**Changing the Emergency Management Paradigm:**

# A Case Study of San Jose, California

*Frances Edwards-Winslow, Ph.D., CEM*

## Director, Office of Emergency Services

**The Third Model: Civil Defense**

Two models of emergency management have been explored by Michael Selves
in his article "Local Emergency Management: A Tale of Two Models." While
smaller cities and newer communities may recognize only these two
models, the older cities of the United States have in many cases
operated under a third, much older model, that of Civil Defense,
bypassing the "emergency services" model Selves describes. During World
War II there was a real concern about invasion of the American mainland.
In fact, rubber boats of German soldiers infiltrated portions of the
Atlantic Coast, and coastal Pacific communities maintained a watch on
their coasts.[^1]

In 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of Civil
Defense, linked to 44 state and 1,000 local civil defense councils.[^2]
The Civil Defense Corps coordinated approximately 10 million volunteers
"to provide shelter instruction, camouflage vital facilities, develop
evacuation readiness, and other services." [^3] The Civil Defense
function brought residents into active partnership with local municipal
governments. In some cases these activities were related to the Police
or Fire Departments, but in many cases they were volunteer groups
connected to the executive function. Being an Air Raid Warden was
socially and politically prestigious in many communities. Blackout
curtain patrol and home survival lectures were the stock-in-trade of
these resident-staffed volunteer groups.

When World War II ended Civil Defense at the federal level was
reorganized into a Civil Defense Board within the War Department. In
1948 the Office of Civil Defense Planning evaluated the need for a
national program. By 1950 the Federal Civil Defense Act provided for
federal assistance: "to provide the states and their political
subdivisions with guidance, coordination and assistance, training and
matching grants on a fifty-fifty basis for the procurement of supplies
and equipment," and a sheltering and evacuation program.[^4] Civil
Defense was still seen as an element of the military, and was often run
by retired military personnel at the local level.

**Master Mutual Aid Agreements**

In the context of Civil Defense planning, the public safety leaders of
California realized that they were facing the Cold War with its own
potential for disaster in the post-nuclear world. Examining the
realities of war in Europe and Japan, firebombing and nuclear-induced
fires were most often the agents of mass destruction. The images of
Dresden, Coventry, Tokyo and large portions of London gave testimony to
the havoc wrecked by fire. The horrific images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
reinforced the fear of nuclear devastation. The fire service in
California joined together to create the Fire Service Mutual Aid
Agreement. In this compact the fire chiefs of the state agreed to
support each other in the event of wartime firestorms. Under the
agreement personnel and equipment would be lent for one shift at no
cost.[^5]

The horror of nuclear war taught Civil Defense leaders that "time,
distance and shielding" were the only protections for the population
from nuclear explosions. Therefore the federal Civil Defense structure
developed the strategy for "crisis relocation planning:"[^6] evacuating
the resident population of a threatened community to a more protected
area with less potential as a target. In San Jose, for example, then an
agricultural county seat town of less than 50,000, the plan was to
relocate the population behind the coastal mountains in Stanislaus
County or San Joaquin County.

Evaluation of population relocation demonstrated that the burden would
rest on law enforcement. Police personnel would have to control traffic
flow one way -- out of town. This would require staffing roadblocks,
deploying tow trucks and gasoline refueling vehicles along the route,
and having in place a staff to protect the evacuated community from
looters. Law enforcement officials in the state then created the Law
Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, designed to provide one shift of personnel
and equipment to a threatened community at no cost.

**Civilians Within Public Safety**

Because of the developing involvement with police and fire over wartime
response actions, Civil Defense was often moved into a public safety
department, often supervised by a rotating mid-level sworn supervisor.
The Civil Defense civilians were generally viewed as separate from the
mainstream work of the host department. At the beginning there was
federal funding for the Civil Defense positions, but over time the
federal money shrunk to matching grant money, declining to 1/3 of the
salary of the primary Civil Defense staff only. All the other costs,
including facilities and supervision, were borne by the municipality. As
the 1960's progressed and the threat of nuclear war receded, Civil
Defense was seen as competing for scarce resources with the host
department's primary and pressing missions: fire fighting and arson
suppression, or crime prevention and civil unrest prevention.

The City of San Jose had an active Civil Defense Program from the early
1950's. At that time the city had a population of less than 50,000
people and was the county seat of an agricultural community dominated by
orchards and fruit canneries. The city's role in providing civil defense
services was highlighted when the federal government invested \$250,000
in the construction of a bombproof emergency operations center (EOC),
complete with air lock entrances, attack warning center, dispatching
capabilities, and a framed photo of President Eisenhower. A metal map
dominated one wall, with magnetic "icons" to facilitate damage
assessment and evacuation planning. All communications lines were routed
through sealed conduit to keep the outside air from entering. The
concrete "bunker" was constructed above ground with air scrubbers and
the facilities to support the EOC staff for weeks. It was reputed to be
blast proof and safe from fallout and radiation. The Office of Civil
Defense staff operated from that facility, coordinating the work of city
departments to ensure continuity of government in the event of attack.
The amateur radio volunteers were early co-occupants of the facility,
ensuring a second method of communication, should the telephone system
be damaged in an attack.

The role of the Civil Defense staff in war planning was clear from the
amount of space dedicated to radiological issues. A large room was
constructed external to the main bunker area that contained Cobalt 60
and Cesium radiological sources in a lead and concrete lined pit.
Shelves were lined with radiological monitoring equipment and stacked
with civil defense hard hats.

The City of San Jose had historically been a reporting station for the
National Weather Service. When the bunker-style EOC was built a weather
room was included. Since weather information, such as humidity and wind
direction, was critically important to the management of any potential
radiological emergency, custody and management of the weather station
became an important part of the work of the civil defense staff members.

As the threat of war subsided and the likelihood of natural disaster was
recognized, federal and state Civil Defense programs evolved to the "all
hazards" approach to emergency management.[^7] Recognizing that floods
and earthquakes were far more likely than Soviet invasion of San Jose,
the work of the Civil Defense Office shifted to community preparedness
education. During this time the name was changed to Emergency Services,
and the civilian staff became part of the San Jose Fire Department. The
emergency services staff began to be drawn from civilian analysts, who
worked in various departments over a career.

The lead staff member was responsible for external relationships with
the federal and state emergency management structures, and for obtaining
continuing federal financial support for the program. The federal
Emergency Management Assistance (EMA) funding supported one third of the
salary of each emergency management staff member. The size of the staff
to be supported was based on the federal formula: one professional staff
member for each 100,000 community members and one support staff member
for every three professionals. In addition grants were available for
specified activities, such as acquisition of equipment or additional
staff members. When San Jose joined the program with a population of
about 200,000 the permanent staff consisted of a manager, an analyst II
and a secretary. Federal funding was frozen at this staffing level and
cost share.

The emergency management function appears to have been compatible with
the work of the Fire Department in the beginning. Fire fighters
traditionally delivered public education on fire prevention, evacuation
drills, and personal fire safety. The emergency management staff
delivered information on developing a personal preparedness capability
for 72 hours of self-sufficiency. They worked with city departments to
develop standard operating procedures for departmental roles in the EOC.
Together with the City Attorney they crafted an emergency management
ordinance that detailed the special powers of the City Manager during a
declared local emergency.

**Competition for Scarce Funds**

The passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 forever changed the way local
governments in California could raise funding for public programs.[^8]
Proposition 13 set the taxable value of a home at the time of purchase,
and set the tax rate as 1% of that purchase price. In future years, as
long as the same owner remained in the home, the taxable value could
rise no more than 2%. If property values should slide during a given
year, however, the downward valuation of the properties is mandated
before the tax bill is figured. This effectively froze the tax base of
most communities, driving them to seek new construction and sales tax
generators as the only way to increase the tax income of the community.

In communities without such tax limitations, the governing body
determines which programs it wants to fund, then sets the tax rate. In
California the governing body is presented with the maximum potential
income for the community, and it must then divide the funds among the
city's services, creating an environment of competition among the
departments, and among programs within a department.

**Emergency Management As An Executive Function: All Hazards**

In the 1980's the State of California under Governor George Dukmejian
developed the Governor's Office of Emergency Services. Emergency
management functions were gathered from various parts of the state
organization and organized into the new office whose Director reported
directly to the governor. The first Director was a National Guard
general, embracing the military Civil Defense roots of emergency
services. Units included fire, law, communications, public education and
recovery. The State Warning Center for hazardous materials events and
the Local Emergency Preparedness Councils were also part of Governor's
OES.

Following the Coalinga Earthquake of 1983 there was a renewed emphasis
on individual and community preparedness for disaster events. The Bay
Area Regional Earthquake Preparedness Project (BAREPP) and the Southern
California Emergency Preparedness Project (SCEPP) brought together
emergency managers, engineers and seismologists to develop knowledge
that could be applied to community preparedness.

Growing out of the new emphasis on natural hazards preparedness,
Governor's OES developed a series of special public events, and created
accompanying educational materials that were distributed to all local
emergency management programs. In honor of the Great San Francisco
Earthquake of 1906, the governor declares April as Earthquake
Preparedness Month every year. Emergency management staff members across
the state, whose salaries were supported by Federal EMA funding, were
required to promote related events in their communities to qualify for
continuing financial support. Directives from Governor's OES began to
include specific types of public events, programs and activities that
had to be undertaken annually in order to qualify for the EMA staff
support money. There was no new funding provided to support these
activities. Cities now had to spend their own funds on supplies and
equipment to support these new activities in order to continue receiving
the federal EMA 1/3 salary match.

By the late 1980's it was becoming clear that emergency management
programs across the state were finding it difficult to keep up with the
mandated work to keep the federal EMA staff support funds flowing.
Annual exercises of EOC staff capabilities, participation in special
events, and development of emergency operations plans all added costs to
the original civil defense programs without any means of raising the
supporting revenue. Local governments adopted a variety of strategies to
deal with the problem. Many communities chose to drop out of the EMA
program after determining that it was costing them more than they were
able to recoup from the federal EMA program.[^9] Other cities
transferred the emergency management function to a sworn police or fire
staff member as a collateral duty. Reasoning that the officer was
already being paid, the city would allocate the 1/3 salary funding to
support the non-salary expenses of the program.[^10] Still others banded
together into "joint powers authorities" and combined their staffs to
create economies of scale.[^11] In these organizations the staff members
were fulltime employees shared by several jurisdictions. For example,
one emergency coordinator might oversee the emergency planning, training
and outreach efforts of three or more communities within the JPA.

Some cities remained in the EMA program, but the host departments found
the financial support of the annual campaigns and exercises difficult.
As local revenue growth dwindled, and community demands for primary
public safety services increased, the value of dedicated emergency
management was questioned. Without the ability to raise new revenues for
new programs, department heads looked to their core services, and
emergency management became a costly stepchild. Positions were not paid
in accordance with responsibility and staff was encouraged to simply
meet the minimum EMA activity requirements rather than to develop a
meaningful program of community preparedness.

**\
The Paradigm Shift in San Jose**

In 1984 the Morgan Hill Earthquake clearly demonstrated some of the
deficiencies inherent in San Jose's existing approach to community
emergency preparedness. The City Council of San Jose created the
Earthquake Preparedness Task Force, a committee of department heads to
"plan a City-wide program to mitigate the loss of life and property,
increase emergency response readiness and enhance the recovery of the
community following a damaging earthquake."[^12] The committee's report
found that emergency management in San Jose was inadequate on many
levels. It decried the ancient EOC facility, the outdated emergency plan
and the lack of community outreach efforts. It created a Five-Year
Program and a Master Plan of individual tasks necessary to achieve a
higher level of preparedness.

The 1988 Master Plan identified a number of action steps designed to
address the deficiencies the committee discovered. Relationships with
the public and the non-governmental elements of the community were
emphasized. A staff of two analysts and a secretary was suggested to
manage the development and implementation of a public education program
that would include written materials, public presentations and the
development of a video lending library. Media relations were also
highlighted, with staff mandated to create a plan for training emergency
public information officers, creating media messages, and obtaining
appropriate equipment for the EPIO program.[^13]

Structural safety was another key element of the plan. Public Works
staff evaluated city-owned buildings for seismic safety and began
designing appropriate upgrades. Non-structural hazards in city
facilities were also to be mitigated. The City Geologist was tasked to
identify high risk areas for liquefaction and slope failures, and work
with Planning Department staff members to develop appropriate land use
regulations.[^14]

In 1989 the Loma Prieta Earthquake struck the Bay Area. San Jose was
sheltered from the worst of the shaking by the Santa Cruz Mountains.
However, the success of the response to the earthquake was not uniform
because some of the deficiencies noted in the 1988 report persisted.

In 1990 a follow-up report was presented to the Committee of the Whole.
It addressed "emergency management issues which were raised by events
related to the October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake...."[^15] The
omnibus report covered a variety of issues in the areas of mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. In the final "General Emergency
Management Issues" section it noted that one source of these problems
was the placement of the emergency management function within the Fire
Department, a department with other competing core services. Access to
the city manager and governing body was exclusively through the fire
chief, a department head who was fighting for budget for apparatus,
personal protective equipment and fire prevention needs. Emergency
management was not viewed as a core service of the department, and
needed funding was not provided as a priority. "Considering the direct
benefits which can be derived in eliminating these encumbrances, the
City Manager is exploring the feasibility of transferring the Office of
Emergency Services from the Fire Department into the City Manager's
Office organization."[^16]

While the Office of Emergency Services was in the Fire Department, staff
members in emergency services roles were drawn from administrative
generalists within the city. Placement in emergency services was not
viewed as career enhancing by most staff members. The staff members
rotated through the emergency management positions without adequate
advance training, and often with little opportunity to obtain formal
training while on the job.[^17]

The windowless civil defense bunker did not provide an employee-friendly
environment. Emergency management staff members felt isolated from other
members of their own department, as well as from the broader city staff.
The state of the art 1950's facility had not been modernized and no
longer met the needs for adequate phone and computer lines to serve the
program. The civil defense metal desks and rolling chairs reinforced the
staffs' sense of being by-passed.

In 1990 the city opened the new Police Communications Building. The
facility was designed to house the Police Garage, Police and Fire
Dispatch, and the Emergency Operations Center. Offices for Office of
Emergency Services (OES) staff members were designed as part of the EOC,
with excellent telecommunications capabilities and windows. This marked
a watershed in the development of the city's Emergency Management
Program.

**Local Emergency Management As An Executive Function**

Starting on July 1, 1990 the OES moved into the City Manager's Office.
Since under California law the city manager is the Director of Emergency
Services, this placement provided an appropriate chain of command for
OES staff. Funding of the program was also at the direct control of the
Manager as part of his office budget. The interim role of Director of
Emergency Preparedness was filled by senior staff members, who began to
bring a new level of credibility to the new Office.

In June 1991 the City began the hiring process for a fulltime
professional Director of Emergency Preparedness. An experienced
emergency management professional was hired from Southern California to
guide the formation of the new OES. As an Office Director the new OES
Director had immediate access to all members of the City's Senior Staff.
As a member of the Senior Staff she was able to develop collegial
working relationships with the other department heads based on a
relationship of equals. Office development advanced quickly because of
the direct reporting relationship to the Assistant City Manager.

Innovative programs included the completion of the emergency operations
center with new technologies. San Jose had one of the first city-level
EOCs with computers at every position, using emergency management
software. Following the first two federally declared flooding disasters
in 1995 the staff evaluated the system and adopted a new software suite
from the Microsoft Office series. This kind of flexibility was possible
because of the program's placement in the organization.

OES nurtured the existing Radio Amateurs in Civil Emergency Services
(RACES) program, bringing its 2002 membership to 140. Staff also created
one of the first Community Emergency Response Team[^18] programs outside
of a public safety department. With almost 1300 members in 2002, the San
Jose *Prepared!* program has served the community well in floods,
traffic accidents and house fires, and is now part of the President's
Community Corps initiative.[^19]

In addition to volunteer programs San Jose OES has taken the lead in
physical mitigation efforts for the community's building stock. After
the Loma Prieta Earthquake an ordinance was passed to require the
retrofit or demolition of unreinforced masonry buildings. In addition, a
special assessment district was created to provide below market rate
loans for owners who wanted to retrofit their buildings. The City also
paid for portions of the pre-construction engineering work.

Later OES obtained Community Development Block Grant funding to partner
with the San Jose State University College of Engineering on residential
retrofitting. Phase I was a series of workshops for single-family
homeowners on bolting and strengthening the wood frame home. Phase II
was the creation of the "Apartment Owners Guide to Earthquake Safety" to
enable owners to identify potentially dangerous buildings, with the goal
of encouraging retrofit.[^20] Phase III was a partnership with the
Housing Department to hire an engineering firm to create model retrofit
plans for three generic multi-family building types, and to develop
basic engineering documents and cost estimates.[^21]

These and other innovative approaches to community safety were made
possible because the OES is an independent organization focused on
enhancement of community emergency and disaster preparedness. Investment
proposals for support of OES activities are submitted as equals with all
other departmental investment proposals, not screened out of the budget
process by a department head with other priorities.

**San Jose Evolved to the Public Administration Model**

San Jose OES never truly fell into the "emergency services" category.
The staff never wore uniforms. They never responded to events at the
field level. Although they were supervised by the Deputy Fire Chief in
the Bureau of Support Services, OES was never part of the first
responder group. As the 1990 report noted, "OES does not fit as a
support service to fire response activities; therefore, city-wide
disaster preparedness program priorities and budgeting requests are in
direct competition with the goal specific demands of the Fire
Department."[^22]

Under the reorganization San Jose OES left the old Civil Defense model
and was one of the first emergency management organizations in
California to fully embrace the public administration model.[^23]
Placement in the City Manager's Office clearly demonstrated that OES was
seen as "an element of the overall administration of government."[^24]
While Selves characterizes one view of the public administration model
as "simply a 'remnant' of the national, Civil Defense,
perspective,"[^25] it may instead be viewed as the evolutionary
development from the older, military oriented model.

The military heritage of emergency management lives on through the
Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) in California Emergency
Operations Centers.[^26] Based on the Incident Command System (ICS),
used at the field level by the fire service nationally, and by law
enforcement in many western states, SEMS is a flexible, hierarchical
structure for managing an emergency or disaster. The City Manager in his
role as Director of Emergency Services fills the role of the general in
the military staffing pattern. The "G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4" positions are
translated into the Operations Section, the Planning/Intelligence
Section, the Logistics Section and the Finance/Administration Section.

San Jose follows the public administration model in approaching
emergency management as a discipline. All professional staff members are
certified by the appropriate part of FEMA for the job that they do. For
example, the Director and Emergency Services Coordinator have completed
the FEMA Professional Development Series, and they both have graduate
degrees in public administration. The Director is a Certified Emergency
Manager under the FEMA-sponsored International Association for Emergency
Management program.[^27] All San Jose *Prepared!* instructors have
completed the FEMA CERT instructor training. As a member of the
Collaborative for Disaster Mitigation, based at San Jose State
University, San Jose OES has been an active proponent of the development
of emergency management courses within the University's Master of Public
Administration program.[^28]

**Terrorism Forces A New Perspective**

Now that "all hazards" has come to include terrorism, emergency services
may be working on the edge of the Selves "emergency services" model. OES
can actually make an important contribution to community emergency
response capability by acting as a neutral ground for police, fire and
emergency medical services (EMS) representatives to meet. Historically,
police and fire personnel have viewed their roles as incompatible, and
to some degree competing, at least for scarce resources. Ten years ago
it was common to hear law enforcement personnel disavow any role in a
chemical spill, while fire and EMS personnel battled for recognition as
public safety partners at a crime scene with living victims. Turf
battles were legion and infamous.

Through the Domestic Preparedness Program[^29] the Office of Emergency
Services in many communities has become the broker for federal grant
funds. Because OES itself does not benefit financially from the
contracts and grants that are available, OES staff members are often
able to be neutral parties, evaluating the needs of the community and
working in partnership with the continuum of public safety
organizations. OES staff members can create committee structures where
all public safety personnel can work together outside of the traditional
turf contests, where the common ground is the new mutual threat of
terrorism. Fire fighters are learning to respect the need for evidence
preservation at a crime scene, and law enforcement personnel are gaining
an understanding that while rescue contaminates a crime scene, it is not
fatal to the prosecution of the case.

The Metropolitan Medical Task Force structure that developed from the
Department of Health and Human Services contracts has created new plans
for integrated public safety response.[^30] Police officers with masks
and NBC canisters[^31] are trained and equipped to direct traffic,
provide crowd control and evidence protection, whether at an industrial
chemical accident or a terrorist attack scene. Fire fighters are trained
and equipped to carefully bag and tag the clothing and shoes of
terrorist attack victims before decontaminating the victims; to preserve
the shrapnel or bomb fragments that they remove from a victim. EMS staff
members understand the need to avoid driving through the incident scene
at any multiple casualty events. All this joint planning, training,
equipping and enhanced understanding grew out of the Domestic
Preparedness Program.

Emergency management is an evolutionary profession with roots in Civil
Defense, public safety and community service. Its future includes
security and citizen involvement. The public administration model best
supports this evolving profession. Education and training can equip the
twenty first century emergency manager to respond to the new demands of
terrorism, technology and organizational integration. San Jose's
emergency management function has evolved, and in doing so become a
recognized leader in disaster preparedness at the municipal level.[^32]

[^1]: "Protecting the Homefront" The History Channel, December 27, 2001.

[^2]: Thomas E. Drabek and Gerrard J. Hoetmer, *Emergency Management:
    Principles and Practice for Local Government*. Washington, DC: ICMA,
    1991, p. 13.

[^3]: *Ibid.*

[^4]: *Ibid.,* p. 14.

[^5]: Begun in the 1950's, the Master Mutual Aid Agreement now includes
    Police and Fire services in California. Twenty-four other
    professions, notably including emergency management, coroners and
    building officials, have been added to the mutual aid system within
    the state.

[^6]: Drabek and Hoetmer, p. 15.

[^7]: A review of the history of emergency management in the United
    States is available in Chapter One of the above quoted ICMA book.

[^8]: David V. Edwards, *The American Political Experience*. Englewood
    Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979, p.533.

[^9]: Notably Irvine, California that had the emergency management
    program in the Public Safety Department.

[^10]: City of Santa Clara, California is an example.

[^11]: San Mateo County and San Diego County are outstanding examples.

[^12]: Joseph Bass, Chair, "Earthquake Preparedness Master Plan." City
    of San Jose, June 1, 1988, p. 1.

[^13]: *Ibid.,* Attachment B, p. 1-2; Master Plan, p. 54-56.

[^14]: *Ibid.,* Attachment B, p. 2-3, Master Plan, p. 45-47.

[^15]: City of San Jose, "Disaster Preparedness Report", Committee of
    the Whole, March 29, 1990, p.1.

[^16]: *Ibid.,* p. 41.

[^17]: Independent study courses generally did not appeal to these staff
    members who viewed their roles as transient. The Professional
    Development Series offered by FEMA required 6 separate weeks away
    from work, often with travel expenses for the city as well as lost
    opportunity work time. The fire department leadership did not choose
    to invest the department's scarce training funds in the transient
    civilian staff members.

[^18]: [www.fema.gov](http://www.fema.gov/) for information on the
    national Community Emergency Response Team program.

[^19]: [www.citizencorps.gov](http://www.citizencorps.gov/). Other
    elements include Neighborhood Watch, a tips program, Volunteers in
    Policing and a medical volunteer corps.

[^20]: Available on the Internet at www.ci.san-jose.ca.us/oes

[^21]: "Practical Solutions for Improving the Seismic Performance of
    Buildings with Tuck Under Parking" is available at
    http://www.sjhousing.org/downloads/Practical%20Solutions.pdf.

[^22]: Committee of the Whole, 1990, p. 41.

[^23]: When the Governor's Office of Emergency Services was created
    within the executive branch, many of the larger cities brought their
    OES functions within the chief executive's office. Other cities with
    the OES function at the executive level include City of Los Angeles,
    where the OES director is a deputy city administrator, and San
    Francisco, where the OES director is politically appointed by the
    mayor and works directly for him. Oakland and Irvine both had the
    OES in the city manager's office but moved it for internal political
    reasons. Oakland went to the Fire Department, and Irvine returned to
    the Police Department.

[^24]: Michael D. Selves, CEM, CPM, "Local Emergency Management: A Tale
    of Two Models," p.6.

[^25]: *Ibid.*

[^26]: For information on the Standardized Emergency Management System
    visit www.oes.ca.gov

[^27]: www.iaem.com/certification.html

[^28]: For information on the Collaborative for Disaster Mitigation
    visit www.sjsu.edu/cdm.

[^29]: Created through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment to the Defense
    Appropriations Bill of 1998, it brought six federal agencies
    together to train and equip America's 122 largest cities to respond
    to a terrorist attack. The partners are Department of Defense (DOD),
    Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Health and human Services
    (DHHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Energy (DOE). San Jose was
    the first city to complete the Department of Defense training under
    this program.

[^30]: Because the Domestic Preparedness Program grew out of the Sarin
    attack in Tokyo and the Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City,
    the original response paradigm was a chemical attack. The original
    contracts made between the first 27 cities and DHHS called for the
    development of a rapid field response by first responders adequately
    trained in terrorism recognition, personal protection and victim
    management: the Metropolitan Medical Task Force. Later, when
    biological warfare was factored in, the Metropolitan Medical
    Response System was created to embrace the continuum of victim care.
    After 2000 the creation of an MMTF was optional, while it was the
    focus of the original contracts in 1997 and 1999.

[^31]: Respirators with "nuclear/biological/chemical" filters.

[^32]: Following 9/11/01 terrorist attacks the San Jose emergency
    management program was widely covered in the press, and named as a
    model by Domestic Preparedness Program partners. See for example the
    Wall Street Journal (10/17/01), New York Times (10/29/01), Christian
    Science Monitor (11/09/01). San Jose OES was used as the model of
    modern civil defense by The History Channel for "Protecting the
    Homefront," December 27, 2001, a program on the history of civil
    defense in the United States.