# ![](media/image1.png)OFFICIAL TEXT

**International Religious Freedom Report 2003\
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor**

(Begin Text)

The 2003 Report covers the period from July 1, 2002, to June 30, 2003.\
\
The Constitution provides for \"all persons the right to worship
according to his or her own religion or belief,\" and states that \"the
nation is based upon belief in one supreme God,\" and the Government
generally respects these provisions; however, there are some
restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized
religions. The Government gives official recognition in the form of
representation at the Ministry of Religious Affairs to five major
faiths: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. While
only these five religions are officially recognized, the law does not
forbid other religions.

The Government made considerable progress in some areas, such as
reducing interreligious violence in the Maluku islands and Central
Sulawesi, and arresting and prosecuting terrorists and religious
extremists for carrying out religiously motivated attacks. However, in
several cases the Government failed to hold religious extremists
responsible for murder and other crimes.

After brokering peace accords signed by Christian and Muslim community
leaders in the provinces of Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi,
the Government deployed large numbers of troops and police in key
conflict areas and encouraged Java-based Islamic extremists to depart.
Interreligious violence decreased in all three provinces; the death toll
in the Malukus fell by two-thirds. Peaceful conditions prompted many
displaced persons to return to their homes, particularly in Central
Sulawesi, and the Government and several nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) facilitated these returns. Nevertheless, there were localized
incidents of interreligious violence in these provinces. At least 55
persons were killed and at least 291,000 persons remained displaced
during the period covered by this report.

The Government made progress in promoting religious freedom by cracking
down on terrorists and other extremists who carried out attacks in the
name of religion. After members of Jemaah Islamiyah (\"Islamic
Community\" or JI), a terrorist organization committed to the goal of
creating an Islamic super-state in Southeast Asia, bombed two nightclubs
in Bali on October 12, 2002, killing 202 people, the Government
aggressively tracked down and arrested at least 32 individuals. JI
members confessed to dozens of terrorist attacks in previous years,
including the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings of churches across the country
that killed 19 persons. The Government charged the group\'s leader Abu
Bakar Ba\'asyir with treason, and his trial began in Jakarta in April.
The trial was ongoing as of the end of the reporting period. Police
arrested and prosecuted at least 18 suspects that were members of Laskar
Jundullah (\"Army of God\"), a militia that in earlier years carried out
attacks against Christians in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. The Islamic
militia Laskar Jihad, which had killed large numbers of Malukan
Christians, officially disbanded in October 2002.

There were, however, some setbacks for respect for religious freedom
during this reporting period. The Government failed to hold accountable
many religious extremists who had committed crimes inspired by religious
intolerance. The Government did not prosecute Laskar Jihad members who
had killed and terrorized Christians in the Malukus and Central
Sulawesi, and allowed them to return to their homes, mostly in Java,
without legal recriminations. The Government arrested Laskar Jihad\'s
chief, Jafar Umar Thalib, and charged him with inciting religious
violence and two other relatively minor offenses. On January 30, a
Jakarta court acquitted him, prompting accusations of high-level
intervention.

In Aceh Province, the Government began the operational implementation of
Islamic law, or Shari\'a, on March 3 by issuing a presidential decree
establishing Shari\'a courts. Some citizens worried that implementation
of Shari\'a would provide new powers to already-discredited law
enforcement institutions and provide opportunities for the Government to
intrude in private religious matters. As of the end of the reporting
period, it was not yet clear whether Shari\'a would apply to non-Muslims
in the province. On May 19, the Government imposed full martial law on
Aceh as part of a military operation to crush the separatist movement.
As of the end of the reporting period, the impact of that measure on the
continued implementation of Shari\'a was unclear.

Islamic hardliners sometimes criticized, threatened, or attacked other
Muslims who held a more moderate view of the faith.

Religious extremists, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), again
physically attacked a number of nightclubs, bars, and billiard clubs in
the name of religion, claiming that the establishments were immoral.
There were strong indications that many of these attacks were linked to
extortion and kickback schemes, rather than to religious motives. The
most high-profile attacks occurred in Jakarta on October 5, 2002. The
Government responded by charging the FPI\'s leader, Habib Rizieq, with
inciting violence. Rizieq\'s trial began in Jakarta on May 8 and was
ongoing as of the end of the reporting period.

Certain political parties advocated amending the Constitution to adopt
Shari\'a on a nationwide basis, but Parliamentarians voted down this
proposal, and the country\'s largest Muslim social organizations
remained opposed to the idea.

In the easternmost province of Papua, NGOs reported that Laskar Jihad
fighters were present in considerable numbers early in this reporting
period. However, by June, six months after the group disbanded, there
was no compelling evidence that any such individuals remained in the
province.

Some notable advances in interreligious tolerance and cooperation
occurred during this reporting period. For example, at Christmastime
2002, with fears running high over a repeat of the Christmas 2000
violence, many Muslims joined ranks with their Christian compatriots to
protect churches across the country. In the first half of 2003, many
Muslims and Christians in Maluku and Central Sulawesi worked together to
repair mosques and churches.

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with the
Government in the context of its overall dialog and policy of promoting
human rights. During the period covered by this report, the U.S.
Government actively engaged with religious leaders and with the
Government, and facilitated a number of interfaith conferences and
seminars. These activities involved scholars and university students,
and emphasized the importance of religious freedom and tolerance in a
pluralistic society.

**Section I: Religious Demography**

The country is an archipelago of more than 17,000 islands covering a
total area of approximately 1.8 million square miles (approximately 0.7
million miles are landmass), and its population is approximately 230
million. Approximately half of the population resides on the island of
Java.

There are no reliable, up-to-date statistics on the religious
affiliation of citizens. The latest data available, from 1990, indicated
that 87 percent of the population were Muslim, 6 percent were
Protestant, 3.6 percent were Catholic, 1.8 percent were Hindu, 1 percent
were Buddhist, and 0.6 percent were \"other,\" which includes
traditional indigenous religions, other Christian groups, and Judaism.
However, the country\'s religious composition is a politically charged
issue, and some Christians, Hindus and members of other minority faiths
believe that the 1990 statistics grossly undercounted the true numbers
of non-Muslims. Confucians note that when the Government compiled the
statistics in 1990, restrictions existed on the practice of their faith.
An official census carried out in 1976-77 showed that 0.7 percent of the
population professed Confucianism, but the current number of Confucians
in the country is not known. The law requires adult citizens to carry a
national ID card (KTP), and this card lists the citizen\'s religious
affiliation. During this reporting period, some non-Muslims, such as
animists, found it difficult or impossible to obtain a KTP that
accurately reflected their faith, and consequently, many were identified
incorrectly as Muslims. There is no information available on the number
of atheists, but their numbers are believed to be small.

Muslims are the majority population in most regions of Java, Sumatra,
Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and North Maluku. Muslims are
distinct minorities only in Papua, Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, and parts
of North Sumatra and North Sulawesi. Most Muslims are Sunni, although
there are adherents of other branches of Islam, including the Shi\'a,
who number approximately 100,000 nationwide; Sufi; and Amadhiyah. The
Government maintained an official ban on the activities of the
Amadhiyah. The mainstream Muslim community may be divided into two
groups: \"modernists\" who closely adhere to scriptural orthodox
theology while embracing modern learning and modern concepts; and
predominantly Javanese \"traditionalists,\" often followers of
charismatic religious scholars and organized around Islamic boarding
schools. The leading national \"modernist\" social organization is
Muhammadiyah, which was founded in 1912 and has approximately 30 million
followers and branches throughout the country. The group establishes
mosques, prayer houses, clinics, orphanages, poorhouses, schools and
public libraries, and runs universities. The largest \"traditionalist\"
social organization is the 40-million-strong Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which
is concentrated in Java and was founded in 1926, partly in reaction to
Muhammadiyah. NU focuses on many of the same activities. The two
organizations frequently issue joint statements that promote religious
tolerance and challenge the religious authority of extremists.

There also are small numbers of messianic Islamic groups, including the
Malaysian-affiliated Darul Arqam, whose support base grew during this
reporting period, and the Indonesian Jamaah Salamulla (or Salamulla
Congregation), a syncretist sect that remained numerically small.
Followers of Amadhiyah, whose group expanded during this reporting
period, claim that their leader Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was an Indian Muslim
prophet and that anyone can become a prophet. The Amadhiyahs have 242
branches spread throughout much of the country; there are 8 Amadhiyah
mosques in Jakarta. Another messianic group, Negara Islam Indonesia
(NII), which hopes to turn the country into an Islamic state, lost
support during the reporting period when evidence came to light that
suggested the group had encouraged a member to commit robbery. Another
such group is the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Institute (LDII),
founded in East Java in the 1940s (see Section II, Abuses of Religious
Freedom).

A high percentage of the country\'s Christians reside in the eastern
part of the country. Roman Catholicism accounts for a significant
percentage of the population in much of East Nusa Tenggara Province.
Catholics are also concentrated in southeast Maluku Province.
Protestantism is predominant in the central part of Maluku, North
Maluku, and North Sulawesi. In Papua Protestants predominate in the
north, and Catholics in the south\--the result of a Dutch colonial
policy, continued by the Indonesian Government after independence, of
dividing the territory between foreign Catholic and Protestant
missionaries. Other significant Christian populations are located in
North Sumatra, the seat of the Batak Protestant Church. There also are
significant Christian populations in West Kalimantan (mostly Catholic),
Central Kalimantan (mostly Protestant), and Java, particularly in major
cities. Many urban ethnic Chinese citizens adhere to Christian faiths or
combine Christianity with Buddhism or Confucianism. Smaller Christian
groups include the Jehovah\'s Witnesses, who claim an active membership
of approximately 17,100, not including children.

Over the past 3 decades, internal migration, both government-sponsored
and spontaneous, has altered the demography of the country. In
particular it has increased the percentage of Muslims in the
predominantly Christian eastern part of the country. By the early 1990s,
Christians became a minority for the first time in some areas of the
Malukus. While government-sponsored transmigration of citizens from
heavily populated Java and Madura to more sparsely populated areas of
the country contributed to the increase in the Muslim population in the
areas of resettlement, there is no evidence to suggest that creating a
Muslim majority in Christian areas was the objective of this policy, and
most Muslim migration was spontaneous. Regardless of its intent, the
economic and political consequences of the transmigration policy
contributed to religious conflicts in the Malukus and Sulawesi, and to a
lesser extent, in Papua.

Many of the country\'s Hindus live in Bali, where they account for over
90 percent of the population. However, the Hindu association Parishada
Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI) notes that there are major concentrations
of Hindus in Central Java, East Java and Lampung Provinces. PHDI
reported that 18 million Hindus lived in Indonesia, a figure that far
exceeds Government estimates. Balinese Hinduism has developed various
local characteristics that distinguish it from Hinduism as practiced on
the Indian subcontinent. There also are Hindu minorities (called
\"Keharingan\") in Central and East Kalimantan, the city of Medan (North
Sumatra), South and Central Sulawesi, and Lombok (West Nusa Tenggara).
Some of these Hindus left Bali for these areas as part of the
Government\'s transmigration program. Hindu groups such as Hare Krishna
and followers of the Indian spiritual leader Sai Baba also are present
in the country, though in small numbers. In addition there are some
indigenous faiths, including the \"Naurus\" on Seram Island (Maluku
Province), which incorporate Hindu beliefs. The Naurus combine Hindu and
animist beliefs, and many also have adopted some Protestant principles.

Among the country\'s Buddhists, an estimated 70 percent practice the
Mahayana school. Theravada followers account for another 20 percent,
with the remaining adherents belonging to the Tantrayana, Tridharma,
Kasogatan, Nichiren, and Maitreya schools. According to the Indonesian
Youth Buddhist Council (MBI), 60 percent of the country\'s Buddhists are
ethnic Chinese. The MBI was part of the Indonesian Great Sangha
Conference (KASI). Another and somewhat older Buddhist organization
active nationally is the Indonesian Buddhist Council (WALUBI), which has
affiliates from all of the schools. Relations between the WALUBI and the
KASI were strained during the period covered by this report, with KASI
members feeling that the Government had unfairly thrown its support
behind WALUBI.

The number of adherents of Confucianism in the country is unclear. The
national census, carried out every 5 years, no longer enables
respondents to identify themselves as Confucian. But in 1976-1977, the
last year in which the category was included, 0.7 percent of the
population was self-identified as Confucian, according to the Supreme
Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia (MATAKIN). Since that census
the proportion of practicing Confucians probably has increased slightly
because the Government\'s lifting of restrictions on Confucianism has
made it easier to practice the faith. The MATAKIN estimates that 95
percent of the country\'s Confucians are ethnic Chinese, with the
balance being mostly indigenous Javanese. The majority of Confucians are
located on Java, Bangka Island, North Sumatra, North Sulawesi, West and
Central Kalimantan, and North Maluku. Many Confucians also practice
Buddhism and Christianity. Before the ban on Confucianism was lifted in
2000, many Confucian temples were located inside Buddhist temples.

Animism and other types of traditional belief systems, generically
termed \"Aliran Kepercayaan,\" still are practiced by sizeable
populations in Java, Kalimantan, and Papua. Many of those who practice
Kepercayaan describe it as more of a meditation-based spiritual path
than a religion. Many animists combine their beliefs with one of the
Government-recognized religions.\
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There are several dozen Jews in Surabaya, East Java, where the nation\'s
only synagogue (Orthodox, Sephardi) is located. There also is a small
Jewish community in Jakarta.

The Baha\'i community said it had thousands of members in the country,
but an exact figure could not be ascertained.

Falun Gong has between 2,000 and 3,000 followers in the country, and its
members said the number of followers grew slightly during this reporting
period. Yogyakarta is home to more than 1,000 practitioners, according
to representatives of the faith. They added that some of the group\'s
activities are mildly hampered by the Government in response to external
pressure.

There are no data available on the religious affiliations of foreign
nationals and immigrants.

At least 350 foreign, primarily Christian, missionaries operate in the
country. Many work in Papua, Kalimantan and other areas where there are
large numbers of animists.

**Section II: Status of Religious Freedom**

*Legal/Policy Framework*

The Constitution provides for \"all persons the right to worship
according to his or her own religion or belief,\" and states that \"the
nation is based upon belief in one supreme God\" and the Government
generally respects these provisions; however, there are some
restrictions on certain types of religious activity and on unrecognized
religions.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs extends official status to only five
faiths: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism.
Religious organizations other than the five recognized faiths are able
to register with the Government, but only with the State Ministry for
Culture and Tourism, and only as social organizations. This results in
restrictions on certain types of religious activities and on religions
with fewer domestic followers. In recent years, the Government had taken
steps to normalize the status of Confucians and Jehovah\'s Witnesses,
but it failed to accord them and members of other less-represented
faiths equal treatment in such areas as civil registration. Religions
that are not permitted to register are precluded from renting venues to
hold services. Any religion that cannot register is forced to find
alternative means to practice their faith.

The Government permits the practice of the indigenous belief system of
Kepercayaan, but only as a cultural manifestation, and not as a
religion; followers of \"Aliran Kepercayaan\" must register with the
Ministry of Education\'s Department of National Education. Some
religious minorities whose activities had been banned in the past, such
as those of the Rosicrucians, were allowed to operate openly. Other
minority faiths such as Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism legally
also are permitted.

Although Islam is the religion of the vast majority of the population,
the country is not an Islamic state. Over the past 50 years, many
fundamentalist Islamic groups sporadically have sought to establish an
Islamic state, but the country\'s mainstream Muslim community, including
influential social organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU,
continued to reject the idea. Proponents of an Islamic state argued
unsuccessfully in 1945 and throughout the parliamentary democracy period
of the 1950s for the inclusion of language (the \"Jakarta Charter\") in
the Constitution\'s preamble, making it obligatory for Muslims to follow
Shari\'a. During the Suharto regime, the Government prohibited all
advocacy of an Islamic state. With the loosening of restrictions on
freedom of speech and religion that followed the fall of Suharto in May
1998, proponents of the \"Jakarta Charter\" resumed their advocacy
efforts, and this was the case prior to the August 2002 Annual Session
of the People\'s Consultative Assembly (MPR), a body that has the power
to change the Constitution. The secular political parties and appointed
police, military, and functional representatives, who together held a
majority of seats in the MPR, rejected in committee meetings proposals
to amend the Constitution to include Shari\'a, and the measure never
came to a formal vote. However, the MPR did approve changes to the
Constitution that mandated that the government increase \"faith and
piety\" in education. This decision, widely seen as a compromise measure
to satisfy Islamist parties, set the scene for a controversial education
bill that was passed in June.

Shari\'a was a source of intense debate and concern during this
reporting period, and many of the issues raised in this debate touched
on religious freedom. In Aceh the Government authorized the
implementation of Shari\'a as part of a special autonomy package
designed to quell a long-running separatist rebellion. Law 18/2001,
which granted Aceh special autonomy, included authorization to implement
Shari\'a in the province as long as it did not violate national law. To
comply, the law required the incorporation of Shari\'a precepts into the
legal code through passage of local regulations by the provincial
legislature. Neither Law 18/2001 nor the two local regulations passed so
far have settled such complicated questions as whether the Supreme Court
can review decisions of Shari\'a courts or whether Shari\'a would apply
to non-Muslims in Aceh or to Acehnese outside the province.

The implementation of Shari\'a had not been a demand of either the armed
Acehnese separatist movement or civil society. There was no consensus in
Acehnese society about the meaning or jurisdiction of Shari\'a. Some
worried about giving discredited law enforcement institutions new powers
to intrude on private religious matters, such as whether an individual
sells food or cigarettes during the fasting month of Ramadan. Some
supporters of Shari\'a saw its implementation as a mechanism for
creating a more effective justice system in Aceh.

The provincial legislature approved two local regulations related to
Shari\'a during this reporting period. Local regulation No. 10/2002
granted authority to Shari\'a courts \"to examine, decide, and resolve
cases related to family, civil, and criminal law.\" This effectively
superseded the authority of the pre-existing religious courts, which had
been responsible for hearing civil cases relating to family law and
involving Muslims. On March 3, the Central Government issued
Presidential Decree 11/2003, which formally established Shari\'a courts
by simply renaming the religious courts, while retaining their
infrastructure, jurisdiction, and staff. But the judges of these new
Shari\'a courts resisted this expansion of their jurisdiction, citing a
lack of expertise. They said they would continue to hear only cases
related to the \"performance of Islamic duties in daily life,\" the
subject of the second local regulation approved by the legislature.

Local regulation No. 11/2002 requires the preservation of Islamic
culture, the observance of Islamic holidays and the wearing of \"Islamic
dress\" by Muslims. Many of these provisions are part of Acehnese social
norms and were already widely observed. For example, a majority of women
in Aceh already wear some sort of head covering when in public. There
was no evidence that the authorities had punished any Muslims\--or
non-Muslims\--for dress-code violations during the period covered by
this report. However, religious freedom advocates viewed enactment of
this regulation with concern.

Religious leaders responsible for the drafting of the Shari\'a local
regulations insisted that there were no plans to institute the stricter
aspects of Islamic law found in the \"hudud,\" such as amputation or
stoning. On May 19, the Government imposed full martial law on Aceh as
part of a military operation to crush the separatist movement. At the
end of this reporting period, the impact of that measure on the
continued implementation of Shari\'a was still unclear.

Women\'s groups took an active role in the process of drafting local
regulations in order to avoid provisions that might restrict women\'s
rights. Debate among women on the interpretation of Shari\'a increased
during this reporting period, with a number of books published and at
least two conferences held.

The Government requires that official religions comply with a number of
Ministry of Religious Affairs and other ministerial directives in their
registration and activities. Among these are the Regulation on Building
Houses of Worship (Joint-Ministerial Decree No. 1/1969); the Guidelines
for the Propagation of Religion (Ministerial Decision No. 70/1978); and
Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions in Indonesia (Ministerial
Decision No. 77/1978).

Conversions between faiths did occur, as allowed by law, but remained a
source of controversy. Comprehensive statistics were not available, but
Catholic officials stated that approximately 10,000 Muslims convert to
Catholicism each year. Some Christians who converted to Islam did so in
order to marry a Muslim. Many of the Muslims who converted to
Christianity appeared to do so in response to either evangelization or
exposure to humanitarian or social activities organized by church
groups. Some Muslims accused Christian missionaries of using food and
micro-credit programs to lure poor Muslims to the faith. Some of those
who converted felt compelled not to publicize the event for
family-related and social reasons.

Religious instruction sparked intense public debate during this
reporting period. Such instruction is required for students at
elementary and secondary public schools. On June 11, the House of
Representatives (DPR) passed the controversial National Education System
Bill, which drew in part on \"faith and piety\" language recently
included in the Constitution. The bill was largely supported by Muslims
and largely rejected by Christians (see Section II, Restrictions on
Religious Freedom). It states, among other things, that each student has
the right to receive religious instruction by teachers of the same
faith. Because few non-Muslims attend Muslim schools, such schools would
likely be unaffected by the bill, and thus not required to hire
non-Muslim teachers, create a program for a (non-Muslim) religion class,
or create a space for worship by Christian or other students. However,
many Catholic and Protestant churches, church groups, and schools viewed
the bill as egregious state intervention into private religious affairs.
They expressed concern that high-quality Christian schools which attract
many Muslim students would be forced to hire fundamentalist Muslim
teachers, create a program for an Islam class, and set up a mushollah
(prayer room). Muslim supporters argued that the nation\'s moral decay
required swift action to instill ethics and morality among its youth.
Other Muslims said the bill was aimed at assuring Muslim parents that
their children could, for instance, receive a high-quality Catholic
school education without being forced to neglect or sacrifice their
Muslim identity. Many Muslim intellectuals opposed the bill, saying it
was too steeped in religion and that the goal of education should be
enlightenment rather than piety. Political observers saw the bill\'s
passage as pure politicking in the run-up to the 2004 elections.
President Megawati signed the bill into law on July 8.

There are 15 political parties directly or partially affiliated with
Islam: the United Development Party (PPP); the Star and Crescent Party
(PBB); the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS); the Indonesian Muslim
Awakening Party (KAMI); the Islamic Members\' Party (PUI); the People\'s
Development Party (PKU); the Masyumi Islamic Political Party (PPIM); the
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia Party (PIMSM); the United Islamic Party
(PSII 1905); the Nahdlatul Members Party (PNU); the Unity Party (PP);
the Democratic Islamic Party (PID); the National United Solidarity Party
(PSUN); the Star of Reform Party (PBR); and the Reform Struggle Savior
Party (PPPR). Former leaders of the Muhammadiyah and the NU led
nationalist parties, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National
Awakening Party (PKB), which attempted to draw on grassroots support
from their former Islamic social organizations.

The country has five Christian parties: the Indonesian Christian Party
(Partindo); the National Indonesian Christian Party (KRISNA); the
Catholic Democratic Party (PKD); the Catholic Party (PK); and the
Democratic People\'s Devotion Party (PDKB). There is only one Buddhist
party, the Indonesian Buddhist Party (Partai Budis Indonesia, or
PARBUDI). In the last general election, in 1999, the 3 Christian parties
in existence at the time received relatively few votes, while the 15
existing Muslim parties together garnered approximately 30 percent of
the vote. Of the Muslim parties, those with moderate views on the role
of Islam in government and society dominated. Parties that strongly
advocated Islamization of government policy won a small percentage of
the vote and few parliamentary seats.

The armed forces provide religious facilities and programs at all major
housing complexes for servicemen and servicewomen who practice one of
the five officially recognized religions. The Center for Mental
Development oversees these facilities and programs. Each branch of the
armed forces had an Agency for Mental Development chaired by a Chief of
Spiritual Development. Christians often have their own prayer groups
that meet on Fridays, coinciding with the Muslim prayer day. Some
officers are qualified as preachers and perform this function as a
voluntary additional duty, but civilian religious leaders conduct most
religious services on military posts. Organized services and prayer
meetings are available for members of each recognized religion. Although
every military housing complex was required to provide a mosque, a
Catholic church, a Protestant church, and worship centers or temples for
Buddhists and Hindus, smaller compounds rarely offered facilities for
all five recognized religions, in part because no adherents to the
smaller faiths were represented at every facility.\
\
Religious groups and social organizations must obtain permits to hold
religious concerts or other public events. Permits usually are granted
in an unbiased manner, unless there is concern that the activity could
anger members of another faith who live in the area.

Religious speeches are permitted if they are delivered to
co-religionists and are not intended to convert persons of other faiths.
However, televised religious programming is not restricted, and viewers
can watch religious programs offered by any of the recognized faiths. In
addition to many Muslim programs, ranging from religious instruction to
talk shows on family issues, there are many Christian programs,
including ones featuring televangelists, as well as programs by and for
Buddhists and Hindus. Islamic television preacher Abdullah Gymnastiar,
known popularly as Aa Gym, claimed a following of 80 million viewers
during this reporting period. Another well-established Islamic
television preacher, Zainuddin MZ, founded a political party.

Some Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist holidays are celebrated as
national holidays. Muslim holidays celebrated during the period covered
by this report included the Ascension of the Prophet (October 4), Idul
Fitri (December 6 and 7), Idul Adah (February 12), the Muslim New Year
(March 3), and the Prophet\'s Birthday (May 15). Nationally celebrated
Christian holidays were Christmas Day (December 25), Good Friday (April
18), and the Ascension of Christ (May 30). Three other national holidays
were the Hindu holiday Nyepi (April 2), the Buddhist holiday Waisak (May
16), and Chinese New Year (February 1), celebrated by Confucians and
other Chinese. On Bali, all Hindu holy days became regional holidays, so
public servants and others did not have to work on Saraswati Day,
Galungan, and Kuningan.

A number of government officials and prominent religious and political
leaders were involved in or supported interfaith groups, including the
Society for Interreligious Dialog (MADIA), the Indonesian
Anti-Discrimination Movement (GANDI), the Indonesian Conference on
Religion and Peace (ICRP), the Indonesian Committee on Religion and
Peace (also ICRP), the Institute for Interfaith Dialog (Interfidei), and
Island Nation Solidarity (Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa).

*Restrictions on Religious Freedom*

During the period covered by this report, certain policies, laws, and
official actions restricted religious freedom, and the police and
military occasionally tolerated discrimination against and abuse of
religious groups by private actors.

Because the first tenet of the country\'s national doctrine, Pancasila,
is the belief in one supreme God, atheism is prohibited; however, there
were no reports of the repression of atheists.

The Government\'s requirement that all elementary and secondary school
students undergo religious instruction at school is implemented in a way
that restricts religious freedom. Students are ostensibly free to choose
from five types of classes, representing Islam, Catholicism,
Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, but this does not accommodate
members of other faiths. Moreover, many young followers of the five
recognized religions do not receive education in their faith, because in
practice, few schools offer all five classes and many offer only one. As
a result, a Buddhist schoolboy in a West Java area where Muslims are
predominant, for example, may be obliged to receive instruction in
Islam. In some cases, a sympathetic school would allow the boy to sit
out the class without any academic penalty. Some schools would even seek
a Buddhist volunteer from the community to provide religious
instruction. Many parents of children of minority faiths resented having
to subject their children to what they viewed as indoctrination.
Supporters of the education bill, which Parliamentarians passed on June
11 (see Section II, Legal/Policy Framework), argued that it would solve
this problem. However, the bill, which states that each student has the
right to receive religious instruction by teachers of the same faith,
created widespread concern that religious freedom would be further
restricted in the field of education.\
\
Jehovah\'s Witnesses stated that although they enjoyed a high degree of
religious freedom, there were incidents in which their children ran into
trouble at school for not taking part in the weekly flag salutation.

The Government continued to restrict the religious freedom of certain
messianic Islamic groups. An official ban on the activities of the
groups Jamaah Salamullah, Amadhiyah, and Darul Arqam remained in effect,
based on a 1994 \"fatwa\" edict by the National Ulemas Council, or MUI.
However, the Government did not take any action to enforce the ban,
enabling the groups to stay in operation through the formation of
companies that distribute \"halal\" goods.

Increasingly, hard-line religious groups used pressure, intimidation, or
violence to silence those whose message they found offensive. In August
2002, Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia prompted a private television network
to stop airing a commercial that featured the phrase \"Colorful Islam,\"
aimed at promoting tolerance and diversity. The group said the ad
insulted Islam.

In December 2002, the Forum of Indonesian Clerics and Islamic Followers
called on police to investigate a prominent Islamic intellectual, Ulil
Abshar-Abdalla, for writing an article that urged a less literal
interpretation of Islamic doctrine. The article stated that some aspects
of Shari\'a, such as cutting off the hands of thieves, might not be
applicable in this culture and this century. The Bandung-based
Indonesian People\'s Ulama Forum, a group of religious scholars, called
the article an insult to Islam. They stated that according to Islam, a
person who insulted Islam should be sentenced to death. However, police
did not arrest Ulil, and the religious scholars later distanced
themselves from their statement, saying they had not meant that Ulil
should be sentenced to death.

The Government continued to restrict the construction and expansion of
houses of worship, and maintained a ban on the use of private homes for
worship unless the community approved and a regional office of the
Ministry of Religious Affairs provided a license. Some Protestants
complained that community approval was difficult to obtain and alleged
that in some areas, even when the Muslim community did approve the
construction of a new church, outside groups of Muslim activists arrived
with a long list of signatures of those opposed to the project, and
permission was subsequently denied. Some members of minority faiths,
particularly Christians, complained that the Government made it much
harder for them than for Muslims to build a house of worship. In
addition, the Government said it routinely received complaints from
Muslims in Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, North Sulawesi, and other
provinces, reporting difficulties in establishing mosques in those
regions.

The Government prohibits proselytizing by recognized religions on the
grounds that such activity, especially in areas heavily dominated by
another recognized religion, potentially is disruptive. A joint decree
issued by the Ministries of Religion and Home Affairs in 1979 remains in
effect, which prohibits members of one religion from trying to convert
members of other faiths, including through bribes, persuasion, or
distribution of religious materials. Door-to-door proselytizing also
remained prohibited. However, the country\'s laws allow for conversion
between faiths, and such conversions do occur (see Section II,
Legal/Policy Framework).

Foreign religious organizations must obtain permission from the Ministry
of Religious Affairs to provide any type of assistance (in-kind,
personnel, and financial) to religious groups in the country. Although
the Government generally did not enforce this requirement, some
Christian groups stated that the Government applied it more frequently
to minority groups than to mainstream Muslim groups.

Foreign missionaries are required to obtain work visas, which some
described as difficult to obtain or extend. Foreign missionaries who
were granted such visas were able to work relatively unimpeded, although
restrictions were imposed in conflict areas. However, to obtain
permission for a visa the Government requires applicants to submit: a
letter from the applicant\'s sponsor; a letter from the Indonesian
Embassy in the applicant\'s country allowing the applicant to obtain a
temporary stay visa; a resume; evidence demonstrating that the applicant
has a skill that a citizen cannot offer; an approval letter from the
Ministry\'s provincial director; a support letter from the Director
General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; a letter from the
receiving religious institution confirming that the applicant will work
no more than 2 years in the country before being replaced by a local
citizen; statistical information on the number of followers of the
religion in the community; permission from regional security authorities
for those who wish to extend their Temporary Stay Permission Card; and
written approval from a Provincial or District Ministry of Religious
Affairs Office, after the office consults with local government
authorities. However, many missionaries work without such visas.

There are no restrictions on the publication of religious materials, and
religious literature may be printed and religious symbols may be used.
However, the Government bans the dissemination of these materials to
persons of other faiths. There were no reports of the Government banning
books because of their religious content during this reporting period.
There were, however, unverified reports that Muslim and Christian
radicals had circulated fraudulent copies of the Koran and Bible
containing inaccurate and inflammatory passages.

The civil registration system continued to severely restrict religious
freedom for persons whose religion is not one of the five officially
recognized by the Government. Animists, Confucians, members of the
Baha\'i Faith, and others\--along with many persons of Chinese descent,
regardless of their religion\--had difficulty obtaining a national
identity card (KTP). The Government requires citizens to carry a KTP,
which lists the holder\'s religion. The Government requires a KTP to
register marriages, divorces, and births. Some officials denied
practitioners of minority religions a KTP outright, while others issued
KTPs that inaccurately reflected the bearer\'s religious affiliation.
For instance, many animists who were able to obtain a KTP found that
they had been listed as Muslims. In November 2002, Surabaya officials
reported to police a Confucian named Anly Cenggana who insisted that he
receive a KTP that correctly identified his faith. The officials said
Cenggana had \"forced\" sub-district staff to issue a KTP with a special
column. The Surabaya government then revoked the card, citing a
\"technical typing error.\" Separately, it was reported that Bingky
Irawan, Chairman of the Surabaya Indonesian Confucius Council, was
unable to obtain an accurate KTP. The card issued to him listed his
religion as Islam. Leaders of some religious groups claimed that Islam
is the \"default\" category, and that this reflects a systematic attempt
by the Government to overcount Muslim citizens and undercount other
citizens. Some citizens who are unable to obtain any type of KTP had
difficulty finding work. However, pervasive corruption within the
Government enabled many KTP seekers to obtain a card of their liking.

Men and women of different religions faced serious obstacles to marrying
and officially registering their marriages. According to interfaith
groups, it was very difficult to find religious officials willing to
perform interfaith marriage ceremonies and to register such marriages
with the Government. As a result, some people converted\--sometimes
superficially\--in order to get married. Others traveled overseas, where
they wed and then registered the marriage at an Indonesian Embassy. In
addition, despite being among the officially recognized faiths, Hindus
stated that they frequently had to travel long distances in order to
have their marriages registered because in many rural areas the local
government could not or would not perform the registration.

Many of the religious communities that suffered discrimination in
marriage registration also encountered difficulties in registering their
children\'s births. Confucians had special difficulty in registering
births. According to the MATAKIN, a Confucian advocacy group, births to
Confucian women are recorded at the Civil Registration Office as being
out of wedlock. Only the mother\'s name is recorded, not the father\'s,
causing shame and embarrassment.

Several groups urged the Government to omit the category of religion
from KTPs, including the Buddhist group the KASI, which raised the
matter with Parliamentarians, and the Indonesian Islamic Students
Movement (PMII), an Islamic student movement within the NU. However,
these groups made little if any progress during the period covered by
this report. Activists noted bureaucratic resistance to change, and
stated that the Muslim majority saw no need to lift the requirement.

Government employees must swear their allegiance to the nation and to
the country\'s national ideology, Pancasila, the first tenet of which is
the belief in one supreme God.

Within the armed forces, there were slight restrictions on religious
freedom during the period covered by this report. Ethno-religious
representation in the general officer corps generally is proportional to
the religious affiliation of the population at large; Javanese Muslims
(the largest single ethnic group) dominate, but Christians are well
represented in the general officer ranks (perhaps reflecting generally
higher educational standards among the Christian communities). Some
allege that promotion to the most senior ranks for Christians and other
minorities is limited by a \"glass ceiling.\" However, there is little
evidence to support this claim. A Christian is currently serving as
Chief of Staff of the Navy, and a Christian has in the past served as
Commander--in-Chief of the Indonesian Defense Forces. In addition there
are high-ranking Hindu officers in the Armed Forces.

The law does not discriminate against any religious group in employment,
education, housing, or health care; however, some religious minority
groups allege that there is de facto discrimination that limits their
access to top government jobs and slots at public universities.

In Aceh Province, there was concern over the March 3 creation of Islamic
law (Shari\'a) courts, following the Central Government\'s issuance of a
presidential decree to that effect (see Section II, Legal/Policy
Framework). Some citizens worried that Shari\'a would be applied to
non-Muslims or to Acehnese outside the province. Others, including some
Muslims, expressed concern that law enforcement institutions would use
new powers to interfere in private matters, including forcing people to
wear \"Islamic dress.\" As of the end of this reporting period, however,
there was no evidence that the authorities had applied any aspect of
Shari\'a to non-Muslims, or had punished any Muslims for dress-code
violations. Nevertheless, deep-seated concern remained among mainstream
Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and others that the
implementation of Shari\'a, even in one region, would undermine the
country\'s tradition of religious tolerance and plurality.

Several small fundamentalist Islamic groups called for the national
adoption of Shari\'a by adding a sentence to the Constitution stating
that there is an \"obligation for Muslims to adhere to the Islamic
faith\"---the so-called "Jakarta Charter." The debate over this
provision dates back to the founding of the nation in 1945. Among those
opposing changes to the Constitution during this reporting period were
the two largest Muslim social organizations, the NU, and the
Muhammadiyah, as well as Christian, Buddhist, Confucian, and Hindu
organizations.

Local leaders in a number of predominantly Muslim areas introduced
stricter Islamic legal practices during this reporting period. In the
Pamekasan Regency of Madura Island, off the coast of East Java, the
regent in November 2002 issued a ruling on the wearing of Muslim
clothing, the setting aside of time for workers to perform group
prayers, and the holding of a monthly religion awareness program. This
followed the adoption of similar policies in the South Sulawesi
regencies of Maros, Sinjai, and Gowa, and in the West Java regencies of
Cianjur, Indramayu, and Garut. Indramayu is a source area for
prostitution, and has high rates of divorce and child illegitimacy.
Local officials instituted a morality campaign and required Government
workers to set aside 30 minutes prior to starting their work to recite
passages from the Holy Koran. Muslim intellectuals noted that in many
cases, these regulations were imposed in response to requests from
residents who were disillusioned with the high crime level and viewed
stricter regulations as a way to correct the problem. Reports from South
Sulawesi indicated that crime rates did, in fact, drop sharply following
the introduction of stricter Islamic practices. However, there was
energetic opposition to the new policies. Some legal experts warned that
the regulations contradict the country\'s Constitution, while some
residents, both Muslims and non-Muslims, complained that the Government
was meddling in citizens\' private lives.

In Hindu-majority Bali, a school in the capital city banned Islamic
veils and jilbabs, prompting some Muslims to complain that their
religious freedom was being violated. The school in question, a
state-run junior high school, said all 774 of its students, including
the 84 who were Muslim, were obliged to follow the school\'s code of
conduct, and that this code forbade the use of veils or headscarves.

In 2002, prior to the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, the Jakarta
Provincial Government issued a decree banning certain nightclubs and
game centers from operating during Ramadan. Live-music venues were
ordered to close by 12:30 a.m. Local leaders issued similar orders in
Surabaya and other cities. Although enforcement of the order was lax,
some members of minority faiths and even some Muslims complained about
the restrictions.

Marriage law for Muslims is based on Shari\'a and allows men to have up
to four wives if the husband is able to provide equally for each of
them. For a man to take a second, third, or fourth wife, court
permission and the consent of the first wife is required. However, women
reportedly find it difficult to refuse. During this reporting period,
Islamic women\'s groups were divided over whether the country\'s
marriage law for Muslims should be amended. In divorce cases, women
often bear a heavier evidentiary burden than men in obtaining a divorce,
especially in the Islam-based family court system, which features more
than 300 courts across the nation. The law requires courts to oblige the
former husband to provide alimony or its equivalent, but there is no
enforcement of alimony payments, and divorced women rarely receive such
support.

*Abuses of Religious Freedom*

Although the Government made significant efforts to reduce
interreligious violence, such violence did occur during this reporting
period, sometimes with official complicity. In addition, the Government
on many occasions failed to punish perpetrators and prevent further
attacks. The Government also at times tolerated the abuse of religious
freedom by private groups.

On October 12, 2002, nearly simultaneous bombings of two nightclubs in
Kuta, Bali killed at least 202 persons and injured hundreds more. The
bombings were carried out in the name of religion by members of Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), a terrorist organization committed to the goal of
creating an Islamic super-state in Southeast Asia. The Government
responded to the attack by arresting at least 32 people and initiating
the prosecution of at least 19 of them. The Government also uncovered
strong indications that JI members were involved in dozens of terrorist
attacks in previous years, including the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings of
churches across the archipelago, which killed 19 persons. The Government
charged JI\'s leader, Abu Bakar Ba\'asyir, with treason, citing in his
indictment the Christmas Eve bombings. His trial, which began in Jakarta
in April, was ongoing at the end of this reporting period.

Areas of the Malukus and Central Sulawesi experienced episodes of
interreligious and interethnic violence during the period covered by
this report, although at far lower levels than in previous years. In the
Malukus, Central Sulawesi, Papua, and Kalimantan, economic tensions
between local or native persons (predominantly non-Muslim) and more
recently arrived migrants (predominantly Muslim), who were seen by
indigenous communities as economically advantaged, were a significant
factor in incidents of interreligious and interethnic violence.

In the Malukus, home to large numbers of Muslims and Christians, at
least 30 persons were killed and approximately 282,000 persons remained
displaced due to violence during this reporting period. On July 27,
2002, in Ambon, 53 people were wounded when a bomb hidden in a pushcart
exploded in a market packed with shoppers in a Christian neighborhood.
On September 5, 2002, three young women died after a bomb went off near
a sports field used by the city\'s rival Muslim and Christian
communities. In January an attorney for detained members of Coker, an
Ambonese Christian gang, stated that gang members had admitted carrying
out many of the bombings in Ambon between 2000 and 2002, including
attacks on Christian targets. The attorney said his clients claimed that
members of the Army Special Forces (Kopassus) facilitated many of the
attacks, providing instructions, weapons, and bombs. Police asserted
that some Kopassus soldiers had assisted the Coker gang in committing
various offenses. A senior military official claimed that police had
tortured the gang members, and therefore called into question the
veracity of the confessions. The International Crisis Group reported
that at the height of the Malukus conflict, Army soldiers, including
those from battalions 731, 732, and 733, had rented their weapons to
militant Muslim fighters.

However, the government-brokered ceasefire signed on February 12, 2002,
remained in place and largely kept the peace in Maluku and North Maluku.
In part, this was due to the deployment of troops in key areas, and the
departure of many outside extremists, particularly Muslim militiamen who
had exacerbated the conflict. In October 2002, the Islamic militia
Laskar Jihad disbanded, having killed large numbers of Malukan
Christians and tipped the conflict\'s balance in favor of local Muslims.
During that month, around 3,000 Laskar Jihad members left Maluku and
Central Sulawesi for their home areas, mainly on Java, without facing
arrest or prosecution for their crimes. Evidence indicates that by the
time Laskar Jihad disbanded, other Muslim militias, such as Laskar
Muhajidin, had already left the region. As of the end of this reporting
period, there were conflicting reports regarding whether outside
militiamen remained in the Malukus.

The Government charged Laskar Jihad\'s chief, Jafar Umar Thalib, with
inciting religious violence and other minor offenses. On January 30, a
Jakarta court acquitted Thalib, prompting human rights activists to
suspect high-level intervention. Thalib\'s supporters hailed him as a
nationalist and a defender of Islam. Earlier, while Thalib was in
detention, Vice President Hamzah Haz had paid him a 90-minute private
visit, inspired, he said, by a sense of \"Muslim brotherhood.\" This
visit fueled doubts about the Government\'s neutrality toward the
Christian-Muslim conflict in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi.
A similar reaction followed a comment by military spokesman Maj. Gen.
Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, who reportedly said Laskar Jihad\'s actions could
not be classified as threats to national unity.

In Central Sulawesi, the government-brokered peace agreement signed in
December 2001, the Malino Declaration, remained in force, but there were
several relapses into interreligious violence. These incidents claimed
at least 25 lives (down from approximately 75 in the previous 12-month
period) and, as this reporting period came to a close, continued to
displace 9,000 people. Unknown assailants carried out many of the
attacks, including the August 2002 attacks in the Poso Regency villages
of Matoko, Sepe, Silanca, and Malitu, in which large numbers of homes
were burned. Police did not arrest any suspects in the separate, fatal
shootings of two civilians in Poso in June. Laskar Jihad members left
Central Sulawesi in October 2002, after the group was disbanded. In
December 2002, members of Laskar Jundullah (\"Army of God\"), a militia
that in earlier years took part in holy war against Christians in Maluku
and Central Sulawesi, bombed a restaurant and a car dealership in
Makassar, South Sulawesi. There are indications that these bombings were
aimed not only at inflaming interreligious tensions but also at sending
a message to a Cabinet minister who played a key role in brokering the
Malino Declaration. Laskar Jundullah\'s leader, Agus Dwikarna, had been
jailed in the Philippines in July 2002 after he was found carrying
bomb-making materials at Manila\'s airport.

Some Christians criticized the arrest, trial, and conviction of Rev.
Rinaldy Damanik, a leader of the Christian community in Central
Sulawesi. The police have stated that Reverand Damanik was in one of a
group of cars that was found to contain a variety of weapons when
searched by authorities. On June 16, a Palu court found him guilty of
weapons possession and sentenced him to three years in prison. Damanik
maintained his innocence throughout and said he would appeal the
verdict. Some of his supporters argued that he had been framed; others
said he was being persecuted for being a Christian who spoke out for his
community.

Some Christians also criticized the January 28 conviction of Alex
Manuputty, a Christian separatist leader sentenced to 3 years in prison
for subversion. Manuputty, chairman of the Maluku Sovereignty Front
(FKM), was convicted of planning a rebellion in the Malukus.

At least 25 churches across the archipelago were destroyed during this
reporting period. In Poso, Central Sulawesi, mobs burned down six
churches between August 4 and 15, 2002, and mobs on the North Maluku
island of Halmahera burned down three churches on September 15, 2002. On
the Central Sulawesi island of Haruku, communal violence destroyed five
churches on September 18, 2002. Churches were also burned, bombed, or
otherwise destroyed in the cities of Bandung, Bekasi, and Sumedang, West
Java; Bantul, Yogyakarta; Medan, Sumatra; Makassar, South Sulawesi; and
Palu, Central Sulawesi. Mobs forcibly closed at least one church during
this period. On September 6, 2002, a local government in Bandung issued
a letter ordering the closure of a Batak HKBP church that had been in
operation for 11 years. On November 6, 2002, after the church\'s roughly
300 member families refused to comply with the order, a 100-strong mob
attacked the church. The mob, reportedly led by an official of the
Mosque Security Council (FSDKM), succeeded in forcing worshippers to
leave the premises. As of June, the congregation was still unable to use
the church.

At least three mosques were attacked during this reporting period. One
was destroyed and two were damaged. All three belonged to the
nonorthodox Amadhiyah community, which some Muslims reject as deviant.
From September 10 to 13, 2002, in the East Lombok town of Selong,
thousands of orthodox Muslims attacked an Amadhiyah mosque, burning the
structure and a number of nearby houses and shops. Three hundred and
forty residents reportedly fled. On the night of December 23, 2002, in
the village of Manior Lor, Kuningan District, West Java, a mob of
orthodox Muslims attacked two Amadhiyah mosques, but the congregation
did not flee the area. On October 7, 2002, in the Lombok village of
Batuyong, a mob forced followers of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation
Institute (LDII), a messianic Islamic group, to leave the village. The
attackers, angered by the Government\'s lack of action against what they
viewed as a deviant sect, burned 13 homes of LDII followers. The
congregation fled but later returned. On December 9, 2002, in the
Central Sulawesi village of Moutong, a clash between two groups of
Muslims reportedly left two people dead and seven houses burned. The
clash reportedly occurred when one group of residents, who follow
mainstream Islamic teachings, became upset with what they considered the
extreme ideology preached by LDII members who had entered their area.

On July 14, 2002, a Protestant sailor offended Catholic parishioners in
the town of Maumere on the predominantly Catholic island of Flores,
sparking a riot. Instead of venting their anger at a Protestant church,
the thousands of rioters attacked a mosque. Some residents concluded
that outside elements had purposely provoked communal unrest.

A number of ethnic Balinese Hindus who had migrated to Central Sulawesi
were attacked by Muslims between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002.
However, during the current reporting period, no such attacks were
reported.

Other conflicts involving members of different religions occurred in
various parts of the country, including disputes in Kalimantan between
ethnic Madurese, who are predominantly Muslim, and indigenous Dayaks,
who are predominantly Christian. However, these disputes stemmed
primarily from ethnic and economic factors, not theological differences.

Although the conflict in Aceh is sometimes cast in religious overtones,
the fighting there has little to do with religion and much to do with
economic and historical grievances. There were, however, instances in
which religious freedom was abused in Aceh during this reporting period.
In June leaders of four Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in
Blangpidie, southeast Aceh, presented themselves to Government
authorities to make clear that there was no truth in statements made by
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that the four influential individuals
supported the pro-independence movement. GAM allegedly made the
statement to drum up support among local residents.

Video compact disks (VCDs) containing religiously inflammatory material
garnered public attention during the reporting period. In March the
Indonesian Muslim Solidarity Movement called on Jakarta police to
investigate those responsible for producing and distributing Christian
VCDs that alleged that KH Zainuddin MZ, a well-known Islamic preacher,
was in fact a Christian who had been baptized and whose child attended
Sunday school. Zainuddin himself rejected the allegations and filed a
defamation lawsuit against Protestant minister Muhammad Filemon. Police
opened an investigation that was still underway at the end of this
reporting period.

There were no religious prisoners or detainees.

*Forced Religious Conversion*

There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of minor
U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United
States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the
United States. This coincided with a continuing de-escalation of
violence in the country\'s main areas of interreligious conflict: the
eastern provinces of Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi.

Between July 1, 2000, and June 30, 2001, extremists forced thousands of
Christians and hundreds of Muslims to convert in these provinces.
Between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002, most such individuals reverted
to their former faith. During the current reporting period, others who
had not yet reverted to their original faith did so. Meanwhile, some,
such as former Christians on the island of Bula, made the decision to
remain members of their new faith. In a few areas, such as the Seram
village of Tamher Warat, Christians who had been forced to embrace Islam
were reportedly still afraid to revert to their former faith, and were
still using their Muslim names. The Government and religious leaders
took steps to promote religious freedom among residents and former
residents of Kasui island, some of whom had been forcibly converted. An
Ambon-based Christian group said some Muslim residents were angry that
former Kasui Christians who had been forced to convert had publicized
their experience. There were unconfirmed reports that local government
officials, largely village heads, were complicit in some of the mass
conversions in 2000 and 2001.

*Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom*

The Government made some progress in improving respect for religious
freedom. In particular, progress was made toward ending the
interreligious violence that in previous years killed thousands of
people and, during this reporting period, prevented the return of
hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in the provinces of Maluku,
North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi.

After Christian and Muslim community leaders signed the
government-brokered Malino Declaration (Malino I) (on Sulawesi) and
followed up by signing Malino II (on the Malukus), the Government sent
in large numbers of troops and police, and many Java-based Islamic
extremists left the area. Interreligious violence plummeted, and
peaceful conditions prompted many displaced persons to return to their
homes. These returns were facilitated by NGOs and the Government, which
earmarked \$11.2 million for the construction of homes for returnees.
Progress was most significant in Central Sulawesi, where the number of
displaced persons fell by more than 100,000. A series of sniper attacks
hindered the return process in mid-2002, but by May the number of
displaced persons in the province fell to approximately 9,000. In the
Malukus, Christian-Muslim reconciliation made considerable progress, but
there was less progress in achieving the return of displaced persons. In
Maluku there were approximately 233,000 displaced persons in May, down
from 256,000 ten months earlier, while in North Maluku, 49,000 remained
displaced.

Although the Government at times failed to hold accountable individuals
who had fostered or carried out religious violence, the Government did
take some actions. On October 19, 2002, the Government announced the
arrest for treason of JI leader Abu Bakar Ba\'asyir, citing the
Christmas Eve 2000 bombings as an example of the group\'s efforts to
overthrow the Government and create an Islamic state. The attacks killed
19 persons and injured at least 120 others.

The Government organized a number of 15-day seminars aimed at promoting
reconciliation between Christians and Muslims from the Maluku capital of
Ambon and other areas. The Government also promoted religious harmony by
sending officials from various religious institutes to areas of current
or potential conflict, where they held discussions with local religious
leaders. In the Malukus, Christian and Muslim leaders also held their
own meetings to build trust between the communities. The Sultan of
Yogyakarta chaired one such meeting, held in Ambon from January 9 to 11.

**Section III: Societal Attitudes**

Religious intolerance remained a matter of growing concern to many
Indonesians during the period covered by this report. After police
arrested religious extremists in the wake of the October 12, 2002, Bali
bombings, many Indonesians refused to believe that their countrymen
could have carried out the attack. This changed, however, after a number
of the terrorists confessed and the public became aware of evidence in
the case.

For many years there has been growing Islamic awareness among Indonesian
Muslims and increasing displays of public piety. During this reporting
period many Christians, members of other minority faiths, and even some
non-practicing Muslims expressed discomfort at the increasing number of
public expressions of Islam. The numbers of political parties and
businesses associated with Islam (see Section II), religious schools
(pesantrens and madrasahs), community prayer rooms (mushollahs) and
Shari\'a banks all grew, and in March the Government announced the
development of Shari\'a-based financial instruments. The popular tabloid
magazine \"Sabili\" named detained terror suspect Abu Bakar Ba\'asyir as
its 2002 Man of the Year. More young women, especially those in high
school and university, donned headscarves or \"jilbab.\" Muslim-only
housing estates attracted more attention. Bookshops did a brisk trade in
fiction with Islamic themes, and Koranic verses were distributed via SMS
message. The number of citizens making the Hajj (Muslim pilgrimage) was
expected to reach 200,000 in 2003, a figure that would mark a slight
increase from the previous year.

In general, Islam in the country remained tolerant, with a pluralistic
outlook. In May a comprehensive survey by the Pew Research Center asked
Muslims whether they felt that Islam should tolerate diverse
interpretations of its teachings. A majority (54 percent) said yes,
while 44 percent said there is only one true interpretation of Islam.

With the removal of Suharto-era restrictions on religious organizations
and expression, there have been some public calls by a minority of
Muslims for the creation of an Islamic state. Ten percent or fewer of
the country\'s Muslims advocate creating an Islamic state or including
the Jakarta Charter in the Constitution. The vast majority of these
individuals pursue their goal through peaceful means, but a small, vocal
minority condones coercive measures and has resorted to violence.
Extremist groups advocating coercion and resorting to violence include:
Laskar Jihad (now disbanded), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the
Hizbullah Front, the Laskar Mujahidin, the Laskar Jundullah, the Islamic
Youth Movement (GPI), and the Surakarta Islamic Youth Forum (FPIS). Many
of the country\'s religious minorities expressed growing concern over
what they perceived to be increasing demands by certain Muslim groups to
impose Shari\'a law in the country.

In the easternmost province of Papua, Muslims constitute a religious
minority except in the districts of Sorong and Fakfak, where they
account for roughly half the population. Most ethnic Papuans practice
Christianity and/or animism. In recent years, migration has changed
Papua\'s ethnic and religious composition. The arrival of Muslim
migrants occasionally led to tensions between indigenous Papuans and new
arrivals. However, these tensions had less to do with religion than with
economics. During this reporting period, interreligious relations were
generally good in Papua. However, in May militiamen from at least one
Muslim Papuan village helped the military carry out an operation in the
Central Highlands in which many homes were burned. This assistance
threatened to inflame historical enmities between Muslim- and
non-Muslim-majority villages in the province. Early in this reporting
period, there were NGO reports that Laskar Jihad, responsible for the
deaths of many Malukan Christians, was present in Papua in considerable
numbers. Some observers speculated that the military had assisted in
bringing them into the province. However, by June an exodus of Laskar
Jihad members appeared to have occurred and it was not clear how many,
if any, remained.

Economic tensions between local or native peoples (predominantly
non-Muslim) and more recently arrived migrants (predominantly Muslim)
were a significant factor in incidents of interreligious and
inter-ethnic violence in the Malukus, Central Sulawesi, Papua, and
Kalimantan.

Societal attitudes of some persons, particularly those in rural areas,
where roughly 70 percent of citizens reside, are shaped by belief in
shamanism. In late 2002, a court in Cianjur, West Java, sentenced to
between 6 and 10 years in prison 20 persons convicted of killing an
alleged shaman in November 2000.

Some notable advances in interreligious tolerance and cooperation
occurred during this reporting period, including at Christmastime 2002.
With fears still running high over a repeat of the Christmas 2000
violence, many Muslims joined ranks with their Christian neighbors to
protect churches and cathedrals across the country. In the first half of
2003, many Muslims and Christians in Maluku and Central Sulawesi worked
together to repair mosques and churches. In Bali, where some feared that
the October 12, 2002, bombings would strain relations between the
island\'s Hindu majority and Muslim minority, no confrontations were
reported. A leader of the Muslim community in the Legian area, Haji Agus
Bambang Priyanto, received praise for organizing the evacuation of
survivors of the attack. Later, representatives of almost every
religious group active in the country took part in an elaborate
cleansing ritual held by Hindu leaders.

Similarly, interfaith organizations remained active during this
reporting period, and attracted media coverage. Among them were the
Society for Interreligious Dialog (MADIA), the Indonesia
Anti-Discrimination Movement (GANDI), the Interfidei, the Indonesian
Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP), and the Indonesian Committee on
Religion and Peace (also called ICRP), the Indonesian Peace Forum
(INFID), and the Institute of Gender and Religious Studies. The GANDI
worked to repeal regulations it considered discriminatory, particularly
toward ethnic Chinese citizens. The MADIA held seminars and discussions
on problems related to respect for basic human rights.

Other private organizations also promoted respect for religious freedom.
The Islamic Liberal Network (JIL), an alliance of Muslim intellectuals
who aim to stimulate debate on Islamic topics, confronted what they
perceived as the growing influence of fundamentalism by participating in
dialog via Internet, radio, newspaper and television, and paid visits to
institutes of higher learning. In East Java, the Averroes Foundation, a
Muslim youth group, published books and held discussions and seminars
aimed at promoting religious tolerance and interreligious dialog.
Members of the PMII joined with other religious youth groups, including
members of the Association of Indonesian Hindu Students (KMHDI); the
Republic of Indonesia Catholic Students Union (PMKRI); and the Hikma
Budi, a Buddhist youth group, to foster religious tolerance.

**Section IV: U.S. Government Policy**

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with the
Government in the context of its overall dialog and policy of promoting
human rights. Many of these discussions focused on religious freedom in
the Malukus and Central Sulawesi. Embassy staff at all levels met
frequently with religious leaders and human rights campaigners in order
to promote respect for religious freedom. They also met regularly with
officials of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the country\'s two
largest Islamic social organizations, to clarify U.S. policy and discuss
religious tolerance and other issues.

The U.S. Government provided grants to local NGOs and international
organizations to assist the Indonesian Government in helping victims of
interreligious violence, particularly those who were displaced by
conflicts. Many of these efforts involved cooperation with CARE, Mercy
Corps, World Vision, Church World Service, Catholic Relief Services,
International Medical Corps or the Consortium for Assistance to Refugees
Displaced in Indonesia (CARDI). Although some of these organizations are
faith-based, there is no bias toward beneficiaries; faith and ethnic
origin play no role in the targeting or distribution of assistance.

Through The Asia Foundation, the U.S. Government provided funding to
Baku Bae Maluku, a local NGO, to evaluate efforts of Muslim and
Christian lawyers in Maluku to resolve communal conflicts, and to take
stock of lessons learned. Also through the Foundation, the U.S.
Government provided funding to Desantara, another local NGO, to ensure
the protection of religious minorities in Cigugur, West Java, and to
prevent religious conflict there.

The U.S. Embassy expanded its outreach to the Muslim community,
selecting dozens of scholars from Islamic institutions and influential
journalists for visits to the U.S. and giving Muslim television viewers
exposure to the principles that guide religious freedom in the U.S. The
U.S. Embassy and the American-Indonesian Exchange Foundation continued
to support the country\'s first graduate-level comparative religion
program at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta.

Released on December 18, 2003\
(End Text)