**The European Union and a Nuclear Security and Defense Policy**

***Patrick Donley***

***Charles Krupnick***

Will the European Union develop a nuclear component to its common
European security and defense policy (ESDP)? It might want one to help
maintain its place among the world's great powers following the nuclear
weapons tests of India and Pakistan and the changes to the international
structure the tests imply. European polities might also pursue a nuclear
ESDP if their interests diverge substantially from those of the United
States, their primary nuclear protector, or if they lose faith in the
US/NATO commitment to their defense. Alliance solidarity has been a
recurring crisis in NATO's 50-year history, but post-Cold War
frustration has been growing on both sides of the Atlantic. Without the
unity inspired by a common threat from the Soviet Union, issues such as
trade, defense burden sharing, and environmental policy could lead to
serious disputes. The US quest for a National Missile Defense (NMD)
system and the EU's own defense initiatives presage an autonomous
European military alliance that may "someday need a single nuclear power
to speak as a deterrent force for \[the\] whole continent," as French
Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine noted in July 2000.[^1]

But powerful counter-tendencies make a nuclear ESDP anytime soon
extremely unlikely. The European Union enjoys considerable power,
prestige, and security without the responsibility and opprobrium of a
collective nuclear force. Most Europeans see no need for a nuclear ESDP,
including residents of the United Kingdom and France where national
nuclear weapons provide part of their deterrent protection and most of
their great power status. Passions against nuclear energy in any form
have a home in European political parties, like the German Greens, that
now occupy positions of power. And, as a French defense paper points
out, there will not likely be a European nuclear doctrine without
European vital interests, and these are inchoate at best.[^2] Nuclear
weapons policy is just not a cutting edge issue in today's European
Union, where an uncertain economy and currency, political
reorganization, and pending enlargement are of far greater concern.
Nonetheless, as a new administration takes power in Washington and the
post-Cold War transition comes to an end in Europe, reflection on the
possibility of a nuclear ESDP is prudent if not essential.

# Background

# Early Nuclear Initiatives

Debates over nuclear weapons were an important backdrop to post-World
War II Atlantic and European organizational activity. The European
Defense Community (EDC) proposal had a nuclear component imbedded
beneath the European army controversy, all of which was rejected in
1954. But nuclear research in Europe was placed under the *Conseil
Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire* (CERN) at about the same time and
the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM) established under the
Treaties of Rome in 1957. In the same year, the Soviet *Sputnik*
satellite revealed gaps in allied defense strategy and dramatized the
need for secure nuclear forces to protect Europe.[^3] NATO evolved into
an arrangement where Europe provided the bases and the United States the
nuclear weapons for deterrent protection against the Soviet Union.
American bombers, ICBMS, nuclear powered missile submarines, and
battlefield nuclear weapons formed the heart of NATO's Cold War
strategy.[^4] Europe became a very nuclear place as a result and was
virtually littered with nuclear weapons from US deployments and British
and French production. In nuclear reactors, it is the most heavily
developed region on earth with 132 of the world's 427 reactors and 35%
of its electricity produced by nuclear energy. Countries in Western
Europe have access to complete uranium fuel cycles, from mining, to
production and use, and then reprocessing into plutonium.[^5]

The autonomous European nuclear force debate was revived by the
French-inspired Foucher Plan of the early 1960s. The United States
countered with the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal to deploy *Polaris*
submarine missiles aboard converted merchant ships. The ships were to be
manned by multinational NATO crews to give Europe its own nuclear
weapons---subject to a US veto. Diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic
struggled to come up with adequate formulas for nuclear control to
restore some balance to the Atlantic relationship, to provide an outlet
for Gaullist independence and an inlet for the United Kingdom to Europe,
and to find a role for West Germany in nuclear operations. MLF ended
unloved by everyone and was allowed to expire in the late 1960s; the
United States kept control of its NATO-committed nuclear weapons, the
United Kingdom received *Polaris* missiles for its submarines, and
France withdrew its military from the Alliance.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, nuclear issues were raised to a fever
pitch by the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) and US strategic
defense initiative (SDI) debates. As a result, the Western European
Union (WEU) was revived and proposals were made to strengthen the
Franco-German Treaty and to combine the French and British \[nuclear\]
deterrent forces.[^6] Into the 1990s and the post-Cold War period, the
EU Maastricht Treaty created a "common foreign and security policy
(CFSP)" calling for joint action in armaments production, export
controls, non-proliferation, and arms control to go along with "all
questions related to the security of the European Union, including the
eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to
a common defense."[^7] Little public discussion of a nuclear dimension
for the European Union took place at the time, although European
Commission President Jacques Delors noted that if "one day, the European
Community has a very strong political union, why then not a transfer of
the nuclear weapon to this political authority?"[^8]

####### WEU

The Western European Union was formed in 1948 but was almost immediately
overshadowed as a defense alliance by NATO. Nonetheless, it was often
vocal about nuclear weapons policy and fulfilled its role as a talking
shop on this and other security issues. The 10 WEU members of the
15-country European Union have a very strong collective defense pledge.
Article V of the Revised Brussels Treaty states:

> If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an
> armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in
> accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
> United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and
> other aid and assistance in their power.

No mention is made of only non-nuclear "military and other aid and
assistance in their power," so a straight reading of the treaty would be
that the United Kingdom and France should use nuclear weapons to defend
their WEU brethren. Because the WEU passed the torch of defense to NATO,
however, there were no effective institutional means to implement
defense action through the organization itself.

As already mentioned, the revitalization of the WEU in 1984 occurred in
part as a reaction to possible decoupling of US and European strategic
interests during the INF/SDI crises. Further institutionalization of the
WEU in the early 1990s complemented the EU's CFSP and offered the
possibility of real WEU military options in the future, with nuclear
weapons a part of the debate. A 1994 report to the WEU Assembly Defense
Committee on "The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons" noted that it
would be "totally illogical to start implementation of the \[Common
Foreign and Security Policy\] CFSP without examining the role of French
and British nuclear weapons in the definition of a common defense policy
of the EU."[^9] A follow-on WEU Assembly declaration in February 1996
detailed what the organization needed to become operational:

# To achieve this objective, WEU must maintain structures that allow the governments of the member countries to take and implement their decisions unaffected by any opposition from countries regardless of whether they are neutral, or are observers or associate members of the organization, and must also extend its activities with a view to obtaining an increasing degree of convergence in the defense policies of its member countries. To that end, it will have to resume and broaden work that will lead to the adoption of a white paper setting out those countries' security and defence interests, the means at their disposal to guarantee them, the strategies they intend to implement, including deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons, and the efforts they are prepared to make as regards armaments and the use of space.[^10]

# 

# United Kingdom and Great Power Status

Europe has had its own nuclear deterrent force of a kind for decades
because both the United Kingdom and France have declared that their
national nuclear arsenals help deter threats against all the countries
of NATO and Europe. The declarations may not be taken too seriously by
other EU members because of the relatively small size of the nuclear
inventories and the historic nationalism of the two countries involved.
Nonetheless, the British and French nuclear forces contributed to allied
security during the Cold War and continue to provide muscle and perhaps
needed ambiguity to Western deterrent efforts.

The United Kingdom had a nuclear project in the early days of World War
II and determined the feasibility of atomic weapon production.[^11] With
its research absorbed into the US Manhattan Project during the war, it
had to endure a period of nuclear exclusion predicated by the McMahon
Act passed by the US Congress in 1946. Since nuclear weapons seemed to
be the country's only possible claim to continued great power status,
the British government decided in 1947 to develop them on its own. This
led to the first British nuclear explosion in 1954, conducted in
Australia.[^12] The country soon developed thermonuclear devices and
went through several delivery system programs, including the V-bombers
(*Valiant*, *Vulcan, Victor*), the contentious *Blue Streak* ICBM and
US-built *Skybolt* air-launched ballistic missile, plus various dual-use
aircraft, before settling on a reliable nuclear submarine-based
ballistic missile system. The United Kingdom has deployed four
*Resolution* class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
armed with American *Polaris* missiles carrying British nuclear
warheads; it is readying a fleet of four new-design *Vanguard* class
SSBNs armed with powerful US-built *Trident D-5* missiles. The United
Kingdom retains some air-launched nuclear capability through dual-use
*Tornado* aircraft, with perhaps 200 or so warheads available at any one
time out of an inventory over 400.[^13]

British nuclear policy and strategy began with independent aspirations,
but soon turned to more cooperative arrangements. By the mid-1960s, the
United Kingdom's nuclear arsenal was firmly committed to NATO, except
for situations of "supreme national interest," and hence helped to
provide a nuclear umbrella for all members of the alliance. Prior to the
1995 EU enlargement, this effectively meant all EU countries as well
because it was hard to imagine an attack on neutral Ireland that did not
affect British vital interests. The admission of more distant neutrals
Austria, Finland, and Sweden in the 1990s altered this strategic
congruency. Suggestions of a European mission for the British nuclear
arsenal were heard from time to time, as in 1967 when opposition leader
Edward Heath suggested that France and Britain should hold their nuclear
forces "in trust" for the remainder of Western Europe once the United
Kingdom was admitted into the European Economic Community, and again in
the 1970s when Heath was prime minister.[^14] The British voters have
been unenthusiastic about EU defense, however: 60% believe military
commitments should be primarily national while only 7% believe the EU
should take the lead.[^15] National leadership will need to work hard to
change attitudes if the United Kingdom is to play a major role in ESDP,
something the Blair government has begun to do. On the other hand, as
Dominique Moisi points out, "Europeans have been disillusioned so often
in the past \[by the United Kingdom\] that it would be imprudent to
celebrate these positive transformations too soon."[^16]

####### France and Nuclear Independence

General Charles de Gaulle became interested in nuclear weapons during
World War II. In 1954 Premier Pierre Mendès-France decided to proceed
with the development of an atomic bomb, a decision affirmed in 1956 by
his successor Guy Mollet.[^17] The French Fourth Republic began creating
the infrastructure of plutonium production reactors and reprocessing
facilities. The first French nuclear explosion took place on 13 February
1960 in Algeria with Fifth Republic President de Gaulle in charge as
commander in chief of the armed forces, and the French presidency has
kept tight reign on the country's nuclear arsenal ever since. France
soon had thermonuclear weapons to be delivered by *Mirage IV* bombers,
then 18 land-based intermediate range missiles based at Plateau
d'Albion, and finally a fleet of five SSBNs from the *Redoubtable* class
and one of the *L'Inflexible* class. In combination, these forces were a
small-scale reflection of the strategic triad of nuclear systems
maintained by the two superpowers. The land-based missiles were phased
out in 1996-97 and French leaders decided not to deploy their *Hades*
tactical nuclear missile system. While air delivery capability from the
*Mirage 2000N* and the new *Rafale* will continue for the foreseeable
future, the bulk of nuclear deterrence will rest with four *Triomphant*
class SSBNs just coming on line, to be equipped eventually with MIRVed
(multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles) M5 missiles. Like the
British arsenal, this should keep at least 200 nuclear warheads
available at all times out of an inventory of 400 to 500. France also
operates several capable nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), like the
United Kingdom, and in early-1999 put to sea the nuclear powered
aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle* after years of troubled design and
repair effort.

Nuclear weapons have been the premiere symbols of France's independence
and particularism since the 1960s. Words like *dissuasion*, nuclear
warning shot, and *tous azimuts* have added to the singularity
associated with French nuclear doctrine, although ambiguity was never
really absent. While the Article 5 commitment to the Revised Brussels
Treaty implies a French nuclear defense guarantee to the members of the
WEU, no government official has ever affirmed it although President
Chirac's first Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette has spoken of nuclear
use if the "'vital security interests of Europe' were threatened."[^18]
In the late-1990s France again raised the issue of a European nuclear
force, but perhaps only to divert attention from its highly
controversial nuclear weapons testing program in the Pacific.

Despite their different views, France and the United Kingdom began to
move toward limited bilateral defense cooperation in the early 1980s.
The rebirth of the WEU in 1984 was an important milestone, followed by
agreements between the countries' defense ministers in 1988. These
included:

-   French SSBNs would be able to call at British ports;

-   France would open its lines of communication, including ports,
    airports, and railways, to British troops being deployed to Germany
    in the event of NATO mobilization;

-   British troops would be able to exercise in France, something not
    allowed since France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military
    structure in 1966.[^19]

In late-1992 a Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and
Doctrine was established. Senior officials from the foreign and defense
ministries of the two countries meet routinely to discuss nuclear policy
issues and to report their findings and conclusions to higher
authorities. In 1993, the Joint Commission announced that the British
and French nuclear doctrines had no significant points of
disagreement.[^20] Exchange visits between nuclear scientists and
defense officials have occurred and technical collaboration reported on
nuclear weapons design, development and stockpile maintenance, computer
simulation, and peer review of data.[^21] Joint missile development was
to be a part of this cooperation, but crumbled in 1993 when the United
Kingdom canceled its participation in the Tactical Air-to-Surface
Missile (TASM) program---a proposed stand-off weapon with several
hundred kilometers of range.

The downsizing and upgrading of strategic forces by both nations after
the end of the Cold War could conceivably create problems keeping enough
submarine-based weapons at sea for effective deterrence. The *Vanguard*
and *Triomphant* classes are modern and equipped with powerful nuclear
weapons, but with only four ships in commission for each country target
coverage could be difficult if ships are unexpectedly placed out of
commission---particularly since one ship from each country will probably
be in scheduled overhaul at any given time. Anglo-French coordination of
SSBN patrols and target coverage would seem a possibility, although the
idea has apparently not gone very far.

# Germany's Nuclear Notions

Germany's diplomacy sometimes belied its stoutly anti-nuclear image. At
its founding, West German leaders were reluctant to give up the right to
access nuclear weapons, despite the country's need for good behavior
after the defeat and atrocities of World War II. Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer, abetted by Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, lurched from
European Defense Community to Franco-German cooperation, and then to the
Multilateral Forces (MLF) initiative, seeking in each some form of
control over the country's nuclear destiny. After Adenauer, German
defense policy moved away from flirtations with alternative arrangements
and committed itself firmly to NATO.[^22] Social Democratic Party (SPD)
participation in government in the mid-1960s and Germany's accession to
the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968 fixed the country's nuclear
direction for the next 30 years.[^23] In 1966, Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger
stated unequivocally:

> The Federal Republic has given an undertaking to its partners in the
> alliance to renounce the production of atomic weapons, and has in that
> respect submitted to international controls. We seek neither national
> control nor national ownership of atomic weapons.[^24]

At about the same time, Germany gained a role in the nuclear affairs of
the alliance as a member of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and
subordinate committees; in wartime, its military could deliver nuclear
weapons through a dual-control system whereby US devices were available
on German delivery systems. This may have amounted to over 1500 nuclear
weapons during the Cold War.

The INF crisis rekindled German concerns about its security from nuclear
attack, as well as enormous anti-nuclear sentiment expressed in German
city streets. In the end, Germany acceded to deployment of *Pershing II*
missiles on its soil and then grudgingly accepted their removal as a
result of the 1987 INF Treaty between the United States and Russia.
German leaders were notably reluctant to give up their nuclear-armed
*Pershing I* missiles. Germany's de jure assurances of nonproliferation
remain valid, however, and there are few signs the country will depart
from them. Article 3.1 of the "Four plus Two" Treaty on German
reunification, signed in September 1990, reaffirmed Germany's pledge not
to acquire nuclear weapons; the unlimited extension of the
Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995 emphasized the same thing.

Germany has had a special defense relationship with France outside NATO
since 1963 when Adenauer and de Gaulle signed the Elysée Treaty. They
pledged cooperation on a wide range of issues, including defense, and
began joint military exercises in 1986. In 1987 the Franco-German
brigade was created, composed of soldiers from both countries integrated
at a very low level. It has served as something of a precursor and model
for the numerous multinational military groupings that emerged in Europe
after the Cold War. French leadership reportedly made an offer of
"nuclear concertation" with Germany in 1995, but was politely turned
down; French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
agreed on defense guidelines in December 1996 and reportedly discussed
possible nuclear use, but not control.[^25]

## Structural Encouragement

####### A More Nuclear World

Like the 50% of Americans who believe they will be attacked by nuclear
weapons sometime in the next 10 years, Europeans are aware of the
prestige and symbolism attached to nuclear weapons and the danger of
being without deterrent protection against them.[^26] William Walker in
a 1998 article in *Foreign Affairs* considered 1995 a break-point after
which the world became more "nuclear-minded." Events included:

-   Russia's failure to ratify START II and its difficulties in
    implementing transparency and irreversibility agreement with the
    United States.

-   India's refusal to join the CTBT in August 1996 and thereby to allow
    it to enter into force.

-   The inability to open negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
    on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

-   The slow progress in implementing plutonium and highly enriched
    uranium disposition programs.

-   The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998.[^27]

Walker blames much of the change on domestic politics. The accession to
power of India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the late-1990s, with
its advocacy of the "Hindu bomb," led directly to the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear explosions. Elsewhere in the world, the nationalistic
Benjamin Netanyahu government in Israel was not helpful nor was Russia's
increased attachment to nuclear weapons. As its economy and conventional
forces withered, nuclear weapons became the only believable Russian
claim to superpower status and to adequate defense. Nor should the
influence of the US Congress after 1994 be forgotten. Republican
leadership and membership have often shown contempt for multilateral
mechanisms, gave strong advocacy for controversial missile defense
systems, and in general vigorously pursued US self-interest, making an
American leadership role in collective nuclear control activities
tentative, and less credible. After 1995 (according to Walker), key
countries attached renewed utility to nuclear weapons, partly due to a
complacent attitude towards the non-proliferation regime after the NPT
extension conference of the same year, and partly due to the
unwillingness of the nuclear states to move forward with their own
disarmament.[^28] Non-nuclear states became more convinced than ever
that the nuclear states had no intention of giving up their nuclear
weapons any time soon, despite the end of the Cold War.[^29]

This was true in Europe as well. France and the United Kingdom showed
even less willingness to give up their weapons than the nuclear
superpowers and, without substantial conventional capabilities, may rely
on them more than in the past.[^30] According to Jasjit Singh, while
Europe has stood firmly for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons during
the past five decades, it has done "precious little" to press for
nuclear disarmament after the end of the Cold War.[^31] Europe's
reaction to the India/Pakistan nuclear tests was restrained, rather like
a fellow traveler; France and Germany issued statements denouncing the
tests but made it clear they would not impose full-scale sanctions,
going so far as to prevent EU efforts to impose stronger penalties.[^32]

# More Nuclear Powers

Shifts in the nuclear strategic landscape could encourage Europe to go
nuclear. In May 1998, India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons; in
April 1999, both countries launched rockets with nuclear delivery
capability and enough range to threaten major cities of their regional
rivals. The declared nuclear club rose from five to seven almost
overnight and shifted the strategic balance a notch or two. If we take
systemic theories of international relations at all seriously, the major
powers of the world should have reacted to this change in relative power
distribution. The United States and Russia still retain a great
preponderance of nuclear forces and need not take any action, except
perhaps to reconsider commitments to further deep reductions in their
arsenals to ensure their security is not unduly threatened. The
intermediate nuclear powers (China, France, the United Kingdom, and
Israel) may need to reexamine their place in the world. China no doubt
already has and may be moving toward qualitative improvement in both
nuclear weapons and delivery systems; France, Israel, and the United
Kingdom may also be conducting nuclear strategy reviews.

One might argue that India and Pakistan are not rivals of Europe and
that testing merely confirmed the widely held belief that both countries
possessed nuclear weapons. Both arguments conclude that there is no need
for a European nuclear reassessment. But there is a difference between
speculation and fact and between threatened and actual use. India and
Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold in the face of serious
international pressure and challenges the nuclear management of the
declared nuclear powers, setting a precedent for other would-be nuclear
club members. Europe should be concerned about a possible nuclear
contagion to more threatening states like Iraq and Iran, and even
friendly ones like Saudi Arabia.

The increased weight of India and Pakistan in the international arena
might offset the temporary sanctions each has endured. Prestige was
certainly among the reasons India decided to demonstrate its nuclear
arsenal. In 1993 an Indian BJP spokesman remarked: "Nuclear weapons will
give us prestige, power, standing. An Indian will talk straight and walk
straight when we have the bomb."[^33] Political weight and prestige
count in the world, qualities an invigorated European Union may
eventually seek through nuclear weaponry. Europeans may eventually tire
of indignities, such as former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens'
famous remark that "Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a
military worm."[^34] The development of a European community with a
distinct economic and political identity, shared cultural
characteristics, and an increased acceptance of its own legitimacy,
could provide motivation for a nuclear European security and defense
policy.

# US Defense Policy

The United States has maintained its NATO commitment to Europe despite
the end of the Cold War. NATO remains an insurance policy against a
possible resurgence of the Russian threat, but is also a means for the
United States to influence European affairs. The continued US role in
Europe and US security policies have been generally accepted by the
allies, but serious concerns have emerged over US plans for missile
defense systems.

In July 1999, former President William J. Clinton signed the National
Missile Defense Act of 1999 which committed the United States to
deploying an "effective National Missile Defense system capable of
defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic
missile attack" as soon as technologically possible.[^35] After a string
of test failures, he deferred a deployment decision to the next
administration. President George W. Bush and his top officials are
enthusiastic proponents of NMD and seem likely to receive vigorous
support from much of Congress. Europe is concerned that the United
States will bolster its own defense at the expense of its European
allies and will abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
perhaps beginning an arms race with Russia and/or China. At their July
2000 summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President
Jiang Zemin issued a joint statement that "implementing this plan
\[NMD\] will have the most grave adverse consequences not only to the
national security of Russia, China, and other countries, but also to the
security and international strategic ability of the US itself."[^36]
Vladimir Yakovlev, commander in chief of Russia's Strategic Rocket
Forces, said Russia might even withdraw from the INF Treaty and resume
the manufacture of medium-range missiles if the United States proceeded
with NMD.[^37]

Europeans fear that US interest in Europe will decrease along with its
vulnerability to ballistic missile attack and that isolationist
tendencies will increase. They also believe that their opinions do not
matter much in Washington and that a positive deployment decision will
be made regardless of their concerns, a path already taken with the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In 1999, British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, French President Jacques Chirac, and German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder wrote a letter to the *New York Times* stating that
rejection of the CTBT "would also expose a fundamental divergence within
NATO."[^38] In spite of these appeals and support from President
Clinton, the US Senate rejected the treaty, particularly telling since
the Russian Duma subsequently ratified it. New President George W. Bush
is on record as supporting the Senate rejection.

####### ESDP and Integration Thrust

Europe might be further distanced from the United States through the
development of an autonomous European security and defense apparatus.
Every step in the evolution of the EU CFSP and ESDP has been
characterized by tension between a suspicious United States and an
increasingly assertive European Union. This included the alleged but
infamous "letter of rebuke" to several European countries in 1991 that
hinted at US withdrawal from Europe should CFSP develop in a way
considered unacceptable to US interests.[^39] The EU's CFSP was
nonetheless approved at Maastricht and came into force on 1 November
1993, with a permanent secretariat to assist the Council of Ministers in
negotiations and decision-making and procedures for collective but
unanimous decision-making. The October 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (put into
force on 1 May 1999) strengthened CFSP by stipulating that the Council
of Ministers could decide on some security issues by qualified majority
vote, subject to appeal based on important national interests. Amsterdam
also created the position of High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, the General Secretariat of the Council, and the
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPU), all designed to help
formulate and implement the political decisions of the Council of
Ministers.

Maastricht included an EU connection to the WEU, which was also pursuing
a strengthening of mission. In 1992, WEU members adopted the Petersberg
Declaration listing the types of missions the WEU might pursue on its
own (i.e., without NATO and the United States), such as humanitarian and
rescue operations, peacekeeping, and combat forces in crisis
management---including peacemaking.[^40] In 1996 at Berlin, NATO leaders
approved the Petersberg tasks as appropriate for the WEU and offered the
possibility of using NATO staff and equipment. Policies and procedures
like the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) were developed to facilitate
autonomous WEU operations.[^41] CJTF would enable Europe to conduct
operations that were not a high priority for the United States while
avoiding duplicate force structures and equipment, and would also allow
associate countries (non-members of NATO, the WEU, or the European
Union) to participate in Europe-led operations.

For some in Europe, however, the WEU was not a serious organization, and
the United States too predominant in its anticipated activities. It
lacked the popular appeal and deep roots of the European Union and never
received more than token support for collective powers from the leading
European countries, much less a nuclear option. The NATO-WEU rubric
began to break down with an initiative by the most NATO-friendly of
countries. In December 1998 at St. Malo, France, Prime Minister Tony
Blair of Great Britain, along with President Jacques Chirac of France,
issued an Anglo-French joint declaration on European defense that
cleared the way for EU defense development. They wanted the European
Union to be able to launch military operations without the United States
in the lead, as almost seemed necessary in Bosnia in 1995. This was a
sharp departure from the previous British reluctance to associate the
European Union with defense and military matters. EU leaders followed up
the initiative at Cologne in June 1999 where they stated their intent
"to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to
assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on
security and defense." This included preparing for the "inclusion of
those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfill
its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks." The
European Union would take over WEU duties by the end of 2000, after
which "the WEU as an organization would have completed its
purpose."[^42]

ESDP development continued at the EU Helsinki summit of 10-11 December
1999. The leadership decided that "cooperating voluntarily in EU-led
operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60
days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to
50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg
tasks."[^43] EU leaders also committed to new political and military
bodies to direct the operations, to develop cooperation and transparency
with NATO, to define arrangements with non-EU European NATO members, and
to establish non-military crisis management mechanisms.[^44] In November
2000, EU members and other countries made formal troop and equipment
commitments to the rapid reaction force, although not without receiving
warnings from US Secretary of Defense Cohen to ensure NATO was not
endangered.

It will take some time for the agreements of Helsinki to be transformed
into actual capability. Even so, it is easy to visualize a future Europe
with its own military force and some successful peacekeeping operations
under its belt occasionally rejecting US involvement and all the baggage
that comes with it; the fewer the players, the fewer interests have to
be taken into consideration, and the more weight each contributing
country has in the decision-making process. ESDP is a logical follow-on
to the EU's economic, financial, social, and political cooperation and
at least a partial vindication of 30-year-old functionalist and
neo-functionalist literature; a nuclear ESDP could be another step in
European integration.

####### NATO's NPG Model

A nuclear ESDP based on weapons and delivery systems created under EU
leadership would require much greater commitments to European
integration than now exist, so much so that nuclear weapons would likely
be only one small result of the revolution in world affairs must that
preceded them. Far more likely would be a formalized extension of
British and French nuclear protection to the rest of the European Union
under some form of collective decision-making structure. This would
require procedures for policy making on weapons deployment, command and
control, safety and security, arms control and proliferation, and
political talent to deal with the anti-nuclear sentiment of several EU
members and their citizens.

NATO has dealt with similar issues for decades and resolved them
successfully through the Nuclear Planning Group. One of the reasons an
autonomous European nuclear force has not developed is undoubtedly
NATO's success at bringing European allies into the nuclear policy
formation process, including the stormy transition from massive
retaliation to the flexible response strategy it retains to this day.
The NPG began meeting in 1967 and is made up of all NATO members except
France, with Iceland participating as an observer. Members share their
nuclear wants and needs at the ministerial level, with permanent staff
and subcommittees providing appropriate support. Use of nuclear weapons
by NATO members would involve as much allied consultation as possible,
although the ultimate decision for release remains with the political
authorities of the countries owning the weapons.[^45]

Although not a member of the NPG because of its withdrawal from the
military structure of the alliance, France has been associated with the
deliberation process because of the pressing requirement to avoid
duplication and fratricide in nuclear targeting. After the end of the
Cold War, France took part in drafting MC 400, the replacement for the
Cold War era MC 14/3 strategic document.[^46] The latest version of the
Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved in April 1999 during NATO's
50^th^ anniversary celebrations, continues to note the existence of
powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance and the threat of nuclear
proliferation. It also states that:

> The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the
> strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United
> States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and
> France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the
> overall deterrence and security of the Allies.[^47]

Various EU bureaucracies, such as EURATOM, deal with nuclear issues on a
full time basis already and the DG-1A directorate, the bureaucratic home
of the EU's developing ESDP, helps Russia to manage nuclear waste
associated with its decommissioned nuclear submarines---certainly a
defense-related nuclear issue. An EU NPG could accomplish objectives
similar to NATO's, with most EU countries already meeting in the NATO
version for years. Implementation would require political commitment,
appropriate staffs, a body of procedures, and perhaps some hardware as
well; changes from NATO would include one less nuclear actor at the
table, a very large one to be sure, and a different name on the meeting
room door.[^48]

# In the Realm of Fantasy

####### Nukes Not Wanted

Regardless of structural circumstances and the relative ease of
establishing an EU NPG, a nuclear ESDP anytime soon is extremely
unlikely. Many European scholars and diplomat consider the topic not
even worthy of serious discussion. How can this be?

The prevailing view is that the European Union simply does not need a
nuclear capability. At no time in the past century has Europe been as
secure from military threats as it is today. Europeans cannot even
fathom Russia or China threatening them in a way requiring a nuclear
response. If anything, Europe and Russia seem poised to become closer
partners in the years ahead as the EU TACIS (technical assistance)
program, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), and the recent
EU-Russia Common Strategy suggest.[^49] In a meeting with Russian
President Putin, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder noted that "Europe
cannot develop peacefully over the long run if Russia is not involved"
and called for the "comprehensive involvement of Russia in the European
integration process."[^50] Europe and China have no major conflicts
except perhaps over trade and human rights, neither of which should ever
approach the point of nuclear confrontation. China and the United States
might rattle their sabers over Taiwan but, short of a Chinese attack on
the United States requiring a NATO response, Europe could easily stay
out of the fray. Scenarios involving rogue states and nuclear terrorism
are just not credible to most Europeans, nor are nuclear responses to
transnational threats. Moreover, as the Gulf War and Bosnia and Kosovo
air campaigns demonstrated, modern precision munitions can be effective
and decisive in combat and have moved the threshold for nuclear war even
higher than it was during the Cold War. Supporting these beliefs is an
underlying assumption that the United States will continue to provide
deterrent protection against aggressive states, regardless of political
differences with Europe, and that the US military will be there when
needed.

Europeans also dismiss the argument that the European Union needs a
nuclear component to maintain its deserved status in the world.
Comparing Europe to India or Pakistan is simply not valid; regardless of
military capability, the European Union is the largest economic region
in the world and has no need for nuclear weapons to be heard. Many
Europeans pride themselves on being an economic power without
commensurate military forces. And nuclear weapons simply do not command
the respect they once did. As the Canberra Commission on the elimination
of nuclear weapons summarized:

> The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so great that they have no
> military utility against a comparatively equipped opponent, other than
> the belief that they deter the opponent from using nuclear weapons. .
> . . Thus, the only apparent military utility that remains for nuclear
> weapons is in deterring their use by others. That utility implies the
> continued existence of nuclear weapons. It would disappear completely
> if nuclear weapons were eliminated.[^51]

Scholars and officials alike are almost unanimous in their opinion that
European public sentiment is strongly opposed to nuclear weapons. Even
if attitudes change and the European Union decides nuclear weapons are
required to complete its identity on the world stage, the British and
French arsenals might satisfy the requirement while still remaining
under national control. The prestige argument is muted by European
realities.

####### NMD and ESDP?

Despite official concern, most Europeans are relatively sanguine about
US missile defense plans and believe it is unlikely to cause substantial
divergence with the United States. Given the system's expense,
complexity, and political sensitivity, the new Bush administration will
need to proceed with caution and to include Europe in NMD discussions.
To protect all 50 US states, the system will require radar stations in
the United Kingdom and Greenland---demanding substantial negotiations
with European allies.[^52] And, after the June 2000 United States-Russia
Summit, the prospect of amending the ABM Treaty in a way that allows for
a limited defense system can not be ruled out. US Ambassador to NATO
Vershbow stated:

> In Washington's deliberations on this issue, the views of Allies are
> being carefully considered. After six months of fruitful consultations
> in Brussels and elsewhere, we recognize that Allies share our strong
> interest in preserving the ABM Treaty and in avoiding a confrontation
> with Russia that could threaten prospects for a cooperative
> relationship.... Fortunately---after an initial period of some
> misunderstanding---we and our NATO Allies are consulting closely and
> listening to each other on NMD. I believe the reality of the missile
> threat to Europe is coming into focus for our Allies and hope that
> this reality will galvanize us toward a common response.[^53]

When discussing ESDP, Europeans are quick to point out the importance of
the phrase "when the alliance as a whole is not engaged" as well as the
number of times the phrase "Petersberg Tasks" are mentioned in
conjunction with their defense plans. European officials and scholars
without exception emphatically state that ESDP is not designed for
territorial defense, which is to remain the purview of NATO. European
Commission external relations commissioner Christopher Patten emphasized
that:

> . . . we do not seek to duplicate NATO's role. The core of NATO's
> function is collective defence. And nobody, I repeat NOBODY, is
> suggesting that this should become part of the EU mandate. We want to
> strengthen our contribution to NATO and to European security. As
> George Robertson put it the other week, "ESDI \[European security and
> defense identity, the military component of ESDP\] is not about Europe
> going it alone, but about Europe doing more."[^54]

Some claim that US leadership over the last 50 years has allowed a
European culture of passivity to develop that can not be erased anytime
soon. According to one scholar, "As a result of living under the US-led
NATO umbrella, European nations no longer possess a nationalistic fervor
that seeks nuclear weapons." Others are doubtful that EU members can
accomplish even the limited conventional objectives of Helsinki, and all
except perhaps the French agreed that a nuclear component to its
security policy is out of the question for the foreseeable future. The
shaky Euro and lackluster progress toward organizational streamlining
and enlargement at the December 2000 Nice summit enhance this view.

####### Greens in Power

Europe's political culture generally opposes nuclear weapons. With the
SPD-Green coalition that took power in September 1998, Germany seems
even less likely to want nuclear weapons access than in the past.
Joschka Fischer, the coalition foreign minister and Green party member,
proposed a rethinking of NATO's nuclear strategy as soon as he took
power, "to lower the alert status of \[NATO's\] nuclear weapons and for
a renunciation of the first-use of nuclear weapons."[^55] The United
States and other allies reacted negatively to Fischer's statements,
noting that the ambiguity and flexibility of NATO's strategy enhances
deterrence and helps keep the peace. German Defense Minister Rudolf
Sharping later back-peddled to reassure US policy-makers, stating that
the new German government believed nuclear forces played a fundamental
role in alliance strategy.[^56] At NATO's 50^th^ anniversary celebration
in Washington, German officials refrained from proposing any changes to
NATO's nuclear strategy, although some sources reported that Germany
(along with Canada) was "badgered" by the United States into not doing
so.

Even more controversial than the Fischer foreign ministry has been the
policies of Green Minister of Environment Jürgen Trittin. He proposed a
rapid shutdown of all German nuclear reactors used to generate
electrical power and an end to spent nuclear fuel reprocessing,
following a trend in Europe begun by Sweden, Spain, and Italy.[^57] In
October 1998, the SPD/Green coalition adopted a one-year deadline to
produce a plan and timetable for shutting down Germany's 19 nuclear
power stations. This potentially mortal attack on the German nuclear
industry and its interlocking partners was too rapid a transition for
the European business and political establishment to accept. German
reprocessing contracts with British and French companies were a
particular concern, made for the long term and valued at between \$1-2
billion.[^58] The vigorous opposition rattled the government and led to
delays in the reprocessing ban, leaving more time to reach agreement
with partners on how to handle existing contracts.[^59] Greens finally
agreed to a maximum lifespan for nuclear stations of 32 years from the
start of commercial production.[^60] While their demands were muted in
the end, the fact that Green parties are an electoral force in Europe
works against the creation of a nuclear ESDP.

####### Historically Unfeasible

For a European nuclear ESDP to develop, substantial historical obstacles
must be overcome. The United Kingdom and France have a long history of
conflict, for example. While much of this rivalry was dissipated after
Anglo-French cooperation in World Wars I and II, post-world war
competition has nonetheless been a reality. When the British decided to
move toward membership of the European Common Market in 1967, the French
vetoed their application citing concerns over undue American influence.
Beatrice Heuser argues that the British also have a historically-based
fear of French neutrality in the event of conflict.[^61] The United
Kingdom would consequently be extremely hesitant to transfer its nuclear
capability to the European Union and remains firm in its belief that US
participation in Europe's defense is essential. Nuclear weapons and NATO
have the added advantage of granting Germany adequate security without
access to nuclear weapons and of allowing the United Kingdom to maintain
its claim to great power status.

In France, nuclear weapons are strongly associated with sovereignty and
independence. After French anger with US decisions during the Suez and
Algeria crises in the 1950s and 60s, France decided and de Gaulle
verbalized that "the defence of France must be in French hands. . . .
\[I\]t is indispensable that it be a French defence and that France
defends herself by herself, for herself, and in her own manner."[^62]
Maintaining a separate nuclear force was also seen as a means of
regaining international standing after World War II and as a substitute
for loosing an empire. Continuing Heuser's argument, the French
government's reliance on nuclear weapons may also spring from a loss of
faith in the French citizenry's willingness to defend itself, primarily
due to the nation's rapid defeat in World War II.[^63] Nuclear
independence is firmly ingrained in French foreign policy and would be a
difficult obstacle for nuclear ESDP advocates to overcome.

####### A Less Nuclear World

Despite the appearance of India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers,
the world is becoming less nuclear in absolute terms. At least 2000
warheads a year are being placed in storage or destroyed as a result of
START I and other arms control agreements between the United States and
Russia; the global stockpile has been reduced from a high of 70,000
during the Cold War to 36,000 nuclear weapons today.[^64] START II,
which has now been ratified by both the US Senate and the Russian Duma,
will lower nuclear weapons of the two powers to 3,000-3,500 each by the
end of 2007. With even further reductions called for under START III,
the question for the nuclear superpowers is not how to make more and
better nuclear weapons, but how to dismantle what they have safely and
with adequate accountability. The United Kingdom and France have each
moved more modestly in the direction of unilateral arms reduction.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime has been institutionally
strengthened over the last several years. The Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) review in 1995 resulted in an indefinite extension of the
agreement vs. the 25 years of the original document. With Brazil's
accession in 1998, only three countries of real concern---India,
Pakistan, and Israel---remain outside the treaty. The May 2000 NPT
Review Conference was particularly telling in that, for the first time
in 15 years, all 155 signatories present reached a consensus that there
should be "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapons States to
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."[^65] Other
portions of the nonproliferation regime, such as the Nuclear Supplier
Group agreements and the Missile Technology Control Regime, are being
strengthened. The Comprehensive Test Ban treaty has gained acceptance as
well (with the notable exception of the United States) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has received added powers to
investigate alleged or suspicious incidents that may lead to nuclear
proliferation. The US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and
Europe's nuclear safety initiatives are helping to stabilize the
still-hazardous situation in the former-Soviet Union. Nuclear-free zones
are emerging and being strengthening, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco
in Latin America, Rarotonga in the South Pacific, and Pelindaba in
Africa. Progress is even being made in Central Asia with the Almaty
Declaration and a proposal made in 1995 by Belarus calling for a
nuclear-free Central and Eastern Europe, to include the Baltic states,
Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
Ukraine, and possibly Moldova.[^66]

Norms have developed in many states that tend to de-legitimize the use
and possession of nuclear weapons. France's resumption of nuclear
testing in 1995 caused a firestorm of criticism, adjudication, and
dispirited rationalization. Greenpeace wanted the European Parliament
and Commission to review the testing under threat of bringing the matter
before the European Court of Justice.[^67] In 1998, the European
Parliament defeated a declaration that nuclear power could not be
considered a safe and sustainable method of energy production, but only
by 225 to 218.[^68] At the same time, the "New Agenda Coalition" of
several nuclear-concerned countries presented the United Nations with a
detailed road map on how to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world over a
period of several years. Of the 16 NATO states, only France, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States voted against the resolution while
the rest abstained; of the states of the former Soviet Union, only
Russia voted against it, Azerbaijan and Belarus voted for it while the
others abstained.[^69]

In December 1996, 60 retired generals and admirals from 17 countries
released a joint statement calling for deep cuts in existing nuclear
arsenals and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The group
included notables such as John Galvin, former Supreme Commander Allied
Forces Europe (SACEUR) and Charles Horner, US commander of allied air
forces during the Gulf War. They proposed an expansion of nuclear-free
zones and asked for movement by Russia and the United States to reduce
and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals.[^70] Recent public
opinion polls in the United States and the United Kingdom showed that
more than 80% of the respondents favored the elimination of nuclear
weapons; in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Norway, those in favor of
abolition exceeded 90%; in Japan, the percentage was 78%; and, in Russia
61%. Yet pollsters also noted that, although the public was generally in
favor of disarmament, it was without real commitment or
enthusiasm---leaving room for policy-makers to swing back to a more
nuclear world.[^71]

# Conclusion

A nuclear component to the EU's ESDP lies somewhere between American
paranoia about the eventual breakup of NATO because of the development
of an EU superpower and the absolute European assurances of the EU's
passivity. On the one hand, the international system is evolving rapidly
with the rise of alternate centers of power and with changes in the
nature of threats to Europe and the United States. The European Union is
seeking a greater voice in foreign policy matters to address the new
circumstances and to express its own greater cohesion at the same time
that isolationist tendencies in the United States are growing. French
officials years have said for the past 10 years that a nuclear-capable
European Union will have to be considered at some point to account for
the new circumstances.

On the other hand, the US nuclear umbrella is still reliable and modern
conventional weapons have increased the viability of non-nuclear
response options. Europe feels reasonably secure from military threats
and the European populace generally opposed to an increased nuclear
stature. The European Union faces a host of decisions in the next few
years that affect its very existence, requiring EU national leaders to
balance carefully their commitment to the Union with the opinions of
their constituents. The tasks to be settled make consideration of an
issue as divisive and controversial as a nuclear ESDP years away in the
best of circumstances. Europe is likely to move in the direction of a
nuclear ESDP only if Germany does so first and, according to Beatrice
Heuser, "It is \[sic\] thus absurd to waste time on speculations about
whether Germany will 'go nuclear.'"[^72] As Europe and the international
environment now stand, a nuclear ESDP really is somewhere in the realm
of fantasy.

[^1]: *Financial Times*, 12 July 2000.

[^2]: ^?^ French "White Paper" on nuclear issues, cited from Bruce D.
    Larkin, *Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France, & China in the
    Global Governance of Nuclear Arms* (New Brunswick: Transaction
    Publishers, 1996), 28.

[^3]: ^?^ David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas,* (Washington
    D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 62.

[^4]: ^?^ See Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG:
    Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000* (Great Britain:
    MacMillan Press, LTD., 1997), 126-137, for more on these debates.
    Dr. Heuser has written extensively on the issue of nuclear weapons
    and Europe and is cited frequently in this article.

[^5]: ^?^ F. Caccia Dominioni, DG XVII (Energy), Director of non-fossil
    Energy Industries and Markets, "The Role and Tasks of EURATOM in the
    Field of Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy," based on an address given
    at the International Conference on Nuclear Safeguards, St.
    Petersburg, Russia, 10-11 April 1995.

[^6]: ^?^ Panayiotis Ifestos, *Nuclear Strategy and European Security
    Dilemmas: Towards an Autonomous European Defence System?*
    (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988), 354.

[^7]: ^?^ "Treaty on European Union," Article D, paragraph 1.

[^8]: ^?^ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 170.

[^9]: ^?^ From CND General Election Pages, "Anglo-French nuclear
    co-operation and the Euro Bomb,"
    http://www.cnduk.org/mannet/election/aglfren.htr.

[^10]: ^?^ Declaration of the Assembly of the WEU, Extraordinary Session
    in London, 22-23 February 1996.

[^11]: ^?^ David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, DC:
    The Brookings Institute, 1983), 26.

[^12]: ^?^ Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American
    Relations Since 1945* (New York: Vantage Books, 1980), 169.

[^13]: ^?^ Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, 33.

[^14]: ^?^ Ifestos, *Nuclear Strategy and European Security Dilemmas*,
    313.

[^15]: ^?^ *Index to International Public Opinion, 1996-1997*, Elizabeth
    Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, eds. (Westport, Connecticut:
    Greenwood Press, 1998), 214.

[^16]: ^?^ *Financial Times*, 16 November 1998.

[^17]: ^?^ Grosser, *Western Alliance*, 172.

[^18]: ^?^ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 119.

[^19]: ^?^ Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W.
    Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, British, French,
    and Chinese Nuclear Weapons* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 197.

[^20]: ^?^ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 166.

[^21]: ^?^ CND General Election Pages,
    http://www.cnduk.org/mannet/election/aglfren.htr.

[^22]: ^?^ Christoph Bluth, *Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear
    Strategy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 179.

[^23]: ^?^ Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, 189 .

[^24]: ^?^ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 140.

[^25]: ^?^ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 120

[^26]: ^?^ George Gallup, Jr., *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1997*
    (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1998), 256. 16%
    considered nuclear attack very likely; 30% somewhat likely.

[^27]: ^?^ William Walker, "International nuclear relations after the
    Indian and Pakistani explosions," *International Affairs* 74.3
    (1998): 509.

[^28]: ^?^ Walker, "Relations after Indian and Pakistani explosions,"
    506.

[^29]: ^?^ Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, ix.

[^30]: ^?^ Larkin, *Nuclear Designs,* 309.

[^31]: ^?^ Jasjit Singh, "India, Europe and Non-Proliferation: Pokhran
    II and After," http://www.idsa-india.org/an-nov8-1.html.

[^32]: ^?^ *Los Angeles Times*, 1 June 1998.

[^33]: ^?^ George Perkovich, "Think Again: Nonproliferation," *Foreign
    Policy Online,* <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ART2.html>.

[^34]: ^?^ *Denver Post*, 26 March 1999.

[^35]: ^?^ U.S. Public Law 106-38.
    [http://www.currentlegal.com](http://www.currentlegal.com/).

[^36]: ^?^ *Financial Times*, 18 July 2000.

[^37]: ^?^ Sharon LaFraniere, "Russian Threatens Action Over U.S.
    Missile Plan," *Washington Post* *Foreign Service*, June 23, 2000,
    <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/Wplate/2000-06/23/1391-062300-idx.htm>.

[^38]: ^?^ Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schröder, "A Treaty
    We All Need," *Britain in the USA*,
    <http://britain-info.org/BIS/FORDOM/defence/8oct99.stm>, 8 Oct 99.

[^39]: ^?^ Charles Krupnick, "Not What They Wanted," *Disconcerted
    Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture*, Alexander Moens
    and Christopher Anstis, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 124-5.

[^40]: ^?^ Petersberg Declaration, 19 June 1992, part II, paragraph 4.
    Cited from *Towards a Common Defence Policy*, Laurence Martin and
    John Roper, eds. (Alençon, France: Institute for Security Studies of
    WEU, 1995) , 9.

[^41]: ^?^ For the development of EU security cooperation up to 1996,
    see Charles Krupnick, "Europe Without the United States?: Prospects
    for European Defense Cooperation after the 1996 European Union
    Intergovernmental Conference," *Airpower Journal* (Special Edition,
    1996): 48-58.

[^42]: ^?^ "Presidency Conclusions: Cologne European Council, 3 and 4
    June 1999, European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common
    European Policy on Security and Defense."

[^43]: ^?^ "Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11
    December 1999."

[^44]: ^?^ "European Security and Defense Policy," in "European Union:
    Policies & Legislation" at
    http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/espweb.htm.

[^45]: ^?^ *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures*
    (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), 225.

[^46]: ^?^ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 165.

[^47]: ^?^ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," paragraph 62.

[^48]: ^?^ Beatrice Heuser noted the relative ease with which a European
    NPG could be established in her discussion of a possible European
    Nuclear Force. Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG*, 171.

[^49]: ^?^ "The EU's relations with Russia - an overview,"
    <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm>,
    1-2.

[^50]: ^?^ *Financial Times*, 16 June 2000.

[^51]: ^?^ "Executive Summary," The Canberra Commission on the
    Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,
    <http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cc_report_exec.htm>.

[^52]: ^?^ *New York Times on the Web,* 26 July 2000,
    <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/072600missile-defense.html>.

[^53]: ^?^ Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Speech to XVIIth International
    Workshop on Political-Military Decision-Making in Berlin, 3 June
    2000, <http://usa.grmbl.com/s20000605q.html>.

[^54]: ^?^ The Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten, CH, "The EU's Evolving
    Foreign Policy Dimension -- The CESDP After Helsinki," Speech to the
    Joint Meeting of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee
    with Members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, 22
    February 2000,
    <http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2000/000222cp.htm>.

[^55]: ^?^ Julianne Smith and Martin Butchers, eds., "A Risk Reduction
    Strategy for NATO," *Research Report 99.1*, January 1999, Basic
    Publications, 8. http://www.basicint.org/nator1.html.

[^56]: ^?^ *Financial Times*, 25 November 1998.

[^57]: ^?^ *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), 6 February 1999.

[^58]: ^?^ *Financial Times*, 17/18 October 1998.

[^59]: ^?^ "Paris Presses Germany on Nuclear Waste Shipments," *Europe
    Energy*, 7 May 1999.

[^60]: ^?^ *Financial Times*, June 24, 2000.

[^61]: ^?^ Beatrice Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs
    in Britain, France and the FRG*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998),
    42.

[^62]: ^?^ Wolf Mendl, *Deterrence and Persuasion: French nuclear
    armament in the context of national policy, 1945-1969*, (London:
    Faber and Faber, 1970), 61.

[^63]: ^?^ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 143.

[^64]: ^?^ *Toronto Star*, 11 December 1998.

[^65]: ^?^ "Nuclear-Weapon States Endorse Goal of 'Total Elimination' of
    Nuclear Arsenals as NPT Review Conference Concludes," United Nations
    Press Release DC/2710, 22 May 2000.

[^66]: ^?^ *Los Angeles Times*, 30 September 1996.

[^67]: ^?^ "EU Commission must act now on French tests or Face European
    court action," <http://www.greenpeace.org/-comms>/rw/oct03.htn.

[^68]: ^?^ "Nuclear questions and a Faustian bargain," *Energy
    Economist*, November 1998.

[^69]: ^?^ William Epstein, "Voting by abstention: opinion that Russia's
    distrust of the United States will negate any chance of nuclear
    disarmament," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 1 March 1999.

[^70]: ^?^" Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and
    Admirals," *Union of Concerned Scientists* web page,
    http:www.ucsusa.org/arms/lebed.html.

[^71]: ^?^ "Voting by abstention; opinion that Russia's distrust of the
    United States will negate any chance of nuclear disarmament,"
    William Epstein, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 1 March
    1999.

[^72]: ^?^ Beatrice Heuser, "Beliefs, Culture, Proliferation and use of
    Nuclear Weapons," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1
    (March 2000): 90.