# Session No. 17

### Course Title: Disaster Response Operations and Management

### 

### Session Title: Managing the Media

## Time: 50 minutes

**Objectives:**

17.1 Draw out the importance of the media in disaster response
operations.

17.2 Identify the different types of media as well as their goals and
typical media behavioral patterns.

17.3 Recognize the challenges the media presents to responders and
emergency managers.

17.4 Explore the ways in which emergency managers and others may
successfully manage the media in times of disasters.

17.5 Provide students with experience in dealing with the media by
having them role play in a fictitious disaster scenario.

**Scope:**

In this session, the professor discusses media issues in disasters.
After a brief discussion about the importance of the media, the
professor identifies the objectives and activities of the media when
disasters strike. Problems in dealing with the media are enumerated.
Steps to effectively manage the media for the advantage of the response
are then listed at toward the conclusion of the session. A role-playing
exercise may be implemented to reinforce the points brought out during
the lecture and discussion.

**Session Requirements:**

1.  Instructor Reading:

> Auf der Heide, Erik. 1987. \"The Media: Friend and Foe.\" Chapter 10
> in *Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination*.
> <http://coe.dmha.org/dr/flash/htm>.
>
> Allison, Eric. 1984. \"Media Relations at Major Response Situations.\"
> *JEMS* (December): 39-42.
>
> Burkhart, Ford N. 1987. \"Experts and the Press Under Stress: Disaster
> Journalism Gets Mixed Reviews.\" *International Journal of Mass
> Emergencies and Disasters* 5 (3): 357-367.
>
> Cowan, Frank. 1996. \"Make Them Go Away! The Media/Dispatch
> Conflict.\" *9-1-1 Magazine*. (July/August): 26-31.
>
> Drabek, Thomas E. under development. "Media in Disaster." Session 30,
> Social Dimensions of Disaster, 2^nd^ Edition. FEMA Higher Education
> course accessed
>
> via: <http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/aem_courses.asp>.
>
> Fischer, Henry W. III. 1998. *Response to Disaster: Fact Versus
> Fiction and its Perpetuation: The Sociology of Disaster*. Lanham, MD.:
> University Press of America.
>
> Fischer, Henry W. III. 1999. Hurricane Georges: The Experience of the
> Media and Emergency Management on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.\" *Quick
> Response Report #117*. Natural Hazards Research and Applications
> Information Center, University of Colorado: Boulder, Colorado.
>
> Onder, James J. 1999. \"Media and Law Enforcement Relations During
> Hostage-Taking Terrorist Incidents: A Cooperative Decision.\"
> *Responder* (January): 26-32.
>
> Payne, Christopher F. 1994. \"Handling the Press.\" *Disaster
> Prevention and Management* 3 (1): 2-32.
>
> Phillips, Brenda D. 1986. \"The Media in Disaster Threat Situations:
> Some Possible Relationships Between Mass Media Reporting and
> Voluntarism.\" *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and
> Disasters* 4 (3): 7-26.
>
> Quarantelli, E.L. 1996. \"Local Mass Media Operations in Disasters in
> the USA.\" *Disaster Prevention and Management* 5 (5): 5-10.
>
> Quarantelli, E.L. and Russell R. Dynes. 1972. \"When Disaster Strikes
> It Isn\'t Much Like What You\'ve Heard and Read About.\" *Psychology
> Today* (February): 67-70.
>
> Scanlon, Joseph. 2005. Research about the Mass Media and Disaster:
> Never (Well Hardly Ever) the Twain Shall Meet. FEMA.
> <http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/ScanlonJournalism.pdf>
>
> Scanlon, Joseph and Conrad McCullum. 1999. \"Media Coverage of Mass
> Death: Not Always Unwelcome.\" *Australian Journal of Emergency
> Management* (Spring): 55-59.
>
> Scanlon, Joseph, Suzanne Alldred, Al Farrell and Angela Prawzick.
> 1985. \"Coping With the Media in Disasters: Some Predictable
> Problems.\" *Public Administration Review* 45 (January): 123-33.
>
> Schaper, Frank C. 1991. \"PIOs Enhance Media Relations.\" *Fire Chief*
> (September): 68-69.
>
> Wenger, Dennis E., James D. Dykes and Thomas D. Sebok. 1975. \"It\'s a
> Matter of Myths: An Empirical Examination of Individual Insight Into
> Disaster Response.\" *Mass Emergencies* 1: 33-46.

1.  Student Readings:

> Scanlon, Joseph. 2005. Research about the Mass Media and Disaster:
> Never (Well Hardly Ever) the Twain Shall Meet. FEMA.
> <http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/ScanlonJournalism.pdf>
>
> Scanlon, Joseph, Suzanne Alldred, Al Farrell and Angela Prawzick.
> 1985. \"Coping With the Media in Disasters: Some Predictable
> Problems.\" *Public Administration Review* 45 (January): 123-33.

3\. Handouts:

Importance of the media

Media characteristics

Media behavior

Problems to be expected

Dealing with the media

Mock Disaster Scenario

**Remarks:**

1.  Prior to this session, the professor may want to record various news
    segments in which TV anchors and reporters cover local, state,
    national and international disasters. These clips may provide vivid
    examples of the issues surrounding media involvement in disasters
    (e.g., types of stories covered, myths and exaggerations, problems
    generated, role of the media in disasters, etc.).

2.  The professor should ensure during this session that the student is
    fully aware of how the media may be both a friend and foe to the
    emergency manager. It is also advisable to underscore how the
    emergency manager may develop strong relations with the media, and
    identify and implement successful procedures for the Public
    Information Officer.

3\. If a large emergency or disaster has occurred recently at or in a
city near the university, the professor might want to invite both an
emergency manager (or incident commander or first responder) and a media
representative (news anchor or reporter) to visit the class and provide
their respective views on the media coverage of the event. Having these
individuals discuss their goals in the disaster and critique each
other\'s operations could prove to be a very enlightening discussion.

4\. The professor may wish to explore the media reports regarding
Hurricane Katrina. This disaster illustrates some unique issues in terms
of anti-social behavior (e.g., looting, shooting, rapes, etc) and the
assignment of blame at the local, state and federal levels.

5.  The exercise at the end of class can be enhanced by recording (audio
    or video) student interaction with the mock reporters and then
    critiquing their performance in the following session. If this is to
    be done, it is necessary to recognize that some students may become
    embarrassed by their comments about the fictitious case. In other
    situations, students may be overly critical of their peer\'s
    performance. Therefore, presenting the video recordings of student
    interaction with the mock media should be done with much sensitivity
    and tact. One way to overcome the drawbacks of this activity is to
    illustrate positive examples only or ask the students in advance if
    their video recording can be shared with the entire class. Some
    students thrive on recognition, and these would be great candidates
    to illustrate successes and mistakes. Regardless of which approach
    is taken, the professor will want to stress that the videos are not
    going to be used to embarrass students, but are employed to give
    them practice in dealing with the media (which can be unpleasant and
    difficult at times). Students should be strongly encouraged to show
    respect to others as they watch and react to the videos. After
    students are evaluated, they can then share what they learned from
    the experience, and state how they would do things differently if
    they were confronted with the same situation in the future.

**Objective 17.1 Draw out the importance of the media in disaster
response operations.**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I. The **media play a vital role** in disaster situations (see Auf der
Heide 1987, Chapter 10).

> A. Help to **warn the public** about an impending hazard.
>
> B. **Provide information regarding evacuation and sheltering**.
>
> C. **Describe what people can do to protect themselves** and others.
>
> D. **Relay what the government is doing** and how they are responding
> to the disaster.
>
> E. **List what organizations are providing relief** and **how
> assistance** can be **given** or **obtained**.
>
> F. **Educate the public** on preventive and preparedness measures.
>
> G. **Minimize** the number of **incoming calls** to a
> disaster-stricken areas (e.g., from concerned relatives).
>
> H. **Generate support for emergency management** personnel and
> programs.
>
> I. Payne (1994, 29) has underscored **these and other ways that the
> media helps authorities in disasters**:
>
> 1\. **Broadcasting information to the public** for emergency services
> (e.g., telephone numbers, status of evacuation routes, etc.).
>
> 2\. **Identifying** for emergency services **those issues that need to
> be addressed** (e.g., location and number of victims).
>
> 3\. **Sharing equipment** (e.g., \"At the Ealing train crash in
> December 1973, the BBC positioned powerful mobile television
> floodlighting to illuminate the scene\").
>
> 4\. **Allowing officials time to speak to the public** about the
> disaster situation.
>
> 5\. **Assisting in the evaluation of the incident** by providing
> copies of photographs and newsreel film.
>
> H. **Similar conclusions** have been reached by Scanlon et. al.
> (1985).
>
> 1\. **\"The media can assist in pre-disaster education. They may be
> crucial to an effective warning process. They can provide information
> and advice to victims and others in the wake of disasters. They can
> help activate the local disaster response. They can assist in
> stimulating effective disaster relief\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 123).

**Objective 17.2 Identify the different types of media as well as their
goals and typical media behavioral patterns.**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I. Those responding to disaster should be aware of the **different types
of media organizations** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 127; see also
Quarantelli 1996).

> A. The **media may represent different levels of society**.
>
> 1\. **Local** (community based)
>
> 2\. **Regional** (several communities or states)
>
> 3\. **National** (a single country)
>
> 4\. **International** (a global perspective)
>
> B. The media may **utilize distinct means** to convey information.
>
> 1\. **Radio**
>
> 2\. **Television/Cable/Satellite**
>
> 3\. **Internet/Print**

II\. Each of these media organizations and mediums **have similar
interest in disasters, but do not do much in the way of preparation**.

> A. \"**Such events make very newsworthy stories - not only because
> they are unusual events, but because of the human interest angle. No
> matter how horrific the event, the public seems to be fascinated by
> other people\'s misfortunes, and the press know it**\" (Payne 1994,
> 24).
>
> B. **\"Reporters are encouraged to find events that have the same
> attributes as that of good fiction: drama, conflict, problems,
> solutions, and rising and falling action. Disasters offer all of these
> characteristics\"** (Auf der Heide 1987, Chapter 10, p. 1).
>
> C. **\"In one DRC study, local newspapers examined in nine communities
> struck by disasters found the range of coverage was 44-160 stories,
> with an average of almost 90 stories in each newspaper concerning the
> occasion. Of these stories, 33 percent appeared within the first three
> pages. In addition, a total of almost 700 photographs accompanied the
> 904 stories\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 6).
>
> D. **\"In another DRC study which did not include all outlets, the
> electronic coverage of two disaster-stricken communities was examined.
> The local television stations produced a total of 175 reports during
> the first two days, or about 44 reports each day. In both cases,
> normal programming was pre-empted, and news coverage was extended to
> cover the disaster. Radio coverage during the first two days totaled
> 134 reports, or about 34 reports each\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 6).
>
> E. Ironically, **the media does not give much attention to disaster
> preparedness**.
>
> 1\. **\"Disaster preparedness planning among local mass media
> organizations is very limited and generally of poor quality\"**
> (Quarantelli 1996, 5).
>
> 2\. **\"The majority have no disaster plans whatsoever, giving no
> consideration to problems they would have if their facilities were
> affected or to the difficulties of coordinating coverage of a major
> story in an altered and turbulent social environment\"** (Quarantelli
> 1996, 5).
>
> 3\. **\"Even where there is planning, it is of inadequate quality.
> Usually plans consist only of brief documents that specify systems of
> notifying and mobilizing personnel, and lists of phone numbers of
> relevant emergency organizations\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 5).
>
> 4\. **\"Furthermore, one DRC \[Disaster Research Center\] study found
> that only 37 per cent of mass media organizations actually used their
> planning in their community disasters\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 5).

III\. Each of these media organizations and mediums has **different
objectives for reporting** (Scanlon et. al. 1985; Auf der Heide 1987;
Quarantelli 1996).

> A. The **media has different goals based on the segment of society
> they represent**.
>
> 1\. **Local** media will provide very **detailed and personal
> stories**, in addition to **specific disaster information** (e.g., for
> victims).
>
> 2\. **Regional** media **are similar to local media**, but they also
> **desire to know how multiple cities and the state or states are
> responding**.
>
> 3\. **National** media tend to focus on **what the president is
> doing** about the disaster as well as the activities of **federal
> organizations** (e.g., FEMA, EPA, Department of Homeland Security,
> CDC, etc.).
>
> 4\. **International** media give preference to **global impacts and
> national responses** (either domestically or abroad).
>
> B. The **means utilized by the media often shapes their goals** for
> reporting.
>
> 1\. **Radio** stations want **short sound bites from victims, scholars
> or public officials.**
>
> 2\. **Television/Cable/Satellite** stations prefer **interviews as
> well as pictures and dramatic presentation.**
>
> 3\. **Internet/Print** media **seek in depth coverage and detailed
> analysis of the situation.**

IV\. Regardless of the different types of media, their **behavior** **is
generally predictable** in normal times as well as in times of disaster.

> A. Cowan identifies some of the **initial steps** to be **taken by the
> media** when a disaster occurs.
>
> 1\. **\"Word of the incident enters the newsroom through one of
> several means (scanners, witness phone calls, field reporters,
> aircraft, wire service, pager-based notification system, and sometimes
> from the agency itself). Resources (photographers, reporters) will be
> directed to respond by an assignment editor, city editor, or photo
> editor\"** (Cowan 1996, 26).
>
> 2\. **\"Thus it has to be accepted that the media, in carrying out its
> legitimate role, will endeavor to intrude into the operational area,
> seek information from all sources, including victims and management
> and staff, and will use any means at its disposal in achieving its
> objectives\"** (Payne 1994, 28).
>
> 3\. **\"Amongst other things, the press will want to know about
> casualty figures, damage, evacuation plans, effect on the community
> and plans to restore normality. In the case of a chemical, nuclear or
> transport incident, they are likely to seek comment as to the cause
> and effect. They will also be interested in environmental and health
> issues, and whether or not there is likely to be public inquiry\"**
> (Payne 1994, 31).
>
> C. **Scanlon and Alldred have identified similar media behavior**
> (1982):
>
> 1\. The media **will hear of a disaster event**.
>
> 2\. They will **immediately report the news** of that incident.
>
> 3\. They will **search for additional information** via telephone or
> personal interviews.
>
> 4\. They will **send reporters to the scene**.
>
> a\. **\"If the event is judged newsworthy enough the media may descend
> on the scene en masse often using expensive equipment, such as
> chartered jets, sometimes tying up local transportation and
> communication facilities\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 124).
>
> 5\. **\"Once on site, the media will make extensive demands on local
> disaster managers, often using pack pressure (media tend to operate in
> groups) to force the holding of news conferences and to** **demand
> answers to specific questions, questions to which there are seldom
> satisfactory answers in the immediate post-impact period\"** (Scanlon
> et. al. 1985, 124).
>
> a\. **\"Reporters want to know things like: . . . . where and when did
> it happen? What streets/roads are closed? Who is hurt? Dead?
> Affected?\"** (Cowan 1996, 28)
>
> b\. **\"The media . . . \[desires\] specifics including who, what,
> where, when, why, how, how much, how many\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985,
> 129).
>
> 6\. **\"The various media - radio, television and print - will shape
> the story to their perception of what should happen\"** (Scanlon et.
> al. 1985, 124).
>
> D. Quarantelli has noted **other common patterns** of media activity
> (1996).
>
> 1\. **\"There is a rather selective reporting of important emergency
> time related activities, with some receiving extensive treatment and
> others little, if any at all\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 7).
>
> 2\. **\"The activities of volunteers, emergent groups and
> organizations that are not a part of the normal \'beat\' system or
> regularly courted for news tend to be ignored in mass media
> accounts\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 7).
>
> 3\. **\" . . . Search and rescue is overwhelmingly carried out
> immediately after impact by the immediate survivors, whereas mass
> media accounts focus heavily on formal search and rescue efforts that
> are relatively insignificant in the carrying out of the task\"**
> (Quarantelli 1996, 7).
>
> 4\. **\"Mass media organizations primarily use traditional sources of
> information even at times of disasters. There is a heavy reliance on
> traditional, which usually means official, sources for news by all
> media organizations\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 8).
>
> 5\. **\"One DRC study found that local governmental officials were
> cited in 14 per cent of radio, 19 per cent of television and 24
> percent of newspaper stories; police, fire and relief agencies were
> also frequently cited. In contrast, local emergency management
> officials were infrequently cited, being mentioned in only 8 per cent
> of radio, 2 per cent of television and 3 per cent of newspaper
> stories\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 8).
>
> 6\. **\"A \'command post\' perspective is generally assumed,
> particularly in the electronic media. . . . A consequence is a
> tendency to present almost exclusively a \'command post view\' of the
> occasion. Thus, it is argued that there is a bias in the reporting
> towards the perception of \'reality\' as seen by only one set of
> actors in the situation, mostly emergency-oriented government
> officials\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 8-9)

**Objective 17.3 Recognize the challenges the media presents to
responders and emergency managers.**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I. It is well-known that **the media often presents formidable
challenges to responders and emergency managers**. The problems
generated by the media are numerous.

> A. **Payne** (1994) has identified **four of the most prevalent
> problems**:
>
> 1\. **Inaccurate Reporting. In regards to the Chernobyl nuclear plant
> disaster, one newspaper story \"exaggerated the likely effect of the
> radiation level found in fish in the Irish Sea, misquoted the
> scientist who had reported on it, and misrepresented his views. The
> article was alarmist and irresponsible\"** (Payne 1994, 26).
>
> 2\. **Intrusive Manner. \"Following the M1 air crash at Kegworth,
> Leicester, news reporters filtered into one of the designated
> hospitals under the pretence of being members of the public visiting
> patients. They got to the bedside of some of the victims of the crash
> for the purpose of getting a first-hand account. As a result, the
> hospital relocated ordinary patients and put tight security on the
> wards containing victims of the incident\"** (Payne 1994, 26).
>
> 3\. **Lack of Sensitivity. \"In 1989 at Hillsborough, Sheffield, there
> was live filming of people being crushed to death at the steel
> barriers. The horror was brought into the homes of the people who were
> viewing the football match on television. At the ground, a cameraman
> who moved around the pitch and terraces filming the scenes was sworn
> at, spat at, cursed and threatened, and not only by the understandably
> emotional fans. (Later, that cameraman** **won an award for the best
> television coverage of the year!)\"** (Payne 1994, 26).
>
> 4\. **Uncooperative Attitude. \"When the *Marchioness* pleasure-boat
> was being lifted from the Thames, the police positioned a number of
> police launches to screen the area from the intrusive press. The press
> moved to another less convenient position and covered the salvage
> operation in full. They claimed they were able to do so tastefully and
> without causing widespread offence\"** (Payne 1994, 26).
>
> B. There are **at least seven other problems** with the media in times
> of disaster.
>
> 1\. **Convergence at the scene**.
>
> a\. **\"The real problems of media disaster relations are not,
> however, the difficulty of gathering accurate information, the
> difficulty in reaching the media with it, and the different approaches
> taken by various media. Rather, it has to do with the fact that
> disasters bring to the scene, immediately, an enormous number of
> reporters, many of whom are well-equipped with expensive and elaborate
> communications systems, including direct access to satellite
> transmitters. Local emergency planners, especially those used to
> dealing with weekly newspapers and small radio stations are likely to
> be overwhelmed by this media invasion. It is quite normal for more
> than 100 national media to be on the site of any incident within a few
> hours\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 131).
>
> b\. **After the Three Mile Island incident, \"The size of the press
> corps, and especially the electronic legions that descended on the
> Harrisburg area in the first few days of the crisis were reminiscent
> in numbers and baggage of the armies of reporters, photographers,
> feature writers, correspondents, camera crews and editing and
> production units that flock every four years to the national political
> conventions. Only in this case there had been no planning time to
> establish procedures, or to set up facilities to deal with this
> overpowering demand for complex information. Three commercial TV
> networks . . . established full-scale field operations in various
> motels in the area . . . Each brought between 75 and 100 reporters,
> editors, managers and technicians. In addition, camera and reporter
> teams were quickly on hand from individual TV stations in nearby**
> **Harrisburg,** **Lancaster, Baltimore and Philadelphia\"** (Auf der
> Heide quoting Holton 1985, 1).
>
> c\. **The media may generate many volunteers, which could lead to
> additional response problems** (Phillips 1986).
>
> 2\. **Additional demands placed on emergency managers and
> responders**.
>
> a\. **\"What do they \[the media\] want to know? Everything! NOW!\"**
> (Cowan 1996, 28).
>
> b\. **It is often difficult to give specific information to the media
> due to the \"initial confusion that surrounds most disaster response
> \[operations\]\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 129).
>
> c\. **\"Many emergency managers have been frustrated when they have
> had to divert much needed time and resources to address the demands of
> the media, while at the same time trying to mount a
> multi-organizational response under conditions of extreme urgency and
> uncertainty\"** (Auf der Heide 1987, Chapter 10, p.1).
>
> d\. **\"Their demands may completely tie up any surviving
> transportation and communication facilities, and local officials may
> find themselves responding more to the needs of the media than to the
> disaster situation\"** (Auf der Heide, Chapter 10, p. 5).
>
> e\. **\"The media have other needs too, and expect local emergency
> personnel to fulfill them. These needs include adequate lighting,
> electrical power, work space, and the provision of officials to give
> them information or take them on tours of the disaster area\"** (Auf
> der Heide, Chapter 10, p. 5).
>
> 3\. **Interference with response operations**.
>
> a\. **\"All this is not to say the media do not, on occasion, cause
> problems. They can help increase convergence to the scene both by the
> curious and by those with genuine concerns. By their own convergence,
> both in person and by telephone, they can create pressures on managers
> for information to the point where media demands interfere with
> effective response.\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 124).
>
> b\. **\"Media access to these incidences sometimes involves a clash
> between law enforcement officials, who want to maintain the tightest
> possible control of events, and the reporters, who want to maximize
> coverage\"** (Onder 1999, 26).
>
> c\. **\"The media have been called a source of interference in local
> decision-making, pressuring officials to indicate what action will be
> taken before the officials are ready to decide what to do\"** (Auf der
> Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 7).
>
> d\. **\"Unfortunately, no solution has been found to a problem which
> is increasing - the problem created by the ability of many TV stations
> to scramble helicopters to a disaster site so quickly that they tend
> to jam the air space above the site to the point they interfere with
> equipment from emergency agencies\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1996, 128).
>
> e\. A **good example** of this interference is after the **1983
> Coalinga California earthquake,** when the media interfered with
> operations.

-   **\"The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) was
    called in to help clear earthquake rubble from the streets. Media
    personnel reportedly contributed to the crowd problems which made it
    impossible to safely remove the debris. As a result, Caltrans
    threatened to remove its equipment altogether unless the traffic
    could be cleared\"** (Auf der Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 8).

> 4\. **Creation of safety problems**.
>
> a\. **\"Indeed, the press, who continually monitor emergency radio
> channels, are likely to arrive at the scene as speedily as the
> emergency services, sometimes before cordon arrangements have been put
> in place\"** (Payne 1994, 28).
>
> b\. **\"It is known that terrorists often demand to meet with news
> representatives and to be put on the air. This adds risk and security
> problems to the situation\"** (Onder 1999, 28).
>
> c\. **The use of private aircraft by the media increased the chance
> for mid-air collisions after the Mt. St. Helens explosion** (Auf der
> Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 8).
>
> 5\. **Lack of technical understanding**.
>
> a\. **\"The media will have problems with technical stories, often
> finding it extremely difficult to assess the competence of alternative
> news sources\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 124).
>
> b\. **\"When reporters assume the role of watchdogs, they often lack
> the scientific background needed to understand what they are
> watching\"** (Burkhart 1987, 357).
>
> 6\. **Misrepresentations and perpetuation of myths**.
>
> a\. **Holton (1985, 13) states \"Reporters on the scene of the
> breaking story may add important details; still it is the anchor who
> summarizes, repeats, amplifies, and ultimately evaluates the material
> coming in from the field. All those judgments are taking place under
> time pressures and in the midst of near chaos. Dozens of facts,
> rumors, conjectures, and ideas are surging about every minute. The
> system does not provide for a detailed review of material. Much of
> what pours in is raw data, edited in the head of the correspondent as
> he or she reads from notes hastily scribbled at the scene. Interviews
> are done with eyewitnesses whose own credibility is unchallenged and
> unchecked\"** (in Auf der Heide 1987, Chapter 10, p. 12).
>
> b\. **\"Media accounts center on the extent of physical damage and on
> incidents that illustrate the human condition. A disaster is a
> dramatic event and editors think it should be reported as drama. The
> camera lens focuses on destruction and despair. What was destroyed is
> interesting; what was left is not. One of the most widely used photos
> of the Alaskan earthquake showed the wreckage of a department**
> **store. The destruction was undeniable, yet the large plate-glass
> windows of the stores across the street were still intact\"**
> (Quarantelli and Dynes 1982, 70).
>
> c\. **\"Another contention of some disaster researchers is that the
> media\'s preoccupation with the dramatic accentuates and exaggerates
> the destructive magnitude of disasters. This has been labeled the
> \'Dresden syndrome\' (the media make every tornado-stricken community
> look like Dresden after it was bombed in World War II). News films and
> photographs focus on scenes of destruction, but not upon surrounding
> undamaged areas. The audience is often led to believe that the whole
> community lies in ruins on the basis of intense coverage of damage
> which may, in reality, be limited to a few buildings or blocks\"**
> (Auf der Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 6).
>
> d\. **\"A very large mass-circulation magazine, reporting on an
> earthquake, presented a full-page picture of an old man asleep in a
> chair holding a dog. The picture conveyed a notion of the weak
> clinging on to their possessions in the face of tremendous adversity.
> \[In reality,\] Skid Row had been one of the most severely damaged
> areas in the city. Those who knew the old man suggested that he had
> been warmer, more comfortable, better fed and drier in a YMCA shelter
> than he had been in years. The dog probably was not his. It is
> doubtful that the photographer or the picture editor knew this, and
> certainly the millions who saw the photograph did not\"** (Quarantelli
> and Dynes 1972, 70).
>
> e\. **\"Ad hoc one-to-one press briefings may give rise to problems,
> particularly in the early stages. Premature comment before all the
> facts are known may lead to conflict and confusion. Moreover, they are
> time-consuming and may lead to complaints of partiality towards a
> section of the media\"** (Payne 1994, 31).
>
> f\. **\"The major impressions of how people behave in disaster come
> from accounts in the mass media\"** (Quarantelli and Dynes 1972, 70).
>
> g\. **\"Mass media reports, especially in television, tend to present
> content that perpetuates certain disaster \'myths\'\"** (Quarantelli
> 1996, 9).
>
> h\. **\" They can spread rumors . . . . They can and do create myths
> about disasters\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 124).
>
> i\. **The media will reinforce disaster myths** (Fischer 1999).
>
> j\. **\"During the massive evacuation in Hurricane Carla more than a
> half million persons left their homes. Fewer than one percent of the
> evacuees reported being involved in traffic accidents along the escape
> route. No fatalities resulted from the evacuation. Based on a
> wire-service story that apparently assumed that all flights are
> disorderly; several newspapers ran a headline reporting: \'More than
> 100,000 Persons Flee In Near Panic\'\"** (Quarantelli and Dynes 1972,
> 70).
>
> k\. **\"Generally, less than 10 per cent of the stories in all media
> present these images. However, the qualitative analysis shows a
> different aspect. Television in particular is prone to perpetuating
> these images\"** (Quarantelli 1996, 9).
>
> l\. **\"The press often reports whole communities fleeing in panic on
> hearing of the approach of a flood or a hurricane. Systematic studies
> reveal that the opposite behavior is more likely. Even when are area
> is evacuated, the majority of inhabitants do not leave. Those who do
> flee are primarily transients and tourists - not the people who live
> there\"** (Quarantelli 1972, 67).
>
> m\. **\"Press reports of martial law inevitably turn out to be
> entirely false or incorrect descriptions of limited emergency power
> usually given to local police by mayors or city councils - usually to
> bar sightseers. In no way do such actions imply or involve cessation
> of regular civilians authority in the area\"** (Quarantelli and Dynes
> 1972, 69).
>
> 7\. **Damage to individual or agency reputation.**
>
> a\. **\"The media can even affect the credibility of an emergency
> response organization. Following the Miramichi earthquakes in New
> Brunswick in 1982, for example, the provincial Emergency Measures
> Organization (EMO) had difficulty getting information from federal
> scientists in Ottawa. The media did not. The result was that instead
> of finding itself a center of information, EMO was forced to turn to
> the media to learn what was going on. This inevitably damaged the
> EMO\'s credibility\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 124).
>
> C. **Burkhart summarizes many of these problems**: **Sensationalizing
> disasters to build circulation, abusing victims, showing their bias,
> rushing into print, being less than formal, failing to attribute
> facts, neglecting to check back with sources, using pseudo experts,
> omitting important aspects, failing to admit limitations** (Burkhart
> 1987).

**Objective 17.4 Explore the ways in which emergency managers and others
may successfully manage the media in times of disasters.**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I. As can be seen, \"**Difficulties with the media occur because
emergency agencies do not understand how the media operate in disasters
and how to deal with them in an effective way**\" (Auf der Heide 1987,
Chapter 10, p. 10.

> A. Therefore, a number of **steps need to be taken to ensure
> successful media relations**. These **measures** can be taken
> **before, during and after the disaster**.

II\. An emergency manager and others can **be prepared** to interact
with the media **before disaster strikes**.

> A. \"**How does one develop an effective plan for media relations in
> disaster**?\" Scanlon and his colleagues answer this question (Scanlon
> et. al. 1985, 125):
>
> 1\. \"First, **establish what media exist and what they can do**.
>
> 2\. Second, **establish their potential \[capabilities\] in
> disaster**.
>
> 3\. Third, **develop a plan for dealing with them** and do that
> planning with media cooperation.
>
> 4\. Fourth, **identify those persons capable of putting the plan into
> effect**.
>
> 5\. Fifth, **test the plan with the media** playing an active role in
> the test.
>
> 6\. Sixth, **evaluate and revise the plan in light of test
> experience**, ensuring media criticisms are taken into account.
>
> 7\. Seventh, **make sure the plan becomes known to all those involved
> in the disaster response** including the public.
>
> 8\. Eighth, **make sure the plan is constantly revised** in light of
> changing conditions, regular tests, and actual experience\" (Scanlon
> et. al. 1985, 125).
>
> B. **Related and additional anticipatory steps** may include:
>
> 1\. **Appointing an effective Public Information Officer**.
>
> a\. **\"Each organization involved needs to appoint a senior official
> as a press liaison officer and media spokesman\"** (Payne 1994, 30).
>
> b\. **\"All departments should have a spokesperson. . . . Fires,
> rescues, hazardous materials incidents and auto accidents are
> newsworthy events. Since the fire service responds to these incidents,
> the fire service should tell the stories. A PIO is the answer to this
> problem. Remember, the media is going to get the story from someone.
> The information might as well come from a logical source\"** (Schaper
> 1991, 68).
>
> c\. **\"Public information officers usually come from the ranks. They
> are already members of the department. Depending on the size of your
> organization, a PIO could be assigned a full-time position or could
> work double duties\"** (Schaper 1991, 68).
>
> d\. **\"The person should speak well and think quickly. Your
> prospective PIO should have a pleasant personality and a professional
> appearance, which projects a positive image of your department\'s
> expertise and standards . . . . The PIO should have the ability to
> quickly gather information and prepare for interviews\"** (Schaper
> 1991, 68).
>
> e\. **\"Accurate reporting requires accurate information. An on-site
> Press Officer (PO) can provide control and access of the site in
> coordinating media personnel on the scene while also functioning as a
> qualified source of information\"** (Allison 1984, 39).
>
> f\. **\"The task of making information available to the media is more
> complicated than it sounds. It requires skilled personnel. On occasion
> these may be trained public relations personnel who can handle the
> pressure of a disaster situation and convey information accurately on
> radio and television. It may also require the presence of experts who
> have some sense of media needs\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 126).
>
> g\. **\"While preparation for any interface with the media is
> important, television requires special attention. Public relations
> professionals describe television as an emotional medium, rather than
> an intellectual one. They say that, while viewers will often forget
> the content of your message, they will remember your style: how you
> looked, your manner, and the quality of your voice\"** (Auf der Heide,
> 1987, Chapter 10, p. 25).
>
> h\. **\"Sometime fear of the media can be the interviewee\'s worst
> enemy. One way of tackling this problem is to avoid facing the
> interview alone. Instead, assemble a group of experts and
> spokespersons and face the media as a team\"** (Auf der Heide, 1987,
> Chapter 10, p. 25).
>
> 2\. **Identifying the media and planning with them**.
>
> a\. **\"The first step toward adequate media planning is, therefore,
> to establish what media exist and whether they have the capacity to
> survive a disaster\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 125).
>
> b\. **\"In establishing contact with the media, probably the best
> place to start is at the top. In print, this means the publisher or
> editor; in broadcasting, the owner or station manager\"** (Scanlon et.
> al. 1985, 126).
>
> c\. **\"Making the media an active partner in disaster planning is by
> far the best way to educate them about the disaster process\"**
> (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 130).
>
> d\. **It is necessary to plug \"the media into all stages of this
> planning process\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 126).
>
> e\. **\"In developing these plans for media relations, it is essential
> to keep local media informed and involved\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985,
> 129).
>
> f\. **\"Ultimately, the group \[of planners\] should develop a
> policy - one that will be flexible enough to deal with the
> complexities of the situation, and clear enough to help new media
> personnel deal with fast breaking, tense, life-and-death
> situations\"** (Onder 1999, 26).
>
> g\. **\"Usually, a good community plan calls for coordination and
> control through one central emergency operations center (EOC) and
> specifies that all information about the disaster must flow as quickly
> and correctly as possible to that center\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985,
> 126).
>
> 3\. **Developing other policies and train everyone** involved.
>
> a\. **\"Agencies need to develop a public information policy for
> dispatch and conduct training in its use\"** (Cowan 1996, 28).
>
> b\. **\"Agencies need to recognize the need to develop a policy,
> provide training, and, if possible, secure the additional personnel
> necessary to handle the calls that will most certainly come from
> harried editors during newsworthy incidents\"** (Cowan 1996, 30).
>
> 4\. Recognizing the need to **develop relationships and contracts**
> before the occurrence of disaster.
>
> a\. **\"For the media, a closer working relationship with the people
> in dispatch, instead of the irregular, heat-of-the-moment, rushed
> phone call to faceless name might make news gathering a little
> easier\"** (Cowan 1996, 31).
>
> b\. **\"The time for communication between the media and law
> enforcement regarding terrorism strategies, tactics and policy matters
> comes before the incident. This will go a long way to establish a
> rapport that is based on forthrightness, openness and trust\"** (Onder
> 1999, 26).
>
> c\. **\"In many communities, media, law enforcement and other
> emergency service organizations meet regularly to discuss public
> information issues. These groups often meet bimonthly to discuss how
> to work together more effectively during complex, major incidences
> where media is involved (e.g., plane crash). Here it is important to
> give media personnel some basic understanding of hostage negotiation
> strategies, the tactical reasons for information dispersement, and
> other issues that affect media coverage\"** (Onder 1999, 26).
>
> d\. **\"Agencies can enter into agreements with these local wire
> services (as well as Associated Press and United Press International)
> to provide them with fast, accurate information. That information is
> then quickly relayed to client news operations. There is no reason to
> call dispatch if the newsroom is getting the information it needs\"**
> (Cowan 1996, 31).
>
> 5\. **Educating the media** about disasters.
>
> a\. **\"Those in the news part of the media business need to
> understand more about how a dispatch center works. They need to
> understand that dispatchers often don\'t have any more information
> than that which is heard over a scanner. Editors need to understand
> that dispatchers are handling an incredible amount of telephone and
> radio calls and can\'t take the time to answer dozens of questions.
> Reporters should find alternate ways to get the basic information
> necessary to get to the scene, then develop more information from
> sources at the scene\"** (Cowan 1996, 31).**\"The media should be
> told, for example, that panic rarely occurs in disaster, and that
> warnings are effective only if they are not countermanded by other,
> contradictory material\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 129).
>
> b\. **\"The media should also be told that they should report all the
> facts possible\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 129).
>
> c\. **\"Media should also be warned that even slight adjustments to
> carefully worded announcements can cause problems. . . . Media should
> be asked to broadcast such statements as written\"** (Scanlon et. al.
> 1985, 129).
>
> 6\. **Being cognizant of your audience and media market**.
>
> a\. **\"Awareness of audience can also enable disaster planners to
> design an education package that will be effective in reaching all the
> people it is designed to serve\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 125).
>
> b\. **\"Market information can be used to determine how certain
> language and/or cultural groups can be reached or if they can be
> reached at all\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 125).
>
> 6\. **Conduct an exercise and anticipate media needs**.
>
> a\. **\"Once the exercise is over they should be invited to sit in as
> full partners in the post-mortem providing their views about what went
> wrong and what went right\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 130).
>
> b\. **\"Do your homework and be ready with answers. Background
> material, graphs, charts, and illustrations can sometimes be assembled
> in advance to help convey what you will want to say\"** (Auf der
> Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 23).
>
> c\. **\"The Press Officer and the agency he represents should prepare
> as much as possible for the unknown. . . . Necessary materials include
> news release forms designated exclusively for the major response and
> easily stored in a standard three-ring notebook. Skeletal in format,
> an emergency news release can address the basics for reporting and
> updating events as they occur. Each release, when made, should be
> numbered in order of release and all information requested by the form
> should be provided even if repetitive. Taking those few minutes to
> complete the release allows the PO to organize his thoughts in
> preparation\"** (Allison 1984, 39).

III\. An emergency manager and others **should help the media report the
news, but do so with several points in mind**.

> A. **Recognizing what the media is searching for as well as the
> dangers** inherent in providing information to the media.
>
> 1\. **\"The reporter assumes that everything you say and everything he
> sees is \'on-the-record\' and fair game unless specifically agreed to
> the contrary in advance. It is wise, therefore, when talking to the
> press, either in person on the phone, to assume that anything you say
> might be published. If you feel the information you provide should be
> anonymous, you might be better off not giving the interview at all\"**
> (Auf der Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 23).
>
> 2\. **\"Reporters have shown they can use all sorts of ingenuity in
> acquiring information. . . . A second reason why withholding
> information may be ineffective is that the media often have unofficial
> access to official sources by monitoring various government radio
> frequencies and by maintaining a well-developed network of
> \'professional\' tipsters\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1996, 128).
>
> 3\. **\"Always reinforce the commitment to assist the media whenever
> possible but remind reporters of the need for adherence to rules for
> the protection of all concerned\"** (Allison 1984, 42).
>
> B. **Obtain the facts and be careful about hiding information**.
>
> 1\. **\"Do not talk to the media until you are ready. Get the facts .
> . . . Always be honest\"** (Shaper 1991, 69).
>
> 2\. **\"A delicate balance must be achieved between refusing to answer
> questions and giving hasty or ill-conceived responses\"** (Allison
> 1984, 39).
>
> 3\. **\"Never hesitate to say, \'I don\'t know\" if asked a question
> to which an answer is not readily available. Assure reporters that the
> answer will be provided as quickly as possible and don\'t forget to do
> so\"** (Allison 1984, 42).
>
> 4\. **\"Disasters are characterized by uncertainty. Often, accurate
> information about the extent of the destruction, dangers to public
> safety, cause of the incident, and other matters of interest to the
> media is simply not available early on. The interviewee should be able
> to admit what he doesn\'t know, and avoid speculating on the answers.
> Instead, he should state that he will try to determine the facts as
> soon as practical and make this information available\"** (Auf der
> Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 24).
>
> 5\. **\"If something comes up which the spokesperson considers
> dangerous, it is not unreasonable to ask the media to hold on briefly
> so that material can be checked out. If an error has been committed,
> it is best to admit it at once. Errors which are concealed will leak
> out and cause far more difficulty than if they are immediately
> disclosed. Finally it is advisable never to say \'no comment\' when
> talking to a reporter. This usually is taken to imply that there is
> something to hide. If information cannot be made available then a
> reason should be given\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 127).
>
> C. **Determine location of on-scene briefings and activate EOC**.
>
> 1\. **A media staging area must be established, preferably for all
> responding agencies** (Onder 1999, 26).
>
> 2\. **\"The lead agency . . . can . . .establish a media center
> outside the controlled area and appoint a senior official to be in
> charge\"** (Payne 1994, 30).
>
> 3\. **\"Another way to reduce the media\'s disruptive activities is to
> channel their information-seeking behavior. This can be done by
> contacting the various media and informing them where centralized
> information can be reached. . . . \[or by using\] automated or
> computerized devices to give regular news updates\"** (Auf der Heide,
> 1987, Chapter 10, p. 22).
>
> 4\. **\"Once on the scene of a major-response incident, the PO should
> assess available information and determine if a central location for a
> press headquarters is required and, if so, designate its location. The
> seriousness of the situation influences the need for such a location
> whether it\'s a structure or a designated area away from the scene
> that has simply been roped off. . . . A centralized press location
> will keep reporters out of the way of rescue personnel and facilitate
> the accurate, prompt delivery of information to the media by the
> PO\"** (Allison 1984, 42).
>
> 5\. **\"An EOC must be established as quickly as possible and the
> media should be aware where it will be and how they will fit into
> it\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 128).
>
> 6\. **\"An efficient EOC briefing operation is an instrument of media
> control, especially if it is located inside a perimeter through which
> emergency and media personnel but not others can pass. Because all
> media will want to be part of the briefings, they are likely to be
> willing to accept some discipline in order to gain access\"** (Scanlon
> et. al. 1985, 126).
>
> E. **Give the media sufficient and easy-to-understand information**.
>
> 1\. **\"Unless emergency officials come up with something to satisfy
> media appetites, the media will find things to report\"** (Scanlon et.
> al. 1996, 128).
>
> 2\. **\"The holding of regular press conferences facilitates the flow
> of official on-the-record information. Without that regular and
> frequent supply of facts, unofficial hearsay and speculation will be
> substituted by the media. Unlike the official sources, they cannot
> have \'nothing to say\'\"** (Payne 1994, 29).
>
> 3\. **It is necessary to brief the media at least twice a day** (Onder
> 1999, 27).
>
> 4\. **\"The goal, of course, is to give media as much information as
> possible\"** (Onder 1999, 28).
>
> 5\. **\"If media being seen or heard in the affected area are not
> present at briefings at the EOC, it is essential that they be kept
> up-to-date with accurate information\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 127).
>
> 6\. **\"It is generally accepted that the best policy is to be as
> forthcoming and helpful as possible in dealings with the media. In
> particular, the aim should be to provide the media with as much
> factual information about incidents as possible, provided disclosure
> would not compromise judicial process; the information is not
> confidential; it will not hamper operations; there is no invasion of
> privacy\"** (Payne 1994, 29).
>
> 7\. **\"Remember that you are not talking to an audience of fellow
> experts. Avoid using technical terminology and jargon. This only
> confuses the public or makes them think you are trying to hide
> something. On the other hand, avoid \'talking down\' to the audience
> too. Be human; strive for an informal, conversational tone, while
> still maintaining a professional demeanor\"** (Auf der Heide, 1987,
> Chapter 10, p. 25).
>
> F. **Ensure accurate communication.**
>
> 1\. **\"The interviewee should ask the reporter to rephrase the
> question if what is being asked is not clear (e.g., Did you mean . .
> .?). Do not allow misleading or inaccurate comments or statements to
> go unchallenged. Correct any bad information built into the questions.
> The longer misinformation lingers before being corrected, the more it
> gains credibility. Refute it politely, offering a brief explanation,
> and move on to the topics you want to cover\"** (Auf der Heide, 1987,
> Chapter 10, p. 25).
>
> 2\. **\"Spokespersons should never repeat media suggestions if these
> are inaccurate, but should reply in their own more moderate words.
> They should not talk about panic or looting, since these things rarely
> occur, but rather should discuss the calmness of the public and the
> self-control being demonstrated\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 127).
>
> 3\. **In the case of phone interviews: \"Find out to whom you are
> speaking, so your answers can best meet the needs of the interviewer.
> Also get a phone number so you can call back with additional important
> information or corrections. Find out when and how the material is
> going to be used and who the target audience is. Be sure you have a
> clear telephone connection. Unfortunate misquotes can result because a
> statement was not clearly heard. Have your interview statements read
> back to you\"** (Auf der Heide, 1987, Chapter 10, p. 26).
>
> G. **Ensure PIOs are visible and are coordinating with department
> leaders** to ensure a unified voice.
>
> 1\. **\"Locally, Sedgwick County EMS command officers are supplied
> with blue vests to be worn during a major response incident to ensure
> easy identification by other command levels when in a crowd. The PO is
> no exception. Clear identification proves to be invaluable in total
> organization of the press communication function as well as assuring
> access to the command levels\"** (Allison 1984, 40).
>
> 2\. **\"The Incident and Medical Commanders should be accessible to
> the PO at all time during the emergency situation. The text of all
> announcements, releases and, whenever possible, answers to expected
> questions by the media should be discussed between the Incident and
> Medical Commanders and the PO in advance of releasing information\"**
> (Allison 1984, 40).
>
> 3\. **\"The press liaison officer (PLO) needs to be briefed to deal
> with media enquiries and to act in liaison with others to whom the
> media will go for information. It is worth remembering that in the
> Piper Alpha disaster, media liaison was fragmented, with**
> **conflicting statements to the press from different organizations\"**
> (Payne 1994, 30).
>
> 4\. **\"Create a Public Information Officer Team. Maintain a recorded
> message for the media, updated regularly. Develop a media notification
> system\"** (Cowan 1996, 30).
>
> H. **Record and periodically assess media reporting**.
>
> 1\. **\"Carry that small tape recorder in the breast pocket of your
> uniform. When announcements and releases are made, record the
> announcements you give to reporters. Be ready to play the recording to
> the Incident Commander and analyze how the reports are being received
> by the media\"** (Allison 1984, 42).
>
> 2\. **It is important to keep track of what is being reported, to make
> corrections as needed** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 127).
>
> 3\. **\"At press conferences, it is important to check the
> accreditation of all persons attending; record the proceedings and
> make the media aware of it; set up a press cuttings service to search
> all newspapers for comment about the incident\"** (Payne 1994, 31).
>
> I. **Ensure safety of the media.**
>
> 1\. **\"Once it\'s determined that the site is completely safe, the PO
> should escort reporters and photographers to the emergency area.
> Safety equipment such as hard hats should be made available and
> provisions made in advance for distribution to members of the press as
> required\"** (Allison 1984, 42).
>
> J. **Keep close tabs on the media during criminal or terrorist
> incidents**.
>
> 1\. **\"Media should be asked to voluntarily withhold sensitive
> information. . . . Such information might include: Information that
> would compromise the secrecy of officials\' planning and execution.
> Words or pictures that could divulge the tactics or position of
> officers, SWAT team members or fire and EMS personnel. Pictures that
> show the hostage takers or hostages, close-ups of the windows where
> they may station police officers, etc.\"** (Onder 1999, 28).
>
> 2\. **\"Media should avoid contact with hostage-takers. . . .
> Reporters are not trained negotiators. One wrong question or
> inappropriate remark could jeopardize the resolution of the
> conflict.** **Furthermore, discussions with hostage-takers could tie
> up telephone lines and delay sensitive communication efforts by
> negotiators\"** (Onder 1999, 28).
>
> 3\. **\"Media should not negotiate with terrorists\"** (Onder 1999,
> 29).
>
> 4\. **\"Media should immediately notify law enforcement authorities if
> the hostage-takers call them\"** (Onder 1999, 29).
>
> 5\. **\"Media should use restraint in reporting hostage-taker demands.
> . . . The media should consider not reading the demands verbatim, but
> paraphrasing them in a general way. This will help minimize the
> perception by the hostage-taker that the media is an automatic, open
> channel to the public\"** (Onder 1999, 29).
>
> 6\. **\"Media should keep their helicopters out of the area.
> Helicopters confuse hostage-takers by \'signaling an impending
> assault,\' show live shots that show tactical operations and SWAT team
> position; serve as a tantalizing target for hostage-takers with
> weapons; noise can drown out telephone discussion; helicopters with
> spot lights, used at night, are threatening; and, contribute to an
> inappropriate, \'circus-like atmosphere\'\"** (Onder 1999, 30).
>
> 7\. **\"Media should avoid using antagonizing language during
> broadcasts\"** (Onder 1999, 30).
>
> 8\. **\"Media should avoid conducting a \'play-by-play\' analysis of
> law enforcement tactical actions . . . . \[For instance,\] \'Gosh,
> they have sharpshooters all around the building, this guy doesn\'t
> have a chance\' or \'The fire trucks are arriving so they\'re about to
> gas the place\'\"** (Onder 1999, 30)
>
> K. **Burkhart\'s study** of scientists\' views of Three Mile Island,
> Bhopal and Chernobyl reveals a number of **proposals to ensure
> accurate journalism**:
>
> 1\. **Deal in facts. Don\'t sensationalize**.
>
> 2\. **Spare the victims unnecessary media exposure.**
>
> 3\. **Stay neutral about the controversies**.
>
> 4\. **Slow down. Be a little more like scientists; give the facts time
> to emerge.**
>
> 5\. **Ensure that each fact is correct, a tip that accuracy-minded
> journalists might be surprised to hear from others.**
>
> 6\. **Attribute everything to named sources. Don\'t use unnamed
> ones.**
>
> 7\. **Run your draft by your sources.**
>
> 8\. **Avoid the pseudo-expert, the scientist speaking outside his area
> of expertise.**
>
> 9\. **When experts disagree, say so. Science is often inconclusive,
> and the news treatment should be so as well.**
>
> 10\. **Admit your limitations. A reporter is only a reporter, and
> shouldn\'t have all the answers\"** (Burkhart 1987, 358-359).

IV\. After a disaster, the emergency manager and public information
officer(s) should **review the incident to improve future media
relations**.

> A. **\"The material gathered by the media before, during, and after
> the disaster should be collected for official review, training, and
> for future public education\"** (Scanlon et. al. 1985, 132).
>
> B. **\"A story never ends when the emergency is over. The follow-up
> can be of great importance to your agency. Stories should be developed
> and accurately placed regarding efforts to aid victims, future
> safeguards, reconstructions and any actions to thank the community for
> its help. A list of community leaders and organizations should be sent
> positive follow-up materials (news clippings, etc.) as well as any
> appropriate thank-you letters\"** (Allison 1984, 42).

**Objective 17.5 Provide students with experience in dealing with the
media by having them role play in a fictitious disaster scenario.**

**Requirements:**

**Reinforce class discussions with the following student activity.**

I. **Divide the students into pairs**. One student should be assigned
the **role of the reporter** and the other should be assigned to act as
**the emergency manager/responder/PIO**. Give the students the **Mock
Disaster Scenario** handout or tell the students that you will read an
excerpt about a fictitious disaster. The **reporter will ask a
question** about the scenario and the **emergency manager/responder/PIO
will give an answer**. The **emergency manager/responder/PIO represents
the community of Hollywood, Florida**.

Note: It might be wise to **force students to interact with someone they
do not normally sit with or talk to in class**. This will provide **a
more realistic situation** in that the reporter and emergency
manager/responder/PIO will not necessarily know each other or be able to
read body language and personal demeanor.

II\. **Read the following scenario excerpts** and **allow the students
sufficient time to ask questions and provide a reply**. Once everyone
has had a chance to participate, proceed to the next scenario excerpt.

A. Scenario excerpt 1:

> **On Saturday, September 13, a tropical depression developed in the
> Atlantic Ocean - nearly 2,000 miles away from the Southeastern shores
> of the United States. To date, this is the third such storm of the
> season. Meteorologists at the National Hurricane Center assert that it
> is far too early to determine the path of this weather system**.

B. Scenario excerpt 2:

> **On Thursday, September 18, the tropical depression is upgraded to a
> hurricane with sustained winds of more than 82 mph. The location of
> the storm is 13.0º North and 45.4º East. It continues to travel
> westward at about 23 mph. Forecasters are still unable to predict the
> destination of Hurricane Cassey. Leaders in Hollywood, Florida decide
> to put the emergency operations center on alert**.

C. Scenario excerpt 3:

> **By Tuesday, September 23, Hurricane Cassey has been upgraded to a
> category 3 storm with winds clocked between 111-130 mph. The storm is
> approaching St. Kits in the Caribbean (17.0º North and 61.7º East) but
> is now turning to Northwest. By now it is becoming clear that Cassey
> will make landfall somewhere in the Southeastern region of the United
> States. Residents are urged to take serious preparations most likely
> to include an evacuation along the coast of Florida. Public officials,
> local emergency managers and the Florida Division of Emergency
> Management are encouraging people from the Keys to Jacksonville to
> closely monitor the storm, which is expected to make landfall in the
> late afternoon or evening on Thursday, September 25. People are
> encouraged to take several steps for preparedness, including storing
> food, bottled water, and purchasing batteries. The emergency
> operations center in Hollywood, Florida is now fully activated**.
>
> D. Scenario excerpt 4:
>
> **On Wednesday, September 24 at 2:45 am, the National Hurricane Center
> upgrades Cassey to a category 4 hurricane. It is now located to the
> Southwest of the Great Bahama Bank (approximately (21.8º North and
> 75.3º East) and is headed toward the Southeastern tip of Andros
> Island. The storm now possesses a storm surge estimated at 13 feet.
> News reports indicate that the storm caused structural damage in the
> eastern portion of the Dominican Republic. Winds broke windows and
> ripped roofs off of hundreds of houses, signs and power poles were
> toppled in many areas, and rain produced modest flooding in low lying
> areas. Meteorologists now predict that the storm will affect the
> Southern tip of Florida. Officials also encourage all residents and
> businesses along the coast from the Keys to West Palm Beach to
> evacuate inland and leave no later than 3:00 pm. About 150,000 people
> are in need of evacuation. The storm is predicted to make landfall
> between Miami and Fort Lauderdale on Thursday, September 25 at 5:00
> pm. Public safety officials and utility companies advise people that
> power may be lost in some areas and not restored in a period of 2 days
> to 1 week. The Red Cross has announced the opening and location of 45
> shelters in inland locations. The emergency operations center decides
> to hold press briefings every 3 hours to update the media on the
> storm\'s progress**.

III\. Have the students **reverse roles**, and **continue** with the
remaining scenario injects.

> A. Scenario excerpt 5:
>
> **By the early morning (4:30 am) of Thursday, September 25, the outer
> bands of the storm have started to adversely affect Southeastern
> Florida. Heavy rain has inundated some areas and wind speeds are
> rising. Meteorologists predict that the eye of the storm will hit near
> Hollywood, Florida, at about 7:30 pm. Public safety officials now tell
> people that the evacuation cut-off point has arrived; people are now
> advised that it is too late to leave and that they should ride out the
> storm in a safe location. Meteorologists encourage people to stay
> tuned to weather reports as Cassey may also produce small tornadoes.**

B. Scenario excerpt 6:

> **By 9:00 pm on Thursday, September 25, it becomes evident that Cassey
> is the largest Hurricane to hit Florida since Hurricane Andrew in
> 1992. Beachfront homes have already been decimated, and several roads
> have been washed out or flooded. Other buildings (homes and
> businesses) around Hollywood and surrounding cities have received
> structural damage. As predicted, power has been lost in numerous
> areas. There are** **no official numbers of people affected or
> injured, but emergency officials are now scrambling to gather further
> information. The emergency operations center is now buzzing with
> activity. Public Safety officials recognize that they must reiterate
> the importance of staying inside and avoid crossing high water
> streets.**

C. Scenario excerpt 7:

> **After a long night of coastal flooding, heavy rain, and intense
> winds, Cassey moves further inland on a path toward Tampa, Pensacola
> and Mobile, Alabama. Fortunately, no tornadoes have been reported.
> However, fire fighters have been dispatched to various neighborhoods
> to search for trapped individuals. During the morning of Friday,
> September 26, local, state and federal officials begin to assess
> damages. By noon, it is believed that at least 200 buildings have been
> completely destroyed and approximately 2,500 have received substantial
> damage. Reports are now coming in regarding deaths and injuries, but
> the numbers are not clear. At least 14 people have died as a result of
> building collapses or flooding. A quick survey of hospitals in the
> area reveals that at least 75 people have been injured with minor cuts
> or major lacerations and blunt force trauma. The police encourage
> people to stay out of the area, unless they are returning to assess
> damages or start the clean up process. Roadblocks have been set up
> around the city to ensure that only local residents and business
> owners have access to the area. The Red Cross notes that it is
> sheltering approximately 3,200 people (most of the evacuees are
> staying at hotels or relatives' homes).**

D. Scenario excerpt 8:

> **On Saturday, September 27, the state works with FEMA to obtain
> Presidential disaster declarations in several counties (including that
> of Hollywood, Florida). With the help of the federal government, the
> state and local governments begin to clear roads. FEMA has also
> brought in ice and water for those individuals that need these
> resources. This agency under the Department of Homeland Security has
> announced numbers for people to call to request federal disaster
> assistance. Utility companies estimate that it will take at least 3
> days before electricity is restored (and may even be as long as 1
> week). The Red Cross asserts that all of their shelters will be open
> for at least 1 week and others may remain open for indefinite periods
> due to the large number of people made homeless by the storm (nearly
> 2,200). The EOC continues to oversee debris management efforts and
> road closures; it is also communicating with hospitals, utility
> companies and state and federal personnel. A Disaster Field Office and
> a few Disaster Recovery Centers are expected to be open in the next
> 24-48 hours. The emergency manager wants to make sure that people stay
> in**-tune with the media for updates and disaster assistance
> information. The EOC will hold one media briefing at 8:00 am, noon,
> 4:00 and 9:00 each day for the next several days. Preliminary recovery
> operations will last for several weeks. Debris management issues and
> rebuilding will take several months.

IV\. **Conclude with a** **discussion** about the exercise.

A. **Possible questions** to be asked include:

1\. **What did you learn from this experience?**

> 2\. **Was it difficult to respond effectively** to the questions being
> asked?
>
> 3\. **What mistakes did you make?**
>
> 4\. **How would you change your replies** if you had a chance to give
> them over again?
>
> 5\. **Did this exercise help you to appreciate those performing the
> PIO function?**

**Questions to be asked:**

**1. Why is the media important to the emergency manager?**

**2. What are the different types of media and what do they desire?**

**3. How does the media behave in disasters?**

**4. What challenges and pitfalls should the emergency manager,
emergency responder and PIO be aware of when they interact with the
media?**

**5. What can be done to effectively manage the media in a disaster
situation?**

**6. What did you learn from the in-class exercise?**

**Importance of the Media**

> **A. Help to warn the public about an impending hazard.**
>
> **B. Provide information regarding evacuation and sheltering.**
>
> **C. Describe what people can do to protect themselves and others.**
>
> **D. Relay what the government is doing and how they are responding to
> the disaster.**
>
> **E. List what organizations are providing relief and how assistance
> can be given or obtained.**
>
> **F. Educate the public on preventive and preparedness measures.**
>
> **G. Minimize the number of incoming calls to a disaster-stricken
> areas (e.g., from concerned relatives).**

**H. Generate support for emergency management personnel and programs.**

**Media Characteristics**

> **Types**
>
> **1. Local**
>
> **2. Regional**
>
> **3. National**
>
> **4. International**
>
> **Means**
>
> **1. Radio**
>
> **2. Television/Cable/Satellite**
>
> **3. Internet/Print**

**Media Behavior**

> **1. Hear of a disaster event.**
>
> **2. Immediately report the news of that incident.**
>
> **3. Search for additional information via telephone or personal
> interviews.**
>
> **4. Send reporters to the scene.**
>
> **5. Request additional information.**
>
> **6. Shape the story.**
>
> **7. Other**
>
> **(Scanlon and Alldred 1982; Scanlon et. al. 1985)**

**Problems to be Expected**

> 1\. **Convergence at the scene**.
>
> 2\. **Additional demands placed on emergency managers and
> responders**.
>
> 3\. **Interference with response operations**.
>
> 4\. **Creation of safety problems**.
>
> 5\. **Lack of technical understanding**.
>
> 6\. **Misrepresentations and perpetuation of myths**.
>
> 7\. **Damage to individual or agency reputation.**

**Dealing with the Media**

-   Appoint a Public Information Officer.

-   Identify the media and plan with them.

-   Develop other policies and train everyone involved.

-   Develop relationships and contracts.

-   Educate the media about disasters.

-   Recognize your audience and market.

-   Conduct an exercise and anticipate media needs.

-   Recognizing the dangers.

-   Obtain the facts and be honest.

-   Locate media area and activate EOC.

-   Give sufficient and easy to understand information.

-   Ensure accurate communication.

-   Coordinate with department leaders.

-   Record and assess reporting.

-   Ensure safety.

-   Closely monitor media during criminal or terrorist incidents.

-   Review the incident to improve future media relations.

**Mock Disaster Scenario**

Scenario excerpt 1:

> On Saturday, September 13, a tropical depression developed in the
> Atlantic Ocean - nearly 2,000 miles away from the Southeastern shores
> of the United States. To date, this is the third such storm of the
> season. Meteorologists at the National Hurricane Center assert that it
> is far too early to determine the path of this weather system.

Scenario excerpt 2:

> On Thursday, September 18, the tropical depression is upgraded to a
> hurricane with sustained winds of more than 82 mph. The location of
> the storm is 13.0º North and 45.4º East. It continues to travel
> westward at about 23 mph. Forecasters are still unable to predict the
> destination of Hurricane Cassey. Leaders in Hollywood, Florida decide
> to put the emergency operations center on alert.

Scenario excerpt 3:

> By Tuesday, September 23, Hurricane Cassey has been upgraded to a
> category 3 storm with winds clocked between 111-130 mph. The storm is
> approaching St. Kits in the Carribbean (17.0º North and 61.7º East)
> but is now turning to Northwest. By now it is becoming clear that
> Cassey will make landfall somewhere in the Southeastern region of the
> United States. Residents are urged to being serious preparations most
> likely to include an evacuation along the coast of Florida. Public
> officials, local emergency managers and the Florida Division of
> Emergency Management are encouraging people from the Keys to
> Jacksonville to closely monitor the storm, which is expected to make
> landfall in the late afternoon or evening on Thursday, September 25.
> People are encouraged to take several steps for preparedness,
> including storing food, bottled water, and purchasing batteries. The
> emergency operations center in Hollowood, Florida is now fully
> activated.

Scenario excerpt 4:

> On Wednesday, September 24 at 2:45 am, the National Hurricane Center
> upgrades Cassey to a category 4 hurricane. It is now located to the
> Southwest of the Great Bahama Bank (approximately (21.8º North and
> 75.3º East) and is headed toward the Southeastern tip of Andros
> Island. The storm now possesses a storm surge estimated at 13 feet.
> News reports indicate that the storm caused structural damage in the
> eastern portion of the Dominican Republic. Winds broke windows and
> ripped roofs off of hundreds of houses, signs and power poles were
> toppled in many areas, and rain produced modest flooding in low lying
> areas. Meteorologists now predict that the storm will affect the
> Southern tip of Florida. Officials also encourage all residents and
> businesses along the coast from the keys to West Palm Beach to
> evacuate inland and leave no later than 3:00 pm. About 150,000 people
> are in need of evacuation. The storm is predicted to make landfall
> between Miami and Fort Lauderdale on Thursday, September 25 at 5:00
> pm. Public safety officials and utility companies advise people that
> power may be lost in some areas and not restored a period of 2 days to
> 1 week. The Red Cross has announced the opening and location of 45
> shelters in inland locations. The emergency operations center decides
> to hold press briefings every 3 hours to update the media on the
> storm\'s progress.

Scenario excerpt 5:

> By the early morning (4:30 am) of Thursday, September 25, the outer
> bands of the storm have started to adversely affect Southeastern
> Florida. Heavy rain has inundated some areas and wind speeds are
> rising. Meteorologists predict that the eye of the storm will hit near
> Hollywood, Florida, at about 7:30 pm. Public safety officials now tell
> people that the evacuation cut-off point has arrived; people are now
> advised that it is too late to leave and that they should ride out the
> storm in a safe location. Meteorologists encourage people to stay
> tuned to weather reports as Cassey may also produce small tornadoes.

Scenario excerpt 6:

> By 9:00 pm on Thursday, September 25, it becomes evident that Cassey
> is the largest Hurricane to hit Florida since Hurricane Andrew in
> 1992. Beachfront homes have already been decimated, and several roads
> have been washed out or flooded. Other buildings (homes and
> businesses) around Hollywood and surrounding cities have received
> structural damage. As predicted, power has been lost in numerous
> areas. There are no official numbers of people affected or injured,
> but emergency officials are now scrambling to gather further
> information. The emergency operations center is now buzzing with
> activity. Public Safety officials recognize that they must reiterate
> the importance of staying inside and avoid crossing high water
> streets.

Scenario excerpt 7:

> After a long night of coastal flooding, heavy rain, and intense winds,
> Cassey moves further inland on a path toward Tampa, Pensacola and
> Mobile, Alabama. Fortunately, no tornadoes have been reported.
> However, fire fighters have been dispatched to various neighborhoods
> to search for trapped individuals. During the morning of Friday,
> September 26, local, state and federal officials begin to assess
> damages. By noon, it is believed that at least 200 buildings have been
> completely destroyed and approximately 2,500 have received substantial
> damage. Reports are now coming in regarding deaths and injuries, but
> the numbers are not clear. At least 14 people have died as a result of
> building collapses or flooding. A quick survey of hospitals in the
> area reveals that at least 75 people have been injured with minor cuts
> or major lacerations and blunt force trauma. The police encourage
> people to stay out of the area, unless they are returning to assess
> damages or start the clean up process. Roadblocks have been set up
> around the city to ensure that only local residents and business
> owners have access to the area. The Red Cross notes that it is
> sheltering approximately 3,200 people (most of the evacuees are
> staying at hotels or relatives' homes).

Scenario excerpt 8:

> On Saturday, September 27, the state works with FEMA to obtain
> Presidential disaster declarations in several counties (including that
> of Hollywood, Florida). With the help of the federal government, the
> state and local governments begin to clear roads. FEMA has also
> brought in ice and water for those individuals that need these
> resources. This agency under the Department of Homeland Security has
> announced numbers for people to call to request federal disaster
> assistance. Utility companies estimate that it will take at least 3
> days before electricity is restored (and may even be as long as 1
> week). The Red Cross asserts that all of their shelters will be open
> for at least 1 week and others may remain open for indefinite periods
> due to the large number of people made homeless by the storm (nearly
> 2,200). The EOC continues to oversee debris management efforts and
> road closures; it is also communicating with hospitals, utility
> companies and state and federal personnel. A Disaster Field Office and
> a few Disaster Recovery Centers are expected to be open in the next
> 24-48 hours. The emergency manager wants to make sure that people stay
> in-tune with the media for updates and disaster assistance
> information. The EOC will hold one media briefing at 8:00 am, noon,
> 4:00 and 9:00 each day for the next several days. Preliminary recovery
> operations will last for several weeks. Debris management issues and
> rebuilding will take several months.