of the
pandemic at its source**.

**Planning must and will consider**:

-   School closures (to prevent spread and incubation);

-   The cancellation of all large gatherings;

-   "Snow Days" (or asking businesses to allow workers to stay home from
    work)

> (though this has serious implications re: timing, loss of
> service/income,

the effect on the business and the economy, etc.)

-   Deferring travel to involved areas;

-   The widespread use of masks (? Effectiveness, ? supply);

-   Communications (the development of phased messaging to the public);

-   Risk Communication to the public.

-   The best role for those who have survived the illness (the
    "deployment of the immune").

**What and where is the triggering point or mechanism that will swing
planning into action?**

A Massachusetts public health expert looked at the newspapers in Boston
from the 1918 pandemic, factored in the population data from today, and
said that "The Boston Globe will run 12-14 pages of death notices for
weeks". In 1918, on one day in Philadelphia, over 700 people died.

If we ask major segments of the population to stay home for days on end,

Who will provide the services? Who will provide day care to the children
if they are not in school and the parent(s) is/are sick or dying?

-   **There will be very little warning.**

-   **There will be simultaneous outbreaks.**

-   **There will be a shortage of supplies of all types.**

-   **Facilities will be overwhelmed.**

-   **Health care workers et al will be at highest risk.**

-   **There will be widespread illness and a shortage of workers.**

-   **There may be more than one wave of infection.**

-   **All planning and response will have to be local. (You're on your
    own.)**

-   **Critical attention must be paid to the legal, public health and
    socio-psychological aspects of the collection, identification and
    disposal of bodies.**

Planning should seek to improve health care systems and public health
"surveillance" through monitoring of data, etc. Clinicians at all
locations and levels will be "sentinels". Syndromic surveillance should
be improved and extended.

"Exercises and simulations are a very good way to elicit critical ideas
and suggestions."

More specifically, **business continuity planning** must address:

-   Forecasting of employee absences;

-   The dissemination of information to employees;

-   The establishment of policies for employees who

> Have been exposed;
>
> Are expected to become ill;
>
> Become ill at the worksite.

-   The impact of the pandemic on the business;

-   The impact on employees and customers;

-   The allocation of resources to protect employees and customers;

-   Communication and education for employees;

-   Connection with external organizations and communities.

**"Destiny should not be confused with poor planning."**

## Cytokine Storms

"As concern mounts over the potential spread of avian flu to humans,
researchers believe they\'ve discovered one reason why the infection can
prove so deadly. Experiments with human cells have found the H5N1 virus
can trigger levels of inflammatory proteins called cytokines and
chemokines that are more than 10 times higher than those that occur
during a bout of the common flu. This massive increase in cytokine and
chemokine activity can inflame airways, making it hard to breathe. It
also contributes to the unusual severity of the avian flu, which can
result in life-threatening pneumonia and acute respiratory distress."
\[Medicine.Net "Health Day"\]

"The study, published in the online journal *Respiratory Research*,
might suggest that if H5N1 does cause a pandemic, it could
disproportionately affect the young and healthy as compared with
seasonal flu, which kills many elderly but few young adults." \[MS-NBC
\]

"A recent laboratory study has produced more evidence that infection of
human lung cells with the H5N1 avian influenza virus leads to intense
inflammation similar to what was seen in victims of the 1918 Spanish flu
pandemic....The H5N1 viruses were \"more potent inducers\" of cytokines
and chemokines---chemical messengers that trigger inflammation---than
H1N1 viruses were, says the report by a team led by J.S.M. Peiris of the
University of Hong Kong. A flood of inflammation-triggering chemicals
released by the immune systems has been referred to as a **\"cytokine
storm.\"** Autopsies of H5N1 avian flu victims in Vietnam and elsewhere
have revealed lungs choked with debris from the excessive inflammation
triggered by the virus. Similar severe lung damage was frequently
reported in victims of the 1918 pandemic, which disproportionately
killed people with the strongest immune systems---young, healthy
adults". \[CIDRAP News\]

\"This study confirms earlier work that H5N1 induces a cytokine
\'storm,\'\" said Michael T. Osterholm, director of the Center for
Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota
School of Public Health, in Minneapolis. \"It helps us understand the
pathophysiology of the disease.\"

The noted increase in cytokine production is what distinguishes avian
flu from other flu, Osterholm said. \"The hyperproduction of cytokines
is very relevant. It points out that the way people actually experience
severe illness with this virus is different than what we see with other
influenza viruses.\"

\"This is basically a cytokine storm induced by this specific virus,
which then leads to respiratory distress syndrome,\" Osterholm said.
\"This also makes sense of why you tend to see a preponderance of severe
illness in those who tend to be the healthiest, because the ability to
increase the production of cytokines is actually higher in those who are
not immune-compromised. It\'s more likely in those who are otherwise
healthy.\" \[Medicine.net\]

**Sources**:

# General News

<http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/nov1605cytokine.html>

<http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=34202>

<http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=55295>

<http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=34202> \[See
this link for information and further links to *GenoMed*.\]

<http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9994455/>

<http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Healthology/story?id=1305156>

<http://www.michnews.com/artman/publish/article_10676.shtml>

**Related Medical Studies**:

<http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/4/28>

<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1365-2249.2004.02415.x?cookieSet=1>

**APPENDIX**

*Note: Appendix information compiled by Program on Homeland Security
staff.*

***[CONFERENCE PRESENTERS]{.underline}***

**DAVID G. SIDEBOTTOM, M.D.**

*Infectious Diseases Consultant at both the Lowell General Hospital and
the Saints Memorial Medical Center, Lowell, MA*

*Topic[: "The Deadliest Disease: An Overview of Past Influenza
Pandemics"]{.underline}*

**HOWARD K. KOH, M.D., M.P.H.**

*Associate Dean for Public Health Practice, Harvard School of Public
Health, Boston, MA*

*Topic: ["The Present Pandemic Dander, and The Requirement for Close
Cooperation to Prepare and Respond"]{.underline}*

**PASCALE M. WORTLEY, M.D., M.P.H.**

*National Immunization Program, Centers for Disease Prevention and
Control (CDC), Atlanta, GA*

*Topic: "[Specific Issues Related to the H5N1 Virus]{.underline}"*

**ALFRED DeMARIA, Jr., M.D.**

*Chief Medical Officer, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, and
Director, Massachusetts Bureau of Communicable Disease Control, Jamaica
Plain, MA*

*Topic: "[The Massachusetts Situation]{.underline}"*

***Afternoon Discussion Panel:***

*Topic: "[The Northeastern Massachusetts And Merrimack Valley
Situation]{.underline}"*

CYNTHIA M. BUTTERS, R.N., M.S., Ed.D., Moderator

*Associate Provost, Middlesex Community College, Lowell, MA*

*Panel Members:*

*SUSAN CONNOLLY, R.N.,*

*Emergency Management Plan Coordinator, Lowell General Hospital*

*SUSAN M. LETT, M.D., M.P.H.,*

*Epidemiologist and Immunologist, Mass. Department of Public Health*

*BENJAMIN PODSAIDLO, EMT-Paramedic*

*Director, Advanced Life Support, Greater Lowell Emergency Medical
Services;*

*Chief of Emergency Preparedness, Saints Memorial Medical Center,
Lowell*

*FRANK C. SINGLETON, M.S., M.P.A.*

*Director of Health, City of Lowell*

*PAUL SULLIVAN*

*Host, "The Paul Sullivan Show", WBZ Radio, 1030 AM, Boston;*

Political Editor, *The Lowell Sun*

***[CONFERENCE ATTENDEES:]{.underline}***

**206**

Note: Attendees were present from five states:

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island and Connecticut,

and included (among others) 85 Registered Nurses, 14 Certified Health
Officers ("public health officers"), and 12 EMT's/Paramedics.

***[INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTED AT CONFERENCE]{.underline}***

***21 Colleges and Universities:***

Assumption College

Babson College

Bentley College

Boston College

Brandeis University

Central Maine Community College

Clark University

Gordon College

Harvard University

Holy Cross

Holyoke Community College

Merrimack College

Middlesex Community College

Mt. Holyoke College

New Hampshire Technical Institute

Stonehill College

Suffolk University

Tufts University

University of Massachusetts -- Lowell

Wellesley College

Wheelock College

***4 Independent Secondary Schools:***

Dexter School

Minuteman Regional High School

Shore Country Day School

Williston-North Hampton School

***5 Federal Agencies:***

Federal Aviation Administration

U.S. Department of Homeland Security -- Transportation Security
Administration

U.S. Department of Transportation

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

U.S. Postal Service

***5 State Agencies:***

Massachusetts Department of Public Health

Massachusetts Air and Army National Guard

Massachusetts State Police Headquarters

Massachusetts Trial Court Security Office

Plymouth County Sheriff's Department

***21 Municipalities:***

(NB: Cities listed in CAPITAL letters)

Acushnet

Amesbury

Andover

Arlington

Billerica

Burlington

Chelmsford

Ipswich

Lexington

Littleton

LOWELL

LYNN

MEDFORD

Methuen

Nantucket

Natick

NEWBURYPORT

PORTSMOUTH, NH

Sudbury

Tyngsborough

Winchester

***19 Hospitals and Allied Health Agencies:***

Association for Gerontologic Education

Beth Israel Medical Center

Clinical Mobility

D'Youville Nursing Home

Family Services of Lawrence

Greater Lowell EMS

Greater Lowell Pharmaceutical Association

Holy Family Hospital

Lakeview House Nursing Home

Lawrence General Hospital

Lowell Community Health Center

Lowell General Hospital

MassPRO

Massachusetts Medical Society

Nashoba Valley Medical Center

Radius Northwood Healthcare Center

Saints Memorial Medical Center

Trinity EMS

Winchester Hospital

***7 Private Institutions/Companies:***

Boston Scientific

CVS Corp.

Emanuel Lutheran Church

Haartz Corp.

MITRE Corp.

TPA Insurance

Wyeth

End