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**[FRA Docket Number 2006-26175]{.underline}**

Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Comments

[Statement of United Transportation Union]{.underline}

October 19, 2007 Public Hearing

Good Morning! My name is James Stem. I serve as the Alternate National
Legislative Director for the United Transportation Union (UTU) here in
Washington. I am here today representing our UTU President, Paul
Thompson. We appreciate FRA scheduling this public hearing on this
important discussion of safety and the implementation of new technology.

The UTU along with the BLET represents the men and women that operate
the freight and passenger trains all over the United States that will be
affected by any exemption from Federal Safety Regulations. UTU supports
and incorporates by reference the comments submitted by BLET, TCU, TWU,
and our other labor representatives.

We participated in the public hearing on ECP brakes that FRA held in
Washington on October 4, 2007 and will also participate this afternoon
in the Technical Conference on ECP brakes that is scheduled following
this hearing. UTU will also file formal written comments with the docket
in a timely manner.

The United Transportation Union supports the implementation of
Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brakes (ECP) in our rail industry.
The safety advantages offered in reduced stopping distances, the
operational advantages provided by the ability to use a graduated
release of brakes on a long freight train, and the safety and
operational advantage of the continuous charging of the brake system
even during a brake application all provide incentives for
implementation. UTU supports and encourages every technological
development that will improve safety in the work environment of our
railroad employees.

In every discussion of new technology to improve safety in our rail
industry, UTU also wants that discussion to include the urgency of
installing switch monitors on every main line switch in non signaled
(dark) territory. Electronic switch monitors used to indicate the
position of main line switches in dark territory have been used
successfully in the rail industry for more than 40 years. This is the
rail application of the same technology that turns on the light when the
door to a refrigerator is opened, and has been available for sixty
years. Main line switch monitors are today an "off the shelf" item that
our rail industry has chosen not to utilize, and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) has not required, for several decades.

As a result of their investigation of the Graniteville, South Carolina
January 6, 2005 accident, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) recommended to the Federal Railroad Administration:

> "Require that, along main lines in non-signaled territory, railroads
> install an automatically activated device, independent of the switch
> banner, that will, visually or electronically, compellingly capture
> the attention of employees involved with switch operations and clearly
> convey the status of the switch both in daylight and in darkness."[^1]

While UTU supports the implementation of ECP brake equipment in our
industry, we do not want to see our scarce safety dollars diverted away
from Main Line Switch Monitors in Dark Territory, and those items that
will create the most significant improvements in safety immediately. UTU
offers caution to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) not to
confuse safety values with capacity and efficiency values.

**[Mechanical Inspections]{.underline}**

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), "FRA seeks comments on
whether or how it should regulate such systems differently than what is
proposed herein." [^2] UTU offers encouragement for FRA to continue to
regulate all movement of freight trains under consistent requirements
for mechanical inspections and repair.

If the electronic self monitoring features of ECP brake equipment will
safely permit an increase in the distance between required brake
inspections, it will have no effect on the mechanical functions of the
freight car involved. ECP brake equipment will not monitor the condition
of draft gear, brake shoes and hangers, coupling devices, safety
appliances and grab irons, sill steps, springs, hopper doors, and the
multitude of items a normal mechanical inspection is designed to check.
A well trained and qualified mechanical inspector must not be removed
from the safety equation because of advanced brake equipment that is
only designed to improve the braking functions.

The primary function of mechanical inspections is to insure the safe
operation of the train and the safety of the employees handling the
equipment in the train. UTU encourages FRA to continue to maintain only
one value for mechanical inspections of freight cars and locomotives.

In reality, brake inspections and locomotive inspections provide an
opportunity for the inspectors to discover many unsafe items. The fact
that fewer brake inspections will be performed on ECP brake equipped
trains is justification for strict adherence to the required mechanical
inspections.

**[Part 229 and Dynamic Brakes]{.underline}**

UTU agrees with FRA that not only is "there insufficient information
available to consider any exceptions to Part 229"[^3], there is no
justification in allowing locomotives and dynamic braking equipment to
deteriorate because the train set has a new type brake equipment.

UTU encourages FRA to continue to maintain one consistent value for
mechanical and locomotive inspections and maintenance.

**[Training]{.underline}**

UTU considers training to be the number one safety issue facing our
railroad industry today. As new equipment, new operating practices, and
a tremendous number of new employees come into our industry, adequate
and appropriate training is a requirement.

UTU encourages FRA to audit the training functions that are a
requirement in Part 232.605 to ensure the affected employees receive the
expected training in a timely manner. This training section should
become a requirement for the implementation of all new technology.

UTU also points out to FRA that there are no requirements in any Federal
Regulation for operating crews to receive the extensive mechanical
training necessary to perform mechanical inspections. We would also like
to point out to FRA that in our industry today there are no members of
an operating crew that are mechanically qualified to make these
inspections. We encourage FRA to accept this reality as you continue to
deliberate on the language in the final rule.

**[The 4 Questions]{.underline}**

UTU will offer our response to the 4 questions posed in the Proposed
Rule:

**[Question #1 -]{.underline}** Will allowing an ECP braked train with
defective brakes to travel to its destination, not to exceed 3,500
miles, decrease, maintain, or exceed the level of safety provided for a
conventional pneumatic braked train receiving a Class 1A brake
inspection every 1,000 miles?

**[Answer --]{.underline}** We think the answer to this question is
obvious. A freight train equipped with ECP brakes with 100% of the
brakes in operable condition will provide an improved level of safety
over the same train only equipped with conventional brake equipment with
100% of the brakes in operable condition.

The most appropriate choice of language to describe the difference
between an ECP brake and a conventional brake on a freight car is that
there has been a retrofit of a new control valve for the brake system on
that car. Nothing else about the brake equipment has been changed. The
brake rigging, the brake shoe hangers, the brake shoes themselves, the
allowable piston travel for the brake cylinder, the size of the wheels,
the capacity of the air reservoirs, and the brake pipe pressure all
remain the same.

The overall braking capacity of the freight car has not changed. The
improvements with ECP provide many operational advantages that may
translate into safety advantages with improved train handling, the
ability to make a graduated release on a long train, and the improved
ability to control buff forces within the train by a consistent and
virtually simultaneous application and release of the brakes.

When you reduce the number of operable brakes by 5% on an ECP equipped
train, you have lost 5% of the total braking capacity of that train. The
logical conclusion is that an ECP train that is allowed to operate with
only 95% of the brakes operable decreases the level of safety as
compared to a conventional train with 100% of the brakes operable.

The issue of allowing these ECP train sets to operate in and out of
terminals, from one Class 1A brake test to another with only 95% of the
brakes operable is also a significant degradation of safety. Switching
defective cars out of a train for repair at a terminal where brake
inspections are performed is the ideal location for that switching to
occur. By allowing these train sets to leave an initial terminal with
only 95% of the brakes in operable condition, if there is an additional
brake failure in route, this set out of defective cars will not occur in
the controlled environment that a yard provides, but on line of road
where the safety of the operating crew will be significantly degraded.
Any time a train is allowed to leave a terminal with defective cars,
there is a gamble with safety.

UTU recommends to FRA that you provide a margin for error in the
allowable percentage of defective brakes on ECP equipped trains. If the
95% of operable brakes while in route is an acceptable operating
practice, then the percentage of defective brakes allowed to leave every
initial terminal should not exceed 2%. If 98% of brakes are required to
be in operable condition at every initial terminal, then the train can
experience an additional 3% of brake failure in route and not be
required to set out cars on line of road. UTU recommends maintaining
this process of requiring a higher percentage of operable brakes at the
initial terminal than is allowed on line of road as with conventional
trains.

**[Question #2 --]{.underline}** What safety hazards, if any, will be
caused by switching an ECP braked car into a technologically
incompatible train equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes?

**[Answer -]{.underline}** There will be no difference, and no
additional safety hazards for a conventional train to switch any car
with defective brakes into a conventional train as long as there are no
mechanical defects on the car. A conventional freight car with the
brakes cut out is no different that an ECP equipped car with the brakes
cut out.

**[Question #3 --]{.underline}** What is safer for an ECP braked car
with defective non-brake parts: Switching it in to a train equipped with
conventional pneumatic brakes -- rendering the switched car's ECP Brakes
ineffective -- for backhauling to the nearest repair station or allowing
it to continue to the nearest forward repair location in the ECP brake
equipped train with more than 85 percent effective and operative brakes?

**[Answer --]{.underline}** This is a very confusing question that makes
many assumptions that are not realistic. If the ECP equipped car has
defective non-brake parts that are mechanically qualified to be moved in
a conventional train, then why would any train have to chose between
setting the car out or carrying the car to the next forward repair
point. If the non-brake defect requires the car to be set out, there is
no difference between a conventional train and an ECP train; the car
should be set out for repair on site or moved under special
circumstances to the nearest repair point.

FRA also allows this issue to be clouded with unrealistic assumptions.
Any time a defective car must be set out for repair, at least 50% of the
time the nearest repair point will be in the forward direction. Also,
only a small percentage of defective cars that are set out can be moved
by another train without repair at that location, or the car would not
have been removed from the original train.

This issue is also being aggravated by FRA's willingness not to require
a higher percentage of operable brakes at every initial terminal than is
acceptable on line of road after a failure.

The short answer to this question is: ECP Brakes are not involved in the
resolution of this issue. A conventional braked car with defective
non-brake parts should be treated exactly the same under the same
regulatory scheme.

**[Question #4 --]{.underline}** Does 49 U.S.C. 20303 provide a
disincentive sufficient to preclude implementation of ECP Brake
technology?

**[Answer --]{.underline}** No. There is no disincentive involved here
that are connected to ECP brake equipped train sets. FRA has provided
more than enough encouragement and regulatory permissiveness in other
areas for ECP Brake implementation.

**[Summary]{.underline}**

The summary of our comments is simple and straight forward:

-   UTU welcomes and supports any technology that will provide
    improvements in safety

-   New technology also brings new safety concerns that must be
    addressed when implemented

-   Qualified mechanical inspectors must continue to provide the current
    required mechanical inspections

-   UTU encourages FRA to continue to maintain a common sense approach
    to the application of existing inspection requirements for
    mechanical and locomotive inspections

-   Adequate training must be part of every discussion of new
    technology.

I will be glad to answer any questions or clarify our remarks. We
appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing.

[^1]: NTSB Safety Recommendation R-05-14

[^2]: September 4, 2007 NPRM Page 50823

[^3]: September 4, 2007 NPRM - Page 50829